- NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS

[Senate Hearing 113-270]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 113-270
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
113TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

HON. CHARLES T. HAGEL; GEN LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA; GEN DAVID M.
RODRIGUEZ, USA; HON. ALAN F. ESTEVEZ; MR. FREDERICK E. VOLLRATH; MR.
ERIC K. FANNING; GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY,
USA; ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; HON. STEPHEN W. PRESTON; HON.
JON T. RYMER; MS. SUSAN J. RABERN; MR. DENNIS V. McGINN; ADM CECIL E.D.
HANEY, USN; LTG CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA; HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES;
HON. JESSICA GARFOLA WRIGHT; MR. FRANK G. KLOTZ; MR. MARCEL J. LETTRE
II; MR. KEVIN A. OHLSON; MR. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN; HON. JAMIE M. MORIN;
AND HON. JO ANN ROONEY

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JANUARY 31; FEBRUARY 12, 14, 28; APRIL 11; JULY 18, 25, 30;
SEPTEMBER 19; OCTOBER 10, 2013

----------

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
113TH CONGRESS

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S. Hrg. 113-270

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
113TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

__________

JANUARY 31; FEBRUARY 12, 14, 28; APRIL 11; JULY 18, 25, 30; SEPTEMBER
19; OCTOBER 10, 2013

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

__________

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE LEE, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS KING, Maine

Peter K. Levine, Staff Director

John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Page

january 31, 2013

Nomination of Hon. Charles T. Hagel to be Secretary of Defense... 1

Statements of:

Nunn, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia, Retired.. 6
Warner, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia,
Retired........................................................ 9
Hagel, Hon. Charles T., to be Secretary of Defense............... 12

february 12, 2013

Business Meeting to Consider the Nomination of the Honorable
Charles T. Hagel to be the Secretary of Defense................ 313

february 14, 2013

Nominations of GEN Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Central Command;
and GEN David M. Rodriguez, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade
of General and to be Commander, U.S. Africa Command............ 355

Statements of:

Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, U.S. Central Command.............. 360
Rodriguez, GEN David M., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, U.S. Africa Command............... 361

february 28, 2013

Nominations of Hon. Alan F. Estevez to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics; Mr. Frederick E. Vollrath to be Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Readiness and Force Management; and Mr. Eric K.
Fanning to be Under Secretary of the Air Force................. 529

Statements of:

Estevez, Hon. Alan F., to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics............. 532
Vollrath, Mr. Frederick E., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Readiness and Force Management............................. 533
Fanning, Mr. Eric K., to be Under Secretary of the Air Force..... 534

iii
april 11, 2013

Nomination of Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, for Reappointment
to the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. European
Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe................... 687

Statement of:

Breedlove, Gen. Philip M., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade
of General and to be Commander, U.S. European Command, and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe............................... 692

july 18, 2013

Nominations of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and Reappointment as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; and ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, for
Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and Reappointment as Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.......................... 765

Statements of:

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and Reappointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 769
Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade
of Admiral and Reappointment as Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff................................................ 772

july 25, 2013

Nominations of Hon. Stephen W. Preston to be General Counsel of
the Department of Defense; Hon. Jon T. Rymer to be Inspector
General of the Department of Defense; Ms. Susan J. Rabern to be
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and
Comptroller; and Mr. Dennis V. McGinn to be Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment......... 949

Statements of:

Warner, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia,
Retired........................................................ 953
Preston, Hon. Stephen W., to be General Counsel of the Department
of Defense..................................................... 956
Rymer, Hon. Jon T., to be Inspector General of the Department of
Defense........................................................ 957
Rabern, Ms. Susan J., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management and Comptroller........................... 958
McGinn, Mr. Dennis V., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Energy, Installations, and Environment......................... 959

july 30, 2013

Nominations of ADM Cecil E.D. Haney, USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command; and LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA, to be General and
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S.
Forces Korea................................................... 1081

Statements of:

Haney, ADM Cecil E.D., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Strategic Command............ 1084
Scaparrotti, LTG Curtis M., USA, to be General and Commander,
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces
Korea.......................................................... 1085

september 19, 2013

Nominations of Hon. Deborah Lee James to be Secretary of the Air
Force; Hon. Jessica Garfola Wright to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Mr. Frank G. Klotz to be
Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security; Mr. Marcel J.
Lettre II to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence; and Mr. Kevin A. Ohlson to be a Judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Services........................ 1157

Statements of:

Conrad, Hon. Kent, U.S. Senator from the State of North Dakota,
Retired........................................................ 1161
James, Hon. Deborah Lee, to be Secretary of the Air Force........ 1163
Wright, Jessica Garfola, to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness........................................ 1164
Klotz, Mr. Frank G., to be Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear
Security....................................................... 1166
Lettre, Mr. Marcel J., II, to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence.................................... 1168
Ohlson, Mr. Kevin A., to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Armed Services......................................... 1169

october 10, 2013

Nominations of Mr. Michael D. Lumpkin to be Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict;
Hon. Jamie M. Morin to be Director of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE), Department of Defense; and Hon. Jo
Ann Rooney to be Under Secretary of the Navy................... 1353

Statements of:

Hoeven, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of North Dakota... 1358
Morin, Hon. Jamie M., to be Director of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, Department of Defense...................... 1361
Lumpkin, Mr. Michael D., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.................. 1362
Rooney, Hon. Jo Ann, to be Under Secretary of the Navy........... 1363

APPENDIX......................................................... 1485

NOMINATION OF HON. CHARLES T. HAGEL TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain,
Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Vitter,
Blunt, Lee, and Cruz.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Travis E. Smith, chief clerk; Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and Mary J. Kyle, legislative
clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel; Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton
Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K.
McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F.
Phillips, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional
staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K.
Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff member; Daniel
A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Mariah K.
McNamara, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Casey
Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Brian Nagle, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Manchin;
Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman,
assistant to Senator Gillilbrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to
Senator Blumenthal; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator
Donnelly; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Hirono; Jim Catella,
assistant to Senator King; Paul C. Hutton IV, assistant to
Senator McCain; T. Finch Fulton and Lenwood Landrum, assistants
to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Craig Abele,
assistant to Senator Graham; Charles Prosch, assistant to
Senator Blunt; Peter Blair, assistant to Senator Lee; and
Brooke Bacak, assistant to Senator Cruz.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning. The committee meets today to
consider the nomination of former Senator Chuck Hagel to be
Secretary of Defense.
Before we begin, I want to first welcome Senator Inhofe as
the new ranking Republican on our committee, succeeding Senator
McCain. Senator McCain has been a great partner over the last 6
years, and I thank him for all that he has done to get our
bills enacted, for all of his leadership on a host of issues,
for his support of the work of this committee, and for always
keeping our hearings lively.
Senator Inhofe has shown his strong commitment to the
national defense over his 20 years on this committee, and I
know that we are going to work well together to continue the
bipartisan tradition of the committee.
We're also pleased to welcome the eight Senators who are
joining the committee this year, both those who are new to the
Senate and those who are new to our committee--Senators
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King on the Democratic side, and
Senators Blunt, Cruz, Fischer, and Lee on the Republican side.
You will all find that this is a wonderful committee where we
work across party lines to support our troops and their
families and their national defense mission.
I would also like to pause for a moment to offer my thanks
and the thanks of our committee to Secretary Leon Panetta, who
delayed his retirement and his return to California to serve
our country first as Director of Central Intelligence and then
as Secretary of Defense. Secretary Panetta has provided a
steady hand at the Department of Defense (DOD) through 2 very
difficult years, and has earned our great respect and our
appreciation.
Finally before we get started, I would like to announce
that the committee will be holding hearings next week on
Benghazi and the week thereafter on the impact of the sequester
on DOD.
Senator Hagel, we welcome you to the Senate Armed Services
Committee and as an old friend of those of us with whom you
served during your years in the Senate. There are few jobs that
are more demanding than the position to which you have been
nominated. The hours are long and extremely challenging, and
require sacrifices from both the Secretary and his family.
We traditionally give our nominees an opportunity to
introduce their families at these hearings, and we would
welcome your doing so during your opening statement.
If confirmed, Senator Hagel would be the first former
enlisted man and the first veteran of the Vietnam war to serve
as Secretary of Defense. You cannot read Senator Hagel's
account of his military service and not be impressed by it. As
Senator Hagel explained a few years ago, ``Probably most
fundamental for me when we talk of going to war, we need to
think it through carefully, not just for the political, and the
geopolitical, and the diplomatic, and the economic
consequences, and those are important. But at least for me,''
he said, ``this old infantry sergeant thinks about when I was
in Vietnam in 1968, someone needs to represent that perspective
in our Government as well. The people in Washington make the
policy, but it's the little guys who come back in the body
bags.''
Senator Hagel's background provides an invaluable
perspective, not only with respect to the difficult decisions
and recommendations that a Secretary of Defense must make
regarding the use of force and the commitment of U.S. troops
overseas, but also with respect to the day-to-day decisions
that a secretary must make to ensure that our men and women in
uniform and their families receive the support and assistance
that they need and deserve.
It would be a positive message for our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines in harm's way around the world to know that
one of their own holds the highest office in DOD, and that he
has their backs.
Senator Hagel, you would be in a position to make key
recommendations regarding Afghanistan, where we are down to the
pre-surge level of troops with 66,000 military personnel in the
country. The Secretary of Defense is called upon to advise the
President on the size and mission of a post-2014 residual
force, and the pace of the drawdown between now and the end of
2014. The key to this transition is ensuring the readiness and
ability of Afghanistan security forces to take over the defense
of their own country. I have always believed that should be our
main mission and its key to success.
During my trip to Afghanistan with Senator Jack Reed last
month, we heard from U.S. commanders on the ground that
Afghanistan security forces are operating on their own on most
operations, including conducting more than 85 percent of
operations with limited or no U.S. support in the difficult
Regional Command East. Yet difficult obstacles remain to the
process of reducing our forces and shifting responsibility to
Afghanistan forces, including the difficulty of negotiating a
status of forces agreement, including recent reports that the
Afghanistan Government might slow down a successful program of
growing and training the Afghanistan Local Police, and
including questions about the current plan to reduce the size
of the Afghanistan National Security Forces from 352,000 to
around 230,000 after 2015.
We face a number of new and growing threats elsewhere in
the world, such as the ongoing threat posed by Iran's nuclear
weapons program and the increasingly destructive civil war in
Syria with the risk that conflict could result in the loss of
control over that country's substantial stockpile of chemical
weapons. There's also the continuing instability in other
countries affected by the Arab Spring, the growth of al Qaeda
affiliates in ungoverned regions, including Yemen, Somalia, and
North Africa, and the continued unpredictable behavior of a
nuclear armed regime in North Korea.
We face these challenges at a time when the DOD budget is
under a unique pressure as a result of cuts previously agreed
upon by Congress, the budgeting by Continuing Resolution (CR),
and the impending threat of a sequester. Secretary Panetta has
said that a sequester would be devastating for our military.
Senator Hagel's views today on the CR and the sequester will be
of great interest to this committee and to the Nation.
Those of us who have served with Senator Hagel in the
Senate know that he is a man who is not afraid to speak his
mind. Senator Hagel has made a number of statements over the
course of his career which committee members will ask him about
during today's hearing. For example, Senator Hagel has stated
that unilateral sanctions against Iran, ``are exactly the wrong
approach,'' and that, ``they are the worst thing we can do
would be to try to isolate Iran''. I believe that while
effective multilateral sanctions are preferable, that
unilateral sanctions are an important part of the approach that
the Obama administration has followed, and that Congress has
supported. It appears that sanctions are producing tremendous
pressure on Iran.
Another statement which has raised concern is Senator
Hagel's recommendation that we conduct, ``direct,
unconditional, and comprehensive talks with the Government of
Iran''. Now while there is value in communicating with our
adversaries, the formulation used by Senator Hagel seemed to
imply a willingness to talk to Iran on some issues that I
believe that most of us would view as non-negotiable, and,
therefore, any willingness to talk to Iran would need to be
highly conditional. Senator Hagel's reassurance to me in my
office that he supports the Obama administration's strong
stance against Iran is significant, and we look forward to
hearing from Senator Hagel today in some depth on that subject.
We will also be interested in Senator Hagel's addressing
troubling statements that he has made about Israel and its
supporters here in the United States, a statement in 2008 that
our policy of non-engagement with the Syrians, ``has isolated
us more than the Syrians,'' and a 2009 statement that ``we
should not isolate Hamas, a terrorist organization''.
There is much to be explored at this hearing, but as we
struggle with the difficult security challenges facing our
Nation, the President needs to have a Secretary of Defense in
whom he has trust, who will give him unvarnished advice, a
person of integrity, and one who has a personal understanding
of the consequences of decisions relative to the use of
military force. Senator Hagel certainly has those critically
important qualifications to lead DOD.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
would like to echo your remarks about Secretary Panetta and the
work that he has done. I do not see him here today, but I do
recall when he was first nominated, I was probably one of the
first phone calls to him, and I have enjoyed working with him.
With Senator McCain, I feel the same way. I will certainly
continue to depend on his counsel, and you and I have worked
very well together in the past.
Mr. Chairman, before I continue my opening statement, I
would like to raise a concern about the sufficiency of
materials provided to this committee by our nominee. Senator
Hagel was requested to provide the speeches he has delivered
over the last 5 years, yet his initial submission was for only
four speeches. Even though, as was noticed by Senator Cruz that
he had honoraria for 12 speeches, but submitted 4 speeches. We
received some more, but only late last night. I think it would
have been a lot more helpful if we had received them before
that, and I am hoping that we will be able to get that
information before we have to cast votes on this nominee. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The President's nomination of Senator Hagel to serve as the
next Secretary of Defense comes at a critical juncture in our
military and national security interests. Senator Hagel is a
good man who has a record of service. I first learned of that
when he was first elected, and I have been a great admirer of
the time that he spent in Vietnam and the sacrifices that he
made.
While his service is commendable, the fate of his
nomination should be decided by the totality of his record. It
is the votes that he has cast, the statements that he has made
over the many years of his career that will inform us as to his
judgment, his view of America's role in the world, and his view
of the military required to support that role.
As I told Senator Hagel in my office over 2 weeks ago, that
after a long and careful review of his record, and there are
things that he has said and there are things that I have
personally experienced with him, that we are too
philosophically opposed on the pressing issues facing our
country, for me to support his nomination. Therefore, I told
him I would not be supporting his nomination.
His record demonstrates what I view as a lack of steadfast
opposition to policies that diminish U.S. power and influence
throughout the world, as well as a recent trend of policy
reversals that seem based on political expediency rather than
on core beliefs.
On many of the security challenges facing U.S. interests
around the world, Senator Hagel's record is deeply troubling
and out of the mainstream. Too often, it seems, he is willing
to subscribe to a worldwide view that is predicated on
appeasing our adversaries while shunning our friends. I
remember quoting Hiram Mann, who said, ``No man survives when
freedom fails, the best men rot in filthy jails, and those who
cry `appease, appease' are hanged by those they tried to
please.''
I am mentioning a few of these things because they are
going to come out in this hearing. In 2000, an overwhelming
majority of Senators sent a letter to President Clinton
reaffirming our solidarity with Israel. I was one of them who
carried that letter around. I remember it well. Senator Hagel
was one of just four who refused to sign that letter, and I am
sure he will want to comment about that.
In 2001, he was one of just two Senators who voted against
a bill extending harsh sanctions against Iran. A year later, he
urged the Bush administration to support Iran's membership in
the World Trade Organization. Senator Hagel voted against a
resolution designating Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corp, a group
responsible for killing American soldiers in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as a terrorist organization. On multiple
occasions, he has advocated for direct negotiations with Iran,
a regime that continues to repress its people, doggedly pursue
a nuclear weapon capability, and employ terrorist proxies,
including Hamas, Hezbollah, who threaten the security of Israel
and the region.
Senator Hagel has also been an outspoken supporter of the
nuclear disarmament and the Global Zero movement. We are very
sensitive to that, and we know that the President has said many
times he wants a nuclear free world, and I know that Senator
Hagel is right there with him. But at a time when North Korea's
belligerent actions threaten our allies with their nuclear
capabilities and security of our own Nation and that of our
allies, why would we want to unilaterally disarm ourselves of
nuclear capability?
Of late, however, Senator Hagel has expressed views in
meetings with Senate colleagues, I have been informed, and
through the press that appear glaringly at odds with many of
his long-held positions, particularly on issues dealing with
Israel, Iran, and our nuclear arsenal. This apparent
willingness to walk back or alter his position, possibly for
the sake of political expediency on such important issues, is
deeply troubling and sends a concerning message to our allies
and adversaries alike.
Though I respect Senator Hagel, his record to date
demonstrates that he would be a staunch advocate for the
continuation of the misguided policies of the President's first
term. Retreating from America's unique global leadership role
and shrinking the military will not make America safer. On the
contrary, it will embolden our enemies, endanger our allies,
and provide opportunity for nations that do not share our
interests to fill a global leadership vacuum we leave behind.
It is for these reasons that I believe that he is the wrong
person to lead the Pentagon at this perilous and consequential
time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
We have two former chairmen of this committee with us to
introduce Senator Hagel. No Senator has had two dearer friends
or better mentors than I have had with Senators Nunn and
Warner. I just want to welcome them back to this committee. I
do not have to tell them that they are among dear, dear
friends, those of us who have known them and who have worked
with them. It is a real, real treat actually to welcome you
back to the committee.
I think I will call on you, Senator Nunn, first. I think we
will call on you alphabetically. I do not have any better way
to do it. Sam, welcome back.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
GEORGIA, RETIRED

Senator Nunn. First, for the record, seniority and age are
two different things. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the Armed
Services Committee, I am honored to join John Warner in
presenting our friend, Chuck Hagel, to the committee and
recommending that Chuck be confirmed as our Nation's 24th
Secretary of Defense.
I think it is worth noting that 68 years ago this month,
John Warner enlisted in the U.S. Navy to fight in World War II.
That was the start of his great career of public service, and
John, I am very proud to be here by your side.
Mr. Chairman, I spent a lot of my Senate career sitting in
your seat waiting on a quorum. Congratulations on not having to
do that today. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I do not how long it will last, but thanks
for pointing it out.
Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, I think it should be noted that
you and Senator McCain have effectively guided this committee
in its important role as a compelling and absolutely essential
voice for a strong and effective defense. Together you have
managed to pass authorization bills, even during contentious
times. I thank you both for your dedicated service to our
Nation. I am confident, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, that
you will continue this tradition, and that Senator McCain will
still be a very valuable member and voice on this committee.
I believe that our Nation is fortunate to have a nominee
for Secretary of Defense with the character, the experience,
the courage, and the leadership that Chuck Hagel would bring to
this position. First, Chuck is acutely aware that even in an
age of rapid technological advances, our military capability
and effectiveness depend on the quality and the morale of the
people who serve our Nation in uniform, as well as the families
that support them.
Chuck received two Purple Hearts in Vietnam, and when he
returned home, he continued to fight for veterans and for
Active Duty military personnel. He knows that our people are
our strongest assets. Second, Chuck's experience in Vietnam
shaped his life and his perspective. War for Chuck Hagel is not
an attraction. I am confident that if confirmed he will ask the
hard and the smart questions before sending troops into battle.
Chuck Hagel knows that the United States has vital
interests that are worth fighting for and dying for. He also
knows that war should be a last resort and that our Nation must
effectively use all of our tools, not limited only to our
military, to protect our important and to protect our vital
interests.
Certainly, Mr. Chairman, there is a tension in these
values, but it is a tension that we should welcome in the
thought process and in the advice that our Secretary of Defense
gives to our Commander in Chief and to this Congress.
From our service together on the Defense Policy Board in
recent years, I know that Chuck Hagel has a clear world view,
and that it aligns with the mainstream of U.S. foreign and
defense policy, and also with President Obama. Chuck Hagel
believes that we must build and preserve American strength as a
force for good in the world. He recognizes that protecting our
interests requires strong allies and friends, as well as strong
American leadership.
Third, Chuck has the depth of experience and the leadership
skills required to handle this tough job. There is certainly no
shortage of security challenges around the world, as this
committee knows, and as you have enumerated this morning, Mr.
Chairman. A very large and impressive group of former Cabinet
officials and public servants from both sides of the aisle have
said that they trust Chuck Hagel with this important
responsibility. I strongly agree.
Fourth, on the fiscal side, I am confident that Chuck will
be a powerful advocate for a common sense approach, both within
the administration and here on Capitol Hill regarding fiscal
challenges to the defense budget. He understands that our
defense capabilities are being threatened on two budget fronts:
first, sequestration with its damaging across-the-board,
upfront budget cuts, and second, rapidly rising costs within
the Department's budget, including, but not limited to, health
care, personnel, and retirement costs.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I believe that
Chuck will work effectively with this committee and Congress in
meeting these budget challenges while protecting our people,
protecting our capabilities, and also while ensuring that the
United States has the strongest military in the world.
Chuck Hagel was a soldier and a Senator, but he has been
also a highly successful executive in both the public and
private sectors. He built a successful company from the ground
up. He is a man who knows how to prioritize, and he knows how
to make tough decisions. He will listen to and carefully
consider the views of our military and civilian leaders, and
guide them as necessary.
Fifth, I believe that Chuck Hagel will be a balanced and
responsible voice on nuclear weapons policy. President Reagan
said it often and said it well: ``a nuclear war cannot be won,
and it must not be fought.''
Mr. Chairman, as this committee knows, the risk of a global
nuclear war has thankfully, substantially declined since the
breakup of the Soviet Union. But with nine nations possessing
nuclear weapons, with nuclear weapons usable material and
knowledge spread across the globe, and with terrorists ready to
use a nuclear weapon if they manage to buy, steal, or make one,
we face enormous risk that a nuclear weapon will be used. If
proliferation continues in countries like Iran and North Korea,
and if we do not secure nuclear materials and weapons globally,
the odds of use will go up even more.
Six years ago George Schultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger,
and I made the argument that we reduce reliance on nuclear
weapons as a vital contribution to preventing that
proliferation, keeping them out of dangerous hands, and
ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. Two-thirds of
living former Secretaries of State and Defense, and national
security advisors have agreed with the vision and the steps
that we outlined, including substantial work on verification
and enforcement.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that all members of the committee and
the Senate will read the recent statement by four credible and
very experienced Americans--Ambassador Tom Pickering,
Ambassador Richard Burt, General James Cartwright, and General
John Sheehan--about their work with Chuck Hagel on nuclear
weapons. They made it abundantly clear that they oppose
unilateral moves. They support bilateral negotiations. They
support verifiable U.S.-Russian arms reductions to be followed
by multilateral negotiations, bringing other nuclear weapons
countries into a serious and verifiable process of reductions.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, there are many essential
characteristics and values that a Secretary of Defense should
possess in our dangerous and challenging world. Let me name
just two or three that I think are very important.
First, someone who is well-informed, has an open mind,
engages in critical thinking, who is capable of and who seeks
out independent thought. Second, someone who sets aside fixed
ideologies and biases to honestly evaluate all options, and
then provides his or her candid judgment to the President and
to Congress. Third, someone who pays attention to people with
the best ideas, regardless of their party affiliation. No one
is perfect. We all know that. But Chuck Hagel comes as close as
anyone I know to having all of these qualities.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and members of the committee,
I served for 24 years on this important committee, and I
recognize that much has changed since I retired 16 years ago. I
continue to believe, however, that every major problem we face
today requires the best input from both political parties if we
are to arrive at a solution. I believe that Chuck Hagel will
seek that input. I urge his support by this committee, and I
urge the confirmation of his nomination by the U.S. Senate.
I thank the chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn.
Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA, RETIRED

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a moving
experience for me to reenter this room. I served on this
committee for 30 years. In that period of time, Senator Nunn
was the chairman, and I was the ranking. But I want to say to
you and Jim Inhofe--Jim and I have been good friends and we
worked together not only on this committee, but other
committees. You will be a splendid ranking member. You follow
in the steps of my dear and valued friend of so many years,
John McCain.
The leadership of this committee throughout my 30 years in
the Senate has been drawn from the ranks of the strongest and
the best of its membership. We have it today, and I have every
reason we will have it tomorrow.
I would like to say a word to the new members of this
committee. As I look back over a very fortunate record of
public service for many years, no chapter of my career was more
important than service on this committee. You will carry with
you for the rest of your life the recollections of the work
that you have done for one of America's most valued assets, the
men and the women and their families of the armed services of
the United States.
I have written out a nice long statement, and then last
night late I received Sam Nunn's statement and Chuck Hagel's
statement, and I said that I felt that another statement just
would not do. I would rather say just a few words from the
heart about the importance of what we have by way of decision
before all of us today.
I thank Senator Nunn for that reference of 68 years ago in
the Navy. I did no more than every other kid on my block. We
all went. But I would like to remind you that a half century
ago, you served in the Coast Guard. So, Grandpa, here is
another grandpa. [Laughter.]
Good friends, we thank Chuck Hagel, and Mrs. Hagel, and his
family because if confirmed, there is an enormous commitment by
the family to this position. Having known Lilibet and slightly
your children, you have made that decision to offer yourself
for continued public service. Public service is a privilege. I
have always regarded it as such.
I will not give a long statement. This statement by Senator
Hagel will soon be shared with you. I read it through not once,
twice, but again this morning. I say this carefully, I have
read the statements that have been placed before the members of
this committee for those 30 years. I have never read a more
carefully prepared statement, a more forthright statement, and
one that has no hedges or deviations. He hits firm on those
issues that will make the decision in your minds and that of
your colleagues as to whether or not he is qualified to take on
this very important assignment.
I first entered the Pentagon in 1969 during the war in
Vietnam under Melvin Laird. Jim Schlesinger followed, and I
have worked with every Secretary of Defense since that period
of time, all different, all with their strengths and indeed
some of their weaknesses. But set forth in this is a series of
commitments to you as a committee, to the members of the full
Senate, and to the American public as precisely what his goals
are and what he will do, how he will serve the President, how
he will give the President his best advice. I know Chuck to
give it very strongly.
I'm going to talk a little bit about Chuck Hagel, the man
that I served with for 12 years. My distinguished colleague and
long-time friend, Sam, had gone when Chuck arrived at the
Senate. The first year he was here, we had the defense
authorization bill on the floor. In those days, as it is today,
that bill goes on that floor, that bill stays on that floor,
sometimes a couple of days, sometimes a week, sometimes broken
up, but we get it through. When it's done, we go immediately
back to our committee spaces and begin to write that bill and
get it to the printer so that we can go to conference. How many
times have we done that together, Senator Nunn, Senator Levin,
Senator McCain, Senator Inhofe, many times.
The first year he was here, he watched that process, and
when I had taken the staff back to the committee room,
surprisingly he showed up. I didn't know him that well,
although I had studied his biography and I wanted to get to
know him because of my deep and abiding interesting in the
Vietnam period, having served for 5 years in that period as
Under Secretary of the Navy.
He strolled into the room and I introduced him to the
people. He said to the staff, you are one of the most
impressive group of young people I've ever seen. I learned a
lot. He shared some of histories as a simple, but elegant,
soldier that he was. That is the way he started, and thereafter
he voted for every single final passage of the authorization
bill, every single final passage of the appropriation bill.
He was at home and learned in that generation of Vietnam,
and I am so proud to have the affiliation of having been, yes,
in comparative safety at the Pentagon. But I did go to the
field of battle and see these young men and some women who
engaged in that struggle. Chuck Hagel brings with him the
experience of having come home to an America that was quite
different than what I experienced when my generation came home
from World War II. We were welcomed with open arms. America at
that time in Vietnam, and how well John McCain can remember
this, was very divided. When you wore your uniform back home,
it did not receive the same respect that it deserved for the
sacrifices that you and your colleagues had committed. Chuck
will never forget that. I will never forget it. John will never
forget it.
Today we welcome home and we do it with the fullest heart
the young men and women who serve, but there have been times in
history when that didn't happen, and that was one. That honed
him to be prepared to take on his responsibilities as he
addresses the declining budget situation, which is going to be
a challenge. I am absolutely certain that he will stand up and
fight as hard as two of his predecessors--Leon Panetta you
mentioned today, and Robert Gates. They gave their President
loyalty, but they gave him their best advice and tough advice,
and fought for their troops, and drilled down to what they have
to maintain whatever budget. Sequester is not the route. But
whatever budget, he will maintain morale and combat readiness.
Also, ladies and gentlemen, that pillar of strength of our
military system, the All-Volunteer Force.
We had drafts in Vietnam. We saw the effect of that. We
decided as a Nation to take a gamble, to let every person who
wished to wear the uniform, giving that opportunity and to
volunteer. No one is forced in there. That has to be
maintained. This man has the experience, gravitas, and the
strength to protect the All-Volunteer Force.
I also was deeply impressed by the Senate and the manner in
which it confirmed John Kerry. John Kerry was also in that
generation, and he served his trials and tribulations, and came
home and faced that public in the same way Chuck did. The
Senate confirmed him with a very strong vote. They sent him
away ready to take on the enormity of his responsibility.
Now I mention that because in my experience, I have seen a
good deal of camaraderie, but a good deal of competition
between the Secretaries of Defense and the Secretaries of
State. It is just sort of built in there, and sometimes a lot
of sand gets in that gear box. But it is important to the
United States that they, having the major jurisdiction over
most of the policy issues, work as a team.
John Kerry and Chuck Hagel are a band of brothers out of
Vietnam with that special bond, and I am sure that you will
utilize that and remember it, and make those two departments
performs their functions to best serve the President and to
best serve the country.
I have pretty well said everything I should say. I want to
be brief because it is important that this committee pursue its
work. But again, Bob Gates, Leon Panetta set the bar for this
century of those who take on this job. You mentioned your long
friendships, Chuck, and how you know both. I would keep close
contact. They have the experience to deal with this President
of the United States, and you are the President's choice.
Folks, there is an old saying in the combat Army infantry
and Marine Corps. ``Certain men are asked to take the point,''
which means to get out and lead in the face of the enemy. Chuck
Hagel did that as a sergeant in Vietnam. If confirmed, Chuck
Hagel will do it again, this time not before a platoon, but
before every man and woman and their families in the armed
services. You will lead them. They will know in their hearts we
have one of our own.
You are on your own, and good luck.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. We thank you both, Senator Warner, Senator
Nunn, for your extraordinarily powerful introductions. I just
wish every member of the Senate and every American could have
heard, and I hope will hear and read about what you said here
today about Chuck Hagel. I also noticed there is another former
Senator, who was a member of that band of brothers, who is with
us today. I just noticed in the audience Max Cleland is here,
and I want to welcome you, Max, too, as an old, old friend of
this committee, and the Senate, and of the Nation.
Let me now call on Senator Hagel. Senator Warner, Senator
Nunn, again, thank you for your introductions, and you are free
to get back to your lives or to stay as you wish.
Senator Hagel.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES T. HAGEL, TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Senator Hagel. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. I am
honored to come before you today as the President's nominee to
be the Secretary of Defense.
First, as you suggested, Mr. Chairman, let me introduce my
family--my wife, Lilibet. Our son Ziller, and our daughter,
Allyn, are not with us today. Our son, Ziller, claims he's
taking a test. We will confirm that later. But both are a son
and daughter that Lilibet and I are very proud of. I think like
any proud father and any proud mother, you all know how I feel
about that as you have the same feelings about your children.
It is the same way Lilibet and I feel about ours.
I also want to introduce my brother, Tom, who served with
me in Vietnam, my brother, Mike, who is our number three
brother, and I might add, who actually possesses any talent our
family has. He has in the Pentagon 10 paintings as Chairman of
the Air Force Artist Guild over the years, and they are hanging
in different locations in the Pentagon. We have one brother of
some acclaim, and one of us did make it, my brother, Mike.
Mike's son is sitting behind him, Josh. He is one of three
children that Mike has.
We have here also cousins, many friends, and people I owe
money to. [Laughter.]
Who knows who else since I have received some publicity
over the weeks.
I want to also thank my friends, Sam Nunn and John Warner.
I want to thank them for their support, their encouragement,
and their friendship over many years. As each of you who had
the privilege of serving with those Senators, I, too, add my
thanks for their tremendous service to our country. These two
distinguished Americans represent what is best about American
public service and responsible bipartisanship. They have
embodied both in their careers, long distinguished careers, and
are models for each of us.
Of course to my family and friends, and my fellow veterans
who are here, as has been noted, Max Cleland, Jan Scruggs, good
friends, veterans from all wars, who are here today who I
worked with for many, many years. I am grateful to them. Not
just to those friends, and supporters, and fellow veterans who
are here, but those who are not, thank you.
A life is only as good as the family and the friends you
have and the people you surround yourself with. I also want to
thank my friend, Leon Panetta, for his tremendous service to
our country over so many years. If I am given the privilege of
succeeding him, it will be a high honor.
President Obama for his confidence and trust in me, I thank
him. I am humbled by the opportunity and the possibility he has
given me to serve our country once again. I fully recognize the
immense responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. I assured
the President that if I am confirmed by the U.S. Senate, I will
always do my best. I will always do my best for our Nation and
for the men and women and their families, who are called on to
make the enormous sacrifices of military service. Their safety,
success, and welfare will always be at the forefront of the
decisions I make.
I also assured the President that I would always provide
him with my most honest and informed advice. I make that same
commitment to this committee and to Congress. If confirmed, I
will reach out to the members of this committee for advice and
collaboration. It will be a partnership because the national
security challenges America faces require it.
Our Nation's security is the highest priority of our
leaders and our Government. We cannot allow the work of
confronting the great threats we face today to be held hostage
to partisanship on either side of the aisle, or by differences
between the bodies represented in Articles I and II of our
Constitution. The stakes are too high. Men and women of all
political philosophies, and parties, and ideas die and fight
for our country. As this committee knows so well, protecting
our national security or committing our Nation to war can never
become political litmus tests.
I know Secretary Panetta has put a strong emphasis on
reaching out to Congress. I, like Leon, come from Congress, and
respect and understand this institution's indispensable role in
setting policy and helping govern our country.
We are all products of the forces that shape us. For me,
there has been nothing more important in my life, or a more
defining influence on my life, than my family. Whether it was
helping my mother raise four boys after my father, a World War
II veteran who died suddenly at age 39 on Christmas Day, or
serving side by side with my brother Tom in Vietnam, or the
wonderful miracle of my wife Lilibet and me being blessed with
two beautiful children. That is who I am.
We each bring to our responsibilities frames of reference.
These frames of reference are formed by our life's experiences.
They help instruct our judgments. We build out from those
personal foundations by continually informing ourselves,
listening, and learning.
Like each of you, I have a record, a record that I am proud
of. I am proud of my record not because of any accomplishments
I may have achieved, or certainly because of an absence of
mistakes, but rather because I have tried to build that record
by living my life and fulfilling my responsibilities as
honestly as I knew how and with hard work. Underpinning
everything I have done in my life was the belief that we must
always be striving to make our Nation a better and more secure
place for all of our people.
During the 12 years I had the privilege of serving the
people of Nebraska in the U.S. Senate, I cast over 3,000 votes
and hundreds of committee votes. I have also given hundreds of
interviews and speeches and written a book. As you all know, I
am on the record. I am on the record on many issues.
But no one individual vote, no one individual quote, no one
individual statement defines me, my beliefs, or my record. My
overall world view has never changed: that America has and must
maintain the strongest military in the world, that we must lead
the international community to confront threats and challenges
together, and take advantage of opportunities together; that we
must use all our tools of American power to protect our
citizens and our interests. I believe, and I always have
believed, that America must engage in the world, not retreat
from the world, but engage with the world. My record is
consistent on these points.
It is clear that we are living at a defining time. Our
Nation is emerging from over a decade of war. We have brought
our men and women in uniform home from Iraq, and have started
to bring them home from Afghanistan.
That does not mean that the threats we face and will
continue to face are any less dangerous or complicated. In
fact, it is quite the opposite. Recent events in Mali and
Algeria remind us clearly of this reality. The 21st century
complexities, technologies, economies, and threats are bringing
the 7 billion global citizens closer together than ever before.
As our planet adds another 2 billion people over the next 25
years, the dangers, complications, and human demands will not
be lessened, but rather heightened.
Despite these challenges, I believe we also have historic
opportunities to help build a safer, more prosperous, more
secure, more hopeful, and more just world than maybe any time
in history of man, for all people. Yes, the curse of
intolerance, hatred, and danger exists around the world, and we
must continue to be clear-eyed about this danger, and we will
be. We will not hesitate to use the full force of the U.S.
military in defense of our security. But we must also be smart,
and, more importantly, wise, wise in how we employ all of our
Nation's great power.
America's continued leadership and strength at home and
abroad will be critically important for our country and the
world. While we will not hesitate to act unilaterally when
necessary, it is essential that we work closely with our allies
and partners to enhance America's influence and security, as
well as global security. If confirmed, I will continue to build
on the efforts of this administration and of former Secretary
Gates, Secretary Panetta, and Secretary Clinton to strengthen
our alliances and partnerships around the world. I will also
look forward to working with my former Senate colleague--your
colleague--and our friend, John Kerry, in this pursuit.
As I told the President, I am committed to his positions on
all issues of national security, specifically decisions that
DOD is in the process of implementing now. This includes the
Defense Strategic Guidance the President outlined in January
2012. Allow me to very briefly address a few of those specific
issues now.
First, we have a plan in place to transition out of
Afghanistan, continue bringing our troops home, and end the
war, which has been the longest war, as we all know, in
America's history. As you also know, discussions are ongoing
about what the U.S. presence in Afghanistan will look like
after 2014. The President has made clear, and I agree, that
there should be only two functions for U.S. troops that remain
in Afghanistan after 2014: counterterrorism, particularly to
target al Qaeda and its affiliates, training, and advising
Afghan forces. It is time we forge a new partnership with
Afghanistan, with its government and, most importantly, with
its people.
Second, as the Secretary of Defense, I will ensure we stay
vigilant and keep up the pressure on terrorist organizations as
they try to expand their affiliates around the world, in places
like Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. At the Pentagon, that
means continuing to invest in and build the tools to assist in
that fight, such as Special Operations Forces and new
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies. It
will mean working hand-in-hand with our partners here at home
across the National Security and Intelligence Communities to
confront these and other threats, especially the emerging
threat--the very dangerous and real threat of cyber warfare.
Third, as I have made clear, I am fully committed to the
President's goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon, and I have been on record on that issue. As I have said
in the past many times, all options must be on the table to
achieve that goal.
My policy has always been the same as the President's, one
of prevention, not of containment. The President has made clear
that is the policy of our Government. As Secretary of Defense,
I will make sure the Department is prepared for any
contingency. That is my job. That is my responsibility. I will
ensure our friend and ally Israel maintains its qualitative
military edge in the region, and will continue to support
systems like Iron Dome, which is today saving Israeli lives
from terrorist rocket attacks. That support I have always made
clear and been on the record for.
Fourth, while we pursue the reductions in our deployed
stockpiles and launchers consistent with the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START), I am committed to maintaining a
modern, strong, safe, ready, and effective nuclear arsenal.
America's nuclear deterrent over the last 35 years has played a
central role in ensuring global security and the avoidance of
world war III. I have been committed to that. My record is
clear on that. I am committed to modernizing our nuclear
arsenal.
As we emerge from this decade of war, we must also broaden
our Nation's focus overseas as we look at future threats and
challenges. As this committee knows, that is why DOD is
rebalancing its resources towards the Asia-Pacific region. We
are in the process of modernizing our defense posture across
the entire region to defend and deepen our partnerships with
traditional allies, especially Japan, South Korea, and
Australia, to continue to deter and defend against provocations
from states like North Korea, as well as non-state actors, and
to expand our networks of security cooperation throughout the
region to combat terrorism, counter proliferation, provide
disaster relief, fight piracy, and ensure maritime security.
I will continue this rebalancing even as we continue to
work closely--closely--with our long-time allies of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and our friends, and with
allies, and partners, and friends in other regions of the
world. At the same time, we will continue to focus on
challenges in the Middle East and North Africa where we have
clear national interests. Rather, it is a recognition that the
United States has been and always will be a Pacific power, and
the Asian-Pacific area is increasingly vital to America's
security and economic interests. That is why we must become
even more engaged in the region over the coming years.
Doing all of this and much more will require smart and
strategic budget decisions. I have made it clear I share Leon
Panetta's and our Service Chiefs' serious concerns about the
impact sequestration would have on our Armed Forces. As someone
who has run businesses, I know that the uncertainty and
turbulence of the current budget climate makes it much more
difficult to manage the Pentagon's resources and our national
security. If confirmed, I am committed to effectively and
efficiently using every single taxpayer's dollar the right way,
to maintaining the strongest military in the world, and to
working with Congress to ensure the Department has the
resources it needs, and that the disposition of those resources
is accountable.
Even as we deal with difficult budget decisions, I will
never break America's commitment to our troops, our veterans,
and our military families. We will continue to invest in the
well-being of our All-Volunteer Force. Working with the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and other institutions, we
will make sure our troops and their families get the health
care, job opportunities, and education they have earned and
deserve, just as I did when I co-authored the post-9/11 GI Bill
with Senators Jim Webb, Frank Lautenberg, and John Warner. This
includes focusing on the mental health of our fighting force,
because no one who volunteers to fight and die for this country
should ever feel like that they have nowhere to turn. That is
unacceptable in this country.
In my 12 years in the Senate, my one guiding principle on
every security decision I made and every vote I cast was always
this--simply this: Is our policy worthy of our troops and their
families and the sacrifices that we ask them to make? That same
question will guide me if I am confirmed as Secretary of
Defense.
Our men and women in uniform and their families must never
doubt that their leaders' first priority is them. I believe my
record of leadership on veterans issues over the years, going
back to my service in the Veterans Administration under
President Reagan, demonstrates my rock-solid commitment to our
veterans and their families.
We must always take care of our people. That is why I will
work to ensure that everyone who volunteers to fight for this
country has the same rights and same opportunities. As I have
discussed with many of you in our meetings, I am fully
committed to implementing the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell,
and doing everything possible under current law to provide
equal benefits to the families of all our servicemembers and
their families.
I will work with the Service Chiefs as we officially open
combat positions to women, a decision I strongly support. I
will continue the important work that Leon Panetta has done to
combat sexual assault in the military. Maintaining the health
and well-being of those who serve is critical to maintaining a
strong and capable military, because an institution's people
must always come first.
As we look ahead to the coming years, we have an
extraordinary opportunity now at this moment to define what is
next for America's military and our country. It is incumbent
upon all of us to make decisions that will ensure our Nation is
prepared to confront any threat we may face in the future,
protect our citizens, and remain the greatest force for good in
the world.
If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, it will be my great
honor, working with the President, this committee, Congress,
and our military, to ensure our policies are worthy of the
service and sacrifice of America's men and women.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Here is
what the plan is now for the hearing. We will have a first
round of 8 minutes each. We have a vote that is scheduled for
12:15 p.m. We are going to work through that vote, and we are
also going to work through lunch, which means that we would ask
you to vote some time during that 12:15 p.m. vote and come back
for those of you who have not had your turn yet.
There are five votes at 2:15 p.m. I hope that we can
complete our first round by 2 p.m. or 2:15 p.m. so that we
could then have a late lunch at 2:15 p.m. during those five
votes. We would then come back perhaps an hour later. We would
ask those who have not had a turn, if that is the case, or
during our second round, that to begin our second round that
you on the final vote, vote early and then come back so we can
start as quickly as possible around 3:15 p.m. or 3:30 p.m., I
would assume, to either complete the first round if it has not
been completed, or to begin our second round.
Because of the time crunch, we have standard questions
which we ask of all nominees. I am going to ask those at a
later time during this hearing, but we will ask them. Again, I
think that we hope to finish today. We will leave the record
open for questions. But our goal would be to finish today no
matter how long it takes today, then to have the record open
for questions.
Let us now begin our first round of 8 minutes.
Senator Hagel, you have made reference to the looming
sequester. We received a letter signed by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff relative to sequester which says that we are on the brink
of creating a hollow force due to an unprecedented convergence
of budget conditions and legislation. They have talked about
the readiness crisis which would result: grounding aircraft,
returning ships to port, stop driving combat vehicles,
training, and so forth.
You have spoken very briefly about your agreeing in general
with the impact. Would you expand on the impact of that
sequester from your perspective?
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, I think the Service Chiefs
have laid it out rather directly, plainly, as Secretary Panetta
has. As recently as 2 or 3 days ago, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Ash Carter, in an interview went into some detail.
The fact is, the bottom line if sequester would occur, it
is not just a reduction in a significant amount of dollars that
would occur, but it would be a convergence of taking the
flexibility, the projection, the management, the future, away
from those who are responsible for managing our budget.
Furloughing civilian employees would have to occur. You listed
an inventory of consequences; of cutting back on flying time,
training, steaming. These are real consequences that would
occur.
I know the Pentagon, the Chiefs, those who have
responsibility for managing every department of this 3 million
person operation, security institution, are preparing for the
worst. But make no mistake, this is not an exaggeration. When
managers are not given the flexibility, and the opportunity,
and the tools to manage with complete uncertainty as to what is
ahead, that is disaster.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. On the question of Iran and the
use of force, the President has said that Iran's leaders should
understand that President Obama does not have a policy of
containment. He has a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon, that he has made clear that he will not
hesitate, in his words, to use force when it is necessary to
defend the United States and its interests. Do you agree with
President Obama's position that, ``all options should be on the
table,'' to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon?
Senator Hagel. I do. I have, and I strongly agree with him.
Chairman Levin. On Iranian sanctions, President Obama has
said that the sanctions which have been put in place are
crippling the economy of Iran. I happen to agree. Their
currency has dropped 80 percent. Oil production has plunged.
Their economy is in a shambles. Do you share the President's
views on the importance and effectiveness of sanctions against
Iran? If so, how do you reconcile your position with some of
your past statements that suggest that the national security of
the United States is not served by isolating Iran?
Senator Hagel. First, I have always agreed with
multilateral sanctions because I think they have an effect. I
think this President, in particular, has probably done more
than any president to effectively employ those kinds of
international sanctions starting with a United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council agreement and U.N. mandates. I agree with what
the President is doing. I have said publicly, incidentally long
before the President ever asked me to consider this job, that
additional sanctions might be required.
As to my record on votes in the Senate regarding unilateral
sanctions, I have differed on some of those. I have voted for
some as well. It was always on a case-by-case basis. When I
voted against some of those unilateral sanctions on Iran, it
was a different time. For example, I believe one was in 2001.
We were at a different place with Iran during that time. Matter
of fact, I recall the Bush administration did not want a
renewal of the 5-year renewal of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
(ILSA) during that time because they weren't sure of the
effectiveness of sanctions.
That was not the only reason I voted against it. It was
because I thought that there might be other ways to employ our
vast ability to harness power and allies. It was never a
question of did I disagree with the objective. The objective
was, I think, very clear to both of us.
I recall, for example, in 2008, Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice sending a letter to the Chairman of the Finance
Committee, Senator Max Baucus, requesting that a sanctions
resolution unilateral in the Finance Committee not come out of
the Finance Committee because the Bush administration at the
time was working with the Russians specifically, but with the
Security Council of the United Nations to try to get
international sanctions, which I think that effort, by the way,
in 2008, led to the 2010 international sanctions.
Chairman Levin. Can you give us your view on the size of
the U.S. force which might be necessary or would be necessary
after 2014, the so-called residual force, if you have an
opinion on the size? You indicated in your opening statement
two missions for that residual force.
Can you also give us your opinion about the size of the
Afghanistan National Security Force after 2014, and whether you
agree with me, and Senator Graham on this committee, and others
that we ought to reconsider the position that the Afghanistan
National Security Force should be reduced by a third starting
in 2014 to about 230,000 from what its current goal is, which
is about 350,000.
Senator Hagel. As you all know, General Allen has presented
his options to the President for the President's consideration.
As far as I know, as of this morning, the President had not
made a decision on what a residual force, numbers wise, would
look like. I have not been included in those discussions, so I
do not know, other than knowing that he has a range of options,
as you do.
But I would say that from what the President has told me,
what Secretary Panetta has told me, that decision will be made
to assure resourcing the mission and the capability of that
mission.
As to what kind of a force structure should eventually be
in place by the Afghans, I do not know enough about the
specifics to give you a good answer, other than to say that I
think that has to be a decision that is made certainly with the
President of Afghanistan, what we can do to continue to
support, train, and protect our interests within the scope of
our ability to do that. Obviously the immunity for our troops
is an issue, which was an issue in Iraq. All those
considerations will be important and will be made. If I am
confirmed and in a position to give the President on that, I
will with consultation of our commanders on the ground and our
Service Chiefs giving the best options that we can provide.
Chairman Levin. Will you review that question of the size
of the Afghanistan force with an open mind if you are
confirmed?
Senator Hagel. I will because I think we have to.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel, my first question is not to be responded as
to explaining the position. I want to state the position or
restate the position on five things that I mentioned in my
opening statement, and merely to ask you if these are accurate
reflections of things that happened in the past.
The first one is in 2007, you voted against the designating
of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp as a terrorist
organization. The second thing in 2006, you were 1 of 12
Senators who refused to petition the European Union (EU) to
identify Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Third, in November
2003, you failed to vote on a Syria accountability act
authorizing sanctions on Syria for its support of terrorism and
occupation of Lebanon. Fourth, in 2001, you were one of only
two Senators that year to vote against renewal of the Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act. Lastly, in 2001, you were one of four
Senators who refused to sign the letter supporting Israel. Are
those accurate?
Senator Hagel. Let's start with the----
Senator Inhofe. No, I just want to know if these are votes
that took place. Do you agree that those votes took place?
Senator Hagel. I want to ask about the letter that you just
noted in your fifth point, what was the date in the letter?
Senator Inhofe. The date?
Senator Hagel. You said I refused to sign a letter.
Senator Inhofe. It was October 2001.
Senator Hagel. A letter to----
Senator Inhofe. Okay, skip that one. Are the other ones
true? [Laughter.]
Senator Hagel. It is very important, Senator, that we----
Senator Inhofe. It is very important because I was holding
the letter at the time that we were gathering signatures.
Senator Hagel. I see. On the 2008 question regarding
designating the Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist
organization, I did vote against it.
Senator Inhofe. I am sorry, and I do not want to be rude.
You and I are very good friends, but I know that my time is
going to expire. Others are going to ask you why you did this.
I was asking for the accuracy, and you do not want to answer
that, that is fine.
Senator Hagel. No, I just said I did vote against it, and I
was going to explain why I voted against it.
Senator Inhofe. I know, and they will be asking you for
your explanation. I want to get to three other things, and that
is why it is critical that we keep moving along here.
One of the criticisms I have had of this administration is
the lack of priority and funding for the military. While they
have increased the deficit by $5.3 trillion in 4 years, the
only major part of the budget that has decreased has been the
military.
Now, that is something that is pretty well known. A lot of
people do not like that idea. The thing that bothers me just as
much is putting another agenda under the military budget. For
example, you have heard Senator McCain, and me, and others talk
about the fact that the Navy paid for 450,000 gallons of fuel,
some $26 a gallon that you can get on the market for $3. The
Air Force, the same thing, except that it is $59 a gallon.
The question I would have of you is just a commitment that
if you are confirmed, will you confine the dollars that we are
going to spend in the defense budget for defense purposes, for
warfighting purposes?
Senator Hagel. Of course I will because that is the intent
of our budget and DOD.
Senator Inhofe. Good. I appreciate that very much. There
was an article the other day in the Washington Post by Jennifer
Rubin called ``Our Dimwitted State Department''. It was kind of
an interesting article. There are four questions that I am
going to ask that you respond for the record. For people who do
not know what that is, that means later on in writing.
The questions that I liked that she asked were, did the
sale of the F-16s encourage Mohamed Morsi to crack down on his
people? Number two, had we known he would crack, would we still
have sent the weaponry? Number three, how will we respond to
Morsi's anti-democratic moves and the rise in violence against
Christians in Egypt, or, as will likely be the case, a failure
to live up to Egypt's security obligations regarding Gaza?
Four, have we miscalculated the Muslim Brotherhood? That would
be for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Question. Did the sale of the F-16s encourage Morsi to crack down
on his people?
Answer. I do not believe that there is a correlation between the
sale of F-16s and the recent violence in Egypt. The F-16 aircraft has
been a key component of the U.S. defense relationship with the Egyptian
Armed Forces (EAF) for the last 30 years. The EAF have been a reliable
partner during Egypt's transition, and provided security to reinforce
Egyptian Ministry of Interior forces during elections and when called
upon by President Morsi during the recent protests in the Suez Canal
governorates. I believe it is in U.S. interests to maintain our defense
relationship with Egypt. Working together to maintain the U.S.-Egypt
defense relationship is also in the interest of Israel. It is critical
that the U.S. Government continues to assist with the
professionalization and the building of EAF capabilities to enable
border security, participate in regional missions, and continue Egypt's
role as a pillar of regional stability.
Question. Had we known he would crack down, would we still have
sent the weaponry?
Answer. I cannot speak for the administration, but as I stated, I
do not believe that there is a direct linkage between the sale of F-16s
and the recent unrest in Egypt. I join U.S. and foreign leaders in
condemning the recent violence. It is clear that a large number of
Egyptian citizens are frustrated with the direction and pace of
political and economic reform. It is critical that all stakeholders,
government and opposition, work to address their frustrations and
concerns peacefully and through dialogue.
Question. How will we respond to Morsi's anti-democratic moves and
the rise in violence against Christians in Egypt, or as will likely be
the case, a failure to live up to Egypt's security obligations
regarding Gaza?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take every opportunity to call for a
transparent, inclusive political process grounded in universal rights,
the rule of law, and respect for the rights of women and religious
minorities. The United States maintains the ability to halt assistance
to Egypt if it is determined that there are major reversals in Egypt's
democratic transition, a severe degradation in the rule of law, or
changes in Egypt's foreign or military policy that directly threaten
U.S. interests, including any changes to the Treaty of Peace with
Israel.
I will also be clear with Egyptian leaders that Sinai security
remains a serious concern, which poses risk to Egypt's internal
stability as well as the security of Egypt's neighbor Israel. Restoring
Sinai security requires consistent action against violent groups acting
in the Sinai and weapons smuggling into Gaza. If confirmed, I will look
for opportunities to provide U.S. security assistance through training
and border security equipment to assist Egypt in addressing this shared
security objective, as well as consistently engage senior Egyptian
leaders on Sinai security.
Question. Have we miscalculated the Muslim Brotherhood?
Answer. No. We are clear-eyed about the Egyptian leadership; the
fact is that the Freedom and Justice Party--the political arm of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood--won a majority of votes in Egypt's
presidential elections. President Morsi has publicly committed to
upholding Egypt's international obligations, including the Peace Treaty
with Israel. We need to hold him to these commitments, as he attempts
to lead Egypt's political transition and democratic consolidation,
address Egypt's rapidly deteriorating economy, and develop sustainable
civil-military relations. President Morsi, as the democratically
elected leader of Egypt, has a special responsibility to build national
consensus and strengthen Egypt's democracy. In my view, U.S. support
through economic and security assistance, as well as consistent
engagement, is critical so that Egypt will continue to serve as a
pillar of regional stability and peace.
Question. Do you support a third site of ground-based interceptor?
It would be on the east coast somewhere.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the analysis
Congress requested in section 221 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2013 to evaluate additional missile defense
locations in the United States, including on the east coast, will be
delivered on a timely basis, and that Congress remains informed about
the Department's analysis about how to best protect the U.S. Homeland.

Senator Inhofe. In the area of the Global Zero policy, you
and I talked about that in my office. Others have talked about
it. We are very much concerned.
When I heard Senator Warner and others talk about what used
to be the case, the problem, in terms of nuclear capability, we
used to be talking about Russia and the United States. It is
not true anymore. Our intelligence has told us since 2007 that
Iran will have that nuclear capability and a delivery system by
2015, so it is other countries that are involved in that.
The question I would ask you, in your book you wrote that,
``We must once again convince the world that America has a
clear intention of fulfilling the nuclear disarmament
commitments that we have made.'' Then a bit more recently you
said, ``I believe that providing necessary resources for
nuclear modernization of the triads should be a national
priority.'' Do you stand by your last statement?
Senator Hagel. My last statement was----
Senator Inhofe. Your last statement is saying that, ``I
believe that providing the necessary resources for nuclear
modernization of the triads should be a national priority.''
Senator Hagel. Absolutely it should be, and I agree with
that. That is what the policy of this administration is.
Senator Inhofe. I am merely bringing out the inconsistency
because when you were involved with supporting the Global Zero
or whatever the organization was, their declaration is, ``We,
the undersigned believe that to protect our children, our
grandchildren, our civilization from the threat of nuclear
catastrophe, we must eliminate all nuclear weapons globally.
We, therefore, commit to working for a legally binding
verifiable agreement, including all nations, to eliminate
nuclear weapons by a date certain.''
Senator Hagel. The position of Global Zero, my position,
some of the individuals--national security leaders, as Senator
Nunn talked about, including himself, has never been unilateral
disarmament, ever. Never. We have over the years, which I have
supported, the United States has led the efforts to reducing
nuclear warheads. There was no more significant voice for that
than Ronald Reagan when he laid before Secretary General
Gorbachev in 1986 a rather bold plan. In fact, I believe,
paraphrasing President Reagan, we must eliminate nuclear
warheads from the face of the planet. I believe he said
something to that effect.
Global Zero has been very clear on this. Their effort is in
line with every major national leader in the world, including
President Obama, to continue to try to make an effort to reduce
our nuclear warheads. But in a dangerous world, nuclear
arsenals and our containment policy, which I mentioned in my
statement, has been critically important. We are not going to
unilaterally disarm. Verifiable. It has to be bilateral. It has
to be negotiated, as all our treaties have been.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hagel, but the reason I
mentioned the mission statement is that is the group that you
belong to. We can talk about that later. You may want to expand
on that for the record.
My time has expired, but I have one last question I would
like to ask, and that is, given that Iran--``The people''--and
I am quoting right now--``from Iran, people of the Middle East,
the Muslim region, and North Africa, people of these regions
hate America from the bottom of their heart.'' It further said,
``Israel is a cancerous tumor in the heart of the Islamist
world.'' It further said, ``Iran's warriors are ready and
willing to wipe Israel off the map.''
The question I would like to ask you, and you can answer
for the record if you would like, is, why do you think that the
Iranian foreign ministry so strongly supports your nomination
to be the Secretary of Defense?
Senator Hagel. I have a difficult enough time with American
politics. Senator, I have no idea. But thank you, and I will be
glad to respond further for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Question. The question I would like to ask you, and you can answer
for the record if you would like, is, why do you think that the Iranian
foreign ministry so strongly supports your nomination to be the
Secretary of Defense?
Answer. While I cannot speak to the motivations of the Iranian
Foreign Ministry spokesperson behind making those statements, there
should be no doubt that I fully support and--if confirmed--will
faithfully execute the President's multi-vector strategy towards Iran.
This strategy has included tough-minded diplomacy, crippling sanctions,
and serious contingency planning with the objective of preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would ask unanimous consent that several letters
of support, including one from 13 former Secretaries of
Defense, Secretaries of State, and National Security advisors,
strongly endorsing Senator Hagel's nomination, be placed in the
record.
Chairman Levin. It will be placed in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I think the President chose
wisely. There are very few people in this country with the
experience, as a combat infantryman, decorated and wounded, as
a business leader, as the second leader of the Veterans
Administration, as a U.S. Senator, as someone who every day
understands that the decisions we make will be carried out by
young Americans, actually looked in the face of young
Americans, who has seen them suffer and die for this country. I
think that quality is, if not unique, extraordinarily part of
the nominee before us. Again, I think the President made a wise
choice.
I think Senator Inhofe's discussions of the Global Zero
Report is an opportunity for a quote, and let me quote. ``There
is one way safely and legitimately to reduce the cost of
national security, and that is to reduce the need for it. This
is what we are trying to do in negotiations with the Soviet
Union. We are not just assessing limits on a further increase
of nuclear weapons. We seek instead to reduce the number. We
seek the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the
face of the Earth.'' President Ronald Reagan in his second
inaugural address.
The notion of Global Zero is not something unique. I would
also point out that as signatories to the nuclear disarmament
treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty, Article 6 undertakes to
commit at least to a treaty ultimately on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective control.
This is an aspiration that the United States has embraced
for a very long time under presidents of both parties. I think,
as Senator Hagel pointed out, this is not unilateral
disarmament. This is a long process of making sure we have the
nuclear weapons in place to deal with appropriate challenges,
some of them very different than the Cold War, but the
aspiration is important. It has been a bipartisan and constant
one for decades. Is that a rough summary of what you might
agree to, Senator?
Senator Hagel. Yes, it is, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Reed. The other issue is that there were several
specific points raised with your record, and let me give you
the opportunity to respond, if you will, to the questions that
Senator Inhofe posed with respect to votes. If you have the
list before you or----
Senator Hagel. The what? I'm sorry?
Senator Reed. Senator Inhofe posed several issues about a
2007 vote, a 2006 resolution with Hezbollah, 2003 Syrian
sanctions, et cetera. You were prepared to comment. I think it
is appropriate that you have an opportunity to comment. If you
want to do so now, I would invite you to do so.
Senator Hagel. I would be glad to further comment for the
record because I have none of those specific quotes in front of
me, and which I will, Senator, listing every vote I took.
I would say, though, included in those votes, which I do
recall some of them, was a vote in 1998, a vote in 2000, a vote
in 2006, specifically against Iran, sanctioning companies,
unilateral sanctions, that in any way assisted in Iran's
building their capability of nuclear weapons or rocket or
missiles. I voted for those.
I recall signing a letter, a Warner-Levin letter in 2002 to
the President of the United States regarding anti-Semitism in
Russia. I wrote a letter to President Clinton specifically in
1999 recommending to President Clinton a number of steps that
he take with President Yeltsin regarding anti-Semitism in
Russia. I remember specifically there were two unanimous
consent resolutions in 2006 against Hezbollah, against Hamas,
against Syria, and Iran that we had unanimous consent, I
supported on the floor of the Senate.
So there is a more complete record, Senator, than just one,
or two, or three, or four, and those are some of them that I
recall. As I noted in one of the responses back to Senator
Inhofe, I did not take any action on any vote, as I suspect
every colleague has the same way to approach votes, on this
specific issue, on Hezbollah, Hamas, which I am on the record
many times designating and saying that Hezbollah and Hamas are
terrorist organizations. I am on the record many times in
speeches, and on the floor of the Senate, and in the book I
wrote in 2008 saying that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.
That is not new. That is in my record.
But the way I approached every vote I ever took in the
Senate was based on what I thought could be most effective,
what was the situation at the time, how could we do this
smarter and better. I have always believed that the President
of the United States is the elected leader of America. He has
within his responsibilities, and I believe it is clearly
articulated in Article 2, to conduct foreign policy. I always
thought the best way to deal with foreign leaders was let the
President do that directly, for us to communicate with the
President.
I do not think there was a letter that I can recall I
signed to a President on any of these issues that I agreed with
it that I did not sign. So it was never a matter of differing
objectives here. It was a matter of how best we could do it.
I mentioned in 2008, the Secretary of State did not want
one of those unilateral sanctions to go forward during the Bush
administration, wrote a letter, 2001, which is one of the
issues that Senator Inhofe brought up. The Bush administration
was opposed to a 5-year renewal of ILSA.
Now, I am not saying that is right or wrong, but every one
of the decisions I made, every vote I cast, was based on at the
time what I thought made the most sense.
[The information referred to follows:]

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Senator Reed. Senator, you have clearly stated that you are
supportive of the President's efforts to support the State of
Israel. You have indicated specifically the example of Iron
Dome. I recall a statement recently by Defense Minister Barak
that he has seldom seen or never has seen the same level of
military support to the State of Israel that he has seen in the
last several years.
You are, I presume and I hope, fully prepared to carry out
that same effort, that same level of support, because of the
vital interests that we share with the State of Israel.
Senator Hagel. I am, and I have a record on that. In my
book in 2008, interviews, speeches, I have always said I am a
supporter of Israel. In some cases, I have said I am a strong
supporter of Israel. In some cases I have even written, and I
think it is in my book, that we have a special relationship
with Israel. We always have had.
I have never voted against Israel ever in the 12 years I
was in the Senate whether it was military authorizations,
additional supplemental appropriations. The record is very
clear on that.
I might add, as long as we are on this subject, that--and
Senator Nelson may have a clearer view of this since he was
just in Jerusalem, there have been a couple of recent
statements made by the current Israeli Ambassador to the United
States, the former Israeli Ambassador to the United States, now
the Deputy Foreign Minister of Israel, that were fairly
positive about me.
I think all the Israeli leaders I have dealt with over the
years and met, I have been to Israel many times. The first two
times I was in Israel was when I was the head of the United
Services Organizations (USO). I kept the Haifa USO open. We did
not close it. There was a lot of pressure when I took over the
World USO to close USOs around the world, and we did. There was
a lot of pressure to close the Haifa USO. I am the one that
made the decision not to do that.
The former Chief of Naval Operations of Israel, Admiral Zev
Almad, who has recently been interviewed about me, has strongly
supported me and said specifically that I was a strong friend
of Israel. Now the USO is closed, but the current then director
of the USO, a lady by the name of Gila Garrison, who lives in
Haifa, said I was a strong supporter and friend of Israel.
I think my record is pretty clear on my support of Israel,
and I would, of course, continue to support the President's
policies. I think he has been as strong a supporter of Israel
as maybe any President since 1948 when Harry Truman helped give
birth to Israel. This President has been there. As he said, I
have Israel's back--$3.1 billion in assistance, almost $300
additional million out of the Defense Department for Iron Dome,
what we are doing with David Sling Arrow. I am a strong
supporter of all those programs and will continue to support
them.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Before I call on Senator McCain,
there is a quorum that is now present, and I now ask the
committee to consider a list of 952 pending military
nominations. They have all been before the committee the
required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report those nominations?
Unidentified Speaker. I so move.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Unidentified Speaker. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye? [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, any? [No response.]
The motion carries. Thank you all very much.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on January 31,
2013.
1. MG William H. Etter, ANG to be lieutenant general and Commander,
First Air Force (Air Force North) and Commander, Continental U.S. North
American Aerospace Defense Command Region (Reference No. 53)
2. MG Kenneth E. Tovo, USA to be lieutenant general and Commander,
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan/Commander, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan (Reference
No. 59)
3. Col. Barbara R. Holcomb, USA to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 62).
4. Col. Patrick D. Sargent, USA to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 63).
5. In the Army there are two appointments to the grade of major
general (list begins with Brian C. Lein) (Reference No. 64).
6. In the Air Force there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Kory D. Bingham) (Reference No. 70).
7. In the Air Force Reserve there are three appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Michael A. Cooper) (Reference No.
71).
8. In the Air Force Reserve there are four appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Victor Douglas Brown) (Reference No.
72).
9. In the Air Force Reserve there are four appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Walter S. Adams) (Reference No. 73).
10. In the Air Force Reserve there are six appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with John J. Bartrum) (Reference No. 74).
11. In the Air Force Reserve there are eight appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Kimberly L. Barber) (Reference No.
75).
12. In the Air Force Reserve there are 11 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Dina L. Bernstein) (Reference No. 76).
13. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Timothy Lee Brininger) (Reference No. 77).
14. In the Air Force Reserve there are 198 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Francis Xavier Altieri) (Reference
No. 78).
15. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Jonathan A. Foskey) (Reference No. 79).
16. In the Army Reserve there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Marion J. Parks) (Reference No. 80).
17. In the Army Reserve there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Karen A. Pike) (Reference No. 81).
18. In the Army there are two appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Derek S. Reynolds) (Reference No. 82).
19. In the Army there are two appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Edward A. Figueroa) (Reference No. 83).
20. In the Army Reserve there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jack C. Mason) (Reference No. 84).
21. In the Army Reserve there are 79 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Ruth E. Aponte) (Reference No. 85).
22. In the Army there are 88 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Leslie E. Akins) (Reference No. 86).
23. In the Army Reserve there are 217 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Timothy G. Abrell) (Reference No. 87).
24. In the Army Reserve there are 225 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Rafael E. Abreu) (Reference No. 88).
25. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Jackie W. Morgan, Jr.) (Reference No. 91).
26. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Dana R. Fike) (Reference No. 92).
27. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Samuel W. Spencer III) (Reference No. 93).
28. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Larry Miyamoto) (Reference No. 94).
29. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with George L. Roberts) (Reference No.
97).
30. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Richard D. Kohler) (Reference No.
98).
31. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Eric T. Cline) (Reference No. 100).
32. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jose L. Sada) (Reference No. 101).
33. In the Marine Corps there are three appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Frederick L. Hunt) (Reference No. 102).
34. In the Marine Corps there are three appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Todd E. Lotspeich) (Reference No. 103).
35. In the Marine Corps there are three appointments to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jason B. Davis) (Reference No.
104).
36. In the Marine Corps there are three appointments to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Travis M. Fulton) (Reference
No. 105).
37. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Bryan Delgado) (Reference No.
106).
38. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with David B. Blann) (Reference No. 107).
39. In the Marine Corps there are five appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Michael Gasperini) (Reference No. 108).
40. In the Marine Corps there are six appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Stephen R. Byrnes) (Reference No. 109).
41. In the Marine Corps there are seven appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Peter K. Basabe, Jr.) (Reference No. 110).
42. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of commander
(Harry E. Hayes) (Reference No. 115).
43. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Shemeya L. Grant) (Reference No. 116).
44. In the Navy there are two appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with Christopher J. Kaine) (Reference
No. 117).
45. In the Navy there are 29 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Jeanine F. Benjamin) (Reference
No. 118).
Total: 952.

Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to
see an old friend here before the committee, and especially
pleased to see Senator Warner and Senator Nunn, two of the
great members of this committee, who have contributed so much
to our Nation's defense.
Senator Hagel, members of this committee will raise
questions reflecting concerns with your policy positions. They
are not reasonable people disagreeing. They have fundamental
disagreements. Our concerns pertain to the quality of your
professional judgment and your world view on critical areas of
national security, including security in the Middle East.
With that in mind, let me begin with your opposition to the
surge in Iraq. In 2006, Republicans lost the election, and we
began the surge, and you wrote a piece in the Washington Post
called ``Leaving Iraq Honorably''. In 2007, you said it is not
in the national interests to deepen its military involvement.
In January 2007, in a rather bizarre exchange with Secretary
Rice in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after some
nonsense about Syria and crossing the border into Iran and
Syria because of Syria, and a reference to Cambodia in 1970,
you said, ``When you set in motion the kind of policy the
President is talking about here, it's very, very dangerous.
Matter of fact, I have to say, Madam Secretary, I think the
speech given last night by this President represents the most
dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam.
If it is carried out, I will resist it.'' Then of course you
continued on and on for months afterwards talking about what a
disaster the surge would be, even to the point where it was
clear the surge was succeeding.
In March 2008, you said, ``Here the term quagmire could
apply. Some reject that term, but if that is not a quagmire,
then what is?'' Even as late as August 29, 2011, in an
interview with the Financial Times, you said, ``I disagreed
with President Obama, his decision to surge in Afghanistan as I
did with President Bush on the surge in Iraq.''
Do you stand by those comments, Senator Hagel?
Senator Hagel. Senator, I stand by them because I made
them.
Senator McCain. Were you right? Were you correct in your
assessment?
Senator Hagel. I would defer to the judgment of history to
support that out.
Senator McCain. The committee deserves your judgment as to
whether you were right or wrong about the surge.
Senator Hagel. I will explain why I made those comments.
Senator McCain. I want to know if you were right or wrong.
That is a direct question. I expect a direct answer.
Senator Hagel. The surge assisted in the objective. But if
we review the record a little bit----
Senator McCain. Will you please answer the question? Were
you correct or incorrect when you said that ``The surge would
be the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country
since Vietnam.'' Where you correct or incorrect, yes or no?
Senator Hagel. My reference to the surge being the most
dangerous----
Senator McCain. Are you going to answer the question,
Senator Hagel? The question is, were you right or wrong? That
is a pretty straightforward question. I would like an answer
whether you were right or wrong, and then you are free to
elaborate.
Senator Hagel. I am not going to give you a yes or no
answer on a lot of things today.
Senator McCain. Let the record show that you refuse to
answer that question. Now, please go ahead.
Senator Hagel. If you would like me to explain why----
Senator McCain. I actually would like an answer, yes or no.
Senator Hagel. I am not going to give you a yes or no. I
think it is far more complicated that, as I have already said.
My answer is, I will defer that judgment to history.
As to the comment I made about the most dangerous foreign
policy decision since Vietnam was about not just the surge, but
the overall war of choice going into Iraq. That particular
decision that was made on the surge, but more to the point, our
war in Iraq, I think was the most fundamental bad, dangerous
decision since Vietnam.
Aside from the cost that occurred in this country through
blood and treasure, aside what that did to take our focus off
of Afghanistan, which, in fact, was the original and real focus
of a national threat to this country, Iraq was not. I always
tried to frame all the different issues before I made a
decision on anything.
Now, just as you said, Senator, we can have differences of
opinion, but that is essentially why I took the position I did.
Senator McCain. It is a fundamental difference of opinion,
Senator Hagel. Senator Graham and I, and Senator Lieberman,
when there were 59 votes in the U.S. Senate, spent our time
trying to prevent that 60th. Thank God for Senator Lieberman. I
think history has already made a judgment about the surge, sir,
and you are on the wrong side of it. Your refusal to answer
whether you were right or wrong about it is going to have an
impact on my judgment as to whether to vote for your
confirmation or not. I hope you will reconsider the fact that
you refuse to answer a fundamental question about an issue that
took the lives of thousands of young Americans.
Senator Hagel. Senator, there was more to it than
flooding----
Senator McCain. I am asking about the surge, Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. I know you are, and I am trying to explain
my position. The beginning of the surge also factored in what
General Allen had put into place in Anbar Province, the Sunni
Awakening. We put over 100,000 young soldiers----
Senator McCain. Senator Hagel, I am very well aware of the
history of the surge and the Anbar Awakening, and I also am
aware that any casual observer will know that the surge was the
fundamental factor, led by two great leaders, General Petraeus
and Ambassador----
Senator Hagel. Well, I do not know if that would have been
required and cost us over 1,000 American lives and thousands of
wounded.
Senator McCain. So you do not know if the surge would have
been required. Okay.
Senator Hagel, let me go to Syria now. More than 60,000
people have been killed in Syria. Do you believe that we should
be more engaged in Syria?
Senator Hagel. I know this administration is very engaged
in working with its partners.
Senator McCain. So you do not think we should do more?
Senator Hagel. When you say ``do more,'' do you mean----
Senator McCain. Do you think we should make sure that the
Syrians get the weapons they need, and perhaps establish a no
fly zone? Do you think we do?
Senator Hagel. I believe that part of our review is looking
at those options.
Senator McCain. It has been 22 months, Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. I was not there. I do not know the details.
I am not there now.
Senator McCain. I am sure you have read in the newspapers
that 60,000 people have been killed, and that it is in danger
of spilling over into neighboring countries. My question, I
guess, is how many more would have to die before you would
support arming the resistance and establishing a no fly zone?
Senator Hagel. I do not think anyone questions the terrible
tragedy that is occurring there every day. It is a matter of
how best do we work our way through this so that we can stop it
to begin with, and then what comes next. I think the
President----
Senator McCain. Did you disagree with President Obama on
his decision for the surge in Afghanistan?
Senator Hagel. I did not think we should get ourselves
into--first of all, I had no regional position as far as no
formal position. But I did not think we were----
Senator McCain. But you were reported on August 29, 2011
saying, ``I disagreed with President Obama and his decision to
surge in Afghanistan.''
Senator Hagel. That was my personal opinion, yes.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Since the issue of Iraq has come up here, I
just want to state for the record and lay the predicate that
this Senator was one of many that voted for the authorization
to go into Iraq, and as it turns out, the lessons of history,
we were given incorrect information as a justification for
going into Iraq.
We were told by the Secretary of Defense, by the Secretary
of State, by the National Security advisor, and the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that there were weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq. So for a lot of the decisions that
were made at the outset, they were decisions that were informed
with incorrect information. As the committee is judging Senator
Hagel on that decision as well as others, I want to tell the
committee what was this experience of this Senator.
Now, what I would like to do with my time here is that
since there are a few of this in this room that served in the
military during the Vietnam era, and you clearly had that
experience in combat, Senator Hagel, I would--and by the way, a
lot of people do not know anything about Vietnam, and do not
know how difficult it was, as Senator Warner has so eloquently
stated in his comments, how the Nation was divided.
But I would like for you, as the committee is getting to
know you, to know something about your service in Vietnam, and
your combat experience. Were you wounded, Senator Hagel?
Senator Hagel. Senator Nelson, thank you. If I may, and if
I read into your question some latitude in answering, I would
respond this way. I think my time is better served to maybe
talk about more of the specific things, like Senator McCain
asked me about and some others. Maybe weave some of my
experience as to how it formed my judgment, rather than going
through a 12-month journal of my time in the jungles when my
brother, Tom, and I were both wounded twice together.
When Tom and I served there, 1968 was the worst year we
had. Those who may not recall that year, we sent over 16,000
dead Americans home. Now, that is unfathomable in the world
that we live in today, 16,000 dead Americans. I saw that from
the bottom.
I think Chairman Levin, in an accurate and appropriate
quote about what I said, in his introductory statements about
what formed me, and it directly goes to Senator McCain's
question about the surge. Just as I said in my statement, I had
one fundamental question that I asked myself on every vote I
took, every decision I made. Was the policy worthy of the men
and women that we were sending into battle and surely to their
deaths? In many cases, unfortunately tens of thousands of cases
that we are living with, these poor families are living with,
wounded, the results, the consequences.
I know it is easy here--it is anywhere--if you do not have
a connection to some of this to see these things a little
differently. It does not mean I am any better, Senator. It does
not mean I am any smarter. It does not mean I am any more
appreciative of the service of our country. That is not it. I
saw it from the bottom. I saw what happens. I saw the
consequences and the suffering when we are at war.
So I did question a surge. It was not an aberration to me
ever. I always ask the question, is this going to be worth the
sacrifice, because there will be sacrifice. In the surge case
in Iraq, we lost almost 1,200 dead Americans during that surge
and thousands of wounded. Now, was it required? Was it
necessary? Senator McCain has his opinion on that shared by
others. I am not sure. I am not that certain that it was
required. Now it does not mean I am right. It does not mean I
did not make wrong votes. But that is what guides me.
You asked me the question about my time in Vietnam and was
I wounded. I was a very insignificant part of this. We were
just doing our job, Senator, as every military person knows
that. Some of this committee has rather distinguished members
who served, starting with Senator McCain, and the sacrifices he
has made to this country.
But it does condition you. I am not shaped, framed, molded,
consumed by that experience. Of course not. But it is part of
me. I tried to explain that in my opening statement. We are all
shaped by those experiences. I hope that experience that I have
had is for the better. I hope if I have the privilege of
serving as Secretary of Defense it will put someone in charge
at the Pentagon--not questioning past Secretaries of Defense; I
can only speak for myself--who understands the realities of
consequences of war. It does not mean I am better, but that is
who I am. I do not walk away from that. I acknowledge that. But
it does not consume me, Senator.
I do not see the lens of every world event and whether we
should use American power through the lens of Vietnam. That is
part of me. It is part of that lens. I think that is for the
better. I think we need to be cautious with our power. I think
we need to be wise with our power.
We have great power. We have awesome power. No nation in
the world is even in our league. We have done so much good with
that power. I do not think there is a nation in the history of
man who has ever been as judicious and careful with its power
as we have. I want to make sure we continue to do that, as you
all do.
We will have differences, Senator, on policies, but all I
can do is my best based on my own experiences. As I also said
in my statement, reaching out, listening, learning, never
knowing enough, understand circumstances change.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Hagel, it is great to
have you with us and to have this hearing and an opportunity to
discuss important issues. I admire your service to your
country, and your combat experience is something we all honor
and respect.
I have been for the most part chairman, ranking member, or
member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of this Senate
Armed Services Committee for the time I have been in the
Senate. We came into the Senate together. So I have had some
experience and knowledge about the great debates involving
nuclear weapons and national security. I believe the Secretary
of Defense should be the core, the rock-solid person, for
defense of America. I believe he should project an image of
solidity and steadfastness that the whole world and American
people can depend on.
I am more than a little troubled by the report that you
participated in--the Global Zero report that calls for the
total elimination of nuclear weapons, and clearly suggests that
is an achievable goal in a realistic period of time, although
certainly not immediately. Your report writers defend you. They
have issued an article defending you and the report that was
just issued last year. They protest mightily and say that,
``Chuck Hagel and Global Zero's views on nuclear weapons are in
the national security interests and squarely in the
mainstream.''
Indeed, your defendants insist you are in the mainstream
because your position is that of President Obama's, and
dramatically they assert you are out of the mainstream if you
believe otherwise.
So your report explicitly calls for, ``an urgent and
transformational change in the U.S. nuclear force structure,
strategy, and posture''. I think it is a rather exceedingly
dramatic report frankly.
Now, specifically as to the historic nuclear force triad
that has been the bedrock of our defense policy for half a
century, your report calls for bilaterally or unilaterally
totally eliminating the intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) triad leg. In fact, the report refers to itself as a
dyad instead of a triad report. You propose eliminating the 76
nuclear B-52 bombers entirely, leaving only 18 B-2 bombers,
reducing nuclear submarines from 14 to 10.
Further, the committee report that you were one of the five
members that produced it, you favor eliminating all tactical
nuclear weapons, de-alerting all weapons, and according to the
report as I read it, that would mean it would take from 1 to 3
days to place a weapon on alert. I certainly agree that that
would be a transformational change in our nuclear force
structure, strategy, and posture. I think it is a big historic
thing.
Now, General Kehler, the present Commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and Secretary of Air Force Mike
Donley do not agree with the recommendations in this report,
people you will supervise. General Kehler told the press on
August 8, 2012, ``I do not support the former vice chairman,''
and that is General Cartwright. ``I do not think that we are in
a place he suggests now, nor do I see that particular place any
time soon.'' So you will be supervising him.
Would you share with us where you are today on that issue?
Do you support the view of General Kehler, or do you support
the view of the commission report that you signed?
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Senator. Let me first correct
some of your interpretation of what the Global Zero report was,
and is, and what it actually said.
First, it did not propose or call for anything. It was, in
fact--the word specifically used at the front end of that
report was ``illustrative,'' proposing nothing, but laying out
different scenarios, and possibilities, and schedules. But here
is the key part of all this, and by the way, this was
summarized in a letter to President Obama in 2009. Bilateral,
never unilateral. Nothing was ever suggested on a unilateral
basis to take down our arsenal. Negotiated, verifiable. These
are all terms that were in the report.
As Senator Nunn said in his opening statement, and I have
alluded generally to this, the mainstream thinking of most
Presidents we have had the last 65 years, and I go back to
Ronald Reagan's comments as Senator Nunn quoted, was reduction
of nuclear weapons for the obvious reasons. That is why we have
engaged in treaties to reduce nuclear weapons. Those were not
unilateral arrangements, those were bilateral arrangements.
The United States and the Russians have about 90 percent of
the nuclear in the world today. Now there are others who have
them. There are nine nuclear powers, dangerous. Obviously the
so-called loose nukes or non-state actors, terrorist groups
getting a hold of these are threats.
Senator Sessions. But, Senator Hagel, I think----
Senator Hagel. I just want to make sure that is clear.
Senator Sessions. I know, but it is not clear in your
report. The report says on page 1, ``These steps could be taken
with Russia in unison through reciprocal presidential
directives, negotiated in another round of bilateral arms
reductions, or in implemented unilateral.'' A little further
on----
Senator Hagel. Well, that is not proposing.
Senator Sessions.--it says it two more times in this report
that these ideas could be a--less good approach would be to
adopt this agenda unilaterally. It suggests that it should be
adopted. That would not be as good, but you would do so. There
is another reference to that, and it does call for these
reductions. In your conclusion, you say, ``The United States
should seek to achieve such reductions in 10 years and plan to
base its arsenal on a dyad of nuclear delivery vehicles.''
You go on to say, ``Trident missile submarines--the optimal
mix would consist of 10 Trident submarines and 18 B-2 bombers,
the normal conditions it would have for the warhead stockpile
would be deployed on these carriers. The other half would be
kept in reserve. All land-based intercontinental missiles armed
with nuclear payloads would be retired, along with carriers of
non-strategic nuclear warheads, all of which would be
eliminated. That is the tactical nuclear weapons, all of which
would be eliminated from the stockpile. B-52 bombers would be
completely dismantled or converted to carry only conventional
weapons.''
I do not believe that is consistent with the policy of the
country as a whole. I supported legislation to create a
bipartisan commission several years ago to help us--Senator
Levin and others supported that. The House supported it, and it
passed--to help us determine how much further we can continue
to draw down our nuclear weapons. It was chaired by William
Perry, the Secretary of Defense under Carter, James
Schlesinger, who served in the Carter and Nixon cabinets. It
had John Glenn on it, Martin Halperin, Lee Hamilton, James
Woolsey, Keith Paine, and others. They had access to the
Defense Department secret documents and information, and they
came out with quite a different view.
Let me just point out some of the things that they came up
with. They said maintain the triad. They said maintain tactical
nuclear weapons. They recommended no change in the alert
statute, and, in fact, the Defense Department's nuclear posture
review under President Obama and Secretary Gates, explicitly
found the alert status should not be altered in their review of
nuclear weapons. They fundamentally found a need for nuclear
weapons. That is the point. Your commission basically said that
it undermines the request for nuclear weapons.
I will give you a chance to respond. On Global Zero, they
sort of I think foresaw this argument. Before your report was
issued, they said this, ``The conditions that might make
possible the global elimination of nuclear weapons are not
present today, and their creation would require a fundamental
transformation of the world political order.''
That is a very strong statement, and I think it was aimed
at this idea that is practical and realistic for us to expect
that the world is going to move to zero nuclear weapons.
So first, I want to ask you one question that you told me
in our meeting that I appreciated. President Obama stated when
we did the New START treaty discussion, vote, and debate, ``I
intend to modernize or replace the triad of strategy nuclear
systems, a heavy bomber, and air launch cruise missile, and
ICBM, and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.''
He committed to, ``accelerate the design of the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility and the
Uranium Processing Facility''--those are the two buildings
where our modernizations would take place--``and request full
funding for those projects''.
First, let me ask you, would you support that vision and
commitment the President made?
Senator Hagel. Absolutely I do, and----
Senator Sessions. Then you are free to respond to what I
was saying. But I really do feel that--I am uneasy about this
vision expressed in that committee report of yours.
Senator Hagel. Let me just briefly come back to what you
said, Senator, and I appreciate you giving me a chance to
respond.
First, my record has always been very clear, everything I
have voted on in my career in the Senate and wherever I have
been. A strong, agile, safe, secure, effective, nuclear arsenal
for the United States is not debatable. I voted that way. I
believe that. You know that the home of STRATCOM is now in
Senator Fischer's State, which used to be the State I
represented or I used to be in that State as a Senator. It has
not changed.
I know a little something about it, not as much as you and
others on the committee, but I have been to that facility many
times. I know General Kehler very well, know all the STRATCOM
commanders very well. You know what the motto of STRATCOM is.
It is a pretty significant motto. ``Peace is our business.''
What has kept the peace, as I noted in my opening statement
as much as anything else in the world since World War II, is
that nuclear deterrent. This prospective, Secretary of Defense,
would never do anything or in any way take any action that
would minimize, or harm, or downgrade that reality. But again,
I go back to--not to get caught up in this report. This report
was about illustrative possibilities, what and how could things
be done. Always bilateral. Always verifiable. Always
negotiable, just as we have always done in our treaties.
I will stop there. That is the commitment I make to you. I
made it to the President. My record is clear on that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. I think we have to move on.
Senator Sessions. Just thank you. I would just say the
vision stated in your Global Zero report, I believe, is likely
to create instability rather than confidence and stability,
create uncertainty in the world among our allies and our
potential adversaries. I do not believe it would meet the goal
that you said not to weaken our ability.
So I am troubled that--I feel--I appreciate your comments
today, but I am troubled by the language in that report.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the 6 years
I have served on this committee, I have served under Senator
Warner as a ranking Republican member, and Senator McCain as a
ranking Republican member. I have to tell you that there has
never been a time that I did not sense that we all agreed that
our work on behalf of our Nation in terms of protecting our
country and defending our country, that it was a bipartisan
effort.
I believe very strongly that this committee needs to be
bipartisan. I hope that the new ranking member holds the same
regard for that as Senator McCain and Senator Warner did,
because at all times I felt that they were respectful and were
willing to listen to our disagreements. I am hopeful that will
continue, and I will be optimistic that it will.
I am going to ask a series of questions, and then at the
end of them, if you need more time, just say so.
Do you believe that all options should be on the table when
we confront Iran?
Senator Hagel. Absolutely.
Senator McCaskill. Do you believe Iran is currently a state
sponsor of terrorism and provides material support to Hezbollah
and to Hamas?
Senator Hagel. Yes, and I am on the record a number of
times saying that.
Senator McCaskill. Do you support sanctions against Iran?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. Do you believe that the United States
should unilaterally eliminate its nuclear arsenal?
Senator Hagel. No.
Senator McCaskill. Do you agree with four national security
leaders, including Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry,
and George Schultz, President Reagan's Secretary of State, when
they said, ``The four of us have come together in a nonpartisan
effort, deeply committed to building support for a global
effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their
spread into potentially dangerous hands, and to ultimately to
end them as a threat to the world. We remain committed to
working towards this vision and advancing the steps essential
to achieve this goal.'' Do you agree with those four bipartisan
national leaders in the area of national security and foreign
policy?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. I wanted to take a few minutes to talk
about some of the things we talked about in my office, and some
people on the committee are going, oh, here she goes on
contracting, but the auditability of the Defense Department.
I know you stated in some of the advance policy questions
that you want to hold people accountable on auditability. I do
not think most Americans realize that as we face shrinking
budgets and as we want to secure the preeminence of our
military, and not hollow out the spending at the Defense
Department, that auditability is a crucial ingredient to us
being able to figure out whether all the money that is being
spent there is being spent like Americans would want it to be
spent.
Can you reassure me that auditability, as prescribed by
law, coming through this committee, that it needs to happen no
later than 2017? Can you make a commitment to me today on the
record that will be a priority of yours, making sure as,
Secretary Panetta did and Secretary Gates before him, that
auditability will be an essential priority of your time as
Secretary of Defense?
Senator Hagel. As I told you, Senator, I will. I make that
commitment to this committee.
Senator McCaskill. Then turning to contracting, I have yet
to have provided to me, other than raw numbers that we spent,
any data that would indicate that major infrastructure
rebuilding as part of a counterinsurgency strategy works.
There are many things that work in a counterinsurgency
strategy, and one of them, as it was originally posed to me
back some 6 years ago on this committee by General Petraeus,
was that the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
funds, that walking around money to fix plate glass windows in
neighborhoods, that that was an essential part of the
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.
That morphed into our military building major
infrastructure projects without really any data ever to
indicate that the billions of dollars that we were spending
was, in fact, advancing our military mission.
In addition to that, it is clear if you want to look at
Iraq and the failures that Iraq represents in some ways, one of
the failures is the crumbling investments that this country
made in Iraq: the health centers that never opened, the water
parks that sit crumbling, the power facilities that were blown
up before they even had an opportunity to operate. I can go
down billions of dollars of waste because we didn't do the
analysis on sustainability after we left.
I am convinced that we have made the same mistakes in
Afghanistan. I would like your response to this issue of major
infrastructure building while we are in a conflict being
conducted by our military, not by the U.S. Agency for
International Development, not by the State Department, and
whether or not you would make a commitment to come back to this
committee with a report analyzing whether or not there is data
to support that aspect of the COIN strategy.
Senator Hagel. I will make that commitment, and it is part
of the larger series of questions and factors always involved
when a nation gets clearly committed, as we were, and still
are, in Afghanistan, and were in Iraq for 8 years. When you are
at war, the highest first priority is to take care of your
people. As a result of that, all the rest of the normal
latitude, and guidance, theory, and policy, is secondary.
I think in both of those wars, because we got ourselves in
so deep with so many people, and the welfare of our men and
women was paramount, we tried a lot of things. We had never
been this way before. We had never seen anything quite like
these two situations. As a result, our Special Inspectors
General have come up with billions and billions and billions of
dollars that are unaccounted for, corruption, fraud, waste,
abuse. It really is quite astounding. But when you think about
the universe of money that went into both those wars, no one
should be surprised.
Now, how do we fix it? What do we do? To your point, how do
we learn? How do we learn from this? We need to learn from
this. It was not the fault of the military. The military was
asked to do everything. We overloaded the circuits of our
military. We said, you do it. You have the money. You have the
structure. You have the organization. You have the people. Now
go do it.
We put these people--these young captains--you talked about
CERP funds--in very difficult spots. These young captains were
given $100,000 in cash, essentially walking around money to
take care of tribal chiefs and so on and so on. It wasn't their
fault. They were told to do this. This is what was part of the
strategy.
I do not question necessarily any particular strategy or
part of it, but I do think it is part of the whole that you are
talking about. If I am confirmed and go over there, I will take
a look at this, and we will go deeper and wider into this
because we owe it to our people. We owe it to the people of
this country who pay the bills. For the future, what did we
learn for future challenges?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Chuck, again,
congratulations on your nomination. As we talked the other day,
you and I have been good friends since I came to the Senate in
2002, sat next to each other for 6 years on the Intel
Committee, and during that process you cast some votes that I
questioned. But we were always able to dialogue, and it never
impacted our friendship, and I am very appreciative of that.
You also were introduced by two of my dearest friends,
Senator Nunn and Senator Warner, which certainly is a credit to
you.
I want to drill down, Chuck, on the issue that I think is
going to be very much at the forefront--probably the number one
issue you are going to have to deal with, assuming that you are
confirmed, and that is the issue of our relationship with Iran
and where we go in the future, short term as well as long term.
Now, you wrote in your book, ``We blundered into Iraq
because of flawed intelligence, flawed assumptions, flawed
judgments, and ideologically driven motives. We must not repeat
these errors with Iran, and the best way to avoid them is to
maintain an effective dialogue.'' You then go on to advocate
again, ``for a direct and strategic diplomatic initiative''.
Now, I heard you in your opening comments say that your
position on Iran is prevention, not containment, when it comes
to their nuclear weaponization. I want you to expand on that,
and I want to go back to Senator Inhofe and Senator Reed's
question or comment relative to why you did not vote to
designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Council as a
terrorist organization.
Iran is the number one terrorist sponsoring state in the
world. I do not think there is any disagreement about that. I
want you to expand on your position on a nuclear weaponized
Iran, and talk about red lines. If your position is truly
prevention and not containment, Chuck, what is the red line?
What is the point? We know there are some things happening over
there right now that are very serious. So how far do we go?
Do you still advocate direct negotiations with Iran as you
said and you made clear that all options are on the table, and
you stated again that military options is one of those. If you
will, talk about direct negotiation. We have never negotiated
with a terrorist state. Why do you feel like that we ought to
dialogue with them, even on this issue today?
Lastly, what alterations, if any, do you think are
necessary to our military force posture in the Gulf region to
deter Iranian regional ambitions and support international
diplomatic efforts to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
capability? That is a broad statement on my part, broad
question, but this is the issue from a national security
standpoint, Chuck, and I would like you to be pretty specific.
Senator Hagel. Let us start with the specific question on a
vote regarding designating the Revolutionary Guard as a
terrorist organization. You recall because you were there,
there were 22 Senators who voted against that. The effort
against it, the main point made on the floor of the Senate came
from Senator Jim Webb. His point was we have never, ever
designated a part of a legitimate government, a state--and when
I say ``legitimate,'' it does not mean we agree with Iran, but
it is a member of the United Nations. Almost all of our allies
have embassies in Iran. So that is why I note an elected
legitimate government, whether we agree or not.
But we have never made any part of a legitimate independent
government designated them or made them part of a terrorist
organization. We have just never done that. So you say, well,
so what? What is the big problem? The problem was, at least 22
of us believed--they were both Republicans and Democrats, by
the way, in that vote, but it was Jim Webb who was on the floor
most of the time on it--said that if you do that, that is
tantamount to giving the President of the United States
authority to use military force against Iran without having to
come back to get a resolution from, or partner with, or
cooperate with, the Congress of the United States. Essentially
if we vote for this, we are giving a President, in a sense,
that authority. Now, you can agree or disagree with that.
But I listened to that debate, and there was some pretty
thoughtful debate. That debate I thought was pretty powerful
with me. We were already in two wars at the time, and I thought
that this made sense, and so I voted against it. That is why I
voted against that. You might also remember that almost
Secretary of State Kerry voted against it. Then Senator Obama,
he gave speeches against it. He did not vote that day. Vice
President Biden voted against it. Dick Lugar voted against it.
There were some other Republicans.
As to the Iranian red line, Persian Gulf, some of the
Iranian questions you asked. I support the President's strong
position on containment as I have said, and I will speak more
specifically to a couple of the examples you used from my book.
But his position I think is right.
When you asked the question about red line, I think the
President has gone as far as he should go publicly on that. He
said clearly that in his words, he has Israel's back. He said
that his policy is not to allow the Iranians to get a nuclear
weapon.
What constitutes when action would be taken? I think that
is always something that should not be discussed publicly or
debated publicly or out in the public domain.
Your quotations from my book, which you acknowledge as well
that I always said the military option should be on the table,
and I had said that consistently as well as engaging with Iran.
I have always thought it is far smarter to approach these very
serious threats, including Iran, probably as significant a
threat as we have out there today, although North Korea is
beyond a threat. It is a real nuclear power and quite
unpredictable. I think Pakistan is another very complicated
reality.
But staying on Iran, I think we are far smarter to do what
the President has been doing, which I laid out, by the way, in
my book. I have a chapter on Iran. I have two chapters on Iraq.
I have a chapter on the Middle East. Getting the world
community behind us with these U.N. sanctions through the
Security Council of the United Nations. These are tough
sanctions. They are having a tremendous impact, you know that,
on Iran.
If, in fact, the military option is the only one required,
I think we are always on higher ground in every way,
international law, domestic law, people of the world, people of
the region to be with us on this if we have tried and if we
have gone through every possibility to resolve this in a
responsible, peaceful way rather than going to war.
Everything I said in my book was about that. I do not have
a problem with engaging. I think great powers engage. I think
engagement is clearly in our interests. That is not
negotiation. Engagement is not appeasement. Engagement is not
surrender. I think if the time is right, the climate is right,
the dynamics are right, we should find ways, if we can find
ways. We cannot force it. But I think we are always smarter and
wiser to take that approach initially.
Posture in the Persian Gulf. Senator, our Fifth Fleet is
located in the Persian Gulf in Bahrain. As you also know, we
have a couple of carrier battle groups in that area. Our
military posture there is very strong. It is very ready. It is
very capable. These are contingencies and options that the
Secretary of Defense, working with these Service Chiefs and
their combatant commanders, always have to give in the present
and make sure that we are prepared.
Let me stop there, I may have missed some of the specific
things that you wanted to discuss.
Senator Chambliss. I am understanding you to say that you
are not ready to discuss red lines in a specific way. Am I
hearing that right?
Senator Hagel. I do not think that is my role now to start
with. I am not the Secretary of Defense. But I think the
President is wise in his course of action in not discussing
that publicly. I think it is a far smarter way to handle it,
and I think he has said what he needs to say. I think it has
been understood in Iran. I think the world understands his
position.
By the way, I have just been handed a note that I misspoke
and said I supported the President's position on containment.
If I said that, I meant to say that obviously his position on
containment, we do not have a position on containment. I
recognize that I have had more attention paid to my words the
last 8 weeks that I ever thought possible, so I do not take any
chances. Thank you.
Senator Chambliss. I think I understood you correct on
containment and prevention.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Just to make sure your correction is clear,
we do have a position on containment, which is that we do not
favor containment.
Senator Hagel. We do not favor containment. That is the
President's position, and that was my position.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. I just want to clarify the
record.
Senator Hagel. If you need further clarification, that is
why I am here.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Senator.
Senator Udall. Thank you for your service. Thank you for
your willingness to once again heed the call and lead DOD.
We had a great private meeting with you last week. We
covered many of the threats and challenges that our country
faces: shrinking budgets, strategic national security shifts,
and ensuring, as you have underlined over and over again
already this morning, that we continue to provide fair and
equal opportunities for all of our servicemembers and their
families.
Again, I want to tell you I appreciate that opportunity. I
am going to take you up on your offer, if you are confirmed, to
continue sitting down with you as a member of the Armed
Services Committee.
I know this issue has already been addressed, but I want to
make sure that I am on the record as raising my concerns, and I
want, as I think this committee should, to give you every
opportunity to clarify and underline your point of view.
When we met privately, you emphasized your determination to
keep all options on the table with regard to Iran, including a
military strike, if Iran continues to pursue a nuclear program
in defiance of this international obligation.
We also discussed your longstanding support of Israel and
our longstanding relationship. But you have critics out there--
I do not have to tell you that--who maintain that your record
on Iran is in question, and that you are anti-Israel. These are
serious charges.
So let me direct some questions your way. Why should
Americans trust that you will consider every option when it
comes to one of the most serious national security threats
facing us today, which is Iran?
Senator Hagel. First, thank you for an opportunity to
clarify these issues. My record has been very clear on Iran.
Senator Chambliss noted from my 2008 book and my chapter,
specifically noting that I said the military option must remain
on the table. I said that as recently in an op-ed that I co-
authored last year in the Washington Post with two former U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) commanders.
We talked about Iran, and one of the very specific points
we bring out in that op-ed was the military option must remain
on the table along with all the other areas of effort,
expertise, diplomacy, economics, and sanctions, the President
is using, which I have already said I support.
My record is rather thorough on this, and I would continue
to support that position, and I strongly support the
President's position.
Senator Udall. Senator, talk about your view on Israel, our
relationship with Israel, how can we continue to have a special
alliance with a country with whom we share more than an
economic or political philosophy, but with a broader or moral
connection that we have to Israel?
Senator Hagel. I have said many times, just as I have said
regarding the military option on Iran many times, in my book,
speeches on the floor, interviews I have given, I am a strong
supporter of Israel. I have been. I will continue to be. I have
also said specifically, and I believe this is in my book, that
we have a special relationship with Israel.
Again, my record is pretty clear. I voted in 12 years in
the U.S. Senate for every authorization, every appropriation
that I had an opportunity to vote on for Israel. I have been to
Israel many times. I have met with their leaders many times.
So again, if you look at my record, I think my record is
pretty clear in my strong support for Israel.
Senator Udall. Senator, I heard you say when you discussed
your vote against the resolution applying to the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard, that in the end you were protecting
Congress' prerogative when it comes to declaring war. Is that
correct?
Senator Hagel. That is exactly right. That is exactly what
I was saying, and I did not say it, I guess, that way. But that
was the point. Again, I say, like I have in answering some of
the other questions, it was not a question of the objective. I
shared the objective, and I suspect all 22 members in the
Senate who voted against that resolution supported the
objective. But as Jim Webb made the case I think pretty
effectively, and Senator Webb was an individual who had rather
considerable experience in this business. He had been Secretary
of Navy under Ronald Reagan. He had been Assistant Secretary of
Defense under Ronald Reagan. One of the most decorated veterans
of Vietnam, U.S. Senator, celebrated author, lawyer. I thought
he made a pretty strong, persuasive case. So did many of us.
Senator Udall. Let us turn to cyber security. I was pleased
that you mentioned cyber security early in your initial
remarks. The Pentagon's move to significantly expand its cyber
security assets and knowledge. I have to talk about Colorado
since I represent Colorado. The Air Force Academy is well
positioned to train those new cyber security experts. We are
also the home of Space Command and U.S. Northern Command.
Would you talk a little bit more about your take on cyber
security, what we ought to be doing, what sorts of resources we
need?
Senator Hagel. Senator, you may know that I have been to
those facilities in Colorado a few times, and I do not know as
much about them as you do. But I am pretty familiar with them.
They are essential to our national security.
Cyber, I believe, represents as big a threat to the
security of this country as any one specific threat for all the
reasons this committee understands. It is an insidious, quiet
kind of a threat that we have never quite seen before. It can
paralyze a nation in a second, not just a power grid or a
banking system, but it can knock out satellites. It can take
down computers on all of our carrier battleships. It can do
tremendous damage to our national security apparatus.
That is the larger threat. But when you start defining it
down, this body, I know. I watched it, went through a pretty
agonizing 3 months at the end of 2012 trying to find a bill
that they could agree on cyber. I know, I believe, Congress
will come back at it in this new Congress. I think you must,
and you know that.
Because we have different intergovernmental authorizations
here--Department of Homeland Security, DOD--where is the
capacity? Where are the budgets? Where are the authorities?
This is law enforcement. This is privacy, business, a lot of
complications that we have really never, ever had to face
before on other national defense threats to this country.
So cyber will be an area that we will continue to focus on.
We must. It is an area that I will put high priority on if I am
confirmed to be Secretary of Defense.
Senator Udall. Senator, in the 2013 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), there is a provision that compels the
military to accommodate the conscience moral principles or
religious beliefs of all members of the Armed Forces. It does
sound reasonable on the surface, but I am especially concerned
that this could lead to misguided claims of a right to
discriminate against lesbian, gay, and bisexual servicemembers,
women, or persons with certain religious beliefs.
The President has said--I want to quote him--that DOD will,
``not permit or condone discriminatory actions that compromise
good order and discipline or otherwise violate military codes
of conduct''.
Will you ensure that DOD, in accommodating religious
beliefs or matters of conscience, does not tolerate
discrimination or harm to others?
Senator Hagel. Absolutely. I will faithfully, diligently
enforce our laws. All men and women deserve the same rights,
and I can assure you that will be a high priority, to enforce
that and ensure that in every way through the entire line of
chain of command and accountability.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Hagel. I look forward to
the second round of questions.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Udall. I think it is now afternoon, so good
afternoon to you, and thank you for being here.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Let me just follow up on that. Does that
mean, though, a chaplain would have to perform a same-sex
marriage, in your view, if he objected based on conscience?
Senator Hagel. I think the Pentagon regulations show,
Senator, that same-sex marriage is legal in the nine States.
Senator Wicker. No, would a chaplain be able to bow out of
that procedure based on conscience?
Senator Hagel. Certainly.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Senator Hagel. But what we do not want, Senator Udall's
point is someone to be denied to be married in a chapel or a
facility and so on, but certainly a matter of conscience, yes.
What I am talking about is a strict interpretation of defending
the law, which defends rights.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much for clarifying that,
and thank you for calling on me early on. We had our
conversation on January 8, and I appreciated that opportunity.
You just said that your statements over time have gotten a
lot more attention than you ever dreamed possible. I hope you
agree that is entirely appropriate in this context.
Chairman Levin mentioned in his opening statement that in
speaking your mind, you said terrible things that caused him
concern. He asked you about that. Senator Inhofe mentioned
several of your statements involved what some people feel are
policy reversals based on expediency, and so those are
concerns.
You and I talked about two of these topics during our
conversation, and one of them was with regard to sanctions
against Iran. You told me in our conversation that you opposed
unilateral sanctions because they do not work and they isolate
the United States. Indeed you had made that statement to the
Omaha paper just the day before. ``I have not supported
unilateral sanctions because when it is us alone, they do not
work and they just isolate the United States,'' in the Omaha
paper.
I will have to say that statement seems to be in direct
contradiction to your letter to Senator Boxer 1 week later when
you told her, ``I agree that with Iran's continued rejection of
diplomatic overtures, further effective sanctions, both
multilateral and unilateral, may be necessary.''
Now, a week before that you said that you have opposed them
because they do not work. Senator Levin mentioned in his
statement he disagrees that. He believes they do work. You gave
him an answer to that statement, and we have it on the record.
But let me just suggest to you, Senator, that if words have
meaning, there is no two ways about it. The statement that you
gave in the Omaha paper and that you gave to me the following
day is substantially and substantively different from what you
wrote to Senator Boxer a week later.
The Office of Secretary of Defense is one of the most
powerful positions in the country, and arguably in the world.
This official, whoever he or she is, must lead with clarity and
precision, and people around the world need to rely on the
clear meaning of the words of the Secretary of Defense.
Now, the other thing we discussed that gave me concern
during our conversation on January 8 was your statement about
the Jewish lobby. You told me that you have had apologized for
using that terminology, and you retracted the use of the term
``Jewish lobby''. What you said was the Jewish lobby
intimidates a lot of people up here. This was in an interview
that you gave to Aaron David Miller. You said, ``I've always
argued against some of the dumb things they do because I don't
think it's in the interest of Israel.''
Here is my problem with your position at this point. You
have corrected the term ``Jewish lobby,'' and I assume now the
correct term would be ``Israel lobby'' or ``Israeli lobby''. Do
you still stand by your statement that they succeed in this
town because of intimidation? That it amounts to causing us to
do dumb things, because I want to say this, Senator. You are
here today as the potential Secretary of Defense, and it would
seem to me that however you characterize them, you have
suggested that there is an effective lobby out there, whether
you call them the Jewish lobby, the Israeli lobby, or the
Israel lobby, and that they succeed in doing dumb things
through intimidation, and that U.S. policy has been the wrong
approach because the intimidation has worked.
So when you talked about the Jewish lobby, were you talking
about the American Israel Public Affairs Committee? Were you
talking about NORPAC? Were you talking about Christians United
or Israel? Do you still believe that their success in this town
is because of intimidation and that they are, as you stated,
urging upon our Government that we do dumb things?
Senator Hagel. First, I have never been accused of
political expediency. I do not do that. It probably has gotten
me in some trouble, Senator.
Second, to address the last comment, and then we will go
back sanctions. I have already said I regret referencing the
Jewish lobby. I should have said pro-Israel lobby. I think it
is the only time on the record that I have ever said that.
Now, you all have done a lot of work with my record, and,
yes, it is appropriate, by the way. Any nominee's record, what
he or she thinks, says, done, absolutely. I was on your side of
dais for 12 years, so I understand that and that
responsibility. So I do not have any problem with that. I have
already noted that I should have used another term, and I am
sorry, and I regret it.
On the use of intimidation. I should have used
``influence,'' I think would have been more appropriate. We
were talking about in that book, and you evidently read it,
Aaron David Miller's book, by the way, it is a book, ``The Much
Too Promised Land.'' He has spoken out directly over the last
few weeks, written an op-ed about my position because it has
gotten some attention as you have noted, and been quite
favorable to me, and said much of that was taken out of
context, and he was offended by it. Those were his words.
Those of you who know something about Aaron David Miller
know that he is Jewish. He is a highly respected individual who
has counseled Presidents and Secretaries of State. He also says
in that interview, which is a fairly short interview, he
mentioned that I am a strong supporter of Israel. That it is in
the interview. So I think that says something.
I should not have said ``dumb'' or ``stupid'' because I
understand, appreciate, there are different views on these
things. We were talking about Israel. We were talking about the
Middle East. We were not talking about Armenia, or Turkey, or
the banking influence, or chamber of commerce influence. That
was what the context of my comments were about.
Your point on the unilateral sanctions conversation and the
quote, a couple of points. Let us go back to the ILSA vote,
about the original ILSA vote during the Clinton administration
and connect that to a comment I made in the World Herald about
they do not work. They are ineffective. By the way, I have
already noted for the record here that I have supported and
voted for some unilateral sanctions, and I think I noted three
specific ones that I recall.
But on your specific question about the specific comment.
Just to give you an example of partly what I was talking about.
You were not in the Senate at the time. Some were. But those
who were here in the Senate might recall the EU's reaction to
that ILSA Act. I was not in the Senate when that was voted on
originally, so I did not have a vote.
But in 1998, the EU passed a resolution against the United
States and threatened to take the United States to the World
Trade Organization. As a consequence, Secretary Albright had to
get into this, and as a consequence of that, President Clinton
had to sign a waiver to allow a French oil company not to be
part of that U.S. unilateral waiver.
Now I am not suggesting United States action should be
hostage to the EU or any other country. But what I am
suggesting is many times there are consequences to these
actions. Now, every Senator has their own position on these,
exercise their own judgment as they should, and cast their own
vote. So I don't think necessarily that there was a disconnect
from what I said in The World Herald to where I have been on
international sanctions.
As to your specific point about supporting unilateral
sanctions as well as international sanctions in the letter to
Senator Boxer, it is a different situation to start with. We
already have very effective international sanctions on Iran.
Senator Wicker. Are you saying that those two statements do
not contradict each other, the one to the Omaha paper and the
one to Senator Boxer?
Senator Hagel. There are two points to it. Let me finish if
I could, Senator, thank you, my second point.
My second point is this. Where we are with Iran today, the
international sanctions that have been placed on Iran, that
puts Iran and the United States in a far different place than
where we were in 2000, or 1998, or 2001 when I did not support
the reimposition. By the way, the Bush administration did not
either. They did not want a 5-year reimposition for some of the
same reasons that I questioned that reimposition of 5 years on
ILSA.
But my point in making where we are today, connecting that
to unilateral sanctions, then we have a different situation.
Unilateral sanctions, because we have already got strong
international sanctions, should be considered. I think the
President is right to consider those. I would support that
because it is different than it was in 2001 or 1998.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. Senator Hagel, thank you for
being here. Thank you for your service to our country and the
military and your service in the U.S. Senate. I also want to
thank your wife and your family for standing with you today.
You played an important role in supporting Vietnam veterans
impacted by the exposure to Agent Orange. I have been involved
in a similar set of issues facing veterans stationed at Camp
Lejeune. They continue to search for answers about the effects
of water contamination there. As many as a million marines and
their families stationed at the base between the early 1950s
and the 1980s may have been exposed to harmful chemicals that
led to the development of cancer and other ailments.
The quest for answers in looking into this has been long.
It has been drawn out, and the recognition that men, women, and
children were dying or going broke paying out of pocket for
their treatment while they were waiting for these various
studies to be completed on the water contamination. We in
Congress took action last year. The House and the Senate passed
a bill that will provide for the treatment of veterans and
their family members through the VA.
I continue to believe that the families of those stationed
at Camp Lejeune during this time period, they deserve answers
from the U.S. Government about who was exposed to the harmful
chemicals, what impact that might have had on their health, and
what the Government knew about this exposure.
I have been fighting for answers with a group of other
committed Senators on a bipartisan basis. Along the way
progress has been held up by endless bureaucratic delays and
obstacles.
My question to you is, do you agree that these marines and
their families deserve complete answers about the water
contamination that occurred at Camp Lejeune? If confirmed, will
you pledge to work with us to overcome any bureaucratic hurdles
that may halt or delay the pursuit of answers for the affected
marines and their family members?
Senator Hagel. Thank you. You noted that we had a long
conversation about this. I committed to you in your office. I
will make that commitment in front of this committee. I will do
that.
There should never, ever be a question about the health,
and the safety, and the environment that we put our men and
women and their families in when we ask them to make sacrifices
to serve this country. I am committed to that, and we will have
further conversations.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. I know you have answered a number
of questions about Israel already today, but I do have one I
want to ask you also. There is a special and historic bond
between the United States and Israel, and I am personally
committed to Israel's security and identity as a Jewish state.
When we met earlier this week, I was pleased to hear you
say you agree and that you also support a two-state solution
and oppose any unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state.
We also discussed the need for a strong military and
intelligence engagement between the United States and Israel.
Just last fall I was in Israel, and I have spoken with senior
military officials from both countries, and I have continually
heard that the ties between our military and our intelligence
organizations have never been stronger.
If confirmed, do you intend to maintain this close
relationship, and do you have any ideas for how we can further
strengthen this coordination?
Senator Hagel. I would once again reaffirm the commitment
that I made to you to this committee. I absolutely support the
continuation and the strengthening of our relationship with
Israel. As been noted before, in my book, a chapter I have on
Israel, I talk about the special and historic relationship
between the United States and Israel.
It is critically important that the qualitative military
edge that we have assured Israel since 1948 be maintained and
be enhanced. The Iron Dome is I think but one example. The
latest military exercise we had with the Israelis last fall,
Austere Challenge, it was the largest military exercise between
our two countries in the history of our two countries. I think
our intelligence agencies are working closer, and are stronger
and more coordinated than ever before.
I think this President has done as much to support Israel
as any president, as I mentioned earlier, since Harry Truman,
and I would look forward to continuing to follow those policies
and enhance those policies.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. I wanted to ask a question on
sequestration. Stopping sequestration from occurring is very
important to me. In North Carolina, we have 7 military
installations, and we have over 100,000 Active Duty
servicemembers in my State. I believe that these cuts are going
to harm our national security, will impair our readiness, will
defer necessary maintenance that will help keep our troops safe
and delay important investments in research and procurement, as
well as stunt our economic recovery at this time.
I do not believe we can allow these cuts to move forward.
Congress needs to work on a bipartisan basis on a balanced plan
that will help eliminate this threat of sequestration. Also we
have to reduce our deficit and protect the critical investments
and areas in our national defense.
When we spoke earlier this week, I was pleased to hear you
say that you did not support these indiscriminate,
unprioritized cuts that sequestration would cause. If allowed
to take effect, how will sequestration impact the Department's
ability to meet the future threats and challenges?
As I shared with you, I chair the subcommittee of this
committee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, so I am
particularly interested in your thoughts. You were commenting
earlier to Senator Udall's questions on cyber security issues,
which is obviously being considered in the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee.
My question is, what impact do you believe that these cuts
would have on our servicemembers and their families at home and
abroad, and in particular the cuts--the sequestration, how
would this impact areas such as cyber security and the other
areas?
Senator Hagel. First, as we have said this morning and you
know, the Chiefs have made very clear and Secretary Panetta,
there will be consequences, significant consequences to the
management of our Defense Department and our ability to have
the flexibility to make the decisions not just for the
immediate, but for the future.
When you hang that kind of uncertainty over any
institution, but especially the institution charged with
national security in our country, it is very dangerous.
Readiness is obviously the number one priority, and we will
continue to do that. The Chiefs have already started to work
through this, and I think in some of the public statements they
have made, we are preparing for that. They will be prepared. If
in the event the sequestration does take effect, we will be
ready to deal with it. But this is going to be very difficult.
We talked a little earlier here this morning about how we
are going to have to reduce training, steaming time, flying
time. But I think the American people do need to be reassured,
as I think Secretary Panetta and the Chiefs have, that the
security of this country is not going to be in jeopardy. But it
is going to be difficult, and it is going to affect longer-term
kinds of planning.
But make no mistake, if this happens, this is going to be a
severe problem.
Senator Hagan. My time is up. Thank you for your comments.
Chairman Levin. Senator Hagan, thank you so much. Now we
were going to work right through the vote that is going on now,
but we are going to take a 10-minute recess right now and come
right back. Then we are going to call on Senator Ayotte and
then Senator Manchin. They are next in line, and I urge them to
go vote and come right back.
We will now recess for 10 minutes. [Recessed.]
Chairman Levin. We will come back to order.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you, Senator Hagel, for your service to our
country and for being here today in this important hearing, and
I want to thank your family as well.
Senator Hagel, I think we have established, as I understand
it from the prior questions you have been asked, in July 2001,
you were one of only two Senators to vote against extending the
Iran Sanctions Act, the sanctions in that act. That is a vote
that you have agreed that you have taken. Correct?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Yes or no? Yes. That was when you were only
one of two Senators in the entire Senate to vote against that.
Also, in 2008, I believe you were asked you were again one
of two Senators within the Senate Banking Committee, though,
not the entire Senate, to vote against the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions Accountability Act of 2008. Is that right?
Senator Hagel. That is right.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Yes. I am sorry. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Yes, thank you, Senator.
As I understand it, on October 2, 2008, Majority Leader
Harry Reid brought a similar bill to the floor. In fact, it was
called the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability Act of
2008, and he brought it to the floor on October 2, 2008. There
have been media reports that you blocked unanimous consent for
the consideration of that bill. Are those true or not?
Senator Hagel. I was one of some Republican Senators who
did not want that vote to go forward. I voted against it in the
subcommittee, and the reason I did was because the Bush
administration did not want that bill to go forward.
The reason that they didn't is because they were involved
in negotiations with the Russians in the U.N. and Security
Council members to put multilateral sanctions on Iran.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
But just to be clear, you did block unanimous consent of
that bill in 2008?
Senator Hagel. I was part of an effort, yes. That is right.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you.
Also, would it surprise you that an earlier version of that
sanctions bill was actually cosponsored by Secretary Kerry,
Secretary Clinton, and President Obama at the time? You were
not a cosponsor. Would that surprise you?
Senator Hagel. Well, no, not necessarily. I didn't ever
base my votes, Senator, on what everybody else thought or did.
I voted based on what I thought was right.
Senator Ayotte. Also, we, of course, the sanctions that are
in place now, that bill or its next generation passed the U.S.
Senate after you left in a vote of 99 to 0, and no one in the
Senate, in fact, voted against that. So that has been our clear
policy of the bill, really the next generation of the bill that
you blocked in the Senate.
I want to ask you also about your position with respect to
involvement in the Global Zero report. I know many people have
asked you questions about this.
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Here is what is troubling me. You have
testified before this committee today that you have never been
for unilateral nuclear disarmament. In other words, unilateral
actions by the United States of America. Yet this report
itself, which you call an illustration, its illustration or
recommendation or however you want to frame it, is to
actually--there are many recommendations in it.
One of them is to eliminate a leg of our triad, which is
the land-based ICBMs. You would agree with that? That is the
illustration that is contained in this report, or you call it
an illustration. Is that right?
Senator Hagel. I call it an illustration, Senator, because
that is the term it used at the front end of the report.
Senator Ayotte. Well, let us----
Senator Hagel. Not a recommendation.
Senator Ayotte. Let me talk about the other terms that this
report uses because this report twice, as Senator Sessions
asked you, on page 1 and on page 16 says that the illustrations
or this example given in this report, one of which is
eliminating a leg of our nuclear triad could be implemented
unilaterally.
So here is what I am struggling with. Why would you ever
put your name on a report that is inherently inconsistent with
what you are telling us today is that you have never been for
unilateral disarmament as a possibility?
Senator Hagel. It is not inconsistent, I don't believe,
Senator. But you used the term ``could''. That is a pretty
important operative word in the report.
The report does not recommend we do these things. The
report says ``could,'' ``illustrative,'' ``scenarios,''
``possibilities''. You probably know the four other individuals
who were involved in that report, mainly General Cartwright,
former strategic commander and----
Senator Ayotte. Senator Hagel, I know we don't have a lot
of time here. I don't dispute the qualifications or the service
of the other individuals that are involved in this report. But
of all the illustrations and of all the ``coulds'' you could
pick, this report says that the President could implement these
unilaterally, although that is inconsistent with what you say
is your position. Yet you signed off on this.
This report also says of all the illustrations you could
have picked, the illustration is eliminating a leg of our
nuclear triad. One thing that troubles me is that of all the
things that this group could have picked as what you call an
illustration is a significant reduction in our nuclear
deterrent.
To me, I view that as troubling and inconsistent. One thing
I would hope you wouldn't do as Secretary of Defense is to sign
off on a report that would say something like unilateral, like
this one does, that could be implemented unilaterally that is
different than your philosophy or our policy.
Senator Hagel. As Secretary of Defense, I won't be signing
off on reports in the same way as a private citizen. Obviously,
I will have a different kind of responsibility if I am
confirmed by the Senate.
But I don't think that there is anything that also changes
my position in that report because it was a letter sent, which
you may have, to the President of the United States----
Senator Ayotte. Just so we are clear, and I am not--I don't
want to interrupt you, but we just don't have a lot of time.
Just so we are clear, you don't view what you are telling us
today and the language in this report as inconsistent?
Senator Hagel. I do not because it wasn't a recommendation.
The report also says and the authors of it says, have always
said, none of this can be any reductions unilateral, just like
any strategic arms reduction treaty that we have signed, both
Republican and Democrats have led on that, has to be bilateral,
has to be verifiable, has to be negotiated.
I have always been there, and that is where we have been on
this report.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you.
May I follow up on the discussion about containment,
nuclear containment with Iran? The first question I would have,
as you said very clearly to Senator Levin, that you believe
that a military option should be on the table with respect to
Iran. In fact, I think you said, ``I do, I have, and I strongly
agree'' in terms of that being one of the options the President
of the United States would have in addressing Iran is the
language that you said.
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Can you help me understand when you went to
Islamabad, Pakistan, in 2006, you said at that time that a
military strike against Iran, a military option is not a
viable, feasible, or responsible option. It strikes me as what
you are saying about the military option now seems inconsistent
with that statement.
Why would you make that statement in Pakistan that it is
not a viable, feasible, or responsible option in light of your
statement today that you do, ``I have, and I strongly agree''
that a military option should be on the table?
Senator Hagel. That statement was made in the context of
all options regarding Iran, and Pakistan was where I was at the
time. The larger context of that was nuclear powers, which
certainly Pakistan is part of that club.
Not unlike what Secretary Gates said about a strike on
Iran, my point was that this would not be a preferable option.
There would be consequences to this option. Things would happen
as a result of it.
If we could find a better option, a better way to deal with
Iran to assure they do not get nuclear weapons, then we are far
better off. That was the context of that statement.
Senator Ayotte. Senator Hagel, I know that my time is up,
and I know we will have an opportunity for a second round of
questions. But as I see your quote, it didn't say preferable
option. It said it was not a responsible option. I view those
words as having a very different meaning.
So I look forward to following up in the subsequent round
of questioning. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel, thank you so much and your family for your
service and for putting your services on the line for us. I
appreciate it very much.
I would like to say this. You and I have not known each
other before. I never had the pleasure of serving with you,
which I wish I would have. We had a great conversation. You
bring a breath of fresh air, truly a breath of fresh air to
this process in a bipartisan way. Having two great Senators
sitting by your side--one a Democrat, one a Republican--that
basically support you wholeheartedly speaks volumes in the
toxic process that we have today.
With that being said, also everyone has been so fixated on
your past, what you have said, and I think I have come to learn
in the very short time I have been a Senator that this town and
this process and this body has become almost a guilt by
conversation. With that being said, I respect you being the
person being able to say what you thought needed to be said.
You voted the way you thought you should be voting for your
constituents and your country, and you weren't really driven by
your party or by any pressure groups.
I can't tell you how much I wish I would have served with
you. Sometimes I feel very lonely.
With all that being said, sir, we are asked to consider you
as a part of the Cabinet. Is there anything that would lead us
to believe that you wouldn't follow the orders that were given?
Senator Hagel. No. I understand clearly the
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. As I said in my
opening statement, those responsibilities are very serious. I
don't know of many jobs that are more serious, and I would
obviously always make every decision for the Defense Department
and my advice to the President based on only one thing, and
that is the security of this country.
Senator Manchin. I looked back at your record. You and I
come from the same era. We are very close in age, and I
remember the Vietnam era very well. That, I think, shaped all
of us to a certain extent of how we looked after, post-Vietnam,
of how we would have looked at it if we would have known what
we knew before.
I am sure that kind of guided you as you looked at this,
Iraq, and I saw the information that we were given. If I had
been a Senator, probably I might have voted also, like many
people that were misled.
But after having seen 5 or 6 years of that unfortunate
scenario play out, the surge, and I know where you are coming
from, would you say that your experiences in Vietnam and
looking at basically what sometimes our misguided mission had
been shaped a lot of your positions today?
Senator Hagel. There is no question that as I have said
this morning, that my experience in Vietnam very much guided
the questions. I think I noted a couple of times in my opening
statement that it was one fundamental question that I always
asked, was the policy worthy of the men and women that we are
asking to make the sacrifices?
I know there are differences of opinion. You mentioned
Iraq. You mentioned the surge. My positions there were very
much guided by, well, what is the political purpose of the
surge?
Senator Manchin. Right.
Senator Hagel. Where do we go from here? Yes, you put
35,000 more American troops in an area for a sustained period
of time or more on top of more than 100,000 we already had
there, you will have a tactical victory. But there will be a
cost for that victory.
That is what always guided me. Do we understand the costs?
Are we prepared to make those costs in lives? Then where was
the bigger answer here? Where were we going with the surge? How
was this going to take us, advance us to where we needed to go,
and where did we think we needed to go?
So, yes, those experiences did shape my questions.
Senator Manchin. I appreciate that. Let me just say that as
speaking of now, what we deal with and the concerns that people
had with your nomination, the support of Israel, I have no
doubt in my mind your support of Israel as our greatest ally
and would always be there. I think you have answered that. I
think we all feel very comfortable with that.
Also your commitment that Iran should not under any
circumstance have the ability to have a nuclear weapon, and I
appreciate that position very much.
Where we go with the strength of our Army if we have our
military might in DOD, the National Guard, how does the
National Guard play in your role of thinking of what they
should be doing and what they could be doing?
Senator Hagel. The National Guard now has a chair at the
table with the Joint Chiefs. General Grass represents the
National Guard effectively, a new chief. But their role will
continue to be important, as will the Reserves.
I think we saw over the last 12 years of war how important
our National Guard is and the Reserves. We could not have
conducted those two wars without the National Guard and
Reserves. I think that has professionalized both Services. They
are going to continue to be necessary. They are important.
Their training, their credibility, their leadership, that
is obviously why the decision was made to assure their
representation with the Joint Chiefs, and I strongly support
the National Guard and Reserves.
Senator Manchin. Personnel, I think that Senator McCaskill
touched on things I am very concerned about. Every time I hear
about the sequestering and people tell me that if we do a
sequestering it could destroy our ability to defend ourselves
and have the military might that we do.
Now I don't see that whatsoever, and I followed the
statistics. I followed all the post-war eras from starting with
Korea and Vietnam, Cold War, and where we are today. This will
be the least amount of money that we have asked to draw down
under any post-war time. But yet everyone is hollering that it
will be devastating.
I know there is a way to do that, but the contracting. We
are having a hard time getting our hands around the
contracting, the cost of contracting, the ability for people in
the contracting world to be reimbursed by over $700,000, almost
twice what the President gets paid. Some of these things, would
you embrace working with us and sitting down and looking and
embracing an audit?
Myself and Senator Tom Coburn have had legislation asking
for a complete audit of DOD. Your thoughts on those two things,
sir?
Senator Hagel. Of course, I will, and as I have noted this
morning, I am committed to do that. I will do it.
Accountability is a primary responsibility of any
institution or organization. That is clearly in the purview of
Congress. We have to do it. We have to improve on the process.
We talked a little bit this morning about the astounding
amount of waste, fraud, and abuse the Inspector General,
Special Inspectors General both in Iraq and Afghanistan have
found. I am committed, as I have said, to assure that we make
that deadline of 2017 on the audits, and I will work with you
closely on that.
Senator Manchin. My time is up, and one thing I want to
state that we talked about in my office is the commitment to
help our returning veterans get jobs. The Jobs Caucus, ``I Hire
a Vet,'' it is so important. I appreciate your support for
that. I look forward to working with you that we can put more
of our vets back to work when they come home and get them back
into mainstream America.
Thank you, sir. I look forward to voting for you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Inhofe.
Good afternoon, Senator. It is good to see you again.
Senator Hagel. Thanks.
Senator Fischer. I want to begin by thanking you for your
service to our country and to the State of Nebraska. I do
appreciate your continued willingness to serve the United
States.
But I need to be honest with you. After our meeting last
week, I still have some concerns about your nomination. Many of
my colleagues are concerned that you have changed your views,
and I share that concern. But I must admit that I am more
worried that your views have not changed.
From your meeting with me last week, it was clear that you
maintain the views that have led to so much scrutiny of your
nomination. Despite these recent claims to the contrary, you
continue to hold, I believe, extreme views far to the left of
even this administration.
In particular, your clear statement to me during our
meeting that if given the opportunity to recast your vote on
the Iranian sanctions, you would still oppose those sanctions.
I believe that indicates that you hold these concerning views.
Our Nation faces many challenges, perhaps none greater or
more immediate than Iran's continued progress towards obtaining
nuclear weapons. At the same time, DOD is entering a period of
transformation that will likely define its role for many
decades to come. The future of our nuclear deterrent could
depend on our choices made by the next Secretary of Defense.
I am going to bring up the report that we have heard about
quite a bit. You are listed as a coauthor of that May 2012
Global Zero report on our nuclear posture. I believe there is a
recommendation in there, and I believe that the recommendation
is to drastically reduce the U.S. nuclear forces.
When we spoke last week, you described this report as being
authored by General Cartwright. I had the impression, and I
believe you implied to me, that you weren't closely affiliated
with it. But you are listed as a coauthor of that report, as
one of the five coauthors.
Moreover, you told me at that time that this report
discussed options. You have reiterated that stance today. But
after I have reexamined it once again, the only options that I
have found in the report are related to how best achieve those
drastic reductions that I believe it advises. There are no
alternative views or dissenting opinions that are presented or
discussed in the report.
It states many controversial opinions. It states them as
facts in support of its conclusion, and I believe it is
important to determine whether or not you agree with those
positions. As it has been said before, my time here is limited,
and so I would like to quickly go through and review some of
those more concerning proclamations that it makes with you. I
would appreciate if we could kind of go through this quickly.
For example, the U.S. ICBM force has lost its central
utility. That is stated in the report. Do you agree with that?
Senator Hagel. Senator, that report was not a
recommendation. That report, as we have said, was a series of
scenarios. Again, I use the term ``illustrative'' because that
was the beginning of the report as possible ways we could
continue to reduce our warheads. Not unilaterally, but
bilaterally.
Every treaty we have ever signed to reduce warheads and the
thrust capability with the Russians has been about reduction.
So that is not new. That is where it has always been.
But ICMBs, your specific question, it is a 25-page report.
I assume you have read it. It talked about one of the reasons
ICBMs may well eventually be insignificant because of the
overflight over Russia and so on. Now those aren't fictional
analyses. Those are facts.
Now no one is recommending in that report--and you probably
know General Cartwright. When he was in Omaha, you probably got
acquainted with him. These are serious people who understand
this business, and no one is recommending that we unilaterally
do away with our ICBMs.
What that report was about was looking at where this is all
going. Again, the title of the report was ``Modernizing Our
Nuclear Strategy,'' not eliminating it.
Senator Fischer. Correct. But do you agree with the
statement made in the report that the ICBMs, that force has
lost its central utility?
Senator Hagel. That is not what the report said.
Senator Fischer. I have it--I have it cited, Senator. With
respect, I can enter that into the record. But it is cited in
the report.
Senator Hagel. The report, in the overall context, ICBMs
and all of the parts of that report were about the utilities of
our triad, where is this going, and the money that we are
investing in it, and we have to look at it. I think those kinds
of reports are valuable to assess our needs, to assess our
nuclear capability, to assess our nuclear deterrent.
I mean, we do studies all the time. This was not an
official report from an official government. Think tanks do
this all the time. I think that is valuable.
Now whether policymakers----
Senator Fischer. Excuse me. I, too, think that reports from
various organizations--think tanks, individuals, groups--I
think those are all very important in getting information and
opinions out there. But when you coauthor a report, I think you
should be able to answer if you agree with statements that are
made in the report.
Senator Hagel. I do not agree with any recommendation that
would unilaterally take any action to further reduce our
nuclear warheads on our capability. But again, that is not what
the report said.
But I do not agree with that. Every option that we must
look at, every action we must take to reduce warheads or
anything should be bilateral. It should be verifiable. It
should be negotiated.
Senator Fischer. Every action that this country takes needs
to be bilateral?
Senator Hagel. I didn't say that. I said in nuclear
capabilities in our warheads. When we are talking about
reducing warheads, as every treaty we have signed with the
Russians has been bilateral. It has been verifiable.
Ronald Reagan said it best, ``Trust, but verify''. I think
that is the key word. He also said, as I said this morning, we
should wipe nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.
I think almost every President has agreed with that,
including, by the way, this President, who has seen this
report. World leaders do agree with the continued reduction,
and this is not a report that is out of the mainstream at all.
President Obama has said in his Prague speech in 2009 that that
was his goal, as Ronald Reagan did, as many Presidents did.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
If I could continue on this vein of questioning, please?
Also, as I read the report, it calls for all U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons to be eliminated over the next 10 years and
asserts that their military utility is practically nil.
Do you agree with that statement?
Senator Hagel. Senator, I don't believe it calls for that.
These are scenarios and schedules and possibilities and
options. But none of this could ever, ever happen unless it
would be negotiated, bilateral, and verifiable. That was part
of a letter that the Global Zero growth group sent to the
President in 2009 specifically stating that.
If I might give you a more recent example of that. Senator
Feinstein's subcommittee----
Senator Fischer. Just a quick one, please.
Senator Hagel.--had a hearing on this last year. In that
hearing, and the committee can get the transcript if it doesn't
have it, General Cartwright and Ambassador Pickering testified.
They went into this, that this is all, everything with any
action we would take would have to be negotiated. It would have
to be bilateral. No unilateral action.
They made that point again on the record in front of
Senator Feinstein's subcommittee. I support that. I agree with
that.
Senator Fischer. I have another statement from the report.
The U.S. ICBM rapid reaction posture remains in operation and
runs a real risk of accidental or mistaken launch.
I think that statement is pretty clear. Do you agree with
that?
Senator Hagel. Yes. I mean, I think accidental launches and
those kinds of things are always to be concerned about. We need
to assure, as we have over the years, that that doesn't happen,
both on the Russian side----
Senator Fischer. That we run a real risk of accidental or
mistaken launch?
Senator Hagel. Well, you take ``real'' out. You could just
put risk. But there is always a risk. I mean, when we are
talking about nuclear weapons and the consequences, you don't
get a lot of second chances. We need to be very sure about
these things, and I think that was the whole point.
Chairman Levin. I think you need to save any additional
questions for the second round, if you would today.
Senator Fischer. Oh, I am sorry. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. You may not have gotten a card. I am sorry
if you didn't.
Senator Fischer. Oh, thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Hagel, for testifying today.
I appreciate that you have brought your family with you. I
appreciate the support of your wife.
I am going to submit several questions for the record
because they are important to me as the Senator from New York,
particularly about New York bases, cybersecurity, and children
of military families with disabilities. But today, I want to
focus on the most urgent issues from my perspective. I want to
talk more about your thoughts on Israel and Israel's security.
I want to talk about Afghanistan, and I want to talk about
personnel issues.
On Israel. Obviously, our relationship with Israel is
tremendously important to Israel, and we are fundamentally tied
to them because of being such a strong democracy in the Middle
East and having our national securities very much being tied in
many ways.
We talked quite a bit about Iran, and you have clarified
your position that containment is not an option. I am concerned
about a statement you said with regard to Iran. A nuclear Iran
is an existential threat to the United States, as well as
Israel. The Iranian Government has been responsible for the
deaths of U.S. servicemembers, an attempted attack on U.S.
soil, and the funding, training of terrorist groups.
Their latest in a long list of direct threats to Israel
came just today. I want to make sure that in your statement
earlier today with regard to whether Iran is legitimate, I can
understand if you meant it is a legal entity that has
international relations and has diplomatic relations and is a
member of the U.N. But I do not see Iran or the Iranian
Government as a legitimate government, and I would like your
thoughts on that.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Senator.
What I meant to say, should have said, it is recognizable.
It has been recognized, is recognized at the United Nations.
Most of our allies have embassies there. That is what I should
have said, and thank you.
Senator Gillibrand. You are welcome.
With regard to Israel, Israel's security is very important,
and I have been one of the strongest advocates for our
alliance, fighting for more increases in missile defense
cooperation as well as coordination on a number of the
technology programs that are fundamental to Israel's security.
Last year, Iron Dome more than proved itself as missiles
from Gaza continually headed towards Israel. In December,
Ranking Member Inhofe and I successfully pushed for full
funding of the U.S.-Israel cooperative missile defense systems.
Will you personally support robust funding for Iron Dome,
David's Sling, and other programs? If we have to have a
Continuing Resolution, the funding for Iron Dome will be well
below the authorized amount for fiscal year 2013. In such a
case, will you recommend either reprogramming other funds or
sending forth an anomaly budget requesting to fully cover our
commitment to this program?
Senator Hagel. First, I fully support and will continue to
fully support Iron Dome and Arrow and David's Sling. As to a
commitment to the second part of your question, I would have to
better understand what our restrictions are going to be in our
budgets before I could make any decisions like that, and I
would have to talk with our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and
each of the chiefs and want to better understand, depending on
how bad and deep this sequestration might get.
But make no mistake. It is clearly a priority program. I
believe we will continue to fund it. We should. I will support
the continuing funding.
Senator Gillibrand. I hope you will also be a strong
advocate because our budget is, even under sequestration,
significant. This is a very high priority certainly for me.
Senator Hagel. If I am confirmed, we will work together, as
I will with this committee, on this and other issues.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
A number of members were just in Egypt, and we met with
President Morsi. Obviously, we are very concerned about the
Sinai becoming a route for arms coming straight from Libya
going to terrorist groups. We, obviously, are very concerned
about we give $1.2 billion to Egypt in aid, and we want to
figure out if there is a way to put some of those funds towards
more anti-terrorism missions as opposed to the typical
technology.
Do you have any thoughts on that and what we can do to
really try to assist in cracking down on the weapons trade?
Senator Hagel. It is a huge challenge and part of obviously
what allows terrorists, extremists to advance their cause.
Maritime security, piracy issues, I mentioned in my opening
statement that is all part of why we need to rebalance
resources and why we need the kind of flexible, agile resource
base--in particular our Navy--to be able to do this.
It also is going to continue to take cooperation with our
allies. We can't do this alone. As good as our intelligence is,
the best in the world, best military in the world, we are the
largest, wealthiest country in the world. But we have to work
with allies, and we have to find that through intelligence
before it gets beyond the capacity to be used to do damage
against the interests of this country and our allies.
Senator Gillibrand. As Israel is one of our most important
allies, one of the growing risks we have now is Syria,
particularly chemical weapons being not properly locked down.
There is concern, and obviously with what happened yesterday, I
suspect that there has been very close cooperation between our
militaries on contingency plans with respect to Syria's
chemical weapons. But will this be something that you can focus
your concern on because of your past statements about the
Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006?
Is this something that you will also commit to and keeping
this alliance strong and making sure we have a strong
contingency plan with regard to any chemical weapons coming out
of Syria?
Senator Hagel. Yes. By the way, I have said on the record
many times that Hezbollah and Hamas are terrorist groups, and I
have said many times on the record that Iran is a state sponsor
of terrorism. So, yes, I am committed to do that and will do
that.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay. For my last minute, with regard
to Afghanistan, we have heard your views, and you didn't give a
specific statement about how many troops when. But will you, in
your capacity as Secretary of Defense, advise the President
that we should be drawing down troops sooner rather than later?
Senator Hagel. I think he has made that pretty clear that
he wants to do that. If I am confirmed, I will need to better
understand all the dimensions of this. I don't know all those
dimensions. I think that there is little question that--and I
support completely where the President wants to go in
Afghanistan and his commitment to unwind that war.
As we have said, there should be, there will be. He has
noted that he will, in fact, enforce a new policy and new
relationship based on a limited objective for our troops there,
and I support that.
Senator Gillibrand. My last question that I will submit
more for the record, but you and I talked at length about it.
Obviously, the personnel of our military is our most important
asset, and when we hear reports that there are upwards of
19,000 sexual assaults in the military against women, it is
unacceptable.
We also have finally repealed ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''.
But it is difficult for a military spouse to even go to the
commissary and be on base or be notified if a spouse is killed
in action. I will need a strong commitment from you that you
will treat our military families and look after them in the way
you would look after your own.
I want you to be concerned about every man and woman in the
military, that their well-being is being looked after, and see
real advocacy and leadership. Not status quo. Not implementing
whatever we put forward. But actually fighting for them every
single day.
Senator Hagel. You have my complete commitment on that. I
have made that commitment to, I think, all members of the
committee that I have spoken to directly and privately.
Again, I mentioned that point in my opening statement, you
will recall. I think I have a pretty clear record on that in my
life. I will continue to do that, will do that, and I agree it
is not good enough just to say zero tolerance. The whole chain
of command needs to be accountable for this, all the way down
to the bottom. So I will.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel, congratulations on your appointment. You are
a good, honest man, and I really appreciate your willingness to
serve the country in the past and be willing to do so in the
future.
What percentage of the gross domestic product do we spend
on defense?
Senator Hagel. We are, I think, it is probably 5 percent
now in that area in our budget, our discretionary budget----
Senator Graham. Is that historically high or low?
Senator Hagel. I think generally depends on real dollars
and wars, but--
Senator Graham. Are we at war?
Senator Hagel. We are at war in Afghanistan. We are at war
around the world with active threat----
Senator Graham. So you agree with me we are at war in
Afghanistan? We are at war around the world. So when you look
at spending on defense, every Senator should be aware of the
fact we are still at war. Do you agree with that?
Senator Hagel. I am sorry. What is your question?
Senator Graham. Do you agree that every Senator, every
Member of Congress should be wide-eyed and understanding that
when you vote on a defense budget we are at war?
Senator Hagel. Yes, I do.
Senator Graham. Okay. Thank you.
Now let us talk a little bit about statements you made. You
have explained this a bit. You said, ``The Jewish lobby
intimidates a lot of people up here. I am not an Israeli
senator. I am a U.S. Senator. This pressure makes us do dumb
things at times.''
You have said the Jewish lobby should not have been--that
term shouldn't have been used. It should have been some other
term. Name one person, in your opinion, who is intimidated by
the Israeli lobby in the U.S. Senate.
Senator Hagel. Well, first----
Senator Graham. Name one.
Senator Hagel. I don't know.
Senator Graham. Well, why would you say it?
Senator Hagel. I didn't have in mind a specific----
Senator Graham. First, do you agree it is a provocative
statement? That I can't think of a more provocative thing to
say about the relationship between the United States and Israel
and the Senate or Congress than what you said.
Name one dumb thing we have been goaded into doing because
of the pressure from the Israeli or Jewish lobby.
Senator Hagel. I have already stated that I regret the
terminology I used.
Senator Graham. But you said back then it makes us do dumb
things. You can't name one Senator intimidated. Now give me one
example of the dumb things that we are pressured to do up here.
Senator Hagel. We were talking in that interview about the
Middle East, about positions, about Israel. That is what I was
referring to.
Senator Graham. So give me an example of where we have been
intimidated by the Israeli/Jewish lobby to do something dumb
regarding the Mideast, Israel, or anywhere else.
Senator Hagel. Well, I can't give you an example.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Do you agree with me you shouldn't have said something like
that?
Senator Hagel. Yes, I do. I have already said that.
Senator Graham. Now do you agree with me that Hezbollah is
a terrorist organization?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator Graham. Now, in 2006, you were 1 of 12 Senators who
refused to sign the letter to the EU asking them to designate
Hezbollah as a terrorist organization for the purposes of the
EU sanctioning Hezbollah. Why were you 1 of 12 who refused to
sign that letter?
Senator Hagel. Because I have generally had a policy during
my time in the Senate that I didn't think it was the right
approach for the Congress of the United States to be sending
leaders any instructions or any documents versus letting our
President do that. As I have already stated----
Senator Graham. Why did you sign the letter to Bill
Clinton, urging him to deal with the Russians when it comes to
their policy against Jewish people?
Senator Hagel. Because I think that is the appropriate
approach because I think it is our President who conducts
foreign policy.
Senator Graham. All I could suggest to you is that when a
letter is presented to a U.S. Senator about the times in which
we live in, you can't write one letter and not write the other
and, in my view, be consistent.
The letter was urging the EU to impose sanctions on
Hezbollah, and you have been a big believer that we shouldn't
go it alone. We shouldn't do it unilaterally. Why in the world
wouldn't you take this chance to urge the EU to go ahead and
sanction Hezbollah because it may help the world at large deal
with this terrorist organization? Your answer is you just don't
think we should be writing letters?
Senator Hagel. That wasn't my answer. My answer was I think
the President of the United States is the appropriate
official----
Senator Graham. So Congress has no interest at all in
whether or not the EU would designate Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization? Do you think that is our role up here, that we
should just stay out of those things?
Senator Hagel. Congress has an interest and responsibility
in all things. But I----
Senator Graham. Okay. I got you. Apparently not there.
Now let me ask you this about the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard. You said just a minute ago you think they are a
terrorist organization. Do you agree with that?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator Graham. Okay. You voted against the amendment
designating them a terrorist organization because you thought
we would be going down the wrong road by doing that because
they are a recognized state. Iran, you wouldn't want to
designate the army of a recognized state as a terrorist
organization?
Senator Hagel. I said that Iran is a state sponsor of
terrorism. I also just clarified a statement on Iran being a
recognized nation by the United Nations, by most world bodies.
The reason again, I will explain it again, why I did not vote,
as 22 other members did----
Senator Graham. Right.
Senator Hagel.--because I think Jim Webb's argument was a
strong argument, and that was we have never--this is what he
said on the floor--designated part of a government as a
terrorist organization. Thereby what his concern was, as was
mine and other Senators who voted against it, would this be
then tantamount to giving the President of the United States
authority from Congress to take military action against Iran?
Senator Graham. I got you. Now let me just ask you this. Do
you believe that the sum total of all of your votes--refusing
to sign a letter to the EU asking Hezbollah to be designated a
terrorist organization, being 1 of 22 to not vote to designate
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organization, being
one of two on two occasions to vote against sanctions that this
body was trying to impose on Iran, the statements you have made
about Palestinians and about the Jewish lobby--all that
together, that the image you have created is one of sending the
worst possible signal to our enemies and friends at one of the
most critical times in world history?
Senator Hagel. No, I would not agree with that because I
have taken actions and made statements very clear as to what I
believed Hezbollah and Hamas are as terrorist organizations. In
fact, Senator----
Senator Graham. If you there was a vote on the floor of the
Senate this afternoon to label the Iranian Revolutionary Guard,
the people who have killed our soldiers in Iraq, some of the
most vicious people to the people of Iran themselves, if there
were a vote tomorrow or this afternoon or after lunch, would
you still vote no?
Senator Hagel. Well, I would want to know from the
President what they were doing, but again----
Senator Graham. I mean, you read the paper. You watch TV.
You have any doubt what they are doing? They are expanding
terrorism. They are trying to intimidate their own people. They
are the instrument of the theocracy to oppress their own
people, and they are the biggest supporter of the regime
keeping them in power so then they can get a nuclear weapon.
If you had a chance tomorrow, today, after lunch to vote to
say that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was a terrorist
organization, would you still vote no?
Senator Hagel. Well, the reason I voted no to start with
began with the same----
Senator Graham. Well, I know why. You told me that. My
question is----
Senator Hagel. That hasn't changed.
Senator Graham.--would you reconsider, and would you vote
yes this time, or would you still vote no?
Senator Hagel. Well, times change. I recognize that, and
yes, I would reconsider. But the whole theory----
Senator Graham. Well, thank you. That is encouraging.
My time is up, but we will have another round.
Senator Inhofe said that you were one of four Senators who
refused to sign a letter in October. The first paragraph says,
``We write to you to express our solidarity with the State of
Israel at this moment of crisis and our profound disappointment
and frustration with Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman
Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. We are dismayed that they
would allow violence by Palestinians to be carried out without
restraint or comment.''
This was when the Intifada was being raging, and Senator
Inhofe, led by Daschle and Lott, wanted a letter from every
member of this body to clearly put us on record that we believe
Arafat and the Intifada is undercutting the agreements they had
reached and that they had resorted to violence to intimidate
the Israeli Government and people in a way that was just
absolutely unacceptable.
If you had a chance to do it over, would you sign this
letter now? I am going to give it to you during whatever break
we have and ask you to reconsider. I would ask you, Senator
Hagel, to tell the country, the world at large, particularly
the State of Israel, you made a mistake by not signing that
letter.
Senator Hagel. Who is the letter to?
Senator Graham. I think it goes to the President. Is that
who it was to? It was the President.
Senator Hagel. I will look at it. I don't recall the
letter, and I will look at it and give you an answer.
Senator Graham. All I can say, it was a very big deal at a
very important time. The lack of signature by you runs chills
up my spine because I can't imagine not signing a letter like
that at a time when it really mattered.
We will continue this conversation. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

The four Senators who did not sign this letter are:

Spencer Abraham, R-MI
Robert Byrd, D-WV
Judd Gregg, R-NH
Chuck Hagel, R-NE

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
We now will go to Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join, Senator Hagel, in thanking you for your
service, thanking your family, and expressing appreciation not
only to you for your service in uniform, but also afterward to
our veterans, which people may not appreciate as much as they
do your military service, but I think is every bit as important
to our Nation.
I just want to say about that letter, I wasn't here when
the letter was circulated. I would have signed it, but I would
certainly join in urging that you reconsider and commit to the
statement of support in the letter for the State of Israel. If
it is appropriate now and applicable to today's events, I hope
you will consider expressing your support for it.
I noted in your opening statement that no single quote and
no single vote define you in the entirety, and perhaps not as a
whole, but votes and quotes do matter. I think that the
questions about what you have said and what you have done in
the past are entirely appropriate, and I think also
reconsidering or your views evolving is also appropriate.
I am going to be submitting questions on some of the topics
that you have heard. You and I have discussed some of these
questions. I might say your private meetings with members of
this body have been very productive and effective, as you have
seen in some of the comments that have been expressed here. So,
the more we hear from you, I think the better you do on many of
these issues.
I want to begin by talking about one issue that concerns
our veterans, and particularly our Vietnam veterans. Many
Vietnam veterans in Connecticut and around the country received
less than honorable discharge as a result of conduct that was a
direct consequence of post-traumatic stress (PTS), at a time
PTS was not a term, not diagnosed, not treated.
But they have to live with the consequences of a less than
honorable discharge. They have to live with fewer benefits
often. I would like a commitment from you that DOD will
reevaluate and revisit perhaps some of those individual cases
as well as its general policies to take account of the fact
that we now know that many of those veterans during the Vietnam
era suffered from PTS or related kinds of injuries.
Senator Hagel. You have my commitment to do everything I
can about that. I understand the issue pretty well, been
working on this issue long before I actually ever got to the
Senate. So I will.
Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I would like the same kind of commitment that you have
expressed very persuasively on the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't
Tell'' on the issue of sexual assaults. This issue bedevils the
military. I don't know whether you have seen an excellent
documentary called ``The Invisible War''?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. I know you are familiar with this
issue. I commend you for what you have said to me privately,
and I would ask that your commitment not only to the
prosecution and holding accountable people who are involved in
this criminal conduct, but also to the victims so that they
receive the kind of services that in the civilian world many of
them do through victim's advocates in the courts and similar
kinds of roles played.
So both to prosecution--effective, vigorous, zealous--but
also to protection of the victims. Can you commit to that?
Senator Hagel. Absolutely, I will commit to that, yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. On the strategic issues, I wonder if I
could talk to you for a moment about submarines, which you and
I discussed privately briefly. DOD, the Joint Chiefs, and the
President have all committed to an Ohio-class replacement
program that consists of a fleet of 12, starting no later than
2031.
The Global Zero report settled on a lower number, 10. I
strongly believe that the cost will increase, the cost per
submarine, and that we will be at severe risk, for reasons that
you may well understand, although we can't really discuss them
in detail here because I think they may be classified. I would
like a commitment that you are committed as well to a fleet of
12 Ohio-class replacement submarines.
Senator Hagel. On that issue, I would want to talk with our
Chief of Naval Operations to get a better understanding of our
budget. I can tell you this. I am committed completely to
modernizing our Navy and everything it includes and will
require. I will give you that commitment.
Senator Blumenthal. I am sure you know that the Ohio-class
replacement program is really the cornerstone of our nuclear
deterrence.
Senator Hagel. I do.
Senator Blumenthal. Vital to our national security, but it
requires clear leadership and support from the next Secretary
of Defense. I hope you will perhaps come back to us on that
issue.
Senator Hagel. I will. You and I will be discussing this, I
am sure, many times if I am confirmed. So thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Going to the Virginia-class submarines, the next multiyear
purchase, known as Block IV, envisions 10 submarines. There is
a threat that it could be reduced to nine. For reasons related
to both cost and national security, I think that number should
be 10.
The intent and spirit of the last NDAA was that it should
be 10, and I would like to ask you, similarly, for your
commitment that there will be 2 submarines for 2014 and that
the program continues to be viable at the level of 10.
Senator Hagel. Senator, I will commit to what we have
committed to carry out what we need to fund and develop and
build in order to maintain the kind of modern Navy we are going
to require. Those submarines, as you note, are cornerstones to
that security.
Senator Blumenthal. They are absolutely vital cornerstones,
essential building blocks to our national security as we move
to the Pacific-Asia theater and seek to advance our interests
there. They have the intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance capability as well as, as you well know,
counterterrorism, the importance. I hope that that effort will
continue, and I appreciate your commitment.
Let me just finish with a question that I think goes back
to the contracting area where you were asked questions before.
Senator Ayotte and I, in a trip led by Senator McCain, recently
visited Afghanistan and were briefed--and I am going to try to
make this question brief--about the continuing corruption in
the Afghanistan Government. Deeply troubling and even shocking.
But equally so is the waste of American taxpayer dollars in
part because of the procedural roadblock to enforcement of
section 841. I am not going to quiz you on 841. So you can take
a deep breath there. But 841 is designed to protect American
tax dollars from corrupt contracts that, in fact, go to benefit
the enemy.
We are working revisions that will make more effective the
procedures for terminating those contracts, getting back
American dollars, extending those protections to nondefense
dollars, and I hope that we can have your commitment as well to
work with us on that area.
Senator Hagel. You have my commitment, and I will
enthusiastically work with you on this area.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate your frank and forthright
answers, and I don't know whether I will be here for the second
round of questioning, but I want to express my sincere
gratitude to you for your willingness to serve and your
patience and forthrightness in answering all our questions.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Hagel, thank you for being here today. Thank you
for your service to the country in so many ways and your
willingness to serve again. To see your wife and your brothers
there behind you is an indication of the family commitment as
well as your personal commitment.
There are several things that I may get to in a second
round on Iran and sanctions. I was very involved in that
unilateral sanctions effort when I was in the House of
Representatives. We drafted some of that legislation in my
office when I was in the House.
Our relationship with Israel is of great concern to me, and
it is a priority to our efforts in the Middle East. I think
that is largely exhausted in this first round, at least from my
point of view. I may want to come back to some of it later.
I want to talk a little bit about the ongoing structure of
the force. The Wall Street Journal in an editorial today said
that the current American military was the smallest, least
modern, and least battle-ready in recent memory.
I don't think that means we are not maybe more modern than
anybody else in the world or more battle ready than anybody
else in the world. But I think that is a recognition that our
investment and the way we have used those resources has gotten
them in a position where we maybe need to be more focused on
rebuilding than we do building down.
Secretary Panetta has been very forthcoming in his comments
about the sort of across-the-board cutting approach of
sequestration. What do we do to get our worn-out equipment and
our worn-out personnel in a better position a year from now
than they are right now? Your brief strategic view of that
because I don't have very much time here.
Senator Hagel. Yes. Senator, you have just identified one
of the priorities of the next few years at DOD. Resetting
equipment and essentially reshaping our force structure, but
also renewing our force structure.
The fact is we have been at war for 12 years. Every Senator
here knows and you have constituents that we keep sending these
kids back and back and back to two wars. Of course, there is
going to be a consequence. Something is going to break down,
not only your equipment, but your manpower. You can't keep
doing that.
So that is going to be an overall challenge, Senator, that
is going to take as much of my time, if I am confirmed, as
anything, as it will our Chiefs. Our Chiefs know this better
than anyone, as we structure, rebalance, renew, and re-outfit.
We have, I believe, a force structure that is as capable as
ever. I don't accept that our force structure is somehow behind
or not modern or not capable. I don't think that is true.
Senator Blunt. I think the point that the editorial was
making was not that we were behind, but we are not at the quite
as far on the cutting edge as we may have been. I would hope
you and I would both want to see us get there.
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator Blunt. Let me ask a question about that. Secretary
Gates said recently that one of his big concerns was that we
repeat the mistakes of what I think he referred to as a
``procurement holiday'' that we took in the 1970s and then, to
some extent, again in the 1990s. We spent a lot of time in the
10 years after that trying to get built back up to where we had
hoped to be.
How, in these discussions of cutting, do we keep the lines
open, do we keep our effort ongoing? One of the things that I
know quite a bit about is the F-18 line because it is in St.
Louis, MO, where Boeing Military is. I do know that if you ever
close that line down, we are always talking about, well, what
other country needs some version of this, and how do we keep
our capacity at a time when there is this talk about cutting
and not just cutting, but sort of cutting everything a little
bit, which means that some of the things that get cut a little
bit I think disappear because they can't survive if they are
only partly there.
Senator Hagel. Senator, you have just again identified one
of the great challenges that lies ahead, and that is
maintaining our industrial base. You use the F-18.
Senator Blunt. There are lots of other lines. That just
happens to be the one I have been on the most times.
Senator Hagel. No, I understand. But that is a good example
of what we are going to have to continue to keep strong.
The reality is, as you say, because we know what we have to
deal with, what our budgets are as a result of the Budget Act
of 2011. What we don't know brings us back to the uncertainty
of sequestration. Some of the examples you are using are good
examples of areas that will and can be, could be cut
arbitrarily in order to fulfill budget requirements.
I think what you have just noted again is going to be a
huge part of keeping our technological superiority, our edge.
Senator Blumenthal mentioned submarines. That is another
component of this. All the superior technical edge this country
has possessed since World War II has kept us, along with other
things and for other reasons, the strongest military power in
the history of man. That must be maintained.
Threats change. Cyber is a good example. I mean, 10 years
ago, nobody had any idea what we were talking about, cyber.
Even 5 years ago. We have to adjust to that challenge, that
reality.
Senator Blunt. Let me see if I can----
Senator Hagel. The core base, though, Senator, is exactly
right, and we have to protect that.
Senator Blunt. We do. We have made efforts with our allies
and friends to give them some other version of equipment we
had, maybe not quite as good as we had, but something that
keeps our defense procurement lines in place so that when we do
need them, they are still there. That is critically important.
Before you were designated Secretary of Defense, as the
potential nominee for this job, in talking about sequestration,
you made a comment about there is lots of bloat--I am sure you
have talked about this comment quite a bit and are very
familiar with it, more than you were before you made it
probably--in the Pentagon. What do you have in mind there?
What is being done at the Pentagon that could maybe better
be done somewhere else or is being duplicated somewhere else? I
think in some of the follow-up of that, I saw you mentioned
things that should be in the State Department have gotten over
to the Pentagon. Are there examples of that that we can work on
and you will want to lead on?
Senator Hagel. Two things. First, that comment came in a
large, extended interview about budgets about everything, and
that interview was done in 2011 prior to the Budget Control
Act, just to get the timeframe right on that. I never supported
sequestration, by the way.
Now, to your question about what we could do. Obviously,
much of the conversation here in the last few hours has been
about acquisition, about waste, fraud, and abuse, billions of
dollars. Why aren't we auditing these programs? Where is the
accountability? That is certainly an area that we are going to
have to take a look at.
My reference to State Department programs, some of the
general areas, I mentioned this this morning--where we have
pushed down on the military the last 12 years to do things that
usually are done out of State Department, aid type programs and
exchange programs, helping civilian type programs in areas.
That was all given to the--not all, but a great deal of it was
given to the military at the time we were at war in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
So the military has taken on a tremendous volume of
assignments and funding that goes with that. That needs to be
sorted through, I think. Those are areas where I think we----
Senator Blunt. One of your commitments will be to help us
sort through that?
Senator Hagel. It has to be, Senator. It has to be.
Senator Blunt. I am out of time, Senator. I will be here
for the second round.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking
Member. It is an honor to be part of this committee. I look
forward to working with my colleagues, and I am proud to serve
the people of Indiana.
We are the heartland of America, and Senator Hagel, we have
over 14,000 members of the National Guard. In our State, we
have the fourth-largest contingent of National Guard members in
the entire country. I want to thank you for your service to the
country, you along with all Vietnam veterans and other
veterans, for what you have done for our Nation. I appreciate
your taking the time to meet with me.
We had an extensive discussion, and your understanding of
the complex challenges we face in the Middle East and the
importance of our alliance with Israel. It is a special and
historic relationship. I believe it is a special and historic
relationship. The people of my State believe that as well.
I think it was important for you to let everyone know that
there can be no nuclear Iran, that there are lines that cannot
be crossed, and we will stand up and defend our friends and the
entire world in that area.
When we were together, I mentioned to you about my visit to
Crane Naval Warfare Systems in Indiana. What they do is they
work to create the technologies to control the spectrum, in
effect, try to win the battlefield before the battle ever
starts on the ground.
We were wondering what can be done in this time of
challenging budgets to ensure that in the area of technology,
in the area of spectrum, we can maintain our budget so that, as
I said, before the war is ever started on the ground, we have
won it on the spectrum level? How critical is that in terms of
your planning in the Defense Department?
Senator Hagel. Senator, I think that focus is on as much
the core challenge that the Pentagon has in front of it as any
one thing. This committee is going to be particularly important
to help the leaders of the Pentagon sort through that because,
as evidenced in the whole series of questions that have been
asked today, Senator Blunt's most recent questions, this is a
time of priorities.
Budgets drive that, but missions should always drive
everything. What are going to be our missions in the Defense
Department over the next few years? How are we going to
resource those missions? What are the priorities going to be?
It is the entire universe of what the responsibilities are and
how do we carry those responsibilities out to secure this
Nation?
Your general questions and most of the questions asked here
today have been about this. Until I would get over to the
Pentagon, if I am confirmed, and understand more of the
specifics and work with the Chiefs and get a better grasp of
exactly what we have, I won't be in a position to be able to
say this or this or we will do this or we won't.
Obviously, that is why I say this committee, the
authorizing committees are going to be particularly important.
Senator Donnelly. My next question probably ties into that
as well, which is, as I mentioned, we have over 14,000 members
of the Guard in our State, Army Reserves. They have done tour
after tour after tour in Iraq and in Afghanistan. As we wind
down, I think it is critical to make sure that we have a
strategic plan for the Guard in the future so that the Guard we
have today, equipment-wise, it is struggling on equipment. We
have to upgrade not only our vehicles, but in other areas as
well.
I guess the question is, how do you view the mission of the
Guard in the years ahead?
Senator Hagel. During our conversation and a couple of the
questions I have had here today on the Guard, I have said I am
committed to a strong National Guard. It is an essential part
of our force structure going into the future. I think it was
proven quite clearly and effectively the last 12 years.
That will be maintained. I think further evidence of that,
putting a Chief of the National Guard into the Joint Chiefs.
You have my commitment that I will be continually focused on
that integration and the upgrading in every way.
Senator Donnelly. I have had the privilege of working with
General Shinseki in recent years on veterans issues, but I
think back to when he testified regarding Iraq and talked about
how many troops he thought were needed and all the
repercussions that came out of that not only for the general,
but in so many ways.
I think it is critical that the generals and the people in
the Pentagon provide you with the most unvarnished information
possible. They tell you exactly what they think. You tell them
exactly what you think, and that nobody at any time has their
career affected for telling you the truth. I want to make sure
that is the way that you are approaching this as well.
Senator Hagel. That is the way I would approach it. I value
that. There is no other way to assure that we are getting the
best, the most honest advice from our most capable leaders than
to say it like that.
The General Shinseki episode was a very unfortunate episode
in this country, what happened to him for telling the truth. I
will assure this committee that if I am Secretary of Defense
that kind of thing will never happen, for a general officer, a
senior commander to be handled and treated that way when he
told the truth to the Congress of the United States.
Senator Donnelly. I will say, and I know you know this, the
job he has done for veterans as the VA Secretary has been
extraordinary.
Another area in regards to not only our veterans, which we
are challenged with right now, but also on Active Duty, is the
suicide rate. It has been heartbreaking. In 2012, we lost more
Active Duty members to suicide than we did in fighting in
Afghanistan.
I know General Chiarelli has at this point basically
dedicated his life to trying to solve this problem. I want to
make sure that the Defense Department is going to lean all in
to try to fix this and provide the care and help and answers so
that that number goes to zero in the years ahead.
Senator Hagel. You have my complete commitment on this
issue.
Senator Donnelly. It is something that our veterans then
face as well. It is also a transition issue that as much as you
can work with the VA, as our Active Duties transition out and
our National Guard when they go home, that they have somebody
to talk to, somebody to tell how they feel, and somebody who
understands what they are going through because if we can help
with that, they have borne the burden of battle, and we owe
them. We owe them everything.
Another question I wanted to ask you about is Pakistan. As
we know, the incredible challenges we have in Afghanistan, so
much of it is caused by Pakistan. We spent about or provided
about $2.5 billion in aid. Do you think those were dollars well
spent?
Senator Hagel. Pakistan is a complicated relationship. It
is a nuclear power. They cooperate with the United States on
some things. We have difficulties with them on others.
As to your question on investment in Pakistan, we condition
that assistance. We must continue to condition that assistance.
I think Pakistan is too dangerous and that area of the world is
so clearly in the national security interest of this country
that we just can't walk away from it and not deal with them.
It is complicated. It is imperfect. But this is where all
the levers of influence and relationships and diplomacy and
economics and power come into play. How we wisely use all of
those resources is going to determine some of the outcomes.
We have to be honest as well. We are dealing with factors
there that we don't agree with, that we have difficulties with.
But again, we have to continue to work at it, and I believe
that we will and we should.
Senator Donnelly. Senator, thank you very much.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel, I want to thank you for being here, and I
want to begin by thanking you for your honorable service to our
Nation, for your personal sacrifice that you have put into
standing and fighting for this country.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. I would like to begin by addressing a
question of process. In your prepared statements today, you
describe that you have given hundreds of speeches and
interviews.
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Senator Cruz. This committee asked you in this process to
submit those speeches in the last 5 years, and in response to
that, you handed over a total of four speeches. In my view,
that submission was facially insufficient for this committee to
assess your record.
Indeed, your financial disclosure revealed you had received
paid honoraria in the past year for 12 speeches, and yet you
did not even hand over those speeches for which you were paid
substantial sums of money. Beyond that, 2 days ago, 6 Senators,
including Ranking Member Inhofe, sent you a letter asking for
financial disclosure. You have not chosen to respond to that
letter.
That letter in particular asked about the private
organizations that have paid you over the past 5 years and the
degree to which any of those funding sources have come from
foreign countries, foreign nationals, foreign sovereign debt
funds. You chose not to respond to that letter.
In my view, unless and until you respond to the requests of
members of this committee, this committee does not have a
proper record on which to assess your confirmation, and I think
we need full disclosure and adequate time to assess that.
Now I would like to ask initially a point of clarification.
With respect to the International Criminal Court, do you
believe the United States should become a party to the
International Criminal Court?
Senator Hagel. Senator, may I quickly respond to your first
comment?
Senator Cruz. I would like you to answer my question. My
time is limited.
Senator Hagel. That question is one that I am most likely
not going to be dealing with, as Secretary of Defense.
Senator Cruz. It is a simple question. Do you think we
should be a member of the International Criminal Court? I am
asking for your judgment on whether the United States should be
a party.
Senator Hagel. I support where the United States is today.
Senator Cruz. We are not a party today. You think we should
not be a party. Is that a correct statement of your position?
Senator Hagel. That is correct, yes.
Senator Cruz. Okay. Thank you.
I would like to draw your attention to an interview you did
in 2009 with Al Jazeera. With the chairman's indulgence, if we
can play an excerpt of that interview?
[Video excerpt shown.]

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Senator Cruz. Now in that excerpt, Senator Hagel, the
caller suggests that the Nation of Israel has committed war
crimes, and your response to that was not to dispute that
characterization, but indeed to describe what he said as,
``Well, I think that is exactly right.''
I would like to ask you, do you think the Nation of Israel
has committed war crimes?
Senator Hagel. No, I do not, Senator. I would want to look
at the full context of the interview. But to answer your
question, no.
Senator Cruz. The context of that question, we played the
entirety of it, and I wanted to give you that context so you
could hear the question and you can hear your response. I would
suggest that a suggestion that Israel has committed war crimes
is particularly offensive, given that the Jewish people
suffered under the most horrific war crimes in the Holocaust.
I would also suggest that for the Secretary of Defense or
prospective Secretary of Defense not to take issue with that
claim is highly troubling. I would also point out in 2006 your
characterization of the Nation of Israel's action, and that was
in a speech on the floor of the Senate, you referred to
Israel's military campaign against the terrorist group
Hezbollah as a ``sickening slaughter''.
Now I would suggest the characterizations, do you think it
is right that Israel was committing a ``sickening slaughter,''
as you said on the floor of the Senate?
Senator Hagel. Again, I would want to read all of it, what
I said. First, I have said many, many times, Senator, every
nation has a right to defend itself.
Senator Cruz. Do you think a ``sickening slaughter'' would
constitute a war crime?
Senator Hagel. No. Depends on were they attacked, depends
on many factors. If Israel was defending itself, there was
slaughter going on on both sides.
Senator Cruz. Does one typically characterize defending
yourself against terrorism as a ``sickening slaughter''?
Senator Hagel. No, but again, Senator, I would want to look
at everything because----
Senator Cruz. Okay. Let us look at another excerpt from the
same interview, if we can play the second excerpt?
[Video excerpt shown.]

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Senator Cruz. Senator Hagel, do you think it is appropriate
for the chief civilian leader of the U.S. military forces to
agree with the statement that both the perception ``and the
reality'' is that the United States is ``the world's bully''?
Senator Hagel. I didn't hear her say that, by the way, of
the United States, and I think my comment was it is a relevant
and good observation. I don't think I said that I agree with
it.
Senator Cruz. With respect, I think the record speaks for
itself. It was in writing that she said the United States is
``the world's bully,'' that it is the reality, and your
response, you did say you agree with it. You said, ``Her
observation is a good one. It is relevant. Uh, yes, to her
question.''
You explicitly agreed with the characterization of the
United States as the world's bully, and I would suggest that is
not a characterization. I think the United States has spilled
more blood, more treasure standing for freedom, liberating
people across the world. To go on Al Jazeera, a foreign
network, broadcasting propaganda to nations that are hostile to
us and to explicitly agree with the characterization of the
United States as the world's bully, I would suggest is not the
conduct one would expect of a Secretary of Defense.
Senator Hagel. Senator, she said that was an observation.
Senator Cruz. I will point out that her quote was ``the
perception and the reality''. With that, my time is expired. I
look forward to a second round of questioning.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now what we are going to do, given the fact that some of
those tapes there are--they need to be transcribed to be made
part of the record so that people can judge exactly what was
said and what was asked. I heard that first question, by the
way, as a response to the need for moral leadership. I didn't
hear it the way Senator Cruz did.
But in any event, it is important that the words be
transcribed so they can be made part of the record. It is a
rather unusual thing. I told Senator Cruz that I preferred that
we have a transcript and that you be asked questions from a
transcript, but that I didn't want to stop him from offering
the tape of it, and he went ahead and did it.
In any event, the fair thing now is that the transcript of
each of those segments be made part of the record and that we
give also Senator Hagel an opportunity, should he want either
on this question or, by the way, on other questions, an
opportunity to answer for the record in any way he might
proceed as though he were answering questions for the record.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We will be happy to provide a transcript, and we will also
be making public a link both to these excerpts and to the
entire transcript so that anyone who wants can view it in its
entirety and assess it in context.
Chairman Levin. That would be very helpful. Thank you,
Senator Cruz.
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Chairman Levin. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Inhofe.
I join my colleagues in welcoming you, Senator Hagel.
We live in a complex world, and any Secretary of Defense
should ask tough questions, maybe not particularly politically
popular questions. I see you, Senator Hagel, as that kind of
person, based on your service to our country, your conduct and
responses to the questions asked of you today, and the
conversation that you and I had.
Turning to your statement this morning, you talked about
looking at our future threats and challenges and why DOD is
rebalancing its resources toward the Asia-Pacific region. Of
course, this kind of rebalance is critically important to
Hawaii in our forward position in the Pacific.
Would you expand as to why and what particular economic or
national security factors come into play as we rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region?
Senator Hagel. Senator, you know better than most your
region and its importance and why it will continue to be
important to the world, but certainly to the United States. As
I noted in my opening statement and you know, we have always
been a Pacific power. We have been a Pacific power because we
have clear economic interests there. We have diplomatic
security interests there. We have strong allies there. I
mentioned some of them in my opening statement.
When we look at the growth of economies, we look at trade
growth, we look at population growth, the rise of China. But
not just China, but that entire Asia-Pacific region, we need to
stay relevant to opportunities as well as challenges in all
areas, but in particular the areas that we see as emerging as
to the largest, most significant economic security issues and
challenges and opportunities.
It is appropriate that any nation rebalance assets. You
have to be relevant to the times, to the shifts, the changes.
Our world today is totally different than it was 12 years ago.
Our force structure is being refit, and we are looking at a far
more agile, flexible force structure as our economies are
becoming more agile and flexible.
For all those reasons and more, that is why we are doing
what I think is exactly the right thing to do. Doesn't mean, as
I said in my opening statement, that we are abandoning anybody
or any part of the world. We can't.
Senator Hirono. Senator, as we live in times of budget
constraints, will you commit to keeping me and this committee
informed as you develop the strategies and contemplate force
posture adjustments that go along with this kind of
rebalancing?
Senator Hagel. Yes. I look forward to it.
Senator Hirono. I am very heartened by your perspective,
turning to another question, that you always ask the question,
is the policy working--worthy of the men and women that we send
into battle and possibly to their deaths? I am very heartened
by that kind of a perspective from someone who served our
country.
What will be your top priorities as you look to care for
the men and women in uniform and their families?
Senator Hagel. As I said in my opening statement, the
welfare, the safety, the success of our men and women in
uniform is my top priority, has been and will continue to be,
and their families.
Senator Hirono. Do you have any specific programmatic ways
that you will reflect that?
Senator Hagel. First, to implement the law. We have a
number of new laws, policies that are in the process of being
implemented. We have spoken about some here today. I will
assure, if confirmed, that we do that.
As I said in my opening statement, we will assure that
every military man and woman and their families are given
exactly the same opportunities and rights as each other and all
members of the Armed Forces.
Senator Hirono. I also take to heart your belief in the
importance of the core nation and the work between DOD and the
VA, and I understand that you have a strong relationship with
Secretary Shinseki. With your experience as a veteran and
having been a senior leader in the Veterans Administration,
what will be your primary challenges and goals as you look to
collaborate with Secretary Shinseki and the VA?
Senator Hagel. It will be the same that Secretary Panetta
and, before him, Secretary Gates initiated in closer
collaboration between the two agencies, and that means the
integration of our systems. As our men and women transition out
from Active Duty into civilian life or retired life and are
going to require the assistance of some veterans assistance
programs, a closer integration.
We know that the backlogs now are still far, far too long
to get evaluations of whether it is post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) or whatever the health issue is. I think
continuing to work with Secretary Shinseki, as Secretaries
Panetta and Gates did, but strengthening that integration of
those systems, of leadership, of our people understanding each
other better, and maximizing the resources that each agency has
and making those resources more value-added and count more.
Senator Hirono. I had an opportunity to meet with Secretary
Shinseki recently, and those kinds of collaborative efforts are
not happening as expeditiously as we would like. I certainly
hope that you will have a renewed sense of urgency about the
outcomes of these collaborative efforts because, of course, the
bottom line is it is to help our men and women who are
transitioning out of uniform into civilian life.
I hope that we have that kind of commitment, strong
commitment from you for outcomes.
Senator Hagel. You have my strong commitment.
Senator Hirono. DOD is the United States' largest consumer
of energy, and we talked about that briefly when you came to
see me. It is clear that the military will benefit greatly from
cheaper, more stable fuel costs over the long term. Promising
work is being done in this area to commercialize alternative
fuels that can be produced abundantly in the United States.
Of course, this kind of collaboration is very important for
Hawaii as being the most oil-dependent State in the entire
country. If confirmed, will you continue to emphasize and
prioritize research, development, and, where possible,
deployment of renewable fuels as well as enhanced energy
efficiency efforts to reduce DOD's energy costs over the long
term?
Senator Hagel. Senator, as you have noted, DOD is the
largest user of certainly liquid fuels. But I think our energy
budget, I don't know the exact number, but it's probably around
$18 billion a year.
Anything we can do to make any aspect of securing our
country more cost effective fuel, we need to look at, and I
would make that a high priority, if I am confirmed and go over
to the Defense Department, to see if we could--how we do that,
how we can continue to do that, because in the end, for all the
reasons you know, it is just clearly in the interest of our
country, our resources, and our people.
Senator Hirono. Certainly, continuing to fund research and
development efforts in these areas will accrue to us in the
long term in terms of huge, huge cost savings for DOD.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Now here is the situation we have. This first vote is a 10-
minute vote apparently, and all the subsequent votes are 10
minutes.
Senator Lee, I am happy to call upon you now, but you would
have to kind of keep track of this yourself and have your staff
keep track of it. If you want to take the risk, there may be
some risk if you took your full 8 minutes.
I would be happy to recess now instead of after your
questions. We are going to recess for the five votes. It will
be about an hour.
Would you like to start now and then take a chance that you
might not finish? Or would you rather start at the beginning
after an hour recess?
Senator Lee. Thank you for that offer, Mr. Chairman.
I better not risk the possibility of missing a vote. I
would prefer that you recess now.
Chairman Levin. We are now going to recess for about an
hour. But I want you all to follow this.
At the last vote--and it may not be the fifth vote. There
may be four votes. We don't know. It is up to five votes. The
final vote, though, we know will be called final passage of the
debt limit bill. We will start, we will begin about 5 minutes
after the beginning of that vote.
We will stand in recess. [Recessed.]
Chairman Levin. The committee will come back to order.
Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Hagel, for joining us today and for
answering the questions that have been asked to you so far. I'd
like to talk to you for a few minutes about Israel. Israel is,
I believe, America's most important ally, certainly in the
Middle East and in many respects in the entire world. A lot of
people in this body are concerned, quite appropriately, about
making sure that alliance remains strong, about making sure
that our interests as Americans are protected abroad. A lot of
us feel like one of the best ways of protecting American
national security is through that alliance in the Middle East.
On April 12, 2002, there was a Palestinian terrorist who
detonated a bomb in downtown Jerusalem, killing 6 Israelis and
wounding I believe about 100 others. On that day, while you
were still serving in the U.S. Senate, you gave a speech on the
Senate floor. You made a couple of comments that I'd like to
discuss with you and ask you a little bit about.
In one segment of the speech you said: ``We understand
Israel's right to defend itself. We're committed to that. We've
helped Israel defend that right. We will continue to do so. But
it should not be at the expense of the Palestinian people,
innocent Palestinian people, and innocent Israelis who are
paying a high price.''
Some who have read that have reacted with concern that this
may be indicative of a feeling on your part that there might be
some moral equivalency between on the one hand Israel's
exercise of its right to defend itself and on the other hand
Palestinian terrorism. Do you believe that there is a moral
equivalency between these two things?
Senator Hagel. Oh, absolutely not, Senator.
Senator Lee. Do you understand how others might read this
statement in such a way that could leave them with that
impression?
Senator Hagel. I do.
Senator Lee. How do you respond to it? In other words, do
Palestinians, let's say those Palestinians who have engaged in
acts of terrorism, perhaps in retaliation against Israel for
Israel defending itself, do they have a legitimate gripe?
Senator Hagel. Terrorism can never be justified under any
circumstances.
Senator Lee. Is their grievance legitimate?
Senator Hagel. The Palestinians?
Senator Lee. Yes, the Palestinians who decide to strap a
bomb onto themselves and detonate it or otherwise engage in
acts of terror; do they have a legitimate grievance that
they're expressing?
Senator Hagel. They have grievances. A lot of people have
grievances----
Senator Lee. Are those grievances legitimate?
Senator Hagel.--but not a justification for terrorism and
killing innocent people, never.
Senator Lee. Are they on par with the grievances that
innocent Israelis have when they become the victims of violent
acts?
Senator Hagel. I don't think you can judge whether it's
Israelis or Palestinians or anybody in the world in separating
innocent victims of terrorism.
Senator Lee. I think you can in some circumstances, can't
you? I mean----
Senator Hagel. Not victims.
Senator Lee. For heaven's sakes, though--oh, okay, maybe
not victims. Can you, and indeed must you not, judge when it
comes to one group of people who may at least be willing to
recognize the other group of people's right to exist?
Senator Hagel. Absolutely. In fact, I'm clearly on the
record on that point. In fact, in 2006 there was the Anti-
Palestinian Terrorist Act that I voted for, and there are a
number of other resolutions, acts, votes, speeches I've made.
In my book I have said unequivocally Hezbollah, Hamas
specifically, they must renounce terrorism, and first they must
accept Israel's right to exist as a Jewish homeland, respect
the borders, protect the borders. Absolutely, I've made that
very clear.
Senator Lee. Okay. Now, later on in the same speech you
asked a question. You referred to the fact, that we really need
to develop peace in the Middle East, and you asked the
question: ``Who guarantees this peace?'' You then continue by
asking another question: ``If in fact we expect Israel to pull
back to their pre-1967 borders, who guarantees that peace?''
Does this, Senator Hagel, reflect sentiment on your part
that that is a legitimate way of solving the peace process, of
bringing about peace in Israel, in the Middle East, is by
asking Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders?
Senator Hagel. No, not at all. What I said was, as you just
quoted me, who guarantees the security of Israel's borders?
Israel's borders must be secure. That's part of the
fundamentals of the Quartet Principles of 2006, in fact, the
U.N. Resolutions 242 and 337 and other resolutions. That's
paramount, the guarantee of the security of Israel and its
borders.
Senator Lee. I understand that part of the question related
to how we bring about that peace, and I want to get back to
that in a minute. But another part of the question started from
the premise that Israel would be withdrawing to its pre-1967
borders. Do you view that as a tenable solution? Do you believe
such borders are militarily defensible?
Senator Hagel. I think that's all negotiable. The Quartet
Principles of 2006, which President Bush laid down, and a two-
state solution, all those issues have to be resolved. Land for
peace, trading land, all those issues are final status issues
that are absolutely key to the future of Israel or before
Israel can agree to anything.
Senator Lee. So you're saying that you might describe a
resolution of this crisis involving withdrawal to the pre-1967
borders as perhaps one among several tenable solutions?
Senator Hagel. It's part of what's been talked about and
defined in, as I said, the 2006 Quartet Principles and U.N.
resolutions that that is part of a final status set of issues
that have to be resolved. The United States and no other
country can impose that on Israel. That is a negotiable issue,
but it's been out there, and that remains to be dealt with in
negotiations.
Senator Lee. Is it one that you think the United States
should encourage?
Senator Hagel. I would encourage peace and a secure, safe
Israel. That's what I think most of us would want to see.
Senator Lee. Okay. Now, in 2009 you made a statement
suggesting that U.S. ground troops should be sent to that part
of the world and installed as U.N. peacekeepers in a ``non-
militarized Palestinian state''. Is this something you stand
behind today? Is this an approach that you think is
appropriate?
Senator Hagel. Senator, I don't have the facts behind me,
in front of me, but I don't think that was a recommendation I
was making. If I recall, my comments--and you may be able to
give me exactly the comments--were in the context of how do you
secure Israel's border, who secures Israel's border? For
example, General Brent Scowcroft has suggested at times maybe
this is a peacekeeping role for NATO. That was what that was
all about.
Senator Lee. Senator, my time has expired. I need to ask
you one more question. I understand that you have made a
statement indicating that there is no justification for
Palestinian suicide bombers, but that there is also no
justification for Israel to ``keep Palestinians caged up like
animals''. Did you say that, and if so do you stand by that
statement today?
Senator Hagel. I said it, and I don't remember the context
or when I said it. But----
Senator Lee. Do you believe today that Israel keeps
Palestinians caged up like animals?
Senator Hagel. No. If I had an opportunity to edit that,
like many things I've said, I would like to go back and change
the words and the meaning. No, it was I think in a larger
context. I've said many, many things over many years. It was a
larger context of the frustration and what's happening, which
is not in Israel's interest, to find ways that we can help
bring peace and security to Israel.
If I had a chance to go back and edit it, I would. I regret
that I used those words.
Senator Lee. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lee.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member.
Welcome, Senator Hagel. It was good to see you with my dear
friend Senator Warner, decorated Navy and Marine Corps veteran
from World War II and the Korean War, Secretary of the Navy,
long-time member of this committee. You couldn't have a better
ally than Senator Warner and it was good to see him here.
He exemplifies--and forgive my Virginia-centrism for a
minute. He exemplifies something that's very important about
our Commonwealth. Our map is a map of the military history of
this country: Yorktown, Appomattox, the Pentagon, where
Setptember 11 occurred. There's a ceremony in Arlington tonight
for the commissioning of a new amphib, the USS Arlington, that
will be commissioned in Norfolk in April.
We care very deeply about these events. One in nine
Virginians is a veteran. Not one in nine voters, not one in
nine adults, but birth to death, one in nine is a veteran. When
you add in Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, DOD civilian, DOD
contractor, and their families, now you're talking about
probably one in three of us. We care very, very deeply about
all that's within DOD.
Virginians talk all the time about national security
concerns and threats. Let me be plain, the threat and the
concern that Virginians are now talking about more than any
other is the inability of Congress to find a way forward on
reasonable budget compromise. That's what's in the newspapers,
that's what's in the headlines.
At the direction of Deputy Secretary Ash Carter, DOD is now
cutting expenditures and planning for future cuts. We have a
looming sequester on March 1 and then a CR expiration on March
27. I'm very worried at the macro level about DOD's ability to
pursue and execute appropriate national security objectives in
this time of congressional inability to find budget compromise.
The current CR limits flexibility, for example, of the
military to appropriately tailor resources to the appropriate
ends under a CR. The Navy has no flexibility to meet a $3.7
billion operations and maintenance shortfall.
I'm new here. To me it seems like funding the military
through CR is poor business, poor budgeting, poor governance.
I'm worried about its effect upon the morale of all of our men
and women in service.
My first question is a really simple one: Do you agree that
we, Congress, must finish an fiscal year 2013 appropriations
process as soon as possible to allow DOD to move forward with
this year's funding decisions, rather than continuing to be
bound by an fiscal year 2012 CR?
Senator Hagel. Yes, I do. I think I've been very clear on
that point all day today. You have described it accurately.
Senator Kaine. My second question is related, is about
sequestration. To me, again the new guy, allowing budget
sequestration--the cavalier discussions I've seen in some
newspapers recently by Members of Congress about the fact that
it's reality and we probably can't change it makes absolutely
no sense.
I'm kind of curious and interested to see whether it might
be more sensible to sort of even realign the deadlines, the
sequester deadline. We are now, based on the vote we just had
on the floor of the Senate, in a budgetary process where
there's a strong likelihood that we'll be able to produce
budgets together with the House. Why would we be making short-
term one-off decisions that are holdovers from a previous
Congress that couldn't get it right when we are embarking upon
a budget process? To my way of thinking, that's the way you
ought to make revenue and spending decisions, in accord with a
budget, rather than through gimmicks like sequester.
I think we're going to get out of this budget uncertainty,
but when we do you will have the task, if confirmed, of being
the Secretary of Defense in a resource-constrained environment
and you're going to have to deal, hopefully in a more
thoughtful budgetary process with Congress, on how to make
priorities about spending. I'd like to have you talk a little
bit about how you would approach that administrative task in a
resource-constrained world, how you're going to approach that
task of dealing with these fiscal realities.
Senator Hagel. First, as I noted this morning in my opening
statement, if I am confirmed I would intend to make this
relationship between the Secretary of Defense and Congress a
partnership, much as Secretary Panetta has done. I think it's
critically important for many reasons. Let's start with the
budget. You authorize, you appropriate. The Federal Government
is captive to that authorization and appropriation, and each
Department must work within the budgetary framework of those
resources.
I have said that, like all of these big issues, it is a
matter of, first of all, clearly defining the mission in its
entirety as to what is the mission of DOD, then what are our
priorities as they fit into our strategic interests around the
world, and the how do you do it? How do you manage it? How do
you lead?
That includes working closely with the Chiefs. That
includes working with all the leadership within DOD. It's about
teams, it's about people, and it's about building consensus in
Congress as well as within the military.
Each Military Chief has a responsibility for his or her
areas and Service, and that's as it should be. Obviously,
Goldwater-Nichols integrated our Services, which was the right
thing. I think most people agree with that. But also, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and each Chief has a
responsibility to look out for the interests of their Service.
The coordination of those efforts and the understanding the
bigger picture are critically important. Those are all
different elements, not unlike you as a governor at one time,
would bring to the job.
Senator Kaine. Senator, switching gears for a minute, it is
still kind of hard to contemplate that if confirmed you would
be the first enlisted person to hold the position of Secretary
of Defense, and I want to ask a question about especially our
enlisteds. Senator Manchin touched upon it earlier, the
unacceptably high rate of unemployment of folks exiting
military service. I think officers have a little bit easier
time, but when we see an unemployment rate among enlisteds that
is higher than the national average, when they've sacrificed,
when they've given, and when they have leadership and technical
skills that could benefit a civilian workforce, we know
something is wrong.
There have been some pilot projects through the NDAAs in
2012 and 2013 to focus on an issue that matters a lot to me,
and we talked about it, how to credential Active Duty military
while they are in their military occupational specialties,
while they are gaining technical skills, with credentials that
mean something in the civilian workforce, so that when they
leave they're not just an E-5 or a gunny sergeant, which people
in the civilian workforce may not understand, but they actually
have the credentials that the civilian-hiring workforce does
understand.
Are you committed to pushing forward on those pilot
programs and expanding them so that we can get at this
unemployment issue?
Senator Hagel. Absolutely. Again, I noted that in my
opening statement, Senator. I think I have some experience in
that area over the years. I'm committed to that. As I said,
nothing is more important than our men and women and their
families. That doesn't mean just throughout their time in our
service to our country, but afterward. What this country
commits to them, we must fulfill that commitment.
Senator Kaine. One last comment, Senator Hagel, not a
question. As the topics have come up today, when we talked
about Iran and the threat of a nuclear Iran, we've often talked
about it as linked with Israel's security, which it is. They're
Holocaust deniers and they've threatened the security of the
State of Israel. But I want to make sure that everybody in this
chamber understands it's not just about the security of Israel.
The Iranian nuclear threat is a much bigger one. It is very
clear that if Iran gets nuclear weapons that other nations will
start to do the same thing, and that would cut completely
counter to I know principles that you hold, principles the
President holds. It's not just on Israel's shoulders to be
worried about a nuclear Iran. It is a threat that we all need
to worry about.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. I agree. I think, just to add one
point on that, you all know, of course, and many have been
involved in this over the years, the current P5 Plus 1
engagement to get all five members of the U.N. Security Council
together on this one issue. Now, we have variations of exactly
what should be done. But I think that gives the world some
indication of how Russia, China, the United States, and
essentially all nations of the world view the threat of a
nuclear Iran.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator, for being here, and thank you very much
for your military service.
My single biggest concern, Senator, about the nomination is
the dramatic flip-flops between your past statements and record
and what you're saying as the nominee. They're about key core
issues, and we've discussed some of those today. I wanted to
focus on that, and I apologize if I go over some of the things
that have come up before. I couldn't be here for most of the
hearing.
In 2006, when Israel was responding to attacks by Hezbollah
from Lebanon, you called that response a ``sickening
slaughter'' and you accused Israel of ``the systematic
destruction of an American friend, the country and people of
Lebanon''. What do you say about those quotes today?
Senator Hagel. Well, first, I said them. I've been asked
about them. I have said I regret saying that. It was in the
larger context of a speech I made about what was going on, the
30-some days of war going on. I also included in that speech
the responsibility of Hezbollah, who started the war. So it
wasn't exactly the way you just noted it. The language is
exact, what you just said, but it was a larger context.
Yes, I regret that language. But I think the bigger point
is, Senator--and I have noted this all morning--my unequivocal
support of Israel over the years. There's been no flip-flop on
that. How I've voted, I've never voted against anything but
Israel's interests in every vote I've cast in the U.S. Senate.
I've said it in my book. They're a special, historic ally. We
will always support them and defend them. I've said it in my
speeches.
There's no flip-flop on my support for Israel.
Senator Vitter. Is there a flip-flop on your calling their
response to Hezbollah ``the systematic destruction of an
American friend, the country and people of Lebanon''? Do you
stand by that today?
Senator Hagel. I just said I said that, and I said that I
regretted saying that. But that's not----
Senator Vitter. Do you stand by those words, or is that a
flip-flop?
Senator Hagel. No. If I had a chance to edit those words
out, I would.
Senator Vitter. That's what I'm talking about in terms of
flip-flop.
Senator Hagel. I suppose if I had a chance to edit a lot of
things in my life, Senator, I'd probably be fairly busy.
Senator Vitter. Let me move on because I have a number of
these concerns. In 1998, in a Senate hearing, you said that
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had ``tilted way too far
toward Israel in the Middle East peace process''. Do you still
think that of that peace process in 1998?
Senator Hagel. I don't recall the event. I don't recall the
words. I don't know where it comes from. I don't know the
context. Again, Senator, I go back for years and years and
years on different things I've said, but I don't recall that or
what the context was, so I don't know.
Secretary Albright has endorsed me, by the way, to be the
next Secretary of Defense. I worked very closely with Secretary
Albright, as I did with President Clinton and his
administration, in support of Israel.
Senator Vitter. In general, at that time under the Clinton
administration, do you think that they were going ``way too far
toward Israel in the Middle East peace process''?
Senator Hagel. No, I don't, because I was very supportive
of what the President did at the end of his term in December-
January, December 2000, January 2001. As a matter of fact, I
recount that episode in my book, when I was in Israel.
Senator Vitter. Just to clarify, that's the sort of flip-
flop I'm talking about, because that's what you said then and
you're changing your mind now.
Senator Hagel. Senator, that's not a flip-flop. I don't
recall everything I've said in the last 20 years or 25 years.
If I could go back and change some of it, I would. But that
still doesn't discount the support that I've always given
Israel and continue to give Israel.
Senator Vitter. Let me go to a third thing, is actually
what you said today, talking about Iran as a ``legitimate
elected government''. Do you think the election that had to do
with this Iranian Government coming to power was free and fair
and legitimate?
Senator Hagel. I noted that the term ``legitimate'' was not
the term I should have used. I should have used ``recognized''.
That's the more appropriate term. I was referring to the fact
that it's a nation that is a member of the United Nations, it
has embassies from all our allies.
Senator Vitter. What about the----
Senator Hagel. It's a recognized nation.
Senator Vitter. What about the word ``elected,'' because
you said ``legitimate elected government''?
Senator Hagel. There was an election in Iran.
Senator Vitter. So my question specifically was, you
apparently think that was a free and fair and legitimate
election?
Senator Hagel. That's not what I said.
Senator Vitter. That's why I'm asking what you meant,
because you said ``legitimate elected government''.
Senator Hagel. I just explained I should have said
``recognized'' instead of ``legitimate,'' which I did earlier
today. There was an election. There will be another
presidential election in June of this year for President of
Iran. Whether it's free and fair, I don't know.
Senator Vitter. Do you expect it to be free and fair and
legitimate?
Senator Hagel. I don't know.
Senator Vitter. Okay. You have no expectations one way or
the other about that?
Senator Hagel. I do know that Iran is not exactly a model
democracy and it has not been. I don't have any expectations
for a free, fair election.
Senator Vitter. Okay. In 2008, you wrote that a nuclear
Iran might be tolerable because ``sovereign nation states
possessing nuclear weapons capability, as opposed to stateless
terrorist groups, will often respond with some degree of
responsible, or at least sane, behavior''. Is that still your
hope or expectation about this Government of Iran?
Senator Hagel. Again, I'm not sure where the reference came
from or the context. But what I obviously was referring to were
different options that people will look at in regard to Iran
getting nuclear weapons. I've always said that Iran must not
get weapons of mass destruction. I've always said it's a
sponsor of terrorists, of terrorism, and I've always said the
military option should remain on the table to assure that Iran
does not get nuclear weapons.
Senator Vitter. Again, this quote, you suggest that Iran
would maybe or hopefully respond in a ``responsible, or at
least sane,'' way. Those were the words. Is that still your
expectation or hope?
Senator Hagel. I always have hope that people respond in a
sane way. But that doesn't at all change the facts that it is a
dangerous, dangerous country that's a threat to the United
States, Israel, and the entire world.
Senator Vitter. Okay. After your nomination, the Iranian
Government press noted with satisfaction that the ``anti-
Israel'' Hagel--obviously, that's not your quote; that's
theirs--is known for ``his criticism of Washington's anti-Iran
policies,'' and that he ``has consistently opposed any plan to
launch a military strike against Iran''. Why do you think they
have that impression?
Senator Hagel. First of all, it's not an accurate quote.
I've never opposed military action against Iran.
Senator Vitter. Let me just clarify. It's an accurate quote
of the Iranian Government press. Why do you think they have
that impression?
Senator Hagel. It's not an accurate statement about my
position.
Senator Vitter. Right. But why do you think they have that
impression?
Senator Hagel. As I said in answer to that question
earlier, I have enough difficulty understanding American
politics, Senator. I surely don't understand Iranian politics.
Senator Vitter. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. But if I might add, I also said that there
have been some rather significant Israeli Government leaders
recently that have said some pretty nice things about me,
current Israeli leaders.
Senator Vitter. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
Senator King.
Senator King. Like all the other inquisitors today,
Senator, I want to thank you for your service, and particularly
for your willingness to put yourself through this process to
serve your country once again. It's one of my life principles
never to take a job where I would have to be confirmed by a
legislative body, and you're doing it.
I also want to comment, I read one commentator that said
the fact that this guy was an enlisted man in Vietnam is nice,
but not really significant. I think it's very significant. I'm
a bit of a student of the Cuban missile crisis, the most
dangerous moment this country has ever experienced, and anybody
that studies that period, it's hard to escape the conclusion
that President Kennedy's service on the front lines of World
War II and Chairman Khrushchev's service in his army during
World War II was a significant influence on their willingness
to back away from the nuclear precipice. I think it's very
important to have people with your experience in this position.
Most of the questions, probably 90 percent, today have been
about policy. But the reality is, as I think you would concede,
that the policy comes from the President of the United States.
You're certainly going to advise, but that's where the policy
comes from. I'd like to ask your thoughts about management,
because you're about to take on the world's most cumbersome
bureaucracy, with a lot of problems and headaches and budgetary
challenges.
Just share with me some thoughts about how you're going to
approach the management of DOD?
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you. I note you were sitting
there during the exchange I had with Senator Kaine about some
of this, and I would, in answering your question, pick up on a
couple of those observations.
First--and you too, I know, you were a Governor. So you
both understand a lot of the pieces of this. No matter how big
an organization is, there are still some fundamentals to
leadership and management. Now, as you have noted, DOD is the
largest institution certainly in this country, maybe the world.
How then do you try to manage it? Well, it's not about me. The
Secretary of Defense, he leads, he advises the President. But
it's really about the people who have the accountability and
the responsibility to manage every aspect of our defense
apparatus. That includes all the officers. I think there are
over 50 presidential appointees in DOD. You have obviously the
military, uniformed military, 1.3 million there. So all of
these people are required to manage the Department.
I think a fundamental to me in answering your question is
accountability. We've had some discussions today about audits.
All institutions must be accountable. Elected officials are
accountable. We're all accountable. The emphasis on
accountability I don't think can ever be overstated. You give
managers flexibility, you give them resources, but you give
them direction and expectations, and they have to be very
clear, very direct, and very defined, but not to the point
where you don't want their input and their ability to be
flexible with their management. I think that's, in my opinion,
Senator, is the key to anything, but surely it is the key to
something as large as DOD.
A number of questions were asked of me today about specific
programs, submarine programs, different areas of technology and
acquisitions, and our superior technology. I've said I don't
know enough about it. I don't. There are a lot of things I
don't know about. I, if confirmed, intend to know a lot more
than I do. I will have to.
But at the same time, I would never think that this, as I
said earlier, is about me or I will be running anything. I will
be the leader, I'll be responsible, I'll be accountable. But I
have to rely on the right teams, the right people, bring those
people together. Again, it's accountability and responsibility.
I would stop there, if that gives you some sense of how I
would intend to do this business.
Senator King. My theory of leadership is hire good people
and take credit for what they do. That's my best advice.
You're a guy from Nebraska. You were in the Army. I'm
imaging that every morning you don't get up and think about the
Navy. I hope to correct that over the next few years.
Particularly of concern to us right now in Maine and in other
parts of the country is the multi-year procurement program
which is in jeopardy because of the budget situation.
Your feelings about multi-year procurement and maintaining
the industrial base, which we just have to do if we're going to
be able to maintain our force?
Senator Hagel. Governor, you probably know, and Governor
Kaine does as well, that there is such a thing as a Nebraska
navy. Our governors make these distinguished appointments
throughout their career. Our fleet is small but mighty. But
that has been my initial, early on experience with the Navy.
Industrial base, I referenced that in a couple of comments
I made earlier today in responding to questions. Absolutely
essential to our future that we maintain a strong, growing,
credible military industrial base, for all the reasons you
understand. Certainly Senator Kaine does, being from Virginia,
and other Senators here who have in their States these
facilities and, more importantly, private companies that
represent our industrial base.
How we then prioritize our needs, how we account for and
audit contracts, forward procurements, cost overruns, waste,
fraud, and abuse, all part of it. This is going to be more and
more essential as we are dealing with, as you have noted, a
restricted budget. It may be a very restricted budget,
depending on how things happen on sequestration.
The Navy is an indispensable part of our security
apparatus. First, it is the one visible projection of power
that we have in the world. Obviously, our rebalancing of
resources in the Asia-Pacific region are some indication of
that. The Persian Gulf; we have been talking all day about
Iran, about Israel, but specifically Iran in the Persian Gulf.
You know we have our Fifth Fleet there in Bahrain. We have two
carrier battle groups in and out of that small little area. The
flexibility, agility, missile defense, nuclear, all those
capabilities are within the Navy.
I am a strong supporter of advancing our Navy technology
and our efforts, and I will continue to do that if confirmed.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator. I'll have some more
questions at a later time. I appreciate it.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel, thank you very much for the tremendous
service that you've already provided to this country and for
your willingness to consider taking on this challenge as
Secretary of Defense and for your stamina at this hearing all
day. You will certainly need it as Secretary of Defense.
I want to follow up on Senator King's question about the
Navy, because the Navy is obviously very important to us in New
Hampshire as well. Our four public shipyards are the backbone
of our naval power, but according to the Navy there's a huge
backlog of the restoration and modernization projects at our
shipyards. According to last year's numbers, that backlog was
around $3 billion.
At Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which Senator King, Senator
Ayotte, and I are all very concerned about, that number was
$513 million. This backlog not only potentially affects our
readiness, but it's also not cost effective. For example, a
2010 Government Accountability Office report pointed out that a
pier project at Norfolk, which I'm sure Senator Kaine is
familiar with, if it had been addressed early it would have
cost $15 million. Because that didn't happen, the pier now is
going to cost about $85 million.
In fiscal year 2012, Senators Collins, Ayotte, and I
included an amendment in the NDAA bill that requires the
Pentagon to produce a shipyard modernization plan to address
these shortfalls. That report's late, but it was promised in
the upcoming budget submission for fiscal year 2014. Will you
commit to ensuring that this modernization plan is produced and
will you commit to pressing the Navy, within the fiscal
constraints that I appreciate, but to fully fund the
investments that are needed to save money in the long term and
ensure that we continue to be very effective and efficient at
our shipyards?
Senator Hagel. Yes, I will make that commitment to do
everything I can to first understand the specifics, which I
don't know all the details. But your request is preliminary to
effective, efficient use of our resources and planning and our
national security. So I will make that commitment. If I am
confirmed, I will get the details. I will assure that the Navy
responds.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I'm sure Senators King and
Ayotte join me in inviting you to come and visit the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard. We hope that you will do that as soon as you're
confirmed.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. I know there's been a fair amount of
discussion earlier today about your involvement with the
organization Global Zero and what your position is on nuclear
weapons. I think it's worth requoting what Senator Reed said
about Ronald Reagan, who said that: ``We seek the total
elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the
Earth.'' I think every President since Ronald Reagan has
supported that aspirational goal, recognizing that at this
point in time it is a goal.
Certainly that's what President Obama has said he supports,
is that some day, probably not in this lifetime, but some day,
we should hope for a world that would be free of nuclear
weapons.
I know I've heard you say that you agree with those two
statements, but do you also agree that as long as nuclear
weapons exist that we have to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversaries?
Senator Hagel. Yes, completely, absolutely. I have never
had any other position but that, as I have indicated this
morning and this afternoon, and will continue to take that
position. As I said in my opening statement and in answer to
other questions, our nuclear deterrent has probably been the
core of keeping world peace and avoiding a World War III, that
nuclear deterrent.
As long as there is the threat of nuclear weapons--and like
you noted and President Obama noted in his Prague speech in
2009--it probably will not happen in our lifetime. But, just as
you noted and Senator Reed's comments about what President
Reagan laid on the table in 1986, we need to keep working on
it. We need to keep moving forward, attempting to do it.
Quite frankly, if you look at the START agreements and you
look at the different treaties we've had, we have brought those
warheads down, under both Republican and Democratic
administrations, bipartisan. What Sam Nunn said this morning,
he and his former colleagues Secretary Kissinger, Secretary
Shultz, Secretary Perry, hundreds of national leaders in
Republican and Democratic administrations over the years have
supported the reduction of weapons of nuclear destruction--not
unilateral, but bilateral, negotiated and verifiable.
As I said this morning, as Ronald Reagan said, ``Trust but
verify''. Nothing unilateral.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Again, I know there's been a lot of discussion about your
comments relative to sanctions on Iran and various options that
we might pursue with respect to Iran and nuclear weapons. But I
wonder again if you would confirm what your position is on the
President's current strategy of strong diplomacy, tough
international sanctions, and keeping all the options on the
table?
Senator Hagel. You have just defined President Obama's
strategy on Iran, which I firmly support, strongly support. It
is the wise way to do it. I don't know if I mentioned this to
you in our meeting, but I wrote a book in 2008 and I have a
chapter on Iran, and I lay all that out in the chapter. As I've
said, I don't think President Obama went to my chapter and
developed his strategy based on my chapter, but there's nothing
in that chapter that I wrote in that book in 2008 or anything
I've ever said that deviates from where the President is.
The military option is always on the table, must be on the
table, always should be the last option, always the last
option. But aren't we wiser and smarter if we can figure this
out, accomplish our objectives, without having to go to war,
for everybody?
Senator Shaheen. I hope so.
You referenced the meeting that we had last week and I very
much appreciated your taking time to come in and sit down and
talk about some of the statements that have been represented
that you have addressed today. One of those had to do with
Israel's security. Again, I know this has been discussed at
length during the day today, but I wonder if again you could
reconfirm what your commitment is on Israel and the security of
Israel in the Middle East?
Senator Hagel. My support of Israel's security is and
always has been very clear. I strongly support Israel. The
security of Israel is a commitment that we made to Israel in
1948 when Israel was born under American leadership, President
Harry Truman. That commitment is a bond that is more than just
an ally to ally. It is special, it's historical, it's values-
driven.
I've never equivocated from that line. My votes in the
Senate have shown that. What I've said publicly has shown that.
I've said this in my book. Absolutely, and we'll continue to do
that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
Okay, we're going to have a 5-minute second round, and if
we need a third round we will have a third round. I'm going to
try to take less than 5 minutes so I can yield a couple
minutes, if I still have them, to Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Earlier today, Senator Hagel, one of my
colleagues made a statement that you had not responded to
requests for copies of all your speeches and to requests about
contributions to certain organizations I believe that you
either served or had spoken to, and that you didn't have the
opportunity at that time to respond to that statement. I want
to give you the opportunity now, if you wish to, or if you
prefer to respond for the record.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will respond for
the record. But I will take this opportunity to respond. First,
as far as I know--and I asked again at the break of our
counsel, Ethics Office lawyers, have we responded to all
requests or are we in the process of responding to every single
request? The answer is yes. Some of these requests didn't come
in until yesterday, specifically the financial documentation
request. Copies of my speeches came in late.
We have given the committee every copy of every speech that
I have that's out there, every video that I have that's out
there. On paid speeches, most every one of those paid speeches,
in the contract it says that they are private and not
videotaped. That wasn't my decision; that was the contract of
the group I spoke to. I believe every paid speech I gave I
didn't have a prepared text. I gave it extemporaneously, which
is something I've been doing for long before I left the Senate.
We are fulfilling every legal commitment I said and I am
obligated to, and I've complied with every ethical request. I
always have. I did when I was in the Senate. I'll continue to
do it now. We are doing it now.
Chairman Levin. There was one or two other times when you
did not have the opportunity to reply to a question and, in
order not to use up all my time, you should feel free to do
that for the record. We're going to keep this record open until
close of business tomorrow for questions and for your answers
until close of business Monday, which means 5 p.m. tomorrow for
questions for the record, 5 p.m. on Monday for your responses
to questions for the record.
At that time, would you give us the update on any
additional documents, speeches, or information that you have
been requested to provide which you have not yet been able to,
but is in the works, so you can give us an update?
Senator Hagel. I will. Again, I have committed and will
continue to commit to complying with every legal document,
legal requirement.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I hope I have a minute or 2 that I can then yield to
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that
courtesy very, very much. I'm going to have to hurry this up a
little bit because it's less time than I thought we had, I say
to my good friend.
It was mentioned that one of the members up here thought I
was being disrespectful during the time that I was questioning
you. It was at a time when I made the statement that you have
been endorsed by the ministry of Iran for your nomination to be
Secretary of Defense. Do you consider that to be a
disrespectful notion on my part?
Senator Hagel. No, it's a legitimate question.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
I have kind of been the leader on postponing any further
Abrams tanks or F-16s to Egypt until such time as that
government is under control. This is my own statement, only
representing my own thoughts. I think Morsi's an enemy. I think
their military is a friend.
There was a vote just a little while ago to do away
permanently with the sending of any of this equipment to Egypt.
I don't think that's a good idea. What I think is a good idea
is to continue to use that as leverage. If you do that, you
lose the leverage. I believe that right now, Morsi has already
distanced himself from the military. To me that's a first good
step, and I would like to think that we could reinstate a
friend in that area.
I would only ask you, would you agree with my statement
that I came out with a long time ago or my bill that I
introduced, I should say, and I re-introduced in a stronger way
today, saying that we would withhold sending this equipment to
Egypt until such time as these conditions are met? I mentioned
the conditions of keeping the accords from Camp David and that
type of thing. Would you consider that?
Senator Hagel. First, that's a policy decision that the
President of the United States would make. If he asks for my
advice I would certainly give it to him. But to the bigger
question, I think it is important that our assistance to Egypt
be conditional. They play an absolutely critical role in
fulfilling the commitments of Camp David for the security of
Israel and elsewhere.
Senator Inhofe. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but we're
almost out of time right now. I appreciate that answer.
You made one statement that I strongly disagreed with. You
said that President Obama has been the strongest Israeli
supporter since 1948. I have a hard time with that. I know that
he's not up for confirmation; you are. But when you see
statements coming out of the administration like, ``The United
States believes that negotiations should result in two states
with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel and Jordan and
Egypt,'' and they come out with the statements like, ``We
believe the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on
the 1967 borderlines,'' these are statements I think are very
damaging, and I can assure you that the leadership over in
Israel feel that those statements are damaging.
Do you still feel that President Obama has been the
strongest supporter of Israel since 1948?
Senator Hagel. I do, and I will tell you very quickly why.
First of all, the 2006 Quartet Principles that President Bush
laid down I think cover most of the points that you've made,
and I supported President Bush then and still do, what he did
in developing those principles.
But when you look at the assistance this administration has
given to Israel, the most significant and largest military-to-
military exercise, Austere Challenge, Israeli-U.S. forces last
fall, the additional moneys that we put into Iron Dome, the
President's position, we have your back----
Senator Inhofe. I've answered the question. That's fine. I
appreciate it.
Senator Hagel. I think it's hard to----
Senator Inhofe. But one other subject before we run out of
time here, and it's one that I know you're very interested in.
You actually were a co-sponsor of the Missile Defense Act of
1999 and I was, too. So we agreed. Times have changed since
that time. At that time people thought having the capabilities
was confined to the Soviet Union at that time, or Russia, and
the United States. A lot has happened since then.
I often say that one of the things I disagreed with most in
the first budget that this President had was when he did away
with the ground-based interceptor site in Poland. I think most
people are aware that was built for protection of Western
Europe and the Eastern United States. I'm satisfied that we
have, even with the reduction of ground-based interceptors on
the west coast, which I disagreed with, but I still think we
have adequate protection on the west coast. It's from the east
coast, and right now our intelligence still says today that
Iran will have the weapon capability and the delivery
capability by 2015. That's why it was supposed to be there.
Now there's a discussion saying to cover that void we need
to have a third site. Do you support a third site of ground-
based interceptor? It would be on the east coast somewhere.
Senator Hagel. I'm aware of the NDAA authorization and
instruction for a third site and an environmental impact
statement. I don't know enough of the details. If I am
confirmed and go over there, I will get into it. But to respond
to that, which I will for the record, I just don't know enough
about it.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, if you'd respond for the record. I
think it's very significant and I think that most people are
looking at this with this void. You have a period of time
between 2015--nobody disputes the capability that Iran will
have at that time. It's not even classified. But there is still
a void of about 6 years between that and when we would have the
capability to knock down what has to be knocked down unless we
have a third site in place. I am hoping that maybe for the
record you'll come back and say that you support the third
site.
[The information referred to follows:]

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the analysis Congress
requested in section 221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 to evaluate additional missile defense locations in
the United States, including on the east coast, will be delivered on a
timely basis, and that Congress remains informed about the Department's
analysis about how to best protect the U.S. Homeland.

Senator Inhofe. The last thing I'll mention, if you'll
forgive me, Mr. Chairman, when Senator Hirono talked to you she
talked about your efforts and her expectations on your being
involved in using DOD for all these environmental things. I
would suggest to you that's why we have a Department of Energy.
When I asked you the question, will you refrain from doing some
of the things that have been done in the past in this
administration, such as forcing the Navy to pay $26 a gallon
for 450,000 gallons of fuel that you could buy for $3 and other
things, it's billions of dollars that we're paying which we
could be using for warfighting. I see an inconsistency in your
answer to me and your answer to the Senator from Hawaii.
Senator Hagel. My answer to the Senator from Hawaii was, I
believe--they can read it back--that I am committed to all
efficiencies that we can find in DOD which are in the interest
of our country. I didn't commit to any one program.
Senator Inhofe. Or any program that would be a costly
program on experimentation, such as the programs that I've just
mentioned, clearly are in the jurisdiction of the Department of
Energy and they're the ones supposed to be doing it. Don't you
agree that we should be confining ourselves to enhancing our
warfighter capabilities?
Senator Hagel. Well, of course. But I think within that
realm certainly the kind of money that we spend, as you've
noted, on fuel, that should include some not only sense of
that, but are there things that we can be doing with our
research and technology in DOD, why wouldn't we? It just seems
to make sense.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, we should as a government, but that's
what the Department of Energy is supposed to be doing. When you
said, as you suggest, the high cost of fuel, yes, it's a high
cost because we're paying 10 times as much as we would have to
pay, money that we could be putting toward our warfighting
efforts. That's my point.
Senator Hagel. Yes, I agree, but why wouldn't we be looking
at all options if we have the kind of sophisticated research
and technology that DOD does and has possession of? Why
wouldn't we be enlarging that? I don't know anything more
specific to or central to our security than energy.
Senator Inhofe. I know my time has expired. We're spending
literally millions, actually some billions of dollars, on some
of these experimentations that again are not in the purview of
this. Right now we're stalling 179 F-35s that we just recently
are putting off. I always say that if they put them off
indefinitely, that's just a cut; it's not a put-off. Those are
things that we should be doing right now.
We're looking at the Ohio-class sub. We should be doing
that right now, but we've postponed it. If we were to spend the
money that we're spending on the environmental causes on
warfighting, I think it would do us better good. Apparently you
don't agree with that.
Senator Hagel. I've said what I said, but I will commit
this to you, Senator, that, as I said to the Senator from
Hawaii, I will, if I'm confirmed, will obviously look at all
these programs. I'll have to.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Sir, I feel like I want to apologize for some of the tone
and demeanor today.
With that being said, if I could ask you this, since we're
so again talking about things you have done, things you have
said over the years. How did you get to Vietnam? I want to go
back there. Were you ordered to go to Vietnam? Were you sent
there? Or how was your orders?
Senator Hagel. Actually I got to Vietnam through kind of an
interesting route. I volunteered for the draft, as my brother
did a month after me. During that time in 1967 the draft was
coming down with pretty heavy levies. You recall.
Senator Manchin. I was there.
Senator Hagel. I know your story. They wouldn't take you,
not because you weren't smart enough, of course, but they
wouldn't take you because of your knees. I know you tried to
bribe your way in, but they still wouldn't let you. I admire
you for that effort and I know your story.
I went to basic training, advanced infantry training. My
brother followed me everywhere a month after me. After advanced
infantry training, I was selected to be one of nine first class
then-Top Secret shoulder-fired heat-seeking missile called the
Redeye gun. At the time it was classified, and it was built to
bring down low-flying Soviet MiGs coming over Germany, eastern
Germany, down the Fulda Gap.
We went to White Sands Missile Range and spent 2 months
training. It was all classified, couldn't get calls in or out.
We were then quietly, all nine of us, ordered to go to Germany
and be integrated into NATO units without any fanfare or
anybody knowing about it.
I got my orders to go to Germany. I went to Fort Dix, NJ,
in November 1967. My eight fellow soldiers and I were getting
packed up to get the bus to go out to the airport to take a
flight to Germany, and I just decided if I was going to be in
the military it didn't make much sense to go to Germany. I'd
never been to Germany. My great-grandparents were from Germany.
Probably a pretty good place, I thought, but I had to go where
there was a war.
So I took my orders down to the orderly, told him I was
Private Hagel, I had orders to go to Germany, here are my
orders, and I wanted to volunteer to go to Vietnam. The office
was a bit quiet. They put me in a holding room. They brought
priests, rabbis, ministers, psychiatrists. All came in to
examine me, thinking that something was wrong, I was running
away from something or I had killed somebody.
After 2 days of testing me to see if it was okay, they held
me, which--I scrubbed barracks for 5 days before they could cut
new orders. So they gave me new orders to go to Vietnam, sent
me home for 5 days, and then on to Travis Air Force Base in San
Francisco, and I got to Vietnam December 1967, got back to the
United States December----
Senator Manchin. There is no reason any one of us should
ever be concerned about your willing to do anything that you
possibly can to defend this country and making sure that we
defend against all foreign enemies, wherever they may be?
Senator Hagel. I hope not, Senator. I mean, we can disagree
on policies, but I think my life and my commitment to this
country is pretty clear, and I'm proud of it.
Senator Manchin. On that, sir, I would say that Israel, the
spokespeople for Israel, support you. They've come to me and
they tell me they support you. Have you gotten that?
Senator Hagel. There are a lot of pro-Israeli groups that
have formally come out and endorsed me, support me, which I'm
grateful for.
Senator Manchin. From what I've heard today, it sounds like
Iran has wishful thinking.
Senator Hagel. Evidently Iran supports me.
Senator Manchin. The President has asked you to serve at
this level, so he has confidence in you.
Senator Hagel. The President did ask me to serve. I said in
my opening statement I am grateful and honored by that trust
and confidence, and I will do everything in my power never to
do anything that would disabuse that confidence and trust for
this country.
Senator Manchin. One final question very quickly, if I may.
As you see the role of Secretary of Defense--and I know we've
talked about and you've been questioned on policy, and I know
you're not going to be in a policy position. You're going to be
basically following policy, not making policy. But if you could
just wrap it up, what we should expect from your position as
Secretary of Defense?
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Senator. If I am confirmed, as I
noted in my opening comments, I would see this relationship,
Senator, as a partnership. I'm going to need your help. I'm
going to need your advice. I'm going to need your
collaboration.
Many people on this authorization committee have a great
deal of experience in this business, many far more than I do,
as is the case in Congress, both the Senate and the House. I
will need that. I will call upon that.
I won't be in a policymaking position, as you note. I also
committed to all of you--and those of you who served with me
know this--I'll always be honest with you. You'll never have to
worry about that. I'll listen to you. I'm sure we won't always
agree, but I'll say it straight, and I'll give you and the
President my honest, most informed advice always.
Senator Manchin. Thank you. I'll say one more thing. Where
I come from there's an old saying: If you can't change your
mind, you can't change anything.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Hagel. You're holding up well. But it's
an important office and you're asked to lead our Defense
Department. I know you know the seriousness of that and it's
exceedingly important.
You have to know, and particularly in recent years, there
has been tension in Congress between the executive branch and
Congress over a number of issues. One of them is national
missile defense, and that's a subcommittee I'm a member of and
we've wrestled with that over the years, and had pretty
consistently a bipartisan congressional vote on those issues.
We voted again this year a unanimous Armed Services Defense
Authorization Bill, unanimous out of committee, under Chairman
Levin's leadership and Senator McCain.
But I'm looking today, I believe in the National Journal,
the Obama administration is moving to begin new U.S.-Russian
talks on further drawdowns of the Nation's nuclear arsenal.
That's also been an issue of concern, but I believe we've been
staying fairly bipartisan and unified on that.
But your report is what causes a great deal of concern,
this study of the Global Zero group. But I just note that Vice
President Biden is set to meet with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov this weekend during the Munich security
conference. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon will then
head to Moscow in February. President Obama and then-President
Medvedev signed the bilateral New START Treaty in 2010 calling
for deployment of strategic nuclear arsenals involving 700
delivery systems.
Now, as I read the Global Zero report that you co-authored
just last year, less than a year ago, you call for the
elimination of all ICBMs, all tactical nuclear weapons, most of
the bombers, I think 76 B-52s eliminated, leaving only 18
bombers and 10 submarines. So instead of 700 delivery systems
that was part of the New START, it looks like you're down to
about 28 delivery systems. So this introduced dramatic concern.
There are worries on Capitol Hill, the National Journal
reports, that the administration could revise its missile
shield strategy or go ahead with cutbacks to the U.S. stockpile
as a means of drawing Russia into new negotiations. Foreign
Policy Magazine reported ahead of your unannounced discussions
with Lavrov, House committee chairman, subcommittee chairman,
Mike Rogers asked that they have assurance as to what's going
on there, essentially.
I would note that the last year's defense authorization
bill calls for briefings on these discussions to Congress, to
the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations
Committee. It says ``Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this act and not less than twice each year
thereafter, the President or the President's designee shall
brief the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate on the dialogue between the United
States and the Russian Federation on issues related to limits
or controls on nuclear arms, missile defense systems, and long-
range conventional strike systems.'' The deadline I believe for
that briefing would be March 2 this year.
So a first question to you: If you're confirmed in this
position, will you honor that request as part of the NDAA?
Senator Hagel. The request for the briefing?
Senator Sessions. Briefings, yes, the requirements for the
briefings. Will you keep Congress advised on any discussions
dealing with national missile defense and dialogue with Russia
on national missile defense and nuclear arms and long-range
conventional strike systems?
Senator Hagel. Yes, I commit to do that.
Senator Sessions. Also, there's a Sense of Congress on
certain agreements: ``It is the Sense of Congress that any
agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation
related to nuclear arms or missile defense systems or long-
range conventional strike systems, obligating the United States
to reduce or limit Armed Forces or armaments of the United
States in any militarily significant manner may be made only
pursuant to the treat-making power of the President as set
forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the Constitution
of the United States.''
That is a Sense of our Congress that any significant
alteration of those deeply important relation between our two
nations, the two most powerful nuclear nations in the world,
would be done by treaty. Will you support that concept and
before making significant changes present those changes to
Congress pursuant to a treaty, and not as a either secret or
open bilateral agreement?
Senator Hagel. Your question is will I commit to a briefing
on all this?
Senator Sessions. No. Whether or not that any significant
changes that would occur in our relationship on those issues,
significant--``in any militarily significant manner may be made
only pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President''. We
would ask that that be presented to this Congress because we
have treaties already that impact so much of this and Congress
believes that any changes should also be made by treaty.
Senator Hagel. Without getting into specifics of it, let me
just commit to obviously consultation with Congress, with the
authorizing committee, yes.
Senator Sessions. It seems like we've not been consulted on
the Biden trip and the Donilon trip. We expect that to be done.
What's been going on is disturbing to us. The President said to
Mr. Medvedev that we'll have more flexibility after the
election, and he was clearly responding to these issues,
missile defense I think in particular and maybe nuclear issues
also. He wasn't consulting with the American people, wasn't
telling us or Congress what he planned to do, but he was
apparently willing to discuss it with the Russian leaders.
I guess I'm asking you, will you comply with the treaty-
making matters? If these agreements are significant militarily,
I believe they should be done by treaty and not by personal
agreements between our two leaders.
Senator Hagel. I would commit to fulfilling any treaty
obligations and any commitments to Congress and any
consultations that Congress needs to be part of, absolutely.
Senator Sessions. I'm not sure that answered the question,
because Congress is concerned about these kind of negotiations
that are going on. We do not have--the President also has made
it clear he believes in zero nuclear weapons. That is his
policy for America. I think it's utterly unrealistic. It's just
amazing to me, and that could lead us into unwise
decisionmaking.
Congress has a responsibility to the American people to
ensure the national defense. We need to know and have you share
those negotiations with us, and changes that impact our
security relationships between us and Russia should be done by
treaty, as they've been done in the past.
Senator Hagel. I've never discussed any of the specifics of
this with the President. I know he knows and believes and is
committed to treaties. That's the purview of the U.S. Senate,
as the Senate passed the New START treaty. All that goes into
that negotiation with, in this particular case, Russia
certainly Congress has to be involved in that.
Senator Sessions. That's very important, Senator Hagel, I
just have to tell you, because there's unease here that may not
be in the works. There's been some discussion for some time
about private unilateral or bilateral negotiations in which
Congress is not involved, that impacts the national security of
our country. That's why this was passed, just passed. So we
expect you to comply with that, and I take your testimony that
you would comply with that.
Senator Hagel. I will comply with all requirements and
laws, absolutely.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator King.
Senator King. Senator Hagel, one of the first meetings I
had after I began running for this office last summer was with
a group of veterans, going all the way from World War II right
up through Iraq and Afghanistan. I want to share with you one
of the ideas that came out of that meeting because it's been
touched upon today, and that is the issue of employability and
employment of particularly recent veterans. The suggestion was
made that the Army and the military has recruiters, people who
help to bring people in, and perhaps it might make some sense
for them to have the reciprocal of recruiters, outplacement
people to deal with soldiers who are, men and women, who are
about to leave, because there's an information gap, is what the
veterans told me, between leaving the military Active Duty and
then going into the Veterans Administration jurisdiction.
There's a gap there.
You don't really need to respond, but that's a suggestion I
might make, where it would be tremendously helpful to provide
that kind of information--what the programs are, what's
available, what the scholarships are, how the GI Bill works,
all those things, to people. I'm sure it's done to some extent
now, but to really regularize that and increase it, to be
comparable to the effort that's put into recruiting.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Senator. I will think about that.
I had not thought exactly about that potential, but I would say
that as we think through how do we accommodate and fulfill
commitments and assist our veterans, I think we have to open up
all vistas of new thinking and that is one that would deserve
some exploration and if I'm confirmed I look forward to
pursuing the idea with you.
Senator King. Thank you.
I'm also serving on the Intelligence Committee and one of
the issues--and you talked about this in your statement and
it's been touched upon some today--is the whole issue of
counterterrorism. Counterterrorism involves the actions of a
number of agencies and bodies of the U.S. Government. I would
commend to you that I think it deserves some real thought as to
where DOD ends, stops, and the CIA begins in terms of action
and counterterrorism action.
I think it would be worthwhile for you, if you are
confirmed, to meet with Mr. Brennan, if he's confirmed, to talk
about the coordination between the two agencies, so we don't
end up with similar, if not identical, functions in different
regions of the world with whole different command structures,
rules of engagement, and all of those kinds of things.
I think counterterrorism sort of spans, covers the gap or
the relationship between traditional defense and the
Intelligence Community.
Senator Hagel. That is an area that is becoming more and
more relevant, complicated, title 10 versus title 50 and all
those dynamics. If confirmed, yes, if Mr. Brennan is confirmed,
we'll be spending some time together.
Senator King. A final thought, and I know you've touched
upon this. I don't think we can adequately emphasize the
importance of the cyber threat. That may well be the war of the
future. My sense is that we're all talking about it, but I'm
not sure we have the sense of urgency. I know Secretary Panetta
has increased or proposed the increase of that capacity. But
people can die and our society could be brought to a standstill
without a rocket ever taking off or an airplane penetrating our
air space, and I hope that will be a point of emphasis because,
as I say, I think that may be the next war.
Senator Hagel. I agree. I noted it in my opening statement.
I agree with everything you've said. This is a huge issue that
continues to loom large over our future and our security, and
it will have, if confirmed, a lot of my attention.
Senator King. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator King [presiding]. In the absence of the chairman,
Senator Ayotte, I believe it's your opportunity.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Wow, that was fast.
Senator Ayotte. You've been promoted very quickly.
Senator King. Really, that's astounding. [Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. First of all, we've all expressed our deep
respect for your service to our country, but also let me thank
you for your endurance. We appreciate it.
I wanted to ask you about a speech that you made in 2007.
It was at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
and it was a speech titled ``The United States and Iran at
Dangerous Crossroads''. In that speech you, in referring to
Iran, you said that ``the strategy of containment remains
relevant today''.
I wanted to ask you about that statement that you made in
2007 about ``the strategy of containment remains relevant''
with regard to Iran today. Now, that was in 2007, but why would
you say that, first of all? Then, isn't that inconsistent with
what you've been saying today with regard to containment?
Senator Hagel. I don't have the speech in front of me and I
think there was more to it than just that few words that you
quoted. If I recall, the entire speech was about how do we deal
with Iran. If I recall, what I was inventorying in specific
reference to containment was within that inventory what are the
options. I don't think that speech says that I support it.
Senator Ayotte. No, but you said that it was relevant to
the discussion with Iran, and I guess I would ask you to say
why do you think that that was a strategy that we should have
considered? It was obviously one of the things you mentioned.
Senator Hagel. I didn't say it was a strategy, I don't
think. As I said, in the context of how do we deal with----
Senator Ayotte. I don't want to be unfair, but I think,
just to be clear, the quote that you said was ``The strategy of
containment remains relevant.'' So why is it relevant with
regard to Iran?
Senator Hagel. The bigger point is what I was saying, I
think--I haven't looked at that speech since I gave it,
probably, but I do recall some of it. The point was, what is
the range of options that we would have to look at, the world
would look at. Again, I didn't advocate it, I didn't recommend
it, I didn't support it.
Senator Ayotte. Was it that containment was one of the
options?
Senator Hagel. Yes. I mean, of course. When you look at the
whole range of what your options are, that certainly would be
one of them.
Senator Ayotte. Do you think containment's one of the
options now?
Senator Hagel. No, I don't know. But it doesn't make any
difference what I think. It's when you look at range, it's like
the Global Zero report. That was not a recommendation report.
That was a range of goals, aspirations, possibilities. That
report never said we recommend the following. If I recall that
speech, I think that was the same kind of what's the range of
options.
Senator Ayotte. Senator, I want to be clear: It does matter
what you think, and obviously your understanding and thought
process on these issues is very important to us. So as a
follow-up, I know that Senator Vitter had asked you about a
portion of the book that you wrote, ``America, Our Next
Chapter,'' and it was in that book you had said that ``The
genie of nuclear armaments is already out of the bottle no
matter what Iran does.'' Obviously, North Korea, other powers.
``In this imperfect world, sovereign nation states possession
nuclear weapons capability, as opposed to stateless terrorist
groups, will often respond with some degree of responsible, or
at least sane, behavior.''
Do you believe that Iran responds or will respond with some
degree of responsible or sane behavior?
Senator Hagel. First of all, it's not what I suggested in
that quote.
Senator Ayotte. Well, it's in the context of Iran, but I'm
asking you just straightforwardly: Do you think that the
Iranian regime responds--you talked about the difference
between nation states versus, for example, stateless terrorist
organizations. Do you believe, in the context of Iran, do you
believe that the Iranian regime responds with some degree of
responsible, or at least sane, behavior, or will respond like
that?
Senator Hagel. So far they have not, and I have said and
I've said in that same book that you're quoting from, that Iran
is a state sponsor of terrorism. I've said that many times. So
no is the answer to your question.
Senator Ayotte. If they haven't been responding with a
level of, with a degree of responsible or sane behavior and, as
you say in your book, that it's a state sponsor of terrorism,
I'm also struggling with the question of why you would have
thought that it was appropriate for us to have direct,
unconditional talks with Iran, because here we have a regime
that doesn't respond in a responsible or sane behavior, is a
state sponsor of terrorism, and what we thought we could--why
that would be an appropriate manner for us to address them?
Senator Hagel. Well, first, I said ``engagement''. I think
we should talk. We actually are indirectly in the P5 Plus 1. We
have been. I think that's responsible. I think it's always
responsible to try to talk first.
North Korea, I don't consider North Korea a responsible,
sane administration, but we are talking to North Korea. We've
been talking bilaterally to North Korea. We're talking with the
Party of 6 to North Korea. I think that's wise. I think it's
always wise to try to talk to people before you get into war.
Senator Ayotte. But I think that you were beyond the P5.
You refer to direct discussions with our two countries, and
also for establishing diplomatic ties with our country.
Senator Hagel. Again, when I talked about the possibility
of diplomatic ties or even I said, I think, in 2002 encouraging
Iran to join the World Trade Organization, I've always thought
that that's smarter more wiser, if you can push, help push,
institutions like China into world bodies, because when they go
into world bodies they have to comply with some semblance of
international behavior. It doesn't mean they always will. They
won't. They cheat. But I think we're smarter to do that.
Senator, I've never thought engagement is weakness. I never
thought it was surrender. I never thought it was appeasement. I
think it's clearly in our interest. If that doesn't work, then
I think the President's position and his strategy has been
exactly right: Get the United Nations behind you, get the
international sanctions behind you, keep military options on
the table. If the military option is the only option, it's the
only option.
Senator Ayotte. Just to be clear, I don't think that all
engagement is weakness, either. But I think there's a huge
distinction when we're dealing with a regime that is the
largest state sponsor of terrorism, and given the fact that
they have a long history, including in Iraq, with assisting the
militias to murder our troops, including what they've done with
Hezbollah and Hamas, what they're doing now in Syria. I think
there's always a distinction in how we deal with different
players around the world, is my point.
I know that my time has expired and I will submit for the
record questions that I think are very important about the
Virginia-class submarine. I share the important work done at
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard with my colleagues Senator Jeanne
Shaheen and also I know Senator King is very focused on that,
and maintaining our submarine fleet. I know that Senator
Blumenthal asked you about that as well.
I do have concerns that part of the Global Zero report does
recommend that the Ohio-class submarine would actually be
diminished down to 10. I'll follow up with those questions and
the record. I have to go now. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. I'd be glad to respond. Thank you.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. No.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Hagel. It's been a long day and I do
appreciate your answers to these important questions.
When we spoke last week, we talked somewhat about the
sequester, also budget concerns, the modernization of our
nuclear forces. Especially being from Nebraska, you understand
the importance of STRATCOM and its mission as it deals with
deterrence that we use in this country and that we've used for
many, many years and I believe has been very, very successful
and it's a good point for us.
Today you also in your opening discussed the need to
modernize our defensive forces. You spoke to Senator Blunt,
also Senator Blumenthal, about the need to modernize our Navy.
I guess I would like to hear your thought process about how
we're going to do this. Where's the money coming from? How are
you going to advise the President in making these decisions?
Because we're looking at sequester, we're looking at budget
constraints. How is this all going to tie together, and what
would be your advice to the President on how the Pentagon is
going to address all of those budget constraints?
Senator Hagel. Let's start with where we are. The Pentagon
is adjusting, and I think responsibly, to our future based on
the Budget Control Act of 2011. You know the details of that.
The Chiefs have submitted plans. I think as we rebalance and
refit and unwind the second war and all the other dynamics that
are changing since the last decade, it gives us some new
opportunities: audits, all the acquisition focus,
accountability. We are being forced, DOD, to take a hard look
at its priorities.
But as I've said before, it begins with mission and then
the resources to fulfill that mission, and then what are the
priorities within that mission.
To your specific question, how do you finance it all, well,
if sequestration would take effect then all of this is going to
be affected. That's exactly right. We've deferred some
decisions. We've set back some of the schedules on some of our
ships, planes, decisions on a number of things.
It isn't just the dollars that affect this, but it's the
planning, it's the flexibility. It's the ability to bring all
this together and then project and plan.
So in no way--I hope I did not give any indication that we
were going to be able to continue to do everything for
everybody everywhere. That's just not a reality.
Senator Fischer. We can't.
Senator Hagel. We can't.
Senator Fischer. How do you decide, though? You've made
commitments to members here today on philosophy, on working
with this committee. Do we have a commitment to build up the
Navy? Do we have a commitment to STRATCOM so that they can
continue their mission of deterrence? Do we have those
commitments?
How do you decide what's going to be the priority? What
will your advice be? Is STRATCOM important? Should that be a
priority? Would it be a priority in your advice to the
President?
Senator Hagel. The Pentagon is working off the Defense
Authorization Act of 2013, which this committee passed. That is
the directive that frames the budgetary restraints, except if
sequestration takes effect. That prioritizes, to your point,
being what's important, what do you budget for, what do you
finance. We have to manage that.
If I am confirmed, then I'll be working closely with our
Chiefs and all of our managers and decisionmakers on how we do
this. On STRATCOM, I think STRATCOM is vitally important to the
future of this country. It's been my position when I was in the
Senate. It was my position long before I was in the Senate. Of
the nine combatant commands--STRATCOM is one of them--that's a
key command.
We have to continue to fund our commands and find ways to
do that. But that's going to require some tough choices and
hard decisions.
Senator Fischer. Right. Also, I believe we need to make
sure we don't have hollow forces out there as well.
My time's up. Once again, I thank you. I thank you for your
service. I thank you for being here today. I thank you for your
willingness to continue to serve the people of this country.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I join everybody else, Senator Hagel, in thanking
you for staying today and the answers you've given.
One of the things we were frustrated about was the
difficulty of getting information on the groups you've spoken
to in the last year, and of course the hundreds of groups
you've spoken to in the course of your career would be too much
to ask. I do have three comments from groups that I'm going to
enter into the record, two comments you made before groups, one
the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee conference in
2002; another Arab-American audience in 2007; and then in 2006,
the one I'll put in the record right now and just enter the
others, the Council on American-Islamic Relations Forum.
``University of Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer praised
Hagel for not being pro-Israel. He said `Potential presidential
candidates for 2008, like Hillary Clinton, John McCain, Joe
Biden, and Newt Gingrich, were falling all over themselves to
express their support for Israel. The only exception to that
rule was Senator Chuck Hagel.' '' Unfortunately, I don't have
anything to go with that of what you might have said.
But some of the concerns of being--I used to say when I was
the Whip in the House that you could count on the House and the
Senate to be, among other things, always pro-Israel, and I
think that's been the mainstream of our views. I've seen a
number of times, in fairness to you, where you've said you're
pro-Israel, but that doesn't mean you have to be reflexively
for everything that Israel is for.
These statements are what they are. They're the things that
were reported from comments you made that are out of the
context of the other comments. But I'm going to put those all
in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Blunt. Also, earlier today I asked you about the
comment about the bloated Pentagon. I want to get this
straight. You said that that, those comments, were before the
sequestration bill passed, and they were after. Sequestration
passed on August 2. The Financial Times interview was on August
29. What you said on August 29 in that Financial Times
interview was you said ``I think''--August 29, 2011. The quote
out of the article was:
``The Defense Department I think''--this was your quote.
``The Defense Department I think in many ways has been bloated.
Let's look at the reality here. The Defense Department's gotten
everything it wanted the last 10 years and more. We've taken
priorities, we've taken dollars, we've taken programs, we've
taken policies out of the State Department, out of a number of
other Departments, and put them over in Defense.''
So that ``bloated'' comment was after sequestration. Of
course, this is the Department you now, 18 months later, if
this nomination is approved, would be running. Again, where do
we find that, those bloated things in the Defense Department,
and what are you prioritizing? Another way to ask what Ms.
Fischer was asking maybe is, are we going to let money drive
strategy here or strategy drive the money? As Secretary of
Defense, which of those positions are you going to take and how
are you going to advocate, here's the money we need for the
strategy we must have until we get to the reality of here's the
money you have, now do the best you can with it? I hope you're
an advocate for strategic-driven spending in the Pentagon,
rather than just the caretaker of the money that winds up
there.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you. There are a lot of
pieces and I know we have time issues, but let me start this
way. First, on the comments I made in the Financial Times
interview, again as I addressed that today, that was an
extensive interview about a lot of things. So I was 3 weeks
off.
Senator Blunt. Well, you were after the sequestration bill
had passed, though. So you were talking----
Senator Hagel. Not sequestration; the Budget Control Act.
Senator Blunt. But that's what included--they were talking
here about what would happen if you took these cuts.
Senator Hagel. That's what I was talking about. But the
Budget Control Act that was passed was implemented a few months
later, which I agreed with, and obviously the majority of
Congress did as well, to try to find $1 trillion overall in our
Government in savings and $490 billion is coming out of DOD for
the next 10 years.
But to your bigger point, you start there with the reality
of what Congress has passed, what Congress has decided to
appropriate for each Federal agency. In this current fiscal
year that we're living in, it's a $525 billion operating budget
and $88 billion for overseas contingencies. DOD works within
the framework of those numbers.
I've said a number of times here that I agree with you that
budget alone should not drive our national security, of course
not. What is the mission, as I've said? What are the
priorities, which you just brought up about different projects
that Senator Fischer and others have asked me about? How are
going to fund everything? Should you fund everything?
Do times change? Are there different threats? Ten years
ago, we put a lot of money in the Defense Department budget;
there was no such thing as a cyber warfare threat. Do we need
to do more there?
Do we need to change our force presence in Asia? We've
decided we're going to do that. That changes things. We're
moving marines around in the Pacific. That wasn't the case 10
years ago.
So things change. You manage and you direct your efforts
and you lead based on the security interests of your country
first. If I am confirmed, Senator, I will be a strong, have to
be a strong advocate for the Defense Department. That will be
part of my job. But that doesn't mean that I don't have some
responsibilities for efficient use of the taxpayers' dollars
and effective use of the taxpayers' dollars.
Senator Blunt. Just the opposite, you do have that
responsibility.
Senator Hagel. I do, that's right.
Senator Blunt. But I think the point is we want to be sure
that you're advocating for the money you think you need to
strategically accomplish what we can. Then obviously at the end
of the day you have to deal with the will of the process to
provide the money you have. But we ought to let the money as
much as possible be defined by the strategy rather than the
other way around, Senator.
Senator Hagel. I agree with that.
Senator Blunt. I'm once again out of time.
Senator Hagel. I agree with that, Senator. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel, we have listened all afternoon to a series
of questions about what you said in 2002, in 2006, in 2007. I
expect, though, if you're confirmed as the Secretary of Defense
the President of the United States will not turn to you and ask
you about your floor speeches, as elegant as they were. He will
ask you if you're prepared to advise him on matters of
literally life and death, that you have prepared DOD to address
every contingency in a thoughtful way, knowing the costs and
the benefits; that he assumes, as I do and as you've stated
repeatedly, your staunch commitment to our allies, in
particular in the context today of the State of Israel; and
that you are fundamentally committed to the welfare of our
troops and families because you have seen as a soldier that
ultimately they are the difference in our military.
Looking not backwards to a series of individual quotes and
footnotes, but looking ahead, if you are there and the
President turns to you, can you give us--and I think you can;
I'm convinced of that--the confidence that you will be prepared
to give him the advice he needs to make life and death
decisions which he as Commander in Chief must make?
Senator Hagel. Senator, when the President asked me to
consider this job I didn't want another job. I was not looking
for another job. Lilibet and I had a pretty good life since I
left the Senate, nothing personal. But the friendships that
we've maintained here and valued here and the experiences we
had here we will treasure for always. Highest privilege of my
life, serving in this body.
I say that because I wasn't looking for another job. The
President asked me to come see him and we had a long
conversation one night, just the two of us, over an hour. We
talked about the job, the world, security, the future. Within
the context of that conversation, we got down into what about
this job.
I didn't try to sell him on the job, that I could do it. In
fact, when he asked me about why am I qualified or why would I
be uniquely qualified, I said I'm not. There are a lot of very
qualified Americans who could do this job. I don't think a lot
of them in the sense that they're out there everywhere. I think
there are some qualifications for this job. But I'm not the
only one.
I said: ``Mr. President, I'm not going to sit here and try
to convince you that I'm the right person. You know me, you
know my record, you know what I believe.'' I've had the
opportunity to work with him pretty closely over the last 4
years as I served as co-chairman with you and Senator Levin's
former colleague, Senator Dave Boren from Oklahoma, on the
President's Intelligence Advisory Board. That's allowed me to
stay pretty current with intelligence and make a contribution
maybe a little bit there. In the last 4 years I've served on
Secretary Gates', Secretary Panetta's Policy Advisory Boards.
I do have some understanding, as I told him, of this. But
why I think when Lilibet and I talked about it I agreed to go
forward with this is because of the tremendous opportunities
and the important time that we are living in and the
opportunities we now have to help make a better world. I think
the next few years are going to be as defining and as important
in this country truly as any few years post-World War II.
I told the President he was here at a very defining time,
and if I can help him do that, if I can help this country, I
want to do it. The experiences I'll bring to the job, Senator,
I think I have a pretty varied background on a lot of things. I
think always in the end, like any job, judgment is the ultimate
determinant of everything. I think experience is a factor,
varied experience, responsible experience. But that all adds up
to judgment. I hope, if I'm confirmed, I can do those things to
give the President and this country wise, informed, honest
advice, and I will do everything within my power to do that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel, thank you for remaining through what has
been a very long hearing.
I'd like to ask some additional questions to further
explore your positions and your record, and begin with asking:
Are you familiar with an individual named Chas Freeman?
Senator Hagel. Yes, yes.
Senator Cruz. He was, if I understand correctly, a vice
chairman at the Atlantic Council; is that correct?
Senator Hagel. When I became Chairman of the Atlantic
Council after I left the Senate to replace General Jim Jones,
he was one of many board members and I think was a vice
chairman. But I never really worked with him in the Atlantic
Council, but I know him, yes.
Senator Cruz. You and he were part of a group that traveled
last year to China together; is that correct as well?
Senator Hagel. No, that's not correct.
Senator Cruz. Okay. There have been press reports to that
effect.
Senator Hagel. Those press reports are incorrect. I have
never been on any trip with Chas Freeman.
Senator Cruz. There have also been press reports that has
described Mr. Freeman as helping coordinate efforts to defend
your nomination. Is that an accurate characterization?
Senator Hagel. I haven't spoken with Chas Freeman in years.
I don't know of any activity that he's involved in to endorse
me. There are a lot of people I appreciate are endorsing me and
supporting me, but I haven't talked to Chas Freeman in years.
Senator Cruz. Is he someone whose judgment you respect?
Senator Hagel. I think Chas Freeman has been an important
public servant for this country. There are a lot of different
opinions that people have on different issues. I don't agree
with everybody and it's pretty clear everybody doesn't agree
with me. So that's okay.
Senator Cruz. Do you consider his views well within the
mainstream?
Senator Hagel. What views are you speaking about, Senator?
Senator Cruz. His views on the Middle East and on the
Nation of Israel?
Senator Hagel. I'm not actually that familiar with all of
his views. I can't speak for Chas Freeman.
Senator Cruz. All right. Let's move on to your record then.
You stated in your prepared remarks: ``My overall world view
has never changed.'' I have to admit I find that difficult to
reconcile with statements and positions you've taken for over a
decade and what seems to me a fairly significant shift since
you've been nominated for Secretary of Defense.
What I'd like to do is go through some past statements,
past positions of yours and just clarify if you agree with them
or not, beginning with number one. In 2001, you voted against
legislation sanctioning Iran. Now, am I correct you no longer
agree with that position; you think sanctions against Iran are
a good policy today?
[The information referred to follows:]

In 2001, Senator Hagel voted against legislation sanctioning Iran
for its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and support for
international terrorism.

Senator Hagel. I have said on the record multilateral
international sanctions----
Senator Cruz. Do you agree with sanctions against Iran?
Senator Hagel. I'm sorry?
Senator Cruz. Do you think sanctions against Iran are a
good idea today?
Senator Hagel. Yes, yes. Yes, I always have.
Senator Cruz. So it's fair--I'm trying to characterize
your--I'm trying to understand your views and characterize them
fairly. It's fair to say you no longer agree with the position
in 2001 that we should not be sanctioning Iran?
Senator Hagel. That was a unilateral sanction and the Bush
administration--
Senator Cruz. Today do you think unilateral sanctions are a
bad idea?
Senator Hagel. It's a different time now because we now
have international sanctions on. I've supported the President's
position----
Senator Cruz. Senator Hagel, please answer the question I
asked. Today do you think unilateral sanctions would be a bad
idea?
Senator Hagel. Not today, 12 years later.
Senator Cruz. So that is not a view you'd agree with today?
Senator Hagel. Because times have changed. We now have
international sanctions on them.
Senator Cruz. The second slide: In 2007, you voted against
legislation designating the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a
terrorist group.
Senator Hagel. That's correct.
[The information referred to follows:]

In 2007, Senator Hagel voted against legislation designating the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist group.

Senator Cruz. You no longer agree with that policy. Today
your position is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is a terrorist
group; is that correct?
Senator Hagel. The Revolutionary Guard is part of the
Iranian Government. The reason I voted against----
Senator Cruz. Sir, I'm not asking the reason. I'm asking
for your views today. Do you believe the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard is a terrorist group, yes or no?
Senator Hagel. It is part of a state sponsor of terrorism,
so it's part of Iran, which I've said is a sponsor of state
terrorism.
Senator Cruz. Is that a yes?
Senator Hagel. That vote wasn't that question. That vote
gave----
Senator Cruz. I'm asking your views today. Do you believe
the Iranian Revolutionary National Guard is a terrorist group?
Senator Hagel. It is part of a terrorist--it is part of a
government that supports terrorism.
Senator Cruz. Is that a yes or a no?
Senator Hagel. It's the answer I just gave you.
Senator Cruz. All right, we'll move on to the next one. In
2008, you also voted against comprehensive Iran sanctions.
We've already discussed that today you agree with sanctions, so
that is another position----
[The information referred to follows:]

In 2008, Senator Hagel voted against the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act in the Senate Banking
Committee.

Senator Hagel. That again was a unilateral sanction that
the Bush administration was opposed to, and the Secretary of
State of this country, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
wrote that.
Senator Cruz. Sir, my time is limited. I understand that
you want to give reasons for the past positions. We've
discussed the reasons. I'm simply trying to clarify your
positions today.
If you look at number four, in 2010 you stated you're not
sure it's necessary to keep all options on the table with
regard to Iran's nuclear program. Do you agree with that
position today or is that no longer your position?
[The information referred to follows:]

In 2010, Senator Hagel told the Atlantic Council he was ``not so
sure it is necessary to continue to say all options are on the table''
regarding Iran's nuclear program.

Senator Hagel. I don't recall that. I have always said that
all options remain on the table. I don't recall that speech.
Senator Cruz. So this is not your position today? I'm just
trying to understand.
Senator Hagel. No, it's not. I have said that all options
must remain on the table, including--in fact, in an op-ed I
wrote with two former CENTCOM commanders last year----
Senator Cruz. The final one I'm going to ask you: In a 1998
Senate hearing, you stated that the United States has ``tilted
too far towards Israel in the Middle East peace process''. Do
you continue to agree with this position or is that no longer
your position today?
[The information referred to follows:]

In a 1998 Senate hearing, Senator Hagel said that the United States
has ``tilted too far toward Israel in the Middle East peace process.''

Senator Hagel. I don't remember that, the context of the
hearing or the speech or all the things I said in it. No, I
don't think the United States has tilted too far to Israel. I
support the President's position on Israel. I've said in my
book and other speeches that I strongly support Israel.
Senator Cruz. So you do not agree with this policy? I will
point out that I have a list of 10 other statements in the past
which I'm pretty confident if I asked you you would say you do
not agree with, and they're all statements and quotes from you.
In my judgment, your record as a U.S. Senator--and you and
I don't know each other. We do not have a personal
relationship. But I think your record and your past statements
as a U.S. Senator demonstrate greater antagonism for the Nation
of Israel than any member of this body, and also demonstrate a
greater willingness to stand against sanctions, stand against
military action, stand against any strong position against
Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, terrorists.
That ultimately is why the Washington Post described your
foreign policy views as ``near the fringe of the Senate''. That
raises, I think, very serious questions about your suitability
to serve as the Secretary of Defense. In my view, having a
Secretary of Defense who is not viewed as supporting credible,
strong military action makes it more likely the United States
will be drawn into military conflict, and I think that would be
a very unfortunate outcome.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
That ends the second round. If you want an opportunity to
comment on that. If not, I will ask you some other questions.
By the way, Senator Ayotte, in reaction to one of the
things you said about it doesn't matter what I believe, I think
what you were--first of all, I think it does matter. We all
would agree it very much matters what you believe. But I think
what you were pointing out is that ultimately what matters is
what the President believes. I think that's what you were
aiming at.
Senator Hagel. That's exactly what I was aiming at, and
that's what I meant to say, that's right. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. I'm now going to ask you the standard
questions that I've delayed, and these are just the questions
we ask of every nominee.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Senator Hagel. I'm sorry? I didn't hear.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Senator Hagel. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Chairman Levin. If you are confirmed, will you cooperate in
providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional
requests?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or their briefings?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that you will provide
documents, including copies of electronic forms of
communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly
constituted committee or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such documents?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Now, we've completed our second round and
that means that if there's other questions remaining, we can
take a few minutes for them. Is there anybody that wants to?
Yes, Senator King.
Senator King. One very brief question. In watching
television over the last week or so, I've seen an ad
questioning your nomination, a television ad. I just wondered
if you or any of the people that have worked on preparing you
for this has any idea who's sponsoring that ad, because it's
not apparent from the ad itself? Have you gotten to the bottom
of that?
Senator Hagel. Senator, first, I have not seen any of those
ads. I know they're there. I long ago figured out the better
way to live life is not get drug down in the underbrush of
these kinds of things. So I don't pay attention to it. My focus
is on what's important about this assignment, this job, if I am
confirmed, and in particular this committee and this body, and
preparing myself hopefully for what matters with the
possibility that the U.S. Senate confirms me for this job.
I have not asked anybody that question. I don't know, have
never seen the ads.
Senator King. Thank you very much, and thank you for your
testimony today. You've been forthright and strong, and again I
appreciate your commitment to this country.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Another question?
Senator Cruz. Very briefly, I wanted to thank you for your
commitment to this committee, number one, to provide a complete
accounting and copies of the speeches you've given; and number
two, to respond to the letter that you received 2 days ago
requesting specific financial information. I appreciate your
commitment to do that.
I also would ask you--in our discussion about Chas Freeman
you said you were not particularly close with him, but that
your understanding was his views were within the mainstream, if
that's a fair characterization.
Senator Hagel. No, I didn't say in the mainstream. I said I
don't know.
Senator Cruz. Okay. What I would ask you to do also as a
follow-up is to review in particular a speech that Mr. Freeman
gave on March 4, 2011, at the Palestine Center in Washington,
DC, and give me your judgment in terms of whether you agree
with the views on the Middle East and the views of the Nation
of Israel that are expressed in that speech. In particular, I
would be interested in your views on the fifth paragraph of
that speech.
In my view, the views expressed in that speech are not
accurate and not within the mainstream, and I would be
interested if you concur in that assessment or if you have a
different assessment.
Chairman Levin. That's a question you're asking for the
record?
Senator Cruz. For the record, yes.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman Levin. Okay. Any other questions for the record
need to be submitted, as I said before, by tomorrow at 5 p.m.
I assume, Senator Cruz, that when you said that he's agreed
to provide all of the speeches, it would be all the speeches
that he has access to; is that fair?
Senator Cruz. That he has or that he can get copies of. I
would certainly hope and expect that he would engage in
reasonable efforts to get copies of speeches if he doesn't have
them in his immediate files.
Chairman Levin. We'll say that if you have easy access or
reasonable access to speeches you've given, even though you
don't have them, that we would expect that you could provide
this as well, as well as the other information you indicated
you're perfectly happy to submit, you just haven't had the time
to get it ready.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, I will commit to that and
every request, as we have. As I said, some of this I didn't see
until yesterday. But everything that is out there that we can
find, we'll make every effort to get it and provide it.
Chairman Levin. We very much appreciate that, and your
openness in your responses today.
Again, the record will be open until tomorrow, as I said,
at 5 p.m. But your answers we would hope and expect would be in
by Monday at 5 p.m., because we would very much like to move
this nomination forward to a resolution, first on this
committee, and that timetable would help us move in an
expeditious way.
We thank you. We thank your family and your friends.
Unless there are other questions, we will now stand
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to the Hon. Chuck Hagel by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in
these modifications?
Answer. I believe that the success of our Armed Forces since the
enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act amply demonstrates that the act
has enhanced the ability of our Armed Forces to defend our Nation and
to operate successfully as joint forces under our combatant commanders.
If confirmed, I will evaluate the implementation of the act, and will
make recommendations for modifications if necessary. At present, I am
aware of no need to make changes to the act.
duties of the secretary of defense
Question. Section 113 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all
matters relating to the Department of Defense (DOD). Subject to the
direction of the President, the Secretary of Defense, under section
113, has authority, direction, and control over DOD.
Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your
ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. I believe title 10 provides the Secretary of Defense
appropriate, sufficient, and clear authority to lead DOD and to serve
as the principal assistant to the President on all matters relating to
the Department. I do not foresee needing to take any actions to enhance
the ability of the Secretary of Defense to execute assigned duties.
Question. What changes to section 113, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. At present, I believe that section 113 provides sufficient
legal authority to the Secretary of Defense to allow him to perform his
two primary functions. I do not foresee needing to recommend changes to
section 113.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I volunteered for the draft and then volunteered to go to
Vietnam after I received orders to go to Germany. I served a 12-month
tour which included the Tet Offensive in 1968. I rose to the rank of
infantry sergeant. For 10 of those months, I served alongside my
younger brother Tom. I understand what it is like to be a soldier in
war. I also understand what happens when there is poor morale and
discipline among the troops and a lack of clear objectives,
intelligence, and command and control from Washington. I believe that
experience will help me as Secretary of Defense to ensure we maintain
the best fighting force in the world, protect our men and women in
uniform, and ensure that we are cautious and certain when contemplating
the use of force.
When I returned from Vietnam, I graduated from the University of
Nebraska, using the G.I. Bill. Because of that benefit, I co-authored
with fellow Vietnam veteran Senator Jim Webb, the new G.I. Bill which
became law in 2008. I know the importance of providing our military
personnel and their families with the benefits they need, not only
while in the military, but once they return to civilian life, and I
will not forget that if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.
I was wounded twice during my tour in Vietnam. In 1981, I was
appointed by President Reagan and confirmed by the Senate to be Deputy
Administrator of the Veterans Administration. I later resigned because
of inadequate support for Vietnam veterans suffering from Agent Orange
and other Vietnam veterans programs that were being eliminated. I have
worked with, and on behalf of veterans' organizations my entire life. I
know when the system is working, and when it is failing. The past
decade of war has produced tens of thousands of wounded warriors. Many
are still on Active Duty. Others have or are transitioning to civilian
life. All need the best care we they can give them. Because of my own
experiences, I will honor that commitment to veterans and their
families if I become Secretary of Defense.
While I do not believe anyone can be fully prepared to manage an
organization as large and complex as DOD, I believe that I have
significant management experience that gives me a strong sense of what
needs to be done. Most important is building and working with teams.
This is always an essential foundational element of management and
leadership. In the 1970s, I was the Chief of Staff to a U.S.
Congressman and then later Manager of Government Affairs for Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company. In the early 1980s, I co-founded Vanguard
Cellular Systems, Inc., a publicly traded company, which became one of
the largest independent cellular systems in the country. I also served
as President and Chief Executive Officer of the World USO; the Chief
Operating Officer of the 1990 Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations
(G-7 Summit) in Houston, TX; Deputy Commissioner General of the United
States for the 1982 World's Fair; President of the Private Sector
Council and president of an investment bank. I have also served on
boards of some of the world's largest companies.
Finally as a U.S. Senator from Nebraska for 12 years, I have a
legislative record of continuing and unwavering support for our
military and our national security. I have voted to authorize the use
of military force and I have questioned the military and foreign policy
decisions of our leaders. I believe this experience has prepared me to
make the tough decisionsand to know that I am accountable for those
decisions.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, you will confront a range of critical
issues relating to threats to national security and ensuring that the
Armed Forces are prepared to deal with these threats.
In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next
Secretary of Defense?
Answer. The next Secretary of Defense will be confronted with a
myriad of challenges stemming from an ever more complex global
environment. Some of the challenges we know today, but many will
continue to unfold as we conclude over 10 years at war and look to the
future of our military posture. In an ever changing world with both
state and non-state actors developing nontraditional tools of war, the
United States will be challenged by technological advancements that
bring the battlefield to both space and cyberspace. Terrorist
organizations continue to proliferate throughout the world and have a
significant presence in places such as Yemen, Somalia and North Africa,
areas that pose great risk for regional stability. With the ever
present threat of Iran, the next Secretary of Defense must be vigilant
in pursuing the goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon, and must maintain our unshakeable commitment to Israel's
security. As the United States begins to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
region, the Department will be faced by new challenges in this vital
part of the world. Piracy, maritime security, disaster relief efforts,
and, of course, continued vigilance to terrorism and proliferation of
nuclear weapons name just a few known challenges. All of these things
come while the United States is fighting its own battles at home to
take care of its service men and women returning from over ten decades
of war with rising medical costs and advanced medical conditions.
Keeping the faith with our military men and women must remain a high
priority to ensure the military itself stays as strong and faithful as
its parts. While these are some of the few challenges we know, there
are far too many that are not yet apparent. We must be prepared for any
contingency we may face in the coming years all while doing so in the
confines of this austere budget environment.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work with the President, Congress,
and with senior civilian and military leaders of DOD to come up with
comprehensive plans to address each issue. No single issue will have a
single simple answer. This will be an iterative process that will
employ the full force of Government. It will necessitate strong
relationships I plan to maintain and strengthen with our allies and
partners throughout the globe. We will define our post-2014 presence in
Afghanistan and create a new relationship and partnership with
Afghanistan. To counter terrorism, we will look into how we use our
special operations forces and the development of new technologies and
surveillance techniques. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we must
maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any
adversary. I am committed to considering all options to counter Iran
and its aggression, and to maintain U.S. support for missile defense
systems in Israel. With the rebalance to the Asia Pacific, our training
and specializations will change as the battlefield and necessary skills
of our servicemembers change. As our troops transition out of over 10
years of war, I will look at the services available for our men and
women, both those that continue to serve and those that transition to
civilian life. If confirmed, I plan to continue the work of Secretary
Panetta to address issues of the force, such as the unthinkable problem
of sexual assault within our ranks. I will continue the implementation
of the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' and the opening of positions
to women. I will give great attention to all issues that confront our
country and our military to ensure the reputation and strength of the
United States.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, it would be a priority to ensure the stable
transition out of Afghanistan in the next few years, to maintain U.S.
military and technological superiority against enemies both known and
unknown, and to keep the faith with our men and women in the military
standing guard to protect this great and vibrant country.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section
163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct
communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the
Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in
performing their command function.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. I believe that having a clear and effective chain of
command is essential to successful military operations, and that these
provisions of law lay the foundation for such a chain of command.
Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade
civilian control of the military?
Answer. In my view, these provisions significantly enhance civilian
control by codifying the placement of the President, as Commander in
Chief, and his principal assistant for military matters, the Secretary
of Defense, where they can best exercise civilian control of the
military: in the top two positions of the military chain of command.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority outside the chain of command
established under title 10, U.S.C.?
Answer. I believe that all military forces normally should operate
under the chain of command established under section 162 of title 10,
U.S.C. However, in certain sensitive operations a temporary exception
to that chain of command may be appropriate. I understand that only the
President may approve such an exception and the President retains
overall command responsibility, as also recognized in section 162. Any
military personnel supporting such sensitive operations remain
accountable to the military chain of command, including the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. If confirmed, I will provide the President
with my best advice regarding any operation where an exception to the
established chain of command may be appropriate.
advice of the service chiefs and the combatant commanders
Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., provides, in part, that
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military
adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense and that if any member of the Joint Chiefs submits
to the Chairman advice or an opinion, in disagreement with, or advice
or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman, the
Chairman shall present that advice or opinion at the same time he
provides his own advice to the President, the National Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C.,
provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the
spokesman for the combatant commanders, especially on the operational
requirements of their commands.
What changes in law, if any, do you think may be necessary to
ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs and of the
combatant commanders are presented and considered?
Answer. If confirmed, I will welcome and carefully consider the
advice of the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
combatant commanders. I believe that the current law provides ample
authority for such a close, advisory process. If I find in the future
that changes may enhance this process, I will work with the Department
and Congress to implement those changes.
Question. What is your view on the appropriate role of the Chief of
the National Guard Bureau as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau brings an important
perspective to the Joint Chiefs and to the Department on matters
affecting the National Guard. In my view, the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau should fulfill his duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in a manner consistent with the laws governing the role of the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the role of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
use of military force
Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should
participate in potentially dangerous situations is one of the most
important and difficult decisions that the national command authorities
have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decisionmaking for such
situations.
What factors would you consider in making recommendations to the
President on the use of force?
Answer. Committing our troops to any military operation is a grave
decision, and one I, if confirmed, would make carefully and cautiously.
In making a recommendation to the President on the use of military
force, I would consider all the factors previous Secretaries of Defense
have identified. These would include: national interest and strategic
objectives; domestic and international legal basis for action; our
ability to achieve our objectives and achieve a successful outcome
through use of force; the unique need for military force and
alternative means, particularly non-military, for achieving our
interests; the risks to our other interests and our force; and the
sufficiency of sustained public support for use of force.
Question. What circumstances should pertain for you to recommend
that the President employ preemptive force?
Answer. The United States must reserve the right, consistent with
longstanding principles of self-defense, to use military force if
intelligence or other information clearly demonstrates that force is
necessary to prevent or blunt an imminent attack on the United States
or an ally. If confirmed, in advising the President regarding the use
of force to preempt an attack, I would consider such factors as: the
nature and immediacy of the threat; the probability of an attack;
whether a pattern of activity demonstrates the intent of an actor to
carry out an attack; the likely scale of the attack and the injury,
loss, or damage likely to result absent preemptive action; and the
likelihood that there will be other opportunities to undertake
effective action in self-defense. I would also ensure that, if force is
determined to be necessary, we adhere to standards that govern the use
of force and work to strengthen our legitimacy in taking action,
including seeking broader international support.
Question. What degree of certainty do you believe is necessary
before the United States would use preemptive force?
Answer. Any decision to use preemptive force must be informed by
the best available intelligence regarding the threat that is to be
countered. There should always be a sound factual basis for concluding
that force is necessary to protect the United States or an ally from
attack. If confirmed, I would examine the underlying intelligence
critically as such a decision must not be taken lightly. I do not
believe, however, that it is necessary that we know the precise timing,
location, or nature of the hostile attack as a prerequisite to using
force to counter or stop an attack on the United States or an ally.
national security budget reductions
Question. Part 1 of the Budget Control Act (BCA) enacted on August
2, 2011 established budget caps designed to realize $917 billion in
budget savings in Federal discretionary spending over the period from
fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2021. As a result, the administration's
DOD current budget plan for fiscal years 2012 to 2021 is $487 billion
lower than the $6.14 trillion it had projected a year earlier for the
same 10-year period. This reduction amounts to nearly 8 percent
compared to the previous plan.
Do you believe that defense spending reductions of this magnitude
(absent a sequester) can be accomplished without significant adverse
impact on our national security?
Answer. Based on my review to date, my answer is yes. I believe the
Department's strategy can be accomplished within the constraints of the
BCA. But only if the Department has to retain the flexibility to adjust
the size of its forces and infrastructure, and take steps to control
its costs, in accordance with the administration's present strategy and
budget.
Question. How would you assess the national military strategy to
deal with the changed budget environment?
Answer. I believe the Department has taken a hard look at the new
security environment and developed a strategy that appropriately
allocates reduced defense resources to the highest priority needs and
ensures our national security objectives are met. If confirmed, I will
further assess the strategy according to changes in the security
environment and continued fiscal pressure.
Question. What are the standards by which you will measure the
adequacy of DOD funding, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the adequacy of DOD funding
by its ability to ensure that the Department is able to meet the
country's security challenges and preserve the strongest military in
the world.
Question. If confirmed, in this era of budget austerity, how will
you prioritize the objectives of completing the mission in Afghanistan,
resetting of the force, investing in the future force, and meeting
ongoing operational commitments around the world?
Answer. Right now, I believe the Department can implement the
administration's present strategy, which carefully balances the above
objectives. I understand that the immediate needs of completing the
mission in Afghanistan and ongoing operational commitments cannot
jeopardize resetting the force and investing in our future. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure that budget decisions are made
carefully so that we maintain a healthy balance among those near-term
and longer-term objectives. I will continue to refine the Department's
spending in line with the priorities of the President's strategic
objectives. However, if multi-year reductions in funding take place
(such as those required by sequestration), the Department would need to
significantly revise the defense strategy and, in all probability,
would need to make some hard choices about which of our current
national defense capabilities we could afford to retain.
readiness of the armed forces
Question. The Joint Chiefs recently stated that ``the readiness of
our Armed Forces is at a tipping point. We are on the brink of creating
a hollow force due to an unprecedented convergence of budget conditions
and legislation that could require the Department to retain more forces
than requested while underfunding that force's readiness.''
How do you currently assess the readiness of the Armed Forces?
Answer. I am deeply impressed by the caliber and capabilities of
our military forces. It is vitally important that they be ready to
respond to the Nation's needs, and I am concerned that further budget
cuts will negatively affect readiness. If confirmed, I will closely
monitor the readiness of the force.
Question. Do you agree with the Joint Chiefs that readiness is at
tipping point?
Answer. Maintaining ready forces is a priority, and I am concerned
by the Joint Chiefs' assessment. If confirmed, I will work with the
Joint Chiefs to better understand the basis of their assessment and how
we can most effectively address the readiness challenges our military
faces.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the impact of budget
conditions on the issue expressed by the Joint Chiefs of a hollow
force?
Answer. My sense is that the concerns the Joint Chiefs have
expressed about readiness come from a variety of factors, including the
challenges of recovering from 10 years of operational stress, of
transitioning to a broader range of operations, and of doing all of
this in the face of fiscal austerity and budget uncertainty. If
confirmed, I will carefully monitor how all of these factors are posing
risks to readiness and will work closely with the military and civilian
leadership of the Department to mitigate those risks to the greatest
extent possible.
Question. How would you define a hollow force?
Answer. A hollow force is one that has been rendered incapable of
performing the mission that we expect it to conduct. With a hollow
force, units do not have the resources, personnel, equipment, and
training necessary to make them capable or ready to execute the defense
strategies that secure our country.
budget uncertainly and sequestration
Question. DOD is currently facing budget uncertainty due to the
fact that it is operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR) through at
least March 27, 2013 and due to the possibility that, absent a budget
deal, the BCA will require a sequester of security funding totaling
more than $40 billion starting on March 1, 2013. DOD officials have
noted that, if CR is extended through the end of the current fiscal
year, in its current form, readiness would suffer. They have also noted
that a sequester could seriously threaten our ability to implement our
current defense strategy. Secretary Panetta has stated that a sequester
would have a ``devastating'' impact on DOD.
What is your understanding of the impact a full-year Continuing
Resolution would have on DOD?
Answer. A year-long CR reduces the Department's funding flexibility
by putting it into a straightjacket, spending money on last year's
priorities not this year's. Continuing Resolutions force the Department
to operate inefficiently because it does not know what projects will be
funded or at what level of funding. The money provided in the
Continuing Resolution does not provide sufficient funding in the right
places, particularly critical operating accounts which could harm
military readiness. In addition, Continuing Resolutions generally push
the Department to use month-to-month contracts and prohibits doing
``new starts'' in military construction or acquisition programs, which
leads to inefficiency and backlogs in contracting.
Question. What do you believe would be the impact on DOD of a full
sequester in fiscal year 2013?
Answer. As Secretary Panetta has repeatedly stated, sequestration--
both the size and the arbitrary manner of these cuts--would be
devastating to the Department. It would harm military readiness and
disrupt each and every investment program. Based on my assessment to
date, I share his concerns. I urge Congress to eliminate the sequester
threat permanently and pass a balanced deficit-reduction plan. Impacts
of sequester could include the need to revise the defense strategy,
fewer day-to-day global activities reducing our presence and
partnerships, less training including cuts to flying and steaming hours
which would reduce readiness, near universal disruption of investment
including 2,500 procurement programs, research projects, and military
construction; reduced and delayed weapons system buys with resulting
price increases, furloughs and hiring freezes for civilian workers
resulting in reduced maintenance of weapons systems, oversight of
contracts and financial systems; negative effects on morale and welfare
of the force including recruiting and retention problems.
Question. What is your understanding of the impact that the
combination of a full-year Continuing Resolution and a sequester would
have on the readiness of the Armed Forces?
Answer. It is my understanding that under this scenario, the
Department would be forced to cut over $40 billion from our budget in a
little over half a year, using a mechanistic formula to do it. It would
result in 20 percent cuts in the Department's operating budgets. As the
Joint Chiefs have warned, such cuts, if allowed to occur, would damage
our readiness, our people, and our military families. It would result
in the grounding of aircraft and returning ships to port, reducing the
Department's global presence and ability to rapidly respond to
contingencies. Vital training would be reduced by half of current plans
and the Department would be unable to reset equipment from Afghanistan
in a timely manner. The Department would reduce training and
maintenance for nondeploying units and would be forced to reduce
procurement of vital weapons systems and suffer the subsequent schedule
delays and price increases. Civilian employees would be furloughed for
up to 22 days. All of these effects also negatively impact long-term
readiness. It would send a terrible signal to our military and civilian
workforce, to those we hope to recruit, and to both our allies and
adversaries around the world.
Question. If confirmed what role would you play toward enacting a
fiscal year 2013 Defense Appropriations Bill and avoiding a sequester?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to urge Congress to pass a
full-year appropriations bill for DOD and for other Federal agencies so
that the Department and other Federal agencies may be run efficiently,
with the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, as the taxpayers
expect and deserve.
financial management and business transformation
Question. DOD spends billions of dollars every year to acquire,
operate, and upgrade business systems needed to support the warfighter,
including systems related to the management of contracts, finances, the
supply chain, and support infrastructure. Despite these expenditures,
the Department's business systems are stovepiped, duplicative and non-
integrated. Also, the Department's ability to leverage these systems to
transform how it conducts its business missions has been frustrated by
its resistance to re-engineering its business processes effectively. As
a result, the Department remains unable to produce timely, accurate and
complete information to support management decisions. For this reason,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified defense
financial management and business transformation as exposing taxpayer
dollars to a ``high risk'' of waste, fraud, and abuse.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the financial management
and business transformation problems of DOD receive priority attention
at the senior management level and throughout the defense enterprise?
Answer. Improving financial management capability is very
important, especially in light of the fiscal challenges facing the
Department and the country. I understand plans exist to continue the
improvement of the Department's business processes and, if confirmed, I
will ensure that senior leadership--including the Chief Financial
Officer, the Deputy Chief Management Officer, and the Chief Information
Officer--focus appropriate attention on this effort by holding them
accountable for progress against these plans.
Question. Do you support the objective of having the Department
achieve an auditable financial statement by the end of fiscal year
2017?
Answer. Yes. I support the effort and will maintain the
Department's commitment to producing audit-ready financial statements
by the congressional deadline of September 2017, with an audit
beginning by the end of calendar year 2017.
Question. What steps would you take if the Department fails to
reach this goal?
Answer. I would want to evaluate the nature of the problem, the
reasons the goal was not met, and the remediation options available to
get the Department back on track before determining the actions to be
taken.
Question. Do you support the objective of having the Department
achieve an auditable statement of budgetary resources by the end of
fiscal year 2014?
Answer. Yes, I agree with current priorities that focus first on
the budgetary information most useful in managing the Department. I
understand there is a plan to ensure the budgetary statement is ready
to be audited by September 2014.
Question. What steps would you take if the Department fails to
reach this goal?
Answer. I understand the plan to meet that deadline has received a
very high priority at all levels of the Department, and if confirmed, I
would sustain this as a high priority and hold senior leadership
accountable for reaching this goal. If problems are encountered that
would put this goal at risk, I would evaluate the nature of the
problem, the reasons the goal was not met, and the remediation options
available to get the Department back on track. I would also ensure that
Congress is kept apprise of the Department's progress.
department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
Question. The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs (VA) have
in recent years increased collaboration between the respective
departments to support servicemembers as they transition to veteran
status. This support includes access to health and mental health care,
improved disability evaluation, and coordination of compensation and
other benefits.
If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that
the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs achieve the
administration's objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?
Answer. I have been working to improve the transition of our
servicemembers to civilian life for most of my life. If confirmed, I am
looking forward to taking a very active role in this area. The
Department of Veterans Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki is a longtime
friend and if confirmed, I will continue the close partnership with him
that has existed under Secretaries Gates and Panetta. I will continue
the practice of holding regular Secretarial-level meetings and will
closely monitor the progress of the many important joint initiatives
between the two Departments.
systems and support for wounded warriors
Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat
operations deserve the highest priority from their Service for support
services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for
return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007
illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of
significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the
enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain,
including a growing population of servicemembers awaiting disability
evaluation.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
Answer. I believe that important progress in the care, management,
and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers has been
made in the years since the revelations at WRAMC, though there is more
work to be done. It will be a top priority to ensure the best quality
care for our seriously ill and injured servicemembers and their
families. My understanding is Secretary Panetta directed a detailed
review of the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES). If
confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to reviewing the details
of that effort. I will also work closely with the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs to ensure that the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs
programs are fully complementary and that wounded servicemembers
experience a seamless system of care as they transition to veteran
status.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based?
Answer. My understanding is that significant progress has been made
in linking an individual with their medical record in a central data
repository, and making this information available to any DOD medical
treatment facility or Veterans Affairs facility. This appears to
provide seamless health care to our members. If confirmed, I will
continue to partner with the VA in this area. Although I believe there
is more work to be done in improving the care of our seriously ill and
injured servicemembers and their families, this issue is a top priority
of the senior leadership of the Department and a strength that I will
continue to build on. I will also look to build on the close
collaboration between the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs
in caring for our servicemembers, veterans, and their families.
Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. One weakness is the lack of sufficient mental health care
providers at both the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs.
While this is mostly a function of the overall shortage of people with
this specialty, I know DOD is working hard to address this problem,
through increased funding and recruitment. Another weakness that I am
aware of is that Veterans Affairs and DOD have multiple caregivers,
overwhelming patients and their families. I understand Secretary
Panetta and Secretary Shinseki signed an agreement to help wounded
warriors navigate through our systems, by naming a lead care
coordinator for each wounded warrior. If confirmed, I will closely
monitor the implementation of this agreement and work to improve upon
it. There is also duplication and overlap in the various services and
care programs provided by the Department, the Military Services, and
Veterans Affairs, and I would want to make sure that all such programs
are fully coordinated, easily accessible, and comprehensible for our
wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. If confirmed, I would look to build on innovative programs
and partnerships--both with other Federal agencies, as well as with
State and local governments and private and community organizations--
that support our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their
families. For instance, the Intrepid Fallen Heroes Fund has added
invaluably to the care and treatment of servicemembers and veterans
with traumatic brain injury (TBI) and psychological health issues
through the National Intrepid Center of Excellence, and they are in the
process of building state-of-the-art satellite treatment centers at
nine of DOD's largest installations. I am also heartened by cross-
agency efforts like the $100 million investment announced last year by
the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs to improve diagnosis
and treatment of mild TBI and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of access to care
and care management for Federal civilian employees who are ill or
injured in theater, including evaluation and response to traumatic
brain injury and post-traumatic stress?
Answer. My understanding is that Federal civilian employees who are
injured or ill in theater have been treated by theater military
treatment facilities just as Active Duty members would be. Once
medically evacuated out of theater, depending on their medical needs,
they are transferred to an appropriate civilian institution. If
confirmed, I would seek to ensure that Federal civilian employees in
theater receive the quality care and care management befitting those
who put themselves in harm's way on behalf of the Nation.
Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES).
The IDES was established to integrate the DOD and Department of
Veterans Affairs disability systems to improve and expedite processing
of servicemembers through the DES.
What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
improve the IDES?
Answer. While the introduction of the joint IDES has on the whole
been an improvement over the separate Departments of Defense and
Veterans Affairs legacy systems, there is still much room for further
improvement, particularly with regard to timeliness. If confirmed, I
will ensure the Department continues to press forward, in close
collaboration with Veterans Affairs, with further improvements to the
IDES.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change,
particularly the Army's problem with an increasing number of soldiers
who are not medically fit for deployment, but who remain on Active Duty
while they process through the lengthy IDES process?
Answer. I am aware that this is an issue, particularly for the
Army. I do not have specific recommendations at this time, but if
confirmed, I will work with the leadership of the military services on
ways that we can better balance the need to provide servicemembers with
a timely and fair disability evaluation with the need to maintain
acceptable levels of deployable personnel.
homosexual conduct policy
Question. The law commonly referred to as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''
was repealed effective September 20, 2011. As part of the
implementation of this repeal, the Secretary of Defense appointed a
benefits review group to conduct a review of all potential benefits
that could be made available to same-sex spouses. The report of this
review group is long overdue and has been repeatedly delayed.
What is your view of the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell?''
Answer. I fully support the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' and
value the service of all those who fight for our country. I fully
support gay and lesbian men and women serving openly in the U.S.
military and am committed to a full implementation of the repeal of
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''.
Question. What is your assessment of the implementation of the
repeal of this law?
Answer. I understand that the senior military leadership have
engaged in a year-long monitoring process and found that repeal of
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' has not had any impacts on readiness,
effectiveness, unit cohesion, recruiting, and retention. At the same
time, I realize that there is still some work to be done to achieve the
full implementation of repeal, particularly with regard to the benefits
available to the families of gay and lesbian servicemembers.
Question. What is the status of the report of the benefits review
group? When is this group expected to issue its report?
Answer. I understand that this review is not taking the form of a
report, per se, but has involved assembling detailed information on
individual benefits (including whether each such benefit might be made
available under current law, and options for how to do so) to support
decision making by the senior civilian and military leadership of the
Department, and also that those decisions are currently under active
consideration. If confirmed, I will review the work that has been
undertaken during the course of the benefits review and will work
closely with the DOD civilian and military leadership to move forward
expeditiously on this issue.
Question. What is your view on the issue of providing military
benefits to same-sex partners?
Answer. As I have stated previously, I fully support the repeal of
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' and value the service of all those who fight
for our country. If confirmed, I will do everything possible to the
extent permissible under current law to provide equal benefits to the
families of all our servicemembers.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that completion of the
report of the Benefits Review Group is expedited and provided to
Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DOD civilian and
military leadership to move forward expeditiously on this issue and
will inform the appropriate congressional committees of decisions as
they are made.
religious guidelines
Question. The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort
Hood observed that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks
the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate
religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for
violence or self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final
Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify
guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the
Department to task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-
disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and
self-radicalization. . . .''
What is your view of these recommendations?
Answer. Ensuring appropriate accommodations for the free exercise
of religions and protecting servicemembers from violence and harm are
both of vital importance. It is my understanding that, pursuant to
Recommendation 2.7, the Department updated its policy on religious
accommodation to ensure religious freedoms and practices are
accommodated to the fullest extent possible considering mission
readiness, discipline, and unit cohesion. Regarding Recommendation 2.8,
the Department did task the Defense Science Board (DSB) to undertake a
study. The DSB recently completed their study and found that it could
not determine a specific list of behaviors that would indicate risk of
violent/extremist behavior. If I am confirmed, I will review the
implementation of the recommendations of the Fort Hood Review.
Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. It is my understanding that policies and programs of DOD
regarding religious practices in the military seek to ensure
servicemembers' rights to observe the tenets of their respective
religions, as well as to hold no specific religious conviction or
affiliation.
Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes, in my view, current policies appropriately accommodate
the free exercise of religion for all servicemembers in the pluralistic
environment that is the U.S. military. If confirmed, I will continue to
monitor and assess these policies.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. It is my understanding that existing policies provide the
military chaplains with sufficient guidance that allows them to
balance, in both formal and informal settings, their own faith
practices with the rights of others who may hold different or no
religious beliefs. I recognize that this at times can be a difficult
balance to achieve, and if confirmed, I would work with the civilian
and military leadership of the Department and with Congress to ensure
DOD continues to do so.
Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific
factbased approach to understanding radicalization will drive the
Department's relevant policies on this topic?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would review the Department's existing
policies and its plans to address these challenges and determine what,
if any, changes should be made. I agree that any changes to how the
Department approaches this issue should be based on a solid scientific
and factual foundation.
Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to
military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and
appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs.
In your view, do DOD policies appropriately accommodate religious
practices that require adherents to wear items of religious apparel?
Answer. It is my understanding that current policies allow for
consideration of accommodations of religious apparel that do not
interfere with the performance of military duties. If confirmed, I
would work with the Military Services to ensure that they strike the
right balance between military uniform and appearance standards and
personal religious practices.
muslims in the u.s. military
Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
Answer. The attack at Fort Hood was a tragedy. It is essential that
the circumstances surrounding the attack not compromise the military's
core values regarding the free exercise of religion and treating every
servicemember with dignity and respect. Each servicemember has the
right to practice his or her religious faith without fear of
persecution or retribution.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
U.S. military?
Answer. If confirmed, I will not tolerate harassment or
mistreatment against Muslims in the military, or against any
servicemember based on their religious faith. This sort of behavior or
any form of cruelty and maltreatment is inconsistent with the
military's core values, detracts from combat capability, and has no
place in the Armed Forces. I will expect commanders and leaders at all
levels to maintain an environment that promotes dignity and respect,
and will hold them accountable for preventing harassment or
mistreatment.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. Sexual assaults continue to be a significant issue in the
military. Victims of sexual assault report that they are victimized
twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive
or inadequate treatment for the victim and failure of the chain of
command to hold assailants accountable. The Annual Report on Sexual
Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies, released in
December 2012, documents that while the military academies are in
compliance with DOD policies, sexual assault and harassment remain a
problem in each academy. Sexual assaults continue to be persistent
problem in the Services, as evidenced by the ongoing prosecutions of
military training instructors for sexual misconduct with trainees at
Air Force basic training at Lackland Air Force Base. Secretary Panetta
has recently announced several new initiatives to address the sexual
assault problems in the military, including comprehensive assessments
of initial training of enlisted personnel and officers, creation of
special victim capabilities, and limiting initial disposition authority
to Special Court-Martial Convening Authorities in the grade of O-6 or
higher.
What is your assessment of the Department's policies for prevention
and response to sexual assaults in the military?
Answer. Sexual assault will absolutely not be tolerated in DOD. It
is a direct affront to the military's core value to protect all members
of the Armed Forces. Current levels of sexual assault are unacceptably
high. I know that the Department has put considerable effort into the
development and implementation of new policies and procedures to
prevent the crime of sexual assault, support victims, and hold
offenders appropriately accountable. But I also know that more needs to
be done. Secretary Panetta and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made this
issue a top priority. If confirmed, will do the same, and ensure that
the Department continues its commitment to address sexual assault in a
comprehensive and persistent manner.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to
prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including
assaults against contractor personnel?
Answer. I do not have enough information to make a comprehensive
assessment of sexual assault prevention and response in deployed
environments at this time. It is my understanding that any deployed
personnel who are victims, whether servicemembers, civilians, or
contractors, receive appropriate emergency medical care and support. I
also firmly believe that there must be strict accountability for those
who perpetrate such assaults in deployed areas. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Department continues to address sexual assault in a
comprehensive manner--across all Services, in all locations, and for
all personnel.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. It is my understanding that all Services have established
guidelines for a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week sexual assault response
capability for victims in all locations, including deployed areas. With
regard to investigations, I understand the Department has multiple
efforts underway to enhance its ability to investigate and respond to
sexual assault, child abuse, and domestic violence. If confirmed, I
will make it a priority to sustain and build on these enhanced
capabilities for the investigation of ``special victim'' crimes.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
Answer. I strongly believe that anyone who commits a sexual assault
in the military needs to be held accountable. The Department has a zero
tolerance policy, but that is not enough. Accountability is key. To
this end, I fully support Secretary Panetta's decision to elevate
initial disposition of sexual assault cases to the level of Colonel or
Navy Captain, or higher. This action helps ensures our more seasoned,
senior commanders determine what actions are appropriate in response to
allegations of sexual assault. It is my belief that military commanders
are essential to making sexual assault prevention and response efforts
successful. But in order to hold assailants accountable, we must have
victims who are willing to come forward and report these crimes. To do
that, victims need to have confidence in our system of military
justice. That is why I also look forward to hearing more about the
impact of the Air Force's pilot program assigning an attorney to each
victim of sexual assault who requests one to represent them. I believe
this could be a very good way to increase the number of victims who are
willing to come forward.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
sexual assaults?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make sexual assault prevention and
response a personal priority and will work closely with the Secretaries
of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Military Services to
ensure that DOD maintains the current high level of senior leadership
focus on this issue.
increased use of national guard and reserves
Question. Over the last 2 decades, the National Guard and Reserves
have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since
World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time in the planning
and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate
health screening and medical response to service-connected injuries or
illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance
programs upon demobilization, and inefficient policies regarding
members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management
policies and systems have been characterized in the past as
``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely
affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
The recently enacted section 12304b of title 10, U.S.C., authorizes
Service Secretaries to mobilize for up to 365 consecutive days Reserve
component units and individuals in support of pre-planned combatant
command missions. Current defense strategy provides for a reduction in
conventional ground forces, an increase in special forces, and the
establishment of a rotational presence in Europe, the Middle East, and
anywhere U.S. interests are threatened. Some in the press have called
this a ``lily pad'' approach, and it potentially dovetails with an
operational view of the Reserve components.
What is your assessment of the Reserve and how it will fit into
this new strategy of smaller, more lethal forces rotating into and out
of many locations of strategic interest?
Answer. The Reserves and National Guard have clearly proven the
ability to accomplish any assigned mission overseas or at home. They
will continue to play a vital role as we move out of the past decade of
war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Department shapes the force to
implement the new defense strategy and to respond to the challenges of
a new era.
Question. What is your understanding of the appropriate size and
makeup of the Reserve components in light of the current defense
strategy?
Answer. I understand that questions about the size and makeup of
the Active and Reserve components are currently under consideration as
the Department continues to implement the new defense strategy and
respond to the current fiscal environment. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Services and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to
determine the most effective mix and makeup of Active, Reserve, and
Guard personnel to support the defense strategy.
Question. What is your assessment of advances made in improving
Reserve and Guard component mobilization and demobilization procedures,
and in what areas do problems still exist?
Answer. I understand that there have been many advances made in
policies and procedures governing the utilization of the Guard and
Reserves, as well as advancing the pre- and post-Active Duty benefits.
These have given Reserve component personnel the ability to plan for
periods of utilization followed by substantial time performing inactive
duty at home. This provides a predictable cycle of Active Duty and
increases readiness by utilizing the Reserve components on a more
regular basis. If confirmed, I will ensure these procedures are
continually assessed to ensure they are providing the Reserve
components the support they need and deserve.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
changes to the enabling of an operational reserve aimed at ensuring
Reserve component and Guard readiness for future mobilization
requirements?
Answer. In my view, the most significant and enduring change in
this area has been the use of the Reserve component as a full partner
in the overall force at large. In particular, the experience and skills
that members of the Reserve component have gained from preparing and
deploying over the past decade have notably increased the overall
readiness of the Reserve component, and the Department will continue to
make use of these enhanced skills and readiness in the future.
Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves or
to further enhance their ability to perform various national security
missions?
Answer. I appreciate Congress' willingness in the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2012 to increase authorities to fully use the Reserves as a
rotational force. If confirmed, I will consider this question in light
of the new strategy, but at the present time I believe that appropriate
policies and procedures are in place and no laws need to be changed.
dwell time
Question. While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in
Afghanistan, many Active Duty military members are still not
experiencing the dwell time goal of 2 years at home for every year
deployed.
In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be
met?
Answer. I understand that all of the Services, on average, are
meeting or exceeding the Department's dwell time goal of 2 years at
home for every year deployed, or 1:2, for the Active component. If
confirmed, I will continue to monitor this issue closely.
Question. When will dwell time objectives be met for the Reserve
components?
Answer. I understand Reserve component dwell time is improving, but
has not reached the Department's dwell time goal of 5 years at home for
every 1 year of active duty, or 1:5. If confirmed, I will continue to
work toward the goal of a 1:5 dwell time ratio for the Reserve
component for all of the Services.
active-duty and reserve component end strength
Question. The Department last year announced its 5-year plan to
reduce Active Duty end strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by
2017, and the Reserve components by another 21,000 over the same
period. These cuts do not include any additional personnel reductions
that could result from sequestration or any agreement to avoid
sequestration.
Do you agree with this plan to reduce Active Duty and Reserve
component end strengths?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the plan, but I believe that we
must be able to balance end-strength, readiness, and modernization. The
end strength drawdown allows us to achieve the right size force and
keep it modern. The plan is designed to maintain capable and ready
military forces while managing reductions in a way that ``keeps faith''
with servicemembers who have been at war for the past 10 years. While
the plan will reduce Active Duty end strength by 100,000, I believe the
Department has scaled back the Reserve component cut to less than
21,000 (17,000). Preserving the Guard and Reserve reduces the risk of
reductions and hedges against uncertainty by providing capacity and
capability that can be called up if needed. As future national security
conditions change, the Department's planned drawdown could change
accordingly.
Question. What is your view of how these planned end-strength
reductions will affect dwell time ratios?
Answer. The Army and Marine Corps end strength reductions are
synchronized with plans for the drawdown in Afghanistan. The
Department's dwell time goal is 1:2 Active, 1:5 for Reserves. With some
exceptions, the current dwell is 1:1 Active, 1:5 Reserve. If the
Afghanistan force drawdown stays on track, the duty/dwell ratio goal
for components should be achieved. If confirmed, I will carefully
monitor the dwell time of our servicemembers since it is critical that
dwell times be sufficient to preserve the wellbeing of our force.
Question. What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives
have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?
Answer. Preserving the All-Volunteer Force is a top priority, so it
is important to avoid stressing the Active and Reserve components. If
confirmed, I would assess our ability to achieve our strategic missions
and dwell time objectives prior to and during implementation of the
planned Army and Marine Corps strength reductions.
Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you
envision if the Department were required to sequester funding as
outlined in the BCA?
Answer. The President notified Congress of his intent to exempt all
military personnel accounts from sequester for fiscal year 2013, if a
sequester is necessary. However, if the Department were required to
sequester funding, I believe that it would first require a revision of
the Defense Strategic Guidance announced by the President last January.
The current strategy could not be met with the significantly diminished
resources that sequester would impose. The revised strategy could very
well impact all components of our workforce--Government civilians and
contractors in the near-term as well as Active Duty and Reserve
component military if the sequester continues beyond fiscal year 2013.
Question. In your view, what tools do the Department and Services
need to get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of
these require congressional authorization?
Answer. The workforce management tools that Congress provided in
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 will be useful for the drawdown. The
Department continues to examine whether other workforce management
authorities are needed and will submit those to Congress as necessary.
In addition, in the event that the Department has to sequester funding,
the Department would likely revisit the size of all components of the
workforce--Active Duty military, Reserve component military, Government
civilians, and contractors. After such a review, the Department might
require, and would then request, additional authorization for tools to
meet reduced end strength goals.
recruiting standards
Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military
service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents
unique challenges.
What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards
regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?
Answer. Today's enlistment qualification standards are well-
defined, supported by years of experience, and have stood the test of
time. They are driven by the need to provide the Services with men and
women who are prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet
performance requirements. The adequacy of these standards is evidenced
by over 11 years of continuous armed conflict manned by a high quality
All-Volunteer Force.
Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of
eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?
Answer. My understanding is the Services are always exploring ways
to improve their ability to expand the recruiting market without
sacrificing quality. As an example, this year the Department expanded
its ability to enlist graduates with alternative diplomas while
minimizing first term attrition. The Services also may be able to
augment their screening procedures by incorporating other measures,
such as temperament, to identify applicants who are likely to adapt
well to the military. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to
continually find new ways to expand the recruit market.
women in the military
Question. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed
Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American
public. Last year, DOD released a report to Congress, required by
section 535 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), reviewing the laws
and policies restricting the service of female members of the Armed
Forces, and provided notice to Congress that the Department would open
positions in ground combat units at the battalion level to women in
occupational specialties for which they are already qualified to serve,
and would eliminate the so-called co-location policy. According to the
report, the changes resulted in over 14,000 positions being opened to
women that were previously denied. Since then, the Marine Corps opened
training positions at its Infantry Officer course to female marines,
and the Army recently announced opening some special operation aviation
positions to female servicemembers.
What is your view of the appropriate role for women in the Armed
Forces?
Answer. Women are indispensable to our military. They have served
ably alongside their male counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan in a
variety of roles. I support the expansion of opportunities for women to
serve. If confirmed, I will ensure that the process of opening
previously closed positions takes place expeditiously and at the same
time that our readiness and ability to defend the Nation are not
compromised by these changes.
Question. Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up
for service by women? If so, which specialties?
Answer. On January 24, 2013, Secretary Panetta rescinded the 1994
Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule and directed the
integration of women into previously closed positions by January 1,
2016. If confirmed, I will continue implementation of that new policy,
including its emphasis on the effectiveness of the fighting force and
the development of gender-neutral standards.
Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy or
legislation regarding women in combat are needed or warranted?
Answer. I am not aware of further necessary changes at this time.
If confirmed, I will closely monitor the implementation of the January
24, 2013 policy and if I see that additional policies or legislation
are needed, I will make recommendations.
rising costs of medical care
Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
In April 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force
Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive.'' In recent
years, the Department has attempted to address the growth in overall
health care costs through various fee increases on military retirees.
What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if
any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of
military health care?
Answer. It is essential that the Department take steps to control
the costs of military healthcare while ensuring it continues to provide
for our military personnel, their families, and retirees. I understand
the Department included proposals in the fiscal year 2012 and 2013
President's budgets that would slow the growth of healthcare costs
while preserving the quality and range of health care. These proposals
include increasing enrollment fees and deductibles for retirees and
increasing pharmacy co-pays. Not many of these proposals were accepted
by Congress. If confirmed, I will review initiatives in this area and
look for further opportunities as we must continue to look for savings
in this area.
Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising
medical costs on future DOD plans?
Answer. As I understand the situation, health care consumes nearly
10 percent of the Department's budget and could grow considerably over
the next decade, taking an ever larger bite out of our ability to
invest in enhanced warfighting capability. However, I realize that the
healthcare benefit is a key component of retention for our men and
women in uniform so I will work closely with the military and civilian
leadership in the Department to find reasonable and responsible ways to
stem this growth without breaking faith with our servicemembers, their
families, and retirees.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time. If
confirmed, I am committed to continuing to review military health care.
Any changes must keep the faith with our troops, be transparent,
preserve the quality and range of health care, and protect wounded
warriors, medically-retired, and the families of those who died on
Active Duty. Given today's budget environment, we must continue to look
for savings opportunities, and this should include military health
care.
personnel and entitlement costs
Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever
increasing portion of the DOD budget.
What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to
control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?
Answer. I understand personnel and entitlement costs make up a
significant portion of the Department's budget and have risen sharply
over the past 10 years. The Department has proposed several initiatives
in an attempt to slow the rate of growth while continuing to attract
and retain the right number and quality of personnel. If confirmed, I
am committed to exploring options to find savings and more efficient
alternatives to help control the rise in personnel and entitlement
costs while still fully supporting the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services
efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high
quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the
Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for other elements of
the force?
Answer. I understand that targeted bonuses and special pays are
very effective tools for achieving the Department's personnel strength
and quality objectives and are generally much more cost-effective than
across-the-board pay increases. Like any compensation program, these
tools must be continually monitored to ensure they are used both
efficiently and effectively and that the Department is receiving best
value for its dollars.
military compensation and retirement commission
Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 establishes a commission to
review all elements of the military compensation and retirement systems
and to make recommendations to modernize those systems to ensure the
long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force, enable a high quality
of life for military families, and to achieve fiscal sustainability for
the compensation and retirement systems.
Do you agree with the need for a comprehensive study of the
military compensation and retirement systems?
Answer. I believe it is appropriate to perform a comprehensive
review of the military compensation and retirement systems to ensure we
have the right mix of pay and benefits to support our members.
Question. Do you support the goals of the Commission?
Answer. Yes. I am committed to ensuring any proposed changes to the
mix of pay and benefits keep faith with those who are serving today and
with those who have served in the past.
dependent care and flexible spending accounts
Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
recommended providing dependent care and flexible spending benefits to
Active Duty servicemembers. Providing these benefits would seem
consistent with the initiatives of First Lady Michelle Obama and Dr.
Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It would appear that no new
legislative authority is needed for the Department to provide these
benefits to servicemembers and their families.
If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the Active Duty
servicemembers and their families?
Answer. Taking care of our servicemembers and their families is a
top priority of DOD. If confirmed, I will examine the option of
flexible spending accounts for military families to determine if they
are an appropriate part of our extensive benefits package for
servicemembers and their families in this time of fiscal austerity.
suicide prevention and mental health resources
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the committee. The Army released a report in July 2010 that
analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In
addition studies conducted by the Army, of soldiers and marines in
theater, showed declines in individual morale and increases in mental
health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple
deployments.
In your view, what role should DOD play in shaping policies to help
prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the
resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members
of the Reserve components?
Answer. Suicides by military members are tragic--every suicide is
one too many. It is a a complex problem that plagues our entire
society--there are no easy answers or quick solutions. I think
Secretary Panetta put it best when he said that suicide is perhaps the
most frustrating challenge he has come across as Secretary of Defense.
I believe that DOD must take a multi-faceted approach to preventing
suicides that involves leadership responsibility, access to quality
behavioral health care, efforts to improve mental fitness and
resiliency, and increased research on causes and means of preventing
suicide. If confirmed, I will push for enhancements to DOD's policies
and programs in each of these areas.
Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Army are taking in response to the
July 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department has taken multiple
actions to address the rise of suicides since the release of the Army's
July 2010 report as well as the report of the DOD Suicide Prevention
Task Force in September 2010. In particular, in November 2011, the DOD
established the Defense Suicide Prevention Office to serve as the
oversight authority for the implementation, standardization, and
evaluation of suicide and risk reduction programs and policies.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
home station?
Answer. I am firmly committed to implementing the President's
Executive Order on ``Improving Access to Mental Health Services for
Veterans, Servicemembers, and Military Families.'' I look forward to
reviewing the 12-month national suicide prevention campaign that DOD
and VA are developing as part of the implementation of this Executive
Order and will ensure that DOD does all it can to ensure that it is
providing sufficient, high-quality behavioral health care to
servicemembers and their families.
military quality of life
Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget
challenges.
How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
and retention and quality-of-life improvements and your own top
priorities for the Armed Forces?
Answer. Quality-of-life programs that address family readiness
needs must be available to families of our military members wherever
they may be located. Changes in our basing, deployment patterns, and
force structure, as we implement our new strategy and respond to the
current fiscal environment, will pose some additional challenges in
delivering these programs. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the
impacts of such changes to ensure the needs of our military families
continue to be met.
Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
qualify of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision
working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy
groups, and Congress to achieve them?
Answer. I recognize that the well-being of the force, as well as
recruiting and retention efforts, are significantly impacted by quality
of life programs. I look forward to working with Congress, family
advocacy groups, the Services, and combatant commanders to ensure we
have a comprehensive, accessible, and affordable suite of programs.
family readiness and support
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families?
Answer. It is the Department's responsibility to help prepare
military families to cope with the challenges inherent with military
service. In order to build and sustain resilient military families, the
Department must continuing to focus on programs that enhance their
social, financial, educational, and psychological well-being.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness
needs are addressed and adequately resourced?
Answer. Sustaining family programs in the current fiscally
constrained environment will be challenging, but it is of vital
importance. If confirmed, I will seek to protect funding for family
readiness programs to the greatest extent possible and will examine all
such programs to ensure that they are operating efficiently so that
available resources are going to their best and most effective uses.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. Changes in our basing, deployment patterns, and force
structure, as we implement our new strategy and respond to the current
fiscal environment, will pose some additional challenges to maintaining
family readiness. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the impacts of
such changes to ensure the needs of our military families continue to
be met.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. I believe that DOD has a responsibility to ensure access to
quality programs, information and resources to families, regardless of
their location. Military OneSource is an excellent example of a
resource that is not tied to location, but allows families to access
information and referral by the internet or by phone with live
consultants available 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week. Maintaining a
strong network of community-based providers, and partnerships with
State and local governments are also key in ensuring local resources
are readily available to servicemembers and their families,
particularly Reserve component families and Active component families
who do not live near a military installation. If confirmed, I will
evaluate these programs to ensure we are meeting the needs of these
military families.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
enhance family support?
Answer. I believe there are opportunities to improve the efficiency
and accessibility of the resources and programs that DOD, other Federal
agencies, State and local governments, and community organizations
provide to support servicemembers and their families. If confirmed, I
will explore these opportunities and how we can better coordinate
efforts among the various entities providing family support.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes. reciprocity is a critical component and underlying
value of our detainee treatment policies. As a Vietnam veteran, I also
view this principle of reciprocity as a way to protect our U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines, should they be captured in
future conflicts.
coordination with the department of homeland security
Question. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOD
established the U.S. Northern Command and an Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.
What is your assessment of the current situation regarding
cooperation and coordination between DOD and DHS on homeland security
and civil support matters, and what will be your goals in this regard
if you are confirmed?
Answer. Recent disaster responses, including the Department's
efforts in response to Hurricane Sandy, show that DOD and DHS have a
strong relationship. This success is a result of active engagement the
Department has at all levels with DHS and many other of the
Department's domestic interagency partners. Elements of the Department
work very closely on a daily basis with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Coast
Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The Department and DHS
have successfully exchanged liaison and coordination staff officers to
cement this collaborative approach at the working level. While a Member
of Congress I voted to establish the DHS and have been pleased to see
its success. If confirmed, my goal would be to continue to bolster the
strong relationship between the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security.
Question. Do you believe the current mechanism for DOD to respond
to the needs of domestic government agencies for DOD support in the
event of a natural or manmade disaster is appropriate, or do you
believe it needs to be modified?
Answer. The mechanisms for the Department to respond to the needs
of domestic agencies appear to be working effectively. It is my
understanding that the Department acted on 60 requests for assistance
from FEMA during the Hurricane Sandy response last year, including
helping to restore power, providing millions of gallons of fuel for
first responders and residents, and removing water from the Brooklyn
Battery tunnel, the longest underwater tunnel in North America. I
understand that the Department also responded to some 21 other requests
for assistance from FEMA for a variety of other disasters in 2012, as
well as providing assistance to other Federal agencies, including the
U.S. Forest Service for wildland firefighting and the U.S. Secret
Service for protection of the President during special events such as
the recent Inauguration. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department's partner agencies to ensure that the current mechanisms
remain effective and, where opportunities arise, pursue improvements.
iraq lessons learned
Question. Did you agree with the President's decision on the
withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq? If so, why? If not, why
not?
Answer. Yes. I supported the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from
Iraq by December 2011 in accordance with the November 2008 U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement. It was the right decision. Our military men and
women in uniform had completed their mission. We now have a strong
relationship with a sovereign Iraq. Our drawdown has allowed us to
advance our strategic partnership based on mutual interests and mutual
respect.
Question. In your view, what aspects, if any, of the departure/
drawdown of U.S. forces would you have modified?
Answer. I would not have modified the withdrawal of all U.S. combat
forces by December 2011. I believe that the deadline helped the Iraqi
Security Forces step up and take responsibility for the security of
their people. This has allowed us to deepen our partnership with a
sovereign Iraq, based on mutual interests and mutual respect.
Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
the Iraq invasion and the follow-on efforts to stabilize the country
through 2011?
Answer. I believe we must think very carefully before we commit our
Armed Forces to battlefields abroad. Our forces deserve policies and
planning worthy of the sacrifices they make in combat. Our Nation
learned a number of lessons in Iraq--from the invasion, to the
stabilization, to the withdrawal of our forces. These lessons include
ensuring appropriate planning and preparation for a range of outcomes
and events, setting clear and realistic strategic objectives,
appreciating the limitations of military force and the necessity of
engaging all levels of national power (political, economic, cultural,
intelligence), recognizing the value and difficulty of building
partnership capacity, enhancing interagency coordination, and improving
our oversight of wartime spending and contracting. One of the most
important lessons is that the U.S. Government must prepare for combat,
post-combat, and securing the peace. The U.S. military must plan and
train with civilian counterparts, be prepared to operate effectively in
all phases of conflict, and improve cultural, linguistic, and
partnering and advising skills within our force.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force
structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?
Answer. I understand the Department has taken a number of steps to
institutionalize the lessons from Iraq across policy, doctrine,
organization, and training. The Department is committed to maintaining
a focus on cultural and linguistic capabilities as well as the new
operational approaches in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and
security force assistance. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the
Department continues to evaluate and implement lessons learned.
Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you
propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating
concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in
Iraq?
Answer. I do not feel I know enough at this time to provide not
have additional recommendations. If confirmed, I will study and
evaluate the Department's efforts to retain and refine the lessons
learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been
developed over the past 10 years of counterinsurgency and stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question. You called for an international mediator under the
auspices of the U.N. Security Council to engage Iraq's political,
religious, ethnic, and tribal leaders. Would you advocate that same
course of action for Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the Afghan-led
reconciliation process and make recommendations on any changes I think
would be helpful. However, within the administration, the Afghanistan
reconciliation process is led by the Department of State. They are in a
better position to advise on the need for a U.N. Security Council role.
Question. Based on the lessons learned during the departure of
military forces from Iraq, if confirmed, how would you shape U.S.
enduring presence in Afghanistan in the post-2014 environment?
Answer. The U.S. presence post-2014 is an issue being discussed
between the President and the Government of Afghanistan. If confirmed,
I would work to ensure that the United States retains criminal and
civil jurisdiction over U.S. forces in the Bilateral Security Agreement
now under negotiation; if it does not, I will not support a continued
U.S. military presence.
stability and counterinsurgency operations
Question. The January 2012 DOD Strategic Guidance called for U.S.
forces to be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other
stability operations if required, and to retain and continue to refine
the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have
been gained over the past 10 years of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. At the same time, the Strategic Guidance states that,
``U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged
stability operations.''
In your view, how should strategic guidance for DOD manage risk and
articulate the types of missions or operations U.S. forces will or will
not be expected to execute or accomplish?
Answer. The Department's strategic guidance documents should set
clear priorities that enable senior Departmental leadership to
determine appropriate trade-offs in military missions and force
structure. Senior leadership deliberation on these trade-offs should be
informed by a comprehensive, strategic understanding of risk to our
defense and national security objectives. As strategy is implemented,
the Department should continue to test it to determine areas of risk
and develop mitigation options. If confirmed, I will aim to have any
risk the Department bears be both manageable and acceptable; although
budget uncertainty will make this a difficult task.
Question. In your view, what are the appropriate roles and
responsibilities, if any, between DOD and other departments and
agencies of the Federal Government in the planning and conduct of
stability operations?
Answer. Coordinated and integrated interagency efforts are
essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. The United
States should emphasize non-military means and military-to-military
cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for
significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. In general,
the Department should be in a support role to other U.S. Government
departments and agencies in the planning and execution of most
stability operations. However, if directed, the Department will lead
stability operations activities to establish security, to restore
essential services, to repair and protect critical infrastructure, and
to deliver humanitarian assistance. Once acceptable levels of security
and public order have been established, the Department should seek to
transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies,
foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental
organizations.
Question. In developing the capabilities necessary for stability
operations, what adjustments, if any, should be made to prepare U.S.
Armed Forces to conduct stability operations without detracting from
its ability to perform combat missions?
Answer. As our campaigns over the last 12 years have demonstrated,
it is no longer an either/or choice between stability operations and
combat. After almost 2 decades of hard-earned lessons in Afghanistan,
Iraq, the Balkans, and elsewhere, I understand the Services have made
great strides in their combined abilities to conduct stability
operations. If confirmed, I will seek to maintain the stability
operations expertise the Department has gained, and to ensure that the
Services have the mechanisms necessary to expand their capacities,
should our military forces be called upon to conduct comprehensive and
sustained stability operations.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to
establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?
Answer. Collaborative and coordinated planning with interagency and
international partners is fundamental to the successful management and
the effectiveness of U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction
activities. We must have a strong combined ability to conduct effective
interagency planning. If confirmed, I will review the Department's
procedures to identify potential improvements in the current processes
and procedures used to manage stability operations across the U.S.
Government and, as necessary and possible, expand the Department's
support to other departments and agencies in their stability operations
planning and execution.
Question. With the drawdown of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
what is your view on the future disposition of foreign and security
force funding authorities including 1206 (Global Train and Equip), the
Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and other security force
assistance authorities?
Answer. Today's security challenges cannot and should not be
addressed by the United States alone. We need partnerships that combine
our unique capabilities with the unique strengths of our allies and
partners. Future challenges will likely emphasize the importance of our
collaboration with capable partners. I understand that in order to meet
our counterterrorism challenges, the Department shares these two
authorities with the State Department to train and equip foreign
security forces in a more rapid fashion than traditional Foreign
Military Financing. Section 1206 is an important part of the
Department's ``toolbox'' for responding to urgent and emerging
counterterrorism challenges and stability operations, and that the GSCF
is in its initial pilot phase. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
Department effectively and efficiently leverages authorities that
enable our security force assistance efforts. These efforts are
important to the Department's ability to build the capacity of foreign
partners to help them develop effective and legitimate security
institutions that can provide for their countries' internal security,
and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and
instability.
Question. In your view, is there a roll for DOD in improving the
operational capabilities of the African Standby Brigades?
Answer. The Department can help improve the capabilities of the
individual countries contributing forces to the African Standby
Brigades. Direct training can make a qualitative difference in the
capabilities of partner countries and increase the effectiveness of the
regional organizations that mandate such operations. In terms of
helping the Standby Brigades once they are established, I understand
that there are Presidential Determinations authorizing work with some
regional organizations. In the cases where the Department is able to
engage, I understand that habitual training and exercises can help
strengthen the Brigades' operational capabilities.
security situation in iraq
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
in Iraq?
Answer. The overall security situation is stable, yet challenges
remain. It is critical for Iraq to resolve its internal boundary
disputes and political differences without the use or threat of force.
I am concerned about the intent of al Qaeda in Iraq to exploit
political and sectarian differences to breed instability. The Iraqi
Security Forces have proven themselves capable of countering this
threat to date and I believe that our continuing partnership with Iraq
should aim to help Iraq against this terrorist threat.
Question. What are the main challenges to stability and security in
Iraq over the coming months?
Answer. The main challenges to internal stability and security in
Iraq are al Qaeda in Iraq, slow political progress, and sectarian-
motivated groups who would use violence to advance their cause.
Moreover, the unresolved status of territories claimed by the Kurdistan
Regional Government has the potential to create fissures that can be
exploited by extremist groups, and could lead to an escalation of
tension between Kurdish and central government forces. While plenty of
stumbling blocks exist, it is important that the Iraqi political
parties continue to look to the political process to resolve their
differences. Continuing to encourage dialogue and respect for the
constitutional process will be crucial to ensuring long-term stability.
The United States must also closely watch the impact that events
external to Iraq, such as the deteriorating situation in Syria, have on
Iraqi stability and security.
u.s.-iraq strategic relationship
Question. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq at the end of
2011 has been described as the beginning of a new chapter in the
strategic relationship between the United States and Iraq. The U.S.-
Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement sets out a foundation for a
normalized U.S.-Iraqi relationship in areas of mutual economic,
diplomatic, cultural and security interests. Secretary of Defense
Panetta and the Iraqi Minister of Defense recently signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) for Defense Cooperation between the Ministry of
Defense of the Republic of Iraq and the DOD of the United States.
How do you envision the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship developing
in the coming years and what are your priorities for that relationship?
Answer. The United States should seek a normal, productive
relationship and a strategic partnership with a sovereign Iraq--
analogous to the partnerships we have with other countries in the
region and around the world. If confirmed, I will continue to
strengthen our military-to-military relationship with Iraq, and further
its reintegration into the region.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that
relationship over the coming years?
Answer. Iraq faces several tough challenges as the Nation's new
government matures and works through internal differences, and it will
be important to continue to engage Iraq during a time of change. We
have moved from occupiers to partners, and that can be a hard
transition. But recent turmoil in the broader Middle East highlights
the importance of active U.S. engagement and maintaining strategic
partnerships with regional partners based on mutual interests and
mutual respect. We must maintain focus on Iraq in order to advance
broader U.S. objectives of peace and security in the region.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the recently
concluded MOU? In your view, does this agreement on defense cooperation
promote U.S. interests with respect to Iraq and the region?
Answer. My understanding of the MOU is that it represents mutual
understandings regarding future expansion of defense cooperation. In a
time of great uncertainty in the region, Iraq will play an increasingly
important role in ensuring stability and it is critical that we
continue to work together to ensure stability and peace in the region.
office of security cooperation in iraq
Question. In the NDAAs for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013, Congress
authorized the Secretary of Defense to support the transition in Iraq
by providing funds for the activities and operations of the Office of
Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I). In the report accompanying the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, the conferees expressed their expectation
that the administration will accelerate the transition of the OSC-I to
a normalized status comparable to Offices of Security Cooperation in
other countries in the region, and that funding for OSC-I activities
and operations will be transitioned out of DOD to other sources, as is
the case for offices of security cooperation in other countries.
Do you support the transition of the OSC-I to a normalized office
of security cooperation comparable to those in other countries in the
region?
Answer. Yes. The OSC-I, under Chief of Mission authority, is the
foundation for our long-term security partnership with Iraq. If
confirmed, I will continue Secretary Panetta's work to normalize the
OSC-I, in coordination with the Department of State, which has lead for
the U.S. Mission in Iraq.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the transition of the
OSC-I to a normalized status, including funding from sources other than
the DOD, is completed in a deliberate manner?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of
State, which has lead for the U.S. Mission in Iraq, to normalize the
OSC-I and transition to traditional security assistance and security
cooperation funding sources.
Question. What timeframe would you use as a target to transition
OSC-1 to a normalized status?
Answer. I am unable to comment on the specific timing as I have not
reviewed the detailed plans and it is a decision to be made with the
Department of State, which has lead for the U.S. Mission in Iraq. If
confirmed, I will review the planning for OSC-I normalization and work
closely with the Department of State.
afghanistan strategy
Question. Do you support the current strategy for Afghanistan? In
your view, is that the right strategy?
Answer. Yes. I support the strategy that the President has set
forth and that we are now implementing, and I believe it is the right
strategy. I believe that any strategy should be reviewed and adapted
over time, and, if confirmed, will give my best advice to the President
and consult with Congress on this critical issue.
Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. I
also believe that, over time, the administration should continue to
assess the strategy. If confirmed, I will consult with Congress, and
with our allies and partners in this regard.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the campaign
in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe that our campaign in Afghanistan has made
significant progress. Our Coalition and Afghan partners blunted the
insurgents' summer offensive for the second consecutive year. The
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are moving into security lead
throughout the country. They are pushing violence out of most populated
areas, and the United States and our coalition partners agreed in
Chicago to support the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan.
Exceeding initial expectations, Afghan forces began leading the
majority of operations in July 2012 and now lead approximately 80
percent of operations. In February, in conjunction with the fourth
tranche of transition, the ANSF is expected to have the lead in
securing 87 percent of the Afghan population. Overall violence was down
7 percent in 2012. At the same time, I understand that significant
challenges remain, including insider threats and completing the
transition to Afghanistan taking on full responsibility for its
security at the end of 2014.
security transition in afghanistan
Question. President Obama and Afghan President Karzai recently
announced that the transition to an Afghan lead for security throughout
Afghanistan will occur this spring, several months ahead of schedule.
As part of the ongoing transition, coalition forces are shifting
increasingly to an advise-and-assist mission but will continue to
support Afghan security forces until the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission concludes by no later than the end of
2014.
Do you support the announced transition of the security lead to
Afghan security forces throughout Afghanistan by this spring?
Answer. Yes. As this transition occurs, I understand that the ISAF
will shift into an advisor support role.
Question. Do you support the shift in the mission of coalition
forces to an increasingly advise-and-assist role in support of Afghan
security forces?
Answer. Yes. This mission shift to an increasingly support role is
consistent with what Afghans want and what was agreed at the 2010
Lisbon Summit--an Afghanistan able to provide for its own security,
with the assistance of the U.S. and other nations. The U.S. and our
coalition and Afghan partners reaffirmed this goal at the 2012 Chicago
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit. For transition to be
successful, it makes good sense for the ANSF to assume lead security
responsibility this year, enabled by continued support and mentoring
from ISAF to prepare them for full security responsibility by the end
of 2014.
Question. Do you agree that it is important for the success of the
mission in Afghanistan to have Afghan security forces, rather than
coalition forces, taking the lead for security and conducting
unilateral operations to the maximum extent?
Answer. Yes. Training and developing the ANSF into a force that can
sustainably assume full security responsibility by the end of 2014 is
critical to meeting this objective.
Question. What is your assessment of the capacity and performance
of the Afghan security forces in assuming the lead for security in
areas designated for transition, including in contested areas?
Answer. I understand that the ANSF have exceeded initial
expectations. Afghan forces began leading the majority of operations in
July 2012 and now lead approximately 80 percent of operations,
including increasingly complex, multi-day operations. Violence in
transition Tranches 1, 2, and 3, where the ANSF are now in the lead,
was down 9 percent, 6 percent, and 14 percent respectively in 2012
compared to 2011. Some of these initial areas of transition include
contested areas, such as Lashkar Gah and Helmand, where the ANSF have
done well. However, the last two transition Tranches contain many
contested areas, so significant challenges remain and ISAF support will
be critical throughout 2013-2014.
Question. In your opinion, are there any conditions on the ground
in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 that would preclude a responsible
transition of mission from combat to support for U.S. forces? Under
what conditions, if any, would you recommend against making such a
transition at the end of 2014?
Answer. Currently, I believe that transition is on track for the
Afghans to assume full security responsibility by the end of 2014. At
this time, I do not foresee any realistic conditions that would
preclude this transition from being completed responsibly by the end of
2014. If confirmed, I will monitor the conditions closely and will
continue to assess progress, in consultation with commanders on the
ground and the Joint Chiefs; and, if necessary and warranted by
changing conditions, I will adjust the Department's recommendations.
draw down of u.s. forces in afghanistan
Question. In June 2011, President Obama announced his decision to
draw down the 33,000 U.S. surge force in Afghanistan so that by the
summer of 2012 U.S. forces will be at a level of 68,000. The President
recently reaffirmed his pledge to continue to bring U.S. forces home
from Afghanistan at a steady pace. He also stated he would announce the
next phase of the U.S. drawdown based on the recommendations of the
ISAF Commander and other commanders on the ground in Afghanistan.
How would you assess the decision to draw down the 33,000 U.S.
surge force from Afghanistan by the end of summer 2012?
Answer. In my view, the decision to draw down the U.S. surge by the
end of the summer has been proven by conditions on the ground. Although
challenges remain and progress in Afghanistan has been uneven in many
areas, overall security has improved and Afghans are increasingly in
the lead.
Question. What in your view should be the pace of reductions in
U.S. forces during each of 2013 and 2014?
Answer. I do not have access to the relevant analysis to make a
detailed assessment, but understand that President Obama will consider
options provided by our senior military and civilian leaders. I support
the President's direction, articulated in the West Point speech, for
``steady'' reductions. If confirmed, ensuring an effective transition
in Afghanistan will be one of my top priorities.
Question. What in your view should be the size and missions of any
residual U.S. force that may remain in Afghanistan after the end of
2014?
Answer. The key missions of any post-2014 military presence would
focus: training, advising, and assisting ANSF; and targeted
counterterrorism missions against al Qaeda and its affiliates, while
also protecting U.S. forces and citizens. The size of the force will
flow from missions assigned.
Question. In your view, is there a minimum number of troops that
will be required to both accomplish the assigned mission and provide
security for those executing that mission?
Answer. I have not yet reviewed the detailed mission planning and
analysis to form a view regarding the appropriate number of U.S.,
coalition, and Afghan troops necessary to fulfill key missions
including force protection. I do believe that sufficient forces should
be provided to do the job assigned to them, while protecting
themselves.
status-of-forces agreement for afghanistan
Question. As called for in the Enduring Strategic Partnership
Agreement signed in May, the United States and Afghanistan are holding
talks on a Bilateral Security Agreement, which will provide essential
protections for any limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after
2014.
Do you agree that it is essential that any status of forces
agreement for U.S. military forces in Afghanistan after 2014 provide
immunity for U.S. troops from prosecution in Afghan courts?
Answer. Yes. I agree with the position made clear by the President
during his joint press conference with President Karzai on January 11,
2013, that ``it would not be possible for us to have any kind of U.S.
troop presence [in Afghanistan] post-2014 without assurances that our
men and women who are operating there are [not] in some way subject to
the jurisdiction of another country.''
afghanistan national security forces
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?
Answer. Based on the information available to me, I believe that
the ANSF has and continues to make significant progress over the past
few years. I understand that today the ANSF field three out of every
four people in uniform defending Afghanistan, and that Afghans conduct
the majority of operations backed up by the ISAF.
Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any,
would you make for addressing those challenges?
Answer. A first challenge is to continue to improve the quality,
readiness and performance of the 352,000 personnel in the ANSF. I
understand that problems remain in leadership, retention, corruption,
and the long personnel training needed to operate certain enablers such
as logistics and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
A second challenge is for the ANSF to develop a greater capacity for
maintaining equipment and integrating it into operations needed for
logistics support, mobility, ISR, and operational planning. I am aware
that the Department has an aggressive effort to close these enabler
gaps. Third, and most broadly, the ANSF must continue building its
self-confidence through operational success in taking the lead
responsibility for securing transitioning areas and protecting the
Afghan people. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to continue, and
where necessary, adjust efforts to build ANSF capacity and capability.
Question. Do you support plans for building and sustaining the ANSF
at 352,000 personnel?
Answer. Yes. I understand that our commanders consider the current
ANSF force of 352,000 personnel necessary to complete the transition to
Afghan lead security responsibility by the end of 2014, and to secure
the country during the transition of power following the Afghan
Presidential election in 2014. If confirmed, I will continue to review
the numbers and capabilities of the ANSF to ensure that we are
supporting a force structure that is sufficient to meet our goals, and
is fiscally sustainable over the long term.
Question. Do you agree that any reductions in the ANSF from this
352,000 level should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan at
the time those reductions would be expected to occur?
Answer. I agree that changes in ANSF force levels should take
account of expected security conditions. At the same time, for planning
and budgeting purposes, it is necessary to make projections about the
future security environment and plans about future force levels. If
confirmed, I will review these issues and propose adjustments over
time, as appropriate.
insider threat
Question. In 2012 there was a significant increase in the number of
so-called ``green-on-blue'' incidents in which individuals in Afghan
uniform attacked U.S. or coalition soldiers. The rising number of
insider attacks has led U.S. and Afghan military leaders to order a
number of precautions against such insider threats, including expanding
Afghan counterintelligence efforts to identify possible Taliban
infiltrators, increasing cultural sensitivity training, and expanding
the ``Guardian Angel'' program to protect against the insider threat in
meetings between coalition and Afghan forces.
What is your assessment of the insider threat and its impact on the
military campaign in Afghanistan?
Answer. Insider attacks have the potential to damage the strategic
trust necessary for our campaign to succeed. It is vital that we work
with our Afghan and international partners to take every step possible
to stop these attacks. I understand that U.S. and Afghan efforts have
reduced attacks and are helping to reduce risks to coalition personnel.
If confirmed, I will continue to pay close attention to countering this
threat.
Question. What is your assessment of the measures that have been
taken by ISAF and Afghan leaders to address the insider threat?
Answer. My understanding is that the measures put in place to date
have helped to mitigate the threat from insider attacks, with the
number of attacks now dropping from a peak in August 2012. Raised
awareness of the threat and the implementation of robust force
protection measures help protect our personnel, but the work by the
ANSF to identify threats and prevent attacks through improved
intelligence gathering and vetting of personnel remains critical. As we
move into the ``fighting season'' we need to ensure these steps
continue to be implemented fully and that ISAF continues to take the
necessary steps to prevent these attacks. If confirmed, I will make
this a key priority.
Question. Are there additional steps that you would recommend to
address this threat, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue current efforts--and ask for
a constant review of additional measures to further reduce the risk
posed by insider threats.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of these green-on-
blue attacks on the level of trust between coalition and Afghan forces?
Answer. It is understandable that insider attacks have negatively
impacted trust in some areas. However, after more than 11 years of
fighting shoulder to shoulder and shared sacrifice, I believe that, in
most areas, the relationship between the ANSF and the Coalition remains
strong, particularly out in the field, where soldiers face a common
enemy every day.
Question. In light of the spike in insider attacks, do you see a
need to reconsider our plans for embedding small Security Force
Assistance Teams of U.S. military personnel with Afghan military units
as part of the transition to an Afghan security lead?
Answer. If confirmed, I will place a priority on mitigating insider
attacks and will ensure that our commanders continually assess the
impact of these attacks on the campaign, and consider whether changes
to the Security Force Assistance Team model should be made, including
any temporary adjustments as needed.
reconciliation
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and
other insurgent groups?
Answer. I agree with President Obama that Afghan-led reconciliation
is the surest way to end violence and ensure lasting stability in
Afghanistan and the region. Most counterinsurgencies end in some form
of negotiation. The U.S. role should be to facilitate credible
negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, and ensure
that three necessary outcomes are met: that the Taliban and armed
groups end violence, break ties with al Qaeda, and accept Afghanistan's
constitution, including protections for all Afghan men and women.
Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States
be taking to help advance the reconciliation process?
Answer. The United States should continue to coordinate efforts
closely with the Afghan Government.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's
neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in the reconciliation process?
Answer. Afghanistan's neighbors should support an Afghan-led
process. Each will benefit from improved stability in Afghanistan or
potentially suffer from continued violence. Pakistan and other
neighbors should work forthrightly with Afghanistan to mitigate any
suspicions or misunderstandings.
special operations in afghanistan
Question. Special Operations Forces depend on general purpose
forces for many enabling capabilities, including ISR; logistics; and
medical evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special
Operations Command, has said ``I have no doubt that special operations
will be the last to leave Afghanistan'' and has predicted that the
requirement for special operations forces may increase as general
purpose forces continue to be drawn down.
If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities
for Special Operations Forces as general purpose forces continue to
draw down in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that all U.S. forces in
Afghanistan--including both Special Operations Forces and general
purpose forces--are supported by sufficient enablers. In addition to
providing clear guidance to commanders, I will seek the military advice
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and ensure that the views of all
relevant combatant commanders are taken into account.
Question. Last April, the United States and Afghanistan signed an
MOU on the ``Afghanization'' of direct action counterterrorism missions
in Afghanistan reflecting the shared intention of having Afghan
security forces in the lead in the conduct of such operations with U.S.
forces in a support role.
Why is it important for Afghan Special Operations Forces to be in
the lead on night raids?
Answer. Having Afghans in the lead for ``night operations'' makes
good sense for three reasons. First, this approach helps ensure that
cultural and language differences do not result in misunderstandings
that could escalate a situation. Second, having Afghans in the lead
allows for improved real-time intelligence collection. Third, the
Afghan Special Operations Forces are capable of fulfilling this mission
and their doing so is a key part of the transition.
Question. General Allen and others have consistently praised the
Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP)
programs--both U.S. Special Operations missions as critical elements of
the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Some Afghans have called
for the removal of U.S. Special Operators from these operations.
What are your views on the value of these programs and do you
believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan
(i.e. post-2014)?
Answer. I understand that VSO and the ALP have contributed to the
decline in Taliban control in many strategic areas throughout
Afghanistan. If I am confirmed, I will make a priority to assess the
potential future value of these programs.
u.s. strategic relationship with pakistan
Question. What would you consider to be areas of shared strategic
interest between the United States and Pakistan?
Answer. I believe the United States and Pakistan share common
interests in disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda, and in
long-term regional stability, including a durable political settlement
in Afghanistan and the safety and security of the Indian Ocean.
Question. In what areas do you see U.S. and Pakistani strategic
interests diverging?
Answer. The United States and Pakistan often diverge over
Pakistan's approach to the militant and terrorist networks that operate
in Pakistan's territory and do not overtly threaten the Pakistani
state. However, in my view, these networks threaten Pakistani
stability, endanger the prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan, and
undermine regional stability--so that in fact, while the relationship
is challenging, I believe our long-term strategic interests are in
alignment.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
military relations?
Answer. U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military ties have been marked by
periodic ups and downs. In my view, the military-military relationship
should be underlined by a realistic, pragmatic approach to enhancing
those areas of cooperation that are dictated by our common interests
and to ensuring accountability for actions that detract from these
interests. If confirmed, I will make accomplishing that goal a
priority.
u.s. assistance to pakistan
Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
military assistance to Pakistan. In addition, the United States has
provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection
with Operation Enduring Freedom.
In your view, how effective has the assistance and other support
that the United States has provided to Pakistan been in promoting U.S.
interests?
Answer. As the President has said, more terrorists have been killed
in Pakistan than anywhere else since September 11--and that would not
be possible without Pakistani cooperation. Security assistance for
Pakistan has helped Pakistan press this campaign against the militant
and terrorist networks that threaten us all. If confirmed, I will work
to ensure that our security assistance and other support to Pakistan
both serves U.S. interests and is cost effective.
Question. Do you support conditioning U.S. assistance and other
support to Pakistan on Pakistan's continued cooperation in areas of
mutual security interest?
Answer. U.S. assistance to Pakistan should not be unconditional. At
the same time, any conditions should be carefully examined to ensure
they advance U.S. strategic interests.
al qaeda and associated forces
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
and its associated forces to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests
overseas, and Western interests more broadly?
Answer. I assess that the threat posed by al Qaeda to the U.S.
Homeland has been significantly diminished over the past 4 years. At
the same time, al Qaeda's remaining leadership in Pakistan and al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula remains of serious concern. Additionally, the
Arab Spring has created new opportunities for al Qaeda affiliates in
Syria and North Africa.
Question. In light of the recent events in Benghazi and Algeria, do
you share the assessment that al Qaeda is on the brink of strategic
defeat?
Answer. Our sustained military, intelligence, and diplomatic
efforts over the last 10 years have brought us closer to the strategic
defeat of core al Qaeda. There can be no doubt, however, that al Qaeda
and associated forces remain potent, dangerous, and adaptable foes--as
evidenced by its despicable actions in Benghazi and more recently in
Algeria. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on defeating al Qaeda
and its associated forces around the world.
arab spring
Question. The Arab Spring has changed--and will likely continue to
change--the political dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa.
These changes require the United States to adjust our military-to-
military and defense civilian relations in this region. Some observers
argue that the United States should reduce significantly our military-
to-military contact in countries as a result of the ongoing changes and
others advocate more robust and stepped-up contact with our partners in
this region.
In your view, what should be the posture of the U.S. Government on
military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?
Answer. DOD's military-to-military and defense civilian relations
with our partners in the Middle East and North Africa have played a
critical role in advancing U.S. strategic interests, which include:
securing and protecting Israel, preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon, defeating extremists, countering terrorist
organizations, ensuring the free flow of commerce, and supporting
operations in Afghanistan. Engagement with key partners' defense
ministries and militaries, building partner capacity to meet common
challenges, having a forward presence to enable operations and deter
threats, and if and when necessary to conduct future contingencies, all
require considerable effort by both DOD and the Department of State.
During this time of change and uncertainty in the region, the
Department should sustain military-to-military and defense civilian
relations, while continuing to evaluate and recalibrate the nature and
substance of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S.
values and advance U.S. vital national interests.
syria
Question. The civil war in Syria continues and President Assad's
commitment to continuing his regime's ongoing operations appear
unwavering--despite broad international condemnation. To date, the
United States has limited its support to opposition forces to non-
lethal assistance to forces on the ground, as well as technical
assistance to elements of the opposition working to build a cohesive
political entity.
In your view, what is the proper role on the United States in this
conflict?
Answer. I support the administration's position that Syrian
President Bashar al-Asad has lost all legitimacy and must step aside to
enable a political solution that ends the bloodshed, and meets the
aspirations of the Syrian people. As President Obama has clearly
stated, Asad must go. I also support the administration's approach to
the ongoing crisis in Syria--working closely with allies, partners and
multilateral institutions to achieve this goal through diplomatic and
economic pressure on the Asad regime.
I agree with the administration's continued support of the Geneva
Action Group's framework for a political solution, which was endorsed
by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the Arab
League, and the U.N. General Assembly. If confirmed, I will continue to
support Joint U.N.-Arab League Special Representative Brahimi's efforts
to build international support for the Geneva framework and urge all
parties in Syria to take steps toward its implementation, to help
expedite an end to the suffering of the Syrian people.
Question. In your view, should the United States provide other
kinds of support to opposition groups on the ground in Syria, including
the provision of lethal support?
Answer. The U.S. Government should continue providing non-lethal
assistance to the unarmed opposition, as well as humanitarian support
to Syrians in need, both inside Syria and in neighboring countries. The
United States should also continue to support the opposition in the
diplomatic arena. This includes helping the newly established Syrian
Opposition Council with its efforts to end the conflict and improve the
future of the Syrian people. I also believe that, like ongoing
diplomatic efforts, U.S. assistance efforts should continue to be
coordinated with our allies, partners, and relevant regional groups to
have the biggest impact possible.
I do not believe that providing lethal support to the armed
opposition at this time will alleviate the horrible situation we see in
Syria. The Syrian people are in great need during this difficult
period, and the United States is helping to address those basic needs
by providing medical assistance, humanitarian assistance, and political
support on the international stage. We must continually explore
additional ways to provide resources and help influence the right
outcome.
Question. If confirmed, will you review Defense Department planning
for options to ensure the security of chemical weapons in Syria, and
recommend any additional planning, if needed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues
planning for a variety of contingencies in order to provide the
President with options. This includes relevant planning for Syria and
specifically, the security and elimination of chemical weapons in
Syria. If confirmed, I will review these plans and, if necessary, I
will direct additional planning on this and any other potential
contingencies.
Question. In your view, what should be NATO's role with respect to
Syria (i.e. should NATO consider a military intervention, the creation
of a no-fly zone, or other military operations to protect civilians and
support opposition forces)?
Answer. The United States is working with our allies to achieve a
peaceful and orderly political transition in Syria and to end the
bloodshed as quickly as possible. Our NATO allies are closely
monitoring the situation in Syria, especially as the conflict touches
on NATO's border in Turkey, and like us, are extremely concerned about
the deteriorating humanitarian conditions on the ground. NATO's
ultimate task is the protection and defense of NATO members. To that
end, I support NATO's decision to augment Turkey's air and missile
defense capabilities in order to defend the population and territory of
Turkey and contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the
alliance's border. This includes the recent deployment of NATO Patriot
batteries to Turkey from the United States, Germany, and The
Netherlands. I understand the administration has also been working with
our international partners, including NATO allies, to ensure that the
appropriate humanitarian assistance is reaching those Syrians in need,
both inside Syria and in neighboring countries (Lebanon, Turkey,
Jordan, and Iraq).
libya
Question. On March 19, 2011, the multilateral military operation,
named Operation Odyssey Dawn, was launched in Libya to enforce United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. Following the initial
operations against Libyan integrated air defense systems, this
operation continued under NATO Command as Operation Unified Protector.
What are your views on the limited U.S. military mission in Libya--
Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector?
Answer. I believe the U.S. and NATO operations in Libya were a
success. Operation Odyssey Dawn stopped Colonel Qadhafi's army from
advancing on Benghazi, saved thousands of lives, and established the
conditions for a no-fly-zone. Operation Unified Protector built on
these accomplishments and created the time and space needed for the
opposition to oppose, and ultimately overthrow, Qadhafi. Both
operations had limited and clear objectives for the unique capabilities
the U.S. military could provide, avoided U.S. boots-on-the-ground,
integrated allies and partners, minimized collateral damage and
civilian casualties to a historically unprecedented extent, and enjoyed
the legitimacy of U.N. Security Council authorization. This was all
achieved at a fraction of the cost of recent interventions in the
Balkans, Iraq, or Afghanistan.
u.s. marine corps support to the state department
Question. The Accountability Review Board for Benghazi recently
completed its report examining the facts and circumstances surrounding
the September 11-12, 2012 attack against the U.S. temporary mission
facility in Benghazi. Among its findings and conclusions, its report
supported the ``State Department's initiative to request additional
marines and expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program--as well as
corresponding requirements for staffing and funding. The Board also
recommends that the State Department and DOD identify additional
flexible MSG structures and request further resources for the
Department and DOD to provide more capabilities and capacities at
higher risk posts.'' In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, Congress
authorized up to 1,000 additional marines in the MSG program to provide
the additional end strength and resources necessary to support enhanced
Marine Corps security at U.S. embassies, consulates, and other
diplomatic facilities.
In your view, should the Marine Corps diplomatic security mission
be expanded to include new roles beyond the protection of classified
information and equipment, and if so, how many additional marines and
what rank structure would be needed?
Answer. I am aware that the Departments of Defense and State are
currently thoroughly examining the challenges and threats posed by
global unrest to our overseas operations and are developing options to
address these challenges. These options include consideration of
expanding Marine Security Guard detachments, as well as adjustments to
their roles and responsibilities. I have not reviewed the details of
the options and, therefore, am unable to comment on the specific
arrangements, numbers of personnel, or rank structure at this time.
However, if confirmed, I will place personal emphasis on this issue and
work closely with the Secretary of State and Congress to ensure we are
doing all we can to help protect our diplomats and diplomatic
facilities overseas.
Question. In your view, should the current arrangements between the
Department of State and U.S. Marine Corps be modified?
Answer. I cannot recommend any changes at this time. If confirmed,
I will review the on-going work and recommendations that are being
developed by the Departments of Defense and State that is examining the
roles, responsibilities, and arrangements of the U.S. Marine Security
Guards and the Department of State.
strategic communications and information operations
Question. Over the past decade, DOD has funded an increasing number
of military information support operations (formerly known as
psychological operations) and influence programs. The GAO reports that
DOD has ``spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year'' to support
its information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs
are in support of operations in Afghanistan, but Military Information
Support Teams (MIST) from U.S. Special Operations Command also deploy
to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe
to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency
for International Development. Further, the geographic combatant
commands are increasingly moving into this operational space.
What are your views on DOD's military information support
operations and influence programs?
Answer. I believe DOD must be able to influence and inform foreign
audiences in environments susceptible to the messages of U.S.
adversaries. MISTs are trained in developing culturally appropriate
messages to counter hostile information and propaganda, as well as
assisting with building the capacity of partner nations to conduct
these activities themselves. I understand that DOD influence
activities, including those conducted by MISTs, are coordinated closely
with the embassies in the areas where they operate, both inside and
outside of areas of conflict, and at times can support common efforts
of other agencies. I understand the Department has taken significant
steps to address congressional concerns related to policy oversight,
budgeting, and effectiveness. If confirmed, I intend to continue to be
responsive to Congress on this matter, as well as to continue the
Department's efforts to coordinate information activities across the
interagency.
Question. In 2005, al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that ``We
are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the
battlefield of the media.'' In 2010, a non-partisan study highlighted
the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment
violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-Jihadism).
In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD, if any, in
developing and implementing a strategy to counter radical ideologies,
and how does that role complement or conflict with the efforts of the
Intelligence Community and the State Department?
Answer. Countering violent extremist ideology is a whole-of-
government endeavor. I believe the Defense Department's focus should be
on using its assets to meet military objectives and providing support
to other U.S. Government agencies as requested. I understand the
Department's activities in this area are closely coordinated with the
Intelligence Community and the State Department.
Question. Defense Secretary Gates launched the Minerva Program in
2009 to develop deeper social, cultural and behavioral expertise for
policy and strategy purposes.
Do you support this program and its goals?
Answer. I understand both Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta
supported the MINERVA initiative, which provides the Department with a
means to focus research on complex social, cultural and political
dynamics related to our strategic interests around the world. If
confirmed, I would seek to learn more about the program and assess its
continued value in supporting policy and strategy development.
somalia
Question. Somalia is a training and operations hub for al Shabab
and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and
Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans, and drugs;
and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was responsible for
the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August
1998.
What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabab to the
U.S. Homeland and U.S. and Western interests in the East African
region?
Answer. My understanding is that successful operations by the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have reduced Al-Shabaab's
freedom of movement in south and central Somalia, but al Shabaab
remains a threat to the U.S. Homeland and to U.S. and Western interests
in the Horn of Africa. Al Shabaab leaders have claimed affiliation with
al Qaeda since 2007 and formally merged with the group in February
2012. Al Shabaab has demonstrated a desire and capability to conduct
terrorist acts throughout the Horn of Africa, and it presents a threat
to the homeland through links into Somali diaspora communities in the
United States and Europe. Al Shabaab continues to repress the Somali
people and remains the greatest threat to the new Somali Government. As
the new Somali Government stands up, I believe that the United States
must remain focused on the risks posed by al Shabaab.
Question. Given the role of the various U.S. Government Departments
and Agencies in the Horn of Africa, what changes, if any, would you
make to DOD's current role in the Horn of Africa?
Answer. With the establishment of the new government in Somalia and
U.S. recognition of that government earlier this month, the Department
will continue to play a role in Somalia's security sector development
in order to help secure the gains made by AMISOM. Most of the U.S.
Government's traditional security cooperation tools have been
restricted from use in Somalia for some time, but I understand that the
United States will explore possible changes in the coming year, as the
United States moves to normalize relations with Mogadishu. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department's approach to
Somalia is developed as part of a coordinated U.S. national security
policy toward the Horn of Africa, and to determine how the Department
can and should best support our foreign policy in this region.
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States
play in the building of a Somali national army?
Answer. The United States can play a guiding and mentoring role in
the development of Somalia's security sector. It is in the U.S.
interest to ensure that Somalia's new government has a competent and
professional military to provide security to its citizens and play a
constructive role in the region.
al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. A number of senior U.S. officials have indicated the most
significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently emanates from Yemen.
What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula to the United States?
Answer. I am very concerned about the threat that al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses to the Homeland. AQAP has attempted at
least three attacks on the United States since December 2009, and in my
view fully intends to attack again. AQAP has shown some very
sophisticated and innovative techniques, such as the development of
concealed explosive devices and printer cartridge bombs. AQAP is also
attempting to recruit and radicalize would-be terrorists in the West
through its extensive media outreach.
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy to
counter al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, specifically in Yemen?
Answer. I support the administration's whole-of-government strategy
to: support the political transition, marshal international economic
and humanitarian assistance, and build Yemen's counter-terrorism
capabilities through training and assistance. The U.S. strategy to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP is a collaborative U.S.-Yemeni
effort. By closely monitoring and acting on current threat streams
while building key Yemeni capabilities, I believe the United States has
shown the ability to counter near-term threats.
We have made a number of important gains against AQAP over the past
couple of years. I understand that the Department continues to
collaborate extensively with Yemeni forces on operational matters,
which have helped remove several key AQAP operatives from the
battlefield. Efforts to counter AQAP's narrative have helped to
delegitimize the group and discourage its efforts to recruit new
operatives. The U.S. Government's work on countering threat financing
has made it more difficult for AQAP to receive funds and to support
other parts of al Qaeda. U.S. efforts--many of them executed by the
Department--to train, advise, and equip Yemeni forces are driving AQAP
from territory it previously held and are enabling precise operations
to capture and kill AQAP leaders.
north africa
Question. In December 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
stated that ``Al Qaeda has long sought to operate in areas beyond the
reach of effective security and governance, [and] we know that al
Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents are looking to establish a foothold
in other countries in the Middle East, and north and west Africa,
including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Boko Haram group in
Nigeria.''
What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its
associated forces in North Africa? Do they pose a threat to the United
States homeland and/or U.S. interests abroad?
Answer. Al Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses
an increasing threat to U.S. interests. My understanding is that at
this time, there is no credible evidence that AQIM is a direct threat
to the U.S. Homeland. However, as seen in the recent hostage situation
in Algeria, AQIM and its associates do threaten U.S. persons and
interests abroad, as well as our European allies.
Question. In January 2013, the French Armed Forces began conducting
operations against violent extremist groups in Mali.
In your view, what should be the role, if any, of the United States
in supporting the French operation?
Answer. The United States shares the French goal of denying AQIM
and other terrorists a safe haven in the region. I agree with the
administration's decision to support the French mission without
deploying U.S. combat forces on the ground. My understanding is that
this support includes assisting the movement of French and African
forces, providing intelligence and planning support, and assisting in
the training and preparation of African forces.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in working with United Nation's Security Council authorized
forces from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in
Mali?
Answer. The African-led International Support Mission in Mali
(AFISMA), approved by a Chapter VII U.N. Security Council mandate to
restore Malian sovereignty and counter violent extremists, is very
important for U.S. interests and for regional stability. I support the
U.S. position to expedite the training, equipping and deployment of
West African troops as part of AFISMA to ensure a successful, African-
led mission.
collaboration between the defense department and the intelligence
community
Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration--both analytical
and operational--between the Defense Department and the Intelligence
Community has grown increasingly close. On one hand, seamless
collaboration is a vital component of effective and rapid responses to
non-traditional threats, and bringing together the strengths of the
full spectrum of defense and intelligence missions creates
opportunities for solutions to complex problems. On the other hand,
such collaboration--without effective management and oversight--risks
blurring the missions of agencies and individuals that have cultivated
distinct strengths or creating redundant lines of effort.
What are your views regarding the appropriate scope of
collaboration between DOD and the Intelligence Community?
Answer. Collaboration between DOD and the Intelligence Community
(IC) is an essential element for supporting our national security
objectives. Eight of the 17 IC components are embedded in the
Department which constitutes a substantial portion of the Nation's
intelligence capabilities and resources. It is my understanding that
the Department depends on capabilities provided by the IC to support
weapons systems acquisition and to enable military operations, while
the IC depends on capabilities provided by the Department to support a
wide range of critical intelligence-related and special activities.
Collaboration has also been central to the ability to dismantle and
eventually defeat al Qaeda and to counter the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). In 2007, the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established the position of the
Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, and dual-hatted the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) as the DDI. The DNI and the USD(I)
have since pursued National Intelligence Program-Military Intelligence
Program budget integration leading to more effectiveness and
efficiencies from vital intelligence resources.
Question. In your view, are there aspects of the current
relationship between the Department and the Intelligence Community that
should be re-examined or modified?
Answer. I do not know the issue well enough to make recommendations
at the time. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department
consistently assesses its processes and procedures for evaluating how
it interacts with the IC and look for opportunities to build on the
existing relationship.
nato alliance
Question. The NATO alliance continues to be central to our
coalition operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, even as many NATO
members have significantly reduced their national defense budgets in
response to economic and fiscal pressures.
Do you agree that U.S. participation in the NATO Alliance
contributes to advancing U.S. security interests?
Answer. Yes. the transatlantic relationship is of critical
importance to U.S. security interests. NATO has been the cornerstone of
European security and an integral part of U.S. foreign policy for more
than 60 years, and NATO has continued to be critically important to
U.S. security interests in recent years. In Afghanistan, there have
been nearly 40,000 allied and partner forces alongside our own. In
Libya, NATO allies came together with Arab and other partners to
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and to support the Libyan people.
Over years in the Balkans, NATO has been vital to stability and has
moved us closer to the goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. NATO
must remain the central Alliance in U.S. global strategy and has proven
an effective partner.
Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that
you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next
5 years?
Answer. In my view, the top NATO-related challenge is the mounting
fiscal pressures facing all allies and the resulting reduction in
alliance military capabilities as allies cut spending. However, these
fiscal difficulties present an opportunity to transform NATO into an
Alliance that is more efficient, with a new way of doing business that
emphasizes innovation, flexibility, and enhanced cooperation and
interoperability with allies and partners. The Alliance must also
continue to adapt to meet the new threats of the 21st century: cyber
attacks, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and regional conflicts.
Question. In light of the reductions in national defense spending
by some NATO members, are you concerned that the alliance will lack
critical military capabilities? If so, what steps, if any, would you
recommend be taken to address potential shortfalls in alliance
capabilities?
Answer. Yes. I am concerned that the Alliance is in danger of
losing critical military capabilities if something does not change. The
past decade-plus of fighting in Afghanistan has left the alliance with
worn equipment and depleted defense budgets. The Alliance should commit
to halting defense cuts, complete the capability projects it has
already initiated, and reinvest the funds it will save from the end of
combat operations in Afghanistan into sustaining and building
prioritized capabilities. If confirmed, I will work to ensure NATO's
commitments to critical capabilities.
Question. The concept of defense cooperation between NATO members
was emphasized at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012.
What areas or projects do you recommend that NATO nations cooperate
in to improve NATO alliance capabilities?
Answer. I support the roadmap for NATO that was agreed to by
Presidents and Prime Ministers from across the alliance at the Chicago
Summit last May. It describes and prioritizes NATO's required
capabilities, encourages greater pooling of resources, and focuses on
improving education, training, and technology to preserve the
interoperability resulting from years of joint operations in
Afghanistan.
Question. Under what conditions, if any, would you envision further
enlargement of NATO in the coming years?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with my colleagues in
the administration and in close consultation with Congress and our
allies to determine which countries and within what timeframe NATO
would undertake further enlargement. Each NATO aspirant should be
judged on its individual merits and progress in implementing political,
economic, and military reforms.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. I agree with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that the
presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, along with NATO's unique nuclear
sharing arrangements, contribute to alliance cohesion and provide
reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional
threats. Any changes should only be taken after a thorough review
within, and a decision by, the alliance. I also support NATO's
Deterrence and Defense Posture Review that the President and fellow
Heads of State and Government agreed to at the May 2012 Chicago NATO
Summit. The review committed the alliance to ensuring that NATO's
nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective. The review also
stated that the alliance is prepared to consider further reductions in
non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the alliance, in the context
of reciprocal steps by Russia. If confirmed, I will continue to consult
with our allies on any such negotiations.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
Israel and Turkey as it relates to NATO? Are you concerned about the
breakdown in the security cooperation relationship between Turkey and
Israel and do you have any ideas as to how to mend it?
Answer. I remain concerned about the deterioration of the
relationship between Turkey and Israel, both of which are important
partners for the United States and are critical to stability in their
region. These relationships are broader than this dispute. Turkey is a
critical NATO Ally, and we will continue to exercise, plan, and work
with Turkey in that context. Israel is a key security partner of the
United States. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the United
States continues, in diplomatic channels and in defense contacts, to
encourage both Turkey and Israel to take the steps necessary to resolve
their dispute and work together to address common regional challenges.
kosovo
Question. Approximately 760 U.S. troops remain in the Balkans as
part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that first deployed to Kosovo in 1999
and today is comprised of over 5,500 personnel from 30 countries.
Spikes in violence in 2011 required the deployment of the NATO
Operational Reserve Force battalion of approximately 600 soldiers to
bolster KFOR and maintain a secure environment. Progress is required in
both the military and political realms before further troop reductions
can be made.
What major lines of effort do you think are required to further
reduce or eliminate U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo?
Answer. I recognize that the United States has a long-established
commitment, together with our NATO allies, to a responsible,
conditions-based drawdown of forces in Kosovo. I understand DOD
continues to work with allies and NATO military authorities in
monitoring and assessing conditions and pursuing carefully developed
plans for the eventual drawdown. Ultimately, a political solution is
needed to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia and thereby
establish lasting security in Kosovo and the region. If confirmed, I
will support this effort, both through Department-led engagements, and
also by supporting our interagency and international partners to
achieve this goal. I understand that a key part of the KFOR military
plan, executed by NATO, is to enable a transition of security
responsibilities to Kosovo. The United States plays a critical role in
this effort. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD provides support for
this goal consistent with decisions among the United States and our
allies.
Question. In your view, is the European Union (EU) playing a
significant enough role in Kosovo?
Answer. The EU is playing a critical role by facilitating high-
level dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. This dialogue is broadly
supported by the United States and our allies as an opportunity to
normalize relations between the two countries. The EU Rule of Law
Mission (EULEX) plays an important role in Kosovo, working to
strengthen legal institutions there. The United States will continue
its support for a robust role by EULEX to fulfill its mandate.
special operations forces
Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have
mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and
enablers that directly support their operations.
What is your assessment of the QDR mandate regarding the mix of
responsibilities assigned to general purpose and Special Operations
Forces, particularly as it relates to security force assistance and
building partner military capabilities?
Answer. I agree with the premise that adversaries will continue to
seek alternative methods to counter U.S. influence and interests, and
that for the foreseeable future the most likely contingencies the
United States will face will involve irregular threats. Therefore, I
fully support the 2010 QDR's strategic shift toward expanding general
purpose forces' capabilities and capacity for these contingencies. The
overall flexibility of our Armed Forces has been greatly improved by
investing in key enablers within our conventional force such as:
strengthening and expanding capabilities for security force assistance;
increasing the availability of rotary-wing assets; expanding manned and
unmanned aircraft systems for ISR; improving counter-improvised
explosive device capabilities; and enhancing linguistic, cultural,
counterinsurgency, and stability operations competency and capacity.
Question. Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to
become more like Special Operations Forces in mission areas that are
critical to countering violent extremists?
Answer. Countering violent extremism requires employing all of the
capabilities of the Department--mixed and matched appropriately--
depending on the mission requirements. The experience of the last 10
years is clear that general purpose units and special forces both
contribute to countering violent extremists.
Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved
for Special Operations Forces only?
Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are a uniquely specialized
component of our U.S. Armed Forces that are trained, organized, and
equipped to conduct counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct
action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-
proliferation of WMD, and other designated operation, often in areas
under enemy control or in politically sensitive environments. In such
operations and environments, SOF provide unique and essential
capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that we should further increase the number
of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
Answer. I understand U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is on
track to meet the growth mandated by the last two QDRs. If confirmed, I
would work with Commander, SOCOM, to better understand the command's
missions, pressures, and growth plans.
Question. Special Operations Forces rely heavily on Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funds.
With the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan, what OCO funding for
special operations needs to be moved into the base budget to preserve
enduring capabilities in your opinion?
Answer. I believe we must continue to provide SOCOM with base
budget resources sufficient to preserve long-term readiness of a global
Special Operations Force. I understand that in the fiscal year 2013
budget the Department moved roughly $1 billion from OCO to base funding
and the intent is to continue this transition, although the current
fiscal and strategic environment make that challenging.
Question. In your view, can the size of Special Operations Forces
be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and
training standards for special operators?
Answer. I understand and agree with the concept that Special
Operations Forces (SOF) cannot be mass produced, and I fully support
SOCOM's efforts to maintain the quality of SOF operators and support
personnel during this current era of SOF growth. Experience has shown
that SOF manpower growth of 3 to 5 percent annually can be sustained
and will not dilute the force or outpace the required training and
support structure. This is the pace SOCOM has sustained to great effect
over the past several years and is on track to sustain this year.
Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
extremist organizations, including those related to information and
military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
Question. What current missions, if any, do you believe can and
should be divested by SOCOM, and why?
Answer. At this time, I do not advocate significant changes to
SOCOM's title 10 missions. If confirmed, I would work with Commander,
SOCOM, to better understand the command's missions, operations, and
pressures and if I see that changes are needed I will offer proposals.
Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
them?
Answer. I do not currently foresee any additional missions that
SOCOM should assume. If confirmed, I would work with Commander, SOCOM,
to review any additional missions that may be proposed.
Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as foreign
internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that
they receive appropriate funding?
Answer. The activities of Special Operations Forces are quite
varied, from high-risk strikes and counterterrorist raids conducted in
minutes, to training and advising foreign counterparts conducted over
months and years. Both require highly skilled operators, trained,
organized, and equipped for the task. I believe that each of these
activities is a highly valued capability for the U.S. Government that
should be maintained and, if confirmed, I will ensure that the
Department is adequately prepared for both.
unified command plan changes
Question. It has been reported that Admiral McRaven, Commander of
SOCOM, is seeking changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and other
authorities that he believes would allow SOCOM to better support the
requirements of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).
Reportedly, such changes would give the Commander of SOCOM combatant
command authority over the TSOCs--including responsibilities for
resourcing--and provide for more rapid deployment of special operations
forces to and between geographic combatant commands without the
requirement for approval by the Secretary of Defense in every case.
Operational control of deployed Special Operations Forces would
reportedly remain with the respective geographic combatant commander.
Some have expressed concern that such changes could raise problems
related to civilian control of the military, infringe upon the
traditional authorities of the geographic combatant commanders, and
make it more difficult for Ambassadors and geographic combatant
commanders to know what military personnel are coming into their areas
of responsibility and what they are doing while they are there.
Please provide your assessment of whether such UCP changes are
appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control
of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic
combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD is considering several
initiatives to enhance the organization, training, equipping, and
employment of Special Operations Forces to meet future global security
challenges, including potential changes to the UCP and other guidance
that establish command responsibilities and relationships. If
confirmed, I look forward to seeing the recommendations from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and senior civilian leadership and will ensure these
proposed changes preserve civilian control of the military principles,
establish clear and appropriate command authorities, and support strong
interagency relationships.
combating terrorism
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
and associated forces to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas,
and western interests more broadly? Which affiliates and associated
forces are of most concern?
Answer. I assess that the threat posed by al Qaeda to the U.S.
Homeland has been significantly diminished over the past 4 years. At
the same time, al Qaeda's remaining leadership in Pakistan and al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula remain of greatest concern. Additionally, the
Arab Spring has created new opportunities for al Qaeda affiliates in
Syria and North Africa.
What is your understanding of the Department's role in the U.S.
strategy to combat terrorism?
Answer. My understanding is that the U.S. Government is engaged in
a multi-departmental, multi-national effort, and that key activities
that the Department undertakes to support this strategy include:
training, advising, and assisting partner security forces; supporting
intelligence collection on al Qaeda; conducting information operations
against al Qaeda; and, when appropriate, capturing or killing al Qaeda
operatives. I understand that the Department also works to help enable
our intelligence and law enforcement partners, both in the United
States and overseas, in their efforts to counter this threat.
Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
departments and agencies?
Answer. Based on my current knowledge, it appears that the
Department is properly coordinating its counterterrorism efforts with
the rest of the U.S. Government. I understand that the U.S. military,
Intelligence Community, and law enforcement agencies regularly
collaborate on operations, and that departments and agencies constantly
share intelligence, with little of the ``stovepiping'' that we saw
before September 11. I will look at this closely if confirmed.
intelligence support for indirect activities
Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence
agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department on special
operators engaged in direct action operations. As a consequence, it is
alleged, general purpose forces and Special Operations Forces engaged
in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense and
population protection, receive less intelligence support.
Do you believe this is true? If so, and if confirmed, how would you
ensure that general purpose forces and special operations forces
engaged in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence support?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Intelligence Community and
DOD continue to expand intelligence support for a full range of
military operations--direct and indirect--not only in Afghanistan, but
across multiple areas of responsibility. The Department has invested in
and employed innovative ISR capabilities increasing its intelligence
and operations support to interagency and foreign partners in their
efforts against emerging threats. DOD and the Intelligence Community
have assisted our partners in Afghanistan, East Africa, the Arabian
Peninsula, Colombia, and the Phillipines. I think that U.S. military
operations around the world over the past few years have demonstrated
that our general purpose forces are the beneficiaries of consistent,
timely support from across the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that intelligence capabilities are properly aligned
across the force for all missions.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year
2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes
the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment)
to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or
facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to
combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. I understand that the section 1208 authority has been a
very effective tool for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducting
counterterrorism operations to build effective security partners.
Combatant commanders strongly support section 1208.
lord's resistance army
Question. The President notified Congress in October 2011 of
Operation Observant Compass (OOC), an operation to support the efforts
of Ugandan and other regional militaries to remove Joseph Kony and
other senior leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from the
battlefield in Central Africa, and of his decision to send
approximately 100 U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel to Central
Africa to help regional partners achieve these goals. Despite pressure
by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces and efforts by U.S. Special
Operations personnel to support them, elements of the LRA--including
Joseph Kony--continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian
populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan. Congress recently passed and the President
signed the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, which reiterated that the ongoing
efforts to remove or apprehend Joseph Kony and his top commanders from
the battlefield and end the atrocities perpetuated by his LRA should
continue as appropriate to achieve the goals of the operation.
Do you support OOC?
Answer. Yes. My understanding is that Department support to
regional counter-LRA efforts helps to advance regional security
cooperation and security sector reform more broadly. If confirmed, I
would seek to continue the U.S. commitment to deepen our security
partnerships with African countries and regional organizations by
expanding efforts to build African military capabilities through low-
cost, small-footprint operations. At the same time, I would work with
the Department of State and other U.S. agencies and departments to seek
to strengthen the capacity of civilian bodies and institutions to
improve the continent's ability to provide security and respond to
emerging conflicts. I would also regularly assess and review Department
contributions to this mission to ensure the deployment of U.S.
personnel is not open-ended.
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of OOC?
Answer. U.S. Special Operations Forces under OOC seek to enhance
the capacity of local forces to end the threat posed by the LRA. It is
my understanding that U.S. military advisors are working with these
forces to strengthen information-sharing and synchronization, enhance
their operational planning, and increase overall effectiveness. While
OOC is important in the effort to counter the LRA threat, there is not
a purely military solution to this problem. If confirmed, I would
support the current U.S. policy of pursuing a comprehensive, multi-
faceted strategy to help the governments and people of this region in
their efforts to end the threat posed by the LRA and to address the
impacts of the LRA's atrocities. The U.S. strategy to counter the LRA
outlines four pillars for continuing support: increasing the protection
of civilians; apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and senior
commanders from the battlefield; promoting the defection, disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and
increasing humanitarian access and providing continued relief to
affected communities.
mass atrocities prevention
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10. What are your views on the role the United States plays
in the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide?
Answer. As President Obama noted in his speech at the Holocaust
Museum last April, preventing and responding to atrocities is a
critical mission and a core national security interest of the United
States. As the President has made clear, we must look at a wide range
of tools before military intervention. I support this view: we should
make every effort to prevent crises from escalating, through every
policy lever at our disposal, including diplomacy, assistance, and
financial measures. I understand that the Atrocities Prevention Board
has strengthened our efforts by developing more tools with which to
work; I support these vital efforts
Question. What are your views on the adequacy of the Department's
tools and doctrine for contributing to this role?
Answer. I understand that the Department has played an active role
in the work of the Atrocities Prevention Board, working closely with
other agencies to develop a range of tools that enhance the USG's
ability to prevent and respond to atrocities. I also understand that
DOD has strengthened its own capabilities, including by developing
formal doctrine on mass atrocity response operations, for the first
time, and incorporating atrocity prevention and response into policy
and plans. If confirmed, I would continue these efforts.
u.s. force posture in the asia-pacific region
Question. The Defense Department's January 2012 strategic guidance,
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century'',
states that ``while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to
security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region.'' Likewise, the 2010 report of the QDR states that the
United States needs to ``sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific
alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and
ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,'' and that, to
accomplish this, DOD ``will augment and adapt our forward presence'' in
the Asia-Pacific region.
Do you feel DOD has adequate resources to implement the new January
2012 strategic guidance?
Answer. Congress passed and the President signed into law the BCA
of 2011. The President insisted that the resulting defense cuts be
driven by strategy and U.S. defense needs in the coming decade. I
understand that the fiscal year 2013 DOD budget was shaped by the
strategic guidance and reflects key mission and capability priorities
emerging from the strategic review. If confirmed, I would continue to
refine the focus of the Department's spending in future budget cycles
and keep it in line with the President's strategic guidance. believe
that the Department is facing hard but manageable cuts. The strategy is
executable with the resource levels currently detailed in the BCA, but
the potentially severe cuts stemming from sequestration would seriously
threaten the Department's ability to implement the strategic guidance.
Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the
Asia-Pacific region?
Answer. The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of
commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in
part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence. I
believe that as a Pacific nation, the United States should, with its
network of allies and partners, maintain an enduring defense presence
in the Asia-Pacific region as a tangible demonstration of U.S.
commitment to Asia's continued security and economic development.
Question. What does the ``rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
region'' mean to you in terms of force structure, capabilities, and
funding?
Answer. The rebalance is broader than just military policies and
programs; it is about harnessing every element of our national power to
sustain a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful
resolution to disputes, and democratic governance and political
freedom, In terms of our force structure the rebalance places a renewed
emphasis on air and naval forces while sustaining ground force
presence. While rebalancing, it will also be important for the
Department to develop new capabilities and investments to respond to
changes in the security environment and technical advancements required
to maintain an edge, our freedom of action, and ability to project
power in the Asia-Pacific region. I believe that the rebalancing to
Asia-Pacific is vital for U.S. future interests, but it can be done
smartly, using air and sea and geographically distributed ground
forces, without sacrificing the needed U.S. presence in the Middle
East.
Question. Do you believe that it is a ``necessity'' to rebalance
the U.S. military toward the Asia-Pacific region? If so, why?
Answer. I share the President's view that future U.S. economic and
security interests will be closely tied to the Asia-Pacific. I have
reviewed the Defense Strategic Guidance released last year, and agree
that the emerging economic and political dynamism in the Asia-Pacific
will require strong and continuous U.S. commitment.
Question. Why, if at all, do you believe it is important for the
U.S. military to maintain and even augment its forward presence in the
Asia-Pacific region, and what are the advantages to having a forward
presence?
Answer. A robust U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific has
underwritten peace and prosperity in the region for the past 60 years.
The Department should be able to assure regional allies and partners,
deter threats to regional stability, and prevail in conflicts if
necessary. If confirmed, I would support the administration's effort to
work towards a posture that is more geographically distributed--for
example, the movement of forces to Guam and Australia; operationally
resilient, with a focus on our sea based assets; and politically
sustainable--meaning we must work with our partners and allies to
address their concerns about U.S. presence, such as in Okinawa.
Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits that
are likely to result from this shift?
Answer. This shift in U.S. posture is meant to continue supporting
peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. forces should be
present to effectively assure our allies and deter potential
adversaries. By emphasizing the Asia-Pacific while also focusing on the
Middle East, rebalancing will necessarily accept risk in other areas
given the resource-constrained environment. I believe the risks
associated with this rebalance are manageable. The potentially severe
cuts stemming from sequestration, however, would seriously threaten the
Department's ability to implement the strategic guidance, including the
rebalance.
Question. What changes, if any, in structure, equipment, and
training do you believe will be necessary to meet the requirements for
general purpose ground forces in an Asia-Pacific strategy?
Answer. My understanding is that our military leadership is already
working hard to ensure fielded capabilities enable our military
personnel to think, train, and, if necessary, fight to succeed in this
theater. The Department is already devoting significant effort to
understanding how to operate in--or gain access to--those areas where
our adversaries may try to deny us access and is developing the
required operational concepts to manage that challenge. We will also
need to build military-to-military ties and other relationships, as
well as language and cultural expertise, to operate effectively in the
Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Office of the Secretary of Defense
leadership to assess any additional changes in structure, equipment,
and training.
china
Question. How would you characterize the current U.S.-China
relationship?
Answer. I would describe the relationship as simultaneously
possessing elements of cooperation and competition. The U.S.-China
relationship, of which the defense component is only one part, is one
of the most complex and important bilateral relationships in the world.
The United States and China are working together to build a cooperative
partnership based on practical cooperation in addressing shared
regional and global challenges--a commitment President Obama and
President Hu made in January 2011. At the same time, China is rapidly
modernizing its military and increasingly asserting claims to territory
in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
Question. From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding
economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how does
that growth influence the U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific
region?
Answer. China's expanding economy and growing military are
developments the United States, allies, partners, and all other nations
in the region must monitor carefully. On the one hand, China's growth
and potential create an opportunity to cooperate where our interests
and those of China converge. At the same time, China's rapid rise and
the relative lack of transparency surrounding its intentions can be a
source of anxiety and concern in the region. If confirmed, I will
evaluate the impact of these developments--as well as the impact of
other security trends--on requirements for the U.S. defense posture in
the region.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's
military modernization program?
Answer. As I understand it, China is pursuing a long-term,
comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the
capacity of its armed forces to fight and win high-intensity regional
military operations of short duration. I understand that Taiwan
contingencies remain the principal focus of much of this modernization,
but there are growing indications that China is developing capabilities
for missions that go beyond China's immediate territorial concerns,
such as its counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and
noncombatant evacuation operations from Libya.
Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to
China's military modernization program?
Answer. I believe the United States should continue to monitor
developments in China's military modernization while encouraging
Beijing to be more transparent about its military and security
strategies, policies and programs. The U.S. response to China's
military modernization should be flexible and supported by the
continued evolution of our presence and force posture in the Asia-
Pacific region, the strengthening of our regional alliances and
partnerships, the maintenance of our global presence and access, and
the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering
efforts to deny us access and freedom of action.
Question. U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue has been
strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and
maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by
China's propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in
an apparent effort to influence U.S. actions.
What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-
to-military relations with China?
Answer. I believe there is value in sustained--and substantive--
military dialogue with China as a way to improve mutual understanding
and reduce the risk that miscommunication and misperception could
result in miscalculation. If confirmed, I would look for ways to
strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship consistent
with our interests and our values.
Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the
quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what
changes would you suggest and, given Chinese resistance to military-to-
military dialogue, how would you implement them?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek ways to improve the U.S.-China
military-to-military relationship, in terms of the quality and the
quantity of exchanges between the Armed Forces of our countries. I
would support continuing to pursue exchanges with the Chinese armed
forces at all levels, and I would look to engage in a wide range of
areas where we might find common ground to encourage China to act
responsibly on the regional and global scene.
north korea
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional
military, proliferation activities, ballistic missile program, and
nuclear program continue to present a serious threat to the United
States, our regional allies, and the international community. The
opaque nature of the North Korean system, coupled with an uncertain
political transition, adds to my concerns. North Korea's December
missile launch, which was a violation of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions, provided yet another example of North Korea's
pattern of irresponsible behavior. If confirmed, I will work with our
allies and other key partners in the region and internationally to
ensure that we can deter and, if necessary, defeat North Korean
aggression.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
Answer. I am concerned about North Korea's WMD and ballistic
missile programs because they present an immediate threat to our allies
and partners as well as a growing threat to the United States. North
Korea's December launch--using ballistic missile technology--
underscores our concerns about North Korea's continued pursuit of a
long-range missile program. The United States will continue carefully
monitoring, and impede, North Korea's WMD and missile development
programs and related proliferation activities. If confirmed, I would
ensure that the Department continues working closely with other parts
of the U.S. Government to address North Korea's missile and WMD
programs, take necessary steps to defend the United States and our
allies, and enhance engagement with our allies to ensure that we can
deter and, if necessary, defeat North Korean aggression.
Question. In your view, what additional steps should the United
States take to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat
and dissuade North Korea from its continued pursuit of ballistic
missile technology and to stop or slow North Korean proliferation
missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran, and others?
Answer. The United States should continue to work to prevent North
Korea's proliferation of weapons-related technology by advancing
international nonproliferation norms and further tightening sanctions
aimed at impeding development of North Korea's ballistic missile and
nuclear programs. This includes cooperating with partner nations to
inspect and interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying
illicit cargo. The United States should also seek to enhance bilateral
and trilateral missile defense cooperation with our Republic of Korea
(ROK) and Japanese allies, particularly in the area of information
sharing. If confirmed, I would continue to work to strengthen the
international consensus against proliferation; to invest in programs
like the Proliferation Security Initiative, which bolsters the will and
capacity of partner nations to interdict these dangerous shipments; to
increase WMD-related information sharing with international partners;
to take necessary steps to defend the United States and our allies; and
to ensure that our ballistic missile defenses are able to defeat any
North Korean attack.
u.s. contributions to international peacekeeping missions
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on July 29, 2009, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
(U.N.) stated that the United States ``is willing to consider directly
contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian
police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I should
note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.'' General Dempsey has said the
United States ``should consider opportunities for U.S. personnel to
contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions'' and that ``experience shows
that even a small number of trained and experienced American
servicemembers can have a significant, positive effect on U.N.
operations.'' In your view, should the United States increase the
number of personnel it contributes in the form of staff positions and
military observers to U.N. peacekeeping missions and other
international peace operations?
Answer. I support in principle additional contributions of U.S.
military personnel to key positions in U.N. peacekeeping operations
where the mission is a strategic priority for the Department and the
United States and where our servicemembers can add significant value to
the mission effectiveness and efficiencies. I understand that, although
we still provide military observers to U.N. peacekeeping missions, the
Department has shifted its contributions almost exclusively to staff
officer positions so as to maximize the returns on our investment.
Question. In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages
of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations in the
form of staff positions and military observer positions?
Answer. The success of U.N. peacekeeping operations is important to
the United States. I believe that the United States should continue to
provide military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations, especially
for key staff positions that help shape the direction and success of
the mission. Such support must be practicable and weighed against the
potential costs and competing demands for military commitments. If
confirmed, I will carefully evaluate the costs of requested U.N.
support against the potential positive impacts and U.S. interests.
department of defense counternarcotics activities
Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs
flowing toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD's
counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to
support the Department's CN operations, including building the capacity
of U.S. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and certain
foreign governments, and providing intelligence support on CN-related
matters and a variety of other unique enabling capabilities.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in counterdrug
efforts?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department plays an
important role in U.S. counterdrug efforts in support of the National
Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. The Department supports and
enables U.S. agencies and foreign partners to be more effective in
executing their respective counternarcotics responsibilities. In the
Western Hemisphere, the allocation of DOD capabilities in support of
U.S. law enforcement interdiction efforts has helped remove hundreds of
tons of cocaine and deny billions in illicit revenues to transnational
criminal organizations. I believe this support role is a sensible and
effective indirect approach.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the
United States?
Answer. Drug trafficking is by far the world's most lucrative
illicit activity and therefore is often used as a source of revenue by
terrorists, insurgents, and other actors threatening our national
security. In my view, the consequences of narcotics flows beyond U.S.
borders--for example, the role of drug trafficking in Afghanistan and
the surrounding region is of particular concern to the Department. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress, the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, other agencies in the U.S. Government,
and military commanders to address the flow of illegal narcotics as it
affects U.S. national interests.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. The Director of National Intelligence recently described
transnational organized crime as ``an abiding threat to U.S. economic
and national security interests,'' and stated that ``rising drug
violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law
in some countries.'' In July 2011, the President released his Strategy
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats
to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in
the strategy is ``enhancing DOD support to U.S. law enforcement''.
In your view, what role should DOD play in combating transnational
organized crime and in training and equipping partner security forces
that have been tasked with combating it?
Answer. By law, the Department is the lead Federal agency for
detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal
drugs into the United States. In the Western Hemisphere, DOD
coordinates the efforts of the U.S. interagency and regional partners
in the detection and monitoring of illicit aerial and maritime drug
shipments towards the United States. It is my understanding that beyond
that, the Department's role is to contribute unique capabilities in
support of law enforcement, other U.S. Government departments and
agencies, and international partners. That support takes multiple
forms: military intelligence support to law enforcement; military-to-
military capacity building; broader capacity building support to
foreign partner security services (including police forces); and
counter threat finance support. believe the Department should continue
to focus on delivering unique capabilities in support of other
departments and agencies that have the lead for combating transnational
organized crime.
counter threat finance
Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have begun
investing more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money
associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking, but the
opportunities for tracking and degrading illicit financing flows are
not yet matched by the effort and resources devoted to them.
Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation
routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production
of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant
national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting
these threats.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. Our Nation's adversaries, from drug traffickers to
terrorists or insurgents, rely upon the flow of money to enable their
activities. All available U.S. Government tools should be employed to
track and disrupt the finances that support these groups, and the
Department can bring unique tools to bear. My understanding is that the
Department is not the lead U.S. agency in counter threat finance, but
does work with other departments and agencies, and with partner
nations, to fight our adversaries' ability to access and use global
financial networks. For example, the Department has worked with the
Intelligence Community and other interagency partners to identify and
disrupt our adversaries' finances and remove key sources of insurgent
funding in Afghanistan. I believe the Department should continue to
work with law enforcement agencies to ensure military support is
targeted, tailored, and in line with defense priorities.
Question. Are there opportunities to replicate or improve upon the
network-disruption efforts of groups like the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization or the Afghanistan Threat Finance
Cell in impacting other facilitation networks?
Answer. My understanding is that the Afghanistan Threat Finance
Cell has been successful at disrupting illicit networks in Afghanistan
through broad interagency cooperation. The Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization's quick reaction and innovation has saved
countless American lives. I believe that the capabilities involved in
network disruption are worth institutionalizing into the Department. If
confirmed, I will work with the Department's senior leadership and the
interagency on this worthy effort.
Question. In your view, how should DOD coordinate and interface
with other key agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the
Intelligence Community, in conducting counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department works closely with
the National Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance as well as the
Department of Treasury's Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis. The Department also supports other U.S. Government
departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny and disrupt
adversaries' ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks
to affect U.S. interests negatively. I believe the Department should
continue to support law enforcement agencies, the Department of the
Treasury, and the Intelligence Community with unique DOD capabilities,
including planning, intelligence analysis and tools, and the
integration of intelligence into operations.
central america and mexico
Question. During a March 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing, the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern
Command discussed the increasingly dangerous region along the northern
and southern borders of Mexico and the devastating impact transnational
criminal organizations are having on the people and security of
southern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The
United States has increased its assistance in this region, but--to
date--DOD has had only a small role.
What are your views on the threats posed by transnational criminal
organizations in this region?
Answer. It is clear that transnational and domestic criminal
organizations and gangs undermine the security of citizens in many
parts of the Western Hemisphere. The influence of criminal elements has
brought an increase in violence as well as an increase in narcotics and
other illicit trafficking. The root causes of violent crime and
insecurity are also influenced by endemic poverty and lack of economic
opportunity, weak government institutions, and widespread corruption
and impunity. Central America has become one of the most violent
regions in the world, and this can be largely attributed to the
influence of these elements. Criminal influences threaten regional
stability and the fundamental security of an area that lies very close
to the United States. I believe the United States has a clear interest
in helping partner nations strengthen their security institutions
consistent with U.S. values.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's role and current
activities in Mexico and Central America?
Answer. I have not had a chance to fully assess these issues, but I
am aware that the Department is building defense relations with Mexico
based on mutual interest. I am also aware that the Department has a
wide range of activities and initiatives with partner nations in
Central America, consistent with our values, shared interests and our
partner's capacity. My understanding is that that engagements in both
Mexico and Central America are broadly focused on defense planning and
institutional reform, human rights training, counterdrug support and
humanitarian assistance activities. I believe these roles and
activities are appropriate to support our policies and strategies in
the region, which focus on efforts to strengthen law enforcement,
governance and rule of law institutions, while improving economic and
social conditions that can contribute to insecurity.
Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to DOD's current
role and activities in this region?
Answer. If confirmed, I would need to conduct a thorough review
before being able to propose specific changes to the Department's roles
and activities in this region. In general terms, however, I am
supportive of leveraging the longstanding military-to-military
relationships within the region to ensure our partner nations' defense
institutions are capable and remain responsive to civil authorities,
while being respectful of human rights.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. The importance of unity of effort and action remains one of
the most critical lessons the Nation has learned from its experiences
with counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe that effective interagency
collaboration can greatly improve the U.S. Government's preparedness to
operate effectively in all phases of conflict. If confirmed, I will
prioritize efforts to ensure interagency collaboration is as robust and
effective as possible.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. Interagency collaboration can always be improved. Ensuring
that the U.S. military plans and trains with its civilian counterparts
in other U.S. departments and agencies, and vice-versa, is one way to
increase our unity of effort in the field. We also need a strong
interagency planning process to ensure effective use of expertise from
across the U.S. Government that recognizes each department's and
agency's unique role and capabilities. I believe that robust civilian
capabilities and resourcing are critical to achieving national security
objectives and will be vital to the success of future operations.
Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
contingency operations?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department has a variety of
efforts devoted to capturing and disseminating best practices within
the Department and to the interagency. The importance of
institutionalizing lessons learned from the past 10 years of war was
highlighted in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. If confirmed I will
continue this emphasis.
intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of 2004
Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (IRTPA), among other actions, realigned the responsibilities for
budgeting for and management of intelligence organizations between the
Secretary of Defense and the head of the Intelligence Community, the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
What do you believe is the role of DOD in intelligence under IRTPA?
Answer. The role of DOD, including the defense intelligence
components, is clearly outlined in law. Under titles 10 and 50 of the
U.S.C., the Secretary of Defense has broad responsibility for the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by the
Department's components. In addition, under title 50, the Secretary has
several specific statutory responsibilities for elements of the
Intelligence Community that are part of DOD, including the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office.
Consistent with the DNI's statutory responsibilities, the Secretary of
Defense is responsible for the continued operation of those elements as
effective organizations within the Department for the conduct of their
missions in order to satisfy the requirements of the Department and the
Intelligence Community.
The Secretary, in consultation with the DNI, is also responsible
for ensuring that the budgets of the Intelligence Community elements
that are within the Department are sufficient to satisfy the overall
intelligence needs of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
combatant commanders, and other departments and agencies. The Secretary
is also responsible for the timely response of intelligence community
elements within the Department to the needs of operational military
forces. The Department strengthened its management of defense
intelligence in 2002 by designating the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) as lead for its intelligence reform efforts and
Principal Staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence
(CI), and security matters.
As a former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, I have seen first-hand
how the Intelligence Community and all its elements have become better
integrated and cooperative and, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I
look forward to furthering that cooperation.
Question. Do you believe that the IRTPA strikes the correct balance
between the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary and the DNI?
Answer. Yes. I believe the duties and responsibilities of the
Secretary and the DNI are well balanced under the IRTPA. The IRTPA
appropriately provided the DNI strong authority to oversee and direct
the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. As such, the
DNI is responsible for establishing requirements and developing budgets
as well as setting objectives and priorities for collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination of national intelligence. The
responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence activities remains
with the Secretary. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
also holds the position of the Director of Defense Intelligence in the
Office of the DNI; the position was established to enhance integration,
collaboration, and information sharing. If confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, I will reinforce this strong and effective relationship with
the DNI.
Question. What changes in the IRTPA, if any, would you recommend
that Congress consider?
Answer. As of now, I would not recommend any changes to the IRTPA.
If confirmed, I would address any proposed changes should the need
arise.
strategic reviews
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD
processes for analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting results for each
of the following strategic reviews:
The QDR (section 118 of title 10, United States Code);
Answer. The QDR is statutorily required, and sets a long-term
course for the Department by assessing the opportunities and challenges
that the Nation faces in the emerging global security environment. It
provides an important opportunity to clearly and concisely articulate
the national defense strategy and identify priorities for defense
policy and force planning. Given the new defense strategy and the
fiscal challenges the Nation is facing, I believe the upcoming QDR will
be critical in setting the future path of the Department.
Question. The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10,
United States Code);
Answer. The National Military Strategy outlines the ways and means
for our military to ensure national security based on guidance from the
National Security Strategy and the QDR. Section 153 of title 10 of the
U.S. Code requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist
the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction
for the Armed Forces. Because the Chairman prepares the National
Military Strategy in consultation with the combatant commanders and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe that it is the best military advice
available for the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also provides an
annual risk assessment based upon the most current National Military
Strategy.
Question. Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10,
United States Code);
Answer. My understanding is that the Department continuously
reviews U.S. Global Defense Posture based in part on combatant command
submissions of annual Theater Posture Plans. The Department has an
executive-level oversight body, the Global Posture Executive Council
(GPEC), composed of senior leaders from across the Department and
including the Department of State. This body provides analysis and
recommendations to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The
Department submits an annual report to Congress that provides an
overview of global defense posture strategy and the status of key
overseas posture realignment actions. My assessment, at this time, is
that the GPEC offers an appropriate forum for comprehensive analysis of
key overseas posture issues.
Question. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions (QRM) Review (section
118b of title 10, United States Code).
Answer. The QRM review is a statutorily required review of the
roles and missions of the Armed Forces and the Department's core
competencies and capabilities to perform and support these missions. My
understanding is that the QRM is required every 4 years, most recently
in 2012, and accordingly will be due again in 2016 submitted with or
before the President's budget submission for the next fiscal year. I
believe that the next few years will be very dynamic--both in world
events and how our military can and should respond--and that the next
QRM review will be very important to capturing the consequences of
those changes.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if
any, to change title 10, U.S.C., and to improve DOD's processes for
analysis, policy formulation, and decisionmaking relative to each
review above?
Answer. Based on my current understanding, at this time I would not
request any changes to title 10, U.S.C. If confirmed and after
reviewing Department processes relating to each review, I will make
recommendations to Congress and the White House accordingly.
Question. The QDR must examine the National Security Strategy as
most recently updated by the President's January 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance (DSG). Noteworthy, the DSG states that the ``tide of war is
receding''.
Do you agree with that assessment and, if so, how might that
influence your analysis and recommendations with regard to strategic
priorities in the QDR?
Answer. I agree that, with the drawdown of the war in Iraq and
transition of security responsibilities in Afghanistan, our future
security challenges will be defined less by the wars of the past decade
and more by emerging complex threats. The Department remains committed
to security in Afghanistan and Iraq, and our counterterrorism mission
will remain a priority for the foreseeable future, but the Department
needs to begin focusing on the mix of skills and capabilities and new
technologies that will be needed in the future. The QDR should,
therefore, examine the current and future security environment, to
include changes since the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was released,
and adjust strategic priorities as appropriate.
Question. Section 118 in title 10, U.S.C. also requires the QDR to
identify the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient
resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for
in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk,
and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current
Future Years Defense Program) required to achieve such a level of risk.
The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not
constrained to comply with and are fully independent of the budget
submitted to Congress by the President.
If confirmed, how would you propose to structure the Department's
QDR analysis and recommendations to address these two requirements?
Answer. It would be my intent, if confirmed, to oversee a QDR
process that begins with an assessment of U.S. interests,
opportunities, and challenges, and concludes with the development of a
defense program and budget designed to meet the resulting defense
objectives we set at a low-to-moderate level of risk. If confirmed, I
would intend to provide my honest appraisal of the resources required
for defense.
Question. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value
in a defense strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the
current budget request or fiscal environment?
Answer. I think we must be aware of the fiscal environment when
determining our defense strategy just as the strategy is informed by
other important environmental factors, such as trends in military
technology. That strategy must ensure that the U.S. military is be
capable of meeting crucial national security priorities across the
range of current and future potential threats.
tactical fighter programs
Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will
face over the next several years is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation
tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology.
Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the
requirements for and timing of these programs?
Answer. Dominance in the air is essential to the success of our
forces. I understand that the F-35, which will replace several older
generation aircraft in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, is
intended to provide that dominance well into the future. I have not
looked at the projected threats in detail; however I believe that other
nations, notably China and Russia, have programs to build advanced
aircraft that will challenge our current capabilities in the coming
years. My view is that we cannot let any other nation achieve parity
with the United States in the ability to control the air.
Question. What is your assessment of whether the restructuring of
the JSF program that we have seen over the past several years will be
sufficient to avoid having to make major adjustments in ether cost or
schedule in the future?
Answer. I know that the Joint Strike Fighter is the Department's
largest acquisition program and that it has experienced significant
cost increases and schedule slips. I understand that the Department has
already taken steps to tighten the contract terms for the F-35 and
restructured the program in 2012 to reduce concurrency, the risk of
being in production before development is finished. I have not had the
opportunity to review this program or its restructuring in detail. If
confirmed, I will make it a high priority to examine the health of this
program to determine if it is on a sound footing and ensure the
aircraft are delivered with the capability we need and a cost we can
afford.
navy shipbuilding
Question. Today's Navy is at its smallest size in decades and could
decline further without additional shipbuilding efforts. Over the past
several years, successive Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) have
concluded that the Navy requires a fleet of at least 313 ships to
perform its mission. Despite this conclusion, the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2013 proposed the decommissioning of nine
ships--two dock landing ships and seven cruisers designed to last
another 10 to 15 years, in order to address defense budget constraints
and growing operating costs. Congress rejected the proposal noting the
Navy's initial investment of $11.6 billion in the nine ships and the
fact that cutting them creates unnecessary and unaffordable future
shipbuilding requirements.
What are your views regarding the CNO's conclusions about the
appropriate size and composition of the fleet, and the adequacy of the
Navy's current and projected plans to deliver that inventory of ships?
Answer. A strong and capable Navy is essential to meet our Nation's
strategic requirements across the spectrum of operational demands.
Therefore, the Navy needs a broad set of capabilities among the mix of
ships in its inventory. I understand the Chief of Naval Operations is
currently analyzing the Navy shipbuilding goal and will present his
analysis shortly. If confirmed, I will review these recommendations for
the Navy's current shipbuilding plan and work with the Navy to ensure
we have the right size, mix, and usage of our naval forces to meet our
strategic goals.
Question. In your opinion, how important is the requirement for a
313 ship fleet on the ability of the Navy to support the national
military strategy?
Answer. I understand that the Navy's presently stated requirement
is for a 313 ship fleet, but I do not yet know all the details of the
mix and capabilities of our present and future fleet. I do know the
United States requires a capable Navy that is robust enough to execute
the full range of missions called upon by our combatant commanders in
support of the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategic
Guidance--including operating persistently across the globe, securing
freedom of access, responding to crises, and projecting power into
denied areas. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy and Congress to
ensure naval forces are appropriately structured to meet our national
defense needs.
Question. Do you believe the Navy can meet its goals for the size
of the fleet in the current budget climate?
Answer. I believe the President's budget request for fiscal year
2013 allowed the Navy to meet its current plan for the size of the
fleet. However, the budget environment that we all are dealing with has
introduced a good deal of uncertainty for the future of each of the
armed services. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the
Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to understand the impact of
budget levels on the size of the fleet and how we work within the
budget constraints to still meet mission requirements.
aircraft carriers
Question. DOD has repeatedly reaffirmed that the United States is
committed to maintaining a fleet of 11 nuclear powered aircraft
carriers despite budget pressures, and maintaining 2 carriers on patrol
in the Middle East. Yet, recent press accounts cite concerns by the
Navy to maintain the carrier deployment schedule due to declining
budgets. The Chief of Naval Operations recently stated ``Right now, we
are committed to providing two carrier strike groups in the Arabian
Gulf through March. We've been doing this since 2010, and we're
committed to that, as I said, through this March. We need to take a
look at that, and we will be, with the Joint Staff and the Services to
see if we need to continue this.''
What is your view of the impact of maintaining two carriers in the
Arabian Gulf on U.S. strategic goals in the region?
Answer. The Carrier Strike Group is a premier instrument supporting
the warfighter and demonstrating U.S. resolve and commitment to allies
around the world. In recent years the Navy has stepped up to meet
increased demands to support operations in the Middle East, as well as
to counter other tensions in the region. This support has been critical
to our goals in the region. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to
ensure that we allocate our resources to ensure the level of presence
necessary to meet our Nation's world-wide strategic goals.
Question. What are your views about the requirement to maintain a
fleet of 11 aircraft carriers?
Answer. I understand that the Department's recent strategic reviews
indicate that an 11-carrier force is the correct size to support our
current strategy and provide sufficient carrier strike groups to meet
overseas presence requirements. However, I also understand that
increased combatant commander demands for carrier strike groups over
the past 3 years have stressed the carrier force. Carriers are an
essential tool given the strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific, an
inherently maritime theater, and the Middle East, an increasingly
maritime theater, and the requirement to conduct operations in multiple
regions simultaneously. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to
ensure that we resource a sustainable level of presence that continues
to support the strategic goals.
future role of the army
Question. In a speech at West Point in February 2011, former
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that it is unlikely that the
Nation will commit large land forces to future conflicts, and that the
Army must ``confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end
scenarios for the U.S. military [will be] primarily naval and air
engagements.'' Accordingly, the Army will find it difficult to justify
the number, size, and cost of its heavy forces. The Defense Strategic
Guidance, announced in January 2012, echoed that prediction and
indicated that ground forces would not be sized to conduct large scale
long-term stabilization operations.
Do you agree with Secretary Gates assertion that the commitment of
land forces, on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, is unlikely in the
future? Why or why not?
Answer. We will continue to need the best Army in the world. But
the best Army does not mean the largest. We must have the Army be
appropriately sized for the contingencies we deem likely, and it also
must be trained and modernized. Our forces must be able to conduct
operations across the spectrum of conflict and adapt to the security
environment as it changes. However, given that we must make choices in
today's fiscal and security environment, I agree that large-scale,
long-term stabilization operations is an area where we can take risk in
the future.
Question. Do you agree that high-end military operations will
primarily be naval and air engagements such that the Army will have
difficulty justifying the size, structure, and cost of its heavy
formations?
Answer. The Nation needs a robust balance of capabilities in each
of the warfighting domains--air, sea, and ground. These capabilities
can and should be complementary of one another--capabilities in one
domain need not come at the expense of those in another. Furthermore, I
know from my experience that war is an inherently human endeavor. As
long as this nation faces adversaries with large, capable ground
forces, the United States will need an Army with diverse and flexible
capabilities, which include heavy forces.
Question. General Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, has
stated that the Army will continue to be an indispensable part of the
joint force and that there is a synergy that is gained of all the
services in order for the military to meet the Nation's needs. He has
also said the Army provides more than Brigade Combat Teams--the Army is
the largest contributor to Special Operations Forces and it provides a
broad range of essential services to combatant commanders to include
ISR; air and missile defense; logistical support; and signal
communication support.
In your view, what are the most important considerations or
criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with
strategy and resources?
Answer. The most important considerations are our national security
requirements. Our security environment and strategy requires the Army
to have the appropriate size and structure to be able to support
steady-state operations to shape the environment and deter potential
adversaries, while simultaneously supporting contingency operations to
defeat any potential adversary should deterrence fail.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
properly align the Army's size and structure with the requirements of
security strategies and the likely availability of resources?
Answer. The Department should align the Army's size and structure
to the strategy in the same way it would align those of any other
component of the joint force: based on appropriate security scenarios,
examining the demands of the missions that are most relevant to that
component and then determining how best to provide the capabilities
required to accomplish those missions. During this period of budget
austerity, some tradeoffs across the force may be necessary. If
confirmed, I will work closely with military and civilian leaders to
balance maintaining the skills needed to meet our most pressing
national security demands within the limits of acceptable risk.
army force structure
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance of January 2012 calls for
the reduction of Army end strength and force structure over the next 5
years to 490,000 personnel and 8 fewer combat brigades. Army analysis
underway and decisions still pending could add a third maneuver
battalion to the modular armored and infantry brigades requiring a
further reduction in the total number of Active component brigades to
support such a redistribution of personnel.
If confirmed, what guidance would you give the Army regarding
priorities for planning, decisions, and execution with respect to the
identification and deactivation of the planned eight and anticipated
additional brigade deactivations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would provide the same guidance I would
give to any Service, which would be to figure out what is in the best
interest of the Nation's security as expressed in the National Security
Strategy and Defense Strategic Guidance. The Army, and the other
Services, must use a holistic approach to ensure our forces are
organized, manned, trained, equipped, and stationed to best incorporate
the lessons of the last decade, while remaining ready for the kinds of
challenges we will face in the future.
Question. If confirmed, will you prioritize for deactivation those
brigades based overseas before those based in the United States?
Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize the selection of brigades
for deactivation based on how best to meet the Nation's global strategy
and objectives while minimizing negative impact on Army families and
communities and ensuring we maintain our treaty obligations and
commitment to our allies. I cannot say now whether that results in
prioritizing overseas units versus U.S.-based units, but, if confirmed,
I will look comprehensively at this issue. I recognize that any force
structure reduction will affect Army communities, and I expect that the
Army and DOD will work with those communities to help minimize the
impact.
Question. In your view, can the Army's Active component end
strength be drawn down below the announced and planned reduction to
490,000? If so, what in your view would be the impact on strategic
risk, if any, and, in your view would that strategic risk be acceptable
or unacceptable?
Answer. Independent of size, we must maintain the best Army in the
world. If fiscal pressures compel us to consider further reductions of
any Service, I plan to study tradeoffs and fully understand the risks
to our strategy before recommending further cuts. But the size of the
force should be driven by mission requirements.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
size and structure of the Army's Reserve component? If confirmed, what
size or force structure changes, if any, would you propose for either
the Army Reserve or the Army National Guard?
Answer. The Active and Reserve components of the Army, as parts of
the entire force, must be sized and shaped to support our strategy. One
of the foundations of the All-Volunteer Force is the Army National
Guard with the critical capabilities it provides to the Governors and
States, in addition to the tremendous support that it provides for
Federal missions at home and abroad. Another foundation is the Army
Reserve, which has been a key partner with the Active Army and the Army
National Guard throughout many diverse missions. However, as the needs
of the Nation change, I expect that the capabilities and capacities
resident in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve may also have
to change. If confirmed, I will review the results of ongoing studies
on recommended composition and size before I propose future changes to
Reserve component end strength.
army modernization
Question. According to a recent study done for the Secretary of the
Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army Gilbert Decker and
retired Army General Louis Wagner, the Army has sunk $3.3 billion to
$3.8 billion annually since 2004 into weapons programs that have been
cancelled. The report states that, ``The Army lacks a credible,
quantitative model and process for determining realistic, achievable
requirements for modernization and recapitalization given reduced
budgets.'' The Army has implemented many of the recommendations made in
the report.
What is your assessment of the Army's modernization record?
Answer. I understand that the Army has terminated several large
acquisition programs in the past, which gave rise to the study
commissioned by Secretary McHugh in 2010. These program terminations
were caused by a variety of factors, to include the Army's reliance on
immature technologies as solutions to very complex and evolving
military requirements. These factors significantly impacted program
cost and delivery schedule. I understand that the Army has undertaken
efforts to address the root causes of these prior terminations in
current and future acquisition programs. If confirmed, I will emphasize
the need for sound, cost-informed planning regarding the Army's
acquisition efforts and work with the Army to continue to address these
root causes.
Question. What actions, if any, would you take to ensure that the
Army achieves a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely monitor and oversee the Army's
acquisition efforts to ensure that stable and affordable modernization
strategies are adopted and implemented. To this end, I will emphasize
the need for Army acquisition programs that incorporate sound and
realistic development strategies, affordable and technically feasible
requirements, and--to the fullest extent practicable--adequate and
stable resources. I understand that these are necessary ingredients for
success in acquisition programs.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
Army's capabilities portfolio review process and its current
modernization priorities and investment strategy?
Answer. It would be premature for me to currently assess the Army's
specific processes for reviewing military requirements or setting
modernization priorities. I understand that the Capability Portfolio
Reviews are designed to provide a comprehensive examination of Army
requirements in an effort to validate their operational value and
inform the programming and budgeting processes. This holistic approach
makes sense to me, but if confirmed, I will work with Army leadership
to review their processes.
Question. What actions, if any, would you take to sustain the
momentum of these reviews in stabilizing the Army's modernization
strategy and priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage and support the Army to
take any necessary steps to properly define its equipment modernization
requirements and priorities. I would closely monitor the outcome of
these processes and support the Army's implementation of a successful
modernization strategy.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's implementation of
the recommendations of the Decker-Wagner Acquisition Report?
Answer. I understand that the actions to implement the approved
recommendations in the 2010 report commissioned by Secretary McHugh are
either complete or underway. If confirmed, I will review the Army's
implementation of the recommendations and work to ensure that they are
reflected in ongoing and future modernization efforts.
unfunded priorities
Question. What is your position on allowing the Service Chiefs to
respond to Congress with a list of critical unfunded priorities not
included in the President's budget request?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to continue the Department's current
policy whereby the Service Chiefs may communicate their unfunded
requirements directly to Congress, once they have informed me of those
requirements.
ballistic missile defense
Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of
Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles,
starting in 2011 and increasing in capability with each of its four
phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability
to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United
States, thus augmenting the existing Homeland missile defense
capability.
Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in
Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?
Answer. Yes. I support the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA). If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to support
implementation of EPAA.
Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its
report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile
defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of
policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term
regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans,
programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and
enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to
defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range
missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging
against future uncertainties.
Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you
implement them?
Answer. Yes. I support the administration's policies, strategies,
and priorities as set forth in this review, and, if confirmed, I will
implement them.
Question. The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) formed a Failure Review Board to determine
the root cause of the failure and developed a plan to correct it,
including flight tests to confirm the correction. Until the flight
tests confirm the correction, MDA has suspended production of the Exo-
atmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that failed in the
previous flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKVs do not
contain a flaw that would need to be corrected later.
Do you agree that it is a high priority to correct the failure of
the GMD system kill vehicle and demonstrate through flight testing that
the system works as intended?
Answer. I'm not familiar with the technical details associated with
these flight test failures, but in general I would agree that for any
system, but especially for a national missile defense system, it is
important to correct failures and demonstrate effectiveness as quickly
as possible.
Question. Do you agree that it is prudent to verify that the flight
test failure problem has been corrected before resuming production of
additional EKVs?
Answer. I am not in a position to express a technical opinion on
the right course of action, but in general it would seem prudent to
demonstrate system effectiveness before committing to production. This
is in line with the administration's principle of ``fly before you
buy''.
Question. Do you support the continued enhancement and sustainment
of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system?
Answer. I very strongly believe that we should sustain and enhance
our national missile defense to protect the Nation from limited ICBM
attack by states like North Korea and Iran.
Question. Do you support the modernization of the Exo-atmospheric
Kill Vehicle, which is based on 20-year-old technology?
Answer. Yes. I understand that the Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV) is a key component of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System
that we rely on to protect the United States.
Question. Would you agree to study the feasibility, advisability,
cost, and potential advantage of deploying additional ground based
interceptors in the United States, including at a site located on the
east coast of the United States?
Answer. I understand that such a study is required by the NDAA and,
if confirmed, I will ensure the Department executes the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2013 direction to analyze potential locations for another
continental United States (CONUS)-based missile defense site and to
conduct environmental impact surveys.
Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced
that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
capabilities.
Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
nations such as Iran?
Answer. Yes. I agree that missile defense cooperation with Russia
has the potential to enhance the security of the United States, NATO,
and Russia. I also agree with President Obama's commitment to ensure
that such cooperation will not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
capabilities.
Question. Do you agree that, irrespective of Russian objections,
the United States is committed to the continued development and
deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and
quantitative improvements to such systems, to defend the homeland, our
forward-deployed troops, and allies and partners overseas?
Answer. I agree that the United States is committed to continue to
develop and deploy missile defenses, including qualitative and
quantitative improvements consistent with the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review. The President is on record as saying, and I agree, that the
United States cannot accept limits on its BMD systems or expose
information that would put our missile defense systems at risk. The
President has made clear the need to ensure our missile defense systems
are capable of defeating the most likely threat we face from North
Korean and Iranian missiles. It makes sense to explore approaches to
missile defense cooperation that improve transparency and reassure
Russia that the U.S. missile defense system does not undermine Russia's
strategic deterrent.
space
Question. China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a
turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to
ensure access to space. As a nation heavily dependent on space assets
for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets
became a U.S. national priority.
Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of
space assets should be a national security priority?
Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness is foundational to all
space activities, and enables the United States to maintain the
strategic advantages we derive from space-based capabilities.
Question. In your view, should China's continued development of
space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?
Answer. Yes. U.S. space policies and programs should be informed by
China's continued development of space systems, including its
multidimensional counterspace program, as well as by the range of other
actors that make the space environment increasingly congested,
contested, and competitive.
Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to national
security space policy and programs?
Answer. At this time, I am unaware of any necessary changes and if
confirmed, I would plan to continue to implement the President's 2010
National Space Policy and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. If
I find need for changes in the future, I would propose them.
Question. Do you support the space code of conduct as a non-binding
agreement among nations that utilize outer space?
Answer. Yes. An international code of conduct for space
activities--a non-binding arrangement among nations that utilize
space--would enhance our national security by helping to maintain the
long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space. As
more countries and companies field space capabilities, a code could
encourage responsible behavior and single out those who would act
otherwise, while reducing the risk of mishaps, misperceptions, and
mistrust.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the overall
management and coordination of the national security space enterprise?
Answer. I understand that there has been a recent reorganization of
the management and coordination of the national security space
enterprise, including the establishment of the Defense Space Council,
and the confirmation of the Secretary of the Air Force as the Executive
Agent for Space. This reorganization has resulted in improvements in
information flow across the Department and among U.S. departments and
agencies, and has also improved the process for acquisition and policy
decisions. If confirmed, I will commit to review this reorganization to
ensure continued progress.
Question. What is your view on weapons in space?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to implement the 2011
National Security Space Strategy, which states that ``it is in the
interests of all space-faring nations to avoid hostilities in space,''
and the President's 2010 National Space Policy, which states that ``all
nations have the right to explore and use space for peaceful
purposes.'' The National Space Policy also directs the Secretary of
Defense to develop capabilities, plans and options to deter, defend
against, and, if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack
U.S. or allied space systems.
Question. The administration is proposing to free up 500 MHz of
spectrum for broadband use, a candidate portion of which includes the
band 1755-1850 MHz, which is used heavily by DOD and other national
security agencies.
Do you support this initiative?
Answer. I fully support the national economic and security goals of
the President's 500 MHz initiative to make spectrum available for
commercial broadband use, the implementation of more effective and
efficient use of limited radio-frequency spectrum and the development
of solutions to meet these goals.
Question. Do you support section 1602 of Public Law 106-65, which
requires the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify that any alternative band or bands
to be substituted for spectrum currently used by DOD and other national
security agencies provide ``comparable technical characteristics to
restore essential military capability that will be lost as a result of
the band of frequencies to be so surrendered''?
Answer. I fully support section 1602 of Public Law 106-65. This
provision is absolutely critical to protecting and maintaining our
warfighting capabilities. This statutory requirement is intended to
ensure the Department is provided access to alternate spectrum before
surrendering any spectrum critical for national security capabilities.
Any spectrum reallocations and auctions should provide sufficient time
for evaluation and certification of such alternate spectrum so that
national security operations are not put at risk.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to comply with section
1602 in light of the 500 MHz initiative?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to
conduct operational and cost-feasibility analysis to guarantee that
spectrum-dependent national security capabilities are preserved, while
supporting the economic benefits spectrum provides to our Nation.
Question. Do you intend to insist that DOD be compensated fully for
the cost of relocating, if required to do so?
Answer. Yes. In order to relocate national security capabilities
that rely on spectrum, while maintaining mission effectiveness, the
Department must have alternate spectrum with comparable technical
characteristics, full cost reimbursement for modifying complex weapons
systems, and adequate time to make the transition.
Question. How do you propose the Department make more efficient use
of communications spectrum through leasing of commercial satellites?
Answer. I understand that both the National Security Space Strategy
and the Department of Defense Space Policy indicate that the Department
will make use of commercial systems to the maximum extent practicable.
I am not familiar with all the details, but will review this more
thoroughly, if confirmed.
Question. Do you support more competition in the launch of DOD
payloads?
Answer. Yes. in general I favor competition in contracting--to
include new competitors that can meet certification standards.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to encourage new
entrants to the medium and heavy lift launch of DOD payloads while
balancing affordability, mission assurance, and maintaining the
viability of the existing launch provider?
Answer. I understand that the Department has developed criteria to
certify new space launch vehicles capable of reliably launching
national security satellites and will openly compete up to 14 space
launches in the next 5 years, while guaranteeing the existing launch
provider at least 28 launches.
Question. Do you support commercial hosting of DOD payloads and if
so how?
Answer. Hosted payloads are one of the ways to enhance resilience
and assure space capabilities in the congested, contested, and
competitive space environment. If confirmed, I would support innovative
approaches to improve the national security benefits we derive from
space in a budget-constrained environment, including through the use of
hosted payloads.
Question. What is your long-term vision and support for the Space-
Based Infrared Sensing System (SBIRS)?
Answer. I understand that the SBIRS provides advanced early warning
of hostile missile threats, allowing our warfighters to take swift and
precise action. If confirmed, I would support the Department's
continued efforts to define the future architecture necessary to
provide early warning.
Question. Do you support splitting the systems sensors up to lower
overall cost of the system?
Answer. I understand that the Department of Defense Space Policy
requires the consideration of resilience in space architecture
development. Splitting space sensors may be one way to achieve
resilience. If confirmed, I will look at options for improving
resilience in this system.
strategic systems
Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin
studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next
15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic
nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.
Do you support the President's intent, stated in his message to the
Senate on the New START treaty (February 2, 2011), to modernize or
replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems?
Answer. I support the President's commitment to a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. I believe
that providing necessary resources for nuclear modernization of the
Triad should be a national priority. I understand the Department is
currently modernizing, replacing, or studying recapitalization options
for each leg of the Triad.
Question. Do you have any concerns about the ability of the
Department to afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while
meeting the rest of the DOD commitments?
Answer. I am not able to make a judgment on this at this time;
however, if confirmed, I will assess the costs to ensure that we
protect critically important nuclear systems modernization while
meeting other defense commitments. We must continue to aggressively
scrutinize each of our programs to ensure we maintain critical
capabilities in a fiscally responsible manner.
Question. The Department is committed to modernizing our nuclear
command and control system, do you support that commitment?
Answer. I do. An effective, reliable Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communication (NC3) system is a vital component of a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent. NC3 systems provide the President
redundant and assured capability to execute U.S. nuclear forces under
any scenario and are a critical element in ensuring crisis stability
and deterrence.
u.s. cyber command personnel requirements
Question. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) in
conjunction with the Chiefs of the Military Services and other elements
of DOD, is now seriously engaged in defining the numbers and
qualifications of personnel required to conduct the offensive,
defensive, and intelligence missions of the Command in support of the
combatant commands and the defense of the Nation in cyberspace.
Preliminary indications are that the numbers of exceptionally qualified
operators are going to be substantial. Secretary Panetta committed to
report to the Committee on Armed Services as early as possible this
year how the Department would address these serious manpower and
training requirements.
Do you believe that the strategy, operational concepts, and
operational assumptions that underpin CYBERCOM's force planning have
received sufficient critical scrutiny and analysis?
Answer. I understand that the Department's leadership has invested
significant effort analyzing the threat, reviewing the force planning
model, and is currently addressing how to implement the proposed model.
If confirmed, I will review this analysis and implementation plan.
Question. Can the Military Services' current personnel systems and
practices produce and sustain the number of highly qualified cyber
operators that CYBERCOM believes are required, especially in light of
end strength reductions and declining budgets?
Answer. Recruiting, training, and retaining military and civilian
personnel needed for cyber operations will be a challenge. This is a
high priority area for the Department with regard to investment of both
resources and management oversight and, if confirmed, I will review
these systems and practices.
Question. Should consideration be given to providing the Commander
of CYBERCOM personnel authorities similar to those granted to the
Commander of SOCOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and senior civilian staff of the Department before recommending
any additional authorities for CYBERCOM.
cyber deterrence
Question. Do you believe we are deterring and dissuading our
adversaries in cyberspace?
Answer. At this time, it appears that the United States has
successfully deterred major cyber attacks. I expect that deterring and,
if necessary, defeating such attacks will be a continued key challenge.
If confirmed I intend to ensure that the Department provides strong
support to our national efforts in this area.
u.s. cyber command status
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has recommended
that U.S. CYBERCOM be elevated from a sub-unified to a full unified
command. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 includes a Sense of the Congress
resolution calling for consultation with Congress before a Presidential
decision is made to make CYBERCOM a unified command, and asking for
consideration of a number of issues associated with such a decision.
Do you believe it would be advisable to consult with Congress prior
to making a decision to elevate CYBERCOM to a unified command?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure consultation with
Congress.
Question. As the current Commander of the sub-unified CYBERCOM is
dual-hatted as the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), what
are your views on the wisdom of having an intelligence officer serve as
a unified combatant commander, rather than a line officer with broad
training and command experience?
Answer. My sense is that dual-hatting the commander of CYBERCOM and
the Director of NSA has worked well to date. However, if confirmed, I
will review specifics of the dual-hatted relationship and assess
whether it should continue in the future. I recognize that NSA support
is critical to CYBERCOM's mission given the technical capabilities
required to operate in cyberspace. In addition, I recognize that the
CYBERCOM commander requires significant understanding of the
intelligence community's capabilities and processes to execute his or
her missions effectively. However, I am also aware of concerns about
the dual-hatted relationship and, if confirmed, will carefully consider
these concerns.
Question. Do you believe that CYBERCOM is mature enough to become a
unified command, and that policy, strategy, operational planning, and
rules of engagement to govern operations in cyberspace are sufficiently
developed to justify this step?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department has made
significant progress since CYBERCOM's creation in 2009. This includes
issuance of a comprehensive strategy for military operations in
cyberspace. In addition, I am told that CYBERCOM is expanding its
integration into the Department's deliberate planning, and that the
Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, will issue a
new set of rules of engagement governing all military operations,
including cyber operations, in the near future. If confirmed, I will
evaluate the maturity of the command and will consult closely with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders, and Congress prior
to any decisions with respect to CYBERCOM.
china's aggressive theft of u.s. intellectual property
Question. A recent report by the National Counterintelligence
Executive confirmed the widespread belief that China is engaged in a
massive campaign to steal technology, other forms of intellectual
property, and business and trade information from the United States
through cyberspace. The current Commander of CYBERCOM has referred to
this as the greatest transfer of wealth in history and, along with
others, believes this is a serious national security issue.
Do you believe that China's aggressive and massive theft of
technology in cyberspace is a threat to national security and economic
prosperity?
Answer. I believe that the theft of intellectual property and other
sensitive information threatens the United States' military advantage
and economic prosperity. If confirmed, I will work within the
Department and with other departments and agencies to address this
threat.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to deter
China from such activities in the future?
Answer. I am not in a position to recommend specific policies,
guidance, or changes to authorities at this time. I understand that the
Department is enhancing its cyber defense programs and those of certain
defense industrial base networks, as well as improving its ability to
identify the origins of intrusion. If confirmed, I will consider what
diplomatic and public engagement as well as other actions that should
be taken to address this challenge.
dod's role in defending the nation from cyber attack
Question. What is your understanding of the role of DOD in
defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this
role distinct from those of the Homeland security and law enforcement
communities?
Answer. My understanding is that DHS has the lead for domestic
cybersecurity. Thus, DHS coordinates national protection, prevention,
mitigation, and recovery in significant cyber incidents. The Defense
Department provides technical assistance to DHS when requested. The
Department's role is to provide the military forces needed to deter the
adversary, and if necessary, act to protect the security of the
country. This includes planning against potential threats to our
critical infrastructure, gathering foreign threat intelligence, and
protecting classified networks. I believe that the defense, homeland
security, and law enforcement communities should work together, and
with our private sector partners to improve network defenses, share
information on cyber threats, and ensure swift response to threats when
they manifest themselves.
Question. Do you believe that defending the Homeland mission will
require both offensive and defensive cyber forces and tools?
Answer. If confirmed, this is an area I will review closely. My
current view is that defending the Homeland from cyber attacks should
involve the full range of tools at the disposal of the United States,
including diplomacy and law enforcement as well as any authorized
military operations.
Question. This new mission will require substantial resources,
including personnel. How do you envision generating these additional
resources in the face of reduced budgets and declining end strength?
Answer. The current fiscal situation will force hard choices across
a range of priority missions, including cyber. If confirmed, I will
consult closely with military and civilian leaders in the Department,
the President, and Congress in finding the right balance.
iran
Question. What is your assessment of the military and political
threat posed by Iran?
Answer. Iran poses a significant threat to the United States, our
allies and partners, and our interests in the region and globally. Iran
continues to pursue an illicit nuclear program that threatens to
provoke a regional arms race and undermine the global non-proliferation
regime. Iran is also one of the main state-sponsors of terrorism and
could spark conflict, including against U.S. personnel and interests.
Iran is also actively investing in the development of a range of
conventional capabilities, including air, missile, and naval assets
that have generated regional anxieties and could threaten our interests
and personnel in the region.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to
Iran?
Answer. I believe that President Obama has put in place and pursued
effectively--with support from the U.S. Congress--a strong, multi-
vector strategy to deal with the threats that Iran poses to the United
States, particularly its nuclear pursuits. This strategy has included a
strong diplomatic effort to test Iranian intentions, lay the ground
work for an international coalition that holds Tehran accountable for
its transgressions, and isolate Iran in the region and globally. This
strategy has also included the application of smart, unprecedented, and
effective sanctions against the Iranian regime that has sharpened its
choices significantly. Lastly, this strategy has credibly, and smartly
in my opinion, made clear that all options are on the table. I believe
that this strategy has made it clear to Iran that the United States
will do what it must to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,
and I will continue to implement this policy if confirmed.
Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions
against Iran--how effective have they been?
Answer. I believe that the President with significant help from the
U.S. Congress, has been able to bring the world community together to
confront Iran with effective sanctions. As a result of these sanctions,
Iran's financial, trade, and economic outlook has deteriorated
significantly. International financial institutions estimate that
Iran's economy contracted in 2012 for the first time in more than 2
decades. Iran's access to foreign exchange reserves held overseas has
diminished. Additionally, the Iranian currency--the rial--reached an
all-time low in mid-October, losing more than half its value since the
start of 2012. Inflation and unemployment are also growing. As the
economic outlook for Iran continues to worsen and as the U.S. continues
to reinforce our pressure track along with the International Community,
I believe that pressure is building on Iran.
Question. You have said that ``Washington should make clear that
everything is on the table with Tehran--an end to sanctions, diplomatic
recognition, civil nuclear cooperation, investment in Iran's energy
sector, World Bank Loans, World Trade Organization membership, Iraq,
Afghanistan, regional security arrangements, etc.--if Iran abstains
from a nuclear weapons program, ends support for terrorist groups,
recognizes Israel, and engages in more constructive policies in Iraq.''
Do you still hold this view?
Answer. I do believe that if Iran lives up to international
obligations, it should have a path to a more prosperous and productive
relationship with the international community and eventual rejoining of
the community of nations. The other choice is clear as well--if Iran
continues to flout its international obligations, it should continue to
face severe and growing consequences. While there is time and space for
diplomacy, backed by pressure, the window is closing. Iran needs to
demonstrate it is prepared to negotiate seriously.
Question. In March 2012, President Obama said ``when it comes to
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options
off the table, and I mean what I say. That includes all elements of
American power: A political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a
diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian
program is monitored; an economic effort that imposes crippling
sanctions; and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any
contingency.''
Do you agree with the President's view that ``all options should be
on the table'' to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon?
Answer. I agree with the President that the United States should
take no options off the table in our efforts to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. If confirmed, I will focus intently on
ensuring that U.S. military is in fact prepared for any contingency.
countering iran's ballistic missile threats
Question. Iran has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S.
forces, allies, and partner nations in the CENTCOM AOR. The Ballistic
Missile Defense Review Report of February 2010 stated that the United
States intends to pursue a phased and adaptive approach to ballistic
missile defense tailored against such missile threats in various
regions, including the Middle East.
Do you agree that such a phased adaptive approach will provide
CENTCOM with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our
forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region
against Iranian ballistic missile threats?
Answer. While I have not looked into the details of the phased
adaptive approach, I believe this approach includes the appropriate
steps to protect the United States as well as our forces and interests
overseas. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the President continues
to propose a budget sufficient to support our ballistic missile defense
priorities, balanced with competing priorities, and consistent with the
projected capabilities of missile defense systems to deal with the
anticipated threats.
Question. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense system with Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. regional
missile defense capabilities against Iran's ballistic missiles?
Answer. My understanding is that today, U.S. Aegis combatants
equipped with Standard Missile-3s are on station and protecting U.S.
forces, partners, and allies in the Middle East as well as Europe
against Iran's ballistic missiles. My expectation is that this
capability will continue to evolve.
Question. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in the
CENTCOM AOR, what role do you see for other nations in the AOR to
contribute to regional missile defense capabilities, such as UAE's
plans to purchase the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system?
Answer. Recognizing that global demand for BMD will likely exceed
the U.S. supply, it is appropriate for the United States to seek
appropriate burden-sharing arrangements with partners and allies in the
CENTCOM area and other regions. Such arrangements can increase the
quantity of missile defense assets in support of U.S. regional
deterrence and security goals. If confirmed, I will encourage those
contributions to our mutual defense needs.
Question. The Intelligence Community assesses that, with sufficient
foreign assistance, Iran may be technically capable of flight testing
an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015. What should the
United States do to hedge against this possibility?
Answer. I understand that, with the deployed Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system, the United States is currently protected against the
threat of limited ICBM attack from states like Iran and North Korea. As
noted in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, it is important
that we maintain this advantageous position by hedging against future
uncertainties. If confirmed, I would continue the current efforts to
prepare options in case the threat changes or if the development of new
technical capabilities is delayed.
u.s.-israel defense cooperation
Question. In recent years, the NDAA has supported close cooperation
and substantial funding for a number of critical missile defense and
rocket defense programs for the state of Israel, including the Arrow
system, the Arrow-3 interceptor, David's Sling, and the Iron Dome
system.
In your view, should the United States continue to support such
joint cooperation and funding for these programs?
Answer. Yes. I am proud of the work that the United States has done
in support of the ballistic missile defense of Israel and, if
confirmed, I will continue to support these efforts. Missile defense is
a core area of U.S.-Israel joint cooperation. The importance of these
efforts came to the forefront with Israel's recent Operation Pillar of
Defense in Gaza. Throughout the 8 days of the operation, Hamas and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched over 1,506 rockets into Israel.
Focusing only on these that posed a real threat to populated areas,
Iron Dome intercepted 421 rockets with an overall intercept rate of
approximately 85 percent--saving the lives of countless Israeli
civilians. This highlights the importance of the work that the United
States is doing with the Israelis on all layers of missile and rocket
defense, and if confirmed, I will work to continue and expand this
cooperation.
dod's cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
Question. The CTR program is focused on eliminating WMD in the
states of the former Soviet Union and other nations around the world.
Its key objectives include: (1) eliminating strategic nuclear weapons;
(2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting, eliminating, and
preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and
capabilities; and (4) encouraging development of capabilities to reduce
proliferation threats. The current CTR umbrella agreement between the
Russian Federation and the United States will expire at the end of May
2013, and it has been reported that the Duma does not support extending
the umbrella as it is currently written at this time.
Do you support extending this umbrella agreement?
Answer. Yes. On December 3, 2012, President Obama said, ``If Russia
believes the CTR agreement hasn't kept pace with the changing
relationship between our countries, we should update it.'' If
confirmed, I will support continuation of the nonproliferation
cooperation with Russia supported by the CTR Umbrella Agreement.
Question. Do you support continued cooperation with the Russian
Federation to eliminate WMD in Russia?
Answer. Yes. U.S. and Russian efforts to secure and eliminate WMD
have made both countries safer, and have proven to be a productive area
of cooperation.
Question. Do you support the use of metrics to assess the progress
of the CTR programs and to ensure individual programs complete their
objectives?
Answer. Yes. Metrics are an important tool in ensuring efficient
execution of the CTR program.
Question. In your view, are Russia and the former Soviet Union
countries making a significant contribution to efforts to reduce the
proliferation threats they inherited?
Answer. My understanding is that the Russian Federation and several
other states of the Former Soviet Union have contributed in many ways
to reduce threats posed by WMD that they inherited. I understand that
the Department supports these efforts through the CTR program, which
helps secure nuclear materials, destroy chemical weapons, and reduce
the threat from especially dangerous pathogens. Russia and several of
its neighbors also made important contributions to the Nuclear Security
Summits held in Washington and Seoul.
Question. Do you think the CTR program is well-coordinated among
the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in
Russia, e.g., DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?
Answer. My understanding is that CTR and other nonproliferation
programs executed by Federal agencies are coordinated well through the
leadership of the National Security Staff. If confirmed, one of my
priorities as Secretary of Defense will be to ensure that all of the
Department's activities in this area are well-coordinated with
interagency partners.
Question. As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond
the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation
prevention and threat reduction goals should the DOD establish or focus
on?
Answer. My understanding is that the President has highlighted
nuclear and biological terrorism as key threats, and that the CTR
program strongly supports these priorities. I agree with these
priorities.
Question. Do you support extending the CTR program to nations in
the Middle East, especially with respect to containing Syrian chemical
weapons?
Answer. My understanding is that the CTR program is authorized to
undertake activities in the Middle East. The main objective of this
expanded authority is to enhance the capacity of regional partners,
particularly the nations that border Syria, to mitigate the threat to
their territory posed by the potential loss or use of Syria's chemical
weapons. If confirmed, I would continue to support this effort.
Question. Do you support extending the CTR program to nations in
Africa, especially with respect to biological materials?
Answer. Yes. based on my current understanding, I believe it makes
good sense to continue to expand the CTR program's geographic reach
beyond the former Soviet Union. Any cost effective steps we can take to
keep terrorists from accessing dangerous biological agents by
partnering with other nations are especially important in regions like
East Africa where active terrorist threats converge with emerging
infectious diseases.
prompt global strike
Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will
continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has
been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the
effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global
strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national
security in the near future?
Answer. I understand that the Department continues to assess a
broad range of conventional strike capabilities to address current and
emerging threats. Conventional prompt global strike weapons could
provide the President with unique conventional capabilities in certain
scenarios that include fleeting or otherwise inaccessible time-
sensitive targets for example. I understand, however, that there are
concerns about this operational concept. At this point, I believe that
it makes sense to assess potential approaches to conventional prompt
global strike. If confirmed, I will look forward to further discussions
with Congress on this topic.
Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would
you expect to pursue if confirmed?
Answer. I understand the Department is continuing to conduct
research and testing to support the development of concepts and
technologies for boost-glide systems that could provide the basis for a
conventional prompt global strike capability. If confirmed, I will
review implementation options.
Question. Do you support a competitive procurement of prompt global
strike systems if they progress to a milestone B stage?
Answer. In general, where viable options exist, I think the
Department should take maximum advantage of a competitive procurement
process.
nuclear weapons and stockpile stewardship
Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and
security of the stockpile?
Answer. I understand that the Stockpile Stewardship Program has
ensured that our nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and
effective without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing. At
the same time, the challenge we face is that some aspects of today's
nuclear complex are in need of repair or replacement. If confirmed, I
will continue to work with the Department of Energy to ensure the
safety, security, and reliability of our stockpile, and the
modernization of the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. The modernization of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) infrastructure and life extension of our nuclear
weapons are critical to sustaining a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent. If confirmed, I will work to ensure appropriate
funding levels and cost-effective management for these efforts, which
will require a substantial and sustained fiscal commitment.
Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you
believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of
nuclear weapons?
Answer. I believe that we should make necessary investments in
infrastructure modernization regardless of potential future nuclear
weapon reductions. I understand that the New START treaty does not
limit nondeployed warheads; if confirmed I will ensure that the
stockpile, including both deployed and nondeployed nuclear warheads,
sustains the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, including our
commitments to extend deterrence to U.S. allies.
Question. What role does the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) play in
helping to establish key stockpile stewardship goals and modernization
objectives?
Answer. The NWC is the primary interface for coordinating nuclear
weapons enterprise issues between DOD and the Department of Energy. I
understand that its current top priority is to address stockpile life
extension and nuclear infrastructure modernization in the current
fiscal environment.
Question. Do you support a more active role of the Office of Cost
Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) in ensuring the programs within
the Department of Energy and the NNSA are appropriately tailored for
the best investment of funds possible to achieve a safe, effective, and
reliable nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. I am not familiar enough with the degree of CAPE's
involvement with the Department of Energy and the NNSA to make that
determination at this time. I understand that CAPE has worked closely
with NNSA over the past year to review NNSA programs, and if confirmed,
will closely consider CAPE's appropriate role in this regard in the
future.
medical countermeasures initiative
Question. The administration has produced an interagency strategy
for the advanced development and manufacture of medical countermeasures
(MCM) to defend against pandemic influenza and biological warfare
threats. In this strategy, DOD will be responsible for the rapid
development and manufacture of medical countermeasures to protect U.S.
Armed Forces and Defense Department personnel.
Do you support this interagency strategy and the MCM Initiative
and, if confirmed, would you plan to implement them?
Answer. I am very concerned about the threat of biological weapons.
I support assigning to the Department the responsibility for protecting
the U.S. Armed Forces and Defense Department personnel with rapid
development and manufacturing of medical countermeasures. If confirmed,
I will need to look into the specific plans associated with the
interagency strategy of the Medical Countermeasure Initiative. I would
do my best to implement the administration's strategy, consistent with
any statutory guidance and available funding.
defense acquisition reform
Question. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)
is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a
sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the
acquisition process.
What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements
in the Defense acquisition process?
Answer. I believe that our weapons systems acquisition process has
substantial room for improvement. My understanding is that WSARA, which
enacted a number of steps to improve many aspects of weapons system
acquisition, has been largely implemented by the Department and that it
is improving the Department's acquisition performance, but that more
needs to be done. I am aware the Department is continuing to implement
the remaining provisions of WSARA and other acquisition improvement
initiatives. If confirmed, I will review these efforts to ensure that
they are adequate and I will continue to work with Congress and our
industry partners to improve the way we acquire systems for the
Department.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
the acquisition process B requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. Close coordination of these three processes is essential to
improving the Department's ability to acquire services and systems and
to obtain the best value for every defense dollar. Since WSARA's
enactment, progress appears to have been made in regard to closer
integration of these three processes, but I do not believe that this
work is complete. In my view, requirements must be feasible and
affordable, there must be an executable plan to acquire the products
that meet those requirements, and there must be an adequate budget
established to conduct the program and acquire the product. If
confirmed, I will work to bring requirements, acquisition, and
budgeting into close alignment by ensuring that the individuals
responsible for these three aspects of acquisition work in conjunction
with one another and not in isolation.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition
accountability?
Answer. I support a chain of command for the acquisition process
that provides for the clear responsibility and accountability that was
established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s. For major
programs, this chain of command begins with the Defense Acquisition
Executive and runs through DOD component head to the Service or
Component Acquisition Executive, the Program Executive Officer, and the
Program Manager. If confirmed, I will hold these individuals
accountable for acquisition system performance.
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
Answer. I have not yet reviewed DOD's investment budget in detail
or the balance between major systems investments, operations, and
recapitalization. However, it is clear to me that pursuing only
affordable programs and controlling costs throughout a product's life
cycle are critical in any financial environment. All programs must be
closely managed to avoid cost growth, and the affordability of any new
requirements must be carefully scrutinized at the outset--before the
program is authorized. If confirmed, I will examine the investment
budget closely for near and long-term affordability, taking into
consideration the potential for cost growth. I will also assess the
sustainability of the balance between the various accounts that make up
the Department's budget, including the investment, operations, and
asset recapitalization portions of the budget.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department has been imposing
affordability cost caps on new programs for over 2 years for both
production and sustainment costs. These caps are being used to force
trade-offs between capability and costs early in a program's life
cycle. If confirmed, I will strongly support the imposition and
enforcement of these cost caps. I will also work with the Department
and industry to ensure that we stay on budget and on schedule. DOD and
the taxpayer cannot afford the excessive cost growth that has plagued
some programs in the past.
reliability of weapons systems
Question. The Department's process for procuring major weapons
systems places insufficient emphasis on reliability and maintainability
and, therefore, produces systems that are increasingly costly to
operate and sustain. Given that these ownership costs comprise most of
a given weapons systems' overall lifecycle cost, these increased costs
could undermine considerably the Department's ``buying power''.
How would you ensure that the defense acquisition system produces
more reliable weapons systems?
Answer. I believe that the key to obtaining necessary reliability
is to establish effective incentives and, when necessary, to enforce
the consequences of failure to meet established standards. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the acquisition system takes this
approach to achieving the needed reliability performance for its
weapons systems.
excessive concurrency in major defense acquisition programs
Question. Major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) have
experienced excessive cost-growth and schedule delays due to, among
other things, too much of an overlap between development and
production. This has exposed these systems to a high risk of costly new
discoveries requiring redesign and retrofit late into operational
testing or production.
What more can be done to ensure that the defense acquisition system
safeguards against excessive concurrency in MDAPs?
Answer. I am not an expert in this field; however, my understanding
is that some limited degree of concurrency between development and
initial production can often be the most efficient way to structure a
weapons system program. However, the Department has in some cases, such
as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, taken too much risk with concurrency,
committing to production well before the design was tested enough to
know that it was mature and stable. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
that the risks of concurrent development and production are fully
understood and taken into account by acquisition decisionmakers before
a program enters production.
procurement program risk
Question. Another major cause of excessive cost growth and schedule
delays in how the Department procures major weapons systems and major
automated information systems (in particular, ``enterprise resource
planning'' systems, which are vital to defense financial improvement
and business transformation), relates to the Department's inability to
identify, price, and therefore effectively manage program risk, (e.g.,
technological, developmental, integration, and manufacturing risk).
How would you improve the defense acquisition system to ensure that
the Department can more effectively and timely address all types of
risk in its major defense procurement programs to better ensure the
delivery of needed combat capability on time and on budget?
Answer. I believe the early identification, management, and
mitigation of program risk is a critical element of any well-managed
acquisition program. I understand that the Department, through
implementation of WSARA and other ongoing initiatives, is working to
improve early planning efforts to better understand risks and to put in
place steps that will remove and/or mitigate them prior to the
commitment of a major investment in product development or initial
production. My view is that new product development inherently involves
risk and that the risk of any new product development must be actively
managed if the program is to be successful. If confirmed, I will review
the adequacy of these initiatives and their effectiveness.
services contracting
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees.
In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support
the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. Although I understand that DOD has been taking steps in
recent years to reduce its reliance on contractors, I believe DOD must
continue to manage its workforce in a way that avoids inappropriate or
excessive reliance on contractor support for basic Department
functions, while also meeting its obligations to perform work
efficiently and effectively and to be a good steward of taxpayer
resources. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department implements a
workforce strategy that aligns functions and work among military,
civilian, and contracted services in a cost effective, and balanced
manner consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, and
laws and regulations.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address the issue of
cost growth in services contracting and ensure that the Department gets
the most for its money in this area?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the efforts of the
administration and the Department to improve the visibility and
accountability of contracted services by expanding and refining the
data we collect from contractors, as required by statute, in order to
compare it to our civilian and military workforce planning factors.
Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
relied on contractor support to a greater degree than previous U.S.
military operations. According to widely published reports, the number
of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has often exceeded
the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.
Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor
support for military operations?
Answer. At this time I don't have enough information to make an
assessment. While many support functions for military operations are
appropriate for contract support, some are more closely associated with
work that should be performed by government employees (military or
civilian), or other Federal agencies. I am aware of recent
recommendations made by the Commission on Wartime Contracting and the
GAO regarding such dependence and, if confirmed, I will support ongoing
efforts to implement those recommendations as appropriate.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department
should take to mitigate such risk?
Answer. Reliance on contractor support can lead to operational risk
if contractors fail to perform or perform outside the scope of
appropriately defined roles. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
have also shown that additional risk is introduced when there is poor
government oversight, further increasing the potential for fraud,
waste, and abuse. We also know that government oversight is critical to
ensure appropriate contractor interaction with local communities.
If confirmed, I will support the Department's ongoing efforts to
minimize any over-reliance on contractors and ensure the appropriate
mix of military, civilian, and contract personnel in theater. I will
also review the Department's progress in implementing recommendations
made by the Commission on Wartime Contracting, the GAO, and the
legislative mandates in the NDAA regarding operational contracting
requirements including considerations for contract support as part of
the national military strategy, the QDR, and the Chairman's annual risk
assessment.
Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. I do not have enough information yet to make a full
assessment of this issue. However, I believe that investments made over
the last few years in the Department's acquisition workforce, as well
as the implementation of recommendations made by the Commission on
Wartime Contracting and the GAO, have vastly improved the Department's
ability to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield. If
confirmed, I will continue to improve our capabilities in this critical
area.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. At this time I don't have enough information to identify
specific steps or actions necessary to improve management of
contractors on the battlefield. If confirmed, I will work with the
Chairman, the Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, and other
Department leadership to ensure commanders in the field have the
necessary resources and access to information to effectively manage
contract support and mitigate against potential risks.
private security contractors
Question. Federal agencies including DOD have spent more than $5
billion for private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over
the last decade. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of
abuses and questionable activities by private security contractors in
both countries.
Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely upon
contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be
expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public
areas in an area of combat operations?
Answer. I believe it may be appropriate to use private security
contractors for specific security functions in contingency operations
when they are limited by specific rules for the use of force. Such
functions include providing security for our military bases in areas of
operations and protecting supply convoys. Without a significant
increase in end strength and resources, the Department would not have
the capacity to take on all the missions private security contractors
are able to fill. However, the Department must provide proper guidance
and supervision when using private security contractors and must ensure
they do not engage in combat operations. I cannot comment on the use of
private security contractors by other Federal agencies.
Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security
contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense
and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The use of private security contractors in support of
contingency operations always requires careful oversight. The
misapplication of the use of force by private security contractors can
undermine our strategic objectives. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD has
established policies and procedures to effectively manage private
security contractors to prevent actions that would be detrimental to
our policy objectives.
Question. Section 846 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD
to carry out risk assessments and risk mitigation plans whenever it
relies on contractors to perform critical functions in support of OCOs.
What steps will you take, if confirmed, to implement the
requirements of section 846?
Answer. I believe that contract support is an essential part of the
total force and will remain so in the future. In many cases contractors
are absolutely vital. For example transportation command heavily uses
contractors to move personnel and equipment. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the DOD policy and operational guidance addresses the
requirements of section 846 and that proper risk assessments and risk
mitigation plans are conducted.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an
area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with
U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD has policies that
effectively guide the operations of private security contractors when
they are used, and that we provide proper oversight. We must also
strive to ensure that all contractors, including private security
contractors, are appropriately legally accountable for their actions,
and that private security contractors that operate in an area of combat
and contingency operations act responsibly.
efficiency in department operations
Question. The Joint Chiefs recently stated that, ``we must be given
the latitude to enact the cost-saving reforms we need while eliminating
the weapons and facilities we do not need.''
In your view, what latitude must be given to the Joint Chiefs to
enact cost-saving reforms?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Joint Chiefs supported some
hard choices that were made in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
in order to achieve the savings required to sustain the new defense
strategy. The Joint Chiefs need Congress to provide them the latitude
to implement those changes and allow them to execute the new strategy.
I also understand that it is now a zero sum game. If the Department is
not able to implement the changes proposed, other offsets must be made,
while still preserving warfighting capability.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Joint Chiefs to
eliminate unneeded weapons?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to sit down
with the Joint Chiefs and to work together to thoroughly review,
identify, and eliminate any effort that is outdated or no longer needed
by the Department.
Question. Do you support the administration's request for the
authority to conduct two rounds of Bases Realignments and Closures
(BRAC) to eliminate unneeded facilities?
Answer. I understand that the administration's proposal for two
rounds of BRAC was not accepted by Congress. However, I also think any
prudent manager has to look at all options when faced with significant
budget pressures. As with industry, the Department should examine its
infrastructure and eliminate excess. The BRAC process is not perfect,
but I believe BRAC is a fair and comprehensive way to right-size the
Department's footprint, and is the best process identified to date. If
confirmed, I would have to look at the need for BRAC in the future.
Question. If so, given the recent report by GAO of the excessive
costs of the 2005 BRAC round, what would be your priorities in carrying
out a round of BRAC?
Answer. It is my understanding that the 2005 BRAC round was an
anomaly, the only round conducted while the Department was growing. It
focused on transformation, jointness, and relocating forces from
overseas. A future BRAC round is more likely to be like the rounds in
1993 and 1995 where excess capacity was reduced.
acquisition workforce
Question. Over the last 15 years, DOD has reduced the size of its
acquisition workforce by almost half, without undertaking any
systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the
specific skills and competencies needed to meet DOD's current and
future needs. Since September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on
that workforce have substantially increased. Section 852 of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development
Fund to help DOD address shortcomings in its acquisition workforce.
This requirement was revised and updated by section 803 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2013.
Do you agree that the Department would be ``penny-wise and pound
foolish'' to try to save money by cutting corners on its acquisition
workforce at the risk or losing control over the hundreds of billions
of dollars that it spends every year on the acquisition of products and
services?
Answer. Yes. It is imperative that DOD act as a good steward of the
resources entrusted to it by the American people. A properly qualified
and sized acquisition workforce is central to maintaining this
stewardship and to ensuring that the Department obtains as much value
as possible for the money that it spends obtaining products and
services from contractors.
Question. Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development
Fund is needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees
with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. I understand that the Acquisition Workforce Development
Fund has provided funds necessary for strengthening the acquisition
workforce with regard to both its size and skills. I support this goal
and, if confirmed, will work with Congress to ensure that the Fund is
used effectively to build the capability of the Department's
acquisition workforce.
human capital planning
Question. DOD faces a critical shortfall in key areas of its
civilian workforce, including the management of acquisition programs,
information technology systems and financial management, and senior DOD
officials have expressed alarm at the extent of the Department's
reliance on contractors in these areas. Section 115b of title 10,
U.S.C., requires the Department to develop a strategic workforce plan
to shape and improve its civilian employee workforce.
Would you agree that the Departments human capital, including its
civilian workforce, is critical to the accomplishment of its national
security mission?
Answer. Yes. I agree. The civilian workforce performs key enabling
functions for the military, such as critical training and preparation
to ensure readiness, equipment reset and modernization. Civilians also
provide medical care, family support, and base operating services--all
vital to supporting our men and women in uniform.
Question. Do you share the concern expressed by others about the
extent of the Departments reliance on contractors in critical areas
such as the management of acquisition programs, information technology
and financial management?
Answer. Yes. We must ensure that we have a properly sized, and
highly capable, civilian workforce that maintains critical skills and
prevents an overreliance on contracted services. If confirmed, I will
support the administration's focus on reducing inappropriate or
excessive reliance on contracted support.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department
undertakes necessary human capital planning to ensure that its civilian
workforce is prepared to meet the challenges of the coming decades?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure departmental human capital
planning employs strategies for recruitment, development, and retention
of a mission-ready civilian workforce.
Question. Section 955 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires a
5-percent reduction in anticipated funding levels for the civilian
personnel workforce and the service contractor workforce of DOD,
subject to certain exclusions.
What impact do you expect the implementation of section 955 to have
on the programs and operations of DOD?
Answer. I do not have enough information at this time to speak to
potential impact. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department's
implementation of section 955, both in the civilian and contracted
support workforces, is done in a manner that best mitigates risk to
programs and operations, while maintaining core capabilities and
support to our warfighters and their families.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
section 955 is implemented in a manner that is consistent with the
requirements of section 129a of title 10, U.S.C., for determining the
most appropriate and cost-efficient mix of military, civilian and
service contractor personnel to perform DOD missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure implementation of section 955
recognizes that the sourcing of work among military (both Active and
Reserve components), civilian, and contracted services must be
consistent with requirements, funding availability, and applicable
laws.
Question. What processes will you put in place, if confirmed, to
ensure that the Department implements a sound planning process for
carrying out the requirements of section 955, including the
implementation of the exclusion authority in section 955(c)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current processes the
Department has for workforce determinations, along with existing
management structures and tools. I do not currently have enough
information regarding possible specific exclusions, but will ensure
that the workforces of the Department are sized to perform the
functions and activities necessary to achieve the missions of the
Department.
test and evaluation
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to ensure that
the Department as a whole and each of the Services specifically
maintains its testing organizations, infrastructure, and budgets at
levels adequate to address both our current and future acquisition
needs?
Answer. Yes. Test and evaluation is a critical element of our
acquisition system, that providing the measured and objective insight
into a system's performance that is essential to making sound
programmatic decisions.
Question. A natural tension exists between major program objectives
to reduce cost and schedule and the test and evaluation objective to
ensure performance meets specifications and requirements. What is your
assessment of the appropriate balance between the desire to reduce
acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate testing?
Answer. Test and evaluation provides acquisition decisionmakers
with accurate and objective information on system performance necessary
to inform critical acquisition decisions. My view is that we should
generally not gamble on the performance of a weapons system when a
reasonable amount of testing will significantly reduce the risk of
redesign or major changes after production has been started. If
confirmed, I will closely monitor the balance between reducing
acquisition cycle time and conducting adequate testing to ensure
warfighters receive affordable, operationally effective, and suitable
systems when they need them.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we
should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been
demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective,
suitable, and survivable?
Answer. I understand that test and evaluation plays a critical role
in product development and fielding. I believe that there are only a
limited number of cases where it might be necessary to field a system
prior to operational testing--for example, to address an urgent gap in
a critical operational capability in an ongoing or imminent conflict.
Even when fielding is accelerated to meet an urgent need, applicable
statutes governing the test process must be complied with. There must
be some level of testing to ensure basic operational performance and
the safety of the system and to evaluate the system's capabilities and
limitations to identify any deficiencies that might need to be
corrected.
Question. Congress established the position of Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on
matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As
established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with
Congress, consistent with the statutory independence of the office.
Do you support the continued ability of the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation's to speak freely and independently with Congress?
Answer. Yes.
funding for science and technology (s&t) investments and workforce
Question. In his State of the Union speech in 2010, the President
said that ``maintaining our leadership in science and technology is
crucial to America's success.'' The DOD budget submissions for fiscal
years 2012 and 2013 supported continued investment in science and
technology, despite the significant budget pressure.
Do you support maintaining growth in the DOD's S&T investments?
Answer. I understand and appreciate the importance of government
investment in science and technology in the area of national security.
Maintaining technological superiority against current and projected
adversaries underpins our National Security Strategy and it is only
through this investment that we can sustain this critical edge. I fully
support the President's commitment to science and technology, and if
confirmed, I will work to support science and technology investments in
our defense budget.
Question. How will you assess whether the science and technology
investment portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs
of the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate conducting reviews of the
Department's current science and technology investment strategy, in the
context of the Department's priorities and capability needs. I also
acknowledge the necessity of maintaining a strong technology base.
Question. Well over half of all graduates of U.S. universities with
advanced degrees in science and technology are non-U.S. citizens. Due
to a variety of reasons, many return to their home countries where they
contribute to competing against the United States in technology
advancement.
What is your view on steps that the Department should take, if any,
to ensure that DOD and the defense industrial base are able to recruit
and retain scientists and engineers from this talent pool?
Answer. In order to maintain our technology superiority, it is
essential for the Department to attract the best and brightest minds.
The President made clear in his recent inaugural address that including
bright students and engineers from abroad in America's workforce is an
imperative for our future. If confirmed, I will work within the
Department and the administration to find ways in which the Department
could enhance its skilled workforce, to include its scientific and
engineering segments, by drawing upon a broad talent pool and by
seeking to recruit and retain the best possible individuals, within the
construct of national security requirements.
defense industrial base
Question. The latest QDR addressed the need for strengthening the
defense industrial base. Specifically, it said: ``America's security
and prosperity are increasingly linked with the health of our
technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain our strategic
advantage well into the future, the Department requires a consistent,
realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and
capabilities of the defense technology and industrial bases--a strategy
that better accounts for the rapid evolution of commercial technology,
as well as the unique requirements of ongoing conflicts.''
What is your understanding and assessment of the current state of
the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. I understand the Department relies on a broadened technical
and industrial base that is now far more global, commercial, and
financially complex than ever before. For the past decade the defense
industrial base has enjoyed a period of increasing budgets that is now
at an end. While I think our industrial base is currently strong, I am
concerned about the impact that further defense budget cuts would have
on the ability of the base to provide the broad range of products and
services that the Department and our Nation need. If confirmed, the
continuing health of the industrial base will be a high priority for
me.
Question. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense
industry?
Answer. Expansion and consolidation of industries and companies is
the hallmark of a robust free market economy as it responds to the
market forces. I expect, and encourage, the free market to act when
faced with changing demands. However, I believe the Government must
also be watchful for consolidations that eliminate competition or cause
market distortions. At the end of the Cold War there was a major
consolidation at the top tier of defense businesses. My understanding
is that the Department's leadership have indicated that further
consolidation at the top tier would not be viewed favorably. I have not
studied this in detail; however, my initial assessment is that this is
the correct view. I also believe that each individual case of
consolidation, acquisition, or merger dealing with our defense firms
must be examined carefully for what is best for the warfighter and the
taxpayer, particularly with regard to its impact on competition.
Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S.
defense sector?
Answer. Foreign investment has generally benefitted the United
States, including DOD, by providing needed capital and increasing
access to leading-edge technologies. However, I believe foreign
investment in the defense sector can also expose critical national
defense-related technologies to risks, including loss of the
intellectual property that gives our military personnel the
technological edge they rely upon. Congress has put provisions in place
to address critical national security concerns of this nature,
including the Committee on Foreign Interests in the United States led
by the Department of the Treasury. If confirmed, I will continue DOD's
commitment to its oversight function and to ensuring that national
security concerns are addressed in transactions that involve foreign
investments in the United States, including investments in the defense
sector.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any do you believe DOD should
take to most effectively and efficiently manage risk and ensure the
continued health of the U.S. defense industrial base?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure the sources of
manufacturing and services in the industrial base that the Department
relies on are capable of meeting our warfighters' requirements. I will
ensure that the Department proactively monitors the base to identify
any risks that need to be addressed. When necessary and as resources
permit, the Department should be prepared to act to ensure that key
industrial capabilities are sustained, although, unfortunately, this
will not be possible in every case. I will also make myself accessible
to the best source of information on the industry's concerns--industry
itself. This means working closely and communicating with private
industry to ensure that, as the Department makes changes necessary to
adapt to a new set of strategic and budgetary challenges, it does not
inadvertently jeopardize critical elements of the industrial base. I
believe the Department must simultaneously be receptive to industry's
concerns and address their issues as effectively as possible,
consistent with the Department's priorities and the resources
available.
reset and reconstitution funding
Question. The Department has a substantial backlog of maintenance
availabilities due to the high tempo and demand of more than a decade
of combat operations. Senior DOD officials have testified that they
will require 2 to 3 years of additional funding to restore readiness
through reset and reconstitution of their equipment and personnel.
Do you agree with the assessment that the DOD will need 2 to 3
years of additional funding for reset and reconstitution?
Answer. I would need to review the facts behind the specific
estimate of 2 to 3 years; however, I believe that it will require
considerable time to repair equipment returning from operations in
Afghanistan because of the nature of the repairs and difficulty of
removing the equipment from theater.
Question. If confirmed, how will you balance maintenance and reset
requirements with fiscal realities and future risk in developing your
budget request?
Answer. The goal of reset and reconstitution is to produce ready
units with the equipment they need for contingencies or current
operations. Any further budget cuts must be balanced against this need
for ready units, and, if confirmed, I will work with the services to
prioritize the readiness of the units needed to implement the
President's strategy.
operational energy
Question. Last July, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Operational Energy Plans and Programs published a policy that any
alternative drop-in replacement fuel procured for DOD-wide use and
distribution within the Class III (Bulk) supply chain must compete with
petroleum products and any awards will be based on the ability to meet
requirements at the best value to the government, including cost.
What is your view of this policy?
Answer. I understand this policy to be a positive one. It is
prudent for the Department to engage in tests and demonstrations that
confirm defense equipment can operate on a range of fuels; however, as
the Department allocates its limited resources to ensure it delivers
necessary warfighting capability, it should only buy large volumes of
these fuels when they are cost-competitive with petroleum products.
Question. What is your assessment of section 526 of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 and how it should apply to
military operations of DOD?
Answer. My understanding is that section 526 has not restricted the
Department from purchasing whatever fuel it has needed to support
military operations. Rather, section 526 applies only to contracts that
are for the express purpose of buying alternative or synthetic fuel. As
long as mission capability is not restricted, it is helpful to have
this guidance that new fuels should not be any more polluting than
fuels produced from conventional petroleum sources.
Question. Considering the potential of further cuts to Defense
budgets and the importance of energy security, do you believe DOD
should jointly invest with other government agencies in the
construction of a commercial biofuels refinery?
Answer. I understand the Department is in the early planning stages
of such a project, undertaken in partnership with the private sector
and the Departments of Energy and Agriculture, which have the lead
roles for the Federal Government in promoting biofuels. I have not
reviewed this project; however, I believe the Nation's long-term energy
security would benefit from a competitive, domestic renewable fuels
industry--the Department has a long history of contributing to national
innovation by innovating to meet the defense mission. As a major
consumer of liquid fuels, the Department would benefit from that
industry as well. That said, I am not yet in a position to comment on
the trade-offs between the value of this investment and the other
priorities of the Department. Given the Department's funding
constraints, I would, if confirmed, examine the value of this
investment carefully before authorizing it to proceed.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for
Defense investments in energy technologies?
Answer. My broad priorities for defense energy investments will be
those that: increase military capabilities, provide more mission
success, and lower total cost. If confirmed, I will focus on both
operational effectiveness and efficiency--improving the energy
performance of aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and military bases;
reducing the vulnerability of our fuel supply lines; lowering the load
our expeditionary forces must carry; and diversifying the energy
supplies we use.
law of the sea convention
Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is
pending consideration in the U.S. Senate.
What is your view on whether or not the United States should join
the Law of the Sea convention?
Answer. I strongly support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea
Convention. Ratification would allow the United States to take its
rightful place and enjoy the benefits and protections of this treaty.
Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention
help or hinder the United States' security posture?
Answer. Becoming a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would
enhance the U.S. security posture around the globe in several
significant ways. First and foremost, accession would enable the United
States to reinforce all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea
codified in the Convention, including the navigational and over-flight
rights that are critical to the global mobility of U.S. forces as well
as the right to submit extended continental shelf claims that would
help us preserve the rights to potential resources. Additionally,
accession would help the United States to promote a common rules-based
approach among other nations to peacefully resolve their territorial
and maritime disputes, particularly in East Asia. Further, accession
would add to the Department's credibility in a large number of Asia-
focused multilateral venues where Law of the Sea matters are discussed.
Lastly, accession would reassure some nations who have expressed
concerns of the legality of cooperative security efforts that United
States supports, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. The
United States has longstanding interests in freedom of the seas and
respect for international law, and our accession to the Convention
would further demonstrate our commitment to those national interests.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
u.s.-armenian defense relationship
1. Senator Levin. Mr. Hagel, what is your assessment of the U.S.-
Armenia defense relationship, and what steps, if any, would you take to
strengthen that relationship?
Mr. Hagel. The U.S.-Armenia defense relationship is sound. As with
all relationships, there is room to grow and areas where we can
strengthen our cooperation and partnership. That growth will be based
on shared interests and willingness to cooperate, available resources,
and capacity to absorb new capabilities and missions.
If confirmed, I would continue to engage Armenian leaders to
strengthen existing areas of engagement and identify new areas of
cooperation that support Armenia's defense reforms, especially its
peacekeeping brigade, and continue its ability to deploy in coalition
operations. I would look for the United States to be Armenia's partner
of choice and help Armenia's defense establishment contribute to
regional security and stability.

nuclear triad
2. Senator Levin. Mr. Hagel, the Global Zero report provides an
illustrative example of a future alternative nuclear policy and force
structure in the 2022 timeframe that would eliminate, through
negotiated international agreements, our land-based Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) as a means to reduce the size of our nuclear
forces consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
Do agree with General Kehler, the Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command and with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that at the
present time, the triad of strategic nuclear forces continues to serve
U.S. national security interests?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I agree that the NPR's recommendation remains the
right one at the present time. I believe that the triad's mix of ICBMs,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers continues to support U.S. national security interests
under New START limits.

malign iranian influence
3. Senator Levin. Mr. Hagel, Iran supports proxies in Lebanon,
Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and the Western Hemisphere. In your
view, what is the impact of Iran's activities in places such as
Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. Hagel. Iranian support for proxy groups and terrorist
activities in the Middle East region and in places around the world
constitutes a serious threat not only for the stability of our partners
and allies who are directly impacted by these activities, but also for
U.S. interests. In short, Iran's activities are malevolent and intended
to be destabilizing. If confirmed, I intend to focus intently on
countering Iran's malign influence--including preventing Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon.

4. Senator Levin. Mr. Hagel, in your view, what role--if any--
should the Department of Defense (DOD) play in countering malign
Iranian influence in the Middle East?
Mr. Hagel. In my view, DOD could help to counter Iranian malign
activities in at least three ways. First, the Department should support
diplomatic and intelligence efforts to inhibit the activities of
Iranian proxy and terrorist groups. Second, the Department can leverage
its presence in the region to deter and, when directed by the
President, disrupt Iranian malign activities. Third, the Department
could leverage its extensive security cooperation relationships with
countries in the Middle East and around the world to partner in
countering Iranian destabilizing activities.

syria
5. Senator Levin. Mr. Hagel, the civil war in Syria continues and
President Assad's commitment to continuing his regime's ongoing
operations appears unwavering--despite broad international
condemnation. You have indicated that you share the Obama
administration's position that Assad must go. In your view, what is the
most effective way to bring about the end of the Assad regime?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that a political transition should remain our
goal. The best way to weaken the Assad regime at this time is through
political, diplomatic and economic pressure, as well as assisting the
unarmed opposition. If confirmed, I will support the President's
ongoing reassessment of the continuously changing conditions on the
ground in Syria to determine what additional steps may be appropriate.

6. Senator Levin. Mr. Hagel, what is your assessment of the
composition and intentions of the Syrian opposition?
Mr. Hagel. Based on my observations, the opposition is made up
largely of Syrians wanting to free themselves from a repressive ruler.
An important exception is the Al Nusrah Front, which the State
Department has listed as an alias of al Qaeda in Iraq. In my view, the
United States should continue to encourage the Syrian Opposition
Council to pursue an approach that isolates extremist elements but is
inclusive of a broad range of communities inside Syria, and I will
continue this policy if confirmed.

7. Senator Levin. Mr. Hagel, are the opposition's motivations
consistent with U.S. interests in the region?
Mr. Hagel. In Syria, the opposition is made up of disparate groups
with varying interests and values. I believe that the Syrian Opposition
Council's fundamental motivation to end Assad's rule is consistent with
U.S. interests. U.S. efforts in Syria should aim to partner with those
groups that share U.S. interests and values, and isolate those groups--
such as the Al Nusrah Front--which do not.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
armenian genocide
8. Senator Reed. Mr. Hagel, could you please provide clarification
of your views on the Armenian genocide?
Mr. Hagel. As President Obama has emphasized in his April 24th
Remembrance Day statements, the achievement of a full, frank, and just
acknowledgement of the facts of what occurred in 1915 is in all of our
interests. I further concur with the President that the best way to
advance that goal is for the Armenian and Turkish people to address the
facts of the past as a part of their efforts to move forward. If
confirmed, I would continue to strongly support the State Department's
efforts to work with Armenia and Turkey to normalize relations so they
can forge relationships that are peaceful, productive, and prosperous.

global zero report
9. Senator Reed. Mr. Hagel, there have been a number of questions
raised about the Global Zero report on U.S. nuclear policy and force
structure. I want to make sure we understand the context of that
report. Is it correct that the report provides an illustrative
alternative nuclear policy and force structure 10 years in the future--
as an example of how we could continue to reduce our reliance on and
the number of nuclear forces, in line with our future security
requirements?
Mr. Hagel. In the Global Zero report we took a longer-term view of
what might be possible under different circumstances. The policy and
force structure it provided was indeed illustrative in nature. The
study group's analysis was intended to provide a stimulus to national
debate about how many nuclear weapons may be enough in the future, and
to illustrate a possible pathway forward.

10. Senator Reed. Mr. Hagel, is it correct that the illustrative
reductions envisioned would be made through bilateral and multilateral
negotiated arms control agreements?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I agree with the administration's view, as stated
in the 2010 NPR, that large disparities in nuclear capabilities on
either the United States or the Russian side could raise concerns and
could hinder our pursuit of a stable, long-term U.S.-Russian
relationship. Therefore, I agree that further reductions should be
negotiated bilaterally or, if appropriate, multilaterally.

11. Senator Reed. Mr. Hagel, is it correct that pursuing additional
reductions to our nuclear forces, beyond the limits established in the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), is consistent with our
obligations under Article VI of the NPT, and with the findings and
conclusions of the April 2010 NPR?
Mr. Hagel. Yes, I believe that pursuing negotiated reductions below
New START levels would be consistent with both Article VI of the NPT
and with the conclusions of the 2010 NPR.

12. Senator Reed. Mr. Hagel, is it correct that the illustrative
example of an alternative U.S. nuclear policy and force structure in
the next decade would be consistent with maintaining a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent force?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
strategic dispersal
13. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, our Nation must recognize the
spectrum of threats that confront us daily, and position our assets
accordingly. Pearl Harbor taught us assets and resources should not be
concentrated in one place. Dispersing our capital ships is in our best
national security interest and specifically, dispersing the East Coast
carrier fleet is a national security priority. One needs to only look
at the Pacific Fleet to see an excellent example of strategic
dispersal. The Navy has stationed its Pacific Fleet at four different
homeports--San Diego, CA; Bremerton, WA; Everett, WA; and Japan, but
has been slow to accomplish the same thing with our Atlantic Fleet. The
military decision to disperse the fleet has been studied, and
restudied. Admiral after admiral, secretary after secretary, have all
testified keeping a second Atlantic homeport is essential to national
security. In addition, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
clearly states, ``To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack, accident,
or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier
in Mayport, Florida.''
Moving a carrier from Norfolk, VA, to Mayport is a cost-effective
national security objective. As Secretary of Defense, will you maintain
the DOD's support for moving a carrier from Norfolk to Mayport and, as
your predecessors have done, will you ensure strategic dispersal is
again added as an objective in the 2014 QDR?
Mr. Hagel. I agree that our country faces a spectrum of threats and
concur that strategic dispersal is a critical element in reducing risk
and providing strategic flexibility in the event of natural disaster,
manmade calamity or attack by a foreign nation or terrorists. If
confirmed, I will look at strategic dispersal as a means of ensuring we
address strategic risk to our national security objectives. I support
the Department's efforts to continue to prepare Mayport for carrier
access.

14. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, will you support the addition of
programmed funds in the next President's budget to do so?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will ensure future budgets and the
upcoming QDR evaluate all options to maximize our strategic objectives,
including strategic dispersal of our carriers on the east coast.

excess capacity in overseas military installations
15. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, the value of having a forward
footprint with our men and women stationed abroad, as well as the
cooperation it breeds with our allies, is critical to our national
security. However, I am concerned about the excess capacity of U.S.
military bases in overseas locations and the drain of our taxpayers
dollars to maintain these installations. I believe this excess capacity
and the potential for savings needs to be addressed before we begin to
close or realign domestic installations. Please share your thoughts on
this issue.
Mr. Hagel. A prudent manager has to look at all options when faced
with significant budget pressure. That includes reviewing options for
consolidation overseas--particularly in Europe, where the Department is
reducing force structure and there are clear opportunities to reduce
supporting infrastructure. The Department should begin this review
immediately, as specific legislation is not required to consider base
closures overseas. However, this should not preclude the Department
from taking simultaneous action to realize infrastructure savings at
domestic installations. Given the size of the cuts the Department is
facing, it is unrealistic to expect to achieve all necessary savings by
looking only at overseas infrastructure.

moratorium on drilling in the gulf of mexico
16. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, in 2006, you cosponsored the Gulf of
Mexico Energy Security Act to restrict leasing in areas of the eastern
Gulf of Mexico within 125 miles of Florida, including areas in the Gulf
of Mexico east of the military mission line. Previous Secretaries of
Defense (Rumsfield, Gates) supported a moratorium on drilling east of
the military mission line. These training ranges are vital for our
fifth generation air superiority assets--F-22, F-35--as well as
providing an area for the critical testing of the weaponry on various
airframes. As Secretary of Defense, will you maintain this vital
military test and training area?
Mr. Hagel. My understanding is that the Department conducted
analysis in 2010 that identified some parts of this region where
drilling would not interfere with military activities if the drilling
activities are significantly constrained--for example, in some regions,
drilling was deemed compatible if the structures were subsurface. If
confirmed, I will review this analysis and ensure the Department does
not put critical military test and training capabilities at risk.

afghanistan drawdown
17. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, President Obama plans to withdraw
combat forces from Afghanistan by 2014. The U.S. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are transitioning from fighting to
training and advising the Afghan security forces, and during his recent
meeting with President Karzai, President Obama signaled the transition
to Afghan security forces may be accelerated. What footprint should the
U.S. and NATO allies have after 2014?
Mr. Hagel. The President has stated, and I agree, that the scope of
the international mission in Afghanistan after 2014 should focus on two
primary objectives: first, to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and its
affiliates; and second, to train, advise, and assist the Afghan forces
so they can maintain their own security. This mission shift is
consistent with what was agreed upon by the United States, NATO allies,
and ISAF and Afghan partners at the Chicago NATO Summit last year and
also with our long-term Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Afghan
Government, signed May 1, 2012. I understand that the President is
considering a range of options provided by his military commanders and
national security team. I have not been a part of those discussions,
but, if confirmed, I will work to ensure that the appropriate resources
and capabilities are made available for the post-2014 mission.

18. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, how will the Afghanistan Government
afford to maintain their military operations?
Mr. Hagel. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the United States,
NATO allies, and other international partners pledged to provide
significant financial assistance after 2014 to help maintain the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF). The Afghan Government also pledged to
provide at least $500 million a year for the ANSF beginning in 2015,
and to increase this amount over time as its economy grows. The
international donor community has also pledged its support to
Afghanistan's continued economic and social development after 2014
through commitments made at the 2012 Tokyo conference, including
pledges for $16 billion in civilian aid over 4 years. With this
support, as Afghanistan's economy grows and its revenues increase,
Afghanistan will increasingly be able to take responsibility for future
security costs. Further, it is my understanding that DOD is working
closely with the Afghan Government to ensure that the force we are
building and developing is a sustainable one. If confirmed, I will
continue to work closely with the Afghan Government to ensure that the
ANSF is sustainable within available resources.

camp lejeune water contamination
19. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, Florida has 16,000 veterans and
civilians in the Camp Lejeune water contamination registry, second only
to North Carolina. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR) is completing studies designed to determine the size and scope
of water contamination at Camp Lejeune. In January, ATSDR released the
preliminary results of a drinking water study, which shows the
following:

Housing complex drinking water was contaminated with
dry cleaning solvents from 1957 to 1987 above the current
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) limits.
Separate housing areas were contaminated with organic
compounds (from 1 million gallons of spilled gasoline) from
1953 to 1985 above the current EPA limits.

Recent ATSDR findings show drinking water contamination at Camp
Lejeune from 1953 through 1987. Although the U.S. Navy Bureau of
Medicine had established Navy drinking water standards during this time
period, DOD continues to state that no standards existed. As Secretary
of Defense, will you ensure that these misleading statements from the
Navy and Marine Corps receive the proper oversight from you?
Mr. Hagel. The health and well-being of our servicemembers, their
families, and civilian employees is of the utmost importance to me. If
confirmed, I will be committed to finding answers to the many questions
surrounding the historic water quality issue at Camp Lejeune and
ensuring appropriate oversight of these efforts. Working with the
leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps, I will engage the proper experts
and review all the facts pertaining to the Bureau of Medicine
Instruction to which you refer, ensuring that accurate information is
provided to all who believe they may have been exposed to contaminated
water at Camp Lejeune. The Department will continue to understand the
meaning of ongoing scientific efforts and provide comprehensive
science-based answers to our servicemembers, their families, and
civilian employees.
I applaud Congress' efforts to support families through the passage
of the Honoring America's Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families
Act of 2012 and I pledge to support the Department of Veterans Affairs
efforts to properly implement the legislation.

air force oversight
20. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, the Air Force recently released two
major decisions which affected Florida: the Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) reorganization and the KC-46 basing selection. We believe there
is room for improvement in regards to the Air Force routing and seeking
validation through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on
these very important decisions.
In regards to the KC-46 basing decision and the analysis to
determine future requirements, the level of engagement and coordination
between the Air Force and Combatant Commands (COCOM), as well as OSD
validation of the Air Force decision, requires additional attention.
On December 18, 2012, in section 2814 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013, the Air Force was
directed to submit a report and include the efficiencies and
effectiveness associated with the AFMC reorganization, as well as the
extent to which the proposed changes were coordinated with OSD.
Critical decisions of a strategic nature need to be properly
coordinated with the COCOMs. As Secretary of Defense, how will you
direct your staff to ensure the Air Force seeks OSD validation prior to
releasing decisions such as these?
Mr. Hagel. It is my understanding that each Service has a
decisionmaking methodology and process for managing its operations,
organizational structure, and basing decisions. OSD oversees these
efforts, which involve key stakeholders including the COCOM. For
reorganization decisions such as these, I think it is important that
the Secretary of Defense allow the Military Departments the latitude to
make proposals to streamline management functions while also preserving
core capabilities. OSD oversight of this process ensures that affected
stakeholders have the opportunity to provide their perspective on the
implications of proposed changes. If confirmed, I will ensure my staff
and the combatant commands continue to appropriately examine the Air
Force approach to basing decisions.

taiwan relations act
21. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and
the Six Assurances of 1982 have contributed to the peace and stability
of the Asia-Pacific region for the past 3 decades. With the military
balance--including air superiority--gradually shifting in China's
favor, what are your plans to implement the security commitment the
United States has for Taiwan under this framework?
Mr. Hagel. I agree that the Taiwan Relations Act has contributed to
peace and stability in the region for over 30 years. In my view, the
increasing complexity and sophistication of the military threat to
Taiwan from China means that Taiwan must devote greater attention to
asymmetric concepts and innovative technologies to maximize Taiwan's
strengths and advantages. If confirmed, I would work closely with
Congress, throughout DOD, and with our interagency partners to ensure
the continued effective implementation of all of the relevant
provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

22. Senator Nelson. Mr. Hagel, as Taiwan is likely to retire some
of its older fighter aircraft in the next 5 to 10 years, do you believe
that sales of advanced aircraft are a next step in this commitment?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I would work closely with Congress,
throughout DOD and with our interagency partners to ensure the
continued effective implementation of all of the relevant provisions of
the Taiwan Relations Act. If confirmed, I will look at what specific
capabilities will help Taiwan meet its self-defense needs in light of
the security situation in the Taiwan Strait and the evolving military
capabilities on the mainland.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
contracting reform
23. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Hagel, in 2011, in its final report to
Congress, the Commission on Wartime Contracting found that as much as
$60 billion, roughly $12 million ``every day for the past 10 years,''
was lost to waste or fraud through contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition to the financial costs, the Commission found that poor
planning, management, and oversight of contracts damaged the United
States' strategic and diplomatic objectives overseas. Building on the
Commission's recommendations, last year I offered legislation, along
with our former Senate colleague, Jim Webb, to reform wartime
contracting practices within DOD, the Department of State, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID). Major provisions of this
legislation were signed into law as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2013.
Section 843 of the new law requires the Secretary to establish a
chain of authority and responsibility for policy, planning, and
execution of operational contract support. Do I have your commitment to
direct the needed resources to look at our overreliance on contractors
and our loss of core capabilities in certain areas and to report back
to me on the responsibilities you lay out after this review?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. If confirmed, you have my commitment to look at the
Department's reliance on the use of contractors in contingency
operations and to assess what core capabilities should be retained in
DOD.

24. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Hagel, section 846 requires the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a risk assessment of certain types of
contracting, including not only private security contractors, but also
contracts for training, intelligence, and a host of other problem
areas. You have your pick of poster child case studies in Iraq and
Afghanistan to know this is a problem. DOD does not operate in a vacuum
in wartime. Do I have your commitment to work with the State Department
and USAID, who are also subject to this provision, and to conduct this
assessment based not just on whether you are legally entitled to
contract something out, but on whether it makes sense in the long term,
for both our military mission and our own future capabilities to do so?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with State Department and
USAID in conducting the required risk assessment of contingency
contracting from not just a legal perspective but also from the
perspective of our long-term capability needs.

f/a-18
25. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Hagel, the F/A-18 program has been a
model acquisition program, and continues to deliver Super Hornets on-
time and on-schedule at less than half the cost of an F-35. The fact
is, the Super Hornet is an aircraft that has performed superbly in
virtually every combat operation and delivers nearly all of the
capability.
As the F-35 program continues to slip, we are nearing the end of
the production line for the Super Hornet, which is currently scheduled
to shut down in 2014. I am concerned that the United States could be
left with a gap in the defense industrial bases' ability to produce
strike fighters and eliminates DOD's ability to rely on the F/A-18
lines to manage future F-35 cost, performance, and schedule risks. As
Secretary of Defense, how would you address this gap?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will assess the strike fighter
capability mix, the progress of the F-35, and the state of the F/A-18
production line to determine if a gap exists and evaluate the options
to address it for feasibility and affordability.

26. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Hagel, international sales of the F/A-18
could help mitigate the risk of the closing of domestic strike fighter
production line that can address our own strike fighter shortfall. Will
you ensure that DOD actively supports international sales of the F/A-
18?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department actively
supports foreign military sales of U.S. defense products including the
F-18.

sexual assault
27. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Hagel, DOD under Secretary Panetta's
leadership has implemented a number of initiatives to try to curb
sexual assaults in the military--a problem he has stated could be six
times greater than reported--and we have seen both military and
civilian leaders acknowledge that sexual assault is a problem that
affects the recruitment, retention, and readiness of our armed forces.
This committee has taken up the issue of sexual violence in the
military and has implemented some reforms in the NDAA, most recently in
fiscal year 2013.
We have seen some promising programs developed by the Services, as
well. You mentioned in one of your responses to the advance policy
questions that you look forward to hearing about the outcome of the Air
Force's pilot program that assigns an attorney to each victim of sexual
assault who requests one to represent them through the process. I have
been impressed by the training for special investigators going on at
the Army's Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri.
This course has been recognized as the ``gold standard'' for special
investigator training, which both DOD and Congress have encouraged the
other Services to follow.
As a former prosecutor, I understand how critically important the
investigation process is to the outcome of sexual assault cases. The
investigation process is also key for victims, as victims may feel more
comfortable coming forward to report their cases if they have
confidence that the military justice system is working and that
perpetrators will be brought to justice.
While I recognize each of the Military Services have a unique
history and culture, that should not be an excuse for refusing to adopt
best practices to combat a problem they all share. Will you push the
Services to adopt best practices in their efforts to combat sexual
assault?
Mr. Hagel. It is my understanding that the Services are sharing
information about their processes and working to adopt these best
practices across the Services. If confirmed, I will work to continue
and expand this important effort.

28. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Hagel, will you review whether the
Services have done enough, in your view, to address the problem of
sexual assault within the military?
Mr. Hagel. Sexual assault is a horrible crime and cannot be
tolerated, ignored, or condoned in DOD. If confirmed, I will be fully
committed to combating this crime and determined in reducing the
instance of sexual assault, with a goal of eliminating it from the
military.
I know that the over the past year, the Department has developed
and implemented several new policies and procedures to prevent the
crime of sexual assault, support victims, strengthen investigations,
and hold offenders appropriately accountable. I also know that these
efforts are not enough.
The Department must continue its multi-discplinary approach in
combatting sexual assault. Prevention efforts are important, so that
the crimes do not happen in the first place. These efforts must ensure
that every servicemember, from top to bottom in our military ranks,
knows that dignity and respect are core values we must all live by.
But accountability is key and people who violate the standards of
acceptable behavior must be held appropriately accountable for their
actions. I believe a positive first step was elevating the initial
disposition of the most serious sexual assault cases to the level of
colonel or Navy captain, or higher. Military commanders are essential
to making sexual assault prevention and response efforts successful.
I look forward to learning more about the Department's ongoing
program to develop Special Victims Capabilities across each of the
Services, a program legislated in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, and
which is under development in the Department in the form of special
training and standardized procedures for investigators, prosecutors,
paralegals, and victim witness liaisons. This program's objective is to
enhance the quality of investigations and accountability in sexual
assault cases and I fully support it.
I also look forward to hearing more about the impact of the Air
Force's pilot program, implemented in January, which assigns an
attorney to a victim of sexual assault who requests one to represent
them. I believe this could be a very good way to improve
accountability. It will improve victim confidence and increase the
number of victims who are willing to report; thereby increasing the
number of cases that can be investigated and the number of cases in
which offenders can be held appropriately accountable.
If confirmed, I will be resolute in advancing the Department's
prevention, investigation, accountability, victim support and
assessment programs in order that we address the problem of sexual
assault in a persistent, comprehensive, and effective manner.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
alternative energy programs
29. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, do you believe that the U.S.
military's dependence on foreign oil represents a national security
risk?
Mr. Hagel. I am concerned about the Nation's dependence on foreign
oil. At the same time, U.S. military forces need to be able to buy fuel
wherever they operate. I support efforts to reduce the military's
energy needs and diversify supplies in order to increase military
effectiveness.

30. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, do you support the continuation of
DOD's energy conservation and alternative energy development programs?
Mr. Hagel. I support the continuation of energy initiatives that
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense mission. The
Department has a long history of harnessing innovation to meet defense
challenges in ways that can benefit the civilian economy, and there is
potential for such gains in this case.

31. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, do you believe those programs
represent a strategic investment that will benefit U.S. national
security and increase our military capabilities?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. Energy efficiency and alternative energy programs
are critical for cost savings, operational effectiveness, and our
strategic national security goals. The Department has a long history of
harnessing innovation to meet defense challenges in ways that can
benefit the civilian economy, and there is potential for such gains in
this case.

africa
32. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, what specific actions should be taken
by DOD to address the wave of extremism in the Sahel region of Africa?
Mr. Hagel. I believe the United States should continue to support
France's strong actions to counter al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb's effort to establish a safe haven in Mali, including by
providing DOD assistance. The Departments of Defense and State should
also continue contributing to the robust international support to the
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). AFISMA will
help to degrade the threat posed by al Qaeda and allied terrorist
groups and put Mali on a path to stability.
Elsewhere in the Sahel region, the United States should continue to
work with regional partners to strengthen their security capacities and
create the conditions to apply region-wide pressure on extremist
groups.

33. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, what methods would you prescribe to
prevent additional countries and national governments in North Africa
from falling to extremists?
Mr. Hagel. Extremists in North Africa clearly pose a significant
threat to regional stability. If confirmed, I will work with the
Secretary of State, other interagency counterparts, international
partners and allies, and countries across the region to build the
capacity of their militaries to counter these threats and to assist
North African governments in improving governance and security for
their populations. This includes preventing the expansion of terrorist
networks and then degrading and, ultimately, defeating terrorist
groups.

pakistan
34. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, do you believe that there are steps
that the United States should take to further pressure Pakistan to
withdraw their tacit support for terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba
and the Haqqani Network in order to enhance the prospects for a stable
peace in the region?
Mr. Hagel. The ability of militant and terrorist networks to
operate on Pakistani soil poses a threat to the United States,
Pakistan, and other countries in South Asia. Therefore, the United
States should continue to work to ensure that Pakistan meets its
commitments, including supporting a durable settlement in Afghanistan,
pressuring the Haqqani Network, and not allowing Pakistani territory to
be used to launch terrorist attacks on other countries. Our approach
should apply diplomatic pressure where needed and ensure our security
assistance, which is an important tool, is not unconditional but
conditions advance U.S. strategic interests.

military healthcare
35. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, as Secretary of Defense, would you
continue to prioritize funding for military suicide prevention
programs, as well as for improved treatment for physical and
psychological injuries?
Mr. Hagel. I am deeply concerned about the significant rise in
military suicides and am firmly committed to prioritizing funding for
the full range of the Department's mental and physical health programs.
These programs include: suicide prevention programs, such as the Army's
Shoulder to Shoulder and Navy's Combat and Operational Stress Control
resilience and fitness programs; peer-to-peer programs such as the
Vets4Warriors which focuses on our Reserve members; transition and
family support programs, such as Recovery Care Coordination; and
quality of life programs, such as those offered through Military
OneSource. In addition, I will continue ongoing collaboration with the
Department of Veterans Affairs, with continued emphasis on the Military
Crisis Line, to ensure that our members receive support as they
transition back to their civilian lives. Finally, and most importantly,
I agree with Secretary Panetta that there is a significant leadership
role and responsibility for preventing suicides and building the
resilience of the force. If confirmed, I will continue to look for
opportunities to improve our military and civilian leaders' ability to
understand the needs of distressed servicemembers and reduce stigma so
that they can be properly guided to the support they need.

role of the reserve component
36. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, would you agree that, over the last
decade, the National Guard and Reserves have demonstrated their value
to the military mission in support of domestic disaster relief, combat
operations, and in a variety of other roles at home and abroad?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. The National Guard and Reserves have played an
integral role during the past decade, mobilizing in unprecedented
numbers for the wars in Afghanistan. They have also been critical to
Homeland defense and security, highlighted by their heroic efforts
during Hurricane Sandy.

37. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, please discuss your views of the
Reserve and National Guard and the role they should play in the coming
years.
Mr. Hagel. The Reserve components have served with distinction over
more than a decade of war and continue to be a relevant and cost effect
part of the Total Force. In a time of declining budgets and complex
contingencies, I believe that the Department will continue to call on
both Active and Reserve components to accomplish the domestic and
overseas requirements of the new strategy. I understand that the
Department is still in the process of finding the proper Active
component/Reserve component mix that will most effectively accomplish
our new strategy in a constrained fiscal environment. If confirmed, I
will work with our military leaders on this important issue.

russian policies
38. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, since Vladimir Putin was reelected as
Russia's president, the Russian Federation has sent mixed signals for
what its defense and foreign policies will be going forward. The
creation of a so-called ``Eurasian Union''--which would consist of
Russia and other former Soviet republics--was a key component of
President Putin's campaign platform, and is viewed by some as an
attempt by Russia to ``re-Sovietize'' the region, which would pressure
U.S. allies in the region. Former Senator John Kerry (nominated to be
Secretary of State) has reaffirmed the U.S. Government's unwavering
support for the independence of these countries and their right to
choose ``political, military, [and] economic'' alliances ``free from
coercion''. One such U.S. strategic partner, Azerbaijan, recently
allowed a lease with Russia for the Gabala Radar station--the last
Russian installation on Azerbaijan's soil--to expire due to a
disagreement over the cost of the lease, continuing a trend of moving
away from Moscow's orbit. As Secretary of Defense, what will be your
policy to ensure that the independence of U.S. strategic partners in
the region is preserved?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will support continuing engagement with
the leaders of the defense and security institutions of former Soviet
Republics to advance reform and defense modernization goals, to
contribute to regional stability and security, and to advance our
shared security interests. It is possible for countries in the region
to preserve their independence while also having a constructive,
positive relationship with the United States, Russia, and other
countries. As sovereign independent nations these countries must pursue
the bilateral and multinational relationships that they assess are in
their own national interests, but I would work to ensure the United
States is the partner of choice. Working with the Department of State
and other U.S. agencies, I would, if confirmed, continue to support
partners in the region building their government institutions,
practices, and capabilities to enable them to exercise the full measure
of responsibilities and opportunities of independent, sovereign
countries.

cooperative threat reduction
39. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, do you support the work conducted
under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs which seek to
eliminate threats, demilitarize systems, and to secure stocks of
existing weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I believe that the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program is a vital mechanism for partnering with other nations to
counter the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. The program is
now global and focused on core U.S. priorities, including nuclear
security, countering biological threats, and destroying chemical
weapons. If confirmed, I will continue to support the work of this
vital program.

40. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, how would you characterize your own
views on the importance and priorities of the CTR program, originally
undertaken in the former Soviet Union, and more recently expanding into
other territories including Africa and the Middle East?
Mr. Hagel. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, I believe
that it made good sense for the CTR program to focus on reducing the
threat posed by the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. Based on
information currently available to me, I believe that the program's
recent expansion into new geographic areas, including Africa, the
Middle East, and Southeast Asia also makes good sense, as does a new
focus on biological threats. In my view, CTR remains a very important
tool in reducing risks to the United States.

nuclear modernization
41. Senator Udall. Mr. Hagel, do you support the restoration of
funding appropriations to maintain the U.S. nuclear triad, and for key
nuclear infrastructure programs such as the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement Nuclear Facility in the fiscal year 2013
appropriations bills?
Mr. Hagel. I support the President's commitment to a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. I
believe that maintaining the triad and modernizing our nuclear forces
and the nuclear weapons infrastructure are national security
priorities. If confirmed, I will give sustained attention to these
issues.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
sexual assault/domestic violence
42. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, as you and I discussed earlier this
week, the number of sexual assault and domestic violence cases reported
in the military every year is appalling. Studies show that there are
3,200 reported cases every year, but even more astonishing is that the
actual number is estimated at 19,000 cases. This means that somewhere
around 80 percent of all cases go unreported.
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that most
victims stay silent because of ``the belief that nothing would be done;
fear of ostracism, harassment, or ridicule . . . or labeled trouble
makers.'' That same report goes on to say that some victims go silent
because they do the math: only 8 percent of cases that are investigated
end in prosecution, compared with 40 percent for civilians arrested for
sex crimes.
This year's NDAA included provisions to combat this problem,
including enhanced education, training, and awareness for our troops
and the leadership. While this is a positive step, just having a zero-
tolerance policy and getting out the message is not always enough.
If confirmed, do you pledge to ensure the NDAA sexual assault
provisions are implemented as rapidly as possible?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

43. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, how do you intend to further prevent
sexual assault and domestic violence?
Mr. Hagel. Sexual assault is a horrible crime and it cannot be
tolerated, ignored, or condoned in DOD. If confirmed, I will be fully
committed to combating this crime and determined in reducing sexual
assault, with a goal of eliminating it from the military.
I know that the over the past year, the Department has developed
and implemented several new policies and procedures to prevent the
crime of sexual assault, support victims, strengthen investigations,
and hold offenders appropriately accountable. I also know that these
efforts are not enough.
The Department must continue its multi-disciplinary approach in
combating sexual assault. Prevention efforts are important, so that the
crimes do not happen in the first place. These efforts must ensure that
every servicemember, from top to bottom in our military ranks, knows
that dignity and respect are core values we must all live by.

44. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, how will you approach fostering an
environment where victims feel safe to come forward to report these
crimes?
Mr. Hagel. I believe a first step in this area is an Air Force
pilot program, implemented in January, which assigns an attorney to a
victim of sexual assault who requests one to represent them. I believe
this could be a very good way to increase accountability. It will
improve victim confidence, increase the number of victims who are
willing to report; thereby increasing the number of cases that can be
investigated and the number of cases in which offenders can be held
appropriately accountable. If confirmed, I will continue to study the
impact of this pilot program and look for other initiatives that may be
helpful.

45. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, how do intend to increase
accountability at all levels--not only of the perpetrators, but also of
their leadership?
Mr. Hagel. Accountability is key and people who violate the
standards of acceptable behavior must be held appropriately accountable
for their actions. I applaud Secretary Panetta's decision last year to
elevate the initial disposition of the most serious sexual assault
cases to the level of colonel or Navy captain, or higher. Military
commanders are essential to making sexual assault prevention and
response efforts successful.
I also look forward to learning more about the Department's ongoing
program to develop Special Victims Capabilities across each of the
Services, a program legislated in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, and
which is under development in the Department in the form of special
training and standardized procedures for investigators, prosecutors,
paralegals, and victim witness liaisons. This program's objective is to
enhance the quality of investigations and accountability in sexual
assault cases. I fully support it.

camp lejeune water contamination
46. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, historic and recent public statements
made by the leadership of the U.S. Marine Corps cite that at the time
of the drinking water contamination period aboard Camp Lejeune, there
were no regulatory standards governing the organic chemicals which
fouled the water aboard the base. Yet, recent Department of the Navy
and Marine Corps documents uncovered by former marines and their
families affected by the contamination indicate there was indeed a
Naval regulatory standard in place for total organics in potable water
as early as 1963 (NAVMED P-5010-5 and BUMED 6240.3B and beginning in
1972, version C).
As Secretary of Defense, what steps would you take to ensure the
Department of the Navy and Marine Corps are truthfully conveying
pertinent facts, disseminating important developments to the Camp
Lejeune community, and allowing the community a voice in the matter to
ensure total transparency regarding this issue?
Mr. Hagel. The health and well-being of our servicemembers, their
families, and civilian employees is of the utmost importance to me. If
I am confirmed, I will be committed to finding answers to the many
questions surrounding the historic water quality issue at Camp Lejeune,
including ensuring appropriate oversight of these efforts. I will work
with the leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps to engage the proper
experts and review all the facts pertaining to the Bureau of Medicine
Instruction to which you refer, ensuring that accurate information is
provided to all who believe they may have been exposed to contaminated
water at Camp Lejeune. The Department will continue to understand the
meaning of ongoing scientific efforts and provide comprehensive
science-based answers to our servicemembers, their families, and
civilian employees.
I applaud Congress' efforts to support families through the passage
of the Honoring America's Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families
Act of 2012 and I pledge to aggressively support the Department of
Veterans Affairs efforts to properly implement the legislation.

biofuels
47. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, in August 2011, the Departments of
the Navy, Agriculture, and Energy signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) to invest $510 million to spur production of advanced aviation
and marine biofuels under the Defense Production Act. The joint-MOU,
where each Department contributes $170 million, requires substantial
cost-sharing from private industry of at least a one-to-one match.
Critics of the MOU claim the Department of Energy (DOE) should be
the only Government agency involved in the promotion of advanced
biofuels. While DOE must certainly play an important role, I believe
the Navy and the Department of Agriculture also need to be involved.
From my perspective, leveraging the unique capabilities of each
agency--in partnership with the private sector--exemplifies the type of
innovative approach needed to solve our country's most vexing
challenges.
As the end-user of this fuel, do you believe there are significant
benefits of having the Navy participate in this initiative?
Mr. Hagel. I have not reviewed all the details of this initiative;
however, all of the Military Services require fuel to operate, so all,
including the Navy, have an interest in promoting military energy
security and have the potential to benefit from such an initiative. I
agree that it is important for the Department to leverage the expertise
of civilian agencies that have the lead or an interest in this area.
The Defense Department has a long history of harnessing innovation to
meet defense challenges in ways that can benefit the civilian economy,
and there is potential for such gains in this case.

48. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, would you agree that leveraging the
unique capabilities of these three agencies enhances the prospects for
programmatic success?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #47.

49. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, in this budgetary environment, I
understand that difficult decisions need to be made about funding
defense programs. However, as the largest single consumer of fuel in
the world, DOD uses approximately 120 million barrels of oil each year
and spent over $17 billion in fiscal year 2011 on fuel alone. This
dependency on a single source of energy jeopardized our military's
readiness. When the price of oil goes up $1, it costs the Navy an
additional $30 million and the entire DOD over $100 million. In 2011,
the Navy was forced to pay an additional $500 million because the price
of fuel was higher than budgeted. Costs overruns could force the
military to curtail training and less urgent operations--resulting in
increased risk to future missions.
Do you believe that developing a commercially viable biofuels
industry will help DOD diversify its fuel sources, reduce the risk of
energy volatility, and ultimately produce cost savings for the Navy?
Mr. Hagel. I believe it is in the long-term energy security
interests of the United States to promote a commercially viable
biofuels industry. A commercially competitive industry could help to
reduce market volatility and reduce risk. If confirmed, I will look
into the role biofuels could play in increasing military capabilities
and lowering costs and risks for the Navy and other military
departments.

lithium
50. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, DOD has indicated that sustaining
domestic capacity of lithium metals is critical because of the
military's reliance on rechargeable lithium batteries in the field and
the importance of lithium to developing next generation batteries. Do
you believe it is in our national security interest to secure domestic
production of lithium metal and reduce our reliance on imports from
China?
Mr. Hagel. My understanding is the Department is examining a range
of options to ensure adequate and sustainable supply of lithium metal.
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the Department has access to
lithium metals, using all authorities available.

51. Senator Hagan. Mr. Hagel, will you consider using authorities
under the Defense Product Act to accomplish this goal?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #50.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
downsizing the force
52. Senator Manchin. Mr. Hagel, if you are confirmed as Secretary
of Defense, you will oversee the military's largest personnel
downsizing in a generation. This, I believe, is one of the most
important tasks facing the next Secretary, especially with the high
rate of veterans' unemployment. I am very concerned about telling
servicemembers, many who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan multiple
times, their services are no longer needed as the force downsizes. If
confirmed, what approach would you bring to overseeing this massive
personnel drawdown?
Mr. Hagel. The Department must take care of its people, not only
while they are serving, but it is an obligation that continues through
the transition to civilian life. We, as a Nation, owe it to them for
the sacrifices they have made.
It is my understanding that the Department has worked with the
Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Labor, the Small Business
Administration, and the Department of Education to redesign the
Transition Assistance Program (TAP). The redesigned TAP curriculum
contains a Department of Labor sponsored employment workshop, a
Veterans Affairs benefits briefing and registrations, a financial
planning workshop and Service-specific training to equip members with
the tools needed to successfully pursue their post military goals. The
Department is also working with other agencies to meet the mandates of
the VOW to Hire Heroes Act.
If confirmed, I will look at the services available for our men and
women, both those that continue to serve and those that transition to
civilian life.

dod audit
53. Senator Manchin. Mr. Hagel, in your advance policy questions
you provided the following statement regarding the Pentagon's audit
objectives: ``Yes. I support the effort and will maintain the
Department's commitment to producing audit-ready financial statements
by the congressional deadline of September 2017, with an audit
beginning by the end of calendar year 2017.'' Will you do everything in
your power to speed this process up?
Mr. Hagel. Improving the Department's financial management
capability is an important priority and, if confirmed, I will ensure
that senior leaders throughout the Department are focused on this goal
and hold them accountable. While I will push for this effort to be
completed as soon as possible and by the dates we have set, the
Department must also be careful not to take manual or ``heroic'' steps
to achieve this goal in an inefficient manner. I understand Congress
has, in fact, directed DOD not to follow such an approach.

military families
54. Senator Manchin. Mr. Hagel, DOD will face difficult budgetary
choices in the future. Priorities will need to be evaluated and some
programs will face cancellation or reduction. After a decade of war it
is not only our soldiers that feel the stress, but so do their
families. How will you help ensure programs for military families
continue to be a high priority for DOD?
Mr. Hagel. I share the concern of our senior military leaders that
fiscal constraints will affect the very necessary programs needed to
support the families of our servicemembers. If confirmed, I will seek
to prioritize funding for family readiness programs to ensure that the
quality of support for our military families is not negatively affected
by budget reductions while also identifying the most effective programs
and best practices. If confirmed, I will work through a newly formed
Task Force on Common Services for military families to seek to protect
funding for family readiness programs.

u.s. role in the pacific
55. Senator Manchin. Mr. Hagel, there has been an increase in
tension in the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands in recent
months. In your view, what is the role of the United States in
territorial disputes in Asia?
Mr. Hagel. I support the President's policy that while the United
States does not take sides over competing claims, the United States
opposes any and all forms of coercion to resolve disputes or apply
pressure (including economic measures). In addition, I believe that the
United States should continue to make clear that we will meet our
Treaty commitments.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
sequestration
56. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you support Secretary Panetta's assessment of the
damaging effects that sequestration would have on the entire DOD and
defense industries. Please describe the negative impact to military
families should Congress fail to reach an agreement.
Mr. Hagel. Sequestration will reduce the operations and maintenance
(O&M) funding that is used to train our troops, to run our bases, and
to run many of our family support programs. While the Department is
still finalizing its assessment of specific impacts, I believe the
these cuts in O&M funding will likely force cuts in our civilian
workforce that will lead to cuts in the hours, services, and staffing
available at clinics, family support centers, libraries, and athletic
facilities. Furthermore, I believe the Department has already concluded
sequestration will force significant cuts in the maintenance of DOD
facilities, which directly affects quality of life.
If confirmed I will make it a priority to minimize the impact of
sequestration on our military families. Sustaining family support
programs in these days of extreme budget uncertainties will be
challenging, but it is an integral part of our military readiness. If
confirmed, I will seek to minimize funding cuts to family support
programs to the greatest extent possible.

57. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, please describe the negative impact
to our defense industrial base should Congress fail to reach an
agreement.
Mr. Hagel. Sequestration would significantly curtail important
industrial base capabilities and skills which, if lost, would be
difficult, expensive, and perhaps even impossible to replace. My
understanding is that the Department has worked diligently to preserve
those truly unique industrial base assets. Sequestration would render
these careful efforts largely ineffectual. I believe the Department is
still assessing the impact on specific weapons programs and service
support contracts, and that those impacts will vary from case to case,
but each such program will be cut by about 10 percent.

women's healthcare
58. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, there have been a number of
positive steps taken over the last year with respect to eliminating
inequalities facing women in our military. One of which was our effort
to bring female servicemember reproductive health care in line with
Federal standards, to ensure women in uniform have the same access to
care as their civilian counterparts. I was encouraged that we were able
to change this policy during last year's NDAA, and I look forward to
its full implementation.
It is my understanding that the Surgeon's Generals of each of the
Services will issue guidance to their Departments to ensure that
doctors and nurses are aware of new medical options available and are
prepared to advise their patients. I also understand that the Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office will issue guidance to victim
advocates to ensure they are aware of this policy change and are
prepared to brief victims on the full range of medical options now
available. Do you commit to implementing this measure, which is now
law, to ensure that our service women have the same health care as the
civilians they protect?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that our female
servicemembers are afforded the same reproductive health care options
as women in the civilian population. I will work with the Services to
guarantee that all medical personnel are aware of the new options and
that every victim has all resources available. I assure you that I will
fully implement all laws protecting women servicemembers' reproductive
rights. My goal is to ensure the health care provided to our
servicemembers remains world class and contemporary.

lesbian/bisexual/gay/transgendered military families
59. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, as the implementation of the repeal
of Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy continues, concerns have been raised
about remaining inequalities faced by Lesbian/Bisexual/Gay/
Transgendered (LBGT) military families. We have a case in New Hampshire
which demonstrates the pain and injustice inflicted by the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). Charlie Morgan is a chief warrant officer in the
Army National Guard. She served her country in the Active Army, the
Reserve and the Guard, and most recently, she was deployed to Kuwait.
Unfortunately, she has been diagnosed with inoperable breast cancer and
due to DOMA, her spouse, Karen, is denied any survivor benefits, and
she is prohibited from health coverage worth well in excess of $10,000
a year. She also cannot get a base pass that would let her escort her
4-year-old daughter to medical appointments on base. Though I recognize
that certain restrictions on monetary benefits apply to LGBT families
under DOMA, will you commit to ensuring that LGBT families are fully
incorporated into military communities and social programs?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. As I have said, I know firsthand the profound
sacrifice our servicemembers and their families make. We must always
take care of our people. That is why, if confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, I will do everything possible to the extent permissible under
current law to provide equal benefits to the families of all our
servicemembers, as members of our military community.

submarines
60. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, recent operations in Libya,
Somalia, and around the globe highlight the value submarines continue
to bring to the fight in both our conventional and covert operations.
Can you discuss the importance of our undersea warfare capability,
particularly with respect to the capabilities the Virginia-class
submarines bring to the Navy?
Mr. Hagel. U.S. undersea warfare capabilities are unparalleled in
the world and give us an asymmetric advantage against our adversaries
in both peace and war. Our U.S. Navy dominates the undersea domain,
using attack and guided missile submarines for a variety of clandestine
missions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
indications and warning, and special operations forces insertion and
recovery. Submarines operate covertly in places that overt units
cannot, providing unequaled capability for intelligence collection.
Ballistic missile submarines, the most survivable leg of the
nuclear triad, are vital to the national mission of strategic
deterrence, and under New START will comprise an increasing percentage
of our operationally deployed weapons.
To maintain our undersea dominance, we must continue a vigorous
submarine building program. The Virginia-class program is the Navy's
most successful shipbuilding program, consistently providing submarines
ahead of schedule and under budget.

pacific versus atlantic focus
61. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, obviously, our strategic shift
towards the Asia-Pacific region prioritizes assets in that area of
responsibility (AOR). However, as recent operations in Libya and Mali,
as well as challenges throughout the Mediterranean, the Middle East,
and North Africa demonstrate, we must maintain the capability to
quickly respond to contingencies on the Atlantic side as well.
Considering the uncertain and complex world of threats we face, how
important is it to maintain flexibility and balance to ensure that our
shift does not leave us vulnerable on the Atlantic side of the country?
Mr. Hagel. I agree that our military forces need to remain
flexible, agile, and balanced in order to be ready for challenges
around the world. I think that DOD recognizes the complexity and
uncertainty of the global security environment and avoids predicting
with certainty how the future will unfold. As outlined in the January
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the Department is developing an
adaptable and technologically-advanced Joint Force capable of
responding to a wide range of contingencies. Regardless of where U.S.
military forces may be positioned or stationed, one of the key
advantages of our military is that we can bring to bear effective
capabilities virtually anywhere throughout the world to address the
threats countering our interests.

israel
62. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, the Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) has been a strong proponent of U.S.-Israeli cooperation on
missile defense and has provided significant funding for cooperative
efforts, like the Arrow system, David's Sling, and the Iron Dome. Last
year, the SASC provided $211 million to help Israel procure additional
Iron Dome defense systems in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. What is
your view on the importance of these cooperative programs?
Mr. Hagel. I strongly support U.S.-Israel cooperative efforts on
missile defense, including Iron Dome. U.S. cooperation with Israel,
enabled by congressional support, has led to the development of one of
the most comprehensive missile defense architectures in the world. Each
of the Israeli programs--Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow--fill a
critical requirement in a multi-layered architecture that has been
designed to protect the Israeli populace from existing and emerging
threats.

63. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, will you commit to continuing these
programs?
Mr. Hagel. Yes, if confirmed, I will seek to continue these
programs and to expand them as appropriate. As we saw in Operation
Pillar of Defense in Gaza, these programs are a lifesaving investment
in Israel's future and our defense relationship.

servicemember reintegration
64. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, you noted in your response to the
advance policy questions that you are committed to working with State
and local governments as well as private and community organizations to
support reintegration of returning servicemembers, particularly those
with combat injuries. Several States have established successful
programs designed to augment reintegration services provided through
DOD's Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP). New Hampshire's
Deployment Cycle Support program is an example of these efforts that
combine State and local as well as public and private funds to provide
comprehensive assistance to military families. What steps can DOD take
to better support these State and local efforts to ensure their
continued success?
Mr. Hagel. I am very familiar with the congressionally-mandated
YRRP established in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 that assists National
Guard and Reserve members as they transition between their military and
civilian roles, providing servicemembers and their families with access
to programs, services, resources, and referrals during all deployment
phases.
I am also aware that there are several State programs that go
beyond YRRP with strong networks of community-based service providers,
and partnerships with State and local governments that are key in
ensuring resources are readily available to servicemembers and their
families when they need them.
I understand that one of the initiatives of the YRRP Center for
Excellence includes evaluating State-based outreach and reintegration
efforts to identify best practices in order to share those initiatives
nationwide. Additionally, the Center for Excellence is evaluating and
substantiating various Service curricula at YRRP events and post-event
survey data to disseminate best practices. They are also creating on-
line toolkits for use across all components at YRRP events.
If confirmed, I will review the Department's support to YRRP
efforts within the Department and across the various State programs to
ensure we are maximizing our combined efforts and sharing best
practices as much as possible.

defense industrial base
65. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hagel, it is critical that DOD and the
Services have an overarching direction and comprehensive policy for
maintaining the manufacturing and engineering capabilities that are
necessary to ensure we have production lines for building ships, combat
vehicles, and even engines and transmissions for our current and future
weapons systems. What is your view of the status and health of the
defense-related industrial base, and can you give your assurances that
you will work to ensure these capabilities remain viable and
competitive in the near- and long-term?
Mr. Hagel. I am committed to a healthy industrial base, and I am
concerned that changes in the defense market may impact that base. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure critical defense industrial base
capabilities remain viable and competitive in the near- and long-term.
The Department is dependent on a strong industrial base for the wide
range of products and services needed to support the missions of our
forces, and to provide for the innovation and technical excellence that
provides technological superiority.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
afghanistan
66. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, I was a cosponsor of the Afghan
Women and Girls Security Promotion Act in the 112th Congress, both the
standalone version and the bill in the form of an amendment that was
included in the final version of the NDAA. I would like to know what
actions you will take to follow the amendment's directive and execute
as robust a report as possible on the efforts made by the U.S.
Government to ensure the security of Afghan women and girls during and
after Afghanistan's transition process?
Mr. Hagel. Promoting and protecting the security of Afghan women
and girls has been a priority of both the Defense and State Departments
in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the State
Department to monitor progress throughout the transition and provide
Congress with information that is responsive to the NDAA.

67. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has reported that some of the $1
billion in fuel purchases from Russia and Turkmenistan were blended
with Iranian oil. What measures are going to be put into place to
ensure that we are not violating our own sanctions on Iran?
Mr. Hagel. I believe the SIGAR reported that there may be Iranian
oil in some products we have purchased. I understand that our contracts
for fuel in Afghanistan, including contracts for fuel purchased in
Russia and Turkmenistan, require certifications that Iran was not a
source of the oil. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that we have
appropriate processes in place to preclude the purchase of fuel that
may have come from Iran and to enforce our own sanctions against Iran.

women in the military
68. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, Secretary Panetta recently
lifted the ban on women serving in direct combat roles. I applaud that
decision and am happy to hear that you plan to continue its
implementation, if confirmed. The military you served in with such
distinction in many ways looks very different than the military of
today. Today, women make up nearly 15 percent of the Armed Forces. More
than 283,000 women have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. More
than 800 women have been wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than
140 women have died. Two women have earned Silver Star medals. Why do
we need to wait until 2016 for the Services to complete their
assessment when so many women are already serving on the front lines?
Mr. Hagel. As I've said, I strongly support Secretary Panetta's
decision to lift the ban on women serving in combat roles. While there
are women serving on the front lines, the rescission of the Direct
Combat Rule and Assignment Policy requires the Services to review the
requirements and standards for all combat positions. It is my
understanding that this process takes, at a minimum, 2 years in order
to review tasks, develop testing, and validate the tests which will
result in gender neutral standards.

69. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, I understand and appreciate that
you support the announcement made last week regarding the policy of
opening combat roles to women. I wholeheartedly support this overdue
change in policy as women already have been fighting and dying on the
frontline. I just as strongly believe that military standards should
not be lowered for women seeking these roles and we will see
extraordinary women meeting those standards and strengthening our
national security. I am concerned, however, about the potential for the
goal posts being moved back, or arbitrary standards set, which would in
effect keep combat roles closed to qualified women. How will you ensure
this policy is implemented as intended and as rapidly as feasible?
Mr. Hagel. I believe the military and civilian leadership are
committed to implementing the rescission as quickly as possible and, if
confirmed, I assure I will work to have it implemented expeditiously. I
will ensure that all standards reflect legitimate requirements for
combat roles. In short, if a female soldier has the full skills and
capabilities required to perform in a position, I will make sure she
does.

70. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, we know that women are already
participating, unofficially, with many combat units and special
operations units. With the lifting of the combat exclusion ban, what
will happen to the women already serving with ground combat troops?
Mr. Hagel. It's my understanding that women who served or are
serving in units under an exception to the ground combat exclusion do
so in an official capacity. It's also my understanding that women
currently serving with ground combat troops will continue to serve with
ground combat troops.

71. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, will their combat service now be
recognized as such?
Mr. Hagel. It's my understanding that women's service in combat is
already being recognized. If confirmed, I expect we will continue to
recognize their service and achievements based on the contributions
they make toward mission accomplishment.

72. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, will they be eligible to compete
now for combat arms leadership positions?
Mr. Hagel. On January 24, 2013, Secretary Panetta rescinded the
1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule and directed
the integration of women into previously closed positions by January 1,
2016. If confirmed, I will continue implementation of that new policy.
Within this policy I expect women will be able to compete for
leadership positions where they are qualified and meet the standards.

73. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, sexual assault is an appalling
problem in our military that continues to threaten the military's core
value of protecting all members of the Armed Forces. It has been
speculated that lifting the direct ground combat exclusion for women
will help mitigate the sexual assault problems in our military by
eliminating gender classes in the military. Do you agree with this
theory, and if so, will you use it as leverage to ensure combat roles
are opened to women swiftly and equally across the Services?
Mr. Hagel. I have not had sufficient time to study this particular
theory. As I have previously stated, sexual assault has no place in our
military or anywhere in our society and I will work tirelessly to
resolve that issue holding all commanders fully accountable.

74. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, lifting the combat exclusion ban
has raised the question of whether women should be required to register
for the Selective Service. Selective Service requirements are
determined by law; would you support Congress' decision to include
women in the mandatory registry for Selective Service at age 18?
Mr. Hagel. This is an issue that concerns DOD, although it is not
responsible for administering the Selective Service System. If
confirmed, I will look forward to participating in any interagency
discussion of the merits of extending selective service registration to
women.

75. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, we have been told many times
that commanders will be held responsible if there is a climate in their
units that contributes to sexual assault or harassment. But I am
concerned that measurable mechanisms for holding leaders accountable in
addressing sexual violence issues have not been devised. DOD needs to
develop a process for more directly holding leaders accountable for
enforcing DOD's sexual abuse and harassment policies. The Defense
Advisory Committee on Women in the Services even recommends that
effectiveness in combating sexual harassment and assault should be a
part of individual performance evaluations of all servicemembers and
not just leaders. Accountability seems to be lacking in many respects.
Case in point: Right now there appears to be no one person assigned to
oversee the implementation of Secretary Panetta's directives on sexual
assault prevention and response.
When it comes to issues of sexual violence in the military, what do
you believe is the best mechanism for evaluating leaders?
Mr. Hagel. The men and women who are serving their country face
many challenges both on and off the battlefield. They should never have
to fear the threat of sexual assault from a fellow soldier or superior.
Accountability is always the most important tool for leader
evaluation. One of the most effective mechanisms across all Services is
the command climate assessment. This tool provides timely feedback as a
modality to determine if leaders have reinforced a culture of mutual
respect and created an atmosphere that reinforces that sexual assault
has no place within our ranks. The results from the assessment are key
indicators whether leaders are taking responsibility for good order,
morale, and discipline.

76. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, do you believe that
effectiveness in combating sexual harassment and assault should be part
of individual performance evaluations for commanders?
Mr. Hagel. Accountability is always the most important tool for
leader evaluation. One of the most effective mechanisms across all
Services is the command climate assessment. This tool provides timely
feedback as a modality to determine if leaders have reinforced a
culture of mutual respect and created an atmosphere that reinforces
that sexual assault has no place within our ranks. The results from the
assessment are key indicators whether leaders are taking responsibility
for good order, morale, and discipline.

77. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, in your opinion, what
consequences should follow if a commander is found to be unresponsive
or ineffective on this issue?
Mr. Hagel. I will hold all commanders responsible for this issue.
In order to successfully address this issue, I will continue to
advance the positive steps taken by Secretary Panetta to change the
policies and the culture that has discouraged victims from speaking out
and trusting that there are resources in place to support and protect
them.
Among the initiatives that have already been taken by this
administration, I feel strongly about efforts to raise the awareness of
this issue and elevate its importance to the Department, including
elevating disposition authority for the most serious cases, requiring
commanders to conduct annual organizational climate assessments, and
enhancing training programs for sexual assault prevention.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
ensure that all of our commanders are responsive and establish
appropriate repercussions for those commanders who do not fully support
this goal.

women's security
78. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, on December 19, 2011, the United
States released its new National Action Plan (NAP) on U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security (WPS). The plan
released by the administration is the first ever U.S. national action
plan and Executive Order to implement these goals to establish women as
influential and active agents in the prevention and resolution of
conflicts. On August 10, 2012, the United States released the first-
ever U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based Violence
Globally, and President Obama signed an accompanying Executive Order
directing all relevant agencies to implement the Strategy. The Strategy
underscores the U.S. Government's commitment to preventing and
responding to gender-based violence.
We know that all too often violence against women is used as a tool
of war, yet U.N. peacekeepers and regional forces are under-trained and
under-equipped in addressing violence against women. What actions will
you take to implement this Executive Order?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that, in the first year of implementation,
the Department made noteworthy progress on the NAP for WPS objectives,
both internally and with a range of foreign defense partners. First and
foremost was Secretary Panetta's decision to rescind the restriction on
women in direct combat, a decision I applaud. Externally, in bilateral
and multilateral engagements, I am told combatant commands and our
Regional Centers are focused on building the capacity of partner
militaries to promote and strengthen gender equality.
I understand that the Department is developing a DOD Instruction to
institutionalize the NAP's priorities. If confirmed, I would continue
this progress in implementing the NAP and ensure the Department
continues to lead by example on WPS issues.

79. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, are there assets, such as excess
defense articles, that the United States can contribute to peacekeeping
forces, such as those in the Congo, in order to specifically help women
facing significant and constant threats of sexual violence?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I plan to fully support the Department's
efforts to implement the U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to
Gender-based Violence Globally and associated Executive Order. In this
context, training of peacekeepers is critical and I believe it is
important that DOD peacekeeping training continue to include human
rights training and targeted instruction on prevention of and response
to sexual and gender based violence. If confirmed, I will also continue
to leverage Department authority to provide excess defense articles to
equip peacekeeping contingents, where appropriate.

cyber
80. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you have said that ``recruiting, training, and
retaining military and civilian personnel needed for cyber operations
will be a challenge''. One noted expert recently told the press that of
the 10,000 necessary top cyber personnel, DOD has or can recruit only
2,000.
Why don't we begin an aggressive program of recruiting National
Guard and Reserve cyber experts--a cyber corps--which would leverage
the training and hiring of the private tech sector? The additional
benefit from using the Guard is their ability to operate both in the
military and Homeland defense space so that they can address the
spectrum of threats to our national interests.
Mr. Hagel. I believe that the National Guard and Reserve are a
tremendous resource of talent and of surge capacity for DOD, and these
skilled personnel can contribute greatly to the cyber mission. We are
already using Guard and Reserve personnel in this mission area. It will
not only be critical to recruit the right talent, but we must take a
strategic approach to leveraging our National Guard and Reserve Forces
as part of our overall structure. If confirmed, I will ensure that we
appropriately draw upon a broad pool of our Nation's cyber experts in
support of our critical cyber mission.

81. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, I also understand that the
pipeline of cyber personnel has to start in early education in order to
interest and educate the right number of future cyber warriors. Why
don't we make Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)
aptitude and interest a significant focus of our Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC) selection?
Mr. Hagel. The Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) is vital to
training the exceptional officers upon which our military relies,
including in cyber skill sets. I believe that we should explore many
approaches to build the critical technical skills DOD needs, and this
should include exploring STEM related incentives in our ROTC program.

new york installations
82. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, I represent New York, home to
our Nation's number one terrorist target. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2013, I worked to ensure the second WMD civil support teams for both
New York and Florida were authorized, and that funds have been
appropriated. Both of these units are fully trained and ready to deploy
in the event of a terrorist attack, yet DOD and the National Guard
Bureau are trying to disestablish our second teams. While I recognize
the need for cost savings, these teams cost so little and yet provide
so much to our country. Given the importance of these teams to our
national security, do I have your commitment to follow clear
congressional direction, which has authorized and fully funded these
teams?
Mr. Hagel. I agree that WMD civil support teams are vital to our
national security. I am not familiar with the funding for these teams,
but I will look into this matter if confirmed.

83. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, I understand that the Army must
cut its forces, but it is taking only two of its eight Brigade Combat
Teams (BCT) slated for reduction out of Europe, and the rest from
Continental United States (CONUS). Will you consider further cuts
outside the CONUS (OCONUS), perhaps using rotational units?
Mr. Hagel. The additional BCT reductions must be made consistent
with our global strategy and treaty obligations. The three remaining
BCTs not stationed in the United States, one in Korea and two in
Europe, provide vital forward presence, partnership opportunities,
deterrence, and rapid response. I will certainly work with my staff and
the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army to see what
other options may be feasible and affordable while still providing the
requisite reassurance to our allies.

84. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, what metrics and methodology
will DOD use in approaching reductions in overseas personnel and
infrastructure, while concurrently taking actions which reduce force
structure in the United States?
Mr. Hagel. The Department will seek to balance posture reductions
in a way that aligns with our national strategic interests. As we
consider options, we will balance our strategic and operational
priorities against the need to reduce costs.

85. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, the Army has reiterated the
importance of rotary wing aviation in Iraq and Afghanistan as a
critical asset to reducing the amount of casualties during ground
convoys because of improvised explosive devices (IED). As the Army
downsizes, do you see the number of Combat Aviation Brigades decreasing
as well?
Mr. Hagel. As it downsizes, the Army must maintain the proper
balance amongst all of its capabilities--Ground Combat capabilities,
Combat Support capabilities, Sustainment and Logistics capabilities,
and Institutional capabilities. Army Aviation must be part of this
balance. I don't know to what extent Aviation will be affected, but I
will review with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of
the Army their plans for the Army drawdown and ensure that I and my
staff continue to be comfortable with the Army's plan.

86. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, we've seen from Air Force 2013
Force Structure proposal, a disconcerting strategy which shifts more
flying missions and iron to the Active component, while placing the Air
Guard with fewer assets. The Guard getting unmanned missions is a
welcome development, but the reduced manning requirements and the
ability of the Air Guard to provide support to Governors with fewer
numbers of critical assets, such as C-130s, remains a concern. It may
also place a chill on Air Guard recruiting given the decreasing
opportunities for pilots. What is your strategy to maintain a strong
balance in flying missions and assets for the Air Guard over the next 4
years and beyond?
Mr. Hagel. Since its inception, the Air Force has relied on the
Total Force--made up of the Active, Reserve, and Air Guard components.
Over the past 2 decades, the Air Force has become a more integrated
force, both operationally and organizationally, as all three
components--Active, Reserve, and Air Guard--have trained, deployed, and
conducted the full range of missions together. I understand the Air
Force continually reevaluates the mix between Active and Reserve
components through an institutionalized process that includes
representatives from all three components. If confirmed, I intend to
work with Air Force leadership to understand and evaluate this process
myself.

87. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, how will you assure that the Air
National Guard has a greater voice in decisionmaking, rather than
simply being handed decisions from the Air Force?
Mr. Hagel. I believe the work currently under way between the
Department and the Council of Governors to develop a mutually agreed
upon consultative process will ensure that the concerns of States are
taken into consideration in future National Guard force structure,
basing and budgeting decisions. I intend to continue with this effort
and am committed to working closely with the Council of Governors.

88. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, with the downsizing of the
military, and last year's request from the administration for Base
Closure and Realignment (BRAC) authorization, I anticipate that we will
be discussing a new round of domestic base closings in this year's
posture hearings. How will the metrics rolled out by the Air Force and
Army respectively, in the last year and a half, inform any BRAC
decisions?
Mr. Hagel. It is my understanding that BRAC recommendations must
result from a process that meets the requirements of the specific BRAC
legislation. Therefore, metrics developed outside the BRAC statutory
process can be used only if authorized in the legislation.

89. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, you have said that you view
cyber threats as one of the top security threats to the United States.
Yet last year the Air Force cut its cyber research budget, and in the
coming year, there is a plan to make the research budget pay for the
operating costs at the Air Force Research Lab in Rome, New York. I am
very concerned that such steps point to a hollowing out of our cyber
preparedness, rather than taking the threat seriously. I hope to work
with you to reverse this trend. Even in a budget scarce environment,
cyber research pays tremendous dividends. Can I count on your support
for increased cybersecurity research?
Mr. Hagel. In today's complex global environment, cyber threats
pose an increasingly serious challenge to national security. DOD
organizations, including the Air Force Research Lab, provide for the
development of vital capabilities needed for both today's warfighter
and for the future strategic environment. If confirmed, I will work
with Congress and the Services to ensure that DOD continues to assess
and invest in critical cybersecurity research activities.

coordination with the department of veterans affairs
90. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, I am concerned about the
transition our warriors face as they leave the DOD and enter the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). While there have been improvements
in the last few years, I am concerned there is still a gap. I am
especially concerned about the issues our female warriors face as they
make this transition, especially those who have been sexually assaulted
while serving. I want to ensure they are getting the information, care,
and assistance they need while not being revictimized by the system.
If confirmed, what are your plans for increasing coordination with
the VA to ensure our troops, especially women, are getting the
important transition information and assistance they need so that no
one falls through the cracks?
Mr. Hagel. I am committed to ensuring every servicemember receives
the training, education, and credentials he or she needs to
successfully transition to the civilian workforce. I believe we must
embed servicemembers' preparation for transition throughout their
military lifecycle. I understand that the Department has redesigned the
Transition Assistance Program (TAP) to ensure all servicemembers are
``career ready'' upon separation. The redesigned TAP complies with the
VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011 that mandates all servicemembers
separating from title 10 Active Duty (including reservists and
guardsmen) participate in the program to ensure they are better
prepared when leaving the military for civilian life.
If confirmed, I will engage Department of Veterans Affairs
Secretary Eric Shinseki in a specific dialogue on the unique issues
facing the transition of our female servicemembers. I will also
continue the practice of holding regular Secretarial-level meetings and
will closely monitor the progress of the many important joint
initiatives between the two Departments.

directed energy
91. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments recommended last year a much greater investment
into directed energy weapons. While DOD has already spent billions of
dollars over several decades on science and technology efforts related
to directed energy, several recent demonstrations by the Navy using
solid state lasers on surface ships indicate that we may be reaching
the point where as a Nation we can begin to realize a return on the
substantial investment and transition this capability from science and
technology to development as a weapon system. I understand that
shipboard directed energy weapons could provide an affordable solution
to significant capability challenges associated with sustaining our
forward presence in strategically critical areas such as the South
China Seas, the Sea of Japan, and the Straits of Hormuz. What is your
view of current DOD efforts to weaponize directed energy technologies?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that the Department has embarked on a
deliberate path to develop the technologies to weaponize Directed
Energy. If confirmed, I will continue to push for directed energy and
other emerging technologies through robust research and development to
continuously improve the capabilities we will field for our forces.

92. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, should the Navy formally
consider initiating a development program of record for high energy
solid state lasers to improve the affordability and capability of our
surface ships?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that the Navy has and will continue to
assess the solid state laser research and development efforts to
determine transition opportunities given the remaining technical risk,
costs and capability limitations that must be addressed prior to
establishing a program of record.

93. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, should such a program, if
undertaken, include contributions from willing and technically capable
allies?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

asia pivot
94. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, the President had announced an
Asia pivot, and between North Korea's missile threats and China's
increased aggressiveness with respect to its neighbors, we have a
number of challenges to react to. But at a time of declining budgets,
how would you balance this pivot against the continuing concerns in the
Middle East and the growing threat in Africa?
Mr. Hagel. As described in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the
Department is rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific while maintaining
focus on the Middle-East. I think that the significant U.S. military
presence and activities in Asia are a clear demonstration of the
enduring U.S. commitment to the region and to addressing current and
emerging challenges in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, if confirmed as
Secretary, I would take every step to maintain the ability of America
to conduct successful combat operations in more than one region at a
time, ensuring that we have the ability to meet threats around the
world, as in the Middle East and North Africa, when they arise. Our
global posture, engagement with allies and partners, and investment in
flexible defense architectures for high-demand capabilities, such as
ballistic missile defense, are of great importance.

95. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, how would this impact decisions
over weapon systems and force structure?
Mr. Hagel. While rebalancing, it will be important for the
Department to protect new capabilities and investments to respond to
the changing character of warfare; to preserve lessons, capabilities,
and expertise built over the past 10 years; and to maintain a
technological edge to meet future challenges.

cutting forces/hollow force
96. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, you have stated that a hollow
force is one that has been rendered incapable of performing the mission
that we expect it to conduct. With a hollow force, units do not have
the resources, personnel, equipment, and training necessary to make
them capable or ready to execute the defense strategies that secure our
country. As the military draws down after a decade of war, what
strategic approach would you implement to ensure we retain the
appropriate balance of training, readiness, and modernization to
prevent the force from becoming hollow?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that last year the President approved the
Department's Strategic Guidance which provided priorities as well as
force sizing direction. This was designed to ensure the Department
could meet the missions we foresee and respond to the unexpected in a
balanced way. However, any dramatic changes to the resources of the
Department, such as with sequestration, would force military and
civilian leaders to reevaluate that strategy.

97. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hagel, as conventional warfare becomes
more technology-based, how do you believe that we should retain talent,
especially in the fields of information technology and cyber warfare
when the technology sector is able to provide pay and benefits that far
exceed what the Government can offer?
Mr. Hagel. Maintaining personnel critical technical skills will be
an increasingly important challenge for DOD. Although the private
sector may be able to offer better pay and benefits in some cases, my
experience with DOD personnel has shown me again and again not only
their talent but their commitment to their national security mission.
In order to recruit and retain these talented individuals in
information technology and cyberspace, I will use every tool I have
afforded by OPM. In addition to many opportunities that the private
sector cannot offer, DOD can focus on new ways to recruit, train, and
retain talented cyber professionals. These include scholarships,
partnerships, ensuring that technical people stay in mission essential
technical jobs, and working creatively with the National Guard and
Reserve components. If confirmed, I will work with DOD and
congressional leaders to address this challenge.
______

Question Submitted by Senators Kirsten E. Gillibrand and Richard
Blumenthal
autism
98. Senator Gillibrand and Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Hagel, we have
worked very hard this year to pass a bipartisan, bicameral provision
funding autism services under TRICARE. Unfortunately we only funded a
1-year project. We understand that you were also supportive of early
intervention and treatment of autism. We'd like to work with you to
find a way to permanently fund Tricare's coverage of autism services.
Mr. Hagel. As I understand it, the TRICARE program provides medical
benefits under the basic program and provides non-medical support
benefits (including respite care) to Active Duty Families under the
Extended Health Care Option (ECHO). TRICARE has always covered medical
benefits such as speech and physical therapy, to individuals with an
Autism diagnosis under the medical benefit. In addition, TRICARE has
implemented coverage of Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) as a medical
benefit, and is reviewing additional provider treatment options for
medical care. This medical care will be provided by authorized TRICARE
providers who are licensed or certified to provide ABA therapy. If I am
confirmed, I look forward to working with you on this important issue
that affects so many families.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
vietnam era veterans
99. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Hagel, an estimated 70,000 veterans who
served in the Vietnam war suffered from undiagnosed at the time Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) during their service and were given
less-than-honorable discharges. I understand that less than 2 percent
of those who have applied for discharge upgrades have been successful
before the Army's records correction boards. In contrast, today's
military personnel are properly and, if appropriate, given a medical
discharge, which entitles them to disability compensation, medical
care, and support. If confirmed, will you review the decisions and
guidance of the Army records correction boards with regards to the
denial of Vietnam veterans' requests for discharge upgrades?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I understand that the Boards for the Correction of
Military Records all operate under procedures approved by the Secretary
of Defense and if confirmed, I will ensure that those procedures
protect all veterans suffering from PTSD.

military-to-military relations
100. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Hagel, as a component of the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN), Azerbaijan provides ground and naval
transit for roughly 40 percent of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) coalition's supplies bound for Afghanistan. Azerbaijan has
extended important over-flight clearance, landing, and refueling
operations for U.S. and NATO flights to support ISAF. In 2012, more
than 150 aeromedical evacuation flights of U.S. Air Mobility Command
were flown over Azerbaijan, rushing more than 2,200 patients to a
higher level of medical care. How do you assess current U.S.-Azerbaijan
military-to-military relations and what will be your policy to expand
this strategic partnership?
Mr. Hagel. My assessment is that the U.S.-Azerbaijan defense
relationship is strong--but still has room to grow. If confirmed, I
will build on existing cooperation and ensure DOD continues to engage
in regular consultations at high levels with Azerbaijani counterparts
to identify areas where we can strengthen our cooperation and
partnership. That growth will be based on shared interests and
willingness to cooperate, available resources, and capacity to absorb
new programs. I will also continue our engagement with Azerbaijan aimed
at supporting Azerbaijan's defense reforms, its ability to interoperate
with NATO, to deploy forces in support of coalition operations, and its
capacity to address terrorism and other transnational threats and
secure its maritime borders and energy infrastructure. I would look for
the United States to be Azerbaijan's partner of choice and help
Azerbaijan's defense establishment contribute to regional security and
stability.

101. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Hagel, in September 2012, Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta invited the Chinese PLA to observe the Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC) military exercise that will take place in 2014. In
2012, RIMPAC involved participants from more than 20 countries. If
confirmed, would you consider extending a similar invitation to observe
RIMPAC to Taiwan?
Mr. Hagel. The United States is firm in its commitment to Taiwan's
self-defense needs under the Taiwan Relations Act. That relationship
includes defense exchanges and other interactions consistent with our
unofficial relationship and as provided for in the Taiwan Relations
Act. If confirmed, I will work to identify appropriate exchanges and
interactions to assist Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, and
contribute to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

102. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, what additional steps would you take to strengthen our
military-to-military relationship with Israel?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will consider what additional steps
could further strengthen our military relationship with Israel,
including but not limited to missile defense, intelligence sharing,
counterterrorism, and maritime security. I know that over the past 4
years the administration has taken unprecedented steps to expand our
cooperation with Israel. Today, with congressional support, the United
States provides Israel over $3 billion annually in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), which is the backbone of our commitment to Israel's
defense. This financial support is complemented by extensive military-
to-military cooperation, including joint exercises. If confirmed, I
will seek to ensure that we build on this cooperation and expand it
into new areas as the United States and Israel address emerging threats
at this time of historic change in the Middle East. I believe we have a
tremendous opportunity for further expansion of our missile defense
efforts as well as cooperation in areas like space and cyberspace.
The foundation for successful cooperation is the close personal
relationships U.S. military and defense civilian leaders have with
Israeli military and defense leadership. Secretary Gates and Secretary
Panetta, as well as the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have all
developed very close relationships with their counterparts. Continuing
with this tradition will be one of my highest priorities if I am
confirmed. This will be vital to ensuring that we understand Israel's
defense requirements, and to finding ways to address mutual threats
that meet our common interests.

103. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Hagel, what role does Israel's
participation in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program have in
maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge in the region?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that the JSF will be a core component of
Israel's qualitative military edge (QME). Israel's QME is predicated
upon its ability to defend itself, by itself, from any and all threats
in the region--whether the threat comes from state or non-state actors
or a coalition of states. Air superiority is one of the most important
components to Israel's QME, and the unique capabilities of the JSF will
ensure Israeli air superiority for decades. Israel will be the only
nation in the region with a fifth generation fighter aircraft, and
Israel's JSF will be tailored to meet its specific security
requirements.

reserve component mobilization
104. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Hagel, following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, President Bush
issued a partial mobilization of the Reserve components, authorizing
the involuntary mobilization of up to 1 million members of the National
Guard and Reserves at any one time for repeated service of up to 2
years. National Guard units like the 143rd Military Police Company out
of West Hartford and the 1048th Transportation Company out of Stratford
have served in Afghanistan for repeated deployments. I know the
sustainability of an operational reserve is something that concerns
you. In 2007, you introduced an amendment limiting the deployment of
servicemembers serving in Iraq to 12 months. While the National Guard
and Reserve have served with distinction, the operational reserve has
without question had impacts that need to be addressed here at home.
What is your vision for maintaining readiness levels within the Reserve
component without continued Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funding post-2014?
Mr. Hagel. I appreciate Congress' efforts in the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2012 to increase authorities to fully use the Reserves in a
planned and programmed manner. Without OCO, the required Reserve
component readiness funding would need to be included in the
Department's annual baseline budget to align resources with the
Department's long-term mission needs.

105. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Hagel, what mobilization authority is
appropriate to use as we continue our counterterrorism efforts with the
Reserve component?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, and in light of the new strategy, I will
consider the question of additional mobilization authorities, but at
the present time I believe that appropriate policies and procedures are
in place and current laws are adequate.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
u.s.-pacific ties
106. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, given the increasingly complex
interrelationships of military, economic, political and diplomatic
policies relevant to regional security issues, what is your view on the
role for DOD institutes like Hawaii's Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies (APCSS) in advancing some of the goals of the rebalance to the
Pacific and also in accomplishing a U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
objective of developing professional and personal ties among with our
allies throughout the region? APCSS brings together military and
civilian representatives of the United States and Asia-Pacific nations
to address regional and global security issues through its
comprehensive program of executive education and conferences.
Mr. Hagel. APCSS contributes to advancing America's Pacific
rebalance by enhancing professional and personal ties with partners
throughout the region, strengthening defense institutional capacity,
promoting critical thinking on regional security issues, and providing
a venue for communication and exchange of ideas involving military and
civilian participants. I agree that APCSS has a unique convening
ability to bring together influential civilian and military
decisionmakers from governments in the region with business and civil
society leaders.

107. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, in your response to an advance
policy question concerning additional steps the United States should
take to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat, you
state that the ``United States should also seek to enhance bilateral
and trilateral missile defense cooperation with our ROK [Republic of
Korea] and Japanese allies particularly in the area of information
sharing.'' Last year, the Korean public's opposition, inflamed by
heightened tensions with Japan, largely led to the failure of the ROK
Government to sign an agreement with Japan that would allow the two
countries to exchange key military intelligence. If confirmed, what
would you do to enhance bilateral and trilateral defense cooperation
with these allies?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will continue to explore ways to deepen
our alliance cooperation with Japan and South Korea, emphasize and
encourage trilateral cooperation, and, where possible, support efforts
to strengthen ties between the two countries. I understand there are
significant cooperative efforts already underway, including the Defense
Trilateral Talks, which recently were conducted at the assistant
Secretary level in Tokyo, and I would continue these initiatives, if
confirmed. Deeper trilateral cooperation enhances our Alliance
capabilities, sends a powerful message to the region, and serves to
reinforce deterrence against possible aggression.

108. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, in your response to the advance
policy question on the status of the U.S.-China relationship, you
recognize the fact that ``China is rapidly modernizing its military and
increasingly asserting claims to territory''. If confirmed, how should
the United States respond to China's increasingly aggressive actions
over the Senkaku Islands and what steps will you take to assure our
Japanese allies of America's commitments to defend Japanese territory
under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will continue our longstanding
commitments to all of our Treaty allies, including Japan. My
understanding is that the administration has made clear that while the
United States takes no position on the sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands, our Treaty commitments apply to all territories under the
administration of Japan. I would support continuing this policy and
communicate it clearly to all parties involved in this issue. If
confirmed, I also would continue U.S. efforts to promote the peaceful
handling of the Senkaku Island dispute by all parties while at the same
time ensuring that the United States maintains the ability to fulfill
all of its security commitments.

109. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, in 2011, while I was attending the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hawaii, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton appeared at the East-West Center in Honolulu and
gave an address titled ``America's Pacific Century''. In her remarks,
she stated that the United States has ``a strong relationship with
Taiwan, an important security and economic partner . . . .'' In what
specific ways will you build on this existing foundation and further
enhance this important relationship as Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Hagel. The United States is firm in its commitment to Taiwan's
self-defense needs under the Taiwan Relations Act. This could include
the provision of defense articles and services, consistent with the
Taiwan Relations Act, as well as training opportunities designed to
improve Taiwan's self-defense capabilities.

110. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, what is your current assessment of
our relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines,
and Taiwan? Please describe your goals should you be confirmed as
Secretary of Defense for each of these relationships.
Mr. Hagel. My understanding is that our relationships with these
allies and partners remain extraordinarily strong, and, if confirmed, I
would ensure that we continue to prioritize our critical alliances and
partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region.
Japan is the linchpin of our presence in Asia. Japan is an
increasingly critical partner in missile defense, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, and other important
areas. If confirmed, I would continue the work of my predecessors to
broaden and deepen this critical alliance to ensure that it is capable
of responding to the security challenges of the 21st century.
The United States has a similarly robust relationship with the
Republic of Korea (ROK). My understanding is that we have a
comprehensive agenda aimed at facilitating the smooth transfer of
wartime operational control in 2015, and ensuring the ROK Government
has the capabilities necessary to defend the peninsula. If confirmed, I
would continue these important efforts, and would also continue to
stress the importance of trilateral ties between Japan, the ROK, and
the United States.
The U.S.-Australia alliance is very strong, reflecting the enduring
bonds forged through the sacrifices of United States and Australian
forces in every major conflict of the last 100 years. The joint U.S.-
Australia force posture initiatives in northern Australia reflect a
reality we all recognize: security and prosperity of our two great
nations is inextricably linked to the security and prosperity of the
Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, my goal would be to continue to
invest in this critical relationship.
I understand that our alliance with the Philippines has matured
substantially during the Obama and Aquino administrations. Over the
past few years, our defense relationship has developed in many
important dimensions. If confirmed, I would continue this trend by
exploring options for increased rotational presence for U.S. forces in
the Philippines while continuing to support the Philippines'
development of a minimum credible defense capability.
The Taiwan Relations Act provides that the United States ``will
make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.'' That policy has contributed to
peace and stability in the region for over 30 years and is consistent
with longstanding U.S. policy, which calls for a peaceful resolution of
the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of
the Taiwan Strait. If confirmed, I would work closely with Congress,
the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and the Department's interagency
partners to ensure the continued effective implementation of all of the
relevant provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

women in combat
111. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, in light of DOD's recent
announcement with regard to the role of women in combat, I'd like to
ask about the priority you will give to developing implementation plans
to move forward with the U.S. NAP on WPS released by the White House in
December 2011. It is my understanding that the Department of State and
USAID have released implementation plans building on the NAP.
If the White House plan envisions an active role in this regard by
DOD, I would be interested in your vision for moving forward in this
regard.
Mr. Hagel. I understand that, in the first year of implementation,
the Department made noteworthy progress on the NAP for WPS objectives
both internally and with a range of foreign defense partners. First and
foremost was Secretary Panetta's decision to rescind the restriction on
women in direct combat, a decision I applaud. Externally, in bilateral
and multilateral engagements, I am told combatant commands and our
Regional Centers are focused on building the capacity of partner
militaries to promote and strengthen gender equality.
I understand that the Department is developing a DOD Instruction to
institutionalize the NAP's priorities. If confirmed, I would continue
this progress in implementing the NAP and ensure the Department
continues to lead by example on WPS issues.

family programs
112. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, last year I attended a graduation
ceremony at Pearl Harbor-Hickam Air Force Base. The graduates were 4-
year-olds from military families involved in a YMCA [Young Men's
Christian Association] program. These kids reminded me that when our
men and women in uniform are deployed, their families serve too. In the
House of Representatives, I was the Co-Chair of the House Impact Aid
Coalition. Impact Aid helps support local school districts that educate
military-connected children. Please elaborate on how you will work to
provide child care and educational opportunities to the children of
military families.
Mr. Hagel. I fully support the Impact Aid program, and these funds
are primarily delivered through the Department of Education to local
school districts. In addition, DOD has been providing hundreds of
millions of dollars to local school districts through a
congressionally-directed program to rebuild locally owned schools
located on military bases that are falling into disrepair. More
directly, DOD has spent billions of dollars on a multi-year program to
rebuild Department owned schools that are in failing condition.
I believe that it is the duty of the Department to prepare military
families to cope with the challenges that military service brings In
order to build and sustain resilient military families, the Department
must continue to focus on programs that enhance their social,
financial, educational and psychological well-being.
I believe there are opportunities to improve the efficiency and
accessibility of the resources and programs that the Department, other
Federal agencies, State and local governments, and Department partners
like the YMCA provide our servicemembers and their families. If
confirmed, I will explore these opportunities and how we can better
coordinate efforts to more effectively provide programs to our military
families.

recruit readiness
113. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, recently, a group of retired
generals and admirals called Mission Readiness found that 75 percent of
young Americans ages 17 to 24 are unable to join the military,
primarily because they are poorly educated, physically unfit, or
involved in crime. As Secretary of Defense, how will you work with
other Federal agencies to combat these problems and improve the pool of
potential recruitments?
Mr. Hagel. Today's enlistment qualification standards are well-
defined, supported by years of experience, and have stood the test of
time. They are driven by the need to provide the Services with men and
women who are prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet
performance requirements. It is imperative we maintain the highest
standards for these reasons.
If confirmed, I will work closely with organizations such as
Mission Readiness, the National Prevention Council and the First Lady's
office to address these issues. I will explore opportunities in the
Department to pilot healthy initiatives at several military
installations to serve as a model for the department, and the Nation.

energy security
114. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, across the globe resource scarcity,
political and social upheaval, and other factors are changing the
nature of the threats our Nation faces. These new challenges are
particularly pronounced when we consider the global energy markets on
which we rely. Prices are set based on global demand--not U.S.
strategic and operational concerns--and many of the source nations are
not our closest allies. Do you view U.S. energy security as a vital
component to our overall national security?
Mr. Hagel. Energy security is central to national security. DOD can
play a role in promoting U.S. energy security in two ways.
First, DOD can improve the energy security of military operations
and defense facilities. The Department has a long history of harnessing
innovation to meet defense challenges in ways that can benefit the
civilian economy, and there is potential for such gains in this case.
Second and more broadly, a core mission for DOD is preventing
conflict, through deterrence and forward presence, partnerships with
other nations, and a range of other activities. The Department also
plays a supporting part in whole-of-government efforts to build peace,
stability, and prosperity around the world. I view the Department's
shaping and prevention efforts as vital to our overall national
security, given the complexity of current and emerging threats and
challenges. In that context, energy security is both part of the
challenge and the response for DOD.

115. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, what role, if any, do you believe
that DOD has in supporting efforts to increase U.S. energy security?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #114.

116. Senator Hirono. Mr. Hagel, Congress has included provisions in
past NDAAs to give the Secretary of Defense the guidance, tools, and
support for initiatives intended to improve the military's energy
security and reduce fuel costs. These include section 526 of the Energy
Independence and Security Act, establishment of an Office of
Operational Energy Plans and Programs headed by an assistant secretary,
and other provisions. If confirmed, do you intend to continue to
encourage the Services to utilize these authorities to meet their
operational and installation energy needs effectively?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
atlantic-pacific military presence
117. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, in 2012, DOD released its new
strategy, noting a rebalance to Asia while also maintaining our
commitments in the Middle East. This strategy is heavily dependent on
the maritime forces of the Navy and the Marine Corps. What is your view
on the necessity of maintaining our naval power projection in the
Atlantic in order to maintain our presence in the Middle East,
especially given the threat of Iran to the region?
Mr. Hagel. Today, the United States must be able to project naval
power globally, with a strategic emphasis on rebalancing to the Asia-
Pacific region and maintaining presence in and around the Middle East.
Our Atlantic fleet will continue to play a vital role in meeting our
global demands. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of the
Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure a strong
and sustainable Navy and Marine Corps that can prevail in light of
current and projected challenges.

118. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, please describe your view on our
naval presence, given the current defense strategic guidance and
ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region.
Mr. Hagel. Historically, the Nation has used globally deployable
Naval forces to provide presence and power projection capabilities in
multiple regions, often shifting between regions on short notice in
response to emerging security threats. Naval presence will continue to
be vital if we are to rebalance toward the Asia Pacific while
maintaining our defense commitments in the Middle East and elsewhere.
If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure a strong and sustainable Navy
and Marine Corps that can prevail in light of current and projected
challenges.

shipbuilding
119. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, State shipbuilding plans are
critical to meet our strategic needs, as well as critical to maintain
our defense industrial base and supply chain. Given the affordability
challenges facing the defense industry, you have the responsibility to
ensure that you set the course for our Navy's force structure and
maintain the Nation's security, all while balancing cost and risk of
shipbuilding efforts. Would you agree to work closely with me, with
this committee, and with this Congress in addressing our shipbuilding
needs?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

120. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, will you remain committed to
ensuring that the vessels we build for our sailors and marines are the
finest this Nation can produce and that they meet military
classifications for warships?
Mr. Hagel. I am committed to ensuring that survivability shall be
addressed on all new surface ship, combat systems and equipment
designs, overhauls, conversions, and modernizations in order that the
design is provided a balance of survivability performance, risk, and
cost within program objectives.

121. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, will you agree to analyze all
avenues of optimal program management and cost control measures in
shipbuilding in order to allow shipbuilders to optimize design and save
taxpayers' dollars?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

defense industrial base
122. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, numerous studies by the Defense
Business Board, GAO, and others point to a need for increased
collaboration between industry and DOD. This becomes ever more
important as the need for efficiencies increases and the number of
industry participants decreases. DOD must provide our servicemembers
with the best equipment possible. Enhancing innovation for defense
applications through the current acquisition system may be an ongoing
challenge in this fiscal environment. How will DOD sustain and improve
capabilities that have been developed through collaborative innovation
with industry?
Mr. Hagel. Industry is our partner in defending this Nation and I
fully recognize the vital role it plays in our national security. If
confirmed, I will assess our current programs regarding collaborative
efforts with industry, particularly in the areas of research and
development, to leverage the innovation of the private sector.

123. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, what is your assessment of the
health of the defense industrial base and areas that require more
attention?
Mr. Hagel. I believe in a strong, healthy industrial base, and I am
concerned that changes in the defense market may impact that base. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Department has a process to assess
fragility of the capabilities needed provide our military with the best
equipment in the world.

veteran assistance
124. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, you noted in your advance policy
questions your commitment to improving the care veterans receive as
they transition from Active Duty to civilian life. In the past few
years, we have seen a high rate of unemployment among veterans, as well
as increasing rates of suicide among this population. In your view,
what are the most critical areas of improvement for veterans care?
Mr. Hagel. This is a far ranging issue that will warrant
significant attention from me, if confirmed. It is my understanding
that our current focus areas are providing: a seamless transition of
health information from DOD to the Department of Veterans Affairs,
timely processing of disability claims, and transitional support such
as employment assistance and related help. If confirmed, I will
evaluate the entire domain of veteran's transition for effectiveness
and where we need more improvement.

125. Senator Kaine. Mr. Hagel, what are the areas of potential
collaboration among public and private sector entities?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that there are numerous areas where public
and private collaborations could advance solutions for some of our most
pressing issues with veterans care. These include opportunities to
collaborate in: scientific research; improving access to mental health
care and piloting new and innovative models of care; ensuring that
military training in medical triage and care provision translates to
employment in the private sector through collaboration with
professional organizations, certification bodies, and academic training
programs (e.g., medics serving as EMTs); and developing evidenced-based
care guidelines and treatment protocols for psychological health and
Traumatic Brain Injury.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
concern about the industrial base
126. Senator King. Mr. Hagel, last year, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert, testified before this
committee about the consequences of sequestration for shipbuilding.
Admiral Greenert said that if sequestration kicks in, we will lose
capabilities in some of our shipyards and we would be looking at a
fleet of 230 ships compared to the current fleet of 285 ships. He went
on to say, ``I'm very concerned about an industrial base that would be
able to adjust from sequestration. It would be very difficult to keep a
shipbuilder that could be efficient in building the types of ships we
need.'' In short, he described the very type of irreversible
consequences that we must avoid. I am proud of the workers at Bath Iron
Works in my home State, but this issue is larger than that because the
six remaining shipyards that build Navy ships are truly strategic
assets that once lost, cannot be restored in a timely manner. Do you
agree with the CNO's assessment and share my alarm that sequestration
will result in greater per unit costs, an unacceptable danger to our
industrial base, and a smaller Navy fleet?
Mr. Hagel. Yes, I agree that the industrial base is a strategic
asset that needs to be protected and that sequestration may have
irreversible impacts in the long term. Sequestration budget cuts would
certainly reduce ship procurement and maintenance, impacting fleet
size. Sequestration would also implement automatic spending cuts
without regard for strategy or priorities, so the Navy would be forced
into a position where they could not execute contract options that were
negotiated to minimize unit costs and stabilize workload in the
shipyards. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to avert
sequestration and work with the Navy to protect the industrial base.

ddg-51 destroyer program
127. Senator King. Mr. Hagel, the enacted NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013
authorized a multi-year procurement of up to 10 DDG-51 destroyers
during the next 5 years beginning in fiscal year 2013. The
Appropriations Committees of both the House of Representatives and the
Senate adopted fiscal year 2013 defense appropriations bills also
included funding to support a 10-ship program. Multi-years present
unique opportunities to procure required major defense systems more
cost effectively than through annual procurements. I realize that
enactment of the fiscal year 2013 defense appropriations legislation is
required before the Navy can execute this vital multi-year procurement
and achieve cost savings while also helping to stabilize our
specialized shipbuilding industrial base. Will you let the leadership
on both sides of the aisle in the Senate and the House of
Representatives know how critical it is that we enact a fiscal year
2013 Defense Appropriations Bill?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will certainly continue to stress to
Congress the importance of receiving an enacted fiscal year 2013
Defense Appropriations Bill. A year-long CR reduces the Department's
funding flexibility by spending money on last year's priorities not
this year's--an untenable position. It also pushes the Department to
use month-to-month contracts and prohibits doing ``new starts'' in
military construction or acquisition programs.

berry amendment
128. Senator King. Mr. Hagel, according to the Berry Amendment, DOD
cannot procure clothing items unless they are produced in the United
States. Congress first established this domestic preference for DOD
procurement in 1941, and for decades the military branches complied by
issuing American-made uniforms, including athletic footwear, for our
troops. In recent years, however, DOD has circumvented this policy by
issuing cash allowances to soldiers for their own purchase of training
shoes.
New Balance makes a compliant athletic shoe. New Balance has 5,000
pairs of Berry-compliant footwear sitting on their shelves, as we
speak. Next year, enforcing compliance with Berry would actually save
money. Currently, the Navy gives a $68 cash allowance to recruits, and
Berry-compliant shoes from New Balance cost $68. Next year, the
allowance will increase to $74, but the Berry-compliant shoe cost will
remain the same. That's a $6 savings per pair of running shoes.
Will you review this policy and work to assure that compliant gear
is purchased and U.S. jobs are protected?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will review the Department's policies
pertaining to the athletic running shoes provided to military enlisted
recruits and will ensure the Department meets its obligations under the
Berry Amendment.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
taiwan relations
129. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and
the Six Assurances of 1982 have contributed to the peace and stability
of the Asia-Pacific region for the past 3 decades. With the military
balance--including air superiority--gradually shifting in China's
favor, what are your plans to implement the security commitment the
United States has for Taiwan under this framework?
Mr. Hagel. In my view, the increasing complexity and sophistication
of the military threat to Taiwan from China means that Taiwan must
devote greater attention to asymmetric concepts and innovative
technologies to maximize Taiwan's strengths and advantages. If
confirmed, I would work closely with Congress, throughout DOD, and with
our interagency partners to ensure the continued effective
implementation of all of the relevant provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act.
I believe that we should make available to Taiwan those defense
articles and defense services which enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability, today and into the future. If
confirmed, I will look at what specific self-defense capabilities
Taiwan needs in light of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait
and the evolving military capabilities on the mainland.

130. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, as Taiwan is likely to retire some
of its older fighter aircraft in the next 5 to 10 years, do you believe
that sales of advanced aircraft are an important next step in this
commitment?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #129.

east china sea
131. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, last August, Taiwan President Ma
Ying-jeou proposed an East China Sea Peace Initiative to address the
ongoing dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku or Diaoyutai
Islands. While Taiwan also claims sovereignty over the islands as part
of the Republic of China, it ``calls on all parties concerned to
resolve disputes peacefully based on the U.N. Charter and relevant
provisions in international law.'' In its proposal, Taiwan goes on to
call on all parties to:

1. Refrain from taking any antagonistic actions;
2. Shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue;
3. Observe international law and resolve disputes through peaceful
means;
4. Seek consensus on a code of conduct in the East China Sea; and
5. Establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and
developing resources in the East China Sea.

Do you believe that such an initiative is a constructive and
necessary step in resolving the dispute in a peaceful and comprehensive
manner?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, working with the Secretary of State and
other interagency counterparts, I would carefully consider any
initiative that seeks to reduce tensions and facilitate a diplomatic
solution to the current tensions.

east asia
132. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, Myanmar has been invited as an
observer to the Cobra Gold exercises in 2013. Do you believe inclusion
of the Burmese military is timely?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that plans call for two Burmese military
officers to be included in the Cobra Gold Observer Program as a way to
promote the Burmese military's exposure to the international community
and international norms of behavior. I believe that this step is timely
and sensible. I also agree with the current Department stance that
future participation should be contingent on continued progress by the
Government of Burma in consolidating democratic reforms, improving its
human rights record, promoting national reconciliation, and suspending
military ties to North Korea.

133. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you envision that the Burmese
will be brought into security partnerships with the United States
bilaterally or through multilateral arrangements with regional
militaries?
Mr. Hagel. I support the administration's approach of cautious and
calibrated engagement with the Burmese military through bilateral and
multilateral arrangements. If confirmed, I will consult with Congress
regarding the scope and scale of bilateral engagement. I also agree
with the current policy that a normalization of defense relations with
Burma can only occur if the Government of Burma continues its efforts
to democratize, improves its human rights record, implements national
reconciliation efforts with its various ethnic groups, and suspends
military ties to North Korea. I also support robust multilateral
engagement of the United States with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and its ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM+)
efforts, of which Burma is a member and will be chair in 2014.

134. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, will a reduction of DOD's budget
impact security cooperation and regional security in East Asia?
Mr. Hagel. As the President has stated, the United States is a
Pacific power with enduring interests in the peace and security of the
region. If confirmed, I will work to uphold and prioritize our security
commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. However, sequestration's
effects would be disastrous for the Department and would necessitate a
review of the new defense strategy.

135. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, will budget cuts impact our ability
to perform humanitarian relief missions or participate in military
exercises like Thailand's Cobra Gold?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I would continue ongoing efforts to ensure
that the United States remains the security partner of choice in the
Asia-Pacific region. However, sequestration would necessitate a
reevaluation of the U.S. defense strategy and any further reductions
could require adjustments to overall implementation of the strategy.

iran
136. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, the Iranian regime continues to
threaten neighbors--our allies in the region like Azerbaijan. There
were news reports throughout the past year that Azerbaijan's security
services arrested several activists belonging to the Iranian
intelligence service and Hezbollah. These operatives were suspected of
planning terrorist attacks against foreigners in the capital Baku,
including the U.S. and Israeli embassies. The United States has long-
term interests in the Caspian region and the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan
and the United States cooperate in countering terrorism, nuclear
proliferation and narcotics trafficking, and promoting security in the
wider Caspian region and beyond. As a key component to the NDN,
Azerbaijan provides ground and naval transit for roughly 40 percent of
the ISAF coalition's supplies bound for Afghanistan. Azerbaijan
expressed its commitment to support U.S. and NATO efforts in
stabilizing Afghanistan beyond 2014 and is among first eight non-NATO
potential operational partners. Azerbaijan has been extending important
over-flight clearance, landing, and refueling operations for U.S. and
NATO flights to support ISAF. In 2012, more than 150 aero-medical
evacuation flights of U.S. Air Mobility Command have flown over
Azerbaijan, rushing more than 2,200 patients to a higher level of
medical care. The United States has also energy interests in the region
and our energy companies have interests in exploring Caspian Sea oil
resources and deliver them westwards to provide for energy security to
our European allies.
If confirmed, what do you think DOD should do to strengthen the
security of our regional allies, like Azerbaijan, that face pressure
and open threats from Iran on a daily basis, and what are the areas you
think we should look into to expand security and defense cooperation
with Azerbaijan to ensure it has adequate means to defend its
territory?
Mr. Hagel. I have deep concerns about Iran's destabilizing
activities and recognize the many shared interests between the United
States and Azerbaijan. If confirmed, I would continue the Defense
Department's high level engagement with its counterparts in Azerbaijan.
In particular, I would seek to strengthen existing areas of partnership
and identify new areas of cooperation in support of Azerbaijan's
defense reforms, its ability to interoperate with NATO and deploy to
coalition operations, its capacity to address terrorism and other
transnational threats and to secure its maritime borders and energy
infrastructure. I would look for the United States to be Azerbaijan's
partner of choice and help Azerbaijan's defense establishment
contribute to regional security and stability, such as by continuing to
encourage Azerbaijan's significant support to international efforts in
Afghanistan.

military suicides
137. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, I am very concerned about the
significant rise in military suicides. According to the most current
published DOD Suicide Event Report, 301 suicides occurred among
military servicemembers in 2011. DOD recently reported 349 suicides in
2012--more than the total number of deaths incurred in combat. Do you
believe DOD is doing all it can to prevent the tragic number of
suicides in the Military Services?
Mr. Hagel. The Department is doing all that it can given the
complex nature of suicide and society's limited base of knowledge in
this realm. Suicide among our Nation's military is clearly tragic and
will require solutions that are informed by evidence of effectiveness.
There is some proof that peer support and call lines help. There is
also a need to continue the focus on resilience building and leadership
education.

138. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, what will you do to get this
problem fixed?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I am committed to seeing that programs
that focus on resiliency and leadership education continue and are
further evaluated with additional research. Furthermore, I understand
that the Department is in the process of drafting its first
comprehensive suicide prevention program policy. It would be a top
priority to review and implement this program policy as soon as it is
ready.

139. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, is DOD fully funding the Services'
suicide prevention programs and research programs that inform us about
effective prevention strategies?
Mr. Hagel. I am not currently familiar with the details of our
research program spending in this area, but I share the views of the
leadership of the Army and the entire Department that this is a top
priority. If confirmed, I will review these research programs for
efficiency and effectiveness in identifying strategies to prevent
suicides and will work to ensure that sufficient funding is available
for this important effort. As with other programs, sequestration could
have a damaging impact on our efforts in this area.

140. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, how will you continue
to fund these efforts under sequestration and a year-long Continuing
Resolution?
Mr. Hagel. The impact of sequestration combined with a year-long
Continuing Resolution will present the Department with very serious
funding challenges. I am deeply concerned about the significant rise in
military suicides and am firmly committed to ensuring that the
Department have the funds necessary to provide high-quality behavioral
health care to servicemembers and their families. But protecting these
vital personnel programs will require sacrifices in other important
areas.

impact of sequestration on the defense health program and family
support programs
141. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, in your advance policy questions
you agreed with the Joint Chiefs when they said that a full-year
Continuing Resolution and sequestration would ``damage our readiness,
our people, and our military families.'' Additionally, you stated:
``Sustaining family programs in the current fiscally constrained
environment will be challenging, but it is of vital importance.''
Under sequestration, do you agree that morale will suffer and
beneficiaries may not be able to get the health care and support
services they need?
Mr. Hagel. I share the concern of our senior military leaders that
the morale of the force will be affected in ways that are unpredictable
if sequester goes into effect and disrupts our training, readiness, and
family support programs. If confirmed, I will attempt to ensure that
reductions do not break faith with our troops and they continue to
receive the health care and support services they need.

142. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you ensure that
defense budget cuts will not hinder or harm the extraordinary care and
support that our wounded warriors and their families receive?
Mr. Hagel. I want to make it clear that if confirmed I will make it
a priority to minimize the impact of sequestration on our wounded
warriors and their families. However, sequestration provides no
exemption for military health care funding, and across the board cuts
to those programs are required by law if sequester takes place. If
confirmed, I will seek to protect funding for wounded warrior care to
the greatest extent possible, subject to those constraints.

budget
143. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, during a series of video interviews
with the Financial Times on August 29, 2011, you were asked about the
prospect of sequestration and its impact on DOD. When asked about the
impact of an automatic $600 billion cut to DOD (beyond the $487 billion
already proposed by the President in April 2011), you appear to
disagree with Secretary Panetta's assessment that such cuts would be
devastating. Instead you stated that you feel DOD is ``bloated'' and
that ``the Pentagon needs to be pared down''.
In an exchange with Senator Blunt at your confirmation hearing, my
colleague asked you to provide some specific examples of what you were
referring to when you identified the DOD budget as being ``bloated.''
During the hearing, you failed to provide any specificity, so please do
so now of where you believe defense spending is excessive and what
accounts and programs you believe should be cut.
Mr. Hagel. I have never said that I support sequestration. I do not
nor have I ever supported sequestration. I support the 2011 Budget
Control Act. I stand by my view that inefficiency and waste exists in
DOD that could and should be reduced or eliminated. The record shows,
in my view, that both the Department's leadership and Congress have
expressed similar views. In his May 2010 speech at the Eisenhower
library, then-Secretary Gates launched an effort to cut inefficiency
and waste in the Department that had grown up over the previous decade
of rising budgets.
As he noted at the time, inefficiency is not just about money. He
cited in that speech a ``top-heavy hierarchy'' in DOD that was out of
step with the 21st century. Following that speech, the Department began
reducing unneeded senior executive and general officer positions to
reduce layers of management.
In the Department's next two budget submissions for fiscal year
2011 and fiscal year 2012, they produced separate justification books,
which the Committee has on file, detailing plans to cut inefficiency
and lower-priority programs by $178 billion and then another $60
billion, respectively. I believe many of those reductions, in areas
such as information technology, smarter acquisition, streamlined
management, and reorganizations, are underway but not yet fully
realized.
Notwithstanding these efforts by the Department, Congress was able
to find additional savings and reduced defense spending below the level
requested by the Department in both of these fiscal years by
approximately $20 billion per year.

143a. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe military resources
should drive strategy or should strategy drive resources?
Mr. Hagel. I believe strategy should drive our resource decisions,
but our strategy must also be realistic and resource-informed.

144. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe that DOD should
pursue a National Security Strategy that assumes a relatively high
degree of risk for our military?
Mr. Hagel. I believe the Department has developed a strategy that
meets the challenges of the current and future security environment
that both minimizes risk and complies with the fiscal constraints
imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA). I also believe that by ending
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and rebalancing to a strategic
posture that modernizes alliances, builds partner capacity and
maintains a ready, agile and responsive force, we reduce the risk to
our military.

145. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, if it is determined that the
reductions being proposed need to be revised and that additional
resources are necessary to meet our national security needs, do you
believe you would have the flexibility to advocate for a decrease in
the $487 billion reduction to defense budgets if you determined a
significant adverse impact to national security?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will continue to work with OMB and
Congress to seek the resources necessary to provide the military
capabilities the defense of our Nation requires. However, the mechanism
of sequestration enacted in the Budget Control Act and the lack of a
full year appropriation are my immediate concerns as they would
severely limit the Department's flexibility to ensure the military has
the funds it requires to fulfill its mission.

146. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, over the past 4 years this
administration has pursued the systematic disarming of U.S. military
power under the guise of defense budget cuts in order to maintain
significantly higher levels of funding for non-security-related
domestic programs. In a letter I sent to Secretary Panetta earlier this
month, I reiterated that we are in full agreement that any additional
cuts to defense spending, especially those of the magnitude of
sequestration, would be unacceptable and will result in serious and
lasting harm to the capabilities and readiness of our military. Do you
agree that sequestration would have lasting harm to the capabilities
and readiness of our military?
Mr. Hagel. The combined impacts of a Continuing Resolution and
Sequestration will have a devastating impact on our readiness,
especially given that we have a shorter period of time and limited
flexibility to manage where the reductions are taken. Based on my
assessment to date, sequestration would harm military readiness and
disrupt each and every investment program. Some of the more notable
impacts of sequester would be reduced global activities, less training
which would decrease readiness, disruption of investment programs,
limits on military construction, and forced furloughs and hiring
freezes for civilian workers.

147. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you agree that averting
sequestration should be our highest priority?
Mr. Hagel. Adverting sequestration, as well as providing the
Department a fiscal year 2013 appropriations bill, should be Congress'
highest priority.

148. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you agree that Congress and the
administration have a shared responsibility in averting sequestration?
Mr. Hagel. The ability to avoid sequestration and to pass a full-
year appropriations bill for DOD is within the power of Congress. It is
my desire that Congress and the administration reach an agreement on a
balanced package of deficit reductions that leads to detriggering of
sequestration and regular appropriation bills.

cybersecurity
149. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, in your advance policy questions
you stated that it is ``your understanding that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has the lead for domestic cybersecurity.''
Cyberspace perhaps more so than any other domain is not bound and has
little regard to geographical boundaries. When it comes to the defense
of the Homeland from a foreign attack what role do you believe DOD
should play?
Mr. Hagel. DOD has the responsibility to defend, deter, and when
directed by the President, take action to defend the United States, its
allies, and its interests in cyberspace as in all domains. I agree that
threats in cyberspace can cross both physical boundaries and particular
departmental responsibilities, and, therefore, believe it is critical
for the Department to work closely with both the public and private
sectors. To support DOD national security responsibilities, I believe
that the Department must maintain a close partnership with DHS.

149a. Senator Inhofe. Do you believe DOD should be the principal
U.S. Government agency responsible for protecting the United States
against foreign cyber-attacks to the Homeland?
Mr. Hagel. It is my understanding that DOD has the mission to
defend the Nation in cyberspace and that DHS should be the lead for
coordinating the cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastructure. I
support these roles and relationship.

150. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, I understand there is some
confusion over the role DHS would play in such an attack on the
Homeland in cyberspace. Do you believe that DHS should have anything
more than a supporting role to DOD in a cyberattack against the
Homeland?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that DOD has the mission to defend the
Nation in cyberspace, and that this includes a close partnership with
DHS in its role of leading efforts for the cybersecurity of U.S.
critical infrastructure, and non-DOD unclassified government networks.
I believe that DHS plays a vital role in securing unclassified Federal
civilian government networks and working with owners and operators of
critical infrastructure to secure their networks through risk
assessment, mitigation, incident response capabilities, and sharing
cyber threat and vulnerability information. DOD supports DHS in its
domestic role.

151. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, who, in your opinion, should be
that principal agency with the responsibility of coordinating the
defense of the Homeland from a foreign cyberattack and the response?
Mr. Hagel. I support the current administration approach, in which
DOD has the responsibility to defend, deter, and, when directed by the
President, take action to defend the United States, its allies, and its
interests in cyberspace as in all domains. I also support DOD's
partnership with DHS in its role leading efforts for the cybersecurity
of U.S. critical infrastructure.

152. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, capabilities-wise, do you agree
that DOD and the National Security Agency have the most comprehensive
set of resources to defend the Nation from a foreign cyberattack?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. At the same time, I believe that DOD should work
closely with other departments and agencies that have unique
responsibilities, capabilities, and expertise, such as DHS and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

153. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you agree that establishing
bureaucracies and duplicative efforts at DHS would be unwise?
Mr. Hagel. I agree that departments and agencies should not set up
unnecessary bureaucracies or duplicative efforts. In the cyber domain,
I believe that DOD and DHS should continue to team together to address
cyber threats, understanding that each has specific roles and missions,
and that DOD has the mission to defend the Nation in cyberspace.

154. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, a recent Wall Street Journal
article titled ``Banks seek U.S. Help on Iran Cybersecurity'' states
that ``major U.S. banks are pressing for government action to block or
squelch what Washington officials say is an intensifying Iranian
campaign of cyberattacks against American financial institutions.'' The
article asserts that some of the financial institutions are concerned
by the lack of U.S. Government response arguing that the banks ``can't
be expected to fend off attacks from a foreign government.'' According
to the article, ``U.S. officials have been weighing options, including
whether to retaliate against Iran.''
What role do you believe DOD should play in events such as the
recent/ongoing Iranian attacks on the financial sector and do you
believe there is an offensive role DOD should be able to utilize via
cyberspace?
Mr. Hagel. Although I am not aware of the specific details of these
events, DOD plays a critical role in a whole-of-government effort to
address threats to both our national and economic security. The
President has made clear that the United States will respond to hostile
acts in cyberspace as we would any other threat to our country, and
that the United States reserves the right to use all necessary means,
including military means as a last resort, to defend our Nation and our
interests. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department develops the
necessary cyber capabilities to defend and, if directed by the
President, conduct offensive operations.

155. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, I was concerned to read in your
advance policy questions that you seem to believe that we are deterring
and dissuading our adversaries in cyberspace. In a letter sent to
Senator McCain last year by General Alexander, the Commander of U.S.
Cyber Command, he asked a similar question to which Gen. Alexander
simply stated ``No . . . much remains to be done across both the public
and private sector.''
Do you agree with General Alexander's assessment? If not, why not?
Mr. Hagel. I do believe that the United States has successfully
deterred major cyber attacks. However, I agree with General Alexander
that there is much more to be done to protect the Nation from cyber
threats. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing DOD efforts to
strengthen the Department's cyber capabilities and support
cybersecurity efforts across the public and private sector. One such
opportunity would be to pass legislation that allows for increased
information sharing on cyber threats and the development of critical
infrastructure cybersecurity standards in partnership with the private
sector.

156. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, what role do you believe offensive
cyber capabilities should play in cyber deterrence?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that an important element of deterrence is to
develop and maintain a wide variety of capabilities, including cyber
capabilities, that can impose costs on a potential adversary. If
confirmed, I will ensure that DOD provides the President with a broad
range of military options.

157. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe the mission to
defend the Homeland will require both offensive and defensive cyber
forces and tools?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I believe the Department must provide a wide range
of credible capabilities in all domains, both offensive and defensive,
to defend the Nation.

national missile defense
158. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you still support the Missile
Defense Act of 1999?
Mr. Hagel. Yes, I co-sponsored the National Missile Defense Act of
1999, and I continue to support the law.

159. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you agree that protection of the
United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical
national security priority?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

160. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you agree it is necessary to
modernize and expand our national missile defense, formally known as
the GMD system, to keep pace with the growing threat?
Mr. Hagel. I support the continued modernization, and expansion if
necessary, of the GMD system and the other missile defense efforts that
can contribute to the protection of the homeland in the future.

missile defense in europe
161. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe the deployment of
SM-3 interceptors in Poland and Romania, as currently planned, is
provocative for the Russians?
Mr. Hagel. While the Russians have argued that the later phases of
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) could undermine their
strategic deterrent, the United States has repeatedly stated that the
EPAA is not directed at Russia and will not have the capability to
undermine Russia's ICBM forces. I agree with this view.

162. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you support President Obama's
commitment to deploy SM-3 missiles in Romania and Poland as currently
planned?
Mr. Hagel. I support the President's approach to missile defense in
Europe, including the deployment of the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania
and Poland as currently planned. If confirmed, I will ensure the
Department continues to support the implementation of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach.

163. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe the United States
should provide legal assurances to Russia that would limit U.S. missile
defense capabilities?
Mr. Hagel. The President is on record as saying, and I agree, that
the United States cannot accept any limits on its BMD systems.

164. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you agree to inform this
committee about ongoing discussions with the Russians concerning
potential limits to U.S. missile defense capabilities or cooperation
with Russia in missile defense?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will keep Congress apprised as required
by the 2013 NDAA.

nuclear weapons
165. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you support modernization of the
nuclear triad and the nuclear weapons complex, as per the stated intent
of the President in his Message to the Senate on the New START treaty?
Mr. Hagel. I support the President's commitment to a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. I
believe that modernizing nuclear forces and infrastructure is critical
and should be a national priority. I also believe that there is a
continuing need to sustain the skilled workforce that underpins
deterrence capabilities.

166. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you agree that restoring NNSA's
production infrastructure is necessary to allow excess warheads to be
retired along with other potential stockpile reductions to the
nondeployed stockpile over time?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that modernizing the nuclear weapons
production infrastructure is very important, and that doing so is
necessary to reducing the stockpile hedge over time.

167. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe it is important to
have the capacity to surge production in the event of significant
geopolitical surprise?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that a modernized nuclear weapons
infrastructure that would allow production of additional warheads is
important to hedge against significant, unforeseen changes in the
international security situation.

168. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, what do you believe should be the
proper role of DOD in determining the annual funding requests for NNSA
Weapons Activities?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
provides a statutory forum wherein the Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration and DOD come together to make
programmatic and funding decisions and, as appropriate, recommendations
for the Secretaries to coordinate requirements and expenditures. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the NWC and the Secretary of
Energy to best coordinate our requirements in a fiscally responsible
manner to continue to meet the Nation's security needs.

arms control compliance
169. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you agree that any outstanding
nuclear weapons treaty compliance concerns should be addressed before
the United States pursues further nuclear arms reduction negotiations
with Russia?
Mr. Hagel. Compliance with legal obligations is central to the
effectiveness of arms control treaties, and concerns about non-
compliance must be addressed. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD
works with the Department of State and other interagency partners in
assessing and responding to compliance concerns. While resolution of
such issues with Russia is clearly important, I do not believe that
discussions of possible further nuclear arms reductions need await
resolution of all compliance issues.

dod financial management system
170. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, are you committed to modernizing
DOD's financial management systems?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I understand that implementation of modern,
integrated business systems is well underway and I will continue to
monitor and support these efforts. They must contribute to improved
efficiency and must also sustain the quality and fidelity of financial
information that we need to manage with.

171. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, would you emphasize
financial management improvement and audit readiness as a top priority?
Mr. Hagel. Improving the Department's financial management
capability is an important priority and if confirmed, I will ensure
that senior leaders are focused on this goal and hold them accountable.

budget cuts and operational readiness
172. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, does the fiscal year 2013 defense
budget of $525.3 billion with $88.5 in OCO funding, affect DOD's
ability to ``respond to every contingency'' as you highlighted in your
opening statement?
Mr. Hagel. Yes, the Department's ability to respond to
contingencies is directly related to the funding it receives which is
translated into military capabilities. I believe the Department can
implement the administration's present strategy within the budget it
has requested. That said, if sequestration occurs, the Department would
need to significantly revise the defense strategy and, in all
probability, would need to make some hard choices about which of our
current national defense capabilities we could afford to retain.

aging military equipment
173. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps have stated that they need at least
2 years of OCO funding after withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan in
order to reset their equipment. If confirmed, will you be prepared to
continue requesting OCO funding until all equipment has been reset?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I believe that it will require considerable time to
repair equipment returning from operations in Afghanistan because of
the nature of the repairs and difficulty of removing the equipment from
Afghanistan.

end strength reductions
174. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do the planned reductions to Army
and Marine Corps end strengths affect DOD's ability to ``respond to
every contingency'' as you highlighted in your opening statement?
Mr. Hagel. Current reductions in the Army and Marine Corps are
being carefully managed in order to balance risk with the right mix of
capabilities necessary to fulfill all of the missions required by the
Defense Strategic Guidance. Currently, reductions are predicated on the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) plans to continue off-ramping forces
heading to Afghanistan. This risk we can manage. However, I am very
concerned about the risk to the Nation given the possibility of
sequestration and the potential for a full year Continuing Resolution.
If not resolved, the fiscal situation could have significant impact on
the ability of the Department to do what is required by the Defense
Strategic Guidance. It is not the planned cuts to the Army and Marine
Corps that cause significant risk, but rather the ones that we may be
forced to make due to the uncertain fiscal environment.

defense budget priorities
175. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, during your testimony you stated
that, if confirmed, you will confine the dollars we are going to spend
in the defense budget for defense purposes, in support of the
warfighter. Do we also have your assurance that you will submit a
budget that reflects this commitment?
Mr. Hagel. I believe a fundamental foundation of any defense budget
submission is to provide the best support we can to our warfighters and
ensure their capabilities, readiness and agility are sustained. If
confirmed, I will uphold this commitment.

industrial base
176. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, what is your definition of the
industrial base?
Mr. Hagel. The defense industrial base is a diverse and dynamic set
of companies that provide both products and services, directly and
indirectly, to national security agencies, including the military. The
defense industrial base includes companies of all shapes and sizes from
some of the world's largest public companies to small businesses.

177. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, what will be your
approach to preserving the industrial base?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continually
assesses the health of the industrial base. I will work closely with
industry and Congress and will be prepared to act to preserve needed
skills and manufacturing capabilities, as resources permit.

acquisition reform
178. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, it seems that every time we have a
change in administrations or the Secretaries of Defense, another
acquisition study is commissioned, usually ignoring the 300 plus
studies that have already produced a report. If confirmed, what will be
your approach to ensuring the acquisition system produces affordable
capabilities that are responsive to the needs of the warfighter?
Mr. Hagel. I understand the Department has undertaken a series of
``Better Buying Power'' initiatives as a broadbased collection of
comprehensive, detailed, initiatives to improve acquisition practices
and ensure the Department is procuring affordable, technically
achievable capabilities on cost and schedule. If confirmed, I will
examine these initiatives to ensure that they adequately address the
problems with the Department's acquisition system.

green agenda
179. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, following up on your testimony, you
stated in response to questions posed by the committee on your
priorities for defense investments in energy technologies that ``my
broad priorities for defense energy investments will be those that:
increase military capabilities, provide more mission success, and lower
total cost.''
With the budget cuts DOD is facing, how will your priorities impact
DOD's current plan to invest $9 billion over the next 5 years on energy
technology investments and an additional $4 billion for renewable
energy facility projects?
Mr. Hagel. I have not yet reviewed the Department's budget related
to energy technologies. If confirmed, I will ensure that investments in
the operational energy area drive enhanced military capabilities,
facilitate mission effectiveness, and lower costs.

180. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, what criteria would
you establish to focus investments on your priorities?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, my main criteria will be to ensure that
DOD investments enhance readiness and warfighting effectiveness and
increase our national security.

181. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe that defense funds
should be used to develop a commercial biofuels refinery?
Mr. Hagel. The Nation's long-term energy security would benefit
from a competitive, domestic renewable fuels industry; as a major
consumer of liquid fuels, the Department would benefit, as well. That
said, I am not yet in a position to comment on the trade-offs between
the value of this investment and the other priorities of the
Department.

182. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe that critical
operations and maintenance funds intended for the training, equipping,
and readiness of our Armed Forces should be used to pay for alternate
fuels that exceed the cost of traditional fossil fuels?
Mr. Hagel. I believe the Department's primary operational energy
goal should be to ensure operational military readiness. I understand
that most of the Department's investments in alternate fuels since 2003
have been for the purpose of ensuring that military platforms can
operate on a wide range of fuels, providing useful military flexibility
if and when they become commercially available and cost competitive
with petroleum products.

183. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, will you pledge to work with
Congress to ensure that all investments and purchases of renewable
energy technologies and alternate fuels are supported by specific
congressional authorizations for that purpose?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department's energy
investments comply with congressional authorizations.

184. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, according to a recent report by a
major oil and gas company, the United States will be energy self-
sufficient in 2030. Other reports by respected organizations have
agreed. Do you agree that the United States could become energy
independent in the next 20 years?
Mr. Hagel. I am greatly encouraged by the recent developments in
the U.S. energy sector and the benefits for our economy.

185. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, how do you foresee this impacting
U.S. foreign policy?
Mr. Hagel. Reducing the Nation's dependence on foreign oil is an
important national security imperative. That said, because oil prices
are set on a global market and will be for the foreseeable future, the
stability of global oil markets will continue to be important for the
U.S. economy.

u.s. africa command
186. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, the outgoing Secretary of Defense
has been a strong supporter of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and
critical engagement and operations ongoing throughout the continent of
Africa. AFRICOM has less than 5,000 boots on the African continent to
cover 54 countries and over 12 million square miles. Its forces are
completely shared with U.S. European Command (EUCOM). How will the
United States be able to adequately support AFRICOM operations given
the cuts in EUCOM personnel, coupled with additional cuts in DOD
funding?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that our low-cost, small-footprint presence
and operations in Africa are appropriate to promoting our interests and
addressing threats to us and our partners. U.S. forces are managed
globally to address ongoing needs anywhere, so forces that operate in
and around Africa extend beyond those assigned to EUCOM. Moreover,
since the attacks on our diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, I
understand that the Department has undergone a rigorous evaluation of
our military posture across the region, to including assessing EUCOM
and AFRICOM force posture. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure
that we appropriately manage the allocation of U.S. military forces
across the globe, including in Africa, to ensure we are best
positioning ourselves on any given day for contingencies that may
arise.

187. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, the President's new strategy calls
for a ``rebalancing'' of resources to the Asia Pacific theater,
maintaining focus on the Middle East, and ``evolving'' force posture in
Europe. Do you believe the President's new Asia-focused strategy puts
our operations at high risk for Africa and South America?
Mr. Hagel. I agree with the Defense Department's new strategy and
move to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region while maintaining focus on
challenges in the Middle East. The strategy also makes it clear that we
will still have interests we need to protect in other regions of the
world and that we will do so through continued partnership, rotational
presence, and smaller foot-print activities. If confirmed, I will make
sure that we are always mindful of how we address threats, manage risk,
and promote our interests in all parts of the world , and what role the
U.S. military and DOD play in that as part of an overall U.S. effort.
However, we may have to seek different approaches to pursuing our
interests in these other regions if the size of our overall defense
budget declines further.

188. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, the headquarters for AFRICOM is in
Stuttgart, Germany. Would you consider moving AFRICOM out of Germany
and somewhere in Africa?
Mr. Hagel. I understand the Department has just completed a study
that compares the costs and benefits of moving the AFRICOM
headquarters. In the end Secretary Panetta considered both cost and
operational factors and decided to keep the headquarters in Stuttgart,
Germany. When assessing possible relocation to the African continent
the Department considered the difficulties in determining a
representative country on such a diverse continent, diplomatic
challenges, high costs of infrastructure, security concerns and
mobility and access challenges. It was decided that a move to the
African continent was not feasible at this time.

budget cuts and operational readiness
189. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, you stated in responses to
questions posed by the committee in regard to the Joint Chief's
concerns about a hollow force that ``the concerns the Joint Chiefs have
expressed about readiness come from a variety of factors, including the
challenges of recovering from 10 years of operational stress, of
transitioning to a broader range of operations, and of doing all of
this in the face of fiscal austerity and budget uncertainty.'' How do
you plan to monitor risk and the potential mismatch between constrained
resources and demands of operational plans?
Mr. Hagel. I am deeply impressed by the caliber and capabilities of
our military forces. It is vitally important that they be ready to
respond to the Nation's needs, and I am concerned that further budget
cuts will negatively affect readiness. If confirmed, I will get regular
updates by the Joint Chiefs on where we must devote the Department's
attention and resources to ensure the readiness of the force.

190. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you believe there currently
exists a mismatch between readiness requirements and military strategy
when assessing the resources available? Please explain.
Mr. Hagel. Maintaining ready forces is a priority. If confirmed, I
will work with the Joint Chiefs to better understand the basis of their
assessment and how we can most effectively address the readiness
challenges our military faces.
My sense is that the concerns the Joint Chiefs have expressed about
readiness come from a variety of factors, including the challenges of
recovering from 10 years of operational stress, of transitioning to a
broader range of operations, and of doing all of this in the face of
fiscal austerity and budget uncertainty. If confirmed, I will carefully
monitor how all of these factors are posing risks to readiness and will
work closely with the military and civilian leadership of the
Department to mitigate those risks to the greatest extent possible.

191. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, as to the mitigation of risk of a
hollow force, do you believe the President will provide you the
discretion to request higher defense budgets than are currently
proposed by the administration over the next 10 years?
Mr. Hagel. I will always give the President my most honest and
informed opinion about all necessary requirements for America's
national security.
I understand the administration has developed Strategic Guidance
consistent with the funding limits of the budget control act. Any
changes to those limits, such as sequestration, will cause a dramatic
change in the force and require a different strategy or different
resources. Additionally, unexpected demands for forces will likely
result in a request for additional funding, as they always have.

geographic risk posed by the revised military strategy
192. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, in your response to the committee
on a question regarding the revised military strategy announced by the
President in the wake of the administration's decision to cut defense
budgets by $487 billion over 10 years, you state: ``By emphasizing the
Asia-Pacific while also focusing on the Middle East, rebalancing will
necessarily accept risk in other areas given the resource-constrained
environment.'' How do you believe the President's military strategy is
taking risks in regions other than Asia and the Middle East?
Mr. Hagel. By prioritizing resources for Asia and the Middle East,
the current defense strategy accepts some risk in terms of the
military's ability to address security challenges elsewhere. I believe
this risk is manageable at the levels of defense spending provided for
in the Budget Control Act. Regardless of where U.S. military forces may
be positioned or stationed, one of the key advantages of our military
is that we can bring to bear effective capabilities where needed to
address threats to our interests. If confirmed, I would work with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services to ensure that
readiness is one of our top priorities, so that our forces are ready to
respond to the full range of contingencies that may threaten our key
interests.

193. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, what specifically are the risks for
Africa and South America?
Mr. Hagel. In Africa, partner states accept a greater share of the
burden to counter the growing capacity of violent extremist
organizations and ensure regional stability. While we believe this
African-led approach manages the threats to U.S. interests, the limited
defense capacities of most African states and the modest investments in
the African security sector are a source of risk. In South America,
transnational criminal organizations undermine peace and security
across the region and into the United States. As in Africa, partner
states in South America will accept a greater share of the burden to
address transnational criminal organizations.

194. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, why do you believe this risk is
necessary?
Mr. Hagel. Not all problems are best met with military tools. Many
of our national security objectives around the world, and notably in
Africa and South America, are best secured through diplomacy and
economic development. I believe DOD's current strategic approach
balances the risk of overwhelming these two regions with U.S. military
presence with the need to be ready to respond to crises that may emerge
there, using globally agile forces.

195. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, what do you believe was lacking in
our military strategy for Asia that required a rebalancing?
Mr. Hagel. As the United States draws down from more than a decade
of war in Afghanistan, we face an inflection point allowing for a
transition from fighting today's wars to preparing for tomorrow's
challenges. The President has been clear that U.S. economic and
security interests are inextricably tied to the Asia-Pacific. The
emerging economic and political dynamism in the Asia-Pacific requires
strong and continuous U.S. commitment and the rebalance is a whole-of-
government effort to renew and deepen U.S. engagement throughout the
region. The rebalance will inform the allocation of activities and
resources to the Asia-Pacific, where the Department will contribute to
peace and prosperity in the region. If confirmed, I will continue the
Department's efforts and activities to seek greater engagement with
allies and partners to build capacity for security cooperation, build
mutual trust, understanding, and norms among countries in the region.

196. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, what does rebalancing mean for the
U.S. military effort in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of force
structure changes, additional or modified military capabilities, and
defense budget modifications?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will focus on strengthening our
relationships, building the capacity of key allies and partners, as
well as maintaining the United States' ability to deter conflict and
respond to any potential contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region. The
rebalance renews emphasis on air and naval forces while maintaining
distributed ground forces. The rebalance also requires the Department
to develop new capabilities in order to maintain a technological edge,
our freedom of action, and ability to project power in the region. I
would work closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Office
of the Secretary of Defense leadership to assess any additional changes
in resources, force structure, equipment, and training.

197. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, the January 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance says that ``our posture in Europe must evolve.'' What is your
assessment of the specific programs and strategic efforts that DOD is
executing, or has planned, to evolve our posture in Europe?
Mr. Hagel. I support the Department's current approach to posture
in Europe and its emphasis on maintaining our Article 5 commitments to
Allied security and promoting enhanced capacity and interoperability
for coalition operations. For instance, I strongly support ongoing
efforts related to the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the
establishment of an aviation detachment in Poland, and enhanced
training and exercises with European allies and partners through
rotational deployments from the United States. All of these efforts
introduce more modern capabilities appropriate for future challenges
and demonstrate our commitment to NATO and the strength of the
Alliance.

198. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, how do you believe our evolving
force posture in Europe will affect our commitment to NATO?
Mr. Hagel. The Department's evolving defense posture in Europe
focuses on enhancing interoperability and training and introducing
modern capabilities more appropriate for future challenges. These
evolutions demonstrate our commitment to NATO and the strength of the
Alliance. Regardless of the rebalance, NATO is already adapting to meet
new and emerging threats, to acquire the core enabling capabilities
needed to respond to the full range of contingencies, and to better
align U.S. and NATO training and education efforts in order to solidify
and maintain the gains realized from having operated together in
Afghanistan. As Secretary Panetta has said, ``Europe is our security
partner of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the
world.'' Our investment in Europe is, therefore, crucial.

iran ministry support
199. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, Iran's Foreign Ministry was quoted
as being hopeful your appointment would improve relations between
Tehran and the United States ``We hope that practical changes will be
created in the U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. officials' approach
will change to respect the Nations' rights. We hope that the U.S.
officials will favor peace instead of warmongering and recognize the
rights of nations instead of interfering in the countries' internal
affairs.''
You stated in October 2009 that ``President Obama's approach to
achieving a Middle East peace is connected to other vital regional and
global issues--like helping forge an emerging Arab consensus on peace,
combating terrorism, and future relationships with Iran and Syria.
These issues are all in the long-term interests of Israel, the U.S.,
the Middle East, and the world.''
In describing the President's approach, what specifically were you
referring to regarding future relationships with Iran and Syria?
Mr. Hagel. While I cannot speak to the motivations of the Iranian
Foreign Ministry spokesperson behind making those statements, there
should be no doubt that I fully support and--if confirmed--will
faithfully execute the President's multi-vector strategy towards Iran.
This strategy has included tough-minded diplomacy, crippling sanctions,
and serious contingency planning with the objective of preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
My comments in 2009 reflected my support for the President's use of
diplomacy as an effective tool of statecraft. This approach allowed the
United States to test the intentions of the regimes in Iran and Syria,
expose them before the world, and when they failed to seize the
opportunities presented to them, build a global coalition against them.

200. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, how would these relationships with
these two terrorist regimes be in the long-term interests of Israel and
the United States?
Mr. Hagel. Much has changed since 2009 in Iran and Syria. With that
in mind, I believe that only after there is a change in regime in Syria
and serious changes in the regime's behavior in Tehran, can we
conceivably think about long-term relationships with these two
countries that could be beneficial to the interests of the United
States and the State of Israel. At the same time, I think the United
States should continue to reach out to the people of Syria and Iran--as
the best long-term investment for our and Israel's interests. Both
societies are tremendously important to the stability of a region that
is of great interest to the United States.

201. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, how would you assess the success of
the President's approach to date in the region?
Mr. Hagel. I think the President's approach to the region has had
some great success during the first term. President Obama responsibly
drew down our presence in Iraq, crippled al Qaeda, isolated and
weakened Iran, strongly supported the security of the State of Israel,
and focused on transforming our relationship with peoples of the
region, while advancing our core interests. That said, much remains to
be done during the second term, and--if confirmed--I look forward to
advancing our interests in the vitally important region of the Middle
East.

north korea
202. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, you wrote that ``Kim Jon Il's
government is a genuinely rogue regime whose nuclear ambitions and
capacity for mischief have been more or less contained, though
imperfectly, through the U.N. and a mature diplomatic structure that
includes the United States, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea.''
Given North Korea's ballistic missile launch in December and recent
threats to conduct further nuclear testing, do you still think that the
diplomatic structure is effectively containing North Korean nuclear
ambitions?
Mr. Hagel. North Korea's December Taepo Dong II missile launch and
recent threats to conduct a third nuclear test underscore the growing
North Korean threat to international peace and security. U.S.
diplomatic efforts following the December missile launch, particularly
with China, resulted in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2087, which
affirms the international community's opposition to North Korea's
provocations. The tightened sanctions in the resolution will help
impede the growth of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program.
If confirmed, I will continue to ensure our military provides the
deterrence and defense necessary to protect our allies and our
interests. This posture is also the best way to create conditions where
diplomacy has the best possible prospects to succeed.

203. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you see the future force
structure of U.S. forces in Korea decreasing below the current size?
Mr. Hagel. To secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
and in Northeast Asia, it is important that the United States and the
Republic of Korea (ROK) maintain a robust combined defense posture. If
confirmed, I will work with ROK leadership to ensure that the United
States maintains an appropriately sized and ready force to respond to
evolving threats in the region.

204. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you think any capabilities need
to be added to our force structure in the Asia-Pacific theater to
ensure regional stability in light of increased North Korean
belligerence?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will maintain the U.S. commitment to the
defense of the ROK using globally available U.S. forces and
capabilities that can be deployed to augment the combined defense in
case of crisis. If confirmed, I would ensure that we have the
capabilities necessary to deter, and, if necessary, defeat, North
Korean aggression.

taiwan
205. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, tensions in the Asia-Pacific have
increased significantly due to more aggressive posturing of China in
places like Scarborough Reef and the Senkaku Islands as China continues
to pursue increased military capabilities. Do you fully support the
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979?
Mr. Hagel. I fully support the Taiwan Relations Act. In my view,
the increasing complexity and sophistication of the military threat to
Taiwan from China increasingly means that Taiwan must devote greater
attention to asymmetric concepts and innovative technologies to
maximize Taiwan's strengths and advantages. If confirmed, I would work
closely with Congress, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and our
interagency partners to ensure the continued effective implementation
of all of the relevant provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

206. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do you support the sale of F-16C/Ds
to Taiwan, why or why not?
Mr. Hagel. With respect to advanced fighter sales, I believe that
we should make available to Taiwan those military capabilities that
would allow the Taiwan Armed Forces to execute its missions effectively
not only for today, but well into the future. If confirmed, I will look
at what specific capabilities those are--or should be--in light of the
security situation in the Taiwan Strait and the evolving military
capabilities on the mainland. In addition, if confirmed, I will work
with the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command to identify appropriate
military training and exercise opportunities that will advance U.S.
interests, enhance Taiwan's defense capabilities, and contribute to
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

207. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, would you support the sale of F-35s
to Taiwan?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #206.

208. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, how would you strengthen the U.S.
security relations with Taiwan?
Mr. Hagel. I agree that the Taiwan Relations Act has contributed to
peace and stability in the region for over 30 years. In my view, the
increasing complexity and sophistication of the military threat to
Taiwan from China means that Taiwan must devote greater attention to
asymmetric concepts and innovative technologies to maximize Taiwan's
strengths and advantages. If confirmed, I would work closely with
Congress, the Commander, PACOM, and our interagency partners to ensure
the continued effective implementation of all of the relevant
provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. I believe that we should make
available to Taiwan military capabilities that would allow the Taiwan
Armed Forces to execute its missions effectively not only for today,
but well into the future. If confirmed, I will look at what specific
capabilities those are--or should be--in light of the security
situation in the Taiwan Strait and the evolving military capabilities
on the mainland. In addition, if confirmed, I will work with the
Commander, PACOM to identify appropriate military training and exercise
opportunities that will advance U.S. interests, enhance Taiwan's
defense capabilities, and contribute to peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait.

209. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, does the United States need to
maintain a two carrier presence in the Pacific at all times and can
this be done if sequestration goes into effect?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the
Navy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Pacific Command to ensure that we
allocate our naval resources at the level of presence necessary to
support our strategic goals, striking a balance between carrier
presence in the Pacific Ocean and other regions. The current budget
uncertainty, combined with ongoing high demand in the Gulf, has made
sustaining two carriers in the Pacific challenging; further significant
cuts in the defense budget would make it, extraordinarily difficult
especially if preserving other U.S. interests--particularly Gulf
presence.

support for israeli security and regional stability
210. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, given the high demand and low
density of our missile defense assets globally, do you support the
allocation of a TPY-2 radar and a BMD-capable ship to the defense of
Israel?
Mr. Hagel. I support strong missile defense cooperation with
Israel, including the deployment of the U.S. TPY-2 radar and
operational cooperation and support, including ship-based. In addition,
the United States and Israel have a long history of cooperative
research and development on missile defense. If confirmed, I will
continue to support a robust missile defense cooperative relationship
with Israel.

iran
211. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, will a two-carrier presence in the
Gulf be sustainable given expected severe defense budget cuts?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that it is critical that the U.S. military
maintain a robust presence in the region to counter Iran, reassure our
partners, and build partner capacity. Our carrier presence is a key
element of this presence. If confirmed, I will work with the combatant
commanders to revalidate our posture and ensure it best addresses the
threats, challenges, and opportunities in the region to preserve all
options for the President while balancing other national security
needs. Current budget uncertainty and further significant cuts in the
defense budget would make sustaining this critical Gulf presence, and
preserving other U.S. interests, extraordinarily difficult.

212. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, do we have enough missile defense
assets in the Middle East to adequately protect our partners and allies
from an Iranian ballistic missile attack?
Mr. Hagel. I believe the phased adaptive approach takes the
appropriate steps to protect our interests in the region. If confirmed,
I will make it a priority to assess the adequacy of our missile defense
posture in the Middle East to protect our deployed forces, allies, and
partners from attack, and will seek adjustments as appropriate. I will
also work to strengthen our cooperative relationships in the Middle
East, and encourage our partners to continue to make investments in
missile defense.

listening to commanders on the ground
213. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, our commanders on the ground in
both Iraq and Afghanistan asked for a surge to achieve national
security objectives - and you disagreed with both of them.
How much weight will you give your combat commanders on the ground
when you make future decisions or recommendations to the President?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I would of course place great weight on
the assessments and recommendations of combatant commanders and theater
commanders on how best to achieve our military and national security
objectives in their theater. If confirmed, it would be my
responsibility to weigh their recommendations against global risk and
force posture, and to offer that judgment to the President alongside
theirs. If confirmed, I will honor the principles, enshrined in law,
that allow the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to voice their
best military advice to the President. I will continue to foster an
environment that welcomes critical thinking and diversity of views from
theater commanders, combatant commanders, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, as better and wiser strategic choices will result.

russia reset
214. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, the administration has made major
efforts towards resetting our relationship with Russia. However, on
major issues such as Syria, Russia remains uncooperative. What is your
assessment of the reset with Russia with respect to military-to-
military relations?
Mr. Hagel. Although we do not see eye-to-eye with Russia on every
issue, there are many areas of cooperation that have been positive,
including transit into and out of Afghanistan, support on sanctions
against Iran, and increased transparency on military reform and
modernization.

215. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Hagel, what areas do you see for future
increased military cooperation with Russia?
Mr. Hagel. The enhanced bilateral military relationship we have
developed with Russia under the reset is worthwhile. If confirmed, I
would seek to continue it, while considering what adjustments may be
needed. My understanding is that DOD has been pursuing several areas of
increased cooperation with Russia, with a focus on developing
transparency by providing a reliable and predictable channel of
communications between our militaries. If confirmed, I would seek to
increase U.S. consultations with Russia on its internal defense reform
efforts, such as modern military recruitment, compensation and benefits
systems, and developing noncommissioned officers. Assisting the Russian
military to enact reforms in these areas will help make it a more
confident, secure and stable organization. If confirmed, I would also
seek to pursue cooperation with Russia on strategic issues critical to
both of our Nations, such as counterterrorism and missile defense.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
afghanistan
216. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, in an interview with the Financial
Times on August 29, 2011, you are quoted as saying, ``I disagreed with
President Obama, his decision to surge in Afghanistan, as I did with
President Bush on the surge in Iraq.'' Do you unequivocally stand by
your statement that you disagreed with President Obama's decision to
surge troops in Afghanistan?
Mr. Hagel. I did disagree with President Obama's decision to surge
troops to Afghanistan. Notwithstanding any past differences in view, if
confirmed, I will work with our military commanders and Joint Chiefs to
ensure that President Obama has the best possible advice in developing
and implementing a strategy that best protects our national interests.

217. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, do you advocate the full withdrawal
of U.S. forces by the end of 2014?
Mr. Hagel. I support the President's plan to transition full
security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces by the
end of 2014, and to retain an enduring commitment in the future. As the
President has stated, a residual force after 2014 would focus on two
primary missions: to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and its affiliates;
and to train, advise, and assist the Afghan forces so they can maintain
their own security. I further support the President's position that any
residual U.S. force would have to be at the invitation of the Afghan
Government and would need to be guaranteed certain legal protections,
which will be negotiated under the Bilateral Security Agreement.

syria
218. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, more than 60,000 Syrians have been
killed in some 22 months of conflict between the rebels and the Assad
regime. You are quoted in an August 29, 2011, interview with the
Financial Times, as saying, ``I think Syria, the outcome there has far
more important consequences for America's national interests than
Libya.'' Should the United States provide at least the same level of
support to anti-Assad forces as we provided to anti-Qaddafi forces?
Mr. Hagel. I continue to believe that the United States has
significant national security stakes in the outcome in Syria. I believe
that the steps taken by the administration to date, including
political, diplomatic and economic pressure, as well as assisting the
unarmed opposition, have been appropriate. If confirmed I will support
the President's ongoing reassessment of the continuously changing
dynamics on the ground in Syria, to determine what additional steps may
be appropriate.

219. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, are U.S. forces capable of
executing, without operational support from international partners, no
fly zones in Syria?
Mr. Hagel. While I have not been briefed in detail on U.S.
capabilities for such a mission, I am confident that the U.S. military
could enforce a no-fly zone over Syria. However, because Syria has an
advanced air defense network, I understand that such a mission could
involve a significant number of and risk to U.S. forces.

220. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, do you believe the United States
should deny Assad his use of air power?
Mr. Hagel. The President has said Assad must go, and a democratic
political transition should remain our goal. If confirmed, I will
support the current focus on weakening the Assad regime through
political, diplomatic, and economic pressure, as well as assisting the
unarmed opposition. Regarding any additional options, military and non-
military, if confirmed, I will support the President's continuing
reassessment of what additional steps may be appropriate.

221. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, do you believe the United States
should provide arms, intelligence, or other military support to Syrian
rebels?
Mr. Hagel. I do not believe that providing lethal support to the
armed opposition at this time would improve the terrible situation in
Syria; however, this question should continue to be re-evaluated over
time. The Syrian people are in urgent need of assistance during this
difficult period, and the United States is helping to address those
basic needs by providing medical assistance, humanitarian assistance,
and political support on the international stage.

iraq
222. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, do you regard the 2007 Iraq surge
as a mistake?
Mr. Hagel. When former President Bush announced his decision to
surge troops to Iraq in 2007, I was against it. I thought the Bush
administration had not defined a clear end state for the war in Iraq,
and under these circumstances I did not believe that adding more U.S.
troops was worth the likely cost in American lives. It is now clear
that a combination of steps including the surge, improved counter-
terrorism techniques, and the Anbar Awakening, contributed to reducing
violence in Iraq. The cost of the surge in American lives was almost
1,200 dead and thousands wounded. What is still not clear, however, is
what role the surge played relative to the other steps that we took, or
what would have happened if we had not undertaken the surge; those are
questions for historians.

223. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, could the other factors that
contributed to the stability of Iraq circa 2007, such as the Anbar
Awakening, have succeeded without the surge?
Mr. Hagel. The Anbar Awakening was an important development--along
with the Shia militant ceasefire--that was a result of the decision of
the Iraqi people to take back their country from extremist forces. Many
of the Anbar Awakening tribes fought alongside our troops, and they
should be commended for their efforts. Over 100,000 young Sunis were
paid by the United States between $350 and $500 per month of helping
us. Our troops benefited from the Awakening and in turn the Awakening
forces were further bolstered by the support offered by our troops. But
ultimately, it is difficult to make a judgment on the causal
relationship between the surge and the Anbar Awakening. Again, this
will be a question best reserved for history to make an ultimate
judgment.

224. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, you advocated the complete
withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by 2011, rather than
negotiating an agreement for an enduring presence of U.S. forces. The
President ultimately did exactly what you recommended--reportedly
against the advice of his military leaders. Do you believe that Iraq is
more stable and better off today as a result?
Mr. Hagel. Yes, I fully supported the withdrawal of all U.S. combat
forces from Iraq by December 2011 in accordance with the November 2008
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. It was the right decision and it gave the
Iraqis the chance to take full ownership and responsibility for their
country. Iraq is better off today because of it. The drawdown has
allowed us to chart a new path in our strategic partnership with a
sovereign Iraq based on mutual interests and mutual respect.
While Iraq is a better place today, it is clear that Iraq has a
long way to go to move beyond a history of violence and instability.
Iraq continues to face security challenges, but our focus must be on
the future. A normalized relationship between our two countries, based
on mutual respect and mutual interests, is the best way to advance
U.S., Iraqi, and regional interests. If confirmed, I will continue
Secretary Panetta's work to strengthen our military-to-military
relationship with Iraq, and further its re-integration into the region.

dod budget
225. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, if additional resources are
necessary to meet our national security needs, would you advocate for a
restoration of some of the $487 billion the President plans to cut from
future defense budgets?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will work with the President, OMB, and
Congress to provide the military capability necessary to defend our
Nation. I recognize that the Budget Control Act of 2011 requires that
to be done within constrained resources. I believe we can defend the
Nation within those limits. If confirmed, I would expect to consult
with the President and Congress as circumstances change. However, I do
believe that if significant multi-year reductions in funding take place
(such as those required by sequestration), the Department would need to
revise the defense strategy.

226. Mr. Hagel, do you agree with former Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates that a 10 percent, or approximately $50 billion, cut to
defense spending in 1 year ``operationally would be catastrophic''?
Mr. Hagel. As both Secretaries Gates and Panetta repeatedly stated,
sequestration--both the size and the arbitrary manner of these cuts--
would be devastating to the Department. It would harm military
readiness and disrupt each and every investment program. Based on my
assessment to date, I share their concern. I urge Congress to eliminate
the sequester threat permanently and pass a balanced deficit-reduction
plan.

force structure and end strength
227. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, do you support the President's plan
to reduce military force structure over the next few years, including
reducing Army end strength to approximately 490,000 soldiers by 2017?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will be committed to maintaining the
best Army in the world--capable and ready--an Army that will support
the mission requirements associated with our defense strategy. In the
future our Army will not be sized for large-scale, long-duration
stability operations, but instead have the agility to respond where the
Nation needs it. I support an Army that is sized according to the
defense strategy and the mission requirements that support that
strategy.

228. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, given our poor track record of
predicting future requirements for ground forces, what do you believe
to be the justification for reducing the size of the Army and Marine
Corps so dramatically?
Mr. Hagel. Our force structure and end strength levels should
support the overall national security and defense strategies. The
defense strategy places emphasis on a smaller, leaner force that is
agile, flexible, and ready to deploy quickly; not a force that is sized
for large, protracted stability operations. You are right that we have
a poor track record in predicting the future. But we have shown that we
can rapidly grow our ground forces, if necessary. We also plan to
preserve readiness in our Reserve Forces.

229. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, the President has exempted military
personnel accounts from cuts related to budget sequestration. Do you
agree that cutting training and equipment funding without proportional
cuts to military personnel accounts will lead to a hollow force?
Mr. Hagel. In general, I agree that we must maintain the right
balance of end-strength, modernization, and training to guard against a
hollow force. However, in the case of the blunt instrument of
sequestration, I support the President's exemption of military
personnel accounts in fiscal year 2013 due to the fact that across-the-
board reductions would be inadvisable for the morale of the force and
not cost-effective.

230. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, in the context of overall budget
reductions, not specifically budget sequestration, would you recommend
curtailing civilian personnel by amounts proportional to cuts made to
the military personnel accounts?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that Secretary Panetta has directed an
internal scrub to see where savings can be made in civilian personnel
accounts. To me this is a prudent review, and something the Department
should do continuously. However, it is not clear that a reduction of a
certain percentage of uniform personnel can be met with a corresponding
reduction in civilian personnel. The two serve different functions, and
in some cases, for example cyber efforts, we foresee a growth in
civilian personnel. But if confirmed, this is an area I intend to look
at closely.

231. Senator McCain. Mr. Hagel, do you intend to comply with
section 955 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, which directs savings in
civilian personnel and service contractor workforces of DOD?
Mr. Hagel. If I am confirmed, I will ensure the Department complies
with section 955.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
gulf region military posture
232. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Hagel, in hindsight it appears your
assessment was wrong on both the effectiveness of the Iraq surge and on
our method of withdrawal. Some argue that our departure from Iraq and
our subsequent disengagement have opened the door to greater Iranian
influence in Iraq and strengthened Teheran's position in the Middle
East. What alterations, if any, are necessary to our military force
posture in the Gulf Region to deter Iranian regional ambitions and
support international diplomatic efforts to stop Iran's effort to
acquire nuclear weapons?
Mr. Hagel. In my view, our military posture in the Middle East
region remains strong and is a critical component of the President's
multi-vector strategy to ensure Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Joint Chiefs and the
CENTCOM Commander to ensure that the Department is fully prepared and
adequately postured for any military contingencies in this critically
important region, particularly with respect to Iran and the President's
firm commitment to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

military readiness depots
233. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Hagel, Georgia is home to two of our
critical defense depots--Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex and Marine
Corps Logistics Base-Albany. One sequestration scenario directs the
Military Services to cancel vital 3rd and 4th quarter depot-level
maintenance activities. This will have an immediate and lasting impact
on military readiness and make it difficult to recover a force that has
seen combat for the better part of 2 decades. Furthermore, thousands of
highly-skilled workers would lose their jobs; and thousands of hours
would be lost for flight time, drive time, and repairs that would
ensure our military's equipment is ready when the Nation calls upon
them. Describe in detail how you will ensure that depots accomplish
their mission and not lose the continuity that is vital to the success
of our force readiness if sequestration occurs.
Mr. Hagel. The work done by the skilled workforce at our defense
depots is critical to the Defense Department. I agree with Secretary
Panetta that the effects of sequestration will be devastating and will
lead to a decline in military readiness. If confirmed, I will work with
the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Joint Chiefs, and Military
Services to sustain readiness as best we can. However, this will be
extremely difficult given the impact of sequestration, especially when
combined with the effects of a year-long Continuing Resolution. If
sequestration occurs, it will likely not be possible to keep our depots
fully operating, and this will impact our future readiness.

general/flag officer reform
234. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Hagel, historically, during military
draw-downs, enlisted personnel percentages take the brunt of the
attrition while a disproportionate amount of general and flag officers
remain in place. It seems we have an excessive number of general
officers in the ranks. If confirmed, will you take a closer look at the
number of general/flag officer authorizations in the military and the
size of their support staffs?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that the Track Four Efficiency Study,
initiated by Secretary Gates and continued by Secretary Panetta,
identified both Service and joint general and flag officer positions
for elimination, realignment, or reduction. Execution of these
modifications is planned to continue over the next 2 years.
If confirmed, I would support continued efforts to ensure we
maintain the appropriate level of leadership across our joint force,
seeking efficiencies as mission and force structure changes allow.

dod financial accountability
235. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Hagel, in the current fiscal
environment it is imperative that we maintain proper financial
accountability in DOD. DOD is required to have an auditable financial
statement by 2017, an objective that Secretary Panetta accelerated to
2014. What specific steps would you take for DOD to reach this goal by
that date?
Mr. Hagel. I agree financial management improvement is an important
priority and support the Department's current plan to have the
budgetary statement ready for audit by 2014 and the full set of
statements ready by 2017. If confirmed, I intend to review the
Department's progress with my senior leadership team on a regular basis
and work through them to remove any institutional barriers to achieving
this goal.

post-2014 afghan bilateral security agreement
236. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Hagel, under the strategic partnership
agreement signed by the United States and Afghanistan in May 2012, both
countries are obligated to negotiate a bilateral security agreement
within 1 year. The talks will set conditions for U.S. forces in
Afghanistan after 2014 as part of a train, advise, and assist mission.
Oversight is key for this process to be successful. We owe it to our
military forces to have an organized, methodical plan in order to not
squander the incredible effort expended by the United States in
Afghanistan. Will you ensure that Congress is involved in the
development process with the bilateral security agreement so that the
administration is not planning in a potentially disastrous vacuum?
Mr. Hagel. I agree on the importance of the Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) for setting the parameters for our forces in
Afghanistan after 2014 and with the need to maintain regular
communication with Congress as the BSA negotiations proceed. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's sustained engagement
with Congress throughout the Bilateral Security Agreement negotiation
process.

237. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Hagel, from your viewpoint, what
conditions need to be set in a post-2014 Afghanistan with U.S. and
coalition involvement for the Afghanistan Government to continue to be
successful?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that improvements in security conditions,
enabled by continued development of the Afghan National Security
Forces, will continue to be critical. Good governance, including
sustained efforts to end corruption, is also important to ensure that
security gains result in sustainable Afghan self-reliance and
governance. Regional peace and deepened cooperation between Afghanistan
and its neighbors will also be important for long-term success. If
confirmed, I will monitor conditions in and around Afghanistan closely
and will continue to assess progress in consultation with commanders on
the ground and the Joint Chiefs, to ensure that we are helping to set
the conditions for continued success in Afghanistan beyond 2014.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
use of military force
238. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you state that one of the key lessons learned from
the Iraq war is the need to think more carefully before using military
force, especially regarding the need to plan for all phases of
operations before beginning a preemptive conflict.
You have stated repeatedly that the United States should keep all
options on the table, to include the use of preemptive military force,
to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Some military theorists
argue that such an attack, even if successful, has the potential to
result in a variety of reactions from Iran, including direct attacks on
U.S. and allied military forces, attempts to interrupt the flow of
commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, and the use of Iranian special
operations forces and proxies to conduct destabilizing operations in
vulnerable regional countries. Arguably, the second and third order
effects of such an attack would be far more widespread than those
resulting from the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
You also noted in your answers to the advance policy questions that
you do not feel knowledgeable enough about how the U.S. military has
implemented the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan to make
recommendations on additional changes. Why do you believe an attack on
Iran is now a viable option, whereas in 2006, you felt differently?
Mr. Hagel. I am fully committed to the President's policy of
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and believe all
options should be on the table to achieve that goal. A military attack
on Iran would most likely have significant consequences, as you have
described. But as I've also said, the military option should be the
last option considered. However, a nuclear-armed Iran would have far-
reaching and unacceptable consequences on regional stability, and on
the security of the United States.

239. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, do you feel the U.S. military is
adequately prepared to deal with the repercussions from a strike
against Iranian nuclear facilities? If not, what changes would need to
be implemented?
Mr. Hagel. While I do not currently have access to the information
needed to answer this question, I have great confidence that General
Mattis, the Joint Chiefs, and Secretary Panetta have ensured that the
U.S. military is prepared to deal with any repercussions from a strike
against Iranian nuclear facilities. If confirmed, I will work with the
CENTCOM Commander to refine planning as necessary over time, to ensure
that our forces remain ready to take any actions the President directs
and to defend themselves and the United States.

240. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, how would you engage regional
partners to limit the potential destabilizing effects of a strike on
Iranian nuclear facilities?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will continue to promote and advance the
Department's military-to-military and defense relations with our key
partners in the region. These relationships are critical to advance
U.S. strategic interests, including preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon, supporting the security of the State of Israel, and
building the capacity of partner nations to meet common challenges and
address future contingencies, if required.

241. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, do you believe you possess the
requisite knowledge about the state of the U.S. military and our allies
and that you are ready now, given the current state of affairs with
Iran, North Korea, and China, to effectively advise the President on
the employment of U.S. military forces towards achieving U.S. strategic
objectives?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. If confirmed, advising the President regarding the
employment of military forces will be my most important duty. I believe
I currently have the judgment and experience necessary to advise the
President on such matters and have a clear understanding of the role of
our military and alliances in achieving national security objectives.
If confirmed, I will ensure that my first priority and responsibility
is to match this prior experience with deeper knowledge of the current
plans and capabilities of our military.

u.s. shipbuilding industry
242. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, would you agree to
work closely with this committee and with this Congress in addressing
the urgent need to increase our shipbuilding rates?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

243. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you remain
committed to ensuring that the vessels we build for our sailors and
marines are the finest this Nation can produce and that you will never
agree to procuring vessels that do not meet the current military
classifications for warships?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the Navy's
fleet is appropriately sized and possesses the capabilities necessary
to fulfill its role in defending U.S. interests both in peace and
wartime. Recognizing the challenges faced within the Department of Navy
to build and maintain an affordable and balanced fleet, I am committed
to ensuring that survivability shall be addressed on all new surface
ships, combat systems and equipment designs, overhauls, conversions,
and modernizations in order that the design is provided a balance of
survivability performance, risk, and cost within program objectives.

244. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you agree to
analyze all avenues of cost reduction in shipbuilding, including multi-
year procurements, block buys of material for multiple ships, and level
loading the funding profiles to allow shipbuilders to optimize design
and material procurement prior to the start of construction?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

245. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, can you provide a rationale for the
Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) move toward a proposed noncommercial
model?
Mr. Hagel. I don't have insight into the specifics of what the DLA
proposed model is; however, it is my understanding that the DLA is
looking at ways to strengthen its relationships with suppliers to
mitigate contract risks. If confirmed, I will be able to look into the
details of the specific objectives and actions.

246. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, what additional oversight would
such a model provide to ensure the prevention of waste, fraud, and
abuse?
Mr. Hagel. At this time I don't have insight into the DLA model.
However I believe it is important that we have transparent contracting
practices that reduce risk and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

taiwan and u.s.-china relations
247. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, during an official visit to China
in September 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta extended an
invitation to his Chinese counterpart, General Liang Guanglie on the
People's Liberation Army's (PLA) participation in the biennial RIMPAC
in 2014. RIMPAC is the world's largest international maritime warfare
exercise, which in 2012 involved over 40 ships and submarines, more
than 200 aircraft, and 25,000 personnel from more than 20 countries
from the Pan Pacific region.
The Taiwan Strait has long been a potential flashpoint in the
region. Taiwan, one of America's important strategic allies in the
region, has been constantly under the threat of a growing PLA. If the
PLA is to be invited to RIMPAC, I believe we should consider involving
Taiwan as well. Would you consider inviting Taiwan's navy to
participate in RIMPAC?
Mr. Hagel. The United States is firm in its commitment to Taiwan's
self-defense needs under the Taiwan Relations Act. That relationship
includes defense exchanges and other interactions consistent with our
unofficial relationship and as provided for in the Taiwan Relations
Act. If confirmed, I will work to identify appropriate exchanges and
interactions to assist Taiwan's defense capabilities, and contribute to
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

248. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and
the Six Assurances of 1982 have contributed to the peace and stability
of the Asia-Pacific region for the past 3 decades. With the military
balance--including air superiority--gradually shifting in China's
favor, what are your plans to implement the security commitment the
United States has for Taiwan under this framework?
Mr. Hagel. In my view, the increasing complexity and sophistication
of the military threat to Taiwan from China means that Taiwan must
devote greater attention to asymmetric concepts and innovative
technologies to maximize Taiwan's strengths and advantages. If
confirmed, I would work closely with Congress, throughout DOD, and with
our interagency partners to ensure the continued effective
implementation of all of the relevant provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act.

249. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, as Taiwan is likely to retire some
of its older fighter aircraft in the next 5 to 10 years, do you believe
that sales of advanced aircraft and submarines are an important next
step in this commitment?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that we should make available to Taiwan those
defense articles and defense services which enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability, today and into the future. If
confirmed, I will look at what specific capabilities those are--or
should be--in light of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait and
the evolving military capabilities on the mainland.

export control reform
250. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, during his tenure as Secretary of
Defense, Robert Gates championed export control reform. Specifically,
he called for streamlining the foreign military sales, release, and
disclosure processes. It is vital that our partners and allies have
more certainty of timelines for delivery of critical defense articles
and services; however, this is not always the case when our processes
get bogged down. Is this something you will also champion if confirmed
as Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Hagel. I fully support the reform efforts because I believe
they are absolutely necessary to meet 21st century national security
challenges. Secretary Gates played a key role in setting the
administration's export control reform objectives: a single list, a
single licensing agency, a single primary enforcement coordination
agency, and a single U.S. Government-wide information technology
licensing system. The administration has made progress in this reform
effort, but the work continues. DOD has been fully engaged in revising
the U.S. Munitions List and I understand that it plans to continue to
focus on completing this important work with our interagency partners
to produce a list that is more transparent and predictable for
government and industry and which focuses on protecting the most
important technologies.
I also fully support ongoing efforts within the Department to
streamline and improve U.S. technology security and foreign disclosure
processes so that decisions are made in a timely fashion and enable us
to focus on the protection of the technologies that are most important,
while providing important capabilities to our allies and partners.
Finally, if confirmed, I would support implementation of the steps that
the Department has taken to continue to improve the Foreign Military
Sales process.

energy certification
251. Senator Wicker. Mr. Hagel, section 2830 of the Military
Construction Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012 requires DOD to
submit to Congress a report on the cost effectiveness of certain green
building standards. Part of the report by DOD found that the adoption
of Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design certifications by
certain departments of DOD is not the most cost effective practice for
energy and water savings. As Secretary of Defense, what policies would
you implement to ensure that DOD's green building policies meet the
military's primary missions of energy and water savings and do not
arbitrarily discriminate against American products such as domestic
wood?
Mr. Hagel. While I am not completely familiar with the different
green building standards that are available, I do think we need to
adhere to the general philosophy of minimizing life-cycle costs and
incorporating features in building construction that result in reduced
operating costs and lower utility bills. I will support policies to
this effect. I will not support policies that arbitrarily discriminate
against American products.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
medium extended air defense system
252. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, section 221 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2013 prohibits the use of any funding for Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS). Are you aware of this provision?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

253. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you ensure that
DOD fully complies with this law?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department fully
complies with this law.

254. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, how much fiscal year 2012 MEADS
funding remains unobligated and how much has been obligated/expended
for MEADS under the terms of the Continuing Resolution?
Mr. Hagel. It is my understanding that of the $390 million in the
U.S. fiscal year 2012 funding provided to the NATO management office
for MEADS, a total of $335 million has been fully obligated to fund
data analysis, archiving the technology and design, capturing
performance results, formal contract closeout; and if necessary for
termination liabilities for contracts and/or subcontracts. $55 million
of fiscal year 2012 funding was also provided to the U.S. Army for
management and oversight of sensitive technologies in MEADS. The
Department is consulting with our partners, Germany and Italy, in order
to complete as much of the remaining design and development effort as
possible while allowing for contract closeout. I understand that $210
million of the total fiscal year 2012 funds has been expended as of
February 1, 2013. No fiscal year 2013 funds are authorized and none
have been obligated or expended under the CR.

255. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, for what purpose were these funds
obligated?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #254.

joint land attack cruise missile defense elevated netted sensor system
256. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, can you provide an update on the
deployment status of Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor System (JLENS)?
Mr. Hagel. I understand JLENS is still in development, and that the
Department recently completed a study on JLENS location and operational
use. It is my understanding a JLENS deployment site was selected and
planning is underway for preparing the site. If confirmed, I will
review the status of these preparations with the Secretary of the Army
and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command.

257. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you commit to
ensuring that JLENS will be deployed in a timely fashion?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #256.

258. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what combatant commands have a
validated requirement for JLENS or have expressed an interest in JLENS?
Mr. Hagel. It is my understanding that because of the unique
capabilities of JLENS to detect a range of air threats, CENTCOM, U.S.
Southern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Northern Command have
expressed interest in this capability.

f-35 joint strike fighter
259. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what is your assessment of China
and Russia's development of fifth generation fighters?
Mr. Hagel. I have not reviewed the breadth of the programs in
detail, but both China and Russia are pursuing advanced fighter
aircraft. We are examining ways to respond to these efforts to upgrade
their capabilities.

260. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, do you believe the F-35 JSF is
necessary in an increasingly contested operating environment?
Mr. Hagel. My view is we cannot let any nation achieve parity with
the United States in our ability to control the air. I understand the
F-35 will bring advanced capability to the warfighters in a contested
environment and ensure the United States can act in our national
interest around the globe.

261. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you continue the
development and procurement of the fifth generation JSF, including the
Marine Corps variant?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will review the F-35 program, to include
the Marine Corps variant, to ensure the aircraft are delivered with the
capability we need and at a cost we can afford.

ballistic missile threats
262. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, analysts have estimated that Iran
may be capable of striking the CONUS with a ballistic missile by 2015.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Mr. Hagel. It is clear that Iran continues to pursue longer-range
missiles and develop technology that could allow Iran to deploy an ICBM
in the future. I believe that U.S. missile defenses must be prepared to
defend the United States today and in the future against any potential
threat posed by countries like Iran and North Korea.

263. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, in light of this analysis, Congress
included section 221 in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. This section
requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study that evaluates
three possible additional locations in the United States, including two
on the east coast, for future deployment of an interceptor to protect
the Homeland against missile threats from countries such as North Korea
and Iran. Are you aware of this reporting requirement?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

264. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, do you pledge to have
the results of this study delivered to Congress within the timeframe
outlined in section 221, as required by law?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the study is
delivered on time and that Congress remains informed about the
Department's decisions about how to best protect the U.S. Homeland from
this threat.

submarine requirements
265. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, do you believe the Virginia payload
module will mitigate some of the anticipated gap in undersea strike
volume?
Mr. Hagel. Yes, although I understand that the cost to include this
capability in the Virginia-class is a challenge to available
shipbuilding resources.

266. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what percent of combatant commander
attack submarine requirements were met by the Navy in 2012?
Mr. Hagel. I have been informed that the Navy has met approximately
60 percent of the combatant commanders' total attack submarine
requirements and 100 percent of the Secretary of Defense-approved
Global Force Management Allocation Plan adjudicated requirement for
Navy support since 2010. The Global Force Management process allows
Navy to meet the combatant commanders' highest priority needs as
determined by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

267. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, do you support Congress' intent to
build two Virginia-class submarines in 2014?
Mr. Hagel. Submarines are critically important to our strategy and
future; therefore, resources permitting, I would support plans to build
two Virginia-class submarines in 2014.

electronic warfare
268. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what is your view on the future of
electronic warfare/electronic attack?
Mr. Hagel. I believe the Electronic Warfare/Electronic Attack (EW/
EA) will play an increasingly important role in future military
operations. It is both an enabler of U.S. operations and a capability
that potential adversaries will exploit to counter the longstanding
U.S. technological edge in weapon systems. Potential adversaries are
pursuing more advanced battlefield systems, including EW/EA, to deny
U.S. power projection capabilities and curtail our ability to maneuver,
conduct precision strikes, and communicate effectively in a conflict
scenario. Continued U.S. investment in EW/EA will be critical to
ensuring that the United States can achieve its operational objectives
in a timely manner and with a minimum of losses; EW/EA systems will
also contribute to the deterrent effect that highly capable U.S. forces
exert on potential adversaries.

269. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, do you believe it still plays a
vital role in our national security?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #268.

u.s.-russian relations
270. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, do you agree that the United States
should not initiate negotiations with Russia for a new arms treaty
unless and until we can confirm that Russia is fully honoring existing
arms treaties with the United States?
Mr. Hagel. Compliance with legal obligations is central to the
effectiveness of arms control treaties, and concerns about non-
compliance must be addressed. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD
works with the Department of State and other interagency partners in
assessing and responding to any compliance concerns. While resolution
of such issues with Russia is clearly important, I do not believe that
discussions of possible further nuclear arms reductions need await
resolution of all compliance issues.

271. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, is Russia fully honoring all
existing arms treaties with the United States?
Mr. Hagel. I do not believe that the Russian Federation is fully
honoring all of its obligations under existing arms control treaties.
For example, Russia ceased implementing the Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe Treaty in 2007.

patriot missile system
272. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, section 226 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2013 requires the Secretary of the Army to submit a prioritized
plan to Congress for the modernization of the Patriot missile system.
Are you aware of this requirement?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

273. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you ensure that
the Army delivers this plan within the timeframe outlined in section
226, as required by law?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army
to ensure the Army delivers this plan as required by law.

overseas cemeteries
274. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, are you aware that section 2857 in
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD to designate a Federal or
private agency to maintain base cemeteries before closing overseas
military bases?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

275. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you ensure that
this provision is adhered to, as required by law?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will carry out the direction given to
the Department in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013.

mental health services
276. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, are you aware that section 206 in
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 authorizes a DOD program to enhance DOD's
research, treatment, education, and outreach initiatives focused on
addressing the mental health needs of members of the National Guard and
Reserve members?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

277. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, do you share my belief that DOD
must address these needs?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I am deeply concerned about the mental health
issues faced by our servicemembers and their families. If confirmed, I
will be committed to providing the highest quality of mental health
care and will comply with the provision in the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2013.

budget auditability
278. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, section 1005 in the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2013 that requires DOD to complete a full statement of budget
resources by 2014, with the ultimate goal to be full auditability by
2017. Are you aware of this requirement?
Mr. Hagel. Yes. I understand that those commitments in our current
plans have been included in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013.

279. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, do you commit to
meeting this statutory requirement and to doing all that you can to
promote good financial stewardship and financial transparency at DOD?
Mr. Hagel. I agree financial management improvement is an important
priority and support the Department's current plan to have the
budgetary statement ready for audit by 2014 and the full set of
statements ready by 2017. If confirmed, I will be committed to
achieving this goal and will ensure that senior leaders remain focused
on this goal and hold them accountable.

women in selective service
280. Mr. Hagel, would you support requiring women to register for
the Selective Service? Please explain your response.
Mr. Hagel. I strongly believe all Americans should be able to serve
in our Armed Forces to their maximum abilities. The Selective Service
Act is administered by an agency outside of DOD. If I am confirmed, I
will look forward to participating in any interagency consideration of
selective service registration that may occur. We currently have an
All-Volunteer Force that is the finest military in the world. I do not
want to suggest that it would be necessary or advisable to restore the
draft.

prostheses for servicemembers
281. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, are the prostheses that our
servicemembers are receiving after a severe injury the most advanced
available on the U.S. market?
Mr. Hagel. The care and support provided to our wounded, ill, and
injured are key focus areas for the Department. I understand that the
Department supports, along with the Department of Veterans Affairs, an
Extremity Injury and Amputation Center of Excellence and that the
standard and quality of care regarding prosthetics meets or exceeds
what is provided in the private sector. I also understand that the
Department supports a variety of research to ensure cutting edge
technology is incorporated into addressing the issues for
servicemembers with extremity amputations. This includes advanced
research into tissue engineering and transplantation. If confirmed, I
will continue to support these collective efforts to improve care.

282. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if not, what actions are being
taken to gain access to these prostheses for our servicemembers?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #281.

national guard youth challenge program
283. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, the National Guard Youth Challenge
Program (NGYCP) works to intervene in and reclaim the lives of at-risk
youth by enhancing their skills, education, and self-discipline. The
program has distinguished itself as an effective intervention in the
lives of troubled young men and women. Over 110,000 students have
graduated from 33 programs nationwide and a majority of these graduates
earn their GED and are actively employed following graduation.
The outstanding success enjoyed by the NGYCP is largely a result of
the leadership and unique advantages the National Guard brings to the
program. The program has also been successful because of the National
Guard's emphasis on quality training for the staff.
A 2012 RAND Corporation study highlighted the value of continued
investment in the NGYCP. According to the report, the program earned
$2.66 in social benefit from students graduating and becoming
productive citizens for every $1 spent. Yet, only two cents of that
original investment was spent on training the program staff.
Based on the critical role training has played in this essential
program's success, if confirmed, do you commit to examining funding for
the NGYCP staff training to determine how it has changed over time and
whether it is sufficient to maintain the quality of the program?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that training plays a large part in the
success of the 100,000 cadets who have successfully completed this
program. The Department continues to review ways in which to further
improve the NGYCP's performance nationwide, including staff training.
If confirmed, I will work closely with Reserve component leaders to
evaluate funding for training and other resources.

guard and reserves
284. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what is your view of the
appropriate role of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Mr. Hagel. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau serves as a full
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as the principal advisor to the
Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces.

285. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what is your assessment of the
Reserve and how it will fit into this new strategy of smaller, more
lethal forces rotating into and out of many locations of strategic
interest?
Mr. Hagel. The Reserve components have served with distinction over
more than a decade of war and continue to be a relevant and cost
effective part of the Total Force. In a time of declining budgets and
complex contingencies, I believe that the Department will continue to
call on both Active and Reserve components to accomplish the domestic
and overseas requirements of the new strategy. We are still in the
process of finding the proper Active component/Reserve component mix
that will most effectively accomplish our new strategy in a constrained
fiscal environment.

286. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what is your understanding of the
appropriate size and makeup of the Reserve components in light of the
current defense strategy and our constrained defense budget?
Mr. Hagel. The Services each have different requirements for their
Reserve Force in their role as force providers. The Service internal
force management processes will continue to refine the size and
capabilities of each Reserve component to accommodate changes to the
defense strategy and reduced budget.

287. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what is your assessment of advances
made in improving Reserve and Guard component mobilization and
demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?
Mr. Hagel. The Department has made great improvements to the
mobilization and demobilization procedures over the past decade. Over
850,000 Reserve and National Guard members have been effectively
mobilized to support contingency and support operations. If confirmed,
I would expect the Services to continue to review procedures in order
to keep faith with our Reserve component members, their families, and
civilian employers and make necessary adjustments as needs are
identified.

288. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what do you consider to be the most
significant enduring challenges to the enabling of an operational
reserve aimed at ensuring Reserve component and Guard readiness for
future mobilization requirements?
Mr. Hagel. The Reserve components currently serve in an operational
capacity-available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine
deployments. With the projected defense budget, the most significant
enduring challenge will be sufficient funding to sustain the
operational experience of the Reserve components gained over the past
decade of utilization.

289. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, do you see a need to modify current
statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National
Guard and Reserves or to further enhance their ability to perform
various national security missions?
Mr. Hagel. At the present time I believe that appropriate
authorities are in place to access the National Guard and Reserves
across their full spectrum of mission assignments.

290. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, when will dwell time objectives be
met for the Reserve components?
Mr. Hagel. I understand the vast majority of dwell time goals for
the Reserve components are currently being met. As we continue the
draw-down in Afghanistan these numbers should continue to improve and
it is expected that dwell time objectives will be fully met during the
last stages of operations there.

291. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what effect would an inability to
meet dwell time objectives have on your decision to implement the
planned end strength reductions?
Mr. Hagel. The ability to meet dwell time objectives will be one of
the many factors taken into account when determining proper end
strength requirements to meet our emerging strategy. Meeting dwell time
objectives is an important factor in keeping faith with our All-
Volunteer Force and their families but cannot be the sole factor when
considering planned end strength requirements.

292. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what is your understanding and
assessment of the current size and structure of the Army's Reserve
component?
Mr. Hagel. The Army Reserve component is currently organized with
350,200 soldiers in the Army National Guard and 205,000 soldiers in the
Army Reserve. Any changes to the size or force structure capabilities
for the Army Reserve components will be analyzed within the Total Force
requirements of the Army and will reflect the projected changes in
budget and defense strategy.

293. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, what size or force
structure changes, if any, would you propose for either the Army
Reserve or the Army National Guard?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #292.

involuntary separation
294. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, are you aware of section 525 in the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 conference report regarding reports on
involuntary separation of members of the Armed Forces?
Mr. Hagel. Yes.

295. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you comply with
this law?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will make certain the Department
complies with the provisions of NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013.

size of the navy
296. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, are you aware of section 1015 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 conference report related to the size of
the Navy?
Mr. Hagel. Yes, I am aware of the reporting requirement in the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2013 related to the size of the Navy. My understanding
is that the Navy has complied with the law and submitted the report to
Congress on 1 February 2013. The report was submitted as an
unclassified document, and additional information about the Force
Structure Assessment was also submitted in a classified document.

297. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed, will you comply with
this law?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #296.

global zero report
298. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Hagel, what specific portions of the May
2012 Global Zero report that you authored do you believe should not be
implemented?
Mr. Hagel. In the Global Zero report we took a longer term view of
what might be possible under different circumstances, and the report's
illustrative reductions to nuclear forces were just that--intended to
provide a stimulus to national debate about how many nuclear weapons
are enough and to illustrate a possible pathway forward. If confirmed,
I will focus on implementing the recommendations of the 2010 NPR, while
also considering what additional steps may be appropriate, and will
consult with Congress on the way forward.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
israel
299. Senator Graham. Mr. Hagel, you were one of four Senators not
to sign a bipartisan letter (dated October 12, 2000, circulated by
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and Senator Tom Daschle) to President
Clinton expressing the Senate's solidarity with the State of Israel, at
a time when both Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman
Arafat and the Palestinian Authority failed to restrain or comment on
violence by Palestinians in violation of the peace process. If you had
a chance to reconsider your decision, would you now choose to sign the
letter?
Mr. Hagel. With respect to this specific October 2000 letter, I
wholeheartedly agreed with the objectives at the time--expressing
solidarity with Israel at a time of crisis--as I do today. Yet, as the
AIPAC Press release of October 13, 2000 states, I was unable to be
reached by the deadline in order to sign the letter. The October 13,
2000 press release explicitly states that while two Senators refused to
sign the letter (Senators Abraham (MI) and Byrd (WV)), ``Senators Hagel
and Gregg (NH) could not be reached'' by the deadline.
Although the circumstances and leaders have changed significantly
since the letter you referenced was sent in 2000, I continue to support
the substance of the letter--expressing solidarity with Israel at a
time of crisis--and I will continue to express this solidarity and
support as I work with my Israeli counterparts if confirmed as
Secretary of Defense. The President has said we have Israel's back, and
I agree.
As my record in the Senate, my public speeches, and writings in my
book demonstrate, I have always been a strong supporter of the U.S.-
Israel relationship and of Israel's right to defend itself.
Additionally, I was a cosponsor of and voted in favor of a number of
pieces of legislation condemning terrorism against Israel, including
the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006. The Palestinian Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2006 not only condemned Palestinian terrorism, but
also placed restrictions on U.S. assistance to the Palestinian
Authority (PA) unless the PA, and all components within it, accepted
the quartet principles of renouncing violence, abiding by previous
agreements, and recognizing Israel's right to exist.

national guard
300. Senator Graham. Mr. Hagel, the Reserve Forces Policy Board
recently issued a report on the fully burdened and lifecycle cost of
military personnel and found that a Reserve component member (National
Guard or Reserve) when not activated is one-third the cost of an Active
component servicemember. In an era of declining budgets, how do you
envision leveraging the cost-effectiveness of the National Guard and
Reserve Forces to meet our Nation's security needs?
Mr. Hagel. The highly cost effective National Guard and Reserve
have served the Nation well both in peacetime and war. During the last
12 years their service has been particularly admirable both overseas
and in reacting to many emergencies here at home. Although I have not
analyzed the Reserve Forces Policy Board report you cite, I do believe
the Guard and Reserve are less costly in a part time status, and
clearly provide highly trained ready assets with a high degree of long-
term cost efficiency to significantly help sustain the All-Volunteer
Force. If confirmed, it would be my intention to maintain a strong
Guard and Reserve, and to take advantage of their skills and
efficiencies as we structure an affordable military force in an era of
challenging budgets.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
taiwan relations
301. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and
the Six Assurances of 1982 have contributed to the peace and stability
of the Asia-Pacific region for the past 3 decades. With the military
balance--including air superiority--gradually shifting in China's
favor, what are your plans to implement the security commitment the
United States has for Taiwan under this framework?
Mr. Hagel. I agree that the Taiwan Relations Act has contributed to
peace and stability in the region for over 30 years. In my view, the
increasing complexity and sophistication of the military threat to
Taiwan from China means that Taiwan must devote greater attention to
asymmetric concepts and innovative technologies to maximize Taiwan's
strengths and advantages. If confirmed, I would work closely with
Congress, throughout DOD, and with our interagency partners to ensure
the continued effective implementation of all of the relevant
provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

302. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, as Taiwan is likely to retire some
of its older fighter aircraft in the next 5 to 10 years, do you believe
that sales of advanced aircraft are an important next step in this
commitment?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will look at what specific capabilities
will help Taiwan meet its self-defense needs in light of the security
situation in the Taiwan Strait and the evolving military capabilities
on the mainland.

303. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, Secretary Leon Panetta previously
extended an invitation to China to be part of RIMPAC last year. Do you
believe that as one of the U.S. strategic partners in the region it is
important to include Taiwan into the RIMPAC exercises? If so, what is
your plan to implement this?
Mr. Hagel. The United States is firm in its commitment to Taiwan's
self-defense needs under the Taiwan Relations Act. That relationship
includes defense exchanges and other interactions consistent with our
unofficial relationship and as provided for in the Taiwan Relations
Act. If confirmed, I will work to identify appropriate exchanges and
interactions to assist Taiwan's defense capabilities, and contribute to
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

military strategy
304. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, our military leaders have stated
that the United States and its military is at a strategic crossroads
marked by significant challenges. We have done a remarkable job over
the last 12 years at catching up to an enemy that we were largely
unprepared for: political Islam and those radical Islamists who seek to
impose their ideology in order to rule others--to govern political,
social, and civic life, as well as religious life. However, we are
currently facing a damaging sequester, additional proposed Navy, Army,
and Air Force cuts, while engaging in a shift of U.S. strategy towards
Asia that seeks to downplay the difficulty associated with the Middle
East and Africa. The report calls for a scaling back of stability
operations while suggesting that operations carried out using special
operations units and drone strikes be increased or sustained. How do
you see the military maintaining its joint readiness training aspects
as it draws down from two wars when our strategy appears to be heading
down a dangerous road?
Mr. Hagel. Maintaining ready forces is a priority. If confirmed, I
will work with the Joint Chiefs to better understand the basis of their
assessment and how we can most effectively address the readiness
challenges our military faces.
My sense is that the concerns the Joint Chiefs have expressed about
readiness come from a variety of factors, including the challenges of
recovering from 10 years of operational stress, of transitioning to a
broader range of operations, and of doing all of this in the face of
fiscal austerity and budget uncertainty. If confirmed, I will carefully
monitor how all of these factors are posing risks to readiness and will
work closely with the military and civilian leadership of the
Department to mitigate those risks to the greatest extent possible.

305. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, what impact do you think current
force posturing will have on our ability to deploy to address potential
threats that are posed by North Korea, Iran, and around the globe?
Mr. Hagel. As described in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the
Department is rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific while maintaining
focus on the Middle-East. I think that the significant U.S. military
presence and activities in Asia are a clear demonstration of the
enduring U.S. commitment to the region and to addressing current and
emerging challenges in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, if confirmed as
Secretary, I would take every step to maintain the ability of America
to conduct successful combat operations in more than one region at a
time, ensuring that we have the ability to meet threats around the
world, as in the Middle East and North Africa, when they arise. Our
global posture, engagement with allies and partners, and investment in
flexible defense architectures for high-demand capabilities, such as
ballistic missile defense, are of great importance.
North Korea's December Taepo Dong II missile launch and recent
threats to conduct a third nuclear test underscore the growing North
Korean threat to international peace and security. U.S. diplomatic
efforts following the December missile launch, particularly with China,
resulted in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2087, which affirms the
international community's opposition to North Korea's provocations. The
tightened sanctions in the resolution will help impede the growth of
North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program. If confirmed, I will
continue to ensure our military provides the deterrence and defense
necessary to protect our allies and our interests. This posture is also
the best way to create conditions where diplomacy has the best possible
prospects to succeed.
With respect to Iran, I believe that it is critical that the U.S.
military maintain a robust presence in the region to counter Iran,
reassure our partners, and build partner capacity. Our carrier presence
is a key element of this presence. If confirmed, I will work with the
combatant commanders to revalidate our posture and ensure it best
addresses the threats, challenges, and opportunities in the region to
preserve all options for the President while balancing other national
security needs.

306. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, you stated in responses to advance
policy questions in regard to the Joint Chief's concerns about a hollow
force that: ``the concerns the Joint Chiefs have expressed about
readiness come from a variety of factors, including the challenges of
recovering from 10 years of operational stress of transitioning to a
broader range of operations, and of doing all of this in the face of
fiscal austerity and budget uncertainty.''
Successfully meeting our national security strategic objectives
with a smaller, overall force will require us to improve our focus on
training our servicemembers from the separate branches effectively.
Last year General Ray Odierno, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army spoke to
this committee about the importance of a joint force that is flexible
and adaptive to the challenges of the new environment. Could you please
provide assurances that vital training will not be walked away from,
training such as Joint Readiness Training Centers where the Air Force
and Army conduct training operations that hugely effect fundamental
joint operations?
Mr. Hagel. Maintaining ready forces is of highest priority,
especially in a world of ever changing challenges and threats. If
confirmed, I will work with the Joint Chiefs to better understand the
basis of their assessment and how we can most effectively address the
readiness challenges our military faces. The highest yield training
exercises will be revisited frequently to ensure that our forces remain
flexible and adaptive to meet our new challenges.

307. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, how do you plan to monitor risk and
the potential mismatch between constrained resources and demands of
operational plans?
Mr. Hagel. I am deeply impressed by the caliber and capabilities of
our military forces. It is vitally important that they be ready to
respond to the Nation's needs, and I am concerned that further budget
cuts will negatively affect readiness. If confirmed, I will get regular
updates by the Joint Chiefs on where we must devote the Department's
attention and resources to ensure the readiness of the force.

nuclear deterrent
308. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, in the Global Zero report, within
the context of rebalancing nuclear deterrence you state, ``new
opportunities will emerge for cooperation with allies and other
countries with common security interests.'' In your 2008 book you
stated that, ``the world needs to establish a new global consensus on
nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation . . . as the world's largest
nuclear power the United States has a responsibility to lead in that
effort . . . '' and that ``we must once again convince the world that
America has the clear intention of fulfilling the nuclear disarmament
commitments that we have made.''
There are nine nuclear powers who are out there and a number of
others who are pursuing nuclear capabilities. Do you believe the
elimination of the U.S. nuclear triad or Global Strike Command as an
independent command will increase the security of the United States and
lead to a more peaceful world?
Mr. Hagel. I believe in the President's long-term vision of a world
without nuclear weapons. It is a vision shared by nearly every
President since Eisenhower, including Ronald Reagan. I also support the
President's commitment that the United States will not disarm
unilaterally. If confirmed, I look forward to leading DOD in supporting
the President's objectives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and
their roles in national security policy and to create the conditions
that will allow others to join with us in this process. Our efforts to
modernize the nuclear deterrent and build a responsive infrastructure
go hand-in-hand with efforts to reduce the world's nuclear dangers. The
United States must have a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
so long as nuclear weapons remain. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
the needed leadership focus on this issue and that institutional
excellence for nuclear deterrence remains a part of the President's
comprehensive approach to nuclear security.

309. Senator Vitter. Mr. Hagel, the Global Zero report would
seriously limit B-52s and U.S. nuclear deterrent. Please share your
thoughts on how you balance your previous position with your statements
that you support our nuclear deterrents.
Mr. Hagel. In the Global Zero report we took a longer term view of
what might be possible under different circumstances. The report's
illustrative reductions to nuclear forces were just that--intended to
provide a stimulus to national debate about how many nuclear weapons
are enough and to illustrate a possible pathway forward. If confirmed,
I will focus on implementing the recommendations of the 2010 NPR, while
also considering what additional steps may be appropriate, and will
consult with Congress on the way forward.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
joint professional military education
310. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, do you believe Joint Professional
Military Education (JPME) helps ensure that the individual Services and
other agencies that play a role in national security cooperate
effectively?
Mr. Hagel. I believe JPME, as established under the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, has been central to strengthening and integrating the
Joint Force. It is my understanding that the JPME system is
fundamentally designed to foster cooperation and jointness among the
members of the different Services. I also understand that members of
the interagency, as well as international partners, attend JPME. As the
last decade of war has shown, jointness among our servicemembers and
their civilian partners is critical to success.
311. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, if so, what would you do as
Secretary of Defense to continue to expand and improve our JPME culture
and programs?
Mr. Hagel. I am not yet familiar with the scope of current JPME
programs. If confirmed, I will work with civilian and military
leadership to assess the effectiveness of these programs and propose
any changes that are deemed necessary.

defense budget and national military strategy
312. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, given the potential severe cuts that
could be imposed upon the defense budget due to sequestration, how will
you put a process in place to ensure a strategy-driven QDR process that
produces recommendations ``fully independent of the budget''?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will work with the Department's
leadership team to ensure that the QDR starts with an assessment of the
opportunities and challenges that the Nation faces in the emerging
global security environment, and then identifies priorities based on
our national security interests for defense policy and force planning.
The assessment of threats, risks, and opportunities, along with the
identification of national security interests, would be undertaken
fully independent of the budget. Prioritization of objectives and
identification of approaches would follow and be resources informed in
order to ensure they are realistic and appropriate.

cyber security
313. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, what should be the DOD's role in
protecting the United States against foreign cyber-attacks to the
Homeland?
Mr. Hagel. DOD has the mission to defend the Nation in cyberspace
and to support a whole-of-government effort to address cyber threats. I
support this approach. This mission includes a close partnership with
DHS in its role of leading efforts for the cybersecurity of U.S.
critical infrastructure, and non-DOD unclassified government networks.

314. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, what should be the DOD's role in
protecting the United States against Iranian attacks on the financial
sector?
Mr. Hagel. While I cannot speak to the details of any specific
attacks, I believe that DOD should contribute its capabilities to
support a whole-of-government effort to address cyber (and other)
threats to U.S. national and economic security. The President has made
clear that the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace
as we would any other threat to our country, and that the United States
reserves the right to use all necessary means, including military means
as a last resort, to defend our Nation and our interests. I support
this approach.

315. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, are we adequately deterring our
adversaries in cyberspace?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that a number of important steps have been
taken to deter malicious activity in cyberspace, but that the United
States must do more to protect public and private networks from cyber
threats. DOD should continue to develop its cyber capabilities and
expertise, and it should work closely with its public, private, and
international partners to deter and discourage malicious behavior. I
also believe that legislation providing for increased information
sharing on cyber threats and the development of critical infrastructure
cybersecurity standards, in partnership with the private sector, would
help reduce vulnerabilities and protect our national and economic
security.

316. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, are you worried that America's use
of cyberwarfare capabilities--such as the famous STUXNET attack on
Iran--is setting a dangerous precedent for others?
Mr. Hagel. I am not able to comment on STUXNET or who was
responsible for it, but I do think that the increased frequency of
disruptive cyber activities is a clear national security concern.
Recent such examples of destructive attacks, such as the Shamoon virus
that virtually destroyed 30,000 computers at Saudi Arabian State Oil
Company Aramco, are a significant escalation in the cyber threat.

317. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, given our growing dependence on
computer networks, should we pursue some sort of a global regime to
limit this danger?
Mr. Hagel. I agree with the President that longstanding norms
guiding state behavior, including the law of armed conflict, also apply
in cyberspace. I also believe we should continue to press for the
development of international cyberspace norms that build upon common
principles for responsible state behavior.

taiwan
318. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act, the 113th Congress will likely advance commercial
relations with and foster future defense sales to Taiwan. However, as
China's naval, air, and missile capabilities increase, defending Taiwan
will become increasingly difficult. Please describe your security
commitments to Taiwan as they relate to the sale of advanced aircraft
to the Taiwan Government.
Mr. Hagel. I believe that the Taiwan Relations Act has contributed
to peace and stability in the region for over 30 years. In my view, the
increasing complexity and sophistication of the military threat to
Taiwan from China means that Taiwan must devote greater attention to
asymmetric concepts and innovative technologies to maximize Taiwan's
strengths and advantages. If confirmed, I would work closely with
Congress, throughout DOD, and with our interagency partners to ensure
the continued effective implementation of all of the relevant
provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. If confirmed, I will look at
what specific capabilities self-defense capabilities Taiwan needs in
light of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait and the evolving
military capabilities on the mainland.

u.s. policy in the caucasus
319. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, how do you assess U.S.-Azerbaijan
relations and what will be your policy to expand this strategic
partnership?
Mr. Hagel. I recognize the many shared interests and current
cooperation between the United States and Azerbaijan across the foreign
policy, economics, energy, and cultural spheres. In particular, the
U.S.-Azerbaijan defense relationship is strong, with room to grow. I
understand that DOD engages in regular consultations at high levels
with Azerbaijani counterparts to identify areas where we can strengthen
our cooperation and partnership.
If confirmed, I would continue this senior level engagement with
Azerbaijan and continue the Department's commitment to supporting
Azerbaijan's defense reforms, ability to interoperate with NATO and
deploy to coalition operations, and capacity to address terrorism and
other transnational threats and secure its maritime borders and energy
infrastructure. I would look for the United States to be Azerbaijan's
partner of choice and help Azerbaijan's defense establishment
contribute to regional security and stability, such as with
Azerbaijan's significant support to international efforts in
Afghanistan.

320. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, how should the United States respond
to the continued presence of Russian military forces inside
internationally-recognized Georgian territory?
Mr. Hagel. I believe that the United States should continue to
support Georgia's territorial integrity within its internationally
recognized borders, and remain steadfast in non-recognition of the
occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We should continue
to object to Russia's occupation and militarization of Georgian
territory. If confirmed, I would speak out in support of Georgia's
territorial integrity and to call on Russia to fulfill its obligations
under the 2008 ceasefire agreement, including withdrawal of its forces
to pre-conflict positions and free access for humanitarian assistance.
I would continue to support the U.S. role as an active participant in
the Geneva discussions, working with the co-chairs and others in
pursuit of a resolution to the conflict.
We should continue to fully support Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity as we seek to work on practical steps with Russia
to promote stability and security on the ground and ultimately, a
peaceful resolution of the conflict.

321. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, how do you assess the current U.S.
military relationship with countries in the Caucasus region,
specifically Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan?
Mr. Hagel. I believe DOD has fostered strong relations with
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to strengthen each nation's political
independence and contributions to broader regional security and
stability. I understand that there are regular senior level
consultations with each of these partners, in support of defense
reforms, interoperability with NATO and support to coalition
operations, and building capacity to address the range of transnational
threats in the region. I believe that these defense partnerships have
produced notable successes, including the significant contributions
made by each country to NATO operations. In Afghanistan, Georgia has
deployed two battalions of soldiers. Armenia and Azerbaijan have each
supplied a company to the NATO International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF). Georgia and Azerbaijan provide key transit access into the
Afghanistan theater. In Kosovo, Armenia has deployed a platoon of
soldiers under U.S. command to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Our defense partnerships should take into account the many
political and security challenges the region faces, among them the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the occupied territories in Georgia. We
should design our engagement deliberately so that it carefully
contributes to regional stability rather than enflaming existing
tensions.

322. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, should the United States deepen its
military ties with these nations?
Mr. Hagel. The United States has a shared interest with Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan to partner on the development of each nation as
a contributor of security and stability to the broader region. If
confirmed, I would continue to engage these nations and seek areas to
deepen these partnerships in ways appropriate to our shared interests,
political will, available resources, and capacity to absorb new
capabilities and missions.

323. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, how will these ties impact U.S.
relations with Russia?
Mr. Hagel. It is prudent to give consideration to how improved ties
with one country might affect the broader region. If confirmed, I would
support DOD efforts to seek and provide transparency in our defense
cooperative relations in the region. I would look for Department
engagement to be guided by principles that strive to enhance regional
security, the strengthening of responsible defense reforms, and
adherence to the rule of law. These principles must also strengthen
sovereignty and independence-the United States should continue to
emphasize its desire to cooperate and assist, not to dominate or
impose. If confirmed, I would support engagement with key states
throughout the region, including Russia, and strive to ensure all
recognize that U.S. cooperation with one is not at the expense of the
cooperation with or security of another.

324. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, do you believe that NATO should
expand?
Mr. Hagel. I support the administration position that NATO's door
remains open.

325. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, please describe how U.S. defense
policies can ensure the sovereignty and political independence of our
regional partners such as Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Mr. Hagel. The objective of our relations with Azerbaijan and
Armenia should be to strengthen each nation's political independence
and contributions to broader regional security and stability. We should
continue to seek regional stability through our bilateral and
multilateral engagement. DOD has an important role to play in those
regards, supporting overall U.S. engagement objectives.

u.s. africa command
326. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, undoubtedly, radical fundamentalism
and terrorism continues to spread in Northern Africa. What is U.S.
Africa Command's (AFRICOM) role in responding to and preventing the
spread of terrorism in Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Libya, and now Egypt?
Mr. Hagel. Countering terrorism in Africa, just as elsewhere in the
world, is a multi-faceted problem requiring a whole-of-government
solution. DOD contributes to the counterterrorism mission in Africa
primarily by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states
and regional organizations, and by working to support African-led
operations, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia. AFRICOM is
responsible for implementing DOD's counterterrorism and partner
capacity-building missions throughout the African continent through
military-military exchanges, exercises, and security cooperation on the
African continent. When directed, AFRICOM is also prepared to conduct
military operations in order to deter and defeat terrorism and other
transnational threats, and to provide a security environment conducive
to good governance and development.

movement of troops to australia
327. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, please describe the nature, purpose,
and strategic importance of our ``permanent and constant'' commitment
to a U.S. military presence in Australia as it relates to countering
China's influence and reasserting U.S. interests in the region.
Mr. Hagel. In 2010, the Prime Minister of Australia and President
Obama agreed to establish a rotational U.S. Marine Corps presence in
northern Australia. The first rotation of approximately 200 U.S.
marines took place from April through September 2012. In addition,
closer cooperation between the Royal Australian Air Force and the U.S.
Air Force has resulted in increased rotations of U.S. aircraft through
northern Australia. These two initiatives further enhance the
capabilities of both countries by increasing opportunities for combined
training and enabling more effective pursuit of common interests in the
Asia-Pacific region. Building on the interoperability developed through
joint operations over the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, these
initiatives will help us deepen that interoperability long after the
wars are over. The United States will not build any U.S. bases in
Australia. U.S. forces will rotate in and out of Darwin and will be co-
located with Australian forces on existing Australian military bases.
Our military cooperation with Australia helps the United States
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region and specifically supports
efforts to become more geographically distributed and operationally
resilient in the Pacific. U.S.-Australian force posture initiatives are
not aimed at any one country. I believe that the U.S. rotational
presence in northern Australia and our strong alliance with Australia
will lead to further cooperation with a variety of nations. The United
States sees many shared regional challenges in the Asia-Pacific,
including responding to natural disasters, countering extremism,
ensuring freedom of navigation, and enhancing regional stability.

satellite and radio systems
328. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, DOD's satellite and radio systems
are essential to our national security. However, some of the spectrum
that DOD currently controls is well-suited for use for commercial
mobile broadband services. In fact, the 1755-1780 MHz band, which DOD
holds the license for, is particularly well suited for mobile broadband
because it is already being used for this purpose internationally.
Additionally, the administration has a stated priority, as part of the
National Broadband Plan, of making more spectrum available for auction
to commercial providers for consumer use. Ostensibly, this plan would
include both the reallocation of some broadcast spectrum and of some
spectrum licenses held by government users. Can you provide the cost
estimate for relocating DOD operations off of the 1755-1780 MHz band?
Mr. Hagel. I understand that DOD and the other Federal agencies are
working through National Telecommunication and Information Agency's
(NTIA) established processes to support the President's goal to make
500 MHz available for commercial mobile broadband use. As part of that
process, the Department has conducted a detailed study of the cost and
operational feasibility of reallocation of the entire 1,755-1,850 MHz
band, which is used by the Department to meet mission requirements. The
NTIA has reported that it would cost nearly $13 billion for DOD to
vacate the entire 95 MHz, and $18 billion to cover non-Department
systems as well, and that alternate spectrum and adequate time to
transition to that alternate spectrum would need to be provided. If I
am confirmed, I will direct the Department to consult with NTIA about
whether it would be useful for the NTIA to initiate a detailed study of
vacating just the lower 25 MHz.

base realignment and closure commission
329. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, what is your position on the
establishment of a new BRAC Commission to oversee additional domestic
base closures?
Mr. Hagel. I understand Congress did not accept that the
administration's proposal for two rounds of BRAC. However, I think it
is necessary for the Department to examine its infrastructure and
eliminate excess. While the BRAC process is not perfect, it is the best
process identified to date, and I believe a fair and comprehensive way
to right-size the Department's domestic footprint. If confirmed, I
would have to look at the need for BRAC in the future and would work
with Congress on any such proposal.

tactical aviation competition
330. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, DOD faces an upcoming challenge to
maintain a competitive and innovative defense industrial base to meet
the Nation's tactical aviation needs. The fiscal year 2013 President's
budget demonstrates a near-term shift to a single manufacturer for
tactical aircraft. This outcome will have significant consequences:
with a single-source option for tactical aircraft programs, DOD will
lose vital competition that can help drive down costs, leading to
potentially more expensive, less capable systems; investment in
innovative technology and engineering for tomorrow's capabilities will
suffer without a balanced, diverse tactical aviation base; and a
limited manufacturing capability will struggle to be flexible to cope
with changing demand and there will be no way to manage risk for future
developing programs. Today, the F/A-18 program provides DOD with a
highly capable, affordable, and available manufacturing line that
promotes competition and drives innovation into tactical aviation. It
is the only current American tactical aircraft that can fill
operational gaps or address the Navy's tactical aviation shortfall. All
F/A-18 aircraft--the F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet and EA-18G
Growler--continue to be delivered on-cost and ahead of schedule. Can
you please discuss the importance of maintaining competition in
tactical aviation production?
Mr. Hagel. I recognize that competition in all acquisition
programs, including tactical aviation production, is key to
affordability, to innovation, and to a strong industrial base. I intend
to fully support the continuation of appropriate competition.

331. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, if confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, what can DOD do to ensure that the F/A-18 line isn't ended in
the near-term, both for the purposes of filling potential operational
gaps and managing risk of future tactical aviation programs?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will assess the balance of strike
fighter capability, and the state of the F/A-18 production line. I will
also ensure the Department supports international sales of the F/A-18.

international sales
332. Senator Blunt. Mr. Hagel, in your testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, you discussed the need to protect the core
defense industrial base, even during a time that budget challenges will
lead to some necessary cuts in spending. One particular way to support
the Nation's defense infrastructure is to support international sales
of American defense manufacturing. International sales help keep
manufacturing facilities alive while ensuring that the engineering
expertise and workforce are retained for additional domestic
production. Your predecessor, Secretary Panetta, took this
responsibility very seriously, advocating for American defense
platforms vigorously as they competed against other international
options in campaigns abroad. The Military Services can also be strong
advocates, although not all demonstrate the same level of commitment to
international campaigns. If you are confirmed as Secretary of Defense,
can you describe your role--both personally and as a broader policy
within DOD--to support international sales of eligible American defense
programs? Please discuss on how DOD and the individual Services might
better promote American products abroad.
Mr. Hagel. I believe that international sales help to sustain the
defense industrial base, and strengthen our relationship with allies
and partners.
If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of State and
Congress to shape international sales planning and to support the
timely transfer of capability. I would also meet with defense industry
leaders to identify areas where foreign sales opportunities exist that
would help sustain needed industrial capabilities.
Furthermore, if confirmed, I would continue to build on the
foundation established by both Secretaries Gates and Panetta to
streamline the Department's foreign military sales process.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
nuclear weapons
333. Senator Lee. Mr. Hagel, nuclear deterrence has been a
successful element of our national defense posture for decades. What is
your position on and rationale for the number of nuclear warheads and
their disposition among the three forms of delivery in order to
maintain a credible and successful nuclear deterrent posture for our
Nation?
Mr. Hagel. America's nuclear deterrent for more than 60 years has
played a central role in ensuring global security. If confirmed, I will
be committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal. I believe that a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers continues to support U.S. national security interests
under New START limits.

334. Senator Lee. Mr. Hagel, what do you see as the future of
Minuteman III?
Mr. Hagel. With regard to Minuteman III, I am aware that the NDAA
for 2007 requires sustaining the Minuteman III weapon system through
2030. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues to
assess the whole Minuteman system and its components to be sure that
this system is sustained through at least 2030.

f-35
335. Senator Lee. Mr. Hagel, the Air Force has retired nearly 1,900
aircraft over the past decade, the majority of which have not been
replaced. Fighter inventories have been reduced by almost 25 percent
and F-22 production was truncated to well below original Air Force
requirements. While newer aircraft tend to be more capable than those
they replace, even a more capable aircraft can only be in one place at
one time. The F-35 is now the sole remaining fighter modernization
program in DOD. What is your position on the need for this aircraft and
how will you ensure we continue to modernize an aging fighter force?
Mr. Hagel. My view is we cannot let any other nation achieve parity
with the United States in the ability to control the air. My
understanding is that other nations are developing modern fighters that
will challenge our existing fighters and that the F-35 is needed to
maintain our advantage. If confirmed I will review the health of the F-
35 program to ensure the aircraft are delivered with the capability we
need and at a cost we can afford. I will also examine our options for
continued modernization in this critical area.

defense industrial base
336. Senator Lee. Mr. Hagel, DOD relies on our Nation's defense
industrial base to provide and support the equipment needed by our
military to fulfill its role in our national defense. What steps would
you take to ensure that we have a robust defense industrial base, both
public and private, that can reliably and affordably provide and
support our military equipment in a timely manner in the future?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will place a high priority on ensuring
the continued viability of the industrial base. I will assess the
programs the Department has already authorized and that are underway to
ensure they meet that goal.
Working closely with the Military Services and industry, I will
ensure early identification of those skills and manufacturing
capabilities that are both critical and increasingly fragile, and take
appropriate actions necessary to preserve those few capabilities.

u.s. role in the united nations
337. Senator Lee. Mr. Hagel, what role should the United States
play within the U.N. peacekeeping missions?
Mr. Hagel. The United States has historically played an important
role in guiding and supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions, and I
believe that this approach continues to make good sense. As a permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council, we should continue to exert
leadership across the full spectrum of peacekeeping activities--from
mission inception and establishment, through various phases of
operations until mission closure. In such diverse venues as Haiti,
Liberia, Sudan and South Sudan, U.N. peacekeeping is making vital
contributions to peace and stability in the face of enormous
challenges. It will not always make sense for the United States to
provide ``boots on the ground'' to U.N. peacekeeping missions, but I do
believe there are likely to be cases where U.S. direct involvement will
be in U.S. national interests.

338. Senator Lee. Mr. Hagel, do you still feel that the United
States should deploy ground troops as U.N. peacekeepers in a non-
militarized Palestinian state? If not, what has changed?
Mr. Hagel. I support a two-state solution, with two states living
side-by-side in peace and security: the Jewish State of Israel and an
independent Palestinian State; each state enjoying self-determination,
mutual recognition, and peace. The arrangements necessary to achieve a
lasting and effective peace can only by determined by the parties
through negotiations. In addressing the specific security arrangements,
these details will also need to be determined by the parties, along
with the other final status issues. Israel must be able to defend
itself--by itself--against any threat. The security provisions in a
final peace deal must be robust enough to prevent a resurgence of
terrorism; to stop the infiltration of weapons; and to provide
effective border security. The United States, and the international
community, should be prepared to support these security requirements as
requested by the parties.

military involvement in asia
339. Senator Lee. Mr. Hagel, in your opinion what effect will the
recent shift to the Pacific bring to Asian countries? What will the
shift mean for: Russia, China, North Korea, Japan, and the Republic of
China?
Mr. Hagel. The President has said that the rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific is a whole-of-government effort to renew and deepen U.S.
engagement throughout the Asia-Pacific. This policy is not a new shift,
but an increased assertion of this region's relative economic,
political, and security importance--one with which I agree. A key tenet
of the rebalance should continue to be modernizing our alliances and
deepening partnerships, especially through increased regional
engagement and capacity building, bilaterally and multilaterally.
Japan is the linchpin of our presence in Asia. Japan is an
increasingly critical partner in missile defense, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, and other important
areas. I would continue the work of my predecessors to broaden and
deepen this critical alliance to ensure that it is capable of
responding to the security challenges of the 21st century.
The United States has a similarly robust relationship with the
Republic of Korea (ROK). My understanding is that we have a
comprehensive agenda aimed at facilitating the smooth transfer of
wartime operational control in 2015, and ensuring the ROK Government
has the capabilities necessary to defend the peninsula. I would
continue these important efforts, and would also continue to stress the
importance of trilateral ties between Japan, the ROK, and the United
States.
The Taiwan Relations Act provides that the United States ``will
make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.'' That policy has contributed to
peace and stability in the region for over 30 years and is consistent
with longstanding U.S. policy, which calls for a peaceful resolution of
the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of
the Taiwan Strait. If confirmed, I would work closely with Congress,
the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and the Department's interagency
partners to ensure the continued effective implementation of all of the
relevant provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.
Our relationship with China will be critical in the rebalance. We
will continue to build our partnership with China based on practical
steps to address shared challenges and interests in the region while
also monitoring the rapid modernization of China's military and
assertion of territorial claims in the region.
Through the rebalance we will work with our partners to deter
destabilizing and provocative behavior by North Korea, including its
proliferation activities, ballistic missile program, and nuclear
program which continue to present a serious threat to the United
States, our regional allies, and the international community. We will
also ensure that we can deter and, if necessary, defeat North Korean
aggression.
The United States will work to build trust and understanding with
Russia in areas of mutual interest in Asia and encourage it to be a
contributor across a broad range of issues in the region.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
iran sanctions
340. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, you claim to have voted against the
renewal of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 2001 because ``I
thought there might be other ways to harness our vast power and that of
our allies.'' Please specify what other ways would have been more
effective than the sanctions imposed by ILSA.
Mr. Hagel. I believe that multilateral sanctions against Iran,
backed by a unified world community, are the most effective sanctions.
For example, the multilateral sanctions implemented in U.N. Security
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929--which resulted from President Obama's
work in 2010 to cement the Permanent 5 UNSC members in unanimously
supporting multilateral efforts--are the most crippling sanctions
against Iran in history. Continuing to maintain the international
community's unified stance to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon--to include further sanctions if necessary--is more effective
than implementing unilateral sanctions. However, times and
circumstances have changed significantly since 2001 and I agree that
Iran's continued pursuit of a nuclear weapon means that further
sanctions, both multilateral and unilateral, may be necessary.

341. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, after receiving criticism for your
record on sanctions, you wrote in a letter to Senator Barbara Boxer
that you now ``agree that with Iran's continued rejection of diplomatic
overtures, further effective sanctions, both multilateral and
unilateral--may be necessary . . . '' In your advance policy questions,
you also compliment the President's strategy on Iran, and acknowledge
that it has ``included the application of smart, unprecedented, and
effective sanctions against the Iranian regime . . . '' The sanctions
the President has utilized include unilateral sanctions. Why do you now
feel you can support unilateral sanctions, when for years in the Senate
you opposed their use?
Mr. Hagel. I continue to fully support President Obama's policy
with respect to sanctions on Iran. While there are some circumstances
in which unilateral sanctions are effective, I believe that
multilateral sanctions against Iran are the most effective approach.
For example, the multilateral sanctions implemented in UNSC Resolution
1929--which resulted from President Obama's work in 2010 to cement the
Permanent 5 UNSC members in unanimously supporting multilateral
efforts--are the most crippling sanctions against Iran in history.
Continuing to maintain the international community's unified stance to
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon--to include further
sanctions if necessary--is more effective than implementing unilateral
sanctions.
That said, now that we have built international support for
sanctions against Iran, unilateral sanctions are more likely to have a
crippling effect. As I wrote to Senator Boxer, I agree that with Iran's
continued pursuit of a nuclear weapon may make further effective
sanctions, both multilateral and unilateral, necessary.

342. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, in your advance policy questions, you
also state that the President's strategy on Iran ``smartly . . . made
clear that all options are on the table'' and that you ``agree with the
President that the United States should take no options off the table
in our efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.'' You
then promise that, if confirmed, you ``will focus intently on ensuring
that the U.S. military is, in fact, prepared for any contingency.'' Yet
in 2010 you told a forum at the Atlantic Council that you were ``not so
sure it is necessary to continue to say all options are on the table''
with respect to Iran. You wrote in your 2008 book America: Our Next
Chapter that, ``the genie of nuclear armaments is already out of the
bottle, no matter what Iran does,'' and went on to imply that sovereign
nation states possessing nuclear weapons could be excepted to respond
with ``some degree of responsible, or at least sane, behavior.'' Please
clarify your view on whether or not the military option should remain
on the table with Iran.
Mr. Hagel. Let me be clear: I support the President's policy on
Iran of prevention, not containment. We must prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. I have never advocated for a policy of
containment nor have I ever stated the United States could live with a
nuclear Iran. In order to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,
we must keep all options on the table, including the military option.
If confirmed as the Secretary of Defense, I will--as stated
previously--ensure that the U.S. military is planning and prepared for
all contingencies. I have consistently argued in favor of keeping all
options on the table, including in my September 28, 2012 Washington
Post op-ed co-authored with two former CENTCOM commanders, where we
said, ``Our position is fully consistent with the policy of presidents
for more than a decade of keeping all options on the table, including
the use of military force, thereby increasing pressure on Iran while
working toward a political solution.''

343. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, in regards to the quote in your book,
why would you feel that a military option would be necessary, when you
seem to believe that the United States and our allies could live with a
nuclear Iran?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #342.

nuclear weapons
344. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, you are a signatory of Global Zero,
an initiative dedicated to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. You
were also a member of the six-person Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy
Commission, headed by retired U.S. Marine Corps General James
Cartwright. As a result, your name appears on the Commission's May 2012
report, which calls for cutting deployed U.S. nuclear warheads from
1,550 to 450 strategic weapons by 2022. In your testimony, you insisted
this report was merely illustrative and had no relevance to your actual
policy on our nuclear arsenal. Yet in your 2008 book America: Our Next
Chapter, you wrote with respect to nuclear disarmament: ``As the
world's largest nuclear power, the United States has a responsibility
to lead in this effort. There is no other way. In particular, we must
once again convince the world that America has the clear intention of
fulfilling the nuclear disarmament commitments that we have made.''
Please explain specifically how you will fulfill the responsibility you
believe we have to lead the effort on nuclear disarmament.
Mr. Hagel. I believe in the President's long-term vision of a world
without nuclear weapons. It is a vision shared by nearly every
President since Eisenhower, including Ronald Reagan. I also support the
President's commitment that the United States will not disarm
unilaterally. If confirmed, I look forward to leading DOD in supporting
the President's objectives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and
their roles in national security policy and to create the conditions
that will allow others to join with us in this process. Our efforts to
modernize the nuclear deterrent and build a responsive infrastructure
go hand-in-hand with efforts to reduce the world's nuclear dangers. The
United States must have a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
so long as nuclear weapons remain. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
the needed leadership focus on this issue and that institutional
excellence for nuclear deterrence remains a part of the President's
comprehensive approach to nuclear security.

negotiating with russia
345. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, you have insisted that you have
always been a strong proponent of bilateral arms control agreements,
and you have spoken warmly in the press (Interview on the Riz Kahn
Show, Al Jazeera, 3/21/09) of former President Dimitri Medvedev as a
youthful leader with a strong commitment to nuclear arms reduction.
Going into the new round of arms talks with Russia that was announced
this week, do you consider President Vladimir Putin a similarly
reliable negotiating partner?
Mr. Hagel. While there has been no announcement of new arms control
talks, if there are such talks in the future, I would expect President
Putin to come to the table as a reliable negotiating partner. Of
course, being a ``reliable'' partner does not mean that President
Putin, or any negotiator, will agree with U.S. positions or
perspectives. But I expect that he would enter into negotiations as a
reliable negotiating partner.

346. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, Senator Kerry was asked during his
confirmation hearing about our relationship with Russia and if he would
recommend entering into any new arms control measures until all
compliance and verification issues regarding existing agreements were
fully settled. Would you recommend any new arms control agreements if
there are existing verification and compliance issues with current
agreements?
Mr. Hagel. Compliance with legal obligations is central to the
effectiveness of arms control treaties, and concerns about
noncompliance must be addressed. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD
works with the Department of State and other interagency partners in
assessing and responding to compliance concerns. While resolution of
such issues with Russia is clearly important, I do not believe that
discussions of possible further nuclear arms reductions need await
resolution of all compliance issues. If confirmed, I would have the
Department work with the interagency to address any compliance concerns
through the existing arrangements established by the respective
treaties for that purpose. If resolution in that manner is not
possible, the administration should raise the issues with the Russian
Federation government at higher levels, including up to the ministerial
or presidential level if necessary.

347. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, how specifically would you address
these issues?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #346.

348. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, should any new arms control
agreements be negotiated, would it be your policy that they will occur
through the treaty power and come to the Senate for ratification?
Mr. Hagel. If confirmed, I will consult closely with Congress
regarding any additional arms control agreements--and whether they
should occur through the treaty power and come to the Senate for advice
and consent to ratification.

israel
349. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, in a number of statements (for
example your July 28, 2006, speech to the Brookings Institution), you
have spoken highly of the 2002 Beirut Declaration by the Arab League as
a ``squandered'' diplomatic opportunity for both the United States and
Israel. Do you believe Israel should be prepared to accept the
``achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to
be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution
194'' as per the Declaration?
Mr. Hagel. I continue to believe, as I did when I cosponsored and
voted for the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, that any partner
for peace must renounce violence, abide by previous agreements, and
recognize Israel's right to exist. Negotiations between the parties are
the only viable path to peace and the two-state solution, with two
states living side by side in peace and security: the Jewish State of
Israel and an independent Palestinian State.
With those goals in mind, the Arab Peace Initiative is a step in
the right direction toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. I
do not believe that Israel or the Palestinians should have an agreement
imposed on them. The details included in the Arab Peace Initiative,
like all details of a peace agreement, will need to be negotiated by
the parties. Other Arab states seeking normalization with Israel, as
suggested in the Arab Peace Initiative, is an aspirational goal for a
comprehensive peace in the Middle East.
All sides seek a just and lasting peace that will ensure Israel's
security. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I look forward to
working with Secretary Kerry to assist the administration's efforts
toward peace.

350. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, your 2006 comment to Aaron David
Miller about how ``The Jewish lobby intimidates a lot of people up
here'' remains troubling. Do you think that people who advocate for a
strong U.S.-Israel relationship--whether you call them part of the
Jewish lobby or the Israel lobby--are advancing the interests of a
foreign government, namely Israel, above those of the United States?
Mr. Hagel. In conjunction with his interview with me in 2006, Aaron
David-Miller also wrote that, ``Hagel is a strong supporter of Israel
and believer in shared values.''
As I have stated many times, I regret my unfortunate choice of
words regarding the Jewish lobby to describe the pro-Israel lobby. I
believe one of the essential elements of our democracy is that every
American has the right to express their views to their elected
officials. In fact, in that same interview with Aaron Miller, I also
said that ``Everyone has a right to lobby; that's as it should be. Come
see your Senator, your Congressman, and if you can get the guy to sign
your letter: great, wonderful.'' I know that the pro-Israel lobby
includes Jews and non-Jews whom are all Americans supporting Israel
because it is in the interest of the United States. I consider myself
to be a pro-Israel American and have supported Israel throughout my
career because of our shared values and ideals of democracy.
On expanding U.S.-Israel cooperation, if confirmed, I intend to
continue to strengthen our bilateral defense relationship in a number
of ways. These include, but are not limited to, missile defense,
intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and maritime security. I know
that over the past 4 years the administration has taken unprecedented
steps to expand our cooperation with Israel. Today, with congressional
support, the United States provides Israel over $3 billion annually in
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which is the backbone of our
commitment to Israel's defense. In addition, President Obama,
Secretaries Gates and Panetta have worked to provide extensive support
of over $270 million to Israel for the Iron Dome counter rocket system.
As Iron Dome has proven itself very well in the field and saved many
Israeli lives, I intend to continue such support.
This financial support is complemented by extensive military-to-
military cooperation, including joint exercises. If confirmed, I will
seek to ensure that we build on this cooperation and expand it into new
areas as the United States and Israel address emerging threats at this
time of historic change in the Middle East. I believe we have a
tremendous opportunity for further expansion of our missile defense
efforts as well as cooperation in areas like space and cyberspace.
Finally, the foundation for successful cooperation is the close
personal relationships U.S. military and defense civilian leaders have
with Israeli military and defense leadership. Secretary Gates and
Secretary Panetta, as well as the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, have all developed very close relationships with their
counterparts. Continuing with this tradition will be one of my highest
priorities if I am confirmed. This will be vital to ensuring that we
understand Israel's defense requirements, and to finding ways to
address mutual threats that meet our common interests.

351. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, if not, why did you say that you
would support the positions of what you called the ``Jewish lobby'' if
you were an Israeli Senator, but that you couldn't since you were a
United States Senator who had taken an oath to the United States?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #350.

352. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, how does that not imply that only
people loyal to Israel could support the positions of the Jewish lobby?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #350.

353. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, given your disavowal of this remark
in your testimony, can you specify how you intend to ``expand the depth
and breadth of U.S.-Israel cooperation'' as you pledged in your January
14, 2013, letter to Senator Barbara Boxer?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #350.

354. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, you have been widely linked in the
press with your Atlantic Council colleague Charles W. Freeman, who has
been a vocal supporter of your nomination. Please review paragraph 5
from Mr. Freeman's May 4, 2011, speech to the Palestine Center in
Washington, DC. (the transcript and video of the speech are available
here, if you would like the full context http://
www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/29130/pid/897):
``Similarly, the cruelties of Israelis to their Arab captives and
neighbors, especially in the ongoing siege of Gaza and repeated attacks
on the people of Lebanon, have cost the Jewish state much of the global
sympathy that the Holocaust previously conferred on it. The racist
tyranny of Jewish settlers over West Bank Arabs and the progressive
emergence of a version of apartheid in Israel itself are deeply
troubling to a growing number of people abroad who have traditionally
identified with Israel. Many--perhaps most of the most disaffected--are
Jews. They are in the process of dissociating themselves from Israel.
They know that, to the extent that Judaism comes to be conflated with
racist arrogance (as terrorism is now conflated with Islam), Israeli
behavior threatens a rebirth of anti-Semitism in the West. Ironically,
Israel--conceived as a refuge and guarantee against European anti-
Semitism--has become the sole conceivable stimulus to its revival and
globalization. Demonstrably, Israel has been bad for the Palestinians.
It is turning out also to be bad for the Jews.''
Do you consider Mr. Freeman's statement to be an expression of
mainstream thinking on Israel?
Mr. Hagel. As I told you at the hearing, I have not spoken with Mr.
Freeman in several years and do not support his comments. The views
expressed in the speech by Chas Freeman that you reference are his own,
and, in my opinion, not accurate.
I am pleased that Israeli and U.S. leaders agree that the U.S.-
Israel Defense relationship is stronger than ever. I intend to work to
continue to strengthen the relationship and am looking forward, if
confirmed, to working closely with my Israeli counterparts.
As I have said consistently throughout my career, Israel has a
right to defend itself. Israeli efforts to protect its citizens against
the actions of terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah,
are part of Israel's right to self-defense. Palestinians will not
achieve peace or prosperity if Hamas insists on a path of terror and
rejection, and Palestinians will never realize their independence
through unilateral actions. I continue to believe, as I did when I
cosponsored and voted for the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006,
that any partner for peace must renounce violence, abide by previous
agreements, and recognize Israel's right to exist. Negotiations between
the parties are the only viable path to peace and the two-state
solution, with two states living side by side in peace and security:
the Jewish State of Israel and an independent Palestinian State.

355. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, would you affirm that if confirmed,
you will not recommend the nomination or appointment of Mr. Freeman to
a position in DOD?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #354.

u.s. troops to u.n. mission
356. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, in a 2009 report that you co-authored
for the U.S./Middle East Project, you advocated for the deployment of
U.S. grounds troops as U.N. peacekeepers in a ``non-militarized
Palestinian state.'' That same year, in a piece for the Atlantic
Council, you wrote, ``No country today has the power to impose its will
and values on other nations.'' These statements seem to hearken back to
2003, when you stated that the United States ``must be careful to avert
the perception that we are charting a unilateralist course in our
foreign policy.'' Do you believe the United States needs a ``permission
slip'' from the U.N. or another international body before it can engage
in military operations--how would you address this concern?
Mr. Hagel. I do not believe we need a permission slip from the
United Nations before we can engage in military operations. The United
States will always remain committed to protecting its national security
interests whenever necessary. I believe the United States is strongest
when we act alongside our partners, with whom we share common
interests. I also believe the United States should, and will, act
unilaterally when we must, as we did with the Osama bin Laden raid. In
every case, we will act in accordance with the standards that govern
the use of force, which requires a basis in domestic law and compliance
with international law.

ploughshares fund
357. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, you currently sit on the board of the
Ploughshares Fund. Among the groups that Ploughshares has supported is
the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), headed by Trita Parsi.
Are you aware that the Ploughshares Fund has given more than $600,000
to NIAC?
Mr. Hagel. I completely support one of the primary objectives of
the Ploughshares Fund: preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
I was not aware that Ploughshares provided financial support to the
NIAC. The Ploughshares Fund is committed to full transparency,
publishes all of their funding decisions and complies with all
applicable laws and best-practices for a 501(c)3 organization.
My understanding is that the case you referenced focused on a libel
lawsuit brought by the NIAC and its president, Trita Parsi, against
writer Seid Hassan Daioleslam. Records of the case do not include the
phrase ``deep and incontrovertible ties'' to high-level agents of the
Iranian regime. In fact, Judge John Bates did not analyze or provide
judgment on any NIAC ties to the Iranian Government. In his judgment,
Judge Bates explicitly wrote that, ``Nothing in this opinion should be
construed as a finding that defendant's articles [about NIAC ties to
the Iranian Government] were true. Defendant did not move for summary
judgment on that ground, and it has not been addressed here.''

358. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, are you aware that NIAC has ties to
the Iranian Government?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #357.

359. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, are you aware of the September 13,
2012, decision rendered by Judge John Bates in the U.S. District Court
in Washington, which exposed NIAC's ``deep and incontrovertible ties''
to high-level agents of the Iranian regime?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #357.

cuba
360. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, in 2002 you referred to Fidel Castro
as a ``toothless old dinosaur'' and praised former President Jimmy
Carter's recommended policy of relaxed sanctions and diplomatic
engagement as ``exactly right''. In 2008, you were a signatory to a
letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urging the U.S. relax
sanctions and engage Cuba due to Castro's ``imminent departure''. As of
February 1, 2013, the Castros have not departed Cuba or shown any
indication that additional concessions from the United States would
modify their repressive regime. An American contractor, Alan Gross,
languishes in a Cuban prison. Do you still believe Mr. Carter's
recommended policy towards Cuba is ``exactly right''?
Mr. Hagel. I support President Obama's Cuba policy which is focused
on supporting the Cuban people's desire to freely determine their
future, reducing their dependence on the Cuban state, and pursuing the
widely shared goal of a Cuba that respects the universal human rights
of all its citizens. The President's actions to facilitate family
travel, people to people travel, the flow of remittances into private
hands, and information to, from, and within Cuba have contributed to
this objective. I share the President's view that the Cuban Government
must change its outdated political model to reflect the commitments
undertaken by other governments in the Hemisphere to promote and defend
representative democracy. Policy matters and other diplomatic issues
involving Cuba are led by the State Department.

361. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, would relaxing sanctions and engaging
with the Castros be the hallmarks of your policy towards Cuba, should
you be confirmed?
Mr. Hagel. See answer to Question #360.

north korea
362. Senator Cruz. Mr. Hagel, in a 2003 interview with PBS, you
declared that isolating North Korea was the last thing the United
States should do. Despite a decade at attempted engagement and
negotiations, North Korea remains overtly hostile to the United States
and is actively pursuing weapons targeted at us and our allies. Given
North Korea's dismal record on negotiating in good faith, how
specifically would the additional outreach you advocated in 2003 have
improved our position in relationship to North Korea today?
Mr. Hagel. Since my interview with PBS in early 2003, diplomatic
efforts through the Six-Party Talks led to the September 2005 Joint
Statement, under which the Six Parties reaffirmed the goal of
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea
committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs. In February 2007, the Six-Party process resulted in North
Korea's agreement to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility in
exchange for heavy fuel oil and talks aimed at normalization of
relations with the United States and Japan. President Obama extended
his hand to North Korea at the start of his administration in 2009.
Although these engagement efforts have not significantly diminished
North Korea's belligerence or pursuit of nuclear weapons, they have
united the international community, including China, against North
Korea's irresponsible behavior.
If confirmed, I would continue to support diplomatic engagement and
ensure that our military provides the deterrence and defense necessary
to create a stable regional environment where diplomacy can succeed. If
confirmed, I will also ensure that we have the capabilities necessary
in the Asia-Pacific theater to deter and, if necessary, defeat, North
Korean aggression.
______

[The nomination reference of the Hon. Charles T. Hagel
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 22, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Charles Timothy Hagel, of Nebraska, to be Secretary of Defense,
vice Leon E. Panetta.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Charles T. Hagel, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Senator Charles T. Hagel
Education:
Honorary Doctorate Degrees:
Georgetown University, College of William and
Mary, Marymount University, Creighton University,
Bellevue University, Doane College, Midland Lutheran
College, and North Central College

University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE
Bachelor of Arts Degree in General Studies,
1971

Brown Institute for Radio and Television, Minneapolis,
MN
Degree in Radio and Television Broadcasting,
1966

Kearney State College, Kearney, NE
January 1965-December 1965

Wayne State College, Wayne, NE
September 1964-December 1964
Employment record:
Vietnam War Commemoration Advisory Committee,
Arlington, VA
Chairman, July 2012-present

President's Intelligence Advisory Board
Co-Chairman, 2009-present

Atlantic Council, Washington, DC
Chairman and Board of Directors
February 2009-present

Defense Policy Board
Member, July 2009-present

President's China 100,000 Strong Initiative
Co-Chairman, 2010-2012

Department of Energy Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future
Commissioner, 2009-2011

Georgetown University
Distinguished Professor of National
Governance, School of Foreign Service
February 2009-present

Deutsche Bank America, New York, NY
Advisory Board Member
May 2009-present

Corsair Capital, New York, NY
Advisory Board Member
February 2009-present

McCarthy Capital, Omaha, NE
Senior Advisor
February 2009-present

Wolfensohn & Company, New York, NY
Director
March 2009-December 2010

Pfizer Boards, New York, NY
Advisory Board Member
February 2009-December 2010

Zurich Insurance Group, Zurich in North America,
Washington, DC
Board of Directors
February 2009-present

M.I.C. Industries, Reston, VA
Special Advisor to the Chairman
March 2009-present

National Interest Security Company, Fairfax, VA
Board Member
March 2009-November 2010

Elite Training & Security, Fairfax, VA
Board Member
March 2009-November 2010

Kasemen, LLC, Fairfax, VA
Board Member
March 2009-November 2010

BP Petroleum, Washington, DC
Advisor
June 2009-March 2010

Chevron Corporation, San Ramon, CA
Board of Directors
April 2010-present

Gallup, Washington, DC
Senior Advisor
July 2011-present

Washington Speakers Bureau, Alexandria, VA
Speaker
February 2009-present

U.S. Senate
1997-2009, Two Terms, State of Nebraska
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export
and Trade Promotion
Chairman, Senate Banking Subcommittee on
International Trade and Finance
Senate Banking Subcommittee on Securities and
Investment
Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission
on China
Chairman, Senate Climate Change Observer Group
Honors and awards:
Global Leadership Award from the International Student
House, 2012
World Affairs Council of Washington DC International
Public Service Award in Recognition of Outstanding Global
Leadership
2nd Degree Order of Dostyk Award from the President &
Government of Kazakhstan
Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund's Charles ``Mac''
Mathias Award
Knight Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Commander's Cross With Star of the Order of Merit of
The Republic of Poland
Brown College Distinguished Alumni Award, 2010
Clifford P. Case Professor of Public Affairs at
Rutgers University, 2010
Ralph J. Bunch Award for Diplomatic Excellence from
the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2010
Citigroup Foundation Lecturer at the University of
Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, 2009
Third Annual Eugene J. McCarthy Lecturer at St. John
University Minnesota, 2009
Junior Statesman of the Year Foundation Award, 2009
Committee on Education Funding Special Recognition
Award, 2009
Aspen Institute Strategy Group Leadership Award, 2008
First annual Cordell Hull Award
Horatio Alger Award from the Horatio Alger Association
Vietnam Veterans of America Legislator of the Year
Award
Center for the Study of the Presidency's Distinguished
Service Medal
American Farm Bureau Federation's Golden Plow Award
Distinguished Alumni Award from the University of
Nebraska at Omaha
Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Civic
Achievement
First World USO Leadership Award
University of Nebraska-Kearney George W. Norris
Distinguished Lecturer Award
Congressional Award from the Paralyzed Veterans of
America, 2008
United Nations Association of the United States of
America's Congressional Leadership Award
Millard E. Tydings Award for Courage and Leadership in
American Politics from the University of Maryland, 2008
National Urban League Congressional Leadership Award,
2008
Distinguished Service Award for International
Statesmanship from the International Relations Council of
Kansas City, 2007
Luminosity Award from the Bonnie J. Addario Breath
Away from the Cure Foundation, 2006
National Farmers Union Golden Triangle Award, 2006
University of Nebraska at Omaha's Alumni Award for
Excellence in Public Service, 2006
Don Wagner Leadership Award, 2006
Omaha World-Herald's 2005 ``Midlander of the Year''
Award
Marlin Fitzwater Excellence in Public Communication
Award, 2005
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Public Service Award
American Association of School Administrators Champion
of Children Award 2005
Edmund S. Muskie Distinguished Public Service Award,
2004
The Atlantic Council's 2004 Award for Distinguished
International Leadership
Fragile X Research Foundation's Research Beacon Award
Boy Scouts of America's Good Scout Award
National Parent Teacher Association's Outstanding
Child Advocacy Award and the Committee for Education Funding
Special Recognition Award
University Club's William Howard Taft Public Service
Award
European Institute's Transatlantic Leadership Award
National School Board Association's Special
Recognition Award
Small Business Administration's Nebraska Veterans
Advocate of the Year Award
USA Engage Congressional Leadership Award
Housing Policy Council Leadership Award
Neuro-Optometric Rehabilitation Award, 2008
U.S. Chamber of Commerce ``Spirit of Enterprise''
Awards, 2007 and 2008
Washington Coal Club Annual Achievement Award, 2006
82nd Airborne Division Association's Recognition for
the ``National Airborne Day'' Senate Resolution
Membership in the Consumers for World Trade Hall of
Fame
Friend of the Farm Bureau Award
U.S. Military honors and awards:
Two Purple Hearts with Oak Leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal
Army Good Conduct Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Vietnam Service Medal with Four Bronze Campaign Stars
(Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase III 67-68, Tet Counteroffensive
68, Vietnam Counteroffensive IV 68, Vietnam Counteroffensive
Phase V 68)
Ten Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medals
Two Valorous Unit Awards
Two Combat Infantry Badges
Qualification Badge, Rifle, Sharpshooter
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Charles
T. Hagel in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Charles Timothy Hagel (Chuck).

2. Position to which nominated:
Secretary of Defense.

3. Date of nomination:
January 22, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
October 4, 1946; North Platte, NE.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Lillian Ziller Hagel (Maiden name: Ziller).

7. Names and ages of children:
Allyn Elizabeth Hagel (Daughter--22 years old).
Charles Ziller Hagel (Son--20 years old).

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
- University of Nebraska at Omaha; 1969-1971 - Bachelor's General
Studies
- Brown Institute for Radio and Television, Minneapolis, MN; 1966 -
Degree in Radio and TV Broadcasting
- Kearney State College, Nebraska; Jan. 1965-Dec. 1965
- Wayne State College, Nebraska; Sept. 1964-Dec. 1964
- St. Bonaventure High School, Columbus, NE; 1961-1964 - Graduate

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
- Co-Chairman - President's Intelligence Advisory Board
- Member - Secretary of Defense's Policy Board
- Co-Chairman - President's China 100,000 Strong Initiative
- Commissioner - Department of Energy Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future
- Chairman - Vietnam War Commemoration Advisory Committee

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
See Addendum (Part A - Question 12).

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
U.S. Senate (1996) Nebraska - Elected.
U.S. Senate (2002) Nebraska - Re-elected.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
2007 - Derek Schmidt for Attorney General (Kansas) $1,000.
2011 - Richard Lugar for Senate (Indiana) $1,000.
2012 - Glenn Freeman for Congress (Nebraska) $500.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
See Addendum (Part A - Question 15).

17. Commitment regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, ifconfinned, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

Addendums

______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Charles T. Hagel.
This 26th day of January, 2013.

[The nomination of the Hon. Charles T. Hagel was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 12, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 26, 2013.]

BUSINESS MEETING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES T.
HAGEL, TO BE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m. in room
SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain,
Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Vitter,
Blunt, Lee, and Cruz.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Travis E. Smith, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; and
Peter K. Levine, general counsel.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; William S. Castle, minority general counsel;
and Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and
Mariah K. McNamara.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Casey
Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Christopher Cannon,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator
Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana
Broitman, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon,
assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant
to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Hirono;
Mary Naylor, assistant to Senator Kaine; Jim Catella, assistant
to Senator King; Joel Starr, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Paul
C. Hutton IV, assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Peter Schirtzinger,
assistant to Senator Fischer; Joshua Hodges, assistant to
Senator Vitter; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt;
Peter Blair, assistant to Senator Lee; and Brooke Bacak,
assistant to Senator Cruz.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. The committee meets today to consider the
nomination of former Senator Chuck Hagel to serve as the next
Secretary of Defense.
We received Senator Hagel's nomination 3 weeks ago. We held
a hearing on the nomination 12 days ago. Senator Hagel has
provided the personal and financial information required by the
committee. He has received letters from the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics and the Acting Department of
Defense (DOD) General Counsel certifying that he meets our
ethics and conflict of interest standards.
He has responded to our advance policy questions and our
questions for the record, and for these reasons I believe the
time has come for the committee to act on this nomination.
Senator Hagel has received broad support from a wide array
of senior statesmen and defense and foreign policy
organizations. At our January 31, 2013, nomination hearing,
Senator Hagel was introduced and endorsed enthusiastically by
two former chairmen of this committee, Senator Sam Nunn and
Senator John Warner. Senator Hagel's nomination has been
endorsed by five former Secretaries of Defense who served under
both Democratic and Republican Presidents: Bob Gates, Bill
Cohen, Bill Perry, Harold Brown, and Melvin Laird.
He has been endorsed by three former Secretaries of State
and by six former National Security Advisors. He's received
letters of endorsement from 9 former ambassadors who worked
with him on Middle East issues, from 11 retired senior military
officers, and from 50 retired ambassadors and national security
officials.
He's been supported by the major groups of American
veterans, including the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Iraq and
Afghanistan Veterans of America, AmVets, Vietnam Veterans of
America, and the American Legion. He's received support from
the Military Officers Association of America, the Foreign Area
Officer Association, and the Non Commissioned Officers
Association.
Senator Hagel's credentials are underscored by his service
in war and in peace. As a young man, Senator Hagel enlisted in
the Army and served in Vietnam where he received two Purple
Hearts, the Army's Commendation Medal, and the Combat
Infantryman Badge for his service. Senator Hagel served as
Deputy Administrator of the Veterans Administration (VA) during
the Reagan administration, and was twice elected to the U.S.
Senate where he served on the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Since he left the Senate 4 years ago, Senator Hagel has
served as chairman of the board of directors of the Atlantic
Council. The Atlantic Council counts among its other directors
and honorary directors, seven former Secretaries of State and
four former Secretaries of Defense, along with numerous other
senior officials from the administrations of both parties. The
Atlantic Council is very much a part of the mainstream of
American foreign policy establishment.
Much of the time and attention in our committee hearing was
devoted to a handful of statements that Senator Hagel made over
the course of his career that raised questions about his views
on Iraq, Israel, and other issues. Senator Hagel explained or
clarified these statements and placed them in context. He
apologized for one remark and told the committee that he would
say other things differently if he had the chance or were
making them over.
Senator Hagel was clear and firm in the positions that he
takes today and that he will, if confirmed, take as Secretary
of Defense. In particular, Senator Hagel stated forcefully and
unequivocally that, first, ``Iran poses a significant threat to
the United States, our allies, and partners, and our interests
in the region and globally. Iran continues to pursue an illicit
nuclear program that threatens to provoke a regional arms race
and undermine the global nonproliferation regime. Iran is also
one of the main state sponsors of terrorism and could spark
conflict, including against United States personnel and
interests.''
Second, he is, ``fully committed to the President's goal of
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.'' All options
``must be on the table to achieve that goal,'' and his policy,
if confirmed, will be ``one of prevention, not of
containment.''
Third, while he believes engagement is clearly in our
interests, engagement is not negotiation. He stated, ``I've
never thought engagement as weakness. I never thought it was
surrender. I never thought it was appeasement. I think it's
clearly in our interest. Get the international sanctions behind
you, keep military options on the table, and if the military
option is the only option, it's the only option.''
Finally, he is ``a strong supporter of Israel,'' and
believes that ``we have a special relationship with Israel,''
and if confirmed, he ``will ensure our friend and ally, Israel,
maintains its qualitative military edge in the region, and will
continue to support systems like Iron Dome, which is today
saving Israeli lives from terrorist rocket attacks.''
Senator Hagel has also recognized the very real risks posed
to our national security as a result of the unique budgetary
pressure arising out of cuts previously agreed upon by
Congress, the budgeting by Continuing Resolution, and the
impending threat of a sequester. This is what Senator Hagel
told the committee: ``Sequestration, if allowed to occur, would
damage our readiness, our people, and our military families. It
would result in the grounding of aircraft and returning ships
to port, reducing the Department's global presence and ability
to rapidly respond to contingencies. Vital training would be
reduced by half our current plans, and the Department would be
unable to reset equipment from Afghanistan in a timely
manner.''
He continued: ``The Department would reduce training and
maintenance for non-deploying units and would be forced to
reduce procurement of vital weapons systems and suffer the
subsequent schedule delays and price increases. Civilian
employees would be furloughed for up to 22 days. All of these
effects also negatively impact long-term readiness. It would
send a terrible signal to our military and civilian workforce,
to those we hope to recruit, and to both our allies and
adversaries around the world.''
Some members of this committee strongly oppose President
Obama's foreign policy, but regardless of how we may feel about
the President's policies, our vote on Senator Hagel's
nomination will not change those policies. If there is a risk
here, it is that the defeat of this nomination will leave the
Department of Defense leaderless at a time when we face immense
budgetary challenges and our military is engaged in combat
operations overseas. Such an absence of senior leadership would
be unlikely to benefit either our national defense or our men
and women in uniform.
I would add, given the recent explosion of a nuclear device
by North Korea, the delay in adopting this nomination and
approving it, I think, will send the exact wrong message to
North Korea.
The President needs to have a Secretary of Defense in whom
he has trust, who will give him unvarnished advice, a person of
integrity, and one who has a personal understanding of the
consequences of decisions relative to the use of military
force. Senator Hagel certainly has those critically important
qualifications, and he is well-qualified to lead the Department
of Defense.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of
all say I have said many, many times, going back to my first
meeting with Senator Hagel when he was first elected, how much
I admire his service to his country, the job that he did, his
Purple Hearts, and all of that. The question is, in my mind, is
that and that alone, enough justification for confirming him to
the nomination for the Secretary of Defense.
Now, I also listened, Mr. Chairman, and what you said was
accurate in terms of what he said now during these hearings. My
problem is that is not what he lived in the past.
I guess I was the first one who decided that I was going to
oppose him, his nomination, and that was before we knew nearly
as much as we know today. At that time, I was aware that he was
one of two Senators who voted against sanctions against Iran.
He was one of four Senators who voted against labeling or
declaring the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) as terrorists.
He was one of four who did not sign a letter, and I remember
that because I helped take the letter of solidarity around to
the various Senators. He was one of only four who did not sign
that.
I was also concerned about the Global Zero Movement. It
sounds real good. We want a nuclear-free world. The problem is,
and I have heard all of his answers to this, but the group that
he is a part of is for, if necessary, unilaterally doing away
with our nuclear capability. I was concerned with the fact that
arguably you could say that Iran could be one of the most
severe of the terrorist type of states. They have said things
like, ``we want to wipe Israel off the map. Israel is a
cancerous tumor in the heart,'' and ``America is rotten from
the bottom up,'' all these things. Yet they, that country, is
endorsing his confirmation.
Lastly, I have mentioned this several times. It was Senator
Cruz who showed us, Mr. Chairman, and I want to tell you how
much I personally appreciate your bending the rules a little
bit to allow him to put the Al Jazeera video up, where he
agreed with Al Jazeera's comments about Israel committed war
crimes, Israel committed sickening slaughter, and America is
the world's bully.
I just cannot for those reasons--and others have other
reasons, but those are the reasons that I opposed him. I still
oppose his confirmation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Now, what we are
going to do is give everybody an opportunity to make a
statement. We will then vote. The time of the vote will be
determined by how many of us want to make statements. I cannot
set that time yet until we get a feel for how many members want
to make statements. What I will do, and I have not had enough
chance to chat with Senator Inhofe on this in terms of the
specific time, but my inclination is to say that we should make
statements within a time limit of 8 minutes. Would that sound
fair?
Senator Inhofe. Very fair.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. I am not urging everybody to
speak or to use their 8 minutes, by the way. That I hope was
not implied by my decision. After we get a feel again for about
how many want to speak, then we will try to set a fixed time
later on this afternoon so that everybody will be given perhaps
20 minutes or so warning at least as to what that fixed time
is.
We will do the best we can, and now call upon Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to set
the example by taking much less than 8 minutes.
As you pointed out, some of the most respected experts on
foreign policy and national defense policy in the United
States, who have served both Republican and Democratic
presidents, are strongly and enthusiastically supportive of
Senator Chuck Hagel's nomination to be Secretary of Defense:
Bob Gates, Bill Cohen, Madeleine Albright, Bill Perry, Brent
Scocroft, Ryan Crockett, and Thomas Pickering.
These ladies and gentlemen have represented the United
States' interests through a lifetime of service. They are, I
think, some of the strongest evidence of the support and the
confidence that they have and we should have in Senator Hagel's
nomination to be the Secretary of Defense.
There has been a lot of discussion particularly about his
approach to our strong historic partnership with the state of
Israel. I was particularly struck by the words of Deputy
Israeli Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon. He is the former
ambassador to the United States. He is now one of the senior
members of the foreign ministry. He has said, ``I have met
him,'' Senator Hagel, ``many times, and he certainly regards
Israel as a true and natural U.S. ally.'' That is coming from
someone who is a serving member of the Israeli Government. I
think that is the case, and that is what his lifetime of effort
as a Senator, as an individual, as a business leader points
out.
I would just conclude by echoing the point that the
chairman made. This is a very dangerous moment--I do not have
to remind anyone in this room--for us. We are facing budget
issues. We are facing national security issues. We are in the
process of our retrograde operations in Afghanistan. Just
within hours ago, the North Koreans detonated a nuclear device.
This is a time that the men and women of the Department of
Defense need a Secretary of Defense. I would urge our strong
support of Senator Chuck Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that
Senator Hagel, as far as I can determine, has complied with the
requirements or the parameters for the information that needs
to be disclosed to this committee.
I am somewhat disturbed to hear that today there are two
more speeches that he had not reported that maybe have just
surfaced. Yet at the same time, I believe he has complied.
I do not believe that we should move forward with his
nomination until questions are answered that Senator Graham,
Senator Ayotte, and I have asked to be answered.
For the first time in my political career, I found myself
in agreement with Mr. Robert Gibbs, who stated on a Sunday
television show that Senator Hagel's performance before the
Senate Armed Services Committee was the most unimpressive and
unfocused that he had ever observed. I agreed with him. It was
the most unimpressive performance that I have seen in watching
many nominees who came before the committee for various
positions. He did not even know that our policy toward Iran is
not one of containment, had to be corrected by the chairman of
the committee. Of course, his failure to answer specific
questions that I asked is very disturbing.
Let me point out that the surge was an issue of the lives
of thousands of American service men and women who are serving
in Iraq. Senator Graham and I and others, not many, were
harshly critical of the Bush administration, called for the
resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld when he said that there was
only a few dead-end kids left in Iraq, and took on our own
administration, our own President, our own Secretary of
Defense.
Then Senator Hagel also thought we were losing, and then
when the surge was implemented, gave a statement that the surge
was the worst blunder since Vietnam, and then went on with some
nonsense about whether Lyndon Johnson was in Cambodia or not.
He continued to oppose the surge and said that it would fail.
I think we are all responsible for our record. I will be
glad and have quite often been pointed out where I have been
wrong. But for him to fail to agree that what was clearly and
obviously a success, to me indicates that he really did not
want to be forthcoming to this committee. I do not think he
complied with the requirements of answering the questions for
members of this committee.
I am aware that some think that it became rather tense. We
are talking about thousands of young Americans who had their
lives on the line in Iraq, including some people that--well,
Senator Hagel's judgment was wrong, continues to be wrong, and
he refuses to admit that he was wrong on this issue and many
other issues.
His gratuitous attacks, for example, saying that President
Bush was the worst President since Herbert Hoover, of course,
were just gratuitous attacks on the President of the United
States.
But you can only judge somebody by their past performance
in order to predict what their future performance will be. His
performance before this committee was the worst that I have
seen of any nominee for office. He refused to answer a simple,
straightforward question as to whether the surge was a success
or not, and whether he supported it or not. That was a key
moment in the history of this country.
So, Mr. Chairman, I hope that we will get the answer that
Senator Ayotte, Senator Graham, and I have asked to be
answered. I hope that will happen. But I cannot vote to report
out Senator Hagel's nomination favorably.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
On this list now in order of appearance, Senator Hagan is
not here. Senator Shaheen, do you wish to make a statement?
Senator Shaheen. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think, while I
appreciate the concerns that have been raised about Senator
Hagel, and I certainly would like to have seen him be much
feistier at his hearing, I do think for anybody to suggest that
he is not qualified, they have not really looked at what his
background has been.
He was the Deputy Administrator of the VA. He managed a
quarter of a million employees during the Reagan years. He
turned around the United Service Organization when it was in
financial difficulty. We all know much about his record as
Senator when he helped to shepherd the 9/11 GI Bill through the
Senate. He has served on the Defense Policy Board at the
Pentagon, as co-chairman of the President's Intelligence
Advisory Board, not to mention all of the things that have been
said about his service in Vietnam and his heroism as an
enlisted man.
I understand that people disagree with his position on
certain issues, and, therefore, everybody has the right to vote
in the way that they say. But the concern that I have is the
suggestion that this man who has served his country really
since he was a young man and enlisted in Vietnam, is not
qualified to be the Secretary of Defense, I think is just not
accurate and reflects certainly a different understanding of
his background and his experience than I have.
So I intend to vote for him. I think he will be an
excellent Secretary of Defense. I hope that we will confirm
him.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
members of the committee.
First, let me just say upfront that I think all of us
deeply respect Senator Hagel's service to his country in
Vietnam and his service in this body. We know that there are
always difficult decisions that you have to make, and I
certainly respect that service that he has given to our
country.
In thinking about this nomination, I certainly come at it
from a perspective which I understand that the President
deserves a certain level of deference with respect to who
serves on his Cabinet. In fact, that is why I voted, for
example, for my colleague, Senator Kerry, who had an
overwhelming vote in the Senate, even though he and I probably
vote very differently on many issues. But certainly he was
confirmed overwhelmingly in this body.
I find myself on this nomination in a very different place.
I very much agree with my colleague, Senator Reed, who was
here, as he described the state of our country, and the state
of our national defense, and the challenges we face around the
world right now. It is a very difficult time and a dangerous
time around the world.
One of the first challenges that we face, and I think one
of the greatest national security threats that we face, is the
march of Iran toward obtaining a nuclear weapon. I find myself
in reviewing Senator Hagel's record and also what he said when
he appeared before us in a very lengthy hearing before the
committee, to be very much at odds with him on this issue. I
think also some of his prior positions are at odds with members
of both sides of the aisle.
For example, as has been mentioned previously by Senator
McCain, I was very troubled that he did not clearly know what
our position was when it came to containment, particularly
since I believe everyone in this room voted, except for the
newer members. We recently voted in a vote of 90 to 1 in the
U.S. Senate explicitly rejecting a policy of containment toward
a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet, Senator Hagel seemed to believe in
his first statement that the President had a strong position of
containment toward Iran. Then he switched his position to say
that we do not have a position on containment. Finally, of
course, the chairman corrected him to let him know what our
position was on containment.
This is one example, I think, of many within the hearing
where there were some issues that I felt that he needed to give
us answers on. This is one of the biggest threats facing the
world right now. I was deeply troubled by his statements with
regard to containment. Also, I think if you look at his prior
history of when he served in this body where he has been on
sanctions, as has already been described, I think all of us
here hope that we can stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon
short of military actions.
But if you are going to do that, the only way we can do
that is through sanctions. Yet, when he was in this body, he
was one of two Senators to oppose sanctions in 2001, again in
2008 in the Banking Committee. He was one of two Senators to
oppose sanctions. Then when I asked him during the hearing,
Senator Reid, the Majority Leader, came to the floor on October
2, 2008, and brought forward an Iran Sanctions Act that is very
similar to the one that we have passed since I have been here,
he blocked unanimous consent for consideration of that before
this body.
I think it is important to note that a similar Iran
Sanctions Act was co-sponsored by Secretary Kerry, Secretary
Clinton, and then Senator, now President, Obama. This is an
issue that we have been strongly on that he is really to the
fringe, I think, of both parties of where we have been on
sanctions. That troubles me given the threats we face around
the world right now.
Of course, he also voted against the Sense of the Senate in
designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a
terrorist organization, and as he told us during the hearing,
because it was part of an elected legitimate Iranian
Government. I do not think that the people who rose up in 2009
in the Green Movement, who were persecuted and shot at by the
Iranian Government, would call that government a legitimately-
elected government, nor would, at the time that he voted
against designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a
terrorist organization, at the time they were assisting those
in Iraq that were murdering our troops. So that troubles me
that he would not think of designating the Guard Corps at that
time a terrorist organization.
Two other issues I would like to talk on, and that is we
are facing grave budget challenges right now. I remember when
Senator Blunt asked him about a prior statement that he made
after the Budget Control Act was passed. He was asked about the
across-the-board cuts made to our military, and he said,
different than what our Secretary of Defense Panetta has said
now, that he felt that the Pentagon was bloated and needed to
be pared down. During our hearing, he said that those were
statements he made prior to the Budget Control Act being
passed, but that was not the case. That was later corrected.
In terms of shepherding the Pentagon, I certainly do not
think that we want to be in a position of thinking, especially
in light of the testimony we heard this morning, that the
Pentagon is bloated or needs to be pared down. I think all of
us agree here that there are things that we could do better in
the Pentagon. I know that many of us have worked on things that
we could do better and more efficient in the Pentagon. But
sequestration is not the answer to that.
Finally, hours ago, as Senator Reed mentioned, the North
Koreans have detonated a nuclear device. Yet a year ago,
Senator Hagel was a signatory to a report that essentially
would eliminate a portion of our nuclear triad. We have three
legs to our nuclear triad, and he was a signator on a report
that recommended that that would be a manner in which we could
eliminate a leg of our nuclear triad.
It seems to me with the North Koreans testing, with Iran
marching toward a nuclear weapon, that is a deep concern that
our Secretary of Defense less than a year ago would sign on to
a report that would state that position.
Now, during his hearing, he tried to claim that this was
just an illustration, but that is actually different than what
the report itself says. The report itself says on the first
page that these are next steps, are possible and desirable. So
I was not satisfied with his explanation of this being an
illustration during the hearing, and I am concerned that is
really where his viewpoints are. I am concerned that those
viewpoints will drive the recommendations that he makes to the
President as the Secretary of Defense.
So for all those reasons, respectful of his service to our
country, I just think that with the challenges we face around
the world right now, I judge him based on his record. I respect
his service. But also I have to judge him based on his
performance before us in the Senate Armed Services Committee,
and I cannot support his nomination.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the
fair, open, transparent process that this committee has
followed as we have considered this important nomination. After
spending several weeks of closely reviewing his qualifications,
meeting with him personally, participating in the nomination
hearing, I will vote for his nomination to become our country's
next Secretary of Defense.
Senator Hagel certainly has shared my concerns about the
serious negative consequences that sequestration would have on
North Carolina. As we heard at the hearing this morning, it is
important that our next Secretary of Defense be strong, be an
advocate for stopping these cuts that would be devastating to
our military strength.
I also believe that Senator Hagel will continue to look for
ways to enhance our military and our intelligence collaboration
with Israel, one of our most important allies. I appreciate and
respect Senator Hagel's service to our country as an enlisted
soldier in Vietnam. It is my hope and expectation that this
perspective that he has will aid in the support of the many
servicemembers and their families who call North Carolina home,
and certainly all of our other States.
I was pleased to hear his assurances that he will monitor
and be a helpful partner in getting the answers about the water
contamination at Camp LaJeuene. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ranking Member Inhofe.
For the past several weeks, I have carefully reviewed
Senator Hagel's record. I know Senator Hagel. I met with him
privately and participated in the committee's hearing,
questioning in both rounds. Ultimately, while I respect his
military service, I do not believe he is the right choice for
this job.
I am concerned by Senator Hagel's record on important
topics, and his testimony before this committee did nothing to
clarify those questions. As many of you have said, this is a
very dangerous moment for our country. The next Secretary of
Defense will likely make critical decisions with respect to
budgeting for national defense that will define its future for
decades to come: confronting a pre-nuclear Iran, dealing with
an increasingly belligerent nuclear armed North Korea, and a
bellicose China. I do not believe he will chart the right
course for our country, and the effect of his decisions on
these topics will last for decades.
I do appreciate the President will nominate candidates that
hold very different views than I do. My support for Senator
Kerry's nomination indicates this. But I cannot support a
candidate whose views are so far afield. As the Washington Post
editorial board indicated, these positions are far to the left
of those held by President Obama.
For those reasons, I cannot support his nomination. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Senator Donnelly is not here at the moment.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
and colleagues. I am honored to serve with you on this
committee. One of my personal and political heroes, former
Senator John Warner, appeared and talked about his committee
service in a most glowing way. He was a decorated war veteran
of two Service branches, the Navy and the Marine Corps, and he
was a Secretary of the Navy. But he said his proudest public
service was his service as a committee member, both as chair of
this committee and ranking member. I have tried to approach
this question thinking about Senator Warner and the way he
approached his job.
I am going to vote for Senator Hagel's nomination to be
Secretary of Defense for three reasons. First, the standard I
think we should apply; second, aspects of Senator Hagel's
experience and character; and finally, some thoughts about the
inquiries and objections that others have raised that I have
taken seriously.
With respect to standard, I echo the point that Senator
Ayotte made earlier. I think we owe deference to a President
for choices to executive positions, and I think that is a very
important thing to grapple with. When the American public
chooses someone to be President, they are giving that
individual a mandate to govern, and that mandate includes the
assembly of a team that the President feels is the appropriate
team. Deference is not a rubber stamp. Deference does not mean
that you cannot vote no. But I think that deference is an
important thing, and I approach any executive nomination with
that in mind.
Moving particularly to Senator Hagel from his experience, I
view his enlisted service and the fact that he would be the
first former enlisted man to be Secretary of Defense is an
incredibly important thing. I want our Secretary of Defense to
go to sleep every night and wake up every day worrying about
our men and women, and especially those who enlist. I have no
doubt, and I do not think that anyone on this committee would
have any doubt, that that would be his overriding concern. I
want that to be an overriding concern. He has been a powerful
veterans advocate in his position with the VA and in his
service to help revive the United Service Organizations.
His role in the Senate is very important. This is a job
that is not an internal management job, but it helps someone to
have that understanding of the different branches of government
and the relationship that is the appropriate one between the
executive and the legislature. I think Senator Hagel will bring
that to the table.
Finally, he has private sector leadership, experience in a
variety of ways, both in a for-profit and the nongovernmental
organization world. He truly has a well-rounded base of
experience to bring to the job.
On the character side, Senator Hagel has shown it again and
again that he is willing to sacrifice and that he has courage.
Sacrificing in service, sacrificing for his country again and
again. He is willing to step up and do it again, and I give him
credit for that. I think he has shown courage, including the
courage to say ``I was wrong.'' That is something that is hard
for me to do in public life. I think it is hard for a lot of us
to do public or private. But Senator Hagel has had the courage
and the independence to acknowledge that he was wrong when he
felt that he was.
I think what he owes to the President, what any Cabinet
Secretary owes to the President, is the best advice they can
give at the time. The President will make the call, but I do
not want Cabinet Secretaries who are going to be hedging their
advice based on what they think will be popular or what the
President will like. I do not have any doubt that Senator Hagel
will be giving the advice as Secretary that he thinks is the
right thing, and then trusting the chain of command and our
Commander in Chief to make the call.
Finally, on a matter of character, I think that Senator
Hagel's philosophy is one that understands America's role in
the world. Our strength is not just military strength. Ever
since Teddy Roosevelt won the Nobel Prize for brokering the end
of the Russo-Japanese War, America has played a big role on the
stage of the globe and an important one. We are exceptional,
and we are exceptional in the role we play in the world. But we
get it right when we appropriately balance military strength,
diplomatic strength, economic strength, and strength of the
moral example. I think Senator Hagel understands that those all
have to be in balance, and I appreciate it.
Finally, a number of tough questions and objections were
raised, and they were all fair. Senator Hagel said the same
thing at the hearing, that he did not mind answering for
anything he had said. Much as I would say he could see some
things that he might have said better, I feel that pretty much
every day in public life I can see things that I might have
said better.
But while the questions were fair, I think the fair answer
to them is review the entire record.
When you first hear that the Senator voted in the Senate
against the designation of the IRG as a terrorist organization,
it does make you sit back and wonder why. The day we were
together, he explained why. Many Senators voted against that
designation because they believed that there was a potentially
perilous consequence to designating a department of a
government as a terrorist organization, that that could, in
fact, lead to an executive overreach, and potentially be a
preliminary step toward hostilities or even warlike activity
without appropriate consultation with Congress.
I am going to be an incredible stickler on the need for an
executive to consult with Congress. Things that might serve as
pretext for executive action need to be avoided. That is why a
number of other Senators, including Senator Webb, my
predecessor in this seat, voted against the same IRG
designation. When that was explained in the context of the
committee hearing, it made a lot of sense. We might have voted
differently on it, but he had a credible rationale.
Finally, I did not view the back and forth over containment
as Senator Hagel saying that he wants to have a containment
policy vis-a-vis Iran. We were talking containment and
prevention shorthand on the floor, and he said he supported the
President's ideas, policy views about containment. We all know
the President's policy about containment is we are not about to
contain a nuclear Iran because a nuclear Iran would jeopardize
Israel, and would also inspire the very kind of arms race in
the Middle East that the President and Senator Hagel have
always been against.
I think a fair read of that discussion was that he
understood what the President's policy was. If you read Senator
Hagel's writings, I think he has been very clear about that,
that we have no containment policy, that the answer we have to
containment is we are going to prevent Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon, and I believe he will do it.
The questions and objections I think are fair. I think they
were answered. I am going to support his nomination.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I am often asked what has
happened to the committee. Nothing. We just disagree on
occasion. [Laughter.]
This is a good committee, and we have a good chairman. We
have a good ranking member. I like my colleagues.
It is the times in which we live. The Democrats are going
to get almost universal support by Republicans, and the
Republicans are going to get almost no Republican support.
[Laughter.]
How is that? John Kerry is a good friend, so is Chuck
Hagel. I find myself disagreeing with Senator Kerry on
occasion, but I think he is in the mainstream of thinking. I
think he will do a good job for the country.
I do not vote against nominees very often. Senator Obama,
if we use his standard, I think we would all be in pretty good
shape over here to vote just the lot. No, but we are not.
At the end of the day, it is just not the one vote about
the IRG. It is a series of votes and statements that paint an
unusually disturbing picture. There is the left lane in
politics, the right line, and the middle lane, and when it
comes to some of the Iranian-Israeli issues, there is the Chuck
Hagel lane. He is in a league of his own. There is nobody with
this kind of series of votes and these series of statements. It
is just not one thing. I say dumb things every day, but it is a
series of things, a series of votes, and an edge about him that
makes many of us very unnerved about his selection at a time
when the world is on fire.
Syria is a contagion that is going to take the King of
Jordan down, and if these press reports are true about our
policy in Afghanistan, we are going to have 8,000 troops left
behind, 41 percent below the commander's recommendation. We are
telling the enemy we will be down to 1,000 by 2017. Afghanistan
will fall apart in 18 months.
The next Secretary of Defense is going to have to deal with
a world on fire, and I just believe that the testimony of
Senator Hagel was not reassuring. I do not think he came across
clear and convincing, that he understood our policies toward
Iran. The fact that you do not understand why and you cannot
clearly articulate the bad news for America if the Iranians get
a nuclear capability, sharply and to the point, is unnerving
for the times in which we live in.
This committee has a bipartisan reputation of holding
Presidents accountable. I joined with the chairman and Senator
McCain and many others to look into the abuses of the Bush
administration when it came to interrogation techniques. I hope
my colleagues on the other side will hold the Obama
administration accountable for what I think was a complete
breakdown of leadership when it comes to Benghazi. We just
cannot investigate Republicans. We are going to have to hold
both parties accountable and both Presidents accountable,
regardless of party.
Mr. Chairman, you are a good chairman. This committee will
get over this aberration and we will get back to doing
business. We will find common ground regarding sequestration, I
hope. But the reason I am voting against Senator Hagel's
nomination is that there are very few people with his voting
record when it comes to Iran and Israel. There are very few
people who have been this wrong about so many different things.
I cannot in good conscience support this nomination because
I think it is sending the worst possible signal to our friends
and our enemies alike. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator. As I think about this, I
approach it as if we are doing a hiring exercise. The
President, of course, makes the nomination, but we are acting
in an impartial capacity.
When I hire somebody, the first thing I look at is
experience, and as I mentioned at the hearing, I think Senator
Hagel's experience as an enlisted man is important,
particularly when we are going into an era where a lot of the
responsibility of the Defense Department is going to be dealing
with people returning from combat, dealing with soldiers--men
and women--who have been in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. I
think having somebody in the position that he has been
nominated for, who has been there, who has been on the front
lines and understands the stresses and the pressures, I think
it is important. I think it is important for the morale of the
entire enterprise.
In addition, he has experience here in the Senate. He has
experience in managing large organizations. He has experience
in ongoing questions of public policy. So that is where I
start, is his experience, look at the resume.
Second, the next thing I do when I hire somebody is check
references. The references that you, Mr. Chairman, read at the
beginning of the meeting, the list of people that are
supporting him from both sides of the aisle, former Secretaries
of Defense, people that are a who's who of national security
policy in the United States, have supported him. These are
people that know him better than I do, and I put a lot of
weight on that. When I see people like Bill Cohen, Secretary
Gates, and Secretary Perry, that carries a lot of weight with
me. Those are serious people who we know put the interests of
the United States at a very high level, and they would not be
recommending someone that they did not feel confident in.
The third thing, of course, in a process is the interview.
I think the interview was the confirmation hearing. We had an
opportunity to question him, and I think Senator Shaheen used
the word ``feisty''. I think he was not as forceful as he might
have been. I am not sure how all of us would have done in a 9-
hour hearing or whatever it was. It was a pretty long day that
day.
I would say, parenthetically, I remember the containment
mistake. I remember the moment he made it, and it was a
mistake. He knew the policy is prevention, not containment. The
word popped out. He used the wrong word. It was not a
deliberate statement of a policy difference with the President.
I would characterize it as a slip of the tongue. The same thing
on the legitimacy of the Iran Government.
The point he was making was it is an established
government. He used the word ``legitimate'', not in the sense
that it was duley elected and met our standards, but it was an
established government. As Senator Kaine indicated, I think he
had a rationale/reason for taking that position because he was
afraid if he took that vote, as Senator Webb said, it would
have been used as a license by the administration to take
aggressive action toward the nation of Iran. I think that was a
rational policy.
Another thing I always look for when I am looking to hire
somebody is character, and this man has character. Mr.
Chairman, at the beginning of the hearing, you used the phrase,
``He would give the President unvarnished advice with
integrity.'' That is a very high quality, very high on my list.
That is what the President needs is unvarnished advice, not
somebody who is always going to agree with him, but somebody
who is going to give him his best judgment and has absolute
integrity.
I think it would have been very easy for him to agree with
Senator McCain in the hearing and avoid that contretemps, but
was not there, and he did not do it. That shows me some
integrity.
Finally, I agree with what other people that have already
stated. I think our role is not to substitute our judgment for
the President, not to say this is who we would have necessarily
hired, but the deference goes to the President to build his
team. I happen to think Chuck Hagel is a man of great
integrity, great intelligence, and is the kind of person that,
I think, will be a strong leader for the Department of Defense,
and particularly for the men and women who are actually the
warfighters.
So I intend to vote for his nomination with confidence and
enthusiasm.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am really concerned about process. I am
really concerned that this committee vote and this entire
nomination is being rushed, and that we are being asked to
vote, maybe forced to vote, before all reasonable requests for
information have been received.
I am concerned about two categories, in particular. One is
financial disclosure and information. I will leave the details
of that to Senator Cruz because he has been very focused on
that, but I certainly echo his concerns.
I want to focus on speeches. One clear category of the
normal precedent of what the committee asked is speeches the
nominee has made in the last 5 years. That is standard. That is
not anything outside the norm. Senator Hagel in response to
that said he ``conducted an exhaustive search for all of my
speaking engagements over the past 5 years''.
After that so-called exhaustive search, he identified 80
speeches, 29 we have texts for, 51 we do not. So one flag is 51
speeches he has identified we do not yet have the substance.
But that is not the biggest flag for me.
The biggest flag is that we have found six outside speeches
that he never identified. Our staff has found them. We have a
lot less information to go on than he did, and we have found
six additional speeches. Five of those we have just recently
gotten text or video, and have not been able to review them. We
have literally gotten those in the last 24 hours. For one of
those we know video exists. It is the June 13, 2008, keynote
speech to the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee. We
know the video exists, but we do not have it yet.
So my request is pretty simple, that we get that video and
that we have some reasonable amount of time to review text or
video of these six speeches and any others that surface. That
is squarely--squarely--within the information the committee
always requires. We are just delayed because Senator Hagel did
not disclose it. We had to find it. So that should not penalize
us, and we should not reward him.
Again, my request is simple. We have five speeches, have
them, but have not reviewed them yet. Gotten them in the last
24 hours. One we know a video exists. We do not have it yet. So
I would like to be able to review that with others before this
committee vote, and I think that is a pretty darn reasonable
request. I would ask for unanimous consent to submit for the
record the information regarding these speeches.
Chairman Levin. It will be accepted.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask for your
response to that request?
Chairman Levin. The question is that we ask of all
nominees, ``provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches that you delivered during the last 5 years of which
you have copies,'' and he answered that question.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, my point is pretty obvious.
He answered it.
Chairman Levin. He did not have copies. He gave us copies
of everything that he had. You have apparently been able to
find transcripts of speeches from the organizations to which he
spoke informally, and that is fine. But he answered the
question, and there is no reason to believe he did not answer
it accurately.
Formal speeches, two copies, last 5 years of which he had
copies. Unless you believe he had copies and did not provide
them, then your document will be accepted for the record. But
that is it.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, he also identified a total of
80 speeches, including speeches which he did not have copies
of.
Chairman Levin. That is correct.
Senator Vitter. My point is these 6 speeches were not on
the list of 80.
Chairman Levin. Then he did not remember those speeches. He
is not trying to hide speeches if he gave us 80 speeches. I
could not give you a list of every speech I have made in the
last 5 years, particularly informal speeches. There is no way.
If I gave you a list which had 90 percent of the speeches that
I had, I would be doing pretty well. So unless you think that
he intentionally misled this committee and have any evidence of
that, we will accept your list for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Vitter. Putting aside whose fault it was or what
his intent was--I cannot tell you what his intent was. I can
just tell you the facts.
Putting that to the side, is it not reasonable for us to
review these six speeches we now know about before we vote?
Chairman Levin. You will have time in the next 24 hours. I
do not know when the Leader is going to bring this to the
floor, but you will have time to review any speeches that you
have access to. But those speeches--you can continue--if there
is 80 out there that he has spoken to--80 organizations, after
these 6 come in, then you may discover, hey, there are 2 other
organizations on that 80 that have found transcripts. This
could go on forever.
We need a Secretary of Defense. We have had the use of a
nuclear weapon in North Korea. We have made every single effort
to provide all the information which this committee ever
requires. He has answered this question. Unless you have
evidence that he has not answered it honestly, we are going to
proceed.
Senator Vitter. Just in closing, I think that request is
very reasonable. I am sorry it is being denied.
Chairman Levin. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. I want to thank the chairman and thank the
ranking member for having this, and I want to confirm
everything that has been said here. I think that it has been a
thoughtful process, even though we might disagree. It is
amazing this process that we are going through right now.
I had some concerns because I had not known or had met
Senator Hagel before he was presented. So I heard all the
different rhetoric that was going on, and I wanted to find out
for myself. I asked the same question as I am sure most of my
colleagues had. I wanted to make sure this was a person that
would not hesitate to defend our country under any
circumstances.
I then looked at his character, too, and I remember he and
I are from the same era. I remember the Vietnam War very well
at that time and the fear in young people in college about
getting drafted by the hundreds every day. I remember losing
some of my classmates. They would go out one time and 6 months
later be coming back in a box. I remember all that.
Here is not only a person that didn't wait to get drafted,
he enlisted. Not only did he enlist, he asked to go to the
fight. I think that told me right there everything I needed to
know, that he would not hesitate to defend this country.
Also, it was said that his testimony, and I was there, and
I started thinking about the things that we have talked about
here, it was less than a stellar performance. I am thinking if
we were all judged on our less than stellar performances as a
Senator, would we be a Senator today? If it has been a bad day,
we have all had maybe a less than a stellar performance if that
is what we are looking at.
The other thing is, in an executive I know as governor and
I know most of you all putting your offices together, you are
going to choose a person that you know that you have confidence
in, that you believe in, that would follow the orders that you
are giving. There is nothing that leads me to believe that he
would have been nominated by the President if the President did
not have complete trust that he would do that.
With all of that in mind, and also I asked the question
directly about Israel because I believe very strongly they are
truly the greatest ally and the only ally we have in that part
of the world. I wanted to make sure that his commitment to
Israel, and I felt very comfortable with his answer, and
standing by Israel. Also, his commitment that we would do
whatever we could to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon.
I have no doubt to believe.
I would say to all of us on this committee, we would have
to think that either the President or the commitment we have
made to this date would not be followed through, the thinking
that he would not follow through on his orders that would be
given to him. I have not found any reason why I would not
support Senator Hagel.
Also, the endorsements that were mentioned. So many people
from both sides of the aisle came up. If it was going to be a
political difference that we had on party lines, you would have
thought that he would have only had maybe Democrats, or if it
was on the other side, only Republicans, that would have been
speaking for him. But when I saw Senator Warner come into that
hearing, and the respect I have for Senator John Warner, a
Republican from Virginia, I think one of the great Senators,
that gave me a little bit more confidence, let's put it that
way.
I have watched that, the eloquent speeches that have been
given here. He is an independent thinking Senator, and a lot of
the things he said, as things that we say, as Senators that are
elected and represent our States, but to speak our mind. He did
that, and it seems like now that is being held against him. I
felt that was unfair.
So for this commitment, his enlistment, his bravery, his
willingness to not only fight, but willing to put his life on
the line. When I look around, how many of us have really had
that opportunity or privilege of serving in the military, let
alone being at war and putting ourselves, making the supreme
sacrifice if called upon.
Senator McCain, I have the greatest respect, and you know
that, for you and the service you have given to this country,
and any of the other members of this. But I would say the
minority of us have had that opportunity that you had in the
service and that you have given to this country. That weighs
heavily on me, too, making that commitment to vote for Senator
Hagel who has done that.
So I would hope it does not become a political vote, if you
will. I would like to see a bipartisan vote, and I intend to
support him. I appreciate the opportunity to be able to speak
upon that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Cruz is next. I do not know--Senator Wicker, I am
sorry. Did you--were you here after Senator Cruz?
Senator Wicker. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Sessions, were you--did
I----
Senator Sessions. I am not sure about that.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Senator Sessions----
Senator Sessions. I am happy to defer to the senior
Senators. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. You are ahead of Senator Wicker, but not
ahead of Senator Cruz. Okay. We are going to call on your side.
It is going to be Senators Cruz, Wicker, and Sessions.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you are going to
get me in trouble cutting in line in front of----
Chairman Levin. Better you than me. [Laughter.]
Senator Cruz. Let me say it is a true honor to have the
opportunity to serve on this committee which has a long
tradition of bipartisan cooperation, working in the interest of
this Nation's national security. I think there are few, if any,
decisions that will have a greater import than this committee's
decision confirming or not confirming the Secretary of Defense
and the potential impact on the national security of the United
States.
What I would like to address is my views on the merits of
Chuck Hagel's nomination, and then also my views on his failure
to disclose what I think are very relevant financial
disclosures.
On the merits, I would like to say at the outset that my
foreign-policy views are considerably less hawkish than some
members of this committee. I have real concerns about the
United States acting as the world's policeman, and I take
seriously George Washington's admonition that we beware foreign
entanglements.
That being said, I also agree strongly with the doctrine of
peace through strength. I think the surest way to avoid
military conflict is for the United States to stand strong
against those who would initiate hostilities, potentially,
against us.
Senator Hagel, although I very much respect his personal
heroism and character and service, putting his life on the line
defending this Nation, his foreign-policy views laid out over 2
decades put him, in the words of the Washington Post, no
conservative publication, near the ``fringe of the Senate''.
In fact, his long articulated views in the Senate have
consistently made him the Senator who has expressed the
greatest degree of antagonism to the Nation of Israel of any
member of this body and the greatest degree of skepticism
toward sanctions, toward any firm response to Iran, to Hamas,
to Hezbollah, to those terrorist organizations that would seek
to harm or to murder innocent Americans.
Indeed, we saw with his nomination something truly
extraordinary, which is the Government of Iran formally and
publicly praising the nomination of a Defense Secretary. I
would suggest to you that, to my knowledge, that is
unprecedented to see a foreign nation like Iran publicly
celebrating a nomination.
On the merits, in my view, if Chuck Hagel is confirmed, it
will make military conflict in the next 4 years substantially
more likely, because, in my view, Chuck Hagel's being confirmed
will only encourage the nation of Iran to continue and
accelerate its program to develop nuclear weapons capacity. If
that occurs, the chances are far greater that our young men and
women will be sent into harm's way.
I don't want to see that happen. I think encouraging those
who would do harm to this country is not, ultimately, in the
interest of this Nation.
That is on the merits. I would also like to address the
procedural issues.
Twice, Senator Hagel has been asked to provide additional
financial disclosures. I would like to focus in particular on
one request. Senator Hagel was asked to disclose all
compensation that he has received in excess of $5,000 over the
past 5 years. That was a request that initially came from six
Senators. In response to that request, he flatly refused.
Now, I would like to point out that information is entirely
within his control. There are no legal impediments to his
disclosing the compensation he personally has received. Yet, he
flat-out refused.
The next iteration, he received a letter from 25 Senators.
It included every Republican member of this Armed Services
Committee. It also included the minority leader and the
minority whip.
That letter stated that, in our collective judgment, this
committee should not vote and the full Senate should not vote
on his confirmation, unless and until he discloses his personal
financial compensation over the last 5 years.
I will confess, Mr. Chairman, I was surprised by his
response. I fully expected him to provide some attempt at
adequate disclosure in response to that request, and that very
clear statement that, in the absence of that disclosure, it was
the judgment of a large number of Senators in this body that
his confirmation should not come to a vote.
His letter came back, and it again flatly refused to
comply. It gave no reason other than that he is not legally
obligated to turn it over, and, therefore, he will not.
I will point out that, right now, this committee knows
absolutely nothing about the personal compensation Chuck Hagel
received in 2008, 2009, or 2010. We do not know, for example,
if he received compensation for giving paid speeches at extreme
or radical groups.
Now, in my view, given the two letters he received, it is a
fair inference to assume that he and those handling his
nomination assembled that information, assembled his
compensation. The only reasonable inference, I think, is when
they assembled it, there was something in there that they did
not want to make public.
It may be that he spoke at radical or extreme groups or
anti-Israel groups and accepted financial compensation; we
don't know. It may be that he received extraordinary payments
from defense contractors, which I would suggest is a matter of
conflict of interest this committee and this Senate would be
interested in.
We don't know what it was, because he simply said: No, I
will not tell you the compensation I personally received.
I will point out, on this question, I agree with Senator
Harry Reid. When it came to the nomination of John Bolton, and
a number of members of this body asked for additional
disclosures from John Bolton, and those disclosures were not
forthcoming, Harry Reid said the following, ``The
administration's stonewalling has not only had the effect of
slowing down the confirmation process, it has also put a
further cloud over this individual and has--perhaps
unnecessarily--raised the impression that the nominee and the
White House have something to hide.''
I don't know if Mr. Hagel has received funds directly or
indirectly from foreign sources, from extreme sources, but his
refusal to provide disclosure, I think, is highly troubling. I
would suggest every member of this committee and every member
of this body should stand together in at least insisting on
adequate disclosure.
I will make one final point: Some have asked, would you
make this same request of a Republican nominee? I will point
out to you, Chuck Hagel is a Republican. I don't know him
personally, unlike many members of this committee. I simply
know his record. I can tell you this, whether this nominee were
nominated by a Democrat or a Republican President, I would be
very interested to know, and I think the American people would
be very interested to know, whether a nominee for Secretary of
Defense has received substantial funds directly or indirectly
from foreign nations, foreign lobbyists, foreign corporations,
or foreign individuals. I would certainly ask that of either
party.
In fact, I suspect, had Mr. Hagel been nominated by a
Republican President, there might be considerably more
agreement on that point.
So I would ask each of us just to give serious thought to
our constitutional responsibility to advise and consent. I
would urge this committee, and the Senate as a whole, not to
march ahead with such speed that there is not sufficient time
to assess this nominee.
Just today, we discovered speeches that he had given that
he had not disclosed.
It is a quite mild threshold to ask what compensation has
he personally received and deposited in his personal bank
account in the last 5 years. I would suggest that should be a
relevant concern for every one of us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
As I mentioned before, my answer to the letter on this
subject is now part of the record.
The first point that you raise, I said the following, that
with regard to the demand that Senator Hagel disclose all
compensation over $5,000 that he has received over the past 5
years, the standard financial disclosure form, which the
committee requires all nominees to provide, calls for the
disclosure of all entities from which the nominee has received
compensation in excess of $5,000 during the previous 2 years.
Now, you may want to change the committee's questions. They
are standard questions. You can take that up at any appropriate
time with the committee if you want, but it is not going to be
a separate rule for Senator Hagel than it is for all the other
nominees. The 2-year disclosure requirement that has been
consistently applied by the committee is established in section
102(b)(1)(A) of the Ethics in Government Act. It applies not
only to all nominees for Senate-confirmed positions, but also
to all candidates for Federal-elected office.
My comments about your request for foreign funding are also
part of the record. They go way beyond what anybody has ever
requested. I think it is not even feasible, in many of the
requests that you have made, to answer them.
But the question that we do ask in part E of the form that
we ask all nominees to fill out is the following: During the
past 10 years, have you or your spouse received any
compensation from or been involved in any financial or business
transactions with a foreign government or an entity controlled
by a foreign government? The answer is no.
Now, you have every right to make a request beyond these
requests that are required by our rules, but I don't think that
we ought to deny a vote to a nominee because he has decided not
to respond to a request that not only goes beyond our rules,
but, in some cases, goes way beyond our rules.
Finally, if you wish to modify the form that we ask
nominees to fill out, that is well and good. But we are not
going to do that retroactively. We are not going to single out
one nominee for that. We will either do it for all nominees, in
which case you can raise this at a committee meeting on
process. You will be more than welcome to do that. But we are
not going to single out one nominee for this kind of disparate
treatment.
Senator Cruz. Mr. Chairman, may I give a brief response?
Chairman Levin. You may.
Senator Cruz. I would point out that these requests are not
out of the ordinary. In fact, two prior nominees have been
asked very similar questions.
When George W. Bush nominated Henry Kissinger to the 9/11
Commission, this body asked what foreign compensation had his
firm received. Indeed, a number of prominent members of this
body, including the majority leader, said they would oppose his
confirmation unless and until he disclosed any foreign
conflicts of interest.
Now, Mr. Kissinger made the decision, rather than disclose
them, to withdraw, which was a reasonable decision for him to
make. That is one precedent.
A second precedent was the nomination of Hillary Clinton
for Secretary of State. In that instance, questions were
likewise raised about potential foreign funds, and Secretary
Clinton did something quite admirable. She voluntarily
disclosed every foreign donation to the Clinton Foundation,
even though the committee rules didn't require it, because
there was a reasonable question that could be raised if foreign
funds had gone to that foundation.
I would suggest those two paths are both reasonable paths
to take. Number one, if reasonable questions are raised about
financial conflicts of interest in a sensitive national
security position of the receipt of foreign funds, one position
is to say, ``I won't make that disclosure, and I will withdraw
from my nomination.'' I will point out that Henry Kissinger's
was for an advisory board, not to be the chief civilian officer
of the U.S. military, a far more important position. Or the
second route is to provide disclosure enough to make clear
there is not a foreign conflict of interest.
Senator Hagel's response is truly unprecedented. I am not
aware of any precedent where questions have been asked--``Is
there a foreign conflict of interest?''--where the nominee has
said, ``I refuse to answer your questions, and, nonetheless, I
will not withdraw. I expect to be confirmed anyway.''
I would suggest that sets a dangerous precedent. Indeed, if
subsequent investigations reveal substantial financial
conflicts of interest, and this Senate has proceeded with
unnecessary haste and without giving due time to advise and
consent on that nomination, I would suggest that each of us who
did so would bear some significant part of the responsibility
for that decision.
Chairman Levin. The precedent, which would be set here,
would be by your unilaterally changing these rules that we have
followed. If this nominee, or any other nominee, wishes to
respond to your request, which goes beyond the rules, they are
free to do so.
But we are not going to accept a change in the rules that
applies to one nominee. If you wish to change these rules, you
may do so at a procedural meeting of this committee. But we are
not going to accept your suggestion and innuendo that there is
some kind of conflict of interest here, because there is no
evidence of a conflict of interest.
He has been asked this flat-out question by our committee:
Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity--e.g.,
that is, employee, attorney, business, or political advisor or
consultant--with or without compensation, a foreign government
or an entity controlled by a foreign government? His answer is
no.
Now, if you have any evidence to the contrary, that is one
thing. But without any evidence to the contrary, to say that
you haven't gotten answers to questions which go beyond the
questions that we ask every other nominee is not going to be
accepted by this chairman.
Senator Cruz. Mr. Chairman, you asked for evidence to the
contrary. I would point to the letter that Mr. Hagel submitted.
There were 7 private funds that had paid him substantial sums
of money that 25 Senators asked him about, and he responded.
The question was, of those private funds that have paid you
hundreds of thousands of dollars, did they receive foreign
funds? He responded that for six of those funds, he could make
the representation that the substantial fees he was paid did
not directly derive from foreign sources. But for the seventh
of those funds, a fund called Corsair Capital, which paid him
$200,000 in the 2 years we know about and, for all we know,
substantially more in the years in which he has not responded
to the question, he said he could not even make that
representation. He could not even say that the $200,000 he
received did not come directly from a foreign government.
The question this committee asked--``Have you been paid
directly by a foreign government?''--I would suggest it is
every bit as relevant to know if that $200,000 that he has
disclosed came from a foreign government.
Now, it may be perfectly appropriate. We might conclude
that it was benign; it was reasonable. But it is, at a minimum,
relevant to know if that $200,000 that he deposited in his bank
account came directly from Saudi Arabia, came directly from
North Korea.
I have no evidence to suggest that it is or isn't. But his
statement was that he could not even tell this committee that
$200,000 did not come directly from a foreign government. I
would suggest that it is evidence that, at a minimum, would
suggest further inquiry is justified.
Chairman Levin. Senator Cruz, you are free to vote against
this nominee for any reason you choose, including that he has
not responded to questions which you have asked beyond the
questions that this committee asks.
But let's be clear as to what the question is that this
committee asked. During the last 10 years, have you or your
spouse received any compensation from or been involved in any
financial or business transactions with a foreign government or
an entity controlled by a foreign government? His answer is no.
You say you don't have any evidence yes or no to the
contrary. If and when you come up with any evidence that he has
not answered this question honestly, I am sure that you will
provide that to the committee.
But for the purposes of this proceeding with this
nomination, your objection is clear on the record. If you come
up with any evidence, you can supply that to us, that he has
not answered these questions honestly.
But we are now going to proceed to call on Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cruz has stated his
opinion, which he is entitled to. But I want to put on the
record that this Senator feels like that Senator Cruz has gone
over the line. He, basically, has impugned the patriotism of
the nominee in your conclusions, which you are entitled to come
to, about him, in essence, being cozy with Iran. You have also
stated your opinion that you don't think he has been truthful
with this committee.
Now, those are two fairly strong statements. I couldn't
help but having had the privilege of serving on this committee
for a while, and seeing the two former chairmen on either side
of the nominee, and I looked at the former Republican Chairman
John Warner's face, as some of the questions were asked, as he
visibly winced.
There is a certain degree of comity and civility that this
committee has always been known for. Clearly, in the sharpness
of difference of opinion, to question, in essence, whether
somebody is a fellow traveler with another country, I think, is
taking it too far.
I would encourage this committee to take the role model of
its former ranking member, Senator McCain, who can get into it
hot and heavy, but at the end of the day, he is going to
respect the other person's motives. I would implore the
committee to consider that.
Now, I would just respond on a former question that was
asked about this Global Zero report. I would simply turn to the
transcript of the committee hearing, page 79. Senator Sessions
has asked questions, and Senator Hagel's response at line 10,
on page 79: ``Thank you, Senator. Let me first correct some of
your interpretation of what the Global Zero report was and what
it actually said. First, it did not propose or call for
anything. It was, in fact, the word specifically used at the
front end of that report was `illustrative,' proposing nothing
but laying out different scenarios and possibilities and
schedules.
``And here's the key part of all this--and by the way, this
was summarized in a letter to President Obama in 2009--
bilateral, never unilateral. Nothing was ever suggested on a
unilateral basis to take down our arsenal. `Negotiated,'
`verifiable,' these are terms that were in the report.
``As Senator Nunn said in his opening statement--and I have
alluded generally to this--the mainstream thinking of most
Presidents we have had in the last 65 years--and I go back to
Ronald Reagan's comments, as Senator Nunn quoted--was reduction
of nuclear weapons for the obvious reasons. That is why we have
engaged in treaties to reduce nuclear weapons. Those were not
unilateral arrangements; those were bilateral arrangements.''
I will continue in the transcript on page 121 at line 2,
where Senator Ayotte asked, ``Here is what is troubling me. You
have testified before this committee today that you have never
been for unilateral nuclear disarmament; in other words,
unilateral actions by the United States of America. Yet this
report itself, which you call an illustration, it is
illustration or recommendation, or however you want to frame
it, is to actually--there are many recommendations in it. One
of them is to eliminate a leg of the triad, which is the land-
based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Would you
agree with that? That is the illustration that is contained in
this report, or you call an illustration. Is that right?''
``Senator Hagel, `I call it an illustration, Senator,
because that is the term; it is used at the front end of the
report.' ''
``Senator Ayotte, `Well, let me talk about the other terms
that this report uses, because this report twice, as Senator
Sessions has asked you, on page 1 and on page 16, says that the
illustrations for this example given in this report, one of
which is eliminating a leg of the triad, nuclear triad, could
be implemented unilaterally. So here is what I am struggling
with: Why would you ever put your name on a report that is
inherently inconsistent with what you are telling us today, is
that you have never been for unilateral disarmament as a
possibility?' ''
Senator Hagel's response is, on page 122, ``Well, it is not
inconsistent, I don't believe, Senator. But you used the term
`could'. That is a pretty important operative word in the
report. The report does not recommend that we do these things.
The report says `could'--illustrative scenarios, possibilities.
You probably know the other individuals who were involved in
that report, mainly General Cartwright, the former Commander of
Strategic Command.''
I wanted to insert those things into the record from the
previous hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Cruz. Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard on a point of
personal privilege?
Chairman Levin. Let me call on Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. I just want to make one observation.
My friend, Senator Nelson, I think I wrote down the words
criticizing our Senator there for implying that Chuck Hagel was
cozy with terrorist-type countries, referring to Iran. Let me
say, I would say, he is endorsed by them. You can't get any
cozier than that.
Chairman Levin. I have been endorsed by people I disagree
with totally. I don't want people who hate me to ruin my career
by endorsing me.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. If I may be heard on a point of personal
privilege, the Senator from Florida leveled to charges directly
at me, and I would suggest both of those charges are false.
The first thing the Senator from Florida said is that I had
impugned Chuck Hagel's patriotism. To the contrary, I have
repeatedly and explicitly praised his personal character and
patriotism and service. My focus is entirely on his
longstanding foreign policy record and his consistent
opposition to sanctions to any form of direct action dealing
with those who would cause harm. So in no way, shape, or form
have I impugned his patriotism. I focused on his foreign policy
record, which even the Washington Post describes as at the
fringe.
Second, the Senator from Florida suggested that I stated
that Mr. Hagel has not been truthful. To the contrary, my point
is exactly the opposite, that the question this committee
asked, whether he has directly received money from foreign
sources, enables him to answer that question truthfully no,
while at the same time not disclosing whether the hundreds of
thousands of dollars he has received have come indirectly from
foreign sources.
His answers could be entirely truthful, and yet the example
I used of Corsair Capital, that money, that $200,000, could
have come from a foreign nation to Corsair Capital, and he
could answer the truthfully, no, I haven't received it, because
it came from an intermediary.
My point is not that he has lied. It is, rather, that he
has refused to answer reasonable questions of disclosure. So I
would suggest, in no way, shape, or form have I intended to or
have I, in fact, impugned his character. My focus has
consistently been on his record, which I think is a record that
is troubling and would be dangerous to the national security
interests of the country.
Chairman Levin. The record of the committee will have to
speak for itself.
Let me now call upon Senator Wicker.
Senator McCain. Could I----
Chairman Levin. Yes, Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I just want to make it clear, Senator Hagel
is an honorable man. He has served his country. No one on this
committee at any time should impugn his character or his
integrity.
Chairman Levin. I think we would all agree with that, I
hope.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Let me see if I can reel this back, Mr.
Chairman. [Laughter.]
This is not my idea of a good time. We have a Republican
nominee for Secretary of Defense by a Democratic President. We
have every Democrat on the committee supporting him. Every
Republican on the committee with just as heartfelt reason to
oppose the nomination.
Chuck Hagel's wife grew up in Mississippi. She has kinfolk
still there. Presumably, they wonder why I can't support their
kinsman.
Mr. Chairman, you say we need a Secretary of Defense, and
we do. The acts of today by North Korea demonstrates that. What
is going on in Iran demonstrates that. But we need the right
Secretary of Defense.
I have to say, sitting there this week with Secretary
Panetta, a man who I have served with, a man who I am proud to
have voted for, I was proud to vote for him at the beginning of
his term as Secretary of Defense, and here at the end of that
term, I am just as proud.
Mr. Chairman, I would be delighted and eager to vote for
you for confirmation as Secretary of Defense. I would do that
without hesitation. I would have voted for Senator Warner,
Senator Nunn. Clearly, Senator Hagel brought the right people
with them.
But we need the right Secretary of Defense. Chuck Hagel is
not the right Secretary of Defense for this time.
We need a Secretary of Defense who can stand before the
world and articulate that we reject a policy of containment of
a nuclear Iran. We need a Secretary of Defense that can stand
before the world and be clear in making the point that the
Iranian Government is not a legitimately constituted
government.
When Senator Hagel made the misstatement about the
legitimacy of the Iranian Government, Senator Gillibrand had to
come back later, explain it to him, walk him back, and help him
correct that misstatement. We need a Secretary of Defense who
doesn't need help in that regard.
Clearly, we need a Secretary of Defense who doesn't need to
be passed a note saying we are not in favor of a containment
policy. He got that wrong, and the chairman had to take a third
stab at it and correct the nominee for Secretary of Defense on
one of the major issues of the day.
Now you could say that Senator Hagel had a bad day, and it
was. It was a troubling performance before this hearing. The
members of this committee acknowledge that and know that. But
here is my larger objection. Here, in Chuck Hagel, we have a
Senator who made a career out of taking a contrary view against
bipartisan consensus positions that have been held across this
table and across the aisle and at both ends of this building.
There has been a bipartisan mainstream national security
consensus in this Congress on Israel, on our policy with regard
to Iran, on our entire Middle Eastern policy, backing Jimmy
Carter's Camp David accords in 1978. Chuck Hagel, without
question, has made a career out of going in front of the
cameras, getting invitation after invitation because it was
good TV, and making it clear that he was outside that national
bipartisan mainstream on all of these crucial national issues.
Now, suddenly, he is the nominee, and we are to believe
that he is squarely in the mainstream of American thought in
this regard. This is the individual who said the Israeli
Government essentially continues to play games. He is the
individual who said he didn't believe in unilateral sanctions
because they don't work and they isolate the United States.
A week later, when it is necessary to say something
different to the Senator from California, he walks that back.
He is the same Senator who decried the systematic destruction
of an American friend by the country of Israel and who said
there is a Jewish lobby in this country that gets its way
through intimidation, and that results in this Government doing
dumb things.
Now when asked by Senator Graham, when asked by me about
the Jewish lobby, he clearly reiterated that he should not have
said the Jewish lobby. He should have said the pro-Israel
lobby, or the pro-Israeli lobby. He told me, ``No, I shouldn't
have said intimidate. I should have said influence.''
So there is an Israel lobby that influences. What about the
dumb things? It finally got to the point where he was just
unable to tell Senator Graham anything other than he really
just didn't have anything at all in mind.
This is a man who has planted himself for 8 years in the
U.S. Senate clearly, as Senator Graham says, not in the left
lane, not in the center lane, not in the right lane, but in the
Chuck Hagel outside the mainstream lane. Let me just tell you,
my friends, I think we know in our hearts, we could do better.
Senator King is going to be a wonderful Senator. He says
this is a job interview. Boy, during that job interview, it
occurred to me that the prospective employer would say we can
do better than this. We can do better. The President can do
better.
I can name several people in this room who could do better,
and we need to do it for the people of the United States and
for the security of the United States.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
President Obama, when he became President, had campaigned a
lot on foreign policy and the war in Iraq. What did he do when
he became President? He turned to the Secretary of Defense of
President Bush and asked him if he would continue to serve as
his Secretary of Defense.
Now I remember when he did that, and I remember the hue and
cry that went up from many in the President's base. They were
upset with the President because he had dared to ask Secretary
Gates to stay on. President Obama weathered that criticism
because he wanted the advice and the counsel of Secretary
Gates.
This is a President who was just reelected by the American
people. As much as some people in this room don't like it, he
was elected President of the United States by the American
people, and he has selected an honorable veteran, a Republican,
who has served our country in various capacities, including
this body.
He has a resume that qualifies him. He has a character that
until today I assumed was not questioned on either side of the
aisle and references embraced by an impressive bipartisan group
of leaders in national defense, including the former chairman
of this committee and ranking Republican of this committee, who
is revered by both sides of the aisle. Not only did he
introduce him, he warmly embraced him and endorsed him.
Now we have had the same set of disclosure rules in this
committee for 25 years, same set of rules. We have applied
these rules across the aisle, didn't matter whether it was a
Republican or a Democrat.
During this period of time, we have confirmed Secretaries
Carlucci, Cheney, Aspin, Perry, Cohen, Rumsfeld, Gates, and
Panetta, as well as thousands of other nominees for senior
civilian positions in the Department of Defense. We asked
Senator Hagel the same questions that we asked all of those
fine men, and he answered them all. There is a whole section on
foreign affiliations, and he answered each one of these
questions on foreign affiliations ``no''.
There are five different questions that cover the
waterfront in terms of foreign affiliations. I certainly
respect my friends across the aisle deeply, and I know we have
different opinions about this, and I know that there are
legitimate policy differences here.
But in this committee, it is my hope that if we have
someone in front of this committee who at a time when many of
his generation were running from facing battle, I remember,
trying to figure out a way to get a deferment, trying to figure
out a way to use their connections to avoid the battlefield,
trying to get to Canada. This is a man who stood up and said,
``Let me go,'' and not only did he go, he served with courage
on the battlefield.
Now I am not saying you have to agree with him. I am not
saying you have to vote for him. But I will say this. I think
we have to be really careful with inferences that would leave
the impression that this man would somehow purposely evade or
purposely mislead this committee as to his relationship with
any foreign government.
He has answered these questions clearly and completely. He
has done everything that we have ever asked a nominee to do. So
I think it is very troubling that we have gotten close to that
line.
I have to tell you, Senator Inhofe, be careful because you
might have an organization that would endorse you that you find
abhorrent. Then would I have the right to say you are cozy with
them? What if some horrible organization tomorrow said that you
were the best guy they knew?
The idea that somebody is endorsed by someone else, that
that somehow signs him up to agree with this country that he
has acknowledged to this committee is a threat to our Nation,
that he has acknowledged that he will not be part of any policy
of containment, that he knows we must stop them from getting
nuclear weapons, and that they are a state-sponsored
organization of terrorism. He answered that very clearly to my
questions.
I just think, am I sad that this is going to be a party-
line vote? Yes, I am. Senator Graham said that this is an
aberration. I sure hope so. Because this Nation deserves us
trying to have it not be a partisan situation on this
committee. I hope this is an aberration, and I do respect
everyone who cannot vote to confirm this Secretary.
But I do think a great deal of deference should be given to
the Commander in Chief on his selection, and I do think his
resume, his references, and most importantly, his integrity
qualify him for this job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Okay. Let me just add one quick thing. This committee has
had to deal with difficult issues before, and there have been
occasions when we have actually split on a party line. We have
survived those very strongly. We will survive this one, and we
will be just as strong coming out as we were going in.
This is a bipartisan committee. We are proud of that
tradition. That tradition is a lot stronger than any particular
single vote or any particular single comment. So we will, I am
sure, I have no doubt about this committee's future
bipartisanship, as difficult as this vote is.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. I will just be very brief here. When you
talk about the relationship between Senator Hagel and a
country, and we were talking about the subject, the country is
Iran. When they are the ones who say that they want to wipe
Israel off the map, that Israel is a cancerous tumor in the
heart. They hate America from the bottom of their heart. Yet he
appears with some of their people on Al Jazeera, where he
agrees with the statement that Israel has committed war crimes.
That goes far beyond just being endorsed. Now that needs to
be in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. I think the transcript of that will be put
in the record because it will be very different in terms of
many of our impressions of it than the way it has just been
described.
But let us proceed, and we will go to Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I respect your chairmanship so much, and we produced the
defense bill unanimously last year again. It came out of the
committee. So that does speak well, I think, for our
bipartisanship.
I would note that I am uncomfortable. I don't think it is
necessary that we rush this vote today. We just received
certain speeches. I haven't seen them. A video apparently of
one is in existence, but not been produced. There are other
things that cause me to think we should be slower about this.
With regard to the committee rules, in the Judiciary
Committee, like this committee, there are basic questionnaires
that go to everyone, but that does not limit the inquiry. We
have had much broader inquiry about individuals when they have
this problem or this question and people ask. So, I think it is
not unreasonable to ask that a nominee disclose his income over
a period of time.
If I am wrong about that, I will change my view. But I
don't think that is an unreasonable, burdensome question to ask
of a nominee who wants to be Secretary of Defense. It has
certainly been done to others, and just because we limit it to
2 years doesn't mean on a given circumstance we couldn't ask
for more. But that is what I would say there.
Colleagues, we are facing and going to be debating the
nuclear posture of the United States a great deal. I understand
the President may talk about it at some length tonight. It does
not totally surprise me because I believe he comes out of the
anti-nuclear left, and as one wise observer of all these
processes over the years said to me recently, ``I am not
surprised that the anti-nuclear left would propose the things
that are in the Global Zero report. That has been out there for
30 or 40 years. What surprises me is that position may be held
by the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America.''
My view is that this nominee has been somewhat erratic in
his positions over time, and I am concerned about that. Senator
Nelson and I swapped as chairman of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, where nuclear weapons issues are debated, and we
have been involved in it for some time. The Global Zero report
that Senator Hagel was one of four other people that signed it
and produced it, said some very troubling things. It outlines a
vision for nuclear weaponry in the United States that is
contrary to our historical position.
Just about 3 years ago, legislation I proposed actually,
America's Strategic Posture, a bipartisan report, was produced.
William J. Perry, who was openly known to favor reducing
nuclear weapons and continuing to reduce them. James
Schlesinger, he was vice chairman. Perry, the chairman.
Schlesinger, vice chairman.
Other people like James Woolsey, Lee Hamilton, Morton
Halperin, John Glenn were on this committee. We appointed them
to see where we were and to produce a bipartisan analysis from
the best heads in the country about what we should do about our
nuclear weapons. They did not say change the triad. They did
not say take weapons off alert. They did not say eliminate all
ICBMs. They did not say eliminate all tactical weapons. In
fact, the contrary.
Now, apparently, Senator Hagel participates in this Global
Zero report just last year, less than a year ago, and this is
what it said. ``In our illustrative plan, the United States
over the next 10 years reduces its arsenal to a maximum of 900
nuclear weapons and increases the warning and decision time
over its smaller arsenal.''
Warning time means you take them off alert so it takes a
lot longer to get them launched than it would today. It goes on
to say, ``These steps could be taken with Russia in unison
through reciprocal presidential directives, negotiated in
another round of bilateral arms reduction talks, or implemented
unilaterally.''
It goes on to make this unusual statement. ``Security is
mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition, and mutual
assured destruction no longer occupies a central psychological
or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship.'' I don't
think that is true of where Russia is.
That was on page 1 of the report. Then it says this about
bilateral nuclear arms negotiations on page 16.
Chairman Levin. Would you forgive the interruption, Senator
Sessions?
I think I am able to set a time for a vote now if we could
get some idea about how long you want to speak, and I am not
trying to limit you. Can you give us an idea about how long?
Because I just talked to Senator Blumenthal, and I want to ask
Senator Hirono the same question.
Senator Sessions. Okay, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
share a few thoughts. About how much time do you want me to
take?
Chairman Levin. Is 5 minutes enough?
Senator Sessions. Seven minutes.
Chairman Levin. Seven minutes? That is fine.
Senator Sessions. I will try to finish in 5 minutes.
Chairman Levin. That is no problem.
Senator Hirono, may I ask you about how long you want to
speak?
Senator Hirono. About 3 minutes.
Chairman Levin. Three minutes.
Senator Blumenthal, 2 or 3 minutes? Senator Udall wanted a
couple of minutes.
I am now going to schedule a vote for 5 p.m. We will vote
at 5 p.m. We will hopefully have just about everybody there. If
not, if somebody is on their way, we can stay here until
everybody has an opportunity either to vote in person or to
vote by proxy.
So 5 p.m., we are going to start the vote.
Senator Sessions, forgive the interruption.
Senator Sessions. Let me ask one question, Mr. Chairman.
There are several members, maybe the majority of the members on
this side had requested we don't carry this vote tonight, and
we would like to have it delayed. We recognize that you are the
majority, and I would just make that request to you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We have made a decision. We are going to proceed to a vote
today. We recognize the request, but we just have to stick to a
plan, which was a reasonable plan, and we are going to start
the vote at 5 p.m. Now back to Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. A growing concern on our side about
moving this nomination so rapidly and a belief that there are
further disclosures. So I don't know where we will end up on
that.
But the report says this. ``The reductions in de-alerting
proposed under this illustrative plan could be carried out in
unison with the United States and Russia through reciprocal
presidential directives, negotiated in another round of
bilateral arms reduction talks, or implemented unilaterally.''
It also says, ``A less good approach,'' but still a good
approach, apparently, ``would be to adopt this agenda
unilaterally.''
Senator Hagel was very anxious to tell us the report did
not call for unilateral actions on behalf of the United States.
It clearly suggests three times the possibility of unilateral
actions. I think it just was surprising to me how driven they
were to reach this conclusion.
In a footnote, a question was raised about observers, I
being one of them, who made the point that if we continue to
draw down our weapons and they get to a certain level, more and
more nations could see themselves as peer competitors. Far from
being deterred from building up nuclear weapons, they might see
it as an opportunity to be on an equal par with Russia and the
United States.
I think that is a legitimate concern. They dismiss that and
say that, ``Global Zero discussions with high-level Chinese
Government officials and military officials and experts
indicate strongly that China remains committed to this course
of a low nuclear policy. China would not race to parity or
supremacy and would, in fact, take the opposite position to
join an arms reduction process if the United States reduces
their arsenals to low numbers.''
Forgive me, but I don't know who he talked to, and I am not
sure they would tell him the truth anyway. Matter of fact, I
doubt it. This is the kind of thing that went into that report.
General Schwartz, the Air Force Chief of Staff, when asked
about this report, was not sympathetic. General Schwartz said,
``I don't agree with this assessment or this study.''
The current commander, General Robert Kehler, Strategic
Forces Command, that has the nuclear requirements for the U.S.
Government, said, ``Regarding the Global Zero report, in my
view, we have the force size, force structure, force posture
today that we need for our national security needs.''
What did the report call for in conclusion? They are not
shy about saying it. The United States ``could seek to
achieve,'' this is in the conclusion, ``such reductions in 10
years and plan to base its arsenal on a dyad,'' no longer a
triad, ``of nuclear delivery vehicles. The optimal mix of
carriers would consist of 10 Trident missile submarines''--
there are currently 14--``and 18 B-2 bombers.''
This would decommission, as they overtly say, 67 B-52
nuclear bombers. They would be totally eliminated, all the B-
52s.
Continuing, ``under normal conditions, one half of the
warhead stockpile, 450, would be deployed on these carriers.
The other half would be kept in reserve, except during national
emergency. All land-based intercontinental missiles armed with
nuclear payloads would be retired.'' All ICBMs would be
retired. ``And the carriers of nonstrategic warheads, all of
which would be eliminated.''
The carriers of nonstrategic, that is tactical nuclear
weapons, would be eliminated from the stockpile. B-52 bombers
would be completely eliminated or converted to carry only
conventional weapons.
I really think that is an extreme position. It is contrary
to the established bipartisan commission that we established,
the concurrent bipartisan policy of the U.S. Defense
Department. I don't know how you will vote on this nomination,
but please, ladies and gentlemen, as we go forward, we are
going to have to be very careful about how we handle strategic
nuclear weapons.
There is no doubt our allies are very uneasy. They don't
understand where we are heading. They don't have the confidence
that we need them to have. If an ally doesn't think that we are
going to be there for them, then will they not have a high
incentive to build a nuclear arsenal themselves to defend
themselves? That worries me.
The members of this committee that I talked to and met
privately said they receive delegations from various countries
I won't name that we respect and are great allies with are
really troubled by this.
I asked a Russian professor on one occasion, ``Would you
eliminate your tactical nuclear weapons?'' He said, ``Do you
know how many troops the Chinese have on our border? We are
never going to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.''
We have to be careful about this dream of a world without
nuclear weapons. Will it encourage Iran? Will it encourage
North Korea, if we reduce our weapons, to stop producing
nuclear weapons? If we continue to go down and people lack
confidence in us, what about countries like Saudi Arabia or
Egypt or Turkey or other countries around the world, South
Korea or Japan? Would they not feel further pressure to build a
nuclear arsenal, and therefore, proliferation would occur?
Mr. Chairman, I think this is out of the mainstream. It
represents a rather erratic position. Having been involved in
this virtually the entire time I have been in the Senate, I
think it is so far away from where we need to be that I would
not be able to support my friend, Chuck Hagel.
I like him. He absolutely deserves our respect for being on
the ground, in combat, putting his life on the line, serving
his country. He is a frank and open person. But he has not been
particularly consistent, in my view, over the years. He has
taken some views that I think are not good for America, and I
believe in the Secretary of Defense, the entire world and all
Americans really need to know that is one person that is
stable, solid, can be counted on to issue measured judgments,
and to execute them as promised.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will be very brief in the interest of time, just to say
that I will be supporting Senator Hagel.
I want to thank particularly Senator McCain for his
comments about Senator Hagel that none of us are seeking to
impugn his character. In fact, many of the Senators who
question him commented that he is a good and decent man and
that they respect his record as a decorated combat veteran.
He would be the first enlisted man to serve as Secretary of
Defense and, therefore, I think uniquely qualified to address
what I view as probably one of the two or three major
challenges for the next leader of the Department of Defense,
which is how to attract and retain the best in America, the
best people in America to serve in our military.
We all are fond of saying that our people are our greatest
asset, and it is true. Anybody who has visited our warfighters
in Afghanistan, as I have done three times--and was privileged
to go with Senators McCain, Graham, and Ayotte a couple of
those times--stand in awe, I think, of the work that they have
done and the sacrifices they have made.
This country traditionally, after such wars, hollows out
its military. I am convinced that Senator Hagel is committed,
passionately committed, to the men and women in uniform and our
veterans. He has been a veterans advocate, as well as a
decorated combat veteran himself.
So I believe there is a reason that we afford the President
some prerogative in choosing his team, which is, ultimately,
the President that we hold accountable for his policies. His
policies, the administration's policies, will have to be
Senator Hagel's policies, if he is confirmed as the Secretary
of Defense.
We should hold the President accountable. I hope to work
with my colleagues on issues like Iran and Israeli security,
and as well as working to stop sexual assault, implementing the
repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' the dangers and realities
of suicide, post-traumatic stress disorder, and, of course, the
looming danger of sequestration. The management of the
Department of Defense is a huge challenge. I hope that we will
come together on a bipartisan basis to help whoever the next
Secretary of Defense is--and I believe he will be Senator
Hagel--to address those challenges.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are good-hearted, right-minded people on both sides
of the Chuck Hagel nomination question, and I don't think there
are any minds to be changed at this point. I would like to
offer a few points about this nominee for the record.
First, it is important to our national security to have
leadership in the Department of Defense right now. The Defense
Department, it is never an easy place to run, but today it
faces an unusually difficult set of challenges. We need a
Secretary of Defense in place to manage the fallout from
sequester, should it come to fruition, as well as the budget
constraints we face in the future.
We need a Secretary of Defense in place to guide the
fundamental rebalancing of our military after the end of the
war in Iraq, as the winding down of the war in Afghanistan
continues, and as we pivot to the Pacific. This rebalancing
must be done while being vigilant about the circumstances in
North Korea, Syria, North Africa, and elsewhere, as well as the
large and ever-increasing cybersecurity threats to our data
systems, power grid, and other infrastructure.
Second, at the same time, we, as a country, must have a
larger discussion about the next generation of warfare. How,
when, and under what circumstances will digital weapons be
used? There are ongoing questions regarding the use of drones.
What role will Congress have in overseeing the use of these
weapons? We need a Secretary of Defense in place to participate
in these discussions.
Third, we also need a Secretary of Defense who will look
after the needs of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
their families. We need a Secretary of Defense who has fought
for veterans issues and can work with the VA to ensure that
these two agencies will work in coordination for the benefit of
our veterans. Senator Hagel has tremendous breadth of
leadership in both the public and the private sectors.
I think that we owe tremendous deference to the President
to put together the team that he can count on. I am confident
that Senator Hagel will provide the President unvarnished
advice and that he will ask the kinds of tough questions that
he has always asked, not necessarily the popular questions.
Senator Hagel, in my view, is clearly qualified to be
Secretary of Defense, and I will be supporting his nomination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, it has
been a spirited discussion. I intend to proudly vote for
Sergeant Hagel. He is a patriot. He has earned the right to
wear two Purple Hearts and many other commendations.
The enduring case for me was made at his nomination hearing
by the long list of former Defense Secretaries and National
Security Advisers, both Republicans and Democrats, who stood
together and supported Senator Hagel's nomination.
The enduring image for me will always be Senator Hagel
flanked by Senators Warner and Nunn, our iconic and respected
national security leaders.
Let us vote, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We are almost at the 5 p.m. hour.
Senator Sessions. Could I say one good thing about our
nominee?
Chairman Levin. Please. Great way to end.
Senator Sessions. I thought I heard him do the containment
comment. First, I perked up. But my honest evaluation, Senator
King, is it was just a mis-speaking. I don't think he rejected
or meant to adopt a containment policy rather than not allowing
them to have a nuclear weapon.
I meant to say that earlier. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
On that very positive note and a generous note, and I say
that very seriously, this committee is a very strong bipartisan
committee, as I said before, and we will continue to be, one
difficult vote notwithstanding.
The clerk, a quorum being present, the 5 p.m. hour having
come, we will now consider the nomination of Charles ``Chuck''
Hagel to be the Secretary of Defense. Is there a motion to
favorably report Mr. Hagel's nomination to the Senate?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Nelson. Second.
Chairman Levin. The clerk will call the role.
The Clerk. Mr. Reed?
Senator Reed. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Udall?
Senator Udall. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. Hagan?
Senator Hagan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. King?
Senator King. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. No.
The Clerk. Mr. McCain?
Senator McCain. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Sessions?
Senator Sessions. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chambliss?
Senator Inhofe. No, by proxy.
The Clerk. Mr. Wicker?
Senator Wicker. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Fischer?
Senator Fischer. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham?
Senator Graham. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Vitter?
Senator Inhofe. No instruction.
The Clerk. Mr. Blunt?
Senator Blunt. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Lee?
Senator Inhofe. No, by proxy.
The Clerk. Mr. Cruz?
Senator Cruz. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Aye.
The Clerk. Fourteen to 11, and 1 no instruction.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Let me announce the vote first, if you
would?
Senator Wicker. On that, it was my understanding earlier
that the vote would be left open, and I would just suggest that
Mr. Vitter may have heard that and might----
Chairman Levin. We will--thank you.
Thank you, I did say that, and we will leave the vote open
for an additional 10 minutes to give Mr. Vitter a chance to
come and vote in person. If he does so, the vote will then
reflect that vote in person. If not, it will be as announced.
I think we all trust each other so that we know what I am
saying here. Would you just please announce the vote again,
subject to that one vote change?
The Clerk. Fourteen ayes, 11 nays, 1 no instruction.
Chairman Levin. If Mr. Vitter does show up in the next,
what did I say, 10 minutes, he can then cast a vote. It will
not change the outcome. (Senator Vitter did not return within
the allotted time.)
Given that vote, we will now favorably report the
nomination of Chuck Hagel to the Senate.
We thank you all, and we look forward to another wonderful
year together.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

NOMINATIONS OF GEN LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND; AND GEN
DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND
TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

----------

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Hagan, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, Inhofe, McCain, Chambliss,
Ayotte, Fischer, and Graham.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine,
general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J.
Noblet, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director, Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Steven M. Barney, minority counsel, Christian D. Brose,
professional staff member; Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff
member; and Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Mariah
K. McNamara, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Christopher Cannon, assistant to Senator Hagan; Marta
McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Karen Courington
and Mary Naylor, assistants to Senator Kaine; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte;
Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer; and Craig
Abele and Matthew Rimkunas, assistants to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody, and welcome.
This morning, the committee considers the nominations of
two very distinguished officers to two of the most active and
challenging combatant commands (COCOM): General Lloyd Austin,
U.S. Army, nominated to be Commander, U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), and General David Rodriguez, U.S. Army, nominated to
be Commander of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
These two combatant commands, CENTCOM and AFRICOM, are the
centers of gravity for our military's operations to counter the
threat of terrorism. Both nominees have served our country with
distinction, and I want to thank each of you for your decades
of military service and your willingness to serve, once again.
I understand that General Austin's wife, Charlene, and
General Rodriguez's wife, Ginny, are with us this morning; I
want to acknowledge them and thank them for their sacrifices,
their support to our nominees throughout the years, which is so
essential to the success of our nominees. As is the committee's
tradition, our nominees are invited to introduce any family
members or friends who may be with them this morning, with
their opening remarks.
If confirmed, General Austin will assume command of CENTCOM
during a critical transition period for our military operations
in Afghanistan. In the coming months, Afghan forces will assume
the lead responsibility for providing security throughout their
country, with coalition forces stepping back to a support role.
On Tuesday, President Obama announced, during the State of the
Union Address, plans for drawing down half of the 66,000 U.S.
troops in Afghanistan this year, a 34,000-troop reduction by
February 2014.
The President continues to consider options for a
significantly reduced U.S. military presence in Afghanistan
after the end of 2014, which will depend on many things, but,
in part, on negotiations with the Government of Afghanistan
over legal protections for our troops. The President has made
clear that the missions of any residual U.S. military presence
in Afghanistan after 2014 will be limited to counterterrorism
operations, and training and advising Afghan forces.
General Austin would bring exceptional experience to
overseeing this transition, having commanded U.S. Forces in
Iraq during the reduction of U.S. Forces and equipment from
Iraq.
Just this past weekend, our forces in Afghanistan have had
a change of command, with General Joseph Dunford replacing
General John Allen as Commander of the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan.
I want to take this opportunity to thank General Allen for
his thoughtful and devoted leadership in Afghanistan, for his
forthrightness in his interactions with me and the rest of the
members of this committee.
When Senator Reed and I visited Afghanistan in January, we
saw real signs of progress, including the Afghan security
forces increasingly taking the lead responsibility for
protecting their country. Good-news stories about Afghanistan
and the Afghan security forces don't seem to get the coverage
in the U.S. media that is given to negative stories. For
example, it was widely reported that only 1 of 23 Afghan
brigades is rated by ISAF as independent. On the other hand, we
heard, from our commanders in Afghanistan, that 87 percent of
operations in Afghanistan's critical Regional Command East are
carried out solely by Afghan security forces.
Another mainly success story is now the 18,000-strong
Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. These community defense
forces, when coordinated with district-level Afghan National
Police and Afghan army forces, are more and more effective in
empowering Afghan communities to defend against Taliban
intimidation and violence. Plans are being developed to
increase the authorized size of the ALP program from 30,000 to
45,000.
The next CENTCOM commander will also play an important role
in shaping our enduring partnership with Afghanistan after
2014, a partnership that I fully support. I am concerned,
however, by plans to reduce the Afghan National Security Forces
by a third, starting in 2015, from 352,000 to 230,000 by 2017.
I believe that any future reductions in the size of the Afghan
forces should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan at
that time. As Afghan security forces make progress in providing
for their country's security, we should reassure them that we
will continue to support these efforts by deciding that, as we
withdraw our forces, that there won't be a drawdown in Afghan
forces.
Progress in Afghanistan remains fragile. Significant
challenges to Afghanistan's long-term stability remain. Among
the greatest threats to stability are the safe havens for
Afghan insurgents across the Pakistan border, which the
Government of Pakistan has failed to disrupt or eliminate. In
addition, the major shortcomings of the Government of
Afghanistan in delivering governance and fighting corruption
creates political and economic instability that could
exacerbate the challenges to the 2014 transition.
In addition to Afghanistan, CENTCOM must contend with one
of the most significant issues in our current national security
debate: the threat posed by Iran and its continued pursuit of
its nuclear program. As the CENTCOM commander, General Austin
will be at the tip of the spear with regard to preparing,
militarily, for the potential of an armed conflict with Iran. I
share the President's view that all options must remain on the
table with respect to Iran.
Iran's hand can be seen throughout the region, including
its relentless pursuit of instability and fomenting of violence
through proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and through its
own covert activities in the region. Already, destabilizing
events in Syria, Yemen, Gaza, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan are made
worse by Iran's funding and supply of terrorist organizations
seeking to undermine governments and to spark further conflict
among sectarian and tribal groups. CENTCOM has a critical role
to play in leading efforts across the region to counter Iran's
malign influence.
Events in Syria continue to deteriorate. The impact of the
Assad regime's increasing dependence on support from Iran, and
desperate actions to hold onto power, can be seen in the
thousands of refugees that flow into the towns and villages of
Syria's neighbors. While the United States is focused on
providing humanitarian relief and nonlethal assistance to the
Syrian opposition, the CENTCOM commander will be asked to
advise on the situation in Syria, including whether to provide
lethal assistance to the opposition, whether the United States
should conduct limited strikes against key Syrian military
capabilities, and whether the United States should seek to
build a coalition of nations to take more significant military
action. These are extraordinarily complex issues that General
Austin will be asked to share his views on today.
CENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) remains the central
location of many of the nonstate terrorist threats that our
Nation faces. In addition to core al Qaeda in Pakistan and the
reemergence of al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula remains focused on attacking the United States and
our interests. Our CENTCOM forces continue to assist our Yemeni
security partners in preventing al Qaeda from taking advantage
of areas in Yemen, where the government has limited control.
The events in Benghazi were a poignant and powerful reminder of
our need and public expectations for a capability to respond
quickly to crises around the world. This is one of the major
evolving situations that General Rodriguez is going to have to
address, and will consume a great deal of his time. But, it's
far from limited to Benghazi and to Libya. We have struggled,
in Africa, to find footholds to allow for responses to the type
of events that occurred in Benghazi or to allow us to conduct
day-to-day operations, like intelligence collection. AFRICOM
has received less, in the way of resources and support, than
other geographic commands, and this disparity, indeed, may grow
in a resource-constrained environment. These challenges,
combined with destabilizing impacts of terrorist and criminal
networks, will make General Rodriguez's task at AFRICOM among
the most complicated in the Department.
An additional matter in the AFRICOM AOR that this committee
watches closely is the ongoing U.S. support operations in
Central Africa to assist the multinational effort to remove
Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants from the battlefield. This
committee--and Senator Inhofe has been very, very active in
this effort--has sought to ensure that this mission is
adequately resourced, including additional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
General Rodriguez, I know that you're familiar with this
mission, and the committee looks forward to hearing from you
about it, and to working with you on it and so many of the
other challenges that you will be facing.
I'm going to turn the gavel over to Senator Kaine, who has
agreed to take over, because I must go to the floor.
I now call upon Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming our witnesses. I've had an
opportunity to get to know them in the past, and visit with
them personally, and I'm very anxious to move on with this.
I thank Charlene and Ginny for being here. You're the guys
who work harder than they do, so we appreciate all your
sacrifices.
If confirmed, General Austin, you're going to be in charge
of overseeing, arguably, the most volatile region of the world,
and in the midst of a declining defense budget. Just last week,
Secretary Panetta announced the indefinite delay of the Truman
Carrier Strike Group deployment in the Middle East, a
development that was undoubtedly welcomed by the regime in
Tehran.
In Egypt, despite the best hopes of the Arab Spring,
President Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood Government have
shown a troubling hostility towards the opposition groups and
minorities, and have taken an increasing bellicose tone toward
our ally, Israel. These developments require us to think long
and hard over what assets we're going to be sharing with them,
the controversial F-16 transfers, and frankly, I didn't agree
with that. But, it's a tough area, and I think, if you look
through that area--and, General Austin, you have Iran, we know,
that is determined to acquire nuclear weapons capability. But,
it's been going on for a long time. We've found that our
intelligence has really been behind the curve on their
capability of what they've developed so far. It's serious. It's
a big step, over there.
In Iraq, our premature withdrawal has directly contributed
to a deteriorating security situation, and allowed al Qaeda to
reestablish a foothold in Syria. Assad's reign of brutality has
now claimed the lives of over 60,000 Syrians, and risks
spilling into neighboring countries.
Pakistan, we see a nuclear-armed government teetering on
collapse, while militant groups, all the military groups, have
enjoyed that as a safe haven.
Afghanistan, you'll oversee our operation and manage the
transition of combat responsibilities to the Afghan security
forces. Without doubt, we have to make sure that the force
structure matches the mission and is driven by the facts on the
ground, and not arbitrary dates. We've talked about this in my
office. General Rodriguez, you and I have spoken about the
squeeze in the Middle East. I've often said that it's kind of
the neglected continent. I was somewhat instrumental when we
established AFRICOM; and so, it was no longer in three
different commands, but in one unified command. It's a tough
area. It's a tough area that has never had adequate resources
to carry out--what I consider adequately carrying out the
mission. Certainly, the Chairman mentioned the problem with the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and that is a problem, and it's
one that is not just confined to a few people that started in
northern Uganda; now has spread throughout eastern Congo and on
up through the Central African Republic, and south Sudan, I
might add.
But, it's connected. It's all terrorism, and it's all
connected together, and it is a serious problem that we are
going to have to deal with. It's the smallest of the Department
of Defense's (DOD) regionally focused combatant commands, with
less than 5,000 boots on the continent. That's a huge
continent. Your work is cut out for you; we've talked about
that, you and I, in my office, in somewhat detail.
While the challenges you will both face are very daunting,
I'm confident that the two of you are up to the task. But, it's
going to be heavy lifting.
As I said to you, General Austin, in my office, are you
sure you want to do this? You said yes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
General Austin, General Rodriguez, we're ready to hear your
opening statements and testimony. Again, we appreciate you
being here, and your service.
We'll begin with General Austin, and General Rodriguez to
follow.

STATEMENT OF GEN LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General Austin. Good morning, sir, Senator McCain, Ranking
Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee.
I want to thank you for this opportunity to appear before
you today. I also want to thank you for the steadfast and
strong support that you have shown, and continue to show, to
our men and women in uniform, our Army civilians, and their
families. It is remarkable, all that they have accomplished
over the past nearly 12 years of war. It was made possible, in
no small part, through your personal efforts, and those of your
colleagues. So, my thanks to all of you.
I'd like to take a moment to introduce my wife, Charlene.
I've been incredibly fortunate to have her as my partner for
more than 30 years. She represents the many wonderful spouses,
who are the true unsung heroes of these conflicts, as they've
supported us back home, and, in doing so, enabled our success.
My thanks to you, Charlene, for your love and support, and
for your many sacrifices, and Happy Valentine's Day.
[Laughter.]
I'm glad, today, to be joined by my teammate, General David
Rodriguez. He, too, is accompanied by his bride, Ginny, who,
like Charlene, has done a tremendous amount for our soldiers
and families over the years.
Dave and I have served together a number of times over the
years, to include in combat. He is a gifted leader and a
decorated soldier, and I'm pleased that he's been nominated to
command U.S. Africa Command.
Ladies and gentlemen, it has been a tremendous privilege
for me to serve my country in uniform for nearly 4 decades, and
I am grateful to be able to continue to serve. I am honored and
humbled to have been nominated by the President to serve as a
commander of CENTCOM. If confirmed, I pledge that I will apply
all of my experiences and judgment, to the best of my
abilities, to help preserve and advance our Nation's interests
in that region of the world.
General Mattis has led CENTCOM masterfully over these past
2\1/2\ years. Our Nation owes him a debt of gratitude. The
impact of his leadership and the efforts of his team during
this decisive period have been tremendous. If confirmed, I
intend to sustain and continue this important work; for the
reality is that, while much progress has been made in the
CENTCOM area of responsibility, there is still a great deal
more to be done. Our national interests, and those of our
allies and friends, demand vigilance as well as our continued
commitment to do our part to help address the many challenges
that exist, and to achieve and maintain security and stability
throughout the Middle East and in South and Central Asia.
Of course, our foremost priority remains the ongoing
mission in Afghanistan. Soon, we will be required to complete
the transfer of responsibilities to the Afghans, and also
transition our people and equipment out of that country, just
as we did in 2010 and 2011, when I served there as the
Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq. This represents a herculean
undertaking, and, if confirmed, I will do everything within my
power to help set the broader conditions for our success in
this most important endeavor.
Meanwhile, one must simply watch the evening news to
understand that the world we live in remains complex and
extremely volatile. Much of the instability and associated
challenges reside in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. While
we have to be pragmatic, we must always be prepared to respond
to contingencies, whenever and wherever they occur around the
world. If we truly want to have an effective and lasting impact
in the region, our friends and allies must be assured of our
support, and our potential adversaries must understand that
there will be consequences for their actions.
As this past decade of conflict has clearly demonstrated,
success in our many endeavors will require effective
application of the full continuum of our Nation's instruments
of power and influence, military as well as economic and
diplomatic. Having worked closely with senior military and
civilian officials from the various U.S. agencies and
organizations, and also having worked closely with leaders from
other countries and partner nations while serving in Iraq as a
commander of U.S. Forces, I can personally attest to the
effectiveness of these kind of collaborations. If confirmed, I
will continue to cultivate my existing relationships while
pursuing additional opportunities and partnerships that will
surely prove beneficial to our efforts.
Senator Kaine, Senator Inhofe, and members of the
committee, these are historic times and difficult times.
However, amidst the many challenges that exist reside
opportunities, and certainly the shared desire of people to see
peace and harmony and prosperity achieved, and even in those
places that have never before experienced them. I fully
appreciate that the work ahead will be great, and the road will
not be easy, but, if confirmed, I pledge to give all that I
have towards ensuring our success, and the success of our
allies and friends around the world, in this most worthy
endeavor.
Thank you again for this opportunity and for your steadfast
support for our service men and women and their families. I
look forward to your questions.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General Austin.
General Rodriguez.

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

General Rodriguez. Senator Kaine, Senator Inhofe,
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I am honored the President has nominated me to serve as the
next Commander of U.S. Africa Command. If confirmed, I'll look
forward to working closely with this committee, as well as all
our joint and interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
partners, to address the challenges we face and the
opportunities to increase stability on this strategically
important continent. Strong partnerships are key to gaining and
maintaining stability in the 54 nations of Africa.
I would also like to thank this committee for the sustained
support it has provided to our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coastguardsmen, and Department of Defense civilians,
and their families, during this time of conflict. They all
selflessly serve the Nation, at home and abroad, often in
harm's way, but always ready to assume their share of the risk,
and all are eternally grateful for the backing and support of
the American people and Congress.
I want to acknowledge the tremendous effort of General Ham
and his team at the U.S. Africa Command. His leadership helps
sustain strong partnerships, providing the foundation for our
continued engagement across the continent and globally. He has
done a superb job, and I hope that, if confirmed, I can expand
on the work he has done.
To General Lloyd Austin, exceptional soldier, leader, and a
good friend, we have served together throughout peace and war
in our careers, and have a significant number of deployments
between us. I'm honored to share this experience with both
Lloyd and Charlene, and am certain that, if confirmed, Lloyd
will continue his remarkable service to the Nation and our
servicemembers.
I also want to thank my wife, Ginny, for her decades of
service as an Army wife. Ginny has cared for, and looked after,
soldiers and their families with energy, empathy, and
understanding. She's also a wonderful mother to our children:
Amy, a former Army officer and current student at the
University of North Carolina; Melissa, a schoolteacher in North
Carolina; David, who works with the Department of the Navy in
Washington, DC; and Andrew, an infantry lieutenant in the Army.
I thank the committee again for allowing me to appear
before you today, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General Rodriguez.
Here's the procedure we will follow. I have a set of
standard questions, that we ask all witnesses, that I will ask
both of you to respond to. We'll then proceed to rounds of
questions, alternating between representatives of the two
parties; and the rounds of questions will be 7 minutes long. If
there are additional questions in the second round that members
want to ask, we'll proceed in that way.
Let me begin with the standard questions that we ask the
witnesses. These are to help us exercise legislative and
oversight responsibilities.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Senator Kaine. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Senator Kaine. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of this
confirmation process?
[Both witnesses answered in the negative.]
Senator Kaine. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Senator Kaine. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Senator Kaine. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal from their testimony in any such briefing?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Senator Kaine. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Senator Kaine. Do you agree to provide documents, including
copies of electronic communications, in a timely manner when
requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with
the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or
denial in providing such documents?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Senator Kaine. With that, we will move to the questions,
and I will begin with Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you, General Austin, General Rodriguez, for
your service to the Nation, and to your families, for
everything you have done. You may want to take them, for a
Valentine's Day lunch, to the Senate Cafeteria. Then again, you
may not. [Laughter.]
General Austin, as we heard the President say, the other
night, he is looking to withdraw 34,000 troops from
Afghanistan. My question is, can that be done in a way that
does not leave Afghanistan less stable?
General Austin. Thank you, sir.
Whereas, I was not a part of the process that helped to
generate the proposals for the numbers of troops to be drawn
down, and the rate at which they should be drawn down, I can
tell you that, from having been a part of that process before,
the types of things that commanders consider, going into those
recommendations, really account for whether or not they can
accomplish the assigned objectives and missions. So, I would
assume that General Allen and General Mattis, as they went
through that process, provided their best military advice. I
would assume that to be the case. But, having not been a part
of that, I cannot speculate as to whether or not----
Senator Donnelly. How quickly will you become a part of
that, and taking a look at that and making that determination?
General Austin. If confirmed, sir, I will get into that
right away and confer with General Dunford and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, and make sure that I have full understanding
of the objectives, the missions, and the resources that have
been provided to accomplish those objectives.
Senator Donnelly. You will give us your unvarnished opinion
as to the plan, how it works, and whether it will meet your
strategic objectives as you look at the situation that we're
in?
General Austin. I will, sir, and the objectives that are
outlined by the senior leadership, that have been provided to
us.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
General Rodriguez, as we look at your mission, one of the
things that strikes me is--and, of course, in CENTCOM, too, how
important it's going to be to build up our partners there so
that they can be self-sustaining in protecting their own
nation. How critical a focus is that going to be for you as you
move into this position?
General Rodriguez. Thank you, Senator. That's a critical
focus, because, obviously, the objective is to have Africans
provide security and stability for themselves. There are a wide
range of tools that we have to do that, and that will be a main
focus.
Senator Donnelly. It seems that that could be the key to
success, is being in a position where the training we provide
enables them to stand up on their own.
General Austin, as we look at the region that you will be
commanding, one of the challenges has always been Pakistan, and
our working relationships with Pakistan. As we go through the
withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, both men and women and
equipment, and again, you mentioned that you had not yet been
fully involved on that plan but, I would think one of the
things we want to do is continue to work closely with Pakistan
on that plan, but also have alternative options, if there are
bumps in the road, as we proceed forward with orders and with
other things. Are you going to be looking at that as part of
what you look at when you get the plan in your hands?
General Austin. Absolutely, sir. I think our relationship
with Pakistan is critical. It is a key country in the region.
My goal would be to immediately work to continue to build upon
the existing relationship, which is on somewhat of a positive
slope right now, a positive path. I want to continue to build
on that. Again, they will be key going into the future, sir.
Senator Donnelly. General Rodriguez, as we look at your
region, we just saw an extraordinarily tragic situation in
Benghazi. When we look at the countries there, and we look at
the challenges that those nations already have in protecting
themselves--and we often depend on home-nation security for our
own consulates and embassies. As you look at that, will you be
asking for a time-and-distance study? How fast can we get to
our consulate? Where is the closest location we have to that
consulate? So that you have a plan that can make sure, if our
consulates are in danger, we will be there to protect them?
General Rodriguez. Senator, if confirmed, I'll do a
thorough study of time, distance, as well as capabilities,
spread throughout the region, who can respond in a timely
manner and ensure that the Department of State is informed so,
together, we can make good decisions on how to best support our
Americans, worldwide, and especially in the African continent.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
General Austin, as we transition from Afghanistan, the
military gains in security that we have achieved--with all your
experience in Iraq, with the transition there--I think one of
the biggest challenges is, as the military leaves, how do we
make sure that some of the gains in, not just military, but in
state functions in Afghanistan, that we're able to hold onto
them? What experiences that you took away from Iraq can help
with that in Afghanistan as we move forward?
General Austin. Certainly, sir, I think our embassy will
remain engaged and continue to work with the Afghan leadership,
to help them build capacity and work with issues on their
political system. But, I think having a competent security
force helps to create the time and space for an immature
political system to mature. We would hope that we would have
the opportunity for that to develop, the Afghans would make the
right choices, going into the future. Certainly, having
advisors around to help advise the military also helps to
influence the rest of the environment, as well. I think the
activity between the embassy staff and what our military is
able to do, and keeping the Afghan security forces focused, I
think that creates some time and space for the political system
to mature a bit.
Senator Donnelly. General Rodriguez, General Austin, thank
you so much for your service. You and your family have
dedicated your life to our country, and we're incredibly
grateful to you.
Thank you.
General Rodriguez. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kaine. The ranking member, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I agree with the remarks by the Senator, on your service
and the time, and the fact that I've had the opportunity to be
with you in the field and at various times. Let's see, General
Rodriguez, we spent some New Year's Eves together over there;
so we got to know each other pretty well.
Anyway, as I said in my opening statement, you guys have
some really serious problems that you're facing over there.
Let's start off on AFRICOM, because that's something I was
perhaps a little more familiar with.
One of the problems is--and we all go through this, and you
guys are not immune from it, like crew rest. When you're trying
to get to places, and you're in Stuttgart, and you have 54
countries and over 12 million square miles--to adequately
support AFRICOM--I'm going to ask you a question, in a minute,
about the resources--but, in terms of time and distance, have
you thought about how you're going to handle that as you get a
crisis in sub-Sahara Africa, you're going to have a hard time
getting there. What do you think about that location?
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir. I think that's going to
require a solid coordination between all the interagency
partners so that we can best understand indications and
warnings, prior to those incidents happening, so we can best
posture ourself to be able to respond appropriately. But
because of the time, the distance, and the basing challenges
that we have, that's going to continue to be a challenge. I
will, if confirmed, look at that very carefully, put some
requirements to the leadership, and then ensure that everybody
understands the risk that's involved in what our Americans
throughout the region are taking on.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, it's something you have no control
over. That's where it is right now. Frankly, when we started
AFRICOM, I was pushing very hard for Ethiopia, or someplace,
for headquarters in Africa. The problem there is the reputation
of our involvement in Africa, it is being misinterpreted as a
colonialism type of an approach. But, I have to say this, every
President that I talk to, including Kikwete, in Tanzania, they
all have said, ``We recognize that would be easier, but there's
no way that we can sell it to the people.'' So, that's going to
be there.
The reason I bring this up is there is always a lot of
people here in the United States, members, our good friends in
the Senate, who would like to move that headquarters stateside.
I think that it's the best we can do right now, in Stuttgart,
and I think you would agree that it would be very difficult to
move that headquarters and operate.
What do you think about this, have you had time to look and
see, in terms of resources--as I said in my opening statement,
we have 5,000 boots on the ground; that's not much for an area
like that--do you have any comments, going in, right now, as to
how you're being resourced, particularly with the drawdowns
that we're talking about at the current time?
General Rodriguez. Senator, thank you. The challenges
across the depth and breadth of Africa that we're facing, with
the resource constraints that we're all living under will be a
challenge. Again, we just have to make great assessments of
where we're going to accept risk, to ensure everybody knows and
understands that. The coordination between the interagency
partners will be critical as we move forward.
We all, as commanders, have to help our leadership assess
the risk throughout the combatant commands. If confirmed, I'll
execute that, to the best of my ability.
Senator Inhofe. The Chairman, in his opening remarks,
talked about the LRA and Joseph Kony. People are now aware of
that. There was a time when they weren't, when you first got
involved over there. My question is, if we're successful in our
operation, in helping them take out Joseph Kony, would you
continue there, and recognize Kony and the LRA as part of a
terrorist group that go far beyond what--originally, it was
just northern Uganda, then spread up to south Sudan and down
into eastern Congo--that it is widespread, and it is a serious
problem? I'd like to get your commitment to stay involved in
that, and recognize it for the problem that it is.
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir. If confirmed, I commit to you
that I will continue to watch Kony and the LRA, and the entire
negative impact it has on the region, as a whole.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and there are so many other areas that
people are not really aware of right now, but one of the things
that I would like to--I wasn't going to dwell on this, this
long, but--we made a good decision, back, right after September
11, when we decided, as a policy for this country, that we were
going to recognize Africa as the squeeze takes place in the
Middle East, and the terrorism goes down through Djibouti and
the Horn of Africa--that our idea was to put in five African
brigades--to help them, not us--but, to help train the
Africans, who are very receptive to the idea, so that when that
happened down there, we wouldn't have to use our forces. It's
kind of been floundering. I'd like to ask you to make those
five African brigades a top priority during the time that
you're spending down there.
General Rodriguez. Will do, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. That's good.
General Austin, as I said a minute ago, and as I asked you
in my office, are you sure you want this job? It's a tough area
there. I would just like to ask you, in just whatever time it
takes, to kind of look at the sequestration and how that's
going to affect you in that critical region that I outlined,
area by area, in my opening statement.
General Austin. Yes, sir. I believe that sequestration will
have enormously negative effects on the Services' ability to
resource our efforts. What will happen is that all the Services
are committed to supporting the current fight, which is what we
should be doing. Over time, the follow-on deployers will be
less ready. Our ability to respond to emerging contingencies in
the region--we'll have less of an ability to do that. We'll
have less flexibility and fewer options, because of some of the
pressure now, with pressure on the budget.
Senator Inhofe. You mentioned four areas, and you called
them ``four principle levers,'' the last time you were here
before this committee. They were military-to-military
engagements, plans and operations, security cooperation
programs, and posture and presence. Of those four, what are
going to be impacted the most by sequestration, should it
become a reality?
General Austin. Certainly our presence and our posture in
the region will be impacted. We're seeing that, the leading
edge of that, with the delay of the deployment of the carrier.
Again, that begins to take away some of the flexibility and the
options available.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
As a schedule accommodation, I'm switching my time spot
with Senator Nelson, and his questions will be next.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The delay of the deployment of that carrier--which
otherwise would go to the Persian Gulf region?
General Austin. That would be a part of its
responsibilities as it completes its tour. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. I asked that question because, of course,
one of the continuing high-visibility questions is what's going
to happen in Iran. If Iran were to continue with the
development of a nuclear weapon, we would need all the military
assets that we could muster. The General has just pointed out
that a sequester is going to keep that carrier in port, which
is not a good thing, because if we ever got into it in Iran, or
if Iran ever started their own aggressive action by mining the
Strait of Hormuz, we would need all of our Navy assets that we
could bring to bear. That's a fair statement, isn't it,
General?
General Austin. Yes, sir. General Mattis has laid out what
his requirements are. Those requirements have been vetted and
approved. Again, if he doesn't get the full complement, then
he'll have to do some things to mitigate that.
Senator Nelson. General, what do you see will be the
remaining force when we are withdrawing, in 2014, from
Afghanistan?
General Austin. Sir, I believe that those decisions are
still being made by the leadership, with the input of General
Dunford and General Mattis. I'm not a part of that process--I
don't know what the objectives are that the leadership will
want to accomplish. That really drives what the force structure
should look like, going forward.
Having been a commander in the field, where I was working
hard with the leadership, to define options, and I found it
very unhelpful when somebody, who wasn't a part of the process,
speculated on what the troop strength should be.
Senator Nelson. In your experience, where you have worked
with the indigenous forces and the leadership of a country like
Afghanistan, can you give us your observations of the progress
of that society, over the course of the last few years?
Basically, what I'm getting at is, have the Afghani people
progressed to the point that it's going to be very hard for the
Taliban to take over, once we leave, and take them back to that
feudal society that they were? What's your observation?
General Austin. Sir, first of all, I think that two of the
key elements that--or three key elements--that kind of go into
this equation, as to whether or not things will remain on track
or not, are, number one, do we have a credible security force
to help guard against the challenges that will no doubt come in
the future? We've worked hard with the Afghans to build a
security force of 352,000, in a relatively short period of
time, and it's still evolving in capability.
The second thing is that I think the political processes
have to mature. I think the people have to begin to have faith
in their leadership, and the leadership has to be inclusive,
has to reach out to the people, and they have to provide a good
governing mechanism for the country. That is critical.
I think the security forces can provide the space for that
to develop. It's going to take some time.
The third piece of this is the corruption that we've seen
in the country, over time they really have to get control over
that and begin to move that in the right direction.
I think, when those things happen--and certainly, they're
capable of happening--then--or working together--then I think
things will continue to move in the right direction.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses and their wonderful wives, for
their service to our country. We're very proud to have you
serving in such positions of responsibility.
General Austin and General Rodriguez--General Rodriguez,
you recently served in Afghanistan, as the commander of the
International Joint Command within ISAF. I'll ask you both the
same question.
The President has announced 34,000 troops, more than half
our force currently serving in Afghanistan, will return home by
the end of the year. Was this recommendation of the uniformed
military via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? Was this a
recommendation of the military?
General Austin. Senator, I don't know what the specific
recommendation was. As I understand it, the----
Senator McCain. No one has told you or General Rodriguez
what the recommendation of the military was?
General Austin. No, sir, I was not a part of that process.
I know they----
Senator McCain. So, you are excluded from knowing what the
recommendation of the military was?
General Austin. I was not----
Senator McCain. Especially given the new responsibilities
you have.
General Austin. No, sir, I was not included in that
process.
Senator McCain. Did either of you recommend this option?
General Rodriguez. No, sir.
Senator McCain. In your best professional military advice,
is the withdrawal of 34,000 troops this year in line with the
conditions on the ground, as you saw them?
General Austin. Sir, I defer to the current commander----
Senator McCain. You really have no opinion whatsoever about
whether we should withdraw 34,000, half our force, by the end
of the year? Is that correct?
General Austin. Having not been a part of the process, sir,
I don't think that I should offer an opinion on this, because I
don't know everything that went into their calculus.
Senator McCain. General Rodriguez, you feel the same way?
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Even though you recently served there?
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir. I've been gone for 18 months,
and things have changed tremendously. I can tell you that I was
a part of the change in the strategy when we put the surge
forward there, that the concept of what we were looking to do,
strategically, is continuing. But, as far as the specific
situation in the country that warrants those decisions, I am
not current in that area, sir.
Senator McCain. So, you wouldn't have any guess as to how
many forces you believe are necessary to achieve our goals? You
wouldn't have any. Whew.
General Austin, you were our commander in Iraq when the
President decided to end negotiations with Iraqis and withdraw
all U.S. troops by the end of 2011. Do you think that Iraq is
more stable today than it was a year ago?
General Austin. Sir, I'm certainly troubled by some of the
things that----
Senator McCain. Do you believe Iraq, today, is more stable
than it was a year ago?
General Austin. I think the stability has held, sir. I
think it's fragile, and it's trending towards being more
problematic, as we watch what's happening with the Kurd-Arab
relationships, with the recent Sunni protests. I think a lot of
that's brought on by a failure to solve some political issues.
Senator McCain. So, whether we had troops there--a residual
force there, or not, wouldn't have mattered?
General Austin. I think that, certainly--if we could have
continued to advise and assist the Iraqis, I think, certainly,
it would have continued to make them better.
Senator McCain. You were present in the room when Senator
Graham and I asked you, after Maliki asked us, what level of
troops would we, the United States, want to remain there in
order to maintain that stability. Do you remember your answer?
You said, ``We're still working on that.'' Do you remember
that?
General Austin. Sir.
Senator McCain. How long did they work on that, General
Austin?
General Austin. Sir, I think we worked with the Iraqi
leadership all the way up until the point in time when they
decided that they weren't going to be able to give us the
protections that we needed to keep our troops there.
Senator McCain. Because, of course, it was down to 3,500.
Isn't that correct?
General Austin. No decision had been made at that point in
time, sir, because----
Senator McCain. Wasn't our number back down to 3,500 troops
left behind? Isn't that an accurate statement? It's written in
Michael Gordon's book, and it's well--knowledge. Isn't that
true? You were there.
General Austin. I was, sir. Again, I presented a range of
options----
Senator McCain. But, don't you know that the administration
position was back down to 3,500? They didn't tell you that?
General Austin. Sir, I was aware of what the number was. I
don't recall, specifically, what the final option was, being
considered.
Senator McCain. You really don't remember, specifically, an
important issue like this, that it wasn't 3,500?
General Austin. Sir, in that range of options--again, since
we never closed, I've never----
Senator McCain. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
testified that the number was down to 3,500. General Dempsey
did, before this committee. You didn't know that? Even though--
--
General Austin. Sir--sir----
Senator McCain.--though you were there?
General Austin. Sir, I did know what the number was. And--
--
Senator McCain. And it was 3,500.
General Austin. It was a small number, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Whew. Which is why--and it's been well
documented--these--the Iraqis decided that to try to obtain
immunity of over 3,500 troops wasn't worth the effort. You
believe Iraq is headed in a positive or negative direction?
General Austin. Sir, I think--again, some of the things
that we're seeing in Iraq are very troubling, with the Arab-
Kurd tensions, with the Sunni protests. On the other hand----
Senator McCain. Iranian aircraft overflying Iraq with arms
for Bashar Assad, for the total estrangement between Barzani
and Maliki, continued violence in Kirkuk and other areas along
the border, the vice president of Iraq having to flee the
country because there's murder charges brought against him.
Does that indicate to you that Iraq is headed in the right
direction?
General Austin. It does not, sir. There are some things
that are very troubling. There are also some things that I
think indicate that, if they make the right decisions, they
have a chance to move in the right direction. They're pumping
3.3 million barrels of oil a day; they've been challenged,
several times, in terms of security, but the security forces
have really held, and they're still loyal to the civilian
leadership. They haven't fractured. There are a couple of
things in there that do indicate that, if they begin to make
the right decisions politically, then I think they have a
chance of moving in the right direction. But, at this point,
they've not made those decisions, and it is troubling.
Senator McCain. General, your predecessor, General Mattis,
had a well-deserved reputation of speaking truth to power, and
in testifying before this committee in a frank and honest
opinion. We have our responsibilities. Our responsibilities can
only be carried out if we have frank and honest--as you were
just asked if you would do, at the beginning of the hearing--
opinions. I'm disappointed by your testimony today, that I have
to draw these facts out from you, that you and I both know are
facts. I hope the next time you're before this committee, that
you will be more forthcoming in your answers. We deserve it. We
have our responsibilities, as well as those that you will
assume.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join in thanking both of you for your
extraordinarily distinguished career, and your families for
their service and sacrifice, as well, and to wish you well in
your new commands, the next chapter of your military careers.
General Austin, we had a very informative and important
discussion yesterday on the subject of sexual assault, with a
number of my colleagues, and a number of yours, and I would
like to ask you and General Rodriguez for your commitment that
you will pursue, as vigorously and aggressively as possible,
the predatory crime, the vicious criminal offense of sexual
assault and rape, wherever it occurs under your commands.
General Austin. Sir, you have my commitment, I will do so.
General Rodriguez. I will, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Let me ask, by the way, have each of you seen the
documentary movie ``Invisible War''?
General Austin. I have seen it, sir.
General Rodriguez. I have seen it, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Will you make it your policy and
practice that, that movie, among other training aids, is seen
by all of the commanders, at whatever level, under your
command?
General Austin. Yes, sir. As you may know, sir, in the
Army, we have encouraged our leadership to use that as a
training tool.
Senator Blumenthal. General Rodriguez?
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Blumenthal. I'd like to ask you for more than just
encouragement, but actually make it a matter of your general
order, or whatever, however you want to implement within your
command, that it be used as a training device.
General Austin. Sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir, it's a requirement.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Let me ask you about--General Austin--focusing on
Afghanistan. I recently had the privilege of traveling to
Afghanistan with a number of my colleagues, including Senator
McCain, who led the trip, and Senator Graham, Senator Ayotte,
and others. I want to focus, for the moment, on contracting
there.
We understand, from the Special Inspector General in
Afghanistan, that 43 contractors, in effect, are doing business
with the enemy, but they have not been processed by the Army
for suspension and debarment, partly because of obstacles--
legal obstacles and others--now in the law of the United
States; section 841, in particular.
I'd like your personal commitment, as CENTCOM commander,
that you will personally review these cases and use the
authority you have to stop U.S. taxpayers' money from being
funneled to the Taliban, and that you will help us--Senator
Ayotte and I, in particular, are working on this issue--help us
to strengthen the law.
General Austin. Sir, you have my commitment.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Very aptly, your prepared
testimony mentions the importance of ``unity of effort''--
that's your phrase, and I think it's a good one--on the
battlefield. I think it's equally important that we have that
unity of effort in stopping American taxpayer money from, in
effect, aiding the enemy in Afghanistan, where corruption has
been, unfortunately, so rampant.
One of the areas where I think section 841 can be applied
more effectively is in the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and State Department aid. I'd like your
commitment that you will help us, in effect, improve the law in
that regard.
Thank you. I understand you have made that part of your
commitment, that you will help us do that.
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Let me ask you now, General Austin, about Syria. As part of
that trip, we visited the refugee camp in northern Jordan, at
Zaatari. I must say, very powerful and moving experience, to
see the conditions of the camp, the numbers of children, the
challenges in providing education, healthcare, basic sanitary
conditions. I'd like your commitment that you will do
everything possible to provide a drastic and dramatic increase
in humanitarian aid to the refugees in Syria and elsewhere,
besides Zaatari, but also in Jordan, where there are those
refugee camps.
General Austin. Sir, I'll do everything within my power to
work with all the appropriate elements of the interagency to
ensure that we're doing everything we can to support the
refugees.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I think a number of us also
were impressed by the herculean efforts being made by the King
of Jordan, and by the Jordanian people, to aid those refugees.
Just an extraordinary humanitarian effort. But also their
commitment to aid in military assistance, the freedom fighters
in Syria.
Let me ask you, don't you think the United States can
provide more training and technical assistance, at the very
least--in terms of communications equipment, logistical aid--to
the opposition forces in Syria?
General Austin. Sir, not being in the seat yet, my vantage
point is that of many people on the outside looking in on this.
I don't know the specifics, as many specifics as I'd like to
know, about the opposition, and what is in the realm of the
possible.
What I'd like to do is, if confirmed, I'd like to have the
ability to go in and assess, to see what's possible. If there
are things that are possible, what options do we have? I don't
feel as if I can give you a very concrete and informed
recommendation, at this point.
Senator Blumenthal. I hope that you will share the sense of
urgency that many of us feel about this situation and about the
very dire predicament of many of those courageous fighters who
are opposing the murderous and barbaric regime that the Assad
Government, if it still is a government, has become. I would
invite you--in fact, I'd urge you--to present to this committee
your recommendation, as soon as possible, because I think we
feel that sense of urgency, and I hope that more can be done,
militarily, to deprive Assad of his superiority, where he has
it, in the air, and his forces on the ground that he is using,
very simply, to slaughter the citizens of his own country.
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My time is expired, but, again, my thanks to each of you
for your extraordinary service in the past and in the future,
and again, to your families.
Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank General Austin and General Rodriguez, and
their families, for, absolutely, your extraordinary service to
our country, and very much appreciate your being here.
I wanted to follow up to what Senator Blumenthal discussed
on section 841. As you recall, Senator Brown and I had worked
on this no-contracting, or the enemy provision, that has given
some authority to DOD to cut off enemy funds. I just want to
join what Senator Blumenthal has said, that I look forward to
working with him, and look forward to your commitment to make
sure that we can give you all the tools that you need,
including extending those tools to the State Department to cut
off funds that go to our enemies. I appreciate your commitment
on that, and look forward to working with Senator Blumenthal
and both of you to make sure that happens.
General Austin, I wanted to ask you--when Senator Donnelly
had asked--you mentioned you had been through the process
before, of deciding what a follow-on force should be. That was
in the context of commanding Iraq? Is that right?
General Austin. That's correct, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. When you were the commander in Iraq, what
was your recommendation to the administration on the troop
levels that should remain, assuming we could negotiate a status
of forces agreement?
General Austin. Ma'am, I presented a range of options to
the leadership. I provided that recommendation. I've never made
public what my recommendations were.
Senator Ayotte. It was reported, at the time, that your
recommendations were between 14,000 to 18,000 troops. Was that
accurate?
General Austin. Again, ma'am, I provided that to the
President, in confidence, and I have not made that public, and
would not like to make that public.
Senator Ayotte. Let me ask you this, General. The
recommendations that you provided, and the number that was
ended up, that Senator McCain just asked you, was that number
significantly below what you recommended?
General Austin. It was, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you.
You have said, in answer to Senator McCain, at this point,
you've not been involved in the decisions on the troop
withdrawal in Afghanistan, or the follow-on force, following
2014. Is that right?
General Austin. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Have you spoken to either General Allen or
General Dunford about this topic?
General Austin. Have I spoken with them?
Senator Ayotte. Have you spoken to them about what their
recommendations are?
General Austin. No, ma'am, I have not.
Senator Ayotte. Senator McCain asked you about the 34,000
withdrawal that the President announced the other day. There
was a report in the Washington Post that General Dunford, whom
I'm sure you have great respect for, as well as General Allen,
that they had been seeking a reduction of no more than 25,000
troops during that same period. That would have been
significantly--certainly, the President's recommendation is
much higher. Would that surprise you? Have you followed any of
the public reporting on this?
General Austin. I have read some of what's in the media.
But, my experience, there, ma'am, is that, that's not always
accurate, because it doesn't have the complete----
Senator Ayotte. Let me follow up. Military officials, on
background, were saying that, ``Pulling out 34,000 leaves us
dangerously low on military personnel, while the fledgling
Afghan army and police need our support. It's going to send a
clear signal that America's commitment to Afghanistan is going
wobbly.''
I guess I would ask you--I'm actually very surprised, as
well, that you've not had conversations, given that you're
taking over in CENTCOM, with General Allen or General Dunford
about this very important question at this point. But, I would
ask you, if we're in a position where the withdrawal puts us in
a situation where we're going to be dangerously low on military
personnel, I would expect you to come forward to this
committee--when asked--and tell us your professional opinion as
to what we should be doing. Will you do that?
General Austin. I will do that, ma'am. I would say that
there are a number of things that the commander considers as he
makes his recommendation: the tasks that he's been presented
with, that he has to accomplish; what--his assessment of the
environment that he has to work in; any significant
transitions--``transitions'' meaning things like an election;
other things, like maybe the fighting season that he has to go
through. All that goes into his calculus to provide a range of
options, in terms of recommendations there. As the leadership
looks at it, they will consider other things, and I just don't
have any idea of what, exactly, went into that specific
calculus. So----
Senator Ayotte. General Austin, I went to a troop
deployment, on Sunday, in New Hampshire, of a Guard unit that's
going to Khost Province in Afghanistan.
General Austin. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. One of the worries that I have is that the
numbers that are being floated by the administration on the
follow-on--don't we get to a point where, if we don't have
sufficient numbers there, we have to worry about the protection
of our own forces?
General Austin. Yes, ma'am. That clearly is one of the
things that commanders must take into consideration, whether or
not they'll be able to provide the adequate force protection
for their troops as they're conducting operations in the area.
Again, depending on what the specific missions are that they'll
be asked to do, and how much of it they'll be asked to do, when
you factor in force protection and other things, then that
really kind of lays out what the commander thinks his
requirements are. Again, typically he will present a range of
options.
Senator Ayotte. I understand it, but certainly we need to
take into account the protection of our own troops there. If we
get to a number that's so low that we can't protect our own
troops, I'm going to be very concerned about that, and I expect
your professional opinion on that as we go forward on this
follow-on.
Just so that everyone understands, why does it matter? Why
does a good outcome in Afghanistan matter?
I'd like an answer from both of you on that.
General Austin. Yes, ma'am, thanks. It clearly is important
to the region. It's important to the United States of America.
We have a lot invested. We'd like to see this country continue
to move forward. We'd like to see the political system begin to
grow. I think, if the right things happen, it'll stabilize
things in the region, and certainly it'll help us with our
relationship with Pakistan and some other things.
I think it's important for the region, and it's also
clearly important for the country of Afghanistan, important to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and important to
the United States of America.
Senator Ayotte. I know my time's up, but, General
Rodriguez, I would like your opinion as to, why does this
matter, in terms of the protection of our country, our
interests? We've sacrificed so much there, and obviously, I
think it's important that we understand, why does the stable
Afghanistan, the outcome of that, matter?
General Rodriguez. Stable Afghanistan, ma'am, means that's
one of the things that was the objective, so that it never
became a haven for al Qaeda and its adherents so they could
never attack both the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests, and our
allies worldwide.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I'll have followup questions for
both of you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, thank you for your service to the Army and to the
Nation. I can't think of two more dedicated and experienced
officers to lead our forces in the various areas of command
you're being assigned.
In fact, General Austin, correct me if I'm wrong--you were
a brigadier general in the invasion of Iraq, with the 3rd
Infantry Division (ID), you were a major general in
Afghanistan, commanding the 10th Mountain Division, you were a
three-star in Iraq, in the multinational forces. You are, I
think, maybe one of the few combatant commanders that are going
to an AOR where you've commanded at every general officer
level. Is that correct?
General Austin. That's correct, sir.
Senator Reed. I don't think we could find someone better
acclimated to the various challenges; and there are quite a few
throughout the region.
One of the issues that's been touched upon is Iraq. From
your perspective, are the problems there more political in
nature or more the military capacity? Because what we've seen
has been, I think, a very chaotic political situation--
demonstrations, sectarian tensions--but, the Iraqi security
forces seem to be performing reasonably well, given the
training and the investment we've made. Is that a fair
assessment?
General Austin. Sir, I would say from my perspective,
that's a fair assessment, that the security forces have done
reasonably well.
Senator Reed. Going forward, the challenges there seem to
be more political than any type of military threat from the
outside, or an uncontrollable internal threat. Is that a fair
assessment, too?
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
One of the key factors and key roles that you play--it's
not just making sure our forces are well prepared, well
organized, and well deployed--it's communicating, explicitly
and implicitly, with leaders in different countries. I can
think of several in your AOR. One is Pakistan, and one is
Egypt, because of our relationship to the militaries. Do you
have any perspective now with respect to your likely engagement
with General Kayani in Pakistan and the Egyptian Army?
General Austin. Yes, sir. I look forward to trying to
develop a--or, not trying, but developing a good working
relationship with General Kayani and the military leadership in
Pakistan. I think it's essential to our overall relationship,
and I think it will be very helpful in us trying to move
forward with what we're doing in Afghanistan.
In Egypt, we have long enjoyed a great military-to-military
relationship that's been very helpful to us. We will continue
to try to build upon that, going into the future.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question, and that's
with respect to our forces in Afghanistan. As the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army, your current role, it would be highly
unusual that you would be participating in the deliberations of
strategy, going forward, in Afghanistan or any other area of
operation. Is that fair to say?
General Austin. That's correct, sir.
Senator Reed. Yes. The planning was done appropriately
through CENTCOM, General Mattis, beginning with General Allen
and his colleague, going up into the Secretary of Defense's
office, not through the Vice Chief's office, to the President
for the final decision. That's the way it's done.
General Austin. That's correct, sir.
Senator Reed. Your collaboration has been--and it'll
increase--certainly increase if you're confirmed; and I have
every expectation you will--but, at that point, you will be
having an opportunity to work closely with General Dunford and
all of the commanders for a period of several months, I
believe.
General Austin. That's correct, sir. It will give me an
opportunity to engage leadership on the ground, to get a clear
understanding, from the staff at CENTCOM and also the Joint
Staff, in terms of all of the elements that have gone into
this, which is typically a pretty tightly controlled process,
and rightfully so.
Senator Reed. Right. Thank you very much.
General Rodriguez, again, thank you for your service.
You're taking over a region which is our newest unified
command, one which is facing a new set of challenges that, 4 or
5 years ago, were not relevant. I think it's appropriately--and
fitting--that you're both sitting side by side, because what
happens in Egypt has certain effects in your command, and what
happens in your command has certain effects throughout General
Austin's command. But, can you give us your sense, right now--
and again, being the U.S. Army Forces Command commander, you
have not, on a day-to-day basis, been engaged in deliberate
planning--can you give us your sense of what the threats are in
AFRICOM, and how well positioned you believe AFRICOM is?
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir.
Sir, the threats in AFRICOM really revolve around three
major areas. Of course, one being al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, which is where the French operation, supported by the
African nations and the United States, is ongoing. Then also,
al Shabaab, over in Somalia, and then Boco Haram. Also the LRA,
as discussed earlier here. Those are the major threats to
stability, militarily; but, of course, they have significant
other ones in both government as well as health issues.
Senator Reed. Yes, I think you've touched on something
that, again, is a critical issue that cuts across both AORs;
that is, governmental capacity, the ability of government to
provide basic service, the ability of governments to function,
at least to respond to the true needs of their people. One of
the issues that we've talked about, General Rodriguez, is that
we have had military training operations that have gone in,
over the last several years, into African countries, as far as
AFRICOM, with mixed results. Do you have any specific ideas
about how you would improve the military training teams that
will be a major aspect of your operational capacity?
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir. If confirmed, I will look at
that very, very hard. As General Ham has stated in the past,
some of the training has been focused on tactical and
technical, and some of the things that we did not emphasize
were the values of the army, as well as the role of a military
in a democracy. Those are some of the things that he's already
started to work on, and I'll watch that very carefully--if
confirmed--and assess that, and go forward in the best way
possible, sir.
Senator Reed. My time is expired, but, again, gentlemen,
there are very few people who have served the Army and the
Nation with your courage and your distinction and your
dedication to the soldiers. For that, I thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
I, too, would like to thank you, gentlemen, and your
families, for your service and dedication to this country. I
would also like to thank you, and thank the servicemembers that
you represent, and their families, for their service to this
country, as well.
If I may, I'd like to continue on that Washington Post
article that came out recently. It did suggest that the
Pentagon is pushing a plan that would keep only about 8,000
troops in Afghanistan. I know that, General Austin, you weren't
a part of the planning process, thus far, but can you support a
plan that would schedule withdrawal of troops in advance? We're
looking at a withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan, and,
according to this article, from about 8,000 down to a thousand,
within a very short period of time. I have questions if we can
even maintain our mission, let alone complete the mission.
How can you make decisions on troop withdrawal, when, as
you stated previously, so much depends upon conditions on the
ground, what the government is doing, what their abilities are,
up to that point? How would you approach a proposal like that?
General Austin. I certainly would, first, really work hard
to make sure I fully understood what the leadership wanted to
get done, moving into the future. Certainly, my advice, as a
commander on the ground or Commander of CENTCOM, I would
provide my advice to them, based upon where I think the
security forces are, and conditions in theater, and what I
think we needed to do to move forward, to make sure we maintain
the gains that we've achieved.
But, I think so much is tied to what it is, what policy
objectives that the leadership wants to accomplish. Based upon
that, I would outline the forces required. I would consider the
fact that there's a NATO complement to whatever forces we're
going to have. Again, it really depends on what level that
we're advising and assisting the Afghan security forces at.
Then, how I assess that we need to do that.
If I'm confirmed, as I go in, those are things that I will
work with General Dunford on, look at very closely, early on. I
know that the leadership is still in the process of making the
decisions on what it's going to look like, post-2014.
Senator Fischer. Do you think it's useful to put those
numbers out there so far in advance? Is there a military reason
it's useful to put those numbers out there?
General Austin. I do know that we're a part of a coalition
effort. I do know that--members of the coalition are trying to
determine what their commitment's going to be, going forward.
They would like--my guess is that they would like as much
predictability as possible.
Senator Fischer. I appreciated Senator Reed's question that
he asked General Rodriguez. How would you prioritize, General
Austin, the threats in your future command? What do you see
those as being?
General Austin. It's a very complex and dynamic region,
volatile region. We see a number of things that are kind of
working together to fuel that instability. You see sectarian
strife in a number of places. You see governments, that are
former autocratic governments, that are either failed or
failing, creating further instability. The instability is an
issue there.
Again, we are certainly concerned about the Iranian
aggression in the region, which adds to the complexity there.
Of course, there's specific issues of Syria and the continuing
work that we have to do in Afghanistan, as well. A number of
things that have to be added together.
Also, there is a persistent threat from elements, like al
Qaeda and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that have the
ability to generate a threat to the Homeland. That is very,
very important.
Senator Fischer. Are we going to be able to meet those,
with the troops that are projected to be there? Are we going to
accomplish our mission? We've had so many families, in this
country, sacrifice. Is it going to be worth it to them? I know
you do this every day--how do you look at families and say to
them, ``We're going to pull out, maybe at levels that I think
might be dangerously low, as I'm getting information on this''?
How are you able to do that? When do we reach a hollow force,
where the men and women that we send into harm's way are no
longer protected?
General Austin. We're going to do everything that--the
leadership will continue to do everything that we can within
our power to make sure that, when our troops are introduced
into a dangerous situation, or into combat, that they are
ready. Whatever we have to do to prioritize resources to make
sure that we support the folks that are doing the hard work of
the country, we're going to continue to do that. Again, the
Services have been clear about the fact that they're going to
support our troops that are in combat.
As we look at the shrinking top-line budgets here--the
shrinking top line of the budget--it's going to make it more
challenging for us to have forces that are ready to address
emerging contingencies. That's my concern, going into the
future.
Senator Fischer. I would ask both of you gentlemen for your
commitment to this committee, and to me, that you will always
be honest and let us know that.
General Austin. You have my commitment.
General Rodriguez. You have my commitment.
Senator Fischer. Thank you so much. Again, thank you for
your patriotism, your dedication, and your service to us.
Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
Generals Austin and Rodriguez, welcome. I echo the comments
made by my colleagues, of appreciation for your service, your
stellar credentials.
I'm given additional confidence by the fact that you've
worked so closely together in the past, because I think the
CENTCOM/AFRICOM real estate and challenges have an awful lot of
overlap, and that should give us confidence, as well.
Just to mix things up, I think I'll start with General
Rodriguez, a few questions.
AFRICOM has an unusual mission. As I understand from our
discussion, your deputy commander is a State Department
official, and it is a mission that is heavily focused on
partnerships with other agencies, and with the training mission
with other governments. I'd like you, just for a minute, to
talk about that unusual nature of the mission, and your own
background. How it fits you to work in that kind of a very
multilateral environment.
General Rodriguez. Thank you, Senator.
As you said, the headquarters was designed a little bit
differently than most of the other combatant commands, and has
more interagency people assigned to the headquarters. I think
all that is a great benefit to the organization, who stretches
and reaches across the interagency in an effort that's required
to be done that way in that interagency effort.
In the ``building partner capacity'' piece, all of our
operations are really just like the ones that General Austin is
talking about--is about helping to build the capacity of that
nation to protect itself and provide stability for itself. We
have worked very hard over the years, and we both have
significant experience trying to build the Iraqi security
forces, as well as the Afghan security forces to do it
themselves, and also to work with our multinational partners to
also ensure that they're part of the solution, both in our NATO
allies and allies throughout the world, as well as the host-
nation countries.
I look forward, if confirmed, to try to continue that
effort to help Africans prepare themselves to take care of
themselves.
Senator Kaine. General Rodriguez, some of the most
challenging attacks on American embassies in our history have
occurred in the AFRICOM footprint. I've been to two hearings,
now, on the Benghazi attack--one, a Foreign Relations Committee
hearing, and one a hearing of this committee--and still have
some confusion about security that's provided to our diplomatic
personnel around the world.
In the Benghazi situation, we were dealing with military
security through the Marine security guards; we were dealing
with State Department security--State Department personnel--
but, also, two local militias--one unarmed, one that was
apparently on some sort of strike or work slowdown because of a
dispute over wages and benefits. I'd just like to hear you talk
about the embassy security--recognizing that State takes lead
on that--but, the embassy security challenges in AFRICOM, and
how you would approach them, as the commander.
General Rodriguez. Thank you, Senator. The challenges, as
you state and we discussed earlier, were about the time-and-
distance factors. If confirmed, I will work very closely with
Department of State, who has the primary responsibility, as
you've stated, to understand and have the best situational
understanding that we can have, so we have threats and
warnings, so that we understand the ones who are most
threatened, so that we can respond appropriately.
We also have to prioritize our collection assets for the
things that we don't know, it's a joint and interagency, as
well as multinational, process to get the best situational
understanding we can.
The second thing is, of course, in collaboration with the
State Department, to make sure that the State Department
understands our responsiveness and what we can do, so that they
can make the best decisions and recommendations to the
leadership.
Lastly, the response forces have already increased, in the
aftermath of the Benghazi attack, and some of the lessons that
were learned. There is now a new Commanders in Extremis Force
that is forward-stationed, and we have more forces forward-
stationed, as well as a special Marine Air-Ground Task Force
that is also in Djibouti right now. In another month, there'll
be a regionally aligned force from the Army who is allocated to
AFRICOM to help with these challenges.
Senator Kaine. Great.
General Rodriguez. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General.
General Austin, to return to a point that we've talked
about briefly, in your advance policy questions, you stated
that maintaining a credible naval force in the region, covered
by sufficient aviation combat power, is essential to
demonstrating an enduring commitment to regional partners.
We've had discussion on this committee, just this week, about
the aftermath of the decision of the deferred deployment to the
USS Truman. Just focusing on that and the sequester, from your
perspective as you prepare to take command of CENTCOM, what is
the impact of a reduced naval presence in the region? Will it
complicate your ability to carry out your mission?
General Austin. I think it will, sir. I think, certainly,
again, those forces have been outlined by General Mattis as
what he needs to accomplish the goals and objectives that he's
laid out. That's been supported by the Joint Chiefs, and
resourced by the Office of Secretary of Defense. This has gone
through a pretty deliberate process to allocate those resources
and forces.
When he doesn't have those available, or when a commander
doesn't have them available, then, again, it really begins to
take away his flexibility to address emerging situations. Once
you reduce the presence in the region, you could very well
signal the wrong things to our adversaries. We'll want the
commander--and I'll certainly want to have, if I'm confirmed--
to have as many options available as possible to address the
current situation and any emerging situations or crisis.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you this. The ``send the wrong
message to allies or adversaries,'' what about the message that
it sends, just from your own experience, inside the
organization, as you deal with your officers and enlisted?
What's the buzz as they continually watch Congress run up
against one kind of fiscal crisis after the next, that gives no
certainty to the military about its resource capacity?
General Austin. It certainly can be disheartening, sir, if
we kind of know we have things that we're trying to accomplish,
we know that we need resources, and it's difficult to get those
resources. Having said that, it's the spirit of our military to
try to find a way to be successful. But, we want to make sure
that, if at all possible, we're resourcing them with the
adequate things--with the things that they need to be
successful.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much, to both of you.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I understand we're going to have two rounds, if you could
just let me know when 7 minutes is up, I have a few more
questions. I'll try not to hold everybody up.
Senator Kaine. Great. We'll move right into a second round
as soon as you're finished if no one else comes.
Senator Graham. Okay. Thank you very much.
This is one of the most important hearings we've had in,
probably, a very long time. That's saying a lot, given the
hearings we've had in recent time.
Both of you, thank you for your service. I know you well,
appreciate your families. You're fine men.
General Austin, here's my dilemma. I'm not so sure--and I
may be wrong--that you cannot tell us what you recommended
about troop levels. I don't know if that's an executive
privilege, or not. I'll have to think about that. I don't know
if you have the right to do that, quite frankly.
I know what you told me. You told me, on the tarmac in
Baghdad, that we needed somewhere between 18,000 and 20,000. I
said, ``That may be more than the market can bear.'' You said,
``Well, look at the numbers.'' I know what your recommendations
were; it was somewhere in the mid-15,000 to 16,000. I think the
bottom line, for most people, was 10,000. I have an exchange
between me and General Dempsey about how the numbers went from
19,000, I think, all the way down to 5,000, and eventually to
0.
I'd like to put in the record the exchange I had with
Chairman Dempsey about the ever-changing numbers in Iraq.
[The information referred to follows:]
Hearing to Receive Testimony on Security Issues Relating to Iraq
tuesday, november 15, 2011, u.s. senate, committee on armed services,
washington, dc.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for testifying. This is a very important issue for
the country, and I think we have had a good discussion.
Number one, I completely concur with the idea that American troops
should not be left behind in Iraq without legal protections. It is not
fair to them. To say that the Iraqi legal system is mature is being
gracious. If an American soldier were accused of rape anywhere in Iraq,
I do not think they would get a fair trial. So at the end of the day,
Iraq has a long way to go on the legal side and I think a long way to
go on other sides.
My concern is that I have never bought into the idea that the
impasse was getting the parliament to approve an immunity agreement. I
will just give you one vignette. I went over with Senator McCain and
Senator Lieberman in May to talk to the prime minister about a follow-
on force, and I was discussing with him that no American politician,
Republican or Democrat, would accept a follow-on force without legal
protections. As we were talking about it, he says, well, how many
people are you talking about? What is your number? I turned to
Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin and said you have not given them
numbers. He says, no, we are still working on that. That is in May.
So let us get into this, General Dempsey. 16, 10, 5, cascading. Is
it your testimony that we were proposing 16,000 to the Iraqis and they
said no? Then we came back with 10,000 and they said no. Then we came
back 5,000 and they said no. Then it got to be zero.
General Dempsey. No, that is not what I testified to.
Senator Graham. What caused the cascading effect? General Austin
told me--and I will just tell you now because it is so important--he
thought we needed 19,000. and I said, Lloyd, that is probably going to
be more than the market can bear. I said that because I am concerned
about American politics too.
Then the numbers were around 15 to 16. Then we started about 10. It
came to 10, and nobody got below 10. So I know what General Austin had
on his mind.
At the end of the day, General Dempsey, you are right. It is about
the missions you want that determines the numbers. We have got through
it pretty well. Iraq does not have the intel capacity we do. We need to
make sure they have better intelligence. They do not have an air force.
We need embedders. We need trainers. We need CT. we need to referee the
Kurd-Arab dispute. I think 10 or 12 is what you need. At the end of the
day, we are down to zero.
I guess my question is, is Iran comfortable with a democracy on
their border in Iraq, Secretary Panetta?
Secretary Panetta. I think they are very nervous about having a
democracy on their border.
Senator Graham. Let me tell you what the speaker of the Iraqi
parliament, a Sunni, Mr. Najaf, said. Iraq now suffers from points of
weakness. If neighboring countries see that Iraq is weak and incapable
of protecting its border and internal security, then definitely there
will be interference. This interference does not exist now. He was
talking about how Iran would step up their efforts to destabilize Iraq
if we all left.
Do you agree that is a more likely scenario? They are doing it now.
They are only going to do it more if we do not have anybody there.
Secretary Panetta. I think there will be a continuing threat. I
think that the reality is that the Iraqis do not want to have Iran
exert that kind of influence in their country.
Senator Graham. Now, if the Sunni speaker of the parliament is
worried about that, is there any doubt the Kurds want us there? If it
were up to the Kurds, there would be 50,000 American troops in
Kurdistan. Do you agree with that?
Secretary Panetta. Yes.
Senator Graham. So we know the Sunnis are worried about this, and
we know the Kurds would have 50,000 if we would agree to put them
there. I would not agree to that, but they are very welcoming of U.S.
troops. So I am getting a little bit concerned that all the blame on
the Iraqi political system is maybe not quite fair.
Secretary Panetta, you were a politician in another life. Would it
be a political problem for President Obama to announce this year that
we are going to keep 15,000 people in Iraq past 2012? Did that ever get
considered in this administration? Did anybody ever talk about the
numbers changing because the Democratic base would be upset if the
President broke his campaign promise?
Secretary Panetta. Not in any discussions that I participated in.
Senator Graham. Do you think it ever happened anywhere? Do you
think anybody in the White House ever wondered about the political
effect of having troops in Iraq on the 2012 election? You talk openly
about the Iraqis having political problems. You do not think there are
any politics going on on our side?
Let me ask you about Afghanistan, General Dempsey. Did any
commander recommend that all of the surge forces be pulled out by
September 2012?
General Dempsey. I honestly do not know, Senator.
Senator Graham. Well, let me tell you. The testimony is clear. No
option was presented to the President in July to recover all surge
forces by September 2012, and you put General Allen in a terrible
spot--the administration has. I think it is no accident that the troops
are coming home 2 months before this election in Afghanistan, and if
you believe that to be true, as I do, I do not think it is an accident
that we got to zero.
Now, at the end of the day, we are at zero. Do you think the people
in Camp Ashraf are going to get killed? What is going to happen to
them?
General Dempsey. Senator, the State Department is leading an effort
to ensure that we work with the Iraqi----
Senator Graham. Can you tell the people back here that the
likelihood of their friends and family being killed is going up greatly
if there are no American forces up there policing that problem?
General Dempsey. I will not say anything to those people because I
am not involved in the outcome.
Senator Graham. Fair enough.
I asked Admiral Mullen, your predecessor, what is the risk of an
Arab-Kurdish conflict over the oil reserves around Kirkuk in terms of a
conflict if we are not present. He said it was high. Do you agree with
that?
General Dempsey. I might have said moderate because of my own
personal contacts with both the Kurds and the Iraqis.
Senator Graham. So you believe that there is a moderate risk, not a
high risk, if there are no U.S. Forces policing the Kurd-Arab
borderline disputes and the Kirkuk issue.
General Dempsey. I do. I would like to take some time to articulate
why I believe that, but if you would like me to take that for the
record, I would be happy to do so.
Senator Graham. I would.
Now, do you believe it is smart for the United States not to have
counterterrorism forces? Is it in our national security interest not to
have any counterterrorism forces in Iraq?
General Dempsey. It is in our national security interest to
continue pressure on al Qaeda wherever we find them either by ourselves
or through partners.
Senator Graham. But do you think the counterterrorism problem in
Iraq is over?
General Dempsey. I do not.
Senator Graham. Secretary Panetta, you have been great about this.
You said there are a thousand al Qaeda in Iraq, and I know in your old
job that you are very worried that they are going to reconstitute. So
will you do the best you can to convince the Iraqis--and I tell you
what. I am willing to get on a plane and go back myself--that they
would benefit from counterterrorism partnership with the United States?
Secretary Panetta. I have made that clear time and time again.
Senator Graham. They just tell you they are not concerned about
that.
Secretary Panetta. What they tell me is that they are concerned
about that. They obviously have their forces that are dealing with
that.
Senator Graham. Is it your testimony the Iraqis would not have
3,000 U.S. Forces? They do not want any U.S. Forces at all. They are
not willing to expend the political capital to get this agreement done
because they just do not see a need for U.S. Forces. Is that the Iraqi
position that they have come to the point in their political military
life that they just do not need us at all?
Secretary Panetta. I think the problem was that it was very
difficult to try to find out exactly--when you say the Iraqi position,
what exactly the Iraqi position was at that point.
Senator Graham. What is the Kurdish position in Iraq about U.S.
Forces?
Secretary Panetta. Well, I do not think there is any question they
would like to----
Senator Graham. So what is the Sunni speaker of the parliament's
position about U.S. Forces?
Secretary Panetta. I think the same.
Senator Graham. Well, when I was with Prime Minister Maliki in May,
the next day he announced that he would accept a follow-on force if
other parties would agree. So how did this fall apart?
Secretary Panetta. I heard the same statements and read the same
statements. But the problem is in the negotiations that involved the
Ambassador, that involved General Austin, in those discussions they
never came to the point where they said we want this many troops here.
Senator Graham. Well, I can tell you--and I have taken my time. I
can tell you in May they had no number given to them by us. They were
in the dark as late as May about what we were willing to commit to
Iraq. So this is a curious outcome when you got Sunnis and Kurds on the
record and the prime minister of Iraq saying he would accept a follow-
on force if the others agreed. I do not know who does the negotiation
for the United States, but if I had three people saying those things, I
thought I could get it over the finish line. But we are where we are.
Thank you for your service.

Senator Graham. The point, Mr. Chairman, was that the
Iraqis were not saying, ``18,000 too many, 15,000 was too
many.'' That wasn't the exchange.
Did Prime Minister Maliki tell you that he thought 18,000
were too many?
General Austin. No, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. So, this was coming from the White
House; this is what Chairman Dempsey said, that the numbers
were cascading down, were not because the commanders were
saying, ``I overshot.'' It's because the political people were
saying, ``That's too many,'' and you kept coming down and down;
and at 10,000, I think, you finally said, ``That's the lowest I
can go.'' The cascading effect of the numbers being reduced
were not the Iraqis saying, ``We can't have all that many
troops,'' it was that our own White House--and they have every
right to do this, by the way--was saying, ``We just don't agree
with the commander's recommendation.''
Do you remember that exchange between me and Prime Minister
Maliki, in May, when we were over there, in 2011?
General Austin. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. He turned to me and says, ``Well, how many
troops are''--cause we were asked to go to Iraq--myself,
Senator Lieberman, and Senator McCain--by Secretary Clinton, to
see if we could push the Iraqis to make sure we had legal
protections for our troops. I'm with the President on this; I
wouldn't have one troop in Afghanistan or Iraq without a status
of forces agreement, that he was absolutely right to insist on
that. But, when Prime Minister Maliki said, ``How many are you
going to recommend?'' I turned to you and Ambassador Jeffrey,
and you said, I believe, ``We're still working on that.'' Do
you recall that conversation?
General Austin. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Graham. Okay.
I was a bit astonished, because it's not that General
Austin didn't know what he needed, it's just nobody would tell
him what they were going to approve.
I just want people to be clear that General Austin always
had a firm view that we needed--18,000 to 20,000 is what he
first said, and I said, ``General Austin, that may be more than
the political market can bear,'' because I'm not insensitive to
the fatigue back here at home. So, you kept putting pen to
paper. I know very well that you were making the best
recommendations you could.
My problem is not with you, General Austin. You put the
numbers to paper, and, at the end of the day, we have none.
I just want to put into the record a load of articles about
Iraq: ``Blood for Oil,'' ``Iraq's Return to Bloodshed,'' ``Why
Kurds Versus Arabs Could Be Iraq's Next Civil War,'' ``Be
Warned, Americans' Withdrawal From Iraq Heralds a World of
Instability.'' I'd like permission to put all these articles
into the record.
Senator Kaine. Without objection, they'll go into the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want everybody to know, General Austin thought long
and hard about a residual force.
Now, do you remember, when you were first getting the job,
taking it over from General O. (Odierno), we had an exchange
where I said, ``In football terms, how would you put us, in
terms of our situation in Iraq in June 2010?'' He said, ``I
think you've--I did, sir. I think we're on the 10 yardline, and
I think that the next 18 months will determine whether we get
to the goal line or give, really, the Iraqis an opportunity to
get to the goal beyond 2011.'' I said, ``We're having a new
quarterback,'' and you said, ``Sir, I'll take the ball.'' You
agreed with me that we were inside the 10, that we needed a
residual force. You talked about the Arab-Kurd conflict. You
told me, in no uncertain terms, ``One of the friction points in
Iraq was at Kirkuk.'' Do you remember that?
General Austin. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you remember the Lions Brigade concept,
where you had Iraqi security forces?
General Austin. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. You had the Peshmerga Brigade, and you had
U.S. Forces, working as a team. I think that may have been your
idea. It was working so well, because the Peshmerga are,
basically, paramilitary forces that are Kurds. Now you see a
shooting war about to erupt, I'm afraid, between the Peshmerga
and the traditional Iraqi Security Forces. You told me that, if
we had about 5,000 people at the Article 140 boundary line, we
could keep tensions down. Do you remember that?
General Austin. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you remember telling me that we were one
perceived slight or insult away from these guys shooting each
other, and we need to have a follow-on force to keep tensions
low?
General Austin. That was my assessment, sir.
Senator Graham. It was a good assessment.
What you see now, Mr. Chairman, is the ``Blood for Oil''
article is a story, last week, about how close they've come to
firing at each other over the oil problems in Kirkuk.
I want to introduce into the record the exchange I had with
General Dempsey, General Odierno, and General Austin, in 2010
and 2011, about what happened in Iraq.
Senator Kaine. Without objection, it will be entered into
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Nominations of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command; and LTG
Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, to be General and Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq
thursday, june 24, 2010, u.s. senate, committee on armed services,
washington, dc.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations to both of you on the job you have done and the new
jobs you're going to undertake, here.
General O--I always butcher your name, I'm just going to call you
General O--there must be a height requirement for these jobs.
[Laughter.]
We mentioned yesterday the World Cup is going on and it's fun to
watch, and I'm pulling for the U.S.A., but I have really no idea what
they're doing when they play soccer. So, we're going to talk football.
I think you indicated, we're probably on the 10-yard line when it comes
to Iraq?
General Odierno. I did, Senator. I do think we are on the 10-yard
line. I think the next 18 months will determine whether we get to the
goal line, or really give the Iraqis an opportunity to get the goal
line beyond 2011.
Senator Graham. But, from our national perspective, we're on the
10, and I think you said we probably have four downs? It's first and 10
on the 10, we have a new quarterback coming in.
General Odierno. That's right.
General Austin. I'll take the ball, Senator.
Senator Graham. I couldn't have found a better guy to be the new
quarterback.
Now, the Sons of Iraq, how is that going, General O, in terms of
getting those people integrated in the Iraqi security forces?
General Odierno. We started out with about 103,000 Sons of Iraq.
About 40,000 have been transitioned into other Government of Iraq jobs.
They actually stopped the transition because they were starting to
realize the value in many areas of what they were providing in terms of
intelligence and other things, so they've slowed that down, and they're
now doing some reevaluation of the Sons of Iraq program, and how they
want to transition that.
Senator Graham. Are they still getting paid?
General Odierno. They are.
Senator Graham. One thing that we need to watch for, General
Austin, is you have thousands of young Sunnis that are receiving a
government paycheck, I think it's like $90 a month, is that right?
General Odierno. Three hundred.
Senator Graham. Three hundred? Okay, $300 a month. We have to make
sure that if that pay stops that we have a plan, do you agree with
that, General Austin?
General Austin. I absolutely agree with that, Senator. I was there,
again, in the early days we begin to transition the Sons of Iraq to
working for the government and work along with the Prime Minister to
outline a plan to effectively transition them. I think they've done a
pretty good job, and we need to continue to do that in the future.
Senator Graham. Okay, who's paying? Is that coming from the Iraqi
budget?
General Austin. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Now, Article 140 boundary dispute issues, I think there are a
couple of trip wires left in Iraq and one of them that stands out to me
is how do you resolve the Arab-Kurdish conflict in Kirkuk and the
boundary dispute. If you could both give me, maybe, a 30-second
overview of where we're at and what could we do in Congress to help
you?
General Odierno. We have established a tripartite security
architecture in the disputed areas for about 6 months now, and it's
been very successful in reducing tensions. It's Pesh Merga, Iraqi Army
and U.S. Forces manning checkpoints and joint security areas where they
do patrolling in these areas, and it has calmed things down
considerably. The United Nations (U.N.) is now taking on the role of
now mediating the long-term issues of the border issues and the status
of Kirkuk and other issues.
Senator Graham. Do you think that will get resolved for this new
government in a year?
General Odierno. It depends. My guess is, some of that will be
discussed during the governmental formation process. How well that goes
could determine how quickly it could happen. I do believe though, to
solve the whole problem, it will be longer than a year.
Senator Graham. General Austin, do you agree that is one of the big
outstanding issues that the Iraqi people have to resolve?
General Austin. Senator Graham, I absolutely do.
I think that, I would be delighted if it could be resolved in a
year but----
Senator Graham. Probably not.
General Austin. I really believe that it's going to take awhile.
Senator Graham. Do you feel like we have enough resources and focus
to help them get it resolved?
General Austin. I think that we're doing the right things in terms
of working with the government to help them build confidence--bring
about confidence-building measures to bring the two sides closer
together. I think, again, it's encouraging to see that the U.N. is
continuing to try to help, we'll require their help in the future.
Senator Graham. Okay.
General Austin. But this is going to take a lot of work.
Senator Graham. Okay.
The hydrocarbon law. Have you had to pass the hydrocarbon law, is
that right, General O?
General Odierno. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. From my point of view, for what it's worth, is that
until the Iraqis have a statute that divides the oil up between each
group where everybody feels like they're getting the resources of the
country fairly shared, it's going to be a tough go. Do you see a
breakthrough in the hydrocarbon law any time soon?
General Odierno. I think the hydrocarbon law, itself, probably
might not get passed. But, I think there are other alternatives.
Senator Graham. They do it year-by-year, budgeting-wise, don't
they?
General Odierno. Yes, year-by-year, but also they get a revenue
sharing agreement----
Senator Graham. Right.
General Odierno.--I think would be important. I think that's
something that people are looking at now, and I think that would help
significantly.
We've had some thawing, there was an argument about whether the
Kurdistan Region could develop their own oil, they have solved that
problem. They have now begun to develop that. The Government of Iraq,
the Central Government is helping them, so that's a breakthrough. We're
starting to see small breakthroughs in the overall resolution of this.
But again, there's still work that has to be done in that area.
Senator Graham. The rules of engagement--as I understand it, we're
partnering with the Iraqi security forces, we have right of self-
defense, obviously, but when you make a raid, now, at night, do you
have to get a warrant?
General Odierno. Under the security agreement, all operations must
be warranted.
Senator Graham. Is that working okay?
General Odierno. It is working very well.
Senator Graham. Do you have good confidence in your judicial
system, there are no leaks?
General Odierno. It's not perfect.
Senator Graham. Not perfect.
General Odierno. No system is perfect. But our ability to present
evidence and get warrants, we absolutely have the ability to do that.
That's working well.
Senator Graham. That's very encouraging.
One last question to both of you. General O, we're talking about
the consequences to the United States of winning in Iraq, and I think
they're enormous. Probably a good time now, given Afghanistan and where
we are at in the world--if, for some reason, we didn't make it into the
end zone, what would be the consequences of Iraq failing?
General Austin, if you could tell this committee, what are the one
or two things that keep you up at night when you think about Iraq?
General Odierno. First, if we had a failed state in Iraq, it would
create uncertainty and significant instability, probably, within the
region. Because of the criticality of Iraq, its relationship to Iran,
its relationship to the other Arab states in the region, if it became
unstable, it could create an environment that could continue to
increase the instability. If it becomes unstable and ungoverned, it
opens the area, potentially, for terrorists, in order to allow Iraq to
become a place where terrorism could be exported.
Now, I don't believe we're close to that. I believe we're far away
from that happening. I think we're definitely on the right path. But
those are the kinds of things that would happen if we had a complete
breakdown inside of Iraq.
General Austin. Senator Graham, we will be successful in Iraq, we
will get the ball into the end zone. I believe that because of all of
the great work that our young men and women continue to do on a daily
basis and the commitment of this entire country to accomplishing that
in the right way.
You mentioned the thing that keeps me awake at night, the one thing
that is foremost in my mind is that if their leadership is unable to
transfer power in a peaceful manner, that would create conditions that
would cause us to, perhaps, revert to sectarian behavior and people to
lose confidence in their ability to be properly represented. That is
one of the major things.
But I am confident that, based upon what we've seen thus far, this
peaceful transition will occur. It will just take some time for them to
form a government.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Graham. Thank you very, very much.
Now, let's move to Afghanistan. I'm not going to block your
nomination, that's not my intent. But, I do believe it's only
fair to the committee that you go talk to General Allen. Pick
up the phone. I know he's on leave. Do you agree he's one of
the finest officers you've ever served with?
General Austin. He is a fine man, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Rodriguez?
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. You all have been at this for a very long
time. All of you. I just can't thank you enough. My time's
about to expire, so we'll do a second round.
What I would like you to do--and you can give this to me in
writing--I want you to go talk to General Allen about his
recommendations in Afghanistan, and see if they make sense to
you, because--and I'm not going to reveal this to the
committee--I know, exactly, his bottom line. I know Senator
Ayotte knows his bottom line. I want to find out what's the
proper role of this committee in divulging information, because
I really do believe we have a right to know what commanders are
recommending, as much as the Commander in Chief, because we
fund wars. This idea you can't tell us is something I want to
explore.
I'm going to stop now, let my colleagues do a second round.
Would you please go to General Allen and get briefed on his
recommendations--bottom line, top line--and write to me as to
whether or not you think they're sound, before we vote. This
could be done, I think, relatively quick.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. We'll move to a second round.
I just want to point out that the questions that the
witnesses both answered at the beginning indicated that they
would provide answers unless they had a good-faith reason, in
consultation with the committee, not to provide them. I believe
some of General Austin's answers have kind of been along that
scheme. But, to follow that instruction, and he will come back
to the committee.
Senator Graham. That's it, Mr. Chairman, I----
General Austin. Yes.
Senator Graham. Really, I think we have a right to get
this, but I don't want to put these gentleman in a bad spot.
General Austin. Right.
Senator Graham. That's why I'm going to wait.
Senator Kaine. Either we'll get the answer or a good-faith
description for why you believe certain conversations cannot be
revealed. We'll get one or the other.
We'll move to a second round of questions, with no one here
who has not asked a first round.
I'll go to Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I share Senator Graham's request, and, obviously, would
like to understand, if you can't provide that information, why
that is, because I think that is something important for this
committee to take up, because we have to make decisions on
resources that are very important, and we have an oversight
function. I very much respect the President's function as
Commander in Chief, but this is a very important issue.
We were on the same trip to Afghanistan, and having seen
the conditions on the ground, and having been to a recent
deployment ceremony, I just want to make sure, also, when our
guys are still there, that we have enough people there to
protect the guys and gals we have on the ground. I appreciate
that very much.
I have a question for General Rodriguez. Can you help me
understand what's happening in eastern Libya right now with the
Qaddafi arms cache that was not secured after the NATO activity
in Libya? What is happening with those arms? Where are they
going? What efforts are we making to secure those arms?
General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am. They had significant arms
caches throughout Libya; and many of them, of course, in
eastern Libya, which is the most unstable part of Libya right
now. The Intelligence Community has assessed that those
continue to move. Many of them have moved southwest, toward the
northern Mali issue, and has increased the capacity of al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb.
The United States and allies have several initiatives to
try to attempt to stem that flow. Most of them are on training
and equipping efforts for both the Libyan army as well as the
Libyan border control people who benefit from some of the
training that we're doing.
Then, the military-to-military relationships and the
coordination that we're doing are all focused to try to get
those under control and limit the ability of that to continue
to migrate away from Libya and into the hands of terrorists.
Senator Ayotte. Just so we understand--when we were on our
trip, we also went to Egypt--those arms are being trafficked
through the Sinai; the arms are going into Syria; they are also
going into Mali and other places, where they're getting in the
wrong hands. That continues, as we sit here today.
General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am, that continues, again, in
all those directions, that's right. It's not only toward
Africa, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. In eastern Libya right now, we have those
military-to-military relations, but we don't have a position
where the Libyan Government is actually stopping the transfer
of those arms, right now, to the wrong people.
General Rodriguez. Eastern Libya is the most destabilized
place, and the militias--there's no state control of many of
those militias, and that's a challenge that the government is
dealing with right now.
Senator Ayotte. So, we still really need to get much
tougher on these arms. This is a dangerous situation, there
have been reports that some of these arms may include
Manportable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS), correct?
General Rodriguez. Yes, that's correct, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. I hope that, certainly, we need to take
greater action on this, because these arms are very dangerous.
They're getting into the hands of terrorists, and this is
continuing. I look forward to supporting you and the
administration to take whatever steps need to be taken to make
sure that happens.
I would also point out that I believe that this is one of
the reasons when we think about the concept of a light
footprint, and we're engaged in an area, that those arms should
have been secured right following our involvement so that we
weren't in the situation where we're chasing them around,
trying to get them from dangerous individuals, who are then
using it to attack us and our allies.
General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Kaine. General Austin, General Rodriguez, a quick
question. Would you agree with me that the number of troops in
any theater is not an end, but it is a means to an end, a means
to accomplishing a defined mission?
General Rodriguez. Yes, sir.
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. If you are each confirmed in your positions,
do you agree that, at any time, if you think that the number of
troops assigned, or the number of troops you're dealing with,
is not sufficient to accomplish the end that you are charged
with accomplishing, that you'll share that concern, under
appropriate channels, with your colleagues and superiors?
General Rodriguez. I will, sir.
General Austin. I will.
Senator Kaine. All right.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. If we told both of you that you're the only
two soldiers left in Afghanistan, you would stay and fight to
the end, wouldn't you?
General Austin. If there's work to be done, Senator, I
would.
Senator Graham. Would you also tell us, ``We have a high
opinion of ourselves, but the chance of success would be pretty
low''?
General Austin. That's correct.
Senator Graham. Okay. What I want to know is, do you agree
with me, General Austin, the last card to play in Afghanistan
is the residual follow-on force, in terms of our presence of
``closing the deal''? This is a very important decision to
make.
General Austin. Yes, sir, I would.
Senator Graham. Okay. I appreciate that very much.
Senator Kaine, you're absolutely right about numbers, but
General Austin, is Iran watching what we're doing in the
region?
General Austin. They clearly are, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Rodriguez?
General Rodriguez. Sir, everybody's watching what we're
doing.
Senator Graham. Okay. If Syria is deteriorating--and we
seem to be leading from behind there--if Iraq is deteriorating,
and we pick a number in Afghanistan that makes it a high
likelihood of failure, that would be sending the wrong signals,
do you agree, to the Iranians, if what I say is true?
General Austin. I would, sir, I would agree with that.
Senator Graham. Okay. If you had a recommendation of 8,000
troops in 2014, by 2017 we would be down to 1,000, don't you
think the enemy would be focusing on the 1,000, not the 8,000?
General Austin. I clearly think that they would, sir. I
think that would----
Senator Graham. Yes. I think that everybody would be
focusing on the low number, not the high number.
I don't know what the numbers are going to be, but I do
want to say this to the administration. I know the war is
unpopular. I want to end it well. Like Senator Levin, I think
we can be successful in Afghanistan. The key is their security
forces. But, we have to have enough capability to keep them
moving forward. I know the number General Allen picked.
NATO will not stay, in any numbers, if we have 1,000
troops. Do you agree with that? No NATO nation's going to get
to our right.
General Austin. That's my assessment, yes.
Senator Graham. I'll wrap this up, Mr. Chairman, by saying
that--I'll make some of my questions in writing--I believe
we're at a pivotal moment in the war in Afghanistan, that NATO
is not going to stay unless we show a willingness to stay
beyond Kabul itself, and that the enemy will look at the bottom
number, not the top number. But, if the President will follow
General Allen's recommendations, within reason--and he's the
President, not me; he has every right to pick the number; every
military commander agrees with it, and I agree with that--but,
as a member of the opposition party, and as somebody who cares
about this, I will either stand with him or lodge my
objections. I just want the administration to know that, if
they can leave a sufficient force behind, beginning in 2014--
and it can be as low as 9,000 or 10,000--that I will stand with
them, that I will keep funding the Afghan army, that I want
this to turn out well. I know it won't be popular at home, but
it's the right thing to do. I do want the administration to
know, they have every right to make this decision, but if they
overrule the commanders and create a force that cannot, in my
view, be successful, I cannot, in good conscience, vote to
continue this operation.
Mr. Chairman, I can't think of a worse outcome for America
than for us to lose in Afghanistan after a dozen years of
fighting, bleeding, hundreds of billions of dollars. That's the
place we were attacked from. How do you win in Pakistan if you
lose in Afghanistan?
Mr. Chairman, I will end with this thought. If we don't get
this residual force right to continue the momentum, Afghanistan
will fall apart quicker than Iraq, and all hell is going to
break out.
Thank you very much.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator.
A third round of questions, also 3 minutes.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. General Rodriguez, would you consider Boco
Haram a terrorist organization?
General Rodriguez. Senator, Boco Haram has committed some
acts that can be associated with terrorism. That's a policy
decision that has to be made. If confirmed, I'll study that
issue and make my recommendations on whether it gets classified
as a terrorist organization, or not, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. I would very much like your opinion, given
some of their activities, including a car bomb attack against
the United Nations headquarters.
General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. I would certainly appreciate your opinion
on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Boco Haram has committed some acts that can be associated with
terrorism. Designating Boco Haram as a terrorist organization is a
policy decision. I will study this issue and make my recommendation on
whether Boco Haram should be classified as a terrorist organization.

Senator Ayotte. Also, General Rodriguez, in thinking about
what happened in the attacks on our consulate in Benghazi, from
your assessment--and obviously, you'll be taking over that area
of responsibility, and you and I have talked about it--what are
some of the lessons learned, do you think, from that?
General Rodriguez. Ma'am, lessons learned, that both DOD
and the Department of State are taken on as the gaps that were
created--or were there, in intelligence--that didn't provide
the sufficient indication or warnings for us to be able to
respond properly. The security decisions that get made by the
Department of State have to be well informed by the Department
of Defense, so we need to do some closer cooperation there.
Then, the response forces that are available to the
combatant commanders need to be continually looked at and
appropriate for the situations that are out there throughout
the region.
Senator Ayotte. You talked about the forces that would be--
as I understand it, going to Stuttgart, that we would have in
place, that we didn't previously have in place--but, how's that
response time, though, when you think about it? Because we're
not going to be Djibouti or Aviano--and also, thinking about
the air assets; will we have any AC-130s or anything that, if
we had to go to that area again to respond--how would we handle
it?
General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am. I think that, again, we'll--
if confirmed, place those requirements on the Department of
Defense. Again, they'll have to make some risk decisions, based
on the situation across the combatant command's area of
responsibility, where to put those. The best we can do is to
make sure everybody understands the risk that they're
incurring, so we can make good decisions on where to keep our
people and where not to keep our people.
Senator Ayotte. I look forward to continuing to--as you're
confirmed, to work with you on that. I think that's a challenge
that we face in that area, and particularly with what we talked
about, with the arms that are still flowing in that area, that
are very dangerous, to a whole host of areas that are getting
in the wrong hands of al Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations.
General Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
I return the gavel to Chairman Levin.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you so much.
I very much appreciate, Senator Kaine, your taking over the
gavel this morning.
Just a few questions, if they haven't already been asked. I
was trying to catch up to what questions were being asked.
General Austin, in your judgment, are the Afghan security
forces on track to assume the lead responsibility for security
in Afghanistan, starting this spring?
General Austin. My judgment's based upon my interaction
with the commanders in the field. I was just recently in
Afghanistan--during the Thanksgiving holiday--and, as I went
around the country, the commanders that I talked to felt that
the Afghans had developed significant capability, and were in
the lead, in many cases, throughout the country. They were
hopeful and very positive about where they were, and very
hopeful that things would continue in the right direction.
Based upon that assessment, I think the Afghans will be
capable of taking the lead in the prescribed timeline.
Chairman Levin. When Senator Jack Reed and I traveled to
Afghanistan in January, we heard, from our military commanders,
that the Afghan National Security Forces are in the lead
already in the vast majority of operations and in the very
challenging Regional Command East, that Afghan security forces
were conducting operations by themselves in 87 percent of the
operation. Have you heard that figure? If not, would that not
be a very reassuring fact?
General Austin. Sir, I've heard similar reports, and it is,
indeed, reassuring. Again, I talk to both brigade commanders in
that area and also the division commander, and they were very
positive about the performance of the Afghan security forces.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
One more question on Afghanistan, and that's a subject
which I've gotten into repeatedly, and Senator Graham and I
have worked together to make the same point, and that has to do
with the future size of Afghan security forces. The current
proposal is to reduce the size of the National Security Forces
in Afghanistan by about a third after 2014, from 352,000 down
to approximately 230,000. I believe it sends the wrong signal
to the Afghans to do that. They are looking for reassurance
that the United States and our allies are committed to an
enduring relationship with Afghanistan. We wrote the President
again last year--Senator Graham, Senator McCain, Senator
Lieberman, myself--to convey that point. At the time when we
are drawing down our troops, it is the wrong message to be
drawing down or suggesting the drawdown of Afghan forces from
their current level to a significantly lower level.
I'm wondering, General Austin, whether or not you feel that
we should keep the Afghan security forces at the 352,000 level
beyond 2014.
General Austin. Sir, I think keeping the larger-sized force
would certainly, as you pointed out, reassure the Afghans. It
would also reassure our NATO allies that we remain committed.
In addition to that, sir, I think a larger Afghan force
would help to hedge against any future Taliban mischief. You
could reasonably expect that an enemy that's been that
determined, that agile, will very soon, after we transition,
begin to try to test the Afghan security forces. Further, I
think that size of a force provides additional capability to
allow the political processes to mature a bit. I think, because
of that, it seems to me that a larger force would be of
benefit.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Just one question for you, General Rodriguez, and this has
to do with the in-extremis force that is desirable, and other
contingency response forces that would be useful, to put the
AFRICOM commander in a stronger position to respond to
contingencies such as we saw in Benghazi. If you've not been
asked that question, can you tell us whether you would look for
ways to find the greater capability to provide contingency
response forces, beyond what they currently are, and were, in
the case of the Benghazi matter?
General Rodriguez. Yes, Senator, I would. If confirmed,
that will be one of the top priorities I have, and I'll report
back to the committee on that. They've already made some
significant improvements in that, and we have to continue to do
that.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Thank you both. We look forward to your confirmation.
Again, I want to thank Senator Kaine for taking over this
morning. It's very much appreciated.
General Rodriguez. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN Lloyd J. Austin III,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The Department has made great progress in the joint arena
since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. The Services and Joint
competencies have proven their effectiveness and capabilities in more
than a decade of war. While there is no room for complacency, I don't
believe there is a need for any major modifications to the act.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I do not believe there is a need for any major
modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Beyond the Act, however,
Congress may want to look at ways to increase integration of non-
military agencies in appropriate training and force readiness
environments in order to build a more effective whole-of-government
approach to crisis prevention and resolution.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense,
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Subject to direction from the President, the Commander,
CENTCOM performs duties under the authority, direction and control of
the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commander, CENTCOM is
responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of the
command to carry out its missions.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information
with the Under Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet CENTCOM
priorities and requirements for support.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information
with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet
CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the
President, National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.
Section 163 of title 10, U.S. Code, allows communication between the
President or the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to
flow through the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and
as instructed by the Unified Command Plan, I would communicate with the
Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I
anticipate a close dialogue with the Chairman on all significant
matters.
I would communicate and coordinate with the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as required and in the absence of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible
for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant
commands. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates closely with the Secretaries
to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip forces for
CENTCOM are met.
Commander, CENTCOM communicates and exchanges information directly
with the Service Chiefs to facilitate their responsibility for
organizing, training and equipping forces. Successful execution of the
CENTCOM mission responsibilities requires close coordination with the
Service Chiefs. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Service
Chiefs to understand the capabilities of their Services to clearly
communicate to them the CENTCOM theater's requirements and to ensure
effective employment of the Services' capabilities in the joint and
coalition execution of the CENTCOM mission.
Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM maintains a unique relationship with
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, due to the volume of
collaboration required to successfully execute missions within the area
of responsibility. Our relationship, like those with other combatant
commanders, is critical to the execution of our National Military
Strategy and characterized by mutual support, frequent contact and
productive exchanges of information on key issues.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM maintains a close relationship with
other geographic and functional combatant commanders. These
relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military
Strategy and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact and
productive exchanges of information on key issues.
Question. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan/Commander,
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A).
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM maintains operational control (OPCON)
over U.S. Forces assigned to NATO-ISAF in his role as the Commander,
USFOR-A, which is CENTCOM's current main effort and top priority for
mission support. For forces further assigned from USFOR-A to NATO-ISAF,
this OPCON authority is largely transferred to Joint Forces Command
Brunssum and Supreme Allied Commander Europe as ``NATO-OPCOM''. Thus
mission direction for NATO-ISAF is a shared responsibility between
CENTCOM and SACEUR chains of command. For this reason we moderate any
interactions with Commander NATO-ISAF by close coordination with
Commander JFC Brunssum and SACEUR.
Question. The respective U.S. Chiefs of Mission within the CENTCOM
AOR.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM maintains a close working relationship
with all U.S. Ambassadors to countries in the CENTCOM region. We
coordinate carefully to ensure that operational and security
cooperation activities remain consistent with each Ambassador's
priorities and Mission Strategic Plan as needed to ensure unity of
effort between U.S. military and other U.S. Government activities in
the CENTCOM region.
Question. The respective U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense
Attaches (SDO/DATT).
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM is in the rating scheme for Defense
Attaches and maintains close relationships and coordination with Senior
Defense Officials. The commander relies on the SDOs to provide the
information necessary to ensure that CENTCOM's security cooperation
activities stay in-step with each Ambassador's priorities and Mission
Strategic Plan.
qualifications
Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important
position at a critical time for CENTCOM.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. Over the course of my 37-plus years serving in the U.S.
military, I have commanded at every level, to include at the Corps and
Theater levels. I spent much of the past decade commanding forces
throughout the CENTCOM region. At the two-star level, I commanded 10th
Mountain Division and Task Force-180 in Afghanistan. At the three-star
level, I commanded Multi-National Corps-Iraq. Most recently, as
Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq, I commanded all forces in that country
and oversaw the successful transfer of responsibilities to the Iraqi
Security Forces and U.S. State Department representatives, as well as
the transition of military forces and equipment out of Iraq. I have
worked closely with partners from across the Interagency and have
existing relationships with civil and military leaders throughout the
CENTCOM AOR. My past experiences have afforded me an in-depth
understanding of the nuanced challenges and opportunities that exist in
that region of the world. I also served previously as Director of the
Joint Staff and as CENTCOM Chief of Staff. These experiences have
provided me with an understanding of the command as well as some of the
relationships and processes that exist at the highest levels.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. If confirmed as the Commander of CENTCOM, you will be
responsible for all military operations in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility.
In your view, what are the major challenges and opportunities that
would confront you if you are confirmed as the next Commander of
CENTCOM?
Answer. The Middle East represents an extremely complex and dynamic
environment. Ethnic, sectarian and ideology-based conflicts are
continuing to play out within countries and between countries across
the region. Challenges abound; as do opportunities. Among the many
challenges we are faced with is the significant threat posed by violent
extremist organizations. Our priorities in the near-term are: (1)
Afghanistan--we must continue to support the mission, with some 66,000
servicemembers still serving in country; (2) Iran--we want to see a
non-nuclear Iran that respects its neighbors; (3) Syria--we would like
to see an end to the civil war and a stable government; and (4) The
broader Middle East--we want a region where stability and security
prevails; we want the conditions set to allow for economic growth and
opportunity; and, representative government that is underpinned by rule
of law. In general, we want a region where all States play a
constructive role in managing and maintaining stability. Our key
opportunities lie in the domain of collective security and building
regional partners' security capacities. Many of our partners in the
region have shown interest and made steady progress to date in taking
on their share of regional security. We will continue to encourage this
interest and capacity building across the region.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges and opportunities?
Answer. I will address these challenges and opportunities using
four principle levers: military-to-military engagements, plans and
operations, security cooperation programs, and posture and presence.
CENTCOM will employ these levers always focused on working by, with and
through our partners to the greatest extent allowable to bolster
regional security and promote stability. Military-to-military
engagements lay the foundation for and bolster our broader diplomatic
and political relationships. It is often the bedrock of the
relationship and affords us the trust necessary to dialogue quietly
about contentious issues. Plans and operations are developed and
executed in conjunction with our fellow combatant commands, interagency
organizations and international partners as necessary to address
developing contingency and crisis situations. Security Cooperation
Programs build partner capacity as the responsible way to reduce U.S.
presence in the region and effectively support their ability to carry
more of the region's security burden. Posture and presence in the
future will be leaner but supported by a base infrastructure that
enables rapid reinforcement.
Question. One challenge with which you may have to deal, if
confirmed, is the impact of the combination of sequestration and the
Continuing Resolution on the ability of the Military Services to meet
the demands of the combatant commanders as well as the execution of
your operating budget. Admiral Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff was recently quoted as saying, ``We are taking a
very close look at how we `appetite suppress' some of the demand
signals that are out there,'' he said. ``We find that there are some
forces out there in the world today that have been asked for and have
been provided to (combatant commanders) that might be servicing a lower
level of interest.''
What is your understanding and assessment of the impact of pending
Defense budget cuts to CENTCOM's operational planning, requests for
forces, and operating budgets? If confirmed, how would you prioritize
the use of available funds?
Answer. All Service Chiefs have been clear and consistent in saying
that sequestration will have devastating impacts on operations. That
said, they've also been clear in stating that they will continue to
support the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, first and foremost. But,
there is shared concern about the impact of cuts on the readiness of
forces responding to emerging contingencies. If confirmed, I will
continue to work closely with the Military Service components to
address any concerns they have with meeting our high priority
operational requirements. I will also defend the authorities which
support our strategic partnerships which are vital to our ability to
promote regional security and stability throughout the region.
Question. In your opinion, what are your considerations or
alternatives if an adequate aircraft carrier presence in the Gulf
cannot be sustained by the Navy beyond March 2013?
Answer. The prudent measure is to maintain continuous aircraft
presence in the Arabian Gulf region, with two carriers in assessed
periods of heightened risk. Maintaining a credible naval force in the
region covered by sufficient aviation combat power is essential for
demonstrating an enduring commitment to regional partners, building
trust and relationships, and the rapid projection of power in a crisis.
While naval and air component commanders continue to work alternative
strategies to deliver combat power in the Arabian Gulf from a single
carrier positioned outside of the Gulf, these alternatives are
predicated upon uninterrupted access to overseas bases and facilities.
Question. If sequestration were to occur, what would be your
assessment of the level of risk to the U.S. national security
objectives in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Sequestration would significantly increase the risk to
ongoing missions in the CENTCOM AOR. Certainly we can expect that if
sequestration occurs those units that are required to address emerging
challenges will be less ready than in the past or have less capability.
While the effects of sequestration will negatively impact all of the
services and combatant commanders, sequestration will arguably have the
greatest operational impact on the CENTCOM AOR due to geography, the
pace of ongoing combat operations and the likelihood of numerous
contingencies.
defense strategic guidance
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense'', announced by
President Obama on January 5, 2012, includes, among other things, the
intention of the administration and the Pentagon to ``rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific region.'' In his associated remarks, Secretary Panetta
explained that the ``U.S. military will increase its institutional
weight and focus on enhanced presence, power projection, and deterrence
in Asia-Pacific. . . . At the same time, the United States will place a
premium in maintaining our military presence and capabilities in the
broader Middle East.''
What do you anticipate will be the impact of this guidance on the
operations and activities of CENTCOM?
Answer. The guidance does increase emphasis on the Asia-Pacific
region while enhancing U.S. technological capabilities in the PACOM
area of responsibility (AOR). However, our Defense Strategic Guidance
reflects a global strategy. The world we live in remains complex and
extremely volatile. In fact, much of the instability resides in the
CENTCOM AOR where significant challenges persist. While I understand
that in an era of constrained resources we must prioritize; the
combatant commander is responsible for ensuring that, at all times, the
command is postured to protect vital national interests in the region.
If confirmed, I will continue to assess conditions in the CENTCOM AOR
and request the resources required to sustain operations.
readiness of forces
Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. Forces
that have been deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom?
Answer. Our forces are the best-trained, best-equipped, and most
experienced in our Nation's history; and, that includes forces deployed
to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Pre-
deployment training at the various joint training centers provides
tailored counterinsurgency scenarios and incorporates up-to-the-minute
lessons learned from troops on the ground in Afghanistan. I have worked
hard in my current position as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to
ensure that all levels of command are appropriately focused on ensuring
the continued and future readiness of U.S. Forces in theater.
Question. Have you observed any significant trends in or apparent
gaps with respect to personnel, equipment, or training readiness in
units as they deploy to or upon their arrival in Afghanistan?
Answer. No. Overall, the readiness of units arriving in the AOR has
been high and the Services have done well preparing units to deploy.
Where issues have arisen, the Services have been adaptive and they have
routinely incorporated feedback from theater thereby making necessary
adjustments in force preparations.
Question. What are your views, if any, on the growing debate over
whether U.S. Forces are putting too much emphasis on preparing for
counterinsurgency and irregular warfare operations or too little
emphasis on preparing for high intensity force-on-force conflict and
full spectrum operations?
Answer. This debate reflects how the U.S. military has adapted over
the past decade-plus of war. Army doctrine reflects this adaptation,
stating that our formations must be capable of performing unified land
operations across a broad range of operations: offense, defense,
stability, and defense support to civil authorities. There is a
recurring dialogue between commanders at all echelons to ensure that
there is a shared understanding of the essential tasks that must be
trained. The commanders' assessment of the situation, mission, time,
and resources drives how commanders execute unit training and
preparation. Ultimately, this is a dynamic process. It is at the heart
of the military's efforts to build and sustain readiness, and it
ensures that our formations are capable of accomplishing the mission
across the full range of operations.
Question. What is your opinion on adding a third maneuver battalion
to the Brigade Combat Team structure?
Answer. The addition of the third maneuver battalion will greatly
enhance the depth, versatility and combat capability of our Brigade
Combat Teams (BCT). Analysis shows that the redesigned BCT will provide
equal capacity to meet combat commander demand while providing a more
robust formation at the point of decision. The three battalion design
is more lethal, survivable and flexible. Importantly, it also increases
the commander's options as the formations execute operations across the
full range of military operations. Ultimately, the addition of the
third maneuver battalion is a key development for the Army as it
transitions from current fight and postures for the next conflict.
afghanistan counterinsurgency strategy
Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for
Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes, I support the current approach of: (1) building Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity; (2) countering violent
extremist organizations; and (3) setting conditions for final transfer
to ANSF control and change of mission by the end of December 2014.
Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?
Answer. The current strategy is showing progress; and, I have every
confidence in the commanders leading the effort. That said, if
confirmed, I will continually assess the situation on the ground,
consult with U.S. leaders, partners, regional leaders and NATO
commanders and provide my best military advice on this matter to my
chain of command. I will also follow up with the members of this
committee, as requested.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the campaign
in Afghanistan?
Answer. Efforts to counter the insurgency and prevent terrorist
safe havens have been and remain effective. Coalition operations have
continued to focus on degrading insurgent networks while building the
capacity of our ANSF partners to maintain security. We were largely
successful during the 2012 fighting season and we met our campaign
objective to force the enemy out of population centers. We continue to
transition the responsibility for security to the ANSF and we have seen
a decrease in violence in areas under ANSF responsibility. That being
said, challenges remain--particularly in areas along the border with
Pakistan and areas in southern Afghanistan where the Taliban continues
to operate. There also remain the dual challenges of narcotics and
corruption that threaten long-term stability. Afghanistan's nascent
government and upcoming elections scheduled for 2014 also pose
significant challenges with respect to maintaining the gains achieved
in recent years.
security transition in afghanistan
Question. President Obama and Afghan President Karzai recently
announced that the transition to an Afghan lead for security throughout
Afghanistan will occur this spring, a few months ahead of schedule. As
part of the ongoing transition, coalition forces are shifting
increasingly to an advise-and-assist mission but will continue to
support Afghan security forces until the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission concludes by no later than the end of
2014.
Do you support the announced transition of the security lead to
Afghan security forces throughout Afghanistan by this spring?
Answer. Yes, I support plans for ANSF assuming the lead for
security across all of Afghanistan by mid-2013, as agreed to at the
Chicago NATO Summit in May 2012. The current security situation and
capability of ANSF supports continued adherence to the transition plan.
Afghans have already assumed the lead through much of the country and
have validated NATO's incremental decisions to make these transfers.
That said, we will certainly incorporate lessons learned from our
experiences in Iraq. Among them we recognize that ISAF will be called
upon to provide critical enablers and advisory support to the ANSF as
they assume the lead for security operations. ISAF will also be
required to maintain sufficient combat power to respond to
contingencies and conduct operations alongside the ANSF.
Question. Do you support the shift in the mission of coalition
forces to an increasingly advise-and-assist role in support of Afghan
security forces?
Answer. Yes. The current situation supports the shift to an advise-
and-assist mission in support of ANSF. If confirmed, I will monitor
changing conditions and dialogue with commanders, regional leaders and
partners to ensure the situation supports the employment of general
purpose forces in a Security Force Assistance (SFA) role. Balanced SFA
enables ISAF to provide tailored forces that support sustainable
development of the ANSF as they move into the lead, as well as special
and general purpose forces to support developing Afghan Army and Police
operations through 2014. The ultimate aim is to build ANSF capacity and
set conditions for them to assume lead for the security of their
country. Much like in Iraq, as the ANSF capabilities and capacity
improve, coalition forces will provide less frequent training and
advice at the lower levels and focus efforts at the higher echelons to
better integrate our enabler support.
Question. Do you agree that the success of the mission in
Afghanistan depends on having Afghan security forces, rather than
coalition forces, taking the lead for security and conducting
unilateral operations to the maximum extent?
Answer. Yes. History has shown that indigenous forces are best
suited to assume lead responsibility for the security of their country.
A great deal of the country has already transitioned to ANSF in the
lead, and we have seen low levels of violence in these transitioned
areas. ISAF will continue to provide critical enablers and advisory
support to ANSF formations as they assume lead responsibilities.
Question. What is your assessment of the capacity and performance
of the Afghan security forces in assuming the lead for security in
areas designated for transition, including in contested areas?
Answer. Over the past several years, we have helped grow the ANSF
into a force that will eventually reach 352,000. The ANSF is steadily
improving in military capability and professionalism. There is still
work to be done before they will be self-sufficient and capable of
providing sustainable security for the long term. However, the ANSF is
on track to assume full security responsibility across Afghanistan by
the end of 2014. During 2012, the Afghan National Army demonstrated
their ability to plan, conduct and sustain large-scale operations.
Their combat enabler capabilities are still developing due to late
fielding, but they are improving in their ability to conduct fire
support, rotary wing support and even limited medical evacuation.
Question. Do you believe that a responsible transition of the
mission for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan from combat to a support role
should be based on conditions on the ground in Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with leaders in
theater, to include General Dunford, to assess the conditions on the
ground and provide my best military advice with respect to the
transition of mission to my chain of command.
Question. Under the current conditions in Afghanistan, would you
support making such a transition by no later than the end of 2014?
Answer. I support the current plan to complete the transition by
the end of 2014, per the President's policy. If confirmed, I will
continue to assess the situation, along with the leaders on the ground,
and provide my best military advice on the timeline and related
transition requirements.
Question. What conditions, if any, would drive you to recommend to
the President to not transition from a combat to a support role?
Answer. We are transitioning from leading partnered
counterinsurgency operations to providing Security Force Assistance
through training, advising and assisting the ANSF based on the current
assessment of conditions on the ground. A number of factors were
considered when making the decision on pace and course of our
transition efforts. Indeed, it would be difficult to name a single
factor that would drive a commander to recommend a change to the
current plan. If confirmed, I will continue to assess conditions on the
ground and provide my best military advice to my chain of command.
draw down of u.s. forces in afghanistan
Question. In September 2012 the drawdown of the 33,000 U.S. surge
force in Afghanistan was completed, bringing U.S. troop levels down to
approximately 68,000. President Obama recently reaffirmed his pledge to
continue the drawdown of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan at a steady pace.
He also stated he would soon announce the next phase of the U.S.
drawdown based on the recommendations of the ISAF Commander and other
commanders on the ground in Afghanistan.
What is your understanding of the missions to be conducted by any
residual U.S. Force that may remain in Afghanistan after 2014?
Answer. My understanding of the missions to be conducted by
residual U.S. Forces remaining in Afghanistan after 2014 will be
counterterrorism; train, advise, and assist the ANSF; and provide
support to Department of State civilian missions. Most importantly,
force protection is inherent in everything we do in theater.
Question. In your current position as Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army, have you provided any recommendations on the size and missions of
any residual U.S. Force that may remain in Afghanistan after 2014?
Answer. No.
Question. Based on your experience as the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army and your experience in the Iraq drawdown, what missions and
force size do you recommend for a residual U.S. Force in post-2014
Afghanistan?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to provide such a
recommendation. I would defer to the current CENTCOM commander and the
commander on the ground to provide their recommendations.
Question. In your view, how should the requirement to provide force
protection for our troops be taken into consideration in any decision
on the size of a residual U.S. Force in Afghanistan post-2014?
Answer. Force protection is an inherent part of everything we do
and therefore must be included in the planning effort.
Question. How does the early transition to Afghan lead for security
announced by Presidents Obama and Karzai impact our mission and
objectives for the 2013 and 2014 fighting seasons?
Answer. The transition is and has always been conditions and
capability based. The early transition announcements reflect the
improving security situation in Afghanistan and ANSF's capabilities to
assume the lead and should have no impact on our mission objectives.
Question. What force structure do you think is appropriate for the
2013 and 2014 fighting seasons?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the force structure
capabilities and capacities that we will maintain over the next 2 years
to ensure they continue to meet our objectives. We will transition to
full security lead by the Afghans in the spring and we will need to
ensure that we have set the proper conditions for successful elections
in 2014. We will also need to ensure that we have the proper forces to
smoothly transition to the train, advise and assist mission by December
2014.
Question. What, in your view, should be the pace of reductions in
U.S. Forces during each of 2013 and 2014?
Answer. This is an operational maneuver. As such, the pace of
reductions should be based on the commander's assessment, the enemy
situation, conditions on the ground, to include ANSF capabilities, and
mission requirements in order to maintain the campaign's momentum and
to avoid jeopardizing the gains we have made. At the same time, we must
be clear that we will not abandon Afghanistan. This is a decisive time
in the country's history and decisions we make now regarding degrees of
support, how the U.S. drawdown proceeds, to include the preservation of
enablers in terms of logistics, medical evacuation, communications, and
air support will be essential for our partners.
logistical challenges
Question. What is your assessment of the speed and reliability of
logistical convoys through the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication
(GLOC) to support our forces in Afghanistan?
Answer. Movement in Pakistan is subject to a number of recurring
challenges including environmental conditions, political factors and
the ongoing security situation. We have cleared out nearly all cargo
previously stranded in Pakistan as a result of the closure that began
in November of 2011, and we recently commenced test shipments of new
cargo. We anticipate challenges as the Government of Pakistan (GOP)
struggles internally to implement new transit processes that were
agreed to during 2012. The GOP appears committed to resolving these
issues and facilitating successful, sustained cargo movement. It is our
intent to use the PAK GLOC consistent with route capacities, GOP
capabilities, the security situation, and environmental conditions.
Question. In your view, what improvements, if any, need to be made
in light of the logistical throughput rate of the Pakistan GLOC?
Answer. The current proven capacity of the PAK GLOC will support
the volumes that we anticipate being shipped via Pakistan.
Infrastructure improvements are not required to support anticipated
volumes, but may provide a positive impact supporting longer term
nation building, transit and trade in the region.
Question. To what extent has CENTCOM developed a common operating
picture to improve its processes for tracking equipment and supplies in
Afghanistan?
CENTCOM leverages both automated systems of record and manual
reporting processes to obtain a common picture of equipment and
supplies in Afghanistan. In addition, CENTCOM is partnering with the
Joint Staff and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to develop a
common operating picture to track the end-to-end retrograde process.
Question. General Austin, you served as the Commanding General of
U.S. Forces-Iraq during the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq
consistent with the 31 December 2011 deadline in the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement.
Taking into account your experience in Iraq, what are the biggest
risks and mitigation strategies associated with drawing down U.S.
Forces from Afghanistan and retrograding military equipment to the
United States?
Answer. The geographic and topographic complexities of Afghanistan
will make the retrograde of materiel and personnel very challenging.
The largest risk to retrograde operations is the threat of disruption
to PAK GLOC and the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) operations. To
mitigate this risk, the CENTCOM Materiel Recovery Element (CMRE) was
established to increase both volume and velocity of retrograde efforts.
Transition and retrograde will also need to be conducted while
contending with an able and determined enemy. As the size of our
footprint shrinks, force protection and availability of enablers will
increase in importance.
Question. How do you intend to address any conflicts between the
objectives of mission accomplishment in the 2013 and 2014 fighting
seasons and the logistical challenge of drawing down forces and
retrograding military equipment?
Answer. The accomplishment of our mission in 2013 and 2014 fighting
seasons will be inextricably linked to the imperative of drawing down
forces and retrograding equipment. The drawdown and retrograde are in
themselves significant military operations that must be fully nested
within the ground tactical plan and plans for operational maneuver.
Fighting season considerations, force levels and retrograde actions
cannot be considered in isolation. The ground commander must plan
operations, assess risk and mitigate conflicts as a whole to ensure all
efforts within theater are nested and synchronized.
status of forces agreement for afghanistan
Question. As called for in the Enduring Strategic Partnership
Agreement signed in May, the United States and Afghanistan are holding
talks on a Bilateral Security Agreement, which will provide essential
protections for any limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after
2014.
Do you agree that it is essential that any status of forces
agreement for U.S. military forces in Afghanistan after 2014 provide
immunity for U.S. troops from prosecution in Afghan courts?
Answer. Yes. Exclusive jurisdiction is an essential requirement.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend that the United States
withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan if those forces do not
have such immunity?
Answer. Yes. Without jurisdiction over our troops, our activity in
Afghanistan must be limited to traditional security assistance. Combat
and training activities cannot be conducted without this protection.
Question. Based on your experience in the Iraq drawdown, what are
the risks associated with removing all U.S. military forces from
Afghanistan?
Answer. Removing all U.S. military forces threatens the
achievements gained in Afghanistan over the last 12 years of sustained
combat. Such a withdrawal could open the door to a return of al Qaeda,
collapse of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and
lead to increased instability in the region. Also, it could delay the
maturation of Afghan forces at a critical point in their development.
afghanistan national security forces
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?
Answer. ANSF operational effectiveness continues a general upward
trend as they continue to improve and professionalize. The ANSF have
increasingly taken the lead in areas previously secured by U.S. surge
forces, and have been able to expand their reach, occupying patrol
bases and combat outposts that had previously been too dangerous to
hold. The ANSF have also increased their abilities to plan, carry out,
and sustain high-level kinetic actions involving multiple ANSF forces.
Question. What is your assessment of the capacity of the ANSF to
take the security lead and to conduct unilateral operations?
Answer. The ANSF have made substantial progress during the past
year, and are steadily building a force that will assume full
responsibility for security operations throughout Afghanistan by the
end of 2014. The ANSF are unilaterally conducting the vast majority of
operations in Afghanistan, although many of these are routine patrols.
Force generation and development efforts continue to yield advancements
in operational effectiveness. During the previous year, ANSF made
strides in performance, increasingly moving into the lead for security
operations. As of the end of the last reporting period, ANSF partnered
with ISAF on more than 90 percent of all operations and was in the lead
in more than 50 percent of these actions.
Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any,
would you make for addressing those challenges?
Answer. There are five key challenges to building the capacity and
capability of the ANSF: leadership, logistics, counter-IED, attrition
and literacy. Counter-IED continues to pose a significant challenge.
Attrition rates have improved; however, we must continue to monitor
levels. We must also continue to help the ANSF to professionalize the
force; train and develop leaders; build their enabler capacity; and,
further expand literacy which will have a lasting impact on the
country. If confirmed, I will work closely with General Dunford to
ensure that he has the resources necessary to develop a sufficient and
sustainable ANSF that can operate independently of coalition
assistance.
Question. Do you support plans for building and sustaining the ANSF
at 352,000 personnel?
Answer. Yes. The target end strength provides the capacity for
achieving security and stability in Afghanistan.
Question. Do you agree that any reductions in the ANSF from this
352,000 level should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan at
the time those reductions would be expected to occur?
Answer. Yes. A sufficient and sustainable ANSF is necessary for
Afghanistan's long-term stability and security. The current ANSF
sustainment plan will maintain Afghan forces at surge strength of
352,000 through 2018, to allow for continued progress toward a
sustainable secure environment in Afghanistan. As security conditions
on the ground continue to improve, ANSF will undergo a gradual, managed
force reduction to a final force structure that is both adequate to
meet security requirements and fiscally sustainable in the long term.
insider threat
Question. In 2012 the number of so-called ``green-on-blue''
incidents, in which ANSF personnel or ANSF impersonators attacked U.S.
or coalition soldiers, increased significantly. The rise in the number
of insider attacks has led U.S. and Afghan military leaders to take a
number of precautions against such insider threats, including expanding
Afghan counterintelligence efforts to identify possible Taliban
infiltrators, increasing cultural sensitivity training, and expanding
the ``Guardian Angel'' program to protect against the insider threat in
meetings between coalition and Afghan forces.
What in your view are the causes of the increase in insider attacks
and what has been their impact on the military campaign in Afghanistan?
Answer. Insider attacks are an insurgent tactic designed to create
a seam and sow mistrust between ISAF and ANSF forces. Most likely the
increase in insider attacks reflects a combination of factors including
the increase in the number of ANSF personnel and a greater number of
Coalition Force (CF) trainers living and working with the ANSF.
Overall, these attacks, while tragic, have not had a significant impact
on the campaign.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of these green-on-
blue attacks on the level of trust between coalition and Afghan forces?
Answer. Clearly these types of attacks have the potential to impact
morale and to compromise bonds among coalition members. However, during
my recent visit to Afghanistan I did not see indications of either low
morale or mistrust among coalition and Afghan forces.
Question. What is your assessment of the measures that have been
taken by ISAF and Afghan leaders to address the insider threat? Are
there additional steps that you would recommend to address this threat,
if confirmed?
Answer. Since January 2012, there has been a significant increase
in the ISAF and ANSF efforts to mitigate insider attacks. In August
2012, ISAF and the ANSF forces formed the Insider Threat Action Group
and the Insider Threat Mitigation Team to jointly identify and
implement insider threat mitigation efforts. Steps are being taken by
Afghans to institute a number of insider threat countermeasures and
supplement the vetting process in order to remove undesirable members
of the ANSF. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander,
ISAF, to ensure appropriate measures are being taken and the necessary
resources allocated to protect coalition forces.
Question. In light of the spike in insider attacks, do you see a
need to reconsider current plans for embedding small Security Force
Assistance Teams of U.S. military advisors with Afghan military units
to assist in the transition to an Afghan security lead?
Answer. Presently, no; but, this is a critical question and if I am
confirmed, I will work with General Dunford as conditions warrant to
evaluate the potential risks to our embedded advisors as transition
progresses.
reconciliation
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and
other insurgent groups?
Answer. Achieving a durable peace in Afghanistan will require some
form of political settlement among Afghans. That settlement must
ultimately be brokered among the Afghans themselves. Afghanistan is
adamant that the Afghan Government must maintain control of any
reconciliation negotiations. The U.S. role should acknowledge that the
Afghanistan Government is the lead for reconciliation and focus on
acting as a mediator and encouraging other nations to play a
constructive role.
Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States
be taking to advance the reconciliation process?
Answer. The United States could work to bring other key AOR
partners with a vested interest in securing a stable Afghanistan into
the reconciliation dialogue to offer their assistance in support of the
peace process.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's
neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in the reconciliation process?
Answer. Neighbors in the region have legitimate interests in
Afghanistan and need to play a constructive role in the reconciliation
process. Specifically Pakistan must take steps to ensure that militant
and extremist groups cannot continue to find safe haven in Pakistani
territory. It should actively support the Afghan-led process.
Ultimately, Pakistan and the other regional neighbors will benefit from
improved stability in Afghanistan.
special operations in afghanistan
Question. Special Operations Forces depend on general purpose
forces for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical
evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations
Command, has said ``I have no doubt that special operations will be the
last to leave Afghanistan'' and has predicted that the requirement for
special operations forces may increase as general purpose forces
continue to be drawn down.
If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities
for Special Operations Forces (SOF) as general purpose forces continue
to draw down in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with SOCOM to assess SOF enabling
requirements and source them with existing CENTCOM assets or through
the request for forces process.
Question. The find-fix-finish operational model is greatly enhanced
by opportunities to capture and interrogate enemy personnel, but that
capability may be eroded as the U.S. military and intelligence
footprint is reduced. An inability to mount capture operations could
lead to a greater emphasis on lethal actions, potentially affecting
public opinion.
What long-term risks are imposed on counterterrorism operations in
Afghanistan as a result of fundamental changes in the operational
environment for SOF?
Answer. As coalition and U.S. SOF are reduced in size and scope
with the drawdown, the ANSF will play an ever-increasing greater role
in counterterrorism. U.S. and coalition operational risk is reduced as
these forces step back and settle into a train, advise and assist
capacity. Long-term strategic risk lies with the capability and
capacity of ANSF SOF to efficiently and effectively execute
counterterrorism. However, this risk is also reduced through adequate
ANSF SOF training and with the provision of adequate operational
enablers to ANSF SOF.
Question. Last April, the United States and Afghanistan signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the ``Afghanization'' of direct
action counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan, which reflected the
shared intention of having Afghan security forces in the lead in the
conduct of such operations with U.S. Forces in a support role.
Why is it important for Afghan Special Operations Forces to be in
the lead on night raids?
Answer. As a sovereign nation, Afghanistan certainly should be in
the lead in these types of operations. Historically, indigenous forces
defeat insurgencies. Successful transition will be characterized by our
Afghan partners taking increasing responsibility for the planning and
command of these night operations.
Question. General Allen and others have praised the Village
Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs--both
U.S. Special Operations missions--as critical elements of the
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. However, President Karzai
recently stated his position that U.S. Forces should withdraw from
Afghan villages.
What are your views on the value of these programs and do you
believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan
(i.e. post-2014)?
Answer. Denying adversaries control over populations is essential
to prevailing in a contest to establish governance. The VSO and ALP
programs have proven effective by enabling local security and re-
establishment or re-empowerment of traditional local governance
mechanisms. ``Bottom-up,'' population-focused stability efforts to
improve security and development undermine hostile influence and
control in contested, strategically important areas. These programs
will prove valuable and effective as part of the long-term strategy in
Afghanistan.
Question. What is your understanding of President Karzai's position
with regard to the VSO and ALP programs?
Answer. President Karzai desires an Afghanistan that is protected
and secured by Afghans. His support for the VSO and ALP programs hinges
on them being Afghan-led, and the traditional ``arbaki'' (local
militia) aspect of the programs. Support for these programs at the
local level has heavily influenced his support for them at the national
level.
Question. Recently, the Special Operations Joint Task Force-
Afghanistan (SOJTF-A), was established to improve coordination among
U.S., coalition, and Afghan special forces. This new command structure
unified, for the first time, command of all capacity building,
counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism activities conducted by special
operations forces in the country.
Do you believe unified command of all special operations activities
is important and if so, why?
Answer. Yes. Synchronization and unity of effort among special
operations activities is absolutely critical and what a unified command
provides. The recent establishment of NATO Special Operations Component
Command-Afghanistan, and the Special Operations Joint Task Force-
Afghanistan (NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A) into a combined organizational structure
provides a robust, properly sized and structured headquarters that
avoids duplication and ensures the best use of available funding,
manpower and infrastructure.
Question. Do you believe general purpose forces could be assigned
to the new Special Operations Joint Task Force, as has been done
previously, to augment special operations forces carrying out the
Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs?
Answer. General purpose and Special Operations Forces are task
organized to produce superior results. It is my experience that when
different forces work together they achieve outcomes that exceed their
capabilities when operating alone.
afghan public protection force
Question. What is your opinion of the progress and future prospects
for the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and its ability to
transition all ISAF fixed-site and convoy security missions by March
2013?
Answer. National Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) assesses that
APPF cannot achieve complete transition before September 2014 even
though Presidential Decree (PD) 62 requires that all ISAF sites and
convoys currently secured by Private Security Companies (PSC) be
transitioned to APPF by 20 March 2013. According to PD62, if policy
does not change it will be illegal to contract services of PSCs after
20 March 2013. ISAF does not currently have the process or manpower in
place to undertake this task and the APPF lacks the capacity to replace
all PSC-provided functions at ISAF locations. ISAF is finalizing a
contingency plan relating to APPF.
no contracting with the enemy
Question. A year ago, at the request of the Department of Defense
(DOD), we enacted the ``No Contracting with the Enemy Act,'' which
gives CENTCOM important new tools to ensure that DOD funds do not go to
support individuals and entities that actively support the insurgency
or actively oppose U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan. Earlier
this month, DOD officials informed us that little action has been taken
pursuant to these new authorities.
What is your understanding of the reasons for CENTCOM's failure, to
date, to make aggressive use of the No Contracting with the Enemy Act?
Answer. Based on my experience in Iraq, I understand the importance
of preventing funds from getting into the hands of the enemy. If
confirmed, I will certainly work to ensure that CENTCOM is in
compliance with the ``No Contracting with the Enemy Act'' provisions.
Question. What steps, if any, will you take if confirmed to ensure
that CENTCOM takes full advantage of the authority provided by Congress
to ensure that DOD funds do not go to support individuals and entities
that oppose our interests in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on my commanders in Afghanistan
and intelligence sources to identify companies or persons that may be
subject to the ``No Contracting with the Enemy Act''. When presented
with evidence of support to the enemy or opposition to the United
States or coalition, I will issue findings against those companies or
persons in accordance with the authorities granted to me by Congress.
afghanistan air force
Question. How do you believe the delays and disruptions in programs
to buy airlift and light tactical aircraft for Afghanistan's air force
have affected Afghanistan's ability to accept responsibility for its
own security?
Answer. To date, there have been no known short-term impacts.
However, as the transition continues, the ANSF will experience more
equipment and personnel challenges without planned aircraft enablers.
ANSF will be required to rely more on indirect fires and mobile land
forces with reduced close air support.
u.s. strategic relationship with pakistan
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic relationship
between the United States and Pakistan? What would you consider to be
areas of shared strategic interest between the two countries?
Answer. The strategic relationship between the United States and
Pakistan remains strained, but is improving. Pakistan's willingness to
cooperate on key U.S. goals has been limited primarily to issues such
as counterterrorism and Afghanistan. As such, we have reduced the scope
of our security assistance to focus on those areas where our strategic
interests overlap, namely counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
capabilities.
Question. What do you consider to be the major challenges in the
U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship?
Answer. Challenges do exist in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.
Among them, Pakistan's at-times divergent interests in Afghanistan, its
existential fear of India and its nuclear arsenal remain roadblocks to
establishing a long-term, strategic partnership. That said, Pakistan
is, and will remain important to achieving U.S. goals in the region,
especially as we transition in Afghanistan. The reality is that most
challenges can be managed by exercising strategic patience and taking
the long view on the relationship.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
military relations?
Answer. The overall military-to-military relationship continues to
improve and I believe we should seek to continue this trend. The
continued importance of the Pakistan military lends credence to the
continued provision of security assistance as an important engagement
tool for maintaining access and influence. We must continue our
``whole-of-government'' approach towards Pakistan to ensure all avenues
of engagement remain open.
u.s. security assistance to pakistan
Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
security assistance to Pakistan. In addition, the United States has
provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection
with Operation Enduring Freedom.
In your view, how effective has the assistance and other support
that the United States has provided to Pakistan been in promoting U.S.
interests?
Answer. Overall, U.S. support to Pakistan has been moderately
effective in promoting U.S. interests. At best, our assistance has
enabled the Pakistani military to increase its effectiveness against
violent extremists. It has also enabled us to sustain military-to-
military relations. However, the high level of financial support has
not fully translated to the desired effects the United States
anticipated.
Question. Do you support conditioning U.S. assistance and other
support to Pakistan on Pakistan's continued cooperation in areas of
mutual security interest?
Answer. Putting specific conditions on U.S. assistance helps to
ensure that our support to Pakistan furthers U.S. interests. Without
such caveats, Pakistan may be tempted to apply our support towards
efforts they deem to be in their national interest, which may or may
not overlap with ours.
combating terrorism
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
(AQ) and its associated forces to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests
overseas, and Western interests more broadly?
Answer. Despite the immense pressure placed on al Qaeda leadership
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, the global al
Qaeda movement remains resilient. Regional instability in CENTCOM's AOR
and evolving security conditions resulting from the Arab Spring are
creating opportunities and potential safe havens for the AQ movement.
AQ, its affiliates and allies are exploiting weak governments in places
like Yemen to gain new footholds, plan attacks against U.S. Forces, our
interests, those of our Western partners and potentially the U.S.
Homeland. AQ's affiliates and allies pose an enduring and persistent
threat to the U.S. Homeland and Middle East stability and security.
Question. Within the CENTCOM AOR, what do you consider the highest
counterterrorism priorities?
Answer. I believe the counterterrorism priorities are Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, and, in the near-term, Syria. Despite our
efforts, the AQ movement remains resilient due to the rapidly changing
and emerging geopolitical environment in the Middle East and North
Africa. AQ senior leadership in Pakistan will likely retain their safe
haven and continue to provide leadership and moral authority to AQ
affiliates as U.S. and coalition forces withdraw. AQ in the Arabian
Peninsula is emerging as the most dangerous of the AQ affiliates and
persists as the Yemeni Government tries to dislodge the group from its
southern Yemen safe haven. AQ in Iraq is reconstituting, increasing
attacks meant to destabilize the Iraqi Government and incite sectarian
conflict. Finally, AQ in Iraq's Syria-based offshoot, the Al-Nusrah
Front, is increasing in capability and influence.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role in
the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The Department's role in the U.S. strategy to combat
terrorism in the CENTCOM AOR is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda and any Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) that poses a direct
threat to U.S. assets, allies, and interests abroad. The Department
must be part of a ``whole-of-government'' approach to combating long-
term terrorism threats. Combined with diplomatic and economic
mechanisms against state-enablers of terrorism, DOD can provide
intelligence collection, training, support, and targeting to support
counterterrorism efforts.
Question. Given your current knowledge of CENTCOM programs, do you
believe the Command's resources are aligned in a manner consistent with
these counterterrorism priorities?
Answer. Yes. CENTCOM resources are utilized to employ a whole-of-
government approach to reach many of its desired end states mentioned
above. Partnerships with U.S. Government entities such as the State
Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the like are
paramount in the efficient utilization of resources.
iraq lessons learned
Question. Did you agree with the President's decision on the
withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq? If so, why? If not, why
not?
Answer. Yes. Given the unwillingness of the Iraqi Government to
grant protections and immunities to our servicemembers, thereby putting
them at risk from prosecution in Iraqi courts, the United States had
very few options. Our mission in Iraq today, which operates as part of
the diplomatic mission, has been very successful at sustaining the
crucial military-to-military relationship with the Iraqi Armed Forces.
Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
the Iraq invasion and the follow-on efforts to stabilize the country
through 2011?
Answer. I believe the most significant lesson learned was that the
U.S. military is as capable and resilient--people, equipment, systems,
and leadership--as at any time in our history, and it reaches its full
potential when integrated and synchronized across a joint framework
that has unity of purpose and effect. The second lesson I took away
from our Nation's commitment in Iraq was the need for a thorough,
interagency, multi-national approach to planning and execution that
delivers flexible military plans and operations that can be adjusted to
account for the ever-changing conditions of warfare. The third lesson I
took away from Iraq in December 2011 was that the military instrument
of power has limitations and is best used as part of a whole-of-
government(s) approach to the complex challenges we see today across
the globe. Finally, I re-learned the value of close, personal
relationships between coalition, host nation, interagency and other
partners as teams of teams work to make progress in support of national
goals.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force
structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has applied
several lessons learned, specifically to the approaching transition in
Afghanistan. In my current position, I can see our approach to
challenges is informed by experiences in Iraq. I am not in a position
to assess the changes at the Department level, but there is a clear
intent to use not only experiences in Iraq, but also experiences in
combating terror and military engagements/operations over the past
decade to inform policy, program, force structure, and operational
concept decisions in the current and future environment.
Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you
propose making to policy, programs, force structure or operating
concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in
Iraq?
Answer. Our relationship with the Iraqi security forces is
incredibly important and robust. If confirmed, I will continue our
efforts to improve the capability of Iraqi security forces while
transitioning to a normal security relationship. Our goal has been and
will continue to be a self-sufficient Iraqi military that provides for
the defense of Iraq. Maintaining an appropriate sized Office of
Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) with the required authorities is
critical to this effort. Iraq's nascent government teeters between
democracy and oligarchy. Although this problem cannot be solved solely
through military means, OSC-I's success in maintaining strong military-
to-military relations will afford other U.S. Government agencies the
time and space needed to achieve U.S. objectives.
security situation in iraq
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
in Iraq?
Answer. The tenuous security situation in Iraq reflects an immature
government and security institutions, ethno-sectarian divisions and
daunting external challenges. Following an unsuccessful effort by
opposition political parties to unseat Prime Minister Maliki through a
no confidence vote, Sunni opposition to perceived central government
sectarianism and authoritarianism has intensified; and Kurdistan
Regional Government and Government of Iraq security forces remain in a
tense stand-off in the disputed areas around Kirkuk. Additionally,
although well below 2006 levels, Iraq has been unable to break the
cycle of extremist violence that has plagued the country since the
withdrawal of U.S. Forces. Specifically, al Qaeda in Iraq has proven
its resilience by maintaining a consistent tempo of high profile
attacks against primarily government targets over the past year.
Question. What are the main challenges to stability and security in
Iraq over the coming months?
Answer. The main challenges to stability include heightened Arab-
Kurd tensions, unresolved sectarian tensions, extremist violence
intended to undermine the government, and the potential for spillover
from the Syrian conflict. The threat of an Arab-Kurd conflict has
increased steadily in the past year as virtually every aspect of the
Arab-Kurd relationship has worsened. Lagging political progress
resulting from a lack of political reconciliation has resulted in
increasing Sunni political opposition to the Shia-dominated government
and made a return to sectarian violence possible. Al Qaeda in Iraq has
continued its cycle of violence and appears to be well postured to
sustain current levels of violence into the future. The Syrian conflict
has the potential to exacerbate many of the existing tensions already
present in Iraq: galvanize the Sunni opposition, strengthen AQI, flood
the country with refugees, and make weapons available to extremists,
all stressing the nascent Iraqi Government.
u.s.-iraq strategic relationship
Question. The withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq at the end of
2011 has been described as the beginning of a new chapter in the
strategic relationship between the United States and Iraq. The U.S.-
Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement sets out a foundation for a
normalized U.S.-Iraqi relationship in areas of mutual economic,
diplomatic, cultural and security interests. Secretary of Defense
Panetta and the Iraqi Minister of Defense recently signed a MOU for
Defense Cooperation between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Iraq and the Department of Defense of the United States.
How do you see the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship developing in
the coming years and in what areas do you see potential for developing
that relationship?
Answer. The domestic and regional political challenges facing Iraqi
leaders are not likely to subside and could complicate our overarching
strategic relationship. However, we have been quite successful over the
past year in sustaining our military-to-military relationship with the
Iraqi Security Forces. I believe this could serve as a launching point
to further expand our economic, cultural and diplomatic relationships
under the Strategic Framework Agreement.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the United
States-Iraqi security relationship over the coming years?
Answer. Domestic challenges, including ethnic and sectarian
tensions and a lack of inclusiveness in the political system, if not
effectively addressed, will complicate our security relationship.
Meanwhile, we may have differing views from our Iraqi partners on
regional conflicts, such as that in Syria, which may limit Iraq's
willingness to partner with us.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the recently
concluded MOU? In your view, how does this agreement on defense
cooperation promote U.S. security interests with respect to Iraq and
the region?
Answer. In my current position I am unable to provide an informed
assessment of the recently concluded MOU. I understand the MOU is an
official commitment between the U.S. Government and the Government of
Iraq for a long-term security relationship. If confirmed, I will work
with leaders in both nations to sustain, establish, and develop
programs that pursue our shared goals. In the strategic realm, this
agreement draws Iraq one-step closer to our Nation.
office of security cooperation in iraq
Question. In fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013, Congress
authorized the Secretary of Defense to support the transition in Iraq
by providing funds for the activities and operations of the OSC-I. In
the report to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013, the conferees expressed their expectation that the
administration will accelerate the transition of the OSC-I to a
normalized status comparable to Offices of Security Cooperation in
other countries in the region, and that funding for OSC-I activities
and operations will be transitioned out of DOD to other sources, as is
the case for offices of security cooperation in other countries.
Do you support the transition of the OSC-I to a normalized office
of security cooperation comparable to those in other countries in the
region?
Answer. Yes. I fully support DOS's transition for Iraq as it was
intended at the outset of planning. The normalization and transition
activities of OSC-I are a reflection of the development of our security
relationship with the Government of Iraq and represent a significant
milestone towards an enduring strategic partnership.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the transition of the
OSC-I to a normalized status, including funding from sources other than
the DOD, is completed in a deliberate manner?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that the OSC-I transition
is planned and executed in a deliberate manner that meets all policy
and legal requirements.
Question. Based on your experience during the drawdown of U.S.
Forces in Iraq, do you agree that setting a target date is critical for
ensuring that the transition of the OSC-I to a normalized status occurs
in a deliberate manner?
Answer. The conditions and requirements for the drawdown in Iraq
were bounded by a timeline, which is a different situation than
transition of a security cooperation mission, but I would say that
planning for strategic transitions should balance conditions, risks,
and timelines that are in line with U.S. policy. As time passes,
leaders will assess changing conditions and risk to mission to ensure
that timelines are met or extended in a manner that best achieves the
goals of the transition. In the end, the U.S. and Iraqi goal should be
a security cooperation organization of the right size and with the
right amount of resources to effectively pursue a positive, long-term
strategic relationship. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
conditions and risks are clearly stated and options are presented that
reflect the results of deliberate planning.
Question. If confirmed, what timeframe would you recommend as an
appropriate target for transitioning OSC-I to a normalized status?
Answer. In my current position I am unable to provide an informed
recommendation for a target date, but I have every confidence in the
leadership team in Iraq and the planning for the current approach to
the transition. If confirmed, I would consult with the interagency team
to ensure that the military components of the transition were properly
aligned and prepared for transition. I would also provide best military
advice on the execution of the transition, presenting options that
ensured our goals were met and our relationship with Iraq strengthened.
If conditions change, I would also make case-by-case recommendations on
programs that could be considered for acceleration or delay.
syria
Question. The civil war in Syria continues and President Assad's
commitment to continuing his regime's ongoing operations appear
unwavering despite broad international condemnation. To date, the
United States has limited its support to opposition forces to non-
lethal assistance to forces on the ground, as well as technical
assistance to elements of the opposition working to build a cohesive
political entity.
In your view, what is the proper role on the U.S. military in this
conflict?
Answer. This is a complex problem requiring a regional solution.
Certainly at this time, based on the complexity and volatility of the
conflict, a regionally-led diplomatic and political strategy, with the
United States in support, has the best chance of succeeding and
enduring. However, we do need to remain vigilant and conduct
appropriate planning to contain two emerging threats, the loss of
control by the Syrian regime of its CW stocks and Advanced Conventional
Weapons and the growing influence of violent extremists like the Al-
Nusrah Front. Both of these emerging threats have the potential to
spillover from Syria into neighboring countries, all of whom are U.S.
allies and partners.
Question. In your view, should the United States provide other
kinds of support to opposition groups on the ground in Syria, including
the provision of lethal support?
Answer. Based on the divergent interests and fractured nature of
the armed opposition groups in Syria, there would be great risk to
providing them with lethal aid at this time. The influential role of
violent extremists like the Al-Nusrah Front within the opposition and
the close proximity of Iranian surrogates and Lebanese Hizbollah to the
conflict increase the chance of lethal aid finding its way into the
hands of malign actors opposed to U.S. interests. The United States is
best served by looking for opportunities to provide humanitarian aid
and non-lethal assistance to acceptable elements of the opposition
while working with regional partners to develop a diplomatic and
political solution to the conflict.
Question. In your view, what should be NATO's role with respect to
Syria (i.e. should NATO consider a military intervention, the creation
of a no-fly zone, or other military operations to protect civilians and
support opposition forces)?
Answer. Any viable and enduring solution to the Syria crisis must
rely heavily on leadership and participation from our regional
partners. Having said that, NATO is currently providing Turkey with
ballistic missile defense to hedge against potential Syrian military
aggression. Any further role will be determined through consultation
with Turkey and our other NATO allies.
Question. In your view, would the removal of the Assad regime be a
strategic defeat of Iran in the region?
Answer. The loss of Assad will be a significant blow to Iran's
prestige and regional influence and will at least temporarily degrade
its operational reach into the Levant by calling into question its
longtime logistics hub in Syria. However, consistent with its hedging
strategy, Iran will seek to develop other avenues for supporting its
proxies and surrogates throughout the region and possibly even focus
more attention on countries with large Shia populations like Iraq and
Lebanon.
Question. In your view, what role, if any, has the Government of
Iraq played with regard to supporting the Assad regime or the armed
Syrian opposition?
Answer. The Government of Iraq is attempting to remain neutral
regarding the Syrian crisis and prefers a diplomatic solution to end
the conflict. Understandably, Iraq is worried about spillover and is
seeking to bolster the security of its border. Although the Iraqi
Government is not directly aiding the Assad regime, it may have tacitly
supported Assad through Iranian over-flights to Syria. Iranian
aircraft, overflying Iraqi territory, have transported humanitarian aid
to the Assad regime and it is likely these shipments have included
lethal aid. Iraqi authorities have conducted some cargo inspections,
but have not fully addressed U.S. demands to ensure over-flights do not
carry lethal aid.
iran
Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has
failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current
and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed
by Iran?
Answer. Iranian military capabilities are significant as compared
to its neighbors, and thus enable Iran to pursue a policy focused on
reducing U.S. regional influence and asserting Iranian dominance in the
region. The expansion of Iran's military and nuclear program over the
last decade provides, in part, Tehran the confidence to threaten and
coerce neighbors; disrupts international trade and commerce; and
targets U.S. and partner interests in the region. Iran also maintains a
significant asymmetric capability via its threat network, led primarily
by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and its
regional surrogates, and to a lesser degree the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security. Iran uses this threat network to covertly
execute its strategic objectives in the region, advance its
destabilizing agenda to include the provision of financial and lethal
aid, and could use this network to attack United States' interests and
our allies.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to
Iran?
Answer. U.S. policy, aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon, is appropriate and critical to avoiding a regional arms
race and preserving stability in the Middle East. The U.S. Government's
dual track strategy of engagement combined with pressure in the form of
sanctions and diplomatic and political isolation is the right approach,
and most likely to provide an enduring solution to the challenge posed
by Iran's nuclear pursuits. The current strategy has rallied
international support and significantly degraded Iran's economy, and as
we sharpen the choice for the regime in Tehran, our parallel efforts of
building our regional partners' military capabilities and maintaining
credible deterrence remain critical elements of our broader multi-
vector approach.
Question. What more do you believe the United States and the
international community can and should do to dissuade Iran from
pursuing nuclear weapons?
Answer. I believe we should continue to employ the dual track
strategy of engagement and pressure to achieve our goals. Whenever
possible we should continue to strengthen the international sanctions
regime so as to increase the pressure on the Iranian Government, while
continuing to work with our international partners to underscore to
Iran the costs it will bear for its nuclear non-compliance, as well as
the deepening isolation it will face on the regional and global stage.
Meanwhile, as we draw down forces in Afghanistan and as the overall
size of the U.S. military presence within the Middle East decreases, it
will become increasingly important that the United States maintain
appropriate military capability in the region in order to be able to
respond to a range of contingencies. This capability will also reassure
our partners as we continue to build partner capacity in response to
increasing Iranian malign activity. U.S. Government actions vis-a-vis
Iran are closely knit together so as to achieve a ``whole-of-
government'' approach to this problem set. By combining our efforts
with the activities of our partners and friends worldwide, we have the
best chance of achieving the objectives we seek in dissuading Iran from
the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.
Question. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing
U.S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by
Iran?
Answer. There are significant risks associated with a reduced U.S.
regional presence. U.S. Forces demonstrate our resolve and our
commitment to regional security and the free flow of commerce, as well
as a reflection of our continued efforts to build the capacity of
regional partners. U.S. Forces provide a deterrent to Iranian overreach
and their drive for regional hegemony, and ensure we are prepared to
respond to a range of regional contingencies. However, the United
States should not carry this burden alone. An appropriately sized force
contributes to increased burden sharing by training with regional
partners to enhance their capacity to better defend themselves.
Nonetheless, we must balance CENTCOM's regional risk assessment with
DOD and Service requirements to manage the overall readiness of the
Force and the costs of associated deployments. This places a premium on
building partner capacity and working by, with and through our regional
partners to achieve a better balance of shared defense requirements. If
confirmed, I will assess CENTCOM's force posture, and my staff and I
will work closely with the Joint Staff to determine the correct U.S.
presence in the Middle East.
Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions
against Iran--how effective have they been and should additional
unilateral or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?
Answer. Iran's economy has been severely impacted by the
unprecedented international sanctions that have been imposed,
especially the sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and the
EU oil embargo. These sanctions have reduced the availability of hard
currency and resulted in a sharply depreciated currency and high
inflation rates. I expect these conditions to be exacerbated by
additional sanctions that went into effect on 6 February that prevent
foreign banks from repatriating Iran's oil revenues, effectively
locking them up overseas. These restrictions will likely cause further
deterioration of Iran's economy, such as expanding trade deficits,
reduction in the availability of hard currency, a further depreciated
Rial and higher inflation.
Question. In your view, what role should CENTCOM play in countering
Iran's support of international terrorism throughout its AOR?
Answer. CENTCOM, in very close coordination with SOCOM, plays a
pivotal role in deterring Iran's support to terrorist organizations and
countering Iran's malign influence. The Iranian Threat Network (ITN) is
a worldwide network whose elements execute direct action, intelligence
operations, influence building and terrorism against United States'
interests, as well as partner nations. From the time of its creation,
in response to the 1979 Iran crisis, CENTCOM has been crucial in
defending U.S. interests within the Middle East. We will continue to
work with our regional partners to build capacity to counter
international terrorism in and outside the AOR. CENTCOM will continue
to be the U.S. military's lead for defending U.S. interests in the
region, maintaining the free flow of international commerce and
protecting regional partners.
egypt
Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
Egypt?
Answer. In the near-term, large-scale civil unrest related to the
ongoing political and economic crises presents an immediate threat to
stability and security in the country. Internal security forces have
struggled to control the types of large-scale demonstrations seen in
Egypt in the past 2 years. Additionally, Egypt's security situation is
impacted by the growth of violent extremist organizations in the Sinai
Peninsula and increased arms smuggling from Libya and Sudan. The
situation on the ground is further exacerbated by the government's
inability to stabilize the political system. The poor security climate
is hindering Egypt's economic recovery because it discourages foreign
investment and the return of Egypt's large tourist economy.
Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egypt security
relationship?
Answer. The Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) has proven to be a reliable
partner for us as we navigate Egypt's internal transition and seek to
promote regional stability and security. We have relied on it during
times of crises and it has been responsive and professional in its
actions. EAF has announced its intentions and followed through in
consistent fashion. Egypt indirectly supports U.S. regional objectives
by allowing unfettered overflight permissions and Suez Canal transit
courtesies not typically afforded to other nations. Additionally,
Egypt's strategic importance and regional leadership role make it one
of the most important partners in CENTCOM's theater of operations.
Close defensive ties allow for open dialogue to discuss hard issues and
identify areas for enhanced cooperation.
Question. What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with
respect to regional stability? In your view, should the U.S. Government
continue to provide defense articles and services, including but not
limited to the F-16s, purchased by the Egyptian military using U.S.
Foreign Military Financing funds?
Answer. By providing equipment and training the United States has
helped Egypt to maintain a strong and disciplined professional defense
force which is critical to ensuring Egypt's continued role as a
regional leader, able to act as a moderating influence and contribute
actively to the resolution of regional conflicts. For the past 30
years, the F-16 aircraft has been a key component of the relationship
between the U.S. military and the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF).
Maintaining this relationship and assisting with the
professionalization and development of the EAF's capabilities to secure
its borders is an essential element of our efforts to stabilize Egypt
and the region.
Question. Egypt has been criticized for its perceived failure to
act along the Egypt-Gaza border to counter the smuggling threat posed
by cross-border tunnels. Egypt has also played an important role,
however, in ensuring peace on the southern border of Israel.
What is your assessment of Egypt's efforts to counter the flow of
rocket and other advanced munitions into Gaza?
Answer. While Egyptian security forces have interdicted weapons
shipments crossing Egyptian territory, their capabilities are limited
and their success sporadic. Weapons coming into Egypt primarily from
Sudan and Libya continue to transit the Sinai into Gaza. Extremists and
militants are leveraging the lack of security in the Sinai and Egypt's
inconsistent initiatives to their advantage.
al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. A number of senior U.S. officials have indicated the most
significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently emanates from Yemen.
What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to the United States?
Answer. Despite suffering severe territorial, personnel, and
resource losses over the last year, attacking the U.S. Homeland remains
a pillar of AQAP's overall strategy. As such, a small cadre of
operatives continues to work tirelessly to develop plots against the
West. While those operations appear to be stalled in the conceptual
stages, the group's history and continued access to innovative
bombmakers and western operatives suggests AQAP is capable of advancing
an operation with little to no warning, particularly if
counterterrorism pressure subsides.
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy to
counter al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
Answer. The CENTCOM strategy to counter threats in Yemen is
outlined in a detailed plan of actions, activities and operations. I am
not currently in a position to assess this strategy. However, I do
believe that our overall approach to countering AQAP must involve our
interagency and regional partners. Only by effectively employing our
network can we defeat the AQAP network. If confirmed, I will study this
challenge further and look to pursue a whole-of-government approach.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the U.S. military in
countering the threat of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and how
should this role be coordinated with other agencies and departments in
prosecuting an interagency strategy?
Answer. CENTCOM, in coordination with U.S. Government agencies and
the Host Nation, supports and conducts enabling and security operations
to promote a secure and stable Yemen in order to neutralize threats
against U.S. interests. CENTCOM supports a whole-of-government approach
to improving the overall stability of Yemen. The goal is to set the
conditions for Yemen to become a secure, stable and responsibly
governed nation capable of providing for its own security and the needs
of its population. CENTCOM Yemen Country Plan balances actions to
disrupt and deny AQAP, security assistance activities, and support for
other U.S. Government agencies' efforts to improve government capacity
and economic development.
regional ballistic missile threats and response
Question. Iran has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S.
Forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the CENTCOM AOR. Syria
also has an inventory of ballistic missiles that pose a threat to the
region. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of February 2010
stated that the United States intends to pursue a Phased Adaptive
Approach to ballistic missile defense against such missile threats in
various regions, including the Middle East.
Do you believe that such a phased adaptive approach will provide
CENTCOM with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our
forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region?
Answer. Yes, I believe a phased adaptive approach will provide
CENTCOM the missile defense capabilities needed. As a framework, this
approach phased over time and adaptive in terms of tailoring
capabilities to specific threats, allows for effective mission command
through continuous analysis and innovative methodologies. Additionally,
continuing to assist our partners as they receive new Ballistic Missile
Defense systems and upgrade older systems will remain a high priority.
It is imperative we work together to increase our ability to defend
ourselves and counter the threat.
Question. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense system with Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. missile
defense capabilities in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The role of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
system with SM-3 missile in the AOR is to provide layered, upper and
lower tier protection, weighted coverage, and defense in depth of key
force projection assets supporting CENTCOM CONPLANS against SRBM/MRBMs.
These elements provide the ability to engage ballistic missiles at
multiple levels (upper and lower tier) and ranges. The Aegis BMD system
with SM-3, in coordination with Patriot, provides our only capability
to execute layered defense in the CENTCOM AOR.
Question. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in the
CENTCOM AOR, what role do you see for other nations in the AOR to
contribute to regional missile defense capabilities, such as UAE
interest in purchasing the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
system?
Answer. CENTCOM, in close coordination with the Department of State
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is working hard to get
countries in the Gulf to realize the importance of cooperative defense,
particularly in the area of air and missile defense. To date, partners
such as UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have either purchased or are in
the process of purchasing THAAD systems. The message to them and others
is simple, no one can stand alone on this issue; cooperation and
synchronization are critical to the successful defense of the region.
central asian states
Question. The Central Asian states along the NDN have played
important roles during the past few years in supporting U.S. and
coalition forces in Afghanistan. These countries could also play a key
role for the retrograde of U.S. and coalition equipment out of
Afghanistan over the coming months and years.
What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with
the Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan?
Answer. The Central Asian States remain key supporting partners for
our Afghanistan Strategic Partnership. As we transition in Afghanistan,
securing access to the NDN for logistical resupply and retrograde
operations is of particular importance as we seek to promote stability
and assure our partners of our continued commitment to the region. The
development of the NDN has been a critical area of investment to that
end and cooperation with our Central Asian partners will gain
additional importance post-2014.
Our relationship with Uzbekistan continues to improve in a
deliberate, balanced way driven by regional security considerations,
expansion of the NDN and mutual benefit.
Tajikistan's ability to build and maintain counterterrorism, border
security, and counter narcotics capabilities is paramount in protecting
our mutual interests from the threat of violent extremist
organizations. We continue to use the Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and
Tajikistan (KKT) route of the NDN as well as explore options to
facilitate the transport of goods in the event of a crisis within this
region.
The Kyrgyz Republic is a key partner for U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan. The NDN network routes and the Transit Center at Manas
remain key factors in successful operations in the region. However, the
Kyrgyz Government has consistently stated there will be no foreign
military at Manas after the current lease expires in July 2014.
Question. What role do you foresee the Central Asian states playing
in the retrograde of U.S. equipment out of Afghanistan?
Answer. The Central Asian States remain key supporting partners for
our Afghanistan Strategic Partnership. As we transition in Afghanistan,
securing access to the NDN for logistical resupply and retrograde
operations is of particular importance as we seek to promote stability
and assure our partners of our continued commitment to the region. The
supply lines through the Central Asian States provide the United States
and NATO flexible and redundant retrograde options. CENTCOM will
retrograde consistent volumes of equipment through the Central Asian
States in order to maintain these routes as a hedge against
geopolitical uncertainty that could impact other routes.
Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of
the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. There are several violent extremist organizations (VEOs),
to include al Qaeda and other Afghanistan- or Pakistan-based groups
such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan that have expressed interest
or intent to operate from and within Central Asia. The VEOs benefit
from narcotics, arms trafficking, and smuggling which are pervasive
threats in the region. These activities threaten legitimate commerce
and the flow of strategic resources. The proliferation of material for
weapons of mass destruction, associated delivery systems and the spread
of technical expertise from and through the Central Asian States is
another concern. Across the region there is a considerable lack of
sustainable development; in the absence of economic opportunity, poor
and disenfranchised communities can serve as hotbeds for the spread of
violent extremism.
india
Question. How does the fact that India is in the U.S. Pacific
Command area of responsibility (AOR) while Pakistan is in the CENTCOM
AOR affect the United States' ability to treat the region's challenges
holistically?
Answer. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) ``seam'' between Pakistan
and India does not degrade our ability to address the larger region.
The CENTCOM and PACOM AOR share many of the same challenges, threats
and opportunities. CENTCOM and PACOM routinely coordinate with each
other to ensure unity of effort when dealing with the region's
challenges.
Question. In your view, how does our military cooperation and
engagement with India affect our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Answer. Pakistan, naturally, has concerns about any military
cooperation between the U.S. and India. This affects both our
relationship with Pakistan and, indirectly, our efforts in Afghanistan.
However, we make clear to Pakistan that our military cooperation and
engagement is not a threat to Pakistan and that this is not a zero-sum
game. We have important relationships and strategic partnerships with
both countries that are not at the expense of either one.
counter piracy operations off the horn of africa
Question. Over the past few years, U.S. Forces have participated in
a multi-national mission to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.
More recently, evidence suggests that the mission has achieved some
measure of success, although the assigned task force continues its
counter-piracy efforts.
What is your assessment of the mission thus far?
Answer. Attacks continue but with limited pirate successes due to
changes implemented by the commercial shipping industry and coalition
naval presence which have placed a financial strain on Somali pirates.
While we are currently experiencing success, piracy activity remains
driven by the desire of pirates to gain multimillion-dollar ransoms
with little risk.
Question. In your opinion, how long should we continue the current
mission as constituted and at what point should we consider a change to
the strategy?
Answer. While the mission has achieved a measure of success, it
would be premature to shift our strategy as piracy will exist until it
becomes cost prohibitive. The lower numbers in pirate success rates is
also based on the introduction of newer, less experienced pirate groups
which could change with time. The presence of counter-piracy Task
Forces not only contributes to security, but facilitates global
commerce and regional prosperity. Furthermore, Maritime Security
Operations offers the best opportunity to work with partners to deny
violent extremists free use of the sea which also contributes to
overall regional security.
Question. What do you see as the most appropriate maritime strategy
in this region of the world, given the threats of weapons trafficking,
human trafficking, and piracy?
Answer. The most appropriate strategy is to continue our leadership
role as expressed in the President's Maritime Security Policy and the
NSS Counter Piracy Action Plan in conjunction with the international
community. Specifically, the U.N., NATO, and the EU; and the maritime
industry in general. The use of proven tactics and procedures within
DOD and the Coalition, combined with the practice of industry best
management procedures (such as vessel protection and disruption
techniques) have reduced the unlawful maritime activity in the Horn of
Africa. The combination of military operations and industry's response
has resulted in suppression of these activities. However, in order to
prevent the re-emergence of this activity, we must continue to work in
partnership with the international community to suppress and strive
towards the eradication of this threat to free international maritime
security.
Question. Given that Somalia has established a new Federal
Government, how should U.S. policy toward pirate groups based in Somali
territory be modified?
Answer. CENTCOM's efforts, in conjunction with the international
community, have produced positive results in increasing the maritime
security in the Somali Basin. We must continue to work as part of a
cohesive whole-of-government effort, both within the U.S. Government
and with the appropriate international organizations (such as the U.N.,
NATO, and the EU) and in conjunction with the Somali Government, to
continue our successes in reducing the maritime security threat
expressed by the pirate groups, both ashore and at sea.
israel
Question. While Israel is not part of the CENTCOM AOR, it does play
a role in the Command's AOR.
In your assessment, what are the most significant threats facing
Israel in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The greatest threat to Israeli security is the prospect of
a nuclear-armed Iran. Despite sanctions and significant pressure from
the international community, the Iranian regime continues to take steps
that could support the development of a nuclear-weapons program. The
potential of an Iranian nuclear weapon, coupled with Iran's advancement
of Theater Ballistic Missiles (both accuracy and quantity), presents
Israel with what they assess to be intolerable threats to their
security. Hezbollah also represents a significant existential threat to
Israel. Other significant threats to Israel's security include Iranian
proxy elements and Palestinian rejectionists such as Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Finally, regional instability provides
VEOs with opportunities to gain new footholds in areas near Israel. For
instance, al Qaeda-aligned groups such as the al-Nusrah Front in Syria
continue to gain strength in key Syrian cities and may target Israel
when the Assad regime collapses. Similarly, violence and domestic
concerns plague Egypt, which provides for under-governance in the
Sinai, allowing greater freedom of action for AQ-inspired groups.
Question. If confirmed, what do you view to be your role with
respect to the defense of Israel?
Answer. EUCOM is the lead military agency charged with defending
Israel; however, CENTCOM has always worked very closely with EUCOM,
SOCOM, and the Department of State to ensure there are no seams or gaps
in our regional plans. As with our other allies in the Middle East, we
must honor our commitments to Israel to support them during crisis. As
the Middle East continues to deal with challenges in Egypt, Syria and
Lebanon it will be critical for CENTCOM, EUCOM and SOCOM to closely
coordinate our efforts to maintain a stable region and provide
appropriate support to Israel.
arab spring
Question. The Arab Spring has changed--and will likely continue to
change--the political dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa.
These changes require the United States to adjust our military-to-
military and defense civilian relations in this region. Some observers
argue that the United States should reduce significantly our military-
to-military contact in countries as a result of the ongoing changes and
others advocate more robust and stepped-up contact with our partners in
this region.
In your view, what should be the posture of the U.S. Government on
military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region,
particularly with respect to Egypt and Bahrain?
Answer. Military-to-military engagements lay the foundation for and
bolster our broader diplomatic and political relationships in the
region, to include in Egypt and Bahrain. Much of this work is ongoing,
but as resources decrease and American forward presence in the region
declines, military-to-military engagements and working by, with, and
through our partners will become even more important. This type of
engagement is often the bedrock of our relationships and affords us the
trust necessary to dialogue quietly about contentious issues.
building partner capacity and security assistance
Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
nations, including the global train and equip authority (``section
1206''), Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and the niche
authority for Yemen's Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Unit.
What is your understanding of the purpose of the section 1206
global train and equip authority and Global Contingency Security Fund?
Answer. The purpose of section 1206 authority (Global Train and
Equip) is to enhance the capacity of foreign nations to conduct
counterterrorism operations with either their national military forces
or maritime security forces. Additionally, the authority allows the
Department to improve partner nations' capabilities to participate in
or support military and stability operations in which the U.S. Armed
Forces are a participant.
The GSCF is similar in some aspects to the section 1206 authority.
Both seek to improve the capability of a foreign country's national
military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or help a
partner nation participate in or support military operations consistent
with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. However, the
GSCF is not as narrowly defined or restricted as section 1206. GSCF can
be used for border security, internal defense, justice sector programs
(including law enforcement and prisons), and stabilization efforts
within a country where instability challenges the existing capability
of civilian providers to deliver such assistance. Additionally, more
organization, such as within a nation's Ministry of Interior, would be
a potential recipient of GSCF funds; section 1206 restricts funding to
a country's Ministry of Defense or Maritime Security forces.
Question. In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in
building the capacities of partner nations in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Our strategic objectives in building partner capacities in
the AOR include partners that are capable of deterring, defending, and
cooperating against attack; controlling their borders; mitigating
ungoverned spaces; enhancing stability; and maintaining cooperative,
interest-based relations with their neighbors; and Regional Partners in
the AOR that remain accessible and cooperative with the United States.
Question. The funding pool available for security assistance and
other military-to-military engagement activities devoted to the CENTCOM
AOR tends to be allocated to specific countries.
What is your understanding of the role CENTCOM plays in developing
U.S. security assistance priorities (e.g., section 1206, Foreign
Military Financing, International Military Education and Training
Assistance, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund)?
Answer. CENTCOM collaborates with the DOS and each Security
Cooperation Office (SCO) to develop security assistance programming
priorities which are aligned with the Department's Security Cooperation
Guidance and supports the Theater Campaign Plan as well as the
individual Country Plans. These priorities and recommended funding
levels are submitted to DOD for inclusion in the President's budget
request each year.
u.s. contributions to international peacekeeping missions
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on July 29, 2009, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
(U.N.) stated that the United States ``is willing to consider directly
contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian
police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I should
note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.'' General Dempsey has said the
United States ``should consider opportunities for U.S. personnel to
contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions'' and that ``experience shows
that even a small number of trained and experienced American
servicemembers can have a significant, positive effect on U.N.
operations.''
In your view, should the United States increase the number of
personnel it contributes in the form of staff positions and military
observers to U.N. peacekeeping missions and other international peace
operations?
Answer. Overall, I agree with General Dempsey's position; however,
our first priority remains our significant troop commitments in
Afghanistan.
Question. In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages
of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations in the
form of staff positions and military observer positions?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping operations are a cost-effective
alternative to unilateral U.S. military action. Such missions support
U.S. interests around the world, promoting stability and saving
civilian lives. U.S. military personnel make significant contributions
to these efforts, particularly in specialized areas such as logistics
and intelligence. However, the competing requirements of additional
participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations must be weighed against
potential costs, to include the increase in the operational tempo of
the force.
Question. In your view, would an increase in the number of U.S.
military personnel assigned to U.N. peacekeeping missions in the
CENTCOM AOR help you advance the theater campaign plan?
Answer. While this is not an issue that I am ready to fully assess,
there are many important factors to balance in making such an
assessment, including ongoing U.S. military commitments and engagements
in the AOR and perceptions in the region that would result from an
increase in U.S. peacekeepers. I would need to study the issue further
to ensure that while addressing one issue we do not inadvertently
create additional issues.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National
Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ``an
abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,'' and
stated that ``rising drug violence and corruption are undermining
stability and the rule of law in some countries.'' In July 2011, the
President released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the
priority action areas designated in the strategy is ``enhancing
Department of Defense support to U.S. law enforcement.''
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's plan for combating transnational criminal
organizations is reflected in the National Security Strategy. As part
of a whole-of-government approach the DOD can bring to bear unique
authorities and capabilities to augment those of our law enforcement
and intelligence communities. Of note is the policy's call for
increasing intelligence and information sharing as well as building
international capacity, cooperation and partnerships.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to the United
States posed by transnational organized crime? Would you consider it a
national security threat?
Answer. The growing interconnectivity among transnational organized
crime (TOC), terrorist groups, and insurgencies threatens U.S. national
security interests. TOC exploits porous borders caused by regional
unrest, the speed of global trade, and the growing demand for drugs and
weapons to cooperate with terrorist and insurgent groups. Similarly,
terrorist and insurgent groups mobilize TOC networks to undermine
governments/State institutions and engage in illicit activities (i.e.,
narcotics trafficking, money laundering, small arms/light weapons
sales, and counterfeit goods) to bolster their resources, which
improves operational capability and effectiveness.
mass atrocities prevention
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10.
What are your views on the role the United States plays in the
prevention of mass atrocities and genocide?
Answer. The United States, as a world leader, has resources which
it can bring to bear to aid in the prevention of mass atrocities and
genocide. The decision to commit these resources clearly resides with
the President. As a military commander, I understand my responsibility
under the Law of Armed Conflict to protect civilians from physical
violence and to contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment
for civilians over the long-term.
Question. What are your views on the adequacy of the Department's
tools and doctrine for contributing to this role?
Answer. Although the CJCS has the Department's lead for further
developing operational principles, the geographic combatant commands
will incorporate mass atrocity prevention and response as a priority in
planning, activities, and engagements. By applying our lessons learned
methodology to previous and future activities we will continue to
expand and refine our capabilities and capacities to respond as a
decisive element of a whole-of-government effort.
counter threat finance
Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have begun
investing more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money
associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking, but the
opportunities for tracking and degrading illicit financing flows are
not yet matched by the effort and resources devoted to them.
Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation
routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production
of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant
national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting
these threats.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. It is appropriate for DOD to play a supporting role in
countering threat finance activities. DOD does bring unique
capabilities to the effort of the broader interagency community. DOD
can provide its intelligence analysis to identify critical network
vulnerabilities as well as its strategic and operational planning
expertise.
Question. Are there opportunities to replicate or improve upon the
network-disruption efforts of groups like the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization or the Afghanistan Threat Finance
Cell in impacting other facilitation networks?
Answer. Yes. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization and the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell multi-national and
interagency approaches to the counter-IED and threat finance problem
sets provide an effective framework that I believe may be applied to
other networked problem sets such as narcotics and weapons trafficking.
If confirmed, I will actively pursue such multi-nation and interagency
solutions to the problems that we face in the CENTCOM AOR to the
maximum extent possible.
Question. In your view, how should DOD coordinate and interface
with other key agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the
Intelligence Community, in conducting counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. In keeping with OSD/Joint Staff/SOCOM (CTF DOD lead
component) policies, DOD should coordinate counter threat finance
activities with other agencies and departments through the Geographic
Combatant Command's interagency process. This type of interface will
ensure the IA receives one set of theater threat finance priorities,
reduces redundant and conflicting DOD requests to the IA, and increases
opportunities to disrupt adversary finance networks. Counter threat
finance intelligence support (e.g., collection requirements,
production) should be brokered through theater, component, task force
J2s and directly with DOD's consolidated threat finance intelligence
initiatives within the Defense Intelligence Agency.
lebanon
Question. Over the past decade, the United States has provided over
$500 million in security assistance to the Government of Lebanon.
In your view, what is the appropriate role for CENTCOM in Lebanon?
Answer. CENTCOM continues to act as a mentor and enabler of the
Lebanon Armed Forces (LAF). Our relationship enables the U.S. and
Lebanon to work toward mutually-supporting goals. A reduction of
CENTCOM involvement in Lebanon would increase the temptation and
necessity for Lebanon to consider taking aid from countries whose
interests conflict with U.S interests.
Question. In your view, what are the U.S. national security
interests in Lebanon?
Answer. The primary U.S. security interest in Lebanon is to
strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as a counterweight to
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and, in doing so, reduce the malign influence
of Iran in the region. Instability in Lebanon plays into the interests
of LH, Syria, and Iran. The multi-confessional nature of the LAF makes
it a unifying force in Lebanon acting as a stabilizing force to the
detriment of our adversaries in the region.
Question. The current government in Lebanon includes Hezbollah, a
designated foreign terrorist organization under U.S. law.
Given the involvement of Hezbollah in the Lebanese Government, what
do you believe to be the appropriate level of engagement with the
Lebanese Armed Forces?
Answer. The LAF has proven itself to be independent of Hezbollah
influence despite Hezbollah's involvement in the Lebanese Government.
To date, Hezbollah's involvement has had no impact on our relationship
and current levels of engagement with the LAF. In light of the ongoing
situation in Syria, our various forms of aid to the LAF are vital to
maintaining peace internally while guarding against spillover violence
from across the Syrian border. Our persistent efforts to provide
military training and material support to the LAF have enabled them to
be a more effective counter-balance to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH).
china
Question. Over the past several years, much as been made of China's
military growth and modernization and of China's influence throughout
Asia, including the portions of the region that fall within the CENTCOM
commander's area of responsibility. For example, many observers point
out that China has developed and maintains a partnership with Iran
based, at least in part, on economic and defense cooperation, and that
China's policies toward Iran have hindered international efforts to
deter Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability.
Question. What do you see as the effect of China's economic and
military growth on the CENTCOM AOR as a whole?
Answer. China relies heavily on energy resources found in the
CENTCOM AOR (Middle East and Central Asia) to meet its growing domestic
demand for energy and achieve its strategic objective of sustained
economic growth. China seeks to build political and economic
relationships with countries in the CENTCOM AOR to ensure that Beijing
maintains access to the region's energy resources, but China plays
little role in guaranteeing security and stability throughout the
region. China has historically been a source of arms sales for
countries seeking to upgrade their arsenals and/or procure cheaper
alternatives to U.S. weapons.
Question. How does China's relationship with Iran, in particular,
affect U.S. security interests in the region?
Answer. China is Iran's largest purchaser of crude oil. However,
China reduced its imports of Iranian crude oil in 2012 compared to the
previous year, in response to U.S. diplomacy. While China voted for
sanctions on Iran in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, it has
publicly opposed additional national sanctions that have been levied by
the United States, European Union and others. Iran seeks to use its
relationship with China to gain influence within the UNSC, seeking
support from China during resolution votes. Iran will likely continue
efforts to build on its relationship with China as it depends on
Beijing to offset the high cost of business transactions due to
sanctions.
dod counternarcotics activities
Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs
flowing toward the U.S. On an annual basis, DOD's counter-narcotics
(CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the
Department's CN operations, including to build the capacity of U.S.
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign
governments, and provide intelligence support on CN-related matters and
a variety of other unique enabling capabilities.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD--and by extension
CENTCOM--in counterdrug efforts?
Answer. In the CENTCOM AOR, counterdrug authorities provided by
Congress permit us to support our Federal law enforcement partners in
their engagement with regional counterdrug security force
organizations. These activities address many of the U.S. Government's,
and by extension CENTCOM's, most pressing regional security issues.
Counterdrug activities are often one of the few avenues for military
engagement with our regional partners.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the
United States?
Answer. The United States should always consider partnering with
governments requesting counterdrug assistance when it supports U.S.
national interests. Drug trafficking organizations are international by
nature and the larger the coalition of the willing to address the
illicit drugs business, the greater the global impact we could achieve.
Counter-narcotics operations provide opportunities for developing
military-to-military relationships and building partner capacity.
Question. Given that the vast majority of illegal drugs transiting
in the CENTCOM AOR are not destined for the United States, should DOD
invest resources in countering the flow of illegal drugs to or through
the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. It is shortsighted to view illicit drugs trafficking
activity through the prism of only what comes into the United States.
Narcotics play a critical role in underwriting corruption, which poses
the greatest strategic threat to the ISAF campaign plan. So, while only
a relatively minor portion of Afghan opiates make their way to the
U.S., their impact on U.S. Government engagement in the CENTCOM AOR is
significant. An effective U.S. counterdrug strategy includes attacking
the illicit drugs trafficking business at every opportunity from source
to end user. Counter-narcotics operations provide opportunities for
developing military-to-military relationships and building partner
capacity.
strategic communications and information operations
Question. Over the past decade, DOD has funded an increasing number
of military information support operations (formerly known as
psychological operations) and influence programs. The Government
Accountability Office reports that DOD has ``spent hundreds of millions
of dollars each year'' to support its information operations outreach
activities. Many of these programs are in support of operations in
Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from U.S.
Special Operations Command also deploy to U.S. embassies in countries
of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the
Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Further, the geographic combatant commands are increasingly moving into
this operational space.
What are your views on DOD's military information support
operations and influence programs?
Answer. Military information support operations (MISO) is a
critical investment in deterrence and prevention of conflict when
synchronized with interagency efforts. Integral to all phases of
military operations, MISO serves to shape information environments and
mitigate risk to mission and forces in advance of and during conflict.
Question. What unique value should such programs contribute in
distinction from strategic communications and influence activities
conducted by other government departments and agencies?
Answer. CENTCOM's Information Operations (IO) capability is unique
in that it is opponent focused (military targets), tightly integrated
with special and technical operations programs and inter-connected with
the communications community both military and interagency. It has the
flexibility to employ attributable and non-attributable means (within
scope of policy) to achieve objectives unlike other Public Affairs and
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. CENTCOM's IO capability
specializes in languages unique to the designated area of operations;
staff and units of execution have hands-on experience understanding key
opponent influence systems; and our IO is postured to rapidly target
those opponents when authorized.
regional alignment and rotational deployments of army brigades
Question. The Army plans to align general purpose combat brigades
with regional combatant commands, including CENTCOM, to support theater
engagement and security force assistance missions and to make those
forces, and other supporting units, available on a rotational basis for
deployment to those regions for training and exercises.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's capability
and capacity to align combat brigades or other units with regional
combatant commands?
Answer. As Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, I have been involved in
the development of the Regional Alignment of Forces concept. I believe
it is sound and will provide geographic combatant commanders with
professionally trained and regionally attuned forces and capabilities
that are both responsive and capable of meeting theater requirements.
The Army is executing its first ``proof of principle'' of the
Regionally Aligned Forces concept in fiscal year 2013 by aligning a
brigade combat team to U.S. African Command (AFRICOM). The Army will
conduct a subsequent comprehensive assessment of this effort that will
further drive our understanding of our capability and capacity to
execute this mission set going forward.
Question. What are your views, if any, on the use of general
purpose forces for missions providing security force assistance to
other nations' militaries?
Answer. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated
that general purpose forces are quite capable of executing the security
force assistance mission set. Moreover, general purpose forces can be a
key asset as we continue to build the military capacity of our allies.
As an example, our military has a rich history of cooperative small
unit training exercises across a range of combatant commands.
Ultimately, such efforts must be synchronized with the combatant
commander's Theater Security Cooperation plan.
Question. In your view, how, if at all, should a unit's regional
alignment impact the assignment of personnel, selection of unit
commanders, priority for cultural and language training compared to
core combat training, and identification and acquisition of special
equipment?
Answer. The Army is currently conducting a comprehensive analysis
of requirements and impacts of the regionally aligned forces concept.
This analysis will account for factors associated with doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities. Further, the 2013 regional alignment of the brigade
combat team to AFRICOM will inform this analysis. Factors associated
with the alignment of divisions and corps will also inform this
analysis. Ultimately, the Army seeks to support combatant commands
while remaining operationally adaptable to respond to global
contingencies, as required.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to implement the use
of regionally aligned forces in support of your theater assistance and
engagement strategies?
Answer. Use of regionally aligned forces to support CENTCOM theater
assistance and strategy will not be fundamentally different than how
other forces are now used. The significance of using such forces is
that regional alignment will enhance relationships between planning
staffs while improving the aligned units' familiarity with areas in
which they will most likely be employed.
Question. In your view, how should funding responsibility be
consolidated or distributed between the Military Departments and the
combatant commands for training and employment of regionally aligned
forces?
Answer. I believe the current construct established under the
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1996 adequately and
efficiently defines the roles and responsibilities of the Services and
defense agencies in supporting the combatant commands. The Services are
and should continue to be funded to man, train and equip their forces
in support of combatant command operational mission sets regardless of
whether those forces are regionally aligned. However, combatant
commanders should provide funds for training and exercises conducted in
their AOR.
Question. In your view, is it feasible and suitable to satisfy
theater engagement and assistance strategies completely with rotational
forces? If not, why?
Answer. CENTCOM has successfully conducted operations, exercises
and activities since its inception without permanently assigned forces.
Like other commands, it plans and requests forces through the Global
Force Management process. I have complete faith that all CENTCOM
theater engagement and assistance strategies can be met with rotational
forces, particularly regionally aligned forces.
nato alliance
Question. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance
continues to be central to our coalition operations in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, even as many NATO members have significantly reduced their
national defense budgets in response to economic and fiscal pressures.
Do you agree that U.S. participation in the NATO alliance
contributes to advancing U.S. security interests?
Answer. Yes, members of the NATO Alliance share the same concerns
for national security as we do. Participation in the Alliance furthers
international security and U.S. security interests.
Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that
you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next
5 years, particularly with regard to NATO activities in the CENTCOM
AOR?
Answer. We are all operating in a challenging fiscal environment,
and are seeking ways to more efficiently meet our strategic objectives.
In this austere environment, there may be opportunities to expand
interoperability and cost sharing through combined training exercises,
utilizing our well-developed training facilities in Europe.
Question. In light of the reductions in national defense spending
by some NATO members, are you concerned that the Alliance will lack
critical military capabilities? If so, what steps, if any, would you
recommend be taken to address potential shortfalls in alliance
capabilities?
Answer. The impact of reduced spending will be felt throughout the
alliance. We can work to mitigate the impact by exploring avenues of
increasing interoperability, and perhaps achieving economies of scale
through international cooperative research, development and
acquisition.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of nations
of the Middle East in recent NATO military operations in Libya?
Answer. Middle East nations have been effective in recent NATO
operations and served as an integral part of the Coalition. A prime
example would be the efforts by UAE, Qatar, and Jordan who flew combat
sorties during Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. Continued training and
exchanges with our partners in the Middle East forges bonds that can
last generations and give us resources that when needed fulfill
operational requirements and further strengthen our ties.
Question. What steps, if any, do you think CENTCOM should take to
improve the interoperability of military forces from the CENTCOM region
with the U.S. and other international security actors?
Answer. CENTCOM remains committed to working with coalition
partners to improve stability, peace and security for all partnered
nations in the CENTCOM AOR and neighboring AORs. Engagement is
certainly less costly than war and ensuring the interoperability of our
militaries is the requisite investment to achieve that goal. The most
dramatic effect on interoperability can be achieved through increasing
International Military Exchange and Training (IMET) funding for
military career schools and education.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
Question. Since September 11, CENTCOM has received the overwhelming
majority of the ISR support that DOD has been able to generate. The
demand for more ISR has continued to outstrip the supply, even though
the Secretary of Defense has taken extraordinary actions to ramp up the
acquisition of more and more capable and varied ISR systems. Other
combatant commands and other military missions and operations outside
of the CENTCOM AOR have gone wanting.
Do you foresee, and if so to what degree, CENTCOM relinquishing
existing ISR systems as forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan and as
demand continues to grow in AFRICOM, PACOM and other AORs?
Answer. CENTCOM remains actively engaged with ISAF and USFOR-A on
planning for ISR support through OEF Change of Mission and support to
the Enduring Force Headquarters post-OEF. We have learned through
experience that as our footprint shrinks the demand for ISR increases.
CENTCOM will conduct an OEF Redeployment Conference and an OPLAN
Development Conference within the next 60 days. Both events will enable
us to further refine the ISR requirements in support of the drawdown
and beyond. If confirmed, I will further assess the requirement for ISR
in the CENTCOM AOR.
science and technology
Question. As with other combatant commands, a science and
technology (S&T) advisor is assigned to support CENTCOM.
If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the CENTCOM Science
and Technology advisor?
Answer. The Science Advisor acts as principle advisor to the
commander on matters of science, technology, innovation, and fielding
of material and non-material solutions for the command's most pressing
capability gaps. If confirmed, I will charge the Science Advisor with
the discovery, research, analysis and advocacy of new and emerging
technologies and techniques which have the potential to provide
solutions to our validated joint needs. I will require the Science
Advisor to continue to discover, develop, and advocate for those
technologies and techniques that will make our warfighters safer, more
efficient, and more effective in the immediate and near-term. I will
charge the Science Advisor to engage with partner countries to develop
mutually required technologies that will also keep coalition forces
safe, allow them to be more effective through better integration with
U.S. Forces, and help build stronger partnerships for the future. I
will also charge the Science Advisor with looking beyond the horizon to
ensure CENTCOM warriors maintain their battlespace technology
superiority during potential future conflicts.
operational energy
Question. Several of your predecessors have established and
published policies regarding operational energy and its important role
in supporting the mission in Afghanistan. These policies have stressed
better management of energy use in the battle space to provide a
strategic and tactical advantage while increasing combat effectiveness
and operational capability.
Do you plan to establish and publish similar policies regarding
operational energy improvements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the CENTCOM
established policies and procedures regarding operational energy which
are now in the refinement phase. These policies and procedures include
a standing policy on Operational Energy which the Command has
implemented and Service Components and Joint Task Forces have similarly
adopted. I will also assess the Command's Operational Energy
initiatives to identify areas where CENTCOM can further enhance combat
power and ensure good stewardship of our finite energy resources.
Question. What is your assessment of how better operational energy
management translates, if at all, into improving combat effectiveness?
Answer. Better operational energy management translates to fewer
fuel convoys, thereby freeing convoy security forces to conduct other
operational missions. Decreased energy consumption and spending also
creates the potential to reinvest funds towards force protection and
other needed capabilities which ultimately increase combat
effectiveness.
Question. How do you plan to track fuel consumption at forward-
deployed locations in Afghanistan?
Answer. The Afghan Sub-Area Petroleum Office (A-SAPO), an element
of USFOR-A Headquarters, receives regular fuel consumption reports from
sustainment forces providing fuel distribution services in Afghanistan.
A-SAPO reviews these reports and forwards them to the CENTCOM Joint
Petroleum Office.
centcom and dod global posture review
Question. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
DOD will conduct a global posture review that assesses U.S. strategic
relationships and interests to identify where and at what levels the
forward stationing of military forces supports those relationships and
interests. The new strategic guidance released by the Secretary of
Defense in January 2012 stated regarding the Middle East that ``the
United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied
military presence in--and support of--partner nations in and around
this region.''
What is your assessment of the current and future strategic
requirement for basing U.S. military personnel and equipment in the
Middle East?
Answer. At present, CENTCOM has sufficient access and basing to
execute current operations and continually looks for ways to improve
the flexibility and depth in the theater basing network to support
potential surge operations if required, and mitigate risk caused by
access denial and loss of access should it occur. The Command has been
working with the Department on key elements of a posture strategy and
is incorporating this in the planning process. CENTCOM has been
revising its posture in theater for some time as we continue efforts to
reset forces for current and future operational requirements. This
process will continue as we work towards the successful completion of
Operation Enduring Freedom.
Question. Aside from contingency operations, do you believe the
number of U.S. Forces permanently stationed within CENTCOM is
sufficient to meet U.S. national security objectives in the region?
Answer. In my current position I am unable to provide an adequate
assessment of requirements and requisite forces in the CENTCOM AOR.
However, if confirmed, I will work with DOD to define the right mix of
capabilities to meet future steady state mission requirements and to
provide a rapid response capability in the event of a crisis.
centcom headquarters
Question. Based on the drawdown in Afghanistan and completed
redeployment out of Iraq, will you conduct a review of the size of the
CENTCOM headquarters?
Answer. Yes. CENTCOM headquarters is undergoing a manpower and
organization review now, assisted by the Army and Air Force Manpower
Agencies. If confirmed, I will assess the study recommendations and
shape the headquarters for future operations.
treatment of detainees
Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or
under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of
nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.
If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD
directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable
to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan fully comply with the requirements of
section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that CENTCOM forces fully
comply with all relevant provisions of DOD directives, regulations,
policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. Forces in
Afghanistan, and that they fully comply with the requirements of
section 1403 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. I understand and support the standards for the
treatment of detainees and will adhere to them, if confirmed. All
detainees shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with U.S. law,
the Law of War, and applicable U.S. policy. Humane treatment entails
the following: no violence, no cruelty, no torture, and no humiliating
or degrading treatment.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. Forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. I believe all military operations, to include
counterinsurgency operations, must be conducted in accordance with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
Question. How would you ensure a climate that not only discourages
the abuse of detainees, but that encourages the reporting of abuse?
Answer. If confirmed, I will set forth clear standards and
expectations and demonstrate my personal commitment to those standards.
I will ensure that guard forces are thoroughly trained in the humane
treatment of detainees. Personnel at all levels will be trained on the
importance of discouraging abuse and empowered to report any signs of
abuse. Where appropriate, we will conduct routine inspections.
traumatic brain injury
Question. On June 21, 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued
a DOD-wide policy on the management of mild traumatic brain injury
(TBI) in deployed settings.
What is your assessment of the effect of this policy in
safeguarding servicemembers from further traumatic brain injury?
Answer. This has proven to be a very effective policy and I am
confident it will contribute immensely in our understanding of mild TBI
and how best to prevent, detect and treat these injuries. The current
policy is based on the recently published DOD Instruction 6490.11 and
ensures that all potentially concussive events (mild TBI) are
identified, evaluated, treated and tracked by both the line leadership
as well as those in the military medical community. This policy also
limits the activity of those individuals identified with multiple
concussions and ensures they receive complete and timely follow-up and
are protected from the possibility of further brain injuries.
mental health assessments and treatment in theater
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
seven separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers and marines deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The most recent
study, MHAT VI, found that ``soldiers on their third and fourth
deployment report lower morale and more mental health problems,'' and
that stigma continues to prevent some soldiers from seeking mental
health care. These types of reports lend support to the fact that
increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Afghanistan
with post-traumatic stress, depression, and other mental health
problems.
Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health
needs of our troops in theater, in terms of both prevention and
treatment?
Answer. Ensuring that the behavioral health and counseling services
are readily available and accessible for our servicemembers remains a
high priority. Services are emphasizing resiliency training for
servicemembers with additional screening prior to deployment by
qualified mental health providers focused on behavioral health (BH)
disorders and wellness. Individuals, who have specific behavioral
health conditions that require specific treatments, and have not
demonstrated adequate resolution of their behavioral health condition
or symptoms, are not permitted to deploy. For those in theater, the
availability of Restoration Centers, telebehavioral health (TBH), and
an easy-to-use crisis line in conjunction with deployed behavioral
health providers have given servicemembers more options to take
preventive measures and seek treatment. If confirmed, I will continue
to emphasize the importance of mental health prevention and treatment
for our servicemembers.
Question. Do you believe that mental health resources in theater
are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers?
Answer. Yes. To my knowledge the Behavioral Health (BH) resources
available to our servicemembers in theater are adequate to handle the
needs of our deployed troops. Keeping in mind that as our footprint
changes our resources will change and we will have to ensure we
maintain an adequate balance between number of servicemembers and
mental health care providers.
Question. If confirmed, would you request additional behavioral
health resources from the Services, if needed, to meet the needs of
units deployed to the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Yes. If additional behavioral health resources were deemed
necessary, I would not hesitate to request such resources from the
Services to fill any identified gaps.
suicide prevention
Question. The number of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the committee. A number of these military suicides are
committed in theater.
What is your assessment of CENTCOM's suicide prevention program?
Answer. The challenge of suicide represents the most difficult one
I have faced in my 37-year career in the Army. While I'm not currently
in a position to assess CENTCOM's suicide prevention program, I know
from experience that an effective suicide prevention program requires
involved and engaged leadership at every level. If confirmed, I will
ensure suicide prevention receives the appropriate command and
leadership emphasis throughout the CENTCOM organization.
Question. In your view, are there any unique stressors in the
CENTCOM AOR that contribute to the number of suicides of servicemembers
serving in, or who have recently served in, the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Certainly there are stressors in the CENTCOM AOR. These
include exposure to combat environments, multiple deployments and high
operational tempo. That said, the challenge of suicide is incredibly
complex. While some of the stressors experienced in the CENTCOM AOR may
contribute to acts of suicide or suicidal ideations, generally there is
no single causal factor. In most cases, a combination of stressors lead
an individual to take his/her own life or attempt to do so. That said,
I do recognize that most CENTCOM forces are rotational. They are often
required to operate in stressful environments away from their loved
ones. If confirmed, as CENTCOM commander I will be mindful of these
stressors and associated challenges and I will make sure my subordinate
commanders are appropriately focused on them as well.
Question. If confirmed, what resources would you use to help
prevent suicides in theater and to prepare redeploying servicemembers
for transition to life back at home?
Answer. Prevention of suicide in theater and at home is a vital
priority--the safety of all deploying, deployed, and returning
servicemembers is always foremost among my priorities.
Confronting the difficult reality of suicide in the force requires
regularly exercising a broad complement of health resources within
fully supportive command culture. This process begins with recognizing
the importance of taking care of people, which will always remain the
most important asset in our military. It is imperative that we
implement programs and separate suicide prevention initiatives that
comprise a comprehensive approach to suicide prevention throughout the
life cycle of the training and deployment so that servicemembers can
receive appropriate counseling, assistance, respite, and support.
Continuing to educate Leaders at all levels regarding behavioral health
and its resources, both in theater and out, along with the installation
of resiliency training will assist with identifying servicemembers who
may need additional resources while decreasing the stigma associated
with behavioral health treatment. All resources available to
servicemembers need to be actively engaged to educate and support our
servicemembers to ensure a seamless transition during all phases of a
deployment.
sexual assault
Question. Sexual assaults continue to be a significant issue in the
military. Victims of sexual assault report that they are victimized
twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive
or inadequate treatment for the victim and failure of the chain of
command to hold assailants accountable. Secretary Panetta has recently
announced several new initiatives to address the sexual assault
problems in the military, including comprehensive assessments of
initial training of enlisted personnel and officers, creation of
special victim capabilities, and limiting initial disposition authority
to Special Court-Martial Convening Authorities in the grade of O-6 or
higher.
What is your assessment of the sexual assault prevention and
response program in CENTCOM?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to assess CENTCOM's sexual
assault prevention and response program. However, if confirmed, I will
make sexual assault prevention a leadership focus throughout the
command and ensure that the sexual assault prevention and response
programs in CENTCOM subordinate commands and components are effective
and vigorously maintained and supported. Training must be high quality
and engaging. Commanders and leaders must be present and involved in
training. They must also take an active role in selecting unit sexual
harassment/assault representatives and victim advocates. It is
extremely important that the right individuals be selected for these
key positions.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources available in the CENTCOM AOR for providing appropriate
support to victims of sexual assault?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to assess the adequacy of
the training and resources available in the CENTCOM AOR. However, if
confirmed, I will make sure that the appropriate support is provided to
victims of sexual assault, both those in the CENTCOM AOR and in CONUS.
That said, I believe that sexual assault prevention and response
training must begin before leaving home station. Forces who have
conducted training prior to deployment are much better equipped to
prevent sexual assault in the first place and address reports of sexual
assault if/when they do arise.
Question. What is your assessment of the capability in the CENTCOM
AOR to investigate allegations of sexual assault and to hold assailants
accountable for their acts?
Answer. I believe that CID, AFOSI, and NCIS are capable of
investigating any sexual assault that occurs in the CENTCOM AOR.
Commanders have the ability to hold servicemembers accountable when
they have been accused of sexual assault. Commanders can pursue the
same options while deployed as they would in garrison, up to and
including a general court-martial, and I will make it a priority to
ensure they have the resources in theater to do so.
intelligence support for indirect activities
Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence
agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in
Afghanistan and Iraq on special operators engaged in direct action
operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and
Special Operations Forces engaged in indirect activities, including
foreign internal defense and population protection, receive less
intelligence support.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that general purpose forces and
Special Operations Forces engaged in indirect activities receive
adequate intelligence support?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure our forces, regardless of
whether they are engaged in direct action or indirect activities,
receive the intelligence support they need to effectively execute and
accomplish their mission. I will clearly state my Priority Intelligence
Requirements and allocate Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance support in accordance with prioritized, theater
requirements and capabilities.
special operations forces in support of country teams
Question. U.S. Special Operations Command deploys personnel to work
with country teams in a number of priority countries where the United
States is not engaged in direct action operations, but rather trying to
stop the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is to support the
priorities of the Ambassador and the geographic combatant commander's
theater campaign plan against terrorist networks.
Please describe the potential value of these special operations
personnel to CENTCOM and the country teams they are supporting.
Answer. Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the best in the
world and are a key component in maintaining the U.S. Government's
access into a host nation, and advancing interoperability with the host
nation's military. These objectives are aligned with the Ambassador's
overarching engagement strategy and the activities of the country team.
They excel when operating in the strategic environment under austere
conditions, and are particularly adept in keeping a small footprint on
the ground. These characteristics make them particularly useful and
valuable in our Theater engagement strategy, and a given when
responding to crisis in the region.
Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, do you intend to do to
make sure the goals of special operations personnel deployed to these
countries are closely aligned with those of the Ambassadors with whom
they are working?
Answer. If confirmed, it would be my responsibility to ensure that
our operations and activities are aligned and integrated into the
Ambassador's country specific objectives and our national security
objectives. I recognize that my relationships with the Chiefs of
Mission in the region will be critical to achieving necessary unity of
effort. I will charge my subordinate SOF commanders at all levels to
keep their lines of communication open with their respective Chiefs of
Mission.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us that
to achieve our goals and objectives we must balance all instruments of
national power. The complexity of the current operating environment
requires a whole-of-government approach that leverages the individual
strengths of the Interagency, to include our military and diplomatic
partners and others. Unity of effort, based on a `team of team'
concept, is essential. We must identify common goals and objectives
early on and work together to achieve them.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. The nature of warfare today requires unity of effort. As
such, I believe we should look to expand our collaboration with our
interagency partners to include all stages of planning and operations.
We must not wait until we are in the midst of crises. By working
together on a routine basis, we will effectively align goals and
objectives, improve communications and enhance the understanding of one
another's methods and perspectives. This will ultimately enhance
individual and U.S. Government effectiveness.
Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
contingency operations?
Answer. Lessons learned from combatant command, combined/joint
operations area, and unit/tactical level activities should be
communicated to the Services for incorporation into professional
military education, for civilian-military structural recommendations,
and for inclusion in the next revisions of joint and Service-level
doctrine.
unified command plan changes
Question. It has been reported that Admiral McRaven, Commander of
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), is seeking changes to the
Unified Command Plan (UCP) and other authorities that he believes would
allow SOCOM to better support the requirements of the Theater Special
Operations Commands (TSOCs). Reportedly, such changes would give the
Commander of SOCOM combatant command authority over the TSOCs--
including responsibilities for resourcing--and provide for more rapid
deployment of Special Operations Forces to and between geographic
combatant commands without the requirement for approval by the
Secretary of Defense in every case. Operational control of deployed
special operations forces would reportedly remain with the respective
geographic combatant commander. Some have expressed concern that such
changes could raise problems related to civilian control of the
military, infringe upon the traditional authorities of the geographic
combatant commanders, and make it more difficult for ambassadors and
geographic combatant commanders to know what military personnel are
coming into their areas of responsibility and what they are doing while
they are there.
Please provide your assessment of whether such UCP changes are
appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control
of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic
combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.
Answer. If confirmed, I will review all recommended changes to the
UCP. However, it has been my experience that Special Operations Forces
are most effectively employed when fully integrated with conventional
forces. This integration ensures better coordination, unity of effort
and the ability to share critical resources.
Question. In your view, are there any countries that should be
added or removed from the CENTCOM AOR as part of the review of the UCP?
Answer. I believe the current area of responsibility effectively
and efficiently facilitates accomplishment of the CENTCOM assigned
missions. If confirmed, I will continuously assess the CENTCOM missions
and AOR and propose realignment if future conditions warrant.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including
training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces,
and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S.
Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. Section 1208 authority provides authority and funds for
U.S. SOF to train and equip regular and irregular indigenous forces to
conduct counterterrorism operations. This authority is considered a key
tool in combating terrorism and is directly responsible for a number of
highly successful counter-terror operations. Throughout the CENTCOM AOR
1208 facilitates multiple joint operations between Theater and National
SOF partnering with host nation forces. These 1208 funded operations
create capable responsive host nation forces closely partnered with
U.S. SOF and represent the best opportunity to counterterrorist
activities that threaten U.S. interests.
military information support operations
Question. Al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work
hard to appeal to local populations. In several cases throughout the
CENTCOM AOR, most recently in Yemen, these efforts have allowed violent
extremists to establish a safe haven, conduct operations, and expand
their recruiting base. The composition and size of these groups in
comparison to the U.S. Government permits it to make policy decisions
very quickly.
Do you believe CENTCOM and other agencies within the U.S.
Government are appropriately organized to respond effectively to the
messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated
terrorist groups?
Answer. Al Qaeda exploitation of the information environment
continues to mature and is a decisive part of the al Qaeda Senior
Leader's campaign. While I'm not currently in a position to assess U.S.
Government MISO capabilities, I recognize that CENTCOM must be able to
dominate the information environment and ensure we do not unwittingly
cede the information battle-space to the enemy.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe CENTCOM should take to
counter and delegitimize violent extremist ideologies?
Answer. CENTCOM plays a significant role in countering and
delegitimizing violent extremist ideologies by eroding recruitment,
reach, fundraising and communication capabilities through military
information support and coordinated interagency operations.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, CENTCOM?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
afghanistan transition
1. Senator McCaskill. General Austin, I am concerned about what
appears to me to be a lack of civilian planning and a lack of
coordination for the transition to our post-2014 involvement in
Afghanistan. The Government Accountability Office recently released a
report that found that the Department of Defense (DOD) is effectively
managing on behalf of the Department of State (DOS) 20 assisted
interagency acquisitions with an estimated value of almost $1 billion
for basic support goods and services. In these cases, DOD has been
involved in every aspect of the acquisition cycle, including planning,
award, management, and oversight. I am concerned that DOS is not
prepared to manage the contracts it will need in the post-2014 period
in Afghanistan when the U.S. military largely leaves Afghanistan. What
do you intend to do, if confirmed, to ensure that there is adequate
coordination to ensure that DOS is not dependent on DOD to manage
contracts in Afghanistan after 2014?
General Austin. Based upon lessons learned from DOD to DOS
transition in Iraq, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and DOS created the
Afghanistan Contract Transition Working Group in 2012. This group is
specifically addressing the transition of contracts from DOD to DOS
post-2014. They are examining all contracts currently in place to
assist DOS in determining which services need to continue after 2014
and to prepare DOS acquisition management personnel to assume control
of contracting operations in Afghanistan. The group reports its
progress on contract transition matters to the Afghanistan Executive
Steering Group, a forum comprised of senior DOD and DOS leaders. If
confirmed, I will continue to facilitate the efforts of this group.

sustainability requirements
2. Senator McCaskill. General Austin, Congress has been clear that
greater analysis and assurances are needed to ensure that the
reconstruction projects the United States is undertaking in Afghanistan
are not only needed and wanted by the Afghan Government, but
sustainable by the Afghan Government. Congress made this clear in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013, which
stated that funding for reconstruction and development in contingencies
will not be available for use until a sustainability assessment is
conducted that accounts for the host country's ability to maintain
these projects. This applies not only to DOD, but also DOS and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID).
Now that these sustainability requirements for infrastructure
projects are law, it is up to these departments, including DOD, to
implement the law effectively and aggressively. Should you be confirmed
as the Commander of CENTCOM, you will play a key role in implementing
the law as it pertains to projects in Afghanistan. What steps will you
take to ensure we are funding sustainable projects in Afghanistan?
General Austin. Prior to funding any infrastructure projects in
Afghanistan, U.S Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) conducts assessments to
ensure we are implementing projects the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) wants, needs and can sustain.
Sustainment estimates, which include personnel, training and funding
resources, are continually refined throughout the project selection
process in consultation with GIRoA. USFOR-A also ensures sustainment
costs have been budgeted by GIRoA or other international agencies. In
partnership with the USAID and U.S. Embassy Kabul, USFOR-A continues to
build GIRoA's capacity to operate and sustain projects which are
critical to Afghanistan's stability and economic development. If
confirmed, I will ensure CENTCOM continues to aggressively support this
oversight process.

sexual assault
3. Senator McCaskill. General Austin and General Rodriguez, it is
my understanding that the movie ``The Invisible War'' is being used to
help educate senior leaders in the U.S. Armed Forces about the issue of
sexual assault in the military. Have you seen the movie?
General Austin. Yes.

4. Senator McCaskill. General Austin and General Rodriguez, as a
leader in the U.S. Army, what have you learned about the issue of
sexual assault facing servicemembers under your command?
General Austin. All individuals deserve to be treated with dignity
and respect, and they should be guaranteed living and working
environments free of sexual harassment and sexual assault. During my
tenure as VCSA, I have conducted a number of sensing sessions with
soldiers of all ranks in order to hear their thoughts and concerns on
the topic. These sessions have proven to be very informative and
helpful to me and other senior leaders and commanders.
We take these issues very seriously and we are actively taking
steps to reduce the incidence of sexual harassment and sexual assault
in our ranks. Indeed, commanders are now, and must remain, critical
players in establishing the right environments, caring for victims and
holding offenders accountable within the military justice system. A key
component in victim reporting is a command climate that fosters a bond
of trust and confidence between Leaders and their subordinates. Culture
change is on the horizon; the Army has seen the propensity to report by
our female soldiers increase in recent years. This positive trend
indicates that our female soldiers do, in fact, trust their chain of
command.
We acknowledge that there is more work to be done to continue this
upward trend and institutionalize our efforts, and our leaders remains
focused and committed to continuing to contribute to this most critical
endeavor.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
afghanistan
5. Senator Manchin. General Austin, I am a strong supporter of
bringing our troops home from Afghanistan as quickly as possible so we
can focus on rebuilding America. The President's recent announcements
to bring home 34,000 American soldiers within the next year and to move
up the transition to Afghan combat lead by a few months are welcome,
but I still believe that we need an even more aggressive timeline for
withdrawal. Over the next 2 years, do you think there will be any
opportunities for further expediting the timeline for withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Afghanistan?
General Austin. We are at a vital juncture in this campaign and the
pace of the transition and withdrawal must remain consistent with the
status of mission and conditions on the ground. However, at this time I
cannot predict if there will be opportunities in the coming days to
further expedite the withdrawal. If confirmed, I will work closely with
General Dunford to continuously assess the situation and provide best
military advice to our civilian leadership.

6. Senator Manchin. General Austin, our combat mission in
Afghanistan is transitioning to one of training, advising, and
assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In light of this
change, what are the milestones and measures of effectiveness that DOD
is using to track the readiness of ANSF to stand on their own? I would
like to see DOD carefully track and report to Congress on progress
against these milestones because the sooner these targets have been
reached, the sooner we can withdrawal troops dedicated to the training
mission.
General Austin. If confirmed, I will focus on several principal
strategic level objectives over the next 2 years including: the
transition of lead security responsibility to the ANSF; ensuring that
we set the conditions for the 2014 Afghan Presidential elections; and,
ensuring all necessary actions are taken to successfully achieve the
full transition of security responsibility to the democratically
elected Government of Afghanistan. Success in Afghanistan will
ultimately hinge, in large measure, on the leadership within
Afghanistan.
Having said that, keeping a close eye on milestones and measures of
effectiveness to track the readiness of ANSF has been an evolutionary
effort over the past several years. We have developed several tools
used to assess and track ANSF capabilities and their ability to stand
on their own. For example, NTM-A uses the Commander's Unit Assessment
Tool to assess the condition of ANSF units in areas that include:
leadership, operations, intelligence, logistics, equipping, personnel,
maintenance, communications, training and education, and partnering.
Capability Milestones are the measures of effectiveness used to track
the ANSF readiness and performance at the ministerial level. These
assessments are conducted quarterly and allow for advisors to focus
efforts with the Afghans to continue improving their readiness and
performance. I will work closely with General Dunford to provide DOD
with progress reports against these milestones in support of
congressional reporting requirements.

7. Senator Manchin. General Austin, this question is related to
your current position as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and impacts
your future position as Commander of CENTCOM because, as you aptly
state in your advance policy questions, you inherently understand ``the
importance of taking care of people, which will always remain the most
important asset in our military.''
It has come to my attention that there are deployed Army battalions
in Afghanistan that do not have the appropriate family support at home
station. In September 2012, Secretary McHugh assured me that deployed
battalions would have Family Readiness Support assistants, but I know
of at least a few battalions that do not. Before voting for your
confirmation, I would like to bring this matter to your attention. Will
you commit that you have reviewed these policies in your current role,
and that in your future role, you wholly agree that deployed units must
have the appropriate family support?
General Austin. I am grateful for the continued support that you
have shown for our servicemembers and families. I absolutely agree that
caring for our families is and must remain a top priority. They
represent a critical part of our Army Team. They've made countless
sacrifices over the years, and certainly we could not have accomplished
all that we have over the past decade-plus of conflict without their
support. I am aware of the issue that has prompted your concern; the
senior Army leadership is currently addressing this matter directly.
You have my full assurance that, if confirmed, as CENTCOM Commander I
will make sure that the families of all of our deployed servicemembers
receive the full support they merit and deserve.

8. Senator Manchin. General Austin, what opportunities do you see
for encouraging other countries, particularly Afghanistan's neighbors,
to do more to build ANSF capacity?
General Austin. Presently, Afghanistan's neighbors are not in an
economic position to provide equipment or technical training to the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). However, all of Afghanistan's
neighbors share a common interest in a stable and secure Afghanistan
with an ANSF capable of preventing Violent Extremist Organization (VEO)
safe havens and controlling the adverse regional effects of narcotics
and criminal patronage networks. Initial ANSF capacity is established
through the efforts of the International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) Coalition and international donors. The future effectiveness of
ANSF will depend on bilateral military engagement with Afghanistan's
neighbors. Nowhere will ANSF bilateral engagement be more critical than
along the remote and rugged border areas with Pakistan in which
extremists and criminals seek sanctuary and who directly threaten both
nations.

9. Senator Manchin. General Austin, are there things the U.S.
military can do to encourage these partnerships to relieve the burden
on our forces?
General Austin. There are a number of things that U.S. Forces have
done and are continuing to do to facilitate our continued partnerships.
First, we are providing first-class training to coalition units
deploying into theater. Second, we are working closely with our
partners in the region to develop the tactics, techniques and
procedures that promote multinational interoperability. Third, we
assist countries in developing their own capabilities through training
events and foreign military sales. Finally, we are continuing to
develop military-to-military relationships at the highest level through
strategic engagements that not only promote trust, but also help key
leaders to understand our various military and political concerns.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
withdrawal of troops from afghanistan
10. Senator Shaheen. General Austin, in your testimony, you stated
that you felt confident that the ANSF were on track to assume the lead
in security this spring. In your examination of the ongoing operations,
are you confident that the withdrawal of 34,000 troops this year will
allow for adequate force protection of Americans still in theater?
General Austin. The safety and security of our deployed forces
remains our foremost priority. The planned withdrawal of 34,000 troops
will be phased, as it was with the Surge drawdown, to ensure we are
able to successfully conduct the required mission while providing
sufficient force protection. Troops will be redeployed incrementally
and on pace with base closure and retrograde.

11. Senator Shaheen. General Austin, from your experience with the
Iraq withdrawal, what do you think that the United States should do
differently as we prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan?
General Austin. The Iraq withdrawal experience taught us two
things: to begin planning earlier and to consider all possibilities,
including not having a status of forces agreement (SOFA) that provides
the legal protection for our military forces and civilians to operate
in a sovereign nation. Redeployment planning and execution is underway
and leaders have incorporated the critical lessons learned from Iraq
including the possibility that the United States and Afghanistan may
fail to agree to a Bilateral Security Agreement.

12. Senator Shaheen. General Austin, what best practices do you
think are applicable to this new challenge?
General Austin. Although the challenges in Afghanistan are
different in many respects, ISAF is using the lessons learned from the
Iraq drawdown to help shape their campaign plan. There are a few best
practices that are critical to success: (1) synchronize retrograde
operations with operational maneuver to ensure adequate force
protection and enabler support as the size of our force decreases; (2)
conduct all planning with DOS and other agencies to ensure all
interagency missions are synchronized and set up for success through
the transition process; (3) prepare for the possibility that no status
of forces agreement will be in place for subsequent protection of U.S.
troops and contractors; and (4) ensure the training and advising of the
ANSF remain the focus, as the ANSF takes the lead for security across
Afghanistan and as we redeploy our forces.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
troop morale in afghanistan
13. Senator Blumenthal. General Austin, I have heard from several
Connecticut servicemembers and their family members deployed to
Afghanistan that when they are not at the base during certain hours,
they do not receive breakfast. I have also heard from servicemembers
that the free wireless Internet provided in Internet cafes is
occasionally too slow for them to communicate with family members back
home via Skype. I understand that servicemembers must pay up to $100
per month if they would like high-speed Internet service in their
living quarters. I have every confidence that you will ensure the
welfare of all military personnel under your command. If confirmed, how
would you address the welfare and morale issues of breakfast and
adequate Internet use for our servicemembers deployed in Afghanistan?
General Austin. The care of our deployed servicemembers is
critically important and I consider this to be an operational issue.
Mission requirements dictate the availability of certain resources and
as our footprint gets smaller, we may necessarily see gaps in certain
services due to operational requirements. That said, if confirmed, I
will ensure that leaders continue to provide proper care and
recreational opportunities within mission constraints.

jordan
14. Senator Blumenthal. General Austin, the civil war in Syria is
causing thousands to flee to the Jordanian Refugee Camp Zaatari where
there are press reports of Jordanian outsiders entering the area and
that it is not properly secured. If confirmed, would you consider
providing specific training and technical assistance to the Jordanian
military to improve security control at the Zaatari refugee camp, where
conditions are worsening and the Government of Jordan is bearing the
brunt of a crisis that requires a regional response?
General Austin. The U.S. military routinely provides focused and
effective training as well as technical assistance to the Jordanian
Armed Forces. The majority of the training and assistance we provide
increases their capacity and capabilities in order to ensure a secure
and stable Jordan. With regards to security at the Zaatri refugee camp,
the Jordanian Armed Forces do not provide any internal or perimeter
security for the camp. The Government of Jordan relies on their police
forces and Gendarme to provide security at Zaatri. The Jordanian Armed
Forces provide security for the refugees at the border and while
transporting them to Zaatri. Because the security providers at the camp
are Ministry of Interior personnel, CENTCOM would need special
authorities to provide any training or technical assistance should they
ask for it.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
tactical nuclear weapons
15. Senator Chambliss. General Austin, several nuclear powers
reside in the CENTCOM AOR. There is much concern about countries like
Pakistan who have unstable governments, discontent populations, and a
nuclear weapons capability. According to the Congressional Research
Service and the Federation of American Scientists, Pakistan has
approximately 90 to 110 warheads, recently passing India's inventory of
80 to 100 weapons. This appears to be a nuclear arms race in South
Asia. What are your thoughts on tactical nuclear weapons?
General Austin. The security and accountability of all tactical
nuclear weapons in that volatile and beleaguered part of the world is
of utmost importance to the United States, especially given our vital
national interests located throughout the region. While Pakistan
represents the only nuclear power in the CENTCOM AOR, we remain
concerned about the persistent risk of proliferation and certainly the
potential for an arms race in South Asia. If confirmed, I will also
work closely with the Commander of PACOM to ensure that nuclear
tensions between Pakistan and India are properly addressed. Meanwhile,
our ultimate goal is to help to discourage Pakistan from maintaining
tactical nuclear weapons given the inherent threat they pose to
security and stability in the region. Larger nuclear weapons are
contained on installations with multi-layered security and are more
difficult to conceal. In contrast, tactical nuclear weapons are far
easier to transport and conceal and thus more difficult to track.

16. Senator Chambliss. General Austin, what is your message to
leaders in Pakistan for future involvement?
General Austin. We want to convey to them our belief that the
significant risks associated with maintaining tactical nuclear weapons
far outweighs any potential benefit. We also want to emphasize the
grave need to ensure the proper security and accountability of these
weapons. Ultimately, it is in both our countries' best interest to
remain engaged at all levels in order to promote Pakistan stability and
security and accountability of all nuclear weapons.

17. Senator Chambliss. General Austin, what will be CENTCOM's role
in engaging with Pakistani military leaders for responsible
accountability and positioning of tactical nuclear weapons?
General Austin. The development of tactical nuclear weapons as a
potential counter to larger conventional forces is certainly an area of
concern that merits our attention. The United States must continue to
employ all elements of national power to aid and assist Pakistan in
improving its overall nuclear security and to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear material and technology. If confirmed, I will ensure that
CENTCOM continues to promote U.S./Pakistan military-to-military
engagements at the highest levels to promote the security and
accountability of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

iranian nuclear weapons capability
18. Senator Chambliss. General Austin, while they state otherwise,
it appears Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. This
is something we cannot allow and there must be a red line drawn prior
to Iran acquiring this capability. What are the key indicators on
Iran's path to nuclear weapons capability?
General Austin. Key indicators could include: (1) Tehran ceases all
cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which could
result in the lack of verification of Iran's nuclear-related materials
and facilities; (2) Uranium enrichment above the 20-percent level is
detected; this would exceed Iran's current civilian use requirements
and may have military implications; (3) Accumulation of large
stockpiles of 20-percent enriched uranium; (4) Confirmation of nuclear
weapons-related activities, many of which were outlined in the
International Atomic Energy Agency November 2011 report annex; (5)
Operation of a plutonium production reactor and establishment of a
plutonium reprocessing capability; (6) Continued testing and growth of
Tactical Ballistic Missile capabilities in the Iranian military.

19. Senator Chambliss. General Austin, what are the red lines and
what actions should we take?
General Austin. The President has stated the United States cannot
and will not allow Iran to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and
avoiding a regional nuclear arms race is critical to preserving
stability in the Middle East. Accordingly, CENTCOM is postured to
provide the President of the United States (POTUS) with a range of
military options, as required. That said, the best way to accomplish
this goal is through diplomacy, both unilateral and with our allies and
United Nation partners, and a tough sanctions regime. In parallel, the
United States needs to continue to maintain a strong U.S. military
presence within the Arabian Gulf region and build our regional
partners' military capabilities to defend themselves and the region in
the event of a crisis with Iran. If a crisis with Iran does occur,
CENTCOM is prepared to defend U.S. interests and our partners'
sovereignty and maintain the free flow of international commerce
throughout the region.

20. Senator Chambliss. General Austin, do you support the full
range of policy options, to include the use of force?
General Austin. Yes. Our Nation has vital national interests
throughout the CENTCOM AOR that would be jeopardized by a regionally-
hegemonic and aggressive Iran in possession of a nuclear weapon.
Therefore, and as POTUS has stated, we will not tolerate a nuclear-
armed Iran and stand ready to employ all instruments of national power
to ensure Iran does not achieve such a capability. If confirmed, as the
CENTCOM Commander, I will be prepared at all times to provide POTUS
with a range of options for effective military actions across the
spectrum of conflict.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
iran's activities
21. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, what are Iran's activities now
in Syria?
General Austin. Over the past 2 years, Iran has focused on keeping
the Assad regime in power to maintain the critical gateway to its
regional surrogates and proxies. Iran is providing the Syrian regime
money, weapons, military advisors, technical support, and is becoming
directly involved in operations against opposition forces.
Additionally, Iran is increasing support to pro-Assad Shia militants,
including establishing, training, and equipping the Jaysh al Sha'bi
militia.

22. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, what are Iran's activities in
Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Afghanistan?
General Austin. The Iranian Threat Network (ITN) is a worldwide
network consisting of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force
(IRGC-QF), Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and their
surrogates, business and logistics support. ITN actions, lethal or
otherwise, are a problem common to nearly every troubled country in the
region including Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iran continues to exploit regional animosity toward Israel to gain
influence in the Levant, portraying itself as the sole supporter of
Palestinian and Lebanese resistance. Iran continues providing Hezballah
with lethal military support, religious guidance, and funding for
numerous outreach programs targeting Shia communities throughout
Lebanon and specifically in southern Beirut. Iranian lethal aid
includes several advanced weapons systems, such as anti-ship missiles,
surface-to-surface missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, several variants
of manportable air defense systems, anti-tank guided missiles and tens
of thousands of tactical rockets.
In Yemen, Iran has taken advantage of unrest since early 2011 to
grow its influence. They are providing lethal and non-lethal support to
segments of the Huthi rebel movement in Yemen, in hopes of building the
group into a Lebanese Hizballah like element it can use to pressure the
Yemeni Government. Iran is also establishing an Arabian Peninsula based
weapons hub for training and exporting lethal aid to Yemen.
Iran is trying to expand its influence in Iraq by strengthening its
political, economic, and military ties with the Iraqi Government and
its senior leaders. Influence over Iraqi officials allows Iran to
extend hard and soft power influence in key areas of Iraq. Iraqi
airspace has been used to ferry lethal aid to Syria, uninhibited by
perfunctory Iraqi inspections of aircraft. Tehran is also engaging
Iraqi political leaders on all sides to ensure the current Iraqi
political crisis does not devolve into conflict. Iran continues to
support its Shia militant proxies, even though the groups have assumed
a lower profile in Iraq over the past year.
In Afghanistan, Iran through the IRGC-QF, continues equipping and
training the Taliban and other insurgents to undermine ISAF efforts to
establish security and stability in Afghanistan. Iran's other
influential efforts include overt support for the Afghan Government and
economic and cultural outreach to the Afghan populace, particularly
Shia minority populations. Politically, Iran seeks to maintain positive
relations within the highest levels of the Afghan Government while
attempting to steer Afghanistan away from a long-term Bilateral
Security Agreement with the United States.

arabian gulf
23. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, are we in a period of
heightened risk in the Arabian Gulf region?
General Austin. Yes. Iran's actions in the Arabian Gulf, of late,
have been more aggressive as Tehran attempts to assert territorial
claims that exceed internationally recognized limits. As Iran continues
to actively challenge our presence in international airspace and waters
of the Gulf, these events create the potential for miscalculation. Iran
also continues improving the lethality and accuracy of its ballistic
missiles and conducts military exercises with the stated purpose of
closing the Strait of Hormuz, threatening not only its neighbors but
also the global economy. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy
Agency has reported that Iran continues to increase and improve its
uranium enrichment activities, causing concerns over the potential
military dimensions of its nuclear program.

24. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, what are the consequences of
not having the second aircraft carrier in the Arabian Gulf region?
General Austin. While the presence of a second aircraft carrier
significantly enhances the flexibility and number of response options
available to POTUS in the midst of a crisis, in its absence the United
States still retains a robust response capability for any number of
contingencies. That said, the lack of a second carrier would increase
response times required to execute some military options in the region.

integrated air and missile defense framework
25. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, given regional threats and a
need to balance Iran's nuclear ambitions, will CENTCOM continue to
pursue a robust integrated air and missile defense framework with our
Gulf Cooperation Council partners?
General Austin. Yes. Developing a robust integrated air and missile
defense framework with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners is central
to demonstrating the U.S. resolve in the region. Iran possesses
extensive ballistic missile capabilities that continue to grow in
quantity and technological sophistication. Their disruptive behavior
threatens the security interests of our regional partners and the vital
interests of the United States and we must emphasize interoperability
with our partners as they procure new and upgrade older missile defense
systems. Ultimately, a layered U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council
missile defense architecture is necessary to effectively counter the
Iranian tactical ballistic missile threat and preserve operational
flexibility.

sequester risks
26. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, how will sequestration increase
risk to our interests in the CENTCOM AOR?
General Austin. Sequestration will significantly increase the risk
to readiness and ongoing missions in the CENTCOM AOR as Chairman
Dempsey and the Service Chiefs have stated. Sequestration will cause
the Services to delay required maintenance to ships and other major
systems, curtail pilot training hours, stall procurement decisions, and
cancel contracts. While such actions may meet short-term sequestration
goals, they introduce risk and likely result in greater expenditures
later. The effects of sequestration will negatively impact all of the
Services, thereby having a significant operational impact on the
CENTCOM AOR due to its geography, the pace of ongoing combat
operations, and the likelihood of numerous unforeseen contingencies.

surveillance in central command
27. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, the 2002 $250 million wargame
Millennium Challenge simulated a naval engagement in the Gulf and found
that speedboats pose a serious threat to our CENTCOM forces, especially
in the Strait of Hormuz. Given that, is persistent ISR that can track
these speedboats still required?
General Austin. Yes. The threat tactics employed during Millennium
Challenge still pose a significant threat to our forces. Specifically,
tactics such as swarming have been practiced and refined by the
Iranians over the years. Iranian speed boats, which we categorize as
Fast Attack Craft and Fast In-shore Attack Craft, pose a unique and
significant threat to U.S. and coalition naval forces, as well as
commercial shipping in the Arabian Gulf. These craft are integral to
Iran's mine-laying and swarm tactics and thus pose a significant threat
to the safety of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the
shipping lanes of the Arabian Gulf. Given the low observable signatures
and dynamic operations of these threats, persistent ISR is still
required.

28. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, given what we know about Iran's
missile capabilities, would you consider integration of fire control
and persistent ISR valuable to the protection of our forward deployed
troops?
General Austin. Yes. CENTCOM forces and coalition partners will
have only minimal time to react to missile launches in the Arabian
Gulf. Rapid identification, verification, geolocation, and kinetic
targeting of such threats is a must (find-fix-finish).

29. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, the Army recently announced
that the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted
Sensor (JLENS) system would be demonstrated in the National Capital
Region to provide exactly that kind of ISR and defense. Would such a
system help counter threats such as those posed to U.S. Forces in the
Gulf?
General Austin. Persistent ISR systems such as JLENS, specifically
designed for missile detection and tracking, would help to counter
threats such as those posed to U.S. Forces in the Gulf. However, JLENS
is not currently a program of record and is still in testing. If this
system does become available for worldwide operational use, JLENS will
offer persistent and multi-sensor capabilities optimized for point area
defense. The fact that JLENS is tethered will prove a limitation
requiring substantial planning and de-confliction to overcome the
impact to air navigation, especially in nations who only grant the
United States limited use of their airspace.

international security assistance force
30. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, if General Dunford told you
that he believes the pace of the withdrawal is jeopardizing our
interests and a positive outcome in Afghanistan, would you support his
request to slow the pace of withdrawal?
General Austin. I will remain in close contact with General Dunford
to assess the conditions on the ground, consider his best judgment in
any major decisions regarding the campaign, including the pace of
redeployment of our forces, and provide my best military advice to my
chain of command.

31. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, if General Dunford says he
needs more forces than planned after 2014, would you support that
request?
General Austin. I will work closely with General Dunford and
consider his best judgment in any major decisions regarding the
campaign, including the size of the forces required to meet the
mission, as directed by the President. I will continue to work with
General Dunford and his team, the Joint Staff and DOD, to assess
conditions on the ground and provide my best military advice to my
chain of command.

32. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, what will happen in Afghanistan
if the United States withdraws too quickly or leaves too few troops in
Afghanistan post-2014?
General Austin. Campaign success through 2014 and beyond requires
balancing many factors, including mission requirements, availability of
resources, and risk to forces. Ultimately, the Afghans are responsible
for securing their own country, and we have made a significant
investment in training their forces to achieve this goal. That said,
while it is hard to predict exactly what would happen if the United
States were to withdraw too quickly, such a withdrawal could jeopardize
the hard fought gains achieved over the last 12-plus years. Ultimately,
withdrawing too quickly could result in increased instability in
Afghanistan and throughout the region. If confirmed, I will work
closely with General Dunford to ensure a responsible transition and
withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan.

syria
33. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, why do you believe that the al
Nusrah Front is increasing in capability and influence in Syria?
General Austin. The ``al Qaeda in Iraq'' Syrian front organization,
al-Nusrah Front, has achieved its current level of capability and
influence because of two key variables. Al Nusrah has focused on
outreach to the Syrian populace, tempering its vision of an Islamic
state and building an outreach program that includes basic humanitarian
assistance. This has some Syrians looking to al Nusrah as a viable
alternative to the current Assad regime. This outreach is powerful when
combined with the second key to al Nusrah's success, the experience its
forces bring to the fight in Syria. This experience, gained largely in
Iraq, includes not only tactics and strategies, but also logistics,
organizational skills, and a discriminating use of violence. Al Nusrah
Front strives to minimize civilian casualties and applies savvy
propaganda when unwanted deaths occur, typically shifting the blame to
regime forces or other Syrian opposition groups.

contracting with the enemy
34. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, are you aware of section 841 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, titled ``Prohibition on Contracting with
the Enemy in the CENTCOM Theater of Operations''?
General Austin. Yes, I am aware of section 841 and the authority
granted to the CENTCOM Commander to issue findings against companies
and individuals actively supporting the insurgency.

35. Senator Ayotte. General Austin, if confirmed, do you commit to
aggressively implementing these authorities to save taxpayer money and
ensure U.S. contracting funds do not end up in the hands of our
enemies?
General Austin. Yes, if confirmed, I will aggressively utilize the
authority provided under section 841 to issue findings against
companies and individuals found to be using proceeds from U.S.
contracts to actively support the insurgency.
______

[The nomination reference of GEN Lloyd J. Austin III, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 23, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General.

GEN Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of GEN Lloyd J. Austin III, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of GEN Lloyd J. Austin III, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Auburn University - ME - Educational Administration
Webster University - MA - Management

Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
U.S. Army War College

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 4 Jun 75
1LT....................................... 4 Jun 77
CPT....................................... 18 Nov 79
MAJ....................................... 1 Jun 86
LTC....................................... 1 Jul 92
COL....................................... 1 Aug 97
BG........................................ 1 Jan 02
MG........................................ 1 Jan 05
LTG....................................... 8 Dec 06
GEN....................................... 1 Sep 10
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Feb 12.......................... Present........... Vice Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
Sep 10.......................... Dec 11............ Commander, U.S.
Forces-Iraq,
Operation New
Dawn, Iraq
Aug 09.......................... Aug 10............ Director, Joint
Staff,
Washington, DC
Apr 09.......................... Aug 09............ Commanding
General, XVIII
Airborne Corps
and Fort Bragg,
Fort Bragg, NC
Feb 08.......................... Apr 09............ Commanding
General, XVIII
Airborne Corps/
Commander, Multi-
National Corps-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Dec 06.......................... Feb 08............ Commanding
General, XVIII
Airborne Corps
and Fort Bragg,
Fort Bragg, NC
Sep 05.......................... Dec 06............ Chief of Staff,
U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Sep 03.......................... Aug 05............ Commanding
General, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light) and Fort
Drum, Fort Drum,
NY, to include
duty as
Commander,
Combined Joint
Task Force-180,
Operation
Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan
Jul 01.......................... Jun 03............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA,
and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Jun 99.......................... Jul 01............ Chief, Joint
Operations
Division, J-3,
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Jun 97.......................... Jun 99............ Commander, 3d
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Aug 96.......................... Jun 97............ Student, U.S. Army
War College,
Carlisle
Barracks, PA
Mar 95.......................... Jun 96............ G-3 (Operations),
82d Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
May 93.......................... Mar 95............ Commander, 2d
Battalion, 505th
Parachute
Infantry
Regiment, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC, and
Operation Safe
Haven, Panama
Oct 92.......................... Apr 93............ Director,
Directorate of
Plans, Training,
Mobilization, and
Security, U.S.
Army Garrison,
Fort Drum, NY
Jun 91.......................... Oct 92............ Executive Officer,
1st Infantry
Brigade, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), Fort
Drum, NY
Jun 89.......................... May 91............ S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 2d
Battalion, 22d
Infantry, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), Fort
Drum, NY
Jul 88.......................... Jun 89............ Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Dec 85.......................... Jun 88............ Cadet Counselor,
later Company
Tactical Officer,
U.S. Military
Academy, West
Point, NY
Jan 85.......................... Dec 85............ Student, Auburn
University,
Auburn, AL
Oct 82.......................... Dec 84............ Company Commander,
U.S. Army
Recruiting
Battalion,
Indianapolis, IN
Oct 81.......................... Oct 82............ Operations
Officer, U.S.
Army Indianapolis
District
Recruiting
Command,
Indianapolis, IN
Apr 81.......................... Oct 81............ Assistant S-3
(Operations), 1st
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Oct 79.......................... Apr 81............ Commander, Combat
Support Company,
2d Battalion
(Airborne), 508th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Mar 79.......................... Sep 79............ Student, Infantry
Officer Advanced
Course, U.S. Army
Infantry School,
Fort Benning, GA
Jan 78.......................... Feb 79............ Scout Platoon
Leader, Combat
Support Company,
1st Battalion,
7th Infantry, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
May 76.......................... Jan 78............ Rifle Platoon
Leader, A
Company, 1st
Battalion, 7th
Infantry, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Sep. 10-Dec. 11... General
Operation New Dawn, Iraq.
Director, Joint Staff, Aug. 09-Aug. 10... Lieutenant General
Washington, DC.
Commanding General, XVIII Feb. 08-Apr. 09... Lieutenant General
Airborne Corps/Commander, Multi-
National Corps-Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Sep. 05-Dec. 06... Major General
Command, MacDill Air Force
Base, FL.
Commanding General, 10th Sep. 03-Apr. 04... Brigadier General/
Mountain Division (Light) with Major General
duty as Commander, Combined
Joint Task Force-180, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan
(No Joint Credit).
Chief, Joint Operations June 99-July 01... Colonel
Division, J-3, Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of operational assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Sep. 10-Dec. 11... General
Operation New Dawn, Iraq.
Commanding General, XVIII Feb. 08-Apr. 09... Lieutenant General
Airborne Corps/Commander, Multi-
National Corps-Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Commanding General, 10th Sep. 03-Apr. 04... Brigadier General/
Mountain Division (Light) with Major General
duty as Commander, Combined
Joint Task Force-180, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan
(No Joint Credit).
Assistant Division Commander Mar. 03-Apr. 03... Brigadier General
(Maneuver), 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized),
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Nov. 94-Feb. 95... Lieutenant Colonel
Parachute Infantry Regiment,
82d Airborne Division,
Operation Safe Haven, Panama.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Silver Star
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with seven Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Combat Action Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Lloyd J.
Austin III, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Lloyd J. Austin III.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.

3. Date of nomination:
January 23, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
August 8, 1953; Mobile, AL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Charlene Denise Banner Austin; Maiden Name: Banner.

7. Names and ages of children:
Reginald Hill (Stepson); age 44.
Christopher Hill (Stepson); age 40.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed above.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of the U.S. Army.
National Infantry Association.
Rocks Incorporated.
555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Patriot Award: October 2009 (Awarded for exceptional service to
country by the Patriot Foundation, Pinehurst, NC).
Lifetime Achievement Award (Awarded by Auburn University).
Pinnacle Award (Awarded by the Chamber of Commerce in Thomasville,
GA).
Honorary Doctorate (Awarded by Fayetteville State University).
Lincoln Award (Philadelphia, PA).

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

[The nomination of GEN Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 26, 2013,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 5, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN David M. Rodriguez,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also improved cooperation between the Services and the
combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. No. At this time I do not believe modifications are
necessary. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert to the need for
modifications.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders
under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies
and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with
regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
Answer. No.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)?
Answer. The Unified Command Plan specifies the responsibilities of
AFRICOM. If confirmed as the Commander of AFRICOM, I would ensure the
accomplishment of those responsibilities. In my view, the most
important requirement is to detect, deter and prevent attacks against
the United States, its territories, possessions, and bases and to
employ appropriate force to defend the Nation should deterrence fail.
AFRICOM's responsibilities also reflect a new and evolving focus on
building partner operational and institutional capacity at the country
and regional levels and supporting the efforts of other U.S. Government
agencies in the area of responsibility. These activities are consistent
with and seek to further the U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, as
released by the President in June 2012.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. In my 36 years of military service, I have served in
numerous positions that prepared me for this command. For the greater
part of my career, I have focused on the training and readiness of
soldiers to build an effective team; preparing and leading soldiers for
missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.
Leading soldiers has prepared me well to do the same for joint,
multinational, and coalition forces. As the Commander of the
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command in Afghanistan, I
came to appreciate the values and challenges of training Afghan forces,
working with 50 coalition countries, and numerous interagency,
intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. As Commander,
Multinational Command Northwest-Iraq, I worked to increase the capacity
of Iraqi security forces. At the same time ensuring our efforts were
coordinated with numerous partner nations, interagency and
intergovernmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations. If
confirmed, I will continue this effort of partnership in AFRICOM.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander of AFRICOM?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will schedule a series of briefings
with the AFRICOM staff, Intelligence Community, Department of State,
National Security Staff, and other interagency partners to better
understand the challenges, expand the breadth and depth of my
knowledge, and prepare myself for this position.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect the
Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. The specific responsibilities of AFRICOM are defined in the
Unified Command Plan which is approved by the Secretary of Defense and
the President. If confirmed, I would expect to have discussions with
the Secretary of Defense to confirm priorities for the command and to
focus my efforts on those areas that require immediate attention.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Africa Command
to the following offices:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Subject to direction from the President, the Commander of
AFRICOM performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commander of AFRICOM is
responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the readiness of the
command to carry out its mission.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. A direct command relationship between the Under Secretaries
of Defense and the AFRICOM Commander does not exist. However, I
anticipate that the AFRICOM Commander will regularly interact,
coordinate, and exchange information with the Under Secretaries of
Defense on issues relating to AFRICOM affairs. The commander should
directly coordinate with the Under Secretaries of Defense on a regular
basis.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs.
Answer. The Commander of AFRICOM coordinates and exchanges
information with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs as needed to discuss international security strategy
and policy as it relates to African nations. The Commander of AFRICOM
also coordinates as required for issues related to security cooperation
programs and foreign military sales.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.
Answer. The Commander AFRICOM coordinates and exchanges information
with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities as needed to discuss
matters related to special operations, counterterrorism, civil affairs,
and information operations. The AFRICOM Commander also coordinates as
required for capabilities development to support the accomplishment of
AFRICOM operations.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the AFRICOM
Commander. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction, and
control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman will transmit
communications between the National Command Authority and AFRICOM
Commander as well as oversee the activities of the commander as
directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor
to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between a combatant commander,
interagency organizations, and the Service Chiefs.
The Vice Chairman serves on several councils and boards whose
decisions affect AFRICOM including the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, the Defense Acquisition Board, the Defense Advisory Working
Group, and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. Interaction between
the Commander of AFRICOM and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
is important to ensure these boards and councils make informed choices
on matters affecting the command.
The AFRICOM Commander will keep the Chairman and Vice Chairman
informed on significant issues regarding the AFRICOM area of
responsibility. The Commander will directly communicate with the
Chairman and Vice Chairman on a regular basis.
Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.
Answer. There is no direct command relationship between the Service
Secretaries and Service Chiefs and the AFRICOM Commander. The Service
Secretaries are responsible for all affairs of their respective
Services including functions pertaining to the administration of and
support for forces employed by AFRICOM. The Secretaries fulfill their
responsibilities by exercising administrative control through the
Service Component Commands assigned to AFRICOM. In this manner, the
Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for AFRICOM Headquarters.
The Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring the organization
and readiness of each Service branch and for advising the President.
The Service Chiefs are also members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
serve as advisers to the President, National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. For matters
affecting AFRICOM, I would anticipate regular communications between
the Commander of AFRICOM and the Service Chiefs. The Commander, AFRICOM
will rely on the Service Chiefs to provide properly trained and
equipped forces to accomplish missions in the AFRICOM AOR.
Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
Answer. The AFRICOM commander maintains a close relationship and
communicates directly with the Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command, on issues of mutual interest. As a subordinate command of
AFRICOM, Special Operations Command Africa and its units deploy
throughout Africa supporting the AFRICOM commander's theater security
cooperation program, deliberate plans, and operational contingencies.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Formal relationships between the AFRICOM commander and the
other geographic and functional combatant commanders will derive from
command authority established by title 10, U.S.C., section 164, and
from the Secretary of Defense when such relationships are established
by him during operational missions. Combatant commanders closely
coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned missions. These
relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military
Strategy, and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact,
and productive exchanges of information on key issues.
Question. The respective U.S. Chiefs of Mission within the AFRICOM
area of responsibility (AOR).
Answer. Each Ambassador serves the President directly as his
personal representative for each country. If confirmed, I will ensure
that all activities of the combatant command in each country are fully
coordinated with the Chief of Mission, consistent with U.S. policy.
Question. The respective U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense
Attaches (SDO/DATT)
Answer. There is a supervisory relationship between the AFRICOM
commander and the U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaches. The
U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaches are formally evaluated
by the AFRICOM Commander. This relationship ensures the Senior Defense
Officials/Defense Attaches maintain close coordination with AFRICOM on
all matters involving U.S. military forces in the country. As the
AFRICOM commander, I will maintain a close working relationship with
the U.S. Senior Defense Official in each country in order to coordinate
activities between the command and the respective country's military.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. If confirmed as the Commander of AFRICOM, you will be
responsible for all military operations in that region. In your view,
what are the major challenges and opportunities that would confront you
if you are confirmed as the next Commander of AFRICOM?
Answer. The security environment of the African continent is
dynamic and, if confirmed, I will seek to counter emerging threats
while strengthening African nations' capabilities to effectively
address their own security challenges. A major challenge is effectively
countering violent extremist organizations, especially the growth of
Mali as an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb safe haven, Boco Haram in
Nigeria, and al Shabaab in Somalia. In order to effectively do so,
AFRICOM relies on current African Partners and seeks the opportunity to
develop new partnerships. Currently, there is an opportunity to assist
the Nations of Libya, South Sudan and Somalia as they continue to
develop their armed forces and develop governmental structures.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges and opportunities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's whole of
government approach implementing the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan
Africa. We will continue our commitment to protect our Nation from
threats emanating from the African continent and strengthen the defense
capabilities of our African partners and seek to develop new
partnerships. If confirmed, I will review and assess AFRICOM's programs
and strategy before taking any action.
u.s. objectives in africa
Question. In his address in Ghana in July 2009, President Obama
reaffirmed Africa's strategic importance to the United States and our
national interests. He identified four priorities for the U.S.
Government's engagement efforts: (1) supporting strong and sustainable
democracies and good governance; (2) fostering sustained economic
growth and development; (3) increasing access to quality health and
education; and (4) helping to prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed
conflict. In June 2012, the administration reaffirmed these priorities
in the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, emphasizing the
increasing capacity of African states to take the lead on security
issues on the continent, but also noting the continuing challenges.
In your view, what is AFRICOM currently doing to advance each of
these objectives?
Answer. AFRICOM's primary contribution is in the area of helping to
prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict. The command works with
African partner nation's military forces to strengthen their defense
capabilities so that they are better able to address security
challenges. AFRICOM's operations, exercises and theater security
cooperation engagements focus on advancing this priority. The command's
efforts to support military professionalization and security sector
reform efforts help to inculcate respect for the rule of law, human
rights, and military subordination to civilian authority--all of which
reinforce the appropriate role of a military in a democratic society.
AFRICOM's efforts play a mostly indirect but important role in
supporting democratic consolidation and preventing a return to conflict
in fragile, post-conflict states. A stable and secure environment is a
precursor to significant advances in the other three areas: supporting
strong and sustainable democracies and good governance; fostering
sustained economic growth and development; and increasing access to
quality health and education.
counterterrorism priorities
Question. Within the AFRICOM AOR, what do you consider the highest
counterterrorism priorities?
Answer. I consider the threat from al Qaeda and its affiliates to
be the highest counterterrorism priority. The three groups in the
AFRICOM area of responsibility--al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, al
Shabaab, and Boco Haram--each present a threat to western interests in
Africa. While each has not specifically targeted the United States,
they have successfully carried out attacks on western interests and
engaged in kidnapping. If they deepen their collaboration, they have
the potential to be an even larger threat.
Question. Given your current knowledge of AFRICOM programs, do you
believe the Command's resources are aligned in a manner consistent with
these counterterrorism priorities?
Answer. Yes, countering violent extremist groups is the command's
first priority.
al qaeda in the lands of the islamic maghreb
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?
Answer. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has publicly stated the
willingness to attack U.S. and Western interests. The group's ability
to conduct large scale terror attacks is restricted by the paucity of
U.S. and Western targets in North Africa and successful Algerian
security service counterterrorism efforts. Al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb's greatest threat to U.S. interests is likely a
catalyst for instability in North Africa through weapons facilitation
and training jihadists in northern Mali.
Since the group publicly announced merger with al Qaeda on 13
September 2006, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has been committed to
attacks against Western targets. On 10 December 2006, it attacked a bus
carrying expatriate employees of the Algerian-American oil company
Brown Root and Condor. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has continued to
conduct bombings in Algeria, predominantly in the coastal region east
of Algiers. On 24 January 2012, Algerian security services disrupted an
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb plot to attack U.S. or western ships
with a small boat. The attack was disrupted in the early planning
stages, highlighting host nation's successful efforts to contain and
neutralize the group. On 19 January 2013, Algerian security forces were
also successful in defeating the militants holding hostages at the
Amenas gas plant facility.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has openly operated in northern
Mali since the collapse of government control in mid 2011. Credible
reporting indicates al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is training
jihadist from across the region, to include members of other al Qaeda
affiliates such as Nigeria's Boco Haram. Coupled with arms flowing from
Qadhafi era Libyan stockpiles, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
activities in northern Mali pose a long-term threat to security and
stability in the region.
Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions
threatening U.S. interests?
Answer. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb likely does not pose a
threat to U.S. and Western interests outside its immediate operating
area of Algeria and northern Mali in the near term, but could in the
future. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb maintains intent and
aspirations and will continue to work on increasing their capability
with the help of other al Qaeda affiliates.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leadership has threatened Europe in
numerous public statements since 2006, yet continues to focus the
majority of its efforts in North Africa. Public statements frequently
mention Spain and France, playing on North Africa's colonial history
with Europe to garner support from the large North African Diaspora. Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb maintains aspirations and intent to attack
U.S. and Western interests, and in 2012, al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb leader made a public call to target U.S. Embassies after the
attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb also poses a threat to Western aircraft flying in Algeria and
Mali. The primary threat to westerners in North Africa remains hostage
taking.
Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent
expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's
capacities and aims?
Answer. Due to the emergent safe haven in Northern Mali, al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb has increased its ability to consolidate its
resources. The French-led intervention in Mali and the return of Malian
Forces to population centers in northern Mali have impacted al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb's ability to operate unimpeded. However, al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb is able to coordinate training, distribute
resources, and conduct attack planning, within its own ranks as well as
with other foreign terrorist organizations. With this capabilitiy, al
Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb will, at the very least, aggressively
pursue the expansion of its influence to neighboring countries, and
might begin planning to conduct attacks against Eurpoe or the homeland
in accordance with general al Qaeda doctrine. French-led operations in
Mali have disrupted and slowed al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, but
there is still much work to be done.
Question. Does AQIM have the capacity to carry out attacks in
Europe or on European commercial aircraft flying over Northwest Africa?
Answer. Prior to the start of the French-led intervention in Mali,
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's growing safe haven and freedom of
movement in northern Mali did afford greater opportunity to plan and
execute operations. I believe it is critically important to continue to
work with our allies and partners to address this threat.
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which AQIM
has benefitted from the flow of arms from Libyan stockpiles since mid-
2011--either in terms of arming itself or profiting from regional arms
sales?
Answer. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb took advantage of the
readily available stocks of weapons and ammunition accessible in Libya
to expand and strengthen its safe-haven in northern Mali and make
itself a more formidable military threat, as well as to indirectly
benefit financially through long established smuggling networks already
under its control.
Almost immediately following the early 2011 outbreak of hostilities
in Libya, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb began actively
working to move weapons from Libya to its secure operating areas in
northern Mali.
There is no indication yet that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is
making significant profits from the sale of Libyan arms to third
parties. However, the instability of increasing amounts of weapons
available in the Sahel may lead to greater opportunities to conduct
kidnaps for ransom, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's primary source of
revenue in the Sahel.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by the
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, an AQIM splinter faction
that has recently emerged in Mali and controls significant territory
there?
Answer. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa self-
identifies as a terrorist organization, and has openly threatened
Western interests in the region. It maintains a working relationship
with the regional groups Ansar al-Dine and al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb. The group has also called for local and foreign fighters to
join together in opposing an international military intervention in
northern Mali.
Question. If confirmed, what efforts, if any, would you undertake
to prevent and/or counter the spread of AQIM operations, fundraising
activities, and ideology in North and West Africa?
Answer. Preventing and countering the spread of al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb takes a whole-of-government approach. Military efforts
alone are only a part of the unified action required to achieve this
whole-of-government approach and achieve lasting results. Currently,
the Department of Defense (DOD) is executing a Global Campaign Plan for
Counterterrorism that supports ``. . . . U.S. Government efforts to
disrupt, degrade, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, its Affiliates and
Adherents and other terrorist organizations. . . . '' As part of
unified action, and in concert with this global campaign plan,
AFRICOM's theater strategy and theater campaign plan, with four
subordinate campaign plans, orients on neutralizing al Qaeda networks
in Africa. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a significant component
of that network in North and West Africa and a major focus of AFRICOM's
North-West Africa Campaign Plan.
Special Operations Command Africa is responsible for coordinating
all activities to neutralize al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb. Their operations include a counter-ideology component to deny
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb recruitment and retention efforts and
interfere with their fundraising. These operations also include working
closely with our critical partners to expand their counterterrorism
capabilities, enabling them to carry the fight to al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb through ``train and equip'' missions which provide
needed capabilities and tactics, techniques and procedures. AFRICOM is
also working with regional organizations like the Economic Community of
West African States to increase their capabilities and capacity to
thwart al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and their affiliates and
adherents.
Integral to all of this is AFRICOM's participation in the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership which is an interagency, Department
of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International
Development, multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist
organizations and their ability to gain recruits.
If confirmed, I will assess the current operations and adjust as
necessary in order to maintain consistent pressure on al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb and affiliated terrorist groups while ensuring
appropriate support for our critical partners.
Question. What risks, if any, do you see accompanying greater
potential AFRICOM engagement in regional efforts to expand government
control and dismantle AQIM?
Answer. With the increasing threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, I see a greater risk of regional instability if we do not
engage aggressively. Our long-term fight against al Qaeda necessitates
persistent engagement with our critical partners.
Strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and
regional organizations is an essential element of the AFRICOM strategy
and mission, and supports U.S foreign policy goals in Africa and the
core principles of the U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism.
Further, building partner capacity is a major component of the
strategic and operational approaches within the Africa Command Theater
Campaign Plan and subordinate campaign plans.
Recent events in North-West Africa--specifically the coup in Mali
and loss of control of territory in the north--increased the threat of
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to our African partners in the region
and, ultimately, to the United States. The French-led intervention in
Mali and the creation of an African-led International Support Mission
(AFISMA) to help restore Mali's terroritorial integrity are positive
steps to restoring stability to Mali. Our current efforts to support
the French and AFISMA with planning support, intelligence sharing,
aerial refueling, and airlift for French and AFISMA forces which will
play a critical role in assisting international efforts to restore
stability.
I feel we face an increased threat to the United States if we do
not engage with select critical partners.
Question. To what extent does AQIM pose a threat to stability in
Morocco and Tunisia?
Answer. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb does not present an
immediate threat to Morocco or Tunisia's stability, but that does not
mean it or other extremists do not possess some capability or intention
to conduct terror attacks in these countries. Within Morocco, the
threat of an attack is degraded by the country's multi-dimensional
counterterrorism strategy that includes regional and international
security cooperation. However, these efforts do not completely negate
the threat as evidenced by the 28 April 2011 Marrakesh bombing. Tunisia
possesses a modest capacity to counterterrorism, but the concept is
limited by perceptions of the former regime's heavy-handed and overly
liberal use of previously established anti-terrorism legislation.
Question. Do you believe current legal authorities, including the
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), are sufficient to
enable you to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities
against AQIM at the level you believe to be necessary?
Answer. The current legal authorities, including the Authorization
for Use of Military Force, to conduct counterterrorism operations and
activities against al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb appear to be
sufficient for operations in the AFRICOM area of responsibility.
However, the Authorization for Use of Military Force is now 12 years
old; and al Qaeda has dispersed and operates in areas far from the
original battlefield. Given these evolutionary changes in the global
security landscape, I intend to continuously review the current
intelligence on al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and assess whether the
existing authorities are sufficient to take all necessary actions.
somalia and al shabab
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabab?
Answer. Al Shabaab is currently undergoing a significant transition
in response to pressure from the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), The Federal Government of Somalia, and allied Somali forces,
but will remain a threat for the near to mid-term in Somalia and
increasingly in East Africa. Unable to effectively combat pro-
government forces' superior armor and weaponry, al-Shabaab has
withdrawn to rural safe havens where it can evade enemy forces and
project a largely asymmetric war, including improved improvised
explosive and increased suicide bombings. No longer responsible for
administrating large population centers, al-Shabaab can refocus its
somewhat debilitated revenue streams on more weapons, fighters, and
attack planning. External attacks, such as those in Kenya, are likely
to be a continued focus as these attacks are a key component to al-
Shabaab's strategy to expel regional militaries from Somalia.
Question. In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area?
Answer. Al Shabaab is an al Qaeda affiliate and is likely to remain
dedicated to the principles of al Qaeda, including executing attacks on
the west. Al Shabaab maintains the near-term capability to threaten
Western interests in Kenya as some elements in the large Somali
populations throughout Kenya support al-Shabaab financially,
ideologically, and logistically. As part of a highly mobile population
in East Africa, these supporters also maintain the ability to move in
and out of regional nations in support of attacks. Al Shabaab's foreign
fighters remain the greatest threat to Western interests regionally and
internationally.
Question. In the last year, the United Nations-supported African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its regional partners have made
substantial military progress against al Shabaab. How would you
evaluate the success of these efforts and the prospects for longer term
stability in Somalia?
Answer. AMISOM has made progress in reducing the territory under al
Shabaab control. The capital, Mogadishu and the port of Kismaayo,
formerly a key hub for al Shabaab, are now under the Somali Government
and African Union Mission in Somalia control. African Union Mission in
Somalia successes have provided space for the political process to
work. However, the Somali Government is in the earliest stages of
development and there is still a long way to go to ensure long-term
stability. It will take the combined efforts of the international
community to assist the Somali Government and people recover from more
than 10 years of conflict.
Question. The State Department has provided security assistance to
Somalia's nascent national security forces for several years through
the AU peacekeeping mission and through contractors. What role, if any,
do you see for AFRICOM in that effort?
Answer. AFRICOM supports Department of State efforts in preparing
Africa Union peacekeepers deploying to Somalia as part of African Union
Mission in Somalia by providing Global Peace Operations Initiative
funding to African Union Mission in Somalia staff, providing secure
communications to Africa Union Mission in Somalia contributing nations,
and providing logistics training, excess equipment, and mentor support
to Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance training in
the region. In addition, AFRICOM has supplied niche intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and counterterrorism
training to deploying African Union Mission in Somalia units, and
additional communications via Department of Defense 1206 funding
mechanisms. This is a critical effort and AFRICOM will continue to work
with Department of State to support African Union Mission in Somalia
troop contributing nations. If directed, AFRICOM is prepared to expand
support to nascent Somalia security forces.
Question. Do you believe current legal authorities, including the
2001 AUMF are sufficient to enable you to carry out counterterrorism
operations and activities against al Shabaab at the level you believe
to be necessary?
Answer. The current legal authorities, including the Authorization
for Use of Military Force to conduct counterterrorism operations and
activities against al Shabaab appear to be sufficient for operations in
the AFRICOM area of responsibility. However, the African Union Mission
in Somalia is now 12 years old and al Qaeda has dispersed and operates
in areas far from the original battlefield. Given these evolutionary
changes in the global security landscape, I intend to continuously
review the current intelligence on al Shabaab and assess whether the
existing authorities are sufficient to take all necessary actions.
Question. What role, if any, do you see for AFRICOM in preventing
further deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, which
according to experts remains among the worst anywhere in the world?
Answer. The primary factor undermining humanitarian support in
certain famine and food insecure regions in Somalia is a general lack
of security in ungoverned spaces and/or al Shabaab resistance to relief
operations. Department of Defense support to regional militaries serves
to facilitate and improve aid delivery, preventing a worsening of the
humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Regional partners such as Ethiopia and
Kenya have demonstrated a commitment to supporting humanitarian
assistance operations, which, as a secondary benefit, also enhances
Somalia's internal security. AFRICOM is well positioned to support the
broader U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance effort, and to assist
our regional partners in key areas such as logistics, medical,
communications, and planning.
nigeria and boco haram
Question. In the past year and a half, Boco Haram's attacks in
Nigeria have become increasingly sophisticated and deadly. There is
concern that the group is expanding ties with other violent Islamist
groups on the continent. In a hearing before the committee in March of
this year, General Carter Ham, the current Commander of AFRICOM, stated
that Boco Haram has emerged ``as a threat to Western interests.''
Do you agree with General Ham that Boco Haram represents a threat
to Western interests?
Answer. Yes. Although Boco Haram's primary target set is largely
domestic, the group demonstrated a willingness to specifically target
western interests within Nigeria when it launched a car bomb attack
against the United Nations' headquarters building in Abuja in August
2011. Additionally, Boco Haram was involved in the abduction and
subsequent murders of two western citizens in May 2011 and possibly a
German in January 2012. Boco Haram's growing ties to the al Qaeda
network, particularly al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, almost certainly
exacerbates the threat Boco Haram poses to western interests.
Question. What is your assessment of Boco Haram's intentions to
expand its scope of operations beyond domestic attacks? How do you
assess its capability to do so?
Answer. Boco Haram's ties to external al Qaeda affiliates,
particularly with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, along with its
larger regional presence and activities, will broaden its intentions to
expand its scope of operations beyond domestic attacks. Boco Haram
maintains presence beyond Nigeria in the neighboring countries Niger,
Cameroon, and Chad. Additionally, there are indications that a sizable
contingent of Boco Haram members is located in northern Mali, where
they almost certainly augment al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb effort to
secure its territorial gains and facilitate the establishment of an
Islamic state. The group's demonstrated ability to conduct complex
coordinated attacks with multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices indicates Boco Haram already possesses the capability to
conduct such an operation beyond domestic Nigerian targets.
Question. To what extent has Boco Haram benefitted from the flow of
arms from Libyan stockpiles since mid-2011--either in terms of arming
itself or profiting from regional arms sales?
Answer. Boco Haram has benefitted from the proliferation of weapons
from Libya. Additionally, the large amount of weaponry al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb acquired from Libyan stockpiles, coupled with the the
relationship between Boco Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
almost certainly resulted in additional arms provided to Boco Haram.
There has been no indication yet of Boco Haram profiting from the sale
of weapons.
Question. What is your assessment of the Nigerian Government's
efforts to eliminate Boco Haram?
Answer. Nigeria's security response to Boco Haram has had some
isolated successes, and the Nigerian Government almost certainly has
the will and means to continue security operations. The Nigerian
Government is conducting a three-pronged response to Boco Haram
including extensive security and intelligence operations, limited co-
option efforts, and a fledging public relations campaign. However, even
if Nigeria manages to destroy all current Boco Haram factions and
nodes, long-term stability in northern Nigeria is contingent on the
Nigerian Government making a concerted political effort to resolve
socio-economic issues like endemic poverty, poor economic prospects,
political marginalization, and corruption.
Nigeria deployed a joint task force to counter Boco Haram in June
2011 and has steadily increased the size and scope of operations over
the last year. Nigerian counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
capabilities are still developing and the army and police often rely on
heavy-handed static security operations. The army and police have been
widely criticized for the excessive use of force which results in local
resentment and undermines Nigeria's modest counterterrorism successes.
Last, while some in the government acknowledge that the use of
excessive force by the Nigerian army and the continued socio-economic
marginalization of northern Nigeria are alienating the population and
helping Boco Haram. There has been little progress made in addressing
alleged human rights abuses by the security services or underlying
socio-economic issues in northern Nigeria.
The Nigerian Government has also indicated a willingness to pursue
negotiations with Boco Haram. Boco Haram leadership has rejected
negotiations, but more moderate fringe factions could still be co-
opted.
Question. What is your assessment of Boco Haram's relationship with
AQIM and Al Shabaab, respectively? Is there any evidence to suggest
that Boco Haram and AQIM have developed operational links?
Answer. Boco Haram's connection to the broader al Qaeda movement is
primarily through al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. There are few
indications that Boco Haram has direct connections to al-Shabaab, and
those that exist indicate al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb acts as an
intermediary.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb appears to provide support to Boco
Haram, evidenced especially in the manner of its resurgence after the
Nigerian Government crackdown on the organization in 2009. Malian
government sources show that for several years Boco Haram has sent
operatives to train with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb elements in
the Sahel. Boco Haram has confined the majority of its attacks to
northern Nigeria; however, the targeting of Western interests within
Nigeria, such as the United Nations' headquarters in Abuja, may
indicate al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb influence on Boco Haram's
target selection. In addition, specific tactics used, most notably that
of the suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices is almost
certainly the influence of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb on Boco
Haram operations.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you recommend for AFRICOM
in building the capacity of the Nigerian security forces to respond to
the Boco Haram threat?
Answer. Growing and deepening the relationship with the Nigerian
Defense Staff is crucial to securing greater partnering opportunities.
An approach to strengthen Nigerian security forces hinges on buy-in
from senior defense leaders who are willing to address underlying
issues to enhance leadership, anti-corruption, and equipment and supply
procurement deficiencies. Nigeria is a prime example of where a whole-
of-government approach is critical to address the complex Boco Haram
threat which is exacerbated by underlying political, economic and
social fractures.
Question. What risks, if any, do you see accompanying greater
potential AFRICOM engagement in regional efforts to expand government
control and dismantle Boco Haram?
Answer. My chief concern would be the risks associated with the
performance of U.S. trained or equipped Nigerian defense forces
continuing on a path of unprofessional activity--violence against
civilians, illegal detainment, and ultimately, ineffective operations
against Boco Haram.
Question. Do you believe current legal authorities, including the
2001 AUMF are sufficient to enable you to carry out counterterrorism
operations and activities against Boco Haram at the level you believe
to be necessary?
Answer. The current legal authorities, including the Authorization
for Use of Military Force to conduct counterterrorism operations and
activities against Boco Haram appear to be sufficient for operations in
the AFRICOM area of responsibility. However, the Authorization for Use
of Military Force has been in place for 12 years and al Qaeda has
dispersed and operates in areas far from the original battlefield.
Given the evolutionary changes in the global security landscape, I
intend to continuously review the current intelligence on Boco Haram
and assess whether the existing authorities are sufficient to take all
necessary actions.
Question. Violent incidents, reportedly including indiscriminate
killing of civilians, committed by Nigerian police and military
services during operations intended to be against Boco Haram have risen
significantly in recent months.
In your view, what measures should the United States incorporate
into current and future military-to-military engagements to help stem
these incidents?
Answer. Basic military professionalization underlies all engagement
with Nigerian Defense Forces. This includes orchestration of a training
program by AFRICOM and often delivered by U.S military judge advocates
through the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies. The
AFRICOM effort is to advance the rule of law in African militaries,
address human rights laws, respect for international law, and the law
of armed conflict. Increasing the intensity and depth of this program
using Defense Institute for International Legal Studies and similar
training resources would be an important step toward stemming
indiscriminate violence.
Professionalization of military forces is also a key reason for a
preference toward use of U.S. uniformed trainers. The objective is to
model the U.S. Army's soldier code of conduct and ethics and also to
demonstrate a disciplined Noncommissioned Officer Corps.
mali
Question. What is AFRICOM currently doing to respond to the
situation in northern Mali, including the significant expansion of
AQIM's operational presence there?
Answer. It is my understanding that AFRICOM is accelerating its
cooperation with Mali's neighbors and continuing to explore ways to
counter the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its
sympathizers while at the same time supporting international
intervention efforts.
The situation in Mali's north is complicated by al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb's growing entrenchment into political and religious
institutions, unaddressed grievances, vast ungoverned expanses, porous
borders, and continuing spillover from the instability in Libya. A
successful solution will require working closely with the international
community--in particular Mali's neighbors and the Economic Community of
West African States--to fully restore credible, elected political
leadership in Mali while addressing the growing humanitarian crisis and
strengthening the Malian security forces, ultimately restoring
governance and security for the whole of Mali's territory.
Question. What is your understanding of the impact of the
suspension of U.S. security assistance programs in Mali on AFRICOM's
activities in Mali and the region?
Answer. Following the March coup, and pursuant to section 7008 of
the Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Appropriation Act, the United States suspended all security assistance
to the Government of Mali on 19 April 2012. As a result, there
currently is very little U.S. military engagement with Mali. U.S. law
dictates that U.S. security assistance to Mali remains on hold until
elections are held and a democratically-elected government takes
office. Once legal and policy requirements are met, military
engagements can resume, AFRICOM would then consider growing military
professionals through the International Military Education and Training
program, Counterterrorism Fellowship Program and the Department of
Defense Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program.
AFRICOM and its components currently maintain border-security,
peacekeeping, and counter-terrorism training with most of Mali's
neighbors until a direct solution in Mali becomes possible.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you propose to reshape the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Defense
Department's complementary Operation Juniper Shield (formerly Operation
Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara) in light of regional security and
governance setbacks stemming from the crisis in Mali?
Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership continues to
be the U.S. Government's regional construct for counterterrorism
partnership in the Trans-Sahel and we will continue to work closely
with our interagency and regional partners to further the Partnership's
objectives.
libya
Question. The recent attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi which
resulted in the death of four American citizens, including the American
Ambassador, Christopher Stevens, demonstrated that post-conflict Libya
is wrought with security challenges that have implications for the
future of Libya and the region as a whole. Conversely, as Libya
transitions to a representative government, the United States is
presented with a historic opportunity to redefine U.S.-Libyan
relations.
What role, if any, do you envision the United States playing in
helping Libya build capable security institutions?
Answer. Department of Defense should have a supporting role to the
broader U.S. Government and international community effort to establish
security institutions in Libya. The Department of Defense sponsored
Defense Institution Reform Initiative and Minister of Defense Advisor
programs are approved for Libya. The Defense Institution Reform
Initiative team made three visits to Libya. All support to the
government of Libya will remain difficult until the security situation
improves, and the U.S. Embassy, Tripoli can support temporary
personnel.
Question. What is your assessment of the risks associated with the
paramilitary forces that continue to have control of large swaths of
Libya?
Answer. The hundreds of disparate militias still operating in Libya
a year after the revolution represent a significant threat to the
future stability of Libya. Their continued presence undermines the
authority of the government and creates the potential for continued
armed conflicts over territory, ethnic ideology, and revenge killings,
as well as creating a more permissive environment for al Qaeda and
other violent extremist organizations to operate. The post-
Revolutionary Libyan Governments have attempted several programs to
disarm, demobilize, and integrate these militias into military and
security services, but the pace for progress remains slow. It is too
early to tell if current Prime Minister Ali Zeidan's Government will
continue to rely on loosely affiliated militias to provide security
throughout Libya.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of the
proliferation of weaponry from Libyan military stockpiles into
neighboring countries?
Answer. The availability of weapons from depots in Libya has
invigorated illicit arms smuggling across Africa, particularly in the
northwest. The Sahel ranks among the world's principal smuggling routes
and is maintained by militants from local Tuareg tribes who assist in
trafficking arms. After the collapse of the Qadhafi Government in
Libya, hundreds of looted missiles, Kalashnikov rifles, rocket
propelled grenades, and small weapons were sold throughout the Sahel.
Additionally, experts estimate Libya had as many as 20,000 first-
generation manportable air defense systems before the uprising, at
least some of which are likely in the hands of terrorist organizations
and militias seeking to incite further instability in Africa and the
Middle East. Armed Tuaregs fighting for Qadhafi returned to homelands
in Mali and Niger and smuggled weapons that fueled the Mali rebellion,
further destabilizing the region and reinforcing a safe haven for al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should AFRICOM play in
assisting the Libyans with addressing the threat to stability posed by
paramilitary forces?
Answer. AFRICOM should have a complimentary role in assisting Libya
with their militia threat, supporting USAID as the lead U.S. agency for
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. AFRICOM should support
proposals for 1206 (counterterrorism) and 1207a (border security) to
develop a core capacity for the Libyan military with personnel that
have come under the government's control. AFRICOM should also support
Foreign Military Sales cases using Libyan national funds to strengthen
the military infrastructure.
Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges to
the Libyan Government in building capable and sustainable security
institutions?
Answer. The Libyan Government's most significant challenge is its
lack of control of the militias operating in Libya. This condition is
exacerbated by the proliferation of conventional weapons and unsecured
borders. Together, this is leading to a rise of terrorist activity,
particularly in Eastern Libya.
Question. In what ways can the United States be most effective in
assisting the Libyan Government in building capable and sustainable
security institutions?
Answer. The United States can be most effective by assisting the
Libyan efforts at disarmament and working with the individual services
in Libya to assist them with their development. AFRICOM has organized
visits by the Libyan Air Force and Navy Chiefs of Staff. Increasing the
International Military Education and Training to better facilitate
Libyan participation in U.S. senior service schools, English language
training, and other training in the United States will also be
beneficial.
Question. With the experience of Benghazi as context, do you feel
that the mechanisms for rapidly moving forces from EUCOM to respond to
crises in AFRICOM are adequate? Are there improvements to this process
that you recommend?
Answer. The newly assigned Commander's In-extremis Force, Army
allocated Regionally Aligned Force, and the Special Purpose Marine Air
Ground Task postures AFRICOM to better plan for and respond to
contingencies. We recommend the Commander's In-extremis Force be placed
in Europe for a shorter response time to the continent. We will
continue to closely coordinate with the Department of State and country
Ambassadors to ensure an accurate understanding of U.S. Africa
Command's response times and capabilities as we support activities on
the African continent. Additionally, with tighter budgets and declining
resources, we must look at more agile ways to share resources between
forces assigned to Europe and Africa.
algeria
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role for Algeria to
play in addressing transnational security threats in the Sahel,
including AQIM? If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage
Algeria to play a more active and constructive role in addressing
security threats emanating from northern Mali?
Answer. Algeria's military is the most capable of any country in
north Africa. As such, I view Algeria as a regional leader, capable of
coordinating the efforts of the Sahelian countries to address
transnational security threats. Algeria shares our concerns with the
situation in northern Mali. Their knowledge of conditions on the ground
in northern Mali is invaluable to the United States. To ensure
continued Algerian cooperation on northern Mali, any military solution
must be United Nations authorized, internationally supported, and use
African forces. If confirmed, I would continue to encourage Algerian
regional leadership through regional exercise and conference
participation, senior leadership engagement and high-level bilateral
dialogues.
Question. What is your assessment of the operational and logistical
capacities of the Algerian-led joint operational command structure for
the Sahel, known as the CEMOC?
Answer. The Algeria-based Combined Operational General Staff
Committee plays no significant role in regional counterterrorism
activity and is unlikely to carry out counterterrorism military
operations for the foreseeable future. Contributing Combined
Operational General Staff Committee members possess varied operational
and logistical capabilities, but the Combined Operational General Staff
Committee organization lacks operational experience and has not
demonstrated any logistical capacity since its 2010 inception. The
Combined Operational General Staff Committee's one major accomplishment
has been the creation of the Unity Fusion Liaison, located in Algiers,
Algeria, which is a mechanism for sharing operational intelligence
between the four member nations (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger)
as well as Burkina Faso, Libya, and Chad. Bilaterally, however,
participating Combined Operational General Staff Committee countries
have conducted joint training and localized operations.
congo/great lakes
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to regional
stability posed by the ongoing military mutiny, known as the M23, in
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)?
Answer. The March 23 mutiny--the armed group known as M23--in
eastern DRC is destabilizing the entire Great Lakes region. Over the
course of this crisis, we have been concerned by reports of enhanced
external support to M23. We have strongly urged all neighboring
governments to take all necessary measures to halt and prevent any and
all support to M23 from their territory and we have underscored to
Rwanda that any support to M23 must permanently end. Furthermore, the
security forces focus on the March 23 Movement has allowed other armed
groups in the region to expand, resulting in increased ethnic violence
and attacks on civilians across eastern DRC. The humanitarian situation
in eastern DRC has deteriorated, and we remain gravely concerned about
the hundreds of thousands of people displaced by insecurity and
violence in Kivus. Additionally, numerous medical aid organizations
have removed most staff from the area due to unacceptable security
risks. While the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo have
been unable to end the M23 rebellion militarily, the Democratic
Republic of Congo has engaged with M23 in discussions in Kampala, and
we continue to urge the presidents and leadership of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda to continue their direct dialogue
to address the root causes of instability. We support the United
Nation's efforts to establish a Peace, Security, and Cooperation
Framework among the governments in the region.
Question. In your view, in what ways (if at all) have U.S. security
sector reform efforts in DRC had a measurable impact on the operational
and logistical capacity, degree of command and control, and transparent
civilian oversight of the Congolese military?
Answer. Assisting DRC military has been a challenge. The desired
end-state is for a disciplined, professional military that respects
human rights, rule of law, and civilian authority. The United States
provides DRC officers with training and assistance in leadership
development, military justice, civil-military relations, and respect
for human rights. The challenge is translating these efforts into long-
term institutional capacity. Although progress is slow, there have been
some improvements. Logistical capacity is one example: the U.S.-led
Defense Institutional Reform Initiative complements European Union
efforts to develop logistics doctrine by helping DRC military translate
their doctrine into strategic and operational guidance.
True security sector reform in DRC will require full commitment by
the government and a unified multilateral effort among the
international community. A memorandum of understanding between the U.S.
Government and the Government of the DRC on security force assistance
is forthcoming. This document will establish ground rules for security
assistance and provide a path for improved cooperation with measurable
conditions.
Question. What is your assessment of the performance of the U.S.-
trained Light Infantry Battalion (LIB, known as the 391st) in its two
deployments to date (first in Dungu, for operations to counter the
Lord's Resistance Army, and currently in Goma, for operations to
counter the ongoing M23 rebellion)? What has been the impact of the LIB
training program--which was carried out in 2010 and supported by
AFRICOM advisors--on the overall capacity, control, and oversight of
the Congolese forces? If confirmed, would you support additional U.S.
operational and logistical training for the Congolese military?
Answer. The 391st Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) has been
scrutinized because of its standing as a U.S. trained unit. There are,
however, limited metrics to measure the battalion's combat
effectiveness and performance in protecting civilians. During a 2012
assessment, AFRICOM's Counter-Lord's Resistance Army Control Element
found that morale was high and the officers and enlisted soldiers
appear motivated, organized and trained in small unit maneuver and
tactics. While the unit appears tactically proficient, they have had
limited engagements against Lord's Resistance Army and March 23
Movement targets. This prevents a full understanding of the combat
effectiveness of the 391st LIB. It can be noted, however, that during a
minor firefight with March 23 Movement, the 391st stood its ground.
The 391st LIB illustrates the larger institutional challenges
within DRCs military and broader defense sector reform. While this unit
is highly respected by senior military and government leaders within
the DRC, it has not had a significant impact on the overall capacity,
control and oversight of Congolese forces. The rebellion by the March
23 Movement underscores that the Armed Forces of the Democratic
Republic of Congo remains a fractured military with a profound need for
national-level security sector reform. Broad security sector reform
will require full commitment by the government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and a unified multilateral effort among the
international community--a single U.S. trained battalion will not
change the core institutional challenges within the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
Question. If confirmed, what changes (if any) would you propose to
U.S. security assistance for Rwanda in light of the Rwandan military's
alleged role in supporting the M23 in contravention of United Nations
sanctions?
Answer. Ensuring peace and security in Darfur, Sudan is a key U.S.
policy priority. Rwanda supports this policy priority by providing
3,200 peacekeepers to the United Nations--African Union Mission in
Darfur, and 850 peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in South
Sudan. While we continue to support Rwanda's participation in United
Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, we recognize that the March 23
Movement would not be the threat it is today without external support
including evidence of support from the Rwandan Government. As the
United States has made very clear, Rwanda must permanently end all
forms of support to Congolese armed groups. For these reasons, we also
cut approximately $200,000 of fiscal year 2012 Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) to Rwanda, as required by law. The Department continues
to closely monitor reports of external support and we will continue to
respond appropriately.
Question. What is your assessment of the current operational
capacity of Burundian troops serving in the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM)? In your view, what has been the impact of U.S.
military training for Burundian troops deploying under AMISOM on
Burundi's internal stability and on regional stability in the Great
Lakes?
Answer. The Burundian National Defense Forces operating as part of
AMISOM are very good tactically at the lower level (squad-company) and
have interacted well with the Uganda People's Defence Force in shared
sectors. However, they lack staff planning ability at battalion and
higher levels.
The training the United States has provided to the Burundians has
helped to integrate their forces at the lower levels and unified their
armed forces, which, as recently as 5 years ago, were still fighting
remnants of a civil war. Burundi works with neighboring countries to
improve security in border areas. They are increasingly concerned with
instability in the Kivu area of Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the resulting refugee flows. Their focus, however, remains on African
Union Mission in Somalia and internal stability.
building partner capacity and security assistance
Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
nations, including the global train and equip authority (``section
1206''), Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and the associated
transitional authorities for East Africa within the GSCF statute.
What is your understanding of the purpose of the section 1206
global train and equip authority and GSCF?
Answer. Section 1206 since its inclusion in the 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act has allowed AFRICOM to increase capability of
our partners to conduct counterterrorism activities. AFRICOM has
concentrated its efforts in the east and northwest areas where the
greatest threat exists. The 1206 authority is more responsive than
other security cooperation methods such as Foreign Military Financing
and is a critical tool. All combatant commands must compete annually
for funds under this program. This annual competition challenges a
longer-term approach to program development for partner nations. While
AFRICOM does not have U.S. Forces employed in stability operations, the
counterterrorism aspects of 1206 have been heavily used in support of
partner nations requirements against al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb or to provide security in countries that may be
threatened by them. Section 1206 is a particularly valued tool since it
allows AFRICOM to select programs that best meet partners' needs. The
dual-key nature of 1206, requiring Department of State and Department
of Defense secretary approval, effectively supports interagency efforts
to strengthen capacity building programs. However, there are inherit
limitations of 1206 in terms of 1 year funding which makes it difficult
to put together complex or sustained projects that are required for
sustained engagement.
While 1206 specifically addresses counterterrorism, the GSCF is
intended as an interagency approach to address broader issues. The GSCF
is in its early stages of development, but should bring a responsive
ability to address a broad range of security issues not limited just to
counterterrorism. Funds to implement the authority must come from both
Department of Defense (80 percent) and Department of State (20
percent). Under the current authority which expires in 2015, once funds
are placed in the Security Contingency Fund, they are available until
expended. This enables planning a bit farther into the future. To date,
however, it is authority without a corresponding appropriation. As the
Security Contingency Fund process matures, I believe we will see a more
coordinated effort between Department of Defense and Department of
State in key partner nations.
Question. In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in
building the capacities of partner nations in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. AFRICOM's capacity building efforts seek to provide partner
nations with the capability to solve their own problems and directly
further the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. When African
nations work together to defeat terrorists like al Shabaab, threats to
our homeland are decreased. When the United States is perceived as a
positive influence in other regions, it assists our efforts across the
board.
Building Partnership Capacity is the baseline to all of AFRICOM's
strategic lines of effort in Africa. The intent is to enable African
partners to develop the defense capabilities necessary for the command
to achieve its objectives. It is preferable to avoid crises that may
demand the introduction of U.S. Forces, therefore the Command strives
to enable African partners to build stability, control borders and
ungoverned terrain, defeat terrorist groups, and develop militaries
that are professional and obey the rule of law.
An example of AFRICOM's partnership building engagement is the
ongoing efforts with African partners that are deploying troops to
various peacekeeping missions throughout the continent, including to
the African Union Mission in Somalia. The Command has provided training
and equipment that have proved to be instrumental in the success these
forces have made in both maintaining stability and combating terrorist
groups. The Command has also assisted Africans in developing rotary
wing medical evacuation capabilities to be used in peacekeeping
operations.
Other areas of focus are providing training and equipment for
partners for the purpose of developing strong border controls to
prevent trafficking of weapons and narcotics which can destabilize a
country.
In the maritime domain, the Command has assisted regional
organizations in developing agreements, operations, and training for
maritime security, as well as developing courses for peacekeepers at
select African Union regional peacekeeping training centers.
All of these efforts combine to develop capacities among African
partners that allow Africans to solve many of their own security
problems. This is cost effective, does not require U.S. Forces, and
prevents conflict.
Question. The funding pool available for security assistance and
other military-to-military engagement activities devoted to the AFRICOM
AOR is extremely small and tends to be allocated to specific countries.
What is your understanding of the role AFRICOM plays in developing
U.S. security assistance (e.g., section 1206, Foreign Military
Financing, International Military Education and Training assistance,
Combatant Commander Initiative Fund, et cetera. . . . )?
Answer. AFRICOM provides input to all of the security assistance
processes annually, based on Department of Defense guidance, AFRICOM
strategy and theater campaign plan prioritization. The command submits
proposals to take advantage of authorities such as 1206 and has
successfully utilized the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund--
specifically this year the Command was able to fund attendance of
Libyan officers to U.S. schools. AFRICOM depends on its input to these
programs to get its mission accomplished. Security Cooperation is the
primary means to affect conditions on the continent.
defense strategic guidance
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense'', announced by
President Obama on January 5, 2012, includes, among other things, the
intention of the administration and the Pentagon to ``rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific region.'' In his associated remarks, Secretary Panetta
explained that the ``U.S. military will increase its institutional
weight and focus on enhanced presence, power projection, and deterrence
in Asia-Pacific.''
What do you anticipate will be the impact on the operations and
activities of AFRICOM?
Answer. The impact on the operations and activities of AFRICOM will
be minimal. In fact, based on the interconnectivity between Africa and
the Asia-Pacific region, AFRICOM's activities may become more
important. The eastern portion of AFRICOM's area of responsibility
abuts the Indian Ocean, a centrally important component of the global
commons, reflecting historic trade ties and encompassing sea lanes of
communication that link Africa to the Middle East, Europe, and the
rising powers of India and China in the Asia-Pacific region.
Several key strategic geographic points exist around the African
continent that are essential to the flow of commerce. For example, Camp
Lemonnier in Djibouti sits on the western side of the Bab el-Mandeb
waterway from Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. The waterway is only 20
miles across and must remain open to ensure the health of the global
economic system. Other important choke points include the Mozambique
Channel and the Cape of Good Hope.
Africa is a pivotal point to the Middle East and Asia-Pacific
providing critical access to the Indian Ocean region and an overwatch
position for Iran. It also serves as an essential platform supporting
U.S. Central Command Counter-Violent Extremist Organization operations.
AFRICOM will continue to counter piracy threats emanating from
Somalia in support of international efforts to promote a lawful
maritime environment and global trade in the Indian Ocean region. The
command will continue to strengthen the defense capabilities of African
partners to solidify security gains in Somalia that underpin the
development of effective governance, economic growth, and development.
dod counter-narcotics activities
Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs
flowing toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD's counter-
narcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support
the Department's CN operations, including to build the capacity of U.S.
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign
governments, and provide intelligence support on CN-related matters and
a variety of other unique enabling capabilities.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD--and by extension
AFRICOM--in counterdrug efforts?
Answer. In my opinion, AFRICOM's role in support of broader
Department of Defense counternarcotics efforts should focus on three
primary areas. First, capacity building efforts with partner nations on
the African continent are critical to helping civilian law enforcement
agencies, Gendarmes, and military organizations combat the growing
menace of narcotics trafficking. Working hand in hand with partners in
the Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs
and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, among others,
the command is able to bring the full weight of U.S. experience from
the decades-long domestic fight against narcotics to bear in helping to
solve this problem in Africa through training, equipping and
information sharing initiatives. Second, through Counterthreat Finance
efforts, the command works with U.S. interagency partners to track down
and ultimately seize illicit proceeds that go directly to Drug
Trafficking Organizations. Third, statutory requirement to serve as the
lead U.S. agency for Detection and Monitoring allow the command to
bring our tremendous technology assets to bear, and a robust cadre of
intelligence analysts can lend great value to the International
Community in analyzing and dismantling drug trafficking organizations.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the
United States?
Answer. The United States has tremendous equities in helping to
stem the world-wide manufacturing and distribution of illicit drugs,
regardless of whether these drugs end up in the United States. In
places like West Africa, drug trafficking and manufacturing is having a
tremendous destabilizing effect through corruption of often senior
government officials, increased rates of drug usage (and corresponding
increases to rates of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome among Africans, and proceeds of illicit
trafficking going towards organizations operating on the continent and
internationally. Working with international partners through such
organizations as the European Union and the Economic Community of West
Africa States, AFRICOM seeks to integrate their capacity building
efforts with those who share common interests in seeing African
partners increase their ability to effectively address this problem.
These integration efforts will also allow all international parties to
better utilize funding for counternarcotic efforts.
Question. Given that the vast majority of illegal drugs arriving in
Africa are not destined for the United States, should DOD invest
resources in countering the flow of illegal drugs to or through Africa?
Answer. It is my opinion that current Department of Defense
resources being invested in counternarcotics efforts are funds well
spent in spite of the fact that many of the drugs are not intended for
the United States. The destabilizing influence of narcotics
trafficking, coupled with the financial benefits realized by terrorist
organizations operating in Africa, make a compelling case for overall
U.S. Government involvement in solving this problem. The cost funding
an effective counternarcotics program in an African partner nation is
far less than the cost of dealing with the consequences of not
addressing this problem which could result in increased regional
instability. Additionally, the capacity building and resources provided
to African partners under the counternarcotics program are also
effective in helping to improve border control and reduce the
trafficking of other illicit goods like weapons and persons.
Question. Illicit trafficking is a growing concern in Africa. West
Africa is a node for Latin American drugs transiting to their primary
destination in European markets. In addition, drugs and their
precursors originating on other continents are transshipped through
Africa. Despite the increase in illicit trafficking across the African
continent, AFRICOM has secured a limited amount of funding for its
counternarcotics efforts.
What is your assessment of the current AFRICOM counternarcotics
program?
Answer. It is my understanding that the AFRICOM counternarcotics
program has improved the capacity of African nations to more
effectively address their challenges in this area. To date, the
program's efforts have primarily been focused in West Africa, working
with countries such as Ghana, Senegal, and Cape Verde. The command's
capacity building efforts have had a direct, positive impact on these
countries' capabilities, as evidenced by the October 2011 seizure in
Cape Verde of 1.5 tons of cocaine, which was directly supported by the
Counter Narcotics-funded Cape Verde Maritime Operations Center.
Additionally, the Counter Narcotics program has taken the lead in
coordination with the Department of State in developing the West
African Cooperative Security Initiative, a whole-of-government approach
that better integrates all U.S. Government counternarcotics efforts in
this important region.
Question. Based on your review of the current program, if
confirmed, what changes, if any, are you interested in exploring?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the current program before
recommending changes. The Counter Narcotics program has been effective
in establishing a presence and making a difference in West Africa,
however, this is not the only region of Africa with a narcotics
trafficking problem. East Africa, particularly Kenya and Tanzania, is
experiencing an increase in heroin trafficking across the Indian Ocean
from Afghanistan and Pakistan destined for U.S. and European markets.
Additionally, in the Sahel region of North Africa, cocaine and hashish
trafficking is being facilitated by, and directly benefitting,
organizations like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leading to increased
regional instability.
lord's resistance army
Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces
(UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support
them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)--including Joseph
Kony--continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian
populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational
concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are
trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of
California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical
support to U.S. Forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and
intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations
continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations
personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations,
thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.
In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?
Answer. The Governments of Uganda, the Central African Republic
(CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Republic of South
Sudan, in collaboration with the African Union, continue to dedicate
material and human resources to bring an end to the threat posed by the
LRA. They are leading this effort, and the United States is committed
to supporting this regional effort. Through our engagement, we are
strengthening partnerships and regional cooperation.
The United States is providing cross-cutting support to advance
four objectives: (1) the increased protection of civilians; (2) the
apprehension or removal from the battlefield of Joseph Kony and senior
LRA commanders; (3) the promotion of defections and support for the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of LRA fighters; and (4)
the continued humanitarian relief of affected communities.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate level of priority
to be accorded to AFRICOM's efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance
Army in central Africa, compared to other AFRICOM objectives?
Answer. The command's number one priority is East Africa with
particular focus on al Shabaab and al Qaeda networks. This is followed
by violent extremist and al Qaeda in North and West Africa and the
Islamic Maghreb. AFRICOM's third priority is counter-LRA operations.
Question. If confirmed, will you promptly review and report back to
the committee on your assessment of this mission?
Answer. This deployment is not open-ended and we will continue to
regularly assess and review whether we are making sufficient progress.
I commit to reporting to the Committee on this deployment at any time
you request.
Question. Each of the countries currently affected by the LRA face
other security threats viewed by their governments as more serious to
their national well-being and, as a result, these countries place a
lower priority on addressing the LRA problem.
If confirmed, how would you seek to strengthen the impact of
Operation Observant Compass while recognizing those competing national
priorities of our partners in the counter-LRA fight?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work to maximize the
success of Operation Observant Compass by seeking, within the
parameters of the current mission, to deepen cooperation with Ugandan
and other regional forces and increase intelligence that is appropriate
to the operating environment.
support to united nations peacekeeping missions in africa
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations (U.N.), stated that the United States ``is willing to
consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff
officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more
women I should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.'' Admiral Mullen
has said he views ``U.N. peacekeeping operations to be extremely
important and cost effective in comparison to unilateral operations''
and that ``the success of these operations is very much in our national
interest.''
In your view, should the United States increase the number of
personnel it contributes in the form of staff positions and military
observers to U.N. peacekeeping missions and other international peace
operations?
Answer. I agree with Ambassador Rice and Admiral Mullen and support
an increase in contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. United
Nations peacekeeping operations play a vital role in advancing the goal
of improved peace, stability and security throughout Africa.
Peacekeeping operations support United Nations objectives, while they
also help to advance U.S. security interests. The U.S. role in United
Nations peacekeeping operations, whether in the form of civilian
police, staff officers, or military observers, may offer the United
States a cost-effective way to continue to advance our mission and
interests.
Question. In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages
of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations in the
form of staff positions and military observers' positions?
Answer. In considering increasing U.S. personnel contributions to
U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is important to balance the advantages
and disadvantages that accompany any decision to deploy American
military personnel. As Admiral Mullen described, United Nations-led
peacekeeping operations can be cost effective, especially in comparison
to unilateral operations. For the majority of these operations, sharing
the manpower and financial burden among donor organizations and
countries allows the international community to do more with less. U.S.
personnel support to U.N. operations offers the United States the
unique opportunity to build relationships and trust that could be of
future benefit. When U.S. military personnel work in partnership with
other U.N. members' military personnel, they build long-lasting
relationships centered on trust and a sense of shared purpose, while
gaining invaluable cultural, regional, and international experience
which helps to further our national interests.
Careful thought and planning must accompany any decision to
establish or increase the U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping
operations. It is vital that we understand the security risks to our
troops and personnel, while we also have a complete understanding of
how U.S. personnel will operate within the U.N. mission. The posting of
U.S. personnel to U.N. missions and operations always require a clearly
defined chain of command in order to mitigate any potential problems or
concerns. Any increase in U.S. support for U.N. operations will
necessarily incur a personnel cost and commitment that must be
understood, accepted, planned for, and managed. Finally, and most
importantly, significantly increasing the U.S. presence, or in some
cases even creating a U.S. presence for small U.N. operations, carries
the risk of overshadowing other participating nations.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National
Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ``an
abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,'' and
stated that ``rising drug violence and corruption are undermining
stability and the rule of law in some countries'' in the Western
Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to
National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the
strategy is ``enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law
enforcement.''
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The Department of Defense plays an important supporting
role in the implementation of the President's strategy, which declares
that transnational organized crime is a threat to national and
international security. The strategy provides a valuable framework from
which AFRICOM can address this complex problem set, in partnership with
other U.S. Government agencies and foreign partners. Illicit drug
trafficking is but one facet of an interconnected transnational threat
that is directly destabilizing many countries in Africa. As part of a
whole-of-government approach to combating transnational organized
crime, the Department of Defense can bring to bear unique authorities
and capabilities to augment those of our law enforcement, intelligence,
and foreign partners so we address the threats transnational organized
crime pose in a coordinated manner.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to the United
States posed by transnational organized crime operating in the AFRICOM
AOR?
Answer. Transnational organized crime in the AFRICOM area of
operations threatens U.S. interests by taking advantage of failed
states and contested spaces, forging alliances with corrupt government
officials and some foreign intelligence services, destabilizing
political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states,
undermining competition in world strategic markets, using cyber
technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds,
creating the potential for the transfer of weapons of mass destruction
to terrorists, and expanding narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking
networks. Terrorists and insurgents are increasingly turning to
criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support,
amplifying the threat to U.S. interests.
Question. What role does AFRICOM play in combating transnational
organized crime and in training and equipping partner security forces
that have been tasked with combating it?
Answer. AFRICOM conducts a number of programs that directly support
the President's transnational organized crime strategy and Department
of Defense guidance that addresses transnational organized crime. In
addition to the command's Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement
Assistance program, there are a variety of security cooperation
programs that fund military-to-military capacity building and
operations that enable partner nations to more effectively deal with
security threats directly relating to transnational organized crime
within their borders. The Command's newly-established Counterthreat
Finance program is another important tool that allows the command to go
after financial proceeds from these illicit activities.
counterthreat finance
Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
Community have called for investing additional resources in identifying
and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and
illicit trafficking.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counterthreat finance
activities?
Answer. The Department of Defense is not and should not be the lead
in this effort. Department of Defense does have unique capabilities and
capacities that can be brought to bear to augment the efforts of the
broader interagency community.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of
AFRICOM in supporting counterthreat finance activities?
Answer. The Department of Defense in general, and AFRICOM
specifically, routinely contribute to threat finance activities with
intelligence analysis to identify critical network vulnerabilities,
providing strategic and operational planning expertise and organizing
and executing engagement activities to help shape the environment.
Countering threat finance activities supports efforts to counter
violent extremists, drug traffickers and other illicit and
destabilizing activities. Additionally, the Kingpin Act has proven to
be an effective tool for the command to use to go after the highest-
level drug traffickers through direct financial sanctions.
africom's military service component commands
Question. AFRICOM does not have any assigned forces and--as a
result--is required to compete for forces within the global request for
forces process. Given the Department's focus on the greater Middle East
and Asia-Pacific, do you believe the AFRICOM Commander will be able to
secure the necessary personnel to accomplish its partnering and
engagement mission within its AOR? If not, how would you assess the
risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to assess the requirements AFRICOM
currently fulfills regarding partnering and engagement missions and
report those finding back to this committee in a timely manner.
However, to my understanding, the command has adequate access to
resources to accomplish its partnering and engagement missions.
AFRICOM's access to rotationally allocated resources has increased over
the past 2 years through efforts such as the allocation of a Special
Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in fiscal year 2012 and the
allocation of a U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Force in fiscal year 2013.
These assets provide much needed flexibility to respond to
opportunities for engagement that arise on the continent. For example,
the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force has filled a key role
in our support to the African Union Mission in Somalia by providing a
10-week training course for deploying African troops. This engineering
focused course teaches deploying troops valuable route clearing
techniques against Improvised Explosive Devices, increasing
survivability of deployed troops and reducing the threat to civilian
populations. The efforts of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task
Force, coupled with a wide variety of other U.S. Government programs,
are helping Africa Union Mission in Somalia forces to make a positive
difference.
The threat to U.S. strategic interests including the global
economic system and American citizens at home and abroad will continue
to increase if the partnership and engagement missions are curtailed or
reduced. There are many opportunities to partner with stable African
partners and to develop partnerships with newly emerging governments.
As opportunities arise, other entities see opportunities to capitalize
on undergoverned and ungoverned spaces on the continent. The attack on
the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi and the subsequent unrest in many areas
across the continent in the days that followed are illustrative to the
impact these threats can have if partners are not capable of
establishing and maintaining a secure environment for their citizens.
regional alignment and rotational deployments of army brigades
Question. The Army plans to align general purpose combat brigades
with regional combatant commands, including AFRICOM, to support theater
engagement and security force assistance missions and to make those
forces, and other supporting units, available on a rotational basis for
deployment to those regions for training and exercises.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's capability
and capacity to align combat brigades or other units with regional
combatant commands?
Answer. The Army is in the process of developing its Regionally
Aligned Force concept and is conducting a ``proof of principle'' with a
brigade combat team aligned to AFRICOM in fiscal year 2013. The Army's
objective is to enhance its support of combatant commanders. Regionally
Aligned Force brigades receive training in culture, geography,
language, and gain an understanding of the militaries they will engage
during their mission alignment.
Question. What are your views, if any, on the use of general
purpose forces for missions providing security force assistance to
other nations' militaries?
Answer. Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that general purpose
forces are fully capable of providing significant security force
assistance to partner nations. As we reduce the rotational requirement
to combat areas we can use these forces to great effect in Africa.
General Purpose Forces will have to be fully flexible to do their
primary mission and to work in the area of security cooperation and
security force assistance.
Question. In your view, how should, if at all, a unit's regional
alignment determine the assignment of personnel, selection of unit
commanders, priority for cultural and language training compared to
core combat training, and identification and acquisition of special
equipment?
Answer. Regionally aligned forces units will be trained to conduct
the full range of military operations, but will also receive training
in culture, geography, language, and gain an understanding of the
militaries they will engage during their mission alignment. The current
Army Brigade Combat Team structure will contain most of the skill sets
required for training and equipping missions on the African continent.
Regionally aligned forces units will be able to ``reach-back'' into
Division and Corps assets in the United States for more specialized
skills.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to implement the use
of regionally aligned forces in support of your theater assistance and
engagement strategies?
Answer. The Department of the Army has significant authorities in
which they can employ regionally aligned forces in support of
geographic combatant commanders. Regionally aligned forces can be
employed for Theater Security Cooperation activities, operational
planning, inspections, coordination visits, and the conduct of
exercises. If confirmed, I would find opportunities across the
continent and within planning efforts to incorporate the expanded
capabilities and capacity of the regionally aligned forces within these
authorities.
Question. In your view, how should funding responsibility be
consolidated or distributed between the Military Departments and the
combatant commands for training and employment of regionally aligned
forces?
Answer. Exercise and security cooperation activities funding is
separate from service funds. Services exist to provide trained and
ready forces. The regionally aligned forces should be no different. For
the combatant commands, it will be necessary to include costs of using
the regionally aligned force units in security cooperation proposals
utilizing authorities like 1206 (Counterterrorism) and 1207 (Security
and Stabilization).
Question. In your view, is it feasible and suitable to satisfy
theater engagement and assistance strategies completely with rotational
forces? If not, why not?
Answer. AFRICOM has successfully conducted operations, exercises
and activities since its inception without permanently assigned forces.
Like other commands, it plans and requests forces through the Global
Force Management process.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
performance criteria and metrics that are or will be used to evaluate
the effectiveness and efficiency of combatant command theater
engagement strategies and, if confirmed, how will you integrate the use
of regionally aligned Army brigades or other units into the evaluation
system?
Answer. Over the last 4 years, AFRICOM has developed a
comprehensive integrated assessment process linking all theater,
regional and contingency plans--including all operations, exercises and
security cooperation activities. The Command measures progress in
achieving objectives and effects using a combination of indicators from
multiple sources: the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government
agencies, and numerous open-source international agencies--such as the
United Nations, the World Bank, and the African Union. The Command also
relies on the Department of State to provide polling data from African
citizens to add depth and breadth to the results. The Command uses
correlation analysis of U.S. activities and resources with progress in
the overall environment to shape and influence the planning and
scheduling of future engagement activities. I look forward to
continuing the best assessment practices at AFRICOM, and ensuring that
future Command-wide assessments support decisionmaking both at the
Command and throughout the Department of Defense.
global peace operation initiative
Question. In 2005, the United States along with our partners in the
G-8 launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to train
peacekeepers. This program is run by the Department of State's Bureau
of African Affairs. DOD has provided varying degrees of personnel
support since the program's inception. A number of national militaries
in the AFRICOM AOR have benefitted from this program and have provided
peacekeeping troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations around the
globe.
What is your understanding of the GPOI program?
Answer. Global Peace Operations Initiative is intended to address
capacity gaps in forces supporting peacekeeping operations. Since its
inception in 2004, the program's goal is primarily to train and deploy
peacekeepers. The program has shifted focus to help peacekeeping
contributing countries train and deploy themselves. The program focuses
its effort in Africa, as it is the stage for several of the largest
peacekeeping operations.
Question. Would you support or oppose AFRICOM's continued
involvement in the program?
Answer. Based on my current understanding, I would support
increased involvement in the Global Peace Operations Initiative.
AFRICOM provides resources to Global Peace Operations Initiative to
develop human capital and critical enablers to support United Nations/
African Union peacekeeping. In the future, with additional funding,
AFRICOM could increase support to build, planning capability,
intelligence support, logistics capacity, skills training, peacekeeping
staffs, and other efforts critical to the success of peacekeeping
operations.
Question. If confirmed, will you advocate for AFRICOM to play a
more direct role in providing U.S. military personnel (vice private
contractors) for the training missions conducted under GPOI?
Answer. Yes. To the extent military personnel are available.
Integrating uniformed trainers provides a significant cost savings and
improvement to the Global Peace Operations Initiative program while
supporting Department of Defense and Department of State objectives to
build the capacity of our partners. Initially I would support a hybrid
contractor-military peacekeeping training model led by the State
Department, coordinated with our country teams, and supported with
military trainers, and transition to full uniformed support of Global
Peace Operations Initiative in the future.
mass atrocities prevention
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10.
Among interagency partners, what is AFRICOM's role in addressing
atrocity threats, and what tools does AFRICOM have for preventing or
responding to atrocities in its AOR?
Answer. AFRICOM is committed to preventing mass atrocities. General
Ham highlighted the importance of this to the command by including
building the capacity of African partners to prevent and protect their
populations from mass atrocities in his Commander's Intent. AFRICOM
participates in and is a leader within the Mass Atrocities Prevention
Response Options development construct within Department of Defense.
The staff includes Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response planning into
planning activities and includes such items as respect for the rule of
law, submission to civil authority, and adherence to human rights norms
into military-to-military engagements. This ultimately addresses the
root causes of mass atrocities.
Question. Has AFRICOM developed planning processes toward this
effort so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency
situations? In your assessment, what country or countries are the most
at risk for mass atrocities in Africa?
Answer. AFRICOM plans for a range of contingencies in support of
U.S. national security policy and to prepare for possible crisis
response scenarios. AFRICOM also pursues ongoing efforts in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, South Sudan, and Central
African Republic to prevent Mass Atrocities. In Liberia, the command is
committed to building the Liberia Security Sector to prevent a repeat
of their disastrous recent history.
special operations authorities
Question. It has been reported that Admiral McRaven, Commander of
U.S. Special Operations Command, is seeking changes to the Unified
Command Plan (UCP) that he believes would allow SOCOM to better support
the requirements of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC).
Reportedly, such changes would give the Commander of SOCOM combatant
command authority over the TSOCs--including responsibilities for
resourcing--and provide for more rapid deployment of Special Operations
Forces to and between geographic combatant commands without the
requirement for approval by the Secretary of Defense in every case.
Operational control of deployed Special Operations Forces would
reportedly remain with the respective geographic combatant commander.
Some have expressed concern that such changes could raise problems
related to civilian control of the military, infringe upon the
traditional authorities of the geographic combatant commanders, and
make it more difficult for ambassadors and geographic combatant
commanders to know what military personnel are coming into their areas
of responsibility and what they are doing while they are there.
Please provide your assessment of whether such UCP changes would be
appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control
of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic
combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the Department of State.
Answer. This is a topic which will require further study. If
confirmed, I will review Admiral McRaven's recommended changes to the
Unified Command Plan and provide an assessment back to this committee
in a timely manner.
However, from my experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is
critical that Special Operations Forces are fully integrated with
conventional forces. This integration provides the commanders and
forces a common operational picture, allows for a more proactive and
responsive decisionmaking process, and access to shared resources.
special operations forces
Question. As forces have been reduced in Iraq and Afghanistan,
there is an expectation that additional Special Operations Forces may
be available for missions in other combatant commands, including
AFRICOM, which have had only a small presence of such forces in recent
years.
What special operations capabilities are in highest demand by
AFRICOM?
Answer. Given the complex strategic environment in Africa and the
need for persistent, distributed, low visibility and small footprint
operations, additional Special Operation Forces specifically organized,
trained, and equipped to operate in sensitive environments are
required. Special Operations Forces capabilities in highest demand
include the following: (1) experienced special operations forces ground
operators to build and maintain partner force counterterrorism capacity
and enable their operations; (2) Special Operations Forces focused on
enhancing partner nation non-lethal capabilities (e.g., Civil Affairs,
Military Information Support Operation) to shape the information
environment and create good will; (3) Special Operations Forces
intelligence personnel and equipment (e.g., analysts, collectors,
associated enablers) to better illuminate the threat; and (4) Special
Operations Forces non-standard, medium and vertical airlift (i.e., low
signature, non-standard aviation, MC-130H, and MC-130P) to provide low
signature movement across the continent, transport and resupply a
crisis response force and extend the range of vertical lift platforms.
Non Special Operations Forces assets required includes Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Personnel Recovery/Casualty
Evacuation rotary wing with associated enablers.
Question. Which countries in the AFRICOM AOR do you believe have
the greatest need for increased engagement with U.S. Special Operations
Forces?
Answer. To achieve a Global Special Operations Forces Network,
Special Operations Command AFRICA requires greater access and
engagements throughout Africa. In order to optimize effectiveness and
strengthen our African partners' counterterrorism/counter Violent
Extremist Organization capabilities necessitates greater engagements
with the following key countries: Libya, Niger, Tunisia, Algeria,
Mauritania, Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon, South Sudan, and Kenya. Greater
collaboration and engagements within the aforementioned countries
greatly furthers the U.S. Government counterterrorism/counterviolent
extremist organizations efforts against the growing and interconnected
al Qaeda threat throughout Northwest Africa and collaborative actions
against al Shabaab within East Africa.
In support of ongoing regional Counter-Lord's Resistance Army
operations, U.S. Special Operations Forces are advising and assisting
partner nation forces from Uganda, Central African Republic, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of South Sudan, in addition to
a number of United Nations missions in the region, to find and remove
Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army as a destabilizing force in
the region.
While U.S. Special Operations Forces continues to build capacity in
Counter-Lord's Resistance Army partner nation forces and has begun to
assist the nascent African Union Regional Task Force, longer-term
development of these forces may require an integrated Special
Operations and Conventional Forces approach to mature the Africa Union
Regional Task Forces as an institution and increase capacity of
individual partner nation forces.
special operations personnel in embassies
Question. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) deploys personnel
to work with country teams in a number of high priority countries where
the United States is not engaged in direct action operations, but
rather trying to train host nation security forces. Their mission is to
support the priorities of the Ambassador and the combatant commander's
theater campaign plan. At times, Ambassadors have complained that they
have not been adequately informed of activities by special operations
forces in their country.
If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the goals of
special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned
closely to those of the Ambassadors with whom they are working?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the activities of special
operations personnel, as well as all personnel, are coordinated with
the embassy Chief of Mission. AFRICOM currently conducts this
coordination by requiring Chief of Mission concurrence on operations,
exercises and engagement activities.
marine security guards in embassies
Question. Due to the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi,
Libya, which resulted in the death of a U.S. ambassador and three other
Americans, many are conveying concern about the safety of U.S.
diplomatic personnel around the world.
Do you share this concern?
Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps has a longstanding relationship with
the Department of State to provide internal security at diplomatic
posts. The Marine Security Guard Detachment Commander, acting under
operational supervision of the Regional Security Officer, is tasked
with providing internal security functions to prevent the compromise of
classified information and equipment vital to the national security of
the United States. A secondary mission of Marine Security Guard is to
provide protection for U.S. citizens and U.S. Government property
located within diplomatic premises. Under certain emergency situations
they will provide special protective services to the Chief of Mission
or Principal Officer. These protocols have proven successful for the
past several decades, and provide flexibility to Regional Security
Officers for the employment of Marine Security Guards upon diplomatic
posts.
Question. The Marine Security Guard Program was established in
1946, and its mission, to provide internal security at designated
embassies of classified information and equipment, remains unchanged to
this day.
In light of increasing threats to U.S. diplomatic personnel by
terrorists throughout the world, do you believe it is time to re-
examine the Program's mission and protocols?
Answer. I believe the Marine Security Guard Program, as defined
under existing protocols between the Marine Corps and Department of
State, functions well and meets the needs of our diplomatic missions
around the world. However, based on changing security dynamics we are
in the process of taking a look at what changes to the program might be
necessary. I fully appreciate the importance of this mission and
understand it is important to work closely with the Department of State
to ensure our Marine Security Guard organization, mission and security
protocols are responsive to their needs.
Question. If so, should it be broadened to provide additional
protection to U.S. diplomatic personnel?
Answer. At this time, I don't believe the program should be
broadened to provide additional protection to U.S. diplomatic
personnel. However, the Marine Corps has a long history of working with
the State Department, and should adjustments be required, will work
eagerly to ensure the internal security functions aboard diplomatic
premises meet the standards required.
Question. In your opinion, what additional steps, if any, should be
taken to reduce the risk of attacks on U.S. embassies and consulates
and diplomatic personnel by terrorist organizations within Afghanistan
and throughout the region?
Answer. We must continue to monitor threats to our diplomatic posts
in Afghanistan and around the region, and adjust our security posture
based on the threats and changing conditions on the ground. External
security at our embassies and consulates is, first, the responsibility
of the host nation and must remain so. In Afghanistan, we maintain a
heightened security posture, and will continue to do so, in order to
reduce risks commensurate with local threats and to advance the
important work of our diplomatic personnel.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
Question. Demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities of every kind has grown exponentially in recent
years largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting
capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of the geographic
combatant commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being
met.
What is your understanding of the support AFRICOM is currently
receiving to respond to its ISR requirements?
Answer. ISR assets are a scarce resource and should be allocated
based on threat. My understanding is AFRICOM does not receive
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to meet its
requirement. However, Department of Defense has provided additional
assets to meet specific needs for operations such as in response to
recent attacks in North Africa. This year, AFRICOM will receive
additional intelligence capabilities to include multi-intelligence
Global Hawks, foliage penetration, and counter-improvised explosive
device technologies.
AFRICOM receives only about 7 percent of its total intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements. However, in response to
the recent attack in North Africa, AFRICOM is currently getting about
50 percent of its stated need for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance in North Africa. AFRICOM's intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance requirements are supported by the Air Force, the
Navy, and the National Intelligence Community. The Services provide
AFRICOM with a wide variety of intelligence capability. Predator,
Pilatus fixed wing aircraft, and Scan Eagle provide full motion video.
EP-3 Orion and other maritime assets provide signals intelligence.
Seaborne assets provide tactical intelligence capability as well as a
forward staging area for MQ-8 unmanned helicopter, and Scan Eagle.
Joint Surveillance and Target Attack aircraft provide ground moving
target indicator capability. Global Hawk provides long-dwell, long-
range imagery.
While AFRICOM is allocated a wide variety of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, current allocation does not provide
sufficient quantity or sensor mix to achieve the objectives which the
Joint Staff directed to AFRICOM.
Question. Do you believe the threat emanating from AFRICOM's AOR
should garner additional resources from within DOD? If so, how do you
intend to advocate for additional ISR assets?
Answer. Yes, I believe additional intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities are necessary to protect American interest
and assist our close allies and partners. The recent crises in North
Africa demonstrate the volatility of the African security environment.
As the United States makes significant progress against al Qaeda on
many fronts, huge pockets of ungoverned spaces and unstable security
situations have provided a safe haven for al Qaeda, its allies and
affiliates. Al Qaeda has taken advantage of the poor security situation
in Libya, easy access to weapons, and the rebellion in Mali to
establish deep roots throughout North and West Africa. While
significant progress has been made in Somalia, an increasingly
desperate al Shabaab has turned to improvised explosive device attacks
against our African partners. Additionally, Boco Haram carried out
hundreds of improvised explosive device attacks in Nigeria. Finally,
kidnapping for ransom continues to be a significant concern in Somalia
and Mali.
If confirmed, I will request additional assets through the global
force management process to take advantage of ISR resources as we draw
down in Afghanistan. Until Global Force Management allocation meets
requirements, I will continue to leverage contract and experimental
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and look to the broader
Research and Development community for innovative solutions to unique
AFRICOM requirements.
combined joint task force-horn of africa
Question. What is your understanding of the mission of Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and its command relationship
to AFRICOM?
Answer. CJTF-HOA is a subordinate command of AFRICOM. Its mission
is to protect, defend, and promote the national security interests of
the United States by conducting military operations to prevail in our
current and future operations against violent extremist organizations
and other transnational threats, and strengthens the capabilities of
our East African Partner Nation militaries and regional security
organizations in order to assist East African Nations to create
security environments that promote security and stability within their
country borders and throughout the region.
Question. How do its roles and responsibilities compare with
AFRICOM's service component commands?
Answer. Unlike the service specific and functional commands, CJTF-
HOA is focused on a specific geographic area of operation--the East
Africa Combined-Joint Operations Area CJTF-HOA is directed by AFRICOM
to plan, coordinate, synchronize, direct and assess operations,
exercises, security cooperation activities and engagements with AFRICOM
components and Special Operations Command Africa along six lines of
effort: Counter Violent Extremist Organizations; Strengthen Defense
Capabilities; Prepare and Respond to Crisis; Counter-Piracy; Counter
Illicit Trafficking; and Maintain Strategic Posture.
Question. How does AFRICOM ensure that CJTF-HOA activities
complement rather than conflict with activities being conducted by
AFRICOM's service components?
Answer. AFRICOM has published an East Africa campaign plan with
CJTF-HOA designated as the supported command.
Question. What are the most effective metrics to measure the impact
of CJTF-HOA's efforts to date?
Answer. CJTF-HOA is currently developing a formal set of assessment
criteria to measure the impact of their efforts.
Currently, the metrics used to measure the impact of CJTF-HOA
effort includes the diminished effectiveness and ability of extremist
organizations to operate in East Africa, the increased capability,
willingness, and partnership of East African nations to eliminate
extremist organizations, and the ability and capability of East African
nations to respond to crisis, protecting U.S. interests in the region.
maritime security
Question. Maritime security has proven to be a significant issue on
the coasts of West and East Africa.
What is your assessment of AFRICOM's ongoing maritime security
initiatives?
Answer. My understanding is AFRICOM has seen some success in
maritime security initiatives. There have been several recent, positive
developments in this area as a result of AFRICOM's initiatives,
especially in the Gulf of Guinea. These initiatives are also U.S.
interagency efforts, especially in conjunction with the Department of
State. In particular, the command's effort to assist the Economic
Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of West
African States in developing a legal and operational framework for
regional cooperation was a positive development. This assistance,
requested by Economic Community of Central African States and Economic
Community of West African States, will improve the ability of these
states to meet the significant challenges of illicit maritime activity,
including piracy, drug, arms, and human trafficking, and threats to
energy and port security which potentially have a negative impact on
economic development. These transnational threats directly impact the
quality of life of the population and affect U.S. national interests.
These regional problems are best addressed with regional solutions. If
confirmed, I will continue to assess these programs and seek
opportunities to build upon these positive steps with our African
partners.
Question. Very few African countries have the capacity to project
naval forces beyond their coastal waters; as a result, the economic
exclusion zones of many coastal African countries are exploited by a
variety of international actors.
What opportunities, if any, do you see for expanded U.S. engagement
on maritime security in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. There are many opportunities to expand AFRICOM's maritime
engagement. AFRICOM is seeking to include more partners in these
maritime security efforts to include the European Union and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization nations; International Organizations such
as the United Nations and African Union; and Regional Organizations
such as Economic Community of Central African States and Economic
Community of West African States. There is also an opportunity to
expand beyond the shores of Africa to include developing closer
coordination and cooperation on activities and events that have
transatlantic impact from South America and the Caribbean, through
Africa and into Europe. Illicit maritime trafficking has global reach
and impact which can be addressed by closer cooperation between
hemispheres (north, south, east, and west).
This multinational approach is already happening in the Navy's
Africa Partnership Station, AFRICOM teams with our African and other
enduring partners to conduct training, exercises and operations like
African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. For example, Naval Forces
Africa has completed five deployments by U.S. ships along with
deployments of ships from several European nations. My current
understanding is that on the whole, our African partners are very
satisfied and have requested more support.
For the past 2 years AFRICOM, in conjunction with the Department of
State and the African Center for Strategic Studies, has been working to
enable countries to develop national maritime strategies that foster
rule of law, emphasize good governance and support economic
development. In addition several countries, such as Ghana and
Mozambique have requested AFRICOM support to develop plans to respond
to threats to security of offshore oil production facilities and
transport vessels.
These challenges present opportunities to enable African countries
to guard their own waters and manage their valuable offshore resources.
The freedom of commerce along the strategically important maritime
transportation corridors is an African, United States, and global
shared interest. If confirmed, I plan to continue the process of
cooperation with U.S. Government agencies and international partners,
and seek to enhance and continue the programs and activities that build
partner maritime security capacity.
china
Question. In your view, do China and the United States share common
security objectives in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. In my opinion, China and the United States should cooperate
on issues of mutual interest, such as counterterrorism, and on other
projects that satisfy both countries' objectives.
Question. In your opinion, what effect has China's engagement with
African militaries had on those militaries and on U.S. security
interests?
Answer. My understanding is China offers military equipment to
African countries at prices that each country can afford, and training
at Chinese military schools is often completely subsidized. While in
many cases the equipment available from China may be older and less
technologically advanced than what other countries can offer, this
equipment provides African militaries with more ``bang for the buck''
than they might be able to afford from any other source, while having
the added perceived benefit of coming without ties, such as Western
concern about human rights and democracy. Chinese equipment and
training has been known to complement U.S. activities, however, for
example by providing a baseline for militaries that move on to Africa
Contingency Operations Training & Assistance peacekeeping training and
participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Question. To what extent do you view China's activities on the
continent as a threat/challenge to U.S. national security interests?
Answer. In my opinion, we should seek to cooperate with China where
we have mutual interests. China acts on the basis of ``non-interference
in internal affairs,'' which means the country does not restrict its
arms sales as a result of concerns about how the purchasing country
behaves internationally or with respect to its own citizens. As a
result, China does not discriminate against countries on the edge of
instability or those with poor human rights records against their own
people. However, China is not actively targeting U.S. interests,
activities, or personnel so it is not a direct threat.
Question. Are U.S. policies in Africa sufficient to counter China's
influence when that is appropriate, or are there additional measures we
should be considering? What role should AFRICOM play in this regard?
Answer. In my opinion, current U.S. policies are sufficient to
address the influence of China in Africa. It is important to look for
and capitalize on areas of mutual national interest between our two
countries. For example, solid opportunities exist for cooperation with
counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea.
Additionally, the Chinese conduct training and have programs that are
similar in nature to ours, but there is very limited coordination or
cooperation on these efforts. If and when our national interests align,
AFRICOM should work to coordinate these efforts if possible in order to
better develop our African partners and increase the security on the
continent.
Question. Do you foresee China's growing energy and resource
demands affecting security developments in Africa?
Answer. China gets significant energy and natural resources from
Africa and would be reluctant to allow those levels to decline. As a
result of China's interest in gaining international respect and
support, it is more inclined to use diplomacy and negotiation to
maintain this desired level of resources. In one recent example with
Sudan and South Sudan, China attempted to mediate between the two
countries when oil production was shut down over a dispute regarding
past and future dispensation of oil revenues.
section 1208 funding
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as
amended, gave U.S. Special Operations Command the authority to provide
support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces,
irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military
operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. Section 1208, within the context of its authority, has
proved to be one of the most responsive and flexible tools to meet
AFRICOM security challenges. This authority allows AFRICOM to enable
partner nations who share the common goal of countering the violent
extremist organizations threat in the region. AFRICOM is responsible to
identify and engage the ``right'' partner unit which is capable and
willing to conduct counterterrorism operations against violent
extremist organizations threats. To do this requires close coordination
with both the regional country teams as well as the legitimate
government officials, both civilian and military. It is essential that
all parties understand and agree to the common threat picture and have
a displayed willingness to act against those threats.
Section 1208 is not a capacity building authority. The purpose of
the funding is to better enable those units that are legitimate
representatives of our partner nation. In some cases, such as Libya,
those units may be ``deputized'' militias.
Question. Do you believe this authority has been appropriately
utilized in Africa?
Answer. Yes. It has been used appropriately in Africa. The
successes in east Africa, specifically the visible improvements made
against al Shabaab in Somalia, is a reflection of using this line of
funding. All activities were conducted with complete transparency and
in full coordination with our Interagency Partners in the region.
Additional details require a higher classification.
However, there is room to expand this authority to achieve focused
effects against the threat. As Special Operations Command continues to
resource and enable the Theater Special Operations Command and those
enhanced capabilities come available, expansion of the 1208 authority
against al Qaeda will provide opportunistic, disciplined, small
footprint, high-impact special operations forces the ability to
maximize the use of this authority.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to have this authority
used in Africa?
Answer. I will continue to identify those partner nations who are
actively pursuing operations to counter the violent extremist
organizations threat stream in Northwest Africa. The countries of
Libya, Niger, and Mauritania are actively countering the threat stream
emanating out of northern Mali. Ideally, AFRICOM would partner with
those units who are actively conducting counterterrorism/counterviolent
extremist organizations operations to better enable their efforts.
Within the capabilities of the Theater Special Operations Command,
I would seek to expand the use of the 1208 authority by continuing to
develop and socialize concepts of operation focused on isolating and
degrading the threat network across the continent to achieve U.S.
counterterrorism objectives.
africa health related issues
Question. Health issues are a significant concern in many African
nations and in their militaries and the U.S. Government's engagement
strategy in Africa includes an emphasis on health-related issues.
To what extent should AFRICOM be involved in broader U.S.
Government ``health diplomacy'' efforts in Africa?
Answer. First, AFRICOM should continue to synchronize Department of
Defense health engagement on the continent to achieve optimum results.
Simultaneously, AFRICOM should coordinate its health engagement with
other parts of the U.S. Government to ensure maximum impact.
AFRICOM is already doing that in a number of areas. Programs like
the Partner Military Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program and our Pandemic Response
Program are good examples. Partner Military Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program,
implemented by the Department of Defense Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Prevention Program's
office is primarily funded by the President's Emergency Plan for
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Relief and executed in collaboration
with agencies like Department of State, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of
Commerce, Department of Labor, and Peace Corps in 41 African countries.
AFRICOM's Pandemic Response Program, currently being implemented in
17 African countries, was funded by the U.S. Agency for International
Development from 2008 to 2012. The program is now funded by Department
of Defense but is still implemented in collaboration with Department of
State, U.S. Agency for International Development and Center for Disease
Control. Similarly, the AFRICOM's malaria initiative with partner
militaries in East Africa (and soon in West Africa) is coordinated with
the President's Malaria Initiative in target countries (same partners
as above). Additionally, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's bio
surveillance program, working with AFRICOM, is coordinating with U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for
International Development.
Question. In your view, should AFRICOM's engagement strategy,
perhaps more than other combatant command engagement strategies,
include an emphasis on military health engagement?
Answer. Comparisons across combatant command geographical areas of
operation are difficult due to the number of cultures and economies
being engaged. But, the conditions of many partner nation militaries in
Africa are such that without improved health intervention (improved
nutrition, better disease prevention, care and treatment) these
militaries will be less able to deploy in their own countries, much
less in peacekeeping operations. As a result, AFRICOM has included
health and medical engagement in our strategies with many partners in
Africa.
Question. How much success has DOD had in efforts to support
prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS in African militaries?
Answer. Africa Command's military Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome program is aimed at
mitigating the impacts of the disease on African military readiness.
The program includes activities that help prevent the escalation of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome infection rates within African security forces, and provide
care and treatment for the servicemembers and families infected or
affected by the disease. DOD activities that support African
militaries' fight against Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome now reach 41 African countries.
During fiscal year 2011, the command's programs reached 508,000
African troops and family members with prevention messages, and
provided counseling and testing services for 412,000 servicemembers and
their families. Almost 4,000 health care workers have received Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
training. Approximately 43,000 individuals are on antiretroviral
treatment as a result of these collaborative efforts. The fight against
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome in Africa is having an impact. A leader of a southern African
country remarked that, 3 years ago, he was conducting burials every day
for a Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection related death; however,
today he conducts one burial every 8 to 10 days.
Other indicators of success include; 17,923 males were circumcised
as part of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection prevention efforts;
96,558 eligible adults and children were provided with a minimum of one
care service; 68,237 Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection positive
adults and children received a minimum of one clinical service; 29,856
HIV-positive persons received cotrimoxazole prophylaxis.
Question. If confirmed, how, if at all, would you like to see such
efforts increased or programmatically altered?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assess the programs before
recommending changes. Current programs are effective and favor greater
efforts in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection prevention and
treatment.
Question. In your view, what should DOD's role be in the program
relative to other elements of the U.S. Government?
Answer. Health and Humanitarian Assistance efforts require a
``whole-of-government'' approach. Department of Defense and its
organizations bring a wide range of capabilities to the table and when
properly coordinated the U.S. Government efforts are greatly enhanced
without expense to national security. It is important that the balance
be maintained. In AFRICOM's case these efforts provide it with
additional access to partner nations and enhance positive perceptions
of our military.
sexual assault prevention and response in africom
Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive
policies and procedures to improve the prevention and response to
incidents of sexual assault. However, new allegations of sexual assault
continue to be reported, and many question the adequacy of the chain of
command's response to these allegations.
Answer. A frequent complaint of victims of sexual assault and their
advocates is that military commanders frequently fail to hold
assailants accountable for their criminal acts. Some in Congress have
proposed that commanders' authority to address sexual assaults be
removed and given to an independent entity.
Question. What is your view of the Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Program in AFRICOM?
Answer. It is my understanding that the program is effective in
AFRICOM. The program addresses the needs of the combatant command staff
by providing trained, in-house Victim Advocates that work hand-in-hand
with the garrison Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention
coordinator. The Stuttgart garrison support agencies provide training,
guidance and support the Victim Advocates efforts and directly address
the needs of victims. Supporting agencies also include Family Advocacy,
the Provost Marshalls Office, Army Criminal Investigation Division,
medical personnel, and others as required to ensure program compliance
and the needs of the victim are met.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources in AFRICOM to investigate and respond to allegations of
sexual assault?
Answer. Although the command's primary support is garrison based,
all indications are the training and resources are adequate to respond
appropriately to allegations of sexual assault.
Question. What is your view of the proposal to give the authority
to an independent agency, not part of the chain of command, to address
allegations of sexual assault, including the authority to hold
assailants accountable for criminal acts?
Answer. The Services recently changed the level of commander with
Uniform Code of Military Justice authority over these types of cases
and this change should be assessed before making further changes.
Giving authority to an independent agency could undermine command
authority by sending the message the commander cannot be trusted to
make a fair and impartial assessment.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the
resources and programs in place in AFRICOM to offer victims of sexual
assault the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
Answer. U.S. Army Garrison Stuttgart is the lead agent to provide
these services to the staff and they have the core functions in place
to support AFRICOM members. They have shown a sincere spirit of teaming
with the command to take care of our personnel.
Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and
procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be
effective?
Answer. Yes. The policies and procedures seem effective.
Confidential reporting provides an option for those who wish to seek
assistance while maintaining confidentiality.
Question. What is your view of steps taken to prevent sexual
assaults in AFRICOM?
Answer. AFRICOM works in synchronization with the victim advocates.
Training is highlighted and conducted by senior leaders in small groups
to discuss troops' responsibility to stop activities that lead to
heightened possibility of sexual assaults. Additionally, the garrison
is examining the infrastructure and facilities to identify mitigation
measures in the barracks and other areas.
quality-of-life challenges in africom
Question. What quality-of-life challenges are unique for personnel
and their families assigned to the AFRICOM area of responsibility?
Answer. The lack of reliable infrastructure on the African
continent presents unique quality-of-life challenges for our personnel
and their families. Among these challenges are unreliable broadband
internet, sporadic postal service access, shortages of essential goods,
varying degrees of host nation medical care and schooling capabilities.
There is a relatively small AFRICOM personnel footprint in our African
embassies--of the 36 staffed, there are fewer than 200 personnel in
both accompanied and unaccompanied tours.
Additionally, there are approximately 5,000 unaccompanied personnel
on the continent at any given time, and the command conducts a variety
of outreach and educational activities such as travel clinics to impart
proper respect for, and adherence to, the unique medical and safety
requirements of our area of responsibility.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these theater-wide
challenges to help improve the quality of life for these personnel and
their families?
Answer. The Command invests in productive partnerships with Service
components and supporting nongovernmental agencies. Army morale,
welfare, and recreation activities are proactive--providing large
mobile support kits containing exercise and recreation equipment,
games, lounge items, and electronic equipment to support our
servicemembers. As always, AFRICOM also receives superb support from
the Red Cross, the United Services Organization, and other
organizations with the mission of supporting America's uniform
personnel. I will continue to invest in, and encourage these
relationships. For school issues, we work closely with the Department
of Defense Education Activity to ensure military dependents get quality
education on the continent. U.S. Transportation Command facilitates
medical evacuation service capability for military personnel and their
families on the continent.
mental health of servicemembers and stress on the force
Question. The committee is concerned about the stress on military
personnel resulting from lengthy and repeated deployments and their
access to mental health care to deal with this increased stress. The
suicide rates in each of the Services are clear reminders that
servicemembers, particularly those who have been deployed multiple
times, are under tremendous stress and need access to mental health
care.
In your view, are there sufficient mental health assets in AFRICOM
to address the mental health needs of the military personnel and their
families?
Answer. Yes. I believe there are adequate Mental Health resources
in the Stuttgart Army Garrison Community to appropriately address the
needs of the headquarters staff and their family members. For example,
AFRICOM is particularly pleased with the response to Department of
Defense Military and Family Life Consultant Program. Through the
Military and Family Life Consultant Program, licensed clinical
providers assist servicemembers, civilians, and their families by
providing brief, solution-focused problem solving support. They work in
support of and in conjunction with existing military entities/services.
There are no records kept and contact with Military and Family Life
Consultant Program is anonymous with the exceptions of allegations made
of harm to self, others, allegations of domestic abuse, sexual assault
and child abuse. The role of the consultant is unique--they are not
traditional therapists. The primary Military and Family Life Consultant
Program role is to assess needs, provide support, or refer as
necessary. Among the service they provide is assistance to
servicemembers, civilians, and families with development of an action
plans. For example, in Djibouti, usage statistics indicate eight
contacts are made on an average day, and the program there will gain a
second consultant to serve that population. The command is also pleased
with the services provided by our local Army health care providers and
the medical services in the local community, as well as Military
OneSource.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the
mental health needs of military personnel and their families in
AFRICOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to place an emphasis in
ensuring that behavioral health services are available to our
servicemembers and their families. I recognize that we must foster a
culture that facilitates an awareness of the impact of behavioral
health issues on individual servicemembers, families, units, and our
military communities.
This awareness starts from the top leadership and extends down to
each individual assigned to the command. I will continue to engage to
ensure we maintain an interdisciplinary approach to addressing the
behavioral health needs of the force. This includes increasing the
effectiveness of health surveillance, detection, and response efforts
to identify, refer, and treat servicemembers and families at risk;
reducing cultural stigma associated with seeking behavioral healthcare
and developing resiliency and coping skills that foster help-seeking
behavior among our servicemembers and their families.
I will leverage policies and programs that assist servicemembers
suffering from physical and behavioral health conditions. The starting
point at every level is education and training. I will also empower all
soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilian personnel to act as
sensors for leadership by noticing small changes in behavior and taking
action early. These efforts encourage unit strength, resilience, and
readiness. I will encourage that service and family members seek mental
health assistance when needed.
Question. Do you have any views on how to reduce the stigma, real
or perceived, for seeking mental health care?
Answer. We have taken conscious steps to adjust policy to reduce
stigma by facilitating culture change within our force through
continued education and by continuing to enhance the support network
for servicemembers who may be at risk. I will continue to emphasize the
importance of assessing the need for behavioral health services at key
transition points to include redeployment, reintegration, and
servicemembers to civilian transition. I will also continue to
emphasize the need for behavioral health screening during routine
periodic health and wellness exams. I will encourage social support and
awareness of behavioral health programs which, through buddy or peer-
to-peer involvement, has been successful in increasing behavioral
health treatment-seeking among veterans. Additionally, increased social
support may also lead to stigma reduction.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
sexual assault
1. Senator McCaskill. General Rodriguez, it is my understanding
that the movie ``The Invisible War'' is being used to help educate
senior leaders in the U.S. Armed Forces about the issue of sexual
assault in the military. Have you seen the movie?
General Rodriguez. Yes, I have seen ``The Invisible War''.

2. Senator McCaskill. General Rodriguez, as a leader in the U.S.
Army, what have you learned about the issue of sexual assault facing
servicemembers under your command?
General Rodriguez. Sexual assault is contrary to Army values,
degrades mission readiness, and will be prosecuted. With continued
leadership and chain of command involvement, the Army can reduce the
incidents of sexual assault and provide the training and guidance to
prevent these incidents from occurring, prosecute those responsible for
sexual assault, and provide the best support to the victims.
The Army Sexual Harassment and Assault Reporting Program is
effective in addressing the needs of the Army by providing trained, in-
house Victim Advocates that work hand-in-hand with the garrison Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention coordinator. The garrison
command support agencies on Army installations provide training,
guidance and support the Victim Advocates efforts and directly address
the needs of victims. Supporting agencies also include Family Advocacy,
the Provost Marshalls Office, Army Criminal Investigation Division,
medical personnel, and others as required to ensure program compliance
and the needs of the victim are met.

building security capacity
3. Senator McCaskill. General Rodriguez, one of U.S. Africa
Command's (AFRICOM) central missions is to strengthen the defense
capabilities of African states. In January 2013, an International
Security Advisory Board report on ``Security Capacity Building'' found
that the United States annually spends more than $25 billion on what is
broadly classified as security capacity of the recipient states. The
report found that we have a multiplicity of programs spread across
different departments and agencies where there may or may not be
coordination in resourcing and execution. A lack of coordination could
easily lead to duplication of effort and waste of resources that would
be better spent elsewhere. As the combatant commander, what would you
do to coordinate efforts with our diplomatic missions and other Federal
agencies to ensure duplication is not occurring?
General Rodriguez. Cross agency communication is key and may
identify duplication of programs. Communication between agencies can be
difficult at times, but it is a challenge that is solvable by
understanding the cultures of the different U.S. agencies and by
demonstrating our willingness to share relevant information between the
African Union and other entities with equities on the continent. Being
a good steward of resources, particularly in our fiscally uncertain
environment, is essential. To accomplish this goal requires close
coordination and that will be one of my priorities as Commander,
AFRICOM.

4. Senator McCaskill. General Rodriguez, in your response to the
advance policy questions, you said: ``AFRICOM's responsibilities
reflect a new and evolving focus on building partner operational and
institutional capacity at the country and regional levels and
supporting the efforts of other U.S. Government agencies in the area of
responsibility (AOR).'' While many at the Department of State (DOS) and
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) welcome the ability
of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there
also is concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities as
well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are not a core
part of its mandate. The highly unequal allocation of resources between
DOD, DOS, and USAID could hinder their ability to act as equal partners
and could lead to the militarization of development and diplomacy. Do
you believe there is a danger in over-emphasizing the U.S. military
presence in Africa?
General Rodriguez. Since inception of AFRICOM in October 2008, all
agencies of the U.S. Government have remained sensitive to this concern
and have operated with a light footprint on the continent. Regarding
Department of Defense (DOD) operations with other U.S. Government
agencies, I believe DOD and the AFRICOM component commands must
thoroughly understand the culture of those agencies--particularly DOS
and USAID--and employ that understanding during planning sessions and
during execution of programs and theater security cooperation events.
It is very important not to militarize development activity or
diplomacy.

5. Senator McCaskill. General Rodriguez, how will you balance our
military presence in Africa with the diplomatic and development
responsibilities of DOS and USAID?
General Rodriguez. The U.S. Ambassadors are the lead for U.S.
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic development in each
African nation. AFRICOM fully supports the Ambassadors and DOS to
ensure a balanced and synchronized effort between diplomatic,
development, and military presence in African nations. It is imperative
that we work together as a whole-of-government team as we engage
African nations. Messaging to the governments and people of the
continent will continue to emphasize our support to African nations.
Traditional U.S. military engagement strategy has been grounded in
threat-based analysis. To meet its growing responsibilities in the even
more complex African context, the Command will compliment this
traditional analytic framework with a partnership-based approach. To do
this, we should use our military capabilities in a supporting role with
the interagency team to find ways to help our partners build resilient,
democratic security institutions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
mali
6. Senator Manchin. General Rodriguez, the AFRICOM AOR has become a
front line in the fight against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. I
am particularly concerned the emergence of al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali. French and Malian forces have made great
strides over the past month in driving AQIM out of areas they held in
northern Mali, but the French have announced they are leaving soon. How
can the United States best support preserving these gains without
investing troops or considerable resources?
General Rodriguez. The most effective way to preserve the gains in
Mali is through a strong, functional Mali Government. We should
continue to support African nations, the Africa Union, African regional
organizations, the European Union, and the United Nations where we have
common objectives. Building the capacity and supporting these
organizations provide African and international solutions to Africa's
problems.

south sudan
7. Senator Manchin. General Rodriguez, South Sudan is the world's
newest country and faces a number of internal and external security
challenges. Can you describe the status of our military-to-military
relationship with South Sudan?
General Rodriguez. The U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan has called
for a limited introduction of our Security Force Assistance (SFA)
program pending improvement in certain issue areas, including: (1)
concern over the government of South Sudan's progress on advancing
democratic principles; (2) concern about the Government of South
Sudan's ability to absorb our assistance while key border security
issues remain unresolved with the north; and, (3) Embassy Juba's
limited capacity to support U.S. servicemembers in the austere Juba
environment.
Our military-to-military relationship with the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) is in the initial stage. Through effective use
of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program,
dozens of SPLA students have attended DOD schools in the United States
ranging from infantry officer basic training to engineer, medical, and
judge advocate general courses. An SPLA brigadier general is scheduled
to attend the U.S. Army War College this year. These alumni will form
the basis of our engagement activities within the framework of our
comprehensive Security Force Assistance (SFA) Program. This SFA Program
emphasizes development of the defense sector at the institutional level
for enduring effects. Additionally, AFRICOM is planning to conduct
limited medical and engineering civic action projects in the next few
months with the SPLA.

8. Senator Manchin. General Rodriguez, as this relationship
evolves, how you will ensure that human rights are an important part of
any military-to-military engagement with South Sudan?
General Rodriguez. Human rights related content--including the rule
of law, civilian control of the military, and code of conduct--are key
ingredients infused into every engagement with the Sudan People's
Liberation Army. Our Security Force Assistance (SFA) Program includes a
priority package of education and mentorship aimed at assisting in the
development of defense sector institutions that will establish, foster,
and enforce laws, codes, and principles related to discipline of the
force, hierarchy of command, and rules of engagement. Our SFA package
also includes ways and means to professionalize and establish
capability and capacity of key functions within the military such as a
judge advocate general corps, military police and inspector general.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
u.s. africa command goals
9. Senator Shaheen. General Rodriguez, Dr. Cynthia Watson, a
professor at the National War College, stated, ``Africa Command hopes
to avoid that traditional combatant command goals of warfighting in
favor of war prevention, making its orientation quite different from
other parallel organizations.'' Do you agree with this assessment?
General Rodriguez. I believe prevention of war is the foremost goal
of all combatant commands. The strategic environment will dictate the
amount of emphasis placed on war prevention versus warfighting. AFRICOM
protects and defends the national security interests of the United
States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and
regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military
operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to
provide a security environment conducive to good governance and
development. We need to be ready to do both.

10. Senator Shaheen. General Rodriguez, do you think that this
mission focus prohibited AFRICOM from being able to respond to the
Benghazi incident?
General Rodriguez. There are a number of lessons learned from
Benghazi that must be considered. We should continue to conduct close
coordination with DOS and our other interagency partners on the African
continent to ensure a common understanding of the risk associated with
the complex threat environment such as that in Libya. We should
continue to work as a team to refine intelligence, reduce the
intelligence gap through better collaboration, prioritizing threats,
and allocating resources to collect on those threats.
Also, we should review the interagency process between the DOD and
DOS to identify security risks and understand DOD response options to
inform DOS security planning and decisionmaking. Regional response
forces like the Commanders In-extremis Force, Army Regionally Aligned
Forces, and the Special Marines Air-Ground Task Force are also part of
the solution in some areas.
I understand AFRICOM is reviewing security assistance and military-
to-military programs to ensure they are best tailored to build host
nation capacity where required. Collaborative efforts to improve
Embassy security are ongoing.

11. Senator Shaheen. General Rodriguez, do you think that AFRICOM's
emphasis on building partnerships will shift as the emerging terrorist
threat increases?
General Rodriguez. Traditional U.S. military engagement strategy
has been grounded in threat-based analysis. To meet its growing
responsibilities in the increasingly complex African context, AFRICOM
will compliment this traditional analytic framework with a partnership-
based approach. To do this, we will use our military capabilities in a
supporting role with our interagency team to find ways to help our
partners build resilient security institutions that are committed to
democratic ideals.

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability
12. Senator Shaheen. General Rodriguez, the current AFRICOM
Commander has previously testified that intelligence and surveillance
continue to be a challenge and that more assets are needed. If
confirmed, what do you intend to do to ensure that AFRICOM has the
appropriate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capability?
General Rodriguez. I will advocate for prioritization of AFRICOM
ISR requirements to support current operations and likely future
mission areas. With potential for receiving additional ISR assets, I
will engage African partner nations for over-flight, refueling and
temporary operating location options. It is also important to invest in
enhancing African nations ISR capabilities as well as information and
intelligence sharing to improve overall understanding of the
environment.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
marine corps in u.s. africa command
13. Senator Blumenthal. General Rodriguez, last week we heard from
General Dempsey of the challenges posed by improving our response
capabilities in Africa, where there are limited base rights and access.
It is my understanding that the United States no longer maintains an
amphibious ready group in the Mediterranean Sea, and this is before
sequestration. If confirmed, will you look at making better use of the
Marine Corps' ability to respond to crises in North Africa, conduct
noncombatant evacuations, and maintain a rapid response capability with
forward deployed forces?
General Rodriguez. I will continue to refine the posture of our
U.S. Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air and Ground Task Force and
other Marine assets as required to respond to crises in North Africa,
conduct non-combatant evacuations, and maintain a rapid response
capability with forward deployed forces. I would add that it is
important for any combatant commander to consider the full range of
Department of Defense and other agency capabilities available for
operational support missions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
surveillance in africa command
14. Senator Chambliss. General Rodriguez, AFRICOM receives only
about 7 percent of its total ISR requirements. However, in response to
the recent attack in North Africa, AFRICOM is currently getting about
50 percent of its stated need for ISR in North Africa. With the
downsizing of military forces and assets, AFRICOM is sure to not get
this percentage of ISR in the future. How will you, as a commander,
ensure that AFRICOM will accomplish its mission without a robust ISR
capability in the near future?
General Rodriguez. I will evaluate current operational
requirements, along with possible risk, and prioritize remaining ISR
capabilities to optimize support to mission execution. In addition,
with the downsizing of military forces and assets we can expect a
reprioritization of ISR assets by the U.S. Government and I will work
to ensure that AFRICOM's requirements are addressed by Department of
Defense and the U.S. Intelligence Community. It is also important to
invest in enhancing African nations ISR capabilities as well as
information and intelligence sharing to improve overall understanding
of the environment.

15. Senator Chambliss. General Rodriguez, with so much territory
uncovered with ISR, what other actions will you take to ensure a
presence throughout the region?
General Rodriguez. I will pursue additional presence and
optimization of current presence across the continent by engaging
African partner nations for key temporary stationing locations that
provide increased flexibility for ISR asset tasking, maximizing
potential support to missions. It is also important to invest in
enhancing African nations ISR capabilities as well as information and
intelligence sharing to improve overall understanding of the
environment.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
surveillance in africa command
16. Senator Ayotte. General Rodriguez, in your advance policy
questions, you mentioned that AFRICOM only received about 7 percent of
its total ISR requirements. That number has increased to 50 percent
now. Based on all of the previous attacks on U.S. and other western
targets in Benghazi in the months preceding the September 11, 2012,
attack that left four Americans dead, do you believe more than 7
percent of AFRICOM's ISR requirements should have been met?
General Rodriguez. I believe the ISR requirements for Africa are
high and increasing at a very fast rate. I will ensure AFRICOM's
requirements compete for ISR assets with the other combatant commands.
ISR assets are low density, high demand capabilities, and are allocated
based on national priorities.

17. Senator Ayotte. General Rodriguez, while the increase for 50
percent is a positive step, do you have concerns that half of our ISR
requirements are not being met?
General Rodriguez. The demand for ISR capabilities has increased
significantly over the past decade. It is rare that ISR supply meets
the demand. Thus, I will continue to address AFRICOM's requirements for
ISR capabilities through the Joint Staff's request for forces and
capabilities system and prioritize the employment of ISR assets AFRICOM
receives. It is also important to invest in enhancing African nations
ISR capabilities as well as information and intelligence sharing to
improve overall understanding of the environment.

18. Senator Ayotte. General Rodriguez, do you believe that DOD is
providing AFRICOM sufficient ISR assets to meet the objectives that the
Joint Staff has given AFRICOM?
General Rodriguez. AFRICOM must compete with other combatant
commands for America's relatively scarce ISR assets. While not unique
to AFRICOM, infrastructure for supporting ISR operations and over-
flight rights of African nations are also considerations. Upon assuming
command of AFRICOM, I will closely review AFRICOM's ISR requirements
and shortfalls in order to prioritize employment and mitigate risk as
best we can.

boco haram
19. Senator Ayotte. General Rodriguez, do you believe Boco Haram is
a terrorist organization?
General Rodriguez. Boco Haram has committed some acts that can be
associated with terrorism. Designating Boco Haram as a terrorist
organization is a policy decision. I will study this issue and make my
recommendation on whether Boco Haram should be classified as a
terrorist organization.
______

[The nomination reference of GEN David M. Rodriguez, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 7, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General.

GEN David M. Rodriguez, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of GEN David M. Rodriguez, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of GEN David M. Rodriguez, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Art
and Science
U.S. Naval War College - MA - National Security and Strategic
Studies

Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic Course
Armor Officer Advanced Course
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Naval War College

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Date of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 2 Jun. 76
1LT....................................... 2 Jun. 78
CPT....................................... 1 Aug. 80
MAJ....................................... 1 Sep. 87
LTC....................................... 1 Apr. 93
COL....................................... 1 Aug. 97
BG........................................ 1 Mar. 02
MG........................................ 15 Jul. 05
LTG....................................... 29 Jul. 08
GEN....................................... 15 Aug. 11
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aug. 11......................... Present........... Commanding
General, U.S.
Army Forces
Command, Fort
Bragg, NC
Mar. 10......................... Jul. 11........... Commander,
International
Security
Assistance Force
Joint Command/
Deputy Commander,
U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan,
Operation
Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan
Oct. 09......................... Mar. 10........... Commander,
International
Security
Assistance Force
Joint Command,
Operation
Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan
Jun. 09......................... Oct. 09........... Deputy Commander,
U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan,
Operation
Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan
Jul. 08......................... Jun. 09........... Senior Military
Assistant to the
Secretary of
Defense, Office
of the Secretary
of Defense,
Washington, DC
Apr. 08......................... Jul. 08........... Commanding
General, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Feb. 07......................... Apr. 08........... Commanding
General, 82d
Airborne Division/
Commanding
General, Combined
Joint Task Force-
76, Operation
Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan
Apr. 06......................... Feb. 07........... Commanding
General, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jan. 06......................... Feb. 06........... Special Assistant
to the Commander,
Multi-National
Corps-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq (No
Joint Credit)
Apr. 05......................... Jan. 06........... Commander, Multi-
National Division-
Northwest,
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Jun. 03......................... Mar. 05........... Deputy Director,
Regional
Operations, J-3,
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Jun. 02......................... Jun. 03........... Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Hood, TX,
and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Oct. 00......................... Jun. 02........... Deputy Commanding
General/Assistant
Commandant, U.S.
Army Infantry
Center and
School, Fort
Benning, GA
Jul. 99......................... Sep. 00........... Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3, XVIII
Airborne Corps,
Fort Bragg, NC
Aug. 97......................... Jul. 99........... Commander, 2d
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jul. 96......................... Jun. 97........... Student, U.S.
Naval War
College, Newport,
RI
Apr. 94......................... Apr. 96........... Commander, 2d
Battalion, 502d
Infantry
Regiment, lOlst
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell, KY
Mar. 92......................... Feb. 94........... Joint Exercise
Officer, later
Executive
Officer, Exercise
Division, C-3/J-3/
G-3, United
Nations Command/
Combined Forces
Command/U.S.
Forces-Korea,
Korea
Apr. 90......................... Mar. 92........... S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 1st
Battalion, 505th
Parachute
Infantry
Regiment, Fort
Bragg, NC, and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
Jun. 89......................... Apr. 90........... Chief, Doctrine
Development, G-3
(Plans), XVIII
Airborne Corps,
Fort Bragg, NC
Aug. 87......................... May 89............ Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Jul. 86......................... Jun. 87........... Commander, B
Company, 3d
Battalion, 75th
Ranger Regiment,
Fort Benning, GA
Aug. 85......................... Jun. 86........... Liaison Officer,
3d Battalion,
75th Ranger
Regiment, Fort
Benning, GA
Jul. 84......................... Aug. 85........... Assistant S-3
(Operations),
75th Ranger
Regiment, Fort
Benning, GA
Jun. 83......................... Apr. 84........... S-3 (Operations),
1st Battalion,
52d Infantry, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Feb. 83......................... Jun. 83........... Assistant S-3
(Air), 3d
Brigade, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jul. 81......................... Feb. 83........... Commander, B
Company, 1st
Battalion, 52d
Infantry, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
May 80.......................... Dec. 80........... Student, Armor
Officer Advanced
Course, U.S. Army
Armor School,
Fort Knox, KY
Jun. 79......................... May 80............ Executive Officer,
Combat Support
Company, 1st
Battalion, 61st
Infantry, 5th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Polk, LA
Jan. 79......................... Jun. 79........... Motor Officer, 1st
Battalion, 61st
Infantry, 5th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Polk, LA
Jun. 78......................... Jan. 79........... Scout Platoon
Leader, Combat
Support Company,
1st Battalion,
61st Infantry,
5th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Polk, LA
Jul. 77......................... Jun. 78........... Rifle Platoon
Leader, A
Company, 1st
Battalion, 6lst
Infantry, 5th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Polk, LA
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, International Mar. 10-Jul. 11 Lieutenant General
Security Assistance Force Joint
Command/Deputy Commander, U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan..
Commander, International Oct. 09-Mar. 10 Lieutenant General
Security Assistance Force Joint
Command, Operation Enduring
Freedom, Afghanistan...........
Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces- Jun. 09-Oct. 09 Lieutenant General
Afghanistan, Operation Enduring
Freedom, Afghanistan...........
Senior Military Assistant to the Jul. 08-Jun. 09 Lieutenant General
Secretary of Defense, Office of
the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.................
Commanding General, 82d Airborne Feb. 07-Apr. 08 Major General
Division/Commanding General,
Combined Joint Task Force-76,
Operation Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan....................
Commander, Multi-National Apr. 05-Jan. 06 Major General
Division-Northwest, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Iraq (No Joint
Credit)........................
Deputy Director, Regional Jun. 03-Mar. 05 Brigadier General
Operations, J-3, Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.................
Joint Exercise Officer, later Mar. 92-Feb. 94 Major/Lieutenant
Executive Officer, Exercise Colonel
Division, C-3/J-3/G-3, United
Nations Command/Combined Forces
Command/U.S. Forces-Korea,
Korea..........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of operational assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, International Mar. 10-Jul 11 Lieutenant General
Security Assistance Force Joint
Command/Deputy Commander, U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan..
Commander, International Oct. 09-Mar. 10 Lieutenant General
Security Assistance Force Joint
Command, Operation Enduring
Freedom, Afghanistan...........
Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces- Jun. 09-Oct. 09 Lieutenant General
Afghanistan, Operation Enduring
Freedom, Afghanistan...........
Commanding General, 82d Airborne Feb. 07-Apr. 08 Major General
Division/Commanding General,
Combined Joint Task Force-76,
Operation Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan....................
Special Assistant to the Jan. 06-Feb. 06 Major General
Commander, Multi-National Corps-
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq (No Joint Credit).........
Commander, Multi-National Apr. 05-Jan. 06 Major General
Division-Northwest, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Iraq............
Assistant Division Commander Jun. 02-Jun. 03 Brigadier General
(Maneuver), 4th Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Fort
Hood, TX, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq..................
S-3 (Operations), later Apr. 90-Mar. 92 Major
Executive Officer, 1st
Battalion, 505th Parachute
Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg,
NC, and Operations Desert
Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.....
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Combat Infantryman Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN David M.
Rodriguez, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
David M. Rodriguez.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, U.S. Africa Command, Germany.

3. Date of nomination:
February 7, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
May 23, 1954; Overbrook, PA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Virginia E. Rodriguez; Maiden name: Flaherty.

7. Names and ages of children:
Amy Marie Rodriguez, age 28.
Melissa Rose Royer, age 26.
David Francis Rodriguez, age 23.
Andrew Scott Rodriguez, age 21.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of the U.S. Army (member).
Veterans of Foreign Wars (member).
82nd Airborne Association (member).

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

[The nomination of GEN David M. Rodriguez, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 26, 2013,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 5, 2013.]

NOMINATIONS OF HON. ALAN F. ESTEVEZ TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS; MR.
FREDERICK E. VOLLRATH TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
READINESS AND FORCE MANAGEMENT; AND MR. ERIC K. FANNING TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

----------

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, and Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter
K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; John H.
Quirk V, professional staff member; and Robie I. Samanta Roy,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; William S.
Castle, minority general counsel; Ambrose R. Hock, professional
staff member; and Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Mariah K.
McNamara, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; David LaPorte, assistant to
Senator Manchin; Elana Broitman, assistant to Senator
Gillibrand; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly;
Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Jim Catella and
Steve Smith, assistants to Senator King; Paul C. Hutton IV,
assistant to Senator McCain; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Robert Foster, assistant to Senator Wicker; and Brad
Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
This morning the committee considers the nomination of Alan
Estevez to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Frederick Vollrath to
be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force
Management; and Eric Fanning to be Under Secretary of the Air
Force.
Mr. Estevez, Mr. Vollrath, Mr. Fanning, we welcome you all.
All three of our nominees have demonstrated their commitment to
public service throughout their careers. We appreciate your
continuing willingness to serve, and we appreciate the support
that your families provide which is so essential to your
success, as you well know. As is our custom, during your
introductory remarks, your statements, please feel free to
introduce any family members or friends that you have with you
here today.
Our witnesses today are nominated for policy positions that
deal with some of the most complex challenges confronting the
Department of Defense (DOD).
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will be a key
participant in major decisions affecting the hundreds of
billions of dollars that DOD spends every year to acquire
property and services. If confirmed, Mr. Estevez will share
responsibility for a broad array of functions, including
developmental testing, contract administration, logistics and
materiel readiness, installations and environment, operational
energy, the acquisition workforce, the defense industrial base,
and efforts to increase the Department's buying power and
improve the performance of the defense acquisition enterprise.
Mr. Vollrath has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Readiness and Force Management, responsible for
developing policies, providing advice, and making
recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness in the areas of civilian and military personnel
policy, readiness of the force, and military community and
family policy. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Readiness and Force Management is responsible for
allocating assigned resources and providing oversight of
subordinate activities, including the overall day-to-day
supervision of the Department of Defense Education Activity and
the Defense Commissary Agency.
Mr. Fanning has been nominated to be Under Secretary of the
Air Force, the second highest civilian position in the Air
Force. The Under Secretary of the Air Force assists the
Secretary of the Air Force in organizing, training, equipping,
and providing for the welfare of its more than 333,000 Active
Duty men and women, 178,000 Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserve members, 182,000 civilians, and their families. He also
oversees the Air Force's annual budget of more than $110
billion and serves as Acting Secretary of the Air Force in the
Secretary's absence. As Under Secretary, Mr. Fanning would also
serve as the Chief Management Officer of the Air Force.
These three nominations come before this committee at a
time of unprecedented turbulence. Just last week, we held a
hearing on the impacts of sequestration and a full-year
Continuing Resolution (CR). We found that if these events come
to pass, which looks more and more likely, the negative impact
on the Department of Defense will be huge.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, the Comptroller, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all
testified to the severe and significant issues that
sequestration and a full-year Continuing Resolution will bring
to each Service. While we hope an 11th hour solution can be
found, we are pleased to see that individuals of the caliber of
the witnesses and nominees before us today are willing to step
into this maelstrom and serve in these important capacities.
The challenges will be great and the tasks even more difficult
than they are currently.
Over the next few weeks, the committee will hold a series
of important hearings. Next Tuesday, we will hear from the
commanders of U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations
Command. Next Thursday, a week from today, we will hear from
U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Transportation Command. The
following Tuesday, March 12, 2013, we will hear from U.S.
Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command.
At the same time that we are doing this at a full committee
level, our subcommittees are beginning to plan their hearing
schedules for the year. In particular, the Personnel
Subcommittee will hold a hearing on sexual assault in the
military on March 13, 2013. I am very pleased that Senators
Gillibrand and Graham are addressing this extraordinarily
important issue. Our servicemembers, men and women, deserve an
environment where they are not subjected to sexual harassment
and sexual assaults. All members of our committee--and I just
talked to Senator Gillibrand about this--whether they are
members of that subcommittee or not are welcome to attend and
participate, and I thank Senator Gillibrand for that.
All our witnesses this morning bring strong qualifications
to the positions for which they have been nominated. I look
forward to their testimony, to the answers that they provide to
our members during questioning. I hope the committee can act
promptly to confirm these nominees.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming the nominees here this morning.
Overshadowing everything that is going on right now, as the
chairman said is the sequestration thing, which we have had the
Chiefs in here and we have had everyone coming in and talking
about the disastrous things that we are facing. Today is the
day, however, that we will actually be voting on a couple of
bills that will have to do with it.
I would be remiss if I did not mention that one of the
alternatives we have had began 5 weeks ago, Mr. Chairman. I
contacted all the Chiefs, all five Chiefs of the Services, and
said, if this becomes reality and we are going to be faced with
this, how much could be mitigated? If you take the same top
line and if you had the ability to make adjustments within each
Service, what could you do? They said, it would put us light
years in better shape than if we just had to take cuts across
the board. I did not think we would get to that point, but we
are there today. That is one of the alternatives that we will
be discussing.
Mr. Estevez, for too long, the way the Department has
developed and procured weapons systems has been riddled with
waste and inefficiency. We have talked about that for as many
years as I have been up here. Recent legislative efforts such
as the Weapons Systems Reform Act have put in place much needed
reforms. Yet, given reductions in the defense budget and the
threat of sequestration, it is more important now than ever
that dollars used to equip our military are spent wisely. This
will require the Department to define program risks. Risks are
things that people do not like to talk about because risks
translates into readiness and translates into deaths. We need
to be addressing these things now, and most importantly, the
Department is going to have to develop a culture of
accountability for all programs.
Mr. Vollrath, through our military forces, although they
remain resilient, 11 years of sustained combat operations have
left them battered. We talk about the suicide problems. I spent
the better part of a day last week out at Bethesda, at Walter
Reed. I was just overwhelmed with the really good job that
people are doing out there, and it may be the only place that
is not impacted by the constraints that the rest of the
military is under. I know that you will be interested in that
and keeping the fine work going, as it has been.
Mr. Fanning, over the last 10 years, the Air Force has
retired nearly 1,900 aircraft and reduced its Active Duty end
strength to approximately 329,000 airmen, making it older and
smaller than at any time since its inception in 1947. While
service life extension programs and modifications have kept our
Air Force flying, the cost to operate and sustain these
aircraft continues to rise. It is something that we have been
dealing with for as long as I have been on both the House Armed
Services Committee and this committee.
It is a challenge and I am sure that you are, all three, up
to these challenges, and I look forward to working with you and
to hearing your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Now, we will first call on Mr. Estevez.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN F. ESTEVEZ, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

Mr. Estevez. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Levin,
Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the committee.
I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I appreciate the great support that this committee
provides to our military.
I am honored that the President has nominated me for the
position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. I would like to thank
President Obama for his trust and belief in my abilities to
serve the Department.
I would also like to thank Secretary Panetta, Deputy
Secretary Carter, and Under Secretary Kendall for their support
of my nomination.
I am joined here today by my wife, Susan Pearson, and my
sisters, Sue Ann and Pamela. I want to thank Susan for her
continued support and sacrifice and her willingness to let me
serve. As I noted in my confirmation hearing for my current
position, without Susan's sage advice and counsel I would not
be sitting here today. I am thrilled that my sisters were able
to come down from New York and New Jersey to join me here
today.
Chairman Levin. We welcome them all. I am sure they are
thrilled to be here.
Mr. Estevez. I hope so.
Chairman Levin. We will get a report from them in a couple
hours. [Laughter.]
Mr. Estevez. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, it has been my privilege to
support the Nation's men and women in uniform by providing
world-class logistics capabilities. In the last 2 years, our
defense logistics system has surged and sustained forces in two
wars, successfully completed the drawdown of our forces and
equipment in Iraq, and is in the process of supporting the
drawdown and transition phase in Afghanistan.
I have had the opportunity to take numerous trips to
Afghanistan over the last 4 years, and I have witnessed
firsthand the magnificent efforts of our deployed forces. They
continue to inspire me and I will be honored to continue to
support them if I am confirmed for this position.
While most citizens do not realize it, the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics makes an impact on the everyday lives of the citizens
of the United States primarily by acquiring the best technology
and capabilities to enable our warfighters to protect this
Nation but also, as was recently shown, by aiding the American
people in the aftermath of natural disasters such as Superstorm
Sandy. If confirmed, I will execute my duties to make sure that
the American people are continually supported by the Department
of Defense.
I would again like to thank this committee for asking me
here today, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Estevez.
Mr. Vollrath.

STATEMENT OF MR. FREDERICK E. VOLLRATH TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR READINESS AND FORCE MANAGEMENT

Mr. Vollrath. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and members of the committee.
I am honored to appear before you today.
I appreciate the confidence that President Obama has
expressed in nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Readiness and Force Management, and I am grateful
to Secretary Panetta for supporting that nomination.
It has been a great honor and privilege for me to have
served our Nation in the U.S. Army wearing that uniform for 35
years and currently as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Readiness and Force Management.
The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Readiness and Force Management for which I have been nominated
is a new position created by the Department pursuant to the
authority provided in the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010. It has also been my privilege to
be the first individual nominated by the President to fill this
very important role. During the past 11 months, I have also had
the added responsibility of standing up the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense while serving as the Principal
Deputy.
I have over 40 years of human resource management and
executive leadership experience and bring with me the unique
perspective of having both government and nongovernment human
resource experience. During my career, I have seen many changes
in our military and fully understand the importance of
maintaining a ready force, especially during these critical
fiscal uncertain times. If confirmed, I will use this
experience to aggressively take on the challenges of this
office.
I am grateful to the members of this committee and to all
Members of Congress for the support they have given to our men
and women in uniform and their families. If confirmed, I pledge
to you that I will work diligently on behalf of our Nation's
servicemembers, their families, and our civilian workforce that
supports them. I am deeply honored to have the opportunity to
continue my service to this great Nation.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Vollrath.
Mr. Fanning.

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC K. FANNING TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE

Mr. Fanning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you
today.
I would like to thank President Obama for nominating me and
the Secretary of Defense for supporting this opportunity to
serve. If confirmed, I greatly look forward to working with
them and with this committee as well.
Nobody gets the opportunity to serve in positions like this
without the help of many people over a very long period of
time. I am fortunate to have many of them here with me today,
dating all the way back to college and including Larry Smith,
who hired me out of college into my first job on the House
Armed Services Committee, through my later work at the Pentagon
and at Business Executives for National Security. He has been
an important friend and mentor to me ever since. Thank you to
them and all the others here today to support me.
My mother had planned on attending, but as of late is
unable to travel. I know she is watching from Florida.
I come from a family with a long history of service in
uniform. Two uncles graduated from West Point and made careers
in the Army. Another uncle served a career in the Air Force. My
cousin flew helicopters in the Marine Corps. I learned from an
early age the importance of service and developed early on a
deep respect and admiration for those who serve in uniform.
The Air Force faces many challenges well known by this
committee but is a proud organization with a rich history. Its
greatest strength, of course, is its people, almost 700,000
Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilians who make up
the Air Force, along with their families. I have been immensely
proud to serve these last 4 years with the men and women of the
Navy and Marine Corps, and if confirmed, I very much look
forward to becoming a part of the Air Force family. It would be
my honor to play a role in making sure that the best men and
women our country has to offer get all the support they need in
undertaking the mission of defending our country, a mission for
which they freely volunteered.
Thank you again for considering my nomination. Thank you
for your service, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Let me now ask you the standard questions that we ask of
all nominees. You can answer together. This is a matter of
exercising our legislative and our oversight responsibilities,
and that is the reason for these questions.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Estevez. Yes.
Mr. Vollrath. Yes.
Mr. Fanning. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Estevez. No.
Mr. Vollrath. No.
Mr. Fanning. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Mr. Estevez. Yes.
Mr. Vollrath. Yes.
Mr. Fanning. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Estevez. Yes.
Mr. Vollrath. Yes.
Mr. Fanning. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or their briefings?
Mr. Estevez. Yes.
Mr. Vollrath. Yes.
Mr. Fanning. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. Estevez. Yes.
Mr. Vollrath. Yes.
Mr. Fanning. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Estevez. Yes.
Mr. Vollrath. Yes.
Mr. Fanning. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Okay. We will have an 8-minute first round
of questions here, and let me start with you, Mr. Estevez.
We have millions of pieces of equipment in Afghanistan, and
we have a logistical challenge of great size as our forces draw
down. Key to the ability to remove this equipment is whether we
are going to have access to ground lines in Pakistan and along
the Northern Distribution Network through Central Asia. Can you
give us your assessment on the level of cooperation that we are
getting now from Pakistan on the retrograde of military
equipment through Pakistan?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, Senator. Right now we are getting
excellent cooperation with Pakistan. We have a number of proof
of principles, as we call them, to move equipment through
Pakistan. They are ongoing right now. Two of them have been
successfully completed. The purpose of these is to hone out the
processes with the Pakistanis, with their customs enforcement,
with their port agencies, and with their trucking companies in
order to facilitate an increased volume of those movements. But
slow, steady progress.
Chairman Levin. All right. So it is not just a contract
agreement or a written agreement to open up these lines? It is
actually now happening. Is that correct?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Mr. Estevez, in response to the
committee's advance policy questions, you stated that you do
not believe that fixed-price development contracts are
appropriate because ``most major weapons systems deal with
maturing designs and significant integration problems, and a
fixed-price development contract imposes too much risk on
industry''.
Now, we just adopted a defense authorization act which in
section 818 says the following that, ``The conferees believe
that program risks should be reduced to the degree that the use
of a fixed-price development contract for a major acquisition
system may be appropriate.'' Our Senate committee report on
this provision explains that both the cost to the Government in
using cost reimbursement contracts too far into the development
and the importance of reducing program risk prior to a
Milestone B decision by avoiding the incorporation of immature
technologies is very important. We have to do that.
I am not going to ask you a question now, but I would ask
you to reevaluate, when you are confirmed, the position that
you took in response to our advance policy questions in light
of our law which we have now passed, section 818 and the
committee report on the provision, and then get back to us.
Will you do that?
Mr. Estevez. I certainly will, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Will you also get back to us on the
question of contract services? Because we are going to need to
do a lot more to understand and control spending on contract
services. Contract services cost us about $200 billion a year,
which is about as much as we spend on all products combined,
including major weapons systems.
I would also ask you, within the first, say, 60 days that
you are in office, will you give us a report on the steps which
you are going to take to address the question of controlling
spending on contract services?
Mr. Estevez. Absolutely, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Vollrath, I would like to ask you about
the threat of sequestration on personnel. Can you describe for
us the impact of sequestration on, just to give one example,
the Services' transition assistance programs?
Mr. Vollrath. Certainly, Senator. The sequestration will
result most likely in furloughs of the civilian workforce for a
period of up to 22 days for the remainder of the year. The
approximately 20 percent reduction in time from that civilian
workforce will have an effect on the transition services that
are required by the law, and we will have to do a significant
job of scheduling to make sure that all servicemembers get the
required transition training and experience. Right now, it
appears that that may be possible.
Chairman Levin. We hope it is possible, but obviously there
is going to be huge pressure. We cannot make cuts of that
nature without an effect. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Vollrath. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
Chairman Levin. By the way, I want to invite you to visit a
college in Lansing, MI, the Lansing Community College, which
has I think the most extraordinary program that I have seen to
transition people into actual jobs which are available using
the experience that they have and smoothing the way towards a
civilian job by dealing with the regulatory agencies that exist
on the civilian side. For instance, this program takes medics
that come out of the military and has it all planned so that
the State regulatory agencies with their certification
requirements give credit for the service performed while in the
Service so that they can much more quickly become medical
technicians, for instance, and then registered nurses. I would
like you to come and visit that program which I think may be
unique in the country.
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, given the opportunity, I most
certainly will do that because we have had a full court press
on trying to get the civilian sector particularly in all States
to accept the credentials that service men and women acquire
while on Active Duty.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, Mr. Vollrath, Senator Gillibrand, as I mentioned
before, is going to have a hearing in her subcommittee on
sexual assaults. I just want to let you know that when she does
that at the subcommittee level, she and Senator Graham are
going to be speaking for the full committee when that happens.
This is something which is simply such an outrage for this to
continue to occur that it must be at the top of the agenda when
you take over responsibility.
For instance, the Air Force is currently addressing a
number of sexual misconduct cases arising out of basic training
at Lackland Air Force Base, and at last count, sexual
misconduct allegations have been made against 32 military
training instructors involving 62 victims. Mr. Fanning, can you
give us your thoughts as to what must be done in this area?
Mr. Fanning. Thank you, Senator.
Any instance of sexual assault is too many, and I think
that leadership across the Department of Defense has to remain
committed to preventing this from happening in the first place.
I believe that we are seeing a marked increase in what the
Department is trying to do to combat sexual assault. If
confirmed into the Air Force, it would be an absolute priority
of mine to continue those efforts and work with Secretary
Donley and General Welsh in that regard.
I think we need, first and foremost, as I said, to focus on
preventing these from ever happening, but if they do, we need
to ensure that victims of sexual assault have a safe place to
report those assaults and have all the assistance that they
need, medical, mental health, and legal. Finally, we need to
make sure that perpetrators are held to account for their
crimes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Vollrath, you heard the comments that I made about my
experience last week at Walter Reed. Have you had an
opportunity to--I am sure you have over a period of time--to
see the development, the progress, the magnificent results that
we are getting over there? If you have seen that, what are your
ideas on continuing that, and do you see that that is going to
be threatened in any way by sequestration?
Mr. Vollrath. In the near term, Senator, I believe
sequestration will have some impact on it. In my particular
portfolio and position, we work closely with the health affairs
side to leverage all of the capabilities that they have
developed and reach out to the civilian community because the
effort is not just and the solution is not just within the
Department of Defense. We need to leverage all resources.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. When you say that it could affect it
adversely now, do you have anything specific in mind? I am just
wondering what areas it could be adversely affected.
Mr. Vollrath. To the degree that the civilian workforce is
there for their support, given that the majority of the medical
care is provided by the uniformed services, the support element
will degrade some of that service.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
The chairman asked you the question about the civilian
employees, the furloughing. In my State alone, we are
estimating about 24,000 people. It is a huge number and we are
concerned about it and you did respond. But if sequestration
occurs, what would DOD and the Air Force do to minimize the
impact on civilian employees? Is there anything, any ideas, you
have now to try to minimize the negative impact that we are
having right now with people? In my State, just knowing it is
going to happen is something that has been pretty critical.
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, we do not have any silver bullet to
spend to minimize the impact on the civilian workforce. I wish
we did. Potentially if we could move money around, that might
assist. But what we have done is to make sure that we do not
take out most of the sequestration or the reductions on the
back of the civilian workforce.
Senator Inhofe. They were pretty optimistic out there in
that they felt the good job they are doing--and I like to stand
behind them in minimizing any of the negative impact. If you
are confirmed, I would like to be kept up to date as to
anything that might affect that.
Mr. Fanning, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)--
first of all, I was wondering how you are juggling this thing,
coming from the Navy and going into the Air Force. In your
opening statement, I was very impressed. You have that close,
intimate connection with both the Army, the Navy, Marine Corps,
and the Air Force. I guess you would fit in about any place.
There was something that I was interested in when GAO
recently released a report entitled ``The Depot Maintenance
Additional Information Needed to Meet DOD's Core Capability
Reporting Requirements.'' The report cited the Air Force for
not having an explanation for a sufficient plan organic--that
is, internal--depot workload to meet these core requirements.
The report specifically cited certain Air Force shortfalls and
plans to mitigate them by assigning work to Air Force depots to
support existing and new weapons systems such as unmanned
aerial systems, munitions, and the F-35. Have you had a chance
to look at that report and that particular area that I have
just quoted?
Mr. Fanning. No, Senator. I have not yet seen that GAO
report although I do appreciate the proper balance in depots
between organic and contractor.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. This actually goes a little bit
further than that because it talks about the mix has not been
quite as accurate as it should have been or equitable as it
should have been in the past, and it makes specific
recommendations.
What I would like to have you do is provide to me where the
Air Force has identified depot work shortfalls and the
specifics. I would like to ask you to read that in the next
short period of time so that we could actually have a
discussion as to what your feelings are going to be on that.
Would you do that for us?
Mr. Fanning. Absolutely, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Air Force reported shortfalls in Core sustaining workloads in
the two areas: (1) Communications/Electronics Equipment; and (2)
Ordnance, Weapons and Missiles. As new weapon systems are fielded such
as MQ-1, MQ-9, KC-46, and F-35, these workloads will be established
organically to specifically address core shortfalls in these and in any
areas identified in future Core analyses. The report stated that the
Air Force would mitigate the shortfall through incrementally assigning
maintenance work to organic (military) depots for the MQ-1 and MQ-9
between the third quarters of fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year
2016. The workloads for these systems have been assigned to the Air
Logistic Complexes and standup of the workloads is being accomplished
with depot activation teams composed of members from the appropriate
program office, depot and industry original equipment manufacturer. The
depot activation teams ensure the necessary facilities, equipment and
personnel are acquired and installed at the organic depots to execute
the planned workload. The Air Force has budgeted for and received funds
to activate MQ-1, MQ-9, and F-35 workloads. The program offices for
these systems are working on plans to activate core workloads no later
than initial operating capability (IOC) plus 4 years and in many
instances earlier than required. For example, the F-35 is activating
the airframe at Ogden Air Logistics Center (ALC), the engine at Tinker
ALC and electronics/communication at Robins ALC while the program is
still in low rate production, well before IOC. The MQ-1 and MQ-9
program office is actively standing up workloads at all three Air Force
Logistics Complexes and at Navy and Army depots to satisfy Department
Core requirements. These programs and others have programmed for depot
activation and are working diligently to ensure the Air Force has the
organic capability required to sustain the warfighter.

Senator Inhofe. Okay, good.
Mr. Estevez, I have expressed concern that wide-ranging
authorities contained in the Defense Production Act are being
used by the Department of Defense to spend $170 million for the
design and construction of a commercial biofuels refinery. On
February 6, 2013, the same day the Secretary of Defense
announced that the Truman carrier group would not be deploying
to the Middle East due to budget cuts, we received a letter
from Frank Kendall, the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, announcing the Department's intent
to spend $30 million on the advance drop-in biofuels production
used by the Defense Production Act.
I am sure that you have heard a lot of this, including the
Senator that was sitting to my left and myself talking about
the concern that we have with the budget shortfalls, with the
disasters that are taking place right now, how we could be
experimenting in biofuels and even talk about the construction
of refineries in terms of prioritizing. I would like to have
your thoughts about that. Is that the best use of defense
funds?
As I remember when they started the Department of Energy,
that is one of the things that they were supposed to be doing.
Do you have any thoughts on that?
Mr. Estevez. I do, Senator. Thank you.
When you look across our energy investments, the vast
majority, 96 percent of our energy investments, go to things
like better engine technology, increasing range, increasing
fuel capability on things like jets, tanks, and the like so
that we are decreasing our demand, decreasing the need to put
fuel out onto the battlefield. A small amount of that resource
does go towards what we would call increasing the flexibility,
increasing the resources that we can draw on, increasing the
supply. The $30 million would go to that. We are assessing the
responses we have on our request for information from industry
on that. Under the sequestration and budget environment that we
are operating under, obviously every investment will have to be
looked at, but we think that the small amount that we are
putting into that is a prudent investment for the future.
Senator Inhofe. We are talking about a lot more money than
$30 million. We are talking about the acquisition in the case
of the Navy. Mr. Fanning, maybe you have some background on
this too. The 450,000 gallons that were procured for, I think
it was--I am going by memory right now--I think $29 a gallon as
opposed to $3 a gallon. You start doing the math on that and
what the Air Force is doing now, it comes up to considerably
more.
Here is what I would like. I do not want to put you on the
spot now. But I would like to have you, for the record, to give
me an evaluation, a justification as to those expenditures and
relative to the other expenditures that directly affect our
national defense, particularly in this time of sequestration.
Would you do that?
Mr. Estevez. I would be happy to do that, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

I believe that the Department of Defense should continue
its modest investment in alternative fuels. As one of the
world's largest consumers of petroleum, the Department has an
interest in diversification of fuel supplies as a hedge against
potential supply disruptions, especially for our legacy fleet
of ships and planes, which will be with us for decades to come.
Over the next 5 years, 96 percent of the Department's funding
to improve operational energy use is devoted to reducing the
amount of fuel required for military operations. The remaining
4 percent is a relatively small but important investment in
alternative fuels, which is a longer-term strategy for our
energy security. Most of this investment ensures that our
equipment can operate on a wide range of fuels, so we are
prepared if and when alternative fuels become commercially
available. As petroleum is a finite resource, we believe this
to be a prudent investment, and we have been performing these
types of activities since 2003.
The Department's primary alternative fuels goal is to
ensure operational military readiness and further the
flexibility of military operations through the ability to use
multiple, reliable fuel sources. To help achieve this goal, we
released the Department of Defense Alternative Fuels Policy for
Operational Platforms in July 2012. The policy confirms that
all investments are subject to rigorous, merit-based evaluation
and that the Department will not make bulk purchases unless
they are cost competitive with petroleum products. To date, the
Department has only purchased relatively small test quantities
of alternative fuels, which are used in testing, evaluation, or
demonstration activities. These purchases are mostly prototypes
and should not be equated with commercial fuels purchases. I
will ensure that the Department complies with the existing
internal policy.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to
each of our witnesses for their leadership and their service to
our country. I am very grateful.
I am very concerned about the status and the well-being of
the men and women who serve in our forces. I am very worried
about the sexual assault rate estimated by the military at
19,000 a year. I am concerned about the suicide rate, almost
one a day. I am concerned about hazing incidents. I am
concerned about how we implement the repeal of Don't Ask/Don't
Tell.
With regard to these issues, I would like to first ask Mr.
Vollrath what he thinks in terms of how will you provide
leadership on these issues to protect the force from hazing,
from sexual assault, to prevent suicide. How do you look
forward to addressing these policies?
Mr. Vollrath. Thank you, Senator.
First, to begin to resolve these issues in the long term,
we need to ensure that we have reasonable policies in place,
good communications over time that are effective so that all
members of the Service understand the rules and the
capabilities that they have to resolve their problems.
Let me talk about a case in point in suicide. Clearly we
have not broken the code on suicide and suicide prevention.
Period. We have not. What should we do and what are we doing?
One, establishing an office to focus and coordinate all of
the efforts that have been taking place across all of the
Services.
Two, ensure that we have a coordinated communication plan.
That is different than just sending out notices or public
service announcements periodically. It is similar to
advertising, frequency and reach. You need a consistent message
and a constant message for people to understand so that they
are willing to change their behavior and the stigma associated
with seeking help is overcome. I will ensure, upon
confirmation, that that takes place.
Third, in all areas, we need to make sure that we do a
better job of educating our leaders all the way to the lowest
level as to the responsibilities that they have to take care of
their members of their organizations all the time. It is not
just at the captain level, the lieutenant level, or the mid-
grade sergeant level. It is at the corporal level.
I believe that we can and will do a better job with the
leadership, the communication, and changing and reinforcing
that culture of care. That same statement and that same thrust
and strategic direction will be employed across all of those
areas that you mentioned, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Another area that needs attention is the transition from
Active Duty to veteran status because if you look at the
indicators, suicide rates are even higher once they leave the
military. If you look at the front page of the New York Times
today when a woman has been sexually assaulted or has trauma
experience while serving, the likelihood of her being homeless
increases greatly once veteran status kicks in. I hope that you
will also focus your attention on that transition, that very
important time between transitioning from Active Duty to
veteran status, to make sure our men and women do not suffer
even after they leave the military.
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, absolutely we will continue to do
that.
Senator Gillibrand. One other personnel issue. We work very
hard in this committee to ensure that children of our military
men and women who have special needs, autism, among other
special needs children, have the access to the resources they
need for just the medical attention they need. We are seeing
that the implementation of even that pilot program is not going
smoothly. I would like your commitment that you will focus on
this issue and make sure that those children receive the health
care that they need.
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, you have my commitment.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
An issue that has been challenging for all of us here in
Congress has been the issue of cybersecurity. I am concerned
that we do not have the capability to recruit all of the best
and brightest within the cyber world to do the work that we
need for cyber defense and other missions related to that.
For Mr. Fanning, I was very pleased to read in your pre-
prepared questions and answers that you plan to provide
direction for Air Force science and technology that will focus
on operation in space and cyberspace domains, but I am very
disappointed that there are significant budget cuts. How will
you deal with these budget cuts? In particular, we have assets
in New York at Rome Labs that will also see budget cuts. I do
not see how you will meet your mission requirements with these
kinds of cuts.
Mr. Fanning. Thank you, Senator.
Not having been confirmed, I am not fully briefed on what
the Air Force's plans are in dealing with potential budget
cuts. Difficult cuts will have to be made. Everything will have
to be on the table. But cybersecurity, if confirmed, would be a
priority of mine, both in making sure that we adequately
resource cybersecurity needs but that we think creatively and
with focus on how we build a cyber workforce. I agree with you.
I think that is going to be a very difficult workforce to
retain once we have recruited and trained it and it would be a
priority of mine, if confirmed.
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Estevez, as conventional
warfare becomes more technology-based, how do you believe that
we should retain the talent especially in the fields of
information technology and cyber warfare that we are going to
need, particularly when the private sector pays far more than
the military can?
Mr. Estevez. Of course, personnel is not my area of focus
other than for the acquisition workforce. But in general, what
we find is that people serve the Department of Defense and our
Government out of a feel for a greater good, as I would say the
folks sitting up here, as yourselves. We have to draw on that
and then we have to ensure that we treat our workforce
properly.
Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Vollrath, one suggestion and one
thing to consider is, obviously, we have great flexibility with
our National Guard and Reserve to recruit talent who are expert
in other fields and work in other fields as their day jobs.
Will you consider how you could possibly recruit National Guard
and Reserve cyber experts or a cyber corps which could leverage
some of the training and hiring from the private sector?
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, absolutely. As we have looked at
trying to develop and grow the cyber community necessary to man
the various different units, use of the Reserve components has
been critical to the long-term strategy to make this effective.
We cannot do it without the Reserve Forces.
Senator Gillibrand. Moving to science and technical
workforce issues, back to Mr. Estevez. What challenges do you
see facing DOD and the research and development communities as
they seek to attract entry, mid, and senior technical experts
into their organizations?
Mr. Estevez. Again, with our budget issues, it is going to
become more difficult. It is an area of focus for us. There are
some tools that we can use, including the use of temporary
assignment of personnel through the Intergovernment Personnel
Act (IPA) and individual augmentees. We use that extensively at
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to attract people
who want to come and serve the Government and serve the
Department for periods of time before they go back to their
universities. Plus we draw on university talent.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for being here and their continued
willingness to serve the country.
Mr. Fanning, a few months ago, the Air Force decided to
kill a huge logistics supply chain management business system
called the Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) after
sinking about $1 billion into the program, finding that another
$1.1 billion would be needed to field just 25 percent of the
promised capability and extracting from the taxpayers' total of
a $1 billion investment less than $150 million in useful
hardware and software.
Some of us on this committee, including the chairman and I,
have been doing everything that we can to prevent the
sequestration which we believe is devastating to our Nation's
security. We believe our uniformed military, as well as the
former Secretary of Defense who testified before this committee
how devastating the effects would be.
How do I, Mr. Fanning, go tell the taxpayers of America in
my State that the Air Force just wasted $1 billion on a program
that obviously was a miserable failure? So far, do you know
anybody who is responsible for that failure?
Mr. Fanning. I have not yet been briefed on the Air Force's
lessons learned, but I have had an opportunity in my Navy
position to watch the developments with this program. I
approach all business information technology (IT) systems with
a great deal of skepticism in the Department of Defense, and in
the Department of the Navy, in fact, we stopped the development
of a major personnel and pay system because we thought it was
on track to not deliver what was promised and waste taxpayer
funds.
I think what I see in ECSS that I see in many other
programs is a rush to a material solution before non-material
solutions or business process----
Senator McCain. Has anybody been held responsible that you
know of, Mr. Fanning?
Mr. Fanning. Not that I know of, no.
Senator McCain. Secretary Estevez, anybody fired? Anybody
removed from their position? Anybody said this is the person in
charge that made this $1 billion--excuse me. We saved $150
million out of $1 billion.
Mr. Estevez. I believe, Senator, and I would have to
confirm this, that the prior program executive officer (PEO)
and prior program manager were removed from their positions.
They were not the people who were there when we killed the
program. They were the people who were there that led to the
program restructuring and led to the recommendation to kill.
Senator McCain. I am sure you understand our frustration,
which brings me to the F-35.
Lieutenant General Bogdan has a pretty good reputation
before this committee. He was in charge of the tanker program
which seems to be on track. Yet, a couple or a few days ago he
said, ``What I see Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney doing
today is behaving as if they are getting ready to sell me the
very last F-35 and the very last engine and are trying to
squeeze every nickel of that last F-35 and that last engine.''
The general told reporters, ``I want them both to start
behaving like they want to be around for 40 years. I want them
to take on some of the risk of this program. I want them to
invest in cost reductions. I want them to do the things that
will build a better relationship. I'm not getting all that love
yet.'' Then he said--asked if he had seen some improvement from
the companies, are they getting better at a rate that I want
them to see them getting better? He said no, not yet. Of
course, now we know that with massive failures, massive cost
overruns that Lockheed has earned a 7-percent profit since the
program began in 2001.
Do you have any justification for that?
Mr. Estevez. I cannot address the past. I can address where
we are today.
Senator McCain. You cannot address the past?
Mr. Estevez. I cannot address what happened from 2001 until
where I am today.
Senator McCain. You cannot address that at all?
Mr. Estevez. Senator, we have put new structures around
that program. We have a new contracting process for that
program. We now have a firm, fixed-price contract, incentive
fee, 12 percent share. Lockheed will also pay the concurrency
problems on that contract. So we have restructured the program.
We brought in Admiral Venlet and now General Bogdan to run that
program, two excellent PEOs, and we are working closely with
Lockheed and Pratt to work through the problems that General
Bogdan referenced in that news article.
Senator McCain. So since 2001--and we are in 2013--we are
beginning to work through the problem. Is that what I can tell
my constituents, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Estevez. I believe you can over the last 4 or 5 years--
5 years or so, we have restructured the program and we believe
we are now on track to get a successful program.
Senator McCain. Now, you are sitting here before this
committee and you can tell us there will be no further cost
overruns borne by the Federal Government?
Mr. Estevez. I could not possibly do that, Senator.
Senator McCain. Why can you not? Why can we not penalize
companies for failure to live up to the obligations of their
contracts?
Mr. Estevez. It is important to get the right structure of
contract. Senator Levin----
Senator McCain. After 12 years.
Mr. Estevez. On this particular airplane, I believe we do
have the right structure of contract now and we will continue
to get better contracts as we move into future development or
production of this airplane.
Senator McCain. Mr. Fanning or Mr. Vollrath, do you have
any comments on this situation? By the way, the plane is
grounded again, as we know, because of a crack in the engine.
It is grounded again. Do you have any comments, Mr. Vollrath?
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, I do not. I do not know enough to
comment intelligently about it.
Senator McCain. If I sound frustrated, I say to the
witnesses it is because I am. This committee has been tracking
this program for many years. We have had witness after witness.
We have had promise after promise. We have had commitment after
commitment. Yet, the only thing that has remained constant is
that Lockheed has earned a 7 percent profit since the program
began in 2012. Excuse me. Since the program began in 2001, 12
years later.
Maybe you can help me out. What am I supposed to go back
and tell my constituents about a $1 billion program that the
Air Force cancelled and, of course, the now most expensive
weapons system in history that has now reached $1 trillion and
the aircraft is now grounded? Do you have any ideas for me, Mr.
Secretary?
Mr. Estevez. Senator McCain, we are working very
diligently, Secretary Carter, Secretary Kendall, myself, our
leaders across the acquisition community to change the culture
and change the processes by which we buy our programs. I know
that you have been briefed on what we call Better Buying Power.
That includes accountability for our PEOs and program managers.
It includes managing affordability. It includes cost control so
that we can change the way we do this.
Senator McCain. According to one of the people who is very
highly regarded by this committee because of his previous
performance, General Bogdan says, are they getting better at a
rate that I want to see them getting better? He said, no, not
yet. I would say you have your work cut out for you.
I can just say that as strong an advocate as many of us are
for maintaining a strong national security, you cannot continue
these kinds of incredible, total loss of the taxpayers' dollars
without there being an understandable backlash on the part of
the taxpayers of America, which I believe will harm our ability
to defend this Nation.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Before I call on Senator Donnelly, let me just tell you,
Secretary Estevez, I share very deeply Senator McCain's
frustration. We need answers. We need answers in addition to
what Senator McCain pointed out. The folks who write the
contracts, unless there is recoupment provided for from the
contractors for failures, there is accountability lacking not
just on the type of equipment itself, the production of that
equipment, the failure of a contractor to produce something
that works.
There is also perhaps failure on our part in terms of did
we write contracts which did not provide for recoupment, and if
there is failure there, where is there accountability inside
the Department or the agency which wrote the contract which let
contractors off the hook? There is a lack of accountability
kind of up and down the line. This engine issue is just the
most recent manifestation of it.
Senator McCain with his great initiative in this area is
going to be--and I will be joining him--actively involved in
this Expeditionary Combat Support System loss. Whether it is
$850 million or $1 billion, it is just incredible. Where is the
recoupment of that money? Why is that a loss to the Treasury
instead of to the contractor? We need answers on that. It is in
the middle of sequestration. It just dramatizes the problem,
but this problem has been existing too long. Senator McCain and
I and others on this committee and other committees have tried
to rewrite laws. We have rewritten laws to provide more
accountability, but we are going to be looking to you,
Secretary Estevez, for answers.
Thank you.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To all of you, thank you for your service to our country.
Mr. Fanning, with our National Guard and our Reserve
members, they at times, obviously, are at home and are not part
of serving at that point. What mental health resources does the
Air Force have when they are at home, when they are not in the
field and they are struggling with suicide and with mental
health issues? Their alternative of going to see private care
or going to talk to friends or whatever--how do we fill that
hole so that they can still receive care, receive counseling
when they are not on Active Duty pay status?
Mr. Fanning. Senator, I think the total force structure of
the Air Force, which is something I am learning about now--it
is different than what we were accustomed to in the Navy and
Marine Corps--is a critical strategy for the Air Force. The
Guard and Reserve are important partners with the Active
component. From what I am told by the Air Force in my briefings
by the Surgeon General, there are a multitude of services
available for people who are not on Active Duty or who are
remotely located.
If confirmed, I will look into this much more closely. I
think one of the problems is making sure that those Guard
members, those Reserve members who are not activated are aware
of the services that are available to them. I think
communication is one of the critical gaps in what we have in
making sure that those individuals know what services are
available.
Senator Donnelly. If you could get further details for us
because, obviously, just because their pay status has changed,
their problems do not go away and their need for help does not
go away. As you said, they may not know where to go for help or
how to get it. So anything you can do in that process to let us
know what the plans are, what the future plans are, we would
appreciate.
Mr. Fanning. Absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense, as a whole, is absolutely committed to
the well-being of all our troops and personnel.
A number of resources exist for Air Force Reserve and Air National
Guard members not on duty when they are struggling with suicidal
thoughts and mental health issues.
The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are dedicated to
developing a culture of resilience, by encouraging healthy lifestyles
in four main areas known as Comprehensive Airmen Fitness: physical,
mental, social, and spiritual. Airmen with strong physical, mental,
social, and spiritual fitness have the ability to withstand, recover
and even grow in the face of stressors and changing demands. By
educating airmen and families about resources and focusing on the
importance of the ``wingman culture'' and building meaningful
relationships, airmen are encouraged to seek help before a crisis
occurs.
The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard provide education,
outreach, and resources for families through unit leadership. Air Force
regulations specifically direct unit commanders and first sergeants to
proactively contact and provide support for family members of deploying
Air Reserve component members. The unit commander also tasks various
support agencies, including Airman and Family Readiness, to ensure that
families are contacted and provided for.
The Yellow Ribbon Program offers resources on behavioral health
issues and suicide mitigation and is offered to Reserve and Air
National Guard airmen and their families predeployment, during
deployment, and post deployment. Funded by Yellow Ribbon, the
Psychological Health Advocacy Program (PHAP) is designed to assist
Reserve airmen and their family members with a variety of needs,
including mental health issues, financial assistance, relationship and
family counseling, and substance abuse through referrals. There are
three regional, four-person teams to support Reserve airmen and their
families as well as provide 24/7, non-crisis telephone support. The
Reserve PHAP staff attends all Yellow Ribbon events as well as provides
outreach to the bases in their regions.
The Air National Guard Psychological Health Program (PHP) was
developed to address psychological health needs of ANG airmen and their
families. The PHP places a licensed behavioral health provider at each
of the Air National Guard's 89 wings throughout the 54 States,
territories, and the District of Columbia. The program provides three
categories of service: leadership advisement and consultation;
community capacity building; and direct services--to include
assessment, referral, crisis intervention, and case management services
that are available daily. The wing directors of Psychological Health
are available 24/7 to operational leadership and provide services to
Air National Guard airmen and their family members regardless of
whether they are at home or on duty status.
The Air Force Reserve Wingman Toolkit is a broad-based Air Force
Reserve initiative designed to empower airmen and their families to
achieve and sustain wellness and balanced lifestyles using the four
domains of Comprehensive Airman Fitness. The toolkit is located at:
http://AFRC.WingmanToolkit.org. The website was first launched in 2010
and is accessible 24/7 from any computer by anyone with access to the
internet. The Wingman Toolkit provides commanders, airmen, families,
and friends (i.e., Air Force Reserve wingmen), access to a wide variety
of resources, training opportunities, a dedicated Wingman Day page,
promotion of the Ask, Care, Escort (A.C.E.) suicide intervention model,
educational outreach materials, social media (Facebook, Twitter, Etc.),
a mobile phone application, SMS texting capability (``WMTK'' to 24587),
inspirational and training videos, a YouTube page, and partnerships
with other organizations. The Wingman Toolkit, in addition to annual
wingman stand down days and the longstanding Air Force suicide
prevention program, educates and equips airmen, commanders, first
sergeants, co-workers, family members, and friends to proactively take
care of themselves and avoid crises. It's also the first line of
support in identifying airmen in need of assistance and prepares them
to get to safer, healthier places.
Since Air Reserve component wingmen (e.g. family, friends) are
often non-military personnel, the Air National Guard's Wingman Project
provides information and resources for suicide prevention on publicly-
accessible websites. The Air National Guard tailors marketing and
resource materials for each State. The primary goal of the Wingman
Project, located at http://wingmanproject.org, is to reduce warfighter,
Department of Defense civilian, and family member suicides through
human outreach, education, and media. The site provides education on
how to intervene if someone is in emotional distress and provides tools
and resources to target specific risk factors for suicide. The Wingman
Project helps airmen actively engage in increasing wellness and
preventing suicide. The Wingman Project has additionally published a
mobile application which works on all smartphone platforms, and can be
utilized to communicate in between drills, ACE training, and locating
helping resources.
The Air Force Reserve has obtained additional Reserve pay funding
to increase chaplain support to installations to help build unit
resiliency and provide suicide prevention support during seasonal
crisis times, for those bases who request additional support, and units
with previous suicide incidents.
The Airman's Guide for Assisting Personnel in Distress (commander
and airman versions) is a web-based tool available to all
servicemembers, including Guard and Reserve, to provide vital
information about the wide range of challenges, indications of
distress, recommended supportive actions by peers and leaders, and
links and contacts for additional resources. The tool facilitates
leader involvement and can help resolve potentially volatile
situations.
TRICARE Reserve Select is available for Reserve component airmen
and their family members and provides coverage for both outpatient and
inpatient treatment. Access to military medical care is available to
servicemembers with duty related conditions through TRICARE and the
Department of Veterans Affairs.
Airman & Family Readiness Program Managers (A&FRPMs) align family
support capabilities with the Joint Family Program in the States to
provide support to all servicemembers and their families, providing
direct sustainment and support to their wings. Air Force Reserve
Command and Air National Guard Family Readiness Programs are designed
to maintain and support mission readiness by assisting servicemembers
and families with adaptations to the challenges of the military
lifestyle.
Vets4Warriors: 1-855-838-8255/1-855-VET-TALK.
www.vets4warriors.com. This Toll-Free 24 hour helpline is available to
servicemen and their families--peer counseling and support, telephone
assessments, and referrals for mental health issues, to include
suicidal thoughts.
Military OneSource is provided by the Department of Defense at no
cost to active duty, Guard and Reserve servicemembers, and their
families. It provides comprehensive information on every aspect of
military life including deployment, reunion, relationships, grief,
spouse employment and education, parenting and child care, and much
more.

Support 24/7, free and confidential resources for Air
Reserve component members consultations on any number of issues
such as spouse education and career opportunities, issues
specific to families with a member with special needs, and
financial support and resources.
Offers personal non-medical counseling services
online, via telephone, or face-to-face.
Non-medical, short-term counseling, as well as
assistance with financial management, taxes, career services,
health and wellness, and much more.

The Department of Veterans Affairs offers multiple resources and
benefits that are available in person, online, or through the mail.
Finally, the Military (or Veterans) Crisis Line, 1-800-273-8255 (TALK),
Press #1, www.militarycrisisline.net, or text to 838255 is available
24/7 to all servicemembers and their families. It is a joint venture
between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans
Affairs' call center, which is associated with Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration's National Suicide Prevention
Lifeline. Resources include an online ``Veteran's Chat'' capability and
the call center's trained personnel provide crisis intervention for
those struggling with suicidal thoughts or family members seeking
support for a Veteran.

Senator Donnelly. Mr. Estevez, we have a case with our
Indiana National Guard where they were working alongside a DOD
contractor in Iraq in 2003 and were exposed to sodium
dichromate. These are our neighbors. These are our friends.
These are men and women working at the local tire store who
were now over in Iraq at that time serving our country. The
contractor they were working with had an indemnification
provision. The question I have is, what are your views of these
indemnification contract provisions used by DOD and what
protection do our servicemembers have when those are in place?
Mr. Estevez. Senator, I am not familiar with the case, of
course, but I would be more than happy to look into it. With
regard to indemnification, of course, it depends on where you
were operating and what backup the Department puts in. We are
asking people to take risks when we put them out on the
battlefield regardless of whether they are operating on a
protected area of that battlefield. But I would be happy to
look into that issue, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Part of the risk should not be that when
they are working next to a contractor. It was not the risk of
insurgents. It was the risk of sodium dichromate. We want to
try to make sure that when we tell our young men and women and
take them from the community colleges and from working at the
accounting firm, that they can expect to be safe--obviously, as
much as possible in the situation that they are placed in.
[The information referred to follows:]

I understand that the indemnification of contractors against
unusually hazardous risks is limited. Only the Secretary of Defense,
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), and the Secretaries of the Military Departments can approve
such indemnification, and a decision to approve indemnification is made
based on the unique facts of the particular case.
I understand that contractor indemnification under Public Law 85-
804 does not apply to servicemembers. Should I be confirmed, I will
undertake to familiarize myself further in this area.

Senator Donnelly. Mr. Vollrath, we are facing
sequestration. It was noted that we lost more men and women to
suicide in the last year than were killed in Afghanistan. The
challenges that we face with sequestration are great. But one
of the things I would ask you in this position is to continue
with the financial challenges we are facing to continue to see
how can you squeeze every dollar out to try to make sure that
we continue to make progress on this front. I know General
Chirelli was extraordinarily focused on this effort. It is
going to take tremendous creativity in the years ahead. But I
would ask, along with the other areas that my colleague,
Senator Gillibrand, was talking about, to please keep a focus
like a laser on how can we end this scourge.
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, you have my commitment, upon
confirmation, that we will continue to keep a full court press
to overcome what clearly is a tragic situation.
Senator Donnelly. Mr. Estevez, we are, obviously, having
troops come home now, and as we do, we are in the situation
where we have more contractors in Afghanistan now than troops.
So what are the expectations of contractor numbers as we move
forward over the next year or 2?
Mr. Estevez. Right now, we have about 110,000 contractors
in Afghanistan. A little more than a third, about 40 percent,
are actually Afghans. Of course, they will stay in Afghanistan.
We are actively drawing down that number. In instances, as we
draw down combat forces, there will actually be more
contractors because they help close down bases rather than have
our military do that. We want the combat power there. But we
have an active cell closing down contracts and bringing those
contractors back.
Senator Donnelly. What do you see as our footprint
contractor-wise a year from now?
Mr. Estevez. It will be about one and a half higher, maybe
two higher as we draw down. There is going to be a little
higher spike as we draw down.
Senator Donnelly. Than it is right now?
Mr. Estevez. No. It will be about the same ratio. Right now
it is approximately 68,000 troops to 110,000 contractors. I
expect that to remain over the next----
Senator Donnelly. The ratio of troops to contractors will
remain in the same neighborhood.
Mr. Estevez. Yes.
Senator Donnelly. Mr. Estevez, in an environment where
countries like China are using cyber attacks to engage in theft
of intellectual property across the board almost, what steps
will you take to enhance DOD's collaboration with the defense
industry to protect U.S. taxpayer-funded intellectual property?
I was with one of our shipbuilding organizations the other day
and they said they are subject to cyber attacks every single
day for the technology they have. What do we do working forward
on that?
Mr. Estevez. Senator, cyber is not exactly my area.
However, I share the concern. In fact, Secretary Kendall has
asked me to lead a task force looking at exfiltration of data,
not necessarily classified data but intellectual property,
things that we care about, working with the industry to do
exactly what you are asking about. It is a very serious problem
for us and for our industrial partners.
Senator Donnelly. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
time.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Before I call on Senator Ayotte, let me
just remind you, Secretary Estevez, we have a new law on cyber
incidents involving defense contractors. It was in our defense
authorization bill. They must report those incidents to us. We
insist that they do that, they comply with the law, but we also
want to do that in the most cooperative and joint way we
possibly can. We are on the same side of that issue, but there
is now a law in place on defense contractors, now not on
utilities and not on electric kind of utility issues and so
forth, but on defense contractors there is. We would expect
that you would remind them of that and fully implement that
law.
Mr. Estevez. Absolutely, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for being here and your willingness
to serve our country.
I ask, first of all, Mr. Fanning about the provisions that
require the Air Force to produce a statement of DOD's budgetary
resources by September 30, 2014, so that the Department can be
audit-ready. Are you committed to doing that?
Mr. Fanning. I am, Senator, yes.
Senator Ayotte. Okay, good. I wanted to be clear because
the questions you were asked in the written questions made it
seem like it was a goal. It is now the law as passed by the
2013 defense authorization, and so this is a very important
issue. I think that it is an important issue as we look at the
fiscal challenges facing the country and also, in particular,
the Department of Defense so that we can have the audit to have
good financial information to make good decisions. So I
appreciate your commitment to that important issue.
I wanted to ask Assistant Secretary Estevez about
contracting, in particular, a concern that I have had. I had
the privilege of visiting Afghanistan in January and meeting
with Major General Longo and talking with him about contracting
in Afghanistan. Previously I had worked with Senator Brown to
introduce the ``no contracting with the enemy'' language that
allowed us to cut off funds that were going to our enemies in
Afghanistan. In fact, I think the Wartime Contracting
Commission found that as much as $60 billion of U.S. Government
contracting funds had either been wasted or misspent, if you
combined Iraq and Afghanistan.
One of the things Major General Longo said to me when I was
in Afghanistan is we need additional tools to be able to make
this legislation even more effective. It struck me also that
this is legislation and tools that would allow DOD, when they
are in contingency circumstances--should be able to cut off
funds to enemies or to those who are cooperating against us.
I plan to work with Senator Blumenthal to introduce
legislation to give you additional tools to cut off funds to
our enemies and to cut off funds to those we are worried about
going to corruption, other means that we would not want
taxpayer dollars going. I think this is an authority that
should be expanded beyond Afghanistan, and I want to get your
thoughts on that.
Mr. Estevez. I appreciate that, Senator Ayotte. First of
all, I want to commend Major General Longo. I worked very
closely with him and Task Force 2010 and what they are doing
there.
We would love to work with you on expanding those
capabilities and tools. We do want to make sure that we have
due diligence for our contractors when we do that. Obviously,
the authorities under A-41 use some extraordinary capabilities,
using classified information, for example, to not contract with
the enemy, and we want to make sure that we do not contract
with the enemy worldwide. I would be happy to work with you on
expanding that.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it. Actually one of the
problems that Major General Longo described to us was the fact
that right now the way A-41 is working, we are only looking at
unclassified information, and in fact that we need to actually
come up with a smarter way because you may have classified
information that tells you someone is an enemy. But if we are
only relying on unclassified, we are actually not cutting off
the full measure of people who are contracting with the enemy.
I look forward to working with you on this. This is a way
we can make sure that taxpayer dollars do not go in the wrong
hands.
I also wanted to ask Mr. Vollrath, you had said a statement
about sequestration. I believe that Senator Inhofe had asked
you a question about it, about the civilian impact as a result
of sequestration. You said that it would help to move the money
around but it does not solve, as I understood what you were
saying, the full problem.
Can you, everyone on this panel, help me understand? Even
if we give you the authority to move the money around, does it
solve the impact of what the Department of Defense is going to
undergo in terms of sequestration? I would particularly ask
with regard to our readiness.
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, the way sequestration is currently
configured, the cuts have to go basically equitably across all
of the programs. When we are faced with a $45 billion to $46
billion reduction to take in 6 or at most 7 months----
Senator Ayotte. As I understand it, the Office of
Management and Budget has estimated that equates to about 13
percent over the 2013 period.
Mr. Vollrath. I will accept that, certainly. I have not
taken the time to focus on that. I have been focused on the
impact on the personnel and the resultant impact, as you
correctly point out, on readiness because when you furlough, of
that $46 billion--$45 billion reduction, you have to take it
somewhere. As I mentioned earlier, we are trying, as best as
possible, to not take it out on the backs of the workforce. So
furloughing for up to 22 days, that is only about $5 billion of
that $45 billion. There is a lot more that needs to be done.
When you take that kind of reduction, particularly in the
civilian workforce, of what amounts to about a 9 percent or for
them a 20 percent reduction in their pay and furlough 1 day per
week--that is basically what that amounts to--there will be an
impact on readiness. You cannot get the same amount of work
done that you would normally get done in 10 days in the
equivalent of 8. It does not work that way unless you want to
ask the civilian workforce to do things that they ought not to
do. So there is going to be an impact at the depot maintenance
level. There will be an impact in the service level no matter
how you slice it.
Now, could it be less? I think that is the point. It might
be possible that it could be less. But I do not believe under
any circumstances that we could not take some of that impact in
our workforce.
Senator Ayotte. Secretary Estevez, just to put the question
to you, so if we give you--right now it is an across-the-board
cut. Right? You have to cut everything. If we give you the
flexibility--we have been hearing from the Department of
Defense. This is the fundamental question. We have been hearing
from them. Secretary Panetta, it is going to undermine our
national security for generations. I had Chairman Dempsey here
less than a week ago or roughly a week ago and he told me on a
scale of 1 to 10, it was a 10 in terms of our national
security.
So as someone who wants to resolve this and respects that
the chairman wants to resolve this in a way that is consistent
with protecting our country, if we gave you all the flexibility
in the world--let us say we did not do it across the board--
where does that leave you there? I think that is an important
question to be answered.
Mr. Estevez. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. A couple things.
One, it is more than just sequestration. It is the
Continuing Resolution that is causing much of the problem.
Passing an appropriation bill or at least giving us the
flexibilities in a CR is critical for us going forward. Number
one.
Sequestration, the $46 billion, I do not think at this
point in the year additional flexibilities there give us what
we need. We will get some of that within the CR, but at this
point in the year to find that $46 billion, I believe as Dr.
Carter said when he was up here 2 weeks ago, we are going to be
looking everywhere we can to get that money.
Senator Ayotte. I mean, we have legislation pending that
deals with flexibility, and so what I want to understand is if
we pass this legislation, does that stop the impact on our
national security or does that mitigate it so it is a
manageable amount of impact on our national security? That is
certainly what I would appreciate your advice on.
Mr. Estevez. It will not stop it. Taking $46 billion again
at this point in the year is not going to stop the impact on
our national security. I think giving us the flexibilities or
passing a 2013 budget for the Department of Defense and making
sequestration go away for 2013 is the only way to really stop
the impact on our national security. Obviously, past that,
flexibilities may but we will be taking money from everything.
So there is going to be a devastating impact to our security.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations on your nominations. It is good to be with
each of you today.
Just a few questions, and I would like to start with Mr.
Vollrath, please, on some personnel issues that I am interested
in the thought process now within DOD, particularly about use
of the Guard and Reserve.
I had an interesting experience last week visiting a Guard
unit in Stanton, VA, called the Stonewall Brigade that is quite
large. I was interested when I found out that their first
operations as a brigade were 20 years before the French and
Indian wars. They go back to 1740 and they can trace the
lineage back that far.
In my discussions with these guardsmen and women and many
during the time I was Governor and was Commander of the
Virginia Guard, it really struck me that the Guard and Reserve
are quite different than they were 10 or 15 years ago, that the
level of training, the level of operational experience has
dramatically increased. That made me start to think about
forward-focused personnel planning and how much do we do with
the Active Force, and there is a training cost to that. How
much do we do in terms of putting in training monies to keep
the Guard at this new kind of elevated level of readiness? I am
just kind of interested in your discussion about that looking
at personnel and the kind of overall manpower needs of our
defense, how the Guard and Reserve are factoring in, in a new
way, and how you factor that in going forward as you evaluate
manpower needs.
Mr. Vollrath. Senator, the Guard and Reserve are critical
to our projected readiness. The Guard and Reserve, as you know
having served as Governor, are now an operational force. They
are no longer that last resort, that strategic reserve if you
will. They are fundamental to how we fight. So on a go-forward
basis, it is critical that they be maintained and sustained for
our long-term readiness.
Having said that, with their experience as an operational
force, it is also key to readiness that we retain as many
people that we can possibly in the Reserves that have that
experience because once we lose that experience, then we
significantly have to start ramping up retraining.
So right now, I would tell you that is a national treasure
and they are key to our national defense right now, far from
being that old strategic reserve. To the Reserve and Guard,
give them credit. They have stepped up to the plate.
Senator Kaine. Going forward, there is no intent from a
planning perspective that the Guard would revert back to just a
pure Reserve function, but there is a thought that going
forward we would make the investments in Guard and Reserve to
keep them at an operational level of training and readiness?
Mr. Vollrath. That appears to be a prudent way forward. We
have the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) coming up in this
next year, and in that process, we will sort out exactly how we
are going to move forward. But I do not know how we do it
without.
Senator Kaine. Just thinking forward, if as part of that
QDR, the decision is made we want to keep Guard at sort of an
operations and not just a pure reserve asset and we want to put
the training in to do that, then that would also affect other
decisions about manpower levels in the Active branches because
to the extent that Guard is at operational level, those numbers
can provide some of the function so that it does factor into
manpower planning in the Service branches as well.
Mr. Vollrath. Absolutely, Senator. It has to be a balanced
approach to it. As we shift from contingency operations to the
more full-spectrum on a go-forward basis, then we are going to
have to sort out very finitely exactly how that force is going
to be structured to do that. That is different from the last 10
years, as you can appreciate.
Senator Kaine. In making sure that the Guard maintains that
desired state going forward, that makes things like retention
and the training of guardsmen and reservists--ongoing
training--absolutely critical.
Mr. Vollrath. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Kaine. In my discussions with the Stonewall
Brigade--and I was asking them about sequester and some of
these budgetary challenges--the one thing that they were most
concerned about was effects on training, the backing up of
assigned training slots at various training facilities where
they would go, oh, we are going to go next year, not this year
or we are going to do it at home rather than go to the slot.
The commander said if I have to put people into an operational
capacity, I want them to be 100 percent ready and not 85
percent ready. The potential degradation in training was what
was cited as their greatest concern right now.
But anyway, it is helpful to hear your thoughts on that.
Let me ask Secretary Estevez, and forgive me if this has
been asked. But in the acquisition space, I would assume that
the combination of sequester and CR, anything short of
appropriations bills and normal budgets, imposes some
inefficiencies in the contracting process because you can find
more efficiencies, the greater their predictability, volume,
multi-unit purchases, et cetera. I would suspect that some of
the short-term savings we might be trying to obtain through
something like sequester actually may work to our long-term
disadvantage even on the savings side.
Mr. Estevez. That is true, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Could you give some examples of that?
Mr. Estevez. The acquisition system is kind of seized up
right now. In fact, the Department as a whole is seized up in
all kinds of contracts. I will speak just for what we are doing
inside the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We are not
letting any contracts. That means contracts to service--the
SAIC types of the world or RAND or whoever. So they cannot plan
their line.
Now, if we go to the industrial side--and you know what is
going on in the shipyards as we cancel availabilities--when we
start taking out of budget planned buys for things like the
Joint Strike Fighter, that is going to increase the unit cost
of those airplanes because you are not buying as many as you
planned. That is not just something like the Joint Strike
Fighter that is in early production. That is things like
Apaches and Chinooks and anything that we are buying as we
start to take those dollars out. That does not mean that that
decreases the need because we still need those airplanes. So we
are going to pay more to get the same plane that we could have
if we had moved along through our budget and dropped whatever
that capability is. It is an inefficient way of doing business.
Our industrial base cannot plan for what they are doing. They
are also making their own assessments. It is not a good way.
Senator Kaine. Let me just follow up with one question to
follow up on Senator Ayotte's question about potential
flexibility because you raised a point that I do not think
everyone completely understands. Being already pretty far into
a fiscal year, you at DOD have been planning around this kind
of ugly, non-strategic, across-the-board cuts. Everybody would
agree that is not the way we should do it, but nevertheless you
have been planning around how to do it, and we are pretty far
into the fiscal year.
If suddenly the rule were to change and you do not have to
do that, you have the flexibility now and then you would get
some time to come up with flexible cuts and now we are farther
into the fiscal year, I gather that there would be some effort
that those cuts would have to be presented from the White House
back to Congress and have Congress look at them and decide, and
now we are farther into a fiscal year. Time is of the essence
in terms of managing cuts of this size by this time in the
fiscal year. Is it not?
Mr. Estevez. Absolutely, Senator. Of course, there are
differences within the investment accounts where we are buying
things that Congress has asked us to buy or that we asked
Congress to help us authorize that you authorized in NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2013. In the operation and maintenance accounts,
where we have to pay for the war, we are going to pay for what
our forces need forward. It is just a complete freeze-up
because you have to push money through those things. So giving
us this flexibility, while we take the time to replan,
essentially means you go along with the plan that you have.
Senator Kaine. Yes.
No further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin
by thanking the chairman for having a hearing on March 13
concerning sexual assault in the military, and I expect and
trust that all of you will cooperate and aid us in this very
important hearing and the effort to further protect against
this truly predatory, criminal action that is all too common
still, even after some good faith efforts by the military to
stop it.
I want to also begin by thanking each of you and your
families for your service to our Nation and for what you have
done in the past and what you will do in the future and hope
that this committee and I personally can be of assistance to
you.
On the issue of contracting with the enemy, I know Senator
Ayotte has raised the issue already. She and I have been
working on revisions to the current prohibitions to impose
tougher penalties and also to streamline the potential
investigation and prosecution and extend them to Departments
other than Defense. So I appreciate your cooperation in that
effort as well.
I want to begin on the Joint Strike Fighter, if I may. I
know Senator McCain has raised it with you, and all of us are
fully and passionately in favor of a better procurement
process. I hope that we can work together on improving that
process so as to cut costs and streamline the procurement and
acquisition process.
But as to the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35, do you agree
with Lieutenant General Bogdan's remarks on that issue?
Mr. Estevez. I cannot speak for Lieutenant General Bogdan
who has the daily relationship with Lockheed and Pratt on that
contract. I can appreciate his frustration, and any PEO's
frustration is that we are trying to get the best value, best
buy for our dollar, and best capability for the taxpayer. That
puts some tension in the relationship with any contractor. We
do expect our contractors and want to hold them accountable and
will hold them accountable to produce.
Senator Blumenthal. I agree completely that they should be
held answerable and accountable for the quality of the product
and costs and so forth.
There is no question in your mind that this Nation is
committed to the F-35. Is there?
Mr. Estevez. No, there is not.
Senator Blumenthal. That the procurement and acquisition of
that plane really require us to remain, as much as possible, on
schedule in buying the airplane because that is the best way to
reduce the cost per unit?
Mr. Estevez. That is correct, Senator, though we would also
say we have flattened our buys as we work through some of the
issues that, to most extents, have been resolved, but we do
have some testing. A little less than 50 percent of the testing
is completed. There are some issues that need to be worked, and
before we ramp up production, we want to ensure that we are
getting the plane that we are paying for.
Senator Blumenthal. The effort to test and improve the
airplane really requires a close working relationship. Does it
not?
Mr. Estevez. It does, Senator. It is not just at the
General Bogdan PEO level. We are working that up to the
Secretary level inside the Department.
Senator Blumenthal. My hope is that Lieutenant General
Bogdan's remarks do not reflect the general attitude in terms
of what that relationship has been or should be because I know
that American taxpayers would be disappointed if they believed
that somehow these contractors were in some way being
disingenuous, as I think those remarks imply. I am not sure
that the Department of Defense would agree with Lieutenant
General Bogdan in that implication.
Mr. Estevez. Again, I am not going to try to speak for
General Bogdan. He and I have not talked about the remarks as
reported in the newspaper. He is traveling in the world at the
moment.
We need and we strive to have and I believe we do have a
strong relationship with the defense industrial base to include
Lockheed and Pratt.
Senator Blumenthal. My own view, for what it is worth, is
that that relationship perhaps could be improved, and I hope
that you will endeavor to improve it, but that these remarks do
not reflect even the relationship as it stands now because I
think there are very complex and challenging issues related to
the development of this new aircraft that we have a common
interest in solving without the kind of tension that could be
exacerbated by these remarks. I have great respect for
Lieutenant General Bogdan. I am not being critical of him. As
you say, these remarks were reported in the newspaper, but I
know that Pratt & Whitney is fully committed to solving the
technical issues and to providing the best value to the
Department of Defense and the American taxpayer.
Mr. Estevez. I appreciate that, and frankly I believe that
Lieutenant General Bogdan would agree with you on that.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
If I may ask Mr. Fanning. I know that the issue of suicide
in the military has been raised and I know that the Department
of Defense is endeavoring to address these issues very
responsibly.
My understanding is that civilian insurance companies have
the capability to look at lifestyle indicators, for lack of a
better word, facts about a person's lifestyle that provide some
indication about the possible tendency towards suicide. In
light of the very alarming statistics--and I know that
``epidemic'' is a vastly over-used term in the Nation's
capital, but certainly it is an alarming trend--I wonder
whether the Air Force has been able to make use of practices in
the civilian world by insurance companies to use those
indicators to identify people who may be more at risk.
Mr. Fanning. Thank you, Senator.
I think across the Department of Defense, there has been an
enterprise perspective or attempt to make use of those
indicators. We know, for example, that financial issues,
relationship issues, legal issues have a higher correlation to
suicide than even deployment schedules. I think the answer is
yes, and if confirmed into the Air Force, taking care of the
men and women who volunteered to serve would be the highest
priority I would think in my job and that would be one of the
things I would look at much more closely.
Senator Blumenthal. I just want to say--and I thank you for
that comment--my own view is that our people are our greatest
asset. As magnificent and amazing as the Joint Strike Fighter
is and all of our hardware, all of our weapons systems, the
people are still our greatest asset, and the more we can do to
attract and retain the very best by showing that we not only
care about them but we are willing to do something about it is,
I think, one of the great challenges ahead. It is one of the
reasons that I voted for Senator Hagel to be our next Secretary
of Defense because I think he is truly committed and passionate
about men and women in uniform and about our veterans. I would
just urge--you do not need my urging, but offer my help in any
way possible in any of those personnel issues that you may face
in your next job, assuming you will be confirmed as I expect
you will be.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Nation.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A few quick questions to each of you, some fairly specific,
and I will be submitting some questions for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. That will be fine.
Senator King. Mr. Fanning, we were disappointed and
somewhat surprised when Bangor, ME, was not selected as even a
potential base for the KC-46. What do you see for the future of
refueling? Is the KC-135 fleet a part of the future? My concern
is, obviously, that if the KC-46 is going to be the future of
refueling, I wonder about the future of the 101st wing in
Bangor. Can you talk to me about that?
Mr. Fanning. Not having been confirmed yet, Senator, I have
not been a part of those deliberations or the process by which
the Air Force decides its basing for the new tankers. But if
confirmed, just the timing of these announcements would make it
a first priority for me, and I would get back with you and your
staff to provide you more information on that.
Senator King. I hope you will because the 101st has done a
spectacular job over the last 10 or 15 years, given the
demands. I would hope that would be part of the future. Okay.
There will be some other questions for the record.
Mr. Estevez, on procurement, one of the real problems that
we are facing right now with the Continuing Resolution and the
sequester is the loss of multi-year procurement contracts. It
is bad for the taxpayers because you lose the benefit of multi-
year buys, and it is also terrible for the industrial base.
Will you work with us on these? In the authorization bill, we
have a multi-year procurement, for example, to take just--it
pops into my head, the 10-year DDG-51 procurement. How do you
see this as we get through this budget situation?
Mr. Estevez. I would agree with you.
Senator King. That was the right answer. [Laughter.]
Mr. Estevez. We have asked for those authorities to proceed
with those multi-years.
Now, if there is no money, that presents a problem for any
procurement, to tell you the truth, because we will have to
look at what is available in those accounts. But we have asked
for in our appropriation bill--and hopefully we will get one--
authority to do those multi-years.
Senator King. As I understand, the Appropriations Committee
bill that is ready to go has the multi-year procurement in it.
Is that your understanding? Out of the committee?
Mr. Estevez. The version that is out, yes.
Senator King. Changing the subject slightly, what is your
assessment of our logistical readiness for the drawdown in
Afghanistan? It is not going to be easy to get all that
materiel out of there. Where do we stand on that front?
Mr. Estevez. It is a fantastic challenge for the logistics
system. It is absolutely executable. It is going to be much
more difficult than the drawdown from Iraq. Afghanistan, just
from a geography standpoint, is a landlocked country. It does
not have the infrastructure that Iraq had. Nevertheless, our
logistics system is up to the task and we will be able to
execute the drawdown and remove our equipment from Afghanistan,
as well as our people, of course.
Senator King. It certainly is going to be a challenge
because there is no access by sea.
Mr. Vollrath, I had a colloquy with now Secretary Hagel.
When I meet with veterans in Maine, particularly the recent
people who have left the Service, one of the biggest problems
they find is the lack of information. It is a complicated
system with the Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense Departments
and all the different programs and what is available, what they
can access, how they do it. You folks have an extensive network
of recruiters who bring people in. I would like you to consider
and suggest a similar reciprocal program to help people when
they leave. Out-placement services is, in effect, what I am
suggesting. That was the number one problem that the veterans
brought to me when I was discussing this issue with them last
summer.
Do you have any thoughts about this?
Mr. Vollrath. Yes, I do, Senator. First, let me say thank
you to Congress for a law that was passed called the Vow to
Hire Heroes Act. That law stipulated that the Department of
Defense would set up a very robust transition assistance
program with the help of the Department of Labor and the
Department of Veterans Affairs. That transition assistance
program, as defined in law, has been put in place. Let me
describe the depth of that.
First, the Department of Defense will set up 100 percent of
every servicemember leaving Active Duty with a plan ahead.
Second, as part of that out-processing or that transition
process, that servicemember will receive up to 4 days of
transition assistance from the Department of Labor so that they
understand how to create a resume, they know how to interview,
and the Department of Labor will then give what is now termed a
warm hand-off to that servicemember to the community to which
they say they are going so that they have the name of a person
in the Department of Labor establishment in that locale that
they, in effect, can report to get the help.
The third part is the Veterans Administration. The VA has
up to 2 days with each of the persons separating to inform them
as to what their benefits are that can be provided by the
Veterans Administration in their totality, and probably most
important, sign them up before they leave for those benefits
and, like with the Department of Labor, create the warm hand-
off for that servicemember with a name in the community for the
Veterans Administration to which the servicemember intends to
go.
In addition to that, we are instituting a three-pronged
voluntary session that each servicemember may avail themselves
of, if they wish. One is to help them apply for school fully,
if they want to go to college or to some trade school. We will
help them with the application and everything they need to get
on board.
Second, if they want to go to a trade school and get that
type of training, then the Veterans Administration, before they
leave, will also give them that capability and provide them
with a place to go and get that training that they desire.
The third has to do with the Small Business Administration
(SBA). The SBA has stepped up to the plate and they also are
providing to any servicemember that is departing a 4-day course
on how to be an entrepreneur to start a small business. That is
key, we believe and so does the SBA, because as you all know,
most of the jobs are created by small business in America.
So not only are we helping them transition, we are trying
to provide them the full measure of transition back into the
community. So your suggestion, Senator, I take fully and will
definitely run with it.
Senator King. It sounds like all the thinking is there. I
just hope that the execution matches the vision. Thank you very
much.
I want to talk about rising personnel costs, but we will do
that on questions on the record. My time has expired.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your answers.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Just on that last question of Senator King, is there a
simple brochure which lays out each of those five points?
Mr. Vollrath. I do not have a simple brochure that does
that, but I have an information paper that does that.
Chairman Levin. Can you put together a brochure which you
could get to all the Members of Congress and then hopefully to
all the servicemembers who are leaving which describes what
efforts are being made to help them transition so that at one
place every one of our servicemembers who is leaving can see
this is what the Department of Defense is doing, this is what
you can expect? Because I think that what Senator King has
raised is something which is really very much on all of our
minds. I think he has really targeted something which we hear
an awful lot about.
Earlier today, Mr. Vollrath, I talked to you about what the
VA program is in one community college in my home State which
actually, apparently in a unique way, has a program which
veterans come to from around the country now that will help
give them credit for the work that they have done, the skills
that they picked up in the military and gaining early
certification from States for that particular skill whether
they are going to become a nurse or a medical assistant or a
truck driver with skills, whatever it is, whatever the skills
they gained in the military, that they do not have to duplicate
them and go through a 2-year program or a 1-year program when a
3-month program is all they need in order to qualify and to
smooth the way through the certification being done in advance
for them through the State agencies which have to certify those
skills before they can operate.
So that point which Senator King has gone through with you
is really a very significant part of what all of us I hope and
know are about. When you are confirmed or even before--but that
should come pretty quickly--work on that very simple one-pager
that could go on a website and can be printed out and handed to
those of us who still read.
Mr. Vollrath. Will do, Senator.
Chairman Levin. The printed word I should say.
Do any of my colleagues have any additional questions?
Senator King. My only comment, Mr. Chairman, based upon
what you just said and I alluded to it--in my experience,
execution is as important as vision. This is really how it is
executed on the street with these guys, men and women, as they
leave. That is critically important because this is what we are
hearing at home. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you all. We thank you, our nominees.
We look forward to your speedy confirmation and we thank you
and your families and friends who are here for your service and
their support of you in that endeavor. Congratulations.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Alan F. Estevez by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I do not see the need for modifications to any of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions at this time. The Goldwater-Nichols
Act has cultivated jointness within the Department of Defense (DOD) and
has outlined appropriate responsibility to senior leaders within the
acquisition and logistics community.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.
duties
Question. Section 133a of title 10, U.S.C., describes the role of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
(DUSD(AT)).
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L) will prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the USD(AT&L) will assign me duties
supporting the roles and missions assigned to him by the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have over 30 years of experience working in defense
establishments. For the last 6 years, I have operated at the most
senior levels within the Office of the USD(AT&L), the last 2 as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness
(ASD(L&MR)). Prior to that, I was the Principal Deputy to that position
for 5 years. For the last year, with the Principal Deputy AT&L position
vacant, I have assisted the USD(AT&L) in managing the full gamut of
AT&L issues and responsibilities to include not only acquisition,
technology, and logistics matters, but also industrial base issues,
installation and military construction issues, and operational energy
issues. I have a proven track record as a skilled manager who is able
to execute programs to completion and manage change. I have managed
complex programs across the defense enterprise, and have worked issues
at senior levels across the Federal Government, with Congress, and with
industry. I have led the defense logistics enterprise and directed
support to our forces in the field as we surged and subsequently drew
down in two wars. Simultaneously, I led efforts to lower the costs of
logistics. I have played a key role in driving our rapid acquisition
support in both Iraq and Afghanistan and ensured the delivery and
sustainment of critical capabilities, such as the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles. I have provided direct oversight to the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), a $50 combat support agency, as it has
supported our deployed forces, our organic industrial depots, and the
American people in disaster relief operations, to include Super Storm
Sandy. I have led the DOD efforts to ensure life cycle costs are
considered early in major acquisition programs. In short, I have proven
my skills in overcoming bureaucratic hurdles to provide needed
capabilities to our warfighters at best value for our taxpayers.
Question. Do you believe that there are any additional steps that
you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe that my expertise qualifies me to perform the
duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (PDUSD(AT&L)), and that no further steps are
needed.
Question. Do you believe that any significant changes should be
made in the structure and decisionmaking procedures of DOD with respect
to acquisition matters?
Answer. No. I believe that the structure and decisionmaking
procedures of the DOD with respect to acquisition matters are sound and
efficient, and I do not advise making any changes.
qualifications
Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for assisting the
Under Secretary in the management of an acquisition system pursuant to
which DOD spends roughly $400 billion each year.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have over 30 years of experience operating in the defense
establishment, including 10 years as a Senior Executive. Over the last
6 years, I have worked at the most senior levels within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. For the last 4 years, I have been responsible
for leading the defense logistics enterprise, providing superb support
to our warfighters engaged in combat operations while simultaneously
lowering the cost of logistics operations. I have assisted the past
three USD(AT&L)s in executing key programs, including enhancing our
acquisition life cycle management capabilities and oversight,
strengthening our nuclear parts management and oversight, executing
operational energy support to provide battlefield flexibility, and
driving the rapid acquisition process to provide and sustain
capabilities, such as MRAP vehicles to support our deployed forces. I
have played a key role in driving efficiencies in our budget, and in
properly managing the Department's budget execution, to include
supporting our efforts to achieve auditability. I am a proven leader
who has demonstrated the skills to manage complex programs and lead
change when necessary.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. I have been a senior leader in the Office of the USD(AT&L)
for the last 6 years, and I have been an advisor on the Defense
Acquisition Board during that time. I have had input to every major
defense weapon system acquisition program over that time period. I have
been the leader in our efforts to strengthen the Department's policies
to ensure sustainability and life cycle costs are considered in defense
programs, and I am responsible for the ensuring life cycle sustainment
projections are discussed as part of the acquisition process. I
initiated the requirement to make the development of a Life Cycle
Sustainment Plan part of a Program Manager's responsibilities, and I
worked with Congress to designate a Product Support Manager as key
program management leader. I have also been a key leader in the
Department's rapid acquisition efforts in support of our warfighters. I
played a key role in the acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of the
MRAP Family of Vehicle program, and led efforts to ensure that the
vehicles could be sustained in the field. I also helped to drive the
requirements for the rapid acquisition and fielding of the lighter MRAP
All-Terrain Vehicle (MATV) and the MRAP wrecker. I have a proven track
record of strong, common sense management and the ability to manage and
oversee change. These skills will be necessary to manage an acquisition
system in an era of declining resources.
relationships
Question. In carrying out your duties, what would be your
relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense's
priorities in acquisition, technology, and logistics.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Deputy Secretary's
priorities and direction in matters of acquisition, technology, and
logistics.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, I will serve as the principal advisor to
USD(AT&L). In this role, I will support USD(AT&L) in his priorities and
duties and provide counsel, when needed.
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L) to coordinate
actions with the other Under Secretaries to best serve the priorities
of the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of DOD.
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist USD(AT&L) in support of the
Deputy Chief Management Officer in the improvement of business
operations of DOD.
Question. The DOD General Counsel.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support USD(AT&L) in working with the
General Counsel to ensure AT&L actions are legally and ethically within
regulations and appropriate statutes.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support USD(AT&L) in his work with the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to ensure appropriate
oversight for major defense acquisition programs to assure that
acquisitions systems are effective and suitable for combat.
Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L) and the Director
of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to support CAPE's
efforts in providing the Department with independent cost analysis and
resource assessments for defense acquisition programs.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the USD(AT&L) and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition in providing oversight of Defense
acquisition systems and programs while taking into consideration life
cycle management costs.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L) and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to ensure DOD
develops and incorporates latest technology and innovative capabilities
while aiming to reduce cost and risk.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Materiel Readiness.
Answer. I currently serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness (ASD(L&MR)). If confirmed, I will work
with the incoming ASD(L&MR) and USD(AT&L) to provide oversight to DOD
logistics programs operations.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy
Plans and Programs.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support USD(AT&L) in his work with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs to ensure support to the warfighter on the battlefield through
energy planning and innovation while mitigating risks and costs.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist USD(AT&L) in his work with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs to protect the United States from nuclear, chemical,
and biological threats.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict.
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist USD(AT&L) and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
in their work to provide rapid capabilities to support special
operations, counter-narcotics, and stability operations.
Question. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L) and the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment to provide
installation services that are cost-effective to support the
warfighter.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Developmental Testing.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L) and the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Testing to ensure that
independent developmental testing assessments are used in informing
acquisition decisions.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for System
Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist USD(AT&L) in his work with the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering to ensure
effective systems engineering throughout the life cycle of Major
Defense Acquisitions Programs, and to identify early and address
systems engineering gaps and deficiencies.
Question. The Director of Program Assessment and Root Cause
Analysis.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support USD(AT&L) in directing the
Director of Program Assessment and Root Cause Analysis to ensure
comprehensive performance assessments are conducted on all Major
Defense Acquisition Programs and that cost and performance issues are
identified and resolved as early in the acquisition Milestone timeline
as possible.
Question. The Acquisition Executives in the Military Departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L) and the Service
Acquisition Executives to ensure effective oversight and transparency
of acquisition programs. Additionally, I will support USD(AT&L) and
Service Acquisition Executives to share best practices and incorporate
these strategies throughout acquisition programs in the Department and
other Service branches.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L) in his support of
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an advisor to the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council and a member of the Defense
Acquisition Board. USD(AT&L) and I will support the Vice Chairman by
ensuring that the requirements for acquisitions programs meet the
services' missions and are cost-effective.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the USD(ATL)?
Answer. The principle challenges I may face as the PDUSD(AT&L) will
be providing needed capabilities to defend the country and maintain the
best military in the world, as outlined in our Defense Strategy, in a
time of declining resources. In the near term, the Nation is still at
war, we face the challenge of sustaining and drawing down our forces in
Afghanistan, an operation which will be significantly more difficult
than our drawdown in Iraq. We also must be able to sustain our
readiness across the globe and avoid the pitfalls of a hollow force. We
must manage our acquisition programs and our spending to ensure we get
the best capability needed at the right cost for the American taxpayer.
As military spending declines, we must ensure that our industrial base
remains strong and vibrant, and capable of producing the needed
innovations to build future military capability. While ensuring we
develop the capabilities for our future challenges, we must also
incorporate and not forget our hard learned lessons from our 12 years
at war, including our ability to rapidly meet warfighter needs and to
manage contractors on the battlefield. Finally, we must ensure we have
a workforce, both military and civilian, that is trained and motivated
to address these challenges. These challenges are exacerbated by the
current budget uncertainty and the specter of sequestration.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the USD(AT&L) to address these
challenges.
We will continue to provide our warfighters the capabilities they
need today to be successful on the battlefield in Afghanistan, while
also providing the policies and supporting the processes needed to
successfully drawdown.
We will continue to strengthen our management of the acquisition
system under our Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative. We will work to
control and reduce costs and provide affordable programs to meet our
warfighters needs. We will continue to work with industry to provide
appropriate incentives--and appropriate revenue--to drive higher
productivity and stability, and we will work to identify, and protect,
as necessary, our most fragile industry skills and capabilities. We
will continue to drive changes in our doctrine and policy to
incorporate our lessons related to rapid acquisition and contingency
contract management. We will work to strengthen our workforce through
training and development, and by rewarding good performance while
holding people accountable for poor performance.
acquisition organization
Question. Do you believe that the office of the USD(AT&L) is
appropriately structured and staffed to execute its management and
oversight responsibilities?
Answer. Yes, I believe the office of the USD(AT&L) is appropriately
structured to execute its management and oversight of responsibilities
and will ensure that it remains so in the future. I believe we will
make some adjustments as we restructure the Deputy Under Secretary
positions as required by law.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the relationship
between the USD(AT&L) and senior acquisition officials in the Military
Departments?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you see the need for any additional processes or
mechanisms to ensure coordination between the budget, acquisition, and
requirements systems of DOD and ensure that appropriate trade-offs are
made between cost, schedule, and performance requirements early in the
acquisition process?
Answer. I do not currently see the need for any additional
processes or mechanisms to ensure coordination between the budget,
acquisition, and requirements systems of the Department. The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council and the Defense Acquisition Board have
helped to ensure this coordination. If confirmed, I will continue to
support USD(AT&L)'s priority of using affordability caps to ensure
appropriate trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance
requirements are made early in the acquisition process.
Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the
Service Chiefs in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-
allocation process?
Answer. The Service Chiefs should and do play an integral part of
the requirements, acquisition, and resource-allocation process. The
Service Chiefs requirements and resource decisions inform the
professional acquisition workforce's acquisition decisions and are
essential to ensuring that these acquisitions programs are successful
from production to fielding and disposal. The Service Chiefs'
leadership in the budget and requirements process ensures that the
acquisition programs meet the needs of the Services, and are budgeted
with the life cycle of the program in mind. I believe it is essential
that our acquisition workforce work with the Service Chiefs to continue
to make well-informed decisions.
Question. What do you see as the potential advantages and
disadvantages to giving the Service Chiefs authority and responsibility
for the management and execution of acquisition programs?
Answer. It is essential that our acquisitions workforce work in
tandem with the Service Chiefs. We must recognize the fact that the
Service Chiefs are often not acquisition professionals. Their thoughts
and guidance are critical in the acquisitions process. However, the
management and execution of programs should be done by acquisition
professionals who have the necessary training, professional experience,
and qualifications.
Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the
combatant commanders in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-
allocation processes?
Answer. Combatant commanders must identify requirements and
capability needs, and they must play a key role in the resource-
allocation processes. If confirmed, I will reinforce USD(AT&L)'s goal
of working with the combatant commanders in support of their
acquisition needs to support wartime operations and evolving threats.
The advice and input of the combatant commanders is needed to make sure
that acquisitions programs meet their needs in strategic operations.
Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe are needed in
the lines of authority and accountability for the procurement of major
weapon systems?
Answer. I do not believe any improvements are needed in the lines
of authority and accountability for the procurement of major weapons
systems. The current process flowing from the Defense Acquisition
Executive to the Secretaries of Military Departments to the Service
Acquisition Executives and Program Executive Officers to Program
Managers is successful so long as trained, competent leaders hold those
positions. While I see no need for a current change to this structure,
if confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L) to review the process to
see if changes are needed in the future.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to empower
program managers to execute major defense acquisition programs and hold
them accountable for how well their programs perform?
Answer. Empowering program managers to effectively and efficiently
execute major defense acquisition programs is a priority for USD(AT&L)
and, if confirmed, I will support USD(AT&L) in this goal. Section 853
of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007
and its subsequent modifications in section 814 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2009 required the Department to enhance the role of Program
Managers in developing and implementing acquisition programs. The
Department has developed a strategy to better educate and train program
managers to ensure leadership and program management accountability.
This strategy includes formal acquisition training, program reviews,
and Milestone Decision Authority forums led by program managers.
Program managers should be fully knowledgeable of their programmatic,
contractual, and financial details of their programs, and should be
able to measure performance against plans and adjust accordingly. BBP
2.0, laid out by USD(AT&L), re-emphasizes the responsibilities of
program managers. If confirmed, I will support USD(AT&L) to continue to
empower program managers while holding them accountable.
major weapon system acquisition
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given decreasing defense budgets, the
historic cost growth trends for major systems, and the continuing costs
of ongoing contingency operations?
Answer. There is great uncertainty about future budgets at the
present time. While I expect the costs of current contingency
operations to decrease in the coming years, the specter of
sequestration drive significant additional uncertainty. Without
sequestration, the current investment portfolio is affordable. However,
if the overall budget decreases more dramatically, it is unlikely the
Department could afford the current portfolio of major systems and
still maintain balanced risk in other parts of the budget.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with USD(AT&L) and others to
ensure that the Department adheres to a sustainable and affordable
investment strategy.
Question. Roughly half of DOD's major defense acquisition programs
have exceeded the so-called ``Nunn-McCurdy'' cost growth standards
established in section 2433 of title 10, United States Code, to
identify seriously troubled programs. Section 206 of the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) tightened the standards for
addressing such programs.
What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address the out-
of-control cost growth on DOD's major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L), as part of our
BBP efforts, to make affordability and cost control a dominant part of
our acquisition culture. I will integrate affordability and cost-
consciousness into our decision processes, and enforce affordability
caps for both production and sustainment. I will work to appropriately
incentivize our industrial base partners though our contracts to
promote cost control. I will also work to ensure the Department's
requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes ensure investment
decisions are informed by sound affordability constraints. For those
programs that do experience unacceptable cost growth, I would work
closely with USD(AT&L) and others within the Department to examine all
available options, including restructure or termination. Lastly, if
confirmed, I would focus on ensuring future programs are started with a
sound affordability and technical grounding to reduce the likelihood of
future growth in costs.
Question. What steps if any do you believe that the Department
should consider taking in the case of major defense acquisition
programs that exceed the critical cost growth thresholds established in
the Nunn-McCurdy provision?
Answer. I believe the basic requirements of the Nunn-McCurdy
provision are sensible in that they require a thorough review of the
root causes of the issues, as well as a careful examination of the
management of the program, costs and options going forward, and a
reassessment of the criticality of the particular program to meeting
validated requirements and national security needs. I also believe the
Department should continue to undertake similar kinds of reviews well
before required to do so by Nunn-McCurdy, and use available authorities
to make appropriate adjustments.
Question. Do you believe that the office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as currently
structured, has the organization and resources necessary to effectively
oversee the management of these major defense acquisition programs? If
not, how would you address this problem?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy
provision, as revised by section 206?
Answer. No. As I previously stated, I believe the basic tenets of
the Nunn-McCurdy provisions are logical. Consistent with other efforts
to streamline reviews in the Acquisition process, if confirmed, I would
work with USD(AT&L) to tailor the reviews to meet the requirements of
individual circumstances.
Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to
recommend terminating a program that has experienced critical cost
growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be guided by the principles outlined
in the Nunn-McCurdy statute.
operating and support costs
Question. The Department estimates that operating and support (O&S)
costs account for up to 70 percent of the acquisition costs of major
weapon systems. Section 832 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 requires
the Department to take a series of steps to improve its processes for
estimating, managing, and reducing such costs.
What is the current status of the Department's efforts to implement
the requirements of section 832?
Answer. The provisions of section 832 pertain to authorities vested
in both the USD(AT&L) and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
Office (CAPE). The two organizations have collaborated on implementing
policy that addresses the requirements outlined in section 832 through
a major revision of Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02,
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, which includes
incorporating requirements from sections 805, 815, and 837 of the NDAA.
Additionally, the CAPE and AT&L have restructured the Defense
Acquisition Guidebook to further emphasize operations and sustainment
(O&S) cost management among the acquisition workforce.
Question. What steps remain to be taken to implement section 832,
and what is the Department's schedule for taking these steps?
Answer. AT&L will publish section 832 implementation guidance in
the DODI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, in
calendar year 2013. In addition, we will supplement the section 832
guidance with an operating and support cost management guidebook to
complement the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office Operations
and Sustainment (O&S) cost estimating guidebook. This management
guidebook will further emphasize the importance of considering O&S cost
during system design trades early in a program's life, and assist
programs in developing Life Cycle Sustainment Plans that include
measures to control O&S cost. We are updating our guidance on
Independent Logistics Assessments to ensure results are unbiased, and
that programs use the assessments to improve reliability, availability,
maintainability and reduce cost. Further, AT&L will monitor program
efforts to manage and control O&S costs during Defense Acquisition
Executive Summary reviews. I expect the Department to issue this
amplifying guidance later this year.
Question. What steps, if any, are needed to ensure that the
requirements and acquisition communities fully and effectively
collaborate to understand and control the O&S costs prior to and early
in product development, when it is possible to have the most
significant impact on those costs?
Answer. The AT&L BBP initiative established an affordability cap
requirement for both acquisition costs and Operations and Sustainment
(O&S) costs. In so doing, we treat the O&S affordability cap in the
same manner as we do a Key Performance Parameter--it will not be traded
away against other system requirements. Accordingly, we are seeing
positive results in Service-implemented configuration steering boards
that facilitate active management of requirements between the
acquisition and warfighter communities. With the proper requirements
defined, AT&L evaluates a program's capability to meet availability and
reliability requirements through milestone reviews and developmental
and operational testing. The end result is an improved ability to
optimize readiness and costs over a programs lifecycle.
The Product Support Manager (PSM) is a critical facilitator of
collaboration between the acquisition and requirements communities.
Since the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, section 805 established the
requirement for PSMs, the Services have designated PSMs for Acquisition
Category (ACAT) I and II programs. We also established the PSM as a key
leadership position and revised the Life Cycle Logistics training
curriculum at Defense Acquisition University to better equip PSMs for
success. USD(AT&L) also provided detailed guidance in September 2011
for Program Managers and PSMs on development of the Life Cycle
Sustainment Plans (LCSP). The LCSP is the program's primary tool for
product support planning and is required for all acquisition
milestones. The LCSP must provide the program's plan to satisfy the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System mandated
sustainment requirements, including the O&S cost key system attribute.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the
Department needs to take to bring O&S costs under control?
Answer. We must execute and enforce key steps in the BBP
initiative--sustainability, affordability, and cost constraints. We
must use ``should cost'' management to drive costs down, including for
sustainment contracts. We must ensure proper alignment of incentives
between the government and its contractors. We are integrating policy,
guidance, workforce training, and improved oversight of programs to
reduce and control Operations and Sustainment (O&S) costs. This
integrated approach provides better sustainment planning for those
programs in the developmental phases of the acquisition process, a
necessary first step to achieve quantifiable savings for programs in
the operating and support phases of the life cycle. Our success will be
the reduction of actual O&S costs realized in coming years.
systems engineering
Question. One of the premises for WSARA was that the best way to
improve acquisition outcomes is to place acquisition programs on a
sounder footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in
the early phases of the acquisition process.
Do you believe that DOD has the systems engineering and
developmental testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed
to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements,
acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition
programs?
Answer. Yes. The Department has put emphasis on building the
systems engineering and developmental testing capabilities required for
acquisition. The numbers of system engineers and developmental testing
personnel has increased. There is a potential challenge with workforce
demographics as senior workforce personnel near retirement and a number
of relatively junior people gain more experience and proficiency. If
confirmed, I will strive to identify ways to address this problem.
Question. What is your assessment of the Department's
implementation to date of section 102 of WSARA, regarding systems
engineering?
Answer. In response to section 102, the Department established the
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems
Engineering, and has staffed this office with highly qualified
professionals. There has also been additional guidance and oversight
provided to the systems engineering capabilities in the Military
Services. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering in his oversight of this
area.
Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to
implement this provision?
Answer. I will work with the Service Acquisition Executives to
implement systems engineering policy and guidance to strengthen
implementation of section 102. We need to continue to address the
competency, capacity, and authority of the systems engineering
workforce as critical components of the acquisition system
open architecture programs
Question. Certain programs within DOD have made considerable
investments over the past several years in an effort to transition
development of combat systems to an open business model, commonly
referred to as Open Architecture (OA). OA systems are characterized by
modular design, public access to design specifications, software reuse,
common interface standards, and seamless interoperability between
system hardware and software applications. By exercising the
government's rights to the software developed with government funds,
rejecting proprietary and closed solutions, the government may be able
to bring to bear the critical elements of competition and innovation to
achieve improved system performance and affordability of major systems
both during the initial acquisition and during the sustainment phase.
To what extent do you believe that DOD implementation of an open
architecture strategy can lead to more efficient and effective
development, production and sustainment programs for major weapon
system acquisition?
Answer. I believe the Department must strongly promote competition
throughout the acquisition lifecycle to obtain the best value for the
warfighter at the lowest cost to the taxpayer. To support a competitive
environment, the Department has been aggressively pursuing open systems
architecture (OSA) as a means of opening our acquisition efforts to
greater competition, as well as more effectively managing intellectual
property to rapidly bring greater innovation, from a wider array of
sources, to the hands of our warfighter.
I support the Department focus on open systems architectures and
believe we must do a better job of creating options with approaches
like this to promote competition throughout the product lifecycle.
Promoting OSA business and technical best practices is one aspect of
BBP 2.0, and the Department is developing tools and guidance to ensure
that OSA practices are effectively applied.
Question. Are you aware of any legislative or regulatory
impediments to more broadly applying such a strategy?
Answer. I am not aware of any legislative or regulatory impediments
that inhibit implementing the DOD OSA strategy. The Department is
working on implementing the legislative authority given us in the last
NDAA for rights to data associated with segregation and reintegration
information. I believe this is a positive change that will be
especially helpful in crafting competitive open business models.
technological maturity
Question. Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone
Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to certify
that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of
maturity before Milestone B approval.
What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that
DOD complies with the requirements of section 2366b?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support USD(AT&L) in his role as
chair of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA) for Major Defense Acquisition Programs in fulfilling
this requirement.
Question. What steps if any will you take to ensure that the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and
Evaluation are adequately staffed and resourced to support decisions
makers in complying with the requirements of section 2366b?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously monitor the staffing
levels for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Developmental Test and Evaluation to ensure they can comply with their
requirements, to include those tasks to certify critical technologies
for major defense acquisition programs as written in title 10, U.S.C.,
section 2366b. To date, I am not aware that these offices have been
unable to meet their statutory requirements, but I will be vigilant to
ensure they will be able to continue meeting this requirement.
concurrency
Question. Some of the Department's largest and most troubled
acquisition programs appear to have suffered significantly from
excessive concurrency--the effort to produce a weapon system, even as
it is still being designed.
What impact do you believe that such excessive concurrency has on
our efforts to produce major weapon systems on schedule and on budget?
Answer. While some degree of concurrency may be appropriate, I
believe that when the proper balance is exceeded the result can
increase costs and lead to schedule delays. Any decision to
concurrently enter into production while still in the design phase must
take into account the risk in the development phase, the urgency of the
need, and the impact on cost and schedule as a result of concurrent
development. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure a careful balance is
established between the risk of concurrency and the urgency for the
need for programs that use it.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address this
issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that concurrency in any
planned major weapon system is thoroughly assessed from a risk and
benefit perspective before recommending the program for initiation, and
then re-evaluate the risks and benefits for each major program
decision. I expect cost and schedule estimates to clearly identify the
impact of any level of concurrent development and production. I will
also ensure that the risks are carefully tracked over the life of the
development effort.
joint strike fighter
Question. Secretary Kendall has been quoted as saying that it was
``acquisition malpractice'' to place the Joint Strike Fighter into
production years before the first flight test.
Do you share this view?
Answer. Yes, I share Under Secretary Kendall's view. Specifically,
the decision to begin production of the F-35 prior to flight test was a
departure from accepted and proven principles. As Under Secretary
Kendall has clarified, it is important to note that this judgment does
not extend to the F-35 program as a whole or any specific person. The
Department remains committed to the F-35 program and the program, if
appropriately managed, the program will provide the Department to
acquire a critical capability at an acceptable cost.
Question. What steps if any do you believe that we can take now to
address any problems or deficiencies that may have developed as a
result of excessive concurrency on the Joint Strike Fighter program?
Answer. I believe that the Department has already taken a number of
steps that will minimize the risks of concurrency. The decision to
maintain production at a fixed rate in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 will
allow time to validate and stabilize the design through the flight test
program. A ramp up in production is not planned until the need for
further design changes are reduced. The Low Rate Initial Production Lot
5 contract has been structured to ensure the appropriate amount of cost
risk is shared between the contractor and the Government. If confirmed,
I will ensure that future production decisions are based on adequate
understanding of the concurrency, costs, and design stability.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe we should
take to avoid similar problems in future acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe we need to pursue acquisition strategies based on
the sound principles of program management and system engineering. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the acquisition and engineering
professional leadership in the Department reviews major programs early
and regularly to preclude planning that is overly optimistic in
assumptions. I believe that a program based on sound acquisition and
engineering strategies will have the best chance to succeed and execute
within planned cost and schedule.
fixed price-type contracts
Question. Section 811 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires the
use of fixed-price contracts for the production of major weapon
systems, with limited exceptions. Similarly, section 818 of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2007 establishes a preference for the use of fixed-
price contracts for the development of major weapon systems.
What is your understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of
using fixed-price contracts for the development and procurement of
major weapon systems?
Answer. The decision to use a fixed price or cost plus contract for
development and/or procurement of a major weapons system should be
based on an understanding of the requirement, the technical risk,
supplier experience and strength, and the market for the product. Fixed
price contracts limit the Government's exposure to financial risk, but
introduce other risks.
Development fixed-price contracts make sense where we have firm
requirements with technical trades complete, where design is
established and required technologies are mature (low risk), where
potential bidders have actual experience with the type of product
desired and where they have the capacity to absorb some level of
financial loss if problems arise. In this instance it is appropriate to
place the financial burden on industry. The disadvantage is if the
development effort experiences problems, there can be serious financial
impact for the contractor. Further, because of the fixed price nature
of the arrangement, it is much more difficult for the Government to
provide technical guidance without having to renegotiate the contract.
For procurement I'm much more comfortable with fixed price
contracts provided there has been sufficient development and testing to
have firm requirements, a proven design, established manufacturing
processes and qualified suppliers. Use of incentive contracts in early
production especially makes sense.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it is
appropriate for the Department to use a cost-type contract for the
development or production of a major weapon system?
Answer. Since most major weapon system development programs deal
with maturing designs and significant integration problems, the factors
I listed in the above question are not present and a fixed price
development contract imposes too much risk on industry. A cost plus
contract, on the other hand, reduces the financial risk and helps
facilitate a more open working relationship with industry to achieve
the desired outcome for the warfighter.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the law governing
the use of fixed-price contracts for the development and production of
major weapon systems?
Answer. No. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and the DOD Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement already provide adequate
flexibilities.
technology transition
Question. The Department continues to struggle with the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has struggled with
moving technologies from DOD programs or other sources rapidly into the
hands of operational users.
What impediments to technology transition do you see within the
Department?
Answer. Over the past 2 years, as part of Deputy Secretary of
Defense's Warfighter Senior Integration group, I have seen improvements
in transitioning technology to the hands of the operator. However,
there are still impediments, such as the lead time and rigidity of the
budget process, the formality and inflexibility associated with
Programs of Record, the difficulties in altering military requirements,
and the hurdles small businesses and non-defense companies have in
doing business with the Government.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance
the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?
Answer. There are already a number of activities underway in the
Department to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition. The
rapid acquisition programs that the Department has initiated to support
ongoing operations have been very successful at acquiring new
technologies and fielding them quickly.
The Department needs to institutionalize the rapid acquisition
process so that future urgent needs can also be met effectively, and
efforts are underway for expanding the rapid acquisition of Joint
Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) from primarily off the shelf
technology to those that require some limited development time and may
not be directly associated with ongoing operations.
Under the BBP initiatives, the Department has taken steps to
improve the use of open systems and open architectures as a means of
permitting new technologies to be inserted into existing programs.
These are just examples of the types of steps the Department needs to
take to improve technology transition.
If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L) and Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to drive additional
opportunities to enhance technology transition.
Question. What role do you believe Technology Readiness Levels and
Manufacturing Readiness Levels should play in the Department's efforts
to enhance effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in
acquisition programs?
Answer. Technology and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (TRLs and
MRLs) are aids to understand how the maturity of technologies or the
lack of maturity can affect an acquisition programs risk. I believe
they are valuable knowledge-based benchmarks against which to assess
program risk, but I also believe that TRLs and MRLs alone are not
conclusive about whether or not a program should proceed to development
and production. Each decision requires an understanding of the actual
risk associated with a technology, and the steps that could be taken to
mitigate that risk. If confirmed, I will continue to use TRLs and MRLs,
but I will also seek to improve how we handle risk assessments early in
programs.
Question. Section 1073 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 established
a competitive, merit-based rapid innovation fund to accelerate the
fielding of technologies developed pursuant to SBIR projects,
technologies developed by the defense laboratories, and other
innovative technologies.
What is your view of the rapid innovation fund established by
section 1073?
Answer. This program emphasizes rapid, responsive acquisition with
preference to small, innovative businesses solving defense problems
using a fully merit-based, competitive proposal process. In September
2011, the Department issued the initial solicitations for Rapid
Innovation Fund (RIF) proposals, receiving over 3,500 responses, which
lead to awards of 177 contracts by the end of September 2012. Given
that the performance period for the majority of these contracts spans
18-24 months, my view is that it is too early to determine the RIF's
overall impact. Our implementation processes were successful in
obtaining proposals, primarily from small businesses. However, contract
awards should not be the sole criteria for success. I believe it will
take more time to objectively assess the effectiveness of RIF in
achieving its goals.
Question. In your view, has the Department been successful in
ensuring that awards under this program are made on a merit basis and
benefit the Department?
Answer. Yes, the Department successfully established a merit-based
Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) program. The Department employed Broad
Agency Announcements in 2011 and 2012 for a competitive, two-step
source selection process. This facilitated submission of white papers,
with a ``go/no go'' evaluation, followed by request for full proposals
to the highest rated ``go'' proposals. All vendors received a
notification. With regard to program benefit, it will be at least 12-24
months before the Department can effectively evaluate the outcome and
benefits of RIF. However, owing to the in-depth involvement by
acquisition program staff in evaluation of RIF proposals, I expect
substantial benefits to be demonstrated.
unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations
Question. Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD
acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly
optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance
expectations. Section 201 of WSARA seeks to address this problem by
promoting early consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and
performance objectives in major defense acquisition programs.
Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition,
budget and requirements communities in DOD can help ensure more
realistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations?
Yes, early communication between these three communities is
essential at all levels
Question. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure such communication?
Answer. If confirmed, I would reinforce existing efforts in the
area of early communication between the communities. I will work with
the component acquisition executives to stress the importance of their
participation in similar early discussions for all acquisitions in
their organizations. I will also stress the need to forge closer
collaboration and understanding between those articulating military
needs and those charged with fulfilling those needs. After early
consideration of cost and capability trade-offs, I will strive to
sustain stable programs through mechanisms such as Configuration
Control Boards, and other forums where requirement, acquisition, and
financial communities can interact usefully to achieve affordable and
realistic outcomes. I will also foster training that inculcates these
approaches into the culture of our workforce.
Question. DOD has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition
and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule
and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.
Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development
can help improve the performance of the Department's major acquisition
programs?
Answer. Yes, but I recognize this is not a panacea, and how these
approaches are applied to a particular situation requires careful
deliberation. The strategy can be effective when faced with technology
that is rapidly changing or we are faced with an evolving threat. It
can also allow the fielding of a capability to the force that is ``good
enough'' in the short-term, while continuing to advance a new
technology to upgrade the system to provide the warfighter with a
technical advantage long-term.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's use of
incremental acquisition and spiral development?
Answer. Applied appropriately, in the right circumstances, these
approaches should not add additional risk. Technical risk can be
minimized with a design that allows for incremental addition of
capability, but this must be inherent in the program plans from the
outset so that upgrades to the final configuration are as seamless as
possible, or rolled into the product as changes in the production
sequence. These approaches require careful consideration of technical
rights, open or commercial standards, and interface requirements. If
requirements are not clearly defined early in the effort, schedules are
not realistic and resources are not provided in the required amount and
with the proper phasing, the acquisition will take longer, cost more,
and deliver less, regardless of the program's execution method.
Question. In your view, has the Department's approach to
incremental acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or
why not?
Answer. I believe that the Department's approach to incremental
acquisition and spiral development has had varied results. As with any
approach, there are examples of both effective and ineffective
employment of this type of acquisition process in the Department's
history. It has been more challenging than expected in certain cases to
``pre-plan'' future spirals of capability. Employed carefully, in the
right circumstances, these approaches can be successful and if
confirmed, I would work to achieve that.
funding and requirements stability
Question. The poor performance of major defense acquisition
programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and
requirements. In the past, DOD has attempted to provide greater funding
stability through the use of multi-year contracts. Section 814 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the use of Configuration Steering
Boards to exercise control over any changes to requirements that would
increase program costs.
Do you support the use of Configuration Steering Boards to increase
requirements stability on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes. Activities such as Configuration Steering Boards
provide a leadership forum to review proposed changes to programs in
terms of requirements, technology, or system configuration with the
intent to preclude adverse program impacts on cost or schedule. If
confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the positive aspects of
Configuration Steering Boards and other similar forums.
Question. What other steps if any would you recommend taking to
increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with senior leaders in DOD to
strive to maintain funding and requirement stability to the maximum
extent possible. The acquisition, requirements, and resource
communities must work together to ensure programs have realistic
requirements and funding profiles at inception, and must continue to
work effectively together as programs execute throughout the lifecycle.
multi-year contracts
Question. The statement of managers accompanying section 811 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the requirements for buying major
defense systems under multi-year contracts as follows: ``The conferees
agree that `substantial savings' under section 2306b(a)(1) of title 10,
U.S.C., means savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of
carrying out the program through annual contracts, except that multi-
year contracts for major systems providing savings estimated at less
than 10 percent should only be considered if the Department presents an
exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other
requirements of section 2306b(a), as amended. The conferees agree with
a Government Accountability Office (GAO) finding that any major system
that is at the end of its production line is unlikely to meet these
standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a multi-year
procurement contract.''
If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you anticipate
that you would support a multi-year contract with expected savings of
less than 10 percent?
Answer. Though each situation is different, I believe that multi-
year contracts can provide substantial cost savings and should be
considered as an option to best serve the warfighter and taxpayer. Key
considerations would be the total savings that could be achieved and
the firmness of the procurement plan. While 10 percent or more is the
goal, it should not be an absolute standard; a lesser percent on a
large procurement still yields significant dollar savings for the
Department. If the Department is confident that the procurement is
needed during the time period, then every opportunity for potential
savings and increasing buying power will be critical in balancing the
Department's budget as budgets decline.
Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you
support a multi-year contract for a major system at the end of its
production line?
Answer. I would have to review the merits of the particular
situation since these are complex circumstances without simple answers,
and there may be times it may be appropriate. In general, I would look
for the total savings potential and stability in the planned
procurement.
Question. What are your views on multi-year procurements? Under
what circumstances do you believe they should be used?
Answer. I believe multi-year procurements are beneficial if they
provide significant savings to the taxpayer, and there is a firm
commitment to the planned procurement to provide stability to the
industrial base. The circumstances and risks of each case need to be
weighed carefully on the individual merits, but the magnitude of the
savings and the expected stability of the program are among primary
considerations.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should DOD ever break a
multi-year procurement?
Answer. I would expect such a circumstance to be very unusual, but
in the rare situation when it occurs, it could be an outcome of a
decision to not to fund a program due to unanticipated budget cuts
forcing the Department to reprioritize, an inability of the contractor
to perform so another supplier must be arranged for, or an
unanticipated threat that makes the program unneeded. If confirmed, I
would continue to support the Federal laws and defense contracting
regulations concerning multi-year procurement.
continuing competition and organizational conflicts of interest
Question. Section 202 of WSARA requires DOD to take steps to
promote continuing competition (or the option of such competition)
throughout the life of major defense acquisition programs.
What is your view on the utility of continuing competition as a
tool to achieve long-term innovation and cost savings on major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. Competition is the Department's most effective tool to
reduce prices, and DOD should use direct competitive acquisition
strategies whenever possible. Competition allows the Department to
leverage innovation, science and technology, design, and drive
efficiency through a program's lifecycle, providing a stronger return
on investment. The Department should attempt to use this paradigm as
much as possible in its programs and contracting strategies. Using the
BBP initiatives, we have stressed the need for a competitive
environment to the greatest extent possible in all our programs,
realizing the classical head to head competition situation is not
always viable. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L) to continue to
stress creating a competitive environment as one of the most effective
ways the Department has of controlling cost.
Question. Do you believe that such continuing competition is a
viable option on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes, creating competition at both the prime and sub-
contract level is among one of the most powerful tools available to the
Department to drive productivity and control cost. To ensure that
competition is emphasized during each phase of the acquisition process,
the Department has issued policy requiring our Program Managers to
present a competition strategy at each program milestone. If confirmed,
I will work with USD(AT&L) and Component Acquisition Executives to
ensure this policy is effectively executed.
Question. In your view, has the consolidation of the defense
industrial base gone too far and undermined competition for defense
contracts?
Answer. The consolidation of the defense industrial base has left
us with a limited number of prime contractors. Further consolidation at
the prime contractor level is probably not in the best interest of the
taxpayer or the Department. If confirmed, I will review any proposed
business deal objectively on its merits and provide my input to the
USD(AT&L). I expect to see increased activity in mergers and
acquisitions in the lower tiers of the industrial base, and even
consolidations to further streamline capabilities and respond in a
market-driven manner to the reduced budgets anticipated over the coming
decade. The USD(AT&L) and I will examine these transactions carefully
on a case-by-case basis to preserve competition and facilitate the most
efficient and effective industrial base possible.
Question. If so, what steps if any can and should DOD take to
address this issue?
Answer. The Department's policy is to allow market forces to shape
the market except in those cases that eliminate competition and are not
ultimately in the best interest of the Department and taxpayer. The
Department discourages mergers and acquisitions among defense materiel
suppliers that are anti-competitive or injurious to national security.
The Department is not, however, an antitrust regulator and the ability
for the other regulatory agencies to intervene must meet statutory
criteria. In cases of concern, I would ensure the Department provides
information and support needed to the antitrust regulators for their
merger reviews. I would also seek to encourage new entrants or
exploration of alternatives in cases where consolidation has resulted
in a loss of competition.
Question. Section 203 of WSARA requires the use of competitive
prototypes for major defense acquisition programs unless the cost of
producing such prototypes would exceed the lifecycle benefits of
improved performance and increased technological and design maturity
that prototypes would achieve.
Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes. Competitive prototyping can be an effective mechanism
for maturing technology, refining performance requirements, and
improving our understanding of how those requirements can drive systems
acquisition costs. They should be used primarily as a means of reducing
future risk in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and
production phase. There are cases however when the cost in time and
money associated with competitive prototypes outweighs the potential
benefits
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the use of
competitive prototypes is likely to be beneficial?
Answer. Competitive prototyping is risk reduction; however, this
comes with a tradeoff of cost and schedule. Like all other risk
reduction techniques, competitive prototyping has to be considered on a
case-by-case basis and it has to reduce the risk of entering
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD). The level of risk
depends on the maturity of candidate technologies, and more
importantly, the risk associated with integrating those technologies
into a viable product. When planned or proposed technology has
implementation risk, particularly in an integrated product, and has not
been demonstrated adequately, competitive prototyping during the
technology development phase can be a key element of a comprehensive
technical risk management process. Overall, competitive prototyping can
provide benefits beyond risk reduction to include sustaining
competition further into the design process, reducing total program
cost, and lead to better products for our warfighters.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the cost of such
prototypes is likely to outweigh the potential benefits?
Answer. In cases where the material solution is based on mature
technologies and demonstrated designs with little integration risk, the
additional costs, and schedule of competitive prototyping may not
offset the potential reduction of risk and overall system lifecycle
costs. Prototypes requiring very high investments with the prospect of
very limited production runs are also not likely to be cost effective.
For example, competitive prototyping of ships and satellites is
frequently cost-prohibitive, both in a Technology Demonstration phase
and in Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. When a low risk
approach is taken such as using a modified non-developmental item the
benefits of competitive prototyping may not justify the cost.
implementation of the weapon systems acquisition reform act of 2009
Question. Several new major weapons programs have been started
since the WSARA was enacted. Examples include the Ohio-class Submarine
Replacement Program, the KC-46 Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement
Program, the VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program, and the
Ground Combat Vehicle Program.
In your view, how effectively have such ``new start'' major defense
acquisition programs abided by the tenets, and implemented the
requirements, of the WSARA, particularly those that address ``starting
programs off right'' by requiring that early investment decisions be
informed by realistic cost estimates, sound systems engineering
knowledge, and reliable technological risk assessments?
Answer. I believe the Department has abided by the tenets and
effectively implemented the requirements of WSARA in each of its ``new
start'' programs begun since WSARA's enactment. The certifications
required by WSARA provide a means to enforce each program's
implementation. Each of the new start programs cited above received
careful attention to develop well understood and technically achievable
requirements with a sharp focus on affordability. I strongly believe
that the keys to successful program execution are sound and realistic
planning at program initiation, which are fundamental principles
embodied in WSARA.
Question. Where do you think there might be room for improvement?
Answer. I believe WSARA provides adequate guidance and authority
without the need for changes at this time. If confirmed, I will support
USD(AT&L) and ensure the ``new start'' programs implement WSARA and BBP
initiatives to maximize the program's probability of successfully
delivering affordable, technically sound capability to the warfighter
and the taxpayer. Fundamentally, the BBP initiatives that Deputy
Secretary Carter and Under Secretary Kendall started are based on the
premise that the Department can learn from experience and continuously
improve. If confirmed, I will work to identify and implement continuous
improvements to the acquisition system.
the better buying power initiative
Question. DOD's Better Buying Power initiative provides acquisition
professionals with important guidance on how to achieve greater
efficiency, enhanced productivity, and affordability in how the
Department procures goods and services.
If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to follow-through on
this guidance and ensure that it is implemented as intended?
Answer. I will work closely with USD(AT&L) on a daily basis as we
continue to pursue the efficiency, productivity, and affordability
initiatives started in 2010 under BBP. The BBP initiatives are not
static, they are under continuous review and are being modified, added
to, and matured as the Department learns more from its experience with
the initiatives. If confirmed, I will follow-through on implementation
of the initiatives and carefully consider additional steps consistent
with the principles and objectives of the initiatives.
Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
strengthen and improve the implementation of the BBP initiative?
Answer. The Department is fully dedicated to the successful
implementation of BBP. Under Secretary Kendall recently introduced BBP
2.0 as part of the Department's commitment to continuous process
improvement in the defense acquisition system. Many of the initiatives
encompassed in BBP 2.0 are continuations from earlier BBP initiatives
begun in 2010, because their implementation is long-term and ongoing.
If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(AT&L), the Component
Acquisition Executives, and others in the Department to monitor and
drive the implementation of these initiatives, as well as identify
additional ways to improve implementation. I will ensure we update
appropriate policies and regulations, issue additional guidance, update
training, and institute data collection mechanisms to objectively
assess outcomes.
urgent and emerging needs
Question. Section 804 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 required the
Department to establish procedures to ensure that rapid acquisition
processes are not misused for the acquisition of systems and
capabilities that are not urgent and would be more appropriately
acquired in accordance with normal acquisition procedures.
Do you agree that rapid acquisition procedures are not generally
suited to the acquisition of complex systems that require substantial
development effort, are based on technologies that are unproven, and
are too risky to be acquired under fixed price contracts?
Answer. I agree that rapid acquisition procedures are not generally
intended for programs of the complexity normal for a standard
developmental acquisition program. The Department reserves rapid
acquisition procedures for urgent requirements where a capability must
be delivered as soon as possible, but generally within 24 months. These
programs, by their nature, are not sustained development programs. They
generally have limited cost risk as compared to traditional major
development efforts, and if a nondevelopmental solution exists, it
makes sense to acquire that solution in order to meet warfighter needs
as soon as possible. However, for many Joint Urgent Operational Needs
(JUONs) and Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs), some
modification, integration, or development of existing products is
required to satisfy the requirement. Not all of these programs are
suitable for fixed price contracts because they often utilize small,
non-traditional suppliers who are not capable of absorbing the cost
risks.
These issues are considered when the requirement is initially
validated, and the acquisition community continues to review them as
the program progresses to ensure that we meet warfighter requirements
in as timely way wherever possible. There may also be exceptional cases
where a technological leap by an adversary may call for taking unusual
risks not normally typified under rapid acquisition procedures. If
confirmed, I will review the Department's use of rapid acquisition
procedures to ensure that they are being properly applied.
Question. DOD recently established a new category of requirement,
known as Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON). Like JUONs, JEONs may
be acquired through rapid fielding processes. Unlike JUONs, however,
JEONs are not limited to capabilities that can be fielded within 2
years, do not require extensive development, are based on proven
technologies, and can be appropriately acquired through fixed price
contracts. The committee report on the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013
directs the Department to develop additional protections to ensure that
the JEON process is not abused.
Would you agree that it would be inappropriate to use the JEON
process to initiate significant acquisition programs without conducting
cost-schedule-performance trade-offs, developing reasonable cost,
schedule, and performance expectations, providing strong systems
engineering, and ensuring the use of appropriately mature technologies?
Answer. In general, I agree that a JEON is not intended as a
mechanism to initiate a Major Defense Acquisition Program. There may be
exceptions in which a rapid development initiated as a JEON (or even a
Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON)) could lead to significant
acquisition programs. For example, route clearance vehicles acquired in
response to a JUON provided the first V-shaped hulled vehicles to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Their success in theater led to the initiation of
additional JUONs that resulted in a significant acquisition program--
the MRAP class of vehicle.
I understand that it is important to evaluate cost, schedule and
performance trade-offs for JEON solutions because doing so is critical
to responding to these requirements in a way that is consistent with
their urgency. Systems engineering, cost and performance tradeoffs, and
addressing technical maturity for JEONs, within the time available, is
critical to ensuring we deliver sufficient capability when it is
needed. The Department tailors its acquisition processes to ensure we
address these important considerations while meeting the warfighter's
immediate need. If confirmed, I will review the Department's handling
of JEONs to ensure the appropriate procedures are in place and are
being followed.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department
develops additional guidance for JEONs, in accordance with the
direction of the committee report on the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013?
Answer. Yes.
contracting for services
Question. By most estimates, the Department now spends more for the
purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon
systems). After a decade of rapid growth, section 808 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2012 placed a cap on DOD spending for contract services for
fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Section 955 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2013 requires a 5 percent reduction in spending for contract services
over the next 5 years.
Do you believe that DOD can do more to reduce spending on contract
services?
Answer. Yes, that is why I strongly support USD(AT&L) and
Department leadership in continuing to make this a priority as
indicated in USD(AT&L)'s November 13, 2012, memorandum entitled,
``Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending''. Through the
initiatives that began under the original BBP in 2010, BBP 2.0 will
focus on initiatives to improve our stewardship over service contracts,
while ensuring the Department only acquires what it truly needs as
economically as possible.
Question. Do you believe that the current balance between
government employees (military and civilian) and contractor employees
is in the best interests of DOD?
Answer. I believe the Department must routinely assess its Total
Force mix to ensure an appropriate alignment of workload to military,
civilian, and contract support. This alignment is driven by many
variables, it takes time to rebalance, and is likely to change based on
mission, operating environment, workload, and costs. I think we must
ensure that we have a properly sized and highly capable government
workforce that guards against an erosion of critical, organic skills
and an overreliance on contracted services, particularly in such areas
as acquisition program management, information technology, and
financial management. However, the Department must also recognize the
contributions and value of the private sector as a vital source of
expertise, innovation, and support to the Department's Total Force. If
confirmed, I will continue to support the administration's and
Department's focus on ensuring our utilization of contracted support is
appropriate given the nature of the mission, risks, and work required.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
control the Department's spending on contract services and ensure that
the Department complies with the requirements of section 808 and
section 955?
Answer. USD(AT&L) is continuing to make the acquisition of services
a priority as part of his broader BBP initiatives. Through the
initiatives that began under the original BBP in 2010, there will be a
focus on initiatives to improve our stewardship over service contracts.
If confirmed, I will support every effort to continue the Department's
effort to comply with the requirements of sections 808 and 955. The
Deputy Secretary of Defense has issued guidance to the Department on
how to comply with the limitation on funds for contracted services
imposed by section 808. Subsequently, a class deviation to the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) implementing that
guidance has been issued on July 31, 2012.
Question. Would you recommend the use of fixed price contracts as
the preferred contracting method for services? If not, why not?
Answer. I would recommend that for service requirements that can be
expressed in performance-based terms, with a defined output, the
Department use fixed-priced contracts as the preferred method. However,
contract type must be tailored to each particular requirement in order
to influence desired results with the contracted service provided. For
example, where contracted support is level of effort in nature, with no
defined output, a cost plus fixed fee arrangement may likely be an
appropriate approach. If confirmed I will support efforts to continue
to address the determination of appropriate contract type as a key
element of consideration in the review and approval process of
acquisition strategies for service requirements.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe that fixed price
contracts should or should not be used for the purchases of services?
Answer. I would recommend fixed price contracts be used for work
that can be expressed in performance-based terms that has a defined
output.
Question. Section 812 of the NDAA for 2007 required DOD to develop
a management structure for the procurement of contract services.
Sections 807 and 808 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (subsequently
codified in section 2330a of title 10, U.S.C.) require DOD to develop
inventories and conduct management reviews of contracts for services.
Do you believe the Department is providing appropriate stewardship
over service contracts?
Answer. Yes I do, but recognize there is room for further
improvement in the Department's stewardship. If confirmed, I would
strongly support USD(AT&L) and Department leadership in continuing to
make this a priority in the BBP initiatives, which focus on initiatives
to improve our stewardship over service contracts.
Question. Do you believe that the Department has appropriate
management structures in place to oversee the expenditure of more than
$150 billion a year for contract services?
Answer. Yes, though they can continue to be improved and expanded
upon. The Military Departments, DLA, and the Missile Defense Agency,
which have the largest portion share of the Department's expenditures
on the acquisition of services, have identified a Senior Service
Manager who is responsible for overseeing all acquisition of services.
These Senior Service Managers are responsible for identifying and
implementing more effective methods to procure required services and
meeting on a regular basis to share lessons learned and best practices.
Each of these Senior Service Managers has developed its own
organizational structure and mechanisms to provide the appropriate
oversight, management structure and review process for the acquisition
of services. In addition, all acquisitions for services which exceed $1
billion are reviewed and approved by the Director, Defense Procurement
and Acquisition Policy and his staff to ensure that the strategy
incorporates tenets the Department has established as requirements for
the effective acquisition of services.
Question. Do you support the use of management reviews, or peer
reviews, of major service contracts to identify ``best practices'' and
develop lessons learned?
Answer. Yes, I believe that the Peer Review process that the
Department has employed on the acquisition of services implemented for
service contracts, and other major acquisitions, has been extremely
beneficial. For acquisitions of services valued at $1 billion or more,
a Peer Review team, comprised primarily of senior leaders and attorneys
from outside the military department or defense agency whose
procurement is the subject of the review, meet with acquisition teams
to critically assess whether the acquisition process for services was
well understood by both government and industry individuals. Similarly,
military departments and defense agencies have developed and are
executing plans to accomplish Peer Reviews within their respective
organizations for acquisitions valued at less than $1 billion. The Peer
Review process helps the Department to influence consistency of
approach, ensure the quality of contracting, and drive cross-sharing of
ideas such as best practices and lessons learned.
Question. If confirmed, will you fully comply with the requirement
of section 2330a, to develop an inventory of services performed by
contractors comparable to the inventories of services performed by
Federal employees that are already prepared pursuant to the Federal
Acquisition Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Section 863 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD
to establish a process for identifying, assessing, reviewing, and
validating requirements for the acquisition of contract services.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 863?
Answer. On March 4, 2012, the Deputy Secretary of Defense sent a
memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the
Directors of the Defense Agencies directing they submit their
respective processes and initial implementation plans to fulfill the
requirements of section 863. The components have now submitted their
plans through the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy.
Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the
Department established for taking these steps?
Answer. The BBP initiatives recently announced by USD(AT&L)
includes as a new initiative to expand the use of requirements review
boards and tripwires. This initiative recognizes that a more robust
process is required to identify, assess, review, and validate
requirements for contracted services. Implementation details are
expected in the coming weeks. If confirmed, I will support vigorous
implementation.
Question. What additional steps if any would you take, if
confirmed, to improve the Department's management of its contracts for
services?
Answer. Consistent with statutory requirements for management
oversight and control processes and the requirements in the original
BBP memorandum of September 14, 2010, the components have put in place
a framework to manage the acquisition of services. The components have
each established a senior manager for services acquisitions. If
confirmed, I would continue to support the Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy in developing, for the Under
Secretary's approval, a new Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) to
govern the acquisition of services to replace and expand upon existing
guidance in DODI 5000.02, Enclosure 9. Further, I would support
rigorous oversight of these policies, once put in place.
contractor performance of critical governmental functions
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees. Section 1706 of title 10, U.S.C., as added by section
824 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, requires that key positions on
major defense acquisition programs be filled by full-time government
employees.
In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support
the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. I recognize that the private sector is, and will continue
to be, a vital source of expertise, innovation, and support. DOD, which
relies on an all-volunteer military force, cannot operate without the
support of contractors. We must also maintain a properly sized, and
highly capable, government workforce that guards against an erosion of
critical, organic skills and an overreliance on contracted services. If
confirmed, I will continue to support the administration's and
Department's focus on ensuring our utilization of contracted support is
appropriate given the nature of the mission, risks, and work required.
Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
services contracts is in the best interest of the Department of
Defense?
Answer. Generally, I do believe that personal service contracts,
established in accordance with the applicable statues, are in the best
interest of the Department. I recognize that certain requirements, such
as limited use of medical care providers, may be appropriately
fulfilled using personal service contracts. However, I also recognize
that service contracts that have been categorized as nonpersonal
contracts may inappropriately evolve into personal service arrangements
in practice. If confirmed, I will work to address this risk and enforce
the limits on use of personal service contracts.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of
personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements
to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those
performed by Government employees?
Answer. When it is appropriate for contractors to perform work that
is similar to work performed by government employees, my view is that
those contractor employees should be held to similar ethical and
conflict of interest standards as the government employees they
support. In particular, they should not be allowed to misuse the
information which may be available to them as a result of their
performance under a DOD contract.
wartime contracting
Question. The number of U.S. contractor employees in Afghanistan
now substantially exceeds the number of U.S. military deployed in that
country.
Do you believe that the Department of Defense has become too
dependent on contractor support for military operations?
Answer. At this time, I do not believe the Department is too
dependent on contractors in support of military operations. The Total
Force is comprised of U.S. military forces, DOD civilians, and our DOD
contractor partners. We live in a constrained resource environment and
future operations will continue to use this Total Force. Military force
structure is fixed by law, and we concentrate military manpower on
combat capabilities and selected tasks that are inherently
governmental. In addition, deployable DOD civilians also handle
inherently governmental tasks. Military planners typically assign the
remaining tasks to other elements of the total force, many of which are
appropriate for contractor support. Contractors are force multipliers,
performing non-inherently governmental functions, and allowing limited
military resources to focus on what they are trained to do. Going
forward, our management of contractors in support of military
operations requires constant attention and review to continue to
identify management improvements.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department
should take to mitigate such risk?
Answer. The risks associated with a heavy reliance on contractor
support include possible loss of selected services for future
contingencies in changed operational environments, the migration of
inherently governmental functions to contractors, the erosion of the
Department's critical core knowledge and capability, and the risk of
losing contingency contract management expertise and structure that has
been established over the last several years. I will ensure we conduct
risk assessments associated with reliance on contract support in a
variety of contingency operations to ensure the risks are addressed and
mitigated. The Department must properly incorporate enduring polices,
training, and doctrine to alleviate these risks. If confirmed, I will
support the additional steps to integrate contractor support estimates
into existing planning processes and procedures, and in force planning
scenario development and joint force assessments.
Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. Yes, though each situation will be different, and this was
not always the case. We are constantly improving our processes and
procedures based on feedback from commanders in the field,
congressional support, and suggestions from our service providers. The
Department is aggressively operational contract support constructs to
better manage contractors on the battlefield. This approach
incorporates Requirement Definitions, as prescribed by Congress; Risk
Management; and Operational Contingency Management practices that
include consideration of contingency contractors and operational
support capabilities in mission planning and execution.
Question. Section 848 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011, section 820
of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, and section 845 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2013 establish planning requirements for contractor
logistics support.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of sections 848, 820, and 845?
Answer. As required by section 820, contractors have been
recognized as part of the Total Force, in addition to military and DOD
civilians, in the appropriate strategic documents including the
Quadrennial Defense Review and relevant policy and planning documents.
Additionally, section 820 risk assessments on the use of contractors
are being conducted, and contractors are being integrated into force
mix evaluations and operational planning, including the biennial risk
assessments by the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Over the past 6
years the Department has made far reaching improvements in the
management and oversight of contractors to include contractor officer
representative training, instruction in our senior service colleges,
and in the General Officer/Flag Officer Capstone training.
Strategically, the Operational Contracting Support Functional
Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB) governance structure oversees
continuing efforts to meet requirements outlined in section 845, as
well as, requirements in previous legislation, the findings of the
Commission on Wartime Contracting, and the Gansler Commission.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to improve its planning processes for the use of contractors in
contingency operations?
Answer. As required by law, we continue to refine contractor
support requirements definition, the contingency program management
organization, and related processes to ensure all needs are captured to
avoid unnecessary duplication of capabilities, and to ensure we are
synchronized with our agency partners. The recent transition in Iraq
and the pending transition in Afghanistan have provided us numerous
lessons learned in these areas.
With regards to operational contracting support, the Joint Staff is
finalizing their important update to Joint Publication 4-10,
Operational Contract Support. Planners at each of the combatant
commands have developed annexes for contracted support in key OPLANS
and CONPLANS, and we are continuing to improve the plans for integrated
contracted support at the service component level. If confirmed, I will
continue to monitor their initiatives closely.
Question. Sections 841 and 842 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012
gives the Department new tools to ensure that it does not enter
contracts with any person or entity who is actively supporting hostile
forces in Afghanistan.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of sections 841 and 842?
Answer. The Department implemented sections 841 and 842 in the
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) via the Class
Deviation #2012-O0005 on January 26, 2012. The deviation adds two new
clauses to the DFARS--252.225-7993, Prohibition on Contracting with the
Enemy in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Theater of Operations; and
252.225-7994, Additional Access to Contractor and Subcontractor Records
in the U.S. Central Command Theater of Operations.
This class deviation allows the Heads of Contracting Activity (HCA)
to exercise the authorities provided in the deviation, upon receipt of
the enemy notification letter from the CENTCOM Commander, to restrict,
terminate, or void contracts with persons or entities that support an
insurgency or otherwise actively oppose U.S. or coalitions forces in
Afghanistan. This deviation also grants contracting officers an
additional access to any contractor's records, including
subcontractors, regardless of contract value, to ensure Department's
contracts are not subject to extortion or corruption. The CENTCOM
Commander has issued four section 841 notifications to date, resulting
in the termination of three subcontracts.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to avoid contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe sections 841 and 842 provide the Department
sufficient statutory authorities to avoid contracting with the enemy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Does the Department need additional tools for this
purpose?
Answer. I believe the tools provided through sections 841 and 842
are sufficient to enable us to succeed in this area.
private security contractors
Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense and other
Federal agencies should reduce their reliance on contractors to perform
security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use
of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat
operations?
Answer. I believe the use of private security contractors must be
carefully considered against the risk of becoming involved in combat
operations. I also believe it may be appropriate to use private
security contractors for specific security functions in contingency
operations when they are limited by specific rules of engagement.
However, the Department of Defense must provide proper guidance and
supervision when using private security contractors and must ensure
they do not engage in combat operations.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an
area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with
U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department of Defense has
policies that effectively guide the operations of private security
contractors when they are used, and that we provide proper oversight.
We must also ensure all contractors, to include private security
contractors, are legally accountable for their actions, and that
private security contractors that operate in an area of combat and
contingency operations act responsibly.
Question. Section 846 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires the
Department of Defense to undertake risk assessments and risk mitigation
whenever it relies on contractors to perform critical functions in
support of overseas contingency operations.
What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the
Department fully implements the requirements of section 846?
Answer. I believe that contract support is an essential part of the
total force and will remain so in the future. In many cases contractors
are absolutely vital. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department
of Defense policy and operational guidance addresses this requirement,
and that proper risk assessments are conducted.
u.s. special operations command acquisition authorities
Question. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is unique within
the DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and
funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed
commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive.
Would you recommend any changes to SOCOM's current acquisition
authorities?
Answer. I would not recommend any changes at this time. If
confirmed, I will support continued dialogue between SOCOM and
USD(AT&L) to improve acquisition efficiency and effectiveness.
Question. What role do you believe SOCOM's development and
acquisition activities should play in broader Service and Department of
Defense efforts?
Answer. I believe the Department should always seek the broadest
benefit and application of its development and acquisition activities.
The best way for the Department to take advantage of potential
synergies and identify best practices is through close coordination
between SOCOM's activities and the broader Department acquisition
system. This coordination would also help to eliminate duplication and
control costs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that special
operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall
Department of Defense research, development and acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ``SOCOM
Acquisition Summit'' that meets in person every 6 months to coordinate,
collaborate, and integrate SOCOM's activities with the rest of the
Department. This initiative, instituted by Deputy Secretary Carter and
Under Secretary Kendall, has proven very beneficial to both SOCOM and
the Department. I see the summit as important to ensure SOCOM's
acquisition needs are understood and integrated with other Department
efforts.
pass-through contracts
Question. Section 852 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007
requires the Department of Defense to promulgate regulations
prohibiting excessive ``pass-through'' charges on DOD contracts.
Section 802 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 adds the requirement for
contracting officers to consider the availability of alternative
contract vehicles before entering into pass-through contracts in the
first place.
In your view, how extensive is the use of pass-through contracts in
the Department of Defense and how important is it for the Department to
reduce the use of such contracts?
Answer. To the extent that pass-through costs exist, I believe it
is important to reduce these costs because of the complexity of the
weapon systems being procured by the Department. Prime contractors
generally need to subcontract a portion of the effort in order to
provide the most effective overall response to the requirement.
However, I do not believe that there are necessarily extensive pass
through costs associated with these subcontracting efforts. In response
to the requirements of section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007,
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) were modified to require
prime contractors to identify their intention to subcontract more than
70 percent of the total cost of work to be performed, and to provide a
description of the added value being provided by the prime as related
to the work to be performed by the proposed subcontractors.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
requirements of section 852 and section 802 regarding pass-through
contracts?
Answer. Per statute, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State
(State), and the Administrator of U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) have 180 days from enactment to implement section
802 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 to issue guidance and implement
regulations. A Federal Acquisition Regulation case, 2013-012, was
established for this purpose. Until this guidance is developed via the
regulatory rule making process, it is difficult to comment on changes
required by either section.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the
Department should take to address the problem of excessive pass-through
charges?
Answer. At this time, I believe we should wait for the Departments
of Defense, State, and USAID to develop the guidance and regulations
required by section 802 to determine if any additional steps need to be
taken.
interagency contracting
Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits
associated with DOD's continued extensive use of interagency contracts?
Answer. When used properly, interagency contracts can reduce
procurement lead time, reduce administrative costs, and support
strategic sourcing objectives. I believe DOD, in collaboration with
numerous non-DOD agencies, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy,
and Congress, have implemented processes and procedures that minimize
the potential for inappropriate usage. I note on February 14, 2013, the
GAO removed the Management of Interagency Contracting from their ``2013
High Risk List''. I believe this action reflects these efforts and
acknowledges that the risk of inappropriate usage under interagency
contracts has been significantly reduced.
Question. Do you believe additional authority or measures are
needed to hold DOD or other agency personnel accountable for their use
of inter-agency contracts?
Answer. No. I have not seen any information that current policies,
statute or regulations are not adequate. DOD policy encourages the use
of an interagency solution when it's the best procurement approach and
is a good business decision for the Department. Recent changes to the
Federal Acquisition Regulations have bolstered the documentation
requirements when conducting an interagency acquisition.
Question. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for
assuring that the work requested by DOD personnel is within the scope
of their contract?
Answer. Yes, I believe contractors should review any order they
receive to ensure the supplies or services ordered by the Government
are within the scope of the contract that the requirement is being
placed under. However, the contracting officer has primary
responsibility for ensuring the work is within the scope of the
particular contract. If a contractor has any concern that the work
ordered is not appropriate under the contract then they should contact
the agency contracting officer who placed the order and request
clarification.
Question. Do you believe that DOD's continued heavy reliance on
outside agencies to award and manage contracts on its behalf is a sign
that the Department has failed to adequately staff its own acquisition
system?
Answer. No, on the contrary, Congress has provided authority for
numerous agencies to provide acquisition support to others. These
potential solutions provide DOD requirements, organizations, and
contracting officers additional flexibility and opportunity, not
previously available, to best meet warfighter and mission needs. The
use of interagency solutions enhances the Department's efforts to run
as efficiently and effectively as possible and is consistent with our
BBP initiatives.
acquisition of information technology
Question. Most of the Department's Major Automated Information
System (MAIS) acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind
schedule. In particular, the Department has run into unanticipated
difficulties with virtually every new business system it has tried to
field in the last 10 years. Section 804 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2010 required the Department of Defense to establish a new acquisition
process for information technology.
Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of business
systems require different acquisition strategies or approaches?
Answer. Yes, some business systems require acquisition approaches
different from those normally used by the Department to acquire weapons
systems. Business systems acquisition approaches should be tailored to
the product being acquired. Information technology developed by the
software industry for the commercial sector is aligned to best
practices for personnel management, finance and accounting, contract
management, and the supply chain. In order to be adopted for use by
DOD, emphasis needs to be placed on re-engineering Department business
processes to align with best practices. The Department has already
begun to adapt to the unique challenges of business information system
acquisition through the implementation of the Business Capability
Lifecycle (BCL), which emphasizes well defined increments of capability
that are developed, tested, and often fielded in increments structured
around 1-2 year software builds. In addition, this approach will also
be incorporated in the revised DOD Instruction 5000.02. If confirmed, I
will assess this further and continue to promote practices that support
better acquisition decisions of business systems.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department of
Defense should take to address these problems?
Answer. The Department has issued guidance requiring the use of the
Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL) for the acquisition process for
business systems, which is an important step for improving the
acquisition process for business systems. Over the past year this
approach has been mandated for all new start business systems that are
above the statutory Major Automated Information System (MAIS)
threshold. In addition, this approach will also be incorporated in the
revised DOD Instruction 5000.02. If confirmed, I will continue to
support USD(AT&L) in his efforts to improve performance in this area
and will continue to monitor the effectiveness of this approach to
acquiring business systems to determine if further changes are needed.
Question. What steps has the Department taken to implement the
requirements of section 804? What steps remain to be taken?
Answer. The Department continues to make progress implementing
several of the key approaches outlined in section 804, specifically in
the areas of Acquisition, Requirements, Testing and Certification, and
Human Capital. We have implemented a framework for implementing a more
flexible and streamlined process for the acquisition of business
information systems to include the Business Capabilities Lifecycle. The
Department's testing community has been working in collaboration with
USD(AT&L) to incorporate an integrated testing, evaluation, and
certification approach to reduce redundancies and improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of testing on the Department's information
systems. The Joint Staff continues to work efforts to include more
streamlined requirements management and approval process for
acquisition of information systems. A comprehensive review of
Information Technology (IT) acquisition competencies is also currently
being conducted by the Department's Chief Information Officer. This
review will update the IT acquisition competencies to better define DOD
critical skill sets. If confirmed, I will continue to assess these
actions to ensure continued progress in these areas.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Chief
Information Officer of the Department of Defense to take these steps?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the DOD
CIO, and I will ensure the OUSD(AT&L) staff and the DOD CIO staff work
collaboratively to identify and take steps needed to improve the
acquisition of IT based capabilities. Program Managers responsible for
procuring IT have traditionally been charged with acquiring the
infrastructure they need to support their assigned procurement. This is
an essential area for the Department to achieve consistently better
outcomes given the continuing rapid evolution of technology.
Question. Section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 gives the
Department of Defense new tools to address supply chain risk in the
acquisition of information technology.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 806?
Answer. The authorities provided by section 806 have the potential
to significantly reduce risks associated with those who may have
intentions to damage our systems and capabilities through the supply
chain. We are working to exercise these authorities effectively. The
Department has submitted a draft DFARS rule (2012-D050) in order to
make use of the section 806 authority to the Defense Acquisition
Regulation (DAR) Council. We anticipate the DFARS rule will next go to
OMB with a request for an interim rule. In the meantime, we have been
conducting table top exercises with the Services and Agencies to
understand what implementation would look like, and documenting
supporting tools and guidance.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to address supply chain risk?
Answer. We must continue to incrementally refine and extend
implementation of our Trusted Systems and Networks and Program
Protection Planning strategies. The Department has developed a
foundation for addressing supply chain risk in acquisition, and
codified this in DODI 5000.02 program protection planning practice, as
well as the DODI 5200.44 Trusted Systems and Networks policy, co-signed
in November 2012 by USD(AT&L) and CIO. The Department will continue to
implement these policies. No additional authorities are needed at this
time to address supply chain risk management.
Question. Section 818 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 establishes
new requirements for DOD and its contractors to detect and avoid the
use of counterfeit electronic parts.
What steps has the Department taken to implement the requirements
of section 818?
Answer. In March 2012, AT&L published overarching Counterfeit
Prevention Guidance employing a risk-based approach to the detection,
prevention, reporting, and disposal of counterfeit parts in accordance
with NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 section 818. Additionally, we have
drafted a Department-wide Counterfeit Prevention Policy based on the
legislation and the March 2012 overarching guidance memorandum.
The Department has developed training and education programs which
are available to DOD personnel and other Federal employees. The
Department is also currently conducting a study into hardware (HW) and
software (SW) assurance testing which will result in a state-of-the-art
report on HW/SW testing tools/techniques by the end of 2013.
Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the
Department established for taking these steps?
Answer. We are nearing completion on a department-wide Counterfeit
Prevention Policy based on the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 section 818
legislation and the AT&L March 2012 overarching guidance memorandum
with an estimated issue date in the second quarter of fiscal year 2013.
We have also drafted three proposed rules currently making their way
through the review and approval process: (1) DFARS case (2012-D055)
``Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts'', (2) a
drafted FAR case (2013-002) ``Expanded Reporting of Non-conforming
Items'', and (3) a proposed FAR case (2012-032), ``Higher level
Contract Quality Requirements.'' We expect publication of the three
proposed rules for public comment in calendar year 2013. Meanwhile, we
are modernizing the GIDEP system to improve functionality, data
throughput, customer support functions, and the ability to accommodate
international requirements.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to address the problem of counterfeit electronic parts?
Answer. We will need to continue to collaborate with industry, law
enforcement, Federal agencies, and OMB to develop strategies and
acceptable global awareness standards to minimize the introduction of
counterfeit parts in the DOD supply chain. The Department also needs to
explore expanding the use of technology in combating this threat
through detection and prevention of their items entering our supply
chain. We continue to evaluate different identification technologies
and quality control techniques, including enhancements in our test and
inspection regime to better assure parts authenticity, and provide
early identification of non-conforming materiel. We will continue to
participate in industry-sponsored working groups, such as those hosted
by the Aerospace Industry Association, the trade association for many
of our prime suppliers, and the Society of Automotive Engineers, as we
strive for ``improved'' commercially acceptable global sourcing
standards.
Question. Some have argued that the current test and evaluation
process does not appropriately address the unique circumstances
applicable to the acquisition of information technology systems.
What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to
improve the test and evaluation process for information technology
systems, including their vulnerabilities in the face of a growing
cybersecurity threat environment?
Answer. Information systems technologies exist throughout virtually
every system the Department operates and produces. While information
technology systems are currently tested as part of the acquisition
process, the Department should explore the effectiveness of more
efficient and tailored test strategies for each of these types of
systems. For example, consideration should be given to earlier
interoperability and cyber security testing to support the software
development process. The Department should also seek to improve
capabilities and approaches that promote a more continuous test
approach that integrates developmental test, operational test, as well
as certification and accreditation activities. If confirmed, I will
work to improve our ability to test information technology systems.
cyberspace-related procurement policy
Question. DOD's new strategic guidance highlights the increasing
importance of cyber operations with respect to both defensive and
offensive capabilities. As a result, this is one of the few areas in
which the Department is proposing to increase its investments.
What acquisition challenges do you foresee that are unique to the
procurement of cyber-related capabilities?
Answer. I foresee many dynamic challenges in this area. The
Department recently instituted a new process for cyber acquisition to
recognize and address these issues, and more effectively acquire
capabilities for offensive and defensive cyberspace operations.
To keep pace with the threat and changing technologies, cyber
related products must often go through the acquisition lifecycle of
development, testing, and fielding on very short timelines. The
challenge to acquiring cyber capabilities at the pace needed will be
managing the risk while streamlining the acquisition process;
accommodating the rapid pace of information technology changes; and
maintaining a rapid pace while prudently evaluating operational
performance prior to fielding. This requires timely collaboration
across a very broad spectrum of stakeholders, including industry
partners, to ensure appropriate results are achieved. If confirmed, I
will work closely with USD(AT&L) to implement and refine the approaches
to address these challenges.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to address
these unique challenges?
Answer. Section 933 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
directed the Department to provide a strategy for the rapid acquisition
of tools, applications, and other capabilities for cyber warfare. In
response, the Department created a Cyber Investment Management Board
(CIMB) and prescribed processes to meet urgent acquisition needs for
cyber capabilities.
If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L) to help actively
oversee the Department's cyber acquisition investments in cooperation
with appropriate personnel across the Department. I will also work with
other Federal agencies and with industry to address the challenge of
acquiring cyber offense and defense capabilities, especially in the
Defense Industrial Base as highlighted in the recent Executive Order on
Critical Infrastructure and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21--
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.
acquisition workforce
Question. Section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 established
an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help the Department of
Defense address shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund was
restructured and extended by section 803 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2013.
Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is
still needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees with
the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes. The fund has enabled DOD to strengthen the workforce
in many critical functions and is needed for continuous improvement of
workforce skills and qualifications. The quality of the workforce and
their efforts are vital to acquisition outcomes that support the
warfighter while managing of taxpayer resources.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the
money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in
a manner that best meets the needs of the Department of Defense and its
acquisition workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support USD(AT&L) as he works with
senior acquisition leaders and the leadership of the Military
Departments to wisely use the fund to implement strategic guidance and
priorities, which include providing the right balance across various
acquisition professional career fields, and improving the
professionalism and qualifications of the workforce.
the defense industrial base
Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.
defense industry?
Answer. I believe the Department relies on a broad technical and
industrial base that is far more global, commercial, and financially
complex than ever before. For the past decade the defense industrial
base has enjoyed a period of increasing budgets that is now at an end.
In addition, financial uncertainty has caused firms to delay investment
decisions and seek other markets. While I think our industrial base is
currently strong, I am concerned about the impact that further defense
budget cuts would have on the ability of the base to provide the broad
range of products and services that the Department and our Nation need.
If confirmed, the continuing health of the industrial base will be a
high priority for me.
Question. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense
industry?
Answer. I believe that the expansion and consolidation of
industries and companies at all tiers is the hallmark of a robust free
market economy as it responds to the market forces. I expect, and
encourage the free market to act when faced with changing demand
signals. However, I also believe the Government must be watchful for
consolidations that eliminate competition or cause market distortions.
The Department's leadership, including Deputy Secretary Carter and
Under Secretary Kendall, have indicated that further consolidation at
the top tier would not be viewed favorably, though it is reasonable to
expect continued mergers and acquisition in the lower tiers in response
to anticipated reduced budgets. I believe that each individual case of
consolidation, acquisition, or merger dealing with our defense firms
must be examined carefully for what is best for the warfighter and the
taxpayer, particularly with regard to its impact on competition.
Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S.
defense sector?
Answer. Foreign investment in our industrial base has generally
benefitted the United States, including DOD, by providing needed
capital and increasing access to leading-edge technologies. However, I
believe foreign investment, particularly in the defense sector, can
expose critical national defense-related technologies to risks,
including the possible loss of intellectual property that gives our
warfighters the technological edge they rely upon. Congress has put
provisions in place to address critical national security concerns of
this nature, including the Committee on Foreign Interests in the United
States (CFIUS) led by the Department of the Treasury. If confirmed, I
will continue DOD's commitment to its oversight function and to
ensuring that national security concerns are addressed in transactions
that involve foreign investments in the United States.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department of
Defense should take to ensure the continued health of the U.S. defense
industry?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the sources of manufacturing
and services that DOD relies on are capable of meeting our warfighters'
requirements. I will ensure the Department proactively monitors the
industrial base to identify risks that need to be addressed on a case-
by-case basis. When necessary and as resources permit, the Department
should be prepared to act to ensure that certain key industrial
capabilities are sustained, although we must recognize this will not be
possible in every case.
I believe the Department must simultaneously be receptive to
industry's concerns and address their issues as effectively as
possible, consistent with the Department's priorities and the resources
available. I will also continue to make myself assessable to industry,
as I always have, working closely and communicating to ensure that, as
DOD makes changes necessary to adapt to a new set of strategic and
budgetary challenges, it does not inadvertently jeopardize critical
elements of the industrial base.
Question. What is your understanding of the status of the
Department's ongoing Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) analysis of
the defense industrial base?
Answer. In 2012 the Department tested the S2T2 analytical process
with the Army M-1 Abrams program. It was a labor-intensive
collaboration between OSD and the Army to identify the most critical
and fragile capabilities in the industrial base, and develop a cost
effective option for preserving the ability to support the current
generation and next generation of ground vehicles. I note that this is
a process, rather than a single analysis, and the Department has plans,
which I would support if confirmed, to expand this process to more
broadly support the other services and perform an assessment of
multiple sectors and programs.
Question. Has the Department taken any concrete steps to enhance
the health and status of a particular sector or tier based upon this
analysis?
Answer. The test case for S2T2 analysis is the M-1 Abrams program.
The primary goal of the assessment was to preserve the tank industrial
base by developing an affordable acquisition profile that would
maintain needed industrial capabilities. Potential Foreign Military
Sales were factored in as a way to make-up for at least some lost work.
Bridge buys or other forms of investment were also factored in for
critical and fragile second to fourth tier suppliers to determine the
fiscal year 2014 funding profile required to address risks in 2015.
Where practical, targeted investments using existing authorities and
other programs are being considered to improve and preserve critical
manufacturing capabilities.
Question. Under what circumstances if any do you believe the
Department should use Defense Production Act Title III authorities to
address defense industrial base needs?
Answer. I believe that the Department should only use title III
authorities when it meets the two determinations consistent with
section 303 of that law that: taking such action is essential to the
national defense; and without such action, U.S. industry cannot
reasonably be expected to provide the capability for the needed
industrial resource, material, or critical technology item in a timely
manner. These decisions must be informed by a thorough industrial base
analysis, consultations with the Defense Production Act Committee
(DPAC), as well as the advice of other agencies in determining
industrial base priorities for DPA title III investments.
Question. What is your view of current or anticipated consolidation
efforts by major defense contractors?
Answer. As I stated in my previous response, I do not foresee a
time in the near future where further consolidation of this part of the
base would be in the best interest of the warfighter or the taxpayer. I
believe that we should preserve as much competition as possible and
avoid market distortions not in the best long-term interests of the
Government.
science and technology
Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of science and
technology programs in meeting the Department's transformation goals
and in confronting irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive
threats?
Answer. Science and Technology (S&T) programs of the Department
have always been critical to meeting new and emerging threats, and I
anticipate this will continue. S&T helps the Department meet
transformation goals; and continues to address emerging threats such as
anti-access/area denial challenges. With a focused, high quality,
aggressive science and technology program that is responsive to the
full range of capabilities required by our Armed Forces, we will be
able to preserve the future and maintain technological superiority over
our adversaries.
Question. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding
funding targets and priorities for the Department's long-term research
efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L), the ASD(R&E)
and the department's leadership to provide direction for funding
targets for long-range research, balanced against other priorities. The
Department and the administration have placed a strong emphasis on
sustaining S&T spending. Secretary Panetta and the USD(AT&L) have
repeatedly indicated that technological superiority underpins the
Department's recently released Military Strategy Guidance; I share that
view. If confirmed I will continue that emphasis and, subject to the
Secretary's approval, use available mechanisms for establishing funding
targets.
Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to
assess whether the Department is making adequate investments in its
basic research programs?
Answer. Establishing viable metrics to assess investments in basic
research has proved to be difficult, in part because the time scale
from basic research funding to output and fielded system can be long.
If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L) and the ASD(R&E) to assess
investments made by the military services and agencies in basic
research and ensure effective management of this portfolio. Specific
metrics should include publications, patents, and technology
transitions to our acquisition programs. However, these are incomplete,
and if confirmed, we will continue to seek basic research metrics.
Question. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between
and among the science and technology programs of the military services
and defense agencies?
Answer. I believe that the Department is improving in this area,
with additional room for improvement. The Department has recently
reintroduced the process whereby all S&T portfolios with significant
multi-agency investment must deliver an integrated roadmap for review
by the Department's S&T Executives. As a pilot, the Department has
established seven Priority Steering Councils, consisting of scientists
and engineers from the services and agencies, whose job it is to
develop cross-cutting roadmaps for the Department's recently designated
S&T Priorities. The councils are complemented by Communities of
Interest (COIs) populated by scientist and engineers from the services
and agencies for the purpose of integrating the Department's S&T
program in specific technology areas. COIs are permanent in nature.
There are also short-term Technology Focus Teams (TFTs) that perform
in-depth analysis of specific technology issues and report their
findings to the S&T EXCOM. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L)
and the ASD(R&E) to continue improvements in coordination among these
areas.
Question. Are you satisfied that the Department has a well
articulated and actionable science and technology strategic plan?
Answer. There is a well-coordinated technology strategic investment
strategy, but I believe there is room for improvement in strategies
that cover specific topical areas. The Department has well-articulated
and actionable strategic plans for basic research, and for Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) education. I believe it
would be valuable to document an overarching Departmental Science and
Technology strategic plan. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L)
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to
develop such a plan.
Question. Do you see a need for changes in areas such as hiring
authority, personnel systems, financial disclosure and ethics
requirements, to ensure that the Department can recruit and retain the
highest quality scientific and technical workforce possible?
Answer. I have not seen specific evidence of problems attributable
to these areas. I believe, as does USD(AT&L), that the Department needs
to continue to strengthen its workforce in the science and engineering
fields. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L), the ASD(R&E), and
other Department leadership to assess this situation and determine
whether any corrective action is needed.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (ASD(R&E)) has been designated as the Chief Technology
Officer of the Department of Defense.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Chief Technology
Officer of the Department of Defense?
Answer. As outlined in the Department of Defense Directive 5134.3,
I believe the appropriate role of the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) is
to provide technical leadership, guidance, and oversight for the
Department's Research and Engineering activities, to include the early
identification of critical technology opportunities that could lead to
affordable new capabilities. Finally, the CTO should evaluate the
adequacy of the Department's overall Research & Engineering investment
and program content.
Question. What authority should the ASD(R&E) have over the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)?
Answer. DARPA is a Defense Agency under the direction, authority
and control of the USD(AT&L) through the ASD(R&E). The DARPA director
directly reports to the ASD(R&E), and consequently DARPA should operate
in accordance with high-level direction from ASD(R&E). I would not
recommend any changes in these roles or authorities.
Question. What authority should the ASD(R&E) have over other
Service and Agency science and technology efforts?
Answer. I believe the existing authorities outlined in DOD
Directive 5134.3 are appropriate. The ASD(R&E) is to recommend
approval, modification, or disapproval of programs and projects of the
Military Departments and Defense Agencies to eliminate unpromising or
unnecessarily duplicative programs, and is also designated to recommend
the initiation or support of promising projects or programs for the
science and technology program. Finally, the ASD(R&E) is responsible
for recommending budget adjustments to the USD(AT&L) and the Secretary
of Defense.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in organizational
structure, workforce, or availability of resources to improve the
effectiveness of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering?
Answer. No. If confirmed, I will continuously monitor the alignment
and balance of all acquisition, technology, and logistics offices to
improve their effectiveness and ability to meet the mission
defense laboratories
Question. What is your view on the quality and relevance of the DOD
laboratories as compared to the DOE national laboratories, Federal
laboratories, academic laboratories, and other peer institutions?
Answer. My view is that the DOD laboratories are in general staffed
with dedicated competent scientists and engineers performing important
missions for the Department. A key issue going forward is how to
operate these Laboratories as an enterprise to meet the needs of the
Department even more effectively. The ASD(R&E) is working with the
Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Services, and other
Departmental stakeholders on an analysis to address Federal laboratory
capacity. If confirmed, I will support the USD(AT&L) in his assessments
of this area.
Question. What metrics will you use, if confirmed, to evaluate the
effectiveness, competitiveness, and scientific vitality of the DOD
laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will primarily rely on an evaluation based
on success in developing and transitioning new technologies to
warfighters, the quality of their technical workforce, and the results
of external reviews of their effectiveness and innovation. I would also
be open to new approaches for objectively assessing the performance of
the laboratories.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to
increase the mission effectiveness and productivity of the DOD
laboratories?
Answer. The USD(AT&L) has initiated the process to assess the
productivity of DOD's acquisition institutions, including laboratories.
If confirmed, I will support that process with the ASD(R&E) to review
options and opportunities to increase the mission effectiveness of DOD
laboratories.
Question. In your view, have the DOD laboratories struck an
appropriate balance between investments in near-term technology
programs that are tied to current battlefield needs and investments in
longer term, higher risk, and revolutionary capability development?
Answer. Yes. The realities of a nation at war have forced our
laboratories to develop near-term programs. However, the labs have
maintained long-term efforts as well. As the Department draws down from
current combat operations, I would expect a modest shift back to medium
and long-term efforts. The Services currently align approximately one-
third of their basic science budgets to in-house programs. A recent
review of the labs' basic science program was conducted by the Defense
Science Board (DSB) and their report concluded that the in-house basic
research program was technically strong and healthy. In general, I
think the Department has a reasonable balance; however, if confirmed,
with the USD(AT&L), I will continue to assess this balance to determine
if adjustments are needed.
Question. Do you believe that this balance is likely to change with
the completion of our withdrawal from Iraq and our ongoing drawdown in
Afghanistan?
Answer. I expect the balance between near-term and longer-term
research will not change dramatically as a result of these events, but
will move slightly away from near-term efforts. In addition, the
portfolio of research topics will likely shift to support the
Department's recently released strategic guidance, particularly toward
any emerging threats, such as anti-access/area denial. If confirmed, I
will continue to assess the balance with the ASD(R&E).
Question. Section 219 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 authorizes
the directors of a defense laboratory to use up to 3 percent of the
total funds available to the laboratory to fund innovative research,
technology transition activities, and workforce development.
What is your understanding of the extent to which the Department
has implemented section 219?
Answer. I understand each of the Services has implemented section
219 programs in a unique fashion that aligns with their unique Service
business models. Though the statute gives authority to lab directors to
utilize up to 3 percent of all available funds for this program, the
actual amount to date has been in the 1 to 2 percent range. The
Department submits a section 219 status report annually to Congress to
detail the related investment, the latest of which was delivered on
June 4, 2012.
Question. Do you believe that the funding flexibility provided by
section 219 has been appropriately utilized by the Department?
Answer. Yes. Each lab director has balanced section 219 investments
with other programs and procurements, and used the flexibility of
section 219 to support their business model. If confirmed, I will
continue to monitor the use of this flexibility by lab directors.
Question. Do you believe that it would be feasible or appropriate
for the Department to use the authority of section 219 to adjust the
balance between investments in near-term technology programs and
longer-term, higher-payoff investments?
Answer. I believe these adjustments are already being done under
section 219, so I recommend no changes at this time.
darpa
Question. In your view, has DARPA struck an appropriate balance
between investments in near-term technology programs that are tied to
current battlefield needs and investments in longer term, higher risk,
and revolutionary capability development?
Answer. Yes. DARPA's mission of creating and preventing
technological surprise does require a focus on high-impact
opportunities for the future. At the same time, DARPA has contributed
to near-term needs, and in the process learned valuable lessons that
inform its longer-term efforts.
Question. What are the major issues related to DARPA investments,
management and workforce, and research outcomes that you will seek to
address?
Answer. DARPA continues to be a key center for DOD innovation. If
confirmed, I will continue to help it remain a preeminent source of
creative and technically superior capabilities.
Question. Do you feel that DARPA is adequately transitioning its
programs to the Services and Defense Agencies? If not, how will you
address that challenge?
Answer. This is always a challenge for high-impact efforts that
challenge the status quo. DARPA continues to build strong relationships
with the Services to ease the way for transition. If confirmed, I will
place a high priority on technology transition.
Question. Do you believe that there has been an appropriate level
of interaction between DARPA and its intelligence community analog,
IARPA, given the overlap in many research areas?
Answer. I have not looked into how DARPA interacts with IARPA, but
if confirmed, I will look into this interaction and take action if
appropriate.
test and evaluation
Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for
failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these
systems are put into production.
What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) in ensuring the
success of the Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe the DOT&E must be an independent entity to ensure
the Department's weapon systems are realistically and adequately tested
in their intended operational environment. If confirmed, I will work
with the DOT&E on testing and evaluation issues as a partner in the
acquisition process, and continue to welcome his insights on program
performance and other issues. DOT&E's independence is of value in the
acquisition process.
Question. What are your views about the role of the Director of
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in ensuring the success of the
Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe the role of the DASD(DT&E) is beneficial to the
Department's acquisition process, and if confirmed I will rely on the
DASD(DT&E) for advice on the demonstrated maturity of designs to enter
initial production and on the adequacy of planned test programs.
Question. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation
conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be
tested?
Answer. I have no evidence that this is a major area of concern.
The test strategy for an acquisition program is based on a variety of
factors, and each program requires a different mix of government and
contractor testing. However, to ensure the Department's systems are
adequately tested, I believe there needs to be government leadership of
DT&E.
Question. Do you believe that the operational and developmental
testing organizations in DOD and the military services are adequate to
ensure an appropriate level of testing, and testing oversight, on major
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes. I also believe the Department can improve its
performance in this area by defining test requirements earlier in a
program and putting more emphasis on early developmental test and
evaluation activities to reduce the likelihood of late discovery of
design or production issues. If confirmed, I will continue to work with
the DASD(DT&E) and DOT&E to ensure the Department conducts effective
and efficient developmental and operational testing.
depot issues
Question. A decade of overseas contingency operations has increased
maintenance requirements and expenditures. These requirements and
expenditures are expected to remain high for several years after the
conclusion of operations in Afghanistan before they begin to decrease.
What do you believe the Department has learned from this
experience, and how will these lessons learned affect, if at all, the
future of DOD maintenance and logistics?
Answer. Since overcoming initial issues early in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the Department has provided superb logistics support to our
deployed forces. There are a number of lessons learned, some of which
have already been incorporated into our policies, processes, and
doctrine. Others are still being documented. We created and have
institutionalized Combatant Command Deployment and Distribution
Operations Centers to facilitate the deployment of forces and delivery
of sustainment supplies. The Department has increased maintenance
capability to support equipment left in theater and optimally
structured reset of equipment retrograded with unit redeployments. This
tailoring has enabled both maximum readiness of materiel in theater to
support warfighting operations, but also of that CONUS to support force
generation and training. An example of this optimization can be clearly
seen in the operations of the Army Field Support Brigades, as well as
in the tailored reset work packages that address not only the high
OPTEMPO and harsh theater environments, but also the restoration and
protection of useful life of our equipment. We have also been able to
efficiently and effectively augment unit maintenance with contractor
maintenance support. Finally, we have incorporated Operation Contract
Support to manage contractors in our policy and doctrine.
Question. For how many years after the end of combat operations do
you believe the Department will need to continue to pay for increased
maintenance to reset and reconstitute the force?
Answer. Our estimates indicate it will take 2 to 3 years to
complete reset and reconstitution post-combat operations in
Afghanistan. This time depends on the velocity of our retrograde
process, the availability of funding, and the capabilities that will be
needed in the force structure to meet the Defense Strategy within the
budget constraints.
Question. What factors do you believe should govern the
Department's strategy to manage workload as maintenance requirements
begin to decrease?
Answer. We must maintain a ready and controlled source of
government-owned and -operated depot maintenance capability by
leveraging the principals of Core and 50/50 statutes. We must also
sustain the critical capabilities of the private sector. To do this, we
must leverage the partnership between the public and private sectors,
and wisely improve our efficiency of maintenance operations in both the
public and private sectors to continually reduce cost and increase our
buying power. This holistic approach will ensure strong national
capabilities.
logistics and readiness
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that life cycle maintenance requirements and sustainment support are
considered in the acquisition process for new DOD systems?
Answer. The Department has made great strides in this area over the
past 2 years. We have heightened the focus on sustainment by elevating
the importance of sustainment planning in milestone reviews to a
comparable level of oversight within acquisition and engineering plans.
Since issuing guidance on requisite content for sound sustainment
plans, we have completed and approved the Life Cycle Sustainment Plans
(LCSPs) for nine Major Defense Acquisition Programs. If confirmed, I
will support the Department's efforts, working closely with the Service
acquisition and materiel stakeholders, to develop solid maintenance
requirements and effective LCSPs that meet system readiness objective
and deliver affordable product support.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the Department of Defense to
conduct life-cycle cost analysis for new capabilities including the
fully burdened cost of fuel during the analysis and evaluation of
alternatives in the acquisition program design trades.
Question. Do you believe that the fully burdened cost of fuel is an
appropriate factor for the Department to consider in the evaluation of
acquisition alternatives?
Answer. Yes. The Fully Burdened Cost of Energy is a useful
component of the total life cycle cost estimating process, which helps
the Department understand the full, long-term expenses the Department
is signing up to when it commits to a new system. Being scenario based,
the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy provides an operational cost
perspective which helps decisionmakers differentiate between the fuel
and logistics demands of competing system concepts.
afghanistan distribution challenges
Question. Last year, an agreement was reached with the Pakistani
Government to reopen the ground lines of communication (GLOC), allowing
military supply convoys to resume logistical support to U.S. forces
inside Afghanistan. However, since the GLOC were closed for several
months, the DOD incurred much higher logistical costs having to rely
entirely upon the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and aerial
resupply.
Are you satisfied with the current rate of logistical resupply flow
through the GLOC?
Answer. Since the Pakistan Ground Line of Communication (PAKGLOC)
re-opened, there have been challenges working through transit authority
procedures required to increase the flow of cargo movements. Currently,
the Department is conducting multiple proofs of principle (PoPs) to
test these new procedures. Initial results are promising. We anticipate
new cargo movements in the Spring 2013 with larger volumes of
retrograde cargo moving through Pakistan in the summer timeframe.
Question. Does the Department have appropriate plans in place to
provide for the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan as we prepare
for the withdrawal of our forces?
Answer. The Department relies on multiple transportation routes for
its retrograde operations, including a combination of ground, air, sea,
and rail. We have a resilient transportation system that provides more
than one way to support the theater. Additionally, the Department has
plans for the disposition of U.S. equipment and supplies to enable
retrograde movements. All military equipment needed for future military
force needs, except equipment that may still be needed by U.S. Forces
in Afghanistan, will be returned to the United States, repaired, and
distributed back to the force. Equipment that will not be needed to
meet future military needs, which is mostly non-military base operating
equipment, will be donated to the Afghan Government, transferred to
other coalition or regional partners, or destroyed in Afghanistan,
depending on the nature of the equipment and legislated authorities.
Question. To what extent is the DOD anticipating throughput
challenges in Pakistan that would limit the DOD's ability to remove
equipment from Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department is currently conducting multiple PoPs to
test the new procedures for movements through Pakistan. Initial results
are good, and we expect these tests to be successful. We anticipate new
cargo movements in Spring 2013 with larger volumes of retrograde
through Pakistan in the Summer timeframe. This will enable two-way flow
to support both resupply and retrograde operations. The Department's
transportation plans for retrograde operations include the use of
multiple routes under varying assumptions, including scenarios with and
without the use of the PAKGLOC.
Question. To what extent has DOD developed alternatives to the
Pakistan GLOC to be able to remove equipment from Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department has developed multiple transportation routes
to augment the ability to retrograde from Afghanistan. One is the use
of the NDN, which is a series of routes through Europe, Russia, and
Central Asia. Another transportation option is to use a combination of
airlift and sealift (multi-modal) movement out of Afghanistan. These
alternatives can and will be used for retrograde operations. However,
sole reliance on these methods is not ideal for significant volumes of
retrograde due to cost, limited airfield capability in Afghanistan, and
the time it will take.
Question. What challenges remain in developing these alternatives?
Answer. These transportation alternatives are in place today. We
anticipate more extensive use of all transportation routes as we
complete the proofs of principle and work with host nations on customs
and transit procedures. Afghanistan poses additional challenges based
on its location, making retrograde operations inherently more difficult
than Iraq. The movement of personnel is not an issue.
Question. In a 2011 report to Congress, GAO found that although
U.S. Transportation Command has established some processes for
oversight, it does not have full oversight of the distribution of
supplies and equipment to the warfighter in Afghanistan. GAO
highlighted several issues to include: a lack of adequate radio-
frequency identification information to track all cargo movements; no
common operating picture for distribution data and integrated
transportation systems; complex customs clearance processes in
Afghanistan and Pakistan that delay shipments; limited information on
incidents of pilferage and damage of cargo; and ineffective tracking
and management of cargo containers.
To what extent, if any, has DOD improved its visibility over
equipment and supplies in Afghanistan?
Answer. Our warfighters and other managers have visibility of
equipment and materiel from a number of sources, and lack of visibility
has not been identified as a significant problem by our warfighters.
With that said, Department policy requires all DOD cargo transiting
Afghanistan to use Radio Frequency Identification tags. This technology
enables the visibility of cargo during transit and storage. Enhanced
in-transit visibility through the use of satellite-enabled technology
is also available for high priority movements. Additionally, we require
contracted carriers to provide automated updates to DOD systems at key
points throughout the movement process. Furthermore, in January 2013,
CENTCOM published a directive to DOD shippers with instructions for
improving cargo security and the tracking and reporting of shipments
transiting Pakistan.
Question. To what extent has DOD developed a common operating
picture to improve its processes for tracking equipment and supplies in
Afghanistan?
Answer. CENTCOM has developed and implemented an automated
Logistics Common Operating Picture, which includes information on the
amount of supplies on-hand and personnel and cargo movements supporting
CENTCOM.
nonstandard equipment
Question. DOD has acquired millions of dollars in tactical
nonstandard equipment (NSE) to address evolving threats in Afghanistan
(and previously in Iraq).
If confirmed, what would be your plan of action to deal with the
NSE accumulated by the Services over the last several years?
Answer. Our forces have greatly benefited from the access to rapid
acquisition of newly emerging technologies and capabilities for Iraq
and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will work with the Services as they
consider future force structure and requirements, and for items that
are to be retained, that the Services have effective plans to sustain
this mission-essential NSE.
Question. What is your assessment of the amount of NSE that has
been transferred by the Services into programs of record to date?
Answer. I do not have data on which NSE has transferred to become
programs of record. The Services continue to carefully evaluate their
force equipment requirements. Some examples of technologies we are
keeping and putting into our formations are the Counter Rocket
Artillery Mortars system that was so effective against the indirect
fire threat in OIF and OEF, as well as selected MRAP vehicles. If
confirmed, I will monitor Service actions to transition NSE to programs
of record.
Question. To what extent, if any, has DOD identified and planned
for future maintenance and sustainment costs for any NSE that will have
to be funded in future budgets?
Answer. For enduring capabilities, it is important that we budget
for sustainment. My understanding is that the Services have begun the
process of determining their maintenance and sustainment costs for NSE
identified as necessary to meet future force enduring requirements. If
confirmed I will support and provide oversight to the Services actions
to monitor and sustain NSE selected for enduring requirements.
corrosion prevention and control
Question. GAO estimates that corrosion damage to equipment and
weapons systems costs the DOD approximately $22 billion per year. The
Office of Corrosion Prevention and Control has been in existence for
almost 2 years now, and a corrosion prevention and control plan (CPCP)
is now required for all category one acquisitions.
Do you believe that a CPCP should be considered during the analysis
of alternatives process or the RFP process?
Answer. I consider corrosion an important factor in system life
cycle cost and performance which should be considered during the
analysis of alternatives (AoA). I support the existing direction to the
Military Departments to objectively evaluate corrosion as part of
program design and development activities, and to weigh the trade-offs
through an open and transparent AoA. Similarly, the RFP process should
also clearly articulate to industry specifically what our needs are for
addressing corrosion prevention and control. Without clearly
articulated requirements in the proposal process, we risk additional
costs in acquisition or sustainment.
Question. What is your assessment of existing alternatives for
hexavalent chromium?
Answer. I am not currently familiar with the use of or alternatives
to hexavalent chromium. If confirmed, I will assess the alternatives
for this material.
operational energy
Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 created the position of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs
If confirmed, how would you work with office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs to
advance the objectives of that office?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with ASD(OEPP) to ensure defense
energy investments increase military capabilities, provide mission
success, and lower total costs. I also will assist ASD(OEPP) and
USD(AT&L) in implementing any necessary changes in the defense
acquisition system to support these objectives.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
developing strategies to reduce the logistical footprint of deployed
units operating in hostile environments?
Answer. The safety and effectiveness of our forces will always be
my highest priority. If confirmed, I will work with USD(AT&L), the
ASD(L&MR), the Joint Staff, and the Military Services to ensure we
optimize our sustainment, maintenance, and materiel reliability to
reduce the logistical footprint of deployed forces. I will support
policies that promote technologies and strategies to reduce the
logistics footprint, and continue to emphasize logistics implications
as a key factor in the decision processes for new weapon systems.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
developing and pursuing alternative energy sources for the Department
of Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to exercise oversight of the
Department's efforts to develop and pursue energy innovations that
advance military missions and capabilities, or innovations that lower
our base operating costs.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's current ability to track
fuel consumption after point of sale at forward-deployed locations?
Answer. The Department's ability to track fuel consumption after
point of sale at forward-deployed locations has improved and continues
to improve. The Department is collecting quarterly estimates of
operational energy consumption with increasing granularity, and
improving its ability to better manage energy in the deployed
environment. While there are still challenges in tracking fuel
consumption by contingency base camps and ground vehicles, I am
confident the Department will continue to increase its ability to
measure--and, thus manage--consumption of operational energy at
forward-deployed locations.
Question. Many of the energy efficiency initiatives that are
currently being developed are designed for use in high heat desert
terrains.
To what extent, if any, is DOD planning and developing energy
saving equipment and technologies to support the warfighter in other
environments that may have differing climates?
Answer. The Departments energy priorities are derived from current
and projected operational needs, so that our forces can operate
effectively in every region of the world, in every environment, and
against every threat. If confirmed, I will ensure that the energy-
saving equipment and technology we are fielding is flexible and
adaptable across a range of contingencies, and is designed to improve
our warfighting capability by lightening the load for our expeditionary
forces, reducing the vulnerability of logistics support lines, and
optimizing the performance of our systems and operating bases.
Question. Last July, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Operational Energy Plans and Programs published a policy that any
alternative drop-in replacement fuel procured for DOD-wide use and
distribution within the Class III (Bulk) supply chain must compete with
petroleum products and any awards will be based on the ability to meet
requirements at the best value to the government, including cost.
What is your view of this policy?
Answer. I support this policy. It is prudent for the Department to
engage in tests and demonstrations that confirm defense equipment can
operate on a range of fuels; however, as the Department allocates its
limited resources to ensure it delivers necessary warfighting
capability, it should only buy large volumes of these fuels when they
are cost-competitive with petroleum products.
Question. What is your assessment of section 526 of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007? What impact, if any, has this
provision had on the operations and activities of the Department of
Defense?
Answer. Section 526 has not restricted the Department from
purchasing whatever fuel it has needed to support military operations.
It is my understanding that section 526 applies only to contracts that
are for the express purpose of buying alternative or synthetic fuel. As
long as mission capability is not restricted, it is helpful to have
this guidance that new fuels should not be any more polluting than
fuels produced from conventional petroleum sources.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for
Defense investments in energy technologies?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be to focus on energy
technologies, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures, that
improve the capabilities and effectiveness of our military forces,
reduce our costs, or help meet the needs of our installations. This
means energy innovations and policies that improve the performance of
our systems, expeditionary outposts, and even portable equipment
carried by our personnel.
environmental security
Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for assisting the
Under Secretary in the oversight of environmental security issues for
the Department of Defense.
What do you see as the most significant challenges facing the
Department in the area of environmental security?
Answer. The greatest challenge will be maintaining and improving
the Department's level of environmental performance given the extremely
challenging budget environment--to include the threat of sequestration
to impose across the board cuts despite legal requirements; the
execution difficulties posed by Continuing Resolutions; and the overall
tightening of the budget. If confirmed, I will continue to look for
ways to meet these challenges to protect human health and the
environment across our enterprise.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans if any do you have
for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the aggressive oversight of
environmental programs, with the goal of minimizing management costs
and making our organizational structure and performance contracts as
efficient and effective as possible. I will also continue to emphasize
strategic R&D investments in technologies to lower the costs associated
with environmental cleanup and compliance.
Question. While the Military Departments have made considerable
progress addressing environmental contamination at military
installations, there remains a substantial amount of work to be done,
including the remediation of discarded munitions and Unexploded
Ordnance (UXO), at current and former DOD sites. The military
departments have managed to maintain reasonably level funding for these
cleanup programs over the past several years; however, many of these
clean-ups will take years to complete and, in the current budget
environment, the restoration accounts will come under pressure.
What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that the
DOD remediation programs receive adequate funding and make meaningful
progress, particularly in the detection and clearance of discarded
munitions and UXO?
Answer. I believe that continuing the Department's existing
remediation programs is important, and, if confirmed, I will work to
balance resources so as not to extend cleanup timelines and jeopardize
our ability to meet cleanup goals. I also support continued R&D
investments in programs that can reduce the cost and timelines for
cleanup. The Department is validating new technology for detection and
clearance of unexploded ordinance that may dramatically accelerate
cleanup of these sites and will lower the overall liability of the
Department.
Question. How might the Strategic Environmental Research and
Development Program (SERDP) help with the overall progress of the
Defense Environmental Restoration program, particularly in view of the
current fiscal environment?
Answer. SERDP and its companion program, the Environmental Security
Technology Certification Program (ESTCP), have and should continue to
reduce the cost and improve the efficacy of the Department's cleanups
under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program.
Question. Technologies that can significantly reduce the costs of
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) cleanup that were developed by SERDP are now
being demonstrated under ESTCP at actual UXO contaminated sites across
the country. We expect the new cleanup technologies to become the
standard approach at UXO contaminated sites within a few years,
reducing the costs significantly. SERDP and ESTCP have already saved
DOD billions of dollars by developing and transitioning technologies
for contaminated ground water and sediment sites.
Answer. SERDP and ESTCP are now turning toward more challenging and
complex sites that constitute the remaining liability under the Defense
Environmental Restoration Program. If confirmed I will continue to
support these programs and work to ensure that they are adequately
funded and effectively executed.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy USD(ATL)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
wasteful spending
1. Senator Nelson. Mr. Estevez, we are often so focused on the next
budget to be passed that we consider the termination of a program as
savings. According to a report from Forbes magazine, the Army has
wasted $32 billion on weapons projects since 1995 and both the Navy and
Air Force cancelled their share of programs to save money. What lessons
have we learned from cancelling these contracts?
Mr. Estevez. We have learned over the years that cancelling
developmental programs is a mixed proposition.
When a program becomes less valuable due to changing threats or
significant technical problems, such cancellations may be exactly the
right thing to do--we avoid spending even more money on unaffordable or
nonperforming programs. In such cases, we need to make cancellation
decisions as early as possible.
The most important lessons we have learned from major program
cancellations are to ensure a program is affordable from the start and
to understand and track the key framing assumptions for each program.
Blind optimism about long-range affordability does not serve us well;
we must analyze long-range cost estimates relative to reasonable
budgetary expectations early during requirements generation to make
each program affordable. We must also understand the risks to cost and
schedule inherent in framing assumptions and act early upon any changes
to avoid incurring large sunk costs on programs. We must control
requirements creep through methods such as configuration control
boards.
Not all sunk costs are squandered when we cancel a program,
however. Technology and manufacturing knowledge from such programs can
be applied to some extent in other systems and programs.
The Department is managing our acquisition processes for improved
efficiencies through our Better Buying Power initiative.

2. Senator Nelson. Mr. Estevez, how can we improve our acquisitions
and procurement processes in the future to avoid this wasteful
spending?
Mr. Estevez. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has initiated several processes
to improve acquisitions and procurement in our ongoing Better Buying
Power initiative efforts. Below are some key elements:
First, we need to avoid starting or continuing programs that cannot
be produced and supported within our future long-range budgets. Our
process for affordability analysis must involve the requirements and
resource communities to scope requirements early, set lifecycle cost
constraints on programs, and enforce those constraints through cost-
control measures and possible early tradeoffs of requirements.
Second, if we consider starting an effort with the intent of
developing technology or designing capabilities, we must carefully
select those efforts and weigh the costs and benefits of new
technologies as we learn more as the program progresses. Then we must
decide whether to halt an effort that initially appeared promising, or
for which we may not need production in quantity in the short-term. In
doing so, our program reviews and gates must be meaningful, deliberate,
and more effective.
Third, we need to understand and monitor the key assumptions that
frame each developmental program. Developing systems that push the
state-of-the-art involves risks, uncertainty, and informed assumptions
on technologies and operational paradigms. We must overtly consider
these framing assumptions at program initiation, then establish and
monitor indicators as assumptions prove to be true or not. Then we can
intervene early to solve the problem or cancel the program before
sinking significant resources into an unviable or immature capability.
Fourth, we must continue to increase the cost consciousness of the
acquisition workforce. It is critical that we target affordability,
control cost growth, and incentivize productivity and innovation while
ensuring the best support to the warfighter. Our efforts must span
across all acquisition and sustainment activities. In order to be
successful, we need to instill a culture of cost consciousness through
sound business acumen, establishing clear expectations, and
recognizing/rewarding the right behavior.

f-35 acquisition
3. Senator Nelson. Mr. Estevez, the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 called for the purchase of 29 F-35
Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Sequestration will slow the acquisition
of these aircraft by three to four each year. How will sequestration
affect the per unit cost of the future purchase of an F-35?
Mr. Estevez. The F-35 program was established on the concept of
economies of scale for production costs. Any reduction in the
procurement quantity of F-35s in a given year, either from our
international partners or from a U.S. Service, will result in an
increase in the cost of each remaining jet. The Department is assessing
the impact that sequestration will have on the fiscal year 2013 budget;
however, if sequestration is continued over the next 10 years, the
impact on the F-35 program will be significant. In one scenario the
Department of Defense (DOD) is considering, sequestration could result
in a reduction of seven to nine U.S. aircraft from the fiscal year 2013
Low Rate Initial Production Lot 7 buy across all three Services
producing a corresponding increase in the cost per jet in Lots 7-11 of
approximately 2.3 percent.

4. Senator Nelson. Mr. Estevez, what is the effect on our allies
and their desire to purchase F-35s?
Mr. Estevez. The F-35 program was established on the concept of
economies of scale for purchases. Many of our allies and partners are
facing financial challenges similar to what we are encountering. While
there continues to be strong support from the Services in these
countries, at the political level we are seeing increased scrutiny and
pressures. Any change in the per unit cost of the F-35 in a given year
may cause our partners to reassess their purchases in that year and
potentially delay their procurement.

joint surveillance target attack radar system
5. Senator Nelson. Mr. Estevez, the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft have proven themselves in all
recent conflicts, including Libya. The decision has been made to
terminate the reengining program and the Air Force has indicated a need
to upgrade the avionics sensors, as well as other systems to keep the
aircraft viable. In light of the current budget environment and the
need to recapitalize the fighter, bomber, and tanker fleet
concurrently, do you believe it makes sense to modernize the JSTARS
platform?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, it makes sense to modernize but such
modernization must be prioritized along with other critical programs.
Due to severe fiscal limitations, DOD is rationalizing how best to
allocate its continued investment in the E-8C JSTARS modernization. The
JSTARS program currently includes funds to operate and maintain the
system through the Future Years Defense Program. In this austere budget
environment, the limited JSTARS funding available was prioritized to
address diminishing manufacturing sources in order to keep the aircraft
mission capable. Any future JSTARS modernization or recapitalization
will leverage ongoing technology development from other Defense
programs and will be weighed against other DOD priorities.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
contracting and acquisition
6. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Estevez, I have already reached out to
DOD to ask how officials plan to implement the major components of my
wartime contracting reform legislation, which was signed into law as
part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. Many of those provisions will
fall within the responsibility of the Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (AT&L) secretariat to carry out, including those that pertain
to current contingency in Afghanistan. Will you commit to identifying
whether AT&L has sufficient personnel to address the reforms required
in these provisions?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, if confirmed, I will commit to identifying
whether AT&L has sufficient personnel to address the reforms required
in these provisions.

7. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Estevez, are you committed to ensuring
that the reforms are integrated into planning and training so that they
will not be ignored in future contingencies? If so, what steps do you
commit to taking?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, I remain fully committed, in partnership with
appropriate DOD organizations, to include the Joint Staff, and the
combatant commands, to integrate planning and training reforms to
ensure improved contingency contracting performance and management
during future contingencies.
Specifically, I will, if confirmed, continue ongoing efforts and
initiate new efforts to institutionalize process tools (e.g., 3 in 1;
Contingency Acquisition Support Module, and other business and planning
tools used across the combatant commands) and doctrine that facilitate
and strengthen both Contingency Contracting and Operational Contract
Support (OCS). The Department has established the OCS Functional
Capabilities Integration Board to actively monitor all ongoing and
planned OCS related initiatives across the Department. The Board meets
quarterly, or more often, as required, to conduct independent
assessments and analyses of OCS capabilities (to include supporting
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, and facilities of the armed forces). Additionally, the
Department is in the process of revising pertinent guidance to address
any weakness in our training with several new and revised OCS courses
in the development phase.

8. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Estevez, in a constrained fiscal
environment, it is more important than ever to ensure that there is a
sufficient number of trained acquisition and other management personnel
capable of overseeing, not just executing, contracts by DOD to ensure
that U.S. taxpayers' dollars are being spent wisely. How will you
ensure that the quality and current level of oversight of contracts is
maintained despite austere budgets?
Mr. Estevez. I agree contract oversight is a key element of
ensuring taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. The largest portion of DOD
contract oversight rests with the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) and the Department has taken steps, aided by the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF), to grow and strengthen
the DCMA workforce. Since 2008, DCMA has increased its acquisition
workforce by over 15 percent, and projects continued growth in the
foreseeable future. Additionally, DCMA has bolstered its training
programs and partnered with the Defense Acquisition University to
establish the College of Contract Management to provide critical
courseware that is both relevant and rigorous. If confirmed, I will
work with the rest of the Department leadership to sustain these gains.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
efficiencies
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, for years DOD has embarked on
several efficiency campaigns. Both Secretaries Gates and Panetta have
included efficiency initiatives as part of the President's budget
submission. Do you believe DOD has adequate tools to track
efficiencies?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, DOD has the tools to track efficiencies. As you
stated, Secretaries Gates and Panetta have included efficiency
initiatives as part of the President's annual budget submission, and
required the Department to track the status of the initiatives. The
Department continues its process of tracking the status of each
efficiency initiative to determine if the projected savings are on
track, while at the same time assessing the associated program and
milestone risks. For those efficiency initiatives under the purview of
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, our efficiencies remain valid and at the
projected levels.

10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, how successful has DOD been in
realizing the efficiencies already assumed in previous budget requests?
Mr. Estevez. DOD has been very successful implementing and
realizing efficiencies assumed in recent budgets. There is a robust
process of tracking the status of each efficiency initiative to
determine if the projected savings are on track and whether there are
associated program and milestone risks. For those efficiency
initiatives under the purview of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, our efficiencies
remain valid and at the projected levels. These initiatives enabled the
Department either to reduce funding requirements or apply them to other
high-priority requirements.

11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, what lessons have you learned in
the assumptions used in taking efficiencies?
Mr. Estevez. I have learned that no matter how many times you have
looked for efficiencies in the past, there is always a way to improve
the level of efficiency of your overall portfolio. However, in
identifying efficiencies, it is paramount that the affected functional
communities and oversight organizations be involved, and that any
barriers to implementing or executing efficiencies be identified and
addressed.

depot impact from decreased budgets
12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, you mentioned in your answers to
the advance policy questions that ``We must maintain a ready and
controlled source of Government-owned and -operated depot maintenance
capability by leveraging the principles of core and 50/50 statutes.''
The prospect of a $42 billion cut from the defense budget this year
from sequestration and the pressure of underfunded readiness accounts
due to the Continuing Resolution will have a devastating effect on
depot and shipyard maintenance activities for the rest of the year. In
your opinion, in this unprecedented fiscal environment, what can be
done to preserve our defense depot capabilities?
Mr. Estevez. While leveraging the principles of core and 50/50
statues will help us preserve the depot and shipyard critical
capabilities, the magnitude of the reductions and shortfalls are
forcing trade-offs between priority requirements across the Department.
Negative impacts on depot workloads are unavoidable given the need to
sustain operations in Afghanistan and meet our global commitments.

13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, how will you maintain the critical
skills of our depot and shipyard employees?
Mr. Estevez. DOD is required by title 10, U.S.C., section 2464, to
maintain a core logistics capability. However, the reductions
associated with sequestration have the potential to erode critical
skills and capabilities over the long-term. If confirmed, I will ensure
we attempt to protect critical skills by workloading the most critical
capabilities.

14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, if confirmed, what will you do to
maintain an efficient and consistent workload through military depots
if defense budget sequestration is allowed to occur?
Mr. Estevez. Unfortunately, due to operating under a Continuing
Resolution for half of the fiscal year, implementation of sequestration
and higher than anticipated Overseas Contingency Operations costs, the
Services are reducing and cancelling third and fourth quarter depot
inductions. Given the concentrated effect of this fiscal situation, the
Services do not have sufficient funding to maintain current,
consistent, nor efficient depot workload. In this environment, DOD and
the Services will smooth workload adjustments by slowing throughput of
existing funded work and pacing the remaining funded inductions while
attempting to satisfy readiness requirements.

15. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, please describe how you plan to
leverage the principles of core and 50/50 statutes during this budget
crisis.
Mr. Estevez. Adherence to core and 50/50 statutes will help us
preserve the depot and shipyard critical capabilities. Within that
framework, DOD will allocate resources and execute schedules to
minimize negative impacts to our depot capability and protect critical
maintenance functions. This should enable the Department to protect
critical capabilities in both the public and private sectors.

depot workload
16. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, the Military Services and the
National Guard all operate military depots with a certain degree of
capacity and workload duplication. The Logistics Management Institute
pointed out in a February 2011 report that ``at the strategic level,
enhanced, integrated governance is required to best manage the day-to-
day workload across all organic depot-level capabilities.'' Do you
agree with this statement?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, cross-Service strategic governance is provided
through DOD regulations and instructions and executive committees and
boards, such as the Maintenance Executive Steering Committee, the Joint
Group on Depot Maintenance, and the Joint Logistics Board. The
Department continually improves its strategic governance by enhancing
the effectiveness and efficiency of these executive bodies. In
addition, the Department is in the final stages of issuing a revised
Depot Source of Repair instruction that will enhance strategic
assignment and establishment of depot capability.

17. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, in your opinion, what needs to be
done within DOD to minimize workload duplication at a time when
workload will be decreasing?
Mr. Estevez. While we have improved cross-Service collaboration and
have had some success in workload reallocation to improve efficiency,
DOD is limited in addressing capacity duplication with respect to
existing capability. To mitigate unnecessary assignment of future
workload, the Department is in the final stages of issuing a revised
Depot Source of Repair instruction to enhance strategic assignment and
establishment of depot capability by requiring single-departmental and
single-Service sources of repair.

18. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, are we at the point that the
Services should look to consolidating similar workloads, such as
aircraft engines, into one facility?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, we are. Our current fiscal situation demands that
we look at all opportunities to enhance efficiency and reduce our cost
of operations. While we have improved cross-service collaboration and
have had some success in workload reallocation to improve efficiency,
DOD is limited in addressing capacity duplication with respect to
existing capability. However, the Department is implementing a Depot
Source of Repair instruction to prevent unnecessary assignment of
future workload.

19. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, to what extent should the Military
Services be allowed to manage their depot activities taking into
consideration their unique mission requirements?
Mr. Estevez. The Services should manage their depot workload to
meet their mission requirements; however, DOD's draft Depot Source of
Repair instruction will ensure consideration of existing depot
capability prior to establishing duplicate capability. Additionally,
the Department's joint governance bodies, such as the Maintenance
Executive Steering Committee, the Joint Group on Depot Maintenance, and
the Joint Logistics Board enable collaboration and strategic
decisionmaking.

20. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, do you believe the methodology for
the determination of core depot requirements needs to be strengthened?
If so, how?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, DOD is currently reviewing DOD Instruction
4151.20, ``Depot Maintenance Core Capabilities Determination Process,''
and will assess current methodology with the objective of strengthening
the requirements determination process. Given where we are in the
assessment process, it is premature to identify specifics.

depot policy
21. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, as you may know, we experienced a
bit of turmoil over the last year on Federal statutes intended to
provide guidance for the management of defense depot requirements. The
Senate was successful in December in restoring the traditional
framework, which has resulted in a balance over the years of a
consistent workload for depots. Part of the agreement with DOD was to
inform Congress of any potential depot policy changes before they take
place. If confirmed, will you agree to share with Congress any concerns
and/or policy issues related to the management of military depot
activities before promulgating any policy changes to the Military
Services?
Mr. Estevez. Yes, if confirmed, I will share any policy changes
prior to implementation.

22. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, do you currently anticipate
proposing any changes to depot policies?
Mr. Estevez. We are reviewing current polices for potential
updates. We anticipate improvements in how we define depot maintenance
to include clarification of modifications coincident with maintenance
operations and software maintenance. We also anticipate adjustments
that would address maintenance in support of systems that were acquired
in nontraditional acquisitions. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the committees as we develop these proposals and will ensure our
depot policies follow congressional intent.

better buying power 2.0
23. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, DOD is currently developing its
latest initiative designed to achieve continuous improvement. This
enterprise, called Better Buying Power 2.0, places particular
importance on improving not only the technical qualifications but
experience and leadership skills of DOD's acquisition workforce.
Ensuring DOD's acquisition workforce has greater experience and
improved technical competence in order to achieve the goals of
acquisition reform was a central argument in Ronald Fox's book,
``Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960 to 2009: An Elusive Goal,'' and the
Defense Science Board's 2009 study titled, ``Creating a DOD Strategic
Acquisition Platform''. However, what is less certain are the means by
which DOD intends to achieve a better trained and more experienced
acquisition workforce. What are DOD's specific plans to increase the
skills and experience of its acquisition workforce through the Better
Buying Power 2.0 initiative?
Mr. Estevez. DOD is focused on increasing the professional skills
and experience of its acquisition workforce through the Better Buying
Power 2.0 initiative, which includes establishing higher professional
qualification standards for Key Leadership Positions (KLPs) and the
``Certification to Qualification'' initiative.
The KLP initiative will define mandatory KLPs and establish core
position requirements, qualifications, and attributes. The
``Certification to Qualification'' structure framework is currently in
development and will focus on the demonstration and documentation of
the skill sets required by the acquisition workforce in order to
achieve successful acquisition results. The Defense Acquisition
Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF) has proven to be a critical asset
for the Department to increase the capacity and capability of its
acquisition workforce. The DAWDF has enabled the DOD Components
(Services, Defense Agencies, and other DOD organizations) to provide
targeted training and leadership development programs for acquisition
workforce personnel.

defense production act
24. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, as you may know, I've expressed
concern that the wide ranging authorities contained in the Defense
Production Act (DPA) are being used by DOD to spend $170 million for
the design and construction of a commercial biofuels refinery. Given
the current budget crisis facing DOD are there higher priorities for
the DPA, other than to construct a biofuels refinery, that are not
currently funded?
Mr. Estevez. As one of the world's largest consumers of petroleum,
the Department has an interest in diversification of fuel supplies as a
hedge against potential supply disruptions, especially for our legacy
fleet of ships and aircraft, which will be with us for decades to come.
This initiative is consistent with the intent of the authorities of
Title III of the Defense Production Act, which are uniquely focused on
enabling multiple departments to leverage cost sharing with the private
sector, and investing in capital expenditures, such as facility
retrofits or wholesale construction.
The authority was specifically created to promote industrial
production that would meet essential national defense requirements and
assist in creating economically viable production capabilities. In
addition to the biofuel initiative, the Title III Program is continuing
to make significant investments in almost forty efforts by creating or
expanding domestic production capabilities for essential materials and
technologies. These include advanced lithium ion batteries for space
and military applications, carbon nanotube and advanced composites for
high-performance structural components, specialty steels, lightweight
ammunition, and armor and advanced electronic components for next-
generation radars and electronic warfare applications. We believe we
are appropriately using DPA Authorities to meet our key priorities.

25. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, do you think that biofuels are a
higher priority than the urgent requirements identified by the DPA
Committee such as telecommunications security and the manufacturing of
critical materials for military weapon systems by a country other than
China? Please provide a list of the initiatives required to address
shortfalls in metal fabrication, power and energy, telecommunications,
and lightweight materials that are not currently funded.
Mr. Estevez. There are no unfunded DPAC initiatives. The biofuel
initiative is being developed and executed concurrently with other
important DPA Title III initiatives that will benefit our national
defense needs and is not diverting resources from other DPA
investments. The DPAC has recommended the following projects for which
funds are available.

1. Metal Fabrication Study Group Heavy Forging Initiative: The DPA
Title III Executive Agent is presently negotiating with the sole
remaining domestic heavy forging company to modernize and expand their
heavy forging capabilities that are critical for naval and other
defense applications.
2. Telecommunications Study Group Optical Networks Initiative: The
DPAC is working with interagency customers, including DISA and DoE that
have identified a need for trusted domestic sources of hardware to
support optical telecommunications capabilities.
3. Lightweight Materials Study Group: The DPAC is further defining
interagency requirements for an investment in lightweight materials.
Projects being developed include low cost carbon fiber and magnesium
alloy processing.
4. The Power and Energy Study Group is developing initiatives for
flexible solar cells for application such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
as well as soldier portable power and power switching devices for power
grid applications.

acquisition reform
26. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Estevez, for the past several years, the
Chiefs of the individual Services have repeatedly stated requirements
creep is one of the major factors creating increased costs and delays
in the acquisition of weapon systems. Specifically, additional
capability requirements continue to be added during the development of
weapons systems. Among other difficulties created by additional
requirements is the redesign, and even rebuilding, of weapons systems.
These concerns continue despite the fact the Joint Requirement
Oversight Council must approve of any requirements changes. Therefore,
what additional steps is DOD using to ensure requirements creep is
reduced and to reform the Joint Capabilities Integration Development
System?
Mr. Estevez. As a key factor in mitigating cost and schedule risk,
control of requirements (including prevention of creep) is a priority
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) objective. DOD efforts are focused on
definition of affordable, technically-executable requirements earlier
in program development, identification of cost-informed tradespace, and
robust oversight of requirements stability. Several initiatives have
been introduced to address the drivers of changing requirements.
Service Acquisition Executive-chaired Configuration Steering Boards
(CSB) are intended as an oversight and controlling mechanism for
proposed changes to requirements, stipulating annual identification of
de-scoping options to reduce program cost or technical/schedule risk,
and continuous monitoring of requirements stability. The USD(AT&L)
Better Buying Power 2.0 initiative and DOD Instruction 5000.02 revision
both advocate the CSB as a best practice to manage changes to
requirements.
Recent revisions to the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System process and business rules for the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council have led to more flexible, rapid review,
and, if necessary, modification of validated requirements that drive
program cost or schedule growth beyond affordability caps. In addition,
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; USD(AT&L); and
Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, as well as Service
Vice Chiefs and Acquisition Executives, recently agreed to establish a
periodic leadership forum to synchronize requirements, acquisition and
programming, and budgeting activities. This will ensure further top-
level leadership attention to emerging program difficulties caused by
changing requirements and facilitate early engagement to ensure
programs remain on track to provide timely and cost-effective
capabilities to the warfighter.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
ohio-class submarine replacement/modernization
27. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, you will be dealing with a
litany of challenges from current budget constraints. According to your
duties, you will aid in the establishing of policies for acquisition
(including procurement of goods and services, research and development,
developmental testing, and contract administration) for all elements of
DOD. There is concern that in this time of fiscal uncertainty, the
replacement of the Ohio-class submarine, a requirement for past Senate
ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), will
be overlooked or delayed. How will you balance and maintain oversight
of the modernization of crucial programs, such as the Ohio-class
replacement program, during your time as the Under Secretary?
Mr. Estevez. DOD is dedicated to recapitalizing the SSBN force to
provide the Nation's most survivable deterrence capability. The
Department remains committed to an ultimate SSBN force level of 12,
which is required to meet current U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
strategic deterrence requirements.
To balance DOD priorities and meet fiscal constraints, the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2013 shifted Ohio-class
replacement's (OR) lead ship construction from fiscal year 2019 to
fiscal year 2021 with all follow-on submarines also being shifted 2
years. The Department remains committed to accomplishing the design and
construction in the most cost-effective manner possible.
This delay results in a 10-year reduction in SSBN force level.
Delaying the start of construction adds risk to the Navy's ability to
meet current STRATCOM requirements in the 2030s; however, during this
time, neither the Ohio-class (nor the Ohio replacement) will have major
overhauls planned, helping to mitigate the risk associated with a
reduced force level during this period. The Navy will be closely
managing this risk during this transition period. By 2042, OR
construction plans will return the SSBN force level to 12, supporting
the start of extended maintenance periods for the new class and
removing on average 2 SSBNs from the operational fleet per year.
This delay will not materially affect the ability of the Department
to support the President's commitment to a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. I believe that we
must continue to aggressively scrutinize each of our programs to ensure
we maintain critical capabilities in a fiscally responsible manner,
which includes force modernization efforts such as the Ohio-class
replacement.

acquisition waste
28. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, DOD, at times, has a dismal
record in regards to its acquisition programs. In a report by the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, they estimate that in
the last decade alone, $46 billion has been utilized on programs that
were never fielded to the force. Wasteful spending must be mitigated
and eliminated in regards to our defense acquisition programs. What
overhaul or changes will you implement to ensure that acquisition
programs are feasible and executable?
Mr. Estevez. If confirmed, I will continue to support the evolution
of the Department's Better Buying Power initiatives and related
activities. I will facilitate the implementation of affordability
analysis and cost constraints on programs; in particular, this will
involve monitoring and enforcing affordability caps while working with
the Service Acquisition Executives and the requirements community to
address cases where, despite all efforts to control costs, the caps
cannot be met. In addition, I will expand the use of identifying and
monitoring key framing assumptions as a tool for informing decisions as
early as possible.
Throughout all of these activities, I will support the development
of our acquisition workforce. Program feasibility and executability
rely on our ability to work openly and intelligently with our partners
outside the immediate acquisition community to inform their decisions
and expectations as to what capabilities our technology and industrial
base can provide and at what cost and schedule.

small business act
29. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, there is inherent value of
small businesses in our economy which support public good especially in
the economic advancement of disadvantaged demographics such as
Veterans, Native Americans, Women, and Minorities. However, the
Military Services all struggle to reach the 23 percent small business
award goal set forth in the legislation of the Small Business Act. The
Services often feel pressure to award a contract to small business to
reach that goal, sometimes at greater expense to the taxpayer and lower
quality to the warfighter. As a consequence, this adversely affects the
cost and quality of capabilities needed by our warfighters. Also,
equally worthy organizations such as non-profit institutions or
educational organizations are excluded from contract competition. Given
the current budget crisis facing DOD, how should we amend the Small
Business Act to better serve the taxpayers and the warfighters?
Mr. Estevez. I believe that the Small Business Act, as implemented
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and DOD FAR Supplement,
properly protects the best interests of our warfighters and the
taxpayers and, at this time, I do not believe that changes to the Small
Business Act are needed to achieve that objective.
Although the Small Business Act requires that the Government-wide
goal for small business prime contracts be established at not less than
23 percent, the Small Business Administration negotiates with agencies
to establish individual agency goals that, in the aggregate, comprise
the Government-wide goal. The fiscal year 2013 DOD goal for Small
Business prime contracting is 22.5 percent. Among the Military
Services, the Department of the Army has consistently exceeded the DOD
goal, averaging 24.06 percent between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year
2012.
Furthermore, it has not been my experience that awarding contracts
to small businesses has resulted in greater expense to the taxpayer and
lower quality to the warfighter. I note in this regard that the FAR
Part 19.501(g) provides that, ``Except as authorized by law, a contract
may not be awarded as a result of a small business set-aside if the
cost to the awarding agency exceeds the fair market price.'' FAR Part
9, pertaining to contractor qualifications, prescribes the policy at
FAR Part 9.103 that, ``Purchases shall be made from, and contracts
awarded to, responsible prospective contractors only.'' I believe DOD's
acquisition workforce strives to ensure that awarded contracts
represent the best value to the Government and taxpayers, while
ensuring that quality goods and services are provided. In my
experience, rather than adversely affecting the cost and quality of
capabilities, small businesses are an important source of cost-
effective innovation critical to supporting the needs of our
warfighters.

30. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, how would you direct the
Services to implement current exceptions to the FARs to protect
educational or other non-profit institutions as well as our ability to
achieve industrial mobilization?
Mr. Estevez. This is an important area and, if confirmed, I will
monitor it closely. I believe the FAR permits educational and other
non-profit institutions to participate in full and open competition for
DOD procurements. I am unaware of instances where they have been
prohibited from doing so. Additionally, protecting our ability to
achieve industrial mobilization and protecting educational or other
non-profit institutions providing critical support in this area can be
addressed using FAR Part 6.302-3. This regulation provides that ``Full
and open competition need not be provided for when it is necessary to
award the contract to a particular source or sources in order: (i) To
maintain a facility, producer, manufacturer, or other supplier
available for furnishing supplies or services. to achieve industrial
mobilization,'' or ``(ii) To establish or maintain an essential
engineering, research, or development capability to be provided by an
educational or other nonprofit institution or a federally funded
research and development center.''
Furthermore, most of DOD's work with educational and other non-
profit institutions takes place pursuant to grant regulations rather
than under the FAR. Therefore, at this time, I do not feel that it is
necessary to provide additional direction to the Services to address
these issues.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
defense industrial base
31. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Estevez, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you say that you are: ``concerned about the impact
that further defense budget cuts would have on the ability of the
[industrial] base to provide the broad range of products and services
that the Department and our Nation need.'' What impact would defense
sequestration and a full year Continuing Resolution have on our defense
industrial base?
Mr. Estevez. Although a full year Continuing Resolution did not
materialize, Defense sequestration is expected to lead to unintended,
unsafe, and wasteful consequences for the Department, some of which
will have secondary effects that last for years. Sequestration will
degrade capital market confidence in the defense industry. Companies
have been less willing to make internal investments in their defense
portfolio, including investments in innovation and design. The impact
of sequestration will be even greater on smaller firms at the lower
levels of the supply chain, where much of the innovation takes place.
These smaller firms often lack the capital structure to withstand
prolonged uncertainty. As a result, we expect to see additional merger
activity and vertical integration at the lower tiers. Some firms,
particularly the small firms with more fragile capital structures, may
have to close their doors completely. Continued technological
innovation and the financial viability of our defense industrial base
are strongly in our national interest.

32. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Estevez, what impact would this damage to
our defense industrial base have on our warfighters?
Mr. Estevez. With reductions in funding, there is a likelihood that
market forces and dynamics will lead to a restructuring of our
industrial base. In a normal downturn cycle, these forces, and
competition in general, can be positive in that they ensure industry is
cost-effective and providing the greatest value for the taxpayer's
investment. However, in a rapid or unstructured decline, the impact can
have long-term negative consequences.
In the near-term, we could expect to see some consolidation within
the smaller and mid-size firms in the industrial base, which may siphon
away some critical skills, particularly in the areas of engineering and
design. Our technological superiority on the battlefield relies on the
skills of the engineering and design teams within industry. The loss of
these design teams could have a long-term negative impact on the
Department's ability to field the capabilities our warfighters need.
Recognizing the changing nature of the fiscal outlook, in 2011, the
Department implemented a sector-by-sector and tier-by-tier approach to
assessing the industrial base. This approach methodically assesses the
criticality and fragility of DOD vendors, across sectors and down
through the tiers, to identify critical skills and capabilities that if
lost, could negatively affect the ability of industry to satisfy DOD
requirements when called upon. In part, because of these analyses, the
Department is better able to inform decisionmakers in the Services and
at the Department level of the potential industrial capability impacts
of budget decisions.

33. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Estevez, how would this impact our national
security?
Mr. Estevez. Defense cuts must be carefully managed to minimize the
impact on national security. With reduced investment in the private
sector, it is logical to expect some job losses as industry right-sizes
to support the Department's needs. Defense cuts may disproportionately
impact smaller firms at the lower levels of the supply chain because
these firms lack the capital structure to withstand prolonged cuts. As
a result, we will see additional merger activity and vertical
integration at the lower tiers of the defense industrial base as
companies reduce capacity to meet demand. This merger activity could
lead to the loss of innovation and design capabilities in the
industrial base. Mergers may result in reduced competition, which the
government will have to monitor or address on a transaction by
transaction basis. With reductions in design capabilities and
production capabilities, we may see longer timelines to field,
maintain, or overhaul equipment. We may also need, over the long-term,
to invest significantly to restore lost capability and capacity during
a crisis.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike S. Lee
biofuels
34. Senator Lee. Mr. Estevez, in 2012, the Navy undertook the
expensive ``Great Green Fleet'' demonstration, purchasing 450,000
gallons of biofuel at $26 a gallon for a total of $12 million spent on
fuel for just one demonstration. The Air Force similarly spent $639,000
on 11,000 gallons of biofuels for a demonstration in 2012, costing the
taxpayer $59 per gallon. With the prospect of sequestration and a much
tighter defense budget in coming years, do you believe that the
military should continue such large-scale demonstrations using
biofuels? Please provide a yes or no answer, and if answering yes,
please provide a justification as to why programs involving biofuels
should be prioritized over other research and development programs.
Mr. Estevez. Yes, I believe that DOD should continue its modest
investment in alternative fuels. As one of the world's largest
consumers of petroleum, the Department has an interest in
diversification of fuel supplies as a hedge against potential supply
disruptions, especially for our legacy fleet of ships and planes, which
will be with us for decades to come. Over the next 5 years, 96 percent
of the Department's funding to improve operational energy use is
devoted to reducing the amount of fuel required for military
operations. The remaining 4 percent is a relatively small, but
important investment in alternative fuels, which is a longer term
strategy for our energy security. Most of this investment ensures that
our equipment can operate on a wide range of fuels, so we are prepared
if and when alternative fuels become commercially available. As
petroleum is a finite resource, we believe this to be a prudent
investment, and we have been performing these types of activities since
2003.
The Department's primary alternative fuels goal is to ensure
operational military readiness and further the flexibility of military
operations through the ability to use multiple reliable fuel sources.
To help achieve this goal, we released the DOD Alternative Fuels Policy
for Operational Platforms in July 2012. The policy confirms that all
investments are subject to rigorous, merit-based evaluation and that
the Department will not make bulk purchases unless they are cost
competitive with petroleum products. To date, the Department has only
purchased relatively small test quantities of alternative fuels, which
are used in testing, evaluation, or demonstration activities. These
purchases are mostly prototypes and should not be equated with
commercial fuels purchases. I will ensure that the Department complies
with the existing internal policy.

future acquisition process
35. Senator Lee. Mr. Estevez, with the prospect of sequester cuts
to DOD this year and continuing cuts through the next 9 fiscal years,
we must change the way that acquisitions are conducted in order to be
more efficient and cost effective. Necessary acquisitions, such as our
next generation fighter jet, have been plagued by delays and budget
overruns. What lessons have been learned so far from the F-35 program
that you will implement in future acquisitions?
Mr. Estevez. There are a number of lessons from the F-35 program
that we are applying across the acquisition structure. The previously
approved level of concurrency in the F-35 program was based on the
expectation that improvements in engineering design tools and modeling
and simulation capabilities would result in a reduced level of
discovery in flight test compared to our historical experience with
similar acquisition programs. However, we learned those assumptions
were invalid and they have not replaced the need for careful and
thorough developmental testing of complex weapons systems. We need to
ensure acquisition strategies are based on sound technological
judgment, reinforced with strong program management underpinned with
proven systems engineering and appropriate developmental testing. We
have introduced Better Buying Power initiatives that will reinforce
strong acquisition discipline, manage costs and program affordability,
and strengthen the acquisition workforce. I believe it is vital that
the acquisition and engineering professional leadership in the
Department exercise early active involvement in our acquisition
programs, and regularly ensure sound program management, engineering,
and testing for every program. A program based on sound acquisition and
engineering principles will have the best chance to succeed and execute
within its planned cost and schedule.

f-35 cost overruns
36. Senator Lee. Mr. Estevez, delays and cost overruns with the F-
35 have caused some of our partner nations, most recently Canada and
Australia, to reassess their acquisition of the jets. What effects will
a reduction of purchases outside of the United States have on the
program and the cost of the jet?
Mr. Estevez. The F-35 delivers joint- and partner-nation air power
essential to our mutual security strategy and is a capability needed to
defeat 21st century threats. The F-35 program was established on the
concept of economies of scale for purchases. Any reduction in the
planned procurement quantity of F-35s, either from the International
Partners or from a U.S. Service, will result in an increase in the unit
cost of each remaining F-35 to be procured. The amount of the cost
increase will be a factor of how many jets are reduced from the
currently planned procurement quantities, and in which years.

37. Senator Lee. Mr. Estevez, how are DOD and the Air Force working
with our partner nations to address their concerns and maintain their
participation in the program?
Mr. Estevez. The F-35 Program Executive Officer (PEO) and his staff
actively engage the F-35 Partner nations on a daily basis. Members of
the Partner nations are fully integrated into the F-35 Program Office.
The PEO ensures open lines of communication to all of the Partners, so
that all countries have the latest programmatic, technical, and
financial updates to support their sovereign decisions on participation
and purchases. Additionally, the Lead Service Acquisition Executive and
the PEO host a number of forums throughout the year, such as the JSF
Executive Steering Board, where all of the Partner nations can voice
their concerns and have a discussion with senior program leaders. The
Defense Acquisition Executive informs all of the Partner National
Armament Directors on major U.S. budget developments affecting
development and procurement accounts, in addition to hosting them
annually (along with the CEOs of the larger F-35 defense contractors)
to review strategic level program progress and concerns. The F-35
program has demonstrated continued progress in a number of areas. Of
paramount interest to the partner nations is affordability and they are
encouraged with the continued cost reduction improvements realized in
the unit cost of the aircraft. However, sequestration effects may
negatively impact this improvement in affordability over the long-term.
______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Alan F. Estevez follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 22, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Alan F. Estevez, of the District of Columbia, to be a Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, vice Frank Kendall III.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Alan F. Estevez, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Alan Fredric Estevez
Education:
North Arlington High School, NJ

1971-1975
High School Diploma awarded 1975

Rutgers University

1975-1979
Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded 1979

Industrial College of the Armed Forces/National Defense University

1994-1995
Masters of Science Degree awarded 1995
Employment record:
Department of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel
Readiness)

August 2011-Present

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Logistics & Materiel Readiness)

November 2006-August 2011
Performing the Duties of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness),
April 2009-August 2011

Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Supply
Chain Integration)

October 2002-November 2006

Deputy, Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Transportation Policy)

May 2000-October 2002
Acting Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Transportation Policy), September 2001-
December 2001

Assistant for Traffic Management, Office of the
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation
Policy)

December 1995-May 2000
Honors and awards:
Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award (2013)
Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award (2011)
Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award (2011)
Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award (2006)
Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian
Service (2005 & 2009)
Service to America Medal, National Security Category (2005)
Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian
Service (2001)
Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence (1997)
Defense Logistics Agency Superior Civilian Service Award (1997)
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Alan F.
Estevez in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Alan Fredric Estevez.

2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics).

3. Date of nomination:
January 22, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
September 20, 1957; Kearny, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Susan Hideko Pearson (Ludrick).

7. Names and ages of children:
N/A.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces/National Defense University,
Masters of Science in National Resource Strategy 1994-1995
Rutgers University, Bachelor of Arts in Political Science 1975-1979
North Arlington High School, NJ, High School Diploma 1971-1975

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness),
Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Aug. 2011-Present
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics &
Materiel Readiness), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC,
Nov. 2006-Aug. 2011

Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness) April 2009-August 2011

Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Supply Chain
Integration), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Oct.
2002-Nov. 2006
Deputy, Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Transportation Policy), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington,
DC, May 2000-Oct. 2002

Acting Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Transportation Policy), Department of Defense, Pentagon,
Washington, DC, Sept. 2001-Dec. 2001

Assistant for Traffic Management, Office of the Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation Policy), Department of
Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Dec. 1995-May 2000

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
DOD Liaison to Board of Governors, Electronic Product Code Global
(EPCGlobal), Global Standard 1 (GS1) (standard setting group) 2004-
2011.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, National Defense Industrial Association
Member, Museum of Modern Art, NY
Member, Defenders of Wildlife
Member, Friends of the National Zoo
Member, Corcoran Gallery
Member, WETA
Member, The Potomac Conservancy
Member, Habitat For Humanity
Member, National Parks Conservation Association
Member, The Nature Conservancy
Member, Rails to Trails
Member, Chesapeake Bay Foundation
Member, WAMU 88.5
Member, Philips Collection
Member, Potomac Appalachian Trail Club
Member, C&O Canal Trust

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award, 2013
Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, 2011
Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award, 2011
Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award, 2006
Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian
Service, 2005 & 2009
Service to America Medal, National Security Category, 2005
Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian
Service, 2001
Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence, 1997
Defense Logistics Agency Superior Civilian Service Award, 1997

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Estevez, A.F. and S. Geary (2006), ``RFID: The Future is Now,''
Exceptional Release Magazine, Summer 2006, pp 26-29.
Estevez, Alan F., (2005), ``RFID Vision in the DOD Supply Chain,''
Army Logistician, May-June 2005, pp 5-9.
Estevez, A.F. and S. Geary (2004), ``Lessons from the Desert,''
Supply Chain Management Review, November/December 2004, pp. 38-43.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I speak in my official capacity at various events about once a
month on topics general DOD logistics topics. However, these are not
formal speeches.

17.Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Hon. Alan F. Estevez was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on March 20, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on October 30, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Frederick E. Vollrath
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in
these modifications?
Answer. Currently, I am not aware of a need for modifications to
the act but if confirmed I will review its implementation and will
recommend modifications if necessary.
duties
Question. Section 138 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that Assistant
Secretaries of Defense shall perform such duties and exercise such
powers as the Secretary of Defense my prescribe.
This is a new position. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do
you expect to be assigned to you?
Answer. Upon my appointment as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Readiness and Force Management (PDASD(R&FM)) in March
2012, it has been my task to establish the Office of Readiness and
Force Management and I have been performing the duties of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management. In this
position, I have been serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary
of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (USD(P&R)) on all matters relating to the areas of civilian
and military personnel policies, readiness of the force, military
community and family policy, Total Force planning and requirements,
diversity management, equal opportunity, and transition policy.
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you to perform the duties of this position?
Answer. I have over 40 years of human resource management and
executive leadership experience, including organizational development
with an emphasis on strategic level efficiencies. I retired in the rank
of lieutenant general after serving 35 years in the U.S. Army human
resource management command and staff positions. I last served as the
U.S. Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), where I directed
all aspects of human resources management and administration for the
total Army. I have also served as the corporate Vice President of Human
Resources (HR) for a large global Fortune 150 Company. I have the
unique experience of both government and nongovernment HR experience.
Question. Do you believe that there are any additional steps that
you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties?
Answer. Upon starting in the position of PDASD(R&FM), I immediately
conducted face-to-face meetings with my staff (collaborative and a open
dialogue). I routinely meet with the deputy assistant secretaries,
directors, and the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to stay informed of current issues and to adjust strategies
as needed. I will continue to reach out to the Departments of Veterans
Affairs and Labor and the Office of Personnel Management to better our
efforts to collaborate in solutions to DOD HR issues.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management
(ASD(R&FM))?
Answer. In my view, major challenges currently confronting the
ASD(R&FM) include the reduced ability to accomplish all of our missions
should sequestration and resulting furloughs of the civilian workforce
come to pass; finding meaningful ways to combat the Department's rising
level of suicides; sustaining the All-Volunteer Force during these
fiscally challenging times, as well as ensuring that we have the right
Force mix as we drawdown Service end strength while applying greater
manpower to emerging areas of growth such as cyber; expanding the
Transition Assistance Program (TAP) and implementing the new Civilian
Personnel Performance Management System; ensuring the policy provisions
are complete to adopt the changes from the extension of Same-Sex
Partner Benefits; and ensuring the Military Compensation and Retirement
Modernization Commission has the appropriate DOD recommendations prior
to the required deadline.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the subject matter
experts and leadership in these areas to develop proactive responses
and approaches to ensure that all courses of action are timely and
appropriate.
relationships
Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your
relationship with the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would report through the USD(P&R) to the
Secretary of Defense as this position reports directly to the USD(P&R).
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would report through the USD(P&R) to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense as this position reports directly to the
USD(P&R).
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness
Answer. The ASD(R&FM) reports directly to the USD(P&R) and serves
as the primary advisor on all matters relating to the areas of civilian
and military personnel policies, readiness of the force, military
community and family policy, Total Force planning and requirements,
diversity management, equal opportunity, and transition policy. The
ASD(R&FM) also provides regular updates to USD regarding matters in ASD
portfolio.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.
Answer. Collaborates with ASD for Health Affairs on matters of
mutual interest or are cross-cutting in nature.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
Answer. Collaborate with the ASD for Reserve Affairs on matters of
mutual interest or are cross-cutting in nature.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Materiel Readiness (ASD(L&MR)).
Answer. The ASD(R&FM) collaborates with ASD(L&MR) on matters of
mutual interest or are cross-cutting in nature.
Question. The Department of Defense General Counsel.
Answer. Seek advice on all legal matters or services performed
within the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness
and Force Management.
Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General.
Answer. Forward or respond to any instances of waste, fraud and
abuse within the office of the ASD(R&FM) and cooperate with the
Inspector General on any investigative activities.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. Collaborate with Service Secretaries on matters of mutual
interest or are cross-cutting in nature. Seek Service input on major
policy initiatives.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Answer. Meet regularly with M&RAs to discuss key personnel issues.
Collaborate on matters of mutual interest or are cross-cutting in
nature and seek input on major policy initiatives.
Question. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for
Personnel, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Commandant of
the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Answer. Meet with Service Chiefs on key personnel issues.
Collaborate on matters of mutual interest or are cross-cutting in
nature.
Question. The combatant commanders
Answer. Formal communications to the commanders of the combatant
commands normally is transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Joint Staff, particularly the Director for Manpower
and Personnel (J-1)
Answer. Meet with J-1 on key personnel issues and collaborate on
matters of mutual interest or are cross-cutting in nature.
disability severance pay
Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced
severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted
from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for
disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in
a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in combat-
related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In
adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of
a combat-related disability contained in title 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)).
Rather than using the definition intended by Congress, the Department
of Defense adopted a more limited definition of combat-related
operations, requiring that the disability be incurred during
participation in armed conflict.
What is your understanding of the number of servicemembers impacted
by the DOD interpretation of ``combat-related disability,'' and how did
the DOD interpretation affect their compensation?
If confirmed, will you reconsider the Department's definition of
combat-related operations for purposes of awarding enhanced severance
pay and deduction of severance pay from VA disability compensation?
Answer. Since Enhanced Disability Severance Pay is outside the
portfolio of OASD(R&FM), I do not have specific details on this
program. I will ensure that the proper authorities, namely the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, understand the
concern expressed here and encourage a review of policy to ensure
equitable and fair treatment of our disabled servicemembers.
homosexual conduct policy
Question. The law commonly referred to as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''
was repealed effective September 20, 2011. As part of the
implementation of this repeal, the Secretary of Defense appointed a
benefits review group to conduct a review of all potential benefits
that could be made available to same-sex spouses. The report of this
review group is long overdue and has been repeatedly delayed.
What is your view of the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''
(DADT)?
Answer. On July 22, 2011, the President, Secretary of Defense and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certified that repeal was
consistent with the standards of military readiness, military
effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the Armed
Forces. Repeal occurred September 20, 2011. I fully support the repeal
of DADT.
Question. What is your assessment of the implementation of the
repeal of this law?
Answer. Since September 20, 2011, the effective date of repeal, the
Service Secretaries, the Service Chiefs and the combatant commanders
have reported no significant issues related to implementation of the
repeal of DADT. I believe this success can be attributed to the
Department's comprehensive pre-repeal training programs, combined with
the discipline of our servicemembers and continued close monitoring and
enforcement of standards by our military leaders at all levels
Question. What is the status of the report of the benefits review
group? When is this group expected to issue its report?
Answer. Following repeal, the Department focused its attention to
benefits. The Department conducted a deliberative and comprehensive
review of the possibility of extending eligibility for benefits, when
legally permitted, to same-sex domestic partners of servicemembers. The
benefits were examined from a policy, fiscal, legal and feasibility
perspective. That review has been finalized and the Secretary of
Defense approved the extension of an additional two member-designated
benefits and 22 additional benefits that are to be made available by
August, 31, 2013 but no later than October 1, 2013.
Question. What is your view on the issue of providing military and
survivor benefits to same-sex partners?
Answer. When DADT was repealed, there remained some areas where our
members and their families were not treated equally. In some of these
areas, the Department can take administrative action that better cares
for members and their families, consistent with the law. When
servicemembers don't have to worry about their families back home, they
can better focus on the mission.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that completion of the
report of the Benefits Review Group is expedited and provided to
Congress?
Answer. The Joint Benefits Review Working Group was chartered to
provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on benefits that
could be extended from a policy, fiscal, legal and feasibility
perspective. The Secretary of Defense made his decision concerning the
recommendation and released a memo on February 11, 2013 detailing which
benefits would be extended.
religious guidelines
Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
programs of the Department of Defense regarding religious practices in
the military?
Answer. Current policies and programs of the Department of Defense
regarding religious practices in the military ensure servicemembers'
rights to observe the tenets of their respective religions, as well as
to hold no specific religious conviction or affiliation. The
Chaplaincies of the Military Departments advise and assist commanders
in the discharge of their responsibilities to provide for the free
exercise of religion in the context of military service as guaranteed
by the Constitution, assist commanders in managing Religious Affairs
and serve as the principal advisors to commanders for all issues
regarding the impact of religion on military operations.
Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
religious practices that require adherents to wear items of religious
apparel or adhere to certain grooming practices related to their faith?
Answer. Current policies allow for consideration of accommodations
of religious apparel that do not interfere with the performance of
military duties. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the
Military Services to ensure that we maintain the right balance between
military uniform and appearance standards and servicemembers' personal
religious practices.
Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes, in my view, current policies appropriately accommodate
the free exercise of religion for all servicemembers in the pluralistic
environment that is the U.S. military. The Department of Defense does
not endorse any one religion or religious organization, and provides
free access of religion for all members of the military services. The
Department respects (and supports by its policy) the rights of others
to their own religious beliefs, including the right to hold no beliefs.
If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and assess these policies.
Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Service
Academies to ensure religious tolerance and respect?
Answer. My assessment is that these measures have been successful
in fostering religious tolerance and respect. Systems are in place to
provide the means for cadets to address and resolve any perceived
unfair treatment on the basis of race, national origin, color, gender,
and/or religious affiliation, or sexual harassment. Servicemembers can
use the chain of command, Inspector General or Equal Opportunity
channels to raise concerns.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. Existing policies provide military chaplains with
sufficient guidance that allows them to balance, in both formal and
informal settings, their own faith practices with the rights of others
who may hold different or no religious beliefs. I acknowledge that this
at times can be a difficult balance to achieve, and if confirmed, I
will continue to work with the civilian and military leadership of the
Department to ensure this balance is maintained.
Question. The Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that
``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations
urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for
religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to
task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-disciplinary
study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-
radicalization . . . ''.
What is your view of this recommendation?
Answer. Ensuring appropriate accommodations for the free exercise
of religions and protecting servicemembers from violence and harm are
both of vital importance. Pursuant to Recommendation 2.7, the
Department updated its policy on religious accommodation to ensure
religious freedoms and practices are accommodated to the fullest extent
possible considering mission readiness, discipline and unit cohesion.
This policy is currently under revision to incorporate language from
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013,
section 533 which protects the rights of conscience of members of the
Armed Forces and chaplains. Regarding Recommendation 2.8, the
Department did task the Defense Science Board (DSB) to undertake a
study. The DSB recently completed their study and found that it could
not determine a specific list of behaviors that would indicate risk of
violent/extremist behavior. If I am confirmed, I will continue to
provide oversight regarding the implementation of the recommendations
of the Fort Hood Review.
Question. Will you work to ensure that a scientific factbased
approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department's
relevant policies on this topic?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will review the Department's existing
policies and its plans to address these challenges and determine what,
if any, changes should be made. I agree that any changes to how the
Department approaches this issue should be based on a solid factual
foundation.
muslims in the u.s. military
Question. In your view, did the attack at Ft. Hood encourage
harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
Answer. The incident at Fort Hood was a tragedy and an isolated
event. We must not allow the circumstances surrounding that incident to
compromise the military's core values regarding the free exercise of
religion and to ensure that we treat every servicemember with dignity
and respect. Each servicemember has the right to practice his or her
religious faith without fear of persecution or retribution. This is a
core value of our Country and our military.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
U.S. military?
Answer. This sort of behavior or any form of cruelty and
maltreatment is inconsistent with the military's core values, detracts
from combat capability, and has no place in the Armed Forces. Through
ensuring clear and consistent policy, commanders and leaders at all
levels will have the guidance necessary to maintain an environment that
promotes dignity and respect, and will hold them accountable for
preventing harassment or mistreatment.
hazing
Question. Numerous incidents of hazing have been reported during
the last year, several of which involved suicide by hazing victims.
Although several of those who committed the hazing were prosecuted,
they were acquitted of the most serious allegations.
Does the Department of Defense have a comprehensive policy
addressing hazing? If so, what is the policy and where is it
documented?
Answer. A 1997 Secretary of Defense policy memorandum prohibiting
hazing is unambiguous; however, the guidance clearly states it is
contrary to good order and discipline and is unacceptable behavior.
This guidance also defines the prohibited conduct which constitutes
hazing as well as guidance for dealing with violations.
Recent leadership statements have continued to emphasize that such
behavior will not be tolerated, to include the Secretary of Defense
message of December 2011, the Secretary of the Army's tri-signed
message of January 2012, and the All Marine Corps Activities message
and revised Marine Corps Order 1700.28A of February 2012.
Question. In your view, should the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) be amended to specifically prohibit hazing? Are other changes to
the UCMJ needed to adjudicate allegations of hazing?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Joint Service Committee on
Military Justice has completed its review of hazing as a separate
offense under the UCMJ and the associated report is currently under
departmental review.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the
issue of hazing?
Answer. The DOD Hazing Review Team is actively examining responsive
courses of action in three focus areas--policy, training and education,
and reporting--all reinforce the Department's position that hazing is
unacceptable behavior.
women in the military
Question. Secretary Panetta, at the recommendation of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, recently rescinded the policy restricting the
assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of
engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has given the military
services until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed
to women, or to request an exception to policy to keep a position
closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
Do you support Secretary Panetta's decision?
Answer. Yes, I support the measures Secretary Panetta has taken to
expand the positions available to women.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for women in
the Armed Forces?
Answer. I believe success in our military is based upon ability,
qualifications and performance of a person consistent with our values
and military readiness. I don't believe there is an appropriate role
for men or for women, rather there is an appropriate position for
anyone who can meet the requirements of that position.
Question. Do you believe it is in the national security interest to
rescind the policy restricting assignment of women to certain units
which have the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat
operations? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, it is in the best interest of this nation to permit
the most qualified individual, who meets the requirements of a
position, to serve in that position regardless of gender.
Question. If confirmed, what action will you take to ensure that
physical standards will be realistic and will preserve military
readiness and mission capability?
Answer. The Department of Defense is aware of Public Law 103-160,
section 543, which prohibits the Department from changing an
occupational performance standard for the purpose of increasing or
decreasing the number of women in that occupational career field. To
ensure physical standards are being properly developed and accurately
correlate with the requirements of the position or occupation, we have
partnered with RAND to assess the Services' work against industry
standards.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements? If so, what steps will you
take, if confirmed, to ensure that such decisions are made on this
basis?
Answer. It is not a requirement to have women in these positions;
rather it is in the best interest of the Department to allow both men
and women who meet the standards for these positions to compete for
them. This is not a program to put women into direct ground combat
positions; it's a program to remove gender as a selection disqualifier
and, if confirmed, I will ensure that such decisions are consistent
with that approach.
Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about
assigning women to what are currently male-only combat units.
To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the
implementation of this policy?
Answer. It's normal for family members to have concerns about their
loved ones, however I expect our commanders to select qualified
personnel, male or female. Additionally, we have had a number of women
in newly opened units since mid-2012, and have already experienced
successful integration of women into formerly male-only units.
Question. If it is a problem, what steps would you take if
confirmed to address it?
Answer. We've required the Services to provide us quarterly
feedback on their elimination of gender-restrictive policy, which
includes feedback on the status of women in these newly opened
positions. If problems are encountered, I will, if confirmed, examine
the issue and address it considering all dimensions and all
recommendations consistent with sustaining readiness.
personnel and entitlement costs
Question. Personnel and related entitlement spending continues to
grow and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.
What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to
control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?
Answer. Congress, in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act,
established a Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization
Commission. Currently, the Department is reviewing all aspects of
military compensation and benefits in order to provided recommendations
to the Commission later this fall.
As a Department, we must continually strive to balance our
responsibilities to our servicemembers, to the Nation, and to the
American taxpayers. If confirmed, I am committed to exploring options
to find savings and more efficient alternatives to help control the
rise in personnel and entitlement costs while still fully supporting
our men and women in uniform and the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services
efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high
quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the
Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for other elements of
the force?
Answer. Bonuses and special and incentive pays are some of the most
cost effective tools available to the Services. These tools provide
effective and easily targetable incentives without the long-term costs
associated with entitlements and are generally much more cost-effective
than across-the-board pay increases. Like any compensation program,
however, these tools must be continually monitored to ensure they are
used both efficiently and effectively and that the Department is
receiving best value for its dollars. If confirmed, I will continue to
work to ensure our bonus and special and incentive pay programs are
administered effectively and efficiently.
dependent care and flexible spending accounts
Question. The 10th QRMC recommended providing dependent care and
flexible spending benefits to Active Duty servicemembers. Providing
these benefits would seem consistent with the initiatives of First Lady
Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It
would appear that no new legislative authority is needed for the
Department to provide these benefits to servicemembers and their
families.
If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the Active Duty
servicemembers and their families?
Answer. In response to the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act,
the Department examined and provided a report on the possibility of
providing a flexible spending account to military members. The report
identified a number of advantages and disadvantages to the Department
offering an Flexible Spending Account (FSA) for military members. The
central issue was a debate of whether the tax advantage to military
members would warrant the cost the Department would incur implementing
and managing such a program. Generally, military members pay very
little out of pocket for their health care and are in a low tax
bracket. Therefore, the majority of active duty military members would
see little, if any, benefit to implementation of an FSA. Finally, most
reservists, who typically receive medical care outside the military
system, already have access to an FSA.
suicide prevention
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the Committee. The Army released a report in July 2010 that
analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In
addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in
theater showed declines in individual morale and increases in mental
health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple
deployments.
In your view, what role should the Department of Defense play in
shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their
families, including members of the Reserve components?
Answer. Suicide is a complex problem and each individual
circumstance is unique. However, I strongly believe that suicide
prevention is a leadership responsibility, and the Department
encourages everyone to responsibly seek professional behavioral health
and other services.
To address the factors that contribute to suicidal behavior, I
believe the Department must support a culture that promotes total force
fitness and resilience. This requires both military and civilian
leaders to be knowledgeable on how to enhance protective factors and a
positive working environment. It means involving families in solutions
and care planning. Peers and non-medical case managers also need to
foster resilience and build a supportive community.
If confirmed, I will partner with the Services to ensure suicide
prevention and resiliency building are emphasized at all levels along
with the promotion of help-seeking behaviors and improving access to
behavioral health care. I will focus on finding best practices and
using them to provide guidance from which the Services can most
effectively operate their suicide prevention programs across the total
force.
readiness responsibilities
Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., gives the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness certain
responsibilities for military readiness. Some important issues that
affect military readiness, however, such as logistics and materiel
readiness, have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Under
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in exercising policy
and program oversight of military readiness, including materiel
readiness?
Answer. The responsibilities of the USD(P&R) are to develop
policies, plans, and programs for the total force and its allocation
among the DOD components, and between the Active and Reserve
components, to ensure efficient and effective support of wartime and
peacetime operations, contingency planning, and preparedness. As part
of these responsibilities, the USD(P&R) coordinates closely with the
USD(AT&L) by reviewing and evaluating the requirements of the Defense
Acquisition Board's major defense acquisition programs and proposed
weapons systems for personnel, training, and readiness implications.
Question. If confirmed, what would you propose as the most critical
objectives to improve policy and program oversight over military
readiness?
Answer. One of the most critical objectives facing the Department
is to oversee the Service's transition, as rapidly as possible, from a
counterinsurgency focused force to a Joint force capable of operating
effectively across the full range of military operations. This is
driven by the recognition that despite today's fiscal challenges, our
forces will be expected to provide enhanced presence, deterrence, and
must also be prepared to respond rapidly to emerging crises in a
diverse and complicated global environment. Specifically, we must
create a Joint force capable of maintaining our commitment to
rebalancing our global posture and presence to the Asia-Pacific region.
These requirements call for a leaner force that is more agile, ready,
and technologically advanced. Achieving this force will take time and
other resources to fully achieve.
This transition is not about returning to pre-September 11 force
profile and readiness standards. The global dynamic, pace of activity,
and our military's global responsibilities have changed since then. We
must again be ready for a wide range of possible missions across the
spectrum of conflict.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Military
Departments as well as other Office of the Secretary of Defense offices
to achieve them?
Answer. Military readiness, by its very nature, has some relevance
for nearly every one of the DOD components. For this reason, my office
must work closely with other OSD offices, the Services, the Joint
Staff, the combatant commands, and the Combat Support Agencies (CSAs)
to ensure we are all moving toward the same goals.
One of the primary mechanisms for ensuring coordination and
synchronization with the DOD components on readiness issues is our
participation in the Deputies Management Activities Group (DMAG). The
Readiness DMAG series focuses on the Department-level readiness issues
that impact current and future military readiness. In support of these
DMAGs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness has
created a readiness forum that is co-lead by the Joint Staff J-3 and
comprised of Service readiness leads, SOCOM, nearly every OSD
component, and several representatives from across the Joint Staff.
This forum meets regularly and serves as an important venue to raise
critical readiness concerns as well as share management best practices.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
Department's systems for readiness reporting and monitoring of military
forces?
Answer. With the deployment of the Defense Readiness Reporting
System (DRRS) and the pending integration of the traditional Status of
Resources and Training System (SORTS), the Department's systems are
fully capable of capturing accurate and timely readiness reporting
indicators. The traditional SORTS metrics provide critical information
to the Services that assist in force management and train, organize,
and equip decisions. The DRRS provides capability assessments for what
the Service's provide that enable better COCOM assessments on their
ability to execute the Defense Strategy.
Question. In your view, does the current readiness reporting system
accurately and reliably collect and display the information necessary
to establish that our forces are not only ``ready'' but ``ready for
what''?
Answer. DRRS, has the capability for all organizations, Service,
Joint, and the CSAs, to assess their readiness for any and all
missions. The use of Mission Essential Tasks in these assessments
provides the fidelity and flexibility for organizations and tactical
units to express what capabilities they can provide and what missions
they are ready to execute.
readiness of the armed forces
Question. The Joint Chiefs recently stated that ``the readiness of
our Armed Forces is at a tipping point. We are on the brink of creating
a hollow force due to an unprecedented convergence of budget conditions
and legislation that could require the Department to retain more forces
than requested while underfunding that force's readiness.''
How do you currently assess the readiness of the Armed Forces?
Answer. In my assessment, our military forces are exceptionally
prepared for the missions they have undertaken for the last 11 years.
The investments the Nation has made in training technologies, force
protection, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance systems have helped maintain our military's standing as
the most formidable force in the world. Today our forces are postured
globally, conducting counterterrorism, stability, and deterrence
operations, maintaining a stabilizing presence, conducting bilateral
and multilateral training to enhance our security relationships, and
providing the crisis response capabilities required to protect U.S.
interests. In the event of an unexpected crisis, large-scale conflict,
or a threat to the Homeland, ready forces are available to provide the
surge capacity to meet wide-ranging operational challenges today.
Question. Do you agree with the Joint Chiefs that readiness is at a
tipping point?
Answer. Maintaining ready forces is a priority and I share that
concern with the Joint Chiefs. The current fiscal environment makes
maintaining readiness very difficult. Managing readiness after a decade
of war was bound to be challenging irrespective of fiscal
considerations because the Services are beginning the difficult process
of resetting and restoring our force's ability to conduct the full
range of military operations as required by the current defense
strategy.
I believe there is a very real possibility that the readiness
effects of sequestration or indefinite operation under a Continuing
Resolution could be devastating. These effects are likely to reduce
readiness both directly, through reductions in operations and training,
and indirectly through effects on personnel and equipment. Some of
those indirect effects, especially those that effect personnel or
spares pipelines, could take years to realize and even longer to
mitigate.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the impact of budget
conditions on the issue expressed by the Joint Chiefs of a hollow
force?
Answer. I think that we can all agree that sequestration is not an
effective method to both reduce the Department's budget and minimize
the impact to the readiness of the force. I agree with Secretary
Panetta's description of the current circumstances as a ``perfect
storm''. Adding the devastating effects of sequestration on top of
continuing to operate under a Continuing Resolution will likely cause
circumstances that are guaranteed to reduce readiness both directly,
through reductions in operations and training, and indirectly through
circuitous effects on personnel and equipment.
Question. How would you define a hollow force?
Answer. A hollow force is a force that has been rendered incapable
of performing the mission that we expect it to conduct. While the units
may exist, they would not have the personnel, equipment, and/or
training necessary to make them capable of executing the defense
strategy or responding to the most likely contingencies.
Question. As the United States draws down the number of forces
deployed to Afghanistan, Commanders have voiced concerns about
leadership challenges for forces in garrison after 12 years of
sustained combat operations.
If confirmed, what could be done at your level to assist commanders
with force management and readiness?
Answer. I think many of the programs the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management provides
oversight on are essential to commanders both in garrison and while
deployed. These programs such as suicide prevention, safety, drug
demand reduction, and a multitude of family programs will continue to
be essential to commanders to help maintain the health of the force.
Additionally, our role to provide oversight of the readiness of the
Services to provide manned, trained and equipped forces puts us in a
good position to engage with commanders at all levels as they adapt
what being ready means as we transition from a counterinsurgency
operation focused environment to a more full spectrum capable force. In
the past year, our R&FM team has established a rich dialogue with the
Services over these challenges.
Question. What will be your roles and responsibilities in
monitoring Service goals for reset and reconstitution of combat forces
and equipment?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Services and
Joint Staff to monitor the Service's progress in meeting their goals
for reset, reconstitution and a return to the full range of military
operations as required by the current defense strategy with clear
emphasis on proper training.
readiness monitoring
Question. Section 117 of title 10, U.S.C., directed the DOD to
``establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system for the
Department of Defense'' which led to the creation of the Defense
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).
What is your understanding of the responsibility you will have, if
confirmed, for the implementation and operation of DRRS?
Answer. If confirmed, I will have direct oversight of the DRRS
Implementation Office and ensure the program reaches its Full
Operational Capability (FOC) as efficiently and effectively as
possible. Additionally, moving forward from FOC, through the DRRS
Executive Committee, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, I will ensure
the Department's future reporting needs continue to be addressed.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness
with regard to the implementation and operation of DRRS?
Answer. Materiel readiness is a key component of the Department's
ability to accomplish its assigned missions. Under the auspices of
ASD(R&FM), DRRS provides ASD(L&MR) the forum to understand materiel
readiness effect on the Department's current operations and contingency
plans.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
implementation and operating capabilities of the DRRS?
Answer. DRRS is in use across the Department today providing up-to-
date readiness information. Presently, an updated version of the
system, which fully incorporates the Department's net-centric
architecture to consume and serve up data, is undergoing formal third-
party testing to validate its accuracy, suitability, and effectiveness.
All testing results to date have been positive and the newly tested
version of DRRS should be ready for release later this summer.
Question. How satisfied are you of the current ability of the DRRS
to inform and contribute to the development of the National Security
Strategy?
Answer. DRRS is a critical Global Force Management capability that
supports the National Military Strategy (NMS) which contributes to the
National Security Strategy. Specifically, DRRS provides near real-time
capability-based readiness of the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Organizations. DRRS also provides the ability to view mission
capability and readiness metrics for all DOD organizations which drives
plans and actions to ensure mission accomplishment. Finally, DRRS uses
Joint and Service provided authoritative data sources in a web-based
architecture providing greater fidelity for refined analysis and force
management. DRRS provides the holistic picture of the DOD from the
highest levels to the tactical to inform the NMS.
Question. How satisfied are you of the current ability of the DRRS
to inform and help shape the development of the defense planning
guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section
113(g) of title 10?
Answer. DRRS permits the Secretary to effectively comply with items
section 113(g) of title 10, as the means by which the Secretary is able
to evaluate the Department's readiness to execute its missions and
contingency plans. Additionally, the nature of DRRS and its
incorporation of the Civil Support Task List allows the Department to
evaluate plans for providing support to civil authorities.
Question. How satisfied are you of the current ability of the DRRS
to inform and assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
prescribing the National Military Strategy?
Answer. DRRS provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with
relevant readiness data to help determine whether combatant commanders
can perform their assigned missions and associated Mission Essential
Tasks (METs) in a joint, interagency, and multinational operational
environment. Involved in this determination are Service assessments of
their ability to conduct missions as part of a Joint organization.
These assessments are analyzed quarterly in the Joint Forces Readiness
Review providing the Chairman a comprehensive view of readiness across
the force.
Question. Do you have any concerns about whether the Quarterly
Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is providing the best mix of
information to clearly inform Congress of the readiness of the Joint
Force, including near-term risks and areas where congressional action
may be needed?
Answer. The QRRC provides a large amount of information and data as
they relate to the overall readiness of our Armed Forces. However, we
feel this report can be improved, particularly in view of an austere
budget climate and the impact that might have on the readiness of our
Total Force. We would like to work with the congressional staffs in
these matters and, if confirmed, I stand ready to brief and discuss the
QRRC at any time.
Question. Are you aware of any readiness information in use within
DOD that is not currently shared with Congress that would be useful for
the exercise of congressional oversight?
Answer. No, I am not aware of any current readiness information
that is not shared with Congress.
foreign language proficiency
Question. In previous reporting, the GAO has identified challenges
that DOD and the Services face in identifying pre-deployment training
requirements for language proficiency and limitations with some of the
Services information management systems to record language proficiency
information.
What are the current predeployment language training requirements
for individuals or units deploying to Afghanistan and other geographic
combatant commands areas of responsibility and what steps has DOD taken
to ensure that forces have the required levels of language proficiency?
Answer. In 2012, the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, specified
the predeployment language and culture training required for all U.S.
personnel deploying to Afghanistan. This policy acknowledged that
various missions would place differing demands on U.S. personnel based
on the anticipated degree of interaction with the Afghan population.
The Department supports this policy with on-line training modules for
basic cultural and communications skills for personnel expecting
minimal contact with the local population. For the personnel expected
to interact with Afghan personnel for the majority of their missions,
DOD offers Language Training Detachments and command-sponsored
classroom programs to supplement its HEADSTART 2 language and culture
training modules offered by the Defense Language Institute Foreign
Language Center (DLIFLC). Mobile Training Teams from DLIFLC are
available to commanders on request. This approach allows commanders to
tailor their training and maximize training resources.
Question. The Army and Marine Corps have provided substantial
language training to select general purpose soldiers and marines
deploying to Afghanistan, yet the Services' training and personnel
systems have not fully captured information on language training that
has been completed and any proficiency gained from the training.
What steps have DOD and the Services taken to provide
decisionmakers with greater visibility within training and personnel
systems on the language proficiency of general purpose forces that
could better inform force management processes?
Answer. The Army and Marine Corps are modifying their training data
bases to track language and culture training provided to individuals.
Additionally, the Department is successfully tracking the language
proficiency of the force using the Language Readiness Index (LRI) in
the Defense Readiness Reporting System. This tool allows decisionmakers
and planners to quickly identify DOD military and civilian personnel
with tested and self-professed language proficiency, the languages they
command, and their proficiency in those languages. This information is
provided by the Services' personnel systems and the Defense Civilian
Personnel Data System and portrays DOD language capability inventory.
Question. At a congressional hearing last year, Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers testified that the United
States could benefit by having more DOD personnel proficient in foreign
languages and that, ``it's an area, frankly, we still need to
improve''.
What is your assessment of the current level of foreign language
proficiency across the Services?
Answer. Our foreign language capability is growing. Our investments
have resulted in over 265,000 DOD personnel with foreign language
skills an increase of 6,497 from previous years. Our challenge is to
generate the language skills to meet the needs of general purpose and
Special Operations Forces while at the same time training to the
professional language level for strategic capabilities like Foreign
Area Officers and Cryptologic Language Analysts. This is our strategy
to provide the Department with the assets it needs for regional
deployments at the operational and tactical levels. This is especially
important as we regionally align combat forces towards specific
regions.
Question. What incentives would you offer, if any, in the form of
either financial stipends or professional advancement opportunities?
Answer. The Department has significantly improved the availability
of Foreign Language Proficiency Bonuses for our total force over the
past 5 years. The bonus was extended to the Reserve component and
payment rates increased. We are assessing its impact and are
considering non-monetary incentives to encourage personnel to pursue
competency in a foreign language. This involves a close look at
linguist career paths, proper utilization, and promotion opportunities
Question. Are you concerned with the current level of reliance upon
contractors to provide translators to deployed combat units?
Answer. Interpreters and translators provide the Department the
ability to provide a high level of foreign language capability, on
short notice, to deploying units. The use of contractors to provide
interpretation to deployed combat units is closely monitored on a
regular basis.
It is not possible within current resources to train sufficient
numbers of military or DOD personnel to meet the ever increasing need
for personnel with high levels of foreign language and cultural skills.
Therefore contract interpreters have and will continue to provide a
much needed surge capability to our deploying forces. However, the
Department recognizes the value of having foreign language skills
organic to a unit and has in the past employed the skills of personnel
in the Army 09L Translator Aide program as well as Military Accessions
Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) program to provide high levels of
language skills to deploying units. The Department is currently
exploring other avenues to provide short-term surge capability for
translation. One of the more exciting initiatives is the National
Language Service Corps, which offers more than 4,000 American Citizens
with advanced language skills who are willing to serve as temporary
Federal employees to meet urgent and surge demands in limited
capacities.
safety and risk mitigation
Question. Since the onset of combat operations over a decade ago,
the overall readiness of the force has steadily declined in terms of
personnel, training, and equipment readiness. As force readiness is
consumed as soon as it is created by the demand of a high operations
tempo, our readiness now faces additional challenges in an economically
austere environment. If the current sequestration cuts were to occur,
our understanding is that approximately $18 billion would be cut from
DOD's operation and maintenance (O&M) budget. If DOD were then forced
to operate under a 1-year Continuing Resolution, the O&M budget would
be cut by an additional $11 billion. Furthermore, to ensure that
Overseas Contingency Operations are funded, another $11 billion would
then have to be cut out of the base O&M budget.
If this scenario were to unfold, how would you provide oversight,
prioritize resources, and ensure the readiness of the force is
sustained?
Answer. The magnitude of sequestration cuts make it impossible for
the Services to avoid cuts to vital training capabilities, training
infrastructure, and training deliverables. Ensuring the readiness of
the force is sustained, other than those units that are next to deploy,
will be virtually impossible. The Army has stated that cuts to training
and maintenance will put two-thirds of their active brigade combat
teams outside of Afghanistan at reduced readiness levels. Navy
operations in the western Pacific, including training, will be reduced
by as much as one-third. With less training and steaming days, the Navy
will inevitably reduce unit readiness levels. The Air Force has stated
that sequestration cuts to their flying hour program will put flying
units below acceptable readiness standards by the end of the fiscal
year. The furlough of DOD civilians will include civilians at training
centers across the country, reducing the quality and quantity of
training immediately, with long-lasting impacts on readiness.
It is clear that sequestration and a continuing budget resolution
will devastate our readiness. When we are not allowed by legislation to
manage individual pieces of the budget, readiness accounts inevitably
pay the price, thus prioritizing resources is problematic. I will work
closely with the Services and Joint Staff, through our various
readiness assessment processes, to identify those readiness shortfalls
that require the attention of the Department's most senior leadership.
Question. Are these potential sequestration cuts to the O&M budget
accurate?
Answer. As I understand it, as part of the overall cut of the $46
billion cut, the Department's O&M accounts will be reduced by $13
billion from the annualized CR level. We must protect the O&M dollars
for our men and women in combat, which under sequestration rules we can
only do by cutting base-budget O&M disproportionately--this results in
an additional shortfall of $5 billion in active base-budget dollars,
for a total of an $18 billion cut.
If the Continuing Resolution is extended in its current form
throughout the year, it exacerbates problems because it does not
provide enough dollars in O&M--adding an additional shortfall of $11
billion.
Question. In your view, what are the indicators of a hollow force?
Answer. It would be a force that has been rendered incapable of
performing the mission that we expect it to conduct. While the units
may exist, they would not have the personnel, equipment, and/or
training necessary to make them capable of executing the defense
strategy or responding to the most likely contingencies. Additionally,
part of avoiding a hollow force is ensuring we have a clear
understanding of the size of the force we can afford to keep ready and
then adhering to that plan.
Question. How has the DRRS contributed to managing risk within DOD?
Answer. DRRS provides the Department with a capabilities centric
look at readiness which has allowed commanders and staffs to understand
readiness issues that directly impact their mission and equate to
operational risk. This knowledge provides situational awareness that
allows them to initiate operational problem solving, identify
capability gaps, conduct trend, threshold and predictive analysis,
create capability Force Package designs and strategies to solve or
mitigate readiness issues and mitigate risks.
Question. How would the DRRS inform your decisionmaking process in
order to reduce risk?
Answer. DRRS contains detailed information on not only what units
are capable of; it also contains data on the resources and training
status on which those capabilities are based. In this sense, it
provides an empirical understanding of why readiness is degraded and
what the associated consequences are. This understanding is essential
to identifying systematic problems and identifying potential mitigation
options.
Question. Why are commanders allowed to subjectively upgrade their
unit's readiness, if the intent of the DRRS is to accurately portray
unit readiness up the chain of command?
Answer. DRRS, like Status of Resources and Training Systems
(SORTS), allows for commanders' upgrades because an assessment of
whether a unit can accomplish their assigned mission is far too complex
to rely on simplistic rules on interpreting data. Intangibles, nuances,
and positive and negative synergies among causal factors can be
extremely important in determining an accurate assessment and we trust
commanders with the responsibility to make those calls. One mechanism
that we use to make sure we understand the final assessments is to
monitor the empirical/non-subjective data on which they are built. This
includes not only unit-level data, but also maintaining some visibility
on the man/train/equip pipeline processes that generate unit readiness.
Question. If either sequestration or a full-year Continuing
Resolution is to be implemented, how should they be modified to reduce
the impact on readiness? Would additional reprogramming authority be
required?
Answer. Both should be modified to allow the Department the
flexibility to allocate our resources to our highest priorities. When
we are not allowed by legislation to manage individual pieces of the
budget, readiness accounts inevitably pay the price. Everything needs
to be on the table. This should include military and civilian force
reductions, basing, and balancing Active and Reserve components.
Adequate flexibility will also require support for follow-on
reprogramming authority.
joint training system
Question. In June of last year, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff published CJCS Guide 3501: The Joint Training System, which
provides an overview of the Joint Training System (JTS) and highlights
the role of senior leadership in the planning, execution, and
assessment of joint training.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the current JTS?
Answer. Today's force is more joint than at any time in our
history. Through a decade of conflict our military members have evolved
from a Service-centric force to a more capable force which includes
both Service-unique attributes as well intentional Service
interdependencies.
The Joint Training System described in CJCS Guide 3501 is focused
on the warfighting organizations--namely the combatant commands and
their Service components. As such, the JTS focuses at the strategic and
operational levels, where combatant commanders can assess their
readiness to ``integrate and synchronize assigned forces to meet
mission objectives''.
One additional aspect of joint readiness bears mentioning here.
While the JTS focuses at the strategic and operational levels of
operations, joint readiness (and by extension, joint training) extends
down to the tactical level as well. Services--including Service
components of combatant commands--must be resourced to ``train the way
they operate''. This includes joint tactical interoperability training.
While tactical training is not the primary focus of the JTS, such
training is also at risk in the current fiscal environment. As Services
retrench into title 10 focus on core competencies, adequate resources
specifically allocated for joint training must be preserved. JTS would
be a more complete system if it provided a conceptual framework for
combatant commanders and Services to plan, resource, and conduct joint
tactical training in addition to operational training for combatant
command staffs.
training ranges
Question. DOD is fielding Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in
greater numbers which has created a strong demand for access to
national airspace to conduct training and for other purposes. The
demand has quickly exceeded the current airspace available for military
operations.
What is your understanding and assessment of DOD's efforts to
develop a comprehensive training strategy for the Department's UAS, to
include identifying any shortfalls associated with current policies,
education, stationing plans, and simulator technologies?
Answer. The DOD UAS Training Strategy is currently being developed
and the Department will be providing a report to Congress in July on
its progress in this area. The training strategy will address critical
elements of UAS training--unit collective training and home station
training of pilots, sensor operators, and ground controllers. We
anticipate that the report will identify and address shortfalls
associated with current policies, training, basing, national airspace,
and training technologies.
defense strategic guidance
Question. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance stressed that the
Department will need to examine the mix of Active and Reserve component
elements and stated that the expected pace of operations over the next
decade will be a significant driver in determining an appropriate mix
of AC/RC forces and level of readiness.
What is your assessment of the implications of a reduction in the
pace of operations on the AC/RC mix and Reserve readiness?
Answer. The National Guard and Reserve have clearly proven the
ability to accomplish any assigned mission whether overseas or at home.
As the pace of operations declines, it is my opinion the National Guard
and Reserve will continue to play a vital role in our national defense.
Recent changes in laws permitting greater access to the Reserve
component (RC), coupled with the proven abilities and current high
state of readiness of the Reserve Forces affords the Department greater
flexibility when determining appropriate force levels and AC/RC mix. In
a constrained resource environment, the RC gives the department a
unique opportunity to preserve overall operational capability and
mitigate risk at reduced costs.
Question. In your view, how can the missions of the Reserve Forces
expect to change to meet new priorities?
Answer. Over the last decade, the Department has learned a
significant amount about using Reserve Forces in many different mission
sets. The upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will lay the ground work
for assigning mission sets to all forces. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Services, the Reserve Chiefs, and the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau to determine the most effective mix and makeup of
Active, Reserve, and Guard personnel to support the National Military
Strategy.
reserve component as a trained and ready operational reserve
Question. One outcome of 10 years of continuous operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, that has included the mobilization of thousands of
Guard and Reserve Forces, has been the realization that our Reserve
components have evolved from a rarely used strategic reserve to a more
frequently used operational reserve.
In your view, what are the essential elements of readiness, if any,
that distinguish the Reserve component as an operational reserve as
opposed to a strategic reserve?
Answer. The decade plus of war has transformed the Reserve
component from a strategic force rarely used to an integral partner of
our national defense. In my opinion the most essential element of
readiness is people. Today our Reserve component has experienced and
skilled people. The combination of their combat experience and civilian
skills make them vitally important to our Nation's defense. I think the
continued use of the RC as a full partner in the Total Force is the
difference between the strategic reserve of the Cold War and the
required efficient use of all elements of the Total Force going
forward--Active, Guard and Reserve, civilian, and contractor.
active duty and reserve component end strength
Question. The Department last year announced its 5-year plan to
reduce Active Duty end strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by
2017, and the Reserve components by another 21,000 over the same
period. These cuts do not include any additional personnel reductions
that could result from sequestration or any agreement to avoid
sequestration.
Do you agree with this plan to reduce Active Duty and Reserve
component end strengths?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to review the plan, but I
believe the end strength drawdown allows us to achieve the right size
force and keep it modern. The plan is designed to maintain capable and
ready military forces while managing reductions in a way that ``keeps
faith'' with forces that have been at war for the past 10 years. As
future national security conditions could change, our planned drawdown
could change accordingly.
Question. What is your view of how these planned end strength
reductions will affect dwell time ratios?
Answer. I understand that all of the Services, on average, are
meeting or exceeding the Department's dwell time goal of 2 years at
home for every year deployed, or 1:2, for the Active component. If
confirmed, I will continue to monitor this issue closely.
The Reserve component dwell time is improving, but has not reached
the Department's dwell time goal of 5 years at home for every 1 year of
Active Duty, or 1:5. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward the
goal of a 1:5 dwell time ratio for the Reserve component.
Question. What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives
have on the decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?
Answer. The Services are continually monitoring dwell time, if
there are any early indicators that the end strength reductions are
affecting the ratio, I will work with the Services to address the
issues. Re-examination of end strength reductions would certainly be
one of the considerations to remedy potential dwell problems.
Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you
envision if the sequester is triggered in accordance with the Budget
Control Act?
Answer. If the Department were required to sequester funding, I
believe that it would first require a revision of the current National
Security Strategy announced by the President last January. The current
strategy could not be met with the significantly diminished resources
that sequester would impose. The revised strategy could very well
impact all components of the total force--Active Duty military, Reserve
component military, Government civilians, and contractors.
Question. In your view, what tools do the Department and Services
need to get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of
these require congressional authorization?
Answer. The Department already has or has been granted the total
force shaping tools necessary to meet the drawdown in its current plan.
military quality of life
Question. In your view, what is the relationship between military
recruitment and retention and quality-of-life improvements and your own
top priorities for the Armed Forces?
Answer. The Military Services must attract and retain people with
the necessary talent, character, and commitment to become leaders and
warriors in the Nation's Armed Forces. The military has consistently
used a coordinated recruiting and retention strategy which maximizes
the efficient use of our greatest asset--our people. This strategy
consists of monetary and non-monetary compensation packages that
include the use of special pays, enlistment bonuses, educational
benefits and quality of life programs. It has long been said that you
recruit an individual and retain a family. As such, it is critical that
quality of life (family, education, child-care, housing), quality of
service (work environment, infrastructure capacity, and support, time
to train), and compensation (pay and benefits) are constantly evaluated
and adjusted to respond to needs of an evolving force and to varying
economic conditions. Recruiting and retention strategies must be able
to generate success in both good and bad economic times. The Services
cannot afford to wait for recruiting and retention misses to signal a
need for adjustments--adjustment tools and authorities to achieve skill
and strength requirements must be set as a priority and readily
available.
Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
qualify of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision
working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy
groups, and Congress to achieve them?
Answer. I recognize that the well-being of the force, as well as
recruiting and retention efforts, are significantly impacted by quality
of life programs. If confirmed, I look forward to coordinating the
efforts of the Services and combatant commanders in order to ensure we
have a comprehensive, accessible, and affordable suite of programs. We
will continue our work with Congress and family advocacy groups to
supplement and enhance our programs and services as needed.
family readiness and support
Question. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns
among military families as a result of the stress of frequent
deployments and the long separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced?
Answer. Quality of Life programs and services consistently rank
high among the considerations of servicemembers and their families when
deciding whether to stay in the military. Families will need assistance
to reintegrate, and communicate with each other after a decade of
deployments and long separations. Programs and services need to be
readily accessible in order to provide servicemembers and their
families established support programs using a variety of delivery
systems, including in-person, web-based, or online support. The DOD
Family Advocacy Program (FAP) provides funding and resources to the
Military Departments to strengthen families. FAP is one of the many
family readiness programs within the Department, and DOD remains
steadfast in its commitment to ensure adequate personnel and resources
are available to assist, assess, and treat servicemembers and their
families when and where needed. Moreover, we work closely with the
civilian community and our Federal partners to support military
families.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and anticipated reductions in
end strength?
Answer. Key areas of focus will be on downsizing, and providing
support for transition planning throughout the military life cycle.
This will include the active engagement of family members in the
process. It will be important to continue to develop family readiness
so that military families can continue to face the anticipated
challenges associated with global rebasing, deployments and anticipated
reductions in end strength.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. DOD is not resourced to meet all the needs of military
families. Actively engaging military families in community-based
programs and services by encouraging participation in the design,
development, and delivery of such programs and services will ensure
that they meet the needs of military families. A variety of programs
and services are already available to assist with the networking,
coordination, and collaboration that is necessary to build community
capacity to support military families.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
enhance family support?
Answer. We must continue to work with civilian communities where
most military families live to promote quality of life enhancements
that address military and family readiness challenges. Beyond looking
to the local community, DOD will continue to assist in workforce
development efforts already underway to create a cadre of service
providers who can provide that support within DOD. This will occur
through our partnership with professional educational institutions and
with local, State, Federal, public, and private agencies and
organizations. If confirmed, I will continue to build upon these
relationships with community partners to provide the necessary
services.
military child development centers
Question. Late last year, the Army announced that it was conducting
a 100 percent audit of employee background check processes at all 283
of its child care facilities at installations in the United States and
overseas because ``derogatory'' information was found in the security
background checks of employees at the Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Child Development Center. As a result, the Secretary of Defense ordered
a 100 percent background check audit of all providers who have regular
contact with children in DOD Child Development Centers, School Age Care
Programs, and Youth Programs, and a 100 percent review and evaluation
of the actual background check documentation on file for each
individual, employee and volunteer, for compliance with applicable DOD
and Military Service policies. Subsequently, DOD reviewed over 44,000
records and reported validation of background checks had been initiated
across the Department as required. Additionally, at the time of the
review, approximately 1,200 background checks were pending
adjudication.
What is the status of the remaining background checks pending
adjudication?
Answer. Because of the length of time required for the adjudication
process, there will always be background checks in adjudication.
Adjudication is the process through which an employee is evaluated for
suitability of employment. Currently, the adjudication process is
specific to each Military Service. It is important to note the FBI
background checks, which include fingerprints, often require months for
completion and it is typical for all programs to have some background
checks in process/pending. For employees whose background checks are
pending, those individuals are either working within line-of-sight
supervision in accordance with Public Law 102-190, section 1094, or are
not yet working in the program.
Question. Are you convinced that the Services performed these
reviews adequately and thoroughly?
Answer. Yes. Additionally, this audit revealed some areas for
improvement and, as a result, all applicable directives and other
regulatory guidelines will be updated to ensure these improvements are
incorporated. DOD leadership and child development program staff are
committed to high quality and consistent delivery of these services and
to ensure the safety and well-being of children in our care.
Question. Are policies and programs in place now to ensure the
safety and welfare of children in Child Development Centers, School Age
Care Programs, and Youth Programs in the future?
Answer. DOD has a longstanding standardized and comprehensive
process for screening applicants for positions involving child care
services on DOD installations and in DOD activities. By law, employment
applications must include a question as to whether the applicant has
ever been arrested for or charged with a crime involving a child. The
application states that it is being signed under penalty of perjury.
Additionally, we are required by law to conduct at least two types of
background checks on every employee who works with children in child
and youth programs. DOD conducts additional background checks, and the
Military Departments and Defense Agencies have the discretion to
conduct more restrictive screenings. These background checks are part
of a system of measures currently in place to ensure children's safety
in DOD programs.
Question. Are OSD policies and programs in place to provide
continued oversight of these programs in the future?
Answer. Based on the findings of the review, we are strengthening
our policies, specifically highlighting prompt and consistent
adjudication. In addition, the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies will increase oversight during unannounced annual inspections
of these facilities and programs.
department of defense schools in conus
Question. Some have questioned the continuing need for DOD-operated
schools for military dependent children within the Continental United
States (CONUS).
In your view, should DOD reassess or update its criteria for the
continued operation of DOD schools within CONUS?
Answer. The Department intends to conduct a comprehensive study to
determine the feasibility of transferring the CONUS based DOD schools.
The Department's planned study that will examine such factors as the
quality of education, adequacy of Impact Aid funding, State laws and
prohibitions on using tax revenues for a public education on Federal
property (e.g., Delaware), capacity of LEAs to assume the educational
responsibility, adequacy of educational and support services for
military dependents, and impact on the morale of military families. The
study will also examine any viable educational alternatives to DOD
ownership.
Question. If so, and if confirmed, how would you approach this
task?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the issue and the
results of the study considering all dimensions and all
recommendations.
conditions of k-12 schools
Question. In 2011, The Department of Defense committed to a $4
billion plan to renovate or construct new K-12 DOD Education Activity
(DODEA) schools over 5 years in order to address inadequate and
deteriorated facility conditions throughout the DODEA facility
inventory. In response, Congress called upon the Department to develop
a minimum standard of design to ensure that DODEA would provide world-
class education facilities for the children of military members.
What is your assessment of this construction program?
Answer. It is critical that we continue with the school
construction program. Nearly 70 percent of our schools are in poor
condition. The Department recognized this growing problem, and approved
a multi-billion dollar construction program through 2018. These schools
are being designed to meet the high-technology teaching and learning
requirements of the 21st century and leverage ``green'' technologies to
improve the environmental impact and long-term operating costs.
Question. If confirmed, will you continue the investments to
achieve the goal to provide world-class schools?
Answer. A world-class education is a top quality of life and
readiness factor for our military families. Dependent education
consistently has been a top priority for the Department. I will
continue to ensure that we invest in the education of our children, and
maintain a top-quality education for our military dependents.
Question. What is your position on the use of defense funds to pay
for facility improvements for schools that are owned and operated by
local education activities?
Answer. The Department continues to work closely with local school
districts to address the capacity shortfalls and physical condition
deficiencies in many of the 160 public schools located on military
installations. It remains important for the Department to continue the
administration of the public schools on military installation grant
program, which, as of February 21, 2013, has distributed more than $208
million to projects for 10 of the 12 highest priority schools. If
confirmed, I would support the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
request to continue the program.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with local education
activities to ensure an adequate level of investment is provided to
schools with a predominant student population of Military Dependents?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Department
of Education and support the full funding of Impact Aid. Annually, the
Department offers about $35 million in grants which have provided
school districts funding to expand learning opportunities in such areas
as foreign languages; STEM, and Advanced Placement Math, Science, and
English and will continue to leverage available resources to provide
the educational opportunities for all 1.2 million school-aged children
of our military families and remain committed to providing a quality
education for all military dependents
Question. What is your view on the adequacy of the Department of
Defense's involvement with the Impact Aid Program?
Answer. The DOD Supplement to Impact Aid program is an important
additional source of funding for local school districts that have lost
property tax revenue due to the enrollment of a large number of
military-connected children. The Department faces challenging budgetary
uncertainties at this time. Many programs are underfunded. Impact Aid
is no exception.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the
Impact Aid program?
Answer. The Department of Education has made significant
enhancements to this program since its inception. The Department's
study of the DOD Domestic Schools will also examine Impact Aid issues.
office of community support for military families with special needs
Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, Congress required the establishment of an Office of Community
Support for Military Families with Special Needs within the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The purpose
of this office is to enhance and improve Department of Defense support
for military families with special needs, whether educational or
medical in nature.
In your view, what should be the priorities of this Office of
Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs?
Answer. A key priority for the Office of Community Support for
Military Families with Special Needs is to strengthen personal
readiness for military families with special needs through a
comprehensive policy, oversight of programs that support military
families with special needs, identification of gaps in services to such
families, and the accessibility to appropriate resources.
Presently, over 126,000 military family members are enrolled in the
Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP). The EFMP supports military
families with special medical and/or educational needs in three
components areas: identification/enrollment, assignment coordination to
determine the availability of services at a projected location, and
family support to help families identify and access programs and
services.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those
military families with special needs dependents so they are able to get
the support they need?
Answer. Communication with military families with special needs and
the provision of information about the EFMP is a major focus of DOD. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to develop and
implement a comprehensive communication and marketing plan designed to
deliver consistent information about the EFMP to families, service
providers, and leadership. We will also continue to solicit input from
families with special needs through the Special Needs Advisory Panel,
as mandated by Congress.
gi bill benefits
Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
Assistance Act in 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill) that created enhanced
educational benefits for servicemembers who have served at least 90
days on Active Duty since September 11. The maximum benefit would
roughly cover the cost of a college education at any public university
in the country.
What unresolved issues related to implementation of the Post-9/11
GI Bill (e.g., coverage of additional military personnel) do you
consider most important to be addressed?
Answer. With the recent change in Public Law 111-277 that corrected
technical issues related to National Guard (title 32) service, I
believe all Armed Service Veterans are fully covered.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of the Post-9/11 GI
Bill on recruiting and retention, including the provision of
transferability for continued service?
Answer. Post Service education benefits have been a cornerstone of
our military recruiting efforts since 1985, and a major contributor to
the success of the All-Volunteer Force. Money for education has been,
and remains at the forefront of reasons young Americans cite for
joining the military. There is no doubt that the Post-9/11 GI Bill will
continue to have this same impact. The Department of Defense is an
``education'' employer. We hire educated young people, invest in them
while in Service, and we encourage them to invest further in themselves
when they leave. The VA-administered education benefits, and in
particular the Post-9/11 GI Bill, facilitates that investment.
military and veteran education program oversight
Question. Congress remains interested in strengthening oversight of
Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs education
programs, including the VA's Post-9/11 GI Bill, and DOD's tuition
assistance and Military Spouse Career Advancement Accounts (MyCAA)
programs.
What is your view of proposals that would require that all schools
participating in these programs be compliant with title IV of the
Higher Education Act, so long as the administering Secretaries had the
authority to exempt such requirements on a case-by-case basis?
Answer. DOD supports the proposal and is clarifying policies to
ensure tuition assistance funding will only be paid to educational
institutions accredited by an accrediting organization, recognized by
the Department of Education, approved for Department of Veterans
Affairs funding, and participating in Federal student aid programs
through the Department of Education under title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965.
Question. What is your view of proposals to change the so-called
90/10 rule to exempt these programs from the calculation altogether, as
has been proposed by officials of the Bureau for Consumer Financial
Protection and others?
Answer. DOD has no objection with the proposal to exempt title X
tuition assistance funds from the 90/10 calculation. Technical
assistance and oversight of any statutory changes to the proposed 90/10
rule should reside with the Department of Education.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Morale,
Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs, particularly in view of the
budget challenges the Department faces?
Answer. Quality of life programs for our military members and their
families are essential to the resiliency of the force, as well as to
recruiting and retention efforts. Changes in our basing, deployment
patterns and force structure have had a significant impact on our
ability to deliver quality of life programs to our military families.
With more than 75 percent of military families now living off
installation, there is an increasing need for partnerships and support
from local governments, school systems, and businesses to ensure we
continue to provide comprehensive, accessible, and affordable quality
of life programs. Additionally, we are conducting a major assessment of
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs to ensure they are being
operated in as efficient and cost-effective manner as possible.
Question. How would you seek to deal with these challenges?
Answer. Sustaining family programs in the current fiscally
constrained environment will be challenging but of vital importance as
we seek to reach servicemembers on and off the installations. If
confirmed, I will make every effort to protect funding for family
quality of life programs to the greatest extent possible and ensure
they are operating efficiently. Good stewardship demands that available
resources are utilized in the most effective manner.
Question. If confirmed, what improvements would you seek to
achieve?
Answer. We have a responsibility to ensure access to quality
programs, information and resources regardless of where our
servicemembers and their families are located. I've mentioned the need
to develop and maintain a strong network of community-based providers.
We'll need to enhance our information and referral resources by
maximizing electronic opportunities provided through internet social
networking avenues and electronic applications. We also have
opportunities to improve the effectiveness of outreach programs, to
better meet military families where they live. If confirmed, I will
evaluate these opportunities, and how we can better coordinate efforts
among the various entities providing support to our military members
and their families.
commissary and military exchange systems
Question. What is your view of the need for modernization of
business policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems,
and what do you view as the most promising avenues for change to
achieve modernization goals?
Answer. Both the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) and the military
exchanges are progressive organizations seeking to reduce costs within
their respective businesses. DeCA, for example, has a proven history of
reducing the costs of the commissary system without decreasing the
value of the benefit provided. Since its beginning in 1991,
efficiencies have allowed DeCA to reduce its workforce by almost 7,000
full time equivalent positions and operating costs by approximately
$700 million in constant fiscal year 1992 dollars. In fact, when
measured in constant dollars, DeCA's operating costs are only slightly
more than one-half of what they were when the Agency was created.
Exchanges are evolutionary models driven by best business practices
and the need to remain relevant to servicemembers in a highly
competitive and ever-changing retail environment. Today's exchanges
have gone beyond the traditional brick and mortar environment,
embracing e-commerce and mobile retail channels to satisfy customer
demands. They are using digital marketing and social media that are now
common in the marketplace for customer outreach. In the traditional
brick and mortar environment, robust infrastructure re-investments, new
branding strategies, enhanced customer service postures, supply chain
enhancements, and targeted merchandise assortment driven by unique
installation customer demographics are all delivering a customer
shopping experience on par or better than the most successful retailers
in the commercial market place. The exchanges continue to exceed the
DOD Social Compact on savings for servicemembers.
For the Exchanges, there are already mechanisms for modernization
through the Cooperative Efforts Board. Promising areas for change
include non-resale procurement, logistics and distribution, exchange
select/private label, legislative and policy, and seasonal and one time
buys.
Question. What is your view of the proposals by some to consolidate
or eliminate commissaries and exchanges?
Answer. Eliminating the commissary and exchanges would be a direct
hit on military compensation. In fiscal year 2012, commissaries saved
military shoppers approximately $2.76 billion, a return of more than
double the $1.31 billion annual commissary appropriation. At a personal
level, a family of four shopping at the commissary regularly can save
$4,500 a year. Exchanges, which receive very little appropriated fund
support, save our customers 22 percent, on average, over commercial
retail stores.
Commissary and exchange benefits form a major part of the military
community support structure that contributes to mission readiness. The
commissary continues to be one of the most popular non-pay compensation
benefits of our military members. Exchanges provide valuable savings at
home and essential health, comfort and convenience items to military
personnel in forward deployed and combat areas. Military families would
rightfully view the elimination of these systems as a significant
reduction of their compensation.
civilian personnel systems
Question. Section 1113 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 provides DOD with extensive personnel
flexibilities for its civilian employees that are not available to
other agencies. In particular, section 9902(a) of title 5, U.S.C., as
added by section 1113, directs the Department to establish a new
performance management system for all of its employees. Section 9902(b)
directs the Department to develop a streamlined new hiring system that
is designed to better fulfill DOD's mission needs, produce high-quality
applicants, and support timely personnel decisions.
What is your understanding of the current status of the
Department's efforts to implement the authority provided by section
1113?
Answer. I understand the Department and organizations that
represent DOD employees, including unions and the Federal Manager's
Association, worked collaboratively over a span of 18 months to design
a performance management system and improved hiring processes. The
Department launched its pre-decisional collaborative process that came
to be known as ``New Beginnings'' in the spring of 2010. The effort
culminated in a comprehensive report from three joint labor-management
design teams. All recommendations have been reviewed through the
Departmental process. If confirmed, I will continue to support the work
that is underway to comply with the National Defense Authorization Act.
Question. Do you agree that DOD's civilian employee workforce plays
a vital role in the functioning of the Department?
Answer. Yes, DOD's civilian employee workforce plays an
instrumental role in the functioning of the Department as part of the
total force across a range of missions.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
these flexibilities in a manner that best meets the needs of the
Department and promotes the quality of the Department's civilian
workforce?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would make it my priority to implement
those flexibilities that would facilitate accomplishing the
Department's missions.
Question. Section 1112 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Department to develop a Defense
Civilian Leadership Program (DCLP) to recruit, train, and advance a new
generation of civilian leaders for the Department. Section 1112
provides the Department with the full range of authorities available
for demonstration programs under section 4703 of title 5, U.S.C.,
including the authority to compensate participants on the basis of
qualifications, performance, and market conditions. These flexibilities
are not otherwise available to the Department of Defense.
What is your understanding of the current status of the
Department's efforts to implement the authority provided by section
1112?
Answer. I understand that the Department has designed a new
leadership program and has graduated the first cohort. Still in the
pilot phase, a second cohort is underway. If confirmed, I will fully
engage to ensure the new program meets the intent of the NDAA
authority.
Question. Do you agree that the Department needs to recruit highly
qualified civilian personnel to meet the growing needs of its
acquisition, technical, business, and financial communities?
Answer. Yes. I completely agree that recruiting highly qualified
civilian personnel both in mission critical occupations, such as
acquisition and finance, and in leadership positions across the
Department is essential to mission success.
Question. In your view, has the existing civilian hiring process
been successful in recruiting such personnel and meeting these needs?
Answer. Although I believe the Department currently has a highly
talented workforce, I wholeheartedly support the initiatives to
streamline and reform the civilian hiring process. While I understand
the Department is making progress, there is still work to be done in
this area, and if confirmed, I would ensure the Department continues to
actively engage in civilian hiring reform initiatives and aggressively
pursues continued improvements.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
the authority provided by section 1112 in a manner that best meets the
needs of the Department and promotes the quality of the Department's
civilian workforce?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will make it a priority to implement
the authority provided by section 1112. The Department recognizes the
need for an improved leader-development model to attract, retain, and
develop civilian leaders to support pipeline readiness and enhance
bench strength. If confirmed, I will assess the section 1112 pilot
outcomes to ensure a successful framework for developing the next
generation of innovative leaders with the technical competence to meet
the future leadership needs of the Department.
human capital planning
Question. The Department of Defense faces a critical shortfall in
key areas of its civilian workforce, including the management of
acquisition programs, information technology systems and financial
management, and senior DOD officials have expressed alarm at the extent
of the Department's reliance on contractors in these areas. Section
115b of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Department to develop a
strategic workforce plan to shape and improve its civilian employee
workforce.
Would you agree that the Department's human capital, including its
civilian workforce, is critical to the accomplishment of its national
security mission?
Answer. Yes. I believe such planning would well position the
Department to acquire, develop, and maintain the workforce it needs to
meet current and future mission challenges.
Question. Do you share the concern expressed by others about the
extent of the Department's reliance on contractors in critical areas
such as the management of acquisition programs, information technology
and financial management?
Answer. We must ensure that we have a properly sized, and highly
capable, civilian workforce that guards against an erosion of critical,
organic skills and an overreliance on contracted services, particularly
in such areas as acquisition program management, information
technology, and financial management. If confirmed, I will continue to
support the administration's and Department's focus on reducing
inappropriate or excessive reliance on contracted support, particularly
for critical, and closely associated with inherently governmental,
work. I will continue to support the ongoing efforts to further utilize
the Strategic Workforce Plan to mitigate against civilian workforce
competency gaps and skill shortfalls in these areas.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department
undertakes necessary human capital planning to ensure that its civilian
workforce is prepared to meet the challenges of the coming decades?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure Department decisions on
workforce shaping align with the Department's long-term strategic
workforce plan, with the understanding that short-term exceptions may
be needed due to emerging dynamics in the budget environment. Forecasts
for the Department's workforce must be based on validated mission
requirements and workload, both current and projected, and any
reductions in the civilian workforce must be directly linked to
workload so as to not adversely impact overall mission capabilities.
Question. Section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 requires a 5 percent reduction in anticipated funding
levels for the civilian personnel workforce and the service contractor
workforce of the Department of Defense, subject to certain exclusions.
What impact do you expect the implementation of section 955 to have
on the programs and operations of the Department of Defense?
Answer. Section 955 requires a reduction in available funding for
the civilian workforce and contracted support, and as such, is being
led by the Office of the Under Secretary, Comptroller. The impact of
how section 955 will be implemented is still being determined and I do
not have enough information at this time to speak to specific impacts
to programs and/or operations. If confirmed, I will work with my
counterparts in Comptroller to ensure that the Department's
implementation of section 955 is done in a manner that reduces mission
impact and mitigates risk to programs and operations, while maintaining
core capabilities and support to our warfighters and their families.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
section 955 is implemented in a manner that is consistent with the
requirements of section 129a of title 10, U.S.C., for determining the
most appropriate and cost-efficient mix of military, civilian and
service contractor personnel to perform DOD missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts in
Comptroller to ensure implementation of section 955 recognizes that the
sourcing of work among military (Active/Reserve), civilian, and
contracted services must be consistent with requirements, funding
availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable
laws (such as section 129a of title 10, U.S.C.) and other total force
management and workload sourcing mandates. The Department must avoid
any inappropriate transfer of work from civilians to contract support
or military personnel. We must also ensure the most cost effective
performance possible while being mindful that risk mitigation must take
precedence over cost considerations to ensure mission success and
prevent an overreliance on contractors.
Question. What processes will you put in place, if confirmed, to
ensure that the Department implements a sound planning process for
carrying out the requirements of section 955, including the
implementation of the exclusion authority in section 955(c)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts in
Comptroller to ensure the requirements of section 955 are implemented
in manner which complements the Department's current processes for
workforce determinations, which strive to achieve effective and
efficient total force manpower solutions consistent with law and
available resources. While I cannot speak to specific exclusions, I
will work to ensure that the workforces of the Department are sized to
perform the functions and activities necessary to achieve the missions
and enable the capabilities of the Department.
acquisition workforce
Question. Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund
to help the Department of Defense address shortcomings in its
acquisition workforce. This provision was amended by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 to ensure a continuing
source of funds for this purpose.
Do you believe that the DOD acquisition workforce development fund
is still needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees
with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. The acquisition workforce development fund has been
instrumental in the Department's efforts to recapitalize its
acquisition workforce and improve oversight, management, and
accountability in the procurements of goods and services. I believe
that the fund is still necessary to further enhance and sustain the
training and expertise of our dedicated acquisition workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to ensure
that the money made available through the workforce development fund is
spent in a manner that best meets the needs of the Department of
Defense and its acquisition workforce?
Answer. It is my understanding that management and execution of the
acquisition workforce development fund is a joint responsibility of the
Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics and Comptroller. If confirmed, I will work
with my counterparts in those offices to ensure that application of
resources is done in a manner that is consistent with the training,
development, and sustainment needs of the acquisition workforce.
Question. One of the central tenets of the Department's Better
Buying Power 2.0 is to improve the ``the Professionalism of the Total
Acquisition Workforce.'' The Department has subdivided this tenet into
four separate initiatives. These initiatives are:

1. Establish higher standards for key leadership positions.
2. Establish stronger professional qualification requirements for
all acquisitions specialties.
3. Increase the recognition of excellence in acquisition
management
4. Continue to increase the cost consciousness of the acquisition
workforce--change the culture.

If confirmed, how will you use funds from the Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund to accomplish the objectives of these initiatives?
Answer. These specific initiatives are under the purview of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
and I cannot speak to their specifics. However, to improve overall
stewardship of the Department's resources, the continuation of the
workforce development fund to recruit, retain, train, and sustain a
professional and highly skilled acquisition workforce is critical.
Question. Section 872 of the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 codifies the authority for the
Department of Defense to conduct an acquisition workforce demonstration
project and extends the authority to 2017.
Do you believe it would be in the best interest of the Department
to extend and expand the acquisition workforce demonstration project?
Answer. The Department is authorized by law up to 120,000 employee
participants covered under acquisition demonstration projects. It is my
understanding that today the Department has 15,800 employee
participants, the majority of which returned to the demonstration
project following the repeal of the National Security Personnel System
(NSPS) as directed by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010. With that
complete, several acquisition organizations across all components have
expressed interest in participating in the project. Project
participation is voluntary and based on meeting acquisition related
workforce demographic eligibility criteria.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to implement
section 872?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Department
components to ensure the Department is effectively positioned to
appropriately expand the Acquisition Demonstration project.
laboratory personnel demonstration program
Question. The laboratory demonstration program founded in section
342 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 as
amended by section 1114 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001, section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008, section 1108 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and section 1105 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, paved the way
for personnel management initiatives and new flexibilities at the
defense laboratories. These innovations have been adopted in various
forms throughout other DOD personnel systems.
If confirmed, will you fully implement the laboratory demonstration
program and the authorities under these provisions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to fully
implement laboratory demonstration programs under these authorities.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the directors of the
defense laboratories are provided the full range of personnel
flexibilities and authorities provided by Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Department
components to ensure the directors of defense laboratories are provided
the full range of personnel flexibilities and authorities provided by
Congress.
dod scientific and technical personnel
Question. Recently, the Department issued guidance, as part of its
efficiencies initiatives, to centralize certain hiring authorities,
including for highly-qualified experts and Inter-Governmental Personnel
Assignment (IPA) positions. Both are heavily used by the Department's
scientific and technical (S&T) enterprise, including the DOD's
laboratories and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
The benefit of these authorities is to use them to make rapid hiring
decisions for individuals in a highly competitive national S&T jobs
market. However, there is concern that the centralization of the
process will actually slow down the Services' and defense agencies'
ability to hire rapidly.
What will you do to ensure that these special hiring authorities
are not negatively impacted in terms of allowing DOD to rapidly hire
these types of highly specialized individuals?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department actively
engages in initiatives to streamline and reform the civilian hiring
system, to include efforts to ensure that the Department's processes
for using special hiring authorities are efficient in fulfilling DOD's
mission needs.
Question. Under the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest
(MAVNI) program, the Department is able to expedite U.S. citizenship
for foreign nationals that enlist in the military and have either
specialized medical or linguistic skills.
How could this program be extended to include, subject to
appropriate security reviews, highly skilled scientific and technical
foreign nationals--e.g., graduates of U.S. universities with doctorates
in fields the DOD has a demand for and where less than half of these
graduates are U.S. citizens?
Answer. Although new enlistees under the MAVNI program are eligible
for expedited naturalization under the provisions of section 1440,
title 8, U.S.C., the MAVNI Pilot Program was designed to meet critical
military readiness needs in the Armed Forces by using the provisions of
section 504(b)(2), title 10, U.S.C. to enlist certain legal non-
immigrants.
Currently, the Services have identified and scoped the program for
fully-qualified health professional in critical medical skills and
individuals with heritage-level language abilities and cultural
backgrounds in a specific set of languages critical to current and
emerging readiness needs.
Although the need for scientific and technical skills has been
identified as a shortage in civilian requirements, expanding MAVNI to
fill civilian needs would not meet the intent or the language of the
statutory provisions under which MAVNI operates.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
simulation training
1. Senator Nelson. Mr. Vollrath, as the defense budget shrinks,
simulation technology is a way troops can remain war ready. Simulation
training--available for a wide variety of weapons systems and crew
positions--is not only cost effective, but reduces the wear and tear on
military hardware. As fiscal constraints reduce live exercises and
training opportunities, can mobility and simulation be relied upon to a
greater extent?
Mr. Vollrath. Modeling and simulation (M&S) supported training
certainly presents an opportunity to mitigate live training costs and
is presently being used by all Services to supplement/support live
training. The Department of Defense has conducted a study of relevant
factors to determine what types of military training are best suited
for M&S supported training. In making this decision, some factors that
must be considered include: individual or collective task; learning
complexity; interaction/fidelity; maturity of technology; and task
domain (procedural, affective, psychomotor, or cognitive). Finally, the
total life cycle costs of live training as compared to M&S supported
training must also be evaluated and compared for each training task. In
general, the study concluded that given current technologies, training
tasks that are procedural, rote, and individual or of low to medium
complexity can be performed very cost effectively with M&S supported
capabilities. As always, the Department will leverage and further
explore any and all ways to cost effectively prepare our Nation's force
for military operations.

military readiness
2. Senator Nelson. Mr. Vollrath, readiness is already impacted by
sequestration. The Florida Air National Guard has reduced their flying
hours by 57 percent, impacting the ability for pilots to remain current
and qualified. The 125th Fighter Wing in Jacksonville provides air
dominance for the southeastern United States. Can you speak to the
downsides of establishing tiered readiness levels for our combat units,
such as the 125th Fighter Wing?
Mr. Vollrath. The Services must be resourced to provide enough
ready units when the Nation needs them. Each Service has force
generation functions to produce ready units/capabilities. They
recognize the realities of how long it takes to generate ready units/
capabilities (and keep them ready) as well as the particulars of the
demand signal from our combatant commanders. Many units/capabilities
aren't required in large numbers or on an immediate timeline, and in
those cases, building rotational force generation models (i.e.
``tiering'') makes perfect sense. What is harmful is when it isn't the
demand signal that shapes the ``tiering'', but a shortage of resources.
My concern is this will result in an inadequate supply of ready forces
when the need arises, and/or the inability to restore the readiness of
forces to meet required timelines.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
mental health
3. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Vollrath, the Armed Forces Health
Surveillance Center recently conducted a study that found pilots of
drone aircraft experience mental health problems like depression,
anxiety, and post-traumatic stress at the same rate as pilots of manned
aircraft who are deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. Air Force officials
and independent experts have suggested several potential causes, among
them witnessing combat violence on live video feeds, working in
isolation or under inflexible shift hours, juggling the simultaneous
demands of home life with combat operations, and dealing with intense
stress because of crew shortages.
The Air Force also conducted research into the health issues of
drone crew members. In a 2011 survey of nearly 840 drone operators, it
found that 46 percent of Reaper and Predator pilots, and 48 percent of
Global Hawk sensor operators, reported ``high operational stress''.
Those crews cited long hours and frequent shift changes as major
causes. That study found the stress among drone operators to be much
higher than that reported by Air Force members in logistics or support
jobs. But it did not compare the stress levels of the drone operators
with those of traditional pilots.
The new study looked at the electronic health records of 709 drone
pilots and 5,256 manned aircraft pilots between October 2003 and
December 2011. Those records included information about clinical
diagnoses by medical professionals and not just self-reported symptoms.
The study found that pilots of both manned and unmanned aircraft had
lower rates of mental health problems than other Air Force personnel.
Clearly this is a readiness issue, with the contradiction in the
findings of those two studies, do you think we have a clear picture of
the mental health needs of our pilots?
Mr. Vollrath. After consulting with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, it is clear that the
Department's understanding of this issue is constantly improving. It is
important to note that rates of formally diagnosed PTSD in Air Force
pilots have remained low. Despite many years at war and an increasing
reliance on remotely piloted aircraft, PTSD rates in all pilots as a
group remain lower (at about two per thousand) than many other career
groups, such as airmen in ``outside the wire'' combat missions (e.g.,
security forces or explosive ordnance disposal staff) or others with
direct exposure to the dead or dying, such as medical personnel.
Even though rates of formal diagnosis of PTSD have remained low, we
are aware that pilots experience stress. Pilots with traditional combat
exposure or those who visualize battle remotely can be at risk for
combat stress or PTSD. Since 2009, line leaders and the USAF School of
Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM) have monitored closely our RPA and
intelligence career fields. Through a series of surveys and interviews
USAFSAM continues to gather information, expand research, and provide
recommendations to leaders and providers, and to inform aeromedical
policy. Future studies will seek to compare RPA teams with other high
tempo teams such as aeromedical and C-17 missions. Finally, stepping
forward to help meet the needs of the growing remotely piloted mission,
the Air Force dedicated several additional mental health providers to
RPA and intelligence units. In concert with flight medicine physicians,
chaplains, and commanders, they will assist Air Force leaders and
supervisors in comprehensive support of these valued teams.

4. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Vollrath, do you believe there is any
pressure among both manned and unmanned aircraft pilots not to report
mental health symptoms to doctors out of fears that they will be
grounded?
Mr. Vollrath. I consulted with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs in order to properly respond to
this question. That aircrew (whether from manned or unmanned airframes)
may not fully disclose mental health problems to physicians due to
fears of being grounded is a phenomenon that is not unique to aircrew,
nor to non-rated servicemembers with mental health problems. Military
members are reluctant to report any condition that they think may
adversely impact their duty or retention status. This is particularly
true of aviators who must meet more restrictive standards, whose
special pay is attached to their operational readiness, and whose
competition for promotion may be affected by an untimely and prolonged
``Duties Not Involving Flying'' period. It is a finding that military
leadership has often encountered across the Services and myriad of
career fields.
DOD health care utilization rates are not the most reliable form of
identifying mental health issues within military populations, including
RPA operators. Relying on self-disclosure to estimate true prevalence
rates has known methodological limitations. Research has shown higher
rates of self-disclosure of symptoms in the pilot community using
anonymous surveys rather than annual web-based health assessments.
Additionally, placement of operational psychologists embedded within
flight medicine and operational units facilitates interaction and
disclosure of problems among RPA pilots. The Air Force implemented this
initiative in 2011 and continues to increase the placements of
operational psychologists across the Air Force.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
child development centers
5. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, allegations of child abuse at the
Fort Myer Child Development Center (CDC) in December prompted the
Secretary of Defense to order the Services to fully investigate all CDC
activities and to provide reports to him by January 21, 2013. The audit
revealed areas for improvement. Last week, we learned that the Fort
Myer CDC has lost its accreditation. When will Congress be provided the
findings of DOD's audit of CDCs?
Mr. Vollrath. At this time, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has not indicated that the report is available for release. It will be
made available to Congress as soon as it is approved for release by the
Secretary of Defense. The Services and OSD are addressing identified
areas of improvement at the DOD and Military Service level. The Fort
Myer Child Development Center National Association for the Education of
Young Children (NAEYC) accreditation was revoked. NAEYC procedures
require revocation if a required standard is not met.

6. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, what improvements will DOD make to
ensure that young children are protected from abuse when receiving care
in CDCs?
Mr. Vollrath. DOD and the Military Services are committed to
providing a safe environment for the 200,000 children that we provide
care for on a daily basis. We are revising the current Department of
Defense Instruction (DODI) which covers background checks for any
individuals who have contact with children on a regular basis
(including child care workers, volunteer coaches, youth recreation
employees, et cetera). While the existing DODI met the requirements of
current legislation, the audit ordered by the Secretary of Defense
identified areas that could be improved upon and we are focusing on
making these changes.

spouse education and career opportunities
7. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, how many spouses have been helped,
and how many still need help from Spouse Education and Career
Opportunities (SECO) programs?
Mr. Vollrath. In fiscal year 2012, the SECO program provided career
and education counseling for more than 132,000 spouses through the SECO
Career Center; provided more than 36,000 military spouses with
scholarships for job training, licensing and certificates through the
My Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) scholarship program, and worked
with 160 private sector companies and organizations to hire more than
36,000 military spouses. However, more than 1 in 4 (26 percent)
military spouses in the labor force are unemployed, which accounts for
approximately 90,000 spouses. Furthermore, when they are employed, the
income levels of military spouses often lag behind their civilian
counterparts. A recent study showed that military wives with full-time
jobs earned 25 percent less than their civilian counterparts. In light
of these statistics, we must continue to work to ensure that our
military spouses are provided the tools, resources, and opportunities
to contribute to their family's financial stability, resilience, and
well-being.

8. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, do you believe these programs, as
currently resourced and executed, are actually helping military spouses
gain employment opportunities that meet their financial and
professional stability needs?
Mr. Vollrath. Yes. The SECO program has been successful because we
address the comprehensive needs of military spouses throughout their
career lifecycle. SECO assists them in deciding on a career path,
provides them information to train and learn in order to access the
career they have chosen, gives them tools and assistance to embark on
an effective career search and makes the connection to the employer who
will value the skills that they bring to the 21st century workforce.

healthcare costs
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, DOD's personnel and entitlement
spending represent an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.
Healthcare spending is a big driver of increased costs. DOD's health
care budget has increased from about $19 billion in fiscal year 2001 to
about $52 billion in fiscal year 2013. Healthcare represents about 10.2
percent of DOD's topline. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, Congress
established the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization
Commission to study and make recommendations on compensation and
retirement reform. Should this Commission consider the impact of
healthcare costs as it develops its recommendations on compensation and
retirement reform?
Mr. Vollrath. Yes, the Department believes the Commission should
consider the impact of healthcare costs as it develops recommendations
on modernizing the military compensation and retirement systems. For
its part, health and dental care are among the areas currently under
review by the Department as it develops modernization recommendations
for the Secretary to transmit to the Commission.

10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, how can DOD better control the
cost of healthcare of servicemembers as they move through the
accession-to-retirement continuum and beyond?
Mr. Vollrath. Although health care is not within the purview of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management, I
have consulted with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs in order to properly respond to this question.
Controlling health care costs is a complex problem that will require a
complementary approach to solving. The Military Health System advocates
four simultaneous actions to reduce costs: (1) internal efficiencies to
better organize our decisionmaking and execution arm; (2) a
continuation of efforts to appropriately pay private sector providers;
(3) initiatives that promote health, reduce illness, injury and
hospitalization; and (4) proposed changes to beneficiary cost-sharing
under TRICARE.

dod review of same sex spouse benefits and impact of defense of
marriage act
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, recently, the Secretary of
Defense announced the intent to provide additional benefits to same-sex
domestic partners who declare a committed relationship, but not to
unmarried heterosexual domestic partners. What is the legal and policy
rationale for DOD to favor same-sex partners over heterosexual partners
in offering these benefits?
Mr. Vollrath. Heterosexual couples, if they so choose, have the
opportunity in every State to get married, and their marriage is
recognized in Federal law. Currently, same-sex couples do not have this
opportunity (per the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), we can only
recognize marriage between a man and a woman). Thus, same-sex couples
and opposite-sex couples are not similarly protected under the law. The
benefits extended are a significant effort to close the gap in equity
for benefits, consistent with current law.

12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, has DOD considered the potential
for litigation by heterosexuals, who are not married but who are also
in a committed relationship, who believe they are being denied equal
treatment?
Mr. Vollrath. Same-sex and opposite-sex couples are not similarly
situated. Opposite-sex couples can get married in any State, the
District of Columbia, or U.S. territory, and their marriage is
recognized under Federal law. Currently, same-sex couples do not have
this same opportunity (per DOMA, we can only recognize marriage between
one man and one woman). Thus, the two categories of couples are not
similarly situated under the law.

13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, what will be the increased costs
associated with extending benefits to the same sex spouses of military
members during a time when this administration has imposed drastic
budget cuts to DOD?
Mr. Vollrath. The cost of extending benefits to same-sex domestic
partners of military members is negligible. Many of the benefits
selected for extension are self-sustaining programs designed to
accommodate fluctuations in need and population, such as commissary and
exchange privileges and MWR programs. Other benefits, such as dual
military spouse assignments and emergency leave, are provided to the
servicemember regardless of relationship status therefore there is no
additional cost anticipated.

women in combat
14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, I am concerned about the
potential adverse impacts to readiness resulting from Secretary of
Defense Panetta's announcement to rescind the 1994 rule that prohibits
women from being assigned to smaller ground combat units, and his plan
to potentially open more than 230,000 combat positions to women. DOD is
pursuing this major policy change during a time when every branch of
the Armed Forces has consistently met recruitment goals, is attracting
and retaining high quality and skilled personnel at record rates and,
recently, requested Congress to authorize the Army and Marine Corps to
reduce end strength by 100,000 ground troops over the next 4 years.
What compelling national security interest is advanced by opening up
more positions to women at this time?
Mr. Vollrath. It is the in best interest of national security to
have the best and brightest person serving in any position based upon
their abilities, qualifications, and guiding principles developed by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is consistent with our values and
enhances military readiness.

15. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Vollrath, what assurance can you provide
that decisions to open positions and units to women will be based on
bona fide military requirements, and will not result in needlessly
exposing any American servicemember, men or women, to more risk of
death or serious injury, than is absolutely required by military
necessity?
Mr. Vollrath. The decision to open positions to all qualified
personnel enhances military readiness. The Department can ill afford to
arbitrarily reduce the pool of qualified personnel based on gender. As
a result, it is in the best interest of the Department to allow both
men and women who meet the standards for these positions to compete for
them.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
end strength in the services
16. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Vollrath, in your responses to the advance
policy questions you discuss end strength reductions that are being
implemented between now and 2017. You correctly highlight the
importance that we keep faith with our troops. In the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2013, I was able to include a provision (section 525) that
requires the secretary of each Military Department to report to
Congress regarding troops that were involuntarily separated from the
military. I am especially concerned about the Army. The Army has
testified in the past that it may have to issue thousands of
involuntary separations to achieve its end strength reductions. I
believe it would be breaking faith with our troops if we welcome home
well-performing troops by handing them a pink slip. Do you agree?
Mr. Vollrath. It is the Department policy that voluntary separation
authorities be used to the maximum extent possible prior to using
involuntary measures to reduce the force. Indeed, that is the best way
to keep faith with our troops. However, we also realize there are
circumstances that may preclude Services from using voluntary measures.

1. Voluntary separation incentives can drive up costs; the
Secretaries of the Military Departments have to balance these costs
with the need to maintain mission readiness. Voluntary separation
incentives may not be sufficient to properly shape the force.
2. Involuntary separations may be necessary for the Services to
properly shape their forces and to allow selectivity when drawing down
the size of our forces. As we draw down it is imperative that we retain
those that the Department will need in the future.
3. The military is the most respected profession in the United
States. Strong retention numbers demonstrate that many of our members
love what they do and want to continue serving as long as possible.

17. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Vollrath, do you commit to ensuring the
Services honor the reporting requirements in section 525?
Mr. Vollrath. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure we fully comply with
the reporting requirements of section 525.

18. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Vollrath, will you make every effort to
avoid the use of involuntary separations as we reduce the size of our
force?
Mr. Vollrath. If confirmed, I will make every effort to minimize
the use of involuntary separations. However, we should all be cognizant
of the fact that involuntary separations will be necessary to ensure
the military is postured correctly for mission readiness and to meet
all national security objectives.

19. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Vollrath, what assistance or additional
authorities do you need to achieve this goal?
Mr. Vollrath. The Department is requesting additional authority for
the Secretary of Defense to have the flexibility to reduce the
mandatory retirement point (for years of service) for lieutenant
colonels and Navy commanders from 28 years of Active commissioned
service to 25 years; and for colonels and Navy captains from 30 years
of Active commissioned service to 27 years.

utilizing the reserves
20. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Vollrath, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you write: ``In a constrained resource environment,
the Reserve component gives the Department a unique opportunity to
preserve overall operational capability and mitigate risk at reduced
cost.'' Do you agree that the Reserve component can provide comparable
operational capability at a reduced cost?
Mr. Vollrath. I believe the last 10 years have proven the Reserve
component can provide comparable operational capability. The current
budget environment provides an opportunity to examine ways in which the
Reserve component may offer the Services an effective way to preserve
capability and capacity, within manageable risk. Each Service should
review their roles and missions and determine the appropriate AC/RC mix
within their respective organization. This review should include
factors such as the capabilities required by the combatant commanders
and the associated timelines, pay, operating costs, time to train, and
levels of proficiency.

21. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Vollrath, based on declining defense
resources, do you agree that we should be increasing, not decreasing,
our reliance on the Reserve component?
Mr. Vollrath. Over the last 10 years, we've seen that the Reserve
component can be a very capable resource. However, getting the right
balance of capabilities across the components is important and should
be a direct function of the demand signal from our combatant commanders
as well as the comparative advantage of each component to produce and
retain those capabilities. We know from past experience that if the
Reserve component is not properly funded, it will atrophy resulting in
recovery timelines that are long and expensive. Getting the right
balance between our AC/RC components is important, particularly as we
adjust to reduced resources.

22. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Vollrath, are there any roles and missions
that we should increasingly shift from the Active component to the
Reserve component?
Mr. Vollrath. Our current fiscal environment, recent legislation
passed by Congress in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), plus our new defense strategy offers us a unique opportunity to
shape our future forces. Getting the right balance of capabilities
across the components is important and should reflect the demand signal
from our combatant commanders as well as the comparative advantage of
each component to produce and retain those capabilities. There may be
current roles and missions that reside in the active component that
could shift to the Reserve and vice versa. As we work the Quadrennial
Defense Review, the Services will take this opportunity to shape their
force mix to maintain the most capability and capacity while mitigating
risk.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike S. Lee
biofuels
23. Senator Lee. Mr. Vollrath, in 2012, the Navy undertook the
expensive ``Great Green Fleet'' demonstration, purchasing 450,000
gallons of biofuel at $26 a gallon for a total of $12 million spent on
fuel for just one demonstration. The Air Force similarly spent $639,000
on 11,000 gallons of biofuels for a demonstration in 2012, costing the
taxpayer $59 per gallon. With the prospect of sequestration and a much
tighter defense budget in coming years, do you believe that the
military should continue such large-scale demonstrations using
biofuels? Please provide a yes or no answer, and if answering yes,
please provide a justification as to why programs involving biofuels
should be prioritized over other research and development programs.
Mr. Vollrath. As this issue is outside of the purview of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management, I
defer to my colleagues Mr. Estevez and Mr. Fanning to respond to this
question.

future acquisition process
24. Senator Lee. Mr. Vollrath, with the prospect of sequester cuts
to DOD this year and continuing cuts through the next 9 fiscal years,
we must change the way that acquisitions are conducted in order to be
more efficient and cost effective. Necessary acquisitions, such as our
next generation fighter jet, have been plagued by delays and budget
overruns. What lessons have been learned so far from the F-35 program
that you will implement in future acquisitions?
Mr. Vollrath. As this issue is outside of the purview of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management, I
defer to my colleagues Mr. Estevez and Mr. Fanning to respond to this
question.
______

[The nomination reference of Mr. Frederick E. Vollrath
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 22, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Frederick Vollrath, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense. (New Position).
______

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Frederick E. Vollrath,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Frederick E. Vollrath
Education:
University of Miami

1958-1962 - Bachelor of Business Administration in
Management awarded 1962

Central Michigan University

1975-1976 - Master of Arts in Personnel Management
awarded 1976
Employment record:
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and
Force Management - 2012-present
Computer Sciences Corporation - 1999-2006

Corporate Vice President of Human Resources

U.S. Army - 1963-1998

Human Resources Management Command
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1)
Retired as Lieutenant General in 1998
Honors and awards:
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Adjutant General Corps Regimental Hall of Fame
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Frederick
E. Vollrath in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Frederick Emil Vollrath.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management.

3. Date of nomination:
January 22, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
July 16, 1940; Miami Beach, FL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Joy Pollock Vollrath.

7. Names and ages of children:
Forrest Vollrath, 48 years.
Hans Vollrath, 46 years.
Mark Vollrath, 39 years.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Coral Gables High School, HS Diploma, 1954-1958.
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, Bachelor Business
Administration, 1958-1962.
Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, MI, Master of Arts,
Personnel Management, 1976.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness and
Force Management)
Retired, Lorton, VA, January 2006-March 2012.
Corporate Vice President Human Resources, Computer Sciences
Corporation, El Segundo, CA, February 1999-December 2005.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Society of Human Resource Management, Member, Alexandria, VA.
Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Member, Charlottesville, VA.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Adjutant General Corps Regimental Hall of Fame

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.

[The nomination of Mr. Frederick E. Vollrath was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 20, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on April 18, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Eric K. Fanning by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. Not currently. I agree with the goals of those defense
reforms; they remain essential to the effective employment of our
Nation's Armed Forces. Most importantly, they have yielded a
demonstrated improvement in the joint warfighting capabilities of the
U.S. military.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I have no suggestions for modifications to the Goldwater-
Nichols legislation. Should I identify areas that merit reform, I will
propose those changes through the appropriate established process.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. If confirmed, I will bring more than 2 decades of broad
experience in national security policy and programs as well as
management to this position. From research assistant on the House Armed
Services Committee, to Senior Vice President for Strategic Development
at Business Executives for National Security, to my current position as
the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy, I have examined national
security challenges from many perspectives. I have worked closely with
the other Military Services, the national security interagency
community, and Members of Congress to help make the right decisions for
our Nation's defense. I have also grappled with tough trade-offs among
programs in a fiscally-constrained environment and have considered the
implications of changes in defense law and policy. If confirmed, I
believe these skills and my experience can benefit the Air Force and
the broader Department of Defense (DOD).
duties
Question. Section 8015 of title 10, U.S.C., states the Under
Secretary of the Air Force shall perform such duties and exercise such
powers as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under
Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. The position of the Under Secretary of the Air Force is
established by law within the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.
Subject to the Secretary of the Air Force's direction and control, the
Under Secretary exercises the full authority of the Secretary to
conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force (except as
limited by law, regulation or limitations imposed by DOD or the
Secretary of the Air Force). The Under Secretary also serves as the
Chief Management Officer of the Air Force, the senior energy official,
and the focal point for space at the Air Force headquarters.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, as
set forth in section 8015 of title 10, U.S.C., or in DOD regulations
pertaining to functions of the Under Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. At this time, I am unaware of any reason to change the
duties and functions of the Under Secretary as set out in title 10 and
pertinent DOD regulations. If I am confirmed and I identify areas that
I believe merit changes, I will propose those changes through the
appropriate established processes.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if
any, do you expect will be prescribed for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary
of the Air Force to further his vision and goals for the Air Force. I
expect the Secretary to prescribe duties for me relating to the Under
Secretary of the Air Force's responsibilities, particularly in the role
of Chief Management Officer.
Question. Section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008, directs the Secretary of a Military Department to
designate the Under Secretary of such Military Department to assume the
primary management responsibility for business operations.
What is your understanding of the business operations
responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. It is my understanding that the business operations
responsibilities of the Chief Management Officer, consistent with
section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, include the following: ensuring the Air Force's capability to
carry out DOD's strategic plan in support of national security
objectives; ensuring the core business missions of the Department of
the Air Force are optimally aligned to support the Department's
warfighting mission; establishing performance goals and measures for
improving and evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
and monitoring and measuring this progress; and working with DOD's
Chief Management Officer to develop and maintain a strategic plan for
business reform.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship
with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense serves as the principal assistant
to the President on all DOD matters. The Secretary of the Air Force is
subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of
Defense and the Under Secretary of the Air Force works for the
Secretary of the Air Force. The Under Secretary also serves as the
Chief Management Officer of the Air Force, the senior energy official,
and the focal point for space at the Air Force headquarters. As the
focal point of space for the Air Force, the Under Secretary coordinates
all of the space functions and activities across the Air Force, and is
the primary interface to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
space matters. If confirmed, I would look forward to working closely
with the Secretary of Defense and his office on space-related matters,
energy issues, and other matters as directed by the Secretary of the
Air Force.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assists the Secretary of
Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and performs
those duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense or by law. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on
a range of matters. In particular, I would look forward to working with
and supporting the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his role as Chief
Management Officer of DOD.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of
Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) is the principal
staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy
Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the management and
improvement of integrated DOD business operations. In this role the
DCMO is charged with leading the synchronization, integration, and
coordination of the disparate business activities of the Department to
ensure optimal alignment in support of the warfighting mission. If
confirmed, I look forward to building on my close working relationship
with the DCMO in my new capacity as the Air Force Chief Management
Officer.
Question. The Director of the Business Transformation Agency.
Answer. This office no longer exists.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Chairman through the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on appropriate
matters affecting the Air Force.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and
obligations of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When
performing duties as the acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's
relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that
of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Vice
Chairman through the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on appropriate
matters affecting the Air Force.
Question. The Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for
and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the
Department of the Air Force. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is
subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
the Air Force. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me a wide
range of duties and responsibilities involving, but not limited to,
organizing, supplying, equipping, training, maintaining, and
administering the Air Force. I look forward to working closely with the
Secretary as his deputy and principal assistant.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is directly responsible
to the Secretary of the Air Force and performs duties subject to his
authority, direction, and control. For the Secretary of the Air Force,
the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing properly organized,
trained, and equipped forces to support the combatant commanders in
their mission accomplishment. The Chief of Staff oversees members and
organizations across the Air Force, advising the Secretary on plans and
recommendations, and, acting as an agent of the Secretary, implementing
plans upon approval. If confirmed, I would foster a close working
relationship with the Chief of Staff to ensure that policies and
resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Air Force and
respect his additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force carry out the
goals and priorities of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will assist the
Secretary in building a strong team through close relationships and
information sharing, and I look forward to working with the Assistant
Secretaries to further the Secretary's vision.
Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.
Answer. The General Counsel (GC) is the senior civilian legal
advisor to Air Force senior leaders and all officers and agencies of
the Department of the Air Force. The GC serves as the chief ethics
official. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a strong working
relationship with the GC and his staff.
Question. The Inspector General of the Air Force.
Answer. The Inspector General (IG) of the Air Force is a general
officer who is detailed to the position by the Secretary of the Air
Force. When directed, the IG inquires into and reports on matters
affecting the discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Air Force. He
also proposes programs of inspections and investigations as
appropriate. If confirmed, I would look forward to developing a good
working relationship with the IG.
Question. The Surgeon General of the Air Force.
Answer. The Surgeon General (SG) of the Air Force is the functional
manager of the Air Force Medical Service and provides direction,
guidance, and technical management of Air Force medical personnel at
facilities worldwide. The SG advises the Secretary of the Air Force and
Air Force Chief of Staff, as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs, on matters pertaining to the medical aspects of the
air expeditionary force and the health of Air Force personnel. If
confirmed, I would look forward to developing a good working
relationship with the SG.
Question. The Air Force Business Transformation Office.
Answer. The Air Force Business Transformation Office is responsible
for assisting the Under Secretary of the Air Force in performing the
duties of Air Force Chief Management Officer as they relate to
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of Air Force business
operations. The Air Force Deputy Chief Management Officer has been
designated as the Director of the Air Force Business Transformation
Office. The office advises Air Force senior leadership on establishment
of strategic performance goals, management of Air Force-wide cross
functional activities to meet those goals, and implementation of
continuous process improvement initiatives. If confirmed, I anticipate
a very active and involved role with the Air Force Business
Transformation Office on matters affecting the Air Force-wide business
operations.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) is the senior uniformed
legal advisor to Air Force senior leaders and all officers and agencies
of the Department of the Air Force and provides professional
supervision to TJAG's Corps in the performance of their duties. If
confirmed, I will look forward to developing a good working
relationship with TJAG and the TJAG staff.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is the senior
uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating,
developing, and coordinating all policies, programs, and plans
affecting Army and Air National Guard personnel, and is also a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Appointed by the President, he serves as
principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the
principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
on all National Guard issues and serves as the Department's official
channel of communication with the governors and adjutants general. If
confirmed, I will look forward to developing a good working
relationship with the chief of the National Guard Bureau on appropriate
matters affecting the Air Force.
Question. The Under Secretaries of the Military Services.
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work diligently to foster a close
working relationship with the Under Secretaries of the Army and Navy. I
look forward to sharing information and expertise that will assist in
the management of the Department of the Air Force and our coordination
with the other Services on matters of mutual interest, particularly in
our capacities as Chief Management Officers for our respective
Services.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, that
you would confront if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. This is a time of great challenge for the Air Force, DOD,
and the Nation. The security environment is one where the pace of
change is rapid. We live in a world where individual acts are powerful
and the effects of these acts can be global. This requires a resilient,
flexible, and responsive force ready to answer the Nation's call.
Force structure choices are difficult, especially under current
fiscal conditions. But the Air Force, like all of the Services, must
continue to maximize each taxpayer dollar to support the joint
warfighter in today's conflict while ensuring we can prevail in the
next fight, whatever and wherever it may be. The Air Force must balance
the need to modernize platforms with the requirement to invest in new
technologies and capabilities. As we all know, the men and women who
serve are truly our most valuable asset. So, the Air Force must also
ensure that it can continue to recruit, train, deploy, and retain
highly-skilled airmen, and support those airmen and their families. At
a time of great fiscal uncertainty for our Nation, these challenges
will continue to pose hard choices for the Service in the years ahead.
If confirmed, I will work to meet these challenges, especially in
my role as the Chief Management Officer of the Air Force, by continuing
to identify efficiencies, ensuring that the Air Force is getting the
most from its investment of taxpayers' resources. I will also work
toward more efficient and cost-effective acquisition processes and
program execution, particularly in the areas of energy and space. I
look forward to working closely with DOD and Air Force leadership,
along with this committee, to develop strategies for addressing these
major challenges facing the Air Force and the Nation.
Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize and what plans
would you have, if any, for addressing these challenges?
Answer. The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have laid
out clear priorities--continue to strengthen the nuclear enterprise;
partner with the joint and coalition team to win today's fight; develop
and care for airmen and their families; modernize air and space
inventories, organizations, and training; and recapture acquisition
excellence.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with senior DOD and Air
Force leadership, as well as this committee, to ensure that we make the
right choices for the Air Force and the Nation. All of these priorities
will require sustained leadership and effort with an eye toward
ensuring the best support for the warfighter and the wise use of
taxpayer resources.
air force global posture
Question. The Department of Defense Strategic Guidance issued in
January 2012 emphasized the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions while
still ensuring the U.S. ability to maintain mutual defense commitments
in Europe. The Strategic Guidance calls for a rebalancing of the U.S.
military investment in Europe, which will be achieved in part through
rotational presence at overseas bases in Europe.
In your view, should we consider making more substantial reductions
in Air Force force structure in Europe, particularly in view of the
shift in strategy toward the Asia/Pacific arena?
Answer. The United States' defense commitments to Europe and our
role in NATO remain paramount to regional stability and our
international security interests. Considerations to substantially
reduce force structure or employ it in new ways within Europe will
require clear planning with our partners. The Air Force brings unique
capabilities to Europe as part of a balanced forward presence that
assures our allies of our commitment and dissuades potential
adversaries from dangerous action. Additionally, I understand the Air
Force meets the capability and force-sizing requirements directed by
the new Defense Strategic Guidance, providing global and adaptable
forces in the highest priority areas and missions in the Asia-Pacific
region and the Middle East, while still ensuring our ability to
maintain our defense commitments to Europe and other allies and
partners. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we continue to invest in
collaborative defense programs, which are in the strategic best
interests of both the United States and our allies. Additionally, if we
identify redundant capabilities that our partners can provide, we
should carefully analyze the marginal costs of overseas presence and
adjust appropriately.
management of space activities
Question. As the Under Secretary of the Air Force, you would have
an important role in helping the Secretary of the Air Force discharge
his responsibilities as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for
Space, in particular, for developing, coordinating, and integrating
policy, plans and programs for major defense space acquisitions.
If confirmed, will you be designated as the DOD Executive Agent for
Space?
Answer. I do not expect to be designated as the DOD Executive Agent
for Space. While this role has been delegated in the past, the new DOD
Directive does not extend the Executive Agent for Space authority.
Question. If you are designated as the DOD Executive Agent for
Space, or are otherwise assisting the Secretary of the Air Force in his
role as Executive Agent, how would you ensure that each of the Military
Services remains fully engaged in and knowledgeable about space
programs and the advantages that such programs can bring to the
warfighter?
Answer. If confirmed, I do not expect to be designated as the DOD
Executive Agent for Space. While this role has been delegated in the
past, the new DOD Directive does not extend the Executive Agent for
Space authority. However, assisting the Secretary of the Air Force in
his role as EA for Space, I will foster a close working relationship
with the Under Secretaries of the Army and Navy, as well as the
appropriate Under and Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), to ensure space acquisition
planning, programming and budgeting are synchronized to continue to
deliver the best space capability to the warfighter.
The responsibilities of the Air Force as the DOD's Executive Agent
for Space can most successfully be accomplished through close
coordination with these organizations for the development of space
policy and the integration of space systems into broader departmental
efforts.
Question. What is your view of the relationship of the Under
Secretary of the Air Force to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration with regard to space policy and systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be assigned a wide range of duties and
responsibilities subject to the authority, direction and control of the
Secretary of the Air Force. I anticipate being an active participant in
a number of deliberative bodies which focus on developing, coordinating
and integrating DOD policy, plans and programs for major defense
acquisitions. For example, I will co-chair the Air Force Space Board
and participate in the Defense Space Council as the Air Force
representative. The perspective gained in these roles will inform my
vision of the best ways to facilitate unity of effort across the space
enterprise with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the DOD
Chief Information Officer, as well as other stakeholders.
Question. In your view, what are the authorities of the Executive
Agent for Space regarding: (1) the budgets, programs, and plans of the
various Service and Defense Agency space programs; and (2) milestone
decisions for space acquisition programs of the various Services and
Defense agencies?
Answer. With respect to planning, budgeting, and programming, I
view the authorities of the DOD Executive Agent for Space as an
integration function across the entire Department and space
communities. If confirmed, I view the synchronization of space budgets
between the Services and the coordination of space and non-space
acquisitions as paramount to delivering fully integrated weapon systems
to the battlefield.
Currently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics has milestone decision authority for space
acquisition programs. If confirmed, I look forward to assisting the
Under Secretary in managing and delivering space capabilities to the
warfighter.
Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
consistently pointed to fragmented leadership as a key contributor to
disconnects in space programs and to acquisition problems. GPS-user
equipment, for example, lags a decade behind new satellites because of
disparate acquisition authority. Architectures for critical areas such
as space situation awareness were slow to develop because of a lack of
an authority that could pull together and adjudicate the needs of the
many organizations in the space arena. Large programs have been
canceled partly because agencies could not agree on requirements or
work effectively together to provide oversight.
What do you think your role would be, if confirmed, in bringing
together the space community versus protecting only the institutional
interests of the Air Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
counterparts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Service Departments and other Defense agencies on space-related issues.
While the vast majority of space capabilities reside within the Air
Force, I understand these capabilities exist to support national
security objectives and the joint warfighter. The office of the Deputy
Under Secretary (Space) shares a staff with the DOD Executive Agent for
Space. This office is staffed by all four Services, which ensures a
multi-Service perspective is brought forth on issues. Additionally, I
will encourage a strong partnership with OSD and the Service
Departments utilizing the Defense Space Council and other mechanisms
for further collaboration, synchronization, and integration across DOD
space activities.
If confirmed, I would use the current governance mechanisms to
actively work with the other members of the Space community; I would
informally develop relationships with peers outside of the Air Force
(e.g. NASA, NRO, ODNI): and I would act in a highly collaborative and
reliable manner with the other members of the Space community
Question. How would you foster better cooperation and coordination
with agencies inside and outside the Defense community?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary
of the Air Force, the Executive Agent for Space, to further cooperate
on space activities across the U.S. Government. The National
Reconnaissance Office is a member of the DSC while the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence is regularly represented as well. The
Intelligence Community Space Board also includes several members from
DOD agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency and Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and observers from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director of
the Executive Agent for Space Staff.
If confirmed, I will also participate in routinely scheduled,
Executive-level meetings such as those between the Air Force, NASA, and
the National Reconnaissance Office. The perspective gained in these
roles will inform my vision of the best ways to facilitate unity of
effort across the DOD Space enterprise and support the Secretary of the
Air Force.
Question. Do you see a need to strengthen the authority of the
Under Secretary of the Air Force or to establish any new authority to
ensure better Government-wide coordination for space?
Answer. At this time, I am unaware of any reason to change the
authorities assigned to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Formed
approximately 2 years ago, the Defense Space Council has had a positive
impact on Government-wide coordination of space activities. If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Secretary of the
Air Force in any capacity to build upon the success of the Defense
Space Council.
space launch
Question. On May 2, 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin announced
plans to merge the production, engineering, test, and launch operations
associated with providing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
services to the U.S. Government. The companies believed the merger
could save $100-150 million per year for the U.S. Government while
continuing to provide assured access to space. An October 2011 GAO
report indicated that these cost savings have not materialized and have
in fact increased due to lack of insight into the costs by the merged
EELV contractor.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the costs of launch are
contained and transparent to the U.S. Government?
Answer. The new EELV acquisition strategy with quantity, rate, and
time commitments, better executive oversight, the emergence of
competition and better incentive contract types should ensure launch
costs are contained. If confirmed, I plan to become more familiar with
these efforts, to evaluate the actual cost savings and other benefits
of the Air Force strategy.
Question. Maintaining assured access to launch has been the
national security goal of the Department of the Air Force.
In your view is that goal achieved with the EELV vehicles or is
there a need for alternative launch options by attracting new entrants
to compete with the current EELV contractor?
Answer. Assured access to space has been achieved to date by the
current ULA launch systems in the EELV program. However, both public
law and policy require the U.S. Government to provide equal opportunity
for all qualified providers. Commercial space transportation providers
that have demonstrated their ability to safely and reliably launch
payloads will be provided the opportunity to compete.
Question. There has been considerable discussion in the past year
about the Air Force's plans for a block buy strategy for space launch.
The high cost of launch, our knowledge about the industrial base,
uneven agency coordination, and inadequate transparency into cost and
efficiencies have been significant elements of the debate over this
upcoming procurement.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Air Force works closely
with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to ensure that DOD has sufficient knowledge of
the heavy-lift program decisions of the administration to facilitate
the ability of DOD's ability to negotiate EELV launch contract prices
in a manner that maximizes investment?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with NASA and
others across the U.S. Government to maximize the Department's
investment. DOD and NASA collaborate on studies and conduct joint
meetings to provide insight into each organization's acquisition
strategy. If confirmed, I will continue to work with NASA to ensure
full understanding of the bearing NASA program decisions may have on
sustaining the launch industrial base.
Question. Do you think that the Air Force's current approach to
coordination with NASA is sufficient or are changes needed?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Secretary's
efforts to build strong relationships with NASA. The Air Force works
jointly with both NASA and the NRO on several key areas including the
acquisition of space launch services and new launch service provider
entrant criteria.
I plan to continue engaging with our space launch partners on
matters regarding the stability of the industrial base, EELV launch
requirements and competition for DOD launch services. I will continue
to look for opportunities for improved cooperation and coordination
while the organizations pursue their respective programs.
Question. In light of budgetary constraints, can more be done to
leverage the expertise and resources of both agencies as well as other
agencies that rely on our national security launch capability, such as
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate opportunities to leverage
expertise across agencies with space launch responsibilities while
bearing in mind that there are many existing collaboration activities
underway. As an example, the Air Force, NRO, and NASA jointly lead the
Government Expendable Launch Vehicle Executive Board as a forum for
interagency communication of acquisition, certification, and
programmatic launch issues.
Question. The discussion over the last year highlighted a need for
a longer term, national strategy for launch--one that optimizes the
industrial base, enables competition, advances technology, and can
respond to a need to change the current acquisition paradigm for space.
What role do you believe the Air Force should play in developing a
national launch strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Air
Force and across the Department to evaluate the need to develop a
comprehensive national launch strategy. As the DOD's Executive Agent
for Space, the Air Force has the ability to reach across the Department
to address DOD space equities and collaborate with external
stakeholders. If confirmed and requested by the Secretary, I will work
with our partners to understand the challenges and assess where key
strategic choices are required.
Question. How can this strategy leverage the government's buying
power to assure mission success while minimizing costs?
Answer. My understanding is that the objective of such a national
strategy is to establish an environment to ensure a stable, flexible,
responsive, and appropriately sized U.S. domestic propulsion industrial
base capable of fulfilling national requirements and commercial market
demands. I look forward to helping develop and decide on a common
strategy. A key element to the strategy should be better leveraging the
government's buying to gain our desired outcomes.
Question. How can we incentivize contractors to implement
efficiencies without adversely affecting mission success?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Air
Force to ensure mission assurance is maintained as an important
contributing factor to launch mission success. I have learned that the
Air Force has taken steps to effectively incentivize ULA to gain
efficiencies in launch capability without impacting mission assurance
through its two-pronged approach--a mission success performance
incentive to ensure focus on mission requirements, and the cost control
incentive to find efficiencies. Careful consideration will be taken to
ensure these incentive features of the contract structure are
appropriately balanced to influence behavior without adversely
affecting mission success.
Question. In the near term, what are your plans, if any, to foster
competition in the launch vehicle industry to ensure DOD pays
competitive prices?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Department on the
implementation of its new acquisition strategy, approved in November
2012, which authorizes competition for up to 14 missions for New
Entrants.
Question. What insight do you plan to have into the progress of new
commercial launch providers in obtaining a government certification?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan on seeing the rapid application of the
Air Force's New Entrant Certification Guide (NECG), to guide the
evaluation and certification processes for prospective New Entrants.
Per the NECG, the Air Force formally reviews and approves all
certification approaches proposed by New Entrants, thereby providing me
direct insight into any government certifications.
military space acquisition policy
Question. A major issue in space acquisition is the decoupling of
acquisition schedules between ground terminals and equipment and the
actual satellite. The result is billions of dollars being spent to
launch next generation communications, early warning, and GPS systems
without the capability on the ground to utilize the full suite of
capabilities on the satellites.
If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that ground and satellite
capabilities are synchronized as contemplated in section 911 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013?
Answer. It is my understanding that the deployment of ground and
satellite capabilities is not always optimally synchronized.
If confirmed, I plan to address programs from an enterprise
perspective and improve synchronization of space, control, and user
segments. I also plan to ensure appropriate resources are allocated and
to balance the need for early development with the appropriate timeline
for fielding.
Question. For several years, the Air Force has proposed a multi-
year procurement approach for its largest satellite programs. This
would have an advantage of stabilizing cost and enabling efficiencies,
but there is also a risk of locking in a strategy that may not be
suited for the decades ahead and of disabling innovation. At the same
time, DOD is weighing the pros and cons of relying more on the
commercial sector to carry military space payloads on board commercial
satellites as well as alternate architectures that emphasize the use of
smaller, simpler satellites that rely on both space and ground networks
to carry out the same missions that large, complex, and expensive
satellites do today.
What are your views on multi-year procurement, incremental funding,
and block-buy approaches, and to what extent do you envision the Air
Force using these approaches for acquiring space systems?
Answer. The Block buys enable ``process efficiencies'' otherwise
lost as a result of production breaks. Lowering production costs by
building and testing two or more satellites in succession by using
nontraditional space procurement funding approaches uses production
facilities more efficiently and helps the Department avoid untenable
funding spikes, which inject instability into programs and hurt the
Space Industrial Base suppliers.
These approaches may not be appropriate for every space system
procurement activity. If confirmed, I will support using innovative
space system procurement approaches, including multi-year procurement,
to ensure we are able to fund and produce these vital systems while
still maintaining our ability to fund other core Air Force
capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your plan to maintain
superiority in space, to push the state of technology, and to sustain
innovation in light of an approach that locks the incumbent contractor
into a long-term deal with just incremental advances in capability?
Answer. Maintaining superiority in space requires continued
investment in science and technology and innovative acquisition
approaches that allow for incremental improvements to operational
satellite programs. If confirmed, innovation will continue to be an Air
Force priority, and I will continue supporting a strong government-
contractor environment that balances affordability with the opportunity
for incremental system improvement.
Question. Do you foresee opportunities to develop national security
space satellites that are smaller, operationally responsive, and cost
less to launch?
Answer. The most important factors in any architecture development
are how they accomplish the mission and how they meet requirements. Any
opportunities for national security satellites that meet mission needs,
cost less to operate, are more responsive, and potentially smaller
should be considered seriously.
Question. If so, what role would you play, if confirmed, in
changing the acquisition culture from one that coalesces around large,
complex, exquisite programs to one that coalesces around smaller,
simpler programs that emphasize resilience over reliability?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with our Air Force
acquisition leadership and with stakeholders in the Defense Department
to foster an acquisition culture that supports delivering capabilities
the warfighter needs. If the needs are best met by smaller, simpler
programs, we will provide the guidance and resources to deliver space
capabilities in that manner.
Question. To what extent would you eliminate barriers and
restrictions to enable DOD to more fully use hosted payloads and ride-
share arrangements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure we look at the totality of
mission needs. Hosted payloads and ride-share arrangements may provide
responsive and cost-effective space capabilities, but rigorous analysis
and cost estimating are required. If hosted payloads and/or ride share
agreements are selected as part of architecture to meet mission
requirements, I will deal with barriers and restrictions to the best of
my ability to enable these nontraditional approaches.
Question. For fiscal year 2013, Congress rejected the termination
of the Operationally Responsive Space Program and instead moved the
office and function under the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC),
as found in section 914 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013.
If confirmed, will you support the implementation of section 914
and support the timely and successful integration of the Operationally
Responsive Space Program into SMC?
Answer. Yes, the Air Force transitioned the ORS Office to AFSPC/
SMC. A more detailed, long-term plan is pending a fiscal year 2013
Appropriations Bill.
Question. If confirmed, will you fully, and in a timely manner,
answer congressional inquiries on the status of the Operationally
Responsive Space Office?
Answer. Yes, I will make it a priority to respond to all
congressional inquiries.
long-range bombers
Question. The B-52s will begin to be retired in the 2030 timeframe
but are in urgent need of recapitalization of their data backbone for
advanced targeting and communications.
Do you support the B-52 Combat Network Communications Technology
(CONECT) program and will you work with Global Strike Command to ensure
the full suite of capabilities of the CONECT system are implemented in
the aircraft?
Answer. I support the capabilities that the CONECT program brings
in order to enable more effective B-52 employment in the complex,
network-centric battle space of the future. Although the Air Force
restructured the CONECT program in the fiscal year 2013 PB, the
capability remains a top Air Force Global Strike Command priority. If
confirmed, I will work with Global Strike Command to balance warfighter
needs and resources as we address our future budgets.
duties and responsibilities as chief management officer
Question. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the
Air Force's Chief Management Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the CMO of each
Military Department to carry out a comprehensive business
transformation initiative, with the support of a new Business
Transformation Office.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the Under Secretary as the CMO of the Department of the Air Force?
Answer. It is my understanding that the responsibilities of the
Chief Management Officer, consistent with section 904 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, include the following:
ensuring the Air Force's capability to carry out DOD's strategic plan
in support of national security objectives; ensuring the core business
missions of the Department of the Air Force are optimally aligned to
support the Department's warfighting mission; establishing performance
goals and measures for improving and evaluating overall economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness and monitoring and measuring this
progress; and working with DOD's Chief Management Officer to develop
and maintain a strategic plan for business reform. Under section 908 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Chief
Management Officer is also responsible for carrying out an initiative
for business transformation for the Air Force. Under section 2222 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, I would be
responsible for pre-certification for Air Force business systems
programs prior to submission for Department of Defense Deputy Chief
Management Officer review and certification. If confirmed, I will
ensure the core function and missions of the Air Force are optimally
aligned to support the joint warfighting mission. I intend to fulfill
the requirements of the law by establishing performance goals and
measures for improving and evaluating the overall affordability,
efficiency, and effectiveness of Air Force programs.
Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?
Answer. I have held equivalent duties and responsibilities as the
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Chief Management Officer,
Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy. While in this capacity, I
have been engaged in the implementation of the CMO duties directed by
section 904 of NDAA 2008, section 905 of NDAA 2009, and section 2222 of
NDAA 2010 and intimately familiar with the related DOD guidance issued
by the DOD Deputy Chief Management Officer. My experience in Navy
Enterprise Resource Planning implementation and assuring compliance
with financial improvement and audit readiness requirements will be of
particular benefit in my new duties.
Question. Do you believe that the CMO and the Business
Transformation Office have the resources and authority needed to carry
out the business transformation of the Department of the Air Force?
Answer. Yes I do, putting aside the uncertainty of sequestration
and further fiscal challenges imposed on the Department and Air Force.
I have favorable first impressions. If, upon further analysis, I become
convinced more resources are required to affect transformation, I would
work closely with the Secretary to ensure the Air Force is applying
sufficient effort to this important issue.
Question. What role do you believe the CMO and the Business
Transformation Office should play in the planning, development, and
implementation of specific business systems by the Military
Departments?
Answer. Consistent with the laws that established them, the CMO and
the Business Transformation Office should work with the Secretary and
Chief to set transformation priorities aligned to DOD and Air Force
needs. They should work to ensure business systems solutions make
economic sense and are feasible; build on or replace existing systems;
and enforce sound execution through application of the DOD
certification process, pursuant to the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 and
amplified in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, that requires all business
systems over $1 million in cost across the future years program be
certified as meeting a mission need and supported by a business case.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
statutory provisions establishing the position of CMO and creating the
Business Transformation Office?
Answer. I have no recommendations to make at this time. If
confirmed, I will continue to assess the requirement for additional or
modified authorities and look forward to working with this committee to
ensure that the objectives of the CMO, as intended by Congress, are
met.
Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the
Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise
architecture and transition plan to guide the development of its
business systems and processes. The Department has chosen to implement
the requirement for an enterprise architecture and transition plan
through a ``federated'' approach in which the Business Transformation
Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the
military departments to fill in most of the detail. The Air Force's
business systems, like those of the other military departments, remain
incapable of providing timely, reliable financial data to support
management decisions. In particular, the Government Accountability
Office has reported that the Air Force has not yet followed DOD's lead
in establishing new governance structures to address business
transformation; has not yet developed comprehensive enterprise
architecture and transition plan that plug into DOD's federated
architecture in a manner that meets statutory requirements; and instead
continues to rely upon old, stove-piped structures to implement
piecemeal reforms.
If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the
Air Force develops the business systems and processes it needs to
appropriately manage funds in the best interest of the taxpayer and the
national defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Air Force comptroller to
ensure that Air Force funding execution is more visible in real time to
senior leaders. While I have not yet been briefed in detail on the
status and challenges for Air Force systems, I would work to ensure
that our systems and processes achieve the outcome of enhancing our
ability to manage funds; ensure a detailed schedule is put in place and
managed to achieve that outcome; and ensure audits are conducted to
validate performance.
Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated,
enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the
successful transformation of the Air Force's business systems?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Air Force's enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the
requirements of section 2222?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the business transformation
staff in a detailed review of how the Air Force is developing and using
its business enterprise architecture to manage transformation and stay
aligned with the DOD Business Enterprise Architecture and related
strategic transformation priorities. I would make it a priority to meet
very early on with the Deputy CMO and Business Transformation staff to
validate the current state of the Air Force business enterprise
architecture and its alignment to the DOD architecture. I would focus
our review on how the architecture is being applied within the Air
Force governance process, and would direct and implement any needed
improvements
Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely
and accurate financial and business information in managing operations
and holding managers accountable?
Answer. I think timely financial information is critical in
managing the operations of large organizations. I understand the
frustration of many at the difficulty in achieving audits of DOD
financial statements and appreciate congressional efforts, through
section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, reinforcing the Secretary of Defense's goal of accelerating audit
readiness. If confirmed, I will be active in supporting DOD and
Secretary of the Air Force's continued focus on financial issues,
achieving the end of calendar year 2014 deadline for Statement of
Budgetary Resources, and realizing full audit readiness by 2017.
Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that
reliable, useful, and timely financial and business information was not
routinely available for these purposes?
Answer. If confirmed, I would use that situation as an opportunity
to improve the process of providing such financial and business
information. I would make this area a priority, especially if it aligns
to the major strategic mission priorities of the organization, and
assign actions with accountability for corrections. Finally, I would
provide active follow-up to ensure the needed results were achieved.
Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in
managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial
and business information available to Air Force managers?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on establishing the priorities
for business performance improvements on behalf of the Secretary of the
Air Force and report on progress toward achieving these goals. As the
CMO, I would expect to be an active and key member of the Air Force
governance process, enforcing Department priorities in decisions
regarding programs, organizations and processes across the functional
staff and Air Force Major Commands.
auditable financial statements
Question. Section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Chief Management Officer of the
Department of Defense to establish a plan to ensure that DOD's
financial statements are validated as ready for audit by not later than
September 30, 2017. The Secretary of Defense has established the
additional goal of ensuring that the statement of DOD's budgetary
resources is validated as ready for audit by not later than September
30, 2014.
In your opinion, is the Department of the Air Force on track to
achieve these objectives, particularly with regard to data quality,
internal controls and business process re-engineering?
Answer. The Air Force plan has been reviewed and integrated with
the OSD FIAR plan that integrates the entire DOD business environment
but, admittedly, it is still not without risk. However, they are seeing
successes to date that affirm they are on the right path. The Air Force
continues to be cautiously optimistic. It has received seven favorable
opinions with two more assertions currently under examination. The
Statement of Budgetary Resources has received clean opinions on the
Budget Authority covering $161 billion while the Existence and
Completeness of Mission Critical Assets has received favorable opinions
on a total of $97.4 billion. The Air Force is the first Service given a
clean opinion on its Fund Balance with Treasury reconciliation process.
This gives the Air Force the ability to validate its transactions
between the general accounting system and Treasury. The Air Force will
continue to assert assessable units until the entire SBR is audit
ready. If confirmed, I will make it a priority in my capacity as Chief
Management Officer to more closely review and monitor the Air Force
strategy.
Question. If not, what impediments may hinder the Air Force's
ability to achieve this goal and how would you address them?
Answer. Currently, a key impediment to the Air Force's ability to
achieve this goal is the lack of contract support to collect, document,
test, and audit the existing business processes. At this time, the
fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2017 Financial Improvement Audit
Readiness (FIAR) support contract is under protest. The Air Force is
carefully working to resolve the issue, but without contract support,
the progress level is greatly reduced. This risk has the potential to
increase due to the current fiscal environment
A second impediment is the lack of an integrated transaction-based
accounting system. The Air Force's reliance on legacy systems requires
additional compensating process controls. The Air Force will analyze
legacy systems and implement appropriate cost-effective changes while
they continue to pursue the Defense Enterprise Accounting and
Management System and the Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay
System. Further, the Air Force continues to collaborate within the
Department to share lessons learned, establish performance measures and
consolidate efforts where applicable.
Question. In your view, are the steps that the Air Force needs to
take to meet the 2014 goal consistent with the steps that DOD needs to
take to achieve full auditability by 2017?
Answer. Yes, the Air Force approach to audit readiness is
consistent with DOD. As an active member of the FIAR Governance, the
Air Force has the opportunity to collaborate on establishing the goals,
objectives and guidance to produce auditable financial statements for
the Department. The Air Force adheres to the same guidance published by
OUSD(C) which controls the standards for sampling, threshold, and scope
to be used during audit readiness efforts. The DOD Comptroller reviews
all assertion packages prior to submission for audit by an Independent
Public Accounting Firm or the DOD Inspector General. Upon favorable
examination, the Air Force will sustain those auditable processes to
support the overall DOD assertion for the principal financial
statements.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Air Force moves to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable
or unsustainable level of one-time fixes and manual work-arounds?
Answer. The Air Force has established a governance process to
oversee its audit readiness objectives, which is aligned to its
Investment Review process, to ensure Senior Leadership oversight across
the Air Force enterprise. This governance is aligned to OSD governance
to ensure Department-wide integration of efforts to achieve audit
objectives and avoid those stove-piped, unaffordable, and unsustainable
fixes. A key element of this governance will be to document and
standardize the business processes across the Air Force to ensure they
are traceable and auditable. In order to do this, the Air Force is
implementing a standard set of tools to validate, document, re-use, and
sustain the results from its audit readiness efforts, while also
ensuring auditability of its Information Technology systems.
Utilizing these standards and tools will allow Senior Leader
oversight on the corrective action plans being implemented across the
Air Force in collaboration with the Army, Navy, and Service providers
throughout the Federal Government. This holistic, enterprise-wide
approach will allow the Air Force to determine impacts of business
process changes, ensure alignment with the DOD Business Enterprise
Architecture, and inform its IT investment decisions. Finally, the Air
Force strategy will provide a mechanism to encourage culture change,
which is necessary for future continuous process improvement, the
results of which will also be documented and auditable.
If confirmed, I will continue to press forward on auditability
goals, but with an eye towards sustainability so as not to waste
valuable resources in this tight fiscal environment.
acquisition issues
Question. What are your views regarding the need to reform the
process by which the Department of the Air Force acquires major weapons
systems?
Answer. Continuing to improve the acquisition process for major
weapons systems is a critical issue for the Air Force, as well as for
DOD. My initial impression is that the Air Force has taken focused
actions to reform its acquisition processes and is continuing to work
to make further improvements in response to the Weapons System
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. In addition, I understand that the Air
Force is working on Mr. Kendall's ``Better Buying Power 2.0''
initiatives in the pursuit of greater efficiency and productivity. If
confirmed, I would expect to learn more about the challenges facing Air
Force acquisition and to help the leadership team take further steps to
deliver better value to the taxpayer and warfighter by improving the
way the Air Force does business.
Question. What steps would you recommend to improve that process?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the acquisition improvements
begun by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff and work
with OSD on their acquisition improvement initiatives. Specifically, I
would recommend the Air Force work with OSD on program affordability,
cost control throughout the program lifecycle, and improving the
acquisition workforce across the Air Force.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the
major defense acquisition programs of the Department of the Air Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of the Air Force
in his goal of recapturing acquisition excellence. I understand his
initiatives include providing full spectrum acquisition capabilities to
the Air Force and the Department of Defense, and ingraining a culture
of process improvement within acquisition. I would look forward to
helping the Secretary to achieve his acquisition goals in whatever
capacity he believes I am best suited to serve.
Question. Roughly half of the Department of Defense's largest
acquisition programs have exceeded the so-called ``Nunn-McCurdy'' cost
growth standards established in section 2433 of title 10, U.S.C. One
such program is the Air Force's Joint Strike Fighter program, for which
total life-cycle cost has now been estimated to exceed $1 trillion.
If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to address the
out-of-control cost growth on the Department of the Air Force's major
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I am in support of the principles that motivated the
Weapons Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. I think that law lays out both
the drivers of program challenges and the need to take very seriously
any critical breaches of Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. As such and if
confirmed, my analysis of the Air Force's acquisition programs would
focus on the assumptions used in establishing program baselines. Such
baselines must be based on realistic schedule and technical assumptions
and accurate cost estimates. If confirmed, I will place an emphasis on
realistic budgeting based on improved program cost estimates.
Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to
recommend terminating a program that has experienced ``critical'' cost
growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
Answer. The direction provided by Nunn-McCurdy and by the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 is essential in determining
whether to terminate or continue a program that has experienced a
critical cost growth. I agree with the new law that, when such breaches
occur, we must understand what the root cause of that breach is. I
further agree with the presumption for termination that must guide
one's analysis and also the requirement that, if a program is
restructured, it should be required to receive new milestone approval
before proceeding. While there are programs that will be essential to
national security, I believe the Department must undertake hard
analysis in looking at the alternatives in such a case.
Question. Many experts have acknowledged that the Department of
Defense may have gone too far in reducing its acquisition workforce,
resulting in undermining its ability to provide needed oversight in the
acquisition process.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. The answer in the past would have been yes, but my
understanding is that the Air Force has alleviated a lot of these
issues through its acquisition improvement initiatives since fiscal
year 2008.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the
Air Force should take to address this problem?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look for ways to continue
strengthening the Air Force's acquisition workforce.
Question. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)
was intended to ensure that future weapon systems move forward on a
sound footing by addressing unrealistic program cost and schedule
estimates, the absence of clearly defined and stable requirements, the
inclusion of immature technologies that unnecessarily raise program
costs and delay development and production, and the failure to solidify
design and manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in the
development process.
Do you support the approach taken by WSARA?
Answer. I fully support the approach taken by WSARA and all efforts
to improve acquisition in the Air Force.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the
Department of the Air Force should take to address these problems?
Answer. I believe the Air Force should continue the effort to
improve and maintain the acquisition workforce expertise. Specifically,
I recommend enhanced acquisition training and increasing the
availability of highly qualified course instructors in such functional
areas as cost estimating that would strengthen the Air Force's program
management business negotiation and oversight role.
Question. By some estimates, the Department of Defense now spends
more money every year for the acquisition of services than it does for
the acquisition of products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the
Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing
the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of
products.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to
improve the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of
services?
Answer. The Air Force must continue its focus on improving services
acquisition. Leaders throughout the Air Force must be aware of their
role in properly assigning personnel to the acquisition teams,
resourcing the programs, ensuring personnel receive the necessary
service acquisition training, and growing experts in acquiring
services. Specifically, the Air Force Senior Manager for Services has
partnered with Air Force Major Commands to identify senior level
Services advocates to ensure consistency with approved processes and
that DOD and Air Force policy is being followed.
Question. Do you think the Air Force should develop processes and
systems to provide managers with access to information needed to
conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an
ongoing basis?
Answer. Yes. It is critical that decisionmakers have access to key
metrics throughout the life of contracted services. The Air Force is
currently developing a senior leader dashboard to provide near real
time visibility on program execution and ensure transparency of
contracted services.
air force policies regarding drug and alcohol abuse
Question. What is your understanding of the Air Force's policy with
respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of Air
Force personnel who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do
you agree with this policy?
Answer. The Air Force does not have any policy per se on
disciplinary actions with respect to particular criminal offenses.
However, I know each drug case is investigated by law enforcement
personnel and the report of investigation is provided to the airman's
commander to review the evidence for appropriate disposition. Each case
is evaluated on its merits, including the type of illegal drug used,
the facts and circumstances of the use or uses, the military record of
the airman, and the strength of the evidence.
The Air Force has a policy on administrative separation for illegal
drug use found in its administrative separation instruction. It states
that drug abuse is incompatible with military service and airmen who
abuse drugs one or more times are subject to administrative separation
for misconduct. In fact, administrative separation processing is
mandatory for drug abuse unless a waiver is granted. This seems to be
an appropriately fair policy to me.
Question. What is your understanding of the Air Force's policy with
respect to rehabilitation and retention on Active Duty of members of
the Air Force who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or
abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
Answer. Only in very limited circumstances does the Air Force
retain airmen determined to have used illegal drugs, including illegal
use of prescription drugs. In order to be retained, airmen have the
burden of proving that retention is warranted by meeting a number of
criteria, to include if such drug use was a departure from the airman's
usual behavior and is not likely to recur, does not involve recurring
incidents, and does not involve distribution. The Air Force does
provide some limited protection for airmen who self-identify their drug
use for the purpose of seeking treatment in that they may avoid
criminal prosecution, but will still face administrative separation.
This seems to be an appropriately fair policy to me.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force has devoted sufficient
resources for implementation of its rehabilitation policies and
objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways have resources been
insufficient?
Answer. Yes. The Air Force maintains a comprehensive and dynamic
drug detection and response program that includes rehabilitation as a
key element. There are trained alcohol and drug counselors and medical
providers at each installation to provide evaluation and outpatient
treatment services. For airmen needing more intensive inpatient
treatment, medical teams arrange for these services through TRICARE
with local community medical centers.
religious guidelines
Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed
that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
self-radicalization'' and recommended that the policy be updated.
What is your understanding of current policies and programs of the
Air Force regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. The Air Force Chaplain Corps provides spiritual care and
the opportunity for airmen, their families, and other authorized
personnel to exercise their constitutional right to the free exercise
of religion. Every effort is made to ensure this right is protected.
Consistent with the Air Force Fort Hood Follow-On Review
recommendations, the Air Force is reviewing and updating policies and
guidance consolidation into a single series of instructions. This
should ensure that leaders consult chaplains and legal counsel before
making decisions, to better address prevention, identification, and
response to religious-based disrespect, harassment, and discrimination
in relevant training of airmen (e.g., equal opportunity training, free
exercise of religion training, wingman training, and commander
courses).
Question. What is your view of the need to clarify the policy
regarding religious accommodation in the Air Force?
Answer. The Air Force continues to ensure clarity to commanders by
providing clear policy on religious accommodation, which maintains
consistency with DOD policy. Air Force policy directs that requests to
commanders for religious accommodation are welcomed and dealt with
fairly and consistently throughout the Air Force. While requests vary
in need and accommodation, all requests should be approved unless
approval would have a real (not hypothetical) adverse impact on
military readiness, unit cohesion, standards or discipline and,
therefore, disapproval of the accommodation request is in furtherance
of a compelling military or government interest. Commanders are to
consult with their installation chaplain and staff judge advocate on
requests for religious accommodation. However, consistent with the Air
Force Fort Hood Follow On Review recommendations, the Air Force is
presently reviewing and updating policy and guidance to address
prevention, identification and response to religious-based disrespect,
harassment and discrimination.
Question. Do Air Force policies regarding religious practices in
the military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that
require adherents to wear items of religious apparel or adhere to
certain grooming practices related to their faith?
Answer. The Air Force has a clear process to ensure every request
for religious accommodation is welcomed and dealt with as fairly and
consistently. Requests for accommodation should be approved, unless
approval would have a real (not hypothetical) adverse impact on
military readiness, unit cohesion, standards or discipline, and
therefore, disapproval of the accommodation request is in furtherance
of a compelling military and/or government interest. Concerning the
wearing of religious garments or other articles, requests for
accommodation involving items such as the outdoor wear of religious
head coverings that are not concealed under military headgear and those
impacting grooming and personal appearance (e.g., hair length and
style, tattoos, and ``body art'') must be approved by the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Manpower, Personnel, and Services.
Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who
have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes, the policies are intended to protect both the free
exercise of religion for all airmen and avoid the appearance of an
official endorsement of any particular religion. Air Force policy
presently communicates that all airmen have the freedom to choose to
practice their particular religion or subscribe to no religious belief
at all. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the implementation of this
policy.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. From what I have been told so far, I believe that Air Force
Chaplains are well trained to provide prayers offered in pluralistic
settings. This requires sensitivity to their audience which includes
individuals from various religious traditions as well as those who
profess no religious belief at all. The guidance provided by Air Force
leaders also makes clear that supervisors respect each chaplains' right
to adhere to the tenets of his or her faith and thus not require
chaplains to participate in religious activities, including public
prayer, which are inconsistent with their faith tradition. If
confirmed, I will look into this in greater detail.
Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Air
Force Academy to ensure religious tolerance and respect?
Answer. Air Force leadership clearly takes very seriously the idea
of religious tolerance and respect. The team effort to improve the
religious atmosphere at the Academy continues to reduce cases of
intolerance and inappropriate behavior. Since beginning their Cadet
Religious Respect Training Program, 7,782 cadets have been trained to
respect the beliefs or non-beliefs of others. In addition, the Dean of
Faculty trained 910 staff members to ensure the academic environment is
free of negative religious expressions. Further, the Athletic
Department's Religious Respect Program trained 300 coaches and staff to
ensure the athletic department adheres to the guidance. Finally, the
Cadet Interfaith Council continues to positively impact relationships
between various faith groups and cooperates in various service projects
to improve the community. If confirmed, I will monitor this closely to
ensure that the training put in place is yielding the desired outcomes.
air force science and technology
Question. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding
the importance of innovative defense science and technology in meeting
Air Force missions?
Answer. The innovative technology produced by the Air Force Science
and Technology (S&T) Program balances high-risk with high-return
science and knowledge. If confirmed, the direction I provide would
focus on supporting the Air Force capabilities fundamental to deterring
and defeating aggression, projecting power in anti-access and area
denial environments, operation in space and cyberspace domains, and
maintaining a safe, secure and effective strategic deterrent.
Question. Do you believe the current balance between short- and
long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force
needs?
Answer. From what I can tell at this point, yes. The success of the
Air Force will depend on continued innovation and technical excellence.
The Air Force S&T Program invests across a broad portfolio to attain a
balance between near-term, quick-reaction capability support; mid-term
technology development to modernize the force; and revolutionary
technologies that address far-term warfighting needs.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring
research priorities that will meet the needs of the Air Force over the
next 10 years?
Answer. As outlined in the Defense Strategic guidance, the future
strategic environment will require an agile and flexible military.
Therefore, it is important that the Air Force S&T Program continue to
invest in a broad portfolio of research to anticipate future needs. If
confirmed, in my role as the senior energy and sustainability official,
I will also take special interest in the Air Force's continued
investment in the development and demonstration of advanced
technologies that address affordability and lifecycle costs of future
systems.
Question. In the face of rising acquisition costs for programs such
as the Joint Strike Fighter, and programs to support space operations,
if confirmed, how would you plan to ensure the protection of funding
for long-term science and technology investments?
Answer. I take the issue of rising acquisition costs very
seriously. Protecting the funding for the Air Force S&T Program is very
important as it is a key element in making mature technologies
available for transition into development programs. The S&T Program
allows the Air Force to sustain its heritage of technological
superiority.
air force laboratories
Question. What role should Air Force laboratories play in
supporting current operations and in developing new capabilities to
support Air Force missions?
Answer. It is my view that the Air Force S&T program--including the
labs--should continue to develop and transition innovative and relevant
technologies; build and nurture a technically skilled, highly educated
and adaptive workforce able to provide effective solutions for today's
issues; and conduct innovative research to maintain our technological
edge over potential adversaries.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that Air Force
laboratories have the highest quality workforce, laboratory
infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to
support deployed warfighters and develop next generation capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will spend time educating myself on the
details of the Air Force's current initiatives in this area. Ensuring
the Air Force continues to have war-winning technology requires the
proactive management of its current Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Mathematics (STEM) workforce and a deliberate effort to grow the
laboratory scientists and engineers of the future. Those researchers
need state-of-the-art laboratory facilities to best support deployed
warfighters with ready-to-use technologies and develop next generation
capabilities. I will rely on and support the senior leadership of the
acquisition community to assess and invest in infrastructure, including
workforce, research facilities and funds necessary to support the
future technology needs of the Air Force.
Question. Do you support the full utilization of authorities
established by Congress under the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration
program?
Answer. Retaining the current world-class, highly-skilled workforce
is an important part of the Air Force's Bright Horizons STEM workforce
strategic roadmap. I understand that the Lab Demo program has done much
to ensure the Air Force Research Laboratory's ability to attract and
retain personnel since its inception in 1997. This flexible system has
helped to achieve the best workforce for the mission, adjust the
workforce for change and improve overall quality. If confirmed, I will
work with the laboratory leadership to monitor the Lab Demo program to
ensure it remains effective for its primary purpose and propose changes
to the program as they become required.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force's laboratories and
engineering centers should have a separate, dynamic personnel system,
uniquely tailored to support laboratory directors' requirements to
attract and retain the highest quality scientific and engineering
talent?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to carefully examining the Air
Force's experience with the Lab Demo program and working with
laboratory director's to determine future needs and authorities for the
program.
Question. How will you assess the quality of Air Force laboratory
infrastructure and the adequacy of investments being made in new
military construction and sustainment of that infrastructure?
Answer. I am aware that the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) effort successfully completed in September 2011 provided several
new, state-of-the-art facilities within the Air Force Research
Laboratory. The Laboratory's BRAC realignments successfully realized
the Secretary of the Air Force's priorities for BRAC 2005, including
the goals of realigning Air Force infrastructure with the future
defense strategy, maximizing operational capability by eliminating
excess physical capacity, and capitalizing on opportunities for joint
activity. If confirmed, I will work closely with the leadership of the
acquisition community to ensure that we remain vigilant and upgrade our
S&T infrastructure in a timely manner so that major research and
programs are not put at risk due to aging facilities.
Question. Are you concerned about the current or future supply of
experts in defense critical disciplines, particularly personnel with
appropriate security clearances, to hold positions in defense
laboratories?
Answer. Yes, I am always concerned about maintaining a solid
representation of Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM)
professionals in the critical defense disciplines our laboratories and
acquisition enterprise require. As I understand it, in the last 5
years, the Air Force has been able to meet its needs by accessing more
than 3,100 engineers, physical and analytical scientists.
Congressionally-authorized personnel and hiring authorities have helped
improve the Air Force's compensation and hiring abilities.
air force test and evaluation capabilities
Question. Over the past few years, the Air Force has proposed
taking measures to significantly reduce its test and evaluation
capabilities--both infrastructure and workforce. These efforts have, in
general, been overturned by the Department of Defense and Congress.
Do you believe that the Air Force has test and evaluation
capabilities that are excess to Department of Defense needs?
Answer. The Air Force strives to ensure it uses and organizes its
test and evaluation (T&E) capabilities as efficiently as possible to
meet Air Force and DOD needs within a fiscally constrained budget. If
confirmed, I will work to continue balancing Air Force T&E
capabilities, Air Force and DOD needs, the available budget, and our
National interest to propose feasible and prudent adjustments.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Air Force has
the appropriate testing infrastructure and qualified test workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work cooperatively with the SecAF,
DOD, and industry to help shape the future of our Nation's
infrastructure and workforce. I will look at the T&E infrastructure and
workforce requirements to identify potential efficiencies; support
workforce shaping, training, and retention programs; and focus the test
infrastructure to support the current and future needs of the DOD
acquisition community and broader national interests.
air force information technology programs
Question. What major improvements would you like to see made in the
Air Force's development and deployment of major information technology
systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will further explore how information
technology systems are delivered to our airmen. Specifically, I will
review the Air Force's current information technology and acquisition
governance structures and processes and look for opportunities to
further strengthen oversight and instill rigor and discipline in the
planning, development, and deployment of major information technology
systems. This is particularly important when the business case supports
pursuing an enterprise solution.
Question. How will you encourage process and cultural change in
organizations so that they maximize the benefits that new enterprise
information technology systems can offer in terms of cost savings and
efficiency?
Answer. If confirmed, I will delve deeper into this area in order
to fully understand and appreciate previous and ongoing Air Force
efficiency efforts and how technology was used to drive down costs. I
will also ensure that there is a solid and rigorous governance
structure in place to ensure the necessary business process
reengineering takes place to realize the benefit of enterprise systems,
when the business case makes clear the value. Savings are not realized
when individual components are able to bend the technology to fit their
processes, rather than change processes to meet the enterprise
solution.
Question. What is the relationship between Air Force efforts to
implement enterprise information technology programs and supporting
computing services and infrastructure to support Air Force missions, to
the efforts being undertaken by the Defense Information Systems Agency
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration?
Answer. All of the Military Departments, led by the Joint Staff and
the DOD Chief Information Office, and in close partnership with the
Defense Information Systems Agency, are in close collaboration and
planning for the implementation of the Joint Information Environment.
This partnership allows the Air Force to synchronize ongoing
consolidation and enterprise service efforts and transition to the
Department's enterprise solutions. If confirmed, I will continue to
forge this relationship and find opportunities to leverage Air Force
investments to better posture the Department to employ the full range
of operational capability and capacity to the Joint warfighter. I will
also look for opportunities from Department investments that the Air
Force can leverage to meet its mission needs.
investment in infrastructure
Question. In recent years, various witnesses appearing before the
Committee have testified that the Military Services under-invest in
their facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of
under-investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs
of facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working
conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies
that could increase productivity.
What is your assessment of Air Force infrastructure investment?
Answer. The Air Force, like all Services, is having to make
difficult investment trade-offs as budgets decrease. If confirmed, I
will review the current and future requirements for infrastructure, to
ensure that the Air Force can support its mission requirements and the
Secretary of the Air Force's priorities.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
increase resources to reduce the backlog and to improve Air Force
facilities?
Answer. If a thorough review of infrastructure investment indicates
the Air Force is taking too much risk, then, if confirmed, I will work
closely with Air Force leadership to make appropriate fiscal
adjustments to reduce the backlog and improve facilities.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. The Air Force is investigating numerous allegations of
sexual misconduct by Military Training Instructors at Basic Military
Training at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland. Several instructors have
already been convicted of various offenses and others are pending trial
by court-martial. The Air Force addressed similar allegations of sexual
misconduct at the Air Force Academy nearly a decade ago. Allegations of
sexual misconduct are not unique to the Air Force and numerous cases of
sexual misconduct involving servicemembers in theater have been
reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates
contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their
own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment.
Secretary Panetta has recently implemented several new initiatives
aimed at curbing sexual assaults in the military and improving victim
support.
What is your assessment of the Air Force's implementation of the
Secretary's new policies, including his decision to withhold initial
disposition authority over certain offenses to the general court-
martial convening authority?
Answer. I support the Secretary of Defense's leadership and his
decision. Withholding the initial disposition authority at the Special
Court Martial Convening authority level reassures airmen that we are
taking the issue of sexual assault very seriously.
Question. What is your understanding of the resources and programs
the Air Force has in place to provide victims of sexual assaults the
medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
Answer. From initial briefings, it appears to me that the Air Force
Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) have the appropriate resources to
offer support to sexual assault victims. Additionally, Air Force
forward deployed mental health assets are available to provide
necessary consultation, assessment, intervention, and referral for
mental health issues, to include support in cases of sexual assault.
The Air Force has also forward deployed judge advocates to provide
complete legal support to the Air Force and Joint missions. Legal
services available to victims at their home station are equally fully
available to victims in deployed locations, to include legal
assistance, defense services, victim witness assistance, or other legal
needs.
This is an issue I take very seriously, and if confirmed I would
make it priority to ensure that adequate resources and programs are
available to victims of sexual assault.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Air Force has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults? In your view, are these steps
adequate?
Answer. I believe Air Force leadership has made a clear priority of
the prevention of sexual assaults and are taking the necessary steps to
do so. The Secretary, Chief of Staff and the Chief Master Sergeant of
the Air Force recently issued a tri-signature memorandum addressed to
every airman that highlighted zero tolerance of sexual assault, the
importance of bystander intervention and responsibility for victim
care. The Chief of Staff also recently convened a wing commander's call
to discuss this topic and directed commanders to conduct a health and
welfare inspection of workplaces to ensure a culture of dignity, trust
and respect is fostered. If confirmed, it would be a priority of mine
to support these steps.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Air Force has in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. I believe the Air Force has taken significant and effective
steps to increase training and provide resources for investigating and
responding to allegations of sexual assault. Air Force installation
level Sexual Assault Response and Prevention Coordinators (SARCs) and
Victim Advocates (VAs) receive extensive initial training before
assuming their positions. Additionally, both SARCs and VAs receive
annual refresher training.
All Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) special
agents receive extensive training in the handling of violent crime
investigations, including specific handling of sexual assault
investigations. In 2009, the Air Force funded 24 additional civilian
special agents to focus on sexual offenses at locations with the
highest incidence of sexual assault. AFOSI also recently developed a 2-
week advanced training course, dedicated exclusively to sexual assault
investigations.
The Judge Advocate General is fully committed to aggressively
addressing allegations of sexual assault and ensuring that commanders,
victims, and accused airmen are appropriately advised on the legal
issues. The Air Force is committed to training prosecutors and defense
counsel to the highest standards. Base staff judge advocates work
closely with the AFOSI special agents to ensure comprehensive
investigations. Through the Senior Trial Counsel (STC) program, 16
highly trained and experienced trial counsel assist base legal offices
in all aspects of evaluating and preparing sexual assault cases and are
detailed to represent the United States as the prosecutor in these
cases. Seven of these STCs are dedicated to specializing in prosecution
of sexual assault cases. Senior Defense Counsels provide assistance to
local defense counsel and representation of accused airmen at trial.
The Judge Advocate General believes that fully training and equipping
both the prosecution and defense in these cases offers the best hope of
optimal fact finding and professionalism in adjudicating sexual assault
cases.
Question. Do you consider the Air Force's current sexual assault
policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
to be effective?
Answer. Current Air Force policies and procedures, particularly
those on restricted reporting, are effective, available both at home
and in deployed locations, and do more than allow victims confidential
access to medical care. When coupled with the new victim to victim
advocate privilege, the policies address many of the concerns victims
have about coming forward and help protect the victims'
confidentiality. The policies preserve the possibility of future
prosecution by allowing victims to anonymously receive Sexual Assault
Forensic Examinations (SAFEs), which are held for 5 years. Victims may
convert their confidential restricted report at any time and
participate in the military justice process. Restricted reporting
allows for the preservation of evidence that would otherwise be
unavailable and the Air Force is able to offer victims care and
treatment that victims may have not accessed without this confidential
option.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of resources in the Air
Force to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and to hold
perpetrators accountable for their actions?
Answer. I believe we are well positioned to execute this
responsibility. The JAG Corps and AFOSI have developed a robust special
victims capability that focuses specifically on teaming to jointly
investigate and prosecute sexual assault offenses. For the 24 civilian
AFOSI agents and 7 senior trial counsels working these cases, this is
their primary mission. The Air Force developed training that JAGs will
be attending jointly with AFOSI in fiscal year 2013. These are the Sex
Crimes Investigation Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center and the Advanced Sexual Assault Litigation Course at
the Air Force JAG School. AFOSI and JAGs will attend both courses,
focusing respectively on the investigation and prosecution stages.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?
Answer. Sexual assault victims who seek medical care or SAFEs in
some States (i.e., California) cannot make a restricted report because
State laws mandate reporting to law enforcement by healthcare
providers. This limitation creates a ``have and have not'' reporting
situation amongst military victims. However, the Air Force provides the
same support and care for the victim whether they filed a restricted or
unrestricted report.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior
military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Air staff in
overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating
to sexual assault?
Answer. Senior military and civilian leaders at all levels,
beginning at the Secretariat and the Air Staff, must focus on promoting
an environment that prevents sexual assault. Eliminating this horrible
crime is absolutely critical. The Secretary of the Air Force directed a
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Executive Steering Group (ESG)
comprised of all the senior functional stakeholders to continually
assess the program and provide advice for improvements in policy and
procedures. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and these
leaders to maintain a very clear focus on this issue.
Question. Do you believe that sexual assault continues to be an
underreported crime within the Department for the Air Force?
Answer. Sexual assault is the most underreported violent crime in
both the military and in American society and so I believe that it
continues to be an underreported crime within the Air Force. The Air
Force survey commissioned by Gallup on sexual assault also confirmed
this view. The Air Force is focused on ways to increase reporting, from
enhanced training throughout an airman's career, to unrestricted and
restricted reporting options, to a wide range of medical, legal, and
functional military services available to airmen who report being a
victim of sexual assault.
Question. If so, what are the barriers that discourage or prevent
victims from coming forward?
Answer. Shame, fear, stigma, and concern for potential re-
victimization continue to be the primary reasons victims do not come
forward. To remove these barriers, victims must have confidence in the
system and in their leadership to do the right thing. Air Force senior
leaders, commanders and senior enlisted are personally involved and
their leadership is instrumental to removing these barriers and
ensuring victims receive the care and support they deserve. This effort
includes the opportunity to request expedited transfers for those
filing unrestricted reports, legal assistance for victims, the support
of a victim advocate and specially trained investigators who are not a
part of the chain of command.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to
remove barriers to reporting sexual assaults?
Answer. First, continued focus on eliminating sexual assaults.
Prevention efforts include training and establishing command climates
where sexual assaults are not tolerated. Thorough and timely
investigation of cases independent of the chain of command provides
reassurance to victims. Another important factor is holding
perpetrators accountable. Finally, victims who file unrestricted
reports are afforded the opportunity to request expedited transfers.
This program provides the victim with safety and security which helps
remove barriers to reporting.
In order to aid in lessening these barriers, we must continue
efforts to remove any perceived negative impact from coming forward
after an assault. Allowing members to seek help and open communication
with them is essential for leading the way in changing perceptions.
Members need to know they will be supported regardless, and that
service leadership is resolved to care for airmen.
Question. In response to the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and
Violence at the Military Service Academies for Academic Program Year
2011-2012, the Secretary of Defense wrote to the Service Secretaries
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness stating:
``Despite our considerable and ongoing efforts, this year's Annual
Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service
Academies demonstrates that we have a persistent problem. I am
concerned that we have not achieved greater progress in preventing
sexual assault and sexual harassment among academy cadets and
midshipmen. These crimes and abhorrent behavior are incompatible with
the core values we require of our Armed Forces' future officers. A
strong and immediate response is needed.''
What has the Air Force done to respond to the Secretary of
Defense's requirement for a strong and immediate response?
Answer. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff have
made this a priority and have stated that the Air Force succeeds
because of the professionalism and discipline of its airmen. Sexual
assault undermines that professionalism. Each cadet now receives over
12 hours of SAPR education training over the course of four years.
Innovative training, to include scenario based programs with subject
matter experts, is now a part of the USAFA SAPR curriculum.
Additionally, the USAFA is in the process of instituting new
initiatives. In April 2013, cadets will be leading the way in
developing and running the USAFA's sexual assault awareness month
(SAAM) activities and in the fall of 2013, the USAFA plans to institute
Cadet Bystander Intervention Training (BIT).
Additionally, in January, an integrated process team, to include
members of the USAFA staff, met with subject matter experts and Air
Force SAPR program managers to review SAPR training for all new
accessions. Based on the recommendations of this group, the Air Force
is capturing best practices while instituting standardized core
competencies and learning objectives as directed by the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
address the findings contained in this report?
Answer. As the Secretary of Defense states, there is no place in
the military for sexual assaults. If confirmed, I would focus on victim
care and support, to include legal assistance. Victims should be able
to trust their leadership to do the right thing. This includes focused
efforts on investigations and prosecutions. This, of course, is on top
of the training being implemented currently.
independence of the judge advocate general
Question. What are your views about the responsibility of The Judge
Advocate General (TJAG) of the Air Force to provide independent legal
advice to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force and to the
Air Staff, particularly in the areas of military justice and
operational law?
Answer. I believe it is critical for the Under Secretary to receive
independent legal opinions from his senior uniformed judge advocate.
Senior uniformed lawyers bring a wealth of experience and perspective
shaped by years of working with commanders in the field. TJAG's ability
to provide independent legal advice is statutorily guaranteed and
vitally important to Air Force senior leader decisionmaking. Generally,
I believe senior leaders are better informed to make the best decisions
when they are aware of both The Judge Advocate General's advice and the
advice of the Air Force General Counsel.
Question. What are your views about the responsibility of staff
judge advocates throughout the Air Force to provide independent legal
advice to military commanders in the field and throughout the Air
Force?
Answer. Staff Judge Advocates (SJAs) are essential to the proper
functioning of both operational and support missions. SJAs have a major
responsibility to promote the interests of a command by providing
relevant, timely, and independent advice to commanders, and this
independence is reflected in statute (title 10, U.S.C.,
Sec. 8037(f)(2)). Convening authorities are required by statute (title
10, U.S.C., Sec. 806) to communicate with their SJAs on issues related
to military justice matters, which is critical to disciplined mission
execution. In addition, commanders and other leaders rely on their
staff judge advocates for advice on all types of legal and policy
matters. SJAs offer legal advice independent of any particular agenda.
I believe it is very important for commanders to continue to receive
uniformed legal advice.
air force end strength reductions and transition assistance
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 established an Active Duty Air Force end strength of 329,460, a
reduction of 3,340 airmen from the fiscal year 2012 authorized level.
The Air Force has informed the committee that it will achieve this
reduction using only voluntary measures, and that transitioning airmen
will benefit from a ``considerably expanded'' Transition Assistance
Program (TAP).
Please describe the voluntary measures that will be used to manage
the Air Force's personnel reductions in fiscal year 2013, and whether
the Air Force envisions using involuntary measures in fiscal year 2014
and beyond.
Answer. The Air Force active component authorized end strength in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 is 329,460,
requiring the Air Force to reduce 3,340 airmen from the fiscal year
2012 authorized end strength of 332,800. Should sequestration go into
effect and continue beyond 2013, the Air Force corporate process would
evaluate and prioritize resources to maintain a balance between people,
equipment and available funding. Continued budgetary shortfalls could
lead to out-year funding cuts that might drive internal Air Force
decisions to decrease force structure, which would undoubtedly lead to
further end strength reductions.
The reduction in end strength in fiscal year 2013 alone will
require the Air Force to take continued force management actions to
reduce the number of airmen serving the Nation while ensuring they
maintain a high quality force. To do so, they will continue a multi-
year force management strategy of leveraging voluntary programs first,
offering incentive programs where needed, and executing involuntary
actions only if required. They currently have the full range of
legislative authorities necessary to execute a force management program
to meet congressionally mandated end strength.
In fiscal year 2013 enlisted airmen in non-critical overage Air
Force Specialty Codes will be offered time-in-grade, Active Duty
service commitment, and enlistment contract waivers. They will also
continue the expanded Palace Chase program. The Air Force also
implemented the Temporary Early Retirement Authority for a second year,
Date of Separation Rollbacks, reduced accessions, initial skills
training separations and Career Job Reservation constraints.
For officers, the Air Force expects no involuntary separations for
fiscal year 2013 other than a limited number of initial skills training
separations for officers. Voluntary programs will include time-in-
grade, Active Duty service commitment, and 10 versus 8 years of
commissioned service waivers for certain year groups and overage career
fields. They will also continue the Palace Chase program for eligible
lieutenant colonels and below. Additionally, they will be offering the
Temporary Early Retirement Authority program and the Voluntary
Retirement Incentive program to the officer force in fiscal year 2013.
For fiscal year 2014, the Air Force expects similar force
management programs, but may include involuntary Selective Early
Retirement Boards. However, given the current set of fiscal challenges
and the uncertainty sequestration presents, I would continue to assess
the need to pursue additional voluntary and involuntary force
management authority actions to meet reassessed authorized end strength
levels in fiscal year 2014 and beyond as approved by Congress and the
Secretary of the Air Force.
Question. Please describe the new TAP program and how it will help
airmen transition back into civilian society during this period of
unstable economic conditions.
Answer. The Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs and Labor
launched a redesigned Transition Assistance Program (TAP) effective 21
November 2012 to better prepare airmen for the transition to civilian
life. The redesigned TAP is focused on reducing veteran unemployment
levels which are 2 percent higher than the rest of the population and
aims to bolster and standardize the transition support that airmen
across the Armed Forces receive prior to separating or retiring from
the Air Force in order to make them as employment ready as possible.
The Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) Act of 2011 and the Veterans
Employment Initiative (VEI) drove the new legislated TAP requirements
to expand training and employment services for Active and Reserve
component members who transition from the Air Force.
DOD and its agency partners work closely with approximately 85 Air
Force Installations (to include 2 Guard and 1 Reserve training hub), to
coordinate delivery of transition services included in the redesigned
TAP.
TAP has been redesigned as a comprehensive, mandatory program that
includes pre-separation counseling, a military to civilian skills
review, VA benefits briefings, financial planning support, job search
skills building, and an individual transition plan (ITP) preparation
which will aid in a successful transition into a ``career ready''
civilian. The program will be renamed ``Transition GPS (Goals, Plans,
Success)''.
The new program features a 5-day workshop with further ``optional''
training tracks (Higher Education, Technical Training, and
Entrepreneurship taught by the Small Business Admin) in addition to
extensive one-on-one counseling.
The ``target population'' of airmen who may need a higher level of
support during their transition process has been defined as: (1) young
airmen (18-24 years old); (2) those completing their first term of
enlistment; (3) members involuntarily separated due to force reshaping;
and (4) those separating rapidly.
Eligible Reserve component airmen are also mandated to actively
participate in the redesigned Transition Assistance Program.
Eligibility includes all members of the Guard and Reserve who are
separating after serving more than 180 days of continuous Active Duty.
Spouses are encouraged to participate with the airman in all facets
of the redesigned program.
The Air Force is aggressively rolling out the redesigned TAP
program to assist transitioning airmen with becoming as competitive as
possible in civilian society during this period of unstable economic
conditions.
personnel and entitlement costs
Question. Military personnel costs, including health care,
compensation, and retirement continue to soar and are becoming an ever
increasing portion of the DOD and Air Force budgets.
What actions do you believe can be taken to control the rise in
personnel costs and entitlement spending?
Answer. Military compensation is, and must remain, competitive to
sustain the recruitment and retention of high caliber men and women to
meet readiness requirements and accomplish our national security
mission. If confirmed, I will remain committed to this goal. However,
in light of the current economic crisis and overall reductions in
defense spending, we must look at balancing personnel costs to avoid
reductions to force structure and modernization efforts critical to the
support of the warfighter and the defense of our Nation. I look at
management of force structure as being a key element in controlling
personnel costs. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Air Force
continues to make difficult, but fiscally responsible decisions to
implement force management programs that allow us to remain at
authorized end strength levels. Additionally, I will pursue legislative
and policy changes needed to ensure that the Air Force is able to
operate as a total force with the most effective use of resources.
Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force's use of
military bonuses in both the Active and Reserve components?
Answer. The bonus programs are among the most flexible and
responsive force management tools to retain airmen in critical fields
with high ops demand and low manning such as special operations,
explosive ordnance, aircrew, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, RPA pilots and health professions. Although overall
retention remains high, bonuses are necessary to target these critical
skills for current health and as an investment in emerging missions. If
confirmed, I would work to ensure that we are using bonuses only where
necessary to maintain the proper force structure and skill sets.
Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force's use of
aviation career incentive pay or assignment incentive pay for unmanned
aerial systems operators, both those who are rated pilots and those who
are not?
Answer. Aviation career incentive pays are an important
compensation tool used to motivate and retain aviators operating manned
and remotely piloted aircraft. As the demand for remotely piloted
aircraft continues to grow, we will continue to rely on monthly
incentive pays to attract officers and enlisted personnel who not only
possess a unique skill set, but who work under challenging conditions
to provide the Nation with an unparalleled combat capability. If
confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to periodically review the
efficacy of all aviation pays and bonuses to ensure we are fiscally
responsible.
sequestration
Question. What would be the impact on the Air Force if
sequestration were to take effect on March 1, 2013, as currently
required by law?
Answer. The Air Force would not be able to eliminate the adverse
impacts of sequestration to readiness or modernization or even
substantially mitigate them. If triggered, the Air Force would ramp
down spending while protecting wartime and readiness accounts for as
long as possible. Additional programs would need to be restructured,
reduced and/or terminated. The effects of sequestration would cause
great harm to national security, both by the size of the reductions and
the across-the-board nature of the implementation of those reductions.
If triggered, the Air Force will also begin the deliberate programming
process of prioritizing programs ensuring we continue to strive to meet
the DOD Strategic Guidance.
Question. What would be the specific impact on Air Force civilian
and military personnel; on family programs; on morale, welfare and
recreation programs; and on the delivery of health care to airmen,
their families, and retirees?
Answer. The Military Personnel Appropriation has been exempted from
sequestration. Any civilian personnel actions taken would be based on
specific guidance from OSD.
suicide prevention
Question. The number of suicides in the total Air Force continues
to be of concern to the Committee.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide
prevention programs and policies for the Air Force, the Air National
Guard, and the Air Force Reserve, to prevent suicides and increase the
resiliency of airmen and their families?
Answer. Engaged leaders and communities are the key to suicide
prevention. Although lower than comparable civilian rates, the Air
Force's total force suicide rate has seen a slow but very concerning
rise in the last several years. It is now at just under 16 per hundred
thousand per year, and I am greatly concerned that we still lose about
50 active duty airmen per year from suicide. Fortunately the Air Force
has an effective program in place--one that is continually improving,
targeting career fields at higher risk. The Air Force Suicide
Prevention Program is a community-based approach that fosters a Wingman
culture organized under commander-led committees of installation
helping agencies. The program is composed of 11 elements of community
and command involvement. Research shows that the Air Force suicide rate
is lower when these 11 elements are fully engaged. This year, the Air
Force is improving the annual self-assessment of those elements.
The Air National Guard and Reserve Command airmen's suicide rates
have been similar to those of active duty Air Force. Although not all
Reserve component airmen are in contact with their units as regularly
as those on Active Duty, their leaders have, and will continue to be
fully engaged in their lives--there for them and their families when
they are in crisis. Like the Active Duty units, the Air National Guard
and Reserve Command both utilize these elements of the prevention
program. In concert with supervisors, chaplains, and community
resources, wing and regional directors of psychological health work to
get these airmen the help they need in crisis.
family support
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for Air Force personnel and their families, and, if confirmed,
how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced?
Answer. I understand that a primary concern for airmen and their
family members is their ability to do the mission and simultaneously
support their families. Specific areas of concern include access to
quality specialized child care and education. Also, for those
transitioning to the civilian sector, military members are concerned
about being prepared for employment and/or continuing their education.
Families are concerned about the civilian spouse finding employment as
they relocate from installation to installation.
I am aware there are DOD and Air Force programs that address these
issues, such as the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), which has been
recently enhanced by the Veteran Opportunity to Work Act of 2011. If
confirmed, I will ensure a thorough review of all available resources
to support valuable family programs.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. I understand the Airman and Family Readiness Centers serve
as a resource hub for Air Force families prior--to, during, and
following deployments. The deployment programs the Airman and Family
Readiness Center have in place for the airmen and family members are
crucial in supporting the mission. DOD has funded valuable resources in
Military Family Life Consultants that work in Air Force Family Support
Programs to deal with family and life issues, child behavioral issues
and school transition issues. I will ensure the Air Force programs are
adequately supported with this valuable resource.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve
component families related to mobilization, deployment and family
readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a
military installation?
The Air Force is a total force, and provides resources and support
to all components through various Airman and Family and Child and Youth
programs. These support programs are sustained through continued
collaboration with the State Joint Base Board and other services.
Geographically separated servicemembers (and their families) have
immediate access to many resources online that enable them to remain
connected to their units and support services.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
enhance family support?
Answer. I will review current manpower and staffing for family
programs. In keeping with current White House directives, I will
support programs that enhance mission readiness.
I would like to see sufficient staffing and training for family
readiness staff as we partner with community organizations to continue
building support for airmen and their families.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
including Active Duty and Reserve personnel members and families
assigned overseas, and personnel deployed in support of military
training and operations.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Air Force MWR
programs, and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to
achieve?
Answer. MWR programs exist to provide Quality of Life (QOL)
programs and services to airmen and their family members. There is a
recognized correlation between QOL, readiness, and resilience,
particularly in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
A top priority for the Air Force is to develop and care for airmen.
I don't foresee any change to that focus. The Air Force's MWR programs
are currently undergoing an enterprise-wide transformation to right-
size and ensure their currency and relevancy for airmen and their
families.
Without a doubt, MWR programs and services for military members and
their families are critical to Air Force readiness and mission
capability. As the Air Force advances MWR transformation, I will
advocate for the Air Force to seek partnership opportunities with local
communities to help ensure they provide the best support possible for
the Air Force while embracing efficiencies and innovative ways of doing
business.
If confirmed, I will fully support the ongoing MWR transformation
efforts to be a model of innovation, efficiency, and resource
stewardship, geared toward meeting the needs of airmen and families now
and in the future.
balance between civilian employees and contractor employees
Question. In recent years, the Air Force and the Department of
Defense have become increasingly reliant on services provided by
contractors. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same
offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many
of the same functions as Federal employees.
Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees
and contractor employees is in the best interests of the Air Force and
the Department of Defense?
Answer. I believe we must continue to ensure that inherently
governmental functions are not outsourced and scrutinize those areas
where the distinction is blurred, and could result in the potential for
wasteful spending. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the
Air Force and leaders across the Air Force to assess this matter to
ensure compliance with the law and with the President's policy. I
believe there is a great deal to do in this area, and will bring
lessons learned from the Department of the Navy, where we have made a
substantial and successful effort to better shape the balance between
the civilian and contractor workforce.
Question. In your view, has the Air Force become too reliant on
contractors to perform its basic functions?
Answer. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and title 10,
U.S.C., section 129, restrict the use of personal services contracts. I
believe these regulations best serve the interests of the Air Force. If
confirmed, I would continue to work with the Secretary of the Air Force
and leaders across the Air Force to ensure compliance with applicable
law and policy.
I agree with the view expressed in President Obama's March 4, 2009
memorandum on government contracting, that states excessive reliance by
executive agencies on sole-source contracts create a risk where
taxpayer funds could be inefficiently spent and otherwise not service
the needs of the Federal Government. I would work with the Secretary of
the Air Force and leaders across the Air Force to assess this matter to
ensure compliance with the law and with the President's policy. I
believe there is a great deal to do in this area, and will bring
lessons learned from the Department of the Navy, where we have made a
substantial and successful effort to better shape the balance between
the civilian and contractor workforce.
Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
services contracts is in the best interest of the Air Force?
Answer. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and title 10,
U.S.C., section 129, restricts the use of personal services contracts.
I believe these regulations best serve the interests of the Air Force.
If confirmed, I would continue to work with the Secretary of the Air
Force and leaders across the Air Force to ensure compliance with
applicable law and policy. I believe there is a great deal to do in
this area, and will bring lessons learned from the Department of the
Navy, where we have made a substantial and successful effort to better
shape the balance between the civilian and contractor workforce.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force and the Department of
Defense should undertake a comprehensive reappraisal of ``inherently
governmental functions'' and other critical government functions, and
how they are performed?
Answer. The Department's ``sourcing'' of functions and work between
military and civilians, or through contracted services, must be
consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness
and management needs, as well as applicable laws and statutes.
Consistent with existing statutory requirements (such as FAIR Act and
title 10, U.S.C., section 2330a), and the total force mix of military,
civilian, and contracted support, I believe the Air Force should pursue
a mitigation of risk and the appropriate consideration of costs. Even
during this period of constrained defense budgets, the Air Force should
ensure that military or Federal civilians are performing all inherently
governmental jobs, and that sufficient levels of civilians are
available to perform critical oversight, management, and readiness
functions of the Air Force. I do not believe a comprehensive review of
``inherently governmental functions'' is necessary, but I do believe
more rigorous oversight where we apply contracted services is necessary
across the Department.
Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate
officials in the Department of Defense to address these issues?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with other Air
Force officials to ensure these matters are addressed in the best
interest of the Air Force and the Department of Defense.
Question. Section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 requires a 5 percent reduction in anticipated funding
levels for the civilian personnel workforce and the service contractor
workforce of the Department of Defense, subject to certain exclusions.
What impact do you expect the implementation of section 955 to have
on the programs and operations of the Air Force?
Answer. Based on the Air Force's understanding of section 955's
requirement for DOD to reduce at least the same percentage reduction in
anticipated funding levels for the civilian personnel workforce and
service contractors as compared to reductions in military pay levels,
and contingent on receipt of DOD's efficiencies plan, the Air Force is
working the following actions:
Civilian--The Air Force, as part of a larger OSD-led effort,
conducted a comprehensive review of capabilities performed by its
civilian workforce. During the course of this review, the Air Force
identified areas where it could most prudently accept risk, while still
being able to accomplish its mission. The result of this analysis led
to a 2.8 percent reduction to Air Force civilian manpower over the next
five years, exceeding the 2.3 percent reduction to Air Force military
manpower over the same time period.
Contractor--The Air Force, as part of the OSD led Limitation on
Aggregate Annual Amount Available for Contracted Services (section 808
of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012), has worked to ensure that contract
obligations for fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 remain at, or are
lower than, what was requested for contracted services in the fiscal
year 2010 President's budget. This, coupled with previously identified
service contract efficiencies (Knowledge Based Services, Advisory
Studies, Service Support Contractors, and Program Mission
Augmentation), should meet the intent of section 955.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
section 955 is implemented in a manner that is consistent with the
requirements of section 129a of title 10, U.S.C., for determining the
most appropriate and cost-efficient mix of military, civilian, and
service contractor personnel to perform Air Force missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Air Force sufficiently
determines the most appropriate and cost-effective mix of military,
civilian, and contracted services by reviewing the performance of
functions identified as core or critical to the mission of the
department, consistent with the workload analysis and risk assessment
required by sections 129 and 129a of title 10.
Question. What processes will you put in place, if confirmed, to
ensure that the Air Force implements a sound planning process for
carrying out the requirements of section 955, including the
implementation of the exclusion authority in section 955(c)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the Air Force to put a
process in place to determine core or critical requirements that
considers critical occupations in the Acquisition Workforce Plan,
personnel employed at facilities that provide core logistics
capabilities, medical services, and maintenance and repair of military
equipment. Civilian personnel workforce or service contractor workforce
performing other critical functions may be identified as requiring
exemptions or exclusion authority in the interest of the national
defense.
Question. Section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 requires the Department of Defense to implement a
freeze on spending for contract services, comparable to the freeze on
civilian personnel required by the efficiencies initiatives.
What is your understanding of the impact that the freeze on
spending for contract services has had on the Air Force?
Answer. I understand the Air Force began aggressively reducing
spending on contracted services in fiscal year 2009 and continues while
ensuring continued mission capability. Decisionmakers must balance
acceptable risk and available budgets to ensure future mission
capability as the reductions are made.
Specific to fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013, the period
covered by the NDAA, my understanding is the limitation is a broad
brush that puts an overall ceiling on not only management support
contracts, but also other mission critical contracts such as Weapon
System Sustainment, Ranges, and Critical Infrastructure. If the
limitation is so broad that it encompasses all contracts, there may be
unintended consequences.
Question. What is your understanding of Air Force plans for
spending for contract services over the next 5 years?
Answer. The Air Force will continue to make tough decisions on
spending cuts. Air Force leaders must balance impacts to mission
capability with the need for reducing spending. I believe additional
emphasis on market research is critical for us to fully understand the
industrial base and that we effectively use competition as a forcing
function to reduce the services spend, while not sacrificing mission
accomplishment.
Question. What is your view on the feasibility and advisability of
further reductions in spending for contract services over the next 5
years?
Answer. Budget cuts must be made carefully and with full
understanding of the accepted risks and impacts to mission capability.
I believe further reductions are necessary, but should be applied
tactically as a result of the analysis of risks to mission capability
and effectiveness.
legislative fellows program
Question. Each year, the Services assign mid-career officers to the
offices of Members of Congress under the Legislative Fellows Program.
Upon completion of their legislative fellowships, officers are supposed
to be assigned to follow-on positions in their services in which they
effectively use the experience and knowledge they gained during their
fellowships.
What is your assessment of the value of the Legislative Fellows
Program to the Air Force and to the career development of the officers
involved?
Answer. I strongly support the Legislative Fellows program and very
much appreciate the continued support we get from Members of Congress
for the program. It provides mid-career officers, civilians, and now
senior noncommissioned officers, a valuable learning experience. The
program exposes top-tier Air Force officers, civilians and senior
noncommissioned officers to the inner workings of the legislative
process. Additionally, the relationships they form with civilian
leaders and their staffs in Congress benefit both the fellow and the
Air Force by enhancing open dialogue and communication between the Air
Force and Congress.
Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force's utilization of
officers who have served as legislative fellows?
Answer. My understanding is that the Air Force makes every effort
to assign them to follow-on positions which use their legislative
experience. Most fellows who are not immediately assigned to a
legislative-related position are selected for command and use their
legislative experience in that capacity and later in their career. If
confirmed, I will continue to emphasize appropriate follow-on
assignments which maximize the skills developed during their time on
the Hill.
management and development of the senior executive service (ses)
Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward
thinking management by senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Air
Force senior executive workforce, especially in the critically
important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the
scientific and technical fields?
Answer. I believe that the members of the Senior Executive Service
are an integral and critical component to the continued success of
these vital career fields. As I understand it, the Air Force manages
their Senior Executive Service workforce through a comprehensive and
strategic corporate approach. The Air Force's deliberate lifecycle
management of their executive cadre facilitates their recruitment,
development, compensation, succession planning and retention. From what
I have seen, the Air Force is particularly effective at making sure its
senior civilian leaders have a healthy balance of experience inside and
outside of the Air Force headquarters. If confirmed, I will continue to
support this approach.
Question. Over the last 10 years, the Air Force budget has almost
doubled, but the number of senior executives in the Department of the
Air Force has remained almost unchanged.
Do you believe that the Air Force has the number of senior
executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department
into the future?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to review the number of
Air Force senior executives and their associated proficiency levels in
critical competencies. If confirmed, I will look into the issue.
remotely piloted aircraft pilot promotion and education
Question. S. 3254, the Senate Armed Services Committee's version of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, as
reported out by the committee, included a provision that would require
a report from the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff on
the promotion rates and educational and training opportunities for
pilots of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). The report would need to
explain the causes for the persistently lower rates of promotion and
education over the last 5 years, the impact of these trends, and the
Air Force's plans to take corrective action.
Are you familiar with the adverse trends in RPA pilot promotion and
education rates?
Answer. Yes, I am familiar with these issues and understand the Air
Force has initiatives in place to improve the health of the RPA career
field as they continue to aggressively monitor progress. The Air Force
has addressed the below Air Force average promotions (11-19 percent
behind the Air Force average) and completion of Advanced Academic
Degrees and Professional Military Education (PME) by improving in-
residence opportunities and promotion board packages that address the
RPA community's unique challenges.
Question. Do you share the committee's concerns about these trends?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will keep RPA a key focus area as we
continue to grow this capability that is instrumental in our current
and future success as the world's dominant air power.
Question. How would you expect to contribute to fixing this
problem?
Answer. If confirmed, I will keep my finger on the pulse of the RPA
community through functional, operational and resource management
leadership. I will ensure current plans in place, aimed at leveling
promotion and educational opportunities through targeted messaging,
improved resourcing, and focused retention strategies, have the desired
impacts and take swift action if they prove to be ineffective. With
such a critically important career field, the Air Force must get it
right at the beginning and build not just a population that is
effective now, but one that is competitive, sustainable, and razor-
sharp in the execution of their duties in the years ahead.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the Air
Force?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
eglin test mission
1. Senator Nelson. Mr. Fanning, in 2011, the Air Force announced a
reorganization of the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and aimed to
reduce overhead costs and redundant layers of staff. The NDAA for
fiscal year 2013 included an amendment which required AFMC to submit an
assessment of the efficiencies and effectiveness associated with this
reorganization. Will you commit to keeping a close eye on the recent
efficiencies initiatives at AFMC started by General Wolfenbarger, as
well as to visit Eglin Air Force Base to see the test mission first
hand?
Mr. Fanning. Yes. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, one of my primary focus areas will be to ensure the Air Force is
structured properly, with the ability to respond to the warfighters'
needs as quickly and efficiently as possible. Given the current fiscal
realities the Department faces now and in the future, we must make
every effort to streamline and eliminate redundant layers of overhead,
at all levels. This is precisely the intent of the Air Force Materiel
Command (AFMC) reorganization.
The reorganization eliminated over 1,000 civilian positions, and is
expected to generate at least $100 million in annual savings, while
concurrently reshaping the Command to align each major mission area
under one center commander. Additionally, AFMC's efforts reduced the
number of direct reports from 12 to 5. Since it was implemented on 1
October 2012, it is well on its way to full operational capability
later this year.
With regard to visiting Eglin Air Force Base, I absolutely commit
to visiting the base as soon as my schedule allows. I am anxious to see
the test mission and the other aspects of the Air Force mission
resident at this location.

kc-46a tanker
2. Senator Nelson. Mr. Fanning, on January 9, 2013, the Air Force
released the initial round of basing for the new tanker, the KC-46A.
The top four bases under consideration are located in the center of the
country, as well as the west coast. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
leads the counterdrug mission and, every year, drug interdiction on the
high seas accounts for the removal of 200 tons of cocaine from the U.S.
supply, which is 10 times that which is removed by U.S. law
enforcement. I do not believe SOUTHCOM was consulted when considering
the first round of basing for the KC-46A and deserves consideration.
Would you commit to looking at the requirements of SOUTHCOM for the
next round of basing decisions for the KC-46?
Mr. Fanning. Yes. As I understand it, the combatant commands
(COCOMs) identify their air refueling requirements to the Air Force
through various Joint strategic planning efforts. In turn, the Air
Force's strategic basing process provides a methodology whereby basing
decisions are consistent with Air Force operational requirements which
are designed to meet the combatant commanders' needs. If confirmed, I
will ensure that these requirements, including those of SOUTHCOM, are
considered as part of the basing decisions.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
sexual assault
3. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Fanning, DOD under former Secretary
Panetta's leadership, implemented a number of initiatives to try to
curb sexual assaults in the military--a problem he stated could be six
times greater than reported--and we have seen both military and
civilian leaders acknowledge that sexual assault is a problem that
affects the recruitment, retention, and readiness of our Armed Forces.
This committee has taken up the issue of sexual violence in the
military and has implemented some reforms in the National Defense
Authorization Act, most recently in fiscal year 2013.
In the advance policy questions you were asked: what are the
barriers that discourage or prevent victims from coming forward and
what additional steps would you take to remove barriers to reporting
sexual assaults? You responded, ``Shame, fear, stigma, and concern for
potential revictimization continue to be the primary reasons victims do
not come forward. To remove these barriers, victims must have
confidence in the system and in their leadership to do the right thing.
Air Force senior leaders, commanders, and senior enlisted are
personally involved and their leadership is instrumental to removing
these barriers and ensuring victims receive the care and support they
deserve.'' You also said, ``Another important factor is holding
perpetrators accountable.'' Yet last week, an officer convicted only 4
months ago of aggravated sexual assault by a jury of officers had all
the charges dismissed by the convening authority, Lieutenant General
Craig Franklin, and he has been reinstated.
Lieutenant General Franklin's decision to dismiss the charges sends
a message to every member of the Air Force that if they are a survivor
of sexual assault they might not find justice in the military justice
system. If confirmed, how will you, as a senior civilian leader in the
Air Force, help restore confidence to the members of the Air Force
after this incident?
Mr. Fanning. Sexual assault is a crime and a matter of serious and
continuing concern; eliminating sexual assault in the military is a
high priority for the Air Force leadership. If confirmed, I will work
closely with Air Force leaders, as well as outside experts, to ensure
our sexual assault prevention and response programs are the best
available--we have a responsibility to all airmen to make this so. This
will be a priority of mine, and something I would speak out about at
every appropriate opportunity.
I continue to believe shame, fear, stigma, and concern for
potential re-victimization are the primary reasons victims do not come
forward and that to remove these barriers, Air Force leadership must be
personally involved. Creating an environment where all Airmen
understand this crime has no place in the Air Force is a vital step in
building confidence in the military justice system. In December 2012,
the Chief of Staff met with all Air Force wing commanders and stressed
the importance of their leadership in tackling this problem. This was
followed by an Air Force-wide inspection conducted to assess and adjust
the command climate across the Air Force.
Further, victims must be encouraged to report this crime and be
fully supported when they do. The Air Force's newly established Special
Victim's Counsel Program is an example of the importance Air Force
leaders place on victim support. By providing victims of sexual assault
with their own specially trained, independent military attorney,
victims now have someone to specifically help them navigate the
investigatory and adjudicatory phases of a case. I believe this will
have a profound impact on reducing barriers victims currently face.
If confirmed, I would closely monitor Air Force effects to ensure
they were making the necessary progress and to look for additional
measures we could take to accelerate progress.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
air force tanker program
4. Senator King. Mr. Fanning, if you are confirmed and once you
assume your duties as Under Secretary of the Air Force, I would like
for you to provide information on the Air Force's plans for sustaining
its air refueling capabilities in the future. I would like to see
included in this information an explanation for how the initial 179 KC-
46A aircraft will be fielded, and the follow-on plans for replacing the
remainder of the KC-135 fleet. I would also like the Air Force's
assessment of the role the 101st Aerial Refueling Wing (ARW) at Bangor,
ME, will play in the future, and the earliest the 101st ARW could be in
line to field new aircraft, including the KC-46A.
Mr. Fanning. If confirmed, it will be an early priority of mine to
better understand the Air Force's Strategic Basing process so as to
have more fidelity into the initial KC-46A basing actions. I commit to
providing answers to these questions at the earliest opportunity.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
efficiencies
5. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, for years DOD has embarked on
several efficiency campaigns. Both Secretaries Gates and Panetta have
included efficiency initiatives as part of the President's budget
submission. Do you believe DOD has adequate tools to track
efficiencies?
Mr. Fanning. Yes. Efficiency initiatives are routinely tracked by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller and DCMO, who
report then to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his role as Chief
Management Officer of the Department of Defense (DOD). In my role as
DUSN/DCMO, I have had responsibility for Department of the Navy
efficiency initiatives. Working closely on these efforts with the Army
and Air Force has led me to believe that the Air Force has a strong
process in place and adequately resources their tracking mechanism. If
confirmed, I will take a closer look to make sure my initial
impressions are justified.
The work we are doing across the Services in the area of achieving
clean audit, as well as the work directed by the OSD Comptroller on
Standard Lines of Accounting, will certainly help improve the quality
of data we have to understand, control and reduce the cost of business
operations.

6. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, how successful has DOD been in
realizing the efficiencies already assumed in previous budget requests?
Mr. Fanning. From my assessment, DOD overall has been largely
successful in realizing the efficiencies already assumed in previous
budget requests. Specifically in the Air Force, a $33 billion
efficiency objective was set in the initial round of efficiency
targets. The Air Force is currently managing and tracking $43 billion
in efficiencies from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2017. The first
year of Service-established targets was 2012 and the Air Force recorded
savings of over $6 billion against a target of $4.8 billion. Included
in the 2012 efficiency savings are reductions of 16.5 thousand
civilian positions with 19.9 thousand removed by 2016. However, some
of the more difficult efficiencies were booked in the out years and
will require continued and concerted leadership attention to achieve.

7. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, what lessons have you learned in
the assumptions used in taking efficiencies?
Mr. Fanning. There have been many lessons learned from the
efficiencies. First and foremost, many of the assumptions made in
taking efficiencies failed fully to take into account the priorities of
external stakeholders, to include local communities and congressional
priorities.
Second, in reducing the size of organizations, we often assume that
the targeted organizations will identify mission to cut. We have
learned that it is very hard for organizations themselves to identify
this mission. It requires sustained leadership involvement to direct
what mission is no longer a priority, and to work with relevant
stakeholders to eliminate the requirement for that mission.
Finally, leadership must stay involved long after the efficiencies
are booked. It requires oversight to ensure that cuts do not grow back
and that the hard work of actually achieving the efficiencies is not
replaced by components offering offsets in their place.

acquisition reform
8. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, for the past several years, the
Chiefs of the individual Services have repeatedly stated requirements
creep is one of the major factors creating increased costs and delays
in the acquisition of weapon systems. Specifically, additional
capability requirements continue to be added during the development of
weapons systems. Among other difficulties created by additional
requirements is the redesign, and even rebuilding, of weapons systems.
These concerns continue despite the fact the Joint Requirement
Oversight Council must approve of any requirements changes. Therefore,
what additional steps is DOD using to ensure requirements creep is
reduced and to reform the Joint Capabilities Integration Development
System?
Mr. Fanning. The Air Force has implemented several acquisition and
requirements initiatives focused on controlling both requirements creep
and program costs. As a result, the Air Force implemented a deliberate
effort to reduce the number of mandatory key performance parameters
(KPPs), limit requirements objectives, better translate capability
requirements into system specifications, and improve oversight of cost
and schedule drivers at key program reviews.
The data shows that the number of KPPs has trended down since 2009.
KPPs averaged 6.1 per program in 2009 and 4.6 per program in 2012. To
further control potential program cost growth and requirements creep,
the Air Force implemented Headquarters Air Force guidance that limits
use of objective values in all Air Force requirements documents.
Requirements creep oftentimes occurs during the translation of
operational capability requirements into derived system level
requirements or specifications. To ensure system requirements documents
(SRD) are accurate, the Air Force directed requirements sponsors to
work with the program offices and provide formal coordination on
generated SRD. The Air Force is also conducting an earlier and more
robust cross-functional review of operational and derived requirements
to inform the acquisition strategy prior to release of the final
Request for Proposals.
Finally, the Air Force Configuration Steering Board (CSB) process
is undergoing enhancements to ensure senior leadership reviews
requirements cost drivers and affordability impacts at CSB reviews.
Although CSB reviews are not part of the formal requirements process,
they include mandatory representation from requirements and acquisition
stakeholders to stimulate informed discussions on how requirements
impact program cost and schedule.

civilian furloughs under sequestration
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, under sequestration, DOD will
furlough civilian personnel for 22 days through the end of this fiscal
year. Employees will suffer an 8 percent pay cut, and many of them will
have a hard time making ends meet. We know that 86 percent of
appropriated fund employees reside outside of the Washington, DC area.
Most States will be affected by the furloughs. In Oklahoma, almost
24,000 civilian employees will be furloughed under sequestration. Many
of them are Air Force civilians. DOD estimates it will cost those
employees in my State approximately $129 million. If sequestration
occurs, what will the Air Force do to minimize the impact on civilian
employees?
Mr. Fanning. Due to the reality of sequestration, the Air Force
immediately took actions to significantly slow spending in order to
operate within mandated budget limitations. As a last resort, DOD
elected to implement furlough. By scheduling furlough days in a
discontinuous manner, the 14 days are spread throughout the remainder
of the fiscal year to mitigate the financial impact to the civilian
workforce. In spreading the furlough to roughly 1 day a week, civilians
are ensured of earning at least 80 percent of their pre-deduction pay
during the furlough period, which reduces the impact on valuable
medical coverage, life insurance, and long-term care insurance
coverage.
The Air Force also ensured any sequestration actions taken were not
permanent and potentially reversible in the event the crisis suddenly
ends. Implementing furlough in a discontinuous manner allows
flexibility if the budget impasse is resolved, in which case the Air
Force could immediately cease with any remaining furloughs in fiscal
year 2013.

10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, does the Air Force have stress
reduction programs in place to help civilian employees get through
these difficult times?
Mr. Fanning. The Air Force is fully committed to supporting
civilian employees during these difficult times, and we have several
programs at their disposal. To the maximum extent possible, Air Force
medical mental health professionals will be available to provide stress
management and reduction programs to our civilian airmen on a space-
available basis. Additionally, Air Force Airman and Family Readiness
Centers provide wellness programs for Airmen, to include civilians and
their family members. Each Air Force base has an Employee Assistance
Program with capacity to help our employees through this difficult
time. Air Force civilian employees may also request to receive
assistance from the Federal Employee Education and Assistance Fund.
Finally, many civilian employees are members of the Guard or Reserve or
are retired servicemembers, and may be eligible to request additional
support from the Air Force Aid Society.
If confirmed, I will remain committed to providing every possible
avenue for support to civilian Airmen affected by furlough and will
share those options with them as quickly as possible. However, I also
realize support programs may not fully compensate them for the lost
income from 22 days of without pay. Therefore, the Air Force must
encourage civilian employees to plan now for the potential reduction of
income. Official notification of any furloughs would come through their
chain of command.

aging fleet of aircraft
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, our Air Force has been
continuously engaged in combat operations for over 2 decades. It is
operating the oldest fleet of aircraft in its history:

Air Force bombers--35 years old on average;
Air Force fighters--28 years old on average;
Surveillance aircraft--over 30 years old on average;
and
Transport and tanker aircraft--over 40 years old on
average with tankers projected to be 70-80 years old before
they are retired.

Given the projected defense budgets, that fleet will continue to
age. What are your concerns about this aging fleet and decreasing
budgets?
Mr. Fanning. Given the outlook for future defense budgets, the
biggest concerns associated with the Air Force's aging aircraft are
keeping them operationally viable given advanced capabilities already
demonstrated by potential adversaries and the increasing costs
associated with maintaining them. Both of these absorb available
funding that could otherwise be used to fund programs with more direct
readiness impact, such as flying hours and training ranges. These
factors, coupled with over 2 decades of ongoing operations and the
resulting reduced training opportunities, have led to a steady decline
in full spectrum mission readiness. The ability of the Air Force to
continue to modernize and recapitalize capabilities is critical to
maintaining its ability to meet Defense Strategic Guidance,
particularly in highly contested environments.

12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, what is the impact of sustaining
aging equipment on our ability to procure new equipment?
Mr. Fanning. Every year the Air Force must carefully balance its
funding between sustaining aging equipment and investing in new
equipment. This period of fiscal constraint makes the attempt to
balance sustainment and investment even more difficult. As the Air
Force defers investments in new equipment, and as sustainment costs for
older equipment increase, the competition for equipment
recapitalization resources intensifies.

13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, do you think we have reached the
point with any of our current equipment that the business case analysis
recommends we procure new equipment but, due to a lack of funds, we are
forced to sustain the existing equipment?
Mr. Fanning. Yes, I believe that for some of our equipment, we may
have reached the point where the business case analysis justifies
replacement, but funding constraints force us to sustain the legacy
system in lieu of modernizing. Where this is the case, we run the risk
of a ``death spiral'' where operating and support costs continue to
rise, crowding out opportunities to modernize. However,
recapitalization decisions are complex and new equipment does not
always cost less to sustain. Therefore, every recapitalization decision
should be carefully evaluated using sound business case analysis that
fully considers life cycle cost (investment, operations, and support)
and capability.

14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Fanning, what impact will the Air Force's
inability to develop and procure new aircraft have on its readiness 10
years from now?
Mr. Fanning. The Air Force's legacy fleet will continue to become
more expensive to maintain as it approaches and exceeds programmed life
expectancy, likely causing reduced aircraft availability for both
training and operational use. Further, many of the aircraft in the Air
Force inventory today have reached the point where further
technological upgrades will provide only minimal improvement against
current threats and leave them ill-equipped for future combat
environments.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
f-35 joint strike fighter
15. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Fanning, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) has experienced several delays in its acquisition process. The F-
16, one of the more successful air platforms, was fraught with
engineering delays as well. DOD has spent massive amounts of funding on
the program and it is an essential piece for our military dominance in
the future. As we approach the next phase of defense strategy with the
shift to the Asia-Pacific and increased tensions in historical hot
spots, it is imperative that we maintain air superiority throughout
this transition. To do so, the F-35 JSF program's success is vital. Is
the Air Force committed to seeing this project to fruition?
Mr. Fanning. The F-35 represents the future of the Air Force
fighter fleet. It will provide critical capabilities required to
accomplish Air Force missions in the threat environment of the future,
and enables true joint and coalition operations. As Secretary Donley
stated in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the
Air Force remains fully committed to the F-35 Program.

16. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Fanning, as Under Secretary, what will
you do to ensure the program is successful and timely in its
acquisition and production?
Mr. Fanning. The Joint Program Office (JPO) has made important
progress in identifying program efficiencies and pursuing cost
avoidance efforts, and the Air Force has stated that it will continue
to fully fund the program to the cost estimate, and is evaluating the
most effective production ramp profile to maximize learning curve
savings.
If confirmed, I will support these initiatives and more deeply
involve myself in the work necessary to support the JPO's efforts to
reduce operations and sustainment costs over the lifecycle of the
program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike S. Lee
biofuels
17. Senator Lee. Mr. Fanning, in 2012, the Navy undertook the
expensive ``Great Green Fleet'' demonstration, purchasing 450,000
gallons of biofuel at $26 a gallon for a total of $12 million spent on
fuel for just one demonstration. The Air Force similarly spent $639,000
on 11,000 gallons of biofuels for a demonstration in 2012, costing the
taxpayer $59 per gallon. With the prospect of sequestration and a much
tighter defense budget in coming years, do you believe that the
military should continue such large-scale demonstrations using
biofuels? Please provide a yes or no answer, and if answering yes,
please provide a justification as to why programs involving biofuels
should be prioritized over other research and development programs.
Mr. Fanning. Yes. It is my understanding that the Air Force
investments in biofuels is limited to certifying fuels that are in the
pipeline or are planned to be in the pipeline, but that there are no
plans to purchase in large quantities until it is cost effective. AF
biofuels purchases are not designed to create a market for those fuels,
but to better understand what alternatives work with existing AF
platforms.
The Air Force should continue testing and certifying any
alternative aviation fuels that have the potential to be produced cost-
competitively by private industry and that meet Air Force
specifications. Alternative fuels provide options for global mobility--
rather than being tied to a specific fuel, the Air Force can use what
is available. The Air Force is in the process of converting its primary
jet fuel used in the continental United States from JP-8, the current
military specification, to the more readily available commercial Jet A
fuel. Since the cost of Jet A is less than JP-8, the Air Force
estimates potential savings of $40 million annually in fuel procurement
costs (Jet A with additives costs two cents ($0.02) a gallon less than
JP-8). As part of this conversion, however, the Air Force will need to
ensure none of the alternative fuels identified in the commercial
specification will negatively impact flying operations. The purpose of
purchasing 11,000 gallons of alcohol-to-jet fuel was to test and
certify the Air Force fleet to ensure it could operate safely and
effectively on such a fuel blend, which is anticipated to have high
commercial viability.

future acquisition process
18. Senator Lee. Mr. Fanning, with the prospect of sequester cuts
to DOD this year and continuing cuts through the next 9 fiscal years,
we must change the way that acquisitions are conducted in order to be
more efficient and cost effective. Necessary acquisitions, such as our
next generation fighter jet, have been plagued by delays and budget
overruns. What lessons have been learned so far from the F-35 program
that you will implement in future acquisitions?
Mr. Fanning. The F-35 program has provided several lessons
applicable to future programs. First, while introducing a minor amount
of concurrency to a program can streamline the transition from
development to production, reduce overall costs and increase
efficiency, starting production of the end item too early in the
process can significantly increase the risk to the government in the
form of additional costs and excessive rework. In today's highly
technical world, early focus on software development, to include
appropriate controls and oversight, must be enacted. Software efforts
should be fully resourced and appropriate controls levied against the
contractor to ensure the use of industry best practices. DOD and the
Air Force recognize the importance of detailed cost estimates which
improve the government's ability to negotiate contracts with the
appropriate levels of risk and benefit for both the government and the
contractor. The F-35 program also demonstrates the value of strong
government oversight of military contracts. The Air Force is starting
to see stabilized and/or improved performance in a number of areas, to
include improved program manager assessments, technical oversight,
cost, workforce capabilities, contracting and funding execution.

asia-pacific shift
19. Senator Lee. Mr. Fanning, please explain how the Air Force is
planning for the military's shift towards the Asia-Pacific region.
Include in your answer what this shift will mean for existing domestic
Air Force bases and what these bases and their communities can be doing
to prepare for the shift.
Mr. Fanning. The Air Force is taking a broad approach to
rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, seeking wider distribution of forces,
expanded agreements with partners, and increased partner
interoperability.
Implementation of OSD's Asia-Pacific rebalance will not result in a
substantial increase of U.S. Air Force permanent presence in the
Pacific Command Area of Responsibility. However, in an era of overall
force posture reductions, the rebalance protects forces in the Asia-
Pacific, resulting in a small percentage increase of our total overseas
presence.
Domestic Air Force bases and their communities will not experience
a significant change in personnel or force structure as a result of the
shift to the Asia-Pacific. However, rotational capabilities will
continue to support the Secretary of Defense's strategy to rebalance
its resources toward the Asia-Pacific region.

finance experience
20. Senator Lee. Mr. Fanning, part of your job as Under Secretary
of the Air Force would be serving as Chief Management Officer of the
Air Force. This is an important position, as it will handle much of the
day-to-day business of the Air Force, including managing finances. What
experience do you have that qualifies you to handle this portion of the
job? Please include specific examples of increasing efficiency and
cutting costs from your time as Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. Fanning. I do feel I am strongly qualified to fill the role as
Chief Management Officer (CMO) in the USAF. I entered my current
position as the Deputy Under Secretary and Deputy Chief Management
Officer of the Navy (DUSN/DCMO) shortly after the Department of the
Navy's first confirmed dual-roll Under Secretary of the Navy (USN)/
Chief Management Officer (CMO). This provided me the opportunity,
working with him, congressional staff, OSD, and the other Services, to
best understand the intent of CMO legislation and implement it in the
most effective manner.
One of the first things I noticed was that the Department of the
Navy's strategy was heavily influenced by a technology-centric
philosophy--essentially implementing large business systems to drive
transformation in the Department. Since transformation is best
accomplished by improving the business and then laying in the
appropriate technology--not the other way around, we changed the
strategy. Moreover, I demand that before any dollar was spent there
must be a compelling business case for that expenditure. In the
simplest terms I always ask two questions: why and so what? Why are you
doing this; what are you hoping to achieve, and so what? Why does that
matter? Will you save money; will you increase performance in some
critical area that someone cares about; or some other goal?
This is the leadership strategy I would employ in the Department of
the Air Force if confirmed by the Senate. I bring to this position a
facts-based, cost-conscious, and business-centric transformation
philosophy. I also believe that in order to successfully transform at
the highest level, you have to build relationships and trust. I have
always found the best way to achieve outcomes is to give clear guidance
and direction but allow individuals to come up with new and innovative
ideas by empowering them. I also believe credibility is vital at this
level and the success we have achieved in the Navy will serve me well.
For example, in 2009 the Navy was handed the remnants of the Defense
Integrated Military Human Resources System and told to implement it in
the Navy. I immediately requested an independent assessment, and
quickly concluded that we should stop inserting technology until we had
first clearly defined the business problems. We then spent a year
deconstructing our business processes, baselining our cost of doing
business and prioritizing the highest impact business problems. Because
of this approach, today the DoN is able to target specific problems
holistic to the personnel and pay business--taking into account policy,
processes and execution--before throwing technology into the equation.
This approach resulted in the DoN reprograming roughly $300 million to
the Navy while modernizing its personnel and pay systems in the right
way.
In terms of efficiencies, I spearheaded the Navy portion of the
Secretary Gates efficiency effort. Two of my staff members served as
part of Secretary Gates' core efficiency team. My office orchestrated
the Navy's response by identifying and executing $35 billion in
efficiencies. The Navy DCMO efforts were recently highlighted in the
GAO report `Opportunities Exist to Improve Information Used in
Monitoring Status of Efficiency Initiatives', GAO-13-105R, December 4,
2012, which praised the progress of Navy efficiency initiatives using
our newly emplaced internal governance structure. It further
highlighted that for all of the initiatives selected, the ``Office of
the Navy Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) coordinated with the
appropriate Navy offices ensuring implementation of efficiency
initiatives went as planned'' and at the right level.
As DCMO, I frequently met with my Air Force, Army, and OSD
counterparts on the broad issues facing the DOD. I have played a key
role in the full spectrum of management of department from streamlining
business processes and certifying business IT systems to helping lead
our Department on its path to audit readiness.

f-35 cost overruns
21. Senator Lee. Mr. Fanning, delays and cost overruns with the F-
35 have caused some of our partner nations, most recently Canada and
Australia, to reassess their acquisition of the jets. What effects will
a reduction of purchases outside of the United States have on the
program and the cost of the jet?
Mr. Fanning. The F-35 delivers joint and partner nation air power
essential to our mutual security strategy, and is a capability needed
to defeat 21st century threats. The F-35 program was established on the
concept of economies of scale for purchases. If an International
Partner or U.S. Service reduces the number of F-35 aircraft they plan
to purchase, the unit cost of each F-35 will increase. The amount of
the cost increase depends on how many jets are reduced and in which
years.

22. Senator Lee. Mr. Fanning, how are DOD and the Air Force working
with our partner nations to address their concerns and maintain their
participation in the program?
Mr. Fanning. DOD and Air Force are in close coordination with all
eight of the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Partner nations
in the F-35 program. In addition to the daily interaction between
liaison officers and DOD staffs working at the JSF Program Office in
Crystal City, there is regular interaction between Lt. Gen. Christopher
Bogdan, the JSF Program Executive Officer and senior leaders from each
of the eight nations. The JSF governance structure addresses
requirements and sustainment issues at different levels of leadership
and allows partner concerns to be addressed in an open forum. The most
recent engagement with senior leaders of F-35 program participants was
the 20 March 2013 Joint Executive Steering Board, where Lieutenant
General Christopher Bogdan briefed our partners that ``affordability is
the #1 concern'' in the F-35 program and provided a status of
development, production, and sustainment issues. There is a high level
of transparency in communicating F-35 program status information to the
partners.
______

[The nomination reference of Mr. Eric K. Fanning follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 4, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Eric K. Fanning, of the District of Columbia, to be Under Secretary
of the Air Force, vice Erin C. Conaton, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Eric K. Fanning, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Eric K. Fanning
Education:
Dartmouth College
1986-1990
Bachelor of Arts in History awarded June 1990
Employment record:
Department of the Navy

Deputy Under Secretary/Deputy Chief Management Officer
July 2009-present

Department of Defense

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
White House Liaison
April 2009-July 2009

Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

Deputy Director
May 2008-January 2009

Communication Management Group (CMG)

Managing Director
May 2007-May 2008

Business Executives for National Security (BENS)

Senior Vice President for Strategic Development
December 2001-May 2007
Washington Regional Director
March 2001-December 2001

1800HomeCare.com

Senior Vice President, Operations and Strategy
1999-2000

Robinson Lerer and Montgomery Communication (RLM)

Senior Associate
1998-1999

CBS National News

Associate Producer, Foreign and National Desks New
York City
1997-1998

The White House

Associate Director of Political Affairs
1996

Department of Defense

Special Assistant, Immediate Office of the Secretary
of Defense
1993-1996

U.S. House of Representatives

Research Assistant, House Armed Services Committee
1991-1993
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Eric K.
Fanning in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Eric Kenneth Fanning.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of the Air Force.

3. Date of nomination:
February 4, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
July 2, 1968; Kalamazoo, MI.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Single.

7. Names and ages of children:
N/A.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Secondary:
Cranbook, Bloomfield Hills, MI, 1982-1984.
Centerville High School, Centerville, OH, 1984-1986 (high school
diploma)
Higher Education:
Dartmouth College, B.A., 1986-1990.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
None.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``The Infusion of Efficiencies into DON Culture and Processes''--
article published in Armed Forces Comptroller Journal, Summer 2011.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Multiple speeches in current position, all relating to defense
management and small business. None have transcripts. None were
formally written.

[The nomination of Mr. Eric K. Fanning was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on March 20, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on April 18, 2013.]

NOMINATION OF GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

----------

THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Donnelly, Kaine,
King, Inhofe, McCain, and Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member;
Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel; and William G.P. Monahan,
counsel.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; and Thomas
W. Goffus, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, John L.
Principato, and Lauren M. Gillis.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to
Senator Donnelly; Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine;
Jim Catella, assistant to Senator King; Paul C. Hutton IV,
assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Craig Abele,
assistant to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to consider the nomination of General Philip
Breedlove, U.S. Air Force, to be Commander of U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).
General Breedlove is familiar with the European area of
responsibility as he currently serves as Commander, U.S. Air
Forces in Europe (USAFE). He is also familiar with the
challenges of wearing more than one hat, as he currently is
also Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Africa.
General, we thank you for your 3\1/2\ decades of military
service and for your willingness to answer the call to serve
once again. We thank your wife Cindy, who is also here with you
this morning. Your family, as you know better than anybody,
their support and their sacrifices make it possible for you to
succeed. Please feel free when we call on you for your opening
statement to introduce your wife and any of your family or
friends that are with you here today.
The next EUCOM Commander and SACEUR, will face significant
challenges within a constrained budget environment. We received
the President's budget yesterday and, like the budgets passed
by the Senate and the House, it does not address the
possibility of a $52 billion sequester next year. If we don't
take action to avoid this second sequester, cuts to defense
spending will have a real impact on our strategy and programs
in the coming years. Despite these cuts, the United States
remains committed to our longstanding trans-Atlantic
relationship with our European allies and to our mutual defense
obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
General, we'd be interested in your thoughts on the impact
of the current sequester and the possibility of a second
sequester in fiscal year 2014 on EUCOM's ability to carry out
its mission.
Last year the Defense Department announced reductions in
the U.S. force posture in Europe, including the removal over
the next couple years of two of the four Army brigade combat
teams deployed in Europe. In addition, two U.S. Air Force
squadrons under General Breedlove's command in Europe were
designated for deactivation.
As the United States continues to rebalance its military
posture globally, I hope you'd share your thoughts on the
ongoing rebalance and what additional revisions, if any, to the
U.S. footprint in Europe you would recommend if confirmed.
Nearly all of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies have undergone budget cuts of their own in recent years,
raising concerns about what the capabilities of the alliance
will be when the next crisis arises. Yet, after 10 years of
fighting together in Afghanistan, the level of NATO cohesion is
high and is unprecedented. One of the major challenges in the
coming years will be capturing the lessons learned from these
coalition operations and maintaining current levels of
interoperability within the alliance.
The NATO mission in Afghanistan is entering a critical
phase in the coming months, with the transition to Afghan
security forces taking the lead on security throughout the
country later this spring and coalition forces shifting to an
advisory mission between now and the end of the International
Security Assistance Force mission by the end of 2014.
The next NATO SACEUR will play a critical role in ensuring
the smooth implementation of NATO's ``in together, out
together'' policy for the Afghanistan mission and in shaping
the post-2014 mission in Afghanistan which was discussed at the
NATO defense ministers meeting in February.
While Syria is not in EUCOM's area, its impact is felt by
key allies in the EUCOM region, including Turkey and Israel. As
the civil war in Syria rages on, President Assad and his
increasingly small inner circle are resorting to the use of
Scud missiles, air strikes, and other indiscriminate
capabilities that terrorize innocent Syrians and increase
further the flow of refugees out of Syria.
Last year the alliance agreed to deploy Patriot missile
batteries to defend Turkey against potential action by Assad.
This action by NATO is commendable, but it's not enough. The
United States needs to build a coalition to ramp up the
military pressure on the Assad regime, and I hope our allies in
NATO will join this effort. The Arab League has already
stripped the Assad regime of its seat at the Arab League and
invited the Syrian opposition as the legitimate representative
of the Syrian people.
General, if confirmed as Supreme Allied Commander for all
NATO military operations, you will be confronted with these
issues and we look forward to hearing from you on this matter
today as well.
At the Lisbon summit in 2010, NATO agreed to develop
missile defense capability to defend NATO European territory,
population, and military forces. This is essential to protect
our forward-deployed forces, allies, and partners against the
existing and emerging regional missile threat from Iran. To
achieve that commitment, NATO agreed to develop and finance a
command and control system and the United States is
contributing Phases 1 through 3 of the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, which remain on track to
protect NATO Europe by 2018, with its defense sites in Romania
and Poland.
Secretary Hagel recently stated that our commitment to NATO
missile defense, ``remains ironclad''. He also announced that
the United States no longer plans to deploy Phase 4 of the
EPAA, because Phase 4 was designed to protect the United
States, not Europe, and we can achieve enhanced protection of
the United States from a potential Iranian long-range missile
sooner by deploying 14 additional ground-based interceptors in
Alaska. General Breedlove, we're interested to know your views
on that issue.
As part of its 2010 Lisbon agreement, NATO also invited
Russia to cooperate on missile defense. Although NATO and
Russia have had different views on missile defense, there are
numerous successful areas of U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian
military cooperation and the NATO-Russia Council continues to
have active discussions on missile defense cooperation,
including a joint theater missile defense exercise program.
The United States and NATO believe that cooperation on
missile defense can enhance the security of both NATO and
Russia and such cooperation could also send a vitally important
signal to Iran that we are united in opposition to any Iranian
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.
Other challenges facing the next EUCOM Commander and SACEUR
include continuing and strengthening bilateral and NATO
efforts: to counter transnational threats from terrorism; to
prevent illicit trafficking, including the flow of narcotics
from South Asia and elsewhere through Southeastern Europe; to
counter cyber threats, including to the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia; to counter piracy; and
to maintain strategic assets, the key transit facilities for
global operations, particularly in support of U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
We all look forward to your testimony today, General, on
these and other issues, and again we thank you for your
continuing willingness to serve our Nation.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are faced with a little bit of a problem this morning in
that at 10:30 we have a Committee on Environment and Public
Works meeting and there are five members on the Republican side
alone that will be going back and forth, as I've already
explained to General Breedlove. So we'll be moving around a
little bit.
I enjoyed very much meeting your beautiful wife and two
daughters. I guess Dave is there somewhere; is that right? Yes.
I didn't mean to sell you short. I just kind of walked by you
to the beauty. [Laughter.] Anyway, it's nice to have your
family here with you.
As I look at Iran, North Korea, and al Qaeda, as you and I
talked in my office, and Mali and the conflict in the Central
African Republic, and 70,000 dead in Syria, I can't understand
how the President thinks that, ``The tide of war is receding.''
On my recent trip to Korea we visited the demilitarized zone,
which as you know from your time in Korea is anything but
demilitarized. On my visit to North Africa we discussed the
problems there, and none would indicate that the tide of war is
receding. If this is what receding looks like, I'd hate to see
what a threat looks like.
Through my extensive travel in Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East and Asia, the critical importance of U.S.
engagement and leadership abroad is readily apparent and the
security dividends of our investment in NATO include the
multinational operations in Afghanistan and Libya and counter-
piracy missions in the Horn of Africa. I do want to cover that
in my questions to you because it's probably even more
extensive than people realize. It's clear that the future
operations we conduct in Africa and the Middle East will be
from Europe and with Europe.
I don't remember a time when the world was more dangerous
than it is now. I can remember people saying that in the past,
but it's for real now. Yet due in part to the wrong perception
that the tide of the war is receding, we are poised to cut our
defense budget by, if you take what has already been done and
what we're looking at in sequestration, about a trillion
dollars. I agree with our former Secretary of Defense it's
devastating to our defense. While our military commanders have
done a phenomenal job with the hand that they are dealt, we owe
them a better hand.
Unfortunately, the President released a budget yesterday
that's symbolic of his last 4 years in office. It highlights
his failure to address the unprecedented resource challenges
facing our military. His proposal continues his unfortunate
history of saddling the men and women of our military with
disproportionate and illogical budget cuts that would undermine
their readiness and their capabilities.
As you and I talked about in my office, four of the six
U.S. fighter squadrons stationed in Europe have been grounded,
and our tanker and airlift squadrons will revert from full
mission capable to a greatly reduced status of basic mission
capable. The lack of resources will make EUCOM's support of
AFRICOM even more difficult. We'll have a chance to talk about
that and I've expressed to you my concern there.
Over the long term, I'm greatly concerned that we'll
squander our investment of our national blood and treasure in
Afghanistan by precipitously drawing down the troops'
capability similar to what we saw in Africa.
Now, when you're confirmed, General Breedlove, you'll be
charged with guiding the most successful alliance in history
through a difficult fiscal environment and be responsible for
ensuring that our efforts in Afghanistan over the last decade
will not have been in vain. I can't think of anyone who is more
up to this very difficult task than you are, and so I'm looking
forward to the successes that we'll see through your leadership
in this new position.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator James M. Inhofe
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming General Breedlove,
who has amassed an impressive record of service. General, I thank you
for your continued willingness to serve the country. Please ensure the
brave men and women you lead know how grateful we are for their
sacrifice, and that of their families, on behalf of our national
security.
General Breedlove, we no longer have the luxury of operating in a
bipolar world as we did during the Cold War--when you were cutting your
teeth as a second lieutenant and when the threats to the Homeland were
clear. Now, more than ever, the threats in the areas of responsibility
around the globe are interconnected. What happens in Europe, the Middle
East, the Asia-Pacific and Africa has the potential to directly impact
the security of the U.S. Homeland.
I have a hard time squaring the reality of an aggressive Iran, a
bellicose Kim Jong Un, a war against al Qaeda in Mali (AQIM), armed
conflict in the Central African Republic, continuing frozen conflicts
in Azerbaijan, and 70,000 dead in Syria, with the President's statement
that ``the tide of war is receding.'' On my trip to Korea in January,
we visited the DMZ, which as you know from your extensive time in
Korea, is anything but demilitarized. It was obvious when we visited
Taiwan that based on the number of missiles pointing at us from China,
the Chinese don't think that the ``tide of war is receding.'' On our
visit to Northern Africa, we discussed AQIM, Boco Haram, and al
Shabaab--none of which would tell you that the ``tide of war is
receding.'' If the ``tide of war is receding,'' I'd hate to see what it
looks like when the President decides it is coming in.
Iran is determined to develop a nuclear weapon, despite growing
international pressure and the damage sanctions are doing to its
economy. Public intelligence reports tell us that they could have a
ballistic missile capable of reaching the east coast of the United
States by 2015. Although I'm encouraged that the President reversed his
earlier misguided decision and is now seeking to bolster our homeland
missile defense system through fourteen additional ground-based-
interceptors on the west coast, I remain deeply concerned about our
ability to defend against the growing threat from Iran. Restoration of
the original planned number of missiles on the west coast helps but is
late to need and does not go far enough. We need the additional
protection that an east coast site would provide.
Throughout my extensive travels to Africa, the Middle East, and
Asia, it has been readily apparent how critically important it is for
the United States to remain engaged and a leader abroad. The return on
that investment abroad is exemplified by the troop contributions of
over 50 nations from around the globe to the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has served as an invaluable partner and critical platform to
integrate the contributions of troops and military capabilities to
bolster operations in Afghanistan, while at the same time operations in
Afghanistan have transformed the expeditionary capabilities of NATO.
The security dividends of our investment in NATO include combined
operations in Afghanistan, Libya, and counter piracy missions off the
Horn of Africa. It is clear that whatever future operations we conduct
in North Africa and the Middle East will be from Europe, and with
Europe.
While the threats that our witness is tasked with confronting are
growing in scope and complexity, the resources available to deal with
them are decreasing. I don't remember a time when the world has been
more dangerous and the threats more complex. Yet, due in part to the
misperception that the tide of war is receding, we are poised to cut
our defense budget by a trillion dollars over the next 10 years. The
misguided policy of the President is the relentless pursuit of
disarmament. As we diminish our defense industrial base, China and
Russia increase theirs; nurturing militant adventurism that ultimately
our military commanders must address. While our military commanders on
the ground have done a phenomenal job with the hand that they were
dealt; we owe them a better hand.
I remain concerned that we have a strategy-resource disconnect that
puts military lives and our national interests at risk. As we speak,
four of six U.S. fighter squadrons stationed in Europe have been
grounded and our tanker and airlift squadrons will revert from full
mission capable to a greatly reduced status of basic mission capable.
This lack of resources will make U.S. European Command support to U.S.
Africa Command even more difficult and further reduce our ability to
react to contingencies similar to Benghazi. Over the longer term, I am
also greatly concerned that we'll squander our investment of national
blood and treasure in Afghanistan by a precipitous draw down of troops
and capabilities similar to what we saw in Iraq.
If confirmed, General Breedlove, you will be charged with
stewardship of the most successful alliance in history and be
responsible for ensuring that our efforts in Afghanistan have not been
in vain. As we saw very clearly in Libya last year, our strategic
partnership and strategic access in Europe is the linchpin for our
engagement in some of the most volatile regions in the world today.
What I'm getting at here General is that there will be no shortage of
challenges facing you and the men and women you will lead. The threats
are growing, and the tools available to address them are declining.
I look to you to provide the committee with your assessment of how
the ongoing budget crisis will impact your ability to effectively
address national security challenges and whether the current strategies
that you are operating under are still executable given the budget
realities.
Thank you again for appearing before us today and I look forward to
your testimony.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN
COMMAND, AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

General Breedlove. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
I would like to introduce my family, sir. I'd like to
introduce first my wife, Cindy. She's been beside me for 34
years. She's moved our household 21 times, 9 of those times
across the oceans, and she completely raised the 3 wonderful
children who have already been acknowledged, Samantha, Rebecca,
and Daniel. I know that I would not be here today without her
and my family.
I'm honored to have my oldest daughter, Samantha, here.
She's a world-class triathlete in my mind. Her husband Kevin
serves in the Army National Guard and has accomplished two 1-
year tours in Iraq.
I'm also honored to have with me my daughter, Rebecca, and
my son-in-law, Clay, both of whom proudly serve their Nation as
lieutenants in the U.S. Air Force. Clay is a third generation
Air Force officer. His father, Master Sergeant Mike Hardy, is
also here with him today.
My son Daniel is here and is a freshman in college and he
makes me proud every day with what he does.
Chairman Levin. Is he going to the University of Michigan,
I hope?
General Breedlove. Sir, no, sir. I'm off to a bad start.
[Laughter.]
Senator Donnelly. We have some other suggestions for that
as well.
General Breedlove. My mother-in-law, Ms. Lib Thompson, is
here today with us as well. Her husband, Don Thompson, now
deceased, served in the Marine Corps and they have both
supported Cindy and I throughout our Air Force career.
Ms. Regina Hagerty is also here in support. She has been a
part of our family for over 28 years, since her husband was my
most influential commander in my early years.
Finally, I'm proud to have Chief Master Sergeant Craig
Adams here. He is the most important half of my command team at
USAFE.
It's a tremendous honor for me to be here today and I'm
humbled to have been nominated by our Commander in Chief for
the position of Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe. Allow me to publicly thank Secretary
Hagel and General Dempsey for their recommendation and for
their trust and confidence. I'd also like to say thank you to
Admiral Jim Stavridis for his 36 years of service to our
country. His leadership of our joint and coalition forces as
our longest serving combatant commander has truly been
inspiring.
The nations of Europe make up the majority of an alliance
key to our collective defense strategy. They have been our most
reliable allies for over 70 years. These partnerships are
irreplaceable. We cannot rebalance or pivot towards Asia
without Europe.
I have served in Europe for a third of my career and if
confirmed this will be my eighth assignment. I have worked hand
in hand with our partner nations to advance U.S. and alliance
objectives. While it's a tremendous honor to be nominated to
this position, I believe leadership is a responsibility that
must be earned through action, a daunting task for anyone
selected to lead the great men and women responsible for a
coalition that has ensured the trans-Atlantic security of our
Nation and its allies.
If confirmed, I fully acknowledge the significance of our
mission in Europe and your expectations of me as a commanding
general. Cindy and I pledge to give nothing less than our all
to live up to decades-long standards of excellence. Our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen who
selflessly serve deserve nothing less than everything I have to
offer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, for allowing me
to appear before you today and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Our timing system worked very well yesterday, so we'll
continue. We thank Senator Inhofe for that suggestion to use
this highly advanced technology, which has been here for
probably 20 years without use by this committee. [Laughter.]
General, last month Senator McCain and I sent a letter to
the President urging him to work with NATO and our regional
partners to pursue additional options in Syria, including the
following options: to degrade the Assad regime's air power with
precision air strikes or the possible use of Patriot missile
batteries; to target Syrian aircraft and missiles; to create
with Turkey's initiative, a safe zone within Syria, with a
limited no-fly zone; to provide additional assistance to vetted
opposition groups.
Can you give us your personal assessment of these options?
Are they viable and are they desirable in your professional
military opinion?
General Breedlove. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
question. We have six batteries of Patriots in Turkey at this
time and they are reacting to and under the command of my NATO
element, Headquarters Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) NATO. They
are voluntary national contributions to an Article 4 request by
Turkey to participate in the defense of a stalwart ally.
Two of those batteries are U.S. batteries and four are
NATO. In order to be able to use any of those batteries in a
safe zone protection of Syria, of course, we would have to
engage Turkey and NATO about the four additional batteries. As
you and I have discussed, sir, clearly the U.S. batteries could
be used in a role to project into Syria. They have the
capability to do it. Their range is somewhat limited, as we
have discussed, at doing that, but they have full capability to
do that. If Turkey and the United States were to look at doing
this in a bilateral fashion or if we could convince our NATO
partners to come alongside of us to also be a part of that,
then we could do that.
The fact of the matter of being able to project power into
Syria is physically possible. There is both good and bad at
creating this impression into Syria. I think that it enables
some of the things that we discussed that you are concerned
about as far as a safe zone in northern Syria. What it would do
is ask us then to reorient the defense away from what they are
defending now, and I guess that's the down side of reorienting
where those Patriots are.
Creating a no-fly zone. I think General Mattis in his last
testimony to this committee put it pretty much the way I see
it: A safe zone could create opportunity to engage with the
opposition, but creating a safe zone in northern Syria would
have to be much more than Patriots. It would probably require
fixed wing air and other capabilities that we would have to
bring to the problem.
As I know you and I have talked and your staff have talked,
creating a no-fly zone first starts with having to take down
the integrated air defense system of the enemy, which would be
something that would have to be done kinetically. I know that
CENTCOM has thought through those issues and their
recommendation at this point is they don't see a military value
in that.
Chairman Levin. Excuse me. CENTCOM has said they don't see
a military value in taking down air defenses of Syria--I'm
sorry.
General Breedlove. I'm sorry, Senator. Let me say that a
different way. What they have said is they don't believe that
there are good military options or outcomes by creating a no-
fly zone.
Chairman Levin. Over a safe zone?
General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Who have they said that to?
General Breedlove. I think, Senator, that was General
Mattis in this committee. Maybe I have that wrong.
Chairman Levin. Yes, I don't think so. But we'll review
that testimony. Senator McCain I know has been very actively
involved in this issue.
Senator McCain. Let me. Could I?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Senator McCain. With your indulgence, sir, General Mattis
said, ``The United States and our allies could identify and
destroy quite a fair amount of Assad's operational aircraft on
the ground using precision strike and standoff weaponry,''
General. So your statement is in direct contradiction to what
General Mattis said in testimony and has told me.
General Breedlove. Senator, I sit corrected. You have it
exactly right, what General Mattis said in your testimony.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you for that important
clarification. The stakes here are very significant.
Yesterday an administration spokesman, senior
administration official, said that, ``The President has
directed his national security team to identify additional
measures so that we can increase assistance.'' I would hope
that would happen quickly, and I know Senator McCain and other
members of this committee have spoken on this subject as well.
I'll leave the subject of Syria, I'll leave it at this
point, in order to be able to ask some additional questions.
But we do hope, General, that when you're confirmed that you
will take back to our NATO allies the feeling of many members
of this committee, who will all speak for themselves, and
hopefully by then an administration position that we be much
more forward-leaning in terms of putting additional military
pressure on Assad, which would really require NATO support, and
it obviously would require Turkey to decide that it is willing
to create a safe zone in northern Syria, providing it has NATO
support. We would hope that you would be able and ought to make
this case to NATO as we've just outlined.
On the missile defense issue, on European missile defense,
is it your assessment that our European allies are supportive
of our new missile defense policy in Europe?
General Breedlove. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for that
question. I have talked to numerous of the major allies that
are a part of AIRCOM since AIRCOM, which is my NATO current
hat, is in charge of the missile defense, which is in its
nascent form now, our initial capability. As I understand the
feedback from all of my NATO counterparts at this point, as
long as we remain steadfast in our support to Phases 1 through
3, which was the portion of the missile defense that was about
Europe, as long as we are unfaltering in our support to proceed
apace with those first three phases, our NATO partners are
comfortable with the announcement.
Chairman Levin. That is our new policy, is that correct?
General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. In your response to prehearing questions
you said that we should continue to seek zones of cooperation
with Russia and that we should continue to believe that
cooperation with Russia on missile defense could enhance the
security of both NATO and Russia. Can you describe ways in
which you believe that missile defense cooperation and
transparency with Russia could enhance our security, including
whether such cooperation could send a powerful signal to Iran
that we oppose jointly, NATO and Russia oppose Iran acquiring
nuclear weapons and long-range missiles?
General Breedlove. Sir, I agree with the opening statement
that was made, and that is that we have to find ways to
cooperate with Russia. I think in the opening statement it made
reference to the signal to Iran. What a powerful signal to Iran
if the U.S. and Russia were cooperating on missile technology
and missile defense.
I think we do need to press hard to move forward with that.
I've started in my current job connecting to senior Russian
leaders and actually have hosted at my headquarters there their
commander of long-range aviation as a first step to get to the
senior leadership. I'm committed, if confirmed, to continue
that pursuit to bring Russia alongside of us in these important
endeavors.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your drawing attention to the
family. I think a lot of people don't understand the sacrifices
that are made. To me, Cindy, when I hear something like you've
been married for 34 years and moved 25 times or whatever it
was, it's inconceivable to me. My wife and I have been married
54 years and we've never moved. Same house that we were
originally in. It's hard to see that. But that's a lifestyle
that you've become accustomed to and you've made great
sacrifices.
I'm not going to do it, but for the record, because of your
current position, not the position for which you will be
confirmed, I hope, I am concerned about where we are in our
Phase 1, 2, 3, and 4, and the fact that cancellation of the
fourth phase in terms of the capability of our SM-3s, the 1A,
the 2B, 2As, and what we don't have. I'd like to get, for the
record, from your past experience where you really think that
puts us today. You and I talked about this in the office, but
I'd like to have it down so that we can have that in writing.
General Breedlove. Sir, I have that for the record.
Senator Inhofe. All right, sir. That's good.
[The information referred to follows:]

After announcement of the change to European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) by Secretary Hagel, it is clear that the U.S.
contribution to defense of NATO Europe will be unaffected. Phases 1-3
of the EPAA will still provide defense of Europe, and Phase 3 in
particular will allow coverage of all European NATO populations and
territory to the extent technically feasible. The indefinite hold on
Phase IV does not affect deployment of Phases 1-3.
The goal of EPAA Phase 4 was defense of the United States against
an intercontinental ballistic missile attack from the Middle East. We
will now meet that goal sooner by additional ground-based interceptors
deployed in the United States, which will also enhance protection of
the United States against the growing threat from North Korea.

The U.S. European Command has already deployed a radar
to Turkey and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships to the
Mediterranean Sea as part of Phase 1.
The United States stated commitment to Phases 1-3
includes the development of Aegis Ashore sites in Romania (2015
timeframe) for Phase 2 and in Poland (2018 timeframe) for Phase
3.
As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Dr.) Miller
stated at a press conference, ``We will still go forward, as
planned, with Phases 1-3. Phase 3 for the European Phase-
Adaptive Approach will involve deploying about 24 SM-3 IIA
interceptors, SM-3 interceptors including the IIA in Poland.
Same timeline, same footprint of U.S. forces to support that.''

Senator Inhofe. Now, you mentioned in my office and I
mentioned in my opening statement that four of the six U.S.
fighter squadrons stationed in Europe have been grounded--and
our tanker and airlift squadrons will revert from full missile
capability to a greatly reduced status for basic mission
capability--how long does it take to make that up?
I'm thinking more because of my personal background in
what's happening to our fighter squadrons stationed in Europe,
because you have a problem. You're going to have to get them
back up ready. What do you do with them during this period of
time? You have four of them that are down there and you also
have the pilots. There's only so much you can do on simulation.
What do you do with them and how long will it take you to get
back and the kind of comparable cost should we see fit to
address this in our National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2014?
General Breedlove. Sir, it is a great question and we have
been thinking about this ever since we have begun to
contemplate that we would have ground forces. As I have
explained to some, the forces actually degrade over time. Our
youngest pilots after about 30 days lose their qualifications.
Our older pilots after about 45 days, they lose their
qualifications.
Once they lose their landing qualifications and other
combat skill qualifications, then we essentially have to put
them through a requalification process. If we were to receive
funding to be able to start flying them very shortly after
they're grounded, that would be a shorter process. If we had to
wait all the way to the end of the fiscal year to get budget
authority for flying hours in the next fiscal year and they are
grounded for say 3\1/2\ months, then it would be much longer.
We've looked at that, sir, and I think for the fighter
aviation a rough number is 2 months, a little more than 2
months to get the squadron back on track. For the lift
squadron, when they lose some of their exquisite capabilities
like paradrop, precision drop, supporting the Army in their
parachute training, etcetera, those are harder to regain simply
because we have to get the training opportunities to do it.
It's not like you can just fly sorties the next day. We have to
marry with the Army and other things. That could take
significantly longer, and that concerns me, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. I think that as we go into our development
of our NDAA and we start our discussions, we want to get from
you some more specifics, because should we do what I consider
to be the responsible thing, we need to know the costs and what
we have sacrificed in this interim period of time.
Just one real question I normally do ask. It's becoming
less relevant, but it still is relevant. That is on the
sequestration. If we were, as I suggested some 7 weeks ago,
able to take the same top line and give the commanders in the
field more flexibility, would that--I have talked to all the
Service Chiefs. I have them on record here. But would you agree
with them that it would be far less devastating if we could
have some flexibility at the discretion of the Service Chiefs?
General Breedlove. I do, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. One of the areas that I've been very much
concerned with is, of course, in AFRICOM. You'll have that
responsibility. It's an awesome responsibility because of your
shrinked resources and the problems that are happening there.
Now, we're used to problems in Africa. We've never, prior to
September 11, really addressed them to any real degree.
Everyone is aware of what happened in Somalia. They're
aware of piracy on the east coast. But, as you and I talked,
I'm reminded when I go over there that, with the new finds of
the oil and the resources in West Africa, we have a new problem
that's developing there and that's piracy in West Africa.
Now, just when you look at the fact that you are up in
Stuttgart and you have to get your resources down to that huge
continent of Africa, how are you going to handle that? It's
hard enough as it is today, but as this expands, and with the
resources you have--and I'm talking about maybe lift resources.
Maybe this is something we need to reevaluate.
How can you handle that with these new problems coming in,
that vast continent of Africa?
General Breedlove. Yes, sir. I think that my last several
assignments in USAFE where we supported Africa before AFRICOM
and now as the Africa commander, I have learned the definition
of geography and what geography means, time, distance, and
heading. I often show a picture, a map of Africa, where you can
literally put almost exactly four continental United States in
the continent of Africa. I understand now as an operational
commander just how hard access is to Africa even if it's
unopposed. Time, distance, and heading becomes a real problem.
Being able to have forces forward deployed in the southern
tier of USAFE so that they can reach into Africa is incredibly
important. Our basing in these southern states--Spain, Italy,
and others--are critical to us. I believe that we are now in
northern Africa looking to see where are there lily pads inside
of Africa that we can establish relationships with nations
whereby when we need to we can move forces forward, to cut that
time, distance, and heading problem down.
Senator Inhofe. I think that's important because that's a
moving target. Not long ago no one was really concerned about
Mali and Chad and some of that area in there. However, we are.
When we look at the five African brigades that we originally
talked about building, not that we're on schedule for doing it,
which would be another question for the record, it concerns me
that we are already to the point where you have to have these
resources, you have to have them developed.
Initially when we, as you well know and most of the people
at this table know, when we established AFRICOM, it would have
been better to have that headquarters down more centrally
located, maybe even in Africa, maybe in Ethiopia. But we know
the political problems down there that made that impossible.
With the reduction in the resources that are already there
and the escalating problems already in eastern Africa, but now
in West Africa, that's going to be one that's going to be a
huge problem for you. I'd like to have you be sure to let us
know as we go into the development for 2014 just what those
problems are so we can help you to address those problems when
that time comes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
For everyone's information, the vote is now scheduled at
11:00 o'clock.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your service, and to all of your
family. I noted that you graduated from college the same year I
did. I consider you as young as I am, and it's wonderful to see
your family here with you today.
You will help in your new position coordinating our
reduction in forces from Afghanistan. As we look at that
process moving forward, what do you consider as the most
significant challenges for the Afghan army, for the police, for
their government, as we move forward in this process?
General Breedlove. Sir, it's a great question. As we look
at what are the sizes that are being contemplated for the long-
term force structure and what are the capabilities that are
being contemplated, it is center in our discussion. I think
first and foremost we need to continue the pressure on making
sure the professionalism of the military meets the requirements
of the Nation. I think that, quite frankly, we are doing pretty
good there in the armed forces piece and we have some work to
do in the Afghan police piece.
But we need to make the military creditable, capable, and
responsive and appear creditable to the Nation of Afghanistan
and the people that they would protect. I would offer that
their recent performance in the military realm has been quite
respectable. Almost 90 percent of the nation now is back to the
Afghanis. They have led now some very large formation attacks
and complex military maneuvers, which are fairly encouraging in
this matter.
Senator Donnelly. Do you have, as we move forward on this,
almost a set of metrics as we head closer toward the end of
2014, that at this point we hope to be here, at this point we
hope to be here?
General Breedlove. Sir, the short answer is no, I do not.
But I know that Joe Dunford, who is a long-time friend, we have
served together many times, I know that he is working on that.
If confirmed, my pledge is to get there to talk to Joe and then
go down and see Lloyd Austin immediately thereafter, to do just
that: How can we develop metrics and thoughts that will inform
this Congress and inform our leadership on the way to go ahead?
Senator Donnelly. What do you see as the biggest challenge
in this process of transition?
General Breedlove. Sir, my initial response now, not having
been there, will be colored by the color of my uniform. As I
talk to the other NATO nations and as I have talked to the
commanders there in my past trips as an Air Force officer, they
are very concerned about enablers. They are very concerned
about being able to do the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance that we do, to be able to do the personnel
recovery that we do, to do the medevac that we do, inter- and
intra-theater airlift.
These are all things that they are not capable of doing and
that NATO has been providing by and large during the time, and
I think those are things that we need to be concerned about.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral Stavridis had told us a few weeks
ago that the remaining bases in EUCOM were forward operating
bases needed for access and that we could conceivably draw down
further. I met with the Army this week and they briefed us on
their plans. Their plans, they told me, were to reduce the
infrastructure in the region by 51 percent between now and
2016. How do we match those goals and the previous testimony
that we heard?
General Breedlove. Senator, let me just talk to what I've
been doing as the air commander there and what I've watched my
fellow commanders around do the same thing. When I took command
about 9 months ago, I immediately started looking at what is
the enduring mission of USAFE as it supports Africa and Europe
and the Middle East, the Eastern Med, and Africa?
I do believe that we have more infrastructure that we can
draw down in the Air Force. I have heard my fellow component
commanders speak to the same. I know very much less about what
Bruce Clingan is looking at in the Navy, but I do know that the
Army thinks that they can bring down further.
I think it's in all of our best interests to do that,
because these bases cost money and the infrastructure that we
can draw down saves money for flying aircraft.
Senator Donnelly. One of the things I just want to try to
get your commitment for, the Indiana National Guard, we're
extraordinarily proud of them. They have ongoing relationships
with European state partners, and I just want to make sure that
we can get your commitment that the longstanding relationships
between National Guard units and the European state partnership
countries will remain with the Guard as we move forward.
General Breedlove. Senator, I can absolutely assure you in
that respect. For EUCOM, 21 state partnership programs
servicing 22 nations. As I talked to the staff in preparation
for this hearing, they tell me that literally one-quarter of
our interaction with our partners are done by the state
partnership program.
[The information referred to follows:]

During the hearing, I referred to 21 state partnership programs
servicing 22 nations in the U.S. European Command area of
responsibility. I misspoke and should have said there are 23 state
partnership programs.

General Breedlove. Specifically in the Air Command, I could
not run by air operations center either in peacetime or in
conflict without the support of two Guard units that bring
people and expertise to my area of command.
Senator Donnelly. As we look at Syria, obviously we're
concerned with all the border areas, but one of the border
areas that we're concerned about conflict threatening to boil
over is in Israel. We are wondering the coordination between
EUCOM and the Israeli Defense Forces, as well as coordination
with our other friends and allies in the area. What kind of
coordination is occurring now and what do you plan moving
forward in this extremely challenging situation?
General Breedlove. The coordination level now is higher
than I've ever seen it. I have been participating in working
with Israel since I was a colonel in Europe. I have flown in
Juniper Falcon from Nevatim Air Base twice in my life during
large exercises with Israel.
At the senior staff level, in preparation for last year's
Austere Challenge 12, which you have heard billed as the
largest missile defense exercise ever, we could not have been
more tightly lashed to Israel in how we plan to do missile
defense of that area should we need to.
I think that it is very strong. It continues to grow
stronger and it should as we bring ourselves closer and closer
together, to dealing with a neighborhood that has been altered,
I think, by the Arab Spring.
Senator Donnelly. Right. That's with our other allies, too,
I presume.
I'm almost out of time, so I want to ask you one last
question. As you look at this region, as you look at your new
potential command, what is your greatest concern as you look,
as you move ahead? What keeps you up at night, other than your
children?
General Breedlove. Sir, I think my first focus is going to
be getting the transition in Afghanistan right. I need to get
over there, engage with the commanders, come back and engage
with the leadership here in Congress and our Nation, and make
sure that we have force sizing, drawdown schedules, and what we
leave behind in residual capability right. I have to focus on
that.
I'm running over a little bit, but, sir, I think it's
really important that as we begin this drawdown in Afghanistan
that we don't take a peace dividend and, as was mentioned in
the opening comments, back way off of the gains that we have
made with our European allies in interoperability and their
investment in defense and in participating in Afghanistan.
Senator Donnelly. General, thank you. To your family, thank
you very much for all your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for you and your family's service. You
mentioned all the different duty stations and I'm sure that
your time at Luke Air Force was by far the most enjoyable of
all of those.
General, I mentioned to you in my office both Admiral
Stavridis and General Mattis have been very candid with this
committee, which is one of the questions that's asked of you on
your confirmation. I hope you will follow in their footsteps,
and I would remind you again on the issue of Syria. Admiral
Stavridis testified before this committee that Patriot missile
batteries could be deployed from their current positions closer
to the border with Syria, where they could help defend civilian
populations in Syria and serve as a powerful deterrent to
Syrian pilots. Do you agree with that?
General Breedlove. I do, Senator.
Senator McCain. Can Patriot missiles shoot down Scud
missiles?
General Breedlove. Yes, sir. In fact that's their primary
duty as they're aligned right now.
Senator McCain. Can they shoot down aircraft?
General Breedlove. Yes, sir, they can.
Senator McCain. General Mattis also testified that a fair
amount of Assad's operational aircraft could be destroyed on
the ground using standoff weaponry. Do you agree with that
statement?
General Breedlove. I do, sir.
Senator McCain. So we really aren't putting pilots at risk
and there's not a requirement to take out the air defenses
around Damascus in order to assure the security of a no-fly
zone. I think we all know that if pilots think they're going to
fly into areas where their risk is incredibly high, as it would
be with the Patriot missile and other capabilities, they would
not do that.
Both former Secretary of Defense Panetta and General
Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, both testified
before this committee that they had supported supplying weapons
to the rebels. Have you reached a conclusion on that? In Syria?
General Breedlove. Senator, I think that if we could assure
that the weapons were going to the right people and that we
would not have to face them in the future, that it would be
helpful to removing the regime.
Senator McCain. I thank you for that answer. Obviously, the
best way to assure that would be if there were a safe zone,
such as Benghazi was in Libya, for the resistance to organize
and control the flow of weapons. I think we all know, and I
know you agree, that the situation has worsened over time, to
the point where the jihadists are playing a greater and greater
role in Syria, which obviously post-Assad, which will happen
some day, is going to be incredibly complicated.
Do you believe that, as opposed to 2 years ago, that
Lebanon and Jordan are more or less stable than they were
before the last 2 years?
General Breedlove. Sir, I would say they are less stable,
not because their intent is not good, but there is so much
instability with the Arab Spring and, sir, a pretty large
refugee problem at this point.
Senator McCain. Of course you are aware that the Russians
continue their flow of weapons into Bashar Assad's forces; and
even now, later reports that the Iranians are not only
providing weapons, but they're training, actually training
people in Iran and sending them back into Syria. Have you heard
those reports?
General Breedlove. Sir, I have not, but I do know that in
general we would not categorize Russia's support to us as
helpful in this area now. I am not privy to those reports yet.
Senator McCain. I think it's good to give them flack
jackets. I don't think there's any way that can really
seriously affect the equation on the ground. I--well, my
opinion is well known.
General Mattis recommended 13,600 U.S. troops and about
half as many international troops in post-2014 Afghanistan to
do counterterrorism and train and assist missions. Have you had
a chance to look at that assessment of General Mattis'?
General Breedlove. Sir, I have looked at General Mattis'
testimony and other thoughts on 13,600. I think that it relates
back to a comment I made earlier, Senator, that I think that
our eventual number in Afghanistan is yet to be determined, but
influencing that will be do we remain at 352,000 in the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) or do we come down to what was
proposed at the Chicago summit of 230,000 and when that
happens. If we keep the ANSF high through 2018, it should give
us more flexibility on numbers. If we don't keep the ANSF
number high, then that would probably cause input.
Senator McCain. One of the things that is a little
frustrating to some of us is we're sort of seeing a repeat of
the Iraq scenario, in that we delay and delay and delay on
these decisions. Meanwhile it puts Karzai and our friends in
the region in an uncertain position. I hope that as soon as you
are confirmed that you would in the deliberations urge a
decision soon on the post-2014. We're into 2013. We need to
have a firm decision as to what our troop strengths are going
to be, what our presence, and what their role is going to be. I
greatly fear the same kind of unraveling that we are seeing in
Iraq today.
Finally, you made a very strong statement to me in my
office when we had the pleasure of our visit about
sequestration. You mentioned that certain squadrons are having
to stand down, that there are certainly decisions having to be
made that are basically no-win decisions.
When I asked you about the effect, especially since you
have a couple of young members of your family here, the effect
of sequestration on the decisions that these young officers,
junior officers and mid-level officers, are going to be making
about whether to remain in the Air Force and in the military,
what's your personal view of that particular situation?
General Breedlove. Senator, it's a great question and I'm
happy to have an opportunity to comment. As I took command, the
chief and I, we got out and talked to our troops. What I will
do is just report to you things that I'm hearing from the
troops. This concerns them greatly. It concerns them, will we
have the wherewithal to do what we do? Will we be able to
continue educational benefits that we thought were a part of
our business? Will we be able to train and fight at the level
that we expected to train and fight at?
I would just say that, from the number of questions that
the chief and I got as we have circulated the battlefield
forward and in Europe, that this is a concern on the mind of
our troops. I am concerned that it will impact the long-term
retention, health, and welfare of our troops.
Senator McCain. Thank you, General.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator King.
Senator King. First, General, thank you very much for your
service, and I am delighted to have you here. I, too, was
struck by the number of times you moved. I, as a young man,
worked on a moving truck for Allied Van Lines and we used to
say that four moves equals a fire. You've been through it.
As NATO reflects--and you mentioned this a bit in your
testimony--on the experience in Afghanistan, what are the major
learnings from that experience and how do you see that
reflecting itself in future activities?
General Breedlove. Sir, there are a couple of very
positives that I think we should take from this experience.
First of all, NATO in general and some of the partners has
become much more interoperable. Much more of the troops have
come up to the same level of standards. We use an acronym
``TTP'' for ``tactics, techniques, and procedures''. We have
standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures. We have
brought their special forces very close to the level of ours.
Their joint tactical air controllers (JTAC) on the ground, are
acting almost interchangeably with our U.S. JTACs.
I think the most positive gain out of a horrific situation
is that our alliance has really begun to be much more jelled in
its ability to employ interactively and mixed together because
of the skill and capability of all.
Sir, I would tell you that's also my number one concern.
You asked about my concerns. That is that if we come out of
Afghanistan we cannot allow what we have gained to fall back
because it was bought with precious time and effort of our
people. I think it's going to be important for me, if
confirmed, to keep pressure on not only defense investment, but
to keep pressure on our ability to train together and keep the
standard of excellence high so that we can remain
interchangeable.
I believe one of the reasons that Libya went so well with
NATO in the lead is because we have become so much more like
each other in the way we do business.
Senator King. I think that clearly is an important lesson.
Just to be clear on the record, you've talked several times
about the grounding of the, I think, it's four squadrons you
said in Europe. Is that because of the sequester?
Senator King. Sir, that's because of the budget effects of
sequester, that's correct. It's not just Europe. These
squadrons are grounded in the United States. In your States we
have squadrons grounded.
The lift and tanking squadrons are equally as affected. As
was mentioned earlier, the effect of going from a fully mission
capable air crew in a lift aircraft to an air crew that can
simply do air-land, load, reload, it is a big effect on our
military capability in a time, as has been captured by the
chairman, a very volatile time.
Senator King. You listed earlier all the qualifications
that were being limited and the mission abilities that were
being limited.
I think it's important to emphasize that the sequester is
not a 1-year deal. At least it's not according to current law.
If nothing happens, it keeps going. This condition that you are
in, unless it's alleviated in some way, would continue and, in
fact, accelerate.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir. I think that in my specific
command as we service not only Africa but Europe, but our
mission in Africa is growing now, which is a strain as well on
our budget.
Senator King. I heard recently on the news a member, not of
this body, but a member of our Government, characterized the
sequester as a ``home run''. I hope this gentleman will talk to
you about the effect on our readiness, on our retention, and on
our military.
Another question, changing the subject, under your area of
responsibility comes both Turkey and Israel. What's your
assessment of the current relationship between Turkey and
Israel, and are we headed for a better relationship? What are
you hearing from your counterparts?
General Breedlove. Sir, a month ago I probably would have
had a negative report. There has been some work done by our
senior leadership and Israel has come forward and talked to
some of the problems that they've had with Turkey in the past.
I now am cautiously optimistic. I think that this relationship
is headed in the right direction. If confirmed, I will continue
to try to foster that relationship.
In my current capacity, I do today, because these are two
incredible allies--Turkey is absolutely critical to us. Their
geopolitical position, their moderate voice in this world--
there are so many things about Turkey that are absolutely dear
to us. We cannot have two of our most important allies in an
adversarial state.
Senator King. Thank you.
One final question. As we've been focused so much on the
Middle East and on Afghanistan, attention has been shifted from
the Balkans, which was a major area of concern a decade ago.
What's the situation there? Are we comfortable with the
circumstances and is there any need for concern or new
attention to that region?
General Breedlove. Sir, I would tell you that I am not
comfortable with the Balkans. Progress has been made. We have
brought the troops down to just about 5,000 now, of which about
800 are United States. We need to bring that down lower. But I
have heard the situation in northern Kosovo described as
stagnant. We were making progress and now we have slowed down
in that progress. That worries me because I think that our
Nations are a little weary of that situation and want to move
on. What I don't think we can do is totally take our eyes off
of a situation that if not watched could possibly go in a
direction we don't want it to go.
I think that there are good things happening. There are
great things happening in the training of the Kosovo Defense
Force. But we need to keep our eye on the ball.
Senator King. Thank you very much, General, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you, General Breedlove and all of your
family, for being here and for your service to our country.
I wanted to ask you about our relationship with Russia, and
in particular looking at the advance questions, you described
Russia will remain the primary actor of regional concern
through 2020. Why do you believe that Russia is the primary
actor of regional concern?
General Breedlove. Thank you, Senator. I think that I would
try to put that in some context, and that is that Russia
remains a very important influence with many of the nations on
its periphery and nations that have been leaning more west than
east and have become good allies--not allies, but have been
great partners with us in places like Afghanistan and others.
But these nations are clearly still tied to Russia for such
things as energy needs, transportation, and others. There's
lots of tentacles that go back and forth. Russia's ability to
either help us or hinder us as we work with these nations I
think is still very great.
I do and I have been quoted often saying that I think we
would be better off if we quit treating Russia or thinking of
Russia as an enemy and try to bring them into a partnership as
we deal with Europe and other places around the world. Russia
has been very helpful with us in counter-piracy and other
things outside of the European theater. I think that Russia
still has deep influence in Europe. We need to try to find out
how to work with them, as opposed to at them.
Senator Ayotte. General, one of the things I wanted to get
your view on is you said we need to stop treating Russia as an
enemy. That strikes me as in line with when the administration,
the Obama administration, came into office, the whole reset of
the Russian relations. Yet if you look at the Russians' actions
both in the United Nations and also on numerous issues, we have
not gotten the reaction that we had hoped. In fact, if you
think about issues like the adoption issue that obviously all
of us have heard from our constituents on, which is just
outrageous, to use children to advance a policy objective like
that or to somehow think that they're going to punish the
United States.
I hear and I understand what you're saying, but we're not,
in my view, getting the reaction that we would hope in turn
from the behavior of the Russians. What is your view on that,
and what are the differences that remain between us and how in
your view are we going to improve our relationship with Russia
in a way that protects our interests and those of our allies?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, I could not agree with your
assessment more. In fact, I've described the reset as sort of
on pause. We had made some progress. There were some political
changes in Russia and we are now sort of very much slowed down.
I think that we have to continue to reach out. I do agree
with your concern that this not become a one-way street and
that we just give, give, give. I think that the principle of
reciprocity is how we need to think about our work with Russia.
But I don't think that we should stop. We need to keep working
with them.
As I mentioned, ma'am, before you were here, I have reached
out to several very senior levels in their air force to
establish dialogue so that we can begin to get some
normalization of conversation and then do some military-to-
military work. If confirmed, I will continue the effort as the
SACEUR and as the Commander in Europe.
Senator Ayotte. I would agree with you on the reciprocity
issue very much, because I feel like it has been a one-way
street at the moment. The Russians, for example, if you look at
conflicts like Syria, could have a major influential role, and
yet they are actually fueling that conflict with their arms
provisions. It's outrageous really. I think in many instances
they have as much the blood of some of the Syrians that are
being murdered on their hands as the Assad regime. I can't
imagine why Russia would want to stand for that.
One of the things that concerns me as well is the arms
control agreements that we have with Russia. Do you understand
whether, or if you can give us some insight, whether the Putin
Government is in full compliance with all existing arms control
agreements that we hold with them right now?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, I could not comment on that at
this time. But I will get back to you on that with a position
and an answer.
Senator Ayotte. I would appreciate that, because the
administration, of course, has made some announcements in the
press that there is some thought of further reducing our
nuclear arsenal in some types of negotiations with the
Russians. I think it's very important for us to understand what
their posture is on existing arms agreements right now.
[The information referred to follows:]

Since U.S. European Command does not participate in the
verification process for arms control treaties, I would refer you to
the President's annual report, submitted through the Department of
State, on ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'' required
by section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended
(title 22, U.S.C., section 2593a).

Senator Ayotte. I would also express the hope, to the
extent you weigh in on these issues, that they would, the
administration, would seek to go through Congress on these
types of issues, particularly with what we see happening in the
world right now. You have in your area of responsibility, of
course, Israel, with Iran marching toward a nuclear weapon,
what we have happening in North Korea. I think this is a very
important issue for Congress to weigh into, rather than just a
unilateral agreement between Russia and the administration.
Certainly in your role, if you're asked for advice, I hope
that you will recommend that Congress be given the role, its
constitutional role in this?
General Breedlove. I will, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Okay, I appreciate that, General.
You talked about your area of responsibility with Israel
and the relationship that you have had based on your experience
with the Israeli military. Do you believe it's important that
Israel maintain its qualitative military edge over any
potential adversary in the region?
General Breedlove. I do, Senator, and that is one of the
primary duties of EUCOM, to continue to make sure that that is
upheld.
Senator Ayotte. Why is that critical in light of the
position we are in right now?
General Breedlove. Senator, I think that it's pretty clear
to all that Israel is in a tough place and the neighborhood is
unsettled. I think that the Arab Spring has further unsettled
the area, and the strategic depth that we talk about Israel
having or lacking is only getting less. We need to make sure
that Israel is able to respond capably with the weapons that
enable them.
Senator Ayotte. When you're confirmed for this position,
what do you think that you could do to further deepen our
relationship with Israel?
General Breedlove. Senator, I think that, building on the
success of Austere Challenge 12, we made a huge leap forward in
our ability to interact in missile defense. We have been doing
exercises such as Juniper Falcon and others that I've
participated in, and Juniper Stallion, which I flew in, where
we bring the interoperability of our conventional forces closer
together.
I believe we need to be very straightforward in our ability
to interact with and come to those same TTPs we talked about
before, make sure that our interoperability is high and our
ability to support Israel is ready.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General. I appreciate your being
here today and look forward to supporting your nomination.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
General Breedlove, what a treat to have you here, and to
see your family and hear you talk about them with such pride is
something that makes an impact on all of us. I have three
youngsters, one a newly minted second lieutenant like one of
your own and two artists. They all grew up eating the same food
and breathing the same air, but they've all gone in very
different directions, but we're proud of all of them.
I want to start where Senator McCain finished with you,
which is as you look at these budgetary uncertainties,
sequester, we can talk about Air Command units standing down.
We can talk about the effect on logistical operations,
refueling, and airlift capacity. We can talk about a lot of
things in the here and now, but there is a concern about
tomorrow as well.
As I talk to my son and his colleagues and others--recently
I was at University of Virginia talking to a Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC) group and one of the youngsters training
to be an officer there said: I sign up voluntarily, knowing
that I'm potentially going to face hostile fire, and I'm
willing to do that. I'm willing to make a career decision that
involves doing that. But I kind of have to wrestle with whether
I want to make a career decision to do that if the support for
me from Congress, budgetary support, is so uncertain.
That was kind of a chilling thought of anything that I've
heard about sequester as I've traveled around the Commonwealth
of Virginia, and I've heard a lot about it because we're so
connected to the military. The thing that probably has struck
me the most is what it is as a young person being willing to
face hostile fire, but having to ask yourself the question of
should I do it if I'm not sure whether Congress is going to be
there with the right kind of budget support for the work that
we do.
You testified about that a good bit already, but I'm really
struck by that and it's a sobering thought for all of us. I
wonder if you have any additional comment on that from what
you've heard from your own troops?
General Breedlove. Senator, you have it exactly right. Our
troops, including my daughter and her husband, are concerned
about these things and we've had these conversations. As I took
over U.S. Air Force Europe and Air Force-Africa 9 months ago,
the chief and I set a mantra: mission, airmen, families. We
have to be able to keep the mission going. That is driving
everything we do. But the way we get the mission done is
through our airmen, and we have to set the airmen so that they
can focus on their mission. If the families are not set, the
airmen are not going to be set. These are inextricably tied.
If confirmed, going forward in Europe, one of the concerns
that I've talked about to my fellow commanders in Europe are
the three things that my wife talks about every time we move:
schools, housing, and access to medical care. If confirmed,
Senator, that will be one of the first focus items I have
across the broader EUCOM Command, because, as I said in the
``Mission, Airmen, Families,'' if we can keep the family, which
is at the base, squared away, then the airmen can focus on the
mission, and that's where we have to be. In the case of EUCOM,
then it would be our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coastguardsmen that we would be enabling.
Senator Kaine. Excellent, excellent.
Let me jump around a bit. What an awesome thing to be up
for nomination to be SACEUR. Some pretty amazing people have
had that title. That has to be--well, it's a good thing, but
it's a humbling thing, too.
Talk to me a little bit about that role, and in particular
NATO lessons learned from Libya? You describe them in a
positive way. We did well because we've gotten to be so much
like one another in the way we approach these challenges. I'd
like you to talk a little bit about that, what you meant by
that, but then how you see that relationship going forward. To
the extent that sequester and other budgetary uncertainty
potentially jeopardize some of what we might be able to do in
that NATO combined operation, I'd love to hear your thoughts.
General Breedlove. Thank you, Senator. Very shortly, I
would also say that, if confirmed, I would find myself sitting
behind the desk that Eisenhower sat behind. I would tell you
that my father from the State of Georgia would roll over in his
grave at that thought, and some of my grammar school and high
school teachers probably as well.
Sir, as far as Libya and NATO, as in almost every case,
there are good things that we learned and there are bad things
that we learned. I highlighted a couple of the good things
previously and those are that we have trained so much together
and now we have fought beside each other in Afghanistan and
other places for some time. What has happened is it has enabled
us to be much more seamless across being able to employ the
NATO force and being able to interchange NATO people, having a
Belgian officer be your deputy commander and having a French
officer be your chief of operations and having a German officer
being your intelligence officer, and expecting that we would be
able to execute at a very high level because of that
interoperability. I think that's very important.
Not to highlight the bad, but there are some bad things.
What we did learn is that the depth of some of our partner
nations and especially their sustainment to the fight is not
very deep. We have work to do in weapons and the amount of
weapons. We have work to do in very critical enablers that are
going to be required for any force--air-to-air refueling
capability and others.
I think probably the most glaring thing we need to work on
as an alliance is intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. You can be very proud of your joint force.
There is no one that does it like us. What we don't want to do
is be the only supplier of that superb capability. We want to
bring others along.
If confirmed, Senator, those are going to be center in the
heart of the shot pattern for what I'll do in NATO.
Senator Kaine. One of the expectations that I would have as
a Senator from Virginia, obviously, is the Allied Command
Transformation is in Norfolk and so the working relationship
with General Palomeros is something we would care deeply about
as well.
The Aegis ballistic missile defense system also has a
Virginia tie to Dahlgren, where much of the research and work
is done. That's a critical part of EUCOM's ability to address
the ballistic missile defense issues. Could you give us just a
quick update on the Phased Adaptive Approach?
General Breedlove. Thank you, Senator. Yes, sir. Right now,
as I mentioned earlier, the announcement that Phases 1, 2, and
3 are firmly on track is a good one. The investments required
to start Phase 2 are on track for putting in that first Aegis
Ashore, as we call it. I believe that right now on Phases 1, 2,
and 3 I have positive reports on how we're proceeding.
Senator Kaine. Finally, I'll just comment that I agree with
comments you've made earlier. I think the U.S.-Turkey
relationship is one of the most strategically important right
now, both because of the region, but also because of Turkey's
important role in NATO. I was heartened to hear your comments
and heartened to hear other reports that suggest that the
Turkey-Israel relationship, which has been quite frosty--for a
long time the military-to-military connection has been quite
positive, but it's been quite frosty--seems to be getting
better.
Your testimony about Israel is also welcome. I'm going to
be with Ambassador Oren, the Israeli Ambassador to the United
States, tonight, introducing him to a large group of people in
Richmond. He will be happy to hear of the importance you accord
that relationship in your testimony.
Thank you for your service and I look forward to supporting
you.
General Breedlove. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
I just have one question. Senator Inhofe has a question or
two that he'll ask in round two, and then we'll be able, I
think, to leave here in time to get over to vote at 11 a.m.
General, you and I have spoken in my office about what are
called residual value payments. We recently completed a
committee report regarding the expenditures which we've made in
certain facilities overseas that are being returned to a host
nation and the improvement in those investments and the
payments which are made by those host nations for those
improvements.
Under our law, those payments must be directed towards
offsetting operation and maintenance costs and they must be
directed according to law towards military construction
projects which are identified in the Future Years Defense Plan,
and they have to be used for Department priorities that are
specified.
Will you take a look at this issue and read this report
when it comes out, because there's been some real significant
problems in terms of the use of those payments, which are
identified in our report. So you can get back to us after you
have read that. Will you do that?
General Breedlove. I will, sir. I did some work with this
last night. I'm much smarter now about it. I understand that
our staffs have cooperated to get this report out and I do
commit to you to get to that report early if confirmed and get
back to you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wasn't going to ask another question until Senator Kaine
asked a question. In fact, I'd say the only answer that you
gave during the course of this hearing that I would disagree
with is your answer to Senator Kaine. We all know and I don't
think anyone questions now that our intelligence assessment,
going way back to 2007, that Iran would have the capability
along with a delivery system by 2015--that's been consistent.
I've often said that it's probably going to be earlier than
that, judging from the miscalculation our intelligence made way
back in 1998 on North Korea's ability to fire a multi-stage
rocket, when they were off by 5 years.
Anyway, I think that we can say that 2015's a critical
time. Then, of course, I disagree with the changes that took
place 4 years ago in terms of the ground-based interceptor in
Poland. But assuming that we are where we are right now--and
you talk about Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3. I understand that
in the SM-3 Block 1A, we're already there, then 2015 for the
1B.
But then the SM-3 Block 2A, which would be necessary for
the protection of our NATO allies, is not scheduled until 2018.
We have a 3-year period that concerns me. I'd like to have you
tell me how you think you'd like to address that 3-year period,
if that concerns you, if that increases risk, and of course
risk means lives.
General Breedlove. Senator, you're absolutely right about
my answer. My answer was not about the timing in relation to
the threat, let me make that clear. What I was trying to answer
Senator Kaine, was that the program and the schedule to
accomplish the things that we are doing----
Senator Inhofe. Is on course?
General Breedlove.--is on course.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand. But I'm suggesting the
course is wrong.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir. I understand that question
completely now, and there are concerns about getting the
appropriate coverage at the appropriate time. I think that one
of the things we are having to do right now is talk to our
fellow European nations about their contribution to EPAA and
their bringing some capability to the task early.
I am encouraged by the fact that we have our Dutch friends
upgrading four of their cruisers to Aegis-class capability to
help us in this battle. I am also encouraged by the fact that
several of the nations, France, Germany, and others, are
looking at voluntary national contribution of not only their
short-range capability, but some of their radars.
I don't want to take too much of your time, but I do see
positive movement in the nations leaning forward now to be a
contributing part both kinetically and as basing nations in
this effort.
Senator Inhofe. I know this is not directly in your new
position, but you're the expert in this and I appreciate your
background and knowledge. I would think that if you're looking
for that 3-year gap to be filled by more assertive progress
from our NATO allies, they're the ones that are at risk. Is
there any reason they would not do everything they can to help
fill that 3-year gap?
Now, obviously the chairman wouldn't want me to get into
the third site discussion and I'm not going to do that. But on
this one, I would think that they would be the ones that would
want to go out of their way and do what is necessary,
specifically looking at that 3-year gap.
General Breedlove. I agree with you, Senator, and I think
Admiral Stavridis has said in the past that the store is open,
we're ready for your contributions. If confirmed, I will
continue the pressure that he's already started on our allied
nations to help us bring that capability to the table.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Kaine, you all set?
Senator Kaine. Yes.
Chairman Levin. We have standard questions which we ask of
our military nominees, which I'll ask you now, in order to make
sure that this committee and other committees of Congress are
able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications
of information. Here are the questions:
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Breedlove. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
General Breedlove. I do.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Breedlove. I have not.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Breedlove. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Breedlove. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Breedlove. They will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Breedlove. I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Breedlove. I do.
Chairman Levin. Yes, Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Just one comment. Of the questions the
chairman asked you, the most difficult one is the second one.
You have answered that correctly, but that's the most difficult
one because you still have a Commander in Chief. We understand
the line of command. Yet there are some things that we'll need
to know, particularly with the upcoming activity we'll have,
for your honest answer, and we'll be looking forward to that.
General Breedlove. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Those are the answers we received today
even before you were confirmed. So we know you'll continue in
that same vein after you're confirmed, which we would hope and
expect will be very promptly.
We thank you. We thank your family and those many folks who
have come here today to support you.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Philip M. Breedlove,
USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have
also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to
recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to
the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions or the Special Operations reforms?
Answer. Successful operations around the world from Iraq and
Afghanistan to Libya demonstrated the importance of Goldwater-Nichols.
I learned the importance and value of joint training early in my career
as an air liaison officer working with the Army in 1985. I am convinced
the success of all of our operations over the past years is directly
attributable to the joint training and doctrine that came out of
Goldwater-Nichols. I do not see the need for modifications at this
time.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I do not see the need for modifications at this time.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?
Answer. The Commander of the U.S. European Command is responsible
for giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces
necessary to carry out all U.S. military operations and activities
across the 51 independent states in the European Command Area of
Responsibility (AOR) in pursuit of U.S. national military objectives.
This AOR includes all of Europe (including Turkey), the Caucasus
Region, and Israel. The commander is also responsible for the health,
welfare and security of the approximately 64,000 servicemembers forward
deployed within that AOR.
The NATO North Atlantic Council and Military Committee assigns
specific roles and duties to SACEUR. These include:

Overall command of all NATO military operations
regardless of geographic boundaries.
Strategic planning to include military planning for
the full range of Alliance missions and contributions to crisis
management and effective defense of NATO territory and forces.
Identifying and requesting forces for the full range
of Alliance missions.
Strategic Analysis: In conjunction with Supreme Allied
Commander for Transformation, supports NATO's Defense Planning
Process and conducts strategic level analysis to identify and
prioritize type and scale of NATO's critical capability
shortfalls.
Operational Leadership: Executes military measures
within the capability of the command to preserve or restore the
security of NATO nations.
Transformation: Cooperates with the Supreme Allied
Commander for Transformation (SAC-T) on integrating
transformation efforts.
Crisis Management. Continually monitors and analyses
the international environment to anticipate crises, and where
appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming
larger conflicts.
Strategic engagement and partnership building:
Develops and participates in military-to-military contacts and
other cooperation activities with NATO partners around the
globe.
In conjunction with Supreme Allied Commander for
Transformation, conducts combined and joint training and
exercises. This role will be critical to the implementation of
the NATO connected forces initiative designed to maintain
interoperable forces in the post ISAF environment.

The responsibilities of the Commander EUCOM and the SACEUR are
complementary. The fact that they have traditionally been vested in one
officer facilitates near-seamless coordination between the U.S. and
NATO military command structures.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. As Commander, U.S. Forces in Europe, Commander, U.S. Air
Forces Africa, and Commander, NATO Allied Air Command, in addition to
my six previous assignments in Europe, I have had the privilege of
working closely with our joint forces, NATO Allies, and coalition
partners. During these assignments, I have had the opportunity to meet
with several Ministers and Chiefs of Defense in Europe, providing me a
unique opportunity to develop lasting relationships. Recent operations
in Europe and Africa have continued to reinforce my belief in the
criticality of these partnerships and inspired confidence in future of
U.S. and European relations. If confirmed, I believe my knowledge of
the region and familiarity with the Alliance, coupled with these
personal relationships, will enhance my ability to perform command
duties for both EUCOM and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE), and contribute to our Nations' shared security objectives.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
EUCOM, or NATO SACEUR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with key officials and
personnel within the executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
Government to uphold and advance the national policies and interests of
the United States in the European theater. To this end, I will also
engage with the governments and militaries of our allies to understand
the magnitude and interdependent issues within the region. I will seek
the cooperation of the Alliance leadership to work together to engage
on vital regional issues. I will also continuously improve my
understanding of the history and culture of the region.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, EUCOM/NATO SACEUR,
to the following:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense exercises authority over the Armed
Forces of the United States through the EUCOM Commander for those
forces assigned to the EUCOM AOR. The EUCOM Commander exercises command
authority over assigned forces and is directly responsible to the
Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions and the
preparedness of the Command.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is delegated full power and
authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the
powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary
is authorized to act pursuant to law. The EUCOM Commander coordinates
and exchanges information with the Deputy Secretary on matters
delegated by the Secretary. The Commander directly communicates with
the Deputy Secretary on a regular basis.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. A direct command relationship between the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy and the EUCOM Commander does not exist. However,
the EUCOM Commander regularly interacts, coordinates and exchanges
information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on policy
issues relating to NATO, European, and Eurasian affairs. The Commander
directly communicates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on
a regular basis.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the EUCOM Commander.
However, the EUCOM Commander regularly interacts with, coordinates and
exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence on intelligence related matters.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and
the EUCOM Commander. The EUCOM Commander and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs work together on
coordinating international security policy and strategy.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and
control of the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman
transmits communications between the President and Secretary of Defense
and the EUCOM Commander, as well as oversees the activities of the
EUCOM Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the
principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the combatant commander,
interagency, and Service Chiefs.
The EUCOM Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant
issues regarding NATO and the EUCOM AOR. The Commander directly
communicates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a
regular basis.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for
administration and support of forces that are assigned or attached to
the EUCOM Commander. The Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by
exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the Service Component
Commands assigned to EUCOM.
Question. The other combatant commanders, in particular Commander,
U.S. Central Command and Commander, U.S. Africa Command.
Answer. Formal relationships between the EUCOM Commander and the
geographic and functional combatant commanders derive from command
authority established by title 10, U.S.C., section 164. Combatant
commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned
missions.
Question. The NATO Secretary General.
Answer. The NATO Secretary General is appointed by the 28 Alliance
Heads of State and Government. He chairs the North Atlantic Council,
the principal decisionmaking body of the Alliance. The SACEUR carries
out roles and missions assigned by the North Atlantic Council, and
directly communicates with the Secretary General on a regular basis.
Question. Commander, International Security Assistance Force.
Answer. The EUCOM Commander has no formal relationship with
Commander, ISAF; however, Commander, ISAF, is ``dual-hatted'': 1. As
the Commander U.S. Forces in Afghanistan he reports to Commander, U.S.
CENTCOM (national command and control); 2. The Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe exercises command authority over the Commander, ISAF,
via the Commander, Joint Forces Command Brunssum, in the Netherlands
(operational command and control).
Question. The Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation.
Answer. Both NATO's Strategic Commanders, SACEUR and Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation (SAC-T), carry out roles and missions assigned
to them by the North Atlantic Council. SACEUR and SAC-T work together
to ensure the transformation of NATO's military capabilities and
interoperability that support Allied Command Operations.
Question. The North Atlantic Council.
Answer. The North Atlantic Council is the principal policy and
decisionmaking body of NATO. SACEUR carries out roles and missions
assigned by the North Atlantic Council.
Question. The U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic
Council.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and either the
EUCOM Commander or the SACEUR. The North Atlantic Council provides
direction to NATO military authorities and the U.S. Permanent
Representative is 1 of 28 members of the North Atlantic Council. The
EUCOM Commander works with the U.S. Permanent Representative on matters
of mutual interest, such as EUCOM military operations and security
cooperation activities that support U.S. objectives and military
contributions to NATO.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM, and
SACEUR?
Answer. If confirmed, one of the biggest challenges I will face is
managing the evolution of NATO, specifically past its operational focus
in Afghanistan. The Alliance has evolved from a Cold War construct to
one with ambitious aspirations and capabilities after integrating
former Warsaw Pact and Eastern European Soviet Republics and building
an out of area expeditionary capability. As EUCOM Commander, my
challenge is to work diligently to support the broader U.S. Government
effort to ensure that the Alliance makes the right choices to maintain
its capability, capacity, and credibility.
The second challenge is the impact of the sequestration reductions
and the continuation of those reductions in the out years.
Sequestration negatively affects both theater operations and EUCOM's
ability to support the U.S. Defense Strategy by further reducing an
already declining budget. This includes an increased risk to access,
degradation of the security cooperation relationships forged over
numerous years, and reduced partner participation in operations.
The third challenge is the potential for a long-term continuation
of the Arab Spring and its impact to Israel's shrinking strategic
depth. Currently Iranian's malign influence in the politics of Syria
and Lebanon are a constant concern. Of specific concern for Israel,
aside from Iran's nuclear ambitions, are security considerations
relative to Syrian chemical weapons and high end conventional weapons,
the decline in influence of Egypt's military and the resulting
instability in the Sinai and the strength of Lebanese Hezbollah. This
instability will remain throughout the region for some time. Our
challenge is to lead the military effort to assure Israel of U.S.
resolve to guarantee its security.
The fourth challenge I see is the security impact of the European
economic crisis. The result of the financial crises upon European
militaries is magnified as national Gross Domestic Products (GDP) have
fallen, and the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense spending has
been cut as governments struggle to deal with reduced revenue and
increasing deficits.
The fifth challenge I see is the growing asymmetric terrorist
threat in Europe from al Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups with
extensive ties to Western Europe. Europe is an important venue for
recruitment, financing, and attacking U.S. and western interests. The
effects of the financial crisis and austerity measures on countries
with historical terrorism and anarchism could spark new forms of
politically and economically-driven terrorism.
The sixth challenge I see is dealing with Russia, which remains an
aspirational superpower but is hindered by endemic deficiencies. Russia
will remain the primary actor of regional concern through 2020 by
virtue of its geographic position, natural resource wealth, military
forces, and desire for regional influence. However, a number of
systemic deficiencies, such as mounting internal stressors--politico-
economic, socio-cultural, and demographic--will continue to challenge
its aspirations. The U.S. and NATO will need to continue to assure our
allies and partners, who live in the Russian self-declared ``sphere of
privileged influence,'' of our resolve.
The seventh challenge I see is the continued risk of conflict in
the Caucasus and Balkans. Chronic ethnic enmity, virulent Islamism/
Islamist influence coupled with socio-economic privations, and the
general intractability of grievances plague the Caucasus and Balkans to
varying degrees. Our challenge is to carefully encourage our European
Allies and partners to continue their commitments to regional security,
while encouraging the development of security capabilities that do not
exacerbate local tensions.
Another important issue is improving our comprehensive readiness to
face 21st century challenges, specifically the threat of malicious
cyber activity. Our primary focus here should be assisting our allies
and partners in the defense of their critical information systems, and
to develop and mature their cyber defense capabilities, programs, and
processes.
The last significant challenge I see is maintaining our force
laydown in today's austere environment. While combat forces receive the
bulk of attention during force restructuring, the capabilities garnered
from critical enablers (i.e., medical, police, intelligence, logistics)
are equally as important. The challenge we have is balancing our
strategic pivot to the East while highlighting the critical role our
European force structure plays in assuring Allies and guaranteeing
continued U.S. access to a critical region of the world. This access
will remain important to U.S.-led global operations across multiple
theaters, and cannot be guaranteed if we abdicate our European
footprint.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges and problems?
Answer. Despite budget reductions, EUCOM must be at the forefront
of revitalizing and supporting NATO, highlighting the critical role the
U.S. partnership plays to ensure the Alliance's credibility,
particularly with regard to our Article 5 commitments. A significant
component of this effort will be our role in a renewed commitment to
the NATO Response Force. This commitment will ensure our NATO allies
continue to meet high standards for interoperability and readiness. We
can also incorporate NATO Smart Defense initiatives into our planning
process, to guide our engagement and help ensure that NATO forces
maintain a credible mix of expeditionary forces.
Next, we must recognize the unique opportunity the economic
downturn presents to help European nations examine defense and force
structure inefficiencies. Stark fiscal realities leave political room
for serious force structure and capability changes consistent with the
vision of Smart Defense. We must also continue to coordinate our
efforts across a broad spectrum of actors, specifically with the
interagency and other geographic and functional commands. This
cooperation can be expanded, as we leverage NATO training and
standardization as a global benchmark for interoperability.
As a command, we must continue to invest in interagency cooperation
and collaboration to reinforce a whole-of-government approach to
numerous challenges. We must also look for ways to enhance security
cooperation planning by working with those allies who conduct security
cooperation consistent with our interests.
Next, we will emphasize civilian-military opportunities for nation
engagement, particularly in the areas of disaster preparedness and
foreign consequence management by leveraging private entities. This
will encourage regional approaches to collaboration within areas like
the Balkans and Caucasus in order to bolster stability.
We must also emphasize technology and innovation to provide a
backstop to decreasing resources, while diminishing our vulnerabilities
to new asymmetric threats. The growing cyber threat must be addressed,
while seeking ways to mitigate the loss of valuable border protections
within the European theater. These physical border protections in many
cases no longer exist. Technological solutions to tracking illicit
materials, such as biological, chemical and radiological agents, must
be found.
Finally, we must continue to seek zones of cooperation with Russia.
Successful avenues to date have included the Arctic Council, health and
bio-surveillance arenas, combating terrorism, and counter-piracy. We
must encourage Russia to play a more constructive role in European and
global security and foreign policy.
defense department strategic guidance
Question. The January 2012 Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic
Guidance, entitled ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense,'' discusses the importance of Europe as ``our
principal partner in seeking global and economic security.'' At the
same time, the DOD Strategic Guidance calls for a rebalancing of U.S.
military posture toward the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions.
Do you agree with the strategy outlined in the January 2012 DOD
Strategic Guidance?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. In your view what will be the major impact of that
strategy on EUCOM and what changes, if any, would EUCOM need to make to
implement that strategy?
Answer. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance mentions Europe
and NATO prominently, and with good reason. As it says on page 2,
``Europe is home to some of America's most stalwart allies and
partners, many of whom have sacrificed alongside U.S. forces in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.'' Europe is primarily a security
producer, rather than a consumer, and EUCOM's strategy must endeavor to
bolster this ability and commitment to providing security. To this end,
one of EUCOM's key priorities is sustaining the U.S. relationship with
its highly capable allies, as well as the sustainment of those allies
who have recently developed capabilities and interoperability with U.S.
forces. EUCOM will also look to grow its links to NATO, bolstering the
viability of this vital Alliance, which will serve to ensure that
European nations continue to approach global security issues through
the NATO Alliance, and ensure that European and U.S. viewpoints are
weighed together in the decisionmaking process. By bringing attention
to the deep and valuable contributions of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance to
U.S. national security and global security efforts, EUCOM supports the
unique and valuable role that these contributions make, and the
strategic access and global reach they provide.
In order to implement this strategy, EUCOM must look to develop
low-cost, innovative ways to emphasize force interoperability, while
encouraging European allies to conserve resources by adopting the NATO
``Smart Defense'' program. One of these new methods will be the
reinvigorated U.S. contribution to the NATO Response Force (NRF), which
will mitigate force structure reductions in Europe by sustaining and
improving interoperability. Over the long term, the NRF will be a vital
asset for post-ISAF interoperability and NATO's Connected Forces
Initiative. The NRF will also serve as a valuable tool for evaluating
the status of European forces. As the most likely companions in any
security effort, from humanitarian assistance to full-spectrum
conflict, the United States must have confidence in the
interoperability and readiness of European forces.
The planned reduction of NATO forces supporting ISAF, combined with
U.S. reinvigoration in the NRF, provides a unique opportunity for EUCOM
to support NATO's Connected Forces Initiative and make adjustments to
both commands' exercise programs, committing to exercising high-end
capabilities and training. Conducting exercises that test these high-
end capabilities, once common, have reduced markedly in the face of
operational commitments. Exercises that bring together several NATO
nations, focused on advanced training objectives that exercise a joint
force across a broad spectrum of threats, will ensure NATO force
relevance and flexibility. After 10 years of combat deployments against
an asymmetric enemy, NATO will need to dedicate itself to flexible
training that emphasizes underutilized skill sets (for example, naval
and air warfare), while incorporating lessons learned from recent
conflicts. Additionally, a small EUCOM investment in some of these
exercises provides the opportunity for newer (i.e. Eastern European)
members of the Alliance, as well as other NATO partners, to pair with
more mature Allies, continuing to burden-share security cooperation
while raising the overall quality of NATO forces.
In response to shared environments of fiscal austerity, NATO has
embraced the idea of collective resource pooling through the Smart
Defense initiative. Alignment of EUCOM engagement with NATO capability
targets will ensure U.S. bilateral efforts complement NATO's
multilateral efforts. Through this improved cooperation, EUCOM can
reinforce NATO's efforts to maintain a credible mix of expeditionary
forces available for burden-sharing in conflicts that would otherwise
be shouldered by U.S. forces alone. Supporting an initiative such as
Smart Defense should not come at the expense of jeopardizing NATO's
Article 5 commitments and defense spending requirements. EUCOM must
ensure waste or unnecessary capabilities are trimmed and strengths are
retained. EUCOM should engage with the Smart Defense structure to
ensure a holistic approach to future NATO capability requirements.
Finally, EUCOM has an opportunity to enhance its security
cooperation planning by reaching out to Allies who are themselves
conducting some level of security cooperation in the theater. EUCOM can
work together with these nations to openly discuss mutual goals and
plans and gain efficiencies from knowing what engagements other nations
are performing in various regions, what effects are desired in these
regions, and what partnering possibilities exist for theater-wide
security cooperation. Fiscal reality drives this consideration, but so
does strategic sense. Such cooperation can help to smooth future
operational interaction and pair high-end allies with developing
nations to establish theater relationships that will bolster European
security and reduce U.S. resource commitments.
nato commitments on afghanistan transition
Question. At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May, NATO members
committed to promoting a stable and secure Afghanistan and to
``preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for
terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world.'' NATO
members also reaffirmed their commitment to the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan through 2014, when the
transition to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) having the
security lead throughout Afghanistan will be completed and the NATO
combat mission will end.
Do you agree with the goals and transition plan for the ISAF
mission endorsed at the NATO Chicago Summit?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. What are the major challenges you foresee, if confirmed
as the next Commander, EUCOM and SACEUR, in implementing the transition
plan for Afghanistan?
Answer. Over the next 20 months, we must fully recruit, field and
ensure the sustainment of the ANSF while we shift the main effort for
security lead to the Afghans in 2013. We must prepare for the Afghan
Presidential election, while redeploying thousands of ISAF forces and
restructuring our basing posture so that we are ready for the post-2014
mission.
Question. How would you address these challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. I would continue the work in progress, and ensure that
redeployment mechanisms and routes are feasible and practical for ISAF
forces.
building and sustaining the afghan national security forces
Question. The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) is
responsible for building the ANSF to an end strength of 352,000 by this
fall, consisting of 195,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and 157,000
Afghan National Police personnel.
What is your assessment of the NATO Training Mission in
Afghanistan, and what changes, if any, would you recommend for the NTM-
A, if confirmed?
Answer. The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan or NTM-A is truly
a success story. It has changed over time as the ANSF capability has
developed, and will continue to do so.
Question. In your assessment, are the current target end strengths
for the ANA and ANP sufficient for Afghan security forces to assume
full responsibility for security and stability in Afghanistan by 2014?
Answer. Yes, they are. The target strengths are important, but so
are the quality, capabilities, and competence of the force. Improving
these aspects will be a significant part of the Security Force
Assistance Teams work from now until the end of 2014, and beyond in the
post-2014 mission.
Question. At the NATO Chicago Summit, the ISAF participating
countries called for future reductions in the size of the ANSF after
2014 to be ``conditions-based.'' At the same time, the ISAF
participating countries discussed a ``preliminary model'' for the
future size of the ANSF of around 230,000, with an estimated annual
cost of $4.1 billion, which would be subject to regular review in light
of security developments.
Do you agree that any reductions in the ANSF after 2014 from an end
strength of 352,000 need to be conditions-based in light of the
security situation in Afghanistan at the time the reductions would
occur?
Answer. The size and balance of capabilities across the ANSF after
2014 will ultimately be a decision for the sovereign Government of
Afghanistan. The financial contributions by the current ISAF nations
and other countries need to be channeled through a transparent and
accountable mechanism that is open to audit by those contributing
Nations.
Question. What should be NATO's role in assessing the security
conditions in Afghanistan for purposes of determining future force
requirements for the ANSF after 2014?
Answer. The future force requirements for the ANSF after 2014 will
be a decision for the sovereign Government of Afghanistan, with
assistance and advice from the post-2014 NATO led International
Training, Advisory, and Assistance Mission.
nato training mission in afghanistan post-2014
Question. In your view, what should be the objectives and
priorities for a possible NATO training mission in Afghanistan post-
2014?
Answer. The objectives and priorities were agreed by NATO Nations
and partners in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Initiating Directive
at the Defense Ministerial meeting last October and reaffirmed in the
February Defense Ministerial meeting. The NATO-led post-2014 engagement
will train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Security Forces in
line with the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership declaration.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
have for modifying the NATO training mission in Afghanistan after 2014?
Answer. There is still much work to be completed on the post-2014
mission. In particular, the Concept of Operations is currently being
developed for endorsement by the Military Committee and subsequent
approval by the North Atlantic Council. Once this is approved, the
Operation Plan will be developed.
insider threat in afghanistan
Question. The recent rise in the number of attacks by individuals
in Afghan uniform on U.S. and coalition soldiers, so-called ``green-on-
blue'' attacks, has raised concerns about the safety of our soldiers
and the success of the transition plans in Afghanistan. ISAF and Afghan
military leaders have announced a number of new or expanded precautions
to address the insider threat, including increased Afghan
counterintelligence efforts to identify Taliban infiltrators,
additional cultural sensitivity training, and expanding the ``Guardian
Angel'' program to protect against the insider threat in meetings
between coalition and Afghan forces.
To what do you attribute the recent increase in the number of
green-on-blue attacks?
Answer. These attacks are an insurgent tactic, just like the threat
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
Question. What is your assessment of the measures that have been
taken to address the insider threat?
Answer. We have analyzed these attacks, and developed tactics,
techniques, and procedures to counter them. The measures we have taken
to mitigate these attacks in conjunction with the Afghans are working.
(20 incidents July-September 12, 10 incidents October-December 13, 3
incidents January-March 13)
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps, if any, would you
recommend?
Answer. It is important to recognize that the number of insider
attacks has decreased since the summer of last year (20 incidents July-
September, 10 incidents October-December, 3 incidents January-March).
The measures taken across the force are having a positive impact, and I
want to ensure we continue to aggressively implement those measures
while maintaining the strong personal bonds that have proven effective
at the tactical level.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of these insider
attacks on morale among U.S. and allied forces in theater?
Answer. These attacks do have the potential to damage trust between
collation and Afghan forces, however close cooperation and our strong
relationship with the ANSF have been invaluable to tackling this common
threat.
Question. In light of the insider threat, do you believe ISAF
should reconsider its plan to embed small units of U.S. and coalition
military personnel with Afghan military units to advise and assist
those units as the Afghan forces transition to the security lead?
Answer. No. The plan is correct and will ensure the ANSF continue
to advance their military capability. The security of U.S. and
coalition military personnel is improved by building close personal
relationships with the ANSF they advise and assist.
eucom's strategic missions
Question. In your view, what are the key strategic missions of U.S.
European Command?
Answer. We derive our key strategic missions from the Command's
formal mission statement: ``U.S. European Command conducts military
operations, international military engagement, and interagency
partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United
States forward.'' Given this mission statement, as well as the Guidance
for Employment of the Force issued by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, EUCOM's key strategic missions are:

Posture EUCOM forces to execute high-priority
contingency operations;
Sustain the trust, relationships and interoperability
forged over the past decade with our Allies and partners;
aligning our efforts with NATO Targets and Partnership Goals;
Contribute EUCOM forces and enable European force
generation to support an effective and responsible transition
in Afghanistan, ensuring Afghanistan's security while assuring
our NATO allies and partner nations of the U.S. commitment;
Nurture strategic relationships and maintain the
necessary force posture to enable continued access--thereby
ensuring United States freedom of action and global reach;
Prevent violent extremist organizations (VEOs) from
establishing footholds in Europe or obtaining or using weapons
of mass destruction; through close coordination with the other
global and functional combatant commands, minimize the seams
that these VEO's often operate in;
Advance NATO European Ballistic Missile Defense
through an integrated approach built on balanced contributions;
Ensure secure cyber access to enable our other
missions and improve collaborative information sharing across
all security levels;
Combat transnational organized crime to reduce the
effects of trafficking and the monies available to fund illicit
activities;
Support continued defense reform and prevent the
escalation of local crises into regional conflicts,
particularly in the Balkans and Caucasus.

Considering these missions in the context of near-term challenges,
EUCOM derives the following Command priorities:

Ensure readiness to execute EUCOM's high-priority
contingency operations;
Preserve our strategic partnerships to include;

Sustain our relationship with high-end allies
ensuring a strong NATO Alliance;
Preserve the recently developed partner
capability and interoperability;
Maintain regional stability and security;

Enable a successful ISAF transition;
Counter transnational threats, focusing on missile
defense, weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism,
illicit trafficking, counter-piracy and threats from
cyberspace;
Maintain United States' strategic access across Europe
in support of global operations;
Focus on four key countries:

Israel, to maintain a strong partnership;
Russia, to encourage areas of cooperation;
Turkey, to reinvigorate our relationship;
Poland, to enhance the realization of its
potential.
u.s. force structure in europe
Question. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance stated that
there is a strategic opportunity to ``rebalance the U.S. military
investment in Europe.'' Currently there are approximately 70,000 U.S.
military personnel stationed in the European area of responsibility. In
January, the Department of Defense announced additional reductions in
U.S. forces in Europe, including the drawdown of two of the four Army
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) stationed in Europe by the end of 2013 and
the inactivation of one A-10 squadron from Germany in 2013. In
addition, U.S. Army Europe has plans to consolidate and reduce its
footprint from 16 garrisons today to 7 garrisons by 2017.
In answer to questions in advance of the hearing in July on his
nomination to be Chief of Staff of the Air Force, then-U.S. Air Forces
Europe Commander General Mark Welsh said that he would support further
consideration of reductions and consolidation opportunities in the Air
Force posture in Europe.
Do you support the reductions in U.S. force posture in Europe
announced earlier this year?
Answer. Yes. The risk posed by the force reductions announced in
2012 is manageable, and can be reasonably mitigated by employing
rotational forces, to include a CONUS-based brigade fully dedicated to
NATO, as well as implementing the posture initiatives described below.
Our successful efforts to revitalize the transatlantic link, our
unwavering commitment to the defense of Europe, and 65 years of
transatlantic cooperation have lowered threat levels on the continent,
and continue to serve the United States as a vital geostrategic
platform to support our enduring global security requirements. Combined
with the drawdown of operations in Afghanistan, this creates a
strategic opportunity to modernize the U.S. military investment in
Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on
future capabilities. While maintaining our enduring relationships and
security commitments, our force structure in Europe is evolving to meet
a broad range of 21st century challenges, including missile defense,
cyber security, counterterrorism, and countering weapons of mass
destruction. To that end, as announced previously, the plan is to
enhance EUCOM's ability to address ballistic missile threats by forward
stationing four Aegis-Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capable ships in
Spain and establishing land-based SM-3 BMD sites in Romania and Poland,
which adds to the capabilities already provided by the AN/TPY-2 radar
in Turkey. Additionally, we will enhance the responsiveness of Special
Operations Forces in the region (increasing our overall air and ground
capabilities in Europe). We also recently established an aviation
detachment in Poland, enhancing their fixed wing training
opportunities.
Question. Do you believe that additional reductions in U.S. forces
stationed in Europe, including the Army and the Air Force, should be
considered consistent with EUCOM's key strategic missions?
Answer. We must ensure that our posture adapts and evolves in ways
that respond to, and anticipate, changes in the international security
environment. The persistence of conflict, the diffusion of power around
the world, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons technologies,
and rising pressures on the freedom of the global commons pose new
security challenges that require innovative adjustments to our defense
posture. To this end, we will seek a new cooperative architecture, one
that generates opportunities to work together with allies and partners
on shared regional and global security opportunities and challenges.
We'll continue to align our posture to achieve our national strategy
goals and objectives.
Question. If confirmed, would you agree to undertake a review of
the U.S. force posture in Europe to determine whether additional
reductions are appropriate?
Answer. Yes. EUCOM is currently supporting an internal DOD European
infrastructure consolidation analysis. I look forward to reviewing the
recommendations of this effort and working with the Department and
Congress to ensure our military presence in Europe continues to
effectively and efficiently support our national strategy.
use of rotational forces in europe
Question. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance stresses the
importance of a U.S. rotational presence for building partner capacity
and promoting interoperability.
What role do you foresee for U.S-based forces in maintaining a
rotational presence in Europe and promoting interoperability with our
NATO and other European partners?
Answer. EUCOM leverages the Global Force Management system to meet
force requirements in order to build partner capacity and promote
interoperability with allies and partners that cannot be addressed by
our assigned forces. This includes employing U.S.-based Navy and Marine
Corps forces for NATO exercises and our annual Black Sea Rotational
Force program of training and military-to-military activities with
allies and partners in the Black Sea/Caucasus region. The
reinvigoration of U.S. participation in the NATO Response Force and
rotation of U.S.-based battalion task forces to Europe will create
additional opportunities to build partner capacity and promote
interoperability that complement the activities of U.S. Army Europe.
These efforts, by our assigned and rotational forces, are critical to
preserving the gains in interoperability and ally/partner nation
expeditionary capability that have been forged over the past decade of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
u.s. commitment under article v of the north atlantic treaty
Question. A cornerstone of the NATO alliance is the principle of
collective self-defense as codified in Article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S.
commitment to its obligations under Article V?
Answer. The United States is unquestionably committed to its
Article 5 obligations. The formal, demonstrated, and sustained
commitment to Article 5 collective defense by the United States has
provided the backbone for the most successful Alliance in history. For
the past 64 years, this commitment has contributed to an unprecedented
period of peace and prosperity in Europe and North America. But the
strategic value of the U.S. commitment is not a win/lose proposition.
Both sides of the Atlantic have benefited from America's unwavering
commitment. While Europeans have enjoyed the benefit of a powerful
security guarantee, the United States has gained a voice in European
security affairs and an economically strong trading partner resulting
in a Transatlantic Alliance that represents 50 percent of the world's
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Moreover, it is our allies' commitment to
NATO which has enabled interoperable European and Canadian forces to
deploy alongside the United States in Afghanistan, to stay the course
in Kosovo, to take the lead in Libya (enabled by the United States),
and to conduct maritime missions in the Mediterranean as well as
counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean. Today, NATO remains the world's
premier security organization and an essential component of the
transatlantic security bridge. It provides a forum for political and
military combined action, and is exhibiting an increasingly global
perspective. It has become a hub to cooperate with like-minded partners
such as Australia, South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, and Japan. All
of this is made possible because of how seriously the United States
takes its Article 5 obligations. In my view, the U.S. commitment to
Article 5 is a strategic imperative.
russia
Question. U.S. European Command has responsibility for the Russian
Federation in its area of responsibility.
How do you see the NATO-Russia relationship evolving in the future?
Answer. Our goal for building NATO-Russia relations is to find ways
we can collaborate to address areas where our interests intersect in
the complex security environment of the 21st century. We continue to
believe that NATO-Russian cooperation can enhance the security of the
United States, our allies in Europe, and Russia. However, differences
remain, and we look to the NATO-Russia Council as a forum to discuss
both our differences as well as our shared interests. The NATO-Russia
Council has achieved much through political dialogue over the last few
years. There remains a robust military to military cooperation program
between NATO and Russia. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
my Russian counterparts and furthering these important relationships.
Question. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-
Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of
common interest between the United States and Russia in the security
sphere?
Answer. We continue to seek cooperation with Russia in zones of
mutual interest and benefit, particularly in the military-to-military
areas of combating terrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping in unstable
regions, and maritime interoperability. Additionally, we look for ways
to support interagency efforts in areas beyond direct Russian Defense
Ministry oversight, particularly in counternarcotics, humanitarian
assistance/disaster response, and support to capacity-building for
Afghanistan security forces through 2014 and beyond, such as the
Afghanistan Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund.
european phased adaptive approach to missile defense
Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to implement the European Phased Adaptive
Approach to missile defense, designed to provide capability against the
existing and emerging missile threat from Iran. Phase 1 was
successfully deployed by the end of 2011, including an Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense-capable ship on patrol in the Mediterranean, an early-
warning missile defense radar in Turkey, and a command and control
center in Germany. Future phases will include Standard Missile-3
interceptors based at sea and on land in Romania and Poland.
Do you agree that the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) will
provide the capability needed to protect U.S. forces in Europe and our
NATO European allies against existing and emerging Iranian missile
threats?
Answer. Yes. EPAA Phases 1-3 are designed to address the increasing
missile threat. The United States remains firmly committed to Phases 1-
3 which is the United States' contribution to NATO missile defense. In
the words of Secretary Hagel: ``Let me emphasize the strong and
continued commitment of the United States to NATO missile defense. That
commitment remains ironclad.'' EUCOM has already deployed Phase 1
capability including a radar to Turkey, which is now under NATO Command
and Control, and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense-capable ships to the
Mediterranean.
The United States' commitment to Phases 2 and 3 includes the
development of missile defense sites in Romania (2015) as part of Phase
2 and in Poland (2018) as part of Phase 3. Both deployments remain on
schedule and on budget, and coordinated with both countries.
Construction on the Romanian site is scheduled to begin this year in
addition to equipment purchases for the Phase 3 site in Poland. The
goal of Phase 4 of the EPAA was to defend the United States against an
ICBM attack from the Middle East. Though we are no longer planning for
Phase 4, we will achieve its intended effect sooner by additional GBIs
deployed in Alaska, which will also enhance protection of the United
States against the growing threat from North Korea.
Question. Do you believe that it is important to develop the
Standard Missile-3, Block IIB interceptor in order to have the
capability to defend against potential future long-range Iranian
missiles that could reach all of Europe as well as the United States?
Answer. We support the Secretary of Defense's decision and we
believe the solution that has been described is the most
technologically sound decision at this time.
missile defense cooperation with russia
Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
cooperate with Russia on missile defense against common missile threats
from nations such as Iran. President Obama has announced that such
cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.
Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
nations such as Iran?
Answer. Yes. Constructive cooperation with Russia in fields of
mutual interest, such as missile defense, is a EUCOM goal. If
confirmed, I would look to continue supporting U.S. interagency efforts
to increase cooperation and transparency with Russia. Cooperation with
Russia demonstrates our transparency and develops trust between
nations. In turn this trust underpins and enhances our security.
Question. Do you believe that such cooperation could send a
powerful signal to Iran and help in our efforts to dissuade Iran from
pursuing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles?
Answer. Yes. Strategic cooperation between Russia and NATO has many
benefits that strengthen our security. We have seen how coordination
with Russia on topics of mutual interest can send powerful messages.
However, our work at EUCOM is closely aligned with the progress of the
NATO-Russia Council in defining and aligning our interests in missile
defense.
Question. In response to a committee question to General Martin
Dempsey, then-nominee to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Dempsey stated that missile defense cooperation with Russia
``could result in tangible benefits to the United States, Europe, and
Russia in the form of a more robust common defense against missile
threats, which could strengthen strategic stability and transparency.
U.S. cooperation with Russia along the lines of shared early warning of
missile launches, technical exchanges, operational cooperation and
planning, and joint exercises would be mutually beneficial.''
Do you agree with General Dempsey's assessment?
Answer. Yes. Both the U.S. and NATO Russia Council are working on
constructive engagements with Russia on Missile Defense, to include
joint technical studies and exercises when Russia is ready.
nato missile defense contributions
Question. The United States is deploying the EPAA as its
contribution to NATO missile defense capability. As part of its
decision to develop such a capability, NATO has agreed to develop and
pay for a missile defense command and control network, the active
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system. Various NATO nations,
including Turkey, Poland, Romania, Germany, and Spain, have agreed to
host elements of NATO missile defense, and they and others are making
additional national contributions to NATO missile defense.
Do you agree that this current NATO approach to missile defense
contributions is reasonable and appropriate?
Answer. Yes, I do. If confirmed, I am looking forward to continuing
to emphasize the efforts already underway, as well as increasing allied
coordination and cooperation during my time as EUCOM Commander in order
to facilitate and enable additional allied contributions to the
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) mission.
EUCOM is observing that the NATO response to the ballistic missile
threat is increasing, and we are actively working with our allies to
explore additional capabilities that complement and are interoperable
with the United States' EPAA contribution to NATO. For instance, EUCOM
just hosted (in September 2012) an Allied BMD Upgrade Conference in
Berlin, Germany, with eight allies (the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark,
Norway, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Italy) that already possess
advanced land-based and maritime air defense assets that could be
upgraded for BMD capability. I look forward to continuing and expanding
such engagement activities with our allies.
Additionally, EUCOM has aligned our exercise program to provide
increased opportunities to work with our NATO allies on the non-
technical aspects of interoperability, including the ability to execute
missile defense.
I think it is also important to keep in mind that the Chicago
Summit called for ``voluntary national contributions to NATO missile
defense''. Several of the allies are already stepping up in this
regard, to include: our basing allies (Spain, Romania, Poland, Turkey,
Germany); allies that possess lower tier BMD capabilities, such as the
Netherlands and Germany (with their Patriot PAC-3 systems); as well as
allies that are considering or already upgrading existing maritime and
land-based air defense systems to provide upper tier surveillance and
interceptor capacity to the Alliance. For example, the Netherlands
recently announced the signing of a contract to upgrade all four of
their Air Defense Command Frigates for BMD surveillance capability that
could be used to cue U.S. Aegis BMD ships or other allied BMD assets,
and provide air defense escort for U.S. BMD ships. Poland and Turkey
are considering the purchase of lower tier BMD systems, such as the
Patriot PAC-3. In short, many allies are already providing support to
various aspects of the BMD mission in Europe, and could potentially
provide additional contributions across the full spectrum of the
missile defense mission, including: basing; passive defense; active
defense; theater missile warning; command and control; attack
operations; and consequence management. All of these are important
contributions to NATO's ballistic missile defense mission.
nato-russia council
Question. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has served as an important
venue for discussions and cooperation between NATO and Russia,
including missile defense cooperation such as the Theater Missile
Defense exercise program. Recent NATO communiques have expressed
support for expanded cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council,
including on missile defense.
Do you believe the NATO-Russia Council has potential as a forum for
NATO-Russian cooperation, including cooperation on missile defense?
Answer. Yes, I do.
The NATO-Russia Council Work Program provides for multiple agreed
areas of cooperation with Russia, including not only missile defense,
but also the Afghanistan Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund, counter-
narcotics training for South and Central Asia, combating terrorism,
crisis management, logistics, maritime search and rescue, counter-
piracy, and others. Although missile defense remains a point of
contention between NATO and Russia, discussions on possible cooperation
continue. NATO has held active discussions with Russia through the
NATO-Russia Council Missile Defense Working group. We continue to
believe that cooperation with Russia on missile defense can enhance the
security of both NATO and Russia.
Question. Do you support continuation of the Theater Missile
Defense exercise program within the NATO-Russia Council?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Both the U.S. and NATO-Russia Council are working on constructive
engagements with Russia on Theater Missile Defense, to include
cooperative technical studies and exercises when Russia is ready. The
effectiveness of these efforts will ultimately depend on Russia's
willingness to engage.
eucom role in coordinating missile defense with israel
Question. U.S. European Command has Israel in its area of
responsibility (AOR) and, among other missions, has the mission of
coordinating and integrating U.S. missile defense capabilities and
operations with those of Israel. To this end, EUCOM has sponsored a
number of previous missile defense exercises with Israel. In addition,
the United States has deployed a EUCOM missile defense radar (known as
an AN/TPY-2 radar) to enhance defense against missiles from Iran.
Do you agree that this EUCOM mission of coordination and
integration of U.S. and Israeli missile defense capabilities and
operations is a critical component of our security posture in the EUCOM
AOR?
Answer. Yes, I do. Cooperation between the United States and Israel
is important to the security of the Middle East, and reflects a common
understanding of the global security environment. Periodic missile
defense exercises such as Exercise Austere Challenge 12 provided an
excellent opportunity to train our military forces to respond to a
regional crisis. This training is essential to building and maintaining
defense interoperability and ensures Israel's qualitative military
edge.
Question. If confirmed, would you continue to make this mission a
high priority as Commander of EUCOM?
Answer. Yes. EUCOM has a robust program to support co-development,
integration, and exercises focused on the missile defense of Israel. If
confirmed, the defense of Israel will continue to remain a EUCOM high-
priority mission under my command.
nato-led kosovo force
Question. Approximately 5,600 troops from 30 contributing nations,
including nearly 900 U.S. troops, are deployed as part of the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR). KFOR's mission is to assist in maintaining a safe
and secure environment in Kosovo consistent with United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1244 and to support the development of the
Kosovo Security Force (KSF). NATO has sought to gradually draw down the
KFOR presence as the security situation has improved.
What do you see as the major challenges in Kosovo, including in
connection with the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force?
Answer. The principle challenge facing Kosovo is solidifying the
gains of independence and continuing to build the institutions of a
modern democratic state. Much progress has been made, but more work
remains. A key to allow Kosovo the space to undertake key reforms is
the quest for and implementation of an acceptable political agreement
with Belgrade that will resolve the longstanding impasse over northern
Kosovo. Setting the stage for successful negotiations and peaceful
resolution remains the top priority. Resolution of this impasse is
critical for Kosovo's and the region's long-term stability.
Subsequently, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) has matured, under
its limited mandate, into a professional, multi-ethnic, civil response
focused, security organization. However, the KSF does not yet possess
the capabilities to replace KFOR as Kosovo's enduring security and
defense organization. Our goal is to start building these additional
capabilities with the KSF early next year after Kosovo legislative
restrictions are lifted this summer. It is essential that NATO is an
active partner in shaping the future KSF with U.S. support, so that the
future KSF contributes to, not detracts from, regional security and is
not viewed as a threat to its neighbors. Some allies who do not
recognize Kosovo's independence are slow to support increasing
competencies of the KSF which could pose additional challenges in the
future.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps, if any, would you
recommend to enhance the ability of KFOR to carry out and complete its
mission in Kosovo?
Answer. KFOR must act within its mandate and mission and we must
not allow KFOR's role to include the realm of law enforcement, yet this
is the predominate capability required to maintain peace in Kosovo.
KFOR's most effective role is to deter violence through a strong
presence, and to respond as a third provider to unrest that exceeds
Kosovo Police and European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)
capabilities. Within this context, our best approach includes: (1)
strong support for continued dialogue; (2) urging Europe to maintain or
increase their contributions to EULEX and encourage EULEX to robustly
fulfill its mandate; (3) urging allies to fully meet force commitments
to KFOR to present a strong and unified KFOR presence; and (4) maintain
the U.S. plan to provide a timely military response after NATO response
forces become committed in the event of crisis.
nato enlargement
Question. What are your views on whether NATO would benefit from
further rounds of enlargement?
Answer. The policy on enlargement is set out in Article 10 of the
North Atlantic Treaty. NATO has an ``Open Door'' policy of further
enlargement that was agreed to by the Alliance Heads of States and
Government at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 and reaffirmed at the Chicago
Summit this year. The decision of which Nations are offered, and when
they join, is political and will be ultimately decided by the 28 member
states of NATO.
Question. What criteria should the United States apply in
evaluating candidates for future NATO enlargement?
Answer. The criteria are well established in the Membership Action
Plan mechanism, which I support. It supports stable, democratic, and
reform-driven Nations who wish to contribute to security.
Question. In your view, is there a limit on the extent to which
NATO can be enlarged and still be an effective military organization
capable of making decisions and acting in a timely fashion?
Answer. NATO has gone through several rounds of enlargement, and
has continued to prove itself effective.
georgia
Question. In your view, how should the United States and NATO
proceed on the issue of NATO membership for Georgia?
Answer. This is a political issue and outside the role and
responsibilities of SACEUR. As I stated previously, Article 10 of the
Washington Treaty, and the agreed Open Door policy for further NATO
enlargement, allow for stable, democratic and reform-driven Nations to
be considered for NATO membership.
That said, I believe the U.S. and NATO should continue to reaffirm
support for Georgia's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the
Bucharest decision regarding Georgia's eventual NATO membership.
Georgia's democratic reform progress, exemplified by the successful
October parliamentary elections and transition of leadership between
democratic parties, their unwavering and substantive support to ISAF
operations, and commitment to the Geneva talks and a peaceful
resolution of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia territorial disputes are
all very encouraging signs that we commend. Likewise, Georgia continues
to demonstrate itself as a strong partner of NATO through its
contributions to our ISAF mission, where its two infantry battalions
serve with no operational caveats, shoulder to shoulder with U.S.
marines, in one of the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan. We will
continue to encourage the new Georgian Government in its reform
efforts. EUCOM is committed to assisting the new government through
close partnership and continued engagement just as we have in the past.
Question. Section 1242 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012 requires the Secretary of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, to develop a plan for normalized
U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia, including the sale of defensive
arms.
What is your assessment of current U.S. defense cooperation with
Georgia?
Answer. The United States currently has a vigorous defense
cooperation program with Georgia. We conduct hundreds of events
annually in a wide-range of areas to include: cyber defense; border
security; professional military education development; and
counterinsurgency operations training, to name a few. Georgia has one
of the most robust Foreign Military Financing programs in EUCOM, with
funding at approximately $14 million.
In January 2012, President Obama offered six enhanced engagement
areas to President Saakashvili, which will help the Georgians improve
their national defense. Those areas are:

1. Operational air surveillance/air defense training and
education;
2. Coastal surveillance training and education;
3. Tactical level train-the-trainer instruction for Junior
Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers;
4. Brigade command and staff training and education;
5. Defensive combat engineer training and education; and
6. Utility helicopter aviation training support.

EUCOM has already conducted or has planned initial engagements with
Georgia in all these areas. We are aggressively using our International
Military Education and Training funding to fulfill many of the
educational requirements in these areas. These new areas of
cooperation, which are in addition to continuing cooperation in defense
institution building efforts, focus on Georgia's self-defense
capabilities and NATO interoperability.
Question. What opportunities, if any, do you see for enhanced U.S.
defense cooperation with Georgia, including defensive arms?
Answer. With regard to defensive equipment, the Obama
administration has agreed to consider favorably the sale of air
surveillance radars, coastal surveillance acoustic systems, and small
arms ammunition.
nato-european union
Question. How would you characterize the NATO-EU relationship
today?
Answer. It is a strong partnership. This is reflected in the
Strategic Concept from the Lisbon Summit, which determined to
strengthen the strategic partnership between NATO and the European
Union (EU).
That said, the characterization of the NATO-EU relationship is
largely a political issue outside the purview of the role of the
SACEUR. However, from a military perspective, the two organizations can
be complementary partners in a comprehensive approach addressing
complex crisis, and I believe the relationship is improving. NATO and
the EU are now coordinating efforts to improve capabilities and the EU
is using NATO Defense Planning baseline information to help establish
priorities.
Question. In your view, what should be NATO's position with regard
to European efforts to strengthen the European Security and Defense
Policy and build military capacity within the European Union?
Answer. NATO's position regarding the strengthening of European
Security and Defense Policy will be decided at the political level by
its 28 member nations. However, from a purely military perspective
there is no question that within Europe the military capabilities are
derived from a single pool of forces which are made available to either
NATO or the EU based on a political decision. Of the 27 EU member
nations, 21 are in NATO. The building of the capacity and capability of
forces within the EU is also the building of military capacity and
capability for NATO. In a resource constrained environment it makes
sense to leverage the capabilities of all NATO and EU members to ensure
the best return on a limited defense investment. If confirmed, this is
an area in which I would seek to develop complementary activities in
coordination with my counterpart, General Jean-Paul Palomeros of Allied
Command Transformation, in Norfolk, who is leading the military effort
to develop capabilities in NATO.
france
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of France rejoining
the integrated military structure?
Answer. I strongly welcome the significant contributions across the
Alliance made by France. France is one of the most militarily capable
members of NATO, and is a critical ally of the United States. We
believe France's decision to reintegrate into the NATO integrated
military structure has been mutually beneficial. The alliance is
stronger militarily, the transatlantic link is more solid, and our own
bilateral relationship with France is strengthened along with it. We
appreciate France's leadership in the alliance--in terms of
capabilities, defense investment, and contributions to operations.
unified command plan changes
Question. It has been reported that Admiral McRaven, Commander of
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), is seeking changes to the
Unified Command Plan (UCP) that he believes would allow SOCOM to better
support the requirements of the Theater Special Operations Commands
(TSOCs). Reportedly, such changes would give the Commander of SOCOM
combatant command authority over the TSOCs--including responsibilities
for resourcing--and provide for more rapid deployment of Special
Operations Forces to and between geographic combatant commands without
the requirement for approval by the Secretary of Defense in every case.
Operational control of deployed Special Operations Forces would
reportedly remain with the respective geographic combatant commander.
Some have expressed concern that such changes could raise problems
related to civilian control of the military, infringe upon the
traditional authorities of the geographic combatant commanders, and
make it more difficult for Ambassadors and geographic combatant
commanders to know what military personnel are coming into their areas
of responsibility and what they are doing while they are there.
Please provide your assessment of whether such UCP changes are
appropriate.
Answer. The UCP changes to SOCOM are designed to provide a greater
measure of flexibility in responding to the fluid and global nature of
counterterrorism. Along with the approved changes in our assigned
forces document called `Forces for', they provide a level of global
perspective to the counter-terror fight that is currently lacking
within DOD. By altering the command relationship slightly, SOCOM gains
abilities that have been in use in Operation Enduring Freedom since
2005 (under SOCOM 121 authorities). These authorities have allowed for
rapid deployment of U.S.-based Special Operations Forces to and between
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
areas of responsibility. They are appropriate, as long as caveats
relating to minimum force levels discussed between EUCOM and SOCOM are
implemented.
Question. Please address any concerns that such UCP changes may
raise, including whether such changes would conflict with civilian
control of the military, infringe upon authorities provided to the
geographic combatant commanders, or raise concerns with the State
Department?
Answer. The UCP and ``Forces for'' changes do not conflict with
civilian control of the military as, fundamentally, the changes require
and defer to civilian authority. This is a bedrock principle of the
U.S. military's constitutional obligation to fully abide by civilian
authority. Additionally, these changes, with the agreed-upon caveat
suggested by EUCOM, do not infringe upon the authority of the
geographic combatant commanders (GCC) in any way. Forces assigned to a
GCC remain under the operational control (OPCON) of that GCC, and
therefore require GCC concurrence prior to being assigned outside the
theater. This arrangement fundamentally supports geographic combatant
commander authority. The same would be true of forces entering the
theater. This will allay State Department concerns about the UCP
change, as it maintains the current notification and permissions
relationship between the GCC and ambassadors, ensuring that foreign
policy concerns continue to be addressed in the same manner as before.
The caveat mentioned above is that EUCOM requested an identified
baseline of Special Operations Forces assigned to the GCC. This would
allow EUCOM to make long-term plans for the engagement of partners and
allies in theater with confidence that the forces assigned against
those engagements are not withdrawn from the theater without an
informed discussion of the costs and disruptions that might be
incurred.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. I believe working in a collaborative manner with
representatives from other Federal partners is essential to achieving
success for any combatant commander. The value provided by
representatives from other agencies cannot and should not be duplicated
within the Defense Department. That is why every geographic combatant
command now has some organizational entity designed to facilitate
collaborative interagency efforts. At EUCOM Headquarters, that
organization is the J9-Interagency Partnering Directorate established
through the vision and wisdom of ADM Stavridis in November 2009.
EUCOM's J9 model has been emulated at other geographic combatant
commands, including U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Southern Command, under
the leadership of ADM Stavridis; U.S. Africa Command; and, most
recently, U.S. Northern Command. At EUCOM, the J9 Interagency
Partnering Directorate hosts 12 Federal agency partners from U.S.
Government Departments and Agencies, including: the Departments of
State, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Energy; and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID). EUCOM utilizes a broad
definition of ``interagency partnering'' to include collaboration with
non-governmental, academic and private sector partners.
In another compelling whole-of-government initiative, EUCOM
installed a career foreign service officer and senior State Department
leader to serve as the ``Civilian Deputy to the Commander.'' The
creation of that position, the Command's most senior ``interagency
representative'' was also an initiative developed by Jim Stavridis. The
position is presently filled by Ambassador Larry Butler.
In my mind, the key to successful interagency partnering is to
properly identify and engage partners early in the planning process in
order to capture the expertise these organizations can bring to the
effort at hand. Once engaged, we must maintain open and continuous
communications with each other throughout operations to fully realize
the benefit of everyone's unique experiences, expertise, and
contributions.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. Our environment is characterized by decreasing resources
and an atmosphere of multiple distributed threats. Given this setting,
it makes both fiscal and strategic sense to continue advocating for an
interagency, whole-of-government, collaborative approach as a
fundamental modus operandi. I believe this is the most effective and
efficient method for us to safeguard and advance U.S. and Theater
priorities.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you seek to play in
encouraging greater interagency collaboration between U.S. Special
Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government
departments and agencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to continue the innovative
interagency efforts underway at EUCOM Headquarters through initiatives
like the Civilian Deputy Commander, the J9 Interagency Partnering
Directorate, and the Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center.
These offices help ensure the combatant command continues to engage in
early and continuous interagency coordination, planning, and
collaboration. They foster a mindset that encourages linking U.S.
Government agency representatives to relevant DOD headquarters and
component staffs. These efforts have ensured the expertise,
capabilities, and priorities of twelve hosted partner agencies are
coordinated with critical EUCOM and component planning and execution
efforts. If confirmed, I would continue to support this important 21st
century way of thinking; strengthening existing relationships among
Federal and non-governmental partners and the command. I would also
look for opportunities to expand their participation across the Command
to capitalize on the capabilities, authorities, and reach-back
abilities present in their parent organizations.
special operations personnel in embassies
Question. U.S. Special Operations Command deploys personnel to work
with country teams in a number of priority countries where the United
States is not engaged in direct action operations but rather trying to
stop the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is to support the
priorities of the ambassador and the geographic combatant commander's
theater campaign plan against terrorist networks. At times, ambassadors
have complained that they have not been adequately informed of
activities by Special Operations Forces in their country.
If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the goals of
special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned
closely with those of the ambassadors they are working with?
Answer. If confirmed, I will promote an interagency approach as we
assess the deployment of military forces within the EUCOM AOR. U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) must have flexibility to respond to
the fluid and global nature of counterterrorism. However, the
ambassadors must be notified of these deployments to ensure foreign
policy concerns are addressed adequately.
Question. What is your assessment of the value of these special
operations personnel to their respective geographic combatant commands
and the country teams they are supporting?
Answer. Special operations forces are an invaluable resource to the
geographic combatant commander. From my experience in Afghanistan,
these forces provide a unique capability that is indispensable to
global counterterrorism efforts.
marine security guards in embassies
Question. Due to the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi,
Libya, which resulted in the death of of a U.S. Ambassador and three
other Americans, many are conveying concern about the safety of U.S.
diplomatic personnel around the world.
Do you share this concern?
Answer. I do share this committee's concern for the safety of our
diplomatic colleagues stationed around the world.
Question. The Marine Security Guard Program was established in
1946, and its mission, to provide internal security at designated
embassies of classified information and equipment, remains unchanged to
this day.
In light of increasing threats to U.S. diplomatic personnel by
terrorists throughout the world, do you believe it is time to re-
examine the Program's mission and protocols?
Answer. The Marine Corps Embassy Security Group does not fall under
the authority of the combatant commands. EUCOM does not have the
expertise to comment on the Marine Security Guard Program's mission and
protocols.
Question. If so, should it be broadened to provide additional
protection to U.S. diplomatic personnel?
Answer. Although the primary mission of the Marine Security Guard
Program is to provide internal security services at designated U.S.
diplomatic and consular facilities to prevent the compromise of
classified information and equipment vital to the national security of
the United States, a secondary mission is to provide protection for
U.S. citizens and U.S. Government property located within designated
U.S. diplomatic and consular premises during exigent circumstances
(urgent temporary circumstances which require immediate aid or action).
Question. In your opinion, what additional steps, if any, should be
taken to reduce the risk of attacks on U.S. embassies and consulates
and diplomatic personnel by terrorist organizations throughout the
world and in the EUCOM area of responsibility, in particular?
Answer. The risk of attack to our diplomatic facilities can never
be completely eliminated. Working closely with my Department of State
colleagues, I will seek to reduce the risk by leveraging the expertise
of our interagency partners in order to strengthen our comprehensive
counter-terrorism strategy. In an era of decreasing resources and
increased threats, we must utilize a whole-of-government approach to
reduce the risk to our diplomatic facilities and personnel in the EUCOM
area of responsibility and beyond.
nato special operations headquarters
Question. The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ)
was created in 2007 to enhance the capabilities of and promote
interoperability between the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of NATO
member nations. Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM), has credited the NSHQ with bringing about ``a
generational leap forward in NATO Allied and Partner SOF
capabilities.''
What do you see as the value of NSHQ to ISAF operations in
Afghanistan?
Answer. Since its establishment in 2007, the NATO Special
Operations Force Head Quarters (NSHQ) has quietly made an immense
behind the scenes impact on operations in Afghanistan, and more
broadly, in the development of a wider Allied and Partner SOF. In an
ISAF context, one of the over arching achievements has been the
establishment of a coherent framework for Allied and Partner SOF
operations under the ISAF mandate that was non-existent prior to the
inception of the NSHQ. This crucial framework has not only brought a
greater capability to ISAF, but has also served to underpin a more
effective and relevant and inter-operable SOF capability through the
creation of doctrine, training, and common standards. Moreover, the
NSHQ has also been instrumental in supporting increased SOF
contributions by Allies and Partners to ISAF operations. Allied and
Partner SOF contributions on the ground have increased by some 500
percent since 2007.
The NSHQ has also closed a number of operational gaps identified in
Afghanistan by developing and conducting a comprehensive purpose built
training and education program at the NATO SOF School. This effort has
included combined joint SOF staff operations and procedures, technical
exploitation, threat network analysis, imagery analysis, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) full motion video
employment. Additionally, the NSHQ has enabled NATO Allied and Partner
SOF through the reciprocal sharing of classified information leveraging
both the NATO SOF communications network and the NSHQ's the Special
Operations Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC) in Kabul that serves more than
2,200 Allied and Partner SOF personnel operating under ISAF. These
enhancements include enabling Allied and Partner SOF task forces to
receive ISR video feeds in support of partnered advise and assist
operations with their Afghan counterparts in the Provincial Response
Companies (PRC).
Question. What role do you believe the NSHQ should play in future
contingencies involving NATO SOF?
Answer. Operations in Afghanistan have led to significant gains in
SOF capabilities and capacities across Allied and Partner SOF. Let me
also point out that the benefits realized from the enhancement of SOF
within the Alliance by the NSHQ also impact bi-lateral and multilateral
SOF operations outside of a NATO context. In response to operational
requirements, the NSHQ has successfully established a NATO Allied and
Partner SOF community where none existed previously. This human SOF
network transcends the Alliance and habitually includes non-NATO SOF
partners from Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland,
Austria, and Switzerland. Looking ahead to future challenges, we need
to transfer the synergy, effectiveness, and efficiency acquired as a
result of operational drivers in Afghanistan, to counter-piracy, and
from NSHQ activities, and orient them towards emerging Alliance
security challenges. In many instances SOF will play an instrumental
role in mitigating threats. The NSHQ role will be crucial in developing
a more responsive and agile series of SOF capabilities including scaled
force packages with organic plug and play capabilities. NSHQ
coordination and focus will ensure greater utility to the Alliance with
an assured full spectrum SOF capability.
Question. How do you believe the NSHQ can most effectively support
NATO SOF capabilities and interoperability?
Answer. The NSHQ role, with its specific and focused advocacy of
SOF initiatives, is a crucial driver of Alliance SOF capability and
interoperability. Moreover, as highlighted at the February NATO Defense
Ministers meeting, NATO SOF interoperability will be key to supporting
NATO's Connected Forces initiative. It is important to recognize that
there is no more efficient or effective means to develop SOF
capabilities, capacities, and interoperability than through an enduring
Alliance with a dedicated SOF advocate hence the reason the NATO SOF
Transformation Initiative was launched following the North Atlantic
Council endorsement at the Riga Summit in 2006. As mentioned, the NSHQ
has made unprecedented strides in the development of SOF capabilities
and capacities across a range of disciplines and functional areas.
Significant improvements include the areas of command, control,
communications, information sharing, policy making, doctrine and
standard operating procedures. A robust SOF community of interest in
SOF medicine has enabled the development of this critical capability
across the Alliance. A well-documented Alliance and National SOF
capability gap is in SOF air which was painfully evident in Afghanistan
and in many cases affected our operational tempo. The NSHQ is working
to gain similar momentum to promote enhanced capability, capacity and
interoperability in the air domain. Success will be the integration of
these capabilities that will eventually allow for a more responsive
employment of SOF in a NATO context and among national SOF.
Question. What do you believe are the appropriate roles for EUCOM
and SOCOM in providing guidance and resources to the NSHQ?
Answer. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters is under the daily
operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, so in terms
of guidance, if confirmed, I would oversee all operational issues
related to the NSHQ. As Commander, EUCOM, I am delegated authority from
the Joint Staff to execute U.S. Lead Agent and framework nation
representative responsibilities, including managing NSHQ manpower and
strength with support from the Army to manage fiscal resourcing. The
Commander of SOCOM is designated as the Lead Component charged with
Executive Agent responsibilities within the U.S. Department of Defense.
In that capacity, Admiral McRaven exercises SOF custodianship of U.S.
framework nation related activities.
mass atrocities prevention
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10.
Among interagency partners, what is EUCOM's role in addressing
atrocity threats, and what tools does EUCOM have for preventing or
responding to atrocities in its AOR?
Answer. EUCOM has been one of the DOD leaders in the development of
an analytical framework to shape the military's role within the
interagency community to focus on the unique aspects of preventing and
responding to mass atrocities. EUCOM has developed detailed operational
level tools to prevent and respond to atrocity threats along three
broad lines of effort. These lines of effort include operational
integration to transform evolving concepts into practicable/executable
tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine development to
institutionalize already accepted practices; and policy development/
refinement to foster interagency integration. A year ago, EUCOM co-
hosted a conference with AFRICOM to catalyze a broad discussion on mass
atrocity prevention and response operations as well as address the
requirements of Presidential Study Directive 10. Attendees included
senior representatives from the National Security Staff, Department of
State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Dr. Sarah
Sewall, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard
University.
Question. Has EUCOM developed planning processes toward this effort
so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations?
Answer. Yes. EUCOM has a level-two contingency plan for conducting
peace operations in the EUCOM area of responsibility with the focus to
contain conflict, redress the peace, and intervene to either prevent or
respond to mass atrocities. The plan provides the staff with tools to
facilitate a rapid response to include: a mass atrocity specific
commander's critical information requirement; a joint operations center
checklist to alert key leaders and initiate crisis action planning; a
playbook that delineates critical events in the interagency response
process; and a detailed mass atrocity response operation annex that
will enable the command to collaboratively plan and execute a mass
atrocity response operation.
counter threat finance
Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
Community have called for investing additional resources in identifying
and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and
illicit trafficking.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. I completely agree. Of course, Treasury has lead and a
great deal of expertise. The U.S. Government, and in this case the
Department of Defense, must invest the required resources to identify
and track the revenue flow derived from illicit activities. These
funds, increasing by trillions of dollars, are key enablers in
challenging security, creating instability, and undermining good
governance on a worldwide scale. Through close interagency partnership
with U.S. law enforcement agencies, DOD support to counter threat
finance serves a critical role in disrupting narco-trafficking and
transnational organized crime.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of
EUCOM in supporting counter threat finance activities?
Answer. Again, acknowledging that Treasury has lead, I believe that
EUCOM, and all of the regional combatant commands, have a critical role
in supporting counter threat finance (CTF) activities. Illicit
trafficking organizations operate on a global scale. As a result,
attacking these networks requires a comprehensive, synchronized,
interagency, and international effort. Currently, EUCOM has an organic
CTF team that works collaboratively with U.S. Government interagency
and international partners in support of the National Transnational
Organized Crime Strategy (TOC) and U.S. national security objectives.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. In July 2011, the President
released the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime:
Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority
action areas designated in the strategy is ``enhancing Department of
Defense support to U.S. law enforcement''.
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's strategy to combat transnational organized
crime (TOC) is organized around a single, unifying principle--to build,
balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat
transnational organized crime and related threats to our national
security, and to urge our partners to do the same. The National TOC
strategy will achieve this end state by pursuing five key policy
objectives:

1. Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and
exploitation of transnational criminal networks.
2. Help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency,
break the corruptive power of transnational criminal networks, and
sever state-crime alliances.
3. Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and
protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system from TOC
penetration and abuse.
4. Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest
threat to national security by targeting their infrastructures,
depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the criminal
facilitation of terrorist activities.
5. Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and
public-private partnerships to defeat transnational organized crime.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat to the United
States posed by transnational organized crime operating in the EUCOM
AOR?
Answer. Transnational organized crime networks use sophisticated
business models and operations to perpetuate their illicit activities.
They are highly adaptable, bold in their techniques, and ruthless in
their execution. These networks are expanding and diversifying their
activities at an alarming rate. The result is a convergence of well-
funded transnational organized crime networks that can destabilize
entire economies, undermine good governance, and create national
security threats to our Homeland and our allies. TOC networks with
links to narcotics and arms smuggling, trafficking in persons, and a
variety of other revenue generating commodities operate throughout the
EUCOM AOR. These entities, with their exceptional destabilizing
influence, threaten our Theater and national security interests, the
security and stability of our allies and partners, and U.S. interests
both at home and abroad.
Question. What role does EUCOM play in combating transnational
organized crime and in training and equipping partner security forces
that have been tasked with combating it?
Answer. In Europe, EUCOM's new Joint Interagency Counter
Trafficking Center (JICTC), is focused on facilitating and implementing
the National TOC Strategy in conjunction with U.S. interagency
organizations and international partners. JICTC's mission is to support
U.S. Interagency and Country Team efforts, and collaborate with similar
international organizations, to counter transnational illicit
trafficking and other associated threats. JICTC also assists partner
nations to build self-sufficient counter-trafficking skills,
competencies, and capacity to defend the Homeland forward from the
rising threats posed by global transnational illicit trafficking. It is
important to emphasize that EUCOM does not seek to become the lead U.S.
Government agency for combating organized crime. Rather, EUCOM and its
JICTC provide support to U.S. agencies to help synchronize their
counter-trafficking efforts in a collaborative, whole-of-government
approach. JICTC's focus areas include: narcotics trafficking;
terrorism; weapons trafficking (illicit weapons, as well as WMD); human
trafficking; and threat financing.
dod counter-narcotics activities
Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs
flowing toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD's counter-
narcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support
the Department's CN operations, including to build the capacity of U.S.
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign
governments, and provide intelligence support on CN-related matters and
a variety of other unique enabling capabilities. EUCOM's AOR is a
receiving market for much of the world's illegal narcotics.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD--and by extension
EUCOM--in counterdrug efforts in the EUCOM AOR?
Answer. The appropriate DOD role in counterdrug efforts inside the
EUCOM AOR is to contribute directly and meaningfully to the U.S.
Interagency development of international, comprehensive, synchronized,
and proactive drug control strategies. Additionally, EUCOM must work
with U.S. Country Teams to help build the capacity of partner-nations
to detect, interdict, and prosecute transnational organized criminals
before their activities adversely impact the United States or U.S.
interests. Those interests include stemming the illicit revenues raised
by the drug trade, revenue which poses a direct threat to U.S.
interests and security in Afghanistan and along our Nation's southern
borders.
Question. Given that the vast majority of illegal drugs arriving in
Europe are not destined for the United States, should DOD invest
resources in countering the flow of illegal drugs to or through Europe?
Answer. Yes. There is a clear financial and logistical illicit
trafficking nexus in Europe. This nexus, rooted in the drug trade,
sustains increasingly global illicit trafficking networks that pose a
direct and growing threat to U.S. security and interests, for it is not
only drugs that can move across these networks. For an extraordinarily
modest investment, EUCOM and its Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking
Center (JICTC) are playing a critical role in the forward defense of
the United States from this growing 21st century threat. EUCOM's path-
breaking work in this arena is playing a vital role in the support,
facilitation, and synthesis of a variety of efforts among U.S.
Government interagency and international partners to implement the
National TOC Strategy, and take some degree of effective action against
this multi-billion dollar security challenge. The alternative--
providing no funding and eliminating this important work--will allow
global illicit traffickers to continue working in and through Europe
unchecked, with direct and indirect consequences for U.S. security
efforts and interests.
building partner capacity within the eucom area of responsibility (aor)
Question. In the past several years, Congress has provided a number
of new authorities requiring the Departments of Defense and State to
work collaboratively to provide security assistance to partner nations.
These include the global train and equip authority (``section 1206'')
and the Global Security Contingency Fund.
In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building
the capacities of partner nations?
Answer. In my view, the principal strategic objective of building
partner capacity is to be able to share more of the burden of
protecting our vital national security interests with our allies and
partners. This involves assisting our allies and partners so that they
can participate in and/or lead multilateral military operations,
contribute to regional stability, counter transnational threats, and
provide for their own internal security. At EUCOM, our focus is
shifting to preserving the partner nation capabilities that have been
developed through a decade of combined operations in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Libya, as well as our building partner capacity efforts, to meet
the challenges of a post-2014 environment.
Question. How would you define our strategic objectives for
building the capacity of partner nations in the European Command area
of responsibility and in what ways, if any, do those objectives differ
from other geographic combatant commands?
Answer. The strategic objectives for building partner capacity in
the EUCOM area of responsibility are defined in the Guidance for
Employment of the Force. One of these strategic objectives is that U.S.
allies and partners in the theater have the capability and capacity for
regional security, to conduct military operations with the United
States and NATO, and to contribute to operations worldwide. This
objective is of special significance to the European theater because of
NATO, and because the majority of countries in the theater are stable
democracies with skilled, capable military forces across the joint
spectrum. As a result, Europe is far more of a security provider than a
security consumer. The foremost examples of this reality are in
Afghanistan, where European allies and partners account for 92 percent
of the non-U.S. forces in the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF); and in Libya where, within weeks, NATO quickly assumed
leadership of the mission and conducted 75 percent of all sorties and
100 percent of maritime operations.
Question. What is the relationship of the global train and equip
authority and the Global Security Contingency Fund to other security
assistance authorities, such as DOD counternarcotics assistance and
foreign military financing?
Answer. Extension of the global train and equip (``section 1206'')
authority, which is currently set to expire on September 30, 2014, is
essential for EUCOM to enable Allies and partners to support NATO's
post-ISAF train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan. The 1206
authority and the Global Security Contingency Fund complement other
security assistance authorities. For example, section 1206 authority
has enabled EUCOM to provide pre-deployment training and equipment to
allies and partners deploying forces to Afghanistan. Prior to fiscal
year 2010, EUCOM's had minimal capability to provide this type of
support to our allies and partners due to insufficient authorities and/
or funding from other programs.
Question. What should be done to ensure that the global train and
equip authority and the Global Security Contingency Fund do not
duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?
Answer. A number of safeguards are already in place to avoid
duplication of effort among the global train and equip authority, the
Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and other security assistance
programs. First, DOD and State Department guidance on section 1206 and
GSCF clearly identifies the purpose and scope of these programs.
Second, proposals for these programs are fully coordinated within DOD
and with the State Department. Third, under EUCOM's Theater Campaign
Plan construct, we develop Country Cooperation Plans and work to align
the appropriate resources and authorities to requirements down at the
activity level. Fourth, program managers and authorities experts at
EUCOM headquarters, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense work with our planners to ensure that we are using the right
programs in the right circumstances, and are not duplicating efforts
across programs.
nato transformation
Question. What is your assessment of the role of Allied Command
Transformation in effecting positive change among NATO member nations?
Answer. NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) makes a
significant contribution to training, education, doctrine, and concept
development across the Alliance.
nato members' spending on defense
Question. According to then-Secretary Gates, in 2011 only 5 of 28
NATO members, including the United States, met the Alliance target of
spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense.
What is your assessment of the impact on NATO of the failure of the
majority of NATO allies to meet agreed targets for defense spending?
Answer. This is a political issue, and a decision for member
states. The Secretary General recognizes the difficulty of delivering
defense for the Alliance in times of economic austerity. The Smart
Defence program, Connected Forces Initiative, and NATO 2020 aim to fill
capability gaps, but are inadequate without sufficient spending on
defense by NATO members.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage NATO
allies to increase their defense spending and enhance the military
capabilities that they can contribute to NATO operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would see my interaction with NATO members
at the strategic military level as a major tenet during my tenure as
SACEUR. This interaction would include discussions on how we can
improve military capabilities across the Alliance. It should be noted
that although many NATO members are not currently meeting their
mandated 2 percent of GDP for defense spending, this is not the only
measure of a country's military capability. Some countries, such as the
Netherlands, are developing specific niche BMD capabilities.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?
Answer. Like former Secretary Clinton, former Secretary Panetta,
the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the
Commanders of U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Northern Command, and
U.S. Pacific Command, and the current Commander of U.S. European
Command, I support U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).
Question. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as
the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?
Answer. As former Secretary Panetta has testified, the Law of the
Sea Convention provides a robust legal regime for global operations by
U.S. Armed Forces. It codifies navigation and overflight rights and
high seas freedoms that are necessary for the mobility of our forces.
It is completely in line with, and supports, the U.S. Defense Strategic
Guidance. To date, 165 states have ratified the convention, and I
believe that it is in our national security interests to do the same.
Our current non-party status constrains our efforts to develop enduring
maritime relationships with partner nations. It also inhibits our
efforts to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative, and elevates
the level of risk for our sailors as they undertake operations to
preserve navigation rights and freedoms. In EUCOM's area of Arctic
interest, which is significant, the Law of the Sea Convention will
strengthen our arguments for freedom of navigation through the Northern
Sea Route and provide stronger moral standing for the United States in
our extensive cooperative efforts with all of the Arctic states. We
need to eliminate seams as much as possible when we operate in
difficult circumstances in the maritime environment with our like-
minded partners. The Law of the Sea Convention would allow us to do
that.
quality of life programs for military families
Question. Three of the top quality of life issues in the EUCOM AOR
include predictable access to quality health care, including family
member dental support; ensuring high-quality dependent education
programs provided by the DOD Dependent Schools; and quality living
accommodations for military families. Commanders in the EUCOM region
have emphasized their support for and reliance on EUCOM resources to
provide crucial morale programs, enhance retention, and foster esprit
de corps.
What do you see as the most significant long-term challenges for
EUCOM in preserving and enhancing the quality of life for assigned
personnel while force redeployments to the United States proceed?
Answer. In a resource constrained environment, it is imperative to
keep faith with, and maintain an enduring commitment to, our forces and
their families, to include those stationed in Europe, by continuing our
proven quality of life programs, even as we seek new and innovative
ways to provide Force and Family Readiness support to those who choose
to serve.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the
adequacy of support services for military families during the
transition to ensure that vital support mechanisms, such as Department
of Defense Schools, morale, welfare and recreation services, family
housing, and commissary and exchange facilities continue to serve
military personnel?
Answer. If confirmed, I will actively support the initiatives
currently underway to upgrade and improve existing medical,
educational, and recreational facilities, while continuing to develop
and expand on partnerships with supporting agencies and services who
can offer effective and efficient alternatives for the future. EUCOM
Force and Family Readiness priorities clearly reflect those outlined in
the President's 2011 report ``Strengthening our Military Families.'' If
confirmed, I will work with the Services and component commanders to
ensure we remain steadfastly committed to those priorities.
sexual assault prevention and response in eucom
Question. In recent years, the Department of Defense has developed
comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing
appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. Numerous
cases of sexual assault and misconduct involving military personnel
continue to be reported. Many victims and their advocates contend that
they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and
then by unresponsive or inadequate investigations and emotional support
for the victim.
Secretary Panetta has recently announced several new initiatives to
curb sexual assaults in the military and to improve support for
victims.
What is your assessment of the Secretary of Defense's recently
announced initiatives, and, if confirmed, how would you implement them
in EUCOM?
Answer. I support the Former Secretary's recent initiatives to
combat sexual assault and think they demonstrate the Department's
commitment to eradicating sexual assault from our ranks. These
initiatives ensure commanders have the resources they need to
investigate and prosecute sexual assault cases, and provide additional
support for victims to ensure they are fully protected and receive the
care they need. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure commanders have
the resources they need to investigate accusations of sexual assault,
provide care and support for victims and fairly adjudicate each case.
Lastly, I will promote a climate that encourages reporting without fear
and holds perpetrators accountable.
Question. What is your understanding of the resources and programs
in place in EUCOM to offer victims of sexual assault the medical,
psychological, investigative, and legal help that they need?
Answer. I am not aware of any shortfalls or deficiencies in command
leadership, personnel, or training to prevent or respond to sexual
assault in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility.
It is my understanding the entire EUCOM AOR has resources and
programs in place to offer victims of sexual assault the medical,
psychological, investigative, and legal help required. If confirmed, I
will work with Service Component commanders to ensure they continue to
have appropriate resources and support to implement effective sexual
assault prevention and response programs. In addition, I will ensure
every measure is in place to support victims.
Question. What is your view of steps the command has taken to
prevent sexual assaults in EUCOM?
Answer. The EUCOM leadership closely monitors command climate
indicators and reports of sexual assault, and responds with effective
command messages and directives that foster a zero tolerance
environment for sexual assault. If confirmed, I will promote a climate
that encourages reporting without fear and holds perpetrators
appropriately accountable.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources in EUCOM to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual
assault?
Answer. The Services recently enhanced their resources for
investigating and responding to allegations of sexual assault. If
confirmed, I will review the Command's sexual assault prevention and
response program to evaluate its effectiveness and ensure adequate
resources are available. I will also work with Service component
commanders to ensure we continue to emphasize the importance of
training and educating servicemembers on the program, their rights and
the command's commitment to safeguard them from predatory behavior in
the ranks.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
military leaders to hold assailants accountable for their actions?
Answer. The Department's policy emphasizes the command's role in an
effective response. Special training is provided to commanders,
investigators, and prosecutors to ensure they are prepared to address
incidents of sexual assault. Our policies seek to balance victim care
and appropriate command action against offenders in order to build
victim confidence to assist in investigations. As military leaders, we
must be vigilant to our duties to hold those assailants accountable for
their actions. I take this obligation very seriously.
Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and
procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be
effective?
Answer. Overall, the Department has put considerable effort into
developing policies and procedures designed to address sexual assault.
In fact, the department faces the same challenges that society faces in
dealing with incidents of sexual assault--balancing care to victims
with prosecuting offenders. Restricted reporting allows victims who
wish to remain anonymous to come forward and obtain the support they
need following an assault. I consider these policies and procedures to
be effective.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of regarding the
manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put
into effect?
Answer. I am not aware of any problems with confidential reporting.
mental health of servicemembers and stress on the force
Question. The committee is concerned about the stress on military
personnel resulting from lengthy and repeated deployments and their
access to mental health care to deal with this increased stress.
Increased suicide rates are clear reminders that servicemembers,
particularly those who have been deployed multiple times, are under
tremendous stress and need access to mental health care.
In your view, are there sufficient mental health assets in EUCOM to
address the mental health needs of the military personnel and their
families?
Answer. Across the EUCOM AOR, I understand there currently exists
an identified shortage of mental health providers available to treat
servicemembers and their families. The Service components have done
much to improve this situation over the past 3 years and continue to
push ongoing initiatives to close the gap. If confirmed, I will work
with the Service components to ensure any remaining gap in behavioral
health services is adequately addressed.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force medical facilities in Europe are
actively involved in addressing the behavioral health needs of its
beneficiaries. Some of the major efforts include:

Integrated Behavioral Health Consultants in Primary Care:
Research has demonstrated that the primary health care setting
is optimal for identifying behavioral health difficulties in
the general population. This is specifically true for the
identification of depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder. By integrating behavioral health professionals into
the primary care clinics, these issues are quickly identified
and receive treatment or appropriate coordination and referral
for further care by a specialized behavioral health clinic.
These providers are also available to provide behavioral health
consultation to the primary health care providers as well as
provide behavioral health educational modification
interventions for patients with complicated conditions or low
compliance with medical treatment. Moreover electronically
secure communication to mental health services have been better
marketed and implemented.
Community Outreach: USAFE and Army Installation Management
Command-Europe adopted toll-free, confidential, anonymous,
telephonic crisis hotline access for servicemembers, veterans,
and family members in Europe to information, with Veterans
Affairs counselors available 24/7 that performed over 500
direct crisis contact interventions in 2012. Other expansion
efforts by Army, Navy and Air Force teams have included
broadened mental health consultation in DOD Dependent Schools,
and nearly 600 separate prevention events in 2012 aimed at
12,100 students that resulted in 230 students being enrolled in
counseling sessions. More Military and Family Life Consultants
have been hired, and overall closer linkages have been also
fostered with Family Advocacy, and additional teamwork have
succeeded with community organizations.
Additionally, the Army Medical Department in Europe is
actively involved in addressing the behavioral health needs of
its soldiers in two ways:
Embedded Behavioral Health (EBH) Teams: The Army directed the
implementation of multi-disciplinary EBH for all operational
units. This modality assigns an EBH team with each brigade-
sized element, and empanels all battalion-sized unit soldiers
to the same provider. Further, the EBH team is located within
the brigade-sized elements' footprint. The Army Public Health
Command conducted a number of evaluations of this model and
found that it decreases the stigma associated with seeking
behavioral health treatment and improves access to care,
continuity of care, Commanders' satisfaction, and treatment
outcomes. This initiative will continue to be rolled out
through fiscal year 2016 to all operational units in U.S. Army
Europe.
Behavioral Health Data Portal (BHDP): The Army directed the
use of the BHDP with all Active Duty soldiers receiving
treatment in outpatient behavior health clinics. The BHDP is a
set of validated survey instruments that soldiers fill out at
intake, and at follow-up appointments as appropriate. This
initiative powerfully impacts soldier treatment in two
important ways. First, the BHDP creates the ability to quantify
treatment outcomes across the enterprise. Second, it displays
for both the provider and the soldier evidence of improvement
or lack of improvement, which can be addressed during treatment
sessions. Research demonstrates the positive influence of
incorporating evidence of patient progress into treatment.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the
mental health needs of military personnel and their families in EUCOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the component commanders to
ensure continued adequate resourcing as well as emphasis on evidence-
based mental health treatments proven to improve the mental health of
our servicemembers. I will demand that leaders at all levels work to
decrease the stigma associated with seeking mental health treatment,
and work to increase access to mental health treatment for military
personnel and their families.
Question. What is your assessment of suicide prevention programs
and resources available to support these programs in EUCOM?
Answer. Through leadership, I will continue to support activities
that reduce the stigma associated with seeking behavioral health
treatment. A very successful technique is encouraging Senior leaders to
reveal, as appropriate, their own positive interaction with behavioral
health treatment and acknowledge that behavioral health issues can be a
direct outcome of military service. I will emphasize the importance of
AOR-wide Exceptional Family Member Program Family (EFMP) travel
decisions. The identification and assessment of family members'
behavioral health needs prior to PCS to EUCOM remains an important risk
mitigation process. The EFMP family travel decision process: (a)
supports family members' health overseas; (b) supports the
servicemembers' ability to focus on his/her mission; and (c) reduces
the likelihood of an ``Early Return of Dependents'' (ERD) to more
robust behavioral health services in CONUS. I will also engage in
strong, dynamic Command messaging that emphasizes behavioral health
issues are treatable, and that the majority of servicemembers improve
when they engage in behavioral health services and stick with treatment
until completion.
It is also worth noting that our Army component within EUCOM, U.S.
Army Europe, has fewer soldier suicides than Army posts of comparable
size in the United States. There are good prevention programs at work
within Europe, and I will continue to identify and expand those
programs that work, while transitioning away from those that do not.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. EUCOM and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes, I do.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
nato burden-sharing
1. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) burden-sharing will continue to be a topic of
interest for this committee and for the NATO alliance as a whole. While
we do see some countries moving further away from their 2 percent
commitments, there are some--like Estonia and Poland--who have placed a
greater emphasis on defense spending in recent years. In your view, are
the Europeans appropriately sharing the burden associated with NATO's
ongoing transformation and its approach to 21st century threats?
General Breedlove. We need to continue to encourage allies to meet
the agreed commitment of a minimum of 2 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) spending on defense. Defense budgets in most countries
have declined at a time when the alliance has undertaken its most
demanding and significant mission ever in Afghanistan, and when the
need for investment in future capabilities is essential. However,
European NATO nations do recognize the global security challenges--we
have seen this recently with the French led intervention into Mali as
one example. NATO allies have taken steps to address the issues related
to falling defense budgets with the announcement at the Chicago Summit
in 2012 of a Defense Package and key initiatives such as Smart Defense
and the Connected Forces Initiative. Alongside the 2 percent guideline,
allies have agreed that at least 20 percent of defense expenditures
should be devoted to major equipment spending. While only four other
allies have met this goal, investment in major equipment by the non-
U.S. allies has held steady at about $50 billion per year for the last
decade.

2. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, do you believe the
contributions from our European partners in NATO are adequate to
implementing the alliance's Strategic Concept, as adopted at the 2010
Summit in Lisbon?
General Breedlove. It is true that individual sovereign governments
continue to make inwardly focused decisions on defense spending, in
many cases not achieving the self-imposed NATO 2 percent GDP benchmark.
However, our European partners still represent the second largest
defense spending block ($280 billion) in the world--after the United
States ($682 billion/year), but ahead of China ($166 billion/year)
and Russia ($90 billion). Europe is still investing in defense,
focused on contributing to NATO and preserving the expeditionary
capabilities and interoperability that has been developed over the past
decade of combat operations with the United States.
I believe there are three capabilities that will be critical to
NATO's success as we face 21st century threats: cyber, Special Forces,
and unmanned reconnaissance platforms. NATO is increasingly using
Centers of Excellence to develop and refine capabilities, notably the
Cyber Center in Estonia. NATO realizes this capability will be the
lynchpin for successful future operations and conflicts. The effective
use of cyber defense may even lessen the chance of conflict if our
allies' systems are more resilient to cyber attacks. Additionally, the
NATO Special Operations Headquarters is up and running in their new
facility across the street from my Headquarters. NATO nations are using
this facility for coordination and in combination with the training
facilities that are in place at Chievres Air Field a few kilometers
away. Finally, NATO has also done an outstanding job with our AWACS
program. The alliance is now pursuing the Alliance Ground Surveillance
(AGS) system to enhance the alliance's ability to have persistent
situational awareness.
European partners are also looking for more cooperative solutions
to security problems. The Baltic Air Policing mission is a great
example of the allies pooling resources to meet a requirement. The C-17
Heavy Airlift Wing in Hungary is another example of this cooperation.
The alliance's collective approach to Ballistic Missile Defense makes
this essential capability an achievable goal.
So, in spite of economic challenges, Europeans are still focused on
defense and the support of the alliance, even if each is not currently
meeting the 2 percent benchmark. They are demonstrating their
commitment in areas such as cyber, Special Operations, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and are showing a greater
desire to cooperate using ``Smart Defense''.

3. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, will you commit to raising
the burden-sharing issue and ensuring that it receives the proper
attention from our European allies?
General Breedlove. Yes. Based on NATO contribution goals and
capability targets, most European NATO nations should do more. Non-U.S.
NATO allies have considerable aggregate economic strength, with the
combined total GDP similar to that of the United States. The problem is
that under austerity budgets there is insufficient political will to
invest in defense capabilities. I will encourage allies to increase
their defense spending so they have the right forces and capabilities
required to address the threats of the 21st century. Additionally, I
will also ask non-NATO allies to invest in their own armed forces in
terms of recruitment, retention, training, and equipping to be able to
address the increasingly complex threats we face in common with the
professional, highly-trained forces we need.
While I will do all I can to encourage better burden sharing with
our European allies, I want to point out progress made thus far on
burden sharing. From 2007-2009, nine NATO countries--United Kingdom,
France, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
Greece--exceeded the United States in foreign assistance funding. In
2010, seven European countries--United Kingdom, France, Iceland,
Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway--exceeded the U.S. funding
contribution to U.N. peace operations in terms the amount contributed
as a percentage of GDP. In 2011, four European NATO Nations
(Luxembourg, France, United Kingdom, and Turkey) met or exceeded the 20
percent NATO guideline for defense spending on major equipment.
Finally, in 2011, the average of all European NATO nations' spending on
major equipment and R&D was 19 percent, as a percentage of defense
expenditures. In conclusion, I will do everything in my power to ensure
that our allies and partners are ready to meet the challenges of an
increasingly complex world.

poland
4. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, the U.S. bilateral security
relationship with Poland is crucial. We have seen an increased U.S.
presence in Poland through military engagements and a new Patriot
missile battery rotation. Can you reiterate for us why Poland is so
important for the United States and for regional security?
General Breedlove. Poland has consistently supported U.S. foreign
policy, contributing troops to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Poland ranks fourth in total force contributions out of 49 partner
nations.
Poland's economy is among the strongest in the EU, with 14.9
percent GDP growth since 2008 compared to -0.6 percent decline EU-wide.
A constitutionally mandated defense budget of 1.95 percent GDP ensures
Poland's defense expenditures grow in line with its economy. Its
economic growth, vibrant democracy, demographic trends, and natural
resources all point to a growing role for Poland in the 21st century.
Poland takes seriously its commitment to NATO and has also agreed
to host the second U.S. missile defense interceptor site in the 2018
timeframe as part of the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
and NATO missile defense.
Poland has announced plans to spend approximately $10 billion to
acquire modern integrated air and missile defense systems, which will
be interoperable with NATO.
Poland has assumed a leadership position in Central Europe and
continues to push for democratization efforts in the Ukraine and
Belarus.
Note: The Patriot rotations to Poland ended in November 2012 with
the activation of the Aviation Detachment. U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) J5 and USAREUR are unaware of any current plans for a new
Patriot rotation.

5. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, missile defense cooperation
seems to be an important area of cooperation with Poland--and an area
for possible further growth. We have completed the Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) agreement as part of the EPAA. However, Poland also plans
to spend millions of dollars on its own theater missile defense needs.
In fact, the modernization of Poland's missile defense program has been
identified as one of its top three priorities through 2022. This would
seem to be a great opportunity for deeper U.S.-Poland cooperation and
for the U.S. defense industry. If confirmed as EUCOM Commander, how
will EUCOM assist the Polish Government in their effort to enhance
their air and missile defense capability?
General Breedlove. EUCOM participates in a bi-lateral Integrated
Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Working Group with the Polish Ministry
of Defense. The primary goal of this working group is to assist in
identification of Polish operational requirements leading to selection
and development of a Polish national IAMD System compatible with EPAA
and interoperable with the developing NATO BMD systems.
U.S. policy, as described in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, is to continue to strongly encourage additional allied
contributions to NATO Missile Defense.

6. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, will you work to ensure that
the Polish national air and missile defense system is interoperable
with NATO's missile defense system?
General Breedlove. Yes. EUCOM continues to advocate for development
of a Polish national Integrated Air and Missile Defense system that is
both compatible with the EPAA and fully interoperable with the
developing NATO BMD systems.

kosovo-serbia
7. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, over the last year, we have
seen some progress on Serbia-Kosovo relations. However, tensions remain
high and miscalculation could result in negative consequences and the
possibility of further bloodshed. It is critical that we maintain a
focus on this important region so as not to lose the gains we've fought
so hard for over the last decade and a half. Can you give us your
assessment of the security situation in Kosovo and the need to maintain
a troop presence in KFOR [the NATO implementation force in Kosovo] in
the coming years?
General Breedlove. I am cautiously optimistic that recent political
progress can return rule of law to the disputed Northern Kosovo region.
However, I expect periods of civil unrest throughout the long and
difficult process of restoring Pristina's authority. In Northern
Kosovo, the parallel government is closely connected to organized
crime, and has much to lose if and when rule of law and border control
is reestablished. U.S. presence in KFOR is vital to maintain KFOR
credibility with Kosovo institutions and multi-ethnic populations.

georgia
8. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, Georgia was promised future
NATO membership at the Bucharest Summit; however, since then, the path
forward for Georgia has been uncertain. I believe Georgia still has
reforms to undertake before it should be considered a NATO member;
however, it is important that we offer a clear path forward for them.
What is your view on the important role Georgia has played in the fight
in Afghanistan?
General Breedlove. Georgia has been a stalwart supporter of NATO
operations in Afghanistan, providing eleven infantry battalions to
Regional Command-Southwest since 2010, with each battalion comprising
approximately 750 soldiers. Georgia is currently the largest per capita
and non-NATO troop contributor to ISAF. In the fall of 2012, Georgia
nearly doubled its troop contribution, and now deploys two infantry
battalions simultaneously. These Georgian units make up half the
infantry force in Helmand Province. They operate without caveats, and
have committed these battalions to the ISAF mission through November
2014.
Georgia has suffered 19 soldiers killed and 129 wounded in action.
Through it all, reports coming back from Helmand speak of the
Georgian's professionalism, bravery, and commitment.
Despite its losses, Georgia stands by the United States and NATO in
our efforts in Afghanistan and has already made offers to NATO's post-
2014 mission, including combat forces and training and equipment for
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Georgian Government has
also pledged $1.5 million for the first 3 years of the transition
period to support the ANSF.

9. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, how important is it that we
remain engaged with the new government in Georgia--particularly with
respect to its NATO membership goals?
General Breedlove. It is very important.
The United States has recognized the first successful democratic
and peaceful transition of power in Georgia's history. EUCOM will
continue our current enhanced security cooperation engagements with the
new government based on mutually agreed priorities just as we have done
in the past. The new Georgian military leadership has already
demonstrated through words and actions, its continued desire for
institutional reform and increased transparency.
Through its contributions to missions in Kosovo, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, Georgia has demonstrated its value as a coalition partner
and future member of NATO. We will continue to work with the new
government on critical capacity building and inter-operability
projects. To that end, Georgia has one of the most robust Foreign
Military Financing programs in EUCOM.
We also continue to move forward on the six engagement areas
President Obama and President Saakashvili agreed to in January 2012,
which will help the Georgians improve their national defense
capabilities. Those are:

Operational air surveillance/air defense training and
education
Coastal surveillance training and education
Tactical level train-the-trainer instruction for NCOs
and Junior Officers
Brigade command and staff training and education
Defensive combat engineer training and education
Utility helicopter aviation training support

nato-russia missile defense
10. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, do you anticipate that
missile defense could be an area for possible cooperation with the
Russians?
General Breedlove. Yes. Missile Defense is one of the six areas of
cooperation that NATO pursues with the Russian Federation in the
framework of the NATO-Russia Council.
Although there was progress made in the joint analysis of mutual
regional threats, progress on NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation
remains slow and difficult. Positions on the overarching political
issues are entrenched and continue to impede development of the two
main strands of practical cooperation, the Joint Analysis for a
framework for missile defense cooperation and the resumption of Theatre
Missile Defense (TMD) cooperation.

11. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, specifically, what kinds of
cooperative efforts on missile defense are possible and could result in
mutual security benefits for NATO and/or Russia?
General Breedlove. In addition to the efforts mentioned in answer
to question #10, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Missile Defense Working
Group has had initial discussions on the two new initiatives proposed
in NATO's Chicago declaration establishing joint missile defense
centers and developing a transparency regime. However, Russia has
rejected development of proposed joint missile defense centers until
the political matters of principle are resolved and has indicated that
it prefers to hear a detailed NATO proposal on a possible improvement
to transparency before engaging.

nato-russia relations
12. Senator Shaheen. General Breedlove, what is your goal--should
you be confirmed--with respect to the future of the NATO-Russia
relationship?
General Breedlove. Since 1991, Russia has been a partner of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At times our partnership and
cooperation is robust and beneficial to the alliance. In the Balkans,
from 1996 to 2003, Russian soldiers conducted joint operations with
NATO forces. In 2006 and 2007, Russia deployed ships to the
Mediterranean Sea as part of the NATO Operation Active Endeavor, and
today we are cooperating in the Gulf of Aden countering piracy. In
Afghanistan, we are developing mechanisms for logistic support to the
ANSF, while regionally we are cooperating with Russia to develop
capacity in the counter narcotics realm. Most recently, during the NATO
Foreign Ministerial, the NATO Russia Council agreed to intensify their
work together on Afghan National Air Force Aviation training. With
these successes, there too have been significant challenges such as
missile defense and conventional arms control, which still affect the
relationship today.
The NRC is where the 28 allies and Russia meet as equals in a
format of 29 nations. This forum provides the framework for
consultations on current security issues and practical cooperation in a
wide range of areas of common interest.
The NRC is where nations determine the level of military
cooperation and develop the NATO-Russia Work Plan. Currently, there are
six specific areas of cooperation; Logistics, Combating Terrorism,
Search and Rescue at Sea, Counter Piracy, Military Academic Exchanges,
and Theater Missile Defense.
We will continue to look for new areas of cooperation which support
NATO objectives, develop the capacity for joint action, and which
promote operator-to-operator engagement. These efforts will contribute
to improving trust as well as create reciprocal transparency and
predictability, with the aim of contributing to the establishment of a
common space of peace, security, and stability.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
defense of israel and iranian nuclear program
13. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, President Obama has
repeatedly stated that allowing Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon is
unacceptable and must be prevented. Most recently during his trip to
Israel the President said, ``We will do what is necessary to prevent
Iran from getting the world's worst weapons.'' If the President
determines military action is required to stop Iran's acquisition of a
nuclear weapon, EUCOM will undoubtedly play a key role in any
operation. Do you agree with the President that a nuclear-armed Iran is
unacceptable and must be prevented?
General Breedlove. I support the President's policy as stated.
Having said that, I also agree with the President and Prime Minister
Netanyahu that the preference is to resolve this situation
diplomatically. In any case, given the levels of unprecedented
coordination and consultation between EUCOM, other U.S. combatant
commands, and the Israeli military along with partner nations, EUCOM is
prepared to play a key role in any operation.

14. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, do you agree with the
President that the use of U.S. military force may be necessary to
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?
General Breedlove. I agree with the President. When it comes to
preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, no options should be
taken off the table, to include the use of military force. I support
the President's position on resolving this issue diplomatically, though
Iran should have no doubt about the resolve of the United States and
EUCOM's preparedness to be a key player for any contingency should the
need arise.

15. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, if confirmed, will you
ensure the forces under your command are prepared to carry out
contingency plans, as ordered by the President, to confront Iran's
nuclear program?
General Breedlove. Yes.

16. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, do you agree that the United
States must maintain a credible threat of the use of force against Iran
and that a public conversation that downplays the threat of force is
counterproductive and actually raises the potential that force may need
to be used?
General Breedlove. The U.S. military must always be prepared to
support U.S. policy goals for any contingency whether it be against
Iran or any other threat to U.S. security and national interests. EUCOM
is postured to maintain a credible threat of the use of force and is
prepared to play a key and supporting role in the region when directed.

17. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, the United States and Israel
hosted the largest ever joint military drill between the two countries
this past October. The drill, called Austere Challenge, hosted over
3,500 U.S. personnel in Israel and had been planned for more than 2
years as part of a longstanding agreement between EUCOM and the Israel
Defense Force to regularly hold bilateral training exercises regularly.
If confirmed, will you support continued joint exercises with our ally,
Israel?
General Breedlove. Yes, EUCOM and the Israel Defense Force have a
longstanding relationship and combined exercise program that includes
seven semi-annual, annual, and biennial exercises: Juniper Cobra,
Juniper Falcon, Juniper Stallion, Noble Dina, Noble Melinda, Noble
Rose, Noble Shirley, and Reliant Mermaid.

18. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what tangible benefits does
the United States derive from these joint exercises with Israel?
General Breedlove. The strategic partner relationship the United
States and Israel maintain in the Middle East is vital to stability in
the entire region. Tensions throughout the Levant have been on the
increase for the last year. EUCOM stands by its valued strategic
partnership with Israel and will continue to improve on the bilateral
cooperation between the two nations. Combined air defense training
exercises are designed to maintain the interoperability between the
United States and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). While driven by the
overall situation in the Middle East, joint U.S./IDF exercises do not
relate to an individual incident or development. As part of our mission
to build partnership capacity, bilateral exercises such as Austere
Challenge are conducted on a routine basis. These exercises focus on
improving only defensive capabilities, not offensive.

19. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, from the Austere Challenge
Exercise, what areas do we need to work on to be ready to help defend
Israel?
General Breedlove. Following Austere Challenge 12 (AC12), the
largest exercise with the Israelis to date, the next logical step is to
now maintain the cooperative military capabilities between our two
nations. EUCOM's next exercise with the Israel Defense Force is Juniper
Cobra 14 (JC14), currently in the early design stage. JC14 will be
designed to sustain the level of interoperability established by
Austere Challenge 12.
Specific AC12 Lessons Learned/areas to work on and proposed
solutions include:

6.5 Software. Patriot Post-Deployment Build 6.5
software anomalies were observed in AC12 (debris showing as
false targets). EUCOM is working with the Program Office in
order to gain Lower Tier Project Office verification.
Increased Interoperable and Distributed Training. Due
to personnel rotations, frequent and robust training is
required between the combined U.S.-Israeli team. In addition to
the biannual Juniper Cobra exercise, EUCOM is exploring, with
the assistance of the Missile Defense Agency, options for
distributed monthly and/or quarterly training.

20. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what do you think of the
Iron Dome system employed by Israel when the terrorist organization
Hamas fired over 1,500 rockets and missiles at the Israeli population
in November 2012?
General Breedlove. Iron Dome is Israel's newest operational missile
defense system. These Iron Dome batteries provide Israeli population
centers, within range of Gaza rockets, with a persistent defensive
capability that does not exist with systems such as the Patriot or
Arrow missile defense systems. To date, official Israeli reports on
Iron Dome weapon system effectiveness show that the system performed
very well in combat operations. After the November 2012 conflict,
Israeli officials placed the overall system's success rate at 84
percent.

21. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what is your overall
assessment of our missile defense cooperation with Israel?
General Breedlove. [Deleted].

israel, turkey, and regional stability
22. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, over the last few years,
Turkey has sought to exclude Israel from joint exercises with the
United States and NATO. Do you agree Israel's participation in joint
exercises with NATO is beneficial?
General Breedlove. I absolutely agree with the statement that
Israel's participation in exercises with NATO is beneficial. I have
been concerned by the impact on NATO partnership cooperation activities
of Turkey's bilateral dispute with Israel. Israel engages with NATO in
the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Mediterranean Dialogue
is one of the few security cooperation venues in the world where Israel
can engage in constructive activities with Arab states. Besides Israel
and Turkey, the other six members all come from the Arab world
(Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia). In this
sense, NATO serves as a platform which can foster better understanding
of issues through such initiatives as the NATO Regional Cooperation
Course at the NATO Defense College which has seen attendance by
Israeli, Turkish, American, and other NATO officers and diplomats to
jointly study security challenges together. Now that Israel and Turkey
are working constructively towards resolution of the dispute, I am
cautiously hopeful that the resumption of Israel-NATO cooperation will
soon extend across the full range of NATO activities that help states
within the region address common regional challenges.

23. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, should the U.S. military
participate in exercises with Turkey if it demands Israel be excluded?
General Breedlove. The improvement of Israeli-Turkish relations is
in the best interests of the United States, Israel, Turkey, and the
region. EUCOM should stand ready to facilitate those activities that
rapidly restore the strength of their relationship including exercises
that involve both Turkey and Israel.

24. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what is your assessment of
Prime Minister Erdogan's regional ambitions?
General Breedlove. Prime Minister Erdogan's domestic security
considerations shape his regional outlook. Turkey's conflict with the
Kurdistan Workers' Party is a case in point. This conflict has spanned
3 decades and cost over 40,000 lives. Recently, there has been some
progress toward opening a dialogue that may signal a reduction in
violence in that struggle, though it is too early to give a clear
assessment. But we are supportive of this effort. PM Erdogan
appreciates that Turkish power within the region is on the rise, but
that Turkey will gain more through economic cooperation with neighbors
than through a more aggressive foreign policy. Turkey's economy has
outperformed regional economies over the last decade, but Turkey
remains dependant on natural gas imports that drive their cooperation
with regional exporters, including Russia and Iraq. In the event of
some regional exigency, PM Erdogan will remain sensitive to perceptions
of Turkey acting unilaterally and generally takes the position that
Turkey should act as a part of a coalition.

25. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, do you think Turkey's
cooperation with EUCOM and NATO on Syria has been adequate?
General Breedlove. As Syria's northern neighbor, Turkey understands
the threat, takes it seriously, and is engaged with the international
community for support. Turkey is a strong and reliable ally of both the
United States and NATO in an unstable region. In response to the Syrian
threat, Turkey has requested and welcomed cooperation in a number of
areas including combined staff planning and the deployment of Patriot
Missiles to defend the Syrian border region. In January, NATO deployed
six Patriot Batteries to Turkey's southern border to augment Turkey's
air defenses. The United States, Germany, and the Netherlands each
contributed two Patriot Batteries to this effort. Over the past year,
EUCOM has worked with Turkey to support and enhance its capabilities to
respond to various Syrian threats. Several of these efforts have been
in support of broader Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of
State initiatives, such as counter- and non-proliferation. It is
important to note that Turkey is currently home to over 250,000 Syrian
refugees, has lost two Air Force pilots to Syrian air defenses, and has
sustained multiple cross-border indirect fire incidents due to the
Syrian crisis.

26. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what plans does EUCOM or
NATO have to secure chemical weapons in Syria if Assad falls and
security of Syrian chemical weapons deteriorates to the point where
proliferation is possible, if not likely?
General Breedlove. Proliferation of chemical weapons is a very
serious matter that could undermine regional stability. Since Syria is
in the area of responsibility of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), I
respectfully request this question be referred to that command.
As with U.S. and international involvement in Libya in 2011, a
resolution from the U.N. Security Council and agreement among the
alliance's 28 members is necessary before NATO assumes a military role
in Syria. NATO is prepared, if called upon, to be engaged.
Several NATO countries are working on individual contingency plans
for possible military action in Syria. Within individual member
countries, discussion regarding options including lethal support, no-
fly zones, and arms embargoes are being considered.
That said, given that Israel and Turkey border Syria, EUCOM
planners are fully integrated and synchronized with CENTCOM efforts and
maintain a strong relationship with our NATO allies.

counter piracy
27. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, NATO has had success in
anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. With expanding oil
discoveries in the Atlantic Ocean off of the coast of Western Africa,
and drug trafficking that runs from South America through that same
area to Europe, do you see the potential need for an anti-piracy
mission off of the west coast of Africa? If so, do you envision a
potential counter-piracy mission off of the west coast of Africa as a
U.S. force, a NATO force, or some combination?
General Breedlove. As a preliminary matter, the Gulf of Guinea is
neither in EUCOM nor NATO's Area of Responsibility. I understand that
AFRICOM is successfully working with West African nations to assist in
the development of their maritime capabilities in order to improve
safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. I believe AFRICOM is in a
better position to assess whether Gulf of Guinea states may require
additional support.
That said, each region is faced with its own unique root causes of
piracy; each will require unique solutions. The strategic environment
and imperatives which led to NATO's involvement in the current counter-
piracy mission are quite different from that off the coast of West
Africa. NATO's mission to counter maritime piracy began in 2008 with
the request from the United Nations to provide escorts to U.N. World
Food Program vessels transiting through dangerous waters to deliver
humanitarian aid to Somalia.
In addition to the threat piracy posed to humanitarian efforts in
Africa, there was an internationally recognized threat to the safety of
vital sea lines of communication and economic interests off the Horn of
Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. This included risks to the safety of
one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the world--the
gateway to and from the Suez Canal.
Countering piracy requires a mix of maritime security capabilities,
use of best practices by the commercial shipping industry, and rule of
law ashore. NATO continues to contribute to international counter-
piracy efforts in full accordance with the relevant U.N. Security
Council Resolutions relating to Somali-based piracy and with the
consent of Somali authorities.
An increase in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea is
of growing concern to the maritime community, but lies outside the
current area of operations for NATO vessels. Where the counter-piracy
mission off the coast of Somalia, a failed state, required an
international response, the Gulf of Guinea is lined with sovereign,
functioning nations. The United Nations and others have called for
nations of West Africa to develop a comprehensive regional anti-piracy
strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.

mali
28. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what type and quantity of
air support has been provided to the French in Mali?
General Breedlove. To date, EUCOM's air support to the French has
been primarily aerial refueling and airborne ISR. Three KC-135 aircraft
were deployed to Spain to provide tanker support to French strike
aircraft. One E-8 was deployed to Spain to provide ISR in support of
French operations in Mali, and two additional KC-135 aircraft were
deployed to support the E-8 ISR missions. To sustain ISR collection,
approximately 30 EUCOM personnel were deployed to Niger to support MQ-1
missions. Additionally, EUCOM postured C-130 aircraft to provide
strategic inter-theater and intra-theater airlift to AFRICOM, France,
and other troop contributing nations from Europe and Africa.

29. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, is our extensive support to
the French in Mali being leveraged to increase our strategic access to
bases, e.g. lily pad bases, in western Africa?
General Breedlove. Respectfully request this question be directed
at U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). EUCOM's role in supporting French
operations in Mali was mainly support to AFRICOM's direct operational
support to the French. The French military operations in Africa are
providing both a great opportunity to improve our bilateral
relationship with France and encouraging the kind of out-of-area
capability and initiative that makes France such a valuable U.S. ally.
France genuinely appreciates the support we provide and I am sure our
combined activities will contribute to expanded access within the
region.

30. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, with the drawdown of forces
in Afghanistan, do you anticipate that we will be able to get more ISR
support into Africa given the large number of terrorist threats, such
as the Lord's Resistance Army and Joseph Kony, al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, and al Shabaab?
General Breedlove. I respectfully request this question be directed
to the U.S. Africa Command.

afghanistan
31. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what key lessons do you
think we must learn from the precipitous draw-down of U.S. troops from
Iraq that can be applied to our draw-down in Afghanistan?
General Breedlove. Logistically, the drawdown in Afghanistan
presents a different set of challenges than the drawdown in Iraq. While
the Iraq drawdown was aided by seaport access and several air hubs, the
drawdown in Afghanistan will rely more upon land and air transport. I
will work with the alliance to synchronize our several--national
redeployment efforts to achieve all available efficiencies--in some
cases, finding economies and savings together that we could not achieve
separately.
ISAF's primary task has changed from leading a population-centric
counter-insurgency campaign to providing Security Force Assistance to
the ANSF, as they assume the lead for providing their national
security. The key missions of our post-2014 military presence will be
focused on training, advising, and assisting ANSF; targeting
counterterrorism missions against al Qaeda and its affiliates; and
protecting U.S. forces and citizens.

32. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what key capabilities must
we maintain in post-2014 Afghanistan?
General Breedlove. Ultimately, Afghans must be able to secure and
stabilize their country themselves. Our objective is to develop the
capability for Afghans to assume these tasks. Achieving this objective
requires a comprehensive program which trains, mentors and advises the
ANSF through army and police advisory teams and within the NATO
Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). NTM-A brings together both NATO
and national training efforts to develop professional, capable and
self-sustaining ANSF.
In parallel with the training and mentoring efforts, ISAF troops
are implementing a phased process to facilitate the transfer of full
security responsibility to Afghan security forces as their capabilities
improve, in keeping with the end of 2014 transition timeline.
The training, advising, and assisting of the ANSF will continue
after transition is complete at the end of 2014, when the ISAF mission
will end.
NATO has agreed to lead a post-2014 mission focused on continued
support to the development of ANSF capacity. Allies and my NATO
military staff are currently going through an in-depth review to
determine what assets and capabilities will be required post-2014 to
maintain the momentum of ANSF development and sustain the progress we
have already made. We have not yet reached the point of formally
defining the number of forces and required capabilities.

33. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, NATO has been transformed by
the expeditionary requirements in Afghanistan. After 2014, what will be
the driving force to maintain those hard-earned skills and further
evolve NATO to be able to meet 21st century threats?
General Breedlove. Alliance forces, along with many non-NATO
contributing nations in Afghanistan, have created a synergy of effort
and network of lasting partnerships that will benefit our Nation and
the alliance long after these deployed forces return home. Lessons
learned from 20 years of NATO-led operations, with integrated,
multinational command structures and forces of the many nations working
alongside each other day after day, have both enhanced our military
interoperability and strengthened the mutual confidence of our forces.
After 2014, NATO is expected to shift its emphasis from operational
engagement to operational preparedness. This means NATO will need to
remain capable of performing its core tasks--described in its Strategic
Concept and of maintaining its forces at a high level of readiness. To
help achieve this, allied leaders have set out the goal of ``NATO
Forces 2020'': modern, tightly connected forces that are properly
equipped, trained, exercised and led.
The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) will help ensure that allies
can communicate effectively, practice together, and validate and
certify their ability to do so. The main requirements of CFI are to
maintain NATO's readiness and combat effectiveness through expanded
education and training, increased exercises, and better use of
technology.
NATO exercises will cover the full spectrum of intensity, promote
interoperability and also compensate for the reduced operational
experience of forces working together. NATO will build a robust
exercise and training program that will underpin the alliance's
interoperability in the future. High-intensity, large-scale exercises
will provide the demanding scenarios necessary for NATO to retain its
``fighting edge.'' Defense Ministers in February 2013 agreed that the
alliance should hold a major live exercise in 2015 and will draw up a
comprehensive program of training and exercises for the period 2015-
2020.
The NATO Response Force will also play an important role in this
context by providing a vehicle both to demonstrate operational
readiness and serve as a ``test bed'' for alliance transformation. It
provides a collective approach with a ready, integrated, deployable,
effective and efficient military response, through which to show
alliance resolve, solidarity, and commitment.

strategic benefits of engagement with europe
34. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, as I said in my opening
statement, if recent history is any indicator, any operations we do in
Northern Africa and the Middle East will be with Europe and from
Europe. Strategic access to key geostrategic terrain as we saw in
Libya, and interoperability as we see by the almost 30,000 European
troops in Afghanistan, seem compelling reasons to remain engaged in
Europe despite today's significant resource constraints. Why do you
think we should remain engaged with Europe in light of today's severe
budget cuts?
General Breedlove. Our Nation must take care--even as we grapple
with significant economic challenges and chart the necessary strategic
reorientations--to protect, preserve, and continue evolving our
extraordinary partnership with Europe. There are five salient reasons
for this. First, Europe is home to most of the world's progressive
democracies; nations with which we share the fundamental values that
are a critical element in building effective coalitions. Second, with a
GDP of $19 trillion--a quarter of the world's economy--and
approximately $4 trillion in annual trade with the United States,
Europe is key to the U.S. and global economies. Third, the European
theater remains critical geostrategic terrain, providing the United
States with the global access it needs to conduct worldwide operations
and crisis response. Fourth, Europe is the backdrop for NATO, history's
most successful and effective alliance, and a vital partner for dealing
with the challenges of the 21st century. Fifth, Europe is today a
security exporter, possessing many of the most highly trained and
technologically advanced militaries in the world. No other region
possesses a comparable pool of capable and willing partners able to
conduct global operations with the United States.
The United States must remain engaged with Europe because it is a
vital enabler for U.S. global reach. The coming decade will be a
dynamic one, highlighted by increasing regional challenges and
strategically overall U.S. primacy in global affairs would be
diminished if we do not remain engaged with Europe. By remaining
engaged, EUCOM will maintain relationships and expeditionary
capabilities within European militaries that will continue to directly
benefit American strategic interests and successfully defend the
Homeland forward.

35. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what is the impact of a
smaller footprint and reduced resources in Europe on U.S. influence
within the NATO organization?
General Breedlove. Despite a smaller footprint and reduced
resources, the United States remains the leader of the alliance. Our
commitment to a strategic partnership with Europe and global
capabilities still provide the unquestioned guarantees of North
American and European security. However, preserving U.S. influence
while NATO resets in a post-ISAF environment will require a careful and
nuanced approach. In particular, consistency in our messaging and our
actions will be an important means of ensuring we retain the trust and
confidence of our European allies and partners. This is especially true
with regard to the posture of U.S. forces in Europe, our pledge to
reinvigorate our participation in the NATO Response Force and rotate
battalion task forces to Europe, and our engagement activities with
allies and partners. In addition, we will have to find efficiencies
through closer collaboration with NATO. For instance, we will have to
look for opportunities to do national training exercises in a multi-
national NATO framework and better harmonize our bilateral assistance
with NATO efforts. Such measures can ensure that the US retains its
leadership of NATO even with reduced resources in Europe.

36. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, as the percentage of GDP
that NATO nations are spending on defense drops from the goal of 2
percent towards an inadequate 1 percent, how do we ensure that Europe
will continue to shoulder its share of the global security burden?
General Breedlove. While the European economic crisis continues to
drive reduced military spending and force structure decisions among
European nations, collectively, our European allies and partners still
represent the second largest defense spending block ($280 billion) in
the world (NATO 13 April 2012 Press Release ``Financial and Economic
Data Relating to NATO Defence'' (PR/CP(2012)047-REV1)--ahead of China
($130 billion/year) and Russia ($64 billion) (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database, http://
milexdata.sipri.org). So, while it is true that governments continue to
make inwardly focused decisions on defense spending--in many cases not
achieving the self-imposed NATO 2 percent GDP benchmark--our European
allies are still investing in defense, focused on contributing to NATO
and preserving the expeditionary capabilities and interoperability that
have been developed over the past decade of combat operations with the
United States. However, it is of concern that the fiscal environment is
driving key allies to undertake decisions that will have a material
impact on their capabilities, forces, and ability to conduct future
contingency operations. Given the persistent economic challenges and
forecasts, our critical European allies and partners will continue to
grapple in the coming years to maintain a full suite of interoperable
capabilities and a sufficiently-sized, ready force to participate in
global contingency operations. We must continue to engage, train, and
exercise routinely with these allies and partners to influence and
assist them in maintaining readiness and interoperability with U.S.
forces. One of the ways we can ensure our allies and partners will be
able to continue to shoulder their share of the global security burden
is for U.S. forces to participate in combined and joint exercises, and
utilize the U.S. Joint Multinational Training Command (Grafenwoehr and
Hohenfels), which will build and sustain interoperability among
themselves and with U.S. forces.

37. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, is the 1206 security
assistance program still useful to EUCOM and your current mission?
General Breedlove. Yes. The section 1206 program remains essential
to EUCOM's ability to support a successful ISAF transition in 2014 and
the post-ISAF train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan.
European allies and partners remain committed to deploying forces to
Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond. The 1206 program enables us to provide
willing allies (the NATO accessions of 1999 and 2004) and partners with
the specialized equipment and training they need to operate safely and
effectively in Afghanistan.

38. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what tangible results have
you seen from the significant 1206 investment made over the years?
General Breedlove. The investment of 1206 funding in Europe has
produced significant results in the form of deployments of additional
ally/partner nation forces to Afghanistan and enhancements in the
operational effectiveness, safety, and interoperability of those
deployed forces. Examples of supported deployments include nine
battalion rotations of Georgian forces to RC-Southwest to support U.S.
Marine Corps' forces; Security Force Assistance Teams from Albania and
Croatia training ANSF; and contributions of Special Operations Forces
from Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Perhaps most
importantly, the 1206 program has built an enduring NATO-interoperable,
expeditionary capability among willing allies and partners that will be
available to support future operations.

nuclear weapons reductions
39. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, prospects for cooperation
with Russia on missile defense seem dim. In your opinion, what will it
take for Russia to cooperate with the United States on missile defense?
General Breedlove. The Russian distrust of the EPAA stems from
their perception that EPAA is a threat to their strategic nuclear
deterrent force. In my opinion, our best chance for success is engaging
in information sharing and greater transparency measures so that they
better understand our approach.

40. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, will the administration
reduce nuclear weapons in Europe due to budget cuts or as a concession
to Russia for a nuclear arms reduction deal?
General Breedlove. NATO and the United States have repeatedly
affirmed that U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe are vital to
alliance security and cohesion. The NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture
Review, released last year and briefed at the Chicago Summit, states
that nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall
capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside conventional and
missile defense forces. The report also states that as long as nuclear
weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Until the President
and NATO both agree on reducing or removing U.S nuclear weapons from
Europe, they will remain based there.

41. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what is your assessment of
how NATO and the Europeans would react to reductions of nuclear weapons
in Europe with or without reciprocal Russian actions?
General Breedlove. My assessment is that they would not react
favorably to reductions not agreed to by NATO. The United States and
NATO currently agree that U.S. nuclear weapons are a core component of
NATO's capabilities for deterrence and defense. Without consultation
with and concurrence from NATO on reductions of U.S. nuclear weapons
based in Europe, they will remain based there at current strength.

42. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, the administration said it
seeks to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in any future arms discussions
with Russia, but Russia has established the condition that all U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons must be removed from Europe. What is your
position on whether the United States can or should remove tactical
nuclear weapons from Europe in exchange for reductions in Russian
weapons?
General Breedlove. We support the administration's policy of basing
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in support of NATO and will continue
to support that policy until directed otherwise by the President.
Negotiations with Russia and/or NATO to remove U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons from Europe are outside our purview.

43. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, what is NATO's position?
General Breedlove. (Please see response to question #41). The
Strategic Concept reconfirmed that as long as there are nuclear weapons
in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Deterrence, based on
an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a
core element of NATO's strategy.
The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review of May 2012 has shown
that the alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria
for an effective deterrence and defense posture.
NATO's reduced reliance on nuclear forces has been manifested in
steady and very significant reductions in the number of systems,
overall weapon numbers and readiness levels since the end of the Cold
War.
If there were to be a reduction in nuclear forces, allies agree
that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) will task the appropriate
committees to develop concepts that allow NATO to reduce its reliance
on non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe. Additionally, the NAC
would delineate what NATO would expect to see in the way or reciprocal
Russian actions to allow for significant reductions in forward-based
non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.
The allies look forward to continuing to develop and exchange
transparency and confidence building ideas with the Russia Federation
in the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of developing detailed
proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's
non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe. NATO is prepared to
consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear
weapons assigned to the alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by
Russia.
In addition, allies support and encourage the United States and the
Russian Federation to continue their mutual efforts to promote
strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their
nuclear weapons.

44. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, has your command, or any
other component of the U.S. Government that you know of, examined the
feasibility of verifying Russian compliance with an agreement to reduce
tactical nuclear weapons?
General Breedlove. Not that I am aware of. We welcome continued
efforts to secure an agreement with the Russian Federation that would
increase transparency on the size and composition of its tactical
nuclear arsenal. The administration is working to initiate, in
consultation with NATO allies, negotiations with the Russian Federation
on an agreement to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles
of the United States and the Russian Federation in a verifiable manner.

article 60 modifications
45. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, commanders in the military
are given great responsibility, literally over life and death.
Decisions they make send men and women into battle where they may die
or be severely wounded. This special trust and confidence is given to
no other position in our Government. In line with this responsibility,
commanders are given the autonomy to discipline, train, and reward
their units so that they can establish a cohesive, mission ready unit
capable of fighting and winning the Nation's wars. While we trust you
with our sons' and daughters' lives, the proposed modifications to
Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) seem to
suggest that we do not trust your discretion when it comes to UCMJ
offenses. Do you, as a commander, consider the UCMJ as it is currently
structured, to be a viable tool to help you maintain and enhance the
cohesiveness and fighting capabilities of your combat units?
General Breedlove. Yes. I believe the UCMJ, as currently
structured, provides a tried and true military justice system that
works fairly, ensures due process, maintains good order and discipline,
and is accountable on and off the battlefield.
The independent authority of the commander to choose a particular
course of action and/or disposition is balanced against a deliberate
and robust procedural, clemency and appellate framework that provides
an accused or convicted servicemember maximum due process rights. The
comprehensive range of punitive options provides an effective deterrent
against the commission of criminal misconduct, which strengthens unit
morale, cohesiveness, and discipline. Current Service policies assist
victims and witnesses through the military justice process to ensure
all members are treated fairly and appropriately.
The military justice system operates effectively while maintaining
the confidence of the force. Of course, part of the trust and
confidence in our system is the fact that there is ongoing scrutiny and
periodic updates to reflect our changing law and military structure.

46. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, have you seen any evidence
that commanders are abusing their discretion as the convening authority
to adjust sentencing?
General Breedlove. I have seen no evidence that commanders are
abusing their discretion as convening authorities to adjust sentencing.
In my experience, commanders take this responsibility very seriously.
The fact that I am not aware of any abuse of discretion by
convening authorities in adjusting sentencing does not mean there is no
benefit in the Department's current scrutiny of the process. In fact,
it is actions such as the Secretary's current review of sentencing
authorities and the Department's record of making changes when
warranted that ensures the continued trust in our laws.

47. Senator Inhofe. General Breedlove, the Secretary of Defense has
announced that he intends to recommend changes to the UCMJ. How would
the proposed changes to the UCMJ impact your effectiveness as a
commander?
General Breedlove. I am aware of and appreciate the Secretary of
Defense's open mind and continued close scrutiny to maintain the value
of the UCMJ as the most effective, fair, and protective military
justice system.
I believe that any change or limitation in the authority or
discretion of a convening authority requires careful thought to avoid
unintended consequences to the effective administration of military
justice. At a minimum, the fair and efficient administration of
military justice requires convening authorities to retain the ability
to conduct pretrial negotiations, and where appropriate, enter into
pretrial agreements that provide limitations on adjudged punishments in
exchange for guilty pleas.
The UCMJ is one of the things that makes the U.S. military great. I
believe the intent of the Secretary's changes is, in part, to preserve
the fairness, transparency, and appropriateness of convening authority
actions. This is the very heart of the public trust in this system.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
benghazi
48. Senator Chambliss. General Breedlove, the attack in Benghazi,
Libya, on September 11, 2012, highlighted several failures in our
Nation's ability to respond effectively and timely to situations that
threaten the lives of our citizens and interests within the region. You
had command authority over the EUCOM-assigned air forces tasked with
supporting the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility.
Could you describe in detail, the timeline and sequence of events for
U.S. Air Forces, Europe in response to the Benghazi attack that
resulted in the deaths of four Americans, to include U.S. Ambassador
Chris Stevens?
General Breedlove. The timeline below reflects the response to the
Benghazi incident from the air component perspective. The timeline
includes the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and the U.S. Air Forces Africa
response from the time of the actual Benghazi incident.

49. Senator Chambliss. General Breedlove, if confirmed, what
changes to force structure and alert posture in Europe are necessary to
respond more effectively to a future Benghazi-like event?
General Breedlove. I am satisfied with EUCOM's actions with regard
to our alert forces post-Benghazi. I intend to continue the ongoing
efforts to adapt and refine EUCOM forces and alert postures which will
enable us to effectively and expeditiously respond to the increasingly
dangerous global security atmosphere characterized as the ``new
normal''.
In the last 6 months, EUCOM has worked aggressively to provide
scalable, rapidly deployable, special operations and security forces to
protect and preserve U.S. personnel and facilities in the event of
regional unrest. These forces maintain sufficient depth and flexibility
to deliver a variety of pre- and post-crisis response options in both
the EUCOM and AFRICOM areas of responsibility (AORs). EUCOM coordinates
weekly with the Joint Staff and AFRICOM to evaluate potential
indications and warnings, and adjusts force postures if required. To
date, EUCOM has modified force structure and alert posture 14 times in
response to changing strategic events.
Currently, EUCOM continues its efforts to transform the post-
Benghazi response force construct into a flexible and scalable set of
options. We continue to provide basing and access to AFRICOM response
forces, and we are significantly increasing those capabilities within
our theater. EUCOM recently coordinated with Spain to host U.S. Marine
Corps forces to support AFRICOM crisis response missions, and we are
already receiving the first wave of marines. We are in the process of
transferring additional security teams and combat enablers to AFRICOM
before 01 June 2013. EUCOM's U.S. Army component has developed a
scalable contingency force with robust augmentation capabilities for
rapid deployment anywhere in the EUCOM theater. This new contingency
response force will be ready for employment prior to 01 June 2013.
As we look to the future, EUCOM will continue to collaborate with
the Joint Staff, adjacent combatant commands, and U.S. Government
agencies to review threats, intelligence products, and other
indications/warnings that would potentially require crisis response
forces. We will continue to mitigate risk by maintaining adaptive force
structure and alert posture within our own forces, and request
assistance where required. Finally, we will continue our efforts to
build and preserve existing strategic partnerships which are vital in
providing basing and access. These efforts are crucial to facilitating
rapid response of U.S. forces and enablers.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
russia reset
50. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, is the Putin Government in
full compliance with all existing arms control agreements with the
United States?
General Breedlove. Since EUCOM does not participate in the
verification process for arms control treaties, I would refer you to
the President's annual report, submitted through the Department of
State, on ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'' required
by section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (22
U.S.C 2593a).

sanctions on iran
51. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, would you agree that Iran's
missile development program and effort to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability threaten not only U.S. national security, but also the
national security of our allies in Israel and Europe?
General Breedlove. I do agree with that assessment.

52. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, do you share President
Obama's assessment that U.S. and international sanctions should be
utilized to the fullest extent to persuade Iran to halt its nuclear
weapons program?
General Breedlove. I do.

53. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, the United States has
implemented full sanctions against Iran Air and Mahan Air, but the
European Commission has not implemented full sanctions. These airlines
have facilitated the illicit activities of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) through their transport of IRGC operatives, arms
shipments, and funds. Additionally, these two airlines have ferried
weapons from Iran to Bashar al Assad's regime in Syria. These shipments
have enabled Assad to continue his slaughter of the Syrian people. Are
you aware of the activities of Iran Air and Mahan Air?
General Breedlove. I am aware that in October 2011, the U.S.
Department of Treasury designated the Iranian commercial airline Mahan
Air as a specially designated terrorist entity pursuant to E.O. 13224
for providing financial, material, and technological support to the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). IRGC-QF uses
Mahan Air to ship arms, transfer funds, and ferry personnel. Mahan Air
also has provided transportation services to Lebanese Hezbollah,
transporting personnel, weapons, and goods on behalf of Hezbollah.
I am also aware that Iran Air was designated in June 2011 pursuant
to E.O. 13382 for providing support and services to Iran's Ministry of
Defense Armed Forces Logistics, Iran's Aerospace Industries
Organization, and the IRGC. Iran Air has transported rockets and
missiles via passenger aircraft, and IRGC officers occasionally take
control of Iran Air flights carrying sensitive IRGC-related cargo.
In September 2012, Treasury identified as blocked property 117
aircraft operated by Iran Air, Mahan Air, or Yas Air (another
designated Iranian cargo airline) to disrupt the flow of weapons and
communications equipment to the Syrian regime. Iran has used Iran Air
and Mahan Air flights between Tehran and Damascus to send military and
crowd control equipment to the Syrian regime, in coordination with
Lebanese Hizballah. Iran has used deceptive measures when shipping
illicit materials to Syria, by using a combination of passenger and
cargo flights and declaring illicit cargo as humanitarian and other
licit goods.
The EU has not implemented full sanctions on Iran Air or Mahan Air,
but many Western European airports refuse Iran Air refueling services,
forcing Iran Air to terminate several European routes.

54. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, are you aware that some of
the international destinations of these airlines include European
cities?
General Breedlove. Yes. Although Iran Air has terminated several
European routes due to some Western European airports refusing
refueling services, I am aware that as of April 2013, Iran Air still
flies to European destinations in Austria, Azerbaijan, Denmark, France,
Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, and the UK. I am also
aware that Mahan Air still has routes to European destinations in
Cyprus, Germany, and Turkey.

55. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, if confirmed, will you work
with the State Department to encourage our European allies to increase
even further their sanctions against Iran?
General Breedlove. I will. At the same time, I will make sure that
I am supporting the State Department's lead and remaining strictly
within my role as a military leader.

56. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, will you look specifically
at this issue related to Iran Air and Mahan Air?
General Breedlove. I will look specifically at Iran and Mahan Air,
and will continue EUCOM engagement with U.S. intelligence and
interagency partners on this issue, to monitor the illicit activities
of Iran Air and Mahan Air as well as other Iranian airlines that
facilitate Iran's illicit activities.

value of u.s. military forces in europe
57. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, in light of the rebalance to
Asia and our Nation's budget crisis, how would you respond to those who
argue that the United States can't afford to maintain a significant
U.S. military presence in Europe and should dramatically reduce or even
eliminate the U.S. military presence there?
General Breedlove. We recognize the challenges of the fiscal
environment and, in accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance,
continue to consolidate our installations and seek additional
efficiencies in U.S. overseas posture while maintaining the necessary
capacity to meet our mission requirements.
Why Europe? First, Europe is home to most of the world's liberal
democracies, with which we share fundamental values, a critical element
to building coalitions. Second, Europe's importance to the U.S. and
global economy cannot be overstated. Its $19.2 trillion total gross
domestic product accounts for approximately 25 percent of the global
economy with $3.9 trillion in annual trade between the United States
and Europe. Third, the European theater represents critical strategic
terrain, providing the global access needed for rapid crisis response
by four U.S. combatant commanders. Fourth, the EUCOM theater is home to
NATO, history's most successful alliance and essential to our ability
to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Fifth, Europe is a security
provider vice consumer, contributing over 50,000 personnel to NATO and
U.N. operations worldwide and spending approximately $280 billion on
defense (second only to the United States and well ahead of China and
Russia). No other region possesses a comparable pool of willing and
capable allies and partners for the United States for conducting global
operations.
We will continue to advocate for a deliberate and balanced approach
to posture in Europe to ensure that future changes meet minimum
requirements to conduct U.S. contingency operations, support U.S.
global strategic access, and meet our NATO commitments.

58. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, from the perspective of U.S.
interests, what is the value of retaining a significant U.S. military
presence in Europe?
General Breedlove. DOD's strategic approach to defense posture is
to maintain a forward posture that promotes U.S. strategic interests by
being either essential to U.S. security, or providing geopolitical
advantages, such as stronger bilateral or multilateral political,
economic, or cultural ties. This inclination to maintain a forward
presence is further supported by the following principles:

(1) First, in an era of resource constraints, the United States
cannot effectively manage global security challenges on its own. The
presence of U.S. military forces overseas can be a powerful catalyst
for promoting multilateral approaches and regional security
architectures that serve both U.S. and partner states' interests.
(2) Second, the long-term presence of U.S. forces abroad reassures
allies and partners of our commitment to mutual security relationships,
generates enduring trust and goodwill with host nations, and increases
regional and cultural expertise in the force. The United States cannot
simply ``surge'' trust and relationships on demand.
(3) Third, our defense posture must balance the benefits of an
overseas presence that assures allies and partners of our commitments,
with the need for flexibility to respond to contingencies, emerging
threats, and global security needs in distant theaters. These are not
mutually exclusive aims. In fact, reducing U.S. presence in a region to
increase flexibility for global deployments may have a perverse effect;
it may weaken U.S. relationships with host nations and lessen their
willingness to receive surge U.S. forces during a crisis.

Forces stationed overseas provide greater utility by `doing' almost
everything CONUS based forces `do' except contribute to a local
community's economic viability. However, these overseas forces also
demonstrate U.S. commitment to our allies; assure, deter, and dissuade;
provide increased flexibility and responsiveness; enhance U.S. access
into and through the European theater; help justify the U.S. leadership
role in NATO; provide multi-national training opportunities; offer
exposure to and awareness of culture differences; and reduce stress on
the rotational force by being on-station.

turkey
59. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, how do you assess Turkey's
role in NATO?
General Breedlove. Turkey, with the second largest body of military
manpower, after that of the United States, has been a steadfast ally
and member of NATO since 1952. Turkey has been a major provider of
forces and capabilities for NATO-led operations and has made
substantial contributions to the NATO Response Force.
Its strategic geographic position on the alliance's southern flank
supports NATO interests in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean
regions. In addition to access to sites for forward deployment in
support of U.S. and alliance operations, Turkey has hosted a variety of
NATO military headquarters since 1952. Today, it is host to the only
Land Component headquarters in NATO's integrated military Command
Structure in Izmir. Turkey, additionally, serves as the framework
nation for a NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) headquarters in
Istanbul, which could be deployed on short notice in support of
alliance operations. Turkey sponsors a NATO-accredited Center of
Excellence for Defense against Terrorism in Ankara as well as a
Partnership for Peace Training Center, which was established in an
effort to contribute to the training and interoperability efforts of
NATO's partner nations. Turkey is also host to an AN/TPY-2 early
warning radar which is an essential component of Phase 1 of the EPAA to
Missile Defense and an integral part of NATO's Missile Defense
architecture. This radar serves as a U.S. contribution to NATO Missile
Defense, as agreed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

60. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, what has been Turkey's role
in Afghanistan?
General Breedlove. In the words of William Holbrooke at the NATO
Defense Ministers meeting, ``I can think of no other country in the
ISAF alliance that has a role that is more important than Turkey's in
terms of operations in Afghanistan.'' Today, Turkey has a wide ranging
and critical role in Afghanistan. This is in part due to the rich and
enduring relationship that Turkey established with the newly
independent Afghanistan in 1921, and which Turkey has maintained
largely uninterrupted for decades. Turkey clearly plays an enduring and
critical part, both as a NATO member with a troop contingent in ISAF,
but also in a broader sense through its engagement in international
cooperation and development with projects focused on alleviating
conditions which are systemic drivers of conflict. In these areas,
Turkey has focused on education, health, and infrastructure development
to improve the Afghan quality of life. Within the NATO context, Turkey
has commanded Regional Command-Capital three times. Turkey has also
provided the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan twice.
It has contributed two Provincial Reconstruction teams and today has
more than 1,000 troops deployed as part of ISAF. Turkey's role will
remain critical in the future precisely because of its unique place in
the Muslim world, its longstanding NATO membership, and its historical
and sustained connection with Afghanistan.

61. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, can you give me an update on
our military relationship with Turkey?
General Breedlove. The bilateral military relationship with Turkey
is strong and coordination has improved over the last year. Events in
Syria, though tragic, have provided opportunities for closer
cooperation in prudent planning in which our military staffs are
working directly with one another. Turkey has also been a valuable ally
that has been instrumental in the expansion of the EPAA to missile
defense by hosting a radar installation at Kurecik. Despite today's
hard fiscal realities, both nations' militaries are preserving optimum
opportunities for engagement and exchanges that help us to share common
experiences and understand one another's priorities and objectives.
Turkey's involvement in security cooperation is as deep as their
operational commitment. Turkey spent $8.5 billion on Foreign Military
Sales with the United States last year. This is a very high level of
spending, but it is tending to decrease as Turkey establishes more
domestic ability to produce its own equipment and weapons systems.
Turkey manages International Military Education and Training (IMET)
very efficiently, covering all expenses for their students and applying
IMET funds only to the cost of educating their servicemembers. As a
result, Turkey sent almost 400 students to American military schools
and programs under the IMET program last year, more than any other ally
or partner.

62. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, what is the relationship
between Turkey and Iran?
General Breedlove. The Turkey-Iran relationship is multifaceted
including issues of energy, trade, cultural, and politico-security
cooperation. Iran is Turkey's second largest supplier of natural gas
and Ankara relies on Iranian oil for its own consumption. Turkey and
Iran also have a shared concern with Kurdish separatism--to include
some limited intelligence sharing and joint security operations--and a
common interest in avoiding another wide-scale military confrontation
in the region. However, opposing positions on Syria (Ankara supports
the Opposition while Tehran supports the Regime), Turkey hosting the
NATO ballistic missile defense radar, and Turkey's adherence to U.S.-
European Union sanctions on Iran has resulted in some chilling of ties.

63. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, how does Turkey view Iran's
nuclear program?
General Breedlove. Ankara continues its public support for Tehran's
nuclear ambitions, which Turkey views as Iran's right to seek peaceful
nuclear technology, and disagrees with sanctions as a means to force
Tehran into compliance. However, Ankara has said it does not support
Tehran possessing nuclear weapons. Ankara will use its influence with
Tehran to pressure acceptance to the offer from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under which Tehran would transfer all of
its 20 percent-enriched uranium (which lies at the dividing line
between low-enriched uranium and highly-enriched uranium) to a third
country under IAEA custody. While Ankara has not officially adopted
U.S.-European Union sanctions as policy, it recognizes its
responsibility to comply.
With respect to Turkey's reaction to a strike on Iranian nuclear
facilities, analyses indicate that Turkey would react harshly against
any military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities as Ankara has
consistently opposed, both publicly and privately, military action
against Iran. Officially, the Turkish military is also opposed to a
strike, believing the consequences would be ``disastrous,'' and a broad
consensus of Turkish intellectuals view a nuclear-armed Iran as the
second worst outcome for the region, behind an attack against Iran's
nuclear facilities.

64. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, how do you believe Turkey
would respond if Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability?
General Breedlove. Ankara has repeatedly stated it will not accept
any neighbor possessing any weapons that it does not possess,
particularly nuclear weaponry. However, Turkey is unlikely to take any
unilateral action against Iran absent provocation. Ankara will likely
demand proof of claims--beyond assertions by Israeli officials--that
Tehran has developed nuclear weapons capability. If Ankara accepts the
evidence as substantiating the claims, we expect the reaction to be
measured based on Tehran's stance. At present, Turkey relies heavily on
Iranian oil and gas for Turkey's own consumption; until there is a
reliable and affordable alternative source, Ankara will be hard pressed
to risk damaging energy relations.

Ankara would likely issue public statements condemning
the development of nuclear weapons and would highlight the
additional instability to the region.
Ankara would likely recall its Ambassador to Tehran
for ``consultations,'' but would not completely sever
diplomatic relations. Expelling Iranian officials is also a
possible option, but would likely only impact lower secretarial
positions.
Ankara would probably support a United Nations
Security Council/General Assembly resolution condemning the
activity.
Militarily, we would not expect to see any shifting of
Turkish forces or equipment to the shared border with Iran.
However, Ankara may seek additional NATO assurances of
protection given Turkey's hosting of the ballistic missile
defense radar.
Ankara may create its own sanctions targeting existing
bilateral relations such as limits on gold imports, or further
reducing imports of oil.

65. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, what is your assessment of
the current relationship between Turkey and Israel?
General Breedlove. Turkish-Israeli relations have been strained for
several years, declining since at least 2009 and stressed further
following the deaths of nine Turkish citizens resulting from Israel's
May 2010 interdiction of the Turkish M/V MAVI MARMARA. Since Israel's
extension of the apology to Turkey for the incident, the two countries
have entered into a discussion on the exchange of Defense Attaches. Any
further progress at this time is likely to depend on the outcome of the
reparations discussions. A draft compensation agreement was reached
between the two countries on May 7, 2013, but a formal settlement has
not yet been reached.

66. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, how important is the
bilateral relationship between Turkey and Israel?
General Breedlove. A strong bilateral relationship between Turkey
and Israel is key to advancing stability in the region and could
provide more support for reinvigorating the Middle East peace process.
For NATO and the United States, warm relations between Turkey and
Israel also open the door for more NATO-Israel engagement-which Turkey
has the ability to veto at the present time. From the U.S. perspective,
a strong relationship between two allies removes roadblocks to
advancing U.S. policies in the region and restarting some suspended
multilateral military training opportunities.

european defense spending
67. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, NATO countries agree to
spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Yet, many European
countries do not honor this commitment. For example, Spain has averaged
1.1 percent defense spending over the last few years. How does this low
defense spending in many European countries impact their military
capabilities, as well as their ability to operate effectively with U.S.
forces?
General Breedlove. The continued European focus on austerity
measures in response to the economic crisis has forced painful military
spending decisions on many countries. Collectively, our European allies
and partners still represent the second largest defense spending block
($280 billion) in the world--ahead of China ($130 billion/year) and
Russia ($64 billion). So, while it is true that governments continue
to make tough choices on defense spending, our European allies are
still contributing to NATO and attempting to preserve the expeditionary
capabilities and interoperability that have been developed over the
past decade of combat operations. Despite limited resourcing, European
partners have made other significant contributions to security. In
2010, seven European countries (United Kingdom (1.54 percent), France
(1.36 percent), Iceland (1.22 percent), Germany (1.2 percent),
Netherlands (1.17 percent), Denmark (1.15 percent), and Norway (1.04
percent)) exceeded the U.S. funding contribution to U.N. peace
operations by percent of GDP (which was .97 percent). I am concerned
about the future military capabilities of our allies and partners given
current levels of defense spending. A disproportionate amount of the
spending cuts are from research, development and acquisition. These
impacts not only effect current readiness, but potentially create a
growing capability gap which will only be partially offset by NATO
Smart Defense and European pooling and sharing efforts. This is a real
challenge that will require serious effort and attention to address
over the next few years. Since the Europeans represent our most
reliable and capable security partners, it has a profound impact on our
ability to address challenges as we also contend with reduced defense
spending. In terms of European forces operating effectively alongside
the United States, I am slightly more optimistic. While we will face a
capability and capacity gap, there is real potential to maintain
interoperable forces through the NATO Connected Forces Initiative. If
we invest the time and resources to exercise and train with our allies
and partners, I am confident we can preserve our hard won
interoperability gains earned from 10 years of shared sacrifice in
places like Afghanistan. The U.S. Joint Multinational Readiness Center
(Hohenfels) and Joint Multinational Training Center (Grafenwoehr), and
the U.S. Air Force Warrior Preparation Center (Miesenbach) will be
crucial to this effort.

68. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, what role could you play in
encouraging our defense partners to devote more of their resources to
defense spending?
General Breedlove. In both my capacities as Supreme Allied
Commander Europe and as Commander, EUCOM, I have a responsibility and
active interest to ensure that our most reliable, capable and willing
partners are prepared and ready to address the full range of 21st
century challenges. The decision to devote more resources to defense
spending will be a political one. But the role I can play, as part of a
network of defense professionals, is to inform the political debate by
identifying the requirements and the risks imposed by a failure to
adequately invest in defense. Using both offices, I will engage with
key leaders to argue for holding the line on defense spending, push
within NATO to support the acquisition of critical capabilities, and
ensure that the EUCOM steady state engagement and country cooperation
plans focus on encouraging the appropriate resources are devoted to
building the required capabilities. Additionally, as NATO nations begin
to develop efficiencies through Smart Defense, it will be crucial to
ensure these efficiencies are reinvested in defense and not simply used
to justify further defense budget cuts. Finally, through key leader
engagements, supporting regional approaches, and building and
resourcing capabilities, I can help make the right arguments to support
European Defense Chiefs and Ministers in order to sway political
leaders to continue to invest in defense. In this capacity, I will also
respectfully ask Members of Congress to continue to engage with
European and Canadian counterparts through such mechanisms as the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly to also help influence our partners and allies
to make responsible decisions involving their security and examine
alternative approaches to austerity in order to ensure their economic
future.

personnel
69. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, to what extent does EUCOM
rely on DOD civilians and contractors to fulfill EUCOM's
responsibilities?
General Breedlove. Within the EUCOM headquarters, civilians and
contractors make up nearly 55 percent of the assigned strength. They
are an integral part of the command that provide invaluable
contributions daily in support of the EUCOM mission.

70. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, how has sequestration
affected the civilian contractors and DOD civilians working at EUCOM,
and how has that affected EUCOM's ability to perform its missions?
General Breedlove. The effects of sequestration are many and are
substantial. Currently, EUCOM has had to enforce a civilian hiring
freeze which has severely hindered the command's ability to recruit and
fill vacancies. Additionally, the command's ability to augment exercise
and contingency operations with approving overtime for civilians and
contractors has been eliminated. The effects throughout the command
with respect to employee satisfaction and morale have also been
significant as employees are distracted by the concern over stability,
job security, and potential financial hardship.

71. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, to what extent does EUCOM
utilize personnel from its Reserve component to support EUCOM's work?
General Breedlove. EUCOM currently has 1,066 Reserve component
positions with reservists assigned. These personnel are mobilization
assets who support EUCOM during their 2 weeks of Annual Training each
year. Additionally, EUCOM augments the Active Duty staff with
reservists on 1 year Active Duty orders. There are 135 Reserve
component personnel at the EUCOM headquarters and the Joint Analysis
Center on 1 year Active Duty orders.

72. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, is the use of Reserve
personnel the most cost efficient method to support surges in demand
for personnel at EUCOM and to make up for temporary reductions in the
civilian and contractor workforce at EUCOM, such as those caused by
sequestration?
General Breedlove. Reserve component personnel provide a valued
resource in terms of experience and depth when augmenting the EUCOM
staff during surge or contingency operations. Many Reserve component
personnel have expertise currently not resident on the staff and are
effective stop-gap measures for temporary surges and limited
contingencies, or until Active component personnel can be obtained.

73. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, is annual training in Europe
for EUCOM reservists critical to maintaining their proficiency and
ability to seamlessly integrate into EUCOM's staff?
General Breedlove. Yes. The training value that our reservists
receive when conducting Annual Training in Europe cannot be replicated
in CONUS. Virtual means of staying ``connected'' across the Atlantic
with the headquarters are useful tools--especially throughout the year,
but by themselves do not provide the required level of proficiency in
EUCOM HQs operations. Staff process training can only be fully
addressed when in situ, making them fully capable in times of crises
and support.

74. Senator Ayotte. General Breedlove, will EUCOM continue to
facilitate annual training in Europe for EUCOM reservists and utilize
them as a cost-efficient means to cope with fluctuating personnel
demands so that EUCOM can fulfill its vital national security-related
missions?
General Breedlove. EUCOM will continue to facilitate that training.
Annual training in Europe for our reservists is an enabler for the
command and provides a key capability that can be employed in
contingency and surge operations.
EUCOM will also continue to use reservists to meet its fluctuating
personnel demands.
______

[The nomination reference of Gen. Philip M. Breedlove,
USAF, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 8, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Air Force
to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General.

Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF
Gen. Philip M. Breedlove is Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe;
Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa; Commander, Air Component Command,
Ramstein; and Director, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Kalkar,
Germany. He is responsible for Air Force activities, conducted through
3rd Air Force, in an area of operations covering more than 19 million
square miles. This area includes 105 countries in Europe, Africa, Asia
and the Middle East, and the Arctic and Atlantic oceans, and possesses
more than a quarter of the world's population and generates more than a
quarter of the world's gross domestic product.
General Breedlove was raised in Forest Park, GA, and was
commissioned in 1977 as a distinguished graduate of Georgia Tech's ROTC
program. He has been assigned to numerous operational, command and
staff positions, and has completed nine overseas tours, including two
remote tours. He has commanded a fighter squadron, an operations group,
three fighter wings, and a numbered air force. Additionally, he has
served as operations officer in the Pacific Command Division on the
Joint Staff; executive officer to the Commander of Headquarters Air
Combat Command; the senior military assistant to the Secretary of the
Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the
Joint Staff.
Prior to assuming his current position, General Breedlove served
Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. As Vice
Chief, he presided over the Air Staff and served as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy
Advisory Working Group. He assisted the Chief of Staff with organizing,
training, and equipping of 680,000 Active Duty, Guard, Reserve and
civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas. General
Breedlove has flown combat missions in Operation Joint Forge/Joint
Guardian. He is a command pilot with 3,500 flying hours, primarily in
the F-16.

______

Education:
1977 - Bachelor's degree in civil engineering, Georgia Institute of
Technology.
1982 - Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air
Force Base (AFB), AL.
1991 - Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
1991 - Master of Science degree in aeronautical technology, Arizona
State University.
1995 - Master's degree in national security studies, National War
College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.
2002 - Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI,
Washington, DC.

Assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 1978...................... March 1979........ Student,
undergraduate
pilot training,
Williams AFB, AZ.
March 1979...................... August 1979....... Pilot instructor
training,
Randolph AFB, TX.
August 1979..................... January 1983...... T-37 instructor
pilot, evaluation
flight examiner
and runway
supervisory unit
controller,
Williams AFB, AZ.
January 1983.................... September 1983.... F-16 student
pilot, MacDill
AFB, FL.
September 1983.................. January 1985...... F-16 aircraft
commander and
instructor pilot,
614th Tactical
Fighter Squadron,
Torrejon AB,
Spain.
January 1985.................... March 1987........ Air liaison
officer, 602nd
Air Support
Operations Group,
Kitzingen AB,
West Germany.
March 1987...................... January 1988...... F-16 pilot, 526th
Tactical Fighter
Squadron,
Ramstein AB, West
Germany.
January 1988.................... August 1988....... Chief of Flight
Safety, 316th Air
Division,
Ramstein AB, West
Germany.
August 1988..................... August 1990....... F-16 flight
commander, then
assistant
operations
officer, 512th
Tactical Fighter
Squadron,
Ramstein AB,
Germany.
August 1990..................... July 1991......... Student, Air
Command and Staff
College, Maxwell
AFB, AL.
July 1991....................... May 1993.......... Chief of Air
Operations,
United Nations
Command and
Republic of Korea/
U.S. Combined
Forces Command,
Yongsan Army
Garrison, South
Korea.
May 1993........................ July 1994......... Commander, 80th
Fighter Squadron,
Kunsan AB, South
Korea.
July 1994....................... June 1995......... Student, National
War College, Fort
Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, DC.
June 1995....................... July 1997......... Operations
officer, U.S.
Pacific Command
Division, Joint
Staff, the
Pentagon,
Washington, DC.
July 1997....................... June 1999......... Commander, 27th
Operations Group,
Cannon AFB, NM.
June 1999....................... May 2000.......... Executive officer
to the Commander,
Headquarters Air
Combat Command,
Langley AFB, VA.
May 2000........................ May 2001.......... Commander, 8th
Fighter Wing,
Kunsan AB, South
Korea.
June 2001....................... June 2002......... Senior military
assistant to the
Secretary of the
Air Force,
Headquarters U.S.
Air Force,
Washington, DC.
June 2002....................... June 2004......... Commander, 56th
Fighter Wing,
Luke AFB, AZ.
June 2004....................... June 2005......... Commander, 31st
Fighter Wing,
Aviano AB, Italy.
June 2005....................... October 2006...... Vice Commander,
16th Air Force,
Ramstein AB,
Germany.
October 2006.................... July 2008......... Vice Director for
Strategic Plans
and Policy, Joint
Staff, the
Pentagon,
Washington, DC.
July 2008....................... August 2009....... Commander, 3rd Air
Force, Ramstein
AB, Germany.
August 2009..................... January 2011...... Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Operations, Plans
and Requirements,
Headquarters U.S.
Air Force,
Washington, DC.
January 2011.................... July 2012......... Vice Chief of
Staff of the U.S.
Air Force,
Washington, DC.
July 2012....................... present........... Commander, U.S.
Air Forces in
Europe;
Commander, U.S.
Air Forces in
Africa;
Commander, Air
Component
Command, Ramstein
Air Base,
Germany; and
Director, Joint
Air Power
Competency
Center, Ramstein.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 1991....................... May 1993.......... Chief of Air
Operations,
United Nations
Command and
Republic of Korea/
U.S. Combined
Forces Command,
Yongsan Army
Garrison, South
Korea, as a
major.
June 1995....................... July 1997......... Operations
officer, U.S.
Pacific Command
Division, Joint
Staff, the
Pentagon,
Washington, DC,
as a lieutenant
colonel.
October 2006.................... July 2008......... Vice Director for
Strategic Plans
and Policy, Joint
Staff, the
Pentagon,
Washington, DC,
as a major
general.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Flight information:
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 3,500
Aircraft flown: F-16, T-37, and C-21

Major awards and decorations:
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters
Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal

Effective dates of promotion:
Second Lieutenant, June 1, 1977
First Lieutenant, Dec. 10, 1979
Captain, Dec. 10, 1981
Major, Nov. 1, 1988
Lieutenant Colonel, June 1, 1993
Colonel, Jan. 1, 1998
Brigadier General, Oct. 1, 2003
Major General, June 23, 2006
Lieutenant General, July 21, 2008
General, Jan. 14, 2011
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Philip M.
Breedlove, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Philip M. Breedlove.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, U.S. European Command Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

3. Date of nomination:
April 8, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
September 21, 1955; Atlanta, GA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Cynthia Sue Breedlove (maiden name: Thompson).

7. Names and ages of children:
Samantha Leigh Tromly, 26.
Rebecca Nichole Breedlove, 23.
Daniel Jesse Breedlove, 18.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
I have no advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time
service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other
than those listed in the service record.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
I currently hold no positions as an officer, director, trustee,
partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any
corporation, firm, partnership, or other business, enterprise,
education, or other institution.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
I am a board member on the Advisory Board of the School of Civil
and Environmental Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
I currently hold no scholarships, fellowships, honorary society
memberships, or have received any other special recognition for
outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the
service record.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
If confirmed, I agree to appear and testify upon request before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
I agree to provide my personal views, if asked, before any duly
constituted committee of Congress even if my views differ from the
administration in power.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

[The nomination of Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 17, 2013,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 18, 2013.]

NOMINATIONS OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINTMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF; AND ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND REAPPOINTMENT AS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 18, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Hagan, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly,
Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker,
Ayotte, and Graham.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel; Mariah K.
McNamara, special assistant to the staff director; William G.P.
Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member;
Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Daniel C. Adams, minority associate counsel;
Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Steven M. Barney,
minority counsel; William S. Castle, minority general counsel;
Samantha L. Clark, minority associate counsel; Allen M.
Edwards, professional staff member; Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff member; Daniel
A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Lauren M. Gillis and Daniel J.
Harder.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Brian
Nagle, assistant to Senator Hagan; Mara Boggs, assistant to
Senator Manchin; Patrick Day, assistant to Senator Shaheen;
Moran Banai and Brooke Jamison, assistants to Senator
Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Marta
McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda,
assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to
Senator Kaine; Jim Catella and Steve Smith, assistants to
Senator King; Christian Brose, assistant to Senator McCain;
Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to
Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and
Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets this morning to consider the
nominations of General Martin Dempsey and Admiral James
Winnefeld, both of whom have been nominated to continue in
their current positions: General Dempsey as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Winnefeld as Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thank you both for your service and
for your willingness to continue to serve in these positions of
huge responsibility.
I would also like to welcome and to thank your family
members, some of whom are with us here this morning. Our
military families, as you well know, are a vital part of the
overall success and well-being of our Armed Forces, and we
appreciate greatly their unwavering support and their many
sacrifices, usually during the course of long military careers.
During your opening remarks, please feel free to reintroduce
your family members to our committee.
The foremost duty of the leadership positions to which
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld have been renominated is
to ensure that our service men and women have what they need to
win wars, to succeed in their missions, and to secure peace.
Our nominees have carried out their duties with energy and with
commitment. It is a testament to the quality of their service
that the President has nominated them to continue in their
positions.
I have had frequent occasions to seek the views of General
Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld over the years in both public and
private settings. Even on those few occasions when I have
disagreed with their assessments and recommendations, I have
found their positions to be thoughtful and well reasoned.
If confirmed, our nominees will face a series of continuing
challenges.
In Syria, Assad is using airstrikes, missiles, helicopters,
tanks, and artillery to attack the Syrian people. He is
targeting civilians in residential neighborhoods, in
marketplaces, in schools, and in places of worship. He has used
chemical weapons against the insurgents. He is increasingly
relying on foreign fighters from Iran and Hezbollah to sustain
his grip on power. To date, his actions have killed more than
100,000 Syrians, led more than a million to flee the country,
forced more than 4 million more to become internally displaced,
leveled entire villages and neighborhoods, and motivated the
Syrian people to rise up against him.
I look forward to hearing the nominees' views on the steps
that might be taken to increase the military pressure on Assad
in support of the administration's goal of convincing the Assad
regime and its supporters, including Russia, that the current
military momentum towards the regime cannot last in the face of
a major insurgency that has the support of both the Syrian
people and an international coalition and that a political
settlement that transitions Syria to a post-Assad regime that
is inclusive of and protective of all elements of the Syrian
society is the only solution.
In Afghanistan, while the campaign is on track to
transition responsibility for the country's security from
coalition forces to the Afghan security forces, and U.S. and
coalition forces continue to draw down over the next year and a
half, significant challenges remain to secure the hard-fought
gains. Among those challenges is putting the U.S.-Afghanistan
strategic partnership on a sound footing for the long term,
including through the conclusion of a bilateral status of
forces agreement to ensure that our troops have the legal
protections necessary for any post-2014 U.S. military presence
in Afghanistan. Recent statements by President Karzai have
complicated negotiation of such an agreement, and I will be
interested in what our witnesses have to say about the
prospects for a successful negotiation, as well as what the
status is of the efforts in Afghanistan militarily.
In mid-March of this year, Secretary Hagel responded to
North Korea's provocative behavior by announcing a series of
steps to improve our Homeland missile defense capability,
including the planned deployment of 14 additional ground-based
interceptors in Alaska by 2014.
On July 5, our ground-based midcourse defense system had a
flight test failure. This test failure, along with an earlier
failure, reinforces the need to pursue a ``fly-before-you-buy''
approach which demonstrates through realistic flight tests that
the system will work as intended before deploying any
additional inceptors. I would welcome our witnesses' comments
on that issue as well.
The National Defense Authorization Act that we will bring
to the Senate floor includes provisions that give the Secretary
of Defense greater flexibility to transfer detainees from
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). I will be interested in our
witnesses' views on these proposed changes in our defense
authorization bill.
Lastly, but far from leastly, we must confront the growing
challenge of sequestration. All of the things that our military
needs to do, responding to regional crises, maintaining
readiness, training and equipping our forces, taking care of
our servicemembers and their families, depend upon appropriate
levels of funding. The damaging effect that sequestration is
already having and will continue to have unless addressed,
remedied, and reversed--that damaging effect on the readiness
of our military must be addressed and addressed in a way that
protects the vitality of our forces.
It is against the backdrop of these and many more
challenges, both foreign and domestic, that we consider these
two very important nominations.
Again, we welcome both of you today. We look forward to
your testimony.
I now call on Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned to
you, we have another hearing simultaneously with this one, two
floors up, so I will be going back and forth.
Over the last 4 years, our military has suffered a steep
and damaging drop in capabilities and readiness. This
administration has cut nearly $600 billion already from the
defense budget, reduced end strength by more than 100,000
personnel, reduced the size of the naval fleet, and cut
hundreds of Air Force combat aircraft. Training and reset
accounts have been gutted and modernization programs are being
starved of resources. On the horizon is the addition of $500
billion in cuts if we are unable to find a solution for the
sequestration, which you know, is kind of ridiculous. When you
tell normal people that we have 18 percent of our budget is the
military budget, and yet we are taking 50 percent of the cuts,
it is totally unreasonable. It lets you know the priorities of
this administration.
The longer we allow our force to deteriorate, the harder
and more expensive it will be to repair and rebuild.
Earlier this year, Chairman Levin and I sent a letter to
Secretary Hagel requesting a detailed plan on how the
Department would allocate the additional $52 billion in
sequester cuts slated for fiscal year 2014. The response we
received was woefully light on details but made clear that
further cuts in fiscal year 2014 will significantly amplify the
pain our military is already enduring.
Admiral Winnefeld, you were asked earlier this year about
the impact of the budget cuts on the military, and you
responded. I have to say it was a very courageous response. I
am quoting now. ``There could be, for the first time in my
career, instances where we may be asked to respond to a crisis
and we will have to say that we cannot.'' Admiral, I feel that
we are well on our way to this unthinkable reality.
Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken
actions internally to address some critical readiness issues,
including the resumption of flight operations for the Air Force
after many squadrons--I believe 16--had been grounded for over
3 months. While this development is welcome news, I remain
concerned over the vital training and maintenance activities,
the services that remain curtailed, and nearly 700,000 DOD
civilians are still being furloughed. What I find most
concerning, however, is that much of this pain has been
unnecessary and could have been avoided all along.
Earlier this year, I introduced a bill that would have
provided for the Department with flexibility to allocate the
sequester cuts in a way that minimizes risk. At that time, all
the Chiefs agreed it would be still devastating, but not as
devastating. When we come back and put our squadrons in flying
status--again, I am going to conduct my own test on this, on
how much more it costs now to retrain, get people back up in
proficiency than it would have, had we just stayed with it.
Our actions at home do not occur in a vacuum. Around the
world, we are seeing the effects of declining military
capability and the absence of American leadership. From the
Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, our adversaries are emboldened
and there are growing doubts about the United States among our
allies.
I raise these issues today because I am deeply concerned by
the current state of our military. As our military is
experiencing an unprecedented deterioration of readiness and
capabilities, I ask our witnesses what advice they are giving
the President on these matters.
General Dempsey, at what point will you advise the
President that the defense cuts will result in the dire
scenario you laid out before our committee in February? You
said, ``If ever the force is so degraded and so unready, and
then we're asked to use it, it would be immoral.''
General Dempsey, you also warned in testimony to this
committee that further defense cuts will, ``severely limit our
ability to implement our defense strategy. It will put the
Nation at greater risk of coercion, and it will break faith
with the men and women in uniform.'' The Service Chiefs are
already talking about combat forces and capabilities that are
starting to hollow out. We had a discussion about this. Are we
hollowing out, or are we already a hollow force?
I am afraid to remind you of the comments from the Director
of National Intelligence, James Clapper, who stated earlier
this year, ``In almost 50 years in intelligence, I don't
remember that we've had a more diverse array of threats and
crisis situations around the world to deal with than we have
today.''
That is our problem, Mr. Chairman, and that is why we are
having this hearing today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Let me call upon you, Chairman Dempsey. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINTMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe, distinguished Senators. I am honored to appear before
you today on this 18th day of July as the 18th Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am also thankful, thankful for the
confidence placed in me 2 years ago, for the continued
confidence of our commander in chief and the Secretary of
Defense, and for the privilege of serving alongside Admiral
Sandy Winnefeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Of course, I am also very thankful for the unwavering love
and support and tireless service in her own way of my wife,
Deanie, who is seated behind me, not to mention our three
children and our seven grandchildren. Yes, that is plus four
since my confirmation hearing 2 years ago, with one more due
any day now to make it a total of eight.
Chairman Levin. I am sure if it were allowed you would, for
that reason alone, love to be appointed a third time.
[Laughter.]
General Dempsey. I do not know. Actually quite the
opposite. I would like to spend some time with them when the
opportunity arises.
I also want to mention I notice that my nephew Michael
Dempsey, who is a student at Wake Forest University and home
for the summer, has joined us today. We are awful proud of him
as well.
But more than anything else, I am thankful for the
opportunity to defend our Nation alongside the men and women
who wear its cloth. When I witness their courage and their
skill, I am very much reminded of the inscription that is on
the Private Soldier Monument called ``Old Simon'' at Antietam
Battlefield that goes like this, ``Not for themselves but for
their country.''
It is on their behalf and in that spirit that I am here
today. My only purpose is to be worthy of their service every
day and in every decision, to strengthen the relationship of
trust that the American Armed Forces has with the American
people, to meet our sacred obligation to keep our Nation immune
from coercion.
We cannot take this relationship for granted. Historic
transitions are testing our ability to meet our obligations. We
are in the midst of a difficult fiscal correction to restore
the economic foundation of power. We are also transitioning
from war to an even more uncertain and dangerous security
landscape.
Even as the dollars are in decline, risk is on the rise. If
we do not manage these transitions well, our military power
will become less credible. We will foreclose options and we
will leave gaps in our security.
It does not have to be that way. We can and we must lead
through these transitions. We have it within us to stay strong
as a global leader and as a reliable ally. We can make our
military more affordable without making our Nation less secure.
To do this, we need to get at least four things right.
First, we need to get our strategy right. This means
aligning our aims with our abilities. Strategy is nothing if it
is not about setting priorities. Even as we rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region, we still have to defend the Homeland from
cyber, terrorist, and missile attack, achieve our objectives in
Afghanistan, deter provocation on the Korean Peninsula, assure
and assist allies across the globe, set a more responsive
posture for a new normal of combustible violence. As we respond
to new contingencies, we must come to terms with the risks and
costs to these existing obligations. We may have to do less,
but we should never do it less well.
Second, we need to get our force right. This means keeping
our military ready and balanced. So far, we are getting it
wrong. We have already lost readiness that will take more time
and additional cost to restore. We are already out of balance
due to the magnitude and the mechanism--not to mention the
steep descent--of budget cuts. But it is not too late to
recover. Remove the budget uncertainty. Slow down the drawdown.
Help us make seemingly intractable institutional reforms. If we
do this, we can build a joint force to meet the Nation's needs
for a price that the Nation is able and willing to pay.
Third, we need to get our people right. This means
strengthening our profession while keeping faith with the
military family. Ours is an uncommon profession, one that must
value character as much as competence, that rests on a
foundation of learning and leadership, that advances equal and
ethical treatment for all its members, and that allows no
quarter for sexual violence in all of its destructive forms. We
also keep faith by making sure that our sons and daughters
always go to war with the best training, the best leadership,
and the best equipment. If we get this wrong, we will not get
anything else right.
Finally, we need to get our relationships right. This means
staying connected to our allies and, most importantly, to our
fellow Americans. Now is the defining moment in our Nation's
relationship with its September 11 veterans. This generation is
a national asset. They are ready to contribute in their
communities. They need opportunities, handshakes, not handouts.
In the end, all relationships rest on trust. Two years ago,
I offered this image at my confirmation hearing to illustrate
the vein of trust that must run from our men and women in
uniform on the front lines back here and right back to our
communities, our families, and the American people.
[The information referred to follows:]

See attached photo.

General Dempsey. Today, it is still all about trust.
Reconfirmation is at its base a reaffirmation of trust. I am
humbled by the opportunity, and I will continue to work to earn
it every day. I know you expect it and I know our men and women
in uniform deserve it.
I would like to say one other thing before passing it back
to you, Mr. Chairman. I am very careful not to presume
confirmation, and in that spirit and not knowing when my last
opportunity will be to appear before this body, I would like to
thank you for your leadership of this committee and your
support of America's men and women in uniform, as well as the
two ranking members, Senator Inhofe, Senator McCain, with whom
I have had the privilege of working for the last 2 years.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Dempsey. Thank you and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral?

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND REAPPOINTMENT AS VICE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral Winnefeld. Good morning, Chairman Levin and Ranking
Member Inhofe and other distinguished members of the Committee
on Armed Services.
I am also honored to appear before the committee this
morning and to do so along with my friend and colleague and
boss, General Marty Dempsey.
The military is a family business, and I am pleased to have
with me today my wonderful wife, Mary, who has been such a
supportive partner. She is behind me in the joint purple
outfit. She has also been a tireless advocate for military
families and wounded warriors and their caregivers, which has
been a great comfort to know that I have such a willing partner
to do this sort of work.
My sons, James and Jonathan, would have been with us also
today, but they are both at athletic tournaments, one at a
State baseball championship tournament and the other at a golf
tournament. But they remind me every day of the importance of
honorable service.
It has been my privilege to serve the Nation as Vice
Chairman for the past 2 years, and I am honored to have been
asked by the President to serve another term.
If reconfirmed, I will continue to provide independent and
objective advice to the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and
the President on the shape, readiness, health, and use of the
military instrument of power and to keep this committee
informed and to give my best effort within the three portfolios
of policy, investment, and people.
In a world growing more rather than less dangerous, at the
same time we face considerable financial pressure, there are
plenty of challenges in the three portfolios I just listed.
In the area of policy, we have been grappling with a host
of threats to our national security interests around the world,
in Afghanistan, in Iran, on the Korean Peninsula, with the
continuing evolution of al Qaeda and its affiliates, in the
aftermath of the Arab Awakening in Libya, Syria, Egypt, and
other nations, and within the increasingly complex cyber
domain.
In the investment portfolio, I was first confirmed by the
Senate for this job on the same day the Budget Control Act
(BCA) was enacted, and we continue to cope with the financial
challenges in the wake of that act that are quietly eroding our
readiness to defend our Nation and have so impacted our ability
to plan for tomorrow.
To the people portfolio, we are doing our best to manage
the enormous uncertainty to which our military and civilian
members and their families are being exposed during this budget
crisis.
We are also expending considerable effort to ensure we are
properly caring for our wounded, ill, and injured members and
their families, as well as finding every lever we can to
eliminate the pernicious insider threat of sexual assault.
These are only a few of the challenges we face, and much
remains to be done in all three of these portfolios.
If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve our
great Nation in uniform and pledge to work with this committee
on the difficult choices required to achieve a capable and
strategically shaped force that can keep America safe and our
interests secure.
Allow me to close by saying how deeply grateful I am for
the energy all the members of this committee and your able
staff bring to these issues and for your longstanding support
for our men and women in uniform and our civilians.
I look forward to taking your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Let me now ask you both the standard questions which we ask
of our military nominees.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir, I have.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. I do.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Dempsey. No.
Admiral Winnefeld. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record and hearings?
General Dempsey. I will.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Dempsey. They will.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Okay. We are going to have a 7-minute first round of
questions.
General, do you support finding additional ways to increase
the military pressure on Assad?
General Dempsey. Senator, first, let me say that I am well
aware of the human suffering and the tragedy unfolding in Syria
and the effect that it is having not just inside Syria but on
the region.
To your question about courses of action going forward, I
support very strongly a whole-of-government approach that
applies all the instruments of national power.
As for the military instrument of power, we have prepared
options and articulated risks and opportunity costs to put
additional pressure on the Assad regime.
Chairman Levin. Does the administration support additional
training and equipping of the opposition?
General Dempsey. The administration has a governmental
approach to the increased capability of the opposition.
Chairman Levin. Does that include training and equipping
militarily?
General Dempsey. Not through the Department of Defense.
Chairman Levin. Through other means, whether it might be
other countries?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Chairman Levin. On Afghanistan, are the security forces of
Afghanistan on track to be fully in charge of securing
Afghanistan by December 2014 when the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) combat mission ends?
General Dempsey. They are. General Dunford assesses that he
will achieve his campaign objectives in developing the Afghan
security forces. Now, he does also acknowledge there are some
potential gaps that he will have better clarity on after this
fighting season.
Chairman Levin. But he is basically on track?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, I am not going to ask you what advice
you have given to the President on the residual force which
might remain, assuming there is an agreement with the Afghans,
after December 2014. I am not going to ask you what the advice
is because that is advice you give confidentially to the
President, and he has a right to your confidential advice.
My question, however, is the following. Have you given the
President your advice relative to the size of the residual
force?
General Dempsey. I have, sir. We have provided several
options. As the Joint Chiefs, we have made a recommendation on
the size and we have also expressed our view on when that
announcement would best meet the campaign objectives.
Chairman Levin. Now, would you agree that legal protections
for our troops, which would be provided for if we can reach a
bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan, are essential to
any long-term U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan?
General Dempsey. I do believe that.
Chairman Levin. So any presence after December 2014 is
dependent upon working out a bilateral agreement with the
Afghans?
General Dempsey. That is right, sir.
Chairman Levin. I hope President Karzai is listening to
that answer.
General Dempsey. I will travel over there on Friday night,
sir, and have a planned office call with him.
Chairman Levin. I hope that you would make that clear, and
also I believe that our committee--and I will not speak for
others directly. If anyone does not feel this way, they will
speak for themselves. But I think it is essential that he
understand that there has to be a bilateral agreement that
protects our troops for there to be a residual presence. I
happen to favor a residual presence, by the way.
General Dempsey. As do we.
Chairman Levin. I happen to favor giving confidence to the
Afghans that there is going to be continuing relations. But I
do not want to just be silent in the face of what I consider to
be President Karzai's unwise--a number of his comments which
are very unwise in terms of whether or not he wants a residual
presence or not. He sometimes acts like he does not want a
residual presence even though it is very clear to me that the
Afghan people do and so does he, but he wants it on his terms,
and it cannot just be on his terms. It has to be on a mutually
agreed basis. Would you agree with that?
General Dempsey. I do, sir. I also, though, would point out
that our relationship and our interests in Afghanistan run
deeper than just President Karzai.
Chairman Levin. Of course. There is going to be an election
next year, and I think you can also pass along to President
Karzai that his assurances that he is not going to be a
candidate in that election but that there will be an election
are something that the committee members, I think probably most
of whom have met with him, take seriously. Those statements of
his matter to us.
Now, on the Guantanamo issue, we have in our National
Defense Authorization Bill language which would give greater
flexibility to the Department of Defense to transfer Guantanamo
detainees to the United States for detention and trial, if it
is determined to be in the U.S. national interest and if public
safety concerns are addressed, to streamline the authority of
the Secretary of Defense to transfer Guantanamo detainees to
foreign countries. Do you support those provisions?
General Dempsey. Senator, what I support as the senior
military leader of the Armed Forces of the United States is
that we must have an option to detain prisoners. We cannot
expect young men and women on the battlefield to have a single
option which would be simply to kill. We must have a capture
and detain option. I support anything that will assure me that
those young men and women will have that option.
Chairman Levin. Assuming that they have that assurance that
there are a place or places----
General Dempsey. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin.--then given that qualification, one which I
share, by the way, do you then support the language of the
bill?
General Dempsey. I would have to see the bill. But if you
are asking me has Guantanamo, the facility, tarnished the image
of the United States globally, I think it has. Therefore, I
would welcome any other solution.
Chairman Levin. On missile defense, we have had an
assessment from Lieutenant General Richard Formica, a letter
providing the assessment that investing in additional sensor
and discrimination capability for our Homeland missile defense
would be a more cost effective and less expensive near-term
Homeland missile defense option than deploying an east coast
missile defense site, particularly since there is no current
military requirement to deploy an east coast site.
Do you agree with those assessments of Vice Admiral James
Syring and General Formica? Do you agree that additional
analysis is needed to determine whether it would be necessary
to deploy an additional missile defense site in the United
States in the future?
General Dempsey. I would like to ask the Vice Chairman who
works that to comment--but I will say I absolutely agree we
should do the analysis before we make a decision on how best to
meet that capability requirement.
Chairman Levin. I am glad you gave me an opportunity to ask
Admiral Winnefeld.
General Dempsey. I have been looking for an opportunity,
Senator. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Well, so have I. Thank you for giving me
that opportunity. Admiral?
Admiral Winnefeld. Chairman Levin, the way I have put it is
I would spend my next dollar on missile defense on the sensor
discrimination that you described. There is an oft-quoted
saying in the U.S. military, ``quantity has a quality all its
own''. In this case, quality has a quantity all its own. If you
can get better discrimination, you can have a better firing
doctrine that would help you there.
I also think it is wise that we are doing the environmental
impact statements (EIS) for a potential east coast site. As we
watch the threat develop--and we are going to have to be very
cognizant of that because it could develop quickly--it may
become necessary to actually put into place a second site. We
will play that as we have to.
Chairman Levin. But when you say we should do the EIS, you
mean before making a commitment to a site, that you complete
those assessments?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir. I think we are planning on
doing the EISs in the relatively near term, and I think they
will be done naturally probably before there is a need to
actually make a decision to go with an east coast site. But I
also want to state we need to be cautious and very cognizant of
where the trajectory is of the threat.
Chairman Levin. When you say they will be done naturally,
you think they should be done?
Admiral Winnefeld. They will be done. They should be done.
I agree with doing them as a hedge, as part of our hedge
strategy that we have always considered having an east coast
site, just as a part of the hedge strategy with putting more
interceptors----
Chairman Levin. I am just trying to get a clear answer. Do
you believe they should be done before the decision is made as
to whether any site is selected?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir, I think so.
Chairman Levin. I have gone over my time. I apologize to my
colleagues and call upon Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my opening statement, I quoted each one of you, and they
are very strong quotes, particularly the one stating ``If ever
the force is so degraded and so unready, and then we're asked
to use it, it would be immoral.'' Then General Dempsey, you
add, ``There could be for the first time in my career instances
where we may be asked to respond to a crisis and we will have
to say that we cannot.'' Then, of course, we saw that James
Clapper said that there has never been a time in our history--
and he has been around for 40 years--when the threats are so
great and diverse as they are today.
Do you agree with that?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator. There are probably fewer
existential threats to the Nation, but there are far more ways
that middle-weight states, non-state actors, and violent
extremist groups can reach out and touch us.
Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with that, Admiral?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir. I would say that there are two
definitions of a hollow force. One is the force is larger than
the readiness money you have to keep it ready, and that is the
more complex definition. The simple one is something that looks
really good on the outside but it is rotten in the middle.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I was not talking about the hollow
force. I was talking about the threats that are out there.
I look back wistfully at the days of the Cold War. Things
were predictable back then. Now, you have entities out there,
like Iran, that our intelligence says are going to have a
weapon and the capability of a delivery system. That is what he
is talking about. I think it is a scary thing.
You both believe that. Have you shared this with the
President?
General Dempsey. Yes, we have briefed the President.
Senator Inhofe. So he knows this?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yet, he continues with his approach.
Let me ask you a question about GTMO. You said you would
welcome any other solution. I have often looked at GTMO as one
of the few good deals we have in this country that we have had
since 1904. Rent is $4,000 a year I think it is, Mr. Chairman,
and they do not collect it half the time. Yet, when you say we
welcome any other solution, what other solution? Is there a
solution out there that would not entail bringing these people
into our continental United States? Either one of you.
General Dempsey. I have seen the analysis done of any
number of solutions, but there has not been any consensus on
which one to pursue. I simply want to align myself with those
who say we have to have a detention solution.
Senator Inhofe. No, I agree. We have to have a detention.
We have something there that is ready-made. I understand that a
lot of the people in the Middle East do not like it. It has
given us a bad reputation in some areas. But, I believe that we
need to think of America first.
I can recall 4 years ago when the President came out
talking about these alternatives that they had. They had sites
in the United States. One was in Oklahoma. I went down there
and I talked to a young lady. She was in charge of our prison
down there. She had had several tours in GTMO, and she said,
``What is the matter with them up there? Don't they know that
we have this?'' It is ready-made.
I have to say this because this is a great frustration to
me. Yes, we have language that is pretty good language in the
bill, but nonetheless--I will just ask one last question on
that.
Can you think of anything that would not entail
incarceration or movement into the United States? Right now off
the top of your head.
Admiral Winnefeld. I do not have an easy answer to that
one, Senator.
One thing I would mention is just a little more flexibility
I think would be useful to us. I will give you an example. We
have a moral obligation to take good medical care of these
detainees. Because we cannot move them outside of GTMO, we have
to build very state-of-the-art medical facilities.
Senator Inhofe. I have seen it.
Admiral Winnefeld. It would be great to be able to move
them briefly back and forth to the United States if they need
medical treatment and send them back. That is the kind of
flexibility I mean.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that is fine.
Admiral Winnefeld. I know that is different from what you
are talking about.
Senator Inhofe. We have that. There is not a person up here
who has not been down there more than once. One of the big
problems they have with the detainees down there is they are
overweight, and they are eating better than they have ever
eaten in their lives. They have better medical attention. They
have tests run that they never even heard of before. I think we
are meeting that.
On April 9, when we stop the flying--I have talked to each
one of you about this, but I think we need to get something on
the record. I have an aviation background, and I do not think
you have to have that to know that you have to keep your
proficiency up. That was 3 months ago, April 9. Now, I applaud
the decision to now get back in and start retraining.
I mentioned in my opening statement that I was going to
conduct a study as to how much more it costs us to go through
the retraining that we are going to have to go through right
now than if we had never made the decision back on April 9.
Have you already done that, or do you have any information
in terms of how much more it is going to cost now than if we
had not done it to start with?
Admiral Winnefeld. I think it is a good question, and I
think we can easily get that for you for the record in terms of
cost.
What I can tell you is that if you take one of these
squadrons that has not been flying at all, it is going to take
anywhere from 1 to 3 months for them to bring their proficiency
back up just in basic airmanship skills, taking off and landing
and that sort of thing, and then probably another 3 months
beyond that to get their combat skills back. I think of it more
in terms of time, but there is a cost dimension and we can get
you that.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but time, would you not agree, equals
risk at the time we need these? We had some of them who came
right out of school right around April 9. They are going to go
back and almost start from the beginning now. If we do not have
the capability of taking care of the needs as they come up, I
believe that that translates into a risk that I am not willing
to take if I can do anything about it.
[The information referred to follows:]

As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air Force still flying
at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000 flying hours at a
cost of $116 million above the President's 2014 budget request and 3-6
months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from
current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-
sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).
Prior to sequestration, a substantial number of Air Force squadrons
were already operating at lower than optimal goals due to previous
Budget Control Act (BCA) reductions and the effects of long-term high
operations tempo. On 9 April, a total of 31 squadrons were stood down,
including 13 combat-coded (fighter, bomber, and Airborne Warning and
Control System) units and 18 institutional units (Weapons School,
Aggressors, Thunderbirds, etc.). Through efficiencies and the $208
million from the Department of Defense reprogramming request, the Air
Force was able to shift funds and increase the flying rates of the 13
combat coded units back to Combat Mission Ready (CMR) rates for the
remainder of fiscal year 2013. It will take 3-6 months at this CMR rate
before these squadrons return to pre-sequestration mission ready rates.
The efficiencies and reprogramming also allowed the remaining 18
institutional units to resume flying, albeit lower than Basic Mission
Capable rates.
The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the
BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring
all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals
needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take
approximately 2 years, an additional $3.2 billion per year in fiscal
year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment
tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

General Dempsey. Senator, could I add?
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
General Dempsey. What we are seeing is that we are going to
end up with two problems over time if sequestration remains in
effect. The immediate problem for the next several years will
be readiness because we will not be able to find the money we
need to achieve the level of sequestration cuts without
dramatically impacting our readiness. Then as the force becomes
smaller, you can restore readiness because you are dealing with
a smaller force, but I think too small. So it goes too far too
fast.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. The proficiency of
a smaller number of units can be greater but you are still
dealing with a smaller number of units. When we have the
diverse threats that we have right now, to me that is not a
very good idea, not that you can do anything about it, but
right now that is a problem.
The last question, because my time is up, would be,
Admiral, I appreciate the fact that you used the word
``immoral''. Given the current path of readiness in the Armed
Forces, in your professional judgment when will the commander
in chief be at a point of making immoral decisions?
Admiral Winnefeld. I do not think I was the one who used
the term ``immoral''.
But I think we are keeping the White House closely informed
as to the outcome of the Strategic Choices and Management
Review. That includes both capability, capacity, and readiness
of the force. They are aware of those results and I am sure
that they are going to factor that into their decisionmaking on
the rest of the budget issues that are in play. Hopefully, we
will be able to find a good resolution that will allow us to go
forward with being able to plan for the future.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate both of you. We have to let
the people know that we have a real serious problem here, and I
think this hearing is our opportunity to do that.
I apologize in attributing a quote to you. I guess it was
General Dempsey who made that quote.
General Dempsey. Yes, it was, sir.
Let me assure you that if the Nation is threatened, we will
go. But that is the point. We will go and we may not be ready
to go. So it would depend on the nature of the conflict in
which we were asked to participate. If it is an existential
threat to the Nation and we send them, there is no immorality
in that. But if this were some other contingency and we were
asking young men and women to go not ready and we had a choice
to do that----
Senator Inhofe. That is where the immorality issue comes
in.
General Dempsey. That is right.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much and I agree
with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join in thanking both of you for your service over many,
many years.
General Dempsey, you and I have discussed briefly the
purchase of helicopters for the Afghan armed services, the
purchase of Russian MI-17s from the export agency controlled by
Russia that is now selling arms to Syria and a country that is
still harboring, providing refuge to Edward Snowden. We
discussed the reasons for that sale. Very graciously, you
suggested you would look into the possibility of either ending
that sale, which will result in helicopters right now,
according to the Inspector General for Afghanistan, sitting on
the runways of Afghanistan because they lack pilots to fly them
and they lack people trained to maintain or repair them.
I wonder whether there is something we can do either to
stop those sales, purchases subsidized by American taxpayers,
provided by American taxpayers to a supposed ally that still
does not have a status of forces agreement with us that will
enable us to continue providing aid to them. I think in
connection with that question, what additional kinds of
resources we should consider stopping if there is no status of
forces agreement?
General Dempsey. Senator, on the MI-17s, I support
continuing on the path we are on to get the Afghans as capable
as possible by the end of 2014, and that will require us to
stay committed to that fleet of MI-17s. There is no way we
could transition at this point and put them in anything other
than that airframe.
What I suggested to you is that if we can achieve a
lasting, enduring relationship with them and if they live up to
their end of the deal and we live to our end of the deal, we
will be investing in them through foreign military sales for
some time. There is a likely point where we could transition
them to U.S.-built aircraft. But in the interim period, we
cannot. I should not say we cannot. It would be my
recommendation that we stay the course with the existing
program.
Senator Blumenthal. Is that interest sufficient, do you
think, to justify the national security waiver under the
legislation that is currently included in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA)?
General Dempsey. I do, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. What would have to change for those
helicopters to be purchased from an American manufacturer such
as Sikorsky or any of the others that are more than capable of
providing better aircraft to the Afghans?
General Dempsey. We actually have experience in making that
transition in Iraq where we have initially outfitted them with
Soviet aircraft and are now making the transition to an
American airframe. It starts with training and long lead time
procurements. But that effort is unlikely to begin until we
establish a bilateral security agreement.
Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Winnefeld, I was at a briefing
recently that you gave, an excellent briefing, on threats to
our Navy. I wonder if you could comment, to the extent you are
able, on the importance of the Ohio-class replacement in terms
of nuclear deterrence, the importance of continuing with that
program, and any possible jeopardy that might be impacted as a
result of sequester.
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, we of course remain committed
to the triad. We believe that is the right approach for nuclear
deterrence for this country, and of course, the fleet ballistic
missile submarines are an absolutely essential element of that
triad. It is the most survivable element that we have. It is a
very reliable platform, a very reliable missile that goes with
it. We are very committed to the next class coming down the
line.
I think we have delayed it about as far as we can. We need
to now--and we are getting into the requirements and design of
this missile-carrying submarine. Again, we are just committed
to the program. It is terribly important that we get this
right.
We are going to try to control the costs on it. We are
going to try to make this, like all the programs we are working
right now, from the beginning a successful acquisition program.
I know that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) and Sean Stackley with the
Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations himself are all
committed to making this a successful program.
Senator Blumenthal. You would agree, would you not, that
this program really has to be spared any impact as a result of
sequester? It is so vital to our national security.
Admiral Winnefeld. I would agree with that, yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. General Dempsey, I wonder if I could
move to a personnel issue that I know, because of your personal
commitment to the well-being of our troops, is of great
interest to you, the electronic medical record system which
still is incompatible--the Department of Defense medical
records system with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
record system--despite questions that I and others have asked
repeatedly under this Secretary of Defense and the previous
one. I remain concerned, to put it mildly, with the fact that
interoperability still is a goal not a reality. I wonder if you
could comment on what can be done to increase the pace of
making those two systems compatible. I had thought originally
that they would be one system. A billion dollars has been spent
on making them one system.
General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
I share your concern. I can also assure you that Secretary
Hagel who has a background in the Veterans Administration
shares it. He has taken a decision to move the responsibility,
the program management, into AT&L where it will, I think you
will see, be much better managed.
We have done other things. For example, agreed to certify
as complete medical records that pass from Active Duty into the
Veterans Administration, which then relieves the burden of them
having to do continual research to figure out if the record is
complete.
That is the path we are on, but your oversight and interest
in it will be an important part of achieving it.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time has expired. But I, again, want to thank you both
for your extraordinary service and just to reiterate, General
Dempsey, I remain unhappy, very strongly unhappy, with our
current position and posture vis-a-vis those MI-17s and I am
not going to let the issue go. With all due respect, I
understand your position. Thank you very much for being so
forthright in your answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator McCain?
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I must tell both the witnesses at the onset I am very
concerned about the role you have played over the last 2 years,
your view of your role as the chief advisors to the President
on national security, and the state of the world over the last
2 years since you have come to hold the office you hold.
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe the
continued costs and risks of our inaction in Syria are now
worse for our national security interests than the costs and
risks associated with limited military action?
General Dempsey. Senator, as we have discussed----
Senator McCain. I would like to know an answer rather than
a filibuster. I have 6 minutes and 10 seconds.
General Dempsey. I assure you, Senator, I will not
filibuster.
This is a regional issue. I would say that the issue in
Syria is we are at greater risk because of the emergence of
violent extremist organizations, as is Iraq.
Senator McCain. You are not answering the question,
General. Do you believe the continued costs and risks of our
inaction in Syria are now worse for our national security
interests than the costs and risks associated with limited
military action?
General Dempsey. With all due respect, Senator, you are
asking me to agree that we have been inactive, and we have not
been inactive.
Senator McCain. We have not been inactive?
General Dempsey. That is correct.
Senator McCain. This, again, gives validity to my concern
because, obviously, we may not have been inactive, but any
observer knows that Bashar al-Assad is prevailing on the
battlefield. Over 100,000 people have been killed. Hezbollah is
there. The situation is much more dire than it was 2 years ago
when you and Admiral Winnefeld came to office.
So your answer is that we have not been inactive?
General Dempsey. That is correct. We have not used direct
military strengths, but we have not been inactive.
Senator McCain. I will ask you for the third time. Do you
believe that we should take military action? Which has greater
risk? Our continued, limited action or significant action such
as the establishment of a no-fly zone and arming the rebels
with the weapons they need, which they have not been getting,
General, I know. I know perhaps better than you because I have
been there. Which do you think is a greater cost? The action
that we are taking now, which has had no effect on the
battlefield equation, or doing nothing?
General Dempsey. Senator, I am in favor of building a
moderate opposition and supporting it. The question of whether
to support it with direct kinetic strikes is a decision for our
elected officials, not for the senior military leader of the
Nation.
Senator McCain. This goes back to my concern about your
role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
General Dempsey. I understand.
Senator McCain. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is
supposed to provide the best advice he can as far as our
overall national security is concerned. That is why you are the
sole military advisor.
You testified this February you had advised the President
to arm vetted units of the Syrian opposition. In April, you
testified you no longer supported the position. Now we read in
published reports that the administration has decided to arm
the Syrian opposition units.
How do we account for those pirouettes?
General Dempsey. I would not accept the term ``pirouette,''
sir. I would accept the term that we have adapted our approach
based on what we know of the opposition. If you recall, in the
beginning of the year there was a period where it was pretty
evident that the extremist groups were prevailing inside the
opposition. So I have not been wavering----
Senator McCain. Is your position that the extremist groups
are prevailing inside the opposition?
General Dempsey. You asked me about February. In February,
I had that concern.
Senator McCain. So that is your answer to why in February
you advised the President to arm them? In April, you said that
we should not, and then now, obviously, we are arming the
rebels. Do you support that policy?
General Dempsey. I support the building of a moderate
opposition and including building its military capability.
Senator McCain. Here is an example of my concern. You told
CNN on July 8, ``the war in Syria is not a simple matter of
stopping the fight by the introduction of any particular U.S.
capability. It seems to me that we need to understand what the
peace will look like before we start the war.'' The war has
been going on, General Dempsey, to over 100,000 people killed.
We did not start the war and we would not be starting a war. We
would be trying to stop a massacre that is going on. We would
try to stop the Hezbollah with thousands of troops. We would
try to stop the fact that the Russians continue to supply
heavily Bashar al Assad's forces and what would be a great
triumph for Iran in the entire region. But you say it seems to
me we need to understand what the peace will look like before
we start the war. Do you think we ought to see how we could
stop the war by intervening and stopping the massacre?
General Dempsey. Senator, would you agree that we have
recent experience where until we understood how the country
would continue to govern and that institutions of governance
would not fail, that actually situations can be made worse by
the introduction of military force?
Senator McCain. Actually, General Dempsey, you and I went
through this in 2006 in Iraq when I said that it was not
succeeding and that we had to have a surge and that only a
surge could succeed in reversing the tide of battle. You
disagreed with me way back then. I think history shows that
those of us who supported the surge were right and people like
you who did not think we needed a surge were wrong.
I guess my question to you is, is it in any way a good
outcome for this situation on the battlefield to continue as it
is with obviously Bashar al-Assad prevailing and a great
victory for Iran and continued slaughter of thousands and
thousands of people, the destabilization of Jordan, the
destabilization of Lebanon, and what is clearly erupting into a
regional conflict? Is that your answer?
General Dempsey. Senator, somehow you have me portrayed as
the one who is holding back from our use of military force
inside of Syria.
Senator McCain. No, I am not saying that, General. I am
saying what your advice and counsel is to the President of the
United States, and your views are very important because that
is your job.
General Dempsey. It is. I have given those views to the
President. We have given him options. Members of this committee
have been briefed on them in a classified setting. We have
articulated the risks. The decision on whether to use force is
the decision of our elected officials.
Senator McCain. The chairman just asked you if you would
give your personal opinion to the committee if asked. You said
yes. I am asking for your opinion.
General Dempsey. About the use of kinetic strikes? That
issue is under deliberation inside of our agencies of
Government, and it would be inappropriate for me to try to
influence the decision with me rendering an opinion in public
about what kind of force we should use.
Senator McCain. So your answer to the chairman's question
about giving your personal view is circumscribed by decisions
that are still being made?
General Dempsey. I will rather let this committee know what
my recommendations are at the appropriate time. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. When might that be?
General Dempsey. Sir, if the administration and the
Government decides to use military force, we have provided a
variety of options, and you know that.
Senator McCain. Well, if it is your position that you do
not provide your personal views to the committee when asked,
only under certain circumstances, then you have just
contradicted what I have known this committee to operate under
for the last 30 years.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General. Thank you, Admiral.
I want to get back to Syria in a second.
But, first, I want to ask you, General Dempsey. In regards
to mental health services for our servicemembers, one of the
things that has recently happened is that at Camp Lejeune, they
were reduced by about 50 appointments per month because of the
sequestration. I was wondering if you know if there has been
any increase in suicide or suicide attempts since sequestration
took effect.
General Dempsey. I do not have that data readily available,
Senator. It is a good question. We are aware of some of the
reduction in services. I can take that for the record.
Senator Donnelly. Okay, great.
[The information referred to follows:]

While it is difficult for the Department to track a direct effect
of sequestration on suicide events or attempts, one thing is certain,
the Department has witnessed a decline in the total number of suicide
events during calendar year 2013 as compared to calendar year 2011 and
calendar year 2012. The latest suicide report from the Armed Forces
Medical Examiner's Office (week ending July 14, 2013) stated that year-
to-date 2013 there have been a total of 156 confirmed and suspected
suicides. This number, while unacceptably high, indicates 45 fewer
suicide events compared to 2012 and 8 fewer than in 2011. We're
cautiously optimistic that our extensive efforts may be showing
results, and we must continue to keep our eye on the ball following
through on prevention efforts to ensure these numbers continue to
decrease. The Department will continue its collaboration efforts with
the Department of Veterans Affairs, other Federal agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and academia to share an understanding
of key risk factors associated with suicide, collaborate on a national
strategy, and develop best practices in suicide prevention.
Since the date civilian furloughs officially began (on/about July
8, 2013), there have been seven new cases of suicide events. While
there has been a decrease in the number of services provided due to
sequestration, the number of suicides has not increased. Suicide
remains a highly complex issue with many facets contributing to a
servicemember's choice to commit this act. Personal/dispositional
factors, contextual factors, clinical health factors, historical
factors, and even deployment factors can all contribute as stressors
linked to suicide events and in some cases a lack of services may not
be at issue at all. While sequestration will force the department to
make tough decisions, suicide prevention is of vital importance and
will remain a top priority for our leaders.

Senator Donnelly. The follow-up on that would be, are there
efforts in place right now to try to minimize the effect on
mental health since it has such a dramatic effect on our
servicemembers?
General Dempsey. There are any number of efforts, and it
has the attention of not only the Department but also the Joint
Chiefs. Admiral Winnefeld himself chairs a meeting with the
Vice Chiefs of the Services. We meet in the tank. We are
concerned because although we have prioritized care for wounded
warriors, families, and mental health services in the face of
declining resources, how that is implemented in the field can
sometimes be missed. We are alert to it.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
I was in Afghanistan a few months ago and met with our
commanders. At the time, we were on all of our metrics. We were
right where we wanted to be as we head toward the end of 2014.
Admiral and General, are we still meeting the plan that we had
laid out? Are we still being able to hold the towns that we
have started to hold? Are we able to turn the Taliban back? Is
the plan moving along on schedule? Is it going faster or
slower? Are we meeting the numbers we were hoping to meet as we
head toward the end of 2014?
General Dempsey. I will start and see if the Vice wants to
add anything.
Besides speaking with General Dunford on a weekly basis and
visiting him about quarterly, I also reach out to as many other
people as I can possibly reach out to who can give us other
views. Yesterday we had a woman from the Congressional Research
Service who had actually spent the last 5 months traveling
around Afghanistan visiting with civilian and military leaders,
mostly Afghans. Her report aligned with General Dunford's
assessment that we can achieve our military campaign objectives
on the timeline that is currently established.
Senator Donnelly. I appreciate the update because if we are
able to stay on that program, then the Afghan forces have a
chance to make this work.
To get back to Syria that Senator McCain was talking about,
if conditions do not change, does it look to you, as it looks
to many, that in the near future Daraa could also fall to the
Assad Government as well?
General Dempsey. Actually the chairman asked----
Senator Donnelly. I apologize. I had to step out.
General Dempsey. No, no, sir. I was just reflecting on the
fact that there are many people concerned about Daraa. I met on
Saturday with King Abdullah from Jordan, and I will be visiting
him next week and his leaders as well. We have military
contingency planning ongoing both back here, but also inside
Jordan. So, yes, we are concerned about Daraa.
The conflict tends to ebb and flow. That kind of conflict
will always ebb and flow. We are watching and making sure that
we would have options available to the national command
authority if necessary.
Senator Donnelly. What steps, short of a limited no-fly
zone, could have the kind of effect that could slow down the
Assad forces?
General Dempsey. Let me pass that to the Vice because he
just did some significant work on this in preparation for his
hearing on Tuesday.
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, there are a whole range of
options that are out there.
Senator Donnelly. The reason I asked that is because I know
there is a whole range of options, but as you look at
everything, the rebel forces are being moved from almost
everywhere they are located. So we have options but the ball
seems to be heading the other way.
Admiral Winnefeld. I would not want to get into any
Intelligence Community judgments or anything classified in an
unclassified hearing. But I think as commonly known, where the
opposition is most on the run right now is in the central and
western part of Syria around al-Qusayr, which they have lost,
around Homs, which is a very difficult situation for them right
now. That also happens to be the most important place other
than Damascus itself probably for the Syrian regime to regain
control of because that represents the pathway from Damascus
into their traditional homeland near the coast. So they really
want that back.
I believe personally--and it is only my personal judgment--
that if the regime is successful in that area, they will next
move north to Aleppo, which is the largest city in Syria. It is
their commercial center. I do not think they are going to go
down to Daraa yet, but we have to watch. We have to maintain
vigilance and discern where this thing is headed.
Senator Donnelly. Then whether it is Aleppo or Daraa, and I
know there are contingencies, but to not take action is to take
action and is determinative of what happens. I think there is a
concern as to how long does this go on before the momentum
becomes irreversible.
Admiral Winnefeld. We are ready to act if we are called
upon to act. I think the current track that is being pursued by
the administration is a diplomatic track. All manner of other
options have been discussed and are continually under
discussion, and I would not want to get out in front of the
President or anybody else on what choices he might make.
Senator Donnelly. In effect, you are waiting to hear at
this point.
Admiral Winnefeld. As we should be. We are ready, providing
every possible option we can in case we are called upon to
exercise the use of force, which we believe is a political
decision.
Senator Donnelly. In regards to the rebel forces, as you
look at them right now, General and Admiral, we have been
concerned about al Nusra and their activities. Do you see the
al Nusra piece growing stronger than the moderate piece? How do
you see this moving on a day-to-day basis?
General Dempsey. There was a period back in April that
Senator McCain referred where I was very concerned that the al
Nusra front, Ahrar al-Sham, and others--there are hundreds of
different groups that shift allegiances and alliances on the
opposition side, and it makes it very challenging to determine
what we are really looking at there. The Intelligence Community
is hard at it. I am hard at it. We are hard at it with our
regional partners. There was a period of time when I was
fearful that the extremist element, the jihadist Salafist side
of the opposition was gaining considerable strength.
Of late, through some efforts that we have made to convince
our allies to avoid creating a problem by empowering some of
these groups, we have had some success at that. We have also
had some success in identifying more clearly a part of the
opposition that could be built and trained not only militarily.
This is the point I really want to make sure resonates. This
opposition has to not only be prepared militarily, but it has
to be prepared if it achieves a position of governance inside
of Syria. Otherwise, the situation will deteriorate even
further.
Senator Donnelly. General, Admiral, thank you for your
service.
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly.
Now, before I call on Senator Wicker, Senator Inhofe has a
very brief comment.
Senator Inhofe. Just a brief clarification. I was told by
my staff when I came back that I might have been misunderstood
in my comments about GTMO. I am arguably the strongest
supporter of opening it up, using it to its fullest capacity
not just for incarceration but for trials. The language is in
the bill. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your good faith efforts in
the language that was in there, but I am against the language
that is in the NDAA.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to state that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, welcome back.
Let us talk about the situation in Egypt. There has been
disagreement in Washington about the wisdom of continuing to
provide assistance to the Egyptian military in light of recent
events there. When I look at Egypt, I do not see very many
Jeffersonian Democrats, but I believe the Egyptian military has
acted with great professionalism and restraint throughout the 3
years of difficult transition since the 2011 ouster of Hosni
Mubarak.
I believe one of the primary reasons there has not been far
more bloodshed and suffering during this time of transition is
the support the United States has provided to Egypt through
foreign military sales and military-to-military cooperation.
In light of recent events, some have called for the end of
these programs. Let me tell you how I feel about this and our
commitments under the Camp David Accords and then I will let
you respond.
First, we must maintain the strength of this relationship
to enable us to assist and influence Egypt's military leaders.
Second, the United States would be shortsighted to overlook
the return on investment we get from the Egyptian military, for
example, Suez Canal transits for our carrier battle groups,
intelligence cooperation, counterterrorism cooperation. These
are examples of the benefits we derive from this relationship.
Third, the Egyptian military has played a stabilizing role
during Egypt's transition.
Fourth, our commitments under the Camp David Accords have
yielded sustainable peace between Israel and Egypt. We must
acknowledge Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement this
weekend on Face the Nation that the Camp David Accords have
been, ``The cornerstone of peace between us and our neighbors,
and it has also been the cornerstone of stability in the Middle
East.''
General Dempsey, do you agree with me regarding the
importance of military-to-military relationships as enablers of
U.S. foreign policy?
General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Do you agree with me that we should
continue to maintain and foster the strength of the U.S.-
Egyptian military relationship?
General Dempsey. I do. If our Government decides that they
have to take some action based on existing legal frameworks and
restrictions, I would recommend that we find a way to restore
those as quickly as possible even if it meant conditioning them
some way. But I very strongly believe we have to maintain our
contact with the Egyptian armed forces.
Senator Wicker. Do you have any reason to believe, as some
have feared and as some fear now, that weapons and equipment
that we provide to the Egyptians or that we have provided in
the past have been used or will be used or would be used in
ways that might eventually endanger the U.S. military or
civilian personnel or U.S. interests?
General Dempsey. There is no indication at this point,
Senator, that that would be a concern.
Senator Wicker. In your opinion, was the elected Government
of Mohamed Morsi moving toward a dictatorship?
General Dempsey. If I could, I would like to use this
opportunity to express my conversations with my counterpart. I
can tell you they very strongly believe that.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me ask you then, before I move on
to another topic. I made some pretty emphatic statements. Would
you like to elaborate? I will give you an opportunity to
elaborate on what you have said about the relationship that we
have had and the assistance and the sales that we have had with
the Egyptian military.
General Dempsey. Thank you. My own personal experience with
it goes back to when I commanded U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
in 2008, and I can tell you that they are a very strong partner
of the United States, a very key nation in the region. As you
put it yourself, we enjoy preferential passage in the Suez,
dynamic overflight. They have committed to the Camp David
Accords. The Israeli military considers the Egyptian military a
strong partner. In my personal experience, which goes back now
about 5 years, they are worth the investment.
Senator Wicker. Now, with regard to Syria, the chairman
talked in his opening statement about a post-Assad solution,
the negotiated solution. Do you agree that unless the momentum
shifts--and I think Senator Donnelly was concerned about this
also--back toward the rebels, there is hardly any chance for
that sort of solution that the chairman seeks and is hoping
for?
General Dempsey. Yes, I agree. I think as the momentum ebbs
and flows, each side feels itself more compelled or less
compelled to seek a negotiated settlement. Sure.
Senator Wicker. If I can, I think you answered a question
from the chairman about ways in which military support could be
gotten to the rebels, and I think he asked about enabling other
governments to support the military efforts if we are unable
politically or unwilling to do so. Do you remember that
question?
General Dempsey. I do.
Senator Wicker. Can you elaborate at all, or is that
something you just do not feel comfortable talking about?
General Dempsey. No. I am comfortable talking about the
commitment to improve the capabilities of the opposition. There
are any number of ways to do it directly.
Senator Wicker. The military capability?
General Dempsey. That is correct.
But you have also heard me say it is not just about
improving or enhancing their military capability.
Senator Wicker. I understand that, but that is what my
question is about.
General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
Of course, other nations as well. There is a significant
diplomatic effort to bundle our efforts together into something
that will increase the pace at which their capability could be
increased.
Senator Wicker. Could you elaborate as to who these allies
might be that are a little more willing?
General Dempsey. I would rather do that in a classified
setting, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Reed is going to yield momentarily to another
Senator who is next in line who I believe is Senator
Gillibrand. Senator Reed is going to yield just for one turn.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Thank you both for your public service, for your
dedication, for all that you do for our military and for our
Nation.
I would like to first focus and continue the conversation
on Syria.
I have grave concerns over the broader regional security in
the Middle East, particularly when we are seeing the continued
influx of jihadi and Hezbollah fighters into Syria. I want to
talk a little bit about what this means for Syria's neighbor.
Obviously, with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran has been able to
have an influence at Israel's border. Will Iran be able to do
the same with regard to Syria in your estimation? What can we
do to prevent both a jihadi haven, as well as a stronghold for
Iran through Hezbollah in Syria?
General Dempsey. I will take this and then if the Vice
Chairman wants to add because we have been--it will not
surprise you to know--deeply involved in this issue
collaboratively.
First of all, you are exactly right to think of this as a
regional issue, Senator. I would add that Iran is not just a
challenge to the United States in its nuclear aspirations but
also through its surrogates, its proxies, its arm sales. They
are trying to foment a sectarian conflict that runs from Beirut
to Damascus to Baghdad. The approach to that, the strategy that
would underpin our efforts should be regional, therefore, which
means we need to increase our support of the Lebanese armed
forces on one side, of the Iraqi armed forces on the other, and
of our Jordanian and Turkish partners on the northern and
southern flank.
Senator Gillibrand. With regard to the broader question on
Iran specifically, I have heard both cautious optimism and
grave concern about the election of Rohani as the new
President. What is your assessment of the impact of the
election? Do you expect his election to change Iran's nuclear
policy or its international policies? What is your initial
assessment?
Admiral Winnefeld. First of all, I reflect back on former
Secretary Gates' oft-quoted remark of he is looking for the
elusive Iranian moderate. Rohani does have a reputation for
being a moderate. He has made some moderate statements since he
has been elected, but he is not in office yet. There are those
of us who have the opinion he is going to struggle a little bit
against a very conservative central government leadership led
by the Supreme Leader that may prevent him from, if he wants to
be a moderate, becoming one.
I think the real watchword here is prudence. It makes sense
to potentially reach out to him, see where he is coming from,
but not to do so naively. I do not think anybody is going to do
that. I think we are in a good position here. But it is an
interesting development. Nobody really expected him to be
elected, at the same time again the elusive Iranian moderate.
We need to maintain the pressure that we are maintaining on the
regime and make it very clear to them what our objectives are,
number one, that they not develop a nuclear weapon.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Turning now to cyber, both of you have testified that you
believe that cyber is a growing threat and a serious concern
for our military and for our national security and for our
economy. We have been working on a bipartisan basis on a bill
called The Cyber Warrior Act--Senator Vitter and Senator Blunt
are leading the charge for the Republican side--in order to
create a National Guard unit that is dedicated solely to cyber
defense of our Nation as a way to get some of our best and
bravest from the private sector who are dedicated to the
military and the defense of this country to be able to use
their talents more efficiently, in a more cost efficient manner
as well.
Can I have your opinions on what the impact of creating
these units would be with their dual status and whether that
would be in the end better for our defense and for growing this
talent in house?
General Dempsey. I will go first. Again, this is one where
the Vice has also been deeply involved.
First of all, you have our commitment to seek to figure out
what are the various roles in all the components of our
military and all the branches of Service. Without making a firm
commitment right now on that particular approach, I will say
that each of the Service Chiefs is taking a look at it under
the advice of our U.S. Cyber Command Commander and U.S.
Strategic Command Commander.
By the way, you say it is a growing concern. It is here
right now. There is urgency to this and I think you understand
that.
We would have to understand what the cyber role would be
for a guardsman. There really would be no role in a title 2
authority. There is no title 2 authority for cyber. It is
really title 10.
But go ahead, Sandy.
Admiral Winnefeld. I would say it has been an interesting
idea that we have looked at and we are committed to looking at.
We are growing our cyber force by a considerable number. It is
probably the only part of our force that is going to grow under
current budget conditions.
We need this new force to do a number of things for us,
principally to help us defend our own networks inside the
Department of Defense to help defend the Nation against cyber
attacks. Obviously, law enforcement, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) have the lead there, but we play an important
role in assisting them.
Then there is the potential for offensive cyber operations
in support of a combatant commander if we end up finding
ourselves in a war.
Where the National Guard fits into those three niches is
something we need to study and look at. We are short of money.
It is going to cost a lot to develop this capability in the
Guard, and it is not there all the time for us. Then again, I
think you make a fair point that there is expertise out there
to tap on.
Senator Gillibrand. That we want to have.
Admiral Winnefeld. I just think we need to look very
closely, very soberly at whether this makes sense financially.
Senator Gillibrand. I would like to work with you both on
this issue.
We have, obviously, been spending a lot of time on sexual
assault in the military. It is something everyone cares deeply
about solving. One of the things I want to get your thoughts on
the military has had a change of position on its view towards
Article 60, that we can actually take Article 60 authority
outside the chain of command and still maintain good order and
discipline, still maintain command climate, command control.
Why do you think removing Article 30 would be different in
any way? Because I would imagine that second legal decision
would not have a differing impact than removing Article 60.
General Dempsey. The approach to Article 60 was because we
had put in place over time in our judicial system other
mechanisms, military judges and prosecutors, and an appeal
process that allowed us to consider changing the authorities of
a convening authority to change a ruling after the fact. But
that is, it seems to us, different than taking the actual
offense out of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
Do you want to add anything to that?
Admiral Winnefeld. I think the most important thing to me
is to make sure that there is an active deterrent out there
that somebody who is contemplating sexual assault knows that
they are going to be caught, that they are going to be
prosecuted, and if they are prosecuted, they are going to be
punished. It is the same thing that has worked in the drug
world for us and the like. It is our strong view that the
commander is responsible for that.
Senator Gillibrand. But I would argue that the commander is
still responsible for that because keeping in a number of the
articles like Article 134, other articles that are general
crimes, you are still fundamentally responsible for command
climate, good order, and discipline. For any type of infraction
of any part of the UCMJ, the commander is responsible for. You
have to set the climate where this assault and rape is not
going to happen where they can not be retaliated against and
where they will report.
Admiral Winnefeld. I could not agree more.
Senator Gillibrand. The only difference is the legal
judgment, that weighing of evidence and facts, will now be done
by a trained objective military prosecutor.
Admiral Winnefeld. I would like to give you a couple of
numbers on what the Army has discovered recently, peeling back
the numbers on what a so-called objective observer might end up
with.
The Army has looked back over the last 2 years and has
found 35 cases where a civilian district attorney (DA) refused
to take a sexual assault case--refused to take the case. The
chain of command in the military insisted that the case be
taken inside the military chain of command. Of those 35 cases,
there are 14 out there that are not yet resolved. They are
still in the court system. There are actually 49. Of the 35
complete, 25 resulted in a court martial conviction. That is a
71 percent conviction rate. The civilian rate is around 18 to
22 percent. So of those 71 percent that were convicted, 24 of
the 25 got punitive discharges. They are doing prison time.
If the Army had not taken those 49 cases and the 35 where
we have achieved a conviction, those people would be walking
the street right now. The victims would not have had the
resolution that they deserved in this case. This was done
inside the chain of command, the chain of command insisting
that a prosecution be pursued, and it was pursued successfully.
I worry that if we turn this over to somebody else, whether it
is a civilian DA or a non-entity in the military, that they are
going to make the same kind of decisions that those civilian
prosecutors made. I worry that we are going to have fewer
prosecutions if we take it outside the chain of command.
Senator Gillibrand. We want prosecutions that are going to
result in guilty verdicts, and weighing these kinds of evidence
is very difficult. That is why being trained to know what kind
of cases you can bring forward and win is so important.
But, moreover, you may have helped a handful of victims. We
are still having 23,000 victims who do not feel the system is
strong enough, objective enough, and transparent enough to even
report. If we are going to address the 23,000 cases as opposed
to the handful where a judgment of a commander might have
helped, we need to change the system.
My time has expired.
General Dempsey. By the way, thanks, Senator. I hope you
know we actually embrace this discussion.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you for your service and
thoughtfulness.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of you for being here and your
families for your distinguished service to our country.
General Dempsey, I want to thank you for your recent visit
to New Hampshire. It really meant a lot to our men and women in
uniform, and they said to me after that it really said so much
about your leadership to go hear from those on the ground. Also
at our shipyard, our civilian workforce--they deeply
appreciated it. So thank you.
Yesterday I was deeply troubled by a report that came out
from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the Joint
Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) Accounting Command
(JPAC), and that report actually said that unfortunately the
leadership weaknesses and fragmented organizational structure
is undermining the important function of JPAC. Of course, with
more than 83,000 of our country's heroes remaining missing or
unaccounted for from past conflicts, including 49 from New
Hampshire for Vietnam and Korea, I believe we have a moral
obligation to those we have left behind.
This follows up a recent Associated Press (AP) report that
found that an internal study that was done at DOD found that
this effort, JPAC, was so inept, mismanaged, and wasteful that
it risked descending from dysfunction to total failure. There
were allegations that this internal study had been suppressed
by DOD.
General Dempsey, what are we going to do about this and how
are we going to make sure that we fulfill our responsibility to
those who have served our country and have been left behind so
that they understand that they are not forgotten?
General Dempsey. First, Senator, thanks for the hospitality
last week. I assure you I always get more than I give on those
visits to soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, coast
guardsmen, and all the components.
This is a new report to us as well. I can tell you, though,
that the Secretary of Defense, while on travel, called me up to
make sure that I had been made aware of it and to tell me that
when he got back and when I complete this process of hearings
and office calls, that he wants to get to the bottom of it.
I mean, it is so new, but it is so discouraging and moving
rapidly toward disgraceful. I assure you we will get at it.
We have a new commander out there, and I can also tell you
that he is seized with this as well.
Senator Ayotte. I have written the chairman and I hope that
we could have, with the full committee, a hearing on this
because I believe it is that important to get to the bottom of
some of the issues that have been raised by this GAO report and
the internal report.
I would like to ask you, Chairman Dempsey, the chairman and
the ranking member of this committee wrote to Secretary Hagel
on May 2, 2013. We have heard testimony both in the Readiness
and Management Support Subcommittee and every subcommittee
within this committee about the impacts of sequestration. In
that letter, the chairman asked you to produce, or the
Department of Defense to produce, a package of reductions for
the fiscal year 2014 defense budget that would be the most
workable approach for meeting the $52 billion in reductions
required by sequestration under the BCA.
We did receive a response recently from Secretary Hagel,
but it does not really answer our question on the specifics.
Have you put together a contingency plan for the $52
billion in reductions required by sequestration in 2014?
General Dempsey. The Services, having received their fiscal
guidance about 2 weeks ago, are preparing that contingency
right now. It will be a contingency that addresses both the
President's budget submission and also the sequestration.
Senator Ayotte. We had asked for this in July. Can you give
me a commitment as to when will this be produced to us, this
committee, so that we can understand the impacts of
sequestration and we can also share it with our colleagues
about what it really means in terms of the impact of the
readiness of our forces?
Admiral Winnefeld. I can probably help.
General Dempsey. Yes, go ahead.
Admiral Winnefeld. It is a very fair question. The answer
that came back was the first contours of what the fiscal year
2014 execution would look like under those conditions.
It is important for us to keep in mind that there are about
five things the Service planners, budget planners, are having
to go through right now. They are going through what 2014 is
going to look like under the conditions that were asked for in
the letter. They are finalizing what 2014 execution would look
like under the President's budget. They are also having to
develop two or three different scenarios for the fiscal year
2015 to 2019 budget. These people are furloughed 1 day a week.
So it is a little tough to produce fine detail of that quickly.
But the Services have been given the task and they will have an
execution plan before the first of October and you will have
it.
Senator Ayotte. We need it sooner. Let me just say that you
can do all the planning you want for the President's budget,
but it is pie in the sky right now. The reality is that the law
is the sequestration, and until the American people understand
and everyone here understands what the real impact of that is,
that is why I am hoping that you will make that the priority.
I know I do not have that much time, but I want to ask you,
the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, about Russia. In
particular, I saw a recent report that Russia is in violation
of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Is that true?
Admiral Winnefeld. That is something that we cannot address
in an unclassified hearing, but I would be happy to get into a
discussion with you in a more classified setting, the point
being that we have very good verification methods in place. We
watch this very closely. We believe that they are in compliance
with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and I need to
leave it at that in this setting.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. I will follow up because I am not
asking about the START treaty.
Admiral Winnefeld. I understand.
[The information referred to follows:]

The administration is prepared to brief the Senator on the issues
relating to the question.

Senator Ayotte. The reason that I am asking this is because
here is where we are with Russia, a postmortem conviction of
Sergei Magnitsky--the human rights case--who was, of course,
tortured and killed for bringing out corruption within the
government. To put it in your face with the United States, they
have not ruled out granting asylum to Edward Snowden. Just
today there was a report that one of Putin's chief opponents,
Navalny, a candidate for the mayor of Moscow, was convicted. It
really reeks of using the judicial system for Putin to punish
his opponents.
When I look at that context, one thing that concerns me is
that our posture with Russia--if they are in violation of their
treaty obligations, that is an important issue.
One final question, Admiral. The President recently
announced that he would be considering further reductions to
our nuclear arsenal. Do you believe that we should do that
unilaterally?
Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, the advice that we have given
to the President is that we not do that unilaterally, that we
do it as part of a negotiated package of reductions.
Senator Ayotte. If there were going to be unilateral
reductions, would you oppose those reductions?
Admiral Winnefeld. I would not give that advice to the
President that we do a unilateral reduction.
Senator Ayotte. You would advise against a unilateral
reduction in our nuclear deterrent?
Admiral Winnefeld. We already have.
Senator Ayotte. Okay. I appreciate that.
General Dempsey. There are three things, Senator. There is
the through negotiations, preserve the triad, and modernize the
stockpile.
Senator Ayotte. My time is up, but I think given the
behavior of Russia, I think it is at best naive to think that
we are going to be able to negotiate any kind of further
reductions, which I would oppose. I do not think that is the
right direction for the protection of this country. But in
light of what I just described--and obviously, we cannot
discuss it in this setting, but if we find out that they are in
violation of other treaty obligations, coupled with their other
behavior, I do not see how we can expect good faith
negotiations from the Russians at the moment.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Nation and to
your families' service because it is evident you cannot do this
alone.
General Dempsey, one of your statutory duties is to provide
your formal military advice on the strategic environment and
military activities needed to address that environment through
the Chairman's risk assessment. Given the current world
environment, which seems to be changing minute by minute--
Senator Ayotte just detailed what has happened in the last 24
hours with respect to the Russians--what changes would you make
today to your risk assessment that you submitted in April?
General Dempsey. Thanks, Senator.
The first thing I think you have probably noticed is we
changed the one we submitted in April. Previously it had been
an accumulation of combatant commander requirements.
By the way, this is to Senator Inhofe's point earlier.
Since I have been Chairman over the past 2 years, the
requirements that the combatant commanders have submitted have
actually increased in U.S. Pacific Command, in CENTCOM, and in
U.S. Africa Command notably. It is to the point about
increasing risk, declining readiness.
We changed it to try to align what we are doing with
national security interests unprioritized, because that is not
our responsibility to prioritize them, and we made an estimate
of what we are doing across the globe that is being placed at
risk. We also looked inside the Services at how the health of
the force is evolving.
In that document, I made mention of the fact that this
document did not account for sequestration, and that once that
became a reality, that I would have to revise my risk
assessment. I will have to do so to align with the submission
that Senator Ayotte just described.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Chairman Dempsey.
Admiral Winnefeld, my colleagues, particularly Senator
Gillibrand, have done extraordinary service to the Nation and
to the military by pointing out that despite years of effort,
we have a significant sexual abuse problem in the military. We
have to, as you both clearly indicated, not rhetorically but
fundamentally respond to this.
One aspect we focused on has been the judicial system. But
some of my experience suggests that there are other levers that
are critical to the climate, the command structure, the
performance of the military, and they include evaluation,
promotion, and retention. If we do not focus on those areas
also, then we will never have the kind of force that we need
and the trust that we need among the men and women who serve in
that force.
Can you comment on that? I know you and your colleagues
have taken on a leadership role in dealing with this issue.
Admiral Winnefeld. In terms of promotion and----
Senator Reed. How do we make this so that every day someone
thinks about their responsibilities? There is a judicial
process out there, but this is what is expected of me to stay
in the force, to succeed in the force, and to have the force
succeed.
Admiral Winnefeld. There are an enormous number of aspects
of that answer, but I will touch on a few.
The most important thing--and Senator Gillibrand touched on
this--is the command climate that we hold commanders
responsible for establishing that makes the likelihood of a
sexual assault drop down hopefully to zero. There are a number
of aspects. It is about teaching people what a heinous crime
this is. It is about reporting it if you see it. It is about
intervening if you see it about to happen, a whole host of
measures that commanders must take to establish the climate
inside their commands. We need to hold commanders accountable
for establishing that climate, and we intend to. That is one of
the reasons why the command climate surveys now are going to be
seen, which we normally have not done, by the next echelon up
in the chain of command. If that next echelon up detects a
problem that the climate is not where it needs to be, then
action can be taken and it can be even entered into somebody's
evaluation as sort of a down strike, as you will.
In keeping with the prevention and the advocacy,
investigation, accountability, and assessment pieces of what we
are trying to do to take on this pernicious issue, it is
absolutely vital that the climate piece of it come to the
forefront and that we hold commanders responsible for that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General Dempsey, can you comment on the current level of
cooperation between the Government in Kabul and NATO
International Security Assistance Force command? Every day
there seems to be another example of friction rather than
harmony.
General Dempsey. The relationship with notably the
President of Afghanistan is ``scratchy'' I think is probably as
good a word as I could describe it. He is addressing what he
describes as issues of sovereignty, and we are trying to close
the gap on what an enduring presence and commitment might look
like.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Winnefeld, in terms of the recent discovery of
contraband coming out of Cuba to North Korea, do you have a
rough assessment at this juncture? Was it the Cubans trying
simply to rehabilitate their equipment, or were they trying to
get equipment to North Korea so the North Koreans could use it?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is a little hard to tell at this
point. The Intelligence Community is still evaluating that. It
would be easy to come to the conclusion that under the guise of
returning equipment to North Korea for repair, that in fact
these are jet engines and missiles that would be going to North
Korea to replenish their stocks or what have you.
In either case, it clearly exposes North Korea's willing
defiance of the international community and United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council's resolution and the like. We are very
glad that the Panamanians discovered this so that we can once
more expose to the world the cynical behavior of the North
Korean regime.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service.
Chairman Dempsey, the Russian President said I think a
couple of days ago that if he thought hurting U.S.-Russian
relationships would be a consequence of granting Snowden
asylum, he would not do it. What would your advice be to the
Russian President about granting Snowden asylum?
General Dempsey. I think that there would be consequences
across all of our relationships, military, economic----
Senator Graham. It would be damaging and not do it. Would
that be your advice?
General Dempsey. I think it would be, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay, thank you very much.
The Prime Minister of Israel was on national television, on
Face the Nation Sunday, and he said the following things about
Iran. There is a new president in Iran. He believes he is
criticizing his predecessor for being a wolf in wolf's
clothing. His strategy is be a wolf in sheep's clothing, smile,
and build a bomb.
Admiral Winnefeld, do you agree with that analysis?
Admiral Winnefeld. As I mentioned earlier, I certainly
would agree that we are for the elusive----
Senator Graham. Is there any doubt in your mind that this
guy is actually a moderate?
Admiral Winnefeld. We are looking for the elusive Iranian
moderate.
Senator Graham. Now, my question to you--and this will
determine how I vote for you. Do you believe the current
President of Iran is a moderate?
Admiral Winnefeld. He does not have a history of being a
moderate, no, sir.
Senator Graham. I will take that as no.
The United States should ratchet up the sanctions and make
it clear to Iran that they will not get away with it, and if
sanctions do not work, then they have to know that you will be
prepared--us, the United States--to take military action. That
is the only thing that will get their attention. Do you agree
with the Israeli Prime Minister about the threat of military
force against the Iranian nuclear program may be the only thing
to get their attention, General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. That has been our approach all along, sir.
So yes.
Senator Graham. So great. We are all on the same sheet of
paper there, that if they do not believe we are going to hit
them, they are going to move.
Here is what he said about all the problems in the Mideast
summed up this way. All the problems that we have, however
important, will be dwarfed by this messianistic, apocalyptic,
extreme regime that would have an atomic bomb. It would make a
terrible, a catastrophic change for the world and for the
United States.
Do you agree with his assessment of how important it is not
to allow the Iranians to get a nuclear weapon?
General Dempsey. I do and that is what we have said.
Senator Graham. Great.
All right. Now, as to Afghanistan, the current commander
suggested that a 12,000-member force, two-thirds being United
States, the other 4,000 being NATO, not counting American
special forces troops SOF capability, would be a reasonable
number to leave behind in terms of a follow-on force. Does that
make sense to you? Is he in the ballpark? Does that make sense?
General Dempsey. He is and we have said so at NATO in
various sessions.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much. That is encouraging.
Do you agree with me that it would be a wise investment to
keep the Afghan army at 352,000 at least for a few more years
rather than draw them down to 232,000?
General Dempsey. I do.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Syria. Is Assad winning?
General Dempsey. Currently the tide seems to have shifted
in his favor.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Admiral Winnefeld?
Admiral Winnefeld. I would say specifically the tide has
shifted in his favor in the central and western part of the
country. It is very fragile in the north, and they are hanging
in there.
Senator Graham. Is he winning overall or not?
Admiral Winnefeld. If I were to have to pick who is
winning, it would be the regime, but not by much right now.
Senator Graham. Okay. All right. So the regime is winning
but not by much.
Could they be winning without Russia's help?
Admiral Winnefeld. I think the most important help they are
getting, sir, is Iranian and Hezbollah. I do not know whether
Russia's help is vital but it is certainly helping them.
Senator Graham. General Dempsey, how would you evaluate the
significance of Russia's help to Assad?
General Dempsey. Through their foreign military sales, they
are arming--
Senator Graham. Let me put it this way. If the Russians
said we want you gone tomorrow, would it matter to Assad?
General Dempsey. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. It would be a gamechanger, would it not,
Admiral Winnefeld?
Admiral Winnefeld. I certainly think so, but Assad is going
to fight to the death I think.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that if Russia said to
Assad we no longer support you, it would be the ultimate
gamechanger?
Admiral Winnefeld. It would be a very important
gamechanger, absolutely.
Senator Graham. Thank you. Do you see Russia doing that?
Admiral Winnefeld. No, sir.
Senator Graham. If he stays versus him going, what is the
most catastrophic outcome for us? If he wins over time and he
does not leave versus having to deal with the fact that we
kicked him out because we said he had to go, what is worse for
us? Him staying or going?
General Dempsey. We have said that it is the Nation's
policy that Assad must go.
Senator Graham. So that means it is worse for us for him to
stay and we not be able to achieve our policy. Do you agree
with that?
General Dempsey. That is my interpretation.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Admiral Winnefeld?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Graham. Will he be in power next year if nothing
changes? Your best military advice. If we keep just where we
are at, Iran is helping him, do you agree they are all in in
helping Assad?
General Dempsey. I do.
Senator Graham. Do you agree that Hezbollah is helping
Assad?
General Dempsey. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Do you agree that Russia is helping Assad?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator Graham. If nothing changes, if we do not change our
game, will he be in power a year from now?
General Dempsey. I think likely so.
Senator Graham. What would that mean for the King of
Jordan? Will he be in power a year from now?
General Dempsey. As I have said, I have met with him and he
is concerned that the demographics in his nation----
Senator Graham. Right. You are dead right. He told me he
did not think he would be here in another year because there
will be a million Syrian refugees and it is destabilizing
Jordan. Do you agree with that?
General Dempsey. That is his concern. That is right.
Senator Graham. What would that mean for the region and us
if the King of Jordan is gone a year from now and Assad is in
power a year from now? Would that be a good thing or a bad
thing?
General Dempsey. He is a strong ally. It would be a bad
thing.
Senator Graham. It would be a horrible thing for the
Mideast, would it not?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator Graham. If this war in Syria keeps going on and
Assad is still in power a year from now, what effect would it
have on Iraq?
General Dempsey. It is already destabilizing western Iraq.
Senator Graham. Iraq would just begin to fall apart at a
faster rate--do you agree with that--because it is
destabilizing the country?
General Dempsey. That would certainly be a possible
scenario.
Senator Graham. From the Israelis' point of view, the
likelihood of Hezbollah getting Russian-made advanced weapons,
if he is still in power a year from now--does that go up or
down?
General Dempsey. From the Israeli standpoint, up.
Senator Graham. Yes. From Israel's standpoint, one of the
worst nightmares for them, short of an Iranian nuclear weapon,
would be Hezbollah getting advanced weapons sold to Assad by
Russia, and that likelihood would go up if he is still in power
a year from now.
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator Graham. We will talk in the second round about
sequestration. Thank you both for your answers.
Chairman Levin. If we can finish the first round by noon at
least, there would be a very brief second round. That is my
current intention, which I have shared with the ranking member.
Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just when I think we have made real progress on wartime
contracting, something happens and I realize that we have still
miles to go before we really have a handle on this.
The latest incident that has come to my attention is a $34
million military base, Leatherneck, in Afghanistan. When the
marines on the ground found out this was going to be built,
they sent the word up they do not need it, do not want it. That
was in May 2010. In February 2011, contracts were issued, and
the building was built.
Now we know it is never going to be occupied, probably
going to be demolished because it was done according to U.S.
wiring standards. For the Afghanistan army to take it over, for
the national forces there to take it over, it would be quite an
investment for them to convert the building for their use.
I understand an investigation is ongoing. I questioned Mr.
Jenman about this the other day. But I need to hear from you,
General Dempsey, that you are committed to getting to the
bottom of this because if we do not fix accountability in this
instance, whoever pulled the trigger on that expenditure really
needs to be disciplined. In my opinion, they should be fired
because we have to start sending a signal that when the people
are saying do not build it, it is a waste of money, that it
does not get built. Are you aware of this situation?
General Dempsey. Absolutely, Senator. You have my
commitment that we will get to the bottom of it.
If I could share just a bit of good news we have--so this
one was not caught, but we have de-obligated about $1.3 billion
in contracting for U.S. Forces Afghanistan and a similar
amount, probably twice that amount, for the Afghan security
forces.
Senator McCaskill. That is good. I appreciate that very
much.
There has been discussion around military sexual assault
that our allies have gone to a different system. The reason
that this was talked about was in the context that Canada and
Europe had gone to a different system in order to provide more
protection for victims. We have had a chance now to take a
really close look at those countries and what happened, and it
is my understanding those changes in their system resulted from
a concern that there was not adequate due process protections
for perpetrators. Is that your understanding as well, General
Dempsey?
General Dempsey. That is correct. Based on our last hearing
on the subject, we have done a lot of research into why our
allies, the five other nations, went that path, and it is not
just because they wanted to protect the accused, but they were
also mandated to do it by human rights courts in the European
Union.
Senator McCaskill. The other argument that is being made
about leaving this in the hand of just prosecutors, civilian
and/or Judge Advocate General (JAG) prosecutors, is that this
would increase reporting. I have had an opportunity to look at
the numbers. In Canada, we actually have 176 in 2007, 166 in
2008, 166 in 2009, 176 in 2010. I looked at the numbers in the
United Kingdom. Their numbers have actually gone down over the
last several years in terms of reports from 54 to 40 to 40. In
Australia, they have been stable at 82, 86, 84 over the last
several years.
In Israel, there had been a fact about reporting going up
when they changed part of their system when it related to
lesser sexual offenses a few years ago. There was testimony
about their reporting going up 80 percent. If you look back at
the numbers--now, these are sex-related offenses total in the
military. So everybody gets an understanding of the difference
between the enormity of the challenges in our military and what
they are looking at in Israel, 26 in 2009, 20 in 2010, 14 in
2011, and 27 in 2012. So yes, there is an 80 percent increase
when they changed this between 2011 and 2012, but they only got
back to the numbers that they had a few years previously before
the change was made.
Are you all aware in the research you have done that
changing the system has resulted in an increased reporting
anywhere in the world?
General Dempsey. There is no analytical evidence nor
anecdotal evidence that it has increased reporting.
Furthermore, what my counterparts tell me is it has slowed the
system down.
Senator McCaskill. You mentioned, Admiral Winnefeld, in
your testimony earlier that you all have taken a look at
prosecutors' decisions in isolation. I have some knowledge of
this. There was discipline meted out in my office when I found
out that prosecutors in our warrant desk, which was our intake
desk, were getting lobbied by some of the trial prosecutors on
their decisions because they did not want any losers. They did
not want them to take cases that were going to reflect poorly
on their won/lost record because when you are a prosecutor,
there is a won/lost record. When you take a case to trial, you
either win or you lose. So your status among your peers and in
some instances your upward mobility in your job could depend on
just your conviction rate. When you isolate them with this
decision, then there certainly could be instances where you
would have a prosecutor that did not want to take a close one,
that did not want a ``he said/she said''.
Do you have additional information that you can share with
this committee in terms of numbers of the number of times that
civilian prosecutors have said no, military prosecutors have
said no, but there are victims out there today that have had
justice because the commander said yes?
Admiral Winnefeld. I do, and I will give you a couple of
examples. The Marine Corps has had 28 cases. They have looked
back to 2010, 28 cases where civilian prosecutors declined to
take the case. Of those, 16 of them the Marine Corps was able
to obtain a conviction at court martial, 57 percent. So those
are 16 perpetrators that are no longer walking the street and
16 victims who received justice who would not have received it
otherwise.
The more startling numbers are from the Army, and I will
repeat them. The Army has looked at 49 cases in the last 2
years. Actually 14 of them are still in process. We do not know
what is going to happen with those cases. They are still in the
trial system. Then 35 of them have been completed. Of those, 25
or 71 percent resulted in a conviction at a court martial. Two
additional ones were plea bargained down to a punitive
discharge. That takes the number up to 77 percent of these
cases that civilian prosecutors would not take that resulted in
some serious action taken against a perpetrator. There are some
that were acquitted, understandably. Most of the ones who were
found guilty have done hard time, are doing hard time, and have
been given a punitive discharge from the military. These were
all done inside the chain of command.
I would add, Senator McCaskill, some of these are very
heinous cases that the DAs would not take. One of them was a
10-year-old autistic girl who was sexually assaulted. We took
the case. The commander insisted on it, and a conviction was
obtained.
Senator McCaskill. This is hard. We all have the same goal.
But I do want to say, as I close this questioning, that anybody
who characterizes me as someone who is protecting the Pentagon,
that somehow I am in cahoots with the Pentagon trying to hurt
sexual assault victims, with all due respect to you guys, I
think you are terrific, but there is nobody who will be further
in front of the line to kick you until you are senseless if we
do not get this problem under control. This is not victims
versus the Pentagon. Anybody who is characterizing that is
doing a disservice to victims and is doing a disservice to the
military and doing a disservice to the members of this
committee who have spent hours trying to find the right way to
make sure that we prosecute more cases effectively within the
military.
I thank you both very much.
Admiral Winnefeld. Mr. Chairman, if I can take 10 seconds?
Senator McCaskill. Yes.
Admiral Winnefeld. I would like to just reinforce what
General Dempsey said a moment ago, that we actually are very
grateful for the attention that the entire committee has given
to this. It has been very helpful to us.
I also want to say that I look forward to our next chance
to have you and other people with prosecutorial experience over
to the Pentagon, as we have done before, and get your thoughts,
show you what we are doing, get your expertise in there. I
think that is a very productive opportunity.
Senator McCaskill. You do not need to worry about me being
invited. As many of your JAGs will know, I call them. I am not
reaching out because you guys are calling plays on this. I was
just infuriated at the article that was written that this is
somehow you guys pulling strings over here telling us what to
do. Nothing could be further from the truth. I appreciate both
of you and your commitment to this, but believe me, we are not
going anywhere.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. If I may just take 30 seconds
before Senator Chambliss speaks, there was an implication in an
article in Politico that the amendment which was adopted by
this committee was somehow or other cleared or shared with the
Pentagon. That is not true. Are you aware of that?
Admiral Winnefeld. Not that I am aware of.
General Dempsey. No.
Chairman Levin. A two-page article suggesting that somehow
or other the Pentagon screened or impacted the language which
we offered in a public session in this committee that led to
the adoption of a bipartisan amendment, part of an article that
suggested that somehow or other the Pentagon wrote something or
screened something.
What they did, very properly so, was asked by the
subcommittee that adopted language on this subject for its
reaction. We do that all the time before the bill is marked up.
The subcommittee then wrote its language under Senator
Gillibrand's leadership. Wrote its language after consultation
appropriately with the Pentagon. Totally appropriately. But the
amendment that was adopted by this committee on a bipartisan
vote was not shared with the Pentagon.
I do not know if the folks at Politico that wrote that two-
page article implying to the contrary want to correct their
article. But in fairness, I believe they should.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I just say on a point of
personal privilege on behalf of Senator McCaskill, the
implication that she is bought off by the Pentagon--she has
been the spark plug in this whole thing from day one. I want
her to know how much I appreciate that.
Chairman Levin. Her prosecutorial experience, I must say,
is invaluable to this committee, not just on this subject but
on a lot of other subjects, including this whole contracting
problem that she has delved into with such tenacity and effect.
Senator Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
your leadership and your impassioned leadership on this issue
of sexual assault. I am not going to go into questioning. I
think it has been thoroughly vetted, gentlemen. We know where
you are and that you are trying to rectify a very serious
situation. But I think you have a thorough understanding that
this committee, as a total committee, is upset with what is
going on in that realm in every branch of our military. We have
to fix it. The system is broken. The chairman's leadership on
this and, as he said, in a bipartisan way I think addresses it
fairly. We will look forward to that debate on the floor.
General Dempsey, in your answers to advance questions from
the committee, you said, ``We are at risk of strategy and
solvency if sequestration is implemented as currently presented
by law.'' The words ``strategy and solvency'' sounds like
sending unprepared troops into combat and not being able to
take action against threats to national security and not being
able to assist allies and partners in unstable regions. Is that
what you meant?
General Dempsey. Yes, sir. Maybe even more simply, it is
the mismatch of aspirations and abilities.
Senator Chambliss. I want to go back, General Dempsey, to
Syria. Again, it has been thoroughly talked about here, but I
am a little bit confused. I heard your response to Senator
McCain's questioning. Here is the way I see where we are with
respect to Syria right now and your participation in the
process.
You have been in place about 2 years, as we all know.
During that 2 years, the conflict in Syria has been going on
the entire time. There has been virtually an uncontrolled
slaughter going on inside of Syria, and I note that even the
President's nominee to be Ambassador to the United Nations said
yesterday in her hearing that the failure of the U.N. Security
Council to respond to the slaughter in Syria is a disgrace that
history will judge harshly. I agree with that. But it is also a
fact that the United States has kind of sat by and watched what
is happening over there and we have really had our hands behind
our back.
Now, you have been in place for 2 years. You have been the
principal military advisor to the President on this issue and
others. Has the President followed your advice on the
involvement of the United States in Syria?
General Dempsey. The President has asked for options, and
we have provided them. On the issues, has he followed my
advice, the issue is whether--there are two issues at work.
Could we and should we? I have advised him on ``could we''. We
have not gotten into a conversation about ``should we'' except
as it relates to the current path, which is one focused
primarily on building a moderate opposition.
Senator Chambliss. I am taking that to mean then that the
President has listened to your options but apparently you have
not picked a side or been forceful in what you think the
President ought to do. Am I correct?
General Dempsey. Sir, let me talk about the role of the
Chairman because it keeps coming back to that. It is my
responsibility to provide options about the use of force and
how they would contribute to a broader strategy not in
isolation.
I am reluctant to--in fact, I am unwilling actually to
discuss my advice to the President on whether we should use
force while that deliberation is ongoing.
To the point about what is my responsibility to this
committee, my responsibility to this committee is to have the
same kind of conversations with you as we have on options and
on what the military instrument of power could do in the
context of a broader strategy.
But the decision on whether to use force is fundamentally a
political decision and one that is being deliberated even
frequently with regard to Syria. But for me to advocate it
would absolutely put me in what I have deemed to be an
inappropriate position with both the President and this
committee.
Senator Chambliss. Did you advocate for a no-fly zone or
against a no-fly zone?
General Dempsey. That is the point, sir. I have not
advocated nor opposed any of those options. I have explained
what they would do to the situation.
Senator Chambliss. Here is my dilemma, General. You are the
top military advisor to the President. Syria is the most
significant international military conflict going on today. It
has the capability of providing future unrest to that part of
the world that may be permanent. There has been no change in
U.S. policy from a military standpoint in Syria during your 2
years.
Now, if we approve you for another 2 years, confirm you for
another 2 years, then is there going to be a change in policy
in Syria over the next 2 years, or are we just going to keep
doing what we are doing, which is watching innocent people
slaughtered?
General Dempsey. Senator, I would hate to take that burden
entirely on myself to determine whether the situation in Syria
will change over the next 2 years. You can be sure that as we
develop options to be considered in military instrument of
power, that I will articulate whether I think they will be
effective, what are the risks involved to U.S. forces, what are
the opportunity costs.
Let me tell you what has changed in the last 2 years. We
are far more involved on the Korean Peninsula at higher states
of readiness. We are far more involved in the Gulf at higher
states of readiness. We continue to manage the conflict in
Afghanistan. There are some significant risks we are accruing
while we also are engaged in trying to determine how to match
ends, ways, and means in the face of sequestration.
Senator Chambliss. In closing, let me just say that
Secretary Hagel in a recent announcement directed a 20 percent
cut in the number of top ranking officers and senior civilians
at the Pentagon by 2019. I applaud that move. I think that is
something that has to be done. We look forward to as a
committee to working with you, assuming you are confirmed, to
carrying out that directive by the Secretary. It is not going
to be easy. It is not going to be pleasant, but everybody has
to share in this pain, including our top ranking folks.
General Dempsey. No question. If I could just respond very
briefly. There are a couple of things we should do, Senator,
whether sequestration was hanging over our heads or not. One of
them is to make ourselves more efficient at the institutional
level. The other is compensation and health care, and we are
going to need your help to do that.
Admiral Winnefeld. If I could add just 1 second. I do not
want to leave the committee with the impression that has been
in the press that it is only the top brass that are being
reduced by 20 percent. It is the entire staffs that are being
reduced by 20 percent. This is a significant cut and we offered
it. We believe that we have to become more efficient and never
waste a crisis. It is the entire staff, not only the Joint
Staff but the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, but
also the combatant commanders' staffs we are going to trim by
20 percent over the next 5 years.
Chairman Levin. Just if I heard you correctly, it is not
just that you support it but that you offered it. Is that
correct?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Hagan?
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you very much for
your service to our country and for being here today.
General Dempsey, on just this past Monday, I had the great
pleasure to be at the Fleet Readiness Center-East at Marine
Corps Air Station Cherry Point to welcome the arrival of the
first F-35B that was scheduled for modifications. I know how
important the F-35B is to the Marine Corps, to our national
security, and to the local North Carolina communities that
support it. This was certainly reiterated to me during my visit
on Monday.
Like you and like the members of this committee, I am very
worried about the damage that sequestration is already doing to
the Department and to our national security. Most of the
members of the civilian workforce that I met with on Monday had
just had their first furlough day the Friday before, which I
think is a harsh reminder of Congress' inability to find a
solution here. We actually have 19,000 civilians working for
DOD that are on furlough in North Carolina.
Please know that I remain dedicated to finding a balanced
bipartisan solution to sequestration, and what I really worry
about are those in Washington who underestimate the damage that
sequestration will have if this is allowed to continue in
fiscal year 2014 and beyond. I think it is important that
Congress and the people hear directly from senior leaders like
yourself about the impact that this is going to have if it is
allowed to continue.
Can you just give a few examples of the impact that it
might have on the F-35B and other modernization programs, as
well as on the local communities that support them?
General Dempsey. Yes, let me give you a very brief,
generalized answer. The Vice Chairman sits on most of the
meetings where the tradeoffs are made in things like
modernization.
But the point is that, as I said, it is too far and too
fast. At the beginning of this period, we will suffer most
prominently in readiness and in modernization. We have to take
money where we can get it. Later on, as the force shrinks, we
will be more ready but we will be less modernized than we think
we need to be, and in my view we will have forces inadequate to
achieve the strategy as currently conceived and we will have to
look back at how we might change our strategy.
Admiral Winnefeld. Specifically on the F-35, our first
priority right now is to finish the development of that
program, and we requested some money in the reprogramming
authority to get that done in fiscal year 2013 to keep the
sustainable technology development effort on track.
Because of the importance of this program, we are doing
everything we can to protect the numbers as the Department
finalizes the lots 6 and 7 prices, and I do not want to stray
outside of my authority. This is really in the Under Secretary
of Defense for AT&L lane. But we are committed to this program,
and we really want to ramp up production as soon as we can to
get the economies of scale that we need in order to make this a
productive program. The F-35 is a very important program to us.
There is no question about it.
Senator Hagan. It is also my understanding on sequestration
that the DOD civilian supervisors, they received notice just
recently that if they have knowledge that the employees that
report to them work more than the allotted hours during their
furloughs, even when it is voluntary on their part, that those
supervisors, these civilian supervisors, are subject to fines
up to $5,000 and potential jail time. When I realized that
there are legal guidelines, I know, that have to be followed.
We certainly do not want to have furloughed employees to have
to involuntarily work without pay, but to me this seems to go
too far. I am troubled that these supervisors could face these
unbelievable penalties because they have motivated workers who
really are dedicated to the national security of our country
despite the furloughs, and we cannot fault them when they want
to continue their mission, once again, because Congress has not
acted.
What are your thoughts on this matter? How does one find
the right balance here?
Admiral Winnefeld. First of all, Senator, I would make a
shout-out to our civilian employees in the Department who are
fantastic. These are people who under ordinary conditions work
extra hours because they believe so much in what they are
doing, and they are just tremendous.
I am not a lawyer and I do not have the legal background in
this. I believe that the restrictions you are referring to when
you are furloughed are legal restrictions, and I think we are
just trying to stay within the letter of the law.
But I could not agree with you more on the overall
principle and the sentiment that these are American patriots
who want to do the best they can for their country. We are
cutting out a day's pay and they still want to do work for us.
I mean, what more can you ask for from these great folks?
So the sooner we can resolve this, the better. I know the
Department is working hard, if we can, to reduce the number of
furlough days this year. There are no guarantees. The
comptroller is working on that. But it is a real tragic
situation for these great Americans.
Senator Hagan. Even these legal ramifications, they are not
supposed to even look at the BlackBerries on the days of
furlough.
The previous two quadrennial defense reviews have mandated
significant growth in our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and
enablers that directly support their operations. Admiral
Winnefeld, in response to the committee's prehearing policy
questions, you said given the financial downturn that we face,
we must balance the need for soft capabilities with our need to
address other capability demands in light of increased
budgetary pressures.
Do you believe that previously directed growth in the size
of SOF should be retained despite the current budgetary
pressures, and how should special operations capabilities be
prioritized compared to the other capability demands that you
referenced?
Admiral Winnefeld. I have to be quite honest in telling you
that if we get into the full BCA caps, the full sequester, what
we call ``sequester forever'' in the Department, that we are
probably going to have to level off SOF growth because there
are so many other programs that are going to be shrinking in
size. It is sort of the philosophy if you are level, then you
are doing pretty well in this budget environment. If you are
growing, it is really unusual. The only thing I know of that
will grow will be the cyber forces, and everything else is
going to be coming down in size. I think keeping it in
perspective that leveling off SOF is probably about as good as
we can do if we get to the full BCA cuts.
Senator Hagan. Even with the demands that we see around the
world today?
Admiral Winnefeld. Even with the demands. Our SOFs are
fantastic. They are doing very important work around the world,
no question. We have a considerable amount of SOF forces in
Afghanistan doing counterinsurgency. That will end at the end
of 2014. We were hoping to take that capacity and bring it home
and do a couple of important things with it. One is to rest the
force a little bit. These folks have been going very hard for
the last decade. Another would be to enhance our building
partnership capacity efforts across the world. We certainly
want to rest the force. We may have to trim back a little bit
on the building partnership capacity just because of the budget
cuts. Again, you are pretty lucky if you are only leveling off
under these circumstances.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey and Admiral Winnefeld, thank you both very
much for your service to this country and for your willingness
to continue to serve under what are very difficult times.
General Dempsey, I very much appreciate your coming to New
Hampshire and your visiting both Pease and our National Guard
and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and meeting with a number of
the businesses in New Hampshire that help make up part of the
great defense industrial base we have in this country.
Many people on the committee have expressed their concerns
about sequestration. I know it is something that you both care
very much about. One of the things that we heard from the
businesses in the meeting that you had in New Hampshire was
their concern about the uncertainty and what that means in
terms of their future ability to provide the support that our
military needs in order to do their job.
I wonder if you could speak to whether this is something
you are hearing from other parts of the country and then how
concerned you are that continuing cuts from sequestration might
have a very damaging impact on the defense industrial base in
this country.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
What I found most interesting in that roundtable were two
things. The big corporations--I will not name names, but the
big corporations have enough flexibility that they can kind of
weather the storm and are likely to still be there when we need
them. It is the small businesses who do not have that kind of
flexibility who I think we risk losing in two ways. One is I
suspect they will look--well, they said it. They are going to
look increasingly overseas. The second thing they said was that
their ability to innovate is being reduced. So we are losing in
several ways that I think could have a long-term negative
effect.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The other thing you have both talked about is the
importance of the people who serve this country, both who serve
actively in the Armed Forces, as well as those people who
support your mission in the civilian capacity. One of the
concerns that I have had is relative to the workers that we
have who have the degrees in the science, technology,
engineering, and math fields.
Looking at the statistics for the people we will need to do
the work of our military and its support in the future, the
statistics do not look very good because the average age of an
aerospace worker in the industry is 44. Also, 26 percent of the
aerospace workforce became eligible for retirement in 2008.
Meanwhile, 50 percent of the Navy's science and technology
professionals will be retirement eligible by 2020. Those
statistics go on.
Can either of you speak to concerns that you have about how
sequestration might be affecting our ability to recruit the
people who have the degrees and the skills that we are going to
need in the future? If we are looking at sequestration not just
in 2013 but 2014, 2015, 2016, for the next 9 years, what does
that do to our civilian workforce that supports your mission?
General Dempsey. I will ask the Vice to respond in a moment
here. But reflecting back to the trip to the Portsmouth Naval
Yard, one of the other things I was unaware of was the
apprenticeship program where they take some of the folks with
the skill set that you described--30 of them, as I remember,
some significant number--from incredible schools in the
Northeast notably and they build into them this passion that I
saw in the workforce there in support of the U.S. Navy and, in
fact, in support of the Coast Guard as well. It is going to be
simply a matter of mathematics. They are going to do less of
that. I think we will lose some of those.
Admiral Winnefeld. Fundamentally, the real challenge we
have under the worst sequester scenario is the steepness of
this cut, and what we have found over time and we understand
very well this time around is that it is very hard to get force
structure out quickly. Force structure meaning people. We
cannot get people out fast enough. What that means is the only
other levers you have are readiness and modernization.
Readiness and modernization are very technical things. So we
will be jettisoning basically a number of modernization
programs or vastly trimming them down, and we will be reducing
readiness which includes depot work and that sort of stuff
which is also technical. I worry about that.
The other thing is that as we get smaller, the tendency
under the rules we have is that sort of the last person in is
the first person out. That is our seed corn, all these young,
technically adept folks that are thinking of coming in or who
are already in. If they are first to go, we are going to lose
them. Then we are going to have the effects that you talked
about where we have a force that stays and retires and there is
nothing to backfill them. It really is something we have to
watch closely. I know Frank Kendall is worried about it. I know
Ash Carter is worried about it. It is something we have to be
very mindful of as we move forward.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I certainly share that concern.
Let me ask you both. One of the things that Senator McCain
and I have worked on is language both in the immigration reform
bill that passed the Senate, as well as in the National Defense
Authorization Act that this committee has done, would deal with
the number of Afghans and Iraqis who have been helpful to the
United States and the international force who are concerned
about their safety once we get past 2014 and the NATO force
withdraws.
I wonder if you could talk about how concerned you are
about that and what kind of message it would send to other
people in the future who might be willing to cooperate with us
in these kinds of conflicts if we are not able to help provide
safety for those people who have cooperated.
General Dempsey. Having lived with those men and women, I
strongly support the effort. But let me turn it over to the
Vice who has been tracking it most closely.
Admiral Winnefeld. Just to give you a sense, actually
yesterday we had a deputies committee meeting that I was unable
to attend but sent someone on this exact issue, special
immigrant visas and the like to get these folks in who have
really literally risked their lives to enable our operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. It has the attention of the National
Security staff. It has our attention, and we will continue to
push it in the right direction.
I would just say if you hear anything that is making you
uncomfortable, do not hesitate to talk to us. We will be happy
to answer any questions you might have.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I know that Senator McCain and
I stand ready to be of any help we can, and I know it has the
support of this committee as well. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for your leadership of this committee. You lead us in a way
that gets most of us to vote together every time we bring a
bill out, and I think that is a testament to bipartisanship in
the defense of America.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. General Dempsey, particularly I just want
to ask you to reaffirm--and I know you will do so--your
responsibility to share with this committee and Congress your
best military judgment about matters and that you will
internally--when asked by the commander in chief to give your
opinion, you will give your best, unvarnished military opinion
and not be influenced by politics or pressures of any kind.
General Dempsey. I can assure you that is what has been my
intent and will remain my intent in the future.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Winnefeld, would you likewise?
Admiral Winnefeld. That is what we have been doing and what
we continue to do. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. I thank you. It is really important
because we have a lot of significant agenda items that are
occurring that will set policy for years to come whether it is
the number of personnel, our involvement around the world,
whether it is missile defense. In particular, we are beginning
to have some hearings on our nuclear capabilities. The public
proposal of the President that he would like to reduce by one-
third our already substantially reduced nuclear arsenal raises
a serious concern to me. We will be asking you as time goes by
your best judgment on that. Of course, it goes beyond the
technical issues to our role in the world and the confidence
our allies have in us also.
General Dempsey, one of the more amazing things to me that
I believe has caused a great deal of unnecessary problems with
the sequester and the reduction in spending was the fact that
this was passed in August 2011, and the President said in a
national debate it was not going to happen but it was the law
of the United States. He signed it. I frankly at the time
wondered how it was going to be fixed. I had my doubts that we
would get it fixed. The President has indicated basically he
wants more taxes and more spending and he will not find any
other reductions in spending anywhere else to relieve the
burdens on the military.
But I would just like to get one thing straight with regard
to the difficulties you have faced this year. My understanding
is that you made no plans and made no cuts in the first 6
months of this year even though you were aware that this was
the law in 2011, and as a result, you have had to make more
dramatic cuts, more unwise reductions to try to finish this
year within the budget law that you have been told you have to
finish under. Has that been a problem for you and why did we
not plan to reduce spending all year instead of making up all
of that in the last 6 months?
General Dempsey. It has been a problem, Senator. We found
ourselves with 80 percent spent with half the year to go. The
answer as to how did we get to that position that was the
budget guidance we received.
Senator Sessions. You got that from the executive branch?
General Dempsey. I get my marching orders from the
Department, but I assume they got it from the Office of
Management and Budget.
Senator Sessions. I do remain concerned about the impact on
the Defense Department. It is not just that I have, as a member
of this committee and personal views, a strong affinity for the
men and women who serve us in uniform, but because half of the
reductions in spending that were included in the BCA have
fallen on one-sixth of the U.S. Government spending, the
Defense Department. This is a disproportionate reduction in
spending in my opinion to our Defense Department, and it is at
a level that is troubling to me.
I am ranking on the Budget Committee and I have seen the
numbers. We should look for other areas within our Government
to find some savings too. For example, Medicaid has no cuts.
Social Security has no cuts. Medicare had a little but it did
not help the Defense Department. That was used to reduce
spending reductions in other departments. Food stamps has gone
up four-fold in the last 10 or 12 years, had zero cuts. We are
just at a point that we have to figure out how to deal with
this. I do believe you are being asked to take a
disproportionate cut, and Congress should work with the
President, the Commander in Chief, and he needs to help us work
through a way to spread out some of this belt tightening so
that other departments and agencies in the Government tighten
their belt too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
comments as well about me, Senator Sessions.
Now, is Senator King here? If not, Senator Kaine? Senator
Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your public service.
Let us talk first about upgrading the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaisance (ISR) fleet. You are moving
from manned platforms to a combination of unmanned and manned
platforms. The law directs the Vice Chairman and the Under
Secretary to certify annually that the Navy remains in
compliance in supporting the needs of the combatant commanders,
and the Navy has certified compliance. My interest in this is
that in the President's budget, the Navy plans to gradually
draw down your manned platforms before going over to the P-8
platform and then to field a fleet of MQ-4C Tritons, the
unmanned aerial vehicles.
Now, it is my understanding that the Secretary of the Navy
is supportive of this position. Have you all spoken to the
combatant commanders to confirm if these ISR capabilities
fulfill their requirements?
Admiral Winnefeld. I have not recently covered that
particular slice of the combatant commander requirements. They
are going to have their integrated priority lists due to us
here over this fall, and we will scan those. We also get
constant feedback from their J-8 organizations, but I would
have to take it up for the record on whether specifically in
that area we are answering their needs.
Senator Nelson. Okay. I would appreciate it. I think that
there is some concern in the Secretary's Office about this
transition, and to see that those manned platforms are utilized
so that there is not a gap while we are transitioning over and
getting the combined fleet between unmanned and manned.
[The information referred to follows:]

Combatant commanders' requests for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaisance (ISR) always exceed our capacity to provide. However,
regarding capability, the combatant commanders contributed to the
Navy's MISR&T Transition Plan through the Battlespace Awareness Joint
Capabilities Board. The combatant commanders understand and support how
we are optimizing the Navy's ``high-demand, low-density'' ISR
capability.
Yes, Dr. Vickers and I, along with Joint Staff and representatives
from the combatant commands, carefully reviewed Navy's current ISR
capabilities and proposed way ahead. We have certified Navy's plan each
of the past 2 years. Such review is critical because, while the EP-3E
ARIES and P-3 Special Projects Aircraft (SPA) have been workhorses for
the Navy and Joint Force for decades, they're fast approaching end-of-
service life (approximately 2020).
To mitigate short-term risk, the Navy is sustaining the
capabilities of both the EP-3E and P-3 SPA aircraft while fielding the
baseline Triton UAV with its greatly improved persistence. They are
also adding a Quick Reaction Capability, which provides certain ``SPA-
like'' capabilities, to the P-8A aircraft. Proper phasing of manpower
is critical to ensure transition of capability and capacity to follow-
on platforms, without impacting combatant commanders.
The Navy's plan, as part of a joint effort, invests in the right
platform/sensor mix and is in the best interests of the Joint force,
particularly in our current budgetary environment. However, additional
requirements, particularly those in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014 draft language requiring the sustainment of
five EP-3Es for allocation, that limit the Navy's ability to execute
this plan may draw resources that impede fielding of the appropriate
future force. Dr. Vickers and I will continue to monitor Navy's
progress closely.

Senator Nelson. Now, once we are withdrawing from
Afghanistan, there is going to be a lot of ISR assets that will
come back and be distributed throughout the combatant commands.
I sure wish that you all would take a look at what
sequestration is doing to us in U.S. Southern Command and the
huge success that they have had interdiction of drugs coming
north. As a matter of fact, just in the last year, Colombia
itself interdicted 207 metric tons. As it started to come
through Central America toward the U.S. border, the Joint
Interagency Task Force-South, which is the joint task force
going after these drugs--that interdicted 152 additional metric
tons. By the time it gets to the southern border of the United
States, then they were interdicting another 10 metric tons. You
can see that the big part has already been interdicted before
it ever got there, thanks to a lot of U.S. Southern Command's
efforts in the joint task force. I would surely appreciate it,
as these ISR assets are going to be available, that you will
consider Southern Command as a part to use those ISR assets. I
know you will.
But would you just for the record state what are going to
be the long-term effects of the sequester on the
counternarcotics mission?
General Dempsey. In general, I will tell you that we will
be able to do less in the maritime transit zones for the
immediate future because of some combination of sequestration
and also maintenance that has been deferred over time. I am
concerned about it. In fact, I met over the past several months
with both my Canadian and my Mexican counterparts to see if we
can collaboratively find a way to mitigate the risk.
Admiral Winnefeld. We have just had to make some very
difficult choices in the current environment with readiness
declining and the Navy unable to support as many ship
deployments as they would like to, as you well know. We have
had some considerable success, as you point out, with
interdicting drugs coming from Central and South America in the
maritime environment and other environments. We are going to
have to allocate resources. As the Chairman mentioned, it is
about balancing ends, ways, and means, and we will just have to
keep our eye on it. Absolutely.
Senator Nelson. I will tell you where you are going to be
additionally stressed is if we are fortunate to get an
immigration reform bill and if it stays in the present posture
that it passed the Senate where all this additional money is
being used to enhance the effectiveness of the land border,
what is going to happen to all those drugs and, indeed, human
smuggling it is going to go right around on the maritime
border.
Now, I think this was an oversight. They would not accept
Senator Wicker's and my amendment to enhance by just $1
billion, DHS, the Coast Guard, and helping DHS with unmanned
platforms.
The Navy blimp is also an asset that can be used on that. I
have ridden in that blimp. It can dwell for a long time. The
amount of gas that it takes for a 24-hour mission is the same
amount of gas that it takes for an F-16 to crank up and just
run out to the runway. It is a cost-effective platform for
observation of something like a maritime border.
Hopefully, if we can pass the immigration reform, we are
going to be able to enhance that maritime border. But this is
going to all the more bring into question the desperate need to
avoid sequester in a place like Southern Command, not even to
speak of all the other commands. I spent some time with Admiral
McRaven, and he walked me through what is going to happen to
Special Operations Command if we have this sequester continue.
It is absolutely ridiculous that we would be doing this to
ourselves not only shooting ourselves in the foot but starting
to shoot ourselves up the torso.
I wish you would take a look at the ISR assets as they come
back and allocate some of them to Southern Command. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
We are going to have a very brief second round of about 2
minutes for those of us who are here. We have a vote. I cannot
see that clock, but it is getting close to 12:15 p.m. Is it
there already? Anyway, I think we have a vote at 12:15 p.m. I
am going to have a 2-minute second round.
General, I want to find a way to work through the options
issue on Syria not in 2 minutes but I want to work through it
because I think there is a real uncertainty among some of us as
to what your role is in terms of telling us your personal
opinion on things, what your role is in terms of giving advice
to the President, in terms of the options that you have laid
out, the pluses, minuses, strengths, weaknesses of each of
those options, whether they could be effective, what are the
costs, what are the opportunity costs, and so forth.
What I am going to ask you to do for the record is to give
us an unclassified list of options and your personal assessment
of the pros and cons of those options. Now, in some of those
pros and cons and your personal assessment, it will be pretty
obvious that you are not going to recommend something. But I am
not going to ask you point blank which of these options you
recommend. You have said you are not going to tell us. You
cannot tell us or you have not decided. For whatever reason,
you are not going to tell us what your preferred option is, but
what you are willing to do is go through with us the pluses and
minuses of each of the various options. That is what I am going
to ask you to do in a fairly thorough way for the record.
If you need to give us a classified annex, that is fine.
But I want to work very hard to try to work through this issue
of the options in Syria.
Now, you are aware of the fact that I personally have
favored arming and training the opposition. I personally,
indeed, want to consider and I have even gone beyond that
talking about stand-off airstrikes against certain facilities.
That is just my own personal opinion so you know where I am
coming from. You and I have talked about it. I am not trying to
persuade you that that is the right position or should be your
position, but that is my public position.
My question to you is whether or not you are willing to
give to us an unclassified list of options and the strengths
and weaknesses, the costs and effectiveness and so forth of
each of those options.
General Dempsey. Absolutely, Senator, as well as the
framework of a strategy in which they might make sense, which I
am happy to do.
Chairman Levin. Anything else you want to add to it. I do
not want to limit you in any way. As long as it includes that,
it may help us work through this issue.
General Dempsey. Yes, but I would ask you take my point
even now that the decision whether to use force is one that I
must communicate personally to the President. As you have seen
me do in the past, if the President takes my advice and you ask
me, I will tell you that he took my advice. If he does not, I
am more than willing to tell you no. My recommendation was
something else. He is certainly under no obligation to take my
advice.
Chairman Levin. You have indicated that you are not going
to share with us your opinion, if you have one, on whether or
not to use force.
General Dempsey. While it is being deliberated.
Chairman Levin. While it is being deliberated. I am not
asking you to do that. I think if you just are able to do what
I have asked you to do, it may be clear that at least some of
those options you think are not wise options just from your
pros and cons assessment.
General Dempsey. Right. I thought we got at it at some
level in the classified briefing.
Chairman Levin. But we need an unclassified answer. You
said you are willing to lay out options and to show pros and
cons of options and whether they can be effective, what are the
costs, various costs, and so forth. If you will do that, it may
be a step that would be a constructive, positive step. If you
can do that within the next 4 or 5 days, we would appreciate
it.
General Dempsey. Sure.
[The information referred to follows:]

See attached letter.

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman Levin. Senator Ayotte, I believe. No. I may be
wrong.
Senator Ayotte. I am next but I am going to defer first to
Senator Graham and then go.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Dempsey, back to Afghanistan. If no troops were
left behind for whatever reason in 2015, we just pulled out and
there were no American forces left behind, the zero option,
very quickly what is the likely outcome in Afghanistan?
General Dempsey. Although I have told you that the progress
of the security forces has been significant, they would not
have the level of confidence to sustain themselves over time if
it happens that precipitously.
Senator Graham. It would lead to what I believe would be a
fractured state, a larger safe haven for al Qaeda types, and
over time would be a disaster. Do you agree with that?
General Dempsey. Those are all high risks.
Senator Graham. Okay, thank you.
Admiral Winnefeld, sequestration. In terms of the Air
Force, if sequestration--let us start with the Navy. Over a 10-
year period, how many ships will we have in the Navy after 10
years of sequestration?
Admiral Winnefeld. I do not have the exact number for you.
Senator Graham. Somebody says 232 ships.
Admiral Winnefeld. It could be that low.
Senator Graham. Would that be just like crazy?
Admiral Winnefeld. It would certainly impact our ability to
respond to contingencies and to have forward presence and
deter----
Senator Graham. Well, I think it is crazy.
One-third of the fighter force is grounded today. They are
beginning to fly again because you have robbed Peter to pay
Paul. But has the effect of sequestration grounded one-third of
our fighter force?
Admiral Winnefeld. It has grounded nine fighter squadrons,
which is not one-third of the fighter force, but there are
other squadrons that are flying at a rate lower.
Senator Graham. What would it take for the enemy to knock
out nine Air Force squadrons?
Admiral Winnefeld. I know where you are coming from and it
would be a heck of a lot.
Senator Graham. If I were the Iranians, I would send a
thank you note to Congress for grounding more Air Force planes
than they could on their own. To say I am upset about this is
an understatement.
Finally, what if, General Dempsey, Congress could not find
a way to reach a deal on funding the Government? Come October
1, we just cannot fund the Government and the politicians in
Washington cannot come up with a budget and we had no money for
our military. What signal would that be sending to our troops
and to our enemies? What kind of national security impact would
it be in the times in which we live if there was no agreement
to fund the Government? What would it mean to our national
security?
General Dempsey. You remember, Senator, I held up this
slide showing that these kids that we send into harm's way
trust us. I would have to assess that bond of trust would be
broken.
Senator Graham. As to our enemies, how would they take
this?
General Dempsey. I think they would be certainly happy at
our demise.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Winnefeld, when you look at the security of this
country, what would you prioritize first?
Admiral Winnefeld. I would prioritize first the survival of
the Nation.
Senator Ayotte. Would that mean protecting the Homeland?
Admiral Winnefeld. It would definitely.
Senator Ayotte. I know that earlier you were asked about
our missile defense system, and you said that the first dollar
we should spend is on the sensor to add discrimination power.
Correct?
Admiral Winnefeld. That is correct.
Senator Ayotte. I guess I am kind of dumbfounded by it
because, as I understand it, that was not in the budget
proposal put forth by the Department. Why was that if it was
the number one?
Admiral Winnefeld. I would have to review the budget
documents to validate that. But one thing to remember is we
have a new commander of the Missile Defense Agency, a new
director there. He is doing an exceptionally good job. Vice
Admiral Syring. He, along with his technical experts, have
studied this and they have come to the conclusion that you can
get better shot doctrine if you get better discrimination. He
would hasten to add that if the threat gets worse, we are going
to need more missiles as well, which is one of the reasons
why----
Senator Ayotte. Okay. Let me follow that, you had said in
your testimony that you have to watch the threat develop from
Iran. In fact, in the recent interview that Prime Minister
Netanyahu gave, he said that Iran is building intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) to reach the American mainland within
a few years. Of course, that is consistent with what we have
heard if 2015 is a potential date when Iran will have ICBM
capability or could have to reach the mainland of the United
States. Is that right?
Admiral Winnefeld. It is an intelligence assessment. It
shifts all the time, but 2015 is the current number when they
could potentially have a capability.
Senator Ayotte. 2015 is the number. I guess I am a little
dumbfounded why we keep saying that there is no current
military requirement for an east coast missile defense site
when the priority of our Nation is to protect the Homeland. As
I understand it, if we went, in terms of an EIS, to production
of an east coast missile defense site, it would take about 6
years, would it not?
Admiral Winnefeld. I do not know that it would take that
long. I would have to get the exact numbers for you. But I
think that when the EISs are done, closely on the heels of that
we would have another threat assessment that is continually
going on. We would have to come to a decision fairly soon, I
think, after that as to whether we would do an east coast
missile field to start with.
[The information referred to follows:]

After the completion of the Environmental Impact Statement and
selection of a site, it will take approximately 5 years--2 years for
planning and design, and 3 years for construction. Location (e.g.
construction seasons, geology, et cetera) and budget programming (i.e.
military construction) will affect the schedule.

Senator Ayotte. When I look at the possibility of 2015 ICBM
capability, I think the tail is wagging the dog in terms of how
long it would take to put that up. I know you said first
dollar. What if you had the second dollar of missile defense?
What would you do with it?
Admiral Winnefeld. The first thing we want to do is get the
CE-2 missiles working and get them into the silos in Alaska to
get the additional missiles we have talked about. That is going
to take some time in and of itself to get that done.
The first dollar, as I mentioned, is the sensors so that we
have this ``quality has a quantity all its own'' phenomenon
where we have to shoot fewer missiles at the inbound threats.
If we can accomplish that, that will really help us.
Then assuming if the threat continues on a trajectory where
Iran develops an ICBM, we may well need an east coast missile
field in order to defend this country.
Senator Ayotte. I think what you are saying today is the
second dollar.
By the way, we could do both at once if we wanted to in
terms of protecting the Homeland, could we not?
Admiral Winnefeld. Physically we could, but in terms of----
Senator Ayotte. If we allocated the resources for you to do
it.
Admiral Winnefeld. Right. The question is is that the
wisest use of the resources. It competes with everything else,
but as you pointed out at the very beginning of this
discussion, the highest priority is the defense of the Nation.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you both for being here. I appreciate
your service to the country.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Thank you both. We are hopeful that we will have a speedy
markup and confirmation, but that will be up to the whole
committee. That would be my hope. Thank you. We thank your
spouses, your wives who are here, your families again for their
great support over the years.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN Martin E. Dempsey,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. On previous occasions you have answered the committee's
policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, the last time being in connection with your first nomination to be
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your
last confirmation hearing?
Answer. No. I continue to believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Act as
passed is effective, and I credit this legislation for making us the
Joint Force we are today. However, if confirmed, I will continue to
examine the lessons of the past 10 years of war to determine if there
are opportunities to make us an even more effective Joint Force.
Question. In light of your experience as Chairman, do you see any
need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications
do you believe would be appropriate?
Answer. I do not believe modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act
are required at this time. Today's Joint Force reflects the commitment
to integration and jointness across the Military Services established
by Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. If confirmed, I will continue to examine
the lessons of the past 10 years of war to determine if there are
needed legislative modifications or other opportunities to improve
jointness.
duties
Question. Based on your experience as Chairman, what
recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and
functions set forth in section 152 through section 155 of title 10,
U.S.C., and in regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD), that
pertain to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general?
Answer. If confirmed, I do not presently foresee recommending any
changes to the law. I will, however, be attuned to potential issues and
opportunities for improvement that might suggest consideration for
eventual changes in the law.
relationships
Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish
important relationships between the Chairman and other officials.
Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must have a close
working relationship with the Secretary of Defense. Under title 10, the
Chairman is assigned several duties that guide the relationship to
include serving as the principal military advisor to the President, the
National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman
also performs other duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The National Security Advisor.
Answer. The National Security Advisor is a special assistant and
direct advisor to the President. As the role of the Chairman is to
serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National
Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense,
if reconfirmed, I will continue to work closely with the National
Security Advisor to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the
interagency and for the purpose of implementing Presidential decisions.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of
Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act.
As such, the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is
similar to that with the Secretary.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and
oversight functions. These instructions and directives are applicable
to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when
directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from
the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified
commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 140, the DOD General
Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of DOD. In general, the DOD
General Counsel is responsible for overseeing legal services,
establishing policy, and overseeing the DOD Standards of Conduct
Program, establishing policy and positions on specific legal issues and
advising on significant international law issues raised in major
military operations, the DOD Law of War Program, and legality of
weapons reviews. The office of the DOD General Counsel works closely
with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and communications with the combatant commanders by the DOD
General Counsel are normally transmitted through the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General.
Answer. The DOD Inspector General performs the duties, has the
responsibilities, and exercises the powers specified in the Inspector
General Act of 1978. If confirmed, I will continue to cooperate with
and provide support to the DOD Inspector General as required.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs the
duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman, with the
approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the
Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman,
the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the
Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability
ceases.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165 provides that, subject to the
authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support
of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The
Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which
program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military
Departments conform to priorities in strategic plans and with the
priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. Because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs
are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However,
this does not diminish their importance with respect to title 10
responsibilities. Among other things, they serve two significant roles.
First, they are responsible for the organization, training, and
equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and
cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can assure
the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the
Secretary of Defense and the President. Second, as members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the
Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their
respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important
role in shaping military advice and developing our joint capabilities.
If reconfirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Service Chiefs
to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct
military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent
directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman
for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their
activities. He provides a vital link between the combatant commanders
and other elements of DOD, and as directed by the President, may serve
as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the
President or Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will continue to
work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their warfighting
capability and to provide support.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of
DOD and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for
formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs, and
plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard
personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser
to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the principal adviser to
the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary and
Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As
National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the department's official
channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General. As a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving
non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense
and civil support missions.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.
Answer. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the
principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense,
and the National Security Council, he is not in the chain of command of
the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The Commander, USFOR-
A reports to the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), who, in
turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting
relationship is prescribed in title 10, U.S.C., section 164(d)(1). The
Commander, USFOR-A does not have a formal command relationship with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he coordinates with him
through the Commander, CENTCOM on a regular basis. The Commander,
USFOR-A sends his advice and opinions on military operations to the
Commander, CENTCOM, who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman.
major challenges
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you have faced in your first term as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. We are experiencing a period of unprecedented uncertainty
and multiple transitions that daily test our ability to meet our
obligations, both in the security environment and across the Joint
Force. We face a difficult fiscal correction to restore the economic
foundation of our power. At the same time, we are transitioning from a
decade of war to a contingency footing in response to an uncertain and
dangerous security landscape. Importantly, we are transitioning a
generation of veterans, as many in the Joint Force return to the
homefront and their communities. Across the force, the issues of sexual
assault, veteran suicide, traumatic brain injury/mental health are
among our most challenging. In the security environment, continued
operations and transition in Afghanistan, the crisis in Syria, and
deterring global provocation are among the most complex national
security priorities we have faced. The Nation is far from being immune
from coercion in cyberspace. This said, I continue to believe that we
have it within us to lead through this critical and defining period,
and remain a strong global leader and reliable ally.
Question. What new challenges do you expect to face if you are
confirmed for a second term?
Answer. We face a series of tough choices moving forward, given our
fiscal reality and the increasingly unpredictable security environment.
These will include, but are certainly not limited to, conducting a
responsible transition in Afghanistan, responding to the dynamic and
persistent threat from violent extremist organizations, deterring
increasingly bold provocation from North Korea and Iran, and detecting
and defeating cyber and other asymmetric attacks against the homeland.
We are less ready today than we were 1 year ago, and our readiness
continues to degrade. If current trends continue, our military power
will become less sustainable, and therefore less credible. In this
context, my challenge is to continue to provide our civilian leadership
with realistic options and risk assessments that balance current
obligations, future contingencies, and the reality of declining
resources. Internally, I will face the challenge of restoring the
versatility of the Joint Force at an affordable cost. I will need to
lead the effort to renew commitment to our profession by making sure we
value character as much as competence.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. We can only address these challenges together--jointly,
across the interagency, and in partnership with Congress. If confirmed,
I will work to strengthen the relationships--and specifically the bonds
of trust--that have allowed us to make important progress in my first
term. This trust permeates all levels. Our men and women on the front
lines must trust that they will be the best trained, led, and equipped
force on the battlefield. Our military families must trust that we will
keep faith at home. The Services and combatant commands must trust
their views will be fairly and accurately represented within internal
JCS deliberations and at all levels of policy debate. Our allies and
partners must trust in our sustained global leadership. The President,
this Congress, and the American people must trust that their military
will meet its sacred obligation to keep our Nation immune from
coercion.
priorities
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
identified in the section above, would you set for your second term as
Chairman?
Answer. If reconfirmed, I will continue to emphasize the focus
areas I established in my 2012 Strategic Direction to the Joint Force
to achieve our national security objectives today, build the Joint
Force for 2020, renew commitment in our profession of arms, and keep
faith with our military family. To do this, we will need to get four
things right. The first is to achieve strategic solvency--this means
establishing security priorities, aligning our aims and abilities, and
balancing current and long-term requirements. Second, I will remain
focused on keeping the Joint Force ready and balanced. To do so, we
must restore readiness lost due to sequester, and ensure that future
cuts do not undermine our ability to send our troops to war with the
best training, leadership, and equipment. Third, we must prioritize
investment in our people. This means valuing and strengthening
character as much as competence, reinvesting in learning and
leadership, advancing equal and ethical treatment for all of our
servicemembers, and allowing no quarter for sexual violence in our
ranks. Lastly, I will focus on maintaining the bond of trust between
our men and women in uniform and the public they serve.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section
163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct
communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the
Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in
performing their command function.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. I believe that the current chain of command provides a
clear and effective means for employing our Nation's military.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority outside the chain of command
established under title 10, U.S.C.?
Answer. Military forces should normally operate under the chain of
command established under section 162 of title 10, U.S.C. However, an
exception to that chain of command may be appropriate for certain
sensitive operations. The military units supporting such an operation
are still governed by the laws of armed conflict and, as an
administrative matter, the military personnel remain accountable to the
military chain of command, including for matters of discipline under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Only the President may approve
such an exception, as also recognized in section 162. If confirmed, I
will provide the President with my best advice regarding any operation
where an exception to the established chain of command may be
appropriate.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military
personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in
title 50, U.S.C.? Do you believe any modifications to these authorities
are necessary?
Answer. As noted above, consistent with title 50 of the U.S.C., the
President may authorize departments, agencies, or entities of the U.S.
Government to participate in or support intelligence activities. While
I believe that all military forces should normally operate under a
military chain of command, there are authorities and agreements that
allow exceptions to this chain of command for title 50 operations. In
some cases, the Secretary of Defense may approve this exception and in
other cases only the President has approval authority. I believe the
current authorities are sufficient to facilitate DOD's providing
appropriate support under title 50 while ensuring necessary oversight.
advice of the service chiefs, combatant commanders, and chief of the
national guard bureau
Question. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the
combatant commanders, especially on the operational requirements of
their commands. Section 151 of title 10 provides for the other members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice or opinion, in
disagreement with or in addition to the advice or opinion of the
Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that advice at the same
time that he presents his own advice to the President, National
Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.
Having served as Chairman, what changes to section 151 or section
163, if any, do you think may be necessary to ensure that the views of
the individual Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, Chief of the
National Guard Bureau are presented and considered?
Answer. I see no benefit in changing section 151 or section 163.
Section 151 and section 163 embody the spirit and letter of Goldwater-
Nichols, a foundation of our Joint Force. I have made it a priority to
hear from and be representative of the views of the combatant
commanders and the JCS. I use their insights and collective experience
to inform my best military advice. I recognize my responsibility and
the value in my representing the views of the JCS and our senior
commanders, even when they may vary.
security strategies and guidance
Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range
and diversity of threats we face today to national security?
Answer. The security environment is more uncertain and dangerous.
It can be characterized as complex due to an increasing number of
strategically significant actors, dynamic due to rapid rates of change,
and uncertain due to shifting nodes of power and influence and an
unclear U.S. fiscal and budget environment. Further, the proliferation
of advanced technologies is resulting in middleweight militaries and
non-state actors with unprecedented destructive and disruptive
capabilities, particularly in the areas of cyber, terrorism, and
missiles.
Question. In your view, is the Nation's defense strategy
appropriate for the threats we face today and could face in the coming
decades?
Answer. The strategy as articulated in the January 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense, is necessary and appropriate to safeguard the
Nation against threats to its interests. However I am increasingly
concerned about our ability to properly resource the strategy and
maintain the readiness of the Joint Force due to continued fiscal
uncertainty and constraints. I have documented the specific concerns in
my classified Chairman's Risk Assessment submitted in February, 2013.
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took
into account a $487 billion reduction in defense resources.
With the additional $500 billion in cuts to DOD as a result of
sequestration is the Defense Strategic Guidance still valid?
Answer. The Department is still in the process of determining what
revisions might be necessary to align ends, ways, and means given the
additional $500 billion in cuts. The sequester was not expected or
desired. The answer will depend a great deal on how the cuts are taken
year by year (slope), the flexibility granted to the Department by
Congress, and Congress' willingness to give the Department more scope
for politically unpopular changes to infrastructure, benefits, and
compensation.
Question. At the issuance of the Defense Strategic Guidance you
said, ``We will always provide a range of options for our Nation . . .
.''
What options do you lose or what options are significantly altered
and in what way if the $500 billion in cuts is enacted?
Answer. We will continue to provide a range of options. But, they
may not be as robust or timely as they might have been, and they will
entail a higher level of risk to the Nation and to the forces
committed. In essence, we will be able to do fewer things
simultaneously, and new contingencies may force us to take risk in
other regions or for other security threats. The full implications of
reduced option are unlikely to be appreciated until an unexpected
contingency or strategic surprise occurs.
Question. What changes, if any, should be considered?
Answer. The recent Strategic Choices and Management Review affirmed
the fundamental soundness of the Defense Strategic Guidance. However,
it makes clear that we need to further prioritize missions within the
context of a continued rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. It also
indicated that we are at risk of strategy insolvency if sequestration
is implemented as currently prescribed by law. That is, there is a
point at which a steep drawdown makes it difficult for us to meet the
current and expected demands being placed on our military.
Question. In your view, is our broad defense strategy and current
establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the
military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces
properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the
Nation faces today and into the next decade?
Answer. These are broad, overarching issues that the Department
traditionally examines through its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
The recent Strategic Choices Management Review did, however, provide
insight to changes that will need to be made in terms of capability and
capacity to meet future security challenges. As a consequence of fiscal
constraints, we are already losing readiness that will cost us more to
restore. Therefore, I am concerned that our Joint Force will be
increasingly less ready for future challenges unless we get budget
certainty and flexibility.
Question. In March you said, ``Recognizing longer-term uncertainty,
I've also begun to reassess what our military strategy should be, as
well as institutional reforms necessary to remain an effective fighting
force.'' On the topic of Strategic Choices and Management Review,
Secretary Hagel said, ``There will be no rollout of any grand plan on
this.''
Will there be any changes in strategy to account for sequestration?
Answer. The Department is still in the process of determining what
revisions might be necessary to align ends, ways, and means given the
additional $500 billion in cuts. I concur with what the Secretary has
stated. We still have considerable work ahead of us to determine the
extent to which we have to change the Defense Strategic Guidance. That
said, the Strategic Choices and Management Review indicated that the
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific remains sound, but that we may need to
further prioritize missions.
Question. Do you feel that we have passed or are approaching the
line where military strategy is driven by resources rather than being
based on objectives and threats?
Answer. Strategy is always informed by the resources available. To
best protect the Nation, we must achieve the best possible balance of
ends, ways, and means while assessing and mitigating risk. I am
concerned that sequester in its current form prevents us from being
able to achieve proper balance, pushing us closer to the line where our
military strategy is out of balance with the resources needed to
achieve it. If so, our military strategy will take some additional risk
in achieving objectives, in the ways we achieve results, and in the way
we apply resources. It is too early to determine if we will achieve the
right balance or if we have crossed the line--but we will watch this
carefully.
Question. What will the indicators be if we cross that line?
Answer. Unready forces, misaligned global posture, inability to
keep pace with emerging threats, reduced security cooperation, and
failure to maintain a high quality All-Volunteer Force are all becoming
increasingly likely the longer sequestration in its current form
persists. I am especially concerned about the All-Volunteer Force. We
presently have the most seasoned, professional force in history. Budget
reductions, inflexibility, and uncertainty will increasingly subject
them to lower readiness, less education and fewer training events.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment?
Answer. The upcoming QDR will enable us to look at these issues in
a deliberate way. I will provide my best advice to the Secretary during
the review and inform Congress as to my recommendations at the earliest
opportunity. The lack of certainty in the budget environment makes it
more difficult to make hard decisions about structures, roles, and
missions, and more difficult to understand the impacts of those
decisions.
strategic risk
Question. Do you believe that the current and planned pace and
scope of operations in Afghanistan in conjunction with current and
planned end-strength and force structure reductions create increased
levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the current or
potential future lack of available trained and ready forces for other
contingencies?
Answer. The answer depends somewhat on the President's decision on
post-2014 presence in Afghanistan and on whether sequestration takes
effect as current prescribed by law. Generally, end-strength and force
structure reductions could entail greater military risk to any mission,
during execution of future contingencies, as force reductions occur.
Question. If so, how would you characterize the increase in
strategic risk in terms of the military's ability to mobilize, prepare,
deploy, and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this
level of risk acceptable?
Answer. In an unclassified forum, I am reluctant to get into
specifics on military risk. In general, a smaller Joint Force would
become more reliant on rapid Reserve mobilization and on maintaining
high readiness levels for its Active Forces. Implementing sequestration
as currently prescribed by law will make it impossible to maintain the
levels of readiness we have today for current contingencies, much less
to make the investments needed to employ the force for more difficult
future contingencies. The concerns expressed in the 32-star letter to
the committee last year about the impacts of sequestration on readiness
still stand. If anything, I am more worried today.
Question. What is the impact of the decision to decrease U.S.
forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security
obligations in other parts of the world?
Answer. As we draw down the forces in Afghanistan, we intend to
reset the force as well as provide for a greater range of options for
contingencies in other parts of the world. This approach will become
increasingly untenable if sequestration as currently prescribed by law
persists.
Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will
reductions to Army and Marine Corps end strength increase or aggravate
this risk?
Answer. Reductions to land force end strength will increase risk
based on our decreased ability to deter conflicts and to shape
conditions overseas through Army and Marine security cooperation
activities. Reduced end strength means that we will be able to ``turn''
the force less frequently, and under certain circumstances we may have
to extend forces beyond the optimum and sustainable boots-on-the-ground
dwell ratio.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
recent announcement to inactivate 13 of its 45 brigade combat teams by
the end of 2017?
Answer. First, it's important to note that these inactivations have
nothing to do with sequestration. The inactivation of the 13 brigade
combat teams will reduce that part of the force that the Army actually
increased over the last 10 years to fight our wars. With the planned
drawdown of these forces, and the conclusion of two long-term stability
operations, we can manage our strategy with the reductions the Army has
planned.
Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if
any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
Answer. Military strategies consist of ends, ways, means, and risk.
``Ends'' are goals or objectives, ``ways'' describe how we intend to
meet those objectives, and ``means'' are the resources available. If we
cannot accept more risk, and the ``means'' are reduced, then we can
only reduce our ``ends'', or change the ``ways''. Possible examples of
changes to ``ways'' include adjusting our operational plans or global
posture, modifying our operational concepts, reducing the scope and
nature of the missions we take on, requesting new authorities, shifting
the burden onto current alliances or undertaking new security
cooperation mechanisms with current or new partners. Possible examples
of changes to ``ends'' include lengthening the time it takes to resolve
various contingencies and changing expectations about the speed with
which we commit forces or the number of casualties we are prepared to
accept. We could also reduce the scope of objectives in a particular
region or contingency, or change the priorities of objectives and
contingencies worldwide. The depth, breadth, inflexibility, and
uncertainty of the budget reductions currently associated with
sequestration will make any of these changes both more necessary and
more difficult.
Question. Upon issuance of the January 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance, you said ``We do accept some risks in this strategy as all
strategies must.''
With the benefit of hindsight, what is your assessment of the areas
where we assume the greatest strategic risk under the current Defense
Strategic Guidance due to cuts of $487 billion?
Answer. The recently completed Strategic Choices Management Review
outlined the magnitude of the challenges we could face and the
difficulty of the decisions involved. But we have yet to make those
choices or complete the staff level assessments for a fulsome answer.
It did, however, indicate that the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
remains fundamentally sound. More directly, my sense is that the Nation
will have a military that is increasingly unready, steadily losing
technology overmatch to possible challengers, that is smaller but
similar in terms of platforms and capabilities, and that will have an
eroded global presence and posture. It is a military that will be
viewed with increasing concern by our longtime allies and with
increasing satisfaction by our potential adversaries. It is a military
that will offer our civilian leaders fewer options and higher
opportunity costs when they decide to employ military force. I will
provide additional specifics in my next classified Chairman's Risk
Assessment related to impacts of sequestration. But the present year-
to-year magnitude of the $487 billion cut cannot be found within our
existing budget without taking unprecedented action. Many of these
actions that are simultaneously prevented by other laws, particularly
with respect to excess infrastructure, compensation and pay, and
procurement, as well as changing the balance between Guard/Reserve/
Active Forces, adjusting the scope and scale of ground force reduction
and allowing the retirement of unnecessary platforms. This is only a
partial list.
Question. What are the additional risks associated with cutting an
additional $500 billion under sequestration?
Answer. Please see previous answers, which outline the additional
risks of fewer options and gaps in or security due to a force that will
be out of balance and less ready than it should be.
chairman's risk assessment
Question. In your 2013 risk assessment, you identified for the
first time six National Security Interests that were derived from four
enduring interests contained in the 2010 National Security Strategy.
Please describe your rationale for assessing risk against these new
interests that have not been incorporated into an updated national
security strategy?
Answer. The four enduring interests in the National Security
Strategy provided guidance for the entire U.S. Government, including
the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power. The six
national security interests derive from these and are focused
explicitly on the military contribution to the four enduring interests.
I have found this construct to be useful tool when articulating
specific risks and prioritizing our military missions. They help us
think through the options for using force and when/where to take risk
and expend resources.
Question. Your April 2013 assessment identified several areas of
broad and significant risk to national security as a result of current
budget issues.
How would you characterize the trends of risk in these areas
(whether they are increasing or decreasing)?
Answer. In an unclassified forum I am reluctant to go into much
detail. Generally, those strategic risk trends have not changed since
March.
As I have mentioned elsewhere, I see increasing strategic risk
associated with sequestration as currently prescribed by law.
I will make note of any changes in my next risk assessment.
Question. What is your current assessment of the risk to combatant
commanders in their ability to successfully execute their operational
plans?
Answer. In my latest Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), I identified
and characterized the ability of combatant commanders to successfully
execute their operational plans and their ongoing missions. The CRA
also included the combatant commanders' assessments of their most
pressing challenges. In an unclassified forum I am reluctant to go into
detail, however, I will say that all military operations entail risk,
but we are committed to providing the President a range of options
given any threat to U.S. interests.
transformation
Question. Military ``transformation'' has been a broad objective of
the Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War.
In your view, what does military ``transformation'' mean?
Answer. Military transformation is really about adapting the Joint
Force to meet future security needs. We must be able to adapt to rapid
changes in technology, the global security environment, and our
adversaries' capabilities. Uncertainty is the only thing certain today.
We must be flexible in order to deter and defeat threats at every point
along the spectrum of conflict, from asymmetric threats to a near-peer
competitor. If confirmed, I will maintain the development of Joint
Force 2020 as a focus area of my chairmanship, in order to ensure that
our Nation's security is never uncertain.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress
made by the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Joint Staff, toward transforming the Armed Forces?
Answer. My 2012 Strategic Direction to the Joint Force identifies
the development of Joint Force 2020 as one of the four focus areas of
my chairmanship, and we've made progress in the past 2 years. We're
working to advance interdependence, integrate new and specialized
capabilities, promote versatility, and preserve readiness by valuing
quality over quantity. For example, we've introduced the Joint
Operational Access Concept to synchronize our efforts across all five
domains--land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace. This concept provides a
framework to ensure the Joint Force remains survivable and successful
despite growth of anti-access and area-denial threats. We're also
moving forward with the Joint Information Environment, implementing
innovative industry-supported efficiencies across the Department to
further enhance mission effectiveness and cyber security. Ultimately,
my aim is a versatile, responsive, decisive, and affordable Joint
Force. If reconfirmed, I look forward to working with you to achieve
this.
Question. If confirmed, what goals, if any, would you establish
during your next term as Chairman regarding military transformation in
the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain as a priority the development
of a superior Joint Force in 2020. Transformation during this period of
fiscal constraint poses challenges for us, but also opportunities. We
will be selective in the capabilities we reconstitute as we draw down
in Afghanistan, and ensure that lessons learned over a decade of war
are retained. We may get smaller, but we can be increasingly versatile
and interdependent. We will be regionally postured, but globally
networked. We will integrate new capabilities and leverage cutting-edge
technologies that will provide a decisive advantage as we adapt to new
ways of war. The economic situation demands that the future force be
affordable, but keeping our military the best led, trained, and
equipped force in the world is a non-negotiable imperative.
Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role
in transformation? If so, in what ways?
Answer. The Joint Staff is contributing significantly to the
transformation of the Joint Force in a closely coordinated effort with
the Services and combatant commands. The Joint Staff's current focus is
on concept, strategy, and doctrine development, and establishing joint
requirements to address gaps in capability. I believe this is the
correct role.
military capabilities in support of defense strategy
Question. The 2010 report of the QDR provided that military forces
shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational
activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other
threats. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for
improved capabilities in key mission areas such as counterinsurgency,
stability, and counterterrorism operations, as well as building the
security capacity of partner states. In contrast, the Defense Strategic
Guidance of January 2012 asserts that the United States will no longer
size its forces for long duration stability operations.
Understanding that the Department is currently embarked on a
Strategic Choices and Management Review that is intended to inform the
2014 QDR, what is your understanding and assessment of the current
ability of each Service to provide capabilities to support these
mission requirements and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you
pursue to improve these capabilities?
Answer. The Services are currently able to provide forces to
support the missions identified within the Defense Strategic Guidance.
Resource constraints, however, are eroding readiness and extending the
timeline by which forces can be made available to fulfill combatant
commanders' requests and respond to emerging requirements. We are
reexamining the plans and scenarios that drive the size and
capabilities of our force to ensure they are informed by the realities
of our fiscal and operating environment. We will continue to closely
manage the way we use our forces as they conduct day-to-day operations.
Further, new fiscal guidance will ensure that the Department invests in
those capabilities most needed to defend the Nation against likely
future mission requirements.
Question. In your opinion, can the 2014 QDR be conducted without an
updated National Security Strategy, which is required by law to be
submitted annually?
Answer. Existing guidance is sufficient to inform my statutory
requirement to contribute to the QDR. The enduring interests
articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy as well as the six
national security interests outlined in the Chairman's Risk Assessment
provide a consistent framework within which to conduct the next QDR. If
national priorities shift in any future NSS, we will adapt our
strategic documents and processes such as the QDR.
Question. Are you committed to meet the statutory date for delivery
of a 2014 QDR to Congress?
Answer. Yes, in accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 118, we
plan to meet the statutory date to deliver a 2014 QDR to Congress.
future army
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of January 2012
articulated the need to shift strategic emphasis toward the Asia-
Pacific region while continuing to engage in the Middle East.
Do you agree that future high-end military operations, as
envisioned by the DSG, will primarily be naval and air engagements such
that the Army will have difficulty justifying the size, structure, and
cost of the number and equipment its combat formations?
Answer. America needs a capable and decisive Army. The size and
structure of the Army will continue to adapt to the evolving security
environment. Our most recent experience with war suggests that we
cannot predict where or when we will be asked to fight. A global
superpower needs to retain sufficient capability, capability, and
readiness to win across all domains. As Chairman, my focus is on
ensuring that the Joint Force as a whole is capable of executing
decisive operations in support of our national interests, regardless of
geography or the theater of operations.
Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations
or criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with
strategy and resources?
Answer. Our Nation needs an Army that can conduct full spectrum
operations as part of the Joint Force. It must be appropriately sized,
structured, and equipped to in order to defend the Nation and defeat
our adversaries. The Defense Strategic Guidance deemphasized long
duration stability operations and reinforced the importance of
defeating and denying the objectives of an adversary. The Army is
realigning and resizing consistent with this guidance.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
properly align the Army's size and structure with the requirements of
security strategies and the likely availability of resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ongoing
realignment and restructuring of BCTs. These measures enhance the
ability of the Joint Force to provide a full range of options to the
President that meets diverse threats in an uncertain environment.
sequestration
Question. Sequestration requires defense cuts totaling $37 billion
over the last half of the current fiscal year.
What is your assessment of how the Department is managing these
cuts in the current fiscal year?
Answer. The cuts required by sequestration in fiscal year 2013 are
a self-inflicted wound to our national security. We have lost readiness
that will take time and money to restore. We are out of balance due to
the magnitude, mechanism, and pace of budget cuts. While the Department
is shifting funds where possible to minimize the impact on warfighting
capabilities and critical military readiness, sequestration to date has
resulted in cuts to training, exercises, and deployments, civilian
furloughs and hiring freeze, reduced base maintenance, disruption to
modernization, and morale challenges. We are leading through these cuts
by doing all we can to protect funding to our deployed forces, our
nuclear enterprise, and our warrior and family support programs.
Question. What are your views on the impact these cuts are having
on readiness?
Answer. We have lost readiness that will take time and money to
restore. The impact of sequestration and other budget constraints are
beginning to emerge in unit level readiness reports. The effects caused
by the cancellation of large force exercises and deferred maintenance
are harder to measure, but will also impose significant strain on long-
term institutional readiness. The combined effect of reduced training
cycles, deferred maintenance, and the pace of current operations is
damaging to both readiness and morale. If current trends continue,
recovery from several months of sequestration will take years.
Eventually, our readiness problem will become a recruitment and
retention problem.
Question. The fiscal year 2014 budget request and the fiscal year
2014 budget resolutions passed by the Senate and the House of
Representatives all assume that sequestration will be avoided in fiscal
year 2014. It appears possible that sequestration will not be avoided
in fiscal year 2014 and DOD will have to cut $52 billion from its
budget request. You have been involved in developing the most workable
approach to meeting the $52 billion savings requirement established by
the Budget Control Act.
What is your assessment of the Department's proposals for managing
the additional $52 billion in cuts in fiscal year 2014?
Answer. The abrupt, deep cuts caused by the Budget Control Act caps
in fiscal year 2014 will force DOD to make non-strategic choices. If
sequester continues, the Department will have to make sharp cuts with
far reaching consequences, including limiting combat power, reducing
readiness, and undermining the national security interests of the
United States. To limit adverse consequences, we need the certainty of
a predictable funding stream, time to balance force structure,
modernization, compensation, and readiness, and the flexibility to make
trade-offs. The Secretary directed a Strategic Choices and Management
Review to develop options that would accommodate these large cuts, but
none of these options fully avoid an increase in risk to our national
security.
Question. What are your views on the impact these cuts will have on
readiness?
Answer. While DOD would attempt to protect the operation and
maintenance funding most closely related to training and readiness,
full protection will be impossible. Therefore, military training and
readiness would remain at the currently degraded levels or, in some
cases, would continue to decline in a sequester-level cut of $52
billion in fiscal year 2014. Ultimately, ongoing cuts will threaten our
obligation to send only the best trained, led and equipped forces into
harm's way.
Question. What are your views on the impact these cuts will have to
military capabilities?
Answer. Given the difficulty of cutting fiscal year 2014 military
personnel funding, DOD would be forced to disproportionately reduce
funding for operations and maintenance; procurement; research,
development, test, and evaluation; and military construction. Funding
for hundreds of program line items, large and small, will be
significantly reduced. We will buy fewer ships, planes, ground
vehicles, satellites, and other weapons systems. Cuts in funding for
research and development will ultimately slow discovery and
advancement, eroding the technological superiority enjoyed by U.S.
forces and translating into less desirable military outcomes in future
conflicts.
readiness funding
Question. Given the reductions in readiness funding, what is your
assessment of the current readiness of the Armed Forces to meet
national security requirements across the full spectrum of military
operations?
Answer. Despite a decade of strenuous demands on the force, we
remain sufficiently ready to conduct current operations. The Joint
Force faced the simultaneous challenge of reconstituting the force and
focusing on a broad spectrum of operations prior to sequestration. Now,
we must prioritize the readiness of our deployed and next to deploy
forces at the expense of reconstituting the majority of the nondeployed
force. This approach is unsustainable and cannibalizes longer-term
reconstitution. Simply put, sequester hinders our ability to generate
forces for contingency operations. If nothing changes, most operational
units will have readiness deficiencies by fiscal year 2014. This lost
readiness will cost more and take longer to recover.
Question. What is your assessment of the near-term trend in the
readiness of the Armed Forces?
Answer. We have curtailed operations, maintenance, and training
across the force because of sequestration cuts. Specific actions by
Service include:

Army--80 percent of ground forces training will be
curtailed for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. Units will
train to just squad-level proficiency. Half of all third- and
fourth-quarter depot maintenance has been cancelled.
Air Force--12 Active Duty combat aviation squadrons
stood down.
Navy--Ship deployments have been reduced. Steaming
days and training opportunities for nondeployed ships as well
as flying hours for nondeployed air wings have also been
reduced, resulting in at least one air wing being at minimum
safety levels by the end of fiscal year 2013.
Marine Corps--Efforts remain focused on meeting near-
term commitments for deployed and next-to-deploy forces. We are
concerned about the availability of amphibious ships.

We are beginning to see the effect of these actions in unit level
readiness reports and expect that trend to continue as time reveals the
full impacts of sequestration. We are prioritizing the readiness of our
deployed and next to deploy forces, but the decreased readiness of the
nondeployed force and damage to production and training pipelines make
this unsustainable.
Question. Given the impact of sequestration, do you support the
additional sourcing of base defense funds to pay for unforeseen
requirements in support of overseas contingency operations?
Answer. While under sequestration, I would support a source of
funding in the base budget to pay for emergent contingency operations.
We will inevitably face new contingencies as operations wind down in
Afghanistan and associated funding for overseas contingency operations
decreases. Without such relief in this or in the form of a
supplemental, the Services will mortgage readiness to absorb the costs
of these operations.
Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration
given the impacts we have already seen to DOD readiness in fiscal year
2013?
Answer. It is critical. I am deeply concerned about the loss of
readiness across the Department. Lost readiness take longer and costs
more to recover. It foreclosed options and compounds risk. We are
repeating the mistakes of past drawdowns. The impact of sequestration
and other budget constraints are beginning to emerge in unit level
readiness reports. The longer term effects caused by the cancellation
of large force exercises and deferred maintenance are harder to
measure, but will impose significant strain on long-term institutional
readiness.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods
currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of
military equipment?
Answer. Requirements drive equipment maintenance based on factors
that include force structure, operations tempo, schedule, nature and
use of the equipment, and safety. The Services' detailed maintenance
plans balance operational availability with maintenance requirements.
Perturbations in the budget process and funding uncertainties have
effects across the maintenance plan for months and even years.
Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last
several years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to
reduce this backlog?
Answer. The Services have successfully managed their equipment
maintenance backlogs in recent years. But funding shortfalls from
successive Continuing Resolutions and sequestration in fiscal year 2013
have culminated in more depot maintenance deferrals across all
Services. If sequestration continues, this backlog will grow, causing
reduced availability rates, less reliable systems, and platforms not
reaching their intended service life. We need budget certainty and
flexibility to best equip the Services to achieve force readiness over
time.
Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance
backlog in order to improve readiness?
Answer. Very. Force readiness includes materiel. The remedy for the
accumulating maintenance backlog is the same as the remedy for force
readiness--time and money.
Question. How important is it to receive Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding 2 or 3 years after the end of combat
operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset?
Answer. Very important. OCO has been a necessary funding source to
conduct ongoing operations and reset equipment to prepare for future
operations. Equipment consumed in Iraq and Afghanistan remains relevant
to unit readiness. OCO beyond the end of combat operations will help
restore the readiness required to support the National Security
Strategy. Lack of OCO for reset will delay the Services' ability to
meet readiness requirements in the out years.
Question. In years past, we have based additional readiness funding
decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists. However, in
recent years those lists have either been nonexistent or have arrived
too late in our markup process.
Do you agree to provide unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a
timely manner beginning with the fiscal year 2015 budget request?
Answer. The provision of unfunded requirements lists to Congress is
a longstanding practice. Given the budget uncertainty, it is difficult
to project whether and when we might submit requirements for 2015.
Should the Services have such requirements, the existing statutory
framework provides the opportunity for the Joint Chiefs to make
recommendations that are responsive to Congress after first informing
the Secretary of Defense.
defense acquisition reform
Question. Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in either House. WSARA
is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a
sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the
acquisition process.
Having now served as the Chairman, what are your views regarding
WSARA and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?
Answer. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 has been
instrumental in ensuring new defense programs start on a sound footing
to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition
process. It also jump-started a culture within the Department focused
on the continuous improvement of our acquisition processes and their
associated outcomes, which I strongly endorse.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
the acquisition process (requirements, acquisition, and budgeting)?
Answer. There is an ongoing effort within the Department to
continuously improve all aspects of the acquisition process. As
recently as January of 2012 a new revision of the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was published, and we are
currently working with the Office of Secretary of Defense to revise DOD
5000.02, ``Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.'' DOD 5000.02
will incorporate the initiatives outlined in Dr. Carter's 2010 ``Better
Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and
Productivity in Defense Spending (BPP 1.0)'' memo and Mr. Frank
Kendall's 2012 initiative entitled ``Better Buying Power 2.0:
Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productively in
Defense Spending'', all of which I strongly support, along with the
improvements instituted in the new JCIDS instruction and manual.
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
Answer. I am concerned that costs in acquisition and procurement
will continue their historic growth profiles, further exacerbating
shortfalls under a sequestered budget. We will continue to scrub our
processes, including our warfighter requirements, to ensure they are
aligned with strategy and available resources. But, it will likely be
necessary to reduce some investments for major systems under full
sequestration.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
Answer. I will continue to partner with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to improve our inter-related processes, and work closely
with our combatant commanders and our title 10 Service providers to
mitigate cost growth impacts of and on our highest priority capability
investments. I will be an advocate for major systems that provide
versatility at an affordable and sustainable cost.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
ensure that requirements are realistic and prioritized?
Answer. The improvements put into place in the latest revision of
the JCIDS process have been very effective. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) is now more focused on weapon system cost,
schedule, and performance, and uses greater analytical rigor to reach
recommendations. The JCIDS process and the associated responsibilities
of the JROC, Services, and the JROC advisors in support of the JCIDS
process will continue to be refined throughout my tenure as Chairman.
contractors on the battlefield
Question. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S.
contractor employees in Afghanistan often exceeds the number of U.S.
military deployed in there. This was also the case during the
operations in Iraq.
Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor
support for military operations?
Answer. They have been part of our military force since the
Revolutionary War. Contractors function in various roles and are a
force multiplier. They provide rapid expansion of manpower when needed
to fill critical gaps. The use of local contractors can be an important
element of military objectives. With that in mind, I think we need to
continuously evaluate the costs and necessity of contractors to make
sure contractor support is properly structured for a period of fiscal
correction.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department
should take to mitigate such risk?
Answer. We are in the process of analyzing lessons learned from
Iraq and Afghanistan and updating doctrine to ensure that we can
properly target capabilities that are optimum for contracting support.
Contracting provides capabilities the military may not have readily
available, but it is critical that we maintain effective oversight and
introduce better cost controls.
Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. Yes. However, oversight is critical to ensure contracts are
properly executed. We are in much better shape today than we were when
the wars began over 10 years ago. We will continue to apply the lessons
learned to improve our processes. We have expanded personnel two-fold
and have a roadmap to move us to an appropriately staffed and organized
contracting capability. I will remain focused on this challenge as we
make resource tradeoffs in the sequestration process.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. The Department will continue to mature the contingency
capabilities of our contracting agencies and to provide dedicated unit
contracting specialists for oversight. We will continue to adjust
doctrine based on lessons learned and maintain our focus on training
and education for this critical military capability.
tactical fighter programs
Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will
face over the next several years is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation
tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology.
Based on current and projected threats, what are your current views
on the requirements for and timing of these programs?
Answer. Dominance in the air is essential to the success of our
Joint Force. Since 1953, our ground forces have not been attacked from
the air by our adversaries. We cannot let any other nation achieve
parity with the United States in the ability to control the air. The
projected threats from our adversaries include programs to build
advanced aircraft that will challenge our current capabilities in the
coming years. The F-35, which will replace several older generation
aircraft across the Joint Force, will continue to ensure our air
dominance well into the future.
Question. What is your current assessment of whether the
restructuring of the JSF program that we have seen over the past 2
years will be sufficient to avoid having to make major adjustments in
ether cost or schedule in the future?
Answer. The Department is committed to the JSF program and the
acquisition adjustments we have made over the past 2 years. But, budget
constraints and uncertainty may impact the program. To date, the F-35
has flown more than 3,000 flights totaling more than 5,000 flight hours
and is largely tracking to our re-baselined plan. The program's
estimate for major milestone events remains aligned to the 2012
acquisition baseline. Flight tests are also progressing close to plan.
ballistic missile defense
Question. Do you agree that the current Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system, with interceptors deployed in Alaska and California,
provides defense of the entire United States--including the east
coast--against missile threats from both North Korea and Iran, and do
you have confidence in that system?
Answer. Yes, I am confident that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
system, supported by other deployed and available ballistic missile
defense capabilities, can protect the United States from both a limited
North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile attack.
Question. On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
announced a series of initiatives to improve our homeland ballistic
missile defense capabilities, including the planned deployment of 14
additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska, to help stay
ahead of the long-range missile threat from North Korea and Iran.
Do you support the initiatives announced by Secretary Hagel, and do
you believe they will help us stay ahead of the threat from North Korea
and Iran?
Answer. Yes, I support the initiatives announced by Secretary
Hagel. The collective results of the initiatives will further improve
our ability to counter future missile threats being developed by Iran
and North Korea.
Question. As indicated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, the administration is pursuing a ``fly-before-you-buy''
approach to missile defense, and will test systems in an operationally
realistic manner to demonstrate they will work as intended before we
deploy them. Since a GBI flight test failure with the Capability
Enhancement-II kill vehicle in 2010, the Missile Defense Agency has
been working to fix the problem and plans to conduct an intercept
flight test in the spring of 2014 to demonstrate the fix.
Do you agree with the ``fly-before-you-buy'' policy, and do you
agree with Secretary Hagel that, before we deploy the additional GBIs,
we need to test and demonstrate the fix so we demonstrate its
capability and have confidence that it will work as intended?
Answer. Yes. I agree with the administration's approach to test
systems in an operationally realistic manner. I also agree with the
importance of achieving confidence in a capability before it is
deployed.
Question. Section 227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for
possible future homeland missile defense sites in the United States, in
case the President determines to proceed with such a deployment in the
future. That EIS process is expected to be complete in early 2016.
Do you agree that the EIS process should be completed prior to
making any decision relative to possible deployment of an additional
homeland missile defense site in the United States, including possibly
on the east coast?
Answer. I agree that EISs should be completed to ensure compliance
with the National Environmental Policy Act prior to the actual
deployment of an additional missile defense site in the United States.
Question. Do you agree with the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency and the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense that there is currently ``no validated
military requirement to deploy an east coast missile defense site''?
Answer. Yes. At this time, there is no validated military
requirement to deploy an East Coast Missile Defense Site. However,
analysis is underway to determine if such a site will be necessary to
defend the Homeland.
Question. Do you agree with their assessment that ``investment in
Ballistic Missile Defense System discrimination and sensor capabilities
would result in more cost-effective near-term improvements to homeland
missile defense'' than deploying an east coast missile defense site?
Answer. Given current fiscal constraints, investment in Ballistic
Missile Defense Systems discrimination and sensor capabilities has the
potential to be a cost-effective near-term approach to improving
homeland missile defense. Deploying an East Coast missile defense site
would likely be a lengthier process.
Question. Do you agree with the following statements regarding a
potential East Coast missile defense site:
General Jacoby (Commander, U.S. Northern Command): ``A third site,
wherever the decision is to build a third site, would give me better
weapons access, increased GBI inventory and allow us the battle space
to more optimize our defense against future threats from Iran and North
Korea.''
General Formica (Commander Space and Missile Defense Command):
``Certainly, it brings increased capacity and increased capability than
we have at Fort Greely.''
National Research Council: ``A GBI site located in northeastern
United States would be much more effective and reliable and would allow
considerably more battle space and firing doctrine options.
Answer. Generally yes, but there is no guarantee of an increased
GBI inventory or that it would be the most cost-effective option.
Question. Do you agree that Presidents Bush and Obama put in place
policies that called for additional missile defense sites in Europe to
better defend against threats to the United States from Iran?
Answer. Yes. The intention of additional missile defense sites in
Europe is to better defend the United States as well as our treaty
allies.
Question. Is this presidentially directed requirement still valid
and, if not, what has changed to permit the elimination of this
requirement for a third interceptor site?
Answer. Additional analysis remains to determine whether a third
site is the optimum and most effective way of fulfilling that
requirement.
space
Question. China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a
turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to
ensure access to space. As a nation heavily dependent on space assets
for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets
became a national priority.
Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of
space assets should be a national security priority?
Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to
operate safely in an increasingly congested space environment. It is
vital that the United States protect national space assets to maintain
the benefits and advantages that are dependent on our access to space.
Question. In your view should China's continued development of
space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?
Answer. Yes. The U.S. Government ensures its space policy and
programs address China's continued development of space systems as well
as systems of other space-faring nations. Our National Security Space
Strategy reflects this domain's role in U.S. national security. Access
to space underpins our ability to understand emerging threats and
challenges, project power globally, conduct operations, support
diplomatic efforts, and enable the global economy. The Department
engages in cooperative opportunities and leads in the formation of
rules and behaviors that benefit all nations. I support the development
of U.S. space capabilities which preserve the use of space for the
United States and our allies, while promoting the principles of the
2010 National Space Policy.
Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to National
Security space policy and programs?
Answer. I do not recommend any proposed changes at this time. If
confirmed, I would continue implementation of the President's 2010
National Space Policy, the supporting 2011 National Security Space
Strategy, and the Department's newly updated Space Policy.
Question. What actions would you take to ensure that the Department
continues to have access to radiofrequency spectrum that is necessary
to train and to conduct its operations?
Answer. It is important that DOD preserve access to the 1755-1850
MHz band and open access to the 2025-2110 MHz bands. The Joint Force is
dependent on tactical systems that operate in the 1755-1850 MHz band to
operate and train its forces. DOD equities in this band include
Satellite Operations, Air Combat Training Systems, Aeronautical Mobile
Telemetry, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems, Electronic Warfare, Joint
Tactical Radios System, and Tactical Radio Relay systems. Other
agencies are seeking DOD to relinquish operations in this band,
particularly the lower 25 MHz (1755-1780 MHz). These agencies also seek
to have DOD Compress into the upper 70 MHz of this band (1780-1850
MHz). DOD analysis has determined that previously mentioned tactical
systems cannot effectively operate in the compressed band. If
compression of this band occurs, DOD would require access in the 2025-
2110 MHz band and resources to modify systems to operate within this
band. Some of the tactical systems could share spectrum with the
commercial wireless industry within the lower 25 MHz without adversely
effecting commercial systems, e.g. satellite operations.
strategic systems
Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin
studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next
15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic
nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.
Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to
afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the
rest of the DOD commitments?
Answer. The modernization of the strategic delivery systems and
sustainment of the strategic nuclear enterprise is important to
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I support
the continued investment in sustainment and modernization as a priority
for defense spending. I am, of course, concerned about the impact of
sequestration on our ability to meet these requirements. Therefore, I
continue to request budget certainty, flexibility, and time to make
sure we can modernize and sustain our strategic systems.
Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and
replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?
Answer. Yes, I will review both to ensure they are cost effective.
Question. The Department will begin to issue guidance from the
recent decision to revise the Nuclear Employment Strategy.
Do you support this change in Strategy?
Answer. Yes, I do support the change in Strategy. Admiral Winnefeld
and I participated in senior leader meetings, where we provided our
best military advice to both the Secretary of Defense and the President
on our nuclear capabilities.
Question. Will you keep Congress fully informed of additional
guidance issued in response to this changed strategy?
Answer. I will work closely with the Secretary and the President to
keep Congress fully informed as additional guidance is developed and
issued with respect to the changes in our strategy.
nuclear weapons employment strategy
Question. President Obama recently issued new guidance on nuclear
weapons employments strategy, consistent with the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR).
Do you support the President's new nuclear weapons employment
guidance, and did you have an opportunity to provide input to the
formulation of the new guidance?
Answer. Yes, I support the President's new guidance. Both Admiral
Winnefeld and I participated in senior leader meetings, where we
provided our best military advice to both the Secretary of Defense and
the President.
Question. Do you agree with the President's assessment that the
United States can ensure its security, and the security of our allies
and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent
while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic
nuclear weapons below the level established in the New START treaty?
Please explain your views.
Answer. We can ensure our security and that of our allies and
partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while
pursuing further reductions beyond the New START treaty central limits.
However, to be very clear on this point, in order to maintain a
credible and effective deterrent we must continue to adequately invest
in the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear
weapons exist. Also, further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons,
beyond the New START Treaty Central Limits, should occur as part of a
negotiated position with Russia. Both Admiral Winnefeld and I have made
this recommendation to the President and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Is the current strategic balance between Russia and the
United States stable?
Answer. I believe we currently have a stable and strategic balance
with Russia, but we must be thoughtful to maintain that balance in such
a manner that we never sacrifice our ability to credibly provide
extended deterrence and assurance to our allies.
Question. What is the military rationale to pursue an additional
one-third reduction in deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons?
Answer. Based on the results of the Post-NPR analysis, the
Department concluded that we could further reduce the number of
deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, while still meeting the
objectives of the revised policy guidance and strategy. From the
military perspective, further reductions should occur as part of a
negotiated position with Russia, and to ensure the credibility of a
smaller deterrent force, our nuclear infrastructure modernization plans
must be fully funded and supported. In following this approach, I am
confident we can maintain a strategic and stable balance with Russia,
while maintaining a viable extended deterrent for our allies and
partners.
Question. What are the potential risks and benefits of pursuing
additional nuclear force reductions?
Answer. I am confident that we can ensure our security and that of
our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic
deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond the New START treaty
central limits. In order to maintain and effective and credible
deterrent, we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization
of our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Also,
further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, beyond the New START
Treaty Central Limits, should occur as part of a negotiated position
with Russia to ensure stability. As we negotiate further reductions
with Russia, to include their larger number of non-strategic nuclear
weapons, I am encouraged by the initiative to expand the scope of those
reductions to include both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons
that are both deployed and nondeployed. I believe this is a prudent
approach that will maintain strategic stability with Russia.
Question. Do you agree it is necessary to address the disparity
between Russia and the United States in tactical nuclear weapons, in a
verifiable manner?
Answer. It is important for us to work with Russia to establish
cooperative measures that will improve mutual confidence regarding the
accurate accounting and security of tactical nuclear weapons. I support
efforts to engage Russia in accordance with the Senate's Resolution to
Ratification of the New START treaty.
Question. Do you agree that any further nuclear reductions should
be done in concert with Russia and that such reductions be part of a
formal agreement requiring the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate?
Answer. The Senate's Resolution to Ratification of the New START
treaty sets forth principles I agree with. This includes the principle
that further arms reduction agreements obligating the United States to
reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in
any militarily significant manner may be made only pursuant to the
treaty-making power of the President. This power is set forth in
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United
States.
Question. Do you agree it is important to address any potential
Russian non-compliance with existing nuclear arms control agreements?
Answer. Yes, we should address treaty compliance concerns. Treaty
compliance determinations are provided to Congress in the report by the
President on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments which is
submitted pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Act, as amended (title 22, U.S.C., section 2593a).
dod's cooperative threat reduction program
Question. The CTR program, which is focused historically on
accounting for, securing or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and materials in the states of the former Soviet
Union, has started to expand its focus to other countries. With this
expansion the CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons
and capabilities including biological surveillance and early warning;
and encouraging development of capabilities to reduce proliferation
threats.
Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S.
Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., DOD,
the Department of Energy, and the State Department?
Answer. Yes. In the past year DOD, the Department of Energy, and
the State Department have jointly decided how to use funds from the
proliferation prevention program. Cooperation is ``built in'' because
drawing from each Department's fund requires concurrence by the other
Department's Secretary. Additionally, many agencies are now working
closely together to reduce threats in particular regions. This
cooperation extends across the Defense and State Departments
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, State's Nonproliferation
Disarmament Fund, and the DOE Proliferation Prevention Program.
Question. The new umbrella agreement with Russia does not include
work with the Russian ministry of Defense and recent efforts in the
program have moved towards preventing proliferation in the Middle East
and North Africa.
Do you support this transition to the Middle East and North?
Answer. I think transition to the Middle East and North Africa
makes good sense. It builds the capacity for regional partners to
improve WMD threat reduction through proliferation prevention. It
increases safety and security of materials of concern, and it helps
with border security and consequence management. The transition to
these regions complements National Strategic objectives and geographic
combatant commander priorities to meet those goals.
Question. What actions will you take to continue a proliferation
prevention relationship with Russia?
Answer. If the agreements with Russia are extended, the project to
transport and dismantle nuclear weapons would continue for some
additional years. This program securely ships strategic and tactical
nuclear warheads to dismantlement locations or to more secure storage
sites until they can be dismantled. DOD plans to support approximately
four secure shipments of legacy nuclear weapons per month and the
associated maintenance for railcars and railcar security systems. While
DOE projects to secure nuclear materials continue, direct DOD support
to our partnership with Russia is critical to U.S. nonproliferation
efforts.
Question. About 60 percent of CTR resources are proposed for
biological programs.
With the very real threat of chemical weapons use and/or
proliferation as we saw in Libya and are seeing in Syria, why is there
such a large percentage of resources directed toward biological issues?
Answer. Dedication of 60 percent of CTR to biological programs is a
necessary balance in order to deal with a pandemic, accidental release
of a pathogen of security concern, or deliberate attack using a
biological agent. All of these would have consequences in the United
States and well beyond our borders and the obvious health impacts.
There is an increasing availability of biological materials, and many
countries are developing laboratory capacity to detect highly dangerous
pathogens. This rapid expansion of poorly controlled infrastructure
could lead to accidental exposure or release of highly contagious
pathogens. An additional vulnerability at these laboratories is the
inherently dual-use nature of biological activity. Legitimate
infrastructure, materials, and expertise, therefore, can easily be
manipulated or used for nefarious purposes if the appropriate safety
and security measures are not in place. As a major hub of international
travel, immigration, and commerce, the United States is directly
threatened by this global danger.
prompt global strike
Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will
continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has
been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the
effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global
strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national
security in the near future?
Answer. We are exploring a range of ways to counter the threat
posed as our adversaries increase the range and lethality of their
weapon systems. There are potential future circumstances that may
require a capability to address high value, time sensitive and defended
targets from ranges outside the current conventional technology. We
will continue to capture these evolving capability needs in our joint
requirements process. We will also continue to evaluate ongoing
analysis of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike capability in order to
provide recommendations on its future development.
Question. What approach (e.g. land-based or sea-based or both) to
implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if
confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to pursue a sea-based approach
as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in February 2012. I
would, of course, remain open to additional analysis or factors that
would suggest another approach.
Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence
capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike
capability?
Answer. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is an
enabling capability for a wide range of important Joint Force
capabilities to include global strike. A Conventional Prompt Global
Strike weapon would likely require an advance persistent surveillance
sensor constellation to enable and enhance its operational performance.
nuclear weapons and stockpile stewardship
Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
challenges, if any, with respect to assuring the safety, security, and
reliability of the stockpile?
Answer. To sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile today,
we must prudently manage our nuclear stockpile and related Life
Extension Programs (LEPs). We must also cultivate the nuclear
infrastructure, expert workforce, and leadership required to sustain it
in the future. If confirmed, I will consider the full range of LEP
approaches to include refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of
nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear
components.
Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile
Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual
certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you
recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing? What
considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard?
Answer. Our current nuclear stockpile is assessed as effective. It
is certified and does not require further nuclear testing. However, the
stockpile is aging. I understand there are, and will always be,
challenges in identifying and remedying the effects of aging on the
stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Department
of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and
infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security
of the stockpile within a constrained budget environment.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. I agree that the full funding of the 1043 report, which has
replaced the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority. The
President's fiscal year 2014 budget request again includes a
significant commitment to support the long-term plan for extending the
life of the weapons in our enduring stockpile and modernizing the
nuclear weapon complex. I am committed to continuing the modernization
and sustainment of our nuclear weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and
infrastructure.
Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you
believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
treaty limits in the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?
Answer. Modernization efforts must be considered in any
deliberations over the size of our deployed stockpile. Further analysis
will be necessary to determine the extent to which it would be
advisable to make further reductions prior to completing modernization
efforts. Factors to be considered in such analysis include U.S. policy
objectives as well as the need to maintain strategic stability with
Russia and China while assuring our allies and partners.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the
nondeployed hedge stockpile of nuclear weapons?
Answer. There may be opportunities to change the nondeployed hedge
of nuclear weapons while still effectively managing stockpile risk.
This would be considered as we complete life-extension programs that
improve safety, security and reliability of the stockpile and as we
modernize the infrastructure. I am committed to reducing the size of
the stockpile consistent with deterrence objectives and warfighter
requirements.
iraq
Question. With the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraq
at the end of 2011, the United States and Iraq began what the President
called a new chapter in the bilateral relationship between the two
countries. At the same time, the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement
continues to set forth a number of principles of cooperation governing
the U.S.-Iraqi relationship. In December 2012, DOD and the Iraqi
Ministry of Defense concluded a Memorandum of Understanding for Defense
Cooperation.
In your view, what are the main areas of mutual strategic interest
in the U.S.-Iraqi relationship?
Answer. We see areas of mutual strategic interest in partnership
with a sovereign, stable and democratic Iraq in several areas to
include: countering Iran's aggression and pursuit of nuclear weapons
capability; mitigating destabilizing effects on the region from
violence in Syria; counterterrorism cooperation to reduce al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) capacity; stable production of petroleum exports; active
participation in regional multilateral exercises; and involvement in
the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Question. What are the main areas of bilateral defense cooperation
between the United States and Iraq?
Answer. The main areas of defense cooperation are through Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Funding (FMF) programs, and
International Military Education and Training (IMET). Iraq has begun to
participate in regional exercises, highlighted by their recent activity
in the International Mine Countermeasure Exercise and Eager Lion
Counterterrorism Exercise. Under the U.S.-Iraq Security Framework
Agreement--and given the lack of a Status of Forces Agreement--DOD is
limited to non-operational training with Iraq. However, our Office of
Security Cooperation-Iraq has helped facilitate bilateral training
between Iraqi Security Forces and other regional militaries. All other
defense training is conducted by contractor personnel through FMS
cases.
Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by al
Qaeda in Iraq?
Answer. AQI continues to pose a significant threat to internal
stability in Iraq. Extremist elements responding to the crisis in Syria
have bolstered AQI capability and motivation. Sectarian divisions,
coupled with a lack of security in the Disputed Internal Boundaries,
have allowed AQI to act as a destabilizing influence. The Iraqi Counter
Terrorism Service (CTS)--one of the most professional and disciplined
units in Iraq--nevertheless lacks the ability to develop actionable
intelligence to effectively suppress the threat.
Question. What is your assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi
security forces to respond to the threat posed by al Qaeda and other
security challenges?
Answer. Due to current sectarian violence and political discord
among the ethnic groups in Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are
reaching their operational limits. Additionally, the lack of a coherent
border security strategy allows the flow of weapons and personnel to
and from Syria. The Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) is
limited to non-operational training. However, Iraq's recent acquisition
of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment will improve
the ISF's ability to counter the AQI threat. Meanwhile, Iraq's external
defense capabilities are extremely limited based on the focus on
internal stability.
Question. What do you see as the principle role or roles of the
Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq?
Answer. The principle role of the Office of Security Cooperation-
Iraq (OSC-I), under Chief of Mission authority, is to conduct security
assistance and security cooperation activities advancing the U.S.
strategic goal of a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. OSC-I
trains the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to meet Iraq's internal security
requirements while leveraging Foreign Military Financing (FMF),
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and
other security assistance authorities to complement Iraq's robust
Iraqi-funded Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-
Iraqi strategic relationship over the coming years?
Answer. The greatest challenge facing the U.S.-Iraq strategic
relationship is the successful transition to a more traditional
security cooperation relationship--with a robust bilateral and
multilateral training and exercise program--despite persistent
sectarian violence throughout the country and rising tensions over
Iranian support to Syria.
Question. What are the lessons learned from the drawdown and post-
combat operations in Iraq that should be applied to the drawdown and
post-combat operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. First, we must improve communication and coordination
between DOD and Department of State as we shift from a military-led
program to a diplomatic-led program. In Iraq, the lack of a fully
integrated civilian-military drawdown significantly complicated an
already difficult transition. Second, we must clearly-define the
missions and support for U.S. and coalition forces remaining in
Afghanistan, with all authorities and agreements in place prior to
completion of full transition. These authorities and agreements--a
primary aim of U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement negotiations--
will provide assurance of the U.S. commitment and help preserve hard-
fought gains as Afghanistan begins the critical post-2014 period.
Finally, we must maintain an equilibrium among our campaign objectives,
retrograde, and the protection of our forces.
stability and support operations
Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has
underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the
conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-
conflict situations. In contrast, however, the January 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance asserts that the Department will avoid becoming
involved in long duration stability and support operations.
What steps, if any, would you recommend to ensure that the lessons
learned from stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are captured
and appropriately institutionalized?
Answer. We've captured the lessons we have learned regarding
stability operations in our Joint Doctrine. Specifically, we have a
complete publication (JP 3-07) dedicated to the topic--the current
version is dated September 2011. Later this year, we will formally
assess this publication with the intent to update it as part of our
routine doctrine process. Further, we will ensure the lessons and
concepts are retained in our training and education.
afghanistan campaign
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the military
campaign in Afghanistan?
Answer. The military campaign in Afghanistan continues to progress
as illustrated by the recent Milestone 13/TRANCHE V announcement. In
fact, the campaign has now shifted into a fundamentally new phase. For
the past 11 years, the United States and our Coalition allies have been
leading combat operations. Now, the Afghans are taking over, and ISAF
is stepping back into a supporting role. The progress made by the ISAF-
led surge over the past 3 years has put the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in control of all Afghanistan's major
cities and 34 provincial capitals and driven the insurgency away from
the population. ISAF's primary focus is now shifting from directly
fighting the insurgency to supporting the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and expand these gains.
Question. What is your assessment and prioritization of enablers
that need to be built and sustained within the ANSF given the cessation
of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat operations
by the end of 2014?
Answer. We have invested considerably in developing the ability of
the ANSF to sustain itself in the field with logistics and mobility. We
will continue to accelerate the development of additional enabling
capabilities to include route clearance and casualty evacuation.
transition of security responsibility in afghanistan and u.s. troop
reductions
Question. In February of this year, President Obama announced that
by February 2014 U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan will be reduced to
34,000. In June, the ANSF achieved Transition Milestone 2013, and
assuming the lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan.
Do you support the President's decision to reduce U.S. troop levels
in Afghanistan to 34,000 by February 2014? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes. Transition Milestone 2013 represents a significant
shift for our mission in Afghanistan. Over the past 11 years, the
United States and our partners have led combat operations. Now the
Afghans are taking the lead for their own security. ISAF's primary
focus has shifted from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting
the ANSF. We match troop levels to the mission and our new mission
requires fewer troops on the ground. The decision to drawdown U.S.
forces was made based on the real and tangible progress of the ISAF
military campaign and an assessment of an increasingly capable ANSF.
Question. What is your understanding regarding the pace of those
reductions in U.S. forces?
Answer. We are on path to meet our objective of 34,000 troops by
February 2014. This objective is based on a transition in our mission
to support increasingly capable ANSF. The Commander ISAF will have the
flexibility to meet his mission and sustain the right forces through
this fighting season. He will also manage the glideslope as we settle
into a supporting role.
Question. Do you support the June transition of lead responsibility
for security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces?
Answer. I support the transition of responsibility for security to
the ANSF. Security progress and the development of the ANSF into a
capable and confident fighting force have enabled the security
transition process to move forward. The ANSF continues to demonstrate
its ability to defeat the Taliban and provide security to the Afghan
people.
Question. Do you support the transition to the ANSF of full
responsibility for security in Afghanistan by December 2014?
Answer. Yes. The ANSF continues to demonstrate significant
improvement. We are seeing many encouraging examples where ANSF are
gaining capability, confidence, leadership, and will to engage with the
enemy. The ANSF is on a path to be capable of assuming full
responsibility for security by December 2014.
Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact of
withdrawing faster than the announced drawdown and of leaving zero
troops in Afghanistan post-2014?
Answer. Withdrawing faster and leaving zero troops in Afghanistan
would likely compromise the sustainability of the ANSF. It would also
impact on our ability to retrograde all our personnel and equipment
while ensuring the protection of the force. Therefore, I continue to
support an enduring presence post-2014 to support ANSF development and
meet our security interests.
afghanistan national security forces
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
professional and effective ANSF?
Answer. The ANSF continues to grow into a confident and capable
force. We are focusing on leadership development as fundamental to the
professionalization of the ANSF. Leadership ratings continue to improve
and the National Military Academy of Afghanistan and the ANA Officer
Academy will play a pivotal role in professionalizing the ANA.
Additionally, the Minister of Defense (MoD) formed an Evaluation
Commission that is responsible for identifying poorly performing
commanders and removes them when required. This allows the MoD the
opportunity to fix the poor/lacking command climate within and address
leadership concerns. Further, the Afghan National Police Training
Command focuses on delineating strategic level roles, literacy of the
force and rule of law knowledge.
Question. Do you support maintaining the ANSF at the level of
352,000 beyond 2014 based on the security conditions on the ground in
Afghanistan?
Answer. I recommended to the Secretary of Defense and the President
that the 352,000 ANSF force level should continue beyond 2014. The
extension of the ANSF ``surge'' force is crucial to put Afghans at the
fore to provide their own security. At this time, it is premature to
assess the duration of this surge, but at a minimum, this extension
would likely be necessary for at least 2 years following the end of the
ISAF mission to counter the possibility of a Taliban resurgence after
the departure of coalition forces.
Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
capacity of the ANSF and what recommendations, if any, would you make
for addressing those challenges?
Answer. The main challenges we face in building the capacity of the
ANSF are attrition, leadership, and limited literacy. Unfortunately,
these issues continue to undermine positive recruiting, training, and
professionalization goals. These are not problems that can be solved in
the short term, but ISAF is continuing to work with the MoI and the MoD
to address them. We must also continue to work on the support functions
that will sustain the ANSF in the field such as logistics.
Question. A recent audit report by the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) raised concerns about DOD plans
to purchase PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan Special
Mission Wing and recommended suspending the contracts for these
purchases. DOD and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training
Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
did not concur with the SIGAR's recommendation on contract suspension.
What is your assessment of current plans to equip the Afghan
Special Mission Wing (SMW) with PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters?
Answer. Our strategy in Afghanistan includes reducing the number of
and reliance on U.S. enablers by building capability in the ANSF. In
part, this will rely on developing the Afghan Air Force and the SMW,
and thus reducing our requirements for aviation assets.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact to Afghanistan
counterterrorism efforts if Mi-17 helicopters are not acquired?
Answer. We need to support development of a helicopter capability
for the ANSF. This capability allows for transporting combat-ready
Afghan troops throughout the remote regions of Afghanistan. The Mi-17
is a proven, familiar, compatible, and is well suited for operating
from remote locations with minimal ground support. It possesses
superior vertical lift capabilities and is capable of operation in the
high-altitude, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. Previous analysis
showed that the Mi-17 stands apart as an all-around helicopter capable
of medium and heavy lift.
Question. Do you support the SIGAR recommendation to suspend the
contracts to acquire these aircraft and helicopters for the Special
Mission Wing? Why or why not?
Answer. No. It is important for the Afghans to operate and sustain
a familiar platform to support the current war effort. The ANSF has
over 30 years of extensive experience with this platform, with the vast
majority of the seasoned Afghan helicopters pilots having flown and
maintained this platform since the 1980s. The ANSF currently has over
150 trained Mi-17 pilots; to retrain the ANSF workforce (aircrew/
maintainers) on an unfamiliar platform would take a minimum of 3 years
and additional funds. Requiring the ANSF to retrain on any other
platform than the Mi-17 would significantly impact the long-term
success of the ANSF.
operation resolute support
Question. In early June, NATO defense ministers endorsed a concept
of operations for the training and advisory mission, known as Operation
Resolute Support, which the Alliance will maintain in Afghanistan after
the ISAF combat mission ends in December 2014. The size of the mission
is yet to be determined, but previously U.S. officials have said that a
force of 8,000-12,000 troops was under consideration.
What do you consider to be the primary role or roles of the NATO
Operation Resolute Support force in Afghanistan after 2014?
Answer. The primary role of the post-2014 NATO mission is to train,
advise, and assist the ANSF at the national and institutional level,
down to the Corps level. Resolute Support Mission may also contain
limited enabler support as we continue to build ANSF capability.
Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in
determining the size of the post-2014 NATO mission in Afghanistan?
Answer. A number of factors will be considered in determining the
size of the post-2014 NATO mission. First, the continued progress of
the ANSF and the level of training, advise, and assistance required to
further that progress. Second, the number of bases required to support
a regional approach and to assist other agencies of the U.S. Government
will drive the size of the post-2014 force level. Lastly, any post-2014
mission will depend on completion of the BSA and the sustainment of
international commitments.
Question. What is the impact on NATO ally commitments to Operation
Resolute Support of the U.S. not announcing a post-2014 force
commitment?
Answer. Our NATO allies are aware that the President is considering
a range of options based on a number of factors to include the
performance of the ANSF during this fighting season. At the NATO
Defense Ministers meeting in June, allies and partners endorsed a
concept of operations for the new mission for Afghanistan after 2014.
This will guide NATO's operational planning over the coming months. A
decision on our force commitment will be necessary soon in order for
NATO members to source the plan in sufficient time to enable the
deployment of forces.
peace negotiations with the taliban
Question. In your view, what ``redlines'' should the United States
and Afghanistan establish for any outcome from peace negotiations with
the Taliban?
Answer. Historically, insurgencies end with some form of a
political settlement. We continue to support an Afghan-led
reconciliation effort with the goal of a negotiated a political
settlement that also protects U.S. security interests. This will likely
require elements of the Taliban that wish to reconcile to: (1) lay down
their weapons and stop violence; (2) denounce al Qaeda; and (3) accept
the Afghan constitution including the rights afforded women and
children.
Question. How effective has the current program for reintegrating
insurgent fighters been in removing fighters from the battlefield? What
additional steps, if any, should be taken to improve the reintegration
program?
Answer. The program has had some success in weakening the
insurgency in some areas. Fighters that are not ideologically committed
to the Taliban can sometime be persuaded to reintegrate. The program,
however, is only successful if there is credible and effective
governance. Any program can be improved, and this is no exception. We
need to maintain oversight of the process of delivering projects and
utilizing the allocated funds.
enduring strategic partnership with afghanistan
Question. Do you support maintaining an enduring strategic
partnership between the United States and Afghanistan beyond 2014?
Answer. Yes. I remain committed to a long-term strategic
partnership with Afghanistan. An enduring strategic partnership is
needed to sustain Afghan forces and to counter transnational terrorist
threats.
Question. How would you describe the main U.S. strategic interests
regarding an enduring relationship with Afghanistan and in that region?
Answer. We remain committed to a long-term strategic partnership
with the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. We have a strategic
interest in making sure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe
haven for al Qaeda and its affiliates that pose a threat to the
homeland. An enduring partnership with a stable Afghanistan also
promotes regional stability.
Question. Do you support the conclusion of the Bilateral Security
Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan?
Answer. I support the conclusion of the Bilateral Security
Agreement. We are currently negotiating an agreement that will provide
the basis for a continued American military presence post 2014. Such an
agreement is necessary for us to maintain a mutually beneficial
partnership.
Question. In your view, what redlines, if any, must the United
States establish for the negotiation and conclusion of the Bilateral
Security Agreement?
Answer. In my judgment, the United States must have Exclusive
Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction over our personnel stationed in
Afghanistan. This is fundamental protection we provide our
servicemembers overseas. We must also ensure that we have necessary
operational authorities to accomplish our mission.
special operations in afghanistan
Question. Special Operations Forces depend on general purpose
forces for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical
evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations
Command, has said ``I have no doubt that special operations will be the
last to leave Afghanistan'' and has predicted that the requirement for
Special Operations Forces may increase as general purpose forces
continue to be drawn down.
If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities
for Special Operations Forces as general purpose forces continue to
draw down in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure adequate enabling capabilities
needed to support the SOF mission set by working collaboratively with
ISAF, CENTCOM, and the NATO Special Operations Command-Afghanistan to
determine requirements. These enabling capabilities would be tailored
to support our post-2014 mission based on force levels that have yet to
be decided.
Question. In April 2012, the United States and Afghanistan signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on the ``Afghanization'' of direct action
counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan--reflecting the shared
intention of having Afghan security forces in the lead in the conduct
of such operations with U.S. forces in a support role.
What is the status of efforts to put Afghan Special Operations
Forces in the lead for such operations and why do you believe such a
transition is important?
Answer. We continue to see ANSF SOF make significant progress in
operational effectiveness, and their independence, capacity, and
competence continues to grow. One hundred percent of ANA Special
Operation Forces missions are Afghan led, and approximately 60 percent
of Provincial Response Company police missions are Afghan led. This
transition is important to demonstrate that GIRoA is capable of leading
security operations needed to further the growth in governance and
Development.
Question. The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local
Police (ALP) programs--both U.S. Special Operations missions--have been
consistently praised by U.S. military leaders as critical elements of
the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
What are your views on the value of these programs and do you
believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan
(i.e. post-2014)?
Answer. VSO and ALP represent a very visible expression of local
security to many Afghans, particularly those in remote and isolated
communities. GIRoA has identified VSO/ALP as a necessary pillar of
their own long-term strategy. In November 2012, the MOI proposed that
the ALP be designated a component of the Afghan Uniformed Police. Then
in March 2013, the ALP was included in the MOI 10-Year Vision for the
Afghan National Police.
u.s. strategic relationship with pakistan
Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
with regard to Pakistan?
Answer. Our strategic interests and national security goals remain
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent the return of
safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This would not be possible
without Pakistani support. We also have an interest in a stable
Pakistan and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.
On the security front, we have a more limited relationship than in the
past, but I believe it is a pragmatic and constructive approach.
Question. Does the United States have a strategic interest in
enhancing military-to-military relations with Pakistan? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes. Military-to-military ties with Pakistan are an
important aspect of the broader bilateral relationship. Our
engagements, and especially our security assistance programs, are
essential for effective military cooperation between our two countries.
I have engaged productively with General Kayani many times in the past,
and the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan plays an
important role in building and sustaining military-military ties at
lower levels. These relationships allow us to engage Pakistan in
clearly defined areas of shared concern such as maintaining regional
stability, curbing violent extremism, and countering the threat of
improvised explosive devices.
Question. If so, what steps would you recommend, if confirmed, for
enhancing the military-to-military relationship between the United
States and Pakistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue my close engagement with the
Pakistan Military. As Pakistan democratic consolidation progresses, we
must ensure that we maintain our military-to-military ties. I will
continue a frank and respectful dialogue about our shared interests in
countering extremist and promoting regional stability. Security
cooperation cannot succeed without the buy-in of Pakistani leadership
and continued support of the U.S. Congress.
Question. For several years, the United States has provided
significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with
military support and operations by Pakistan in connection with
Operation Enduring Freedom.
What is your assessment of Pakistan's cooperation with the United
States in counterterrorism operations against militant extremist groups
located in Pakistan?
Answer. Pakistan's cooperation on counterterrorism has not always
met our expectations. Since 2009, Pakistan has undertaken
counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations in the
northwest, including Swat, North and South Waziristan, Mohmand, and
Bajaur with mixed results. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund
reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan
forces have helped enable these operations. It is in our interest that
Pakistan continues this campaign as effectively and comprehensively as
possible.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to maintain
transit and provide security along the ground lines of communication
(GLOCs) through Pakistan?
Answer. The key route to sustain forces has been movement via
sealift to Pakistan and then ground movement through Pakistan to
Afghanistan. This is the cheapest, fastest, most direct surface route.
Since the reopening, the Government of Pakistan has provided security
to U.S. and NATO cargo shipments through the PAK GLOC. Pakistan is
maintaining security along the GLOCs through Pakistan to Afghanistan
for the trans-shipment of equipment and supplies in support of U.S.
military operations in Afghanistan and the retrograde of U.S. equipment
out of Afghanistan.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to counter
the threat improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack
the network, go after known precursors and explosive materials?
Answer. Pakistan recognizes the IED problem is a shared problem.
They also suffer significant casualties within Pakistan as a result of
extremist attacks using IEDs. We are making progress in the area of C-
IED cooperation. Pakistan is taking demonstrable steps to disrupt the
IEDs, to include placing new restrictions on the distribution of
precursor materials and hosting regional discussions to discuss the IED
problem with international partners, including Afghanistan.
iran
Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has
failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current
and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed
by Iran?
Answer. Iran poses a significant threat to the United States, our
allies and partners, and our regional and global interests. Countering
Iran's destabilizing and malign behavior requires a comprehensive
approach. Iran is actively investing in the development of a range of
conventional capabilities, including air, missile, and naval assets.
Iran continues to publicly threaten to use its naval and missile forces
to close the Strait of Hormuz or target U.S. interests and regional
partners. Iran is also one of the main state-sponsors of terrorism,
proxy and surrogate groups. Iran continues to provide arms, funding,
and paramilitary training to extremist groups. On the nuclear front,
Iran continues to pursue an illicit nuclear program that threatens to
provoke a regional arms race and undermine the global non-proliferation
regime. Iran also continues to develop ballistic missiles that could be
adapted to deliver nuclear weapons. Iran will seek to use its threat
capabilities to enable greater influence in the region and threaten our
allies.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to
Iran?
Answer. I support the U.S. policy of preventing Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. To this end, we are prepared with military options to
include associated costs and risks. Moreover, we are pursuing a
comprehensive strategy to confront Iran's malign behavior that includes
diplomatic isolation, economic pressure through sanctions, diplomatic
engagement through the P5+1, and military pressure through contingency
preparations and exercises. In addition, we are reassuring our partners
in the region by deepening our security commitments and building their
capabilities.
Question. What more do you believe the United States and the
international community can and should do to dissuade Iran from
pursuing nuclear weapons?
Answer. This policy question is best answered by the State
Department. That said, it is clear that continued international unity
on sanctions is crucial to bringing Iran to the negotiating table with
a serious proposal. Further, we need to sustain a comprehensive
strategy that includes diplomatic pressure through UN Security Council
Resolutions, economic pressure through sanctions, diplomatic engagement
through the P5+1, and military pressure through contingency
preparations and exercises.
Question. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing
U.S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by
Iran?
Answer. The reduction of U.S. force presence in the Middle East--
due to withdrawal from Iraq (and Afghanistan), rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific, and in part from fiscal constraints--could impact our ability
to deter aggression and assure our allies. That said, we retain a
significant and ready presence in the region with high-end capabilities
that should serve to mitigate against such concerns. Furthermore, our
global reach and strike capabilities contribute to our ability to deter
and assure.
Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions
against Iran--how effective have they been and should additional
unilateral or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?
Answer. The United States has put in place against Iran tough,
smart, and crippling sanctions. As a result of these sanctions, Iran's
financial, trade, and economic outlook has deteriorated significantly.
International financial institutions estimate that Iran's economy
contracted in 2012 for the first time in more than 2 decades.
International sanctions have hindered Iran's weapons procurement
efforts and driven up the costs of obtaining necessary components for
its military. Sanctions also appear to have slowed Iran's progress on
its nuclear program, making it increasingly difficult for Iran to
import needed materials or skills. The question of additional sanctions
is best answered by the State Department.
Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering
Iran's support of international terrorism?
Answer. Iranian support for proxy groups and terrorist activities
constitutes a serious threat to our partners and allies as well as U.S.
interests. In short, Iran's activities are malevolent and intentionally
destabilizing. DOD continues to help counter Iranian malign activities
in at least three ways. First, we support diplomatic and intelligence
efforts to inhibit the activities of Iranian proxy and terrorist
groups. Second, we leverage our military presence in the region to
deter and, when directed by the President, disrupt Iranian malign
activities. Third, we leverage our extensive security cooperation
relationships with countries in the Middle East and around the world to
build partner capacity and trust to counter Iranian destabilizing
activities.
Question. Do you agree with President Obama that all options,
including military options, should remain on the table with respect to
Iran?
Answer. I do agree that all options must be kept on the table in
order to achieve our policy objectives toward Iran. It is our
responsibility to conduct prudent planning for all contingencies, and
we will ensure that military plans are kept up-to-date. This
preparedness will have the effect of reinforcing our overall policy.
Question. Do you assess that sanctions will prevent or dissuade
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons?
Answer. Continued international unity on sanctions is crucial to
bringing Iran to the negotiating table with a serious proposal.
Departments of State and Treasury have put in place the strongest and
most comprehensive international sanctions in history, and we believe
the sanctions are having a dramatic effect on the Iranian economy. I
support continuing sanctions pressure on Iran; however, it is not yet
clear if sanctions will ultimately prevent or dissuade Iran.
syria
Question. What is your assessment of the situation in Syria and its
impact on the region?
Answer. The crisis in Syria continues to be tragic, dynamic, and
complex. The conflict reflects a sectarian fault line that extends
across and is destabilizing the region. We are planning and engaging
with Syria's neighbors--Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq--to
contain the spillover effects that would render our allies and partners
less secure. The competition among states with regional interests
continues to fuel the violence with negative implications for deepening
Sunni-Shia tensions within Syria and beyond.
Question. In your view, what is the most appropriate role for the
United States in assisting regional friends and allies respond to the
situation in Syria?
Answer. The United States provides leadership and support to the
surrounding countries through multilateral planning efforts and
humanitarian assistance. We are continuously engaged with key regional
partners such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq to provide
assistance, technical knowledge and military contingency planning.
Question. In your view, what--if any--role should the U.S. military
play with respect to the situation in Syria?
Answer. We should and are pursuing a regional strategy along four
lines of effort. First, we are working with our partners in the region.
Second, we are supporting the moderate opposition. We are currently
providing non-lethal assistance to increase the capability of the
opposition. Third, we are providing humanitarian assistance to help
with a massive refugee problem. Fourth, we are planning and posturing
our forces for a wide range of military options.
Question. In your view, what role--if any--are Iran, Russia, and
Hezbollah playing in the current conflict in Syria?
Answer. Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah continue to support the Assad
regime. Russia continues to supply arms, and Hezbollah supports the
regime operationally with personnel and weapons--as does Iran. Their
continued support of the Assad regime has led to recent regime momentum
and gains on the ground.
Question. In your view, what are the prospects of a negotiated
solution in Syria?
Answer. A negotiated settlement is a preferred path to achieving
our policy objectives. However, its prospects are diminished by the
sectarian character of the conflict. Assad is further emboldened by
Russia's continued support. The reality of disparate opposition groups,
many at odds with U.S. values, also make it difficult to achieve a
negotiated settlement.
Question. In your view, is the momentum currently on the side of
the Assad regime or the forces fighting to overthrow Syria?
Answer. Momentum shifts are characteristic of this form of
protracted conflict. The fragmentation of the opposition undermines
their momentum. The Assad regime is supported by Hezbollah, Iran, and
Russia, which has helped the regime regain some areas that they once
ceded.
Question. Are there asymmetric options that bypass Syria's
integrated air defense system rather than kinetically neutralize it,
such as standoff weapons and/or stealth, and what is your assessment of
those options from a military perspective?
Answer. We have a wide range of options. These details of these
options are better discussed in a classified setting.
Question. What are the risks associated with doing nothing to alter
the balance of military power in Syria between Assad and the armed
opposition?
Answer. We have learned from the past 10 years that it's not enough
to simply alter the balance of military power without careful
consideration of what's necessary in order to preserve a functioning
state. That said, we are taking actions to support the moderate
opposition so that they can alter the balance of military power. If we
were to end all our support to our allies and to the opposition, we
might expect the suffering to worsen and the region to further
destabilize.
the 2001 authorization for use of military force
Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)?
Answer. The United States is in an armed conflict against al Qaeda
and its associated forces. An associated force is defined as a group
that: (1) is an organized, armed group that has entered the fight
alongside al Qaeda; and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. These
are the same terrorist threats that perpetrated the horrendous acts on
U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, and the AUMF still serves as the legal
basis under U.S. domestic law to employ military force against these
threats.
Question. What factors govern DOD determinations as to where the
use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant to the AUMF?
Answer. In May 2013, the President promulgated Presidential Policy
Guidance (PPG) governing direct action against terrorist targets
located outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. This
document codifies and harmonizes the procedures necessary for DOD to
conduct these types of military operations. The PPG and its derivative
operational plans clarify, formalize and strengthen the standards,
policies, and determinations of DOD concerning where, how, and against
whom military force may be utilized outside the United States and areas
of active hostilities. DOD meticulously follows the formalized
procedures of the PPG to ensure we make well-informed decisions based
on the most up-to-date intelligence and the expertise of our national
security professionals. Senior commanders and their legal advisors
carefully review all operations for compliance with U.S. and
international law before a decision is rendered by the Secretary of
Defense or the President.
Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
including the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism
operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary
and appropriate?
Answer. The AUMF in its current form provides the necessary and
sufficient authorities to counter al Qaeda and its associated forces.
If a terrorist threat emerges that does not fit within the AUMF, DOD
would consult with Congress and facets of the executive branch on the
question of authorities.
al qaeda
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western
interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
Answer. Years of sustained counterterrorism (CT) pressure have
degraded the ability of al Qaeda's Pakistan-based leadership to operate
freely. Our efforts have made it difficult for al Qaeda to replenish
its senior ranks with the type of experienced leaders, trainers, and
attack planners it promoted in previous years. We have also limited the
group's ability to mount sophisticated, complex attacks in the West.
Despite these setbacks, al Qaeda retains its intent, though not the
robust capability, to plan and conduct terrorist attacks against the
West. Al Qaeda core continues to inspire and guide its regional nodes,
allies, and like-minded extremists to engage in terrorism. Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula remains committed to attacking our interests in
the region and is the most likely group to attempt an attack in the
United States in the near-term.
yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in
Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that
strategy?
Answer. Our overall engagement strategy with Yemen combines
diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives to improve stability and
security. DOD fills a critical role in this strategy primarily by
supporting the development of the Yemeni armed forces. We are fostering
a strong partnership with the Yemeni military to better address
critical security threats, including the campaign against al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The security situation in Yemen remains
fragile and we must continue our partnership in the fight against AQAP.
Question. Given the continuing political instability and slow
progress of reforms to the military in Yemen, what are your views on
the United States continuing to provide security assistance--most
significantly DOD section 1206 funding--to Yemeni counterterrorism
forces?
Answer. A stable, unified, and economically viable Yemen, free of
violent extremists, remains in our best interest. We have just passed
the first anniversary of a 2-year plan to complete the government and
military transition from the Saleh regime to a new representative
system. While progress has been slow, President Hadi and the military
are taking steps to reform and restructure the military as part of the
overall political transition process. President Hadi and senior Yemeni
military figures actively engage the United States for support and
advice on the military reorganization process. The 1206 funds are, and
will remain, critical to building the capacity of the Yemeni counter
terrorism forces to disrupt and degrade the AQAP operational space,
securing their boarders, and disrupting maritime and land smuggling
routes.
somalia and al shabaab
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al
Shabaab?
Answer. Al Shabaab remains on the defensive. The coalition among
Somali Government, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and
Ethiopian National Defense Forces maintain pressure on the group.
Despite its loss of territory in 2012, al Shabaab has demonstrated a
continued ability to conduct complex attacks against Western interests
and Somali Government targets in Mogadishu. The group also conducted
small and medium scale attacks in Kenya. This trend will likely
continue throughout the rest of 2013, despite increasingly public
disputes amongst al Shabaab senior officials.
Question. In your view, does al Shabaab pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area?
Answer. Al Shabaab does not pose a direct threat to the Homeland or
Europe at present. Nevertheless, the group poses an ongoing threat to
U.S., Western, and other allied interests in East Africa. In February
2012, al Shabaab and al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri announced al
Shabaab's merger with al Qaeda. Although the group is aligned with al
Qaeda's global jihadist objectives, al Shabaab focuses on defending
territory in Somalia against the coalition of Somali Government, the
AMISOM, and Ethiopian military forces--as well as conducting attacks in
East Africa.
Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy
in Somalia and the role of DOD in that strategy?
Answer. The current U.S. strategy in Somalia consists of three
elements: (1) supporting the AMISOM to combat al Shabaab, increase
stability and promote the institutional building of the Somali Federal
Government; (2) strengthening the new Somali Federal Government with
stabilization and economic recovery assistance in parallel with
humanitarian assistance; and (3) building a durable and responsive
central Somali Government while engaging with other Somali regional
actors such as Somaliland and Puntland (the ``dual track policy''). The
DOD role in support of the State Department is to increase AMISOM
capacity to combat al-Shabaab, engage with the new Somali National
Army, and develop ways to increase security. These efforts enable
Somali Government institutions and organizations to mature.
Question. Should the United States establish military-to-military
relations and consider providing assistance to the Somali national
military forces?
Answer. We are prepared to establish military-to-military relations
with the new Somali National Army. This supports the State Department
in recognizing and strengthening the Somalia Federal Government. We
plan to continue assistance to our partner nations in the AMISOM while
exploring ways to assist the Somali National Army. Short-term Somali
stability depends on AMISOM, and long-term security requires a
professional and accountable Somali National Army based on the rule of
law.
al qaeda in the islamic maghreb
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?
Answer. AQIM and its allies have proven resilient despite the
French-led military intervention in Mali. Although these groups no
longer control key strategic towns, they retain the capability to
launch sporadic attacks within Mali and neighboring countries, expand
their safe haven, and attract recruits in pursuit of a hard-line
Islamic state based on al Qaeda ideology. Further, AQIM will likely
continue to bolster its ties to al Qaeda-associated terrorist groups
throughout the region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, to influence and
support attack planning. AQIM will continue to pose a local and
regional threat into 2014, as North African Governments struggle to
disrupt AQIM movement across expansive, porous borders.
Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions
threatening U.S. interests?
Answer. AQIM does not presently pose a significant threat to the
U.S. Homeland. We see no indications the group views conducting attacks
outside North Africa and the Sahel as a priority in the near term.
However, the group remains a credible threat to U.S. and western
interests within North and West Africa, where it has conducted or
attempted attacks in several countries (i.e. Mali, Niger, Algeria,
Mauritania). AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al Qaeda-
associated terrorist groups throughout the region, such as Boko Haram
in Nigeria, to influence and support attack planning.
Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent
expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's
capacities and aims?
Answer. The expansion of AQIM in Mali between early 2012 and
January 2013 increased the group's capacity as it collaborated with
splinter groups al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad in West Africa, al-Mulathamun
battalion, and Tuareg rebel group Ansar al-Din (AAD). This expansion
reflects an increase in the group's membership. This growth has not
changed the group's regionally-focused aim of establishing shari'a
throughout North Africa. We continue to work with allies and partners
to provide a more permanent security solution to AQIM expansion into
the Sahel by supporting several regional efforts, including: The French
Operation Serval; the Economic Community of West African States
African-led Intervention Force in Mali; and the Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
Question. What is your assessment of the importance of security
assistance to address the growing AQIM presence in southern Libya?
Answer. North African countries struggle to cooperate and
coordinate CT operations, creating exploitable security seams across
expansive, porous borders. Preserving security assistance is critical
to enabling Libya to build the internal capacity to address these
challenges. Security assistance is just one piece of a larger effort
that includes law enforcement, justice system reform, and border
control. However, our ability to provide assistance will require
patience. Tripoli currently lacks the institutions to integrate
security assistance or the mechanisms to allocate aid. Tripoli
primarily relies on armed militias for security, many operating outside
of central government control and some which are complicit in AQIM-
linked activities including weapons smuggling.
Question. What authorities will most quickly help address the
threat in southern Libya?
Answer. For counterterrorism and border security efforts we are
using 1206 and 1208 authorities, along with the Global Security
Contingency Fund. No further authorities are needed at this time in
order to address the situation in southern Libya.
Question. Does DOD require any new authorities for this situation?
Answer. No, our 1206, 1207, and 1208 authorities give us the
appropriate means to provide targeted security assistance to address
emerging threats. However, these authorities have not functioned as
efficiently as they should. They have been constrained by the
bureaucratic sluggishness that has often limited U.S. responsiveness to
our partners, and has on occasion prevented us from taking full
advantage of opportunities for stronger partnerships against common
threats in North Africa and throughout the Middle East since the ``Arab
Spring'' began. For example, the equipment from a 2009 1206 case for
Tunisia was just delivered this past spring--though 1206 cases are
meant to address near-term CT threats. Most of these delays are caused
by the bureaucratic inefficiencies between DOD and the Department of
State (DOS). We continue to pursue changes that will lead to greater
responsiveness and bolster our efforts in Libya, and the region in
general.
nato
Question. At the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012, President Obama
called the Alliance the ``bedrock of our common security'' for over 65
years. At the same time, concerns have been raised about the decline in
defense spending by a number of NATO member countries, resulting in the
United States accounting for approximately 75 percent of defense
spending among NATO member countries.
In your view, how important is the NATO alliance to U.S. national
security interests?
Answer. The NATO alliance is of critical importance to the national
security interests of the United States. The combined military
capabilities of the 28 NATO members are second to none. NATO and its
allies possess the capability to deploy and sustain highly trained,
interoperable forces that are able to conduct full spectrum military
operations anywhere in the world.
Question. In your view, what impact have national defense budget
cuts had on the capabilities of the NATO alliance, and what do you
believe needs to be done to address any capability shortfalls?
Answer. Cuts our allies are making to their defense budgets are
reducing the alliance's ability to confront security challenges and
placing at risk NATO's ability to sustain concurrent operations. NATO
has mitigated this underinvestment by a heavy and growing reliance on
U.S. capabilities, but this trend poses risks to the future strength of
the alliance. Our allies need to focus their resources on alliance
required capabilities. As their economies improve, they need to
increase their defense spending.
Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that
you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next
5 years?
Answer. The greatest opportunity for NATO to meet its strategic
objectives over the next 5 years is to maintain the unprecedented level
of readiness and interoperability achieved over the last 10 years of
combat operations in Afghanistan. The Alliance is working to attain
that goal through expanded education and training, increased number of
exercises, and better use of technology. The greatest challenge of
course lies within the ability of the 28 nations to provide the funding
and resources required to implement those initiatives and to continue
to develop the capabilities needed to meet future challenges.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. Yes. NATO's Strategic Concept states NATO's commitment to
the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear
weapons. However, it also made clear that as long as there are nuclear
weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. NATO's 2012
Deterrence and Defence Posture Review confirmed that nuclear weapons
are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and
defense alongside conventional and missile defense forces. The review
showed that the Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the
criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture.
Question. What strategy, if any, do you feel should be used to
address declining defense budgets, as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP), in Europe?
Answer. The longstanding and agreed NATO guideline for each ally is
to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. This provides a basis for
comparing defense spending, but what really matters is how each nation
allocates its defense resources. It is important to assess whether
alliance members are procuring the appropriate quantity and quality of
capabilities to meet identified NATO requirements. During this period
of fiscal constraint, allies need to rigorously prioritize their
defense investment with a focus on Alliance capability requirements.
When economies improve, they should increase their investment.
u.s. force posture in europe
Question. DOD continues to review its force posture in Europe to
determine what additional consolidations and reductions are necessary
and consistent with U.S. strategic interests.
How would you define the U.S. strategic interests in the European
area of responsibility (AOR)?
Answer. NATO will remain our Nation's preeminent multilateral
alliance and continue to drive our defense relations with Europe.
Through the new Strategic Concept, we defined a clear role for NATO in
the years ahead, including space and cyberspace security, Ballistic
Missile Defense, counter-trafficking and nonproliferation.
Question. Do you believe that additional consolidation and
reductions of U.S. forces in Europe can be achieved consistent with
U.S. strategic interests in that AOR?
Answer. I fully support the U.S. Army Europe plans to reduce its
footprint from 16 garrisons to 7 garrisons by 2017. Regarding any
additional reductions, we must ensure that our posture adapts to
changes in the international security environment. Currently, there are
several studies reviewing U.S. posture in Europe to include an internal
DOD European Infrastructure Consolidation study and a congressionally-
directed independent assessment of the overseas basing presence (NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2012, section 347).
u.s. force posture in the asia-pacific region
Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense
Guidance.
Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date?
Answer. Yes. Despite the impact of sequestration, we continue to
make progress on our key priorities in the Asia-Pacific. We are
modernizing and strengthening our alliances and partnerships through
multi-lateral and bilateral exercises while enhancing our engagement
with region-wide institutions. We are enhancing our presence in the
region by maintaining a defense posture that is more geographically
distributed, politically sustainable, and operationally resilient. We
are strengthening our military capabilities by sustaining investments
critical to our ability to project power in support of security
commitments.
Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the
Asia-Pacific region over the next couple of years and what specific
capabilities or enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities?
Answer. Our security priorities are those inherent in the
rebalance: modernizing and strengthening our alliances, enhancing our
presence, and pushing more quality forward in terms of capabilities.
These efforts will enable us to shape partnerships and deter and
respond as necessary to the threats in the region. We will continue to
deter North Korea's continued provocative behavior. We will leverage
our presence to mitigate tensions and encourage responsible behavior in
the land and maritime territorial disputes such as exist in the East
and South China Seas. We will need to deter disruptive activities in
space and cyber space that have and will continue to become more
sophisticated and damaging. Our forward presence and engagements are
our overarching ways to address these challenges. Our people are our
most valuable asset for building relationships. Special Operations
Forces, cyber, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are
key capabilities I see for the near future.
Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated
with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to
the Pacific?
Answer. To this point, budget reductions have not threatened our
ability to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. However, full sequestration
may limit or delay the strategic alignment of our engagement and
capabilities. Some key relationships may take longer to develop due to
constraints on education and exercises. At the same time, fiscal
realities afford an opportunity to ensure we are putting the right
resources in the right places, at the right times. We will continue our
steady, thoughtful, and measured rebalance to the region.
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic consequences,
including impact on relationships with partners and allies, if
sequestration results in a ``rebalance'', that is, a net reduction in
military assets in the U.S. PACOM AOR?
Answer. Rebalance is intended as a net increase in military
capability to the Asia-Pacific region. That said, the essence of
rebalance is about more than hardware. It is about more engagement and
attention. With the looming impact of sequestration on readiness and
engagement, our ability to expand military to military partnerships and
build partner capacity will be reduced, limiting our ability to develop
and expand the scope and quality of critical relationships.
security situation on the korean peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
on the Korean peninsula and of the threat posed to the United States
and its allies by the current state of North Korea's ballistic missile
and nuclear weapons capabilities?
Answer. The security situation on the Peninsula is stable at the
moment. However, I am concerned that we are in a period of prolonged
provocation. North Korea military activity is at seasonal normal
levels. North Korea has toned down rhetoric since the height of
tensions in April of this year and appears to be engaged in diplomatic
overtures, perhaps to win concessions. I remain concerned with North
Korea's development of ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and
bellicose rhetoric threatening to use these weapons; however, we do not
have any indications of imminent use of ballistic missile or nuclear
capabilities at this time.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?
Answer. Currently, DOD is taking the appropriate steps to prevent
proliferation. We support interagency efforts to prevent North Korea
proliferation through WMD nonproliferation regimes including the
Australia Group (CW/BW), Missile Technology Control Regime, Hague Code
of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Nuclear
Suppliers Group. These regimes use customs and law enforcement
practices such as export control lists to interrupt proliferation of
WMD materials to Syria, Iran, and others from North Korea.
Additionally, DOD supports interagency counter-proliferation efforts
through involvement with the Proliferation Security Initiative and
geographic combatant commander support for potential interdictions. I
remain open to additional options for improving our contribution to
countering proliferation.
Question. Are you satisfied that the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)
combined counter-provocation plan, which was finalized a couple of
months ago, strikes the right balance between enabling the South
Koreans to respond to and defend against a provocation from North Korea
while ensuring that the United States is involved in any decisions that
might widen the military action to include U.S. forces?
Answer. Yes. The plan allows for the sovereign right of self-
defense by the Republic of Korea in a timely and proportional manner
without undue escalation and without violating the terms of the
Armistice Agreement. Should the circumstances require or justify
additional response, a bilateral U.S.-ROK consultative mechanism is in
place to reach a suitable decision together. However, the situation on
the Peninsula is always rife for miscalculation on all sides. U.S.
deterrent forces, and the close relationship USFK enjoys with the ROK
Government, are our strongest mitigation against escalation.
Question. What is your view regarding the timing of transfer of
wartime operational control from the United States to the ROK,
currently scheduled for December 2015, and do you support the transfer
as scheduled?
Answer. I support the transfer as scheduled. From a military
perspective, the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control
is appropriate. The conditions for the transfer are based on meeting
capability-based milestones, including acquisition of weapon systems,
command and control systems, ISR platforms, appropriate and adequate
supply of munitions, along with the right certification process to
validate the readiness for the transfer. The ROK military is a very
capable force, but it has had some setbacks in funding to achieve these
milestones. General Thurman and his team at U.S. Forces-Korea are
working hard with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet the
certification and capability requirements.
china
Question. In the past several months, the United States and China
have had several high level engagements, including President Obama's
meetings with President Xi last month and your visit to China in April.
In view of these engagements, what is your assessment of the
current state of the U.S.-China military relationship and your views
regarding China's interest in and commitment to improving military
relations with the United States?
Answer. Healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-
military relations are in both nations' interest and are an essential
part of the overall relationship. There are recent examples where we
have improved practical cooperation, such as counter-piracy,
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and military medicine
exchanges. However, a deeper U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue
is needed to address many of the sources of insecurity and potential
competition that may arise as our two forces come into closer and more
frequent contact.
Question. How has China's aggressive assertion of territorial and
maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea and East China
Sea, effected security and stability in the region?
Answer. The United States has a national interest in the
maintenance of peace, stability, respect for international law, freedom
of navigation, and unimpeded lawful commerce. While the United States
does not take sides in any territorial disputes, any such disputes must
be resolved without coercion or the use of force. We strongly support
dispute resolution on the basis of existing international mechanisms
and in accordance with established international norms and
institutions. At the same time, beginning serious negotiation on a Code
of Conduct for interaction in disputed maritime territories will
significantly reduce tension and potential for conflict across the
region. We have made it clear to China that we have commitments to
allies and partners and will continue our engagement while maintaining
our posture across the Asia Pacific.
Question. If reconfirmed, what will be your priorities vis-a-vis
China?
Answer. Positive and constructive engagement with China is a key
part of our strategy in the Asia Pacific. In support of this, my
priorities include a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous
military-to-military relationship. I will also work towards a model of
relations where communications are not cut off when difficulties arise,
which is precisely the time that communication and dialogue are the
most important. Finally, we need increased cooperation, channels of
communication, and interactions between the two militaries to improve
our partnership and reduce the risk of miscalculation, miscommunication
or accidents. I will give particular emphasis to improving the quality
of our strategic dialogue and supporting the establishment of norms for
behaviors in cyberspace.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
Question. Despite the ongoing drawdown in Afghanistan, demand for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of every
kind remains very high due to the enhanced situational awareness and
targeting capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of the
geographic combatant commands still have validated ISR requirements
that are not being met.
What is your assessment of the Department's current disposition of
ISR assets across the various combatant commands?
Answer. I think we have maximized and optimized our ISR capability.
We remain focused on our #1 priority, supporting the warfighters in
Afghanistan. At the same time, we are supporting the rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region while provided necessary capabilities to counter
emerging extremist threats in AFRICOM's AOR. Prioritization is key to
providing flexible and responsive forces.
Question. As our forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, will
existing ISR assets be re-postured to support combatant command needs
in other regions, or will the ISR capacity be reduced?
Answer. In short, both. The fiscal year 2015 Global Force
Management Allocation Plan is the first in which we begin to
``reposture'' ISR forces. Full Motion Video, Signals Intelligence, and
Imagery Intelligence, among others, are valuable in any AOR. But many
of the assets are very niche, and it will be difficult to translate
their applicability in Afghanistan to other parts of the world.
Budgetary pressures further constrain meeting combatant command
requirements. Because of this, our total ISR force, quantitatively,
will be diminished in fiscal year 2015 and beyond. But the technologies
developed and lessons learned in Afghanistan will build a decidedly
more capable, if smaller, global ISR force.
Question. Most of the highest-value ISR assets acquired after
September 11 are aircraft that were not designed to be survivable in
high-threat air defense environments, although in some cases unmanned
aerial vehicles were designed to be deployed in large numbers in the
expectation of substantial combat attrition.
Do you believe that the Department needs a major shift towards ISR
platforms that are survivable in high-threat situations, or merely an
augmentation of the capabilities we now have, with the assumption that
air superiority can be gained rapidly enough to operate today's assets
effectively?
Answer. The ISR assets we have in the Joint Force today are ready
to perform missions across a range of warfighting scenarios. As we move
toward the Joint Force of 2020, we will increasingly need ISR platforms
that are survivable and can counter sophisticated adversaries defenses.
special operations forces
Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in
our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support
their operations.
Do you believe that QDR directed growth in the size of SOF should
be retained despite current budgetary pressures?
Answer. Growth in Special Operations Forces capability has been
necessary to meet the demands of the global conflicts in which we have
been engaged over the past decade. We will judiciously balance the need
for further growth in SOF with our need to address other capability
demands in light of increased budgetary pressures. As a consequence, I
do not expect additional, significant growth beyond what has already
been programmed.
Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
extremist organizations, including those related to information and
military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
changes to U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) title 10 missions
to make them better reflect the activities Special Operations Forces
are carrying out around the world.
What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
divested by SOCOM, and why?
Answer. At this time, I do not advocate for significant changes to
SOCOM's title 10 missions. I use a range of processes--such as the
Unified Command Plan, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan--to review the mission sets and
responsibilities assigned to SOCOM on a continuing basis. Additionally,
the language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., includes ``such other
activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of
Defense,'' which provides the President and the Secretary of Defense
the flexibility needed to meet rapidly changing circumstances.
Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
them?
Answer. Pending a review of strategic planning documents, I do not
advocate for SOCOM to assume any additional missions at this time.
Special Operations Forces already provide a broad but uniquely
specialized range of support to Joint Force Commanders. They are
trained to conduct operations including counterterrorism,
unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign
internal defense, and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, in areas under enemy control or in politically sensitive
environments. In such environments, SOF provides unique and essential
capabilities, and we will continue to leverage lessons learned in our
Decade of War studies to enhance SOF and General Purpose Force
integration.
Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as
unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much
emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?
Answer. In addition to developing specific Joint Doctrine on
Unconventional Warfare, I have placed considerable emphasis on many
aspects of foreign internal defense in my Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations. I appreciate the significant legislative support for the
many security force assistance and training and equipping missions that
SOF undertakes. One area that may require enhanced legislative
authorities is for greater opportunities to leverage non-SOF units to
undertake partner capacity building tasks.
special operations authorities
Question. Reportedly, the Commander of SOCOM has sought more
control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations
Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense recently modified policy
guidance for the combatant commands that gave SOCOM, for the first
time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance
to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic combatant
commanders and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. It has been
reported that the Commander of SOCOM is also seeking new authorities
that would allow him to more rapidly move Special Operations Forces
between geographic combatant commands.
Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are
appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control
of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic
combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.
Answer. Special Operations Forces do not undertake operations
without the approval of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the
geographic combatant commanders, and the Chiefs of Mission. The
proposed changes enhance the ability of our global Special Operations
Forces to network with our U.S. interagency counterparts as well as our
foreign allies and partners. I fully support a more efficient and
effective ability of our Special Operations Forces to more dynamically
respond to global demands in the future.
combating terrorism
Question. The administration recently released its National
Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to
maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of
partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the
need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats
``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South
Asia.''
How do you view the DOD's role under the new National Strategy for
Counterterrorism?
Answer. The United States pursues a comprehensive approach to
counter terrorist networks that threaten our Nation. The military is
one element of this effort. DOD works closely with interagency
stakeholders and key partners and allies to combat those threats beyond
South Asia in support of the strategy. Training, advising, and
assisting partnered forces allows us to leverage our unique Defense
capabilities outside of the Afghanistan theater of operations. The
Department implements rigorous guidelines, standards and accountability
for lethal action against terrorist networks who threaten our Nation.
Question. What is your understanding of the impact of the
Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on DOD's role within
the U.S. Government's counterterrorism strategy?
Answer. The recently signed Presidential Policy Guidance on
Counterterrorism is a codification of policies and procedures that have
been applied for some time. The guidance clarifies, formalizes, and
strengthens the standards and processes we use. Military capabilities
are one part of our comprehensive counterterrorism effort. We will
continue to enable our allies to develop the capability to counter
terrorists within their borders. When necessary and after a robust and
accountable review process, we can take direct action against those
specific terrorist networks that threaten U.S. persons. Our current
authorities are sufficient to defend the Nation against existing
terrorist threats. The Department implements a rigorous, transparent
and accountable review process. We will scrupulously adhere to the rule
of law and the highest ethical standards in implementing the strategy
and guidance.
Question. Will DOD see its role increase or decrease?
Answer. The best way to defeat terrorism is with a comprehensive
approach. DOD will continue to play a significant role in
counterterrorism. The presidential policy framework codifies rigorous
guidelines, oversight and accountability for targeted, lethal action
against specific terrorist networks that threaten our Nation. The
military also conducts a range of activities to build partner capacity
and support other government agency efforts.
Question. If the role increases, what, if any, are the commensurate
increases in capabilities or capacities that are required?
Answer. DOD will continue to develop new capabilities,
technologies, and tactics as well as streamlined processes and
procedures to ensure we stay ahead of our enemies as they also adapt.
Joint Force 2020 must include and integrate innovative capabilities
such as cyber, Special Operations Forces and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.
Question. Will DOD require any new authorities?
Answer. I believe that existing authorities are adequate. Should a
new group threaten the United States, we can respond as necessary under
U.S. domestic and international law. I have not encountered a situation
during my tenure as Chairman in which we did not have the necessary and
sufficient authorities. If confirmed and this occurred during my
tenure, I would consult within the executive and with Congress to
determine whether additional authorities or tools have become necessary
or appropriate.
Question. Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its
efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and
agencies?
Answer. Improving interagency coordination was a key finding in our
Decade of War study. The Joint Staff regularly and actively
participates in both the National Security Staff's Counterterrorism
Security Group and the President's Counterterrorism Board of Directors.
Our combatant commands support our efforts and work closely with U.S.
Embassies, interagency partners, and local actors. Institutionally, the
Department is deliberately and carefully integrating lessons learned in
our doctrine, training, planning and operations. We seek to support
similar efforts where and when they exist in other organizations.
Question. What do you view as the role of DOD in countering al
Qaeda and affiliated groups in cyberspace?
Answer. Defense of cyberspace requires a public-private effort to
provide the best protection possible for our Nation. We are making
significant progress. Cyber is an essential capability for Joint Force
2020. DOD works with interagency and commercial partners in order to
counter threats from non-state actors in cyberspace and other domains.
We will continue to employ a robust defensive posture on our military
networks. In the event of a cyber attack, DOD has processes in place to
identify it with interagency partners, defend against the attack, and
share information with industry to mitigate effects.
international peacekeeping contributions
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, then U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to
consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff
officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more
women I should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers
in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. In Afghanistan, our military commitment is shifting from
combat operations to maintaining a long-term relationship with the
people of Afghanistan in concert with our NATO allies. This mission
shift allows us to consider other opportunities for U.S. forces and
personnel to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world
on a very selective basis and under the right conditions. Our
experience shows that even a small number of U.S. personnel can play an
out-sized role in improving the effectiveness of U.N. operations.
Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to
requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the
United Nations?
Answer. We have been responsive to requests from the U.N. for
personnel support. This year, for the first time in nearly 2 decades, a
U.S. general officer is helping to lead peacekeepers in a U.N. field
mission. By all accounts, this officer has done a terrific job in
Liberia. He is even supervising members of the Chinese People's
Liberation Army. Additionally, when the U.N. requested U.S. officers
for the new mission in South Sudan, U.S. Africa Command provided three
of its own staff officers to deploy immediately until the Services
could provide long-term fills. We are currently working with Africa
Command on a similar solution for the mission in Mali. As I told
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon during his visit this spring, we look
forward to exploring even more opportunities to offer our leaders in
support of the U.N. and other multilateral institutions.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. Among other lessons, it seems clear to me that we have
learned that countering insurgent and terrorist threats demands the
integration of all instruments of national power toward a common
purpose. Over the past decade, our interagency coordination has been
occasionally uneven due to policy gaps, inconsistent resources, and
differences in organizational culture. While we struggled early on to
harness the full extent of our whole-of-government effort, over time,
our military and civilian organizations have learned to better leverage
each other's strengths. If confirmed, I am committed to
institutionalizing these lessons learned even as we reset and prepare
for the future.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. It begins with leadership. We've learned that we need to
stress the value of interagency coordination at all levels. For DOD,
this means exposing our military personnel to a range of interagency
organizations to facilitate understanding of different agency cultures,
equities, capabilities, and limitations. We also incorporate
interagency partners into our training and education programs, building
the kinds of relationships that increase our overall effectiveness.
More can be done, and if confirmed, I will work with this Congress to
enhance these programs.
Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
contingency operations?
Answer. As Chairman, I led a ``Decade of War'' effort to examine
this question and to ensure that we do not lose the lessons of 10 years
of war. Codifying our work is key. Critical doctrinal publications such
as Joint Pub 3-08, ``Inter-organizational Coordination during Joint
Operations,'' capture the best practices of our recent experience. The
current version was published in June 2011, and importantly, our
interagency partners contributed to writing it. If confirmed, I plan to
begin a formal update of this publication in the coming year.
Question. Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical
level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than
on a regional basis (e.g. international terrorists departing Mali for
safe havens in Libya).
How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in
individual countries can best be coordinated in the interagency arena?
Answer. Our performance in crisis situations rests on how well we
collaborate on a routine basis. Therefore, I support a whole-of-
government planning, operations and resourcing framework to ensure our
country plans are mutually-reinforcing. The military develops Theater
Campaign Plans and Functional Campaign Plans that address regional and
trans-regional issues. We seek input from interagency partners in the
development of these plans to de-conflict, if not complement efforts.
State is beginning to develop Joint Regional Strategies to address
regional foreign policy priorities and drive country strategies. This
new regional perspective will improve our ability to coordinate DOD
plans with State plans.
responsibility to protect
Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the ``responsibility
to protect'' (R2P)--that is, the responsibility of the international
community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by
encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states
build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national
authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 QDR, DOD names
``preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities'' as one of a long
list of potential contingencies that DOD might be called on to address.
DOD has begun to explore some of the implications of R2P, by
considering ``mass atrocity prevention and response operations''.
In your view, how high a priority should the ``responsibility to
protect'' be for the U.S. Government as a whole?
Answer. Preserving the capacity of the United States and its
partners to prevent human suffering is a means of promoting our values
and strengthening our influence around the world. Although neither the
United States nor any other country recognizes the ``responsibility to
protect'' as a legal basis for the use of military force, the U.S.
Armed Forces can carry out these types of missions if called upon to do
so. Prioritization is not a decision for the military to make.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in
fulfilling the responsibility to protect?
Answer. The role of DOD will be to support our government's policy
decision. The whole-of-government approach should involve an
appropriate mix of diplomatic, economic, and/or military measures. The
role of DOD will be to provide options and assess the risk associated
with those options. We will also make a recommendation on the strategy
for any specific situation to include those involving atrocities.
Question. In your view, what is the proper application of R2P
doctrine with respect to the situation in Syria?
Answer. The conflict in Syria is as complex as any I have seen. We
have an obligation to think through the efficacy and consequences of
any direct U.S. military action in Syria, especially if it could create
conditions that would cause more civilian casualties, unleash chemical
weapons, or bring the United States into a broader regional conflict.
Even as we consider the use of force, we must continue to work with our
allies and partners in the region to prevent their destabilization,
provide humanitarian aid, and support the Syrian opposition. The United
States is providing nearly $815 million in aid to help the victims of
this conflict, including emergency medical care and supplies, food, and
shelter.
operation observant compass & the lord's resistance army
Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces
(UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support
them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)--including Joseph
Kony--continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian
populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational
concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are
trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of
California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical
support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and
intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations
continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations
personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations,
thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.
In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?
Answer. The strategy is comprised of four elements: (1) protect
civilians; (2) promote DD/RRR (disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration, repatriation, and resettlement); (3) increase
humanitarian access/support; and (4) remove Joseph Kony and senior LRA
leaders from the region. DOD plays a role in all four pillars but is
the primary agent for implementing the fourth element.
Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD's current level of
support to this mission?
Answer. In the near-term, the current level of military support is
appropriate. DOD is currently weighing options to determine the future
level of support. DOD must prioritize limited resources among numerous
competing priorities, requirements and risks to other missions. Cost is
another factor being considered given the current budget constraints.
human terrain in conflict
Question. In 2009, then-Secretary Gates helped launch the Minerva
Initiative and the Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling Program to
develop deeper social, cultural, and behavioral expertise for policy,
strategy and operational purposes in the Middle East and Far East.
How have these programs contributed to our understanding the
complex human terrain of these parts of the world?
Answer. Yes. The Minerva Initiative examines the social and
political dynamics of present and future conflict. Research conducted
under its auspices validated the COMISAF policy of ``courageous
restraint'' (e.g. exercise patience before using force); enriched our
understanding of the radicalization processes, and produced a method
for empirically characterizing tribal cohesiveness, a predictor of the
susceptibility to al Qaeda influence. The Human Social Culture Behavior
Modeling (HSCB) Program, which forecasts instability globally, has been
fielded at PACOM, SOUTHCOM, STRATCOM, and SOCOM.
Question. Are we adequately resourcing these programs and how can
we improve our capabilities to understand the perceptions, attitudes,
ethnic identities, religious beliefs and predispositions of the
audiences we seek to reach and interact with in these regions?
Answer. Although the HSCB Modeling program concludes its 4 year
program in fiscal year 2013, we continue to fund many other social
science research efforts. As we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan,
cultural and regional skills are key to succeeding in Irregular
Warfare. Accordingly, I have mandated that they be covered in at all
levels of Joint Professional Military Education curricula and in Joint
Doctrine publications on Stability Operations, Counterinsurgency
Operations, and Special Operations.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National
Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ``an
abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,'' and
stated that ``rising drug violence and corruption are undermining
stability and the rule of law in some countries'' in the Western
Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to
National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the
strategy is ``enhancing DOD support to U.S. law enforcement.''
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime integrates all elements of national power to combat transnational
organized crime and related threats to national security. Ultimately,
the strategy seeks to reduce transnational organized crime to a
manageable public safety concern.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role
within the President's strategy?
Answer. DOD is not the lead agency responsible for combatting
transnational organized crime. DOD instead plays an appropriate and
critically important role supporting law enforcement to counter threats
to national security.
Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support
to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters
related to transnational organized crime?
Answer. DOD provides unique supporting capabilities to address the
full range of transnational criminal threats, including military
intelligence support to law enforcement, military-to-military
capability development, and military operational activities against
threats to the U.S. DOD supports U.S. law enforcement and the
Intelligence Community as part of a whole-of-government approach,
consistent with current authorities.
mass atrocities prevention
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10.
Among interagency partners, what is DOD's role in addressing
atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have for preventing or
responding to atrocities?
Answer. DOD has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting Mass
Atrocity Response Operations. Based on this doctrine, atrocity
prevention and response is now incorporated into DOD plans and planning
guidance. In addition, DOD has conducted a comprehensive review of
training in this area and is working to strengthen the capacity of UN
peacekeeping operations to respond to atrocity events.
Question. Has DOD developed planning processes toward this effort
so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations?
Answer. Yes, DOD has developed planning processes toward this
effort. All DOD components have been directed to integrate atrocity
prevention and response into their policies and plans. Specific plans
are further developed and implemented at the geographic combatant
command level, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff.
Question. In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity?
Answer. In my view, the situation in Syria is tragic and an
atrocity. By some estimates as many as 100,000 combatant and non-
combatants have been killed, with over 5 million displaced.
counter threat finance
Question. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and
facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism,
production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other
significant national security threats could have an outsized impact on
confronting these threats. In August 2010, the Department issued a
Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy Directive which recognized the CTF
discipline as an essential tool in combating criminal networks and
terrorist organizations and called for the integration of CTF
capabilities into future force planning and the continued support to
interagency partners conducting CTF operations.
What is your assessment of the Department's efforts to date to
institutionalize and support these capabilities?
Answer. Upsetting the financial supply lines of our adversaries is
a proven way to disrupt threats to U.S. national security. DOD Threat
Finance Cells already have a track record of success in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We need this capability in the Department. DOD Directive
5205.14 (CTF), updated in November 2012, institutionalizes counter
threat finance within DOD. Ultimately, our success in counter threat
finance will depend on our ability to integrate efforts with other U.S.
Government agencies, multinational organizations, and host nations.
Question. What is your assessment of the current ability of the
Department to provide support to other U.S. Government departments and
agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?
Answer. DOD currently supports the efforts of other government
agencies with its unique capabilities, including long-term planning,
network analysis, intelligence analysis and tools, and the integration
of intelligence into operations. The result is a well-coordinated,
capable, and robust counter threat finance posture. If confirmed, I
will continue to remain fully engaged in the interagency process to
counter threat finance activities.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's
current counter threat finance efforts?
Answer. The Department is examining its current counter threat
finance efforts. We are focused on incorporating lessons learned from
Iraq and Afghanistan and further strengthening and institutionalizing
our counter threat finance capability. We may recommend additional
training and education for the force.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including
training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces,
and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S.
Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your current assessment of this authority?
Answer. Combatant commanders continue to view section 1208 as a key
tool in the ongoing fight against terrorism. The ability for Special
Operations Forces to leverage willing partners who possess access to
areas, people, and information denied to our forces is critical to
tactical and strategic success. This authority has allowed us to
respond quickly to global challenges while maintaining appropriate
civilian oversight, including Secretary of Defense approval and
congressional notification. The Department is appreciative of Congress'
continued support for this authority. If confirmed, I will continue to
keep you informed through our annual report and briefings.
active-duty and reserve component end strength
Question. Last year, DOD announced its 5-year plan to reduce
Active-Duty end strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by 2017, and
the Reserve components by another 21,000 over the same period. These
cuts do not include any additional personnel reductions that could
result from sequestration or any agreement to avoid sequestration.
What is your view of the role of the Reserve components as the
Active components draw down?
Answer. Twelve years of combat operations has transformed our
Reserve component from a strategic reserve to a full-spectrum force
critical to our overall military readiness. Recent combat deployments,
as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and homeland defense
missions, have resulted in our Reserve component being far more
operationally capable and experienced than before. We have yet to
determine the final steady-state balance between the Active and Reserve
component, in part because of continuing budget uncertainty. But going
forward, the Reserve component will be an essential part of the total
force.
Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you
envision if the sequester continues into 2014 and beyond?
Answer. Because military personnel cannot be reduced quickly, a
continuation of sequester funding levels would require DOD to take
disproportionate cuts from the modernization and readiness portions of
the fiscal year 2014 budget. To ensure these accounts do not bear an
excessive portion of budget reductions, DOD would seek to significantly
draw down the size of the military after fiscal year 2014.
Question. In your view, what tools do DOD and the Services need to
get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these
require congressional authorization?
Answer. In my view, DOD's existing force management tools provide
the necessary flexibility to enable the Services to get down to
authorized end strength. At this time, the Services are not requesting
additional force management tools.
religious guidelines
Question. In your view, do policies concerning religious
accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual
expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different
beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes. Our official policy states, ``DOD places a high value
on the rights of members of the Military Services to observe the tenets
of their respective religions or to observe no religion at all.'' (DODI
1300.17, ``Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military
Services''). By both policy and practice, commanders are committed to
ensuring members of the Joint Force of deep religious faith, as well as
those of no religious faith, can serve in a climate of mutual respect
and trust.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and
good order and discipline?
Answer. Yes. Commanders consider requests for accommodation of
individual expressions of belief, to include apparel, grooming and
worship practices. Requests are given equal consideration as long as
they do not negatively impact mission accomplishment, military
readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline, or any other military
requirement.
prevention of and response to sexual assaults
Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more
than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including
2558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports
(restricted, meaning that, in accordance with the victim's request,
they were handled in a confidential manner and not investigated).
Moreover, a recent survey conducted by DOD indicates that the actual
number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent
of active duty women and 1.2 percent of active duty men surveyed
reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in
the previous 12 months.
What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. We have taken swift, deliberate action to change a military
culture that had become too complacent of discrimination, harassment,
and assault. The Secretary and I, along with the Joint Chiefs, remain
personally committed to eradicating sexual assault within our ranks and
to improving processes and programs as part of our comprehensive
approach. The Services have achieved significant progress in many
areas. They have added specialized training for investigation and
litigation, provided broader access to victim's advocates and Special
Victim's Counsel, and hired Highly Qualified Experts to evaluate our
progress. We are focused on taking care of victims, preventing the
conditions that make assault possible, and enforcing respectful unit
environments.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. Our primary concern remains the safety and well-being of
the victim. We are taking swift and deliberate action to reinforce a
professional work environment, prevent and respond to predatory and
precursor behaviors, and better protect victims. Should a sexual
assault occur, we prefer the victim come forward with an unrestricted
report, to allow for thorough investigation and litigation. However,
confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, allows a victim to
access services to meet their personal needs without the additional
anxiety of a criminal investigation. Moving initial disposition
authority to O-6 commanders or higher has increased unrestricted
reporting, and access to Special Victim's Counsel has increased
victims' willingness to change a restricted report to an unrestricted
report. However, both restricted and unrestricted reporting options
remain essential to our response to sexual assault.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD
oversight of military service implementation of DOD and Service
policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assaults?
Answer. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO)
oversees the Department's sexual assault policy and works with the
Services' offices to execute the Services' sexual assault prevention
and response plans. SAPRO also works with the civilian community to
develop and implement innovative prevention and response approaches to
the programs. They continue to lead on this issue by informing and
advising commanders at all levels. Despite their best efforts, we have
not yet turned the tide on this crime in our ranks. Therefore, I will
continue to support initiatives for strengthening oversight and
accountability.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. The commander is central to our ability to effect
institutional change. We must hold commanders accountable at every
level for reinforcing the highest standards of respect and trust that
all of our men and women in uniform--and the American people--deserve.
The sexual assault crisis in the military is a result, in large part,
of a climate that had become too complacent. We have already refined
our assessments of command climate by updating the surveys that
specifically enable servicemembers to evaluate their commanders on unit
climate and sexual assault response. Additionally, we have moved
initial disposition authority for incidents of sexual assault to the O-
6 commanders or higher. We will not let up in our efforts to drive the
crime of sexual violence from our ranks.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. The commander's role in the military justice process is
longstanding and essential to the effectiveness of our Joint Force. Our
commanders are responsible for the efficiency of their units first, but
more broadly, it is in their hands that the defense of the Nation
rests. Because of the tremendous responsibility placed in commanders,
they must also have broad authority to enforce discipline and execute
their duties. This is a foundational element of the military justice
system. The central imperative in commanders' responsibility to
accomplish their assigned missions, in peacetime and in war, is the
good order and discipline of the men and women they lead. Commanders
regularly consult with their judge advocates, including when deciding
whether to prosecute alleged offenses. Removing commanders from the
military justice process in this way would send the message that there
is a lack of faith in the officer corps and that commanders cannot be
trusted to mete out discipline. Such a message would surely undermine
good order and discipline. Absolving commanders of their role in the
military justice system would potentially undermine the military's
ability to adequately address this issue. Commanders must be held
accountable for maintaining a climate that does not tolerate sexual
assault. Responsibility and accountability go hand-in-hand: in order to
hold commanders accountable for the good order and discipline of their
units, they must hold that responsibility and be empowered by the
system. Disempowering commanders will not help the military tackle this
problem.
Question. Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
requires the convening authority to take action on the sentence issued
by a court-martial and authorizes a convening authority, in his sole
discretion, to take action of the findings of a court-martial,
including setting aside a finding of guilty or changing a finding of
guilty to a finding of guilty of a lessor included offense.
What is your view about the authority of a convening authority to
set aside or modify findings of guilt and authority to reduce a
sentence imposed by court-martial?
Answer. Article 60 of the UCMJ currently grants broad authority and
discretion to convening authorities to dismiss findings of guilt after
trial. That authority, which dates back well over 200 years, was
necessary when the military justice system lacked many of the
procedural safeguards inherent in the system today. In the past, the
military justice system lacked attorneys serving as trial and defense
counsel, independent trial judges, and an appellate process. Article 60
was necessary so that commanders, with the advice of their staff judge
advocates, could ensure the proceedings, and in particular the
findings, were fair and just. Many changes to the military justice
system, which began with the Military Justice Improvement Act of 1968,
now provide the necessary due process and safeguards. Licensed military
attorneys now serve as prosecutors and defense counsel, independent
military judges preside over courts-martial, and convicted
servicemembers are entitled to a robust appellate process. Due to these
changes, there is little or no need for a convening authority to
dismiss the findings after a panel (jury) has found the accused guilty.
A convening authority should have the discretion, however, to dismiss
minor offenses under appropriate circumstances, such as to prevent an
accused from the burden of a felony conviction when found guilty of
minor misconduct but acquitted of major offenses. Examples of such
minor misconduct include underage drinking and brief absences without
leave, which on their own would not normally be adjudicated by courts-
marital. Rather, a convening authority should have the flexibility to
adjudicate such offenses in an alternate fashion. Convening authorities
should also retain the ability to modify sentences, which is an
essential component of our plea bargain process.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. The Department, in January, rescinded the policy
restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the
primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has
given the Military Services until January 1, 2016, to open all
positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to
policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that
must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense. The Services are working now to develop gender-
free physical and mental standards for all military occupations,
presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender,
to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.
If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these
standards?
Answer. Women continue to serve with distinction throughout the
Armed Forces, and the successful integration of women into currently
closed positions requires thoughtful planning and deliberate action as
we proceed. I am working with the Services to provide quarterly reports
to the Secretary of Defense on the progress of requirements review and
validation, the timeline for opening closed occupations, limiting
factors to executing implementation, positions being considered for an
exception to policy, and an assessment of newly integrated positions.
All our standards should be reviewed to make sure they are essential to
the occupation and task. Full implementation should occur by January 1,
2014. Ultimately, we're acting to strengthen the Joint Force.
Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and
will preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability?
Answer. The Service Chiefs and I identified guiding principles to
better align our policies with the experiences we have had over the
past decade of war. This means setting clear, essential, gender-neutral
standards of performance for all occupations based on what it actually
takes to do the job. With the Joint Chiefs, I am closely monitoring
each of the Services as they develop their implementation plans and
providing quarterly reports to the Secretary of Defense. Effective
planning and implementation requires that we appropriately integrate
women into the organizational culture of certain military occupations.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements?
Answer. Yes. Performance standards exist to ensure individuals can
accomplish the tasks required of the mission. Eligibility for training
and development should consist of qualitative and quantifiable
standards reflecting the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for
each occupation as required by Public Law 103-160, section 543 (1993).
Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that such decisions are made on this basis?
Answer. I will continue to work with the Joint Chiefs to ensure
changes are carefully reviewed and implemented so our service women are
set up for long-term success with viable career paths. This deliberate
process will anticipate second- and third-order effects while guarding
against unintended consequences. Our force deserves our full faith and
commitment that we get this right.
Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about
assigning women to what are currently male-only combat units.
To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the
implementation of this policy?
Answer. I think families recognize the bravery and sacrifice of
women in combat, especially over the past decade of war. The successful
integration of women into currently closed positions requires we be
thoughtful and deliberate in planning. One of my guiding principles is
to also ensure a sufficient cadre of midgrade and senior female
enlisted and officers are assigned to commands, to become established
members of the command and to act as mentors to younger women as they
integrate into the unit. These mentors will help establish a climate of
trust and support.
Question. If it is a problem, what steps would you take if
confirmed to address it?
Answer. I will continue to hold the Services accountable to open
all specialties, as the Secretary of Defense and I must personally
approve any request for exceptions to policy. If members of our
military can meet the qualifications for a job, then they should have
the right to serve, regardless of creed, color, gender or sexual
orientation.
rising costs of medical care
Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at
Maxwell Air Force Base that ``health care is eating the Department
alive.'' In recent years, the Department has attempted to address the
growth in overall health care costs by identifying efficiencies as well
as by proposing increased cost shares for military retirees.
What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if
any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of
military health care?
Answer. Quality health care is a critical component to having a fit
and ready force. We are examining fiscal year 2014 options to slow the
growth of health care costs while preserving the quality and enhancing
the range of health care services available to the Military Family.
Reform to control costs is essential to making healthcare more
sustainable. If confirmed, I will continue to assist the Secretary of
Defense in this comprehensive review of benefit payment structures,
organizational structure, systems, and policies to improve
affordability.
Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising
medical costs on future DOD plans?
Answer. Health care costs consume 10 percent of the department's
budget. In real terms, costs have tripled since 2001 and are forecasted
to nearly double again by 2030. Increasing health care costs will
inhibit future force readiness as competing requirements confront a
decreasing top line. Health care is key to retaining high quality
servicemembers and to keeping faith with our entire military family. I
will continue to work closely with DOD leadership and Congress to find
reasonable and responsible ways to slow this growth.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
Answer. Over the last several budget cycles, Congress has permitted
small, necessary increases in the TRICARE Prime enrollment fees. These
adjustments were an important step to managing costs, but they are not
enough to sustain the benefit in the long term. Given today's budget
environment, we must find a mutually acceptable compromise to reduce
health costs while still maintaining the quality of care our force and
our veterans deserve. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely
with the Secretary of Defense and this Congress to do so.
systems and support for wounded warriors
Question. Servicemembers who are or have been wounded and injured
in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service
for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation,
evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty
when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or
discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center
(WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the
needs of significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers.
Despite the enactment of legislation and continuing emphasis, many
challenges remain, including a growing population of servicemembers
awaiting disability evaluation.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD, the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Services to improve the
care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured
servicemembers and their families?
Answer. We have made substantial progress in medical care over the
last 12 years of war. From first responder care to joint battlefield
surgical care, from the Air Force's enroute care to advanced
rehabilitation provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs, the
medical advances we've made are, quite literally, lifesaving and world
changing. In other arenas, particularly those surrounding family and
transition, we have been slower to make progress. We are structured to
fight and win wars, but are not as well prepared to manage a large
population of transitioning servicemembers. We are making progress
within the boundaries of law, but I am committed to improving our
efforts and results.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based?
Answer. We can make further progress by leveraging the
collaboration on research and treatment between the private medical
research and healthcare sectors and our Centers of Excellence. These
partnerships have made significant strides in the care of our Wounded
Warriors and on the health of our Total Force. We have successfully
returned many of our Wounded Warriors to service. We have also
established robust, day-to-day collaboration with the Department of
Veterans Affairs. It is not uncommon for VA providers to speak directly
to battlefield providers, and such end-to-end feedback directly
benefits veterans' care. We also have uniformed servicemembers working
in VA facilities and VA benefits personnel working in our medical
facilities, to better serve the large population of servicemembers
transitioning to civilian life.
Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. Individual case management needs further improvement. This
involves a servicemember transitioning from the Active Force to DOD
retiree or eligible veteran status. The key components of this process
remain the implementation of a single electronic health record, which
follows the servicemember through transition, and a single tracking
tool for case management. Our ability to communicate across our
individual bureaucracies continues to be an area requiring our full
attention and effort.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. As the conflict in Afghanistan winds down, I recognize the
importance of preserving the knowledge, skills, and advances made in
caring for our wounded servicemembers over the past decade. Last month,
I asked the Defense Health Board to make a high priority the ability to
sustain current practices and continuing advancements in treatment and
rehabilitation for our seriously wounded servicemembers and their
families.
Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES).
The Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) was established to
integrate DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs disability systems to
improve and expedite processing of servicemembers through the
disability evaluation system.
What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
improve the DES?
Answer. In addition to the changes we have already made, Senator
Dole's and Secretary Shalala's commission recommended further statutory
changes to limit DOD to the ``ability'' business and of the VA to the
``disability'' business in keeping with each department's core
competencies. I support their commission's recommendations. Barring
legislative change to establish a single system, we have gone about as
far and as fast as we can with separate processes and systems.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
Answer. I will continue to do my very best to expedite transition
and disability processing within the bounds of law and my authorities.
I will advocate for governance process improvements and other system
upgrade to streamline and simplify the process.
suicide prevention and mental health resources
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the Committee.
In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in
shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their
families, including members of the Reserve components?
Answer. The Joint Chiefs have a shared responsibility to address
military suicides with the same devotion we have shown to protecting
the lives of our forces in combat. I am working closely with the
chiefs, our interagency partners, and the White House to increase our
understanding of the factors leading to suicide and how to best
leverage care networks to keep our servicemembers and veterans alive.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
home station?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to champion the fielding of
effective treatments for mental health issues, traumatic brain injury,
and combat stress. This includes the robust system of behavioral health
care resources that are already available in the Afghanistan Theater of
Operations. I will also continue my support of the Services to reduce
the stigma and remove barriers to seeking mental health services for
both servicemembers and their family members. This effort must include
steps to ensure subordinate commands praise help-seeking behavior and
promote reaching out by providing examples of servicemembers who have
benefitted from mental health assistance or counseling.
military quality of life
Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget
challenges.
If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military
quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of
intense downward pressure on budgets, and how do you envision working
with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and
Congress to achieve them?
Answer. The entire enterprise is under scrutiny, and we are seeking
a way to balance the needs of providing security to the Nation and
ensure the long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force. Part of our
evaluation has focused on providing a quality of life for
servicemembers and their families that fosters successful recruitment,
retention, and career progression. We are also looking to modernize and
achieve fiscal sustainability for the compensation and retirement
systems. The mental health of our servicemembers is also a priority. We
will work to ensure that the downward pressure of budgets does not
adversely impact this vital area. I have my Joint Staff positioned on
working groups, task forces and other venues to work together with the
Services and other concerned parties to ensure we keep faith with our
military family in these areas.
family readiness and support
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families?
Answer. According to recent Family Readiness surveys, military
families are most concerned about pay and benefits and retirement. DOD
is fully engaged through the Pay and Retirement Working Group, which
feeds recommendations to the Military Compensation and Retirement
Modernization Executive Committee to address these concerns. In my
judgment, families are also attuned to the need for our compensation
system to be sustainable.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness
needs are addressed and adequately resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Services as
they assess military family needs and program effectiveness.
Unsustainable costs and smaller budgets mean we must examine every
warrior and family support program to make sure we are getting the best
return on our investment. We must promote the most effective programs
across the force and carefully reduce duplicative efforts. This ongoing
effort includes current studies--via DODEA, DECA, and a number of
university partnerships--to identify best practices and evaluate the
value of existing programs. This effort also includes: the
restructuring of medical facilities [included in the fiscal year 2014
budget] to make them more efficient, without sacrificing quality or
continuity of care as well as fee adjustments that exempt disabled
retirees, survivors of servicemembers who died on active duty, and
their family members.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. As stated above, if confirmed I will continue to work with
the Services to meet the changing needs of our military families. Part
of this effort involves working with the White House and the Services
to support community-based partnerships to improve education,
employment, and wellness support for current and transitioning members.
The Services have also adjusted force size and rotation, redoubled
transition support, and invested in world-class health care for our
wounded. This includes the fielding of effective treatments for mental
health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress. It also
entails the push to reduce the stigma and remove barriers to seeking
mental health services for both servicemembers and their family
members.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. We have a duty to ensure every family has access to quality
resources, regardless of component or location. If confirmed, I will
continue to support the Services' effort to leverage public-private
partnerships within the communities. We will also continue to leverage
the State Joint Force Headquarters of the National Guard to help
members access child care, mental health services, employment
opportunities and many other services that bolster family readiness.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
enhance family support?
Answer. In my 2012 Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, I
identified ``Keeping Faith with our Military Family'' as one of my four
focus areas during my tenure as Chairman. Keeping faith with our
military family recognizes the military family's extraordinary
contributions, preserves trust, and supports them in the ways they need
most. If confirmed, I will continue this focus with the Services.
Today, we are actively involved in Family Support Working Groups,
Resource Management Decision Working Groups and other venues to ensure
program effectiveness, share best practices, and reduce duplication of
efforts. America's citizens have also stepped forward. From the local
to the national level, thousands of organizations, higher learning
institutions, and businesses have partnered to support our Military
Family.
operational energy budgeting
Question. Since Congress created the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs, much
progress has been made in a few short years in these programs.
In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department needs
to improve the incorporation of energy considerations into the
strategic planning and force development processes?
Answer. We have a comprehensive Department strategy which addresses
energy challenges and leverages opportunities for the current and
future force. For all new weapon systems, there is now an Energy Key
Performance Parameter that must be considered during the system
requirements process. Operationally, we are making strides to improve
electrical generation efficiency in Afghanistan through the use of
micro-grids, reducing the individual soldier battery requirements
through solar power technology, and testing advanced renewable energy
technologies in the battlefield environments. We have made much
progress and will continue to focus on incorporating energy
considerations in wargames and joint exercises in order to improve our
strategic planning and force development.
Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the
Department should increase funding for operational energy requirements,
energy efficiency, alternative energy, and renewable energy
opportunities?
Answer. Each Service has invested significant resources to address
operational energy requirements. My primary emphasis remains on
reducing operational energy dependence to provide increased operational
flexibility, combat effectiveness, force protection, and mobility
options for Joint Commanders. I am focused on fully understanding the
energy requirements of our Joint Force and will continue to support the
Service initiatives to reduce our energy demands across the force.
law of the sea convention
Question. You have previously expressed your support for U.S.
accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Do you still believe that the United States should join the Law of
the Sea Convention (LOSC), and, if so, why?
Answer. Yes, I testified in support of the United States becoming a
party to the LOSC before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May
2012. Being a party to LOSC enhances the United States' security
posture by reinforcing freedom of navigation and over flight rights
vital to ensuring our global force posture and demonstrating our
commitment to the rule of law. It strengthens our credibility and
brings the full force of our influence in challenging excessive
maritime claims.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. I continue to share the view that the way in which we treat
detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. forces
are treated should they be captured in future conflicts.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
army camouflage program
1. Senator Hagan. General Dempsey, I understand the Army has
conducted an extensive development program for the next-generation of
camouflage patterns for combat uniforms. I commend the Army for working
to ensure our warfighters have the best possible signature management
and concealment in their combat ensembles. My understanding is that a
decision has been made on the family of patterns that will be issued to
Army soldiers but that the announcement has been delayed.
As we remain deployed in Afghanistan, I am concerned that this
delay is preventing our soldiers from having the best camouflage
possible. I am further concerned as this delay is having a severe
impact on what is left of the industrial base in the United States that
manufactures the textiles and uniforms that support the armed services.
Orders for the current Army camouflage pattern have slowed
dramatically, as procurement officers have slowed purchasing so as to
not have inventory of a soon-to-be obsolete pattern. This is causing
layoffs and possible plant closings across the United States. What is
the status of the Army camouflage program and when do they plan on
making the announcement?
General Dempsey. Soldiers in Afghanistan are not at risk of harm
associated with the current camouflage pattern. Deployed forces are
provided the Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP)
uniform, with matching individual equipment. The OCP is the optimal
camouflage solution for that operating environment and has proven
effective in providing our soldiers with the necessary concealment
capability.
The Army is nearing completion for the scientifically-based
camouflage study, which constituted the most extensive uniform
camouflage study ever undertaken with extensive soldier involvement. No
final decision has been made regarding any camouflage pattern or the
Army's timeline for introducing a future pattern uniform.
We recognize and are sensitive to the issues facing industry while
this decision is pending. In anticipation of a potential pattern
change, the Army has taken fiscally prudent steps to avoid building
large inventories of uniforms and Organizational Clothing and
Individual Equipment in the current Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP)
that would otherwise be rendered obsolete and require disposal. The
Army's objective is to spend wisely, and thereby avoid having a large
stockpile of items in UCP that may not be used.

afghan women
2. Senator Hagan. General Dempsey, Afghan women have made
remarkable hard-fought strides since 2001. During my recent trip to
Afghanistan and through other discussions here in Washington, I
recently learned that we are beginning to terminate or descope many
programs that are intended to build Afghan society, specifically
programs involving women and domestic issues. The targets established
by the Afghan Government for female recruitment to the Afghan National
Security Force (ANSF) are 5,000 women in the Afghan National Police
(ANP) by the end of 2014 and 10 percent of the overall Afghan National
Army (ANA) force size. While cultural factors have made recruiting and
retaining Afghan female police officers and army personnel more
challenging, the effort to expand female participation in the ANSF is
under-resourced and under-prioritized. Recent hearings have identified
that there are numerous examples of descoping and cancellation of
programs to support, recruit, professionalize, and train women in the
ANSF.
Please provide your views on how best we can sustain and enhance
our earlier efforts to recruit, train, and mentor women into the ANSF
so that these hard-won gains will continue to benefit Afghanistan after
our drawdown.
General Dempsey. There is no simple solution to an issue directly
related to the cultural and social realities of Afghanistan. Current
measures to ensure the continued recruitment of women for all elements
of the ANSF must remain in place. Financial incentives and
international encouragement will be the primary tools to promote the
recruitment, support, and training of women in the ANSF. I see two
elements that must be addressed to maintain progress. The first is
maintaining the standards within the ANSF to ensure it remains a
positive and respected organization with critical roles for women in
the Army and Police. The second is sustainment and enhancement of ANSF
public messaging and efforts to recruit and train women. Eventually,
this could help to change the cultural acceptance of women serving in
these roles within Afghan society. In any case, our continued
involvement in the development of the ANSF is our best chance to
encourage positive change in this issue over time.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
sequestration and a hollow force
3. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your professional judgment,
are defense budget cuts currently hollowing out the readiness and
training of our Armed Forces?
General Dempsey. Prior to sequestration, the Joint Force faced the
simultaneous challenge of reconstituting the force and restoring its
ability to conduct the full spectrum of operations--much broader
operations than the limited mission conducted in Afghanistan. Now, with
sequestration, we are prioritizing the readiness of our deployed and
next to deploy forces at the expense of reconstituting the majority of
the nondeployed force. While this approach provides ready forces to
meet current and near-term force requirements, it comes at the expense
of modernization and future readiness. In broad terms, current defense
budget constraints are creating a gap between our strategy and the
means required to accomplish it. The cuts are deep. More challenging,
they are historically steep. We are in fact hollowing out the readiness
of the force.

4. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, has the President been made
aware of this assessment?
General Dempsey. Yes.

5. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, if sequestration continues into
2014, will the hollowing out of the armed forces accelerate?
General Dempsey. I am very concerned about the loss of readiness
across the Department. This challenge may not accelerate, but it is
sure to persist.
The fiscal year 2013 sequestration cuts were not strategy based or
strategy uniformed. The impact of sequestration and other budget
constraints are beginning to emerge in unit level readiness reports.
The longer-term effects caused by the cancellation of large force
exercises and deferred maintenance are difficult to measure at this
time but will certainly impose significant strain on long-term
institutional readiness. The continuation of sequestration into 2014
will compound these effects since readiness and modernization are
essentially the only levers available to achieve the magnitude of cuts
required by the sequestration mechanism. By definition, continuation of
sequestration will result in a less ready, less modern force. Due to
the reality that it takes longer to restore readiness than it does to
lose it, continued sequestration will pose institutional challenges far
beyond 2014.

6. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, do you currently have a plan to
reverse this deteriorating trend?
General Dempsey. One of the overarching priorities of the Strategic
Choices and Management Review (SCMR) was to look first at savings
gained from reducing overhead and structural costs (``tail'') in order
to minimize the impact on the capability and readiness of the force
(``tooth''). As stated by the Secretary, a top priority in future year
budget plans is to build a ready force. We have a responsibility to
defend the country, no matter the size of our budget. The Services and
defense agencies are now in the midst of determining the shape, size,
and readiness of a military operating with severely reduced long-term
funding.
A plan to ``reverse'' deterioration would depend on how long the
sequestration mechanism remains in effect, how small we make the force,
and how much savings we can harvest from institutional reform.

7. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what has the Secretary's
Strategic Choices review found with respect to risk for our military
under sequestration? In other words, under sequestration, what can't we
do that we must do?
General Dempsey. The SCMR showed that we will not be able to
implement immediate significant cuts strategically. If significant and
abrupt cuts are directed, we will risk fielding an unprepared force.
We are looking for ways to make these immediate cuts in the least
damaging way, but because up to half of the Department's budget is
placed off limits from savings--for example, we cannot generate quick
savings from cutting personnel and infrastructure--the only way to
implement an abrupt 10 percent reduction is to impose disproportionate
reductions in training, maintenance, and investment. Readiness, in some
cases, would continue to decline beyond current degraded levels. We
would also be forced to make disproportionately large cuts in funding
for modernization programs, eroding our technological superiority and
damaging our Better Buying Power initiatives.

8. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in addition to devastating
readiness, how will the sequester in fiscal year 2014 impact the
Department of Defense (DOD) plans in the Pacific? Army and Marine Corps
end strength? The Joint Strike Fighter? Shipbuilding? Missile Defense?
Military space programs?
General Dempsey. Over a longer term, sequester in fiscal year 2014
through fiscal year 2021 would seriously disrupt our forces and
programs, requiring that we substantially modify and scale back the new
defense strategy.
Continued sequestration would inevitably disrupt DOD's investment
programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter, Shipbuilding, Missile
Defense, and Military space programs. Under current mechanical rules
that govern the sequester process, every one of our more than 2,500
procurement programs, research projects, and military construction
projects would be indiscriminately reduced. Some military managers
would be forced to buy fewer weapons. Reductions in quantities will
likely cause unit costs of weapons to rise, which will in turn demand
further cuts in quantities.

9. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your advance policy question
response you said: ``The recent Strategic Choices and Management Review
affirmed the fundamental soundness of the [January 2012] Defense
Strategic Guidance,'' but you also said, ``The Department is still in
the process of determining what revisions might be necessary to align
ends, ways, and means given the additional $500 billion in cuts,'' and
`` . . . we are at risk of strategy insolvency if sequestration is
implemented as currently prescribed by law.'' You seem to be saying
simultaneously that in the context of sequestration, our current
strategic guidance works fine, is under revision, and doesn't work.
Will sequestration require a new defense strategy? Please answer yes or
no and explain why.
General Dempsey. Yes. Full sequestration will cause us to relook
the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) in terms of changing objectives
and timelines. The missions that the military is called to do were re-
affirmed in the SCMR. However, to complete these missions successfully,
with further reduced means resulting from sequestration, we will need
to rebalance our ends, ways, and means. For example, there may be
things that can no longer be done simultaneously due to readiness or
availability of units at a given time. If we fail to adjust the ends
and ways with the sequestration cuts that require $50 billion every
year, the resulting decrease in readiness and modernization could
render the existing strategy insolvent.

10. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your professional opinion,
should defense strategies continue to be adjusted to meet diminishing
budgets or should defense budgets be guided by a sound defense strategy
that meets our national security objectives?
General Dempsey. We need to have a budget informed strategy, not a
budget driven strategy. Our budget should be guided by an agreed upon
strategy that meets our national security objectives. Adjusting our
ends, ways, and means in order to maintain an acceptable balance is a
part of any strategy; however, the strategy should not be derived
solely from the budget.

11. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your view, do we have
adequate and ready forces today to be able to simultaneously carry out
operational plans for two major contingency operations? If not, how
does this impact your assessment to commit forces to a major regional
contingency?
General Dempsey. It would depend on which two major contingency
operations, and the nature, size, and scope of the simultaneity and
desired end states. We regularly conduct ``bundled'' plan assessments
to determine our ability to meet simultaneous requirements of specific
operational plans. In certain high priority, resource demanding and
high consequence scenarios, we are challenged to meet the demands of
our operational plans with adequate and ready forces. In these
instances, we review the mitigation options and residual risk resulting
from delayed timelines and modified objectives to assess the risk to
forces and successful plan execution.
My assessment on the feasibility of committing force to
contingencies is always informed by other global commitments and the
degree to which our most important national security interests are
effected.

defense strategy
12. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, you talk about strategy in
terms of balancing ends, ways, and means, and the need to balance
ambition and means. This sounds eerily similar to the rationalization
used by European nations to reduce defense spending to the extent that
defense spending at 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a
distant memory and we are looking at an average of our allies that will
approach 1 percent of GDP. Our defense strategy must address threats to
national security. Do you agree that sequestration will result in
unacceptable risk to the military's ability to address national
security threats creating a situation of strategic insolvency?
General Dempsey. Sequestration's mechanism and magnitude,
unmitigated, will increase risk to the military's responsibilities as
they are currently defined and create unacceptable risk to our national
security. My sense is that if sequestration continues the Nation will
have a military that is increasingly unready, steadily losing
technology overmatch to challengers and unable to maintain global
presence and posture. It is a military that will be viewed with
increasing concern by our longtime allies and with increasing
satisfaction by our potential adversaries. It is a military that will
offer our civilian leaders fewer options and higher opportunity costs
when they decide to employ military force. I will provide additional
specifics related to impacts of sequestration in my next classified
Chairman's Risk Assessment submitted with PB15.

13. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, if we continually rebalance
ends, ways, and means due to resource constraints, our military
strategy becomes resource-driven and not threat-driven, eventually
resulting in a strategy that only works at the level of unacceptable
risk. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is supposed to be threat
driven by design. Are you committed to a QDR that provides
recommendations that are not resource-constrained?
General Dempsey. I am committed to conducting the QDR in a manner
that focuses on the threats in our current and predicted environment
during the time horizon covered by the QDR.

14. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, how will you know when the
risk to our national interests assumed by a reduction in defense
budgets and a subsequent revised defense strategy becomes unacceptable?
General Dempsey. Risk to the strategy becomes unacceptable when we
no longer have trained and ready troops to respond to contingencies
that threaten our national security interests.

legacy
15. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your professional judgment,
at full sequestration will the elimination of brigades, ships, and
squadrons incur unacceptable risk to our national security by not
having enough forces to carry out even one major contingency operation
with enough reserves to deter a second adversary? For example, does a
potential looming crisis or conflict with Iran constrain your options
to take or propose other military actions due to resource limitations?
General Dempsey. I am concerned that full sequestration is
significantly impacting military readiness, increasing risks especially
in the event of multiple contingencies.

16. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, given the current path of the
readiness of the armed forces, in your professional judgment, when will
the Commander in Chief be at that point of making immoral decisions?
General Dempsey. Risk rises significantly when we no longer have
trained and ready troops to respond to contingencies that threaten our
national security interests. I am evaluating the impact of full
sequester on readiness and plan to provide my assessment to Congress
once complete.

17. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, while I understand that no
military leader wants to shy away from a battle, whether it be with an
adversary or otherwise, what would be your course of action if given an
order to deploy troops into harm's way that are of insufficient
numbers, degraded capability, or not ready?
General Dempsey. My military advice would depend on the nature of
the threat. But let me assure you that if the Nation is threatened, we
will deploy in its defense. That said, I am very concerned that we will
have fewer options, that our deterrent effect will be diminished, and
that military action will result in more casualties if we fail to
maintain our high state of readiness because of budget uncertainty.

18. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, how will you know when this
point has come?
General Dempsey. We are watching for several indicators. Sequester
increases unready forces, misaligned global posture, reduced security
cooperation, and decline of the All-Volunteer Force. I am especially
concerned about the All-Volunteer Force. Today we have the most
seasoned, professional military force in history. Budget reductions,
inflexibility, and uncertainty increasingly threaten training,
readiness, recruiting, and retention.

19. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, each American who is graced
with the privilege to serve and sacrifice for this great Nation at some
point becomes keenly aware of the history and legacy that they will
leave to those that follow. What do you hope will be your legacy as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and how do we avoid the legacy of
being in charge during the age of a hollow force?
General Dempsey. Every military leader--myself included--works
tirelessly to preserve the culture of service you describe in defense
of our Nation. During this period of historic transition, I want to set
the conditions for the force of tomorrow. The fiscal pressures we face
increasingly challenge our ability to field a future force that is
balanced and has sufficiently levels of readiness. To achieve this, we
need the certainty of an approved budget, the flexibility to make
tradeoffs, and time to absorb budget cuts. The responsibility for
tomorrow's force rests on the efforts of us all--those in uniform and
our elected officials.

readiness and flying hour cuts
20. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, due to a recently approved
reprogramming, the Air Force was able to move $208 million into flying
hour funds. Why couldn't DOD do this before April 9, 2013? Was it due
to a lack of flexibility in moving funds within the DOD budget?
General Dempsey. Yes, both the NDAA and fiscal year 2013 enacted
budgets were 3 and 6 months late respectively, which resulted in a 6
month Continuing Resolution that limited our flexibility (transfer
authority) to move money between major budget categories and into
flying hour funds. The Air Force's limited Operations and Maintenance
transfer authority of $15 million was insufficient to restore any
reasonable portion of the $591 million flying hour reduction resulting
from sequestration in fiscal year 2013. Consequently, the lack of
flexibility and reduction in Operations & Maintenance funds resulted in
the Air Force grounding some flying squadrons on April 9, 2013. The
reprogramming action completed in July gave the Air Force the authority
to shift $1.6 billion from other appropriations into critical
Operations & Maintenance funds to minimize the impact on readiness,
$208 million of which was applied towards the Air Force flying hour
program.

21. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, I believe DOD was short
approximately $11 billion in overseas contingency operations (OCO)
funding and has requested that $9.6 billion be reprogrammed from the
base budget. If DOD received full funding for overseas contingency
operations, what impact would that have had on DOD operations and
readiness as a whole, to include Air Force flying hours?
General Dempsey. The President's fiscal year 2013 OCO budget fully
funded wartime operations based on our best estimates 2 years ago.
However, during execution of the fiscal year 2013 budget in the spring
of 2013, the Department identified a shortfall of between $7-$10
billion, conservatively, in OCO funds due to a combination of
sequestration reductions against both the Base and OCO O&M budgets and
higher than forecasted wartime operating costs, including fuel,
retrograde transportation, etc.
To ensure we could properly conduct wartime operations and to help
minimize some of the devastating impacts to base budget readiness, the
Department requested $9.6 billion in reprogramming authority from
Congress. Because it was unclear how much of the reprogramming action
would be approved, the Services continued scrutinizing their budget
activities to find additional resources to address the funding
shortfall. Ultimately, Congress approved the majority of the requested
fiscal year 2013 reprogramming actions, allowing the Department to
appropriately fund wartime operations and mitigate a portion of the
impacts to readiness in the Air Force Flying Hour Program. Ultimately,
the curtailed readiness activities will have a cumulative effect in
fiscal year 2014, which will be amplified with further sequestration.

22. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, how many additional hours will
have to be dedicated to bring all these units and its aircrews back up
to mission-ready status?
General Dempsey. As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air
Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000
flying hours at a cost of $116 million above the PB14 request and 3-6
months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from
current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-
sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).
Prior to sequestration, a substantial number of Air Force squadrons
were already operating at lower than optimal goals due to previous
Budget Control Act (BCA) reductions and the effects of long-term high
operations tempo. On 9 April, a total of 31 squadrons were stood down,
including 13 combat-coded (fighter, bomber, and AWACS) units and 18
institutional units (Weapons School, Aggressors, Thunderbirds, etc.).
Through efficiencies and the $208 million from the DOD reprogramming
request, the Air Force was able to shift funds and increase the flying
rates of the 13 combat coded units back to Combat Mission Ready (CMR)
rates for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. It will take 3-6 months at
this CMR rate before these squadrons return to pre-sequestration
mission ready rates. The efficiencies and reprogramming also allowed
the remaining 18 institutional units to resume flying, albeit lower
than Basic Mission Capable (BMC) rates.
The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the
BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring
all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals
needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take
approximately 2 years, an additional $3.2 billion per year in fiscal
year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment
tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

23. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, how much will that cost?
General Dempsey. As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air
Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000
flying hours at a cost of $116 million above the PB14 request and 3-6
months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from
current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-
sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).
Prior to sequestration, a substantial number of Air Force squadrons
were already operating at lower than optimal goals due to previous BCA
reductions and the effects of long-term high operations tempo. On 9
April, a total of 31 squadrons were stood down, including 13 combat-
coded (fighter, bomber, and AWACS) units and 18 institutional units
(Weapons School, Aggressors, Thunderbirds, etc.). Through efficiencies
and the $208 million from the DOD reprogramming request, the Air Force
was able to shift funds and increase the flying rates of the 13 combat
coded units back to CMR rates for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. It
will take 3-6 months at this CMR rate before these squadrons return to
pre-sequestration mission ready rates. The efficiencies and
reprogramming also allowed the remaining 18 institutional units to
resume flying, albeit lower than Basic Mission Capable (BMC) rates.
The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the
BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring
all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals
needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take
approximately 2 years, an additional $3.2 billion per year in fiscal
year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment
tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

24. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what happens to these units on
October 1, 2013, when sequestration hits again?
General Dempsey. Given the nature of the cuts in fiscal year 2013,
we had no flexibility in managing squadron readiness. If sequester hits
in fiscal year 2014, we will be able to rotationally stand-down units,
or fly them at reduced rates, similar to actions we took in fiscal year
2013. The net effect of cuts spread over the full fiscal year versus
just 7 months will lead to readiness levels slightly higher than under
sequester in fiscal year 2013, but still well below pre-sequester--and
already sub-optimal--readiness levels. This will significantly erode
our training and force development efforts, and increase risk in our
ability to fill OPLAN and the Secretary of Defense ordered missions.

iran nuclear weapons
25. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your professional military
opinion, do you think sanctions will prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons capability?
General Dempsey. The United States and its allies have put in place
against Iran tough, smart, and crippling sanctions. However, sanctions
alone were not designed to, nor will they, prevent Iran from obtaining
a nuclear capability. The purpose of these sanctions is to bring Iran
back to the negotiating table with the P5+1.

26. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what timeline do you think
Israel is on for taking kinetic action after Prime Minister Netanyahu's
remarks this weekend?
General Dempsey. We do not think Israel has made a decision to
strike Iran. We fully support Israel's right to self-defense.

27. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, does a potential looming
crisis or conflict with Iran constrain your options to take military
action in other parts of the world due to resource limitations?
Specifically, are you concerned that taking action in Syria, combined
with readiness and resource impacts due to budget cuts and
sequestration, invites too much strategic risk if friction with Iran
results in a conflict in the Gulf as well?
General Dempsey. The Department maintains a robust military
presence in the region to deter or counter destabilizing activities,
reassure allies and partners, and safeguard the region's vital links to
the international community. We are currently postured to respond to
contingencies in the Gulf and are watching Syria very closely. Military
involvement in Syria may impact contingency plans for Iran. The impacts
depend on the level of military intervention. A small-scale
intervention along the lines of training and equipping an opposition
force would likely have little effect on our readiness vis-a-vis Iran.
However, a larger scale intervention that entails implementing a no fly
zone, suppressing enemy air defenses, and/or executing punitive strikes
against regime forces will likely draw from resources that could be
used in an Iran contingency. So, depending on the nature of the Iranian
contingency, heavy involvement in Syria could strain our ability to
sustain our forces simultaneously in the Gulf. Moreover, the risk could
increase when readiness and resource constraints from the budget cuts
are entered into the equation.
In terms of sequestration, a reduction of U.S. force presence in
the Middle East (due to sequestration) will degrade military options to
respond to contingencies, place U.S. interests, citizens, and military
forces at higher risk, and strain relationships with regional partners.
This in turn, will reinforce Iranian beliefs that U.S. threats of
military action lack credibility and may strengthen Iranian resolve in
P5+1 negotiations and embolden Iran to increase activities that
destabilize the region. These effects go well beyond Iran and will
decrease DOD options to shape and react to future events as well as
weaken mil-mil relationships with regional partners, which U.S. foreign
policy has often leveraged for broader diplomatic gains.

military assistance to egypt
28. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, the Egyptian military seems to
be the primary stabilizing institution in Egypt. What is your position
on whether or not we should cut off aid to the Egyptian military?
General Dempsey. The situation in Egypt is rapidly evolving.
Ultimately, the decision to extend military aid to Egypt rests with the
President. I believe we must remain engaged with the Egyptian military
at some level.

29. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, if aid is cut off, should we
restore it as soon as possible?
General Dempsey. If the decision is made to terminate or suspend
aid to the Egyptian military, we should make it clear from the start
under which it will be restored.

military options in syria
30. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, has the President given you
specific objectives in Syria that your military options should
support--or has he only asked you for military options?
General Dempsey. The President has articulated his priorities and
what he views as our core national interests in Syria. Likewise, the
NSS has described a set of objectives which were derived from these
core national interests. In support of these objectives, we have
developed a range of military options.

31. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, if no U.S. military action is
taken to alter the balance of military power between Assad and the
armed opposition, what does the military think the most likely outcomes
are?
General Dempsey. The crisis in Syria is tragic, dynamic, and
complex. It is a deeply-rooted, long-term conflict among multiple
factions that will continue to fight after Assad's rule ends. The
Syrian people face a long and difficult struggle. Potential outcomes
could include the status quo, increased spillover in the Levant that
compels a regional actor to attempt to alter the balance between the
Regime and the opposition, or the fracturing of the country into
sectarian based provinces.

32. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your professional military
opinion, what are the military options that could best accomplish
changing the balance of military power between the Assad regime and the
armed opposition without boots-on-the-ground, assuming: (1) vetted
rebels are provided with light arms and anti-tank weapons and training;
(2) no kinetic action against Syrian integrated air defense system; (3)
limited strikes in Syria would be allowed as would flight into Syrian
airspace; (4) airstrikes would last no more than 2 weeks; (5)
collateral damage to civilians is to be minimized. Under those
parameters, assuming legal justifications were in place: (1) what could
you accomplish in terms of altering the balance of military power; (2)
what lines of military effort would you recommend; (3) what are the
risks associated with those lines of effort; and (4) what is the cost
of your recommended course(s) of action? Please provide an assessment
of the impact on your ability to handle an Iranian conflict following
such an action.
General Dempsey. Within the framework and the constraints and
objectives articulated above, there are military options available,
which we have fully briefed to the national security staff.
At the unclassified level, these options would include strikes with
standoff weapons on key Syrian Regime infrastructure, logistics nodes,
and combat forces command and control nodes that could degrade regime
forces. Striking attack helicopters on their ramps with standoff
weapons would have an important impact on regime close air support
capability, though the locations of those helicopters varies. Contrary
to what some have suggested, although fixed wing tactical aircraft are
being used by the regime against the opposition, they are not the
principal firepower element being used to target the opposition. For
this reason, striking runways, again as some have suggested, is not an
optimal use of expensive standoff weapons, to say nothing of the fact
that the regime would rapidly repair runway damage and resume
operations. While the above strikes would have an effect on the balance
of military power, they are not likely to be decisive.
Rather, the regime is primarily targeting the opposition through
artillery and rocket attacks and ground forces operations. We believe
that suppressing these attacks would require a campaign that would
roll-back certain (though not necessarily all) elements of the
integrated air defense system and subsequently enable a campaign
against Assad's ground forces. Details of such a campaign would be
classified, but such a campaign is feasible. Contrary to depictions of
our prior responses as involving a massive campaign, this would not
require enormous resources, but would require a moderate number of ISR,
tactical aviation, and traditional support aircraft such as tankers,
AWACS and personnel recovery resources, as well as regional bases and
defenses for those bases. Principal risks to this approach would be:
(a) the risk of retaliation from Syria against regional partners and
U.S. bases within those countries; and (b) the risk to U.S. aircraft
from mobile surface-to-air missile systems.
To effect a positive and longstanding result, U.S. support should
contribute to enabling a substantial number of moderate opposition
fighters over an extended period of time. Such an endeavor to build a
moderate opposition force capable of defeating regime forces and
consolidating and holding territory would require at least 2 years.
This extended large-scale train and equip effort is probably the wisest
course of action; however, it is not without substantial obstacles.
Preferably, strikes would be deferred until an opposition force is
capable of maintaining and exploiting at least some of the gains
provided by the strikes.
The two options outlined above could complement one another and
cause the balance of military power to shift. However, we believe it is
unrealistic to expect this shift to occur rapidly. Both sides are in an
existential struggle for survival, and have demonstrated considerable
resiliency. We are concerned that some consider such a campaign to be
easy. Once the first 2 weeks pass without a clear solution to the
conflict, there would most certainly be an appetite for more action.
Thus, we need to understand that the United States would likely be
drawn into a protracted conflict, and would need to be prepared for the
expense and follow-on actions in a post-Assad Syria that would likely
be demanded.
Finally, we need to be prepared to fund either or both options. Our
initial estimate for a train and equip mission is in the hundreds of
millions dollars per year. The cost of the strikes depends on the
number of munitions expended, but costs would start in the tens of
millions and could easily increase to hundreds of millions.
Regarding Iran, we are currently postured to respond to
contingencies in the Gulf and we monitor Iranian actions very closely.
If action against Iran were sequential to action in Syria, we would use
forces already anticipated for such a conflict. If such action were to
occur in parallel, some of the forces we would deploy would not be at
optimal levels of readiness.

afghanistan post-2014 troop presence and bilateral security agreement
33. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, is the zero option of no U.S.
troops in Afghanistan after 2014 a real option given the results we
have seen in Iraq with a similar precipitous withdrawal?
General Dempsey. We have presented the President with a range of
options to consider. I have not been asked to prepare a zero option,
nor do I recommend one. Our post-2014 presence will be predicated on a
number of things, including the ongoing Bilateral Security Agreement
(BSA) negotiations, performance of the ANSF, and an invitation from the
government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. We also developed a
complementary drawdown plan that would support a range of options, with
mitigating factors included.

34. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what mission sets and
commensurate levels of troops do you recommend for Afghanistan post-
2014?
General Dempsey. Our post-2014 mission will be to train, advise,
assist, and counter terrorism. Several factors determine the size of
the post-2014 mission, including the continued progress of the ANSF and
the level of train, advice, and assist required to further that
progress, the outcome of the BSA negotiations, and threat assessments.
In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently
in the planning stages for post-2014 Resolute Support Mission, of which
the United States will be the leading troop contributing nation. We
assess that a range of 8-12K will be required.

35. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, General Dunford says that
above all, the Afghans need to know the United States is committed to
an enduring partnership. It would seem that announcing a desired number
of U.S. troops in Afghanistan post-2014, pending successful BSA
negotiations, would send a strong message--when will the administration
announce the desired troop levels for post-2014?
General Dempsey. The United States has been extremely clear in our
commitment to the people of Afghanistan post-2014. I have recommended
that the administration announce U.S. troop levels for post-2014 after
the conclusion of the BSA and formal invitation by the President of
Afghanistan to remain.

36. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, after letting the Taliban
raise the flag and the country name they used when they governed
Afghanistan on the political office the United States helped arrange in
Doha, Qatar, the Afghan people and President Karzai were understandably
upset. Are the chances for a U.S.-led peace process, or reconciliation
process, dead?
General Dempsey. While the reconciliation process in Afghanistan
has thus far been exceedingly complex and challenging, is has not
stopped moving forward. It remains an important element of fostering
stability in Afghanistan. We will continue to support our Afghan
partners in their efforts to meet with the Taliban and reach a
political settlement that provides peace and security for the people of
Afghanistan.

37. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, are we forcing this issue and
doing more harm than good?
General Dempsey. A reconciliation process inevitably introduces
additional complexity into internal conflict in any nation, as well as
uncertainty among the elements making up both sides of the conflict.
There will be both progress and setbacks along the way in any such
negotiation process. Afghanistan is no exception. Nonetheless, a
political solution has been required to end most insurgencies (witness
the ongoing process in Colombia), and we support reconciliation as a
part of the end game solution in Afghanistan. The Department of State
is taking the necessary measured steps to support the peace process. A
reconciled Afghanistan is in the best interest of all parties involved.
President Karzai acknowledges this, and continues to encourage the
peace process, albeit on his terms.

u.s. africa command
38. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what is your threat assessment
of U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR)--is the
threat growing, stabilized, or receding?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]

39. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, do you believe we have the
forces in place in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and AFRICOM to be able
to both remain engaged in Africa and respond, if necessary, to threats
as they evolve?
General Dempsey. DOD is prepared to respond to threats and crises
as they arise while remaining engaged in AFRICOM and EUCOM.
AFRICOM forces remain engaged in priority missions such as
countering violent extremist organizations and partnership building
within Africa, in accordance with the President's priorities for the
continent. Meanwhile, we have taken a number of steps to be better
prepared for crisis operations, particularly in Northern Africa. For
example, the Marine Corps has resourced additional Marine Security
Guard (MSG) Detachments to meet regional threats and address Department
of State security concerns. While relieving an embassy under attack is
highly complex, we also maintain Marine FAST platoons and other forces
in the region to be able to rapidly reinforce an embassy in advance of
a problem. Among these forces is a dedicated Special Marine Air Ground
Task Force-Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) in Spain capable of quickly
responding to a variety of threats in Africa or Europe.
DOD has also developed and adopted rules that will allow force
sharing between combatant commands (COCOMs) for brief durations to
ensure rapid response in the event of a crisis. DOD and the Department
of State work together to ensure that high risk facilities are properly
secured with DOD support, as required. Finally, DOD monitors specified
crisis response forces throughout the world and makes adjustments to
position and posture forces based on threat requirements.

40. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, do you believe we have
dedicated enough intelligence assets to the continent of Africa?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]

41. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what is you assessment of
combining AFRICOM with EUCOM?
General Dempsey. Assigning combatant commands under the current
structure has led to productive engagement, planning, and operations in
the respective areas of responsibility. However, depending on the
magnitude of budget cuts to DOD, we may need to consider combatant
command consolidations among a number of other difficult staff
consolidation and reduction decisions. Combining AFRICOM and EUCOM
would be one of several options we would consider.

civilian furloughs
42. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what can DOD do to end
civilian furloughs now?
General Dempsey. The Secretary of Defense instructed all components
to monitor funding closely for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. On 6
August, the Secretary announced that this goal was accomplished, and
reduced the total furlough days for most civilians from 11 to 6 days.
None of us want to see this occur again in 2014, but the sequestration
reductions will be more severe next year than this year.

43. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, will DOD use civilian
furloughs next year to cut personnel costs?
General Dempsey. The $37 billion in fiscal year 2013 budget cuts
mandated by sequestration, combined with short timelines that limited
our options, were a major cause of these furloughs. We would hope to
avoid furloughs in the future because of their deleterious effects on
morale and their potential to cause our best civilians to seek
employment elsewhere. However, a $52 billion sequestration top line cut
in fiscal year 2014 would perpetuate our readiness shortfalls, likely
requiring additional civilian personnel actions. These actions could
include furloughs, but we believe under a longer-term view would more
likely be weighted towards reductions in civilian billets leading to a
reduction-in-force action.

44. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, how long will it take before
you realize this is a penny-wise pound-foolish approach to cost
savings?
General Dempsey. We already realize the drawbacks of civilian
furloughs--they are as distasteful to us as any other budget reduction
mechanism. However, in fiscal year 2013, sequestration was applied by
congress on a short timeline, limiting our options and resulting in
drastic measures like readiness stand-downs and furloughs that were not
strategically or managerially sound. To avoid even more far reaching
effects on training, we furloughed most of our civilian employees for
up to 6 days. This impacted morale and productivity in most of our
support operations, but we were left with no other alternative in
finding $37 billion in savings in such a short period of time.
Going forward, the SCMR has defined the decision-space faced by the
Department's senior leadership. This, in turn, will inform the Services
and defense agencies in developing their fiscal year 2015-2019 budgets
later this year, as well as ultimately inform the Department's next QDR
early next year.

sexual assault
45. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, at the hearing on June 4,
2013, concerning sexual assault, you committed to review what our
allies have done to structure their military justice systems. Have you
had an opportunity to review the military justice systems of our
allies?
General Dempsey. My legal counsel has personally met with
representatives from the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany,
and the Netherlands to discuss their military justice systems. He has
briefed me and issued a written assessment of his review to Congress.
In addition, I have spoken to several of my counterparts.

46. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what have you learned about
those systems and why they were changed?
General Dempsey. In most or all of their systems, commanders retain
the ability to deal with minor military infractions through summary
proceedings, analogous to our nonjudicial punishment system or adverse
administrative actions.

None of our allies mentioned above retain the
commander in the role of the convening authority; however, this
was not done in response to sexual assault. Most or all of
their systems were changed in order to better protect the
rights of the accused, often in response to judicial
challenges.
There is no analytic evidence to suggest that the
changes they made improved reporting, investigation, or
prosecution.
Our allies' militaries are much smaller, and thus do
not handle the volume of military justice cases that the U.S.
Armed Forces do. Many of their systems do not allow for
expeditionary justice (in combat or deployed environments) or
are incapable of doing so.

impact of senate appropriations committee funding reduction for b-61
bomb
47. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what are the military and geo-
political implications of the Senate Appropriations Committee's
recommendation to reduce funding for the B-61 Life Extension Program
(LEP) by $168 million?
General Dempsey. A $168 million reduction to the B-61 LEP would
slip the delivery of the first production unit past fiscal year 2019
and impact our commitment to our NATO and Asian allies. Additionally,
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command stated that the program is
important to the long-term viability of the B-2A strategic mission and
is needed regardless of changes to NATO commitments.
This reduction would also limit the DOD and Department of Energy
from leveraging interoperable technology for other strategic weapons.
We would need to adjust the budget and scope for those programs,
resulting in delays to the overall Nuclear Weapons Council Baseline
Plan.

religious expression
48. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, have the Armed Forces gone too
far in suppressing religious expression?
General Dempsey. No. DOD continues to place a high value on the
rights of all military servicemembers to practice their faith and
observe the tenets of their respective religions, to include the right
to hold no religious beliefs. Whenever possible, commanders approve
requests for accommodation of servicemembers' religious practices. This
is both our policy and our practice.

49. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, if a soldier's religious faith
is an important part of their resilience in dealing with the stresses
of military service, is there any reason why they should be prohibited
from fully exercising that faith and sharing it with others in the
Services?
General Dempsey. We recognize that the spiritual dimension and
religious faith do indeed play an important role in building and
enhancing resilience for a number of our servicemembers. Commanders are
conscientious about allowing them to practice their faith. We also know
that some of our servicemembers do not hold to any particular religious
belief, and we respect their rights as well. The only reason why a
servicemember may be unable to fully exercise his or her faith or to
share that faith with others is if doing so would have an adverse
impact on mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion,
standards, or good order and discipline. Servicemembers are free to
share their faith with others, but must not force unwanted, intrusive
attempts to convert others of any faith or no faith to one's beliefs.

50. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, since the Services still
respect the rights of Americans to not bear arms in national defense
because of sincerely held religious beliefs, is it not just as
important to respect the rights of those to serve to express their
religious beliefs?
General Dempsey. Yes. DOD does respect the rights of all
servicemembers to hold and express sincere religious beliefs. Granting
conscientious objector status, to which your question appears to refer,
is but one example of how seriously U.S. military leadership takes the
rights of its members to hold and express sincere religious, moral, and
ethical beliefs. By both policy and practice, commanders are committed
to ensuring members of the U.S. military of deep religious faith, as
well as those of no religious faith, can serve in a climate of mutual
respect and trust.

51. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, should a military chaplain be
allowed to express the views of their faith in performing their
official duties, even if those views are not shared by all?
General Dempsey. Yes. U.S. military chaplains are not restricted in
expressing the views of their faith. They enter the military as fully
qualified religious ministry professionals who represent specific
religious organizations. Chaplains perform all the offices, functions,
sacraments, ordinances, and ceremonies required of a ministry
professional for that religious organization. Chaplains are also
trained to offer religious ministry to, and be respectful of, those of
all faiths and those of no faith. Chaplains volunteer for Military
Service with the understanding that they will be required to function
in a pluralistic environment. They willingly support the free exercise
of religion by all members of the Military Services, their family
members, and other persons whom they are authorized to serve.

women in combat
52. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, assuming a person meets the
necessary high physical standards that the Services are developing for
troops in frontline combat units, is it your professional military
opinion that both men and women must be allowed to be assigned to those
units?
General Dempsey. The elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Rule which provides greater flexibility
assigning the best qualified individuals where they are needed most
regardless of gender. Greater flexibility and wider pool of skilled
personnel creates a more agile and responsive force generation model
for greater readiness.

53. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, is it your professional
military opinion that our Nation should put women, based solely on
meeting objective physical standards, in frontline combat positions
against a potential enemy that will seek to exploit captured American
women soldiers in an unspeakably cruel fashion with the goal of
undermining our national will to engage in combat?
General Dempsey. As the Services review their standards for each
military specialty, they are considering several criterion. Physical
capability is just one of those. Our women in uniform are vital to
mission readiness. The Department is committed to removing any barriers
that prevent servicemembers from rising to their highest potential,
based on their ability and not constrained by gender-restrictive
policies. This is also in part due to the realization that the
character of warfare has changed. Combat is far more fluid and
asymmetrical where the distinctions between frontline, direct combat
areas and rear, support areas no longer exists. Any decision regarding
the assignment of women to combat-related duties or to combat units
should be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission
readiness and should be approached carefully and deliberately.

54. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, is there any place in your
analysis of the potential role of women in combat, to objectively
consider women's health, privacy, and cultural issues in the ultimate
decision whether to assign women to frontline combat units?
General Dempsey. Yes. The health, privacy and culture of women in
combat are not new factors in determining how we employ women in the
military and will be considered during our assessment. Ultimately the
guiding principles we established at the onset will determine how we
employ women in the future.

Preserve unit readiness, cohesion, and morale.
Ensure the opportunity to succeed with viable career
paths.
Retain the trust and confidence of the American people
by promoting policies that maintain the best quality and most
qualified people.
Validate occupational performance standards, both
physical and mental, for all military occupational specialties.
Ensure a cadre of midgrade/senior women enlisted and
officers are assigned to commands at the point of introduction
to ensure success in the long run.

tricare fees
55. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, prior to sending fee increase
proposals to Congress, why doesn't DOD sit down with beneficiary
associations and Congress to design fee increases that are reasonable
and acceptable to everyone?
General Dempsey. Military health benefit reform has been shaped
over the last 8 years by program and policy experts, Members of
Congress, constituencies, and subject matter experts from within and
outside of the Department. The Department's proposals have been and
will continue to be based on sound principles, as well as feedback from
these stakeholders.

56. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, it seems to me that DOD should
wait on the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization
Commission to report its recommendations before asking Congress to make
piecemeal changes to personnel benefits. Do you agree or disagree, and
why or why not?
General Dempsey. The Commission has a unique opportunity to make
real and substantive change. We also recognize that comprehensively
reviewing all areas of military pay and benefits, developing
recommendations for change, and vetting them within DOD and with other
Departments takes time. We would like to take that time, but
sequestration has radically changed the budget reality and demands more
rapid action from the Department and Congress if we are to sustain
long-term readiness and modernization.

57. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, wouldn't development of a
comprehensive package of compensation and retirement benefit changes,
to include health benefit changes, make more sense rather than a piece-
meal approach that wouldn't get us to an optimal solution for
controlling DOD's sky-rocketing personnel costs?
General Dempsey. If we had the luxury of time to allow development
of a comprehensive package before making any changes, we would support
it. However, given the enormous pressure the DOD budget is under, we
need to act with urgency on both efficiencies and compensation reform
if we are to maintain an acceptable level of military capability,
capacity, and readiness to be able to conduct our military missions. I
am not convinced that there is excessive risk in getting compensation
and benefits under control through carefully, but quickly, considered
individual actions.

adequate forces
58. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in your professional judgment,
how far can we go with the elimination of brigades, ships, and
squadrons before we incur unacceptable risks to our national security?
General Dempsey. The SCMR's purpose was to look at these numbers.
We are taking the SCMR results and continuing to analyze impacts and
assess options. The QDR will use the foundations that the SCMR provided
to best determine how far we can go without reaching unacceptable risk.

59. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, aside from the issue of the
hollowness of our forces, will sequestration require the elimination of
more brigades, ships, and squadrons to the point where we will not have
enough forces to carry out even one major contingency operation with
enough Reserves to deter a second adversary?
General Dempsey. No, I do not believe that we will reach that
point. As long as we have access to the Reserves, we will have enough
forces to deter a second adversary; however it will take time to ensure
they are fully trained and ready for the contingency along with the
time to get them from the homeland to the fight. In essence, we will be
able to do fewer things simultaneously, and new contingencies may force
us to take risk in other regions. We will be less flexible. That much
is clear.

60. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, does a potential looming
crisis or conflict with Iran constrain your options to take military
action in other parts of the world due to resource limitations?
Specifically, are you concerned that taking action in Syria, combined
with readiness and resource impacts due to budget cuts and
sequestration, invites too much strategic risk if friction with Iran
results in a conflict in the Gulf as well?
General Dempsey. We are currently postured to respond to
contingencies in the Gulf and are watching Iran very closely. Any use
of additional forces than those that are deployed right now or those
that are next to deploy will require time to train and equip to ensure
they are ready to respond as replacements and this will cause increased
stress on the force in regards to dwell time. However, our global reach
and strike capabilities contribute to our ability to deter and assure,
helping to mitigate this concern.

army end strength and mission execution
61. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, can you provide us an
assessment of the impact of the reduction of 10 Brigade Combat Teams
(BCT) on DOD's ability to meet the requirements of the National
Military Strategy (NMS)?
General Dempsey. These BCT reductions will reduce the part of the
force that the Army actually increased over the last 10 years to fight
our wars. With the planned drawdown of these forces, and the conclusion
of two long-term stability operations, we can manage our strategy with
the reductions the Army has planned. Also, the Defense Strategic
Guidance deemphasized long duration stability operations and reinforced
the importance of defeating and denying the objectives of an adversary.
The Army is realigning and resizing consistent with this guidance.

62. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what are your concerns with
regards to the reduction of 10 Army BCTs?
General Dempsey. As these reductions are driven by the Army's
drawdown of its temporary endstrength and are consistent with the
Defense Strategic Guidance, I am not overly concerned with this
reduction in forces. I am concerned that sequestration will force
further reduction of ground forces end strength that decreases military
options available to respond to contingencies and increase risk to the
force.

63. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what is your position
regarding a reduction of 100,000 soldiers should the full effects of
sequestration go into effect?
General Dempsey. Our Nation needs an Army that can conduct full
spectrum operations as part of the Joint Force to meet the NMS
objectives. It must be appropriately sized, structured, and equipped in
order to defend the Nation and defeat our adversaries. We grew ground
forces to meet the large requirements of OIF and OEF. As this war
period comes to a close, we are assessing what is needed for the future
in the context of constrained resources. My instincts are that a
reduction of ground forces to levels required by full sequestration
would pose significant risk to our national security.

64. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, please provide an assessment
of the impact of the reduction of 100,000 soldiers on DOD's ability to
meet the requirements of the national military strategy.
General Dempsey. At full sequestration, our national military
strategy will need to change.

65. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what are your views regarding
the mix of Active and Reserve Force structure should the Army be forced
into reduction of another 100,000 soldiers?
General Dempsey. The Army uses an established, comprehensive, and
transparent process to determine the optimal number and mix of Active
and Reserve component forces. We will need to work together to emerge
with the right mix of capabilities and capacity to accomplish core
missions with acceptable risk in accordance with the Defense Strategic
Planning Guidance (DSG).
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
uh-1n replacement opportunities
66. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, as evidenced by the recent
relief of 17 officers at Minot Air Force Base and the reports of the
Defense Science Board (DSB) Standing Task Force on Nuclear Weapons
Surety, there is still a serious neglect of priority and budget for the
sustainment of the Air Force's Priority One Nuclear Enterprise. This
lack of prioritization and resourcing manifests in a nuclear enterprise
that continues to conduct critical mission activities with outdated and
insufficiently supported aircraft and ground vehicles, to include the
woefully inadequate 40-plus-year-old UH-1N helicopter.
The Air Force has acknowledged the need to replace the UH-1N for
over a decade. The aircraft's inadequate speed, range and payload, and
obsolescent sensors and monitoring equipment are well-documented. The
use of an antiquated airframe such as the UH-1N to provide security for
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) sites reflects a lack of
proper resource prioritization by DOD.
As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you are required
to provide cross-Service oversight and recommendations that lead to the
most effective and efficient use of the greater defense industrial
capabilities. There are inexpensive and cost-effective solutions
available to replace the Vietnam-era Huey being fielded by other
Services that are far more reliable, capable, and safe.
As demonstrated in the Senate Armed Services Committee markup of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, I would like to understand the current
plan for replacing the existing UH-1N fleet. In addition, I would like
your commitment that this issue will be addressed in the upcoming
fiscal year 2015 budget submittal. Despite being an Air Force priority
for over 10 years, why has the replacement of the UH-1N fleet not been
realized?
General Dempsey. The requirement for a more responsive capability
to meet ICBM security needs remains valid, but budget constraints in
both the near-term and the foreseeable future make committing to new
acquisition programs challenging. A formal replacement strategy for the
UH-1N is due to the SASC on February 1, 2014. As potential solutions,
the Air Force is pursuing a variety of replacement options to include
Excess Defense Articles at low or no cost. We remain committed to
remaining involved and attentive to this requirement.

67. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, the leadership of Air Force
Global Strike Command (AFGSC) recently commented that: ``I have had an
urgent and compelling need since 1996 in terms of speed, range, and
payload . . . the UH-1 does not meet the need. How much longer are we
willing to wait and take this risk?'' Has there been any change to the
ICBM security force posture that you believe makes the replacement of
the UH-1 less compelling or a more acceptable security risk?
General Dempsey. No, the ICBM security force posture has not
changed. The requirement to replace the UH-1s remains valid. However,
based on budget constraints, the Air Force currently plans to sustain
the UH-1 for another 6-10 years vice replacing them. The Air Force will
mitigate risk by upgrading UH-1 cockpits and making them night-vision-
compatible combined with other critical safety improvements. The Air
Force also recently received three UH-1s from the Marine Corps, which
will increase capacity and availability. In addition, the Air Force and
Army are examining options for the Army to transfer additional UH-1s to
the Air Force.

68. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, there are aircraft being
fielded by DOD today that are significantly more capable and less
costly to own and operate than the UH-1N. In your leadership role on
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), have you, or will you,
direct the Air Force to prioritize consideration of in-production DOD
aircraft as a replacement for the UH-1 rather than continue to assume
the associated security risks?
General Dempsey. The JROC does not direct service acquisition
decisions. Rather, it defines and validates Joint force requirements
that are then submitted to both budget and acquisition processes. The
JROC does validate the results of analyses of alternatives, and will be
alert to consideration of all possible alternatives, including in-
production aircraft. When the decision is made to replace the UH-1N, a
full and open competition will be conducted to find the helicopter that
meets the mission requirements and provides DOD the most capable
replacement at the most economically feasible cost. This may ultimately
be an aircraft that is already in production, but those efficiencies
will be evident through the proper source selection process.

69. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, the Combat Rescue Helicopter
(CRH) mission requirements were determined to be overly robust and
expensive to justify the CRH's use for the domestic support missions
currently conducted by the UH-1N. There is concern that the lack of
urgency regarding fielding of a UH-1 replacement may indicate an
attempt to merge CRH and UH-1N missions in the future. Did the JROC
review of the CRH program validate any requirement to provide site and
convoy security for the Nation's ICBM force or for supporting the Air
Force District of Washington VIP airlift/evacuation missions currently
supported by the UH-1N?
General Dempsey. The CRH's primary mission is to recover isolated
personnel from hostile or denied territory. It will also execute
humanitarian missions, civil search and rescue, disaster relief,
casualty/medical evacuation, and non-combatant evacuation operations.
CRH is not being produced to replace the UH-1N; rather it will replace
the Air Force's aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. Thus, JROC
review and validation of the CRH requirements did not include missions
currently supported by the UH-1N, such as providing site and convoy
security for the Nation's ICBM force or supporting the Air Force
District of Washington VIP airlift/evacuation missions. However, this
would not preclude the CRH from being called upon to execute missions
currently being performed by other vertical lift platforms.
______

[The nomination reference of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 24, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while
assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 152 and 601:

To be General

GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 0000
______

[The biographical sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA

Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Duke University - MA - English
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts
and Sciences
National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic
Studies

Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
National War College

Foreign language(s):
French

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Date of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 5 Jun 74
1LT....................................... 5 Jun 76
CPT....................................... 8 Aug 78
MAJ....................................... 1 Sep 85
LTC....................................... 1 Apr 91
COL....................................... 1 Sep 95
BG........................................ 1 Aug 01
MG........................................ 1 Sep 04
LTG....................................... 8 Sep 05
GEN....................................... 8 Dec 08
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 75.......................... May 76............ Platoon Leader, B
Troop, 1st
Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
May 76.......................... Sep 77............ Support Platoon
Leader, 1st
Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Sep 77.......................... Jun 78............ S-1 (Personnel),
1st Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jul 78.......................... Jan 79............ Student, Armor
Officer Advanced
Course, U.S. Army
Armor School,
Fort Knox, KY
Apr 79.......................... Jan 80............ Motor Officer, 1st
Squadron, 10th
Cavalry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO
Jan 80.......................... Oct 80............ Commander, A
Troop, 1st
Squadron, 10th
Cavalry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO
Oct 80.......................... Jun 81............ S-3 (Operations),
1st Squadron,
10th Cavalry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO
Jun 81.......................... Jul 82............ Commander,
Headquarters and
Headquarters
Troop, 1st
Squadron, 10th
Cavalry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO
Aug 82.......................... May 84............ Student, Duke
University,
Durham, NC
Jun 84.......................... Jul 87............ Instructor, later
Assistant
Professor,
Department of
English, U.S.
Military Academy,
West Point, NY
Aug 87.......................... Jun 88............ Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Jul 88.......................... Sep 89............ Executive Officer,
4th Battalion,
67th Armor, 3d
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Sep 89.......................... May 91............ S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 3d
Brigade, 3d
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
Jul 91.......................... Jun 93............ Commander, 4th
Battalion, 67th
Armor, 1st
Brigade, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jul 93.......................... Jun 95............ Chief, Armor
Branch, Combat
Arms Division,
Officer Personnel
Management
Directorate, U.S.
Total Army
Personnel
Command,
Alexandria, VA
Aug 95.......................... Jun 96............ Student, National
War College, Fort
Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, DC
Jul 96.......................... Jul 98............ Commander, 3d
Armored Cavalry
Regiment, Fort
Carson, CO
Jul 98.......................... Oct 99............ Assistant Deputy
Director for
Politico-Military
Affairs, Europe
and Africa, J-5,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Oct 99.......................... Aug 01............ Special Assistant
to the Chairman
of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Sep 01.......................... Jun 03............ Program Manager,
Saudi Arabian
National Guard
Modernization
Program, Saudi
Arabia
Jun 03.......................... Oct 04............ Commanding
General, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Oct 04.......................... Jul 05............ Commanding
General, 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 05.......................... May 07............ Commander, Multi-
National Security
Transition
Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO
Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Aug 07.......................... Mar 08............ Deputy Commander,
U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Mar 08.......................... Oct 08............ Acting Commander,
U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Dec 08.......................... Mar 11............ Commanding
General, U.S.
Army Training and
Doctrine Command,
Fort Monroe, VA
Apr 11.......................... Sep 11............ Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
Sep 11.......................... Present........... Chief of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistant Deputy Director for Jul 98-Oct 99 Colonel
Politico-Military Affairs, Europe
and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC....................
Special Assistant to the Chairman Oct 99-Aug 01 Colonel
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The
Joint Staff, Washington, DC.......
Commander, Multi-National Security Aug 05-May 07 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Aug 07-Mar 08 Lieutenant General
Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
FL................................
Acting Commander, U.S. Central Mar 08-Oct 08 Lieutenant General
Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
FL................................
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sep 11-Present General
Staff, Washington, DC.............
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of operational assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Jan 91-Feb 91 Lieutenant Colonel
Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army, Operations
Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.
Commanding General, 1st Armored Jun 03-Oct 04 Brigadier General/
Division, U.S. Army Europe and Major General
Seventh Army, Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq.....................
Commander, Multi-National Security Aug 05-May 07 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Combat Action Badge
Parachutist Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Martin E.
Dempsey, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Martin E. Dempsey.

2. Position to which nominated:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:
June 24, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
March 14, 1952; Jersey City, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Diane Sullivan Dempsey.

7. Names and ages of children:
Christopher, 34.
Megan, 33.
Caitlin, 30.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Veteran of Foreign Wars.
Member, Association of the U.S. Army.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify
upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, when asked before any duly constituted
committee of Congress, to give my personal views, even if those views
differ from the administration in power.
______

[The nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM James A. Winnefeld,
Jr., USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. On previous occasions you have answered the committee's
policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, the last time being in connection with your first nomination to be
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your
last confirmation hearing?
Answer. My views have not changed. I have served in various joint
capacities throughout my naval career and I've now had the privilege to
serve 2 years as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My recent
experience confirms the tremendous advancements created by this
landmark legislation. I do not see a need to change the provisions of
this legislation at this time.
Question. In light of your experience as Chairman, do you see any
need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications
do you believe would be appropriate?
Answer. Reflecting on my recent experience, I do not believe
changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. However, if
confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities or shortcomings that
might indicate that changes to the legislation are warranted.
duties
Question. Based on your experience as Vice Chairman, what
recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and
functions set forth in section 154 of title 10, U.S.C., and in
regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD), that pertain to the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and
operation of the Joint Staff in general?
Answer. If confirmed, I do not foresee recommending any changes to
the law. I will, however, remain attuned to potential issues and
opportunities for improvement.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following
officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him and
other such duties as may be assigned by the Chairman, with the approval
of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, in the absence or disability
of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs
the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the
absence or disability ceases. These duties would include providing
military advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Vice Chairman may also
provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request in
his capacity as a military adviser.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full
power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters
upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the
relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar
to that with the Secretary.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned
by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When
there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during the absence
or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and
performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or
the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to
continuing my close working relationship with the Chairman.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
areas. With particular regard to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Vice Chairman
serves on many deliberative panels focused on resource decisions,
including the Deputies Advisory Working Group as its Vice Chair and as
Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work very closely with the
USD(AT&L) on continuing improvements to the requirements process and
providing senior-level focus on key acquisition programs.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)).
Answer. I recognize the importance of the Vice Chairman working
closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in
appropriately managing and providing oversight of the budgetary and
fiscal processes of the Joint Staff required to achieve the budgetary
goals prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).
Answer. The Vice Chairman and USD(P) work together to represent
defense and military interests in interagency affairs. They often co-
lead or serve together on various ad hoc committees or projects as
directed by Congress or as assigned from time to time by Secretary of
Defense or by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, such as the Nuclear
Weapons Committee or the Deputy's Management Action Group. The Vice
Chairman and USD(P) also serve together on the Deputies Committee,
monitoring the work of various interagency policy committees as well as
supporting the Principals Committee and the National Security Council.
If confirmed, I plan to continue my frequent interaction with the
USD(P).
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Within their assigned areas, Under Secretaries exercise
policy and oversight functions and interact frequently with the Joint
Staff. They may issue instructions and directive-type memoranda that
implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and
directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their
responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of
Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the
unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will continue to work
closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense.
Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the
Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation as a principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials of DOD
on cost assessment and program evaluation. If confirmed, I look forward
to continuing to work closely with the Director under the auspices of
the Vice Chairman's resourcing and requirements functions, as well as
benefitting from the extensive and independent analysis provided by the
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office towards making informed
resourcing decisions.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense
for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks and
Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are
subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out
their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and
Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to
commanders of unified and specified commands are transmitted through
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will
continue to work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner
similar to that of working with the Under Secretaries.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165 provides that, subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support
of forces assigned to unified and specified commands.
The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the
Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which
program recommendations and budget proposals of the military
departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the
requirements of the combatant commanders. The Vice Chairman has
numerous interactions with the Service Secretaries in the various
management forums within the Department. Finally, in his role as the
Chairman of the JROC, the Vice Chairman has considerable interaction
with the Service Secretaries' acquisition staffs. If confirmed, I look
forward to continuing my close and productive working relationship with
the Service Secretaries and their staffs.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and the
Chief of Naval Operations.
Answer. The Service Chiefs serve two significant roles. First, they
are responsible for the organization, manning, training, and equipping
of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation
of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can be ensured of the
readiness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the President
and Secretary of Defense. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, they are advisors to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense
as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. The
Service Vice Chiefs play a key role on the JROC, chaired by the Vice
Chairman. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs to fulfill the combatant
commanders' warfighting and operational requirements, and on other
relevant policy matters.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of
DOD and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for
formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs and
plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard
personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser
to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the principal adviser to
the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary and
Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As
National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the department's official
channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General. As a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving
non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense
and civil support missions. If confirmed, I will continue to work
closely with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to provide support
as required.
Question. The Combatant Commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct
military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital
link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD and, as
directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication
between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of
Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the
absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as
Chairman when interacting with the combatant commanders. Having served
as a combatant commander, I have clear insight into the capabilities
and limitations of combatant command staffs. If confirmed, I will
continue to work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their
warfighting capabilities and provide other support as required.
major challenges
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you have faced in your first term as Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. In a world of accelerating change that is growing more
rather than less dangerous, I have faced a number of challenges in what
I have labeled the three portfolios of policy, investment, and people.
In the policy portfolio, we have been grappling with a host of
threats to our national security interests . . . in Afghanistan, Iran,
and the Korean Peninsula; with the continuing evolution of al Qaeda and
its affiliates; in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening in Libya, Syria
and Egypt; and within the increasingly complex cyber domain.
Maintaining a balanced approach to securing our interests in these
areas in a declining budget environment requires constant effort.
In the investment portfolio, we continue to struggle with budget
challenges that are quietly eroding our readiness to defend this nation
today and have impacted our ability to prepare for tomorrow. I was
confirmed on the day the Budget Control Act was passed, and have
discovered that the Vice Chairman has a unique role in encouraging the
various elements of the Department in coming to grips with the reality
of decreasing budgets
In the people portfolio we are trying to manage the enormous
uncertainty to which our military and civilian members and their
families are exposed as Congress struggles to come to agreement on a
budget. We have also expended considerable effort to ensure proper care
for our wounded, ill, and injured members, as well as finding every
lever we can to eliminate the pernicious insider threat of sexual
assault.
Much remains to be done in all three of these portfolios. If
reconfirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve this great Nation in
uniform, and pledge to work with this committee to strike the right
balance among ends, ways, and means of protecting our country and its
interests.
Question. What new challenges do you expect to face if you are
confirmed for a second term?
Answer. If confirmed, my foremost challenge will be to continue
supporting the Secretary and Chairman in guiding the force through
fiscal contraction while sustaining readiness and protecting our Nation
and its security interests. The challenges I listed above will
persist--indeed, they may become worse as the Department's fiscal
uncertainty deepens--and require constant attention and visionary
leadership. As always, new problems will emerge: new crises and
contingencies; new hurdles in tending to the capability, capacity, and
readiness of the force; and new challenges faced by our most important
resource, namely our people.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will renew my efforts to support the
Chairman and Secretary. There is much to be done. There is more
progress to be made balancing the ends, ways and means of strategy--
particularly in preserving as many of our ``ends'' as possible by
refining our ``ways'' as the ``means'' continue to decline--this means
new ways of applying force and refreshing our plans on how and where we
do it. We need to continue our press for a more efficient Department,
leveraging congressional assistance where possible in doing so. We must
ensure our people navigate the shoals of a changing financial and
operational environment--and we need to remain persistent in our
determination that they perform to the highest possible standards in
terms of integrity, conduct, and respect for taxpayer dollars. Finally,
I will use my leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee
(JROC) and the budgeting and acquisition sides of the investment
triangle to find the right balance among the capability, capacity, and
readiness of our force. In these and other ways I will lend my best
efforts to ensuring our Nation is safe.
priorities
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
identified in the section above, would you set for your second term as
Vice Chairman?
Answer. There are a number of specific areas I will maintain high
on a list of priorities. Among these are:

Working closely with interagency stakeholders, U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) and International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) to ensure the trajectory of our efforts in
Afghanistan remain on track.
Ensuring the Department is fully prepared to support
the President regarding any decision he may make regarding use
of force in any of several areas where it may become necessary.
Maintaining unrelenting emphasis on every possible
aspect of conquering the insider threat of sexual assault in
our ranks.
Continuing to ensure the Department's budget decisions
are based on strategy and that they emphasize improved
efficiency before reducing military capability, capacity, or
readiness.
Highlighting the importance of readiness in an
environment where it will be tempting to preserve politically-
attractive capacity and capability at its expense.
Maintaining emphasis on wounded warrior programs even
as the number of new wounded members declines due to the
transition in Afghanistan--these heroes require care long after
they return home.
Building on a good trajectory of requirements and
acquisition reform and remaining vigilant regarding current and
future programs--there is much to be done in this area.
Ensuring the Department maintains a collegial and
influential relationship with the National Nuclear Security
Administration to ensure the needs of our nuclear
infrastructure are met.
Pressing for high-leverage technical innovation that
is relevant to the current and future warfighting environment.
Working closely with my fellow senior military leaders
to ensure we all serve with distinction and integrity.
joint requirements oversight council
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as
the Chairman of the JROC, which has the responsibility to review and
validate Service requirements.
Are there any recommendations that you would make to modify the
JROC or its authority or the requirements process?
Answer. I do not believe additional formal changes or modifications
to the JROC, its authority, or the requirements process are needed at
this time. The JROC's authority as detailed in title 10, U.S.C.,
section 181, is sufficient to allow the JROC to carry out its
responsibilities for overseeing the joint military requirements
process. We continue to make every effort within existing authorities
to improve JROC processes and products.
Question. Has the `trip-wire' process, to bring troubled programs
back to the JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to
mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule delays before the program
faced a Nunn-McCurdy review, been regularly employed on large programs
that have experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays?
Answer. The trip wire process continues to function well. We have
expanded the trip-wire process to include both schedule delays and
quantity changes, in addition to cost growth, when validating
capability documents. Only a few programs have recently exceeded trip-
wire values. The most recent case was a review of the Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 for an IOC schedule delay of
greater than 12 months.
However, rather than waiting for trip-wires to be breached, we try
to proactively engage programs and their requirements. I recently
signed out a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) Relief JROCM (015-13)
which was intended to encourage acquisition managers, in coordination
with the appropriate requirements sponsors, to officially request
requirements relief where KPPs appear out of line with a cost-benefit
analysis. This has resulted in KPP changes for the Three Dimensional
Expeditionary Long-Range Radar, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and
Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle.
Question. Has the JROC altered requirements, either for performance
or procurement quantities, as a result of such reviews?
Answer. As previously stated, only a few program reviews have been
required as a result of their exceeding trip-wire values. In the case
of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2, the
JROC acknowledged that the schedule delay was driven primarily by the
extension of fielding schedules and funding alignment and no change was
made to performance or procurement quantities.
On the other hand, there have been performance parameter changes
due to cost-benefit analysis resulting from the KPP Relief JROCM, which
encourages requirements reviews when appropriate. Whether for a trip-
wire breach or a proactive scrub of the requirements, we have recently
made KPP changes to the following programs: Long Range Strike-Bomber
(LRS-B), Joint Strike Fighter, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Unmanned
Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike, Armored Multi-
Purpose Vehicle, WIN-T, Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range
Radar, Common Point Ground System, Air and Missile Defense Radar, and
Global Positioning System Modernization.
Question. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)
required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that trade-off analyses are
conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the
requirements development and approval process. Such analyses enhance
DOD's understanding of what performance factors are the critical ones
driving costs and schedules.
What is your view of the modifications to the JROC process made by
WSARA?
Answer. I fully support the major revisions to the joint
warfighting requirements process that were made in early 2012. This
includes updates to governing documents and the means by which
supporting bodies carry out their responsibilities in accordance with
title 10, U.S.C., section 181, and applicable portions of the WSARA
(primarily sections 105 and 201). We critically assess the impact of
requirements on the cost, schedule and performance of programs as a
matter of routine when those programs are in front of the JROC.
Question. What additional steps do you believe that Congress or DOD
should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and
performance objectives for major weapon systems are made at an
appropriately early point in the acquisition process?
Answer. DOD is striving to push capability gap information out to
industry earlier in the acquisition process. By partnering early with
industry and providing timely insight into our vision for future
capabilities, DOD is better able to leverage industry science and
technology (S&T) efforts and, informed by early S&T development,
provide feasible and affordable options for acquisition decisions. A
recent example of this approach is the Army's Future Vertical Lift
Initial Capabilities Document which defined capability gaps in the 2030
and beyond Joint Operational Environment. There is no doubt more we can
do in this area.
The JROC also considers cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs
as early as the analysis of alternatives (AoA) review.
Question. Are there any other recommendations that you would make
to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?
Answer. I do not believe additional changes or modifications to the
JROC, its authority, or the requirements process are needed at this
time. The JROC's authority as detailed in title 10, U.S.C., section
181, is sufficient to allow the JROC to carry out its responsibilities
for overseeing the joint military requirements process. That said, we
continue to make every effort within existing authorities to improve
internal JROC processes and products.
Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the
DOD acquisition process?
Answer. The changes to the JROC process have enabled a much closer
relationship with USD(AT&L) by ensuring that requirements and their
associated costs are continually evaluated through the acquisition
life-cycle. We currently have an excellent relationship with USD(AT&L),
to include their participation as one of the statutory experts invited
to JROC meetings. Their insights are most valuable as we consider
requirements alternatives, while at the same time we work closely with
them to ensure requirements are kept under control and, in some cases,
prudently trimmed as informed by a cost, schedule, performance and
warfighter needs.
Question. What is your vision for the role and priorities of the
JROC in the future?
Answer. The JROC is our key body shaping the future Joint Force
(title 10, U.S.C., section 181). The priorities for the JROC and the
JCIDS process are to: (1) debate strategic and operational requirements
and make difficult choices earlier; (2) strive for better upfront
fidelity on cost/schedule/performance tradeoffs; (3) require greater
analytic rigor and risk/portfolio analysis; and (4) ensure a more
dynamic/iterative process throughout a program's lifecycle.
Additionally, the JROC could play an important role in retuning system
requirements in the face of the dramatic resource reductions stipulated
by the full BCA caps.
Question. Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to
understand and identify where there are opportunities for multi-service
collaboration or where programs could or should be modified to take
advantage of related acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes. We developed and expanded opportunities for multi-
service collaboration for several programs during the past couple of
years, including ground and amphibious combat vehicles and long range
air search radars. This is always a difficult issue for the individual
Services, but we have managed to make progress in this area thanks to a
group of open-minded Service Vice Chiefs.
Question. What principles guide your approach to inviting, and
helping ensure the sufficient participation of other stakeholders in
the JROC?
Answer. Over the past several years, the JROC has been refined into
a more lean executive body where key leaders and advisors have frank
and open discussions. In addition to the statutory members and
advisors, combatant commanders participate when appropriate. I strongly
believe in the importance of including these stakeholders, and I turn
to them with an offer to speak on every issue, and they have been
forthcoming. In short, we have created a smaller more intimate forum
that still includes the major stakeholders, which has led to a more
fulsome discussion of requirements issues.
joint capabilities integration and development systems
Question. What is your perspective on the responsiveness of the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) process
in addressing joint capabilities needs?
Answer. We work requirements based on urgency: life/death
requirements for current conflicts are worked in days; requirements to
address conflicts that appear to be imminent are worked in weeks to
ensure that systems can be fielded in time; enduring warfghting
requirements are worked as quickly as possible using our streamlined
JCIDS. While we still look for ways to continuously improve the JCIDS
process, it has been dramatically enhanced and addresses requirements
through a more efficient and interactive process. Combatant commander
input is better incorporated to ensure joint capabilities produced are
more timely, precise and needs-based. The most recent changes to the
process consolidate guidance documents, streamline procedures, mandate
shorter document lengths, and reduce timelines to increase
effectiveness and responsiveness.
Question. What level of involvement in the joint requirements
process and the JROC do you believe is appropriate for the COCOMs?
Answer. As the primary customers for the capabilities delivered by
acquisition, the combatant commanders play a critical role in the joint
requirements process at all levels, to include the JROC. Combatant
command input during the requirements-generation process helps ensure
that joint-capability outcomes more accurately match the current and
future needs of the dynamic security environment. As such, we closely
review Combatant Commander Integrated Priority Lists and they are
invited to participate in every meeting. It is the norm for these
commanders to have a representative in a meeting that covers a topic of
importance to them.
Question. Do you think that JCIDS needs to be changed? If so, what
are your views on how it could be improved to make the process more
responsive to users' needs while efficiently investing resources in a
fiscally constrained budget environment?
Answer. Revisions made in early 2012 were a big step forward in
improving JCIDS, and the next scheduled review and revision of key
documents is ongoing. These documents include: The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5123.01 (JROC Charter), CJCSI
3170.01 (JCIDS Instruction), and the JCIDS Manual. Recent changes to
JCIDS emphasize flexibility and speed in requirements generation,
review, and validation. The changes also enable, when necessary,
reassessment and adjustments to previously validated documents when
poorly crafted requirements and timelines are identified. Preserving,
and building upon, these JCIDS revisions will promote greater
efficiencies and future success. In addition, we are working closely
with USD(AT&L) to ensure that the Defense Acquisition System and the
Joint Requirements processes are tightly synchronized and integrated to
ensure that requirements are valid, feasible and affordable.
Question. The requirements development process is not a stand-alone
process, but instead is required to work collaboratively with the
acquisition and budgeting processes.
What steps are needed to better align the requirements development
process with the acquisition and budgeting processes to make for a more
efficient and effective process for delivering capabilities?
Answer. The pending update to the Department of Defense Instruction
(DODI) 5000.02 and the revisions to JCIDS guidance documents will
improve coordination between our requirements and acquisition
processes. Additionally, I initiated and attend a quarterly leadership
forum with USD(AT&L) and Director-CAPE to help align requirements,
acquisition, and resourcing. These meetings have included macro
discussions on the process as well as a few individual programs, and I
look forward to expanding the concept. Developing a more synchronous
and flexible relationship between military requirements, acquisition,
and budgets will enable DOD to deliver its warfighter capabilities at
more reasonable costs.
acquisition reform and acquisition management
Question. What is your view of the changes made by the WSARA?
Answer. The WSARA has been important in making sure new defense
programs start on a sound footing to avoid the high cost of fixing
problems late in the acquisition process. It also helped foster a
culture within DOD focused on the continuous improvement of our
acquisition processes and their associated outcomes. I am very
encouraged by the cooperation we have built with USD(AT&L), which was
encouraged by the tenets of the WSARA.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in
the oversight and management of acquisition programs after requirements
have been established?
Answer. The JROC has an enduring title 10 oversight responsibility
to ensure that an acquisition program's requirements are realistic and
relevant throughout the life of the acquisition. The WSARA also
required the Secretary of Defense--via the Chairman and the JROC--to
ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and
performance as part of the requirements development and approval
process. We are seeing this play out, as the JROC has made several mid-
stride adjustments to requirements to reflect emerging realities during
acquisition, always ensuring warfighter needs are fully considered.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in
reviewing the progress of major defense acquisition programs or other
acquisition programs?
Answer. The progress of major defense acquisition programs is
monitored by the JROC often through Milestone C. JROC oversight is
required to ensure that an acquisition program's requirements
throughout its life are realistic and relevant. The WSARA also requires
the Secretary of Defense--via the Chairman and the JROC--to ensure that
trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as
part of the requirements development and approval process. A good
example of this is the JROC's continuing interest in the F-35, to
include the helmet associated with the aircraft. The JROC requires
periodic and detailed updates on JSF performance, cost and schedule to
ensure KPPs are appropriate in light of cost.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the
Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition
management processes?
Answer. No, I do not see a need for any change at this time.
Question. What is your view of the role played by Configuration
Steering Boards (CSB) in preventing cost growth due to requirements
creep?
Answer. CSBs provide an important senior level forum for
acquisition and requirements officials to review and assess
requirements to achieve balance between weapon system performance and
affordability over a program's lifecycle. They institutionalize
Military Service, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Joint
Staff review of potential requirements trade-offs. While the CSBs are
gathering momentum, my understanding is that USD(AT&L) is very
supportive of using this process to help identify areas where
requirements may need refinement.
Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between CSBs
and the JROC in managing requirements for acquisition programs?
Answer. CSBs provide an important senior level forum for
acquisition and requirements officials to review and assess
requirements to achieve balance between weapon system performance and
affordability over a program's lifecycle. A key output of a CSB could
be a recommendation to the appropriate validation authority--the JROC
in the case of KPPs--to review or relax a requirement in order to
achieve a better balance between performance and affordability.
Question. What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for
Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule,
and performance objectives?
Answer. The Nunn-McCurdy requirements have introduced rigor into
our processes and better scrutiny of Major Defense Acquisition Programs
regarding cost, schedule, and performance objectives. I particularly
appreciate the flexibility within the process to account in particular
for price increases solely due to quantity decreases.
Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between the
JROC and those DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy
requirements?
Answer. I do not recommend any changes at this time. The current
relationship between the JROC and DOD officials charged with
implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements is appropriate. The JROC's
role is to validate the criticality to national security of the systems
based on the estimated increase in cost.
urgent needs processes
Question. In your view, what specific steps should the Department
take to better manage the joint urgent needs process?
Answer. The Department exercises sound management of the Joint
Urgent Needs process. DOD Directive 5000.71 (Rapid Fulfillment of
Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs) was recently approved. It
established the Warfighter Senior Integration Group to lead and
facilitate agile and rapid responses to validated combatant commander
urgent operational needs. In addition, we recently added the ability
for combatant commanders to request rapid capability fielding if
conflict is imminent (rather than ongoing) through a Joint Emergent
Operational Needs (JEON) document. I believe we have struck the right
discipline and balance between addressing truly urgent and emergent
warfighter needs and merely using the system to circumvent the rigor of
the deliberate process (while at the same time we are streamlining the
latter process).
Question. What is your sense of where DOD might consolidate urgent
needs entities and/or processes and how cost savings could be achieved
through such consolidation?
Answer. This is an area where we have taken many steps, and seen
important results, over the past several years. To further improve upon
our efforts, the Department is reviewing the entities and processes
that we use to fill urgent capability gaps in light of our drawdown
from Afghanistan. Without pre-judging any results, it is possible we
could consolidate these entities, and we will remain vigilant for such
opportunities. The goal will be to ensure the Department is still
poised to quickly address evolving threats as we draw down from our
wartime footing, while ensuring the efforts are properly-scaled for
anticipated future requirements.
Question. Do you believe that the Joint Staff should take steps to
integrate the Joint Urgent Needs process with the individual services'
processes? If so, please explain?
Answer. We are currently reviewing our urgent needs processes, to
include seeking efficiencies and deconfliction between the Services'
processes and joint processes. Despite the success of our joint
processes, I believe we will find that each Service will still need a
way to address critical needs that are specific to their component.
nuclear weapons council
Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, you will continue to serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons
Council.
What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC)?
Answer. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal is
a key priority in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), central to the
responsibilities of the NWC. I have worked closely with the other NWC
members to develop a plan for the Nuclear Enterprise that is
responsible and affordable to ensure a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal for the long term. The refinement and execution of this
plan continues to be my priority. We will need to remain vigilant, as
the effects of potential full sequestration levels of funding on the
Enterprise are not yet fully understood.
Additionally, I will continue to work with other NWC members to
ensure modernization of our aging nuclear facilities and investment in
nuclear enterprise-related human capital, to accelerate dismantlement
of retired warheads, and to improve our understanding of foreign
nuclear weapons activities.
Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the
organization, structure, or function of the NWC?
Answer. I have served as a member of the NWC for the past 2 years
and have no firm change recommendations at this time. However, if
confirmed, I will continue work with the NWC chairman and members to
assess the organization, structure and function of the NWC, and where
warranted, provide recommendations for changes to increase
effectiveness and value in support of the nuclear mission for national
security. I will also remain alert for any need to adjust governance of
the Nuclear Enterprise's activities.
integration of space programs
Question. What is your view on the need to institute a more
integrated approach to both the military and intelligence sides of the
space community?
Answer. I believe we are making progress in this area. The military
and intelligence space communities participate in a number of joint
forums and joint program development. We expect senior leaders to be
innovative in identifying and implementing integrated programs. This is
necessary for efficacy and efficiency in a much more constrained budget
environment. However, when the needs of either community diverge to the
extent that joint solutions impose impractical cost and risk, careful
consideration should be given to viable independent, yet complementary
solutions.
space program management
Question. In many instances the military and intelligence space
programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties.
In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with
establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining
control over the integrity of the requirements once established. If
confirmed as chairman of the JROC you will be involved in determining
these requirements.
How in your view can or should the space systems requirements
process be improved?
Answer. All weapon systems requirements are closely scrutinized to
best meet the needs of the Joint Force in terms of cost, schedule, and
performance. If confirmed, I will continue to work with senior leaders
to improve early and continuous coordination between OSD, the military,
and intelligence communities throughout the space acquisition
requirements process. The active participation of the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) Commander has been most helpful in this regard.
Question. In general, space programs take many years to move from
conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the
satellites is significantly outdated by the time the satellites are
launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to
terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious
cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as
sunk costs are never fully amortized.
How in your view can this cycle be addressed?
Answer. The WSARA is designed to help ensure that new defense
acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost
and schedule impacts of fixing problems later in the acquisition
process.
Some aspects of this phenomenon will be very difficult to fix, as
satellites by nature of their complexity and rigorous requirement for
reliability take considerable time to design, build, and launch.
However, I believe we can make improvements in our space programs by
ensuring early, ongoing and rigorous reviews of costs, requirements,
and performance, and their alignment. Again, bringing the expertise
available from the STRATCOM Commander will be a key element in placing
this cycle on a tighter rotation.
space cooperation
Question. Do you support arms control limitations on space
capabilities?
I continue to support the principles outlined in the 2010 National
Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral
and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to
encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. The
Department should only consider proposals and concepts for arms control
measures that are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the
national security of the United States and its allies.
Question. Would you support the United States signing the so-called
European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?
Answer. The Department is currently supporting the State Department
in negotiations on the European Union's proposed International Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities. This is an effort to develop a
pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe activities in space. If
confirmed, I remain committed to continuing our support to evaluating
proposed drafts of the Code and considering appropriate steps to
establish rules of the road for space operations that are consistent
with our national security interests and access to space.
operationally responsive space
Question. Do you support the concept of operationally responsive
small satellites and what do you see as the most promising
opportunities for small satellites?
Answer. I support resilience in space programs and we are
continuing to review and support programs that best meet the needs of
the Joint Force in future conflicts and given fiscal constraints. Given
unlimited funding I would want to push further and faster on this
program. Under the current environment we will need to be very
selective in pursuing operationally responsive space, and should select
only those that provide best value. The most promising concepts would
be for rapid reinsertion of communications and surveillance capability
in the wake of the initial stages of a conflict with a space-capable
adversary.
Question. Do you believe that smaller less complicated less
expensive satellites can play a role in providing resiliency or
redundancy for space systems?
Answer. I support resilience in space programs and we are
continuing to review and support programs that best meet the needs of
the Joint Force in future conflicts, within fiscal constraints. Such
programs could include smaller less complicated less expensive
satellites, and it could also include adding payloads to other
satellites.
prompt global strike
Question. DOD is currently working on technologies that if
successful could lead to the decision to develop and deploy
conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability.
Do you believe that a prompt global strike capability should be
developed and deployed?
Answer. Although a decision has not been made to deploy such a
capability, I believe it would have potential utility in a variety of
time-sensitive scenarios and would thus provide greater flexibility to
the President for taking kinetic action if required. There are
potential future circumstances that may require a capability to address
high value, time sensitive and defended targets from ranges outside the
current conventional technology. Therefore, we continue to look for
affordable technology risk reduction and maturation of engineering
concepts.
Question. If your answer to the previous question is yes, what is
your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt
global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to
develop the capability?
Answer. If a decision is made to develop and deploy a capability,
it should have specific attributes. The capability should influence,
dissuade, or defeat an adversary using conventional weapons to rapidly
penetrate or circumvent access-denied areas. It could be useful in
situations ranging from a rapid strike against a known terrorist
leader, to hitting a rogue regime's mobile missile that is positioned
for launch, to quickly interfering with the ability of an adversary to
target one of our space assets. This is an example of how we are
actually trying to constrain requirements so we don't end up with gold
plated systems we can't afford. So while it should be both prompt and
accurate, not requiring the capability to hit any target on the globe
or hit hard and deeply buried targets should allow us to hold an
adequate set of targets at risk at lower cost.
nuclear weapons
Question. If confirmed, you will continue to be a member of the
Nuclear Weapons Council, and work closely with the National Nuclear
Security Administration and its Stockpile Stewardship Program.
What, in your view, are the longer-term Stockpile Stewardship
Program goals and what are the key elements that should be addressed
from a DOD perspective?
Answer. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with
the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental
tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear
weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for
nuclear weapons explosive testing. The Secretaries of Defense and
Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
I believe these goals are appropriate and the program is effective;
today's stockpile has been certified without a need for further nuclear
testing. But the stockpile is aging. The Nuclear Weapons Council has
developed a long-term plan that includes life extension programs to
address aging concerns and enhance safety and security in a responsible
manner. I believe the plan is executable and affordable. If confirmed,
I will work across the interagency to ensure this plan is continuously
updated and implemented.
Question. In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship Program
providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of
the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing and if not what tools are
needed?
Answer. I believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program provides
the requisite tools, as attested to by the national security lab
directors in their annual assessment letters. These tools are critical
as we life-extend our aging nuclear weapons. As we sustain the program,
it is important these tools allow us to assess the full range of life
extension programs to include: refurbishment of existing warheads,
reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of
nuclear components.
Question. Do you believe the administration's 1251 report sets
forth an appropriate road map for the modernization of the nuclear
weapons complex and the strategic delivery systems?
Answer. The administration's section 1043 report, which has
replaced the 1251 report, describes an appropriate roadmap for ensuring
the future safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile
and associated delivery platforms as well as for modernizing the
nuclear weapons complex. The plan described in the 1043 report
represents a strong commitment to the nuclear mission and is an
important element of assurance that the U.S. deterrent remains strong.
Additionally, this plan reflects the work of the Nuclear Weapons
Council in developing an executable and affordable long-term plan for
the Nuclear Enterprise.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. Funding of the 1043 report, which has replaced the 1251
report, is a critical national security priority. The President's
fiscal year 2014 budget request again includes a significant commitment
from DOD to modernizing the nuclear weapon complex and supporting the
long-term plan for extending the life of the weapons in our enduring
stockpile. If confirmed, I will support the continued modernization and
sustainment of our nuclear weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and
infrastructure.
Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you
believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) limits for either the deployed or
nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?
Answer. U.S. objectives in future negotiations with Russia must
consider multiple factors. It is my view that any reductions in the
numbers of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons, either strategic
or non-strategic, would need to be negotiated in a manner that
strengthens deterrence of potential adversaries, maintains strategic
stability with Russia and China, and assures our allies and partners.
The timing and size of reductions, if any, would have to be closely
coupled to the status of the modernization effort. If confirmed, I will
support the Department's continuing assessment of the proper force size
and capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent.
new start treaty and future reductions
Question. The New START treaty has now entered into force. Under
the terms of the treaty both sides have 7 years to come into compliance
with the treaty.
Do you believe that there is any opportunity to come into
compliance in less than 7 years and what would be the conditions under
which such compliance could be achieved?
Answer. I believe the United States will be compliant by the
February 2018 deadline although we have not made a final decision on
the compliant force structure. Continued funding support from Congress
is required to ensure the required activities of the department and the
Services can be executed in a timely fashion for compliance. While
achieving the limits on delivery vehicles will take nearly the entire
compliance period, it may be possible to accelerate other elements of
compliance, such as achieving the total deployed warhead limit of 1550
up to a year early.
Question. Do you believe that reductions in the total number of
warheads, both Reserve and operationally deployed, is feasible prior to
the expiration of the New START treaty and, if so, under what
conditions?
Answer. The treaty requires the Parties to ensure their strategic
offensive forces are at or below the treaty's three central limits 7
years after entry into force, which will occur on February 5, 2018. DOD
is on schedule to comply with this obligation. The treaty expires in
2021 and may be extended one time for 5 years if both the United States
and Russia agree. Once we are in compliance with the central limits, it
is technically feasible to further reduce the total number of warheads;
however I would only recommend such reductions through negotiations
with Russia.
nuclear triad modernization
Question. Under the NPR, the administration has committed to begin
modernization of each leg of the nuclear triad including development of
new nuclear cruise missiles and extending the life of nuclear weapons.
This process will continue over the next 30 years and longer, and will
be very expensive.
If confirmed, would you agree to review the requirements and cost
of these initiatives, identify any opportunities for cost savings, and
report back to the committee on a periodic basis if you identify such
opportunities?
Answer. Yes. This falls under my responsibilities as Vice Chairman,
and I would be pleased, if confirmed, to report any opportunities for
cost savings to the committee. I am currently paying close attention
within the bounds of my authority to development of the Long Range
Strike Bomber, and intend to do the same for the new SSBN. I serve as a
member of the Nuclear Weapons Council and have contributed over the
past 2 years at developing an affordable and executable strategy for
the Nuclear Enterprise that includes life extension programs of nuclear
weapons.
nuclear weapons employment strategy
Question. President Obama recently issued new guidance on nuclear
weapons employments strategy, consistent with the 2010 NPR.
Do you support the President's new nuclear weapons employment
guidance, and did you have an opportunity to provide input to the
formulation of the new guidance?
Answer. Yes. I support the President's new guidance. The Commander
of STRATCOM and I and our staffs both participated in the analysis
process. The two of us and General Dempsey participated in senior
leader meetings during development of the guidance, where, based on the
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of
STRATCOM we provided our military advice to both the Secretary of
Defense and the President.
Question. Do you agree with the President's assessment that the
United States can ensure its security, and the security of our allies
and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent
while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic
nuclear weapons below the level established in the New START treaty?
Please explain your views.
Answer. Yes. I agree with this assessment. We can ensure our
security and that of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and
credible strategic deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond
the New START treaty central limits. However, to be clear on this
point, we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization of
our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Further,
my advice is that further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons,
beyond the New START treaty central limits, should occur as part of a
negotiated position with Russia. Both General Dempsey and I have made
this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.
Question. Please explain the risks and benefits of pursuing up to a
one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons, including the
implications of the vast disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between
Russia and the United States.
Answer. From our post-NPR analysis and close work with STRATCOM,
the Navy, and the Air Force, I am confident we can ensure our security
and that of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible
strategic deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond the New
START treaty central limits. However, to be very clear on this point,
we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization of our
nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Also, further
reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, beyond the New START treaty
central limits, should occur as part of a negotiated position with
Russia in order to preserve strategic stability.
As we negotiate further reductions with Russia, to include their
larger number of non-strategic nuclear weapons, I'm encouraged by the
administration's efforts to expand the scope of those reductions to
include both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons that are both
deployed and non-deployed. I believe this is a prudent approach that
will maintain strategic stability with Russia and adequately meet the
President's goals of reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons.
strategic systems
Question. Over the next 5 years, DOD will begin to replace or begin
studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next
15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic
nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.
Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to
afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the
rest of the DOD commitments?
Answer. Yes. I am concerned that in the current budget environment
will we be challenged to complete these modernization programs; thus,
if confirmed, I will be paying very close attention to these programs
as they develop and mature. The modernization of the strategic delivery
systems and sustainment of the strategic nuclear enterprise is
important to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent and is essential to deterring potential adversaries and
assuring our allies. As with any funding choices in a fiscally
constrained environment we will make decisions that will provide the
best possible systems that are fiscally prudent while managing
appropriate risk.
Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and
replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?
Answer. Yes. This falls under the responsibilities of Vice Chairman
and I will continue to review the modernization and replacement
programs to ensure that they are cost effective. I am already closely
monitoring the Long Range Strike Bomber program and am satisfied that
it is currently on track.
Question. The Department will begin to issue guidance from the
recent decision to revise the Nuclear Employment Strategy.
Do you support this change in strategy?
Answer. Yes. As Vice Chairman I had the opportunity to participate,
along with the Commander, STRATCOM, in the discussion of the new
strategy and to provide the inputs from the Joint Chiefs.
Question. Will you keep Congress fully informed of additional
guidance issued in response to this changed strategy?
Answer. Yes. I have and will continue to fully inform Congress of
additional guidance issued as a result of the change in the Nuclear
Employment Strategy.
future technologies
Question. During the Cold War, DOD pursued three key technologies
to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces:
precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-based
navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces
unparalleled superiority until now. Our technology edge, however, in
these areas is beginning to erode. Last year, DOD published seven
strategic science and technology priorities.
Do you believe these priorities are still relevant today?
Answer. Yes. The Joint Staff participated in a DOD process in 2011
to publish seven strategic science and technology priorities:
electronic warfare/protection, data to decisions, engineered resilient
systems, cyber science and technology, counter WMD, autonomy and human
systems. These seven priorities are still relevant today in assuring
our leadership and superiority in future conflicts.
Question. If not, what additional technology priority areas should
DOD be pursuing?
Answer. These seven strategic areas remain fully relevant. We need
to ensure that several key capabilities remain included within research
and development in these areas, including greater cyber capability
(with emphasis on network protection), fully protected precision
navigation and timing that is semi-independent of the global
positioning system constellation, high speed standoff weapons, and
improved ability for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
through adverse weather and foliage.
ballistic missile defense
Question. Do you agree that the current Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system, with interceptors deployed in Alaska and California,
provides defense of the entire United States--including the east
coast--against missile threats from both North Korea and Iran, and do
you have confidence in that system?
Answer. Yes. I agree that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
system, supported by other elements of the ballistic missile defense
architecture, provides defense of the United States from both a limited
North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile attack. I am
confident in the system and say this even in light of the recent
failure of a CE I missile test, of which we have now had three of four
tests execute successfully. We still believe in this program and are
determined that it succeed.
Question. On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
announced a series of initiatives to improve our homeland ballistic
missile defense capabilities, including the planned deployment of 14
additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska, to help stay
ahead of the long-range missile threat from North Korea and Iran.
Do you support the initiatives announced by Secretary Hagel, and do
you believe they will help us stay ahead of the threat from North Korea
and Iran?
Answer. Yes. I support Secretary Hagel's initiatives and believe
they will improve DOD's ability to counter future missile threats from
Iran and North Korea, while maximizing the benefit from increasingly
scarce taxpayer resources.
Question. As indicated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, the administration is pursuing a ``fly-before-you-buy''
approach to missile defense, and will test systems in an operationally
realistic manner to demonstrate they will work as intended before we
deploy them. Since a GBI flight test failure with the Capability
Enhancement-II kill vehicle in 2010, the Missile Defense Agency has
been working to fix the problem and plans to conduct an intercept
flight test in the spring of 2014 to demonstrate the fix.
Do you agree with the ``fly-before-you-buy'' policy, and do you
agree with Secretary Hagel that, before we deploy the additional GBIs,
we need to test and demonstrate the fix so we demonstrate its
capability and have confidence that it will work as intended?
Answer. Yes. I agree with the ``fly-before-you-buy'' approach to
test systems in an operationally realistic manner. It is essential to
correct system issues before they affect the deployed forces.
Question. Section 227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for
possible future homeland missile defense sites in the United States, in
case the President determines to proceed with such a deployment in the
future. That EIS process is expected to be complete in early 2016.
Do you agree that the EIS process should be completed prior to
making any decision relative to possible deployment of an additional
homeland missile defense site in the United States, including possibly
on the east coast?
Answer. I agree the Department must comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act and conduct an EIS prior to the actual
deployment of an additional missile defense site in the United States.
It follows that it would be wise to obtain the results of the EIS
before making any decisions.
Question. Do you agree with the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency and the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense that there is currently ``no validated
military requirement to deploy an East Coast missile defense site''?
Answer. Yes. Technically there is currently no validated military
requirement to deploy an East Coast Missile Defense Site. However, that
could change based on the trajectory of the threat from Iran, so we
continuously analyze this assessment and will update it as required if
we conclude differently.
Question. Do you agree with their assessment that ``investment in
Ballistic Missile Defense System discrimination and sensor capabilities
would result in more cost-effective near-term improvements to homeland
missile defense'' than deploying an east coast missile defense site?
Answer. Yes. The MDA Director has made a compelling case that,
along with reliability improvements to the interceptor, better sensor
and discrimination capability would reduce the number of interceptors
required to engage a given target. Thus, I believe this is the more
cost effective approach and so agree with their assessment, which is
consistent with the Department's analysis. However, if the threat
achieves a trajectory that would indicate greatly increased capacity
for producing ballistic missiles, it could be necessary to deploy an
East Coast missile defense site, so we continue to assess the
requirement.
Question. Do you agree with the following statements regarding a
potential East Coast missile defense site:

General Jacoby (Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)):
``A third site, wherever the decision is to build a third site,
would give me better weapons access, increased GBI inventory
and allow us the battle space to more optimize our defense
against future threats from Iran and North Korea.''
General Formica (Commander Space and Missile Defense
Command): ``Certainly, it brings increased capacity and
increased capability than we have at Fort Greely.''
National Research Council: ``A GBI site located in
northeastern United States would be much more effective and
reliable and would allow considerably more battle space and
firing doctrine options.

I fully agree with the first two statements. The question is
whether or not a third site will be required given the trajectory of
Iran's ability to produce quantities of ballistic missiles that can
threaten the United States. I generally agree with the third statement,
except a GBI site in the United States will not increase reliability--
only improved interceptors and sensors and other technical improvements
will accomplish that objective.
Question. Do you agree that Presidents Bush and Obama put in place
policies that called for additional missile defense sites in Europe to
better defend against threats to the United States from Iran?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Is this presidentially directed requirement still valid
and if not, what has changed to permit the elimination of this
requirement for a third interceptor site?
Answer. We have subsequently determined that, while maintaining our
commitment to the defense of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies in Europe, it would be wiser and more fiscally prudent to
invest in ballistic missile defense capability in terms of improved
sensors and increased capacity at existing sites, while we evaluate the
need for a third site in the United States. Engagement geometry and
cost both favor this approach.
Question. You have focused on improving the cost effectiveness and
affordability of our major weapon systems, including missile defenses.
Missile defense systems are limited in quantity primarily by their very
high cost, which is exacerbated in the current financial environment
that includes sequestration.
What are your views on whether and how we can make missile defenses
more cost-effective and affordable, and how we can manage our missile
defense capabilities in a manner that best meets the needs of our
combatant commanders?
Answer. We remain mindful of the fact that we are on a negative
economic glideslope regarding regional ballistic missile defense, in
which the offense is able to use relatively cheap missiles that are
countered by relatively expensive defensive systems. In this regard, we
should apply greater emphasis on more economic passive defense measures
such as dispersal and hardening in order to make the most of our more
complex defensive assets. We should also emphasize interoperability on
a joint and coalition basis in order to use the full spectrum of
offensive and defensive capabilities in a comprehensive joint manner so
as to provide the best defense with the most economical use of
resources. Candidly, we have more work to do in this regard, but are
making progress. I have favored encouraging our coalition partners,
including those in the Arabian Gulf region and the Western Pacific, to
invest in ballistic missile defense capability in order to free
resources for our own ballistic missile defense needs. Finally, I also
favored moving a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery to Guam,
which not only provides defense for Guam but also yields an asset that
is globally deployable operating day-to-day in an actual operational
environment in which it defends U.S. territory.
u.s.-iraq strategic relationship
Question. What is your assessment of the development of the U.S.-
Iraq strategic relationship since the withdrawal of U.S. military
forces at the end of 2011 consistent with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement?
Answer. The development of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship
since 2011 has been a slow and deliberate process. The conflict in
Syria, the Arab awakening, internal sectarian divisions, and Iran's
ambitions for influence have dominated Iraq's focus. Sectarian violence
and authoritarian moves by Prime Minister Maliki have also hindered
some efforts. In many areas, U.S. and Iraqi strategic goals align, but
in areas with less common ground such as Syria we continue to engage
the Iraqis in order to transform them into true regional partners.
Iraq's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program offers a strong foundation
to develop this strategic relationship, and the $14.3 billion in
committed Iraqi national funds to FMS cases is a clear indication of
the desire to continue to nurture our strategic relationship.
Question. What areas, if any, do you see for the enhancement of the
military-to-military relationship between Iraq and the United States?
Answer. The main areas to enhance the U.S.-Iraq military-to-
military relationship are the FMS program, the International Military
Education and Training (IMET), and bilateral or multilateral exercises.
The FMS program provides an avenue for Iraqi Security Forces to train
on U.S. equipment and, in part, inside the United States. The IMET
program helps develop Iraqi leaders through intermediate and senior
level development education and long-term relationships with
counterparts in the U.S. military. Both programs offer the opportunity
to continue and enhance our military-to-military relationship. The
U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and Joint Military Cooperation
Agreement help ensure our military-to-military relationship remains on
track.
Question. In your view, does the Office of Security Cooperation
within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq have the right staffing levels and
personnel to carry out its mission?
Answer. Based on assessments from the Chief of the Office of
Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) and the U.S. Ambassador, I believe
we have sufficient personnel to execute a coherent strategy between the
Department of State and DOD. With the transition of Office of Security
Cooperation in Iraq training sites during calendar year 2013 and the
continued transition to FMS funded training, the previous need for
250(+) personnel in OSC-I has dissipated. I think we are on track to
have the right number of personnel at the end of September 2013, using
the glide path plan agreed upon by DOD, the U.S. Mission Iraq, and Main
State. The Chief of OSC-I and the Ambassador will reassess the manning
requirements once the last four sites transition later this year.
Question. What safeguards can be used to ensure Iraq does not
employ F-16s in a way that increases sectarian strife within Iraq?
Answer. In addition to political influence based on our bilateral
relationship, we would also retain the option of withholding F-16
training, support equipment, spare parts, or munitions. Iraqi misuse of
F-16 aircraft would also complicate and potentially jeopardize FMS,
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Individual Military Education and
Training--which provides a credible deterrent. However, this issue
offers no easy solution, and it is a challenge we face to some degree
when we sell weapons systems to any partner.
security situation in afghanistan
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
in Afghanistan?
Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan continues to improve,
and the ANSF is proving they are willing and capable of assuming the
lead in security operations. U.S. and coalition forces, working side by
side with our Afghan partners, have reversed the Taliban's momentum and
pushed insurgents out of population centers. The ANSF and ISAF continue
to deprive the insurgents of key safe havens, command and control
nodes, and support zones. They are now less capable, less popular, and
less of a threat to the Afghan Government than a year ago. Despite this
degradation, safe havens in Afghanistan and sanctuaries in Pakistan
continue to provide Taliban senior leadership some freedom of movement
and freedom of action. Additionally, Afghan Taliban and all its
subgroups, including the Haqqani Network, remain capable of conducting
isolated high profile attacks that, as intended, capture
disproportionate attention. However, sustained counterterrorism
pressure continues to degrade this ability.
transition of security responsibility in afghanistan
Question. In February of this year, President Obama announced that
by February 2014 U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan will be reduced to
34,000. In June, the Afghan National Security Forces achieved
Transition Milestone 2013, assuming the lead responsibility for
security throughout Afghanistan.
Do you support the President's decision to reduce U.S. troop levels
in Afghanistan to 34,000 by February 2014? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes. Transition Milestone 2013 represents a significant
shift for our mission in Afghanistan. Over the past 11 years, the
United States and our partners have led combat operations. Now the
Afghans are taking the lead for their own security. ISAF's primary
focus has shifted from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We match troop levels to
the mission and our new mission requires fewer troops on the ground.
The President's decision to drawdown U.S. forces was made based on the
ISAF Commander's input, the real and tangible progress of the ISAF
military campaign, and a comprehensive assessment of conditions on the
ground, including an increasingly capable and confident ANSF.
Question. What is your understanding regarding the pace of those
reductions in U.S. forces?
Answer. Troop reductions are based on our mission, ANSF capability
and conditions on the ground. We are on path to meet our objective of
34,000 troops by February 2014, to include troops, bases, and
equipment. It is important for the ISAF Commander to have the
flexibility to meet his mission and sustain the right forces through
this fighting season and he has the latitude to manage the glideslope
from now to the end of the year as we settle into a supporting role.
Question. Do you support the June transition to the Afghan security
forces of lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan?
Answer. I support the transition of responsibility for security to
a capable and confident ANSF. ANSF improvement has enabled us to
achieve transition Milestone 2013. There are occasional setbacks and
deficiencies, but the ANSF continues to demonstrate its ability to
defeat the Taliban and provide security to the Afghan people.
Question. In your view, is the campaign on track for the completion
of the ISAF mission and the assumption by Afghan security forces of
full responsibility for the country's security by December 2014?
Answer. Yes. The ANSF are at the forefront of the fight and are now
responsible for maintaining and expanding security in the face of the
insurgency. In late 2009, a concerted effort to grow the ANSF was
initiated with the goal of generating and fielding trained and equipped
Afghan combat elements and getting them into the fight. Unit partnering
between Afghan and ISAF forces--enabled by the U.S. troop surge ordered
by President Obama--provided the ANSF the space to develop combat
capabilities and leadership skills from the tactical level on up.
Moving into the 2013 fighting season, the insurgency now confronts a
combined ANSF and Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) force of nearly
350,000 personnel who have secured over 87 percent of Afghanistan's
population, and are leading 93 percent of all conventional operations.
The only conventional operations they are not leading are a small
number of unilateral conventional operations including security patrols
around ISAF bases, route clearance patrols, and retrograde operations.
These forces are operating with growing confidence, improved
leadership, warfighting capability, and a vision for the future. They
are a source of security, confidence, and pride for the Afghan people--
factors the insurgents must consider as their influence and
effectiveness in Afghanistan wanes.
building the afghan national security forces
Question. In your view, is the current end strength level of
352,000 for the ANSF the appropriate level to provide security and
stability in Afghanistan beyond 2014?
Answer. In my view, the 352,000 ANSF force level should continue
beyond 2014. The extension of the ANSF ``surge'' force has been
instrumental in breaking Taliban momentum. This force structure also
enables our own troop reductions and retrograde operations. It is too
early to assess the duration of this surge, but at a minimum, this
extension would likely be necessary for at least 2 years following the
end of the ISAF mission.
Question. What in your view are the greatest challenges to
completing efforts to build the capacity of the ANSF to assume
responsibility for Afghanistan's security?
Answer. Although not insurmountable, the main challenges we face in
building the capacity of the ANSF are attrition, leadership, limited
literacy and low technical competence. Low literacy rates, in
particular, hamper the ANSF ability to meet goals in more technical
areas. This is of greatest concern in the Afghan Air Force. Under
current conditions, the creation of a fully functional Afghan Air Force
is still 4 to 5 years off. ANSF has made great strides and is showing
significant improvement, but these issues continue to undermine
positive recruiting, training, professionalization, and competency
goals. These are not problems that can be solved in the short term, but
ISAF is continuing to work with the MoI and the MoD to address training
the force in areas of professionalism, leadership, literacy, and
technical competency. Over time, and with our assistance, we are
confident that the ANSF address these challenges.
Question. A recent audit report by the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) raised concerns about DOD plans
to purchase PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan Special
Mission Wing and recommended suspending the contracts for these
purchases. The Department of Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan did not concur with the SIGAR's recommendation on
contract suspension.
What is your assessment of current plans to equip the Afghan
Special Mission Wing with PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters?
Answer. Our strategy in Afghanistan includes reducing the reliance
on U.S. enablers by building the capability of the ANSF. Developing the
Afghan Air Force and the SMW is a key element in reducing our
requirement to provide aviation support to the ANSF. The fact is that
Afghans are better able to fly and maintain these systems, which will
be a necessary capability for the ANSF to prevail over the Taliban.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact to Afghanistan
counterterrorism efforts if Mi-17 helicopters are not acquired?
Answer. It is critical for us to support a robust helicopter
capability within the ANSF. Analysis shows that the Mi-17 is the best
all-around helicopter for them. The ANSF is familiar with the Mi-17,
which is well suited for transporting combat-ready Afghan troops
throughout remote, high, hot, and rugged terrain with minimal ground
support. It is easier for the ANSF to maintain this helicopter than
more sophisticated aircraft. While it is unfortunate that the Mi-17 is
the optimal vertical lift solution for the ANSF, we view it as critical
for successful transition of security to the ANSF.
Question. Do you support the SIGAR recommendation to suspend the
contracts to acquire these aircraft and helicopters for the Special
Mission Wing? Why or why not?
Answer. We support the SIGAR audit in general but not the specific
recommendation to suspend contracts for the Special Mission Wing. We,
to include COMISAF, believe that we can overcome the difficulties of
maintenance, training and personnel that were identified in the audit.
It is in both Afghan and U.S. interest that the Afghans develop their
own counterterrorism and counternarcotics capability on a timeline that
supports our transition. These aircraft are essential for these tasks.
That said, we acknowledge the maintenance and operational challenges
that SIGAR identifies. We will work through these in concert with
COMISAF. We cannot afford, however, the sequential approach that SIGAR
recommends. Training, maintenance, personnel and aircraft procurement
will continue apace with governing management to ensure coordinated
fielding of ready capability. Notably in this context, the Mi-17 is the
best aircraft to meet the SIGAR identified challenges. The Afghans have
over 30 years of experience with the Mi-17 to include current
operations. Any other aircraft would substantially worsen the
challenges reported in the audit and set back fielded capability by
years.
enduring strategic partnership with afghanistan
Question. Do you support maintaining an enduring strategic
partnership between the United States and Afghanistan beyond 2014?
Answer. Yes. We remain committed to an enduring strategic
partnership with Afghanistan. Such a partnership is in our national
interest, and critical to our objectives of disrupting, dismantling,
and defeating al Qaeda and preventing its return to Afghanistan, and
denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government.
Question. How would you describe the main U.S. strategic interests
regarding an enduring relationship with Afghanistan and in that region?
Answer. We are committed to a long-term partnership with
Afghanistan. It is in our national interest to ensure that Afghanistan
never again becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda or its affiliates that
pose a threat to our Homeland.
special operations in afghanistan
Question. Special Operations Forces depend on general purpose
forces for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical
evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations
Command, has said ``I have no doubt that special operations will be the
last to leave Afghanistan'' and has predicted that the requirement for
Special Operations Forces may increase as general purpose forces
continue to be drawn down.
If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities
for Special Operations Forces as general purpose forces continue to
draw down in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure adequate enabling
capabilities to support the SOF mission by working collaboratively with
CENTCOM and NATO to determine requirements and fill them to the maximum
extent possible. These enabling capabilities would be tailored to
support our post-2014 mission and would be based on force levels that
have yet to be decided.
Question. In April 2012, the U.S. and Afghanistan signed a
memorandum of understanding on the ``Afghanization'' of direct action
counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan--reflecting the shared
intention of having Afghan security forces in the lead in the conduct
of such operations with U.S. forces in a support role.
What is the status of efforts to put Afghan Special Operations
Forces in the lead for such operations and why do you believe such a
transition is important?
Answer. The ANSF SOF continue to make significant progress in
operational effectiveness, and their independence, capacity, and
competence. One hundred percent of ANA Special Operation Forces
missions are Afghan led, and approximately 60 percent of Provincial
Response Company police missions are Afghan led. With our mentorship,
their ability to execute these types of missions continues to grow in
sophistication. This capability is critical for GIRoA to demonstrate
its ability to lead security operations.
Question. The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local
Police (ALP) programs--both U.S. Special Operations missions--have been
consistently praised by U.S. military leaders as critical elements of
the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
What are your views on the value of these programs and do you
believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan
(i.e. post-2014)?
Answer. These programs represent a visible expression of local
security to many Afghans, particularly those in remote and isolated
communities. GIRoA has identified VSO/ALP as a necessary pillar of its
own long-term strategy. These programs provide a vehicle for GIRoA to
extend governance to the local level.
pakistan
Question. What is your assessment of the military-to-military
relationship between the United States and Pakistan?
Answer. Our military-to-military relationship has improved in the
past year, emerging from the crisis that occurred subsequent to the
cross-border incident in late 2011 and subsequent closure of the ground
lines of communication through Pakistan used for our logistics in
Afghanistan. While Pakistan defines its interests in ways that overlap
but are not identical to ours, our military-to-military ties allow us
to engage Pakistan in areas of shared concern such as maintaining
regional stability, curbing violent extremism, and countering the
threat of improvised explosive devices. The Chairman, the Central
Command Commander, and the ISAF Commander have frequent interaction
with General Kayani, and the Office of the Defense Representative in
Pakistan has close ties with counterparts. Pakistani counterinsurgency
operations against extremist organizations have been helpful to our
efforts in the region. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund
reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan
forces have helped enable these operations. The Pakistani military has
also hosted several U.S. delegations this year to discuss the IED
problem and other issues.
Question. Should that military-to-military relationship be
enhanced, and if so, what steps would you recommend for doing so, if
confirmed?
Answer. Military-to-military ties with Pakistan are an important
aspect of the broader bilateral relationship. A key moment in this
relationship will occur when General Kayani transitions out of his job
this fall. The Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan plays
an important role in building and sustaining military-military ties
with security assistance programs. As Pakistan's democratic
consolidation progresses, we must ensure we maintain our military-to-
military ties. Security cooperation cannot succeed without the buy-in
of Pakistani military leadership and continued support of the U.S.
Congress. I meet with Pakistani representatives when they are in
Washington, but normally leave the central personal interactions to the
Chairman, the Central Command Commander, and the ISAF Commander in
order to keep under control the number of different voices the
Pakistani leadership hears. However, if confirmed, I will focus on
ensuring our relations remain smooth and stable during the transition
to General Kayani's successor, along with ways in which we can work
productively with Pakistan to enhance security along the shared border
with Afghanistan and stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
iran
Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has
failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current
and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed
by Iran?
Answer. Iran's persistent, though often clumsy, efforts to
undermine our partners and spread its influence pose a significant
potential threat to the United States, our allies and partners, and our
regional and global interests. Countering Iran's destabilizing hostile
behavior requires addressing multiple threat vectors, including
conventional military, unconventional state-sponsored terrorism, and
nuclear challenges.

Conventional Military Challenges. Iran is actively
investing in the development of a range of conventional
capabilities, including air, missile, and naval assets that
have generated regional anxieties and could threaten our
interests and personnel in the region. Iran continues to
publicly threaten to use naval and missile forces to close the
Strait of Hormuz or target U.S. interests and regional partners
in response to increasing sanctions or an attack on the
country.
Unconventional Challenges. Iran is also one of the
main State-sponsors of terrorism, proxy and surrogate groups,
and unconventional attacks, including against U.S. personnel
and interests. Over the past 3 decades, Iran has methodically
cultivated a network of terrorist and militant groups capable
of targeting regional and global targets. Iran also continues
to provide arms, funding, and paramilitary training to
extremist groups.
Nuclear Challenges. Iran continues to pursue an
illicit nuclear program that threatens to provoke a regional
arms race, and undermine the global non-proliferation regime.
Iran is proceeding with uranium enrichment and heavy-water
nuclear reactor activities in violation of multiple United
Nations Security Council resolutions, and Iran continues to
develop ballistic missiles that could be adapted to deliver
nuclear weapons.

Iran's security threats toward Israel will persist, and there
remains a high potential that Iran will make a serious miscalculation
of U.S. resolve leading to rapid escalation of conflict. Politically,
Iran will seek to use its capabilities to enable greater influence in
the region, particularly with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners and
in the border nations of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan--where U.S.
presence has decreased in recent years.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to
Iran?
Answer. I fully support the U.S. policy of preventing Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons. The United States is also pursuing a multi-
vector strategy that I have labeled a strategic progression. This
strategy initially began with outreach which, while unsuccessful,
established the foundation required for pressuring Iran under the most
intrusive sanctions regime in history. This pressure also includes
diplomatic isolation through U.N. Security Council Resolutions,
diplomatic engagement through the P5+1, and military pressure through
contingency preparations and exercises. Should Iran fail to meet its
obligations regarding cessation of nuclear weapons development, we have
additional options to coerce Iran into doing so using military force
that are available to the President. Meanwhile, we continue to sustain
pressure on Iran's other nefarious activity, and we are reassuring
partners through our presence in the Arabian Gulf region and through
various security commitments.
Question. What more do you believe the United States and the
international community can and should do to dissuade Iran from
pursuing nuclear weapons?
Answer. We should maintain the current strategic progression, which
is currently in what I would describe as the ``pressure'' stage. Should
pressure not work and Iran continue to progress, it may become
necessary to further increase pressure or transition to a more coercive
stage. That is a policy question best addressed by President's national
security team, in which the Chairman and I participate. If confirmed, I
will work to ensure we are well prepared to pursue all military options
necessary to achieve this end.
Question. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing
U.S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by
Iran?
Answer. A precipitous reduction of U.S. force presence in the
Middle East would negatively impact our ability to deter aggression and
assure our partners. We still maintain a large number of forces
deployed to the region, and have managed minor reductions--such as a
recent restoral of aircraft carrier presence to more traditional
levels--by messaging our continued resolve, through our known ability
to restore presence, and through our global strike capability. I would
add that our ability to respond to an Iranian provocation is impacted
more by the decline in readiness associated with budget reductions
under the sequester mechanism than by a reduction in presence.
Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions
against Iran--how effective have they been and should additional
unilateral or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?
Answer. Because of these sanctions, Iran's financial, trade, and
economic outlook has deteriorated significantly. Inflation and
unemployment are also growing. International sanctions have hindered
Iran's weapons procurement efforts and driven up the costs of obtaining
necessary components for its military. Sanctions also appear to have
slowed Iran's progress on its nuclear program, making it increasingly
difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills. That said,
should Iran maintain its defiance of the international community and
continue to develop a nuclear weapon, it may be necessary to step up
sanctions even further.
Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering
Iran's support of international terrorism?
Answer. Iranian support for proxy terrorist activities around the
world constitutes a serious threat not only for the stability of our
partners and allies who are directly impacted by these activities, but
also for U.S. interests. DOD counters Iran's destabilizing activities
in multiple ways. The Department supports diplomatic and intelligence
efforts that inhibit activities of Iranian proxy and terrorist groups.
Additionally, we use DOD presence in the region to deter and, when
directed by the President, disrupt Iranian aggression. Further, we use
our strong security cooperation relationships with regional and global
partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities. We will continue
to work with the intelligence community and our many regional partners
to maintain awareness of--and where feasible disrupt--Iran's asymmetric
efforts.
Question. Do you agree with President Obama that all options,
including military options, should remain on the table with respect to
Iran?
Answer. Yes. We keep all options credibly on the table to inhibit
Iranian aggression and nuclear ambitions by maintaining a robust
regional presence, conducting prudent planning for all contingencies,
and exercising independently and with our many partners.
Question. What is your assessment of whether sanctions as currently
enacted will stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability?
Answer. The Departments of State and Treasury have put in place
wide-ranging and unprecedented international sanctions. I believe they
are having a dramatic effect on the Iranian economy and should
continue. They appear to have made some difference, though not yet a
decisive difference, in the Supreme Leader's calculations. Thus, it
remains to be seen whether these sanctions will alter Iran's course. We
have plans in place to take additional action if required.
syria
Question. What is your assessment of the situation in Syria and its
impact on the region?
Answer. The crisis in Syria is a dynamic, complex and unlimited
sectarian struggle between two sides who believe that to lose means the
most severe end state. It is manifesting deep ethno-sectarian divisions
across the region. The conflict risks the spread of chemical weapons
and the emergence of a terrorist group that could threaten U.S.
interests, and it has already cost the lives of over 100,000 Syrian
people and the displacement of many more. Its regional impacts extend
in varying degrees to Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
Competition between and among states with regional interests continues
to fuel the violence from afar, deepening Sunni-Shia and Sunni-Sunni
tensions within Syria and beyond.
We continue to provide military options to the President and to
work with our interagency and regional partners to address the
destabilizing effects of this crisis.
Question. In your view, what is the most appropriate role for the
United States in assisting regional friends and allies respond to the
situation in Syria?
Answer. The United States is pursuing a diplomatic solution in
Syria with the goal of a transitional government with full executive
power by mutual consent, and is providing considerable humanitarian and
non-lethal support to the forces opposing the Syrian Government. The
U.S. military is providing support to the surrounding countries through
multilateral planning efforts, exercises, and some humanitarian
assistance. We are continuously engaged with key regional partners such
as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq to provide assistance, technical
knowledge, and military contingency planning. We have placed a number
of F-16s and a Patriot battery in Jordan to demonstrate our commitment
to that nation's security.
Question. In your view, what--if any--role should the U.S. military
play with respect to the situation in Syria?
Answer. There is a broad spectrum of potential roles the U.S.
military could play in Syria. These include helping provide
humanitarian assistance, providing security assistance to Syria's
neighbors, and providing non-lethal assistance to the opposition,
including essential provisions such as food and medical supplies--all
of which we are currently doing. The military could support an
international effort to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons program in a
permissive post-Assad environment. Although there are legal hurdles
involved, additional U.S. military involvement could include training,
advising and assisting opposition forces from outside Syria--forces
carefully selected to minimize the chances that they would abuse the
power we would provide. At an unclassified level, the U.S. military
could also conduct a broad spectrum of kinetic options in Syria,
ranging from different types of limited kinetic strikes designed to
achieve a variety of objectives, to different varieties of no-fly zone
or humanitarian safe zones. All of these options have been presented to
the National Security Staff for consideration by the Principals and the
President. Each comes with costs, risks, legal hurdles, and opportunity
costs. Notably, given the degradation of U.S. Air Force readiness due
to the effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequester, the higher levels of
kinetic response would impose severe opportunity costs for potential
contingencies elsewhere in the world.
Question. In your view, what role--if any--are Iran, Russia, and
Hezbollah playing in the current conflict in Syria?
Answer. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah continue to provide support to
the Assad regime.
Russia continues to provide arms, diplomatic and financial support
to the Syrian regime. I defer to the intelligence community for
specifics. Though it has recently held off on providing the S-300
surface to air missile system, it could reverse this decision at any
time. Russia's continued support for the regime has cost it
considerable credibility in the region.
Meanwhile, in order to support its client Hezbollah and sustain a
hostile state on Israel's border, Iran provides the Assad regime with
financial support, weapons, training, and advice regarding how to
conduct the fight against the opposition forces.
Hezbollah has provided advice and has injected a considerable
number of forces directly into the fight, providing a decisive
capability in some cases, though sustaining serious losses. Again, I
would defer to the intelligence community for specifics.
Question. In your view, what are the prospects of a negotiated
solution in Syria?
Answer. Clearly, a negotiated settlement is the preferred path to
achieving our policy objectives. However, its prospects are diminished
by the sectarian and ``total war'' character of the conflict. The
intelligence community has indicated that this type of conflict only is
resolved through negotiation when both sides are exhausted or the
dominant side is forced to the table by a major patron state. The
former will likely take many years, and the likelihood of latter
occurring is questionable. Greatly complicating the likelihood of a
negotiated settlement is the factious nature of the opposition forces--
despite intense pressure by its international patrons to coalesce
politically, the opposition is still not united.
Question. In your view, is the momentum currently on the side of
the Assad regime or the forces fighting to overthrow Syria?
Answer. The Assad regime--with direct support from Hezbollah, and
weapons provided by Iran and Russia--has recently regained control of
several areas previously in dispute or under the control of opposition
forces. Momentum can ebb back and forth in these types of conflict, and
it would appear to have shifted towards the regime in that part of the
country.
Question. Are there asymmetric options that bypass Syria's
integrated air defense system rather than kinetically neutralize it,
such as standoff weapons and/or stealth, and what is your assessment of
those options from a military perspective?
Answer. We have a range of military options. These are best
discussed in a classified setting.
al qaeda
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western
interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
Answer. A decade of relentless counterterrorism pressure has
degraded al Qaeda's ability to operate. They are less capable of
staging sophisticated, complex attacks against the west. Despite these
setbacks, al Qaeda retains its intent to plan and conduct terrorist
attacks against the west. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
remains the AQ associated group most likely and capable of attempting
an attack on the United States in the near-term. Other groups, such as
al Qaeda in Iraq, al Shabaab, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb, and others are more preoccupied with struggles internal to the
areas in which they operate. However, to varying degrees they still
have the intent and capability of conducting an attack on the United
States or its people.
the 2001 authorization for use of military force
Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)?
Answer. The United States is in an armed conflict against al Qaeda
and its associated forces. An associated force is defined as a group
that: (1) is an organized, armed group that has entered the fight
alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. These
are the same terrorist threats that perpetrated the attacks on U.S.
soil on September 11, 2001, and the AUMF still serves as the legal
basis under U.S. domestic law to employ military force against these
threats.
Question. What factors govern DOD determinations as to where the
use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant to the AUMF?
Answer. In May 2013, the President promulgated Presidential Policy
Guidance (PPG) governing direct action against terrorist targets
located outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. This
establishes procedures for DOD to conduct these types of military
operations. The PPG and its derivative operational plans formalize DOD
standards, policies, and determinations concerning where, how, and
against whom military force may be utilized outside the United States
and areas of active hostilities. DOD meticulously follows the
procedures of the PPG to ensure we make well-informed and ethical/legal
decisions based on the most up-to-date intelligence and the expertise
of our national security professionals. Senior commanders and their
legal advisors carefully review all operations for compliance with U.S.
and international law before a decision is rendered by the Secretary of
Defense or the President.
Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
including the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism
operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary
and appropriate?
Answer. The AUMF in its current form provides necessary and
sufficient authorities to counter al Qaeda and its associated forces.
If a terrorist threat emerges that does not fit within the AUMF, the
DOD would consult with Congress and the executive branch on the
question of authorities.
yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in
Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that
strategy?
Answer. Our overall engagement strategy with Yemen is solid. It
combines diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives to improve
stability and security and assist president Hadi during this period of
transition. Building an enduring partnership with the Yemeni military
is key to addressing critical security threats, including the campaign
against AQAP. The security situation in Yemen remains fragile and we
must continue our partnership and support.
Question. Given the continuing political instability and slow
progress of reforms to the military in Yemen, what are your views on
the United States continuing to provide security assistance--most
significantly DOD section 1206 funding--to Yemeni counterterrorism
forces?
Answer. A stable Yemen that is free of violent extremist remains in
our best interest. AQAP elements seek to exploit instability and pose a
legitimate threat to the United States, our assets in the region, and
the transitional Yemeni Government. While progress has been slow,
President Hadi and the military are taking steady steps to reform and
restructure the military as part of the overall political transition
process. They continue to engage the United States for support and
advice on the military reorganization. The 1206 funds remain critical
to building the capacity of Yemeni counter terrorism forces to disrupt
and degrade the AQAP operational space.
somalia and al shabaab
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al
Shabaab?
Answer. While al Shabaab remains on the defensive, it has
demonstrated a continued willingness and ability to conduct complex
attacks against western interests and Somali Government targets in
Mogadishu. This trend will likely continue throughout the rest of 2013,
despite increasingly public disputes amongst al Shabaab senior
officials and the efforts by the Somali Government, the African Union
Mission in Somalia, and Ethiopian National Defense Forces to maintain
pressure on the group.
Question. In your view, does al Shabaab pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area?
Answer. Al Shabaab does pose a threat to allied interests in East
Africa, but it does not pose a direct threat to the Homeland or Europe
at present. Al Shabaab merged with al Qaeda in February 2012 and shares
al Qaeda's global jihadist objectives. However, the group continues to
focus its efforts on defending territory in Somalia against the
coalition of the Somali Government, the African Union Mission in
Somalia, and Ethiopian military forces--as well as conducting attacks
in East Africa.
Question. Should the United States establish military-to-military
relations and consider providing assistance to the Somali national
military forces?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure we are prepared to
establish military-to-military relations with the new Somali National
Army in support of the State Department efforts to recognize and
strengthen the Somalia Federal Government. Meanwhile, we plan to
continue assistance to our partner nations in the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM) and explore ways to assist the Somali National
Army. Somali stability in the near-term depends on AMISOM. Long-term,
their security would be strengthened by a professional and accountable
Somali National Army.
al qaeda in the islamic maghreb
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?
Answer. Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its
allies have proven resilient despite the French-led military
intervention in Mali. They are exploiting the Tuareg rebellion in
northern Mali for safety. Although these groups no longer control key
strategic towns, they retain the capability to launch sporadic attacks
within Mali and neighboring countries, expand their safehaven, and
attract recruits in pursuit of a hardline Islamic state based on al
Qaeda ideology. AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al
Qaeda-associated terrorist groups throughout the region, such as Boko
Haram in Nigeria, in order to influence and support attack planning.
AQIM will continue to pose a local and regional threat into 2014, as
North African Governments struggle to disrupt AQIM movement across
expansive, porous borders.
Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions
threatening U.S. interests?
Answer. In my view, the U.S. Homeland is not significantly
threatened by AQIM. We see no indications the group places a priority
on attacks outside North Africa and the Sahel, at least in the near
term. However, the group remains a credible threat to U.S. and Western
interests within North and West Africa, where it has conducted or
attempted attacks in several countries (i.e. Mali, Niger, Algeria,
Mauritania), and possibly in Europe. AQIM will likely continue to
bolster its ties to al Qaeda-associated terrorist groups throughout the
region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, in order to influence and
support attack planning.
Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent
expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's
capacities and aims?
Answer. The expansion of al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali between early 2012 and January 2013 increased
the group's capacity as it collaborated with splinter groups al-Tawhid
wa al-Jihad in West Africa, al-Mulathamun battalion, and Tuareg rebel
group Ansar al-Din to enlarge its area of operations to several cities
in northern Mali and enforce Sharia law. Although the group expanded in
size, this growth has not changed the group's regionally-focused aim of
establishing Sharia throughout North Africa. Following heavy losses in
the subsequent French-led intervention, AQIM largely retreated to its
traditional safehaven in the Tigharghar mountains, where it continues
to regroup and remains capable of conducting attacks in the region.
combating terrorism
Question. The administration recently released its National
Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to
maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of
partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the
need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats
``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South
Asia.''
How do you view the DOD's role under the new National Strategy for
Counterterrorism?
Answer. DOD's role is one element of a comprehensive government
approach that integrates our unique capabilities with those of our
interagency partners and allies. In support of our strategic goals to
combat al Qaeda-linked threats in South Asia and beyond, DOD is
building partner capacity by training, advising, and assisting
partnered forces to confront mutual threats. DOD will also continue to
conduct lethal action against terrorist networks within rigorous
guidelines, accountability methods, and standards.
Question. What is your understanding of the impact of the
Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on DOD's role within
the U.S. Government's counterterrorism strategy? Will DOD see its role
increase or decrease? Will DOD require any new authorities or any
increased capabilities or capacities?
Answer. I feel our current authorities are sufficient to play our
part in defending the Nation against existing terrorist threats.
Counterterrorism is a deeply interagency effort that includes
intelligence, law enforcement and defense capabilities, and our success
stems in large part from the exceptional cooperation in this regard
that has developed over the years. It remains to be seen, but it is
possible the DOD role could increase under the PPD. The recently signed
Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism is a codification of
policies and procedures that have been applied for some time. The PPG
and its derivative operational plans formalize the standards, policies,
and determinations of DOD concerning where, how, and against whom
military force may be utilized outside the United States and areas of
active hostilities.
U.S. military capabilities are but one part of our comprehensive
counterterrorism effort. We will continue to enable our allies to
develop the capability to counter terrorists within their borders. When
direct action is necessary, DOD meticulously follows the PPG procedures
to ensure we make well-informed decisions based on the most up-to-date
intelligence and the expertise of our national security professionals.
The Department implements a rigorous, transparent and accountable
review process. We will scrupulously adhere to the rule of law and the
highest ethical standards in implementing the strategy and guidance.
Question. Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its
efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and
agencies?
Answer. I believe that improved interagency cooperation is one of
the signature accomplishments of the struggle against terrorism over
the last decade. Nonetheless, improving interagency coordination was a
key finding in our Decade of War study, and it is essential that we
continue to raise the bar. At the national level, the Joint Staff
participates in both the National Security Staff's Counterterrorism
Security Group and the President's Counterterrorism Board of Directors.
At the regional level, our geographic combatant commands advance our
efforts by working closely with U.S. embassies, interagency partners
and local actors. The Department continues to work with our interagency
partners to assess and integrate lessons learned into our doctrine,
training, planning, and operations.
Question. What do you view as the role of DOD in countering al
Qaeda and affiliated groups in cyberspace?
Answer. We view cyber as an essential capability for Joint Force
2020. Similar to our other counterterrorism efforts, we recognize that
defense of cyberspace requires an integrated approach to providing the
best protection possible for our Nation. Working with intelligence,
homeland security, and law enforcement partners, we will remain alert
to the potential for cyber attacks on our Homeland conducted by
terrorist groups. Meanwhile, opportunities exist for DOD to assist in
the exploitation of cyberspace to counter extremist messaging through
military information support operations. We have processes in place to
identify and defend against cyber attacks, and share information with
industry to mitigate effects.
special operations forces
Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) have
mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and
enablers that directly support their operations.
Do you believe that QDR directed growth in the size of SOF should
be retained despite current budgetary pressures?
Answer. Growth in our Special Operations Forces capability was
necessary to meet the demands of the conflicts in which we have been
engaged over the past decade. While some of the growth has supported
countering terrorism, the principle share of increased capacity has
been used to support counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We have planned to use the SOF capacity released by the
reduction in COIN demand in Iraq and Afghanistan in two ways: (1) to
rest and reset the force; and (2) to grow our building partner capacity
efforts worldwide. However, given the financial downturn we face, we
must balance the need for SOF capabilities with our need to address
other capability demands in light of increased budgetary pressures.
Accordingly, I support maintenance of only programmed SOF resourcing,
shifting priorities inside the community in order to best establish the
capabilities, capacities and readiness required to meet our most
pressing needs--most notably continuing to counterterrorism--while
doing the best we can to service other missions.
Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
extremist organizations, including those related to information and
military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
changes to U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) title 10 missions
to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces
are carrying out around the world.
What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
divested by SOCOM, and why?
Answer. At this time, I do not recommend changes to SOCOM's title
10 missions. In coordination with DOD, the Joint Staff uses a range of
processes--such as the Unified Command Plan, Guidance for the
Employment of the Force, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan--to
assess missions and responsibilities assigned to SOCOM on a continuing
basis. SOF remain uniquely suited to conducting certain information and
intelligence operations. The language in section 167 of title 10,
U.S.C., provides the President and the Secretary of Defense flexibility
to meet changing circumstances.
Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
them?
Answer. I do not recommend SOCOM gain any additional missions at
this time, pending a review of strategic planning documents. SOF are
well-positioned to provide an appropriate range of capability to Joint
Force Commanders. We will continue to use lessons from our Decade of
War studies to better integrate SOF and the general purpose force.
Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as
unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much
emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?
Answer. The Chairman has placed emphasis on many aspects of foreign
internal defense in his Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and has
developed specific Joint Doctrine on Unconventional Warfare. If I am
confirmed, one area that I may examine for enhanced legislative
authorities is greater opportunities for non-SOF units to undertake
building partner capacity tasks, which will relieve some of this burden
from SOF forces in a severely restricted budget climate.
special operations authorities
Question. Reportedly, the Commander of SOCOM has sought more
control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations
Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense recently modified policy
guidance for the combatant commands that gave SOCOM, for the first
time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance
to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic combatant
commanders and Special Operations Forces assigned to them. It has been
reported that the Commander of SOCOM is also seeking new authorities
that would allow him to more rapidly move Special Operations Forces
between geographic combatant commands.
Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are
appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control
of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic
combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.
Answer. Special Operations Forces undertake operations only with
the approval of the requisite authorities, including the President, the
Secretary of Defense, the geographic combatant commanders, and, where
appropriate, the Chiefs of Mission. The SOCOM commander has made it
clear that the changes he is recommending are not intended to infringe
upon the authority of the Combatant Commanders--and as a former
commander, I remain sensitive to this. Rather, he is trying to provide
better capability to the combatant commanders such that they may use
SOF forces more efficiently and effectively. I believe the proposed
changes enhance the global force by networking with our U.S.
interagency counterparts as well as our foreign allies and partners. If
I am confirmed, I would support a more efficient and effective ability
of our Special Operations Forces to respond to global demands in the
future.
u.s. cyber command manning and training
Question. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), as a combatant command,
executes offensive and defensive military operations in cyberspace
under title 10. CYBERCOM, in conjunction with the Military Services, is
defining its personnel requirements, which will result in a requirement
for the Services to provide thousands of personnel with high levels of
training and skill in a technically demanding area. This force
requirement could grow substantially in future years as DOD learns more
about the cyber capabilities of potential adversaries and as more
countries gain sophisticated cyber warfare expertise and capacity.
What are your views about programming the majority of these
personnel under the Military Intelligence Program (MIP)?
Answer. U.S. Cyber Command is a subunified command. The significant
amount of the work to provide planning and options in cyberspace is
going to require intelligence personnel, not unlike the work conducted
by our airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
platforms. We are taking a very close look at the mix of personnel,
both military and intelligence, required to execute missions in
cyberspace and intend to strike the right balance. The Services are in
the process of building our initial target of 133 cyber teams from
existing force structure. Based on how the Services are currently
manned, trained, and equipped, MIP personnel in two Services, the Army
and the Navy, will be in the majority, while in the Air Force and
Marine Corps, MIP personnel will be in the minority. As we normalize
cyber operations, we believe those differences between Services will
decrease over time, and across the entire force we would expect MIP
personnel to be in the minority overall, just like the other domains.
However, we also expect MIP personnel to be a larger percentage of the
cyber force due to the significant requirement for ISR support in the
cyber domain.
Question. Are cyber offensive and defensive operations intelligence
missions?
Answer. No, cyberspace operations are not inherently intelligence
missions, though they can require intelligence if they are to succeed.
DOD cyberspace operations are designed to operate and defend DOD
information systems, support the defense of non-DOD systems, and to
project power in and through cyberspace in order to satisfy national
security objectives. Like all operational military missions, cyberspace
operations, both offensive and defensive, are supported by mission-
tailored-all source intelligence. As such, cyberspace operations
include the conduct of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
and operational preparation of the environment in support of mission
objectives. However, a substantial portion of the offensive and
defensive work is not an intelligence mission.
Question. Will programming of CYBERCOM personnel under the MIP
budget also lead to policy and resource oversight by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?
Answer. Like any domain, there are both military operations and
intelligence aspects of cyber operations that demand policy and
oversight from both the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Both are active in this
area. I would defer to OSD for further guidance on oversight
requirements.
Question. Do you have any concerns about the ability of the
Services to generate and retain the required numbers of skilled and
highly trained personnel to support CYBERCOM?
Answer. Because manning, training and equipping the force, and then
retaining highly skilled personnel, is always a core concern, the
Services are closely managing their provision of critical cyber
personnel. The Services recognize this as a key priority and seem to be
on track to provide the required personnel. As the Department gradually
transitions to a Joint Information Environment, we should be able to
transition more billets that are involved in simply managing networks
into support more advanced CYBERCOM missions. We will continue to look
to CYBERCOM to define a joint training standard. Cyberspace personnel
managed by each Service to meet the Service's unique requirements must
also meet DOD's established common standards and qualifications. It is
imperative that these personnel exhibit exceptional knowledge of
technical fundamentals and tactical tradecraft, and be able to employ
that expertise as part of an integrated warfighting team. We have
advanced our ability to generate skilled cyberspace professionals in a
short amount of time, but must continue to provide the right incentives
to retain these personnel in the current budget environment as we
attempt to compete against industry for highly trained and skilled
personnel.
Question. Should training for the CYBERCOM mission teams be
conducted by the National Security Agency, by the Military Services, or
in joint training facilities?
Answer. There is some training associated with specialized cyber
operations tasks that is common to both an intelligence and an
operational function, and that is best conducted in close coordination
with the National Security Agency. There are also service training
venues established that have the ability to produce some of the
necessary skills required for CYBERCOM Mission Teams. Going forward, it
will be important for the Joint Staff, the Services, and CYBERCOM to
work together to build joint training standards and determine the best
way to train to those standards.
Question. Have you considered whether the Commander of CYBERCOM
should have authorities over Service personnel decisions affecting the
cyber mission that are similar to those enjoyed by statute and by DOD
regulation by the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command?
Answer. The Department is examining this option as one of many
possible ways to enhance the effectiveness of cyber forces. For now the
current way in which personnel authorities are structured is working
satisfactorily. However as CYBERCOM evolves there may be merit in
mirroring some of the approaches we have taken with SOCOM, including
personnel decisions.
Question. Are there adequate cyber test facilities to support
CYBERCOM's offensive missions, taking into account that such missions
may involve permanent damage to targets?
Answer. There are currently a number of test ranges and facilities
available to conduct such testing. The quantity is currently adequate,
but the need could grow--clearly, financial limitations and uncertainty
could constrain additional of additional facilities should they be
required. The real issue is the joint alignment and management of those
resources to facilitate testing and training on an annual basis. The
need for cyber facilities for testing and mission rehearsal of advanced
offensive capabilities remains a critical enabler for CYBERCOM mission
effectiveness. We continue to review the offensive testing and
evaluation requirements, especially in light of the approved cyber
mission force build out. These requirements are often blended with
training, exercise, and certification requirements to drive cyber range
solution sets across DOD.
defense science board report
Question. The Defense Science Board (DSB) in January 2013 released
a Task Force report on ``Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced
Cyber Threat.'' This report concluded that the effects of cyber warfare
on civilian infrastructure could be as severe as some forms of nuclear
attack, and suggested that nuclear forces should play a role in
deterring devastating cyber attacks.
What are your views on whether nuclear weapons could and should be
used as an element to deter severe attacks on critical infrastructure?
Answer. As stated in the NPR, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear
weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies,
and partners. We have other means to credibly deter cyber attacks
against the United States, to include both non-kinetic and kinetic
means.
Question. The DSB report also recommended that DOD segregate a
portion of its long-range advanced conventional strike capability and
greatly enhance its resistance to cyber attack to ensure that the
President retains options below the use of nuclear weapons in the event
of a cyber attack that compromised our conventional forces or the means
of controlling them.
What are your views on the reasoning of the DSB Task Force
regarding the severity of the potential threat to our conventional
forces and the means of controlling them, and whether prudence dictates
extraordinary protections for portions of our military forces?
Answer. I do not believe we need to segregate any quantity of
conventional forces strictly in anticipation of a cyber attack.
Anticipated budget restrictions will stress our conventional operations
capacity enough, and segregating more of these forces will hinder our
ability to use them for other contingencies. Rather, we should ensure
we continuously assess the security and robustness of the networks we
use to exercise command and control over these strike capabilities. The
networks supporting our long-range advanced conventional strike
capability already employ robust protection measures, particularly
those platforms that are nuclear-capable. Additionally, we maintain
redundant forms of communication, to include analog systems, and
routinely train and exercise to minimize the extent to which cyber or
electronic warfare attacks degrade our capabilities. Again, however, we
should not rest on our current capability, and improved security and
survivability of our command and control systems is a matter I take
very seriously.
Question. The DSB report also concluded that DOD has an inadequate
understanding of how conflict in cyberspace would or could develop,
what actions and reactions might ensue, and how conflict could
escalate. To help address this deficiency, the Task Force urged the
Department to develop the capability to conduct large-scale modeling
and simulation of cyberwarfare.
What are your views on this issue?
Answer. Conflict in cyberspace will indeed be complex. As we have
seen over history, it would be hubris for anyone to claim a complete
understanding of how a new technology will perform in combat or will
influence a conflict. We can only do the best we can to understand it
in advance. As such, developing and conducting large-scale modeling and
simulation exercises would expand our understanding of cyberspace
conflict, decision thresholds, escalation concepts, and decision
uncertainty. We are taking steps to improve our cyber test and training
range capacity and capabilities to ensure we can train our cyber forces
in exercises like Cyber Flag and Cyber Knight. The major cyber ranges
are receiving an increase in funding in fiscal year 2014 to meet an
expected demand in training and testing. The Services and combatant
commands continue to aggressively incorporate cyber into exercises at
the direction of the Secretary. We are also incorporating cyber into
our large scale modeling and simulation capabilities to better
understand the domain. The Joint Staff tested for the first time in a
recent NORTHCOM exercise a simulation capability that presented to the
training audience degraded network effects from cyber activity. The
Department of Defense has also taken steps by issuing orders, policy,
and doctrinal guidance to the Joint Force as seen in new joint
doctrine, updates to the Standing and Supplemental Rules of Engagement,
and guidance about exercising cyberspace operations with the other
operating domains. These actions, combined with the lessons garnered
through future large-scale modeling and simulation, should improve our
understanding of the dynamics of conflict in cyberspace.
intelligence collection and analysis
Question. After September 11, intelligence collection and analysis
focused on discovering, identifying, locating, and defeating terrorists
and insurgents. These missions involve ``finding needles in
haystacks,'' and were addressed in part by human intelligence
operations and by applying advanced information technology to collect
and combine and sift through vast amounts of information from many
unconventional sources. These intelligence capabilities are applicable
to a range of transnational security challenges, but are less useful
for supporting more traditional forms of military operations against
nation-states.
Do you think it is necessary to evaluate the current posture and
plans of DOD's intelligence components to ensure that capabilities and
capacities for supporting military operations against elusive,
networked adversaries and against conventional military establishments
are appropriately balanced?
Answer. Balancing intelligence collection between threat networks
and nation-states is continually evaluated at the theater level by
combatant commanders and reflected in both their collection management
process and their inputs into SecDef's management of the force guided
by the Force Allocation Decision Model.
This balance is also scrutinized at the national level by the
intelligence community as guided by the President's National
Intelligence Priorities Framework in concert with experts in Congress
and the NSS.
Since 2001, we have presided over a growing enterprise of ISR
systems and operations. Some of these systems, while extremely
effective in relatively permissive environments, will likely be
unsuitable for operations against a modern military force. Therefore,
as we build ISR in Joint Force 2020, sensor and platform diversity will
be critical to successfully operate against a wide variety of target
sets and in a variety of threat environments--permissive, contested,
and denied.
That said, there are a few key similarities between countering
elusive, networked adversaries and conventional military
establishments, particularly when trying to find, fix, and finish
critical elements of that conventional force, such as asymmetric
capabilities (including weapons of mass destruction) and command and
control nodes. In such cases, we will benefit from the advances we have
made over the past decade.
information operations
Question. The Government Accountability Office reports that DOD has
``spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year'' to support its
information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are
in support of operations in Afghanistan, but Military Information
Support Teams from U.S. Special Operations Command also deploy to U.S.
embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to
bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). Further, the geographic combatant
commands are increasingly moving into this operational space.
What are your views on DOD's military information support
operations and influence programs and their integration into overall
U.S. foreign policy objectives?
Answer. We continue to assess and improve our information
operations activities because winning the narrative remains a critical
element of advancing our national security. I view Military Information
Support Operations as traditional military activities that a global
combatant commander uses to support theater security cooperation and
underpin theater campaign plan objectives. Influence programs and
activities are also a means to support broader U.S. foreign policy
objectives.
DOD's military information support operations and influence
programs are integrated into geographic combatant command (GCC) and
country team objectives and programs. Synchronization across government
is critical, and GCCs continue to improve coordination with the State
Department, USAID and Country Teams by conducting monthly and quarterly
working groups/VTCs and reports to share information.
Question. What is the role of DOD versus the Intelligence Community
and the State Department?
Answer. DOD continues to work alongside the Department of State and
USAID in support of foreign policy objectives. DOD information
operations can complement and reinforce the Department of State and
other government agency efforts by focusing on military audiences and
ensuring information operations themes and messages are derived from
and synchronized with the State Department public diplomacy.
DOD conducts periodic working groups with the Intelligence
Community and the State Department to deconflict and synchronize
information operations and military information support operations
(MISO) activities at the GCC, Joint Staff and OSD levels.
Question. How do you believe the success of these programs should
be measured, especially in light of the constrained budget environment?
Answer. Measuring success of these programs remains a challenge.
The information space is inherently complex, but should not be yielded
to an adversary. It is not always easy to discern whether a change is
due to an information program or some other activity more closely
associated with actions on the ground. However, DOD continues to
develop and monitor measures of performance and measures of
effectiveness for these programs. We are incorporating these lessons in
our doctrine, training, planning, and reporting.
department of defense counternarcotics activities
Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department's CN
operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around
the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that
DOD ``does not have an effective performance measurement system to
track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.'' This is the
second such finding relating by GAO to DOD CN in the last decade.
What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?
Answer. DOD's counternarcotics activities operate in an inherently
complex environment in which it can be difficult to determine with
precision whether generated effects are due to DOD efforts, other U.S.
interagency efforts, host nation efforts, or factors beyond the control
of these entities. I believe it would be hubris for anyone to claim the
ability to create a system that would accurately track the progress of
any effort in the complex arena. We do believe that DOD's CN program is
critically important to enabling the broader U.S. interagency and
foreign partner counternarcotics efforts. Our foreign and interagency
partners with counterdrug responsibilities continually ask for DOD
training, equipment, exchanges of information, planning,
infrastructure, transportation, analytical, aerial reconnaissance,
communications, and related support to build the capacity of foreign
security services with counterdrug responsibilities. These roles and
activities are appropriate and effective in strengthening law
enforcement, governance, and rule of law institutions.
Question. In your personal view, should DOD continue to play a role
in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics?
Answer. Yes. though current budget limitations will present an
enormous challenge to our ability to do this while addressing our many
other security responsibilities. With the potential for the convergence
of violent extremist organizations with drug trafficking organizations,
I see DOD's continued support to law enforcement as a necessary
component of our national security.
Question. In your position as the Commander of U.S. Northern
Command, what was your assessment of the DOD CN program as it related
to Mexico and the Caribbean?
Answer. The CN efforts of the United States, Mexico, and Caribbean
nations have achieved major and sustained progress against cocaine use
and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. U.S. Northern
Command furthers this effort by achieving unprecedented cooperation
with the Governments of Mexico and Caribbean nations in our efforts
against the threat, and I expect continued cooperation in future years.
I believe these roles/relationships are essential to our policies and
strategies in the region. However, this progress is deeply threatened
by current budget decreases and uncertainties, as resources will likely
be diverted from this area to address our many other security needs.
Question. In your position as the Commander of U.S. Northern
Command, were there any activities that you had hoped to be able to
conduct using DOD CN funding, but were not able to do and that you, if
confirmed, would recommend DOD seek the authority to conduct?
Answer. I found that I had sufficient authorities to serve an
effective supporting role to other U.S. Government agencies and foreign
partners with counternarcotics responsibilities. Should I be confirmed,
I will remain supportive of leveraging our current authorities and
longstanding relationships within the region to support our partner
nations and defend the Nation from transnational criminal
organizations.
responsibility to protect
Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the ``responsibility
to protect'' (R2P)--that is, the responsibility of the international
community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by
encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states
build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national
authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review, DOD names ``preventing human suffering due to mass
atrocities'' as one of a long list of potential contingencies that DOD
might be called on to address. DOD has begun to explore some of the
implications of R2P, by considering ``mass atrocity prevention and
response operations''.
In your view, how high a priority should the ``responsibility to
protect'' be for the U.S. Government as a whole?
Answer. The ``responsibility to protect'' is not currently viewed
by the United States as a legal basis for the use of military force.
Our nation may call on us to prevent human suffering, initially using
means other than force, and could use military force as a last resort
if other instruments of national power fail. We work closely with our
international military partners, where needed, to emphasize
professionalism, commitment to the rule of law, and strengthen their
capacity to protect their citizens. Without legal standing, it is not a
practice we would rank order by priority, though we would be prepared
to act if called upon by the President to do so.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in
fulfilling the responsibility to protect?
Answer. The use of military force is only one of many instruments
of national power. We should always view use of force as a last resort,
to be considered only when all other instruments of national power have
failed and used under appropriate legal authority. We should ensure we
are doctrinally prepared to execute a mission if called upon to do so.
The role of DOD in fulfilling the responsibility to protect, should it
be cited as a casus belli, would be to provide the President with a
full range of options and be prepared to act if called upon to do so.
Question. In your view, what is the proper application of R2P
doctrine with respect to the situation in Syria?
Answer. R2P has been mentioned as a potential legal basis for the
use of force in Syria, but to my knowledge a decision has not been
taken to activate this basis. Using R2P as a basis would be a political
vice military decision. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government is working with
allies and partners and with the Syrian opposition to provide
humanitarian assistance within Syria and across the region. The United
States is providing nearly $815 million in aid to help the victims of
this conflict, including emergency medical care and supplies, food, and
shelter. The recent addition of more than $300 million in humanitarian
aid will increase food aid, medical care, clean water, and provide
shelter and other relief supplies for families suffering in Syria and
neighboring countries.
operation observant compass & the lord's resistance army
Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces
(UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support
them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)--including Joseph
Kony--continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian
populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational
concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are
trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of
California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical
support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and
intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations
continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations
personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations,
thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.
In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?
Answer. Operation Observant Compass aims to: (1) protect civilians,
(2) promote DD/RRR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration,
repatriation, and resettlement), (3) increase humanitarian access/
support, and (4). This is a whole-of-government effort across a range
of U.S. Government agencies and partners. DOD is the primary agent for
assisting the UPDF in removing Kony and other senior LRA leaders from
the region.
I acknowledge the operational challenges of this mission in the
context of competing demands and higher priorities. U.S. Special
Operations forces do accompany UPDF partners on missions in the Central
African Republic, remaining clear of combat action with LRA elements,
but they are not doing so in Sudan or the disputed region due to
diplomatic concerns.
Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD's current level of
support to this mission?
Answer. The current level of support is appropriate. DOD is
currently weighing future options, as we prioritize limited resources
among numerous competing priorities.
international peacekeeping contributions
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to consider
directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers,
civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I
should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers
in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be willing to consider opportunities
to support peacekeeping missions, including key staff officers and
military observers, if such a course of action aligned with our
national security interests. However, this mission must of necessity
compete within the spectrum of other national security interests,
including counterterrorism, that are often a higher priority.
Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to
requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the
United Nations?
Answer. We have made additional contributions in this area over the
past 2 years, as the appointment of Army Brigadier General Hugh Van
Roosen to force chief of staff for the United Nations Mission in
Liberia has demonstrated. We have also worked closely with the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations to overcome administrative obstacles to
the assignment of U.S. servicemembers within the U.N. Secretariat. I am
confident we will continue to improve upon our processes and support of
multilateral institutions. We may be able to bring more capacity to
bear as we draw down from Afghanistan, keeping in mind that the force
will be shrinking with budget cuts and we need to allow the force to
rest. Our U.S. servicemembers bring battle-tested experience and
expertise that enhance these types of organizations in the execution of
their vital global missions.
global peace operations initiative
Question. The Global Peace Operations Initiative was established
after the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit to address growing gaps in
international peace operations. In most cases, DOD plays a supporting
role in the implementation of this train and equip program.
What is your understanding and assessment of this program?
Answer. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a key
component of our Government's strategy to build the capacity of U.S.
partners to carry out peacekeeping operations. Through small
investments in training and equipment, we can prepare motivated
partners for successful participation in peacekeeping. GPOI has
directly trained over 175,000 peacekeepers from 38 countries and
enabled the training of another 52,000 instructors since 2005. Over two
dozen peace operations have benefited from the program. GPOI is a
strong example of the results we obtain when the Departments of State
and Defense work together to promote our Nation's security.
Question. Would you support additional DOD contributions--in the
form of U.S. military trainers--to support this program?
Answer. The GPOI has been successful in building partnership
capacity in large part because of its flexibility. Our combatant
commanders have made excellent use of this program to tailor assistance
to the specific needs of individual partners. While GPOI underwrites
training delivered by both contractors and military personnel, our
experience has shown that servicemembers produce more effective and
longer-lasting results than contract instructors. If confirmed, I would
consider this factor, subject to the demands of our other operations
overseas and against the backdrop of the severe budget restrictions we
face under the Budget Control Act.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National
Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ``an
abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,'' and
stated that ``rising drug violence and corruption are undermining
stability and the rule of law in some countries'' in the Western
Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to
National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the
strategy is ``enhancing DOD support to U.S. law enforcement.''
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime integrates all elements of national power, including the
military, to combat transnational organized crime and related threats
to national security. Ultimately, within our capacity to do so, the
strategy seeks to reduce transnational organized crime to a manageable
public safety concern.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role
within the President's strategy?
Answer. DOD is not the lead agency responsible for combatting
transnational organized crime. DOD instead plays an appropriate and
important role in supporting law enforcement to counter threats to
national security.
Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support
to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters
related to transnational organized crime?
Answer. DOD is often able to provide unique supporting capabilities
to address the full range of transnational criminal threats, including:
military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter-threat
finance, military-to-military capability development, and military
operational activities against threats to the United States. Some of
the capabilities DOD has developed over the last decade of war are
applicable to countering transnational organized crime. DOD should
provide support to U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community
as part of a whole-of-government approach, consistent with current
authorities.
mass atrocities prevention
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10.
Among interagency partners, what is DOD's role in addressing
atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have for preventing or
responding to atrocities?
Answer. DOD has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting Mass
Atrocity Response Operations and conducted a comprehensive review of
DOD training. Atrocity prevention and response is now part of DOD plans
and planning guidance. In addition, DOD is working with the U.N. to
strengthen that organization's ability to respond to atrocity events.
Question. Has DOD developed planning processes toward this effort
so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations?
Answer. Yes. DOD has developed planning processes toward this
effort.
Question. In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity?
Answer. My view is consistent with the White House Fact Sheet of
May 1, 2013.
future of nato
Question. As a result of coalition operations in Afghanistan,
Libya, and elsewhere the NATO alliance has achieved unprecedented
levels of integration and interoperability.
If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for
capturing the lessons learned from recent coalition operations and
maintaining the capabilities developed as a result of those operations?
Answer. Both the United States and NATO have been capturing
incorporating lessons learned into education, training and preparations
for future operations and missions. Within the Joint Staff, our J-7
Directorate for Joint Development has the DOD lead on lessons learned.
Our J-7 works with NATO, Allied Command Transformation, headquartered
in Norfolk, VA, which has the lead on lessons learned from Alliance
operations (with most of NATO's work performed by the Joint Analysis
and Lessons Learned Center located in Monsanto, Portugal).
I am keenly aware of the potential for diminishing interoperability
and readiness as operations in Afghanistan draw down. If confirmed, I
intend to continue our efforts through the Connected Forces Initiative
to ensure all NATO forces and those of capable partners remain ready
and interoperable. Subject to funding, this will include expanded
education; increased training and exercises; and better use of
technology. Additionally, the increased support for the NATO Response
Force to which we have committed in the wake of our drawdown in Europe
will provide excellent opportunities for maintaining our coalition
warfighting capability. Finally, a broad array of exercises will help
inhibit the atrophy of this important capability.
Question. In your view, what existing or new missions should be the
focus of NATO's strategic efforts over the next 5 years?
Answer. In my view, NATO operations in Afghanistan will remain a
key focus of NATO's strategic effort over the next 5 years. This
includes successfully concluding the ISAF combat operation by the end
of 2014 and ensuring that NATO is ready to commence its new train,
advise, and assist mission, known as Resolute Support, on 1 January
2015. The task of that mission will be to ensure that Afghan National
Security Forces are sustainable, credible, and capable of maintaining
security in Afghanistan under responsible and efficient Afghan Security
Institutions, operating within appropriate civilian and political
controls.
That said, NATO must also anticipate future threats or enhance its
preparedness for threats we already understand. These include continued
emphasis on ballistic missile defense, an understanding of the
transformation of terrorist groups, and cyber defense to the extent it
is collectively feasible. Given the evolution of terrorist threats, it
may be wise to consider an alliance capability to respond quickly to
terrorist events that threaten member citizens overseas.
Question. What steps, if any, could or should NATO take, in your
view, to reduce tensions with Russia?
Answer. NATO has made significant progress in reducing historical
Cold War animosities and suspicions by focusing on cooperation in
addressing common security threats in the areas such as Afghanistan
stabilization, counter-piracy, counterterrorism, and
counterproliferation. Such cooperative efforts are spearheaded through
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC should continue to explore new
forms of transparency and confidence building to augment the level of
trust and goodwill between NATO and Russia. Enhancing military-to-
military contacts at all levels is always beneficial, as we discovered
during the conflict in Georgia; while Russia can be grudging in
developing these contacts, NATO should play a role in fostering this
aspect of the relationship.
But long-term improvement in relations has as much to do with
changed perceptions within Russia as with any NRC project or initiative
that can be accomplished. A shift in Russia's own strategic calculus
will take time and firm, consistent NATO engagement.
Question. In your view, how should NATO proceed on the issue of
further enlargement of the alliance over the next 5 years?
Answer. The further enlargement of the alliance is a political
decision that can be made only by the NATO Heads of State and
Government. I continue to believe, however, that nations able to
meaningfully contribute to the security of the alliance should be given
favorable consideration, consistent with Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty.
prevention of and response to sexual assaults
Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more
than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including
2,558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports
(restricted, meaning that, in accordance with the victim's request,
they were handled in a confidential manner and not investigated).
Moreover, a recent survey conducted by the DOD indicates that the
actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1
percent of active duty women and 1.2 percent of Active Duty men
surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual
contact in the previous 12 months.
What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. In short, while we have established a strong sense of
urgency and put a host of important initiatives in place, I would be
the first to acknowledge that we have a long way to go to achieve our
goal of a culture in which such assaults simply cannot occur. We are
aggressively pushing forward under the five pillars of Prevention,
Advocacy, Investigation, Accountability, and Assessment, and we will
not rest until we have solved this problem.
We have taken strong action to bring perpetrators to justice,
address a military culture that became too complacent of corrosive
climate, and hold commanders accountable for both. The Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs are personally committed to eradicating
sexual assault within our ranks. We will continue to improve processes
and programs as part of our comprehensive approach.
The Services have achieved progress, to include specialized
training for investigation and litigation, access to victim's advocates
and counsel through special victim's programs, and highly qualified
experts to advise on program progress.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. Our foremost concern remains the safety and well-being of
the victim. If a sexual assault occurs, we would rather the victim
provide an unrestricted report, which allows for thorough investigation
and delivery of justice as appropriate.
However restricted reporting must remain an option for victims,
permitting access to services to meet their personal needs without the
additional stress of a criminal investigation. I am personally
committed to developing a climate across our Joint Force that makes
victims comfortable and confident in unrestricted reporting.
We are starting to see what we believe are higher rates of
unrestricted reporting. Our initiative to move initial disposition
authority to O-6 commanders or higher has increased unrestricted
reporting. Access to Special Victim's Counsel and advocates has
increased those victims willing to change a restricted report to an
unrestricted report. We will continue to pursue these and other
measures with the victim's interest always in mind.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD
oversight of military service implementation of the DOD and Service
policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assaults?
Answer. I believe DOD oversight of policy implementation is
adequate and improving, but I recognize we still have gaps to close in
collecting timely data and changing behavior in the force from top to
bottom.
The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) oversees
the Department's sexual assault policy. I have developed significant
confidence in this office and its leadership, and I personally rely on
them for advice and information. SAPRO works with the Services' offices
to execute the Services' sexual assault prevention and response plans.
SAPRO also works with the civilian community to develop and implement
aggressive prevention and response approaches to the programs. They
continue to lead on this issue by informing and advising commanders at
all levels and closing the gaps as we detect them.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. My experience has always been that commander accountability
is the cornerstone of unit mission success and discipline, with
commanders at every level upholding the standards of trust and respect
that all of our men and women in uniform deserve. This is a consistent
and important element of our military culture: the commander is held
responsible for the climate in his or her unit. Sexual assault in the
military found root in a climate that had become complacent. We are
changing that, swiftly. We have already amended our command climate
assessments by updating the surveys to include servicemembers'
evaluation of their commanders on climate and sexual assault response.
We will ensure that senior leadership has access to the results of
those surveys. We have moved initial disposition authority for
incidents of sexual assault to O-6 commanders or higher. But to make
all of these efforts take hold and change the unit culture, the role--
and accountability--of the commander remains essential.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. We hold a unit commander responsible for everything the
unit does or fails to do, on or off duty, whether CONUS or deployed in
remote expeditionary circumstances. That kind of responsibility is best
served by authority that aligns with it. Commanders receive extensive
training in their unique legal responsibilities and continue to
regularly consult with their judge advocates on all issues, including
whether (or not) to prosecute alleged sexual assault offenses. If a
commander and his or her judge advocate disagree, the decision will be
reviewed at the next higher level. Removing commanders from the
military justice process would send a harmful message that commanders
cannot hold their people accountable and are not themselves accountable
for everything in their unit. We could have removed this authority from
commanders when we were struggling with equal opportunity and drug
issues, but we didn't--and we got it right because commanders are the
ones who fix problems in their units. I've had women commanders come up
to me and insist we not take this out of the chain because they don't
believe they can demand higher standards if they cannot enforce them.
Question. Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
requires the convening authority to take action on the sentence issued
by a court-martial and authorizes a convening authority, in his sole
discretion, to take action of the findings of a court-martial,
including setting aside a finding of guilty or changing a finding of
guilty to a finding of guilty of a lessor included offense.
What is your view about the authority of a convening authority to
set aside or modify findings of guilt and authority to reduce a
sentence imposed by court-martial?
Answer. Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
currently grants broad authority and discretion to convening
authorities to dismiss findings of guilt after trial. I have already
endorsed Secretary Hagel's proposed amendments to Article 60 that
remove a convening authority's ability to modify Court Martial findings
or sentences for qualified offenses. A convening authority should
continue to have the discretion to dismiss minor offenses under
appropriate circumstances, such as to prevent an accused from the
burden of a felony conviction when found guilty of minor misconduct but
acquitted of major offenses. A convening authority should have the
flexibility to adjudicate such offenses in an alternate fashion, and
should retain the ability to modify sentences, which is an essential
component of our plea bargain process.
Question. During the recent full committee hearing on sexual
assault, it was suggested that the terminology used in the Workplace
and Gender Relations Surveys have resulted in difficulty in providing
an accurate picture of the prevalence of sexual assault within the
military. Specifically, use of the term ``unwanted sexual contact''
comprises such a broad spectrum of behavior that some have questioned
the value of the survey.
What is your view concerning the methodology and terminology used
in the Workplace and Gender Relations Surveys and what changes would
you recommend to improve the survey as a basis for better understanding
the prevalence of sexual assault in the military?
Answer. I feel we need to improve our methodology to provide more
detailed--and more frequent--information about the prevalence of sexual
assault and the conditions under which it occurs. Many of the survey
terms we have used for years are too broad in scope and cover a broad
spectrum of behavior--a choice that was made for understandable reasons
at the time. However, we have learned from our efforts over the past
decade and see the need for both aggregate and discrete data to inform
our programs. Common terminology throughout the government and private
sector will also help both communities talk about the same thing and
better share effective practices.
religious guidelines
Question. In your view, do policies concerning religious
accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual
expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different
beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes. We value the service and sacrifices of those members
of the Joint Force who hold deep religious faith, and those of no
religious faith, equally--and commit to provide each with a climate
that promotes mutual respect and trust. DODI 1300.17, ``Accommodation
of Religious Practices Within the Military Services'' states that ``The
Department of Defense places a high value on the rights of members of
the Military Services to observe the tenets of their respective
religions or to observe no religion at all.'' We take the words ``high
value'' seriously. As a result, policies ensure that each of the
Services allows individuals to request accommodation of religious
practices. Each request is considered on a case-by-case basis. The
commander values the servicemember's free exercise of religion, while
ensuring that approval of requests does not adversely affect mission
accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order,
discipline or any other military requirement.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and
good order and discipline?
Answer. Yes. Standing policies ensure commanders consider requests
for accommodation of individual expressions of belief, to include
apparel, grooming and worship practices. Requests are given equal
consideration as long as they do not negatively impact mission
accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order,
discipline or any other military requirement.
Question. There have been reports of incidents in which individuals
in the armed services have not been accommodated in the free exercise
of religion.
What actions, if any, have you directed to address these reports?
Answer. While I'm not personally aware of any servicemember who has
been denied accommodation of his or her free exercise of religion, I do
know that in each of the Services, commanders carefully consider each
individual request for accommodation and take these matters seriously.
If an individual's request for accommodation is denied, then policies
are in place that allow the member to appeal that denial all the way up
to Service Headquarters level. Our policy is actually to approve these
requests whenever possible. The bottom line is that military leaders
place a high value on each servicemember's individual religious
freedoms and we do our best to accommodate those freedoms.
reserve components as an operational reserve
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Reserve
components as an operational Reserve, as opposed to its longstanding
traditional role as a strategic reserve?
Answer. As budget pressures tighten, the Reserve component role
will evolve along with that of the Active component, which could alter
the current shape of both components in ways yet to be determined.
However, we know that sustained engagement in combat operations has
transformed the Reserve components of our Armed Forces. Repeated combat
deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and homeland
defense missions, have produced a force more operationally capable and
experienced than any time in our Nation's history.
I remain confident that given sufficient predictability of the next
deployment, the vast majority of Reserve component forces and
capabilities can be accessed systematically long into the future.
National Guard and Reserve members expect to deploy periodically to
meet the Nation's security needs, and many have volunteered with this
understanding. This operational force is a direct result of the
substantial investment in resourcing commitments and the personal
sacrifice of members, their families, and their civilian employers.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to
maintaining and enhancing the National Guard and Reserves as a relevant
and capable operational reserve?
Answer. Our current budgetary challenges and the steady decline of
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding will challenge our
ability to maintain current levels of readiness in the National Guard
and Reserves. With respect to the National Guard, we must be sensitive
to responsibilities for State missions when considering the use of
these units for operational employment overseas. While remaining a
strong supporter of our Nation's Reserve component, I am concerned that
a singular focus on maintaining the Reserve component at high readiness
will degrade Active Duty readiness--our most responsive force. We are
already seeing this with the requirement now in law for Air Guard units
to be maintained at full combat readiness, which in a difficult budget
environment has accelerated a decline in Active component squadron
readiness.
Question. What are your views about the optimal employment in
generating forces for combat missions of the National Guard and
Reserve?
Answer. We have seen a significant change in Reserve component use
over the past 20 years and have developed a Total Force--Active,
National Guard, and Reserve--to meet sustained combatant commander
requirements around the globe. This evolution and the broad range of
security and financial challenges on the horizon require us to make
smart decisions about Total Force roles and missions to ensure we have
the forces needed to defend and advance our national interests.
The recently published report to Congress on Unit Cost and
Readiness for Active and Reserve components of the Armed Forces
examined this issue in depth. The report concluded that the factors
used to determine the proper mix and employment of Active and Reserve
component units differ greatly not only among the Services but also for
individual missions and unit types. These findings will inform the next
Quadrennial Defense Review which will ultimately determine the optimum
mix and employment models for our Total Force.
Question. In your view, should homeland defense or other global or
domestic civil support missions be assigned exclusively to the National
Guard?
Answer. No, this should be a full-spectrum effort, and it would be
a disservice to our citizens if any one element capable of providing a
response were to be excluded for political or other reasons. I believe
each component of the Total Force--Active, Guard, and Reserve--has an
important, layered, and interdependent role in the successful execution
of homeland defense and civil support missions. We have taken steps to
enhance this system through, for example, the Dual Status Commander
concept. The Council of Governors has been most helpful in bringing
perspective to and gaining understanding of the complexities of this
process. I believe we should bring the most appropriate force to
respond to any challenge the Nation faces, whether the issue is foreign
or domestic.
For domestic response, the National Guard is deeply embedded in our
communities. In many cases, these soldiers and airmen possess unique
skills, qualifications and experiences that enable rapid responses to
natural and manmade disasters and provide invaluable contributions to
homeland defense missions. In other cases, an Active component or
Federal Reserve unit may be able to provide the right response more
quickly due to their unique capabilities and/or proximity to an
incident area.
national guard
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in
the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard,
the Air National Guard, and the National Guard Bureau?
Answer. In military operations since September 11, the Nation drew
extensively upon the Reserve components to meet operational
requirements, and they have integrated seamlessly with the Active
component on the battlefield for over a decade. The placement of the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the Joint Chiefs of Staff
formalized this operational relationship. Though the tempo of
operations for the Reserve component will reduce as operations in
Afghanistan draw to a close, some operational use of the Reserve
component will persist. The National Guard Bureau has tremendous
experience in domestic operations, so it will be an important voice for
ensuring a seamless response across military components and interagency
partners.
Question. In your view, should there be a requirement that the
position of Commander, U.S. Northern Command or Commander, U.S. Army
North, the Army component commander, be filled only by a National Guard
officer? Please explain.
Answer. While I would welcome assignment of a National Guard
officer to one of these commands, I believe senior leadership positions
should be filled with the best, most fully qualified officer available
at the time for that position. National Guard officers who possess the
required qualifications for these positions should be considered
equally with their Active component and Federal Reserve counterparts. I
believe that restricting the selection pool to only National Guard
officers could arbitrarily eliminate a more qualified officer for the
position, which is contrary to our goal of finding the absolute best
candidate for the job.
Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to ensure that
a ``deep bench'' of National Guard general officers is continually
being developed?
Answer. Building a deep and capable bench of general officers is
extremely important for all components of the Total Joint Force,
including the National Guard and Reserves. Key factors in developing a
deep bench of general officers include education, deliberate officer
development, and experience. We currently make education opportunities
available to all our Reserve component officers, allowing them to
attain the same qualifications as their active counterparts. The
Services, National Guard Bureau, and the Federal Reserves maintain
effective officer development and management programs to ensure the
right people are receiving the right education and experience at the
right time. The ``Chairman's 18 Reserve Positions''--18 general and
flag officer billets throughout the Joint Force designated for Reserve
component officers--is having a powerful and positive impact providing
Reserve component officers the requisite experience required to be
effective leaders at senior levels in the Total Joint Force. Inclusion
of a three-star National Guard officer as the Deputy Commander at
NORTHCOM and as the Deputy Director of the National Guard Bureau have
enhanced our ability to provide senior positions for Guard officers.
rising costs of medical care
Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at
Maxwell Air Force Base that ``health care is eating the Department
alive''. In recent years, the Department has attempted to address the
growth in overall health care costs by identifying efficiencies as well
as by proposing increased cost shares for military retirees.
What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical
costs on future DOD plans?
Answer. Health care consumes nearly 10 percent of the department's
budget and could grow considerably over the next decade, taking an ever
larger bite of our ability to invest in enhanced warfighting
capability. The healthcare benefit is an important component of
retention for our men and women. If confirmed, I will continue to work
closely with Service and Department leaders and with this Congress to
find reasonable and responsible ways to stem this growth while still
fairly providing for the needs of our men and women. This will require
finding efficiencies and encouraging healthier lifestyles, and may
require increased cost shares from the constituents of the system.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
Answer. Through the last two budget cycles, Congress has permitted
small increases in the TRICARE Prime enrollment fees. These adjustments
were an important step to managing costs, but they are not enough to
sustain the benefit in the long term. If confirmed, I will continue to
seek to better manage costs by building a shared Joint Force commitment
to behaviors that promote health and continuing to look for savings
where practical. We may also need to increase constituent participation
in paying for this system. Given today's budget environment, it is
critical that we find an acceptable compromise to reduce costs while
maintaining the quality of care our personnel and veterans expect.
Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
the costs of military health care?
Answer. We are continuing to look at fiscal year 2014 options that
would slow the growth of health care costs while preserving its quality
and range. We're looking at options such as facility consolidations and
civilian-military personnel mix changes, as well as initiatives that
increase cost-sharing with beneficiaries, such as increased co-pays and
other fee adjustments. If confirmed, I will continue to review
initiatives for controlling the costs of military health care while
always keeping in mind the importance of providing quality service to
our people.
systems and support for wounded warriors
Question. Servicemembers who are or have been wounded and injured
in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service
for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation,
evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty
when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or
discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center
(WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the
needs of significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers.
Despite the enactment of legislation and continuing emphasis, many
challenges remain, including a growing population of servicemembers
awaiting disability evaluation.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD, the
Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to improve the care,
management, and transition of seriously ill and injured servicemembers
and their families?
Answer. I feel we've made amazing progress in medical care over the
last 12 years of war. We've achieved revolutionary medical advances,
including joint battlefield surgical care, and advanced rehabilitation
provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs. But we've been
advancing more slowly in other areas, particularly those surrounding
family and transition. We're making progress, but I recognize we have
work to do. If I am confirmed, I will keep my focus on this critical
area. My wife Mary has played a key role both by being active in
finding ways to enhance care for our wounded warriors and their
caregivers and in enhancing my own understanding of the problems we
face.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based?
Answer. We will look to expand research and treatment through
collaboration between the private medical research and healthcare
sectors and our Centers of Excellence. Many of our Wounded Warriors
have successfully returned to service through such programs. We must
also continue to grow our day-to-day collaboration with the Department
of Veterans Affairs. We are close to achieving our goal of 100 percent
certified medical records accompanying a servicemember transitioning to
the VA.
Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. One key area for improvement is individual case management
when a servicemember transitions from the Active Force to DOD retiree
or eligible veteran status. Streamlining this process relies on a
single electronic health record, to follow the servicemember through
transition, and a single tracking tool for case management. Our
communication across our bureaucracies continues to be an area of
frustration. We also have more work to do in ensuring the best possible
opportunities exist for our wounded warriors, to include jobs and
continued care for their mental and physical disabilities.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. We need to continue our progress in tracking and assisting
our wounded warriors and their caregivers, and in finding opportunities
for meaningful employment, physical rehabilitation, and mental health.
If confirmed, I will remain vigilant for new opportunities to help
these American heroes, especially when and where they are frustrated by
bureaucratic issues.
Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES).
The Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) was established to
integrate the DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs disability systems
to improve and expedite processing of servicemembers through the
disability evaluation system.
What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
improve the DES?
Answer. I support the recommendations of Senator Dole's and
Secretary Shalala's commission, to regain patient focus within each
department's core competencies. Otherwise, IDES has developed to its
limit to have the separate processes operate as if unified. We have
recently made progress in this area by setting--and nearly achieving--a
goal of having 100 percent certified complete medical records for
transitioning servicemembers.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work to accelerate
transition and disability processing within the bounds of the law,
principally by working to ensure no bottlenecks exist on the DOD side
of the equation. Our governance process improvements with the VA are
integral to streamlining the process.
suicide prevention and mental health resources
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the Committee.
In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in
shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their
families, including members of the Reserve components?
Answer. In general, preventing suicides falls under the Service
Secretaries' and Service Chiefs' title 10 responsibilities. However,
the Joint Chiefs must collectively approach the critical issue of
military suicides with the same urgency we have given to protecting the
lives of our men and women in combat. One way to do this is through
shared understanding among the Services--which the Joint Chiefs can and
will promote, similar to sharing best practices regarding prevention of
sexual assault. The Department continues to work across the interagency
and the White House to better understand the factors leading to
suicide, and to ultimately enable all our Veterans and their families
to enjoy the future they have sacrificed so much to secure.
Each of the Services has a comprehensive suicide prevention program
dedicated to evaluating the impact on force readiness, informing senior
leaders, and providing guidance and oversight for program
implementation. The Department currently has a number of programs in
place designed to build resilience, provide adequate mental health
resources, increase help-seeking behaviors, and offer a variety of
additional services aimed at helping servicemembers deal effectively
with stressors.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
home station?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work in concert with the Service
Chiefs to maintain, and increase where needed, effective treatments for
mental health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress. The
extensive behavioral health resources already available to our forces
in Afghanistan represent an important foundation upon which we will
continue to build. I will also continue to support service efforts to
remove lingering stigmas or barriers to treatment for servicemembers
and their families. We will ensure commanders encourage seeking help by
highlighting examples of servicemembers who have benefitted from mental
health assistance or counseling.
military quality of life
Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget
challenges.
If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military
quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of
intense downward pressure on budgets, and how do you envision working
with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and
Congress to achieve them?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support essential areas,
such as mental health counseling, fitness, child care, and spouse
employment. I believe we can sustain a reasonable level of essential
services only if we continue to reduce overlaps and seek other
efficiencies in the way we apply our declining resources. However, we
also need to provide security to the Nation and sustain the quality of
the All-Volunteer Force. The entire military enterprise is under
scrutiny. We can only achieve balance and priority through honest
discussion and tough choices regarding which Services foster successful
recruitment, retention, and career progression while achieving fiscal
sustainability for the military of the 21st century.
family readiness and support
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families?
Answer. According to recent surveys, military families are most
concerned about pay and benefits and retirement. DOD engages military
families on this issue via the Pay and Retirement Working Group. The
working group's input is addressed through the Military Compensation
and Retirement Modernization Executive Committee.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness
needs are addressed and adequately resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to place military family
needs among my highest priorities. We must examine every warrior and
family support program to ensure that we target funding at the most
impactful programs and reduce duplicative efforts. To do so, we will
continue current studies with DODEA, DECA, and a number of university
partnerships that are focused on best practices and the return on
investment of existing programs.
Among these efforts, we must also include the restructuring of
medical facilities to make them more efficient, without sacrificing
quality or continuity of care.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services to
meet the changing needs of our military families. The Joint Staff is
building--with the White House and the Services--sustainable community-
based partnerships and initiatives that improve education, employment,
and wellness support for current and transitioning members.
DOD has also adjusted force size and rotation, redoubled transition
support, and invested in world-class health care for our families. This
includes: (1) fielding effective treatments for mental health issues,
traumatic brain injury, and combat stress; and (2) continuing the
effort to reduce the stigma of service and family members seeking
mental health services.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. We must ensure that every family has access to quality
resources, regardless of component or location. Current efforts include
the Services' effort to leverage: (1) public/private partnerships
within the communities; and (2) the State Joint Force Headquarters of
the National Guard to help members access child care, mental health
services, and employment opportunities. If confirmed, I will continue
my support of these critical efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
enhance family support?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the Services
caring for our families. Today, Family Support Working Groups, Resource
Management Decision Working Groups, and other venues are actively
attempting to ensure program effectiveness, share best practices, and
reduce duplication of efforts. America's citizens have also stepped
forward--from the local to the national level, thousands of
organizations, higher learning institutions, and businesses have
partnered to support our Military Family. However, there will always be
new ideas and initiatives to enhance family support. I will be most
interested in those with high leverage that provide dramatically
enhanced support without further deepening our fiscal crisis.
counter threat finance
Question. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and
facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism,
production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other
significant national security threats could have an outsized impact on
confronting these threats. In August 2010, the Department issued a
Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy Directive which recognized the CTF
discipline as an essential tool in combating criminal networks and
terrorist organizations and called for the integration of CTF
capabilities into future force planning and the continued support to
interagency partners conducting CTF operations.
What is your assessment of the Department's efforts to date to
institutionalize and support these capabilities?
Answer. We learned the importance of CTF through our success in
Iraq and Afghanistan with the Threat Finance Cells. Identifying and
upsetting financial supply lines are a proven means of disrupting
threats to U.S. national security. DOD Directive 5205.14 (CTF), which
was updated in November 2012, drives the institutionalization of CTF
within DOD.
Threat Finance Cells--which are comprised of intelligence, law
enforcement, and defense personnel--play a supporting role in
identifying insurgent, criminal, and terrorist finances; disrupting
front companies; developing actionable financial intelligence;
freezing/seizing illicit funds; and building criminal cases.
Ultimately, success in CTF will depend on DOD's continued ability to
integrate with, support, and complement other U.S. Government,
multinational, and host nation activities.
Question. What is your assessment of the current ability of the
Department to provide support to other U.S. Government departments and
agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?
Answer. DOD currently supports the interagency with its unique
capabilities, including long-term planning, network analysis,
intelligence analysis and tools, and the integration of intelligence
into operations. The result is a well-coordinated, capable and robust
CTF posture. If confirmed, I do not anticipate an immediate need to
expand the support that DOD is providing, but we will continue to
remain fully engaged in the interagency process to counter threat
finance activities.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's
current counter threat finance efforts?
Answer. The Department is examining its current counter threat
finance efforts and identifying ways to strengthen it, incorporate
lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, and further institutionalize
DOD's capability. Possible recommendations may include further training
and education for the force. However, budget reductions will likely
make it difficult to significantly expand this program.
law of the sea convention
Question. You have previously expressed your support for U.S.
accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Do you still believe that the United States should join the Law of
the Sea Convention, and, if so, why?
Answer. Yes. I support the United States acceding to the Law of the
Sea Convention. My career as a Naval Officer intermixed with joint
tours drives home the importance of this orderly set of laws governing
activity on the sea--a set of rules that benefit our maritime nation
greatly. Our accession would increase our credibility and influence in
defending the Convention's existing norms that enable the access,
mobility, and sustainment of our military forces and commercial fleet.
Our non-party status detracts from our ability to lead developments in
the maritime domain, and enables emerging powers to advance their
contrary interpretations of the Convention. As the global security
environment changes, it will become increasingly important for the
United States, as the world's foremost maritime power, to use all
elements of national power and lead from inside the framework of the
Convention rather than observe from the outside.
treatment of detainees
Question. The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the
United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.
If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD
directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable
to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 of
the Detainee Treatment Act and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would continue to take steps to ensure
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures applicable to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements
of section 1403 of the Detainee Treatment Act and with Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. I support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations and in DOD
Directive 2310.01E.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
navy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance transition plan
1. Senator Nelson. Admiral Winnefeld, section 112 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 directs the Navy
to sustain and continue to upgrade its manned airborne intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleet until it commences
fielding a platform or mix of platforms that provide equal or greater
capability. The law directs the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to
certify annually that the Navy remains in compliance and is supporting
the needs of the combatant commanders. The Navy has certified
compliance. In the President's budget request, the Navy plans to
gradually draw down its aging EP-3E and P-3 Special Projects Aircraft
over the period of fiscal years 2016-2018 as part of a maritime ISR
transition plan that will field a fleet of MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV). I understand the Secretary of the Navy is supportive of
this transition. Have you spoken to the combatant commanders to confirm
if these ISR capabilities fulfill their requirements?
Admiral Winnefeld. Combatant commanders requests for ISR always
exceed our capacity to provide. However, regarding capability, the
combatant commanders contributed to the Navy's MISR&T Transition Plan
through the Battlespace Awareness Joint Capabilities Board. The
combatant commanders understand and support how we are optimizing the
Navy's ``high-demand, low-density'' ISR capability.

2. Senator Nelson. Admiral Winnefeld, is the Navy effectively
managing the ISR platform transition?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes. Dr. Vickers and I, along with Joint Staff
and representatives from the combatant commands, carefully reviewed
Navy's current ISR capabilities and proposed way ahead. We have
certified Navy's plan each of the past 2 years. Such review is critical
because, while the EP-3E ARIES and P-3 Special Projects Aircraft (SPA)
have been workhorses for the Navy and Joint Force for decades, they're
fast approaching end-of-service life (approximately 2020).
To mitigate short-term risk, the Navy is sustaining the
capabilities of both the EP-3E and P-3 SPA aircraft while fielding the
baseline Triton UAV with its greatly improved persistence. They are
also adding a Quick Reaction Capability, which provides certain ``SPA-
like'' capabilities, to the P-8A aircraft. Proper phasing of manpower
is critical to ensure transition of capability and capacity to follow-
on platforms, without impacting combatant commanders.
The Navy's plan, as part of a joint effort, invests in the right
platform/sensor mix and is in the best interests of the Joint Force,
particularly in our current budgetary environment. However, additional
requirements, particularly those in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 draft
language requiring the sustainment of five EP-3Es for allocation, that
limit the Navy's ability to execute this plan may draw resources that
impede fielding of the appropriate future force. Dr. Vickers and I will
continue to monitor Navy's progress closely.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
readiness and flying hour cuts
3. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, due to a recently approved
reprogramming, the Air Force was able to move $208 million into flying
hour funds. Why couldn't DOD do this before April 9, 2013? Was it due
to a lack of flexibility in moving funds within the DOD budget?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, both the NDAA and fiscal year 2013 enacted
budgets were 3 and 6 months late respectively, which resulted in a 6
month Continuing Resolution that limited our flexibility (transfer
authority) to move money between major budget categories and into
flying hour funds. The Air Force's limited Operations and Maintenance
transfer authority of $15 million was insufficient to restore any
reasonable portion of the $591 million flying hour reduction resulting
from sequestration in fiscal year 2013. Consequently, the lack of
flexibility and reduction in Operations and Maintenance funds resulted
in the Air Force grounding some flying squadrons on April 9, 2013. The
reprogramming action completed in July gave the Air Force the authority
to shift $1.6 billion from other appropriations into critical
Operations and Maintenance funds to minimize the impact on readiness,
$208 million of which was applied towards the Air Force flying hour
program.

4. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, I believe DOD was short
approximately $11 billion in overseas contingency operations (OCO)
funding and has requested that $9.6 billion be reprogrammed from the
base budget. If DOD received full funding for overseas contingency
operations, what impact would that have had on DOD operations and
readiness as a whole, to include Air Force flying hours?
Admiral Winnefeld. The President's fiscal year 2013 OCO budget
fully funded wartime operations based on our best estimates 2 years
ago. However, during execution of the fiscal year 2013 budget in the
spring of 2013, the Department identified a shortfall of between $7-$10
billion, conservatively, in OCO funds due to a combination of
sequestration reductions against both the Base and OCO operation and
maintenance budgets and higher than forecasted wartime operating costs,
including fuel, retrograde transportation, etc.
To ensure we could properly conduct wartime operations and to help
minimize some of the devastating impacts to base budget readiness, the
Department requested $9.6 billion in reprogramming authority from
Congress. Because it was unclear how much of the reprogramming action
would be approved, the Services continued scrutinizing their budget
activities to find additional resources to address the funding
shortfall. Ultimately, Congress approved the majority of the requested
fiscal year 2013 reprogramming actions, allowing the Department to
appropriately fund wartime operations and mitigate a portion of the
impacts to readiness in the Air Force Flying Hour Program. Ultimately,
the curtailed readiness activities will have a cumulative effect in
fiscal year 2014, which will be amplified with further sequestration.

5. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, how many additional hours
will have to be dedicated to bring all these units and its aircrews
back up to mission-ready status?
Admiral Winnefeld. As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air
Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000
flying hours at a cost of $116 million above the PB14 request and 3-6
months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from
current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-
sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).
Prior to sequestration, a substantial number of Air Force squadrons
were already operating at lower than optimal goals due to previous
Budget Control Act (BCA) reductions and the effects of long-term high
operations tempo. On 9 April, a total of 31 squadrons were stood down,
including 13 combat-coded (fighter, bomber, and Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS)) units and 18 institutional units (Weapons
School, Aggressors, Thunderbirds, etc.). Through efficiencies and the
$208 million from the DOD reprogramming request, the Air Force was able
to shift funds and increase the flying rates of the 13 combat coded
units back to Combat Mission Ready (CMR) rates for the remainder of
fiscal year 2013. It will take 3-6 months at this CMR rate before these
squadrons return to pre-sequestration mission ready rates. The
efficiencies and reprogramming also allowed the remaining 18
institutional units to resume flying, albeit lower than Basic Mission
Capable (BMC) rates.
The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the
BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring
all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals
needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take
approximately 2 years, an additional $3.2 billion per year in fiscal
year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment
tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

6. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, how much will that cost?
Admiral Winnefeld. As of today, there are 18 squadrons in the Air
Force still flying at reduced levels of readiness. An additional 7,000
flying hours at a cost of $116 million above the PB14 request and 3-6
months would be necessary to bring these remaining 18 squadrons from
current (lower than Basic Mission Capable) flying rates back to pre-
sequester mission status (Combat Mission Ready flying rates).
Prior to sequestration, a substantial number of Air Force squadrons
were already operating at lower than optimal goals due to previous
Budget Control Act (BCA) reductions and the effects of long-term high
operations tempo. On 9 April, a total of 31 squadrons were stood down,
including 13 combat-coded (fighter, bomber, and AWACS) units and 18
institutional units (Weapons School, Aggressors, Thunderbirds, etc.).
Through efficiencies and the $208 million from the DOD reprogramming
request, the Air Force was able to shift funds and increase the flying
rates of the 13 combat coded units back to Combat Mission Ready (CMR)
rates for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. It will take 3-6 months at
this CMR rate before these squadrons return to pre-sequestration
mission ready rates. The efficiencies and reprogramming also allowed
the remaining 18 institutional units to resume flying, albeit lower
than BMC rates.
The Air Force will continue to have readiness challenges due to the
BCA and sequestration, beyond the units that were stood down. To bring
all Air Force flying squadrons back to full mission readiness goals
needed to meet Defense Strategic Guidance requirements, it would take
approximately 2 years, an additional $3.2 billion per year in fiscal
year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, and a reduction in current deployment
tempo (e.g. deploy-to-dwell at 1:3 or better).

7. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what happens to these units
on October 1, 2013, when sequestration hits again?
Admiral Winnefeld. Given the nature of the cuts in fiscal year
2013, we had no flexibility in managing squadron readiness. If
sequester hits in fiscal year 2014, we will be able to rotationally
stand-down units, or fly them at reduced rates, similar to actions we
took in fiscal year 2013. The net effect of cuts spread over the full
fiscal year versus just 7 months will lead to readiness levels slightly
higher than under sequester in fiscal year 2013, but still well below
pre-sequester--and already sub-optimal--readiness levels. This will
significantly erode our training and force development efforts, and
increase risk in our ability to fill OPLAN and the Secretary of Defense
ordered missions.

8. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, in your professional military
opinion, what are the military options that could best accomplish
changing the balance of military power between the Assad regime and the
armed opposition without boots-on-the-ground, assuming: (1) vetted
rebels are provided with light arms and anti-tank weapons and training;
(2) no kinetic action against Syrian integrated air defense system; (3)
limited strikes in Syria would be allowed as would flight into Syrian
airspace; (4) airstrikes would last no more than 2 weeks; (5)
collateral damage to civilians is to be minimized. Under those
parameters, assuming legal justifications were in place: (1) what could
you accomplish in terms of altering the balance of military power; (2)
what lines of military effort would you recommend; (3) what are the
risks associated with those lines of effort; and (4) what is the cost
of your recommended course(s) of action? Please provide an assessment
of the impact on your ability to handle an Iranian conflict following
such an action.
Admiral Winnefeld. Within the framework and the constraints and
objectives articulated above, there are military options available,
which we have fully briefed to the national security staff.
At the unclassified level, these options would include strikes with
standoff weapons on key Syrian Regime infrastructure, logistics nodes,
and combat forces command and control nodes that could degrade regime
forces. Striking attack helicopters on their ramps with standoff
weapons would have an important impact on regime close air support
capability, though the locations of those helicopters varies. Contrary
to what some have suggested, although fixed wing tactical aircraft are
being used by the regime against the opposition, they are not the
principal firepower element being used to target the opposition. For
this reason, striking runways, again as some have suggested, is not an
optimal use of expensive standoff weapons, to say nothing of the fact
that the regime would rapidly repair runway damage and resume
operations. While the above strikes would have an effect on the balance
of military power, they are not likely to be decisive.
Rather, the regime is primarily targeting the opposition through
artillery and rocket attacks and ground forces operations. We believe
that suppressing these attacks would require a campaign that would
roll-back certain (though not necessarily all) elements of the
integrated air defense system and subsequently enable a campaign
against Assad's ground forces. Details of such a campaign would be
classified, but such a campaign is feasible. Contrary to depictions of
our prior responses as involving a massive campaign, this would not
require enormous resources, but would require a moderate number of ISR,
tactical aviation and traditional support aircraft such as tankers,
AWACS and personnel recovery resources, as well as regional bases and
defenses for those bases. Principal risks to this approach would be:
(a) the risk of retaliation from Syria against regional partners and
U.S. bases within those countries; and (b) the risk to U.S. aircraft
from mobile surface-to-air missile systems.
To effect a positive and longstanding result, U.S. support should
contribute to enabling a substantial number of moderate opposition
fighters over an extended period of time. Such an endeavor to build a
moderate opposition force capable of defeating regime forces and
consolidating and holding territory would require at least 2 years.
This extended large-scale train and equip effort is probably the wisest
course of action; however, it is not without substantial obstacles.
Preferably, strikes would be deferred until an opposition force is
capable of maintaining and exploiting at least some of the gains
provided by the strikes.
The two options outlined above could complement one another and
cause the balance of military power to shift. However, we believe it is
unrealistic to expect this shift to occur rapidly. Both sides are in an
existential struggle for survival, and have demonstrated considerable
resiliency. We are concerned that some consider such a campaign to be
easy. Once the first 2 weeks pass without a clear solution to the
conflict, there would most certainly be an appetite for more action.
Thus, we need to understand that the United States would likely be
drawn into a protracted conflict, and would need to be prepared for the
expense and follow-on actions in a post-Assad Syria that would likely
be demanded.
Finally, we need to be prepared to fund either or both options. Our
initial estimate for a train and equip mission is in the hundreds of
millions dollars per year. The cost of the strikes depends on the
number of munitions expended, but costs would start in the tens of
millions and could easily increase to hundreds of millions.
Regarding Iran, we are currently postured to respond to
contingencies in the Gulf and we monitor Iranian actions very closely.
If action against Iran were sequential to action in Syria, we would use
forces already anticipated for such a conflict. If such action were to
occur in parallel, some of the forces we would deploy would not be at
optimal levels of readiness.

9. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, assuming you were given the
constraint of no U.S. boots-on-the-ground and to minimize collateral
damage, without kinetically taking out the Syrian integrated air
defense system, what limited U.S. military options could change the
balance of military power between Assad and the armed opposition? I am
looking for an option that falls between doing nothing and doing a no-
fly-zone over Syria. In your professional military opinion, do you
think we should do any of these options?
Admiral Winnefeld. Two contributions to the contest in Syria could
most effectively change the balance of power between President Assad
and the armed opposition.
The first is to train and equip an opposition force that can
competently fight in this war. This can and should be conducted outside
Syria in a neighboring state. I am in favor of expanding this effort.
The second is to conduct operations to begin a campaign to attrite
the forces that are causing the most damage to the opposition; namely
artillery and rockets launched by Syrian regime forces, followed
closely by attack helicopters. To be sure, attacking command and
control nodes and fixed wing aircraft would have an impact, but not a
decisive impact. Thus, I do not believe that merely cutting runways, as
some have suggested, or hitting fixed wing tactical or transport
aircraft on the ground will turn the tide. We have learned this before
in places like Libya and Serbia, where a considerable level of effort
was required to shift events on the ground in favor of an opposition
force. This is serious business, and merely launching a few Tomahawk
Land Attack Missiles into Syria hoping to turn the tide of this war
will not accomplish that objective.
Rather, it would make more sense to execute a campaign that would
take out the above-mentioned most effective regime forces (artillery,
rockets, and attack helicopters). The details of such a campaign would
be classified, but it would generally involve removing the most
important elements of the IADS and gradually eliminating the forces
that most threaten opposition elements.
My role is to provide advice on how, not whether, to use force.
However, I believe such an operation would only be advisable under a
satisfactory combination of the following factors: the level of U.S.
interest at stake justifies the use of force; the contemplated action
is deemed legal under domestic and international law; such a legal
basis would not invite unwelcome similar action from parties elsewhere;
the outcome of such action would result in decisive effects for a force
that clearly shares our interests; an executable and affordable plan
exists for what would follow such action; financial support is
obtainable from Congress, if required; and no other contingencies of
greater importance than instability in Syria are imminent.

10. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, Assad uses airfields to
receive weapons and troops from Iran, move Syrian army troops around
the country, resupply those troops, and conduct airstrikes against the
opposition. Do these airfields represent a strategic vulnerability?
Admiral Winnefeld. The airfields do represent one of several
strategic vulnerabilities, but these airfields are not the regime's
center of gravity. Degrading Assad's airfields would hinder the regime
but probably not shift the balance of power decisively in favor of the
opposition. Moreover, degrading airfields is an expensive and
frustrating business, in which cratered runways are repaired quickly
and damaged fuel farms are replaced by trucks carrying fuel.
Artillery, rockets, and, to a lesser degree, attack helicopters are
principal forces hindering opposition progress in threatening the
regime. Thus, I would view those forces as a more important strategic
vulnerability than airfields.

11. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, could a limited strike,
using standoff weapons and stealth aircraft, crater major runways,
making them unusable for the Assad regime?
Admiral Winnefeld. The U.S. military has the capability to crater
Syrian runways, but only at great expense. Cratering all the runways at
a representative airfield in Syria would require 50-70 TLAM missiles.
However, these runways would only be unusable for several days before
they are repaired. Moreover, Russian-built aircraft are especially
adept at operating off rough airfields, including those that have been
cratered and rapidly repaired. Finally, cratering runways does little
or nothing to impact attack or logistics helicopter operations.

12. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, would we have to bomb the
Syrian integrated air defense to do a limited stealth and standoff
weapons attack?
Admiral Winnefeld. The U.S. military can conduct a limited stealth
and standoff weapons attack without bombing Syrian integrated air
defenses. The question is whether such an attack would be decisive in
turning the tide in favor of the opposition. Such an attack could
achieve a limited objective, such as deterring future use of chemical
weapons, but it would not alone shift the tide of the war, as we have
seen in several other cases (such as Serbia and Libya).

13. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, how would the movement of
Russian
S-300 surface-to-air missile systems into Syria affect military
options?
Admiral Winnefeld. The S-300 is a modern surface-to-air missile
system that, if procured by Syria, would be their most advanced
surface-to-air weapon. The
S-300 would significantly increase the risk to any U.S. aircraft or
cruise missiles flying within its engagement zone.

14. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, after letting the Taliban
raise the flag and the country name they used when they governed
Afghanistan on the political office the United States helped arrange in
Doha, Qatar, the Afghan people and President Karzai were understandably
upset. Are the chances for a U.S.-led peace process, or reconciliation
process, dead?
Admiral Winnefeld. While the reconciliation process in Afghanistan
has thus far been exceedingly complex and challenging, is has not
stopped moving forward. It remains an important element of fostering
stability in Afghanistan. We will continue to support our Afghan
partners in their efforts to meet with the Taliban and reach a
political settlement that provides peace and security for the people of
Afghanistan.

15. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, are we forcing this issue
and doing more harm than good?
Admiral Winnefeld. A reconciliation process inevitably introduces
additional complexity into internal conflict in any nation, as well as
uncertainty among the elements making up both sides of the conflict.
There will be both progress and setbacks along the way in any such
negotiation process. Afghanistan is no exception. Nonetheless, a
political solution has been required to end most insurgencies (witness
the ongoing process in Colombia), and we support reconciliation as a
part of the end game solution in Afghanistan. The Department of State
is taking the necessary measured steps to support the peace process. A
reconciled Afghanistan is in the best interest of all parties involved.
President Karzai acknowledges this, and continues to encourage the
peace process, albeit on his terms.

16. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, in your military opinion,
what is the troop level at which the United States and international
troops can only do force protection and no other mission? In other
words, at what troop level is the military only able to protect itself?
Admiral Winnefeld. Troop numbers in combat are not only based on
troop-to-task but also the threat environment. Current plans call for a
NATO train, advise and assist mission and a separate U.S.
counterterrorism mission. Our force protection posture will be designed
to protect the force conducting these missions, as well as any
supporting U.S. forces. Based on our current threat assessment, our
planning consideration allocates approximately 40 percent of the
deployed servicemembers to force protection.

key performance parameters
17. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, please list examples of
where changes you have helped institute in the military's requirements
process through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has
been successful.
Admiral Winnefeld. Examples of successes from changes made to the
JROC and JCIDS process include:

F-35: Addressed service concerns with Key Performance
Parameters (KPPs) for all variants and reduced performance
threshold values associated with combat radius and short
takeoff distance, saving money without compromising required
performance for the warfighter.
Ground Combat Vehicle/Amphibious Combat Vehicle (GCV/
ACV): Directed an assessment of commonalities, which confirmed
the requirement for different base vehicles and identified a
number of technical areas where commonality could potentially
provide measurable cost savings.
Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B): From the initiation
of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and Capabilities
Development Document (CDD), the JROC reviewed and approved both
in less than 30-days--typically would have run 6-months
minimum.
Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and
Strike System (UCLASS): Re-examined the operational concept of
deploying UCLASS which resulted in requirements trades from the
previously approved ICD and eventual CDD.
3 Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar-Ground/
Air Task Oriented Radar (3DELRR-G/ATOR): Reviewed potential
overlapping requirements for service-specific radar
capabilities. Analysis enabled 3DELRR to proceed with reduced
performance threshold values and to meet cost and schedule
targets.
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS): Reassessed
CPGS ICD which resulted in substantial cost savings by making
acceptable technology development and performance tradeoffs.
Global Positioning Satellite Modernization AoA:
Reviewed and confirmed that the existing program of record
satisfies combatant command requirements. Avoided substantial
expenditure aimed at achieving unnecessary performance
improvements.
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR): Reduced
performance threshold values to ensure the system would not
require new hosting platform development while still providing
improvements to current capabilities.
Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): After validation
of the CDD, industry engagement resulted in KPP change
proposals that adequately addressed the identified capability
requirements while meeting or exceeding affordability targets.
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals
(FAB-T): Reviewed the CDD and approved revisions to both the
Initial Operational Capability definition and several KPPs.
Apache Block III: Reviewed and approved revisions to
Capability Production Document KPPs to include Net Ready-
related specified solutions and engine performance to account
for engine wear over the duration of the program.

18. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, in addition, what other
reform initiatives such as this are you working on?
Admiral Winnefeld. Other recent and future JROC and JCIDS
initiatives include:

Key Performance Parameter Relief (JROCM 015-13):
Intended to encourage acquisition managers, in coordination
with the appropriate requirements sponsors, to officially
request requirements relief where KPPs appear out of line with
an appropriate cost-benefit analysis. This has resulted in
increased descoping actions such as in AMPV above, JMS, and
Apache Block III.
I initiated Quarterly Leadership Forums between
myself, USD(AT&L), and D/CAPE to ensure continued coordination
and alignment between requirements, acquisition, and
resourcing.
We are reviewing and updating JROC and JCIDS guidance
documents based on lessons learned and opportunities to further
improve the process. Additionally, we are working closely with
AT&L as they update the DODI 5000.02 (Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System).

u.s. africa command
19. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what is your threat
assessment of U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) area of responsibility--
is the threat growing, stabilized, or receding?
Admiral Winnefeld. [Deleted.]

20. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe we have the
forces in place in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and AFRICOM to be able
to both remain engaged in Africa and respond, if necessary, to threats
as they evolve?
Admiral Winnefeld. DOD is prepared to respond to threats and crises
as they arise while remaining engaged in AFRICOM and EUCOM.
AFRICOM forces remain engaged in priority missions such as
countering violent extremist organizations and partnership building
within Africa, in accordance with the President's priorities for the
continent. Meanwhile, we have taken a number of steps to be better
prepared for crisis operations, particularly in Northern Africa. For
example, the Marine Corps has resourced additional Marine Security
Guard (MSG) Detachments to meet regional threats and address Department
of State security concerns. While relieving an embassy under attack is
highly complex, we also maintain Marine FAST platoons and other forces
in the region to be able to rapidly reinforce an embassy in advance of
a problem. Among these forces is a dedicated Special Marine Air Ground
Task Force-Crisis Response in Spain capable of quickly responding to a
variety of threats in Africa or Europe.
DOD has also developed and adopted rules that will allow force
sharing between combatant commands for brief durations to ensure rapid
response in the event of a crisis. DOD and the State Department work
together to ensure that high risk facilities are properly secured with
DOD support, as required. Finally, DOD monitors specified crisis
response forces throughout the world and makes adjustments to position
and posture forces based on threat requirements.

21. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, do you believe we have
dedicated enough intelligence assets to the continent of Africa?
Admiral Winnefeld. [Deleted.]

22. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what is you assessment of
combining AFRICOM with EUCOM?
Admiral Winnefeld. Assigning combatant commands under the current
structure has led to productive engagement, planning, and operations in
the respective areas of responsibility. However, depending on the
magnitude of budget cuts to DOD, we may need to consider combatant
command consolidations among a number of other difficult staff
consolidation and reduction decisions. Combining AFRICOM and EUCOM
would be one of several options we would consider.

f-35 joint strike fighter program
23. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what is your assessment of
the F-35 program?
Admiral Winnefeld. One of the Department's top priorities is to
ensure the success of the F-35 development program and achieve a stable
design that will permit increased and more economical production rates.
The President's fiscal year 2014 budget request includes a total of
$8.3 billion for continued system development ($1.8 billion) and
procurement ($6.5 billion) of an additional 29 F-35 aircraft. To ensure
the F-35 maintains its effectiveness against continually evolving
threats, this request also includes resources to deliver advanced
weapons and sensors to the F-35 fleet in the years following Initial
Operational Capability (IOC).
To date, the Department has accepted close to 70 aircraft from the
production line which are undergoing test activities at NAS Patuxent
River and Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) while the Air Force and Marine
Corps are training pilots and maintainers at Eglin AFB. In addition,
the Marine Corps activated the first operational F-35 squadron last
fall at MCAS Yuma, AZ and is currently accepting deliveries of F-35B
STOVL aircraft as part of a 16-aircraft squadron by September 2013.
Moreover, the Services documented their IOC plans in a report to
Congress in June, and the government recently reached agreement with
the contractor for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lots 6 and 7.
While we have over 50 percent of the flight test program remaining
and have a good deal of development to complete, including software and
weapons integration, both the F-35 A and B completed the first lifetime
(8,000 hours) of fatigue testing and will begin the second lifetime
testing soon. Likewise, the F-35C is projected to complete the first
lifetime this fall. While we remain fully committed to the program, our
focus is on completing development, which will permit ramping up to
increased economies of scale in production, and on getting support
costs down.

24. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, why do we need the F-35?
Admiral Winnefeld. The F-35, as our primary air dominance platform,
meets the National Security Strategy challenge of preparing for
increasingly sophisticated adversaries and deterring and defeating
aggression in anti-access environments. The F-35 will execute a broad
range of missions against the most capable threats across the full
spectrum of military operations. It will defeat increasingly
sophisticated threat aircraft and air defenses to provide Joint Forces
the freedom of action to conduct land, maritime and air operations. The
F-35 capabilities will preserve our ability to precisely project power
into distant, highly contested environments.
The F-35 will form the backbone of U.S. combat airpower for decades
to come. It will replace aging, legacy fighters from across the Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps with a multi-role, fifth generation
aircraft. It will achieve air dominance across multiple missions to
include: offensive and defensive counter-air, suppression and
destruction of enemy air defenses, and precision strike (e.g., air
interdiction, strategic attack, and close-air support). It provides
advanced capability in the following areas:

- Survivability: detects, denies, and defeats sophisticated
threats.
- Lethality: locates, identifies, intercepts, and destructs
enemy aircraft, missiles, land and sea forces.
- Interoperability and Networking: enhances linked and
synchronized interoperability among the Services and our
international partners.
- Computer Network Operations: protects own networks from enemy
attack and disrupts enemy networks.
- Affordability: the program's tight focus on reducing cost has
realized significant and encouraging success. International
participation further reduces cost.
- Logistics Supportability and Commonality.

The F-35 is central to the National Military Strategy and our
ability to deter and defeat an increasing anti-access threat.

25. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what is the threat that is
driving procurement of this aircraft--air and ground?
Admiral Winnefeld. The multi-role F-35 is the centerpiece of the
Department's future air dominance and precision attack capabilities.
The F-35's fifth generation attributes, including integrated advanced
technology sensors, networking, and signature controls, are critical
for maintaining U.S. air supremacy and ensuring our ability to operate
against modern and emerging threats. The emergence of competitor fifth
generation aircraft within the next decade--coupled with the
proliferation of sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities and
modern integrated air defense systems--increasingly threaten our
current fourth generation aircraft. The F-35 is designed to control the
air and to penetrate heavily defended environments in order to deliver
a wide-range of precision munitions.

26. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, why can't we just purchase
more F-16s and F/A-18 Super Hornets?
Admiral Winnefeld. The Department's priority in TACAIR is to
acquire fifth-generation fighter/attack aircraft as quickly and
efficiently as practical while maintaining sufficient inventory of
legacy aircraft to meet current and near-term commitments. F-16s and F/
A-18E/Fs remain highly capable strike and fighter aircraft and will be
operated for many additional years. However, the limitations of these
fourth generation aircraft against adversaries employing sophisticated
surface-to-air and air-to-air threats will make them much less
survivable in the future. The F-35 will represent a generational leap
in effectiveness over these superb, but legacy, platforms.

27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, does DOD still plan to
procure 2,443 F-35s?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, the Department's current plan is to procure
2,443 F-35 aircraft. The President's fiscal year 2014 Defense budget
request includes a total of $8.3 billion for the program--$1.8 billion
for continued system development and $6.5 billion for procurement of 29
aircraft. The Department endeavored to protect the development of the
F-35 program this year as it adjusted its budget to meet the mandates
of sequestration.

28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what impact does slowing
down or delaying F-35 production?
Admiral Winnefeld. Slowing down or delaying F-35 production has two
major impacts. First we need to begin to ramp up production to take
advantage of more economic orders of quantity. The Department has
maintained a flat production ramp for the last few years to mitigate
the costs associated with concurrency. As the potential risks of
finding major design flaws through ground and flight test subside, we
need to ramp up the production profile at a measured rate to reduce the
cost of the aircraft. Slowing or delaying this will cost us more money.
Second, delaying or slowing F-35 production impacts our operational
forces. The F-35 will replace most of the legacy tactical aircraft
force structure for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Delaying the
transition to the F-35 will force the Services to extend the life of
their current fleets through costly life cycle extensions, additional
inspection and modification schedules, and in some cases changes to
operational plans. The F-35 represents the future of our joint tactical
aircraft fleet. Any delays to that end state impact our ability to meet
current and future operational commitments.

29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what would be the impact of
decreasing procurement of any of the F-35 variants?
Admiral Winnefeld. Unit cost is extremely sensitive to the total
quantity procured. Savings in the cost of the aircraft can be realized
through bulk purchases and other economies of scale. The actual cost of
an individual aircraft in any given LRIP lot is largely influenced by
how many aircraft are being purchased, and how much production line
learning has been achieved to that point. Loss of purchases will limit
the ability of the program to take advantage of economies of scale, as
well as reducing learning opportunities, which would drive the cost up
significantly.

30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what is your operational
assessment of the importance of the international partnership in this
program?
Admiral Winnefeld. The F-35 program is the Department's largest
cooperative program with eight partner nations participating including
the United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia,
Denmark, and Norway. The F-35 enhances the strength of our security
alliances by closing a crucial capability gap which enables us to
operate together more effectively. Likewise, operating a common fifth
generation strike fighter aircraft not only helps minimize
communications and interoperability issues among partner nations but
also becomes another element that binds us together. In addition,
partner nation procurement and Foreign Military Sales of the F-35
mitigate costs through increased production quantities. Notably,
partner nations recently have met and expressed their continued
commitment and support for the program; however, they are also
monitoring how DOD budget cuts will impact the cost of the program.

civilian furloughs
31. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what can DOD do to end
civilian furloughs now?
Admiral Winnefeld. The Secretary of Defense instructed all
components to monitor funding closely for the remainder of fiscal year
2013. On 6 August, the Secretary announced that this goal was
accomplished, and reduced the total furlough days for most civilians
from 11 to 6 days. None of us want to see this occur again in 2014, but
the sequestration reductions will be more severe next year than this
year.

32. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, will DOD use civilian
furloughs next year to cut personnel costs?
Admiral Winnefeld. The $37 billion in fiscal year 2013 budget cuts
mandated by sequestration, combined with short timelines that limited
our options, were a major cause of these furloughs. We would hope to
avoid furloughs in the future because of their deleterious effects on
morale and their potential to cause our best civilians to seek
employment elsewhere. However, a $52 billion sequestration top line cut
in fiscal year 2014 would perpetuate our readiness shortfalls, likely
requiring additional civilian personnel actions. These actions could
include furloughs, but we believe under a longer-term view would more
likely be weighted towards reductions in civilian billets leading to a
reduction-in-force action.

33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, how long will it take before
you realize this is a penny wise-pound foolish approach to cost
savings?
Admiral Winnefeld. We already realize the drawbacks of civilian
furloughs--they are as distasteful to us as any other budget reduction
mechanism. However, in fiscal year 2013, sequestration was applied by
Congress on a short timeline, limiting our options and resulting in
drastic measures like readiness stand-downs and furloughs that were not
strategically or managerially sound. To avoid even more far reaching
effects on training, we furloughed most of our civilian employees for
up to 6 days. This impacted morale and productivity in most of our
support operations, but we were left with no other alternative in
finding $37 billion in savings in such a short period of time.
Going forward, the Strategic Choices and Management Review has
defined the decision-space faced by the Department's senior leadership.
This, in turn, will inform the Services and defense agencies in
developing their fiscal year 2015-2019 budgets later this year, as well
as ultimately inform the Department's next Quadrennial Defense Review
early next year.

34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, early this year you hosted a
meeting with Members of Congress and the Vice Chiefs of the Services.
One of the major themes from that meeting was the commitment to address
cultural change in the Services to combat sexual assault. What steps
have you taken since then to effect that cultural change and what will
you do, if confirmed, to continue progress?
Admiral Winnefeld. Cultural change begins at the top of any
organization. The senior leaders within the Department of Defense are
committed to aggressively addressing this issue. The Joint Chiefs have
reviewed and made changes to service policies, have shared best
practices, have recommended a number of important initiatives to the
Secretary that have been implemented across the department, have
conducted a stand-down to focus exclusively on sexual assault, have
updated our training programs, and are currently engaged in developing
specific metrics to ensure we maintain a persistent focus on this
issue. Our initiatives are designed to cover the full spectrum of
attacking this problem, including but not limited to: continuing our
efforts to create an environment where this crime is much less likely
to occur; taking the best possible care of the victims of this crime
when it occurs; continuing progress in creating an atmosphere more
conducive to reporting; and continuing to tighten our prosecution
efforts. Measuring progress is exceptionally difficult, but we feel we
are making progress--for instance, the Services believe they are
already seeing increased rates of reporting. The personal engagement by
senior leaders created action down the chain of command and the
priority to change our culture is recognized throughout our Services.
We will continue to focus on combatting sexual assault within our ranks
to drive a culture of respect and dignity for all our servicemembers--
and I personally welcome and look forward to our continued interaction
with Congress on this vital issue.

impact of senate appropriations committee funding reduction for b-61
bomb
35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, what are the military and
geo-political implications of the Senate Appropriations Committee's
recommendation to reduce funding for the B-61 Life Extension Program
(LEP) by $168 million?
Admiral Winnefeld. A $168 million reduction to the B-61 LEP would
slip the delivery of the first production unit past fiscal year 2019
and impact our commitment to our NATO and Asian allies. Additionally,
the Commander of STRATCOM stated that the program is important to the
long-term viability of the B-2A strategic mission and is needed
regardless of changes to NATO commitments.
This reduction would also limit the DOD and the Department of
Energy from leveraging interoperable technology for other strategic
weapons. We would need to adjust the budget and scope for those
programs, resulting in delays to the overall Nuclear Weapons Council
Baseline Plan.

tricare fees
36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, prior to sending fee
increase proposals to Congress, why doesn't DOD sit down with
beneficiary associations and Congress to design fee increases that are
reasonable and acceptable to everyone?
Admiral Winnefeld. Military health benefit reform has been shaped
over the last 8 years by program and policy experts, Members of
Congress, constituencies, and subject matter experts from within and
outside of the Department. The Department's proposals have been and
will continue to be based on sound principles, as well as feedback from
these stakeholders.

37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, it seems to me that DOD
should wait on the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization
Commission to report its recommendations before asking Congress to make
piecemeal changes to personnel benefits. Do you agree or disagree, and
why or why not?
Admiral Winnefeld. The Commission has a unique opportunity to make
real and substantive change. We also recognize that comprehensively
reviewing all areas of military pay and benefits, developing
recommendations for change, and vetting them within DOD and with other
Departments takes time. We would like to take that time, but
sequestration has radically changed the budget reality and demands more
rapid action from the Department and Congress if we are to sustain
long-term readiness and modernization.

38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, wouldn't development of a
comprehensive package of compensation and retirement benefit changes,
to include health benefit changes, make more sense rather than a piece-
meal approach that wouldn't get us to an optimal solution for
controlling DOD's sky-rocketing personnel costs?
Admiral Winnefeld. If we had the luxury of time to allow
development of a comprehensive package before making any changes, we
would support it. However, given the enormous pressure the DOD budget
is under, we need to act with urgency on both efficiencies and
compensation reform if we are to maintain an acceptable level of
military capability, capacity, and readiness to be able to conduct our
military missions. I am not convinced that there is excessive risk in
getting compensation and benefits under control through carefully, but
quickly, considered individual actions.

nuclear force reductions and modernization
39. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Winnefeld, you state in your advance
policy questions that ``the timing and size of reductions, if any,
would have to be closely coupled to the status of the modernization
effort.'' The status today of that effort is as follows: (1) 2-year
delay for the follow-on SSBN; (2) 2-year delay to the follow-on ALCM;
(3) 2- to 3-year delay to LEP for the B-61 nuclear bomb; (4) 2-year
delay for the W-78/88 LEP; and (5) an indefinite delay for the
construction of a facility to replace the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Facility in Los Alamos. At what point are you prepared to say that
delays in the nuclear modernization effort, as promised by the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), should caution against further
nuclear force reductions? Put another way, if these delays get worse,
are you prepared to recommend against further nuclear force reductions
below New START levels?
Admiral Winnefeld. The Nuclear Weapons Council has recently
approved a baseline strategy that provides an executable 25-year plan
that sustains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile.
This strategy is aligned with plans for platforms and delivery systems,
and has adjusted the start dates and delivery targets for LEPs and some
portions of the infrastructure improvements. This plan is executable
with respect to throughput considerations and given fiscal constraints.
It also moves us towards a responsive infrastructure, as stated in the
Nuclear Posture Review and considered as part of the follow-on nuclear
force reductions. I consider execution of this baseline strategy to be
necessary for any negotiation of further nuclear force reductions below
New START levels.
However, this plan is vulnerable to additional budget cuts--it is
very fragile. While my recommendations on additional nuclear weapons
cuts are primarily tied to the direct linkage they should have with
negotiations with Russia, I would have to also take into consideration
any further delays to modernization programs. Because I believe below
New START cuts would be well in the future, we will have a much better
understanding of the status of the programs when and if they are in
play.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
uh-1n replacement opportunities
40. Senator Wicker. Admiral Winnefeld, as evidenced by the recent
relief of 17 officers at Minot AFB and the reports of the Defense
Science Board (DSB) Standing Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety,
there is still a serious neglect of priority and budget for the
sustainment of the Air Force's Priority One Nuclear Enterprise. This
lack of prioritization and resourcing manifests in a nuclear enterprise
that continues to conduct critical mission activities with outdated and
insufficiently supported aircraft and ground vehicles, to include the
woefully inadequate 40-plus-year-old UH-1N helicopter.
The Air Force has acknowledged the need to replace the UH-1N for
over a decade. The aircraft's inadequate speed, range and payload, and
obsolescent sensors and monitoring equipment are well-documented. The
use of an antiquated airframe such as the UH-1N to provide security for
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) sites reflects a lack of
proper resource prioritization by DOD.
As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you are required
to provide cross-Service oversight and recommendations that lead to the
most effective and efficient use of the greater defense industrial
capabilities. There are inexpensive and cost-effective solutions
available to replace the Vietnam-era Huey being fielded by other
Services that are far more reliable, capable, and safe.
As demonstrated in the Senate Armed Services Committee markup of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, I would like to understand the current
plan for replacing the existing UH-1N fleet. In addition, I would like
your commitment that this issue will be addressed in the upcoming
fiscal year 2015 budget submittal. Despite being an Air Force priority
for over 10 years, why has the replacement of the UH-1N fleet not been
realized?
Admiral Winnefeld. The requirement for a more responsive capability
to meet ICBM security needs remains valid, but budget constraints in
both the near-term and the foreseeable future make committing to new
acquisition programs challenging. A formal replacement strategy for the
UH-1N is due to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 1,
2014. As potential solutions, the Air Force is pursuing a variety of
replacement options to include Excess Defense Articles at low or no
cost. We remain committed to remaining involved and attentive to this
requirement.

41. Senator Wicker. Admiral Winnefeld, the leadership of Air Force
Global Strike Command recently commented that: ``I have had an urgent
and compelling need since 1996 in terms of speed, range, and payload .
. . the UH-1 does not meet the need. How much longer are we willing to
wait and take this risk?'' Has there been any change to the ICBM
security force posture that you believe makes the replacement of the
UH-1 less compelling or a more acceptable security risk?
Admiral Winnefeld. No, the ICBM security force posture has not
changed. The requirement to replace the UH-1s remains valid. However,
based on budget constraints, the Air Force currently plans to sustain
the UH-1 for another 6-10 years vice replacing them. The Air Force will
mitigate risk by upgrading UH-1 cockpits and making them night-vision-
compatible combined with other critical safety improvements. The Air
Force also recently received three UH-1s from the Marine Corps, which
will increase capacity and availability. In addition, the Air Force and
Army are examining options for the Army to transfer additional UH-1s to
the Air Force.

42. Senator Wicker. Admiral Winnefeld, there are aircraft being
fielded by DOD today that are significantly more capable and less
costly to own and operate than the UH-1N. In your leadership role on
the JROC, have you, or will you, direct the Air Force to prioritize
consideration of in-production DOD aircraft as a replacement for the
UH-1 rather than continue to assume the associated security risks?
Admiral Winnefeld. The JROC does not direct service acquisition
decisions. Rather, it defines and validates Joint force requirements
that are then submitted to both budget and acquisition processes. The
JROC does validate the results of analyses of alternatives, and will be
alert to consideration of all possible alternatives, including in-
production aircraft. When the decision is made to replace the UH-1N, a
full and open competition will be conducted to find the helicopter that
meets the mission requirements and provides DOD the most capable
replacement at the most economically feasible cost. This may ultimately
be an aircraft that is already in production, but those efficiencies
will be evident through the proper source selection process.

43. Senator Wicker. Admiral Winnefeld, the Combat Rescue Helicopter
(CRH) mission requirements were determined to be overly robust and
expensive to justify the CRH's use for the domestic support missions
currently conducted by the UH-1N. There is concern that the lack of
urgency regarding fielding of a UH-1 replacement may indicate an
attempt to merge CRH and UH-1N missions in the future. Did the JROC
review of the CRH program validate any requirement to provide site and
convoy security for the Nation's ICBM force or for supporting the Air
Force District of Washington VIP airlift/evacuation missions currently
supported by the UH-1N?
Admiral Winnefeld. The CRH's primary mission is to recover isolated
personnel from hostile or denied territory. It will also execute
humanitarian missions, civil search and rescue, disaster relief,
casualty/medical evacuation, and non-combatant evacuation operations.
CRH is not being produced to replace the UH-1N; rather it will replace
the Air Force's aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. Thus, JROC
review and validation of the CRH requirements did not include missions
currently supported by the UH-1N, such as providing site and convoy
security for the Nation's ICBM force or supporting the Air Force
District of Washington VIP airlift/evacuation missions. However, this
would not preclude the CRH from being called upon to execute missions
currently being performed by other vertical lift platforms.
______

[The nomination reference of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr.,
USN, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 24, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for reappointment as the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated
while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under
title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:

To be Admiral.

ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr.,
USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Transcript of Naval Service for ADM James Alexander Winnefeld, Jr., USN

07 June 1978.............................. Ensign
07 June 1980.............................. Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1982.............................. Lieutenant
01 September 1988......................... Lieutenant Commander
01 September 1992......................... Commander
01 September 1997......................... Captain
01 October 2003........................... Rear Admiral (lower half)
06 May 2006............................... Designated Rear Admiral
while serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
01 August 2006............................ Rear Admiral
14 September 2007......................... Vice Admiral
19 May 2010............................... Admiral, Service continuous
to date

Assignments and duties:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Station, Annapolis, MD (Division Officer). June 1978 Nov. 1978
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL Nov. 1978 Apr. 1979
(DUINS)........................................
Training Squadron SIX (Student)................. Apr. 1979 June 1979
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL June 1979 Dec. 1979
(DUINS)........................................
Training Squadron TWO THREE (Student)........... June 1979 Dec. 1979
Training Squadron TWO TWO (Student)............. Dec. 1979 May 1980
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Jun. 1980 Apr. 1981
Pilot).........................................
Fighter Squadron TWO FOUR (Power Plants Branch Apr. 1981 Nov. 1983
Officer).......................................
Naval Fighter Weapons School, San Diego, CA Nov. 1983 Jan. 1987
(Quality Assurance Officer)....................
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Replacement Naval Jan. 1987 Apr. 1987
Aviator).......................................
Fighter Squadron ONE (Operations Officer)....... Apr. 1987 Jan. 1990
Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/CENTCOM Feb. 1990 July 1991
Branch, J3)....................................
Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to the Chairman July 1991 Aug. 1992
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)..................
Fighter Squadron ONE TWO FOUR (Student)......... Aug. 1992 Jan. 1993
XO, Fighter Squadron TWO ONE ONE................ Jan. 1993 Apr. 1994
CO, Fighter Squadron TWO ONE ONE................ Apr. 1994 Mar. 1995
Naval Nuclear Power Training Command, Orlando, Mar. 1995 Feb. 1996
FL (Student)...................................
Prospective Executive Officer, USS John C. Feb. 1996 Mar. 1996
Stennis (CVN 74)...............................
Naval Reactors, Department of Energy, Mar. 1996 Aug. 1996
Washington, DC (Student).......................
XO, USS John C Stennis (CVN 74)................. Aug. 1996 May 1998
CO, USS Cleveland (LPD 7)....................... May 1998 Feb. 2000
CO, USS Enterprise (CVN 65)..................... Feb. 2000 Mar. 2002
Office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations Mar. 2002 July 2003
(Executive Assistant)..........................
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Director, July 2003 Dec. 2004
Warfare Programs and Readiness) (N8)...........
Commander, Carrier Strike Group TWO............. Dec. 2004 June 2006
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (Director June 2006 Aug. 2007
of Joint Innovation and Experimentation, J9)...
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Striking and Sep. 2007 Aug. 2008
Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces Europe/Commander, Joint
Headquarters Lisbon............................
Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Plans and Aug. 2008 May 2010
Policy) (J5)/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to
the United Nations Military Staff Committee....
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North May 2010 Aug. 2011
American Aerospace Defense Command.............
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff....... Aug. 2011 to date
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medals and awards:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with one Silver Star
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal with First Strike/Flight Award
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with ``E'' Device
National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with four Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with two Bronze Stars
Expert Pistol Shot Medal

Special qualifications:
BS (Aerospace Engineering) Georgia Institute of Technology, 1978
Designated Naval Aviator, 1980
Capstone, 2004-3
Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009

Summary of joint duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/ Feb. 1990-July 1991... LCDR
CENTCOM Branch, J3).
Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to July 1991-Aug. 1992... CDR
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff).
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command June 2006-Aug. 2007... RADM
(Director of Joint Innovation and
Experimentation, J9).
Commander, SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Sep. 2007-Aug. 2008... VADM
Striking and Support Forces NATO/
Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval Forces
Europe/Commander, Joint
Headquarters Lisbon.
Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Aug. 2008-May 2010.... VADM
Plans and Policy) (J5)/Senior
Member, U.S. Delegation to the
United Nations Military Staff
Committee.
Commander, Northern Command/ May 2010-Aug. 2011.... ADM
Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command.
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Aug. 2011-to date..... ADM
Staff.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM James A.
Winnefeld, Jr., USN, in connection with his nomination
follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James A. Winnefeld, Jr.; Nickname: Sandy.

2. Position to which nominated:
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:
June 24, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
April 24, 1956; Coronado, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Mary Alice Winnefeld.
Maiden name: Mary Alice Werner.

7. Names and ages of children:
James, age 17.
Jonathan, age 15.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
I serve as a trustee of the Naval Academy Foundation Athletics and
Scholarships program, as reported on my SF 278. Trustee means
``member'' in this case. I have no advisory or supervisory role in the
organization.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
None.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013.]

NOMINATIONS OF HON. STEPHEN W. PRESTON TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; HON. JON T. RYMER TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MS. SUSAN J. RABERN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER; AND MR. DENNIS V.
McGINN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS,
AND ENVIRONMENT

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Udall, Manchin,
Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, and Inhofe.
Also present: Senator John Warner, R-VA (Ret.).
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Mariah K.
McNamara, special assistant to the staff director; William G.P.
Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member;
Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Daniel C. Adams, minority associate counsel;
Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; William S. Castle, minority
general counsel; Samantha L. Clark, minority associate counsel;
Natalie M. Nicolas, minority staff assistant; and Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Daniel J. Harder and John L.
Principato.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator
Udall; Mara Boggs and David LaPorte, assistants to Senator
Manchin; Patrick Day, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Moran
Banai, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant
to Senator Blumenthal; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to
Senator Donnelly; Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine;
Steve Smith, assistant to Senator King; Alex Herrgott,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham; and Peter Blair,
assistant to Senator Lee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets, this morning, to consider nominations for a number of
important and challenging positions and assignments.
We welcome Steve Preston, who's nominated to be the
Department of Defense (DOD) General Counsel; Jon Rymer,
nominated to the Department of Defense Inspector General (IG);
Susan Rabern, nominated to be the Department of the Navy's
Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and Comptroller;
and Retired Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn, nominated to be the
Department of the Navy's Assistant Secretary for Energy,
Installations, and Environment.
We appreciate your being here today. We appreciate, also,
your willingness to serve in these positions which have such
great responsibility.
We welcome your family members this morning. The committee
is keenly aware of how important families are, in terms of
supporting the family members who take these positions, and to
the success of our civilian leaders. We very much appreciate
those family members who are able to join us today. Our
witnesses should feel free, during their opening remarks, to
introduce family members or others who may be with them here
this morning.
We're especially pleased to welcome back to our committee a
dear, dear friend. I won't call him an old friend, although he
is an old friend. John Warner is a true giant, a modern giant
of the U.S. Senate. I don't want to say we miss him every day,
because that might suggest something about my Ranking Member,
which I don't want to suggest. [Laughter.]
But, we miss you every day around here. The contribution
that you made to this body and to our country, the ability that
you have to bring people together, to look at issues in a clear
and a clean way, free from a lot of parochial or partisan
manner, is something which we treasure in our memory and we
wish we could replicate here in the Senate today.
John, we just love to see you here. I know every member of
this committee treasures our relationship with you, but I
particularly treasure the long, long relationship that we had.
Senator Inhofe. May I say something?
Chairman Levin. Please.
Senator Inhofe. Let me also echo a few things about Senator
Warner. We've been good friends for many, many years. He does
have some frailties, however. I always remember, when you were
out in Oklahoma and my staff, which, under my supervision,
generally drives pretty fast--I always remember your statement.
You said, ``I've been through two wars, I've been through
there, and I'm not going to die on this highway. Slow down.''
[Laughter.]
He did. John spoke, and speaks, with authority, and people
listen.
It's nice to have you back, John.
Chairman Levin. I have a lot of memories. I ought to share
one, at least, since my ranking member shared one. I have so
many. But, the love of life that Senator Warner has, the lust
for life--when we were traveling together, and we'd be eating
in a restaurant, and he would have something, which he had
special gusto for and fondness for, some food. After we were
done, he'd walk into the kitchen, in his commanding way, and
say, ``Can you pack up about 20 of those dinners for my crew?
I'm taking them to the airplane and handing them out to people
on the way.'' He always took care of the men and women who
traveled with us. It was always in his mind to do that.
But, the way in which John Warner gives a zest to life is
something we also ought to emulate. We treasure the many, many
memories. I won't go into them more than that, but we will call
on Senator Warner to defend himself in a couple of minutes,
when he introduces Admiral McGinn.
The positions to which our witnesses have been nominated
are vital to the effective and the efficient operation of the
Department of Defense. Two of the positions--the DOD General
Counsel and the DOD Inspector General--are direct advisors to
the Secretary of Defense and to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and they are the senior most civilian positions in the
legal and oversight functions of the Department.
The DOD General Counsel is the chief legal advisor in the
Defense Department and is involved in many of the most
important and complex issues facing the Department of Defense
in the Military Services. The Office of General Counsel handles
a broad portfolio, including international law, real estate,
environmental law, contracts, personnel law, ethics, and
legislation. Mr. Preston is highly qualified for this position,
having served previously as Principal Deputy General Counsel
and as the Navy's General Counsel. Currently, he is the General
Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a position he
assumed following Senate confirmation in 2009.
The Department of Defense Inspector General is a senior
independent agency official who provides oversight related to
the programs and operations of the Department. The IG's mission
is to promote integrity, accountability, and improvement of DOD
personnel, programs, and operations to support the Department's
mission and to serve the public interest. Mr. Rymer, a recently
retired Army Reserve soldier, is currently the IG at the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and he's held
that position since 2006. If confirmed as the DOD Inspector
General, he'll be required to maintain his independence and
exercise strong oversight of critical programs within the
Department.
The two nominees for positions within the Department of the
Navy will also, if confirmed, have important responsibility.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial
Management and Comptroller is responsible for managing the
Navy's budget and for keeping the Navy on the path to an
auditable financial statement. Ms. Rabern has a distinguished
background. She served for 20 years in the U.S. Navy and has
held the position of Chief Financial Officer at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Customs Service, and
the U.S. Agency for International Development. She is currently
the Director of the Virginia Military Institute Center for
Leadership and Ethics.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
Installations, and Environment is responsible for, among other
things, enhancing energy security of the Navy and Marine Corps
forces, construction and maintenance of installations, family
housing, and environmental protection. These issues are
critical to the readiness of our sailors and marines, and the
welfare of their families. Retired Vice Admiral McGinn, having
served 35 years in the Navy, has considerable experience with
Navy programs and policies. Most recently, he has led the
American Council on Renewable Energy.
Again, we welcome all of our nominees. We look forward to
your testimony.
I'll now call on Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming, not just our friend John, but the
whole panel.
Mr. Preston, you've been nominated to serve as General
Counsel for the Department. The General Counsel serves as a
chief legal officer in the Department. Therefore, I believe
it's absolutely necessary to understand what your role was and
what actions you took as the General Counsel of the CIA after
the attack on our facility in Benghazi on September 11. In
addition, if confirmed, you will provide a vital role in
determining the future of Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). Therefore,
gaining a better understanding of your thoughts on this matter
will be important to this committee's consideration.
Finally, the General Counsel plays a significant role in
the conduct of the Defense Department activities all around the
world, including ongoing counterterrorism activities. As the
threat from global terrorism continues to evolve, it's
important that we have the strong legal foundations that
provides our military with the tools necessary to keep the
Nation safe.
Mr. Rymer, you have been nominated to serve as Inspector
General of the Department. If confirmed, you will will step
into an organization that has not had a confirmed Inspector
General since December 2011. There's a lot of work to be done,
especially in oversight of activities that will lead to
financial audit readiness in the Department of Defense, in
providing intelligence, oversight, and, in an area of
particular importance to this committee, conducting senior
official investigations. The Department urgently needs an
Inspector General who can lead this important role to promote
the accountability and integrity.
Vice Admiral McGinn, after a distinguished 35-year career
in the Navy, you've been nominated to serve as the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and
Environment. I note that, since 2011, you've been the President
of the American Council on Renewable Energy, which is no
surprise to me, and you are no stranger to the lime light,
having testified before Congress on the perils of the national
security of human activity and climate change. We completely
disagree on these issues, but, thankfully, implementing a
national policy for climate change will not be one of your core
responsibilities if you are confirmed. Instead, you'll be
tasked with helping the Navy navigate a complex range of
installation and environmental issues, as well as its fiscally
responsible pursuit of the green fleet.
Additionally, I look forward to hearing your views on the
relocation of marines in the Pacific theater. I just got back
from there, and I see now, with sequestration, the really
serious problems that we're having. Certainly, Senator Warner,
you've been following this, too. The need to expand Marine
Corps ranges and protect the sea ranges--most important, the
devastating impact of sequestration on the Navy's ability to
maintain shore facilities, depots, and shipyards. This is
something that is very current. We have a problem that's
looming. We'll have a chance to talk about during the course of
this hearing.
Ms. Rabern, you've been nominated to serve as Assistant
Secretary for the Navy for Financial Management and
Comptroller. The Navy, like all of our Military Services, is
suffering greatly as a result of the drastic budget cuts and
the prolonged fiscal uncertainty. Additionally, the inability
of the Department and the Military Services to achieve full
financial audit readiness is concerning to many of us in
Congress.
I thank the very distinguished panel and look forward to
your testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
I think what we'll do is go a little bit out of order,
here, to give Senator Warner an opportunity to introduce
Admiral McGinn, because you may have to leave, Senator Warner,
in which case you, obviously, are free to do so after your
introduction, and then we will go back to the other end of the
table after you introduce Admiral McGinn.
Again, a very warm welcome, John, and please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA, RETIRED

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the
distinguished ranking member from Oklahoma.
It was a moving experience for me to come up here today and
be in this room in the presence of two individuals that enabled
me to achieve the career, such as I did, for 30 years in this
body.
Senator Levin, you and I came together, and Senator Inhofe
joined us shortly after that. Through our joint efforts, and,
most importantly, through a trust and friendship we both had
for each other, I was able to finish up and look back with a
sense of pride and accomplishment. I thank you both, and the
other members of this distinguished committee. I wish them
well, particularly some of the new members. It's a great
experience in life, and it's absolutely essential for this
country.
I'll be very brief, Mr. Chairman, because the nominee is
well known. But, before I proceed to the nominee, may I say, I
studied, with great interest and care, all four of the resumes
of these individuals. It's extraordinary to see generations who
have done public service, go into the private sector, then
willing to forego many of the benefits of private sector and
return to serve their Nation and the public. Judging from my
own experience, these four resumes constitute an extraordinary
body of knowledge needed in these respective positions and
needed by our country at a critical time.
I wish them each well, and specifically my good friend,
Admiral Dennis McGinn. Again, the Navy's been an important part
of my life for over a half century. I've known many persons in
the Navy Department, having served as Secretary of the Navy for
many years. But, this is an unusual individual.
We were put together in the context of organizations that
were seeking to do public policy dissemination in a very
nonpartisan way. The Center for Naval Analysis, where Admiral
McGinn was vice chairman of the Military Advisory Board, that
organization is an integral part of the old naval secretariat.
It has grown into a much larger and more effective entity now,
and just serving the public on issues of great importance,
particularly those related to national security. Very able
leadership, and the Admiral, I'd say, was the vice chairman of
the Military Advisory Board. I was with the Pew Charitable
Trust. Those two organizations collaborated to put on the road,
years ago when I first left the Senate, a team to go out and
just talk and listen to the general public, gather facts, and
come back, promulgating no special message, except that key one
related to the nexus, the linkage between national security,
national defense, environment, and our global standing in this
competitive economic world.
Particularly, our job was to visit military bases and go
out and relate to the general public of the remarkable job
being done by the men and women in uniform to address the
questions of energy, how their own creativity, their own
innovations, contributed; the feedback that they gave through
their respective commands and centralized back in the
Department of Defense. Its remarkable story as energy loomed on
the horizon as such a vital part of our overall security, they
were some of the leaders, and continue to be.
The Admiral and I gave many appearances together for town
councils, universities, colleges, and all types of things, over
a period of several years, and we got to know each other well.
I say to you, he is a true American story, from midshipman
at the Academy, 30-plus years with the fleet and the sailors,
and then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. It's all in the
record, but it's an extraordinary story of accomplishment of a
professional in our national security system.
His hallmark, if I were to pick one out, is humility.
Surprisingly, humility. Now, he's a naval aviator, and that is
extraordinarily difficult for that particular class of
individual, it has been my experience for them to be humble.
But, he had it. He was in full afterburn, and, most of the time
when we were speaking and I had to lean over gently, as you've
done to me many times, both you, tapping me, ``That's enough.''
[Laughter.]
But, I have coached him to be brief and to the point and to
follow orders of the Commander in Chief and of the Secretary of
the Navy, and he has pledged to do that, to me, and I'm certain
he would do the same for you.
He's accompanied today by a very lovely Navy wife, and he
will introduce her at an appropriate time.
With that, I once again thank this committee for its work,
and wish you well, because these are troubled times for our
country. But, it appears to me, with all due respect to the
confirmation process, a very vital part of the function of the
U.S. Senate, we have fine people. This country is greatly
strengthened by the will of such people to step forward and do,
time and time again, public service.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much. Before you leave,
Senator Warner, one of the new members that you looked over to
and referred to is Senator Kaine, who is, of course, a
Virginian--a proud Virginian who brings a huge amount of
background experience to this committee. I'm just wondering
whether he might--and I know he does--want to say a word or two
to you before you leave.
Let me recognize our new member from Virginia, Senator
Kaine.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting the guy
at the end of the aisle go a little bit out of order, here.
I want to thank my friend Senator Warner. As some of my
colleagues know, my father-in-law and Senator Warner returned
from being in the Navy in World War II in the Pacific, not
serving together, but they returned together to be students and
finish their college education at Washington and Lee University
(W&L). The families have been close friends. My father-in-law,
who turns 90 on the 21st of September, former Governor of
Virginia, Linwood Holton, considers John Warner as one of his
dearest friends. They ran against each other for the Senate in
a Republican nominating contest in 1978, and this was the
victor. But, my father-in-law has always so admired Senator
Warner. There's no public official who's served Virginia in the
last century who is as admired, by Virginians of all political
persuasions, than Senator Warner. To be able to be a member of
this committee, even in this junior role, and know that this
Senator preceded me in fantastic service here, is a very
humbling thing.
It is great to be with you, as always, Senator, and it's so
nice that the chairman let me say those words.
Senator Warner. I thank you very much, my good friend and
colleague. Indeed, your father, former Governor of Virginia, is
a dear and valued friend.
I wish to give you a little bit of hope. I once occupied
that seat. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Through the years, Senator Levin, who's
over there, we merged together as these two great giants of
Senators up there today.
Good luck to each and every one of you, and to the
importance of the confirmation process.
I thank the chairman and the ranking member.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator.
Senator Warner. I say to Dennis McGinn, you're on your own
now. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I quote Senator Warner with that farewell
all the time, ``You're on your own.''
You're all on your own now, except your families are behind
you, which means you're not at all on your own.
Let me start with you, Mr. Preston, and then we'll go in
regular order.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN W. PRESTON, TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Preston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe,
members of the committee. It's a great honor for me to be here
as the President's nominee to be General Counsel in the
Department of Defense.
I wouldn't be doing this, but for the support of my family,
with us here this morning. If I may, my wife, Mary, our
daughter, Julia, and our son, Collett. I'm pleased and very
proud to be able to introduce them to you this morning.
Let me also pause to express my appreciation to President
Obama and Secretary Hagel for their confidence in me.
This is my third appearance before a committee of the U.S.
Senate as a nominee seeking confirmation. I was examined by the
Intelligence Committee, a little more than 4 years ago, in
connection with my current appointment as General Counsel of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Back in September 1998, I
appeared before this honorable committee prior to my
appointment as General Counsel of the Department of the Navy.
Now, I must say, I have found that the temptation to open
with a lengthy statement diminishes dramatically from one of
these hearings to the next, so I assure you, I'll be brief with
my opening. [Laughter.]
Much has changed in the world and at DOD since I first came
before this committee, almost 15 years ago. That was before
September 11. It was even before the attack on USS Cole. Much
has changed, but much remains the same, in terms of the role of
a general counsel and what I will pledge to you, if confirmed.
If confirmed, I will pledge my continued personal
commitment to the rule of law, and will work to ensure that the
Department remains in full compliance with all applicable law.
I will also pledge always to keep in mind the importance of the
mission--protecting our country from threats to the national
security--and will work to help find lawful paths to achieve
mission objectives. Following the Secretary's lead, I will
pledge my best efforts to ensure that the Armed Services
Committees are kept properly informed, in furtherance of their
critical oversight responsibilities. Finally and most
important, as General Counsel, I will pledge to serve the
people who serve people who serve us, the fine men and women of
the U.S. Armed Forces.
I want to thank you again for this opportunity to be heard.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Preston.
Mr. Rymer.

STATEMENT OF HON. JON T. RYMER, TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Rymer. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe,
distinguished members of the committee, I'm honored to appear
before you today as President Obama's nominee to serve as the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense. I would like to
thank the President and Secretary Hagel for their expression of
confidence in me.
On a personal note, I want to offer my heartfelt thanks to
my wife, Deb, and my son, Thomson, who are both with me here
today, for their commitment and support during my career.
Mr. Chairman, I'm humbled by the magnitude of this position
and the challenges it presents. If confirmed, I'm committed to
ensuring efficient, effective, transparent, and independent
oversight of this dynamic Department.
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires the
Inspector General to supervise and coordinate audit and
investigation activities; to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in agency operations; and to prevent and detect
fraud in agency programs. The IG Act also requires the
Inspector General to keep both Congress and the Secretary
informed of problems and deficiencies in the Department. At the
Department of Defense, these responsibilities take on an even
greater importance, as they relate to the safety and security
of the brave men and women who serve our country.
If confirmed, I believe my background and experience will
serve me well as the DOD IG. First of all, I'm mindful of the
important role that an IG plays in the Federal Government,
having served 7 years at the FDIC as the Inspector General and
for a 9-month concurrent period as the interim Inspector
General at the Securities and Exchange Commission. I've been an
active member of the IG community, serving as the chair of the
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
(CIGIE) Audit Committee and a member of the CIGIE Executive
Council since 2008. I've also represented the community on
several audit standards-setting bodies.
Second, given my 30-plus years of Active and Reserve
service in the U.S. Army, I have a profound respect for the
members of the military. Having retired from military service
last month, it would be an honor for me to continue to serve
with our troops, albeit in a different capacity, as the IG.
Finally, my private-sector experience includes over 20
years as a banker, a management consultant, and internal
auditor. If confirmed, I will capitalize on my past experiences
and commit to providing the strong leadership needed to manage
this important office.
I look forward to working with Congress, Secretary Hagel,
and the Department's leadership to provide independent,
relevant, and timely oversight that is critical to supporting
the warfighter and promoting accountability, integrity, and
efficiency. I also look forward to working with Principal
Deputy Inspector General Lynne Halbrooks and the nearly 1,600
employees who are committed to fulfilling the responsibilities
of the IG Act at the Department of Defense. Finally, I welcome
the opportunity to work with my counterparts in the Department
oversight community.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and members of the committee for
your time and for your attention and for allowing me to appear
here today.
This concludes my prepared statement. I'll be happy to
respond to your questions.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Rymer.
Dr. Rabern.

STATEMENT OF MS. SUSAN J. RABERN, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER

Dr. Rabern. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, distinguished
members of the committee, I'm honored to have the privilege of
appearing before you today as the President's nominee for your
consideration to be the next Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Financial Management and Comptroller.
The Navy has been an important part of my life since I was
a small child, growing up in the wheat fields of Kansas,
listening to my father's stories of his service during World
War II.
I would like to express my deep appreciation to Secretary
Mabus for his confidence in me. My husband, David, can't be
here today because of preexisting commitments at work, but I am
forever indebted to him for his unfailing and steadfast
support. My daughters, Stacy, Allison, and Megan, have made
many sacrifices throughout their lives because of my career. I
want to formally recognize and thank them for their love,
support, and enthusiasm, even though they can't be with us
today.
Government service in any capacity, but especially during
these difficult times, is an enormous responsibility. The
responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management and Comptroller, are especially
significant. I'm aware of the daunting challenges associated
with financial operations and financial management in the
Department.
I have been honored to serve in the U.S. Navy, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the former U.S. Customs Service, and
the U.S. Agency for International Development in financial
management positions. In each position, I have been grounded in
a daily recognition that my stewardship over resources and
people is rooted in the public trust. I believe there is no
greater responsibility.
If confirmed, I will work within the Department and with
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to ensure that the
Department of Navy is properly and efficiently resourced. I
will strive to ensure that we're taking care of our most
precious resource: our sailors, marines, and the civilians who
support them. I will work as hard as I can to ensure they have
the platforms, equipment, tools, and training they need to
guarantee their ability to perform their vital role in our
Nation's security, and that it is never in doubt. I will ensure
that we develop and execute balanced budgets that are the
result of thorough and timely analysis and in support of the
goals and initiatives that Secretary Mabus has established for
the Department.
I am deeply honored to have been nominated for this
position. If confirmed, I pledge to you that I will do my best
to serve the Nation and the men and women of the Department of
the Navy to the utmost of my ability.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Rabern.
Admiral McGinn.

STATEMENT OF MR. DENNIS V. McGINN, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS, AND ENVIRONMENT

Admiral McGinn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
and distinguished members of the committee. It is a privilege
for me to appear before you today, and I am deeply honored to
be nominated by President Obama as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment. I'm thankful
for the support of Secretary Hagel and Secretary Mabus.
I am especially grateful to Senator John Warner for being
here today with a strong vote of confidence and his unfailing
wise counsel. He exemplifies the ideal of service to nation,
and, throughout his many decades of that service, has
consistently defined what it means to be a true statesman. I am
humbled by his generous support.
On a personal note, I am most grateful for the love and
unwavering support of my wonderful wife, Kelly, who is with me
today, and for the support of our four children, three
grandchildren, and that of our entire extended family. They are
the very center of my life and happiness. Thoughts about their
future security and well-being, and that of all Americans, are
why I seek the opportunity to continue to serve our Nation.
Having proudly worn the uniform of our Navy for more than
35 years in peace and war, I am keenly aware of the momentous
challenges facing the Department of the Navy--indeed, facing
all of our Military Services--during these times of great
change. Among these are the need to maintain high mission
readiness in an uncertain world, to build future capabilities
in an environment of reduced budgetary resources, and, most
importantly, to care for our sailors and marines, and their
families.
If confirmed, I'll look forward to leading a highly
talented, dedicated, and hardworking team in our military and
civilian workforce to ensure that the mission of the Department
of the Navy is well served and supported. I pledge to wisely
apply available resources to increase the availability and
efficient use of all of our energy sources, to maintain our
installations and training ranges in a high state of readiness,
to preserve a high quality of life for our sailors, marines,
and their families, to fully meet our obligation as good
stewards of the environment, and to enhance safety in every
aspect of our overall mission.
If confirmed, I pledge to carry out the policies and
directives of the President, Congress, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy. My day-in and day-out
priorities will be driven by the unwavering goal of fully
supporting the combat effectiveness and operational efficiency
of our Navy and Marine Corps team. In developing and applying
these priorities, I look forward to working closely with
Congress and with this committee.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
Now let me ask you all the standard questions which we ask
of all our nominees. In order to exercise our legislative and
oversight responsibilities, these are the questions that we
ask.
Have you all adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
[All four witnesses answered in the negative.]
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
[All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
[All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
[All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
[All four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Okay, let's try a 8-minute round this morning for our first
round, and, if we need a second round, we'll do that.
Mr. Preston, we have approved a fiscal year 2014
authorization bill in committee. It's not yet gone to the
floor, but in committee. We included a number of changes to the
procedures for transfers of detainees from Guantanamo.
We would provide greater flexibility to the Secretary of
Defense to transfer Guantanamo detainees to foreign countries,
if the Secretary determines doing so is in our national
security interest and that steps have been, or will be, taken
to substantially mitigate any risk of the transferred
individual reengaging in terrorist activity.
Our provision would also give the Secretary of Defense
authority to allow the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the
United States for detention and for trial, if determined to be
in the U.S. national interest and if it can be done safely.
We would allow the temporary transfer of Guantanamo
detainees to a DOD medical facility to prevent death or
significant imminent harm.
Mr. Preston, are you familiar with these provisions? If so,
what are your views on increasing the flexibility of the
Department of Defense and the administration in handling
detainees at Guantanamo?
Mr. Preston. Mr. Chairman, I will have to admit I'm a bit
more familiar with the existing law, section 1028. I am aware
of the legislative provision to which you're referring. As my
current responsibilities don't include direct responsibility
for detainee operations and the transfer process, I'm not as
intimately familiar with it as perhaps others are.
Certainly, the policy of the administration is to favor
transferring these detainees, and I support the
administration's policy. I think a critical element of the
existing law and of proposed legislation would be to facilitate
transfer in a fashion that ensures the protection of the
national security.
I'm afraid, beyond that, I don't have developed views, or
sufficiently informed, to comment on the legislative proposal.
Chairman Levin. All right, thank you.
Mr. Preston, during the hearing on your nomination to be
the CIA General Counsel, you were asked about so-called
``enhanced interrogation techniques,'' and specifically whether
you believed waterboarding was torture. I'd like to ask you
that question here, in connection with your nomination to be
the DOD General Counsel. Do you believe that waterboarding is
torture?
Mr. Preston. Mr. Chairman, I believe, under current law,
waterboarding is torture. I will say that, in the course of my
duties, by virtue of the cessation of the program by executive
order in 2009, I have not had occasion to independently examine
that question with reference to CIA activities since January
2009. But, I believe that the state of the law is clear. In
addition to the President, the Attorney General, the Nation's
chief legal officer, has determined that waterboarding is
torture. That's the law, in my view. I support the President's
decision to ban waterboarding and the other so-called
``enhanced interrogation techniques''.
If I might add, though, at the time that the waterboard was
used in connection with the former Detention and Interrogation
Program, my understanding is that CIA personnel relied on what
was the authoritative statement of the law at the time, the
opinions issued by the Department of Justice. Of course, those
opinions have since been disavowed and withdrawn.
Chairman Levin. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI) has completed a report on the CIA Detention and
Interrogation Program. Recently, the CIA provided a written
response to the Intelligence Committee's report. As the CIA
General Counsel, were you involved in the preparation of the
agency's response?
Mr. Preston. I did have some involvement. I did not direct
the effort.
Chairman Levin. Are there any portions of that response
that you disagreed with?
Mr. Preston. Sir, I think the agency's comments are an
appropriate response to the SSCI report. For my part, I don't
believe there's anything legally objectionable. That's the
determination I need to make.
I must say, I have to rely on those with far greater
familiarity with the report and the record when it comes to
facts and findings. But, I accept the conclusions and support
the recommendations, and I support the Director's decision to
forward these comments to the committee. Frankly, it's my hope
that they will be useful to the committee as it continues to
consider the matter.
Chairman Levin. For the record, there are some significant
differences between many members of the committee and that
response, and it's very possible that there's going to be some
additional questions for you about your awareness of the
response and your agreement or disagreement with certain
statements that are in that response. But, we'll save that for
the record.
Mr. Preston. Very well.
Chairman Levin. There's been considerable discussion inside
and outside Congress about the scope of detention authority
pursuant to the authorization for the use of military force,
particularly as it pertains to U.S. citizens. In your view, if
a U.S. citizen joins a foreign army, a foreign military force,
and is captured while engaged in combat against our forces, do
we have the authority, under the Law of Armed Conflict, to hold
that person in military custody?
Mr. Preston. In terms of the availability of indefinite Law
of War detention for a U.S. citizen captured on U.S. soil, I
believe that the law is unsettled, but the President has made
clear that it is not his intent to authorize any such Law of
War detention for U.S. citizens captured on U.S. soil.
Chairman Levin. If that citizen is involved with a foreign
army in attacking say, a U.S. Navy base, is that person
detainable under the Law of War?
Mr. Preston. Ordinarily, an enemy combatant is, but I
understand that this has been the subject of litigation and
that the issue hasn't been resolved by the courts.
Chairman Levin. If an American citizen is captured in
combat, having joined a foreign army outside of the United
States, under the Law of War, may he or she be detained?
Mr. Preston. Again, I believe, as an enemy combatant, he or
she could. I, frankly, don't know whether there's remaining
doubt, in terms of litigation of that issue.
Chairman Levin. What is your understanding of what
constitutes an ``associated force'' that is subject to the use
of military force under the 2001 authorization? I'll ask two
questions, here; it'll be my last one--what is your opinion
about the impact of the end of combat operations in Afghanistan
on the application of the authorization for the use of force to
al Qaeda and its associates elsewhere than Afghanistan?
Mr. Preston. I'd be happy to answer both of those, sir,
starting with the first.
Of course, the language of the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF) refers to groups and individuals
responsible for the September 11 attacks and those who harbored
them. As you well know, that has obviously been applied to al
Qaeda and the Taliban and interpreted also to reach associated
forces.
My understanding of the concept of associated forces is
that it is quite narrow. It has been described as requiring an
organized armed group that has entered the fight alongside al
Qaeda and as a cobelligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities
against the United States and its coalition partners. It's not
any group that is ideologically aligned with al Qaeda. It would
not be any group that poses a threat to the United States
without having joined the fight with al Qaeda. But, it does
reach groups that have joined the fight with al Qaeda and
against the United States.
Chairman Levin. Wherever they may be.
Mr. Preston. I believe that is correct.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Mr. Preston. Would you like me to answer your second
question?
Chairman Levin. Please. Yes, if you could do it briefly.
Mr. Preston. Just only to--I'm sorry, Senator--only to say
that the end of the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan will not
necessarily mark the defeat of al Qaeda and the end of the
conflict with al Qaeda. It may well, I think, drive additional
attention to the state of the conflict. But, the withdrawal of
forces from Afghanistan does not in any per-se way mark the end
of the conflict.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When Admiral McGinn made his opening statement, I was
reminded of something. While Senator Warner is still here, I'll
repeat it.
I'm impressed with your children and grandchildren.
However, I have 20 children and grandchildren. [Laughter.]
Admiral McGinn. I'll work on it, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. You have some time, before you're my age.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I can remember, I'd always take pictures--
candid pictures, and we had a Christmas card that would come
out every year. Senator Warner, over there, said, ``You know,
you're the only one who sends a card out where you have 22
members of the family, and not any 2 are looking the same
direction.'' [Laughter.]
You don't want to make that mistake.
Let me share with you, Mr. Preston, my feeling. During the
Benghazi incident, I was very much concerned about that. Chris
Stevens, the Ambassador who was killed, was a friend of mine,
was in my office a very short period of time before that
happened. He talked about the threats that were there, the
dangers in that general area. During the time that the
September 11 attack took place, I don't think anyone is really
certain as to whether that was an organized terrorist attack.
However, when the Annex, that was the next morning, took place,
Mr. Clapper, who was, at that time, the Director of National
Intelligence, made the statement. He used the word
``unequivocal''. It was unequivocal--this is the morning after
September 11, during the Annex attack--that it was committed by
organized terrorists at that time. After we had hearings, in
this room, with many other members, I asked the same question
to other individuals. They all agreed.
Now, I think one of the reasons was the equipment that was
used, the six mortar rounds and all of that; it became very
convincing. Anyway, these individuals all said that it was
unequivocal that it was an organized attack.
The first question I'd ask you is: What was your position
during September 11, at that time?
Mr. Preston. Of last year, sir?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Mr. Preston. I was General Counsel at CIA.
Senator Inhofe. All right. What was your role in the
Benghazi matter?
Mr. Preston. Sir, first, let me just mention what first
comes to mind when you raise Benghazi, and that is that it was
a terrible tragedy for our country. We lost four good
Americans.
My role in the aftermath of Benghazi was extremely limited.
I had----
Senator Inhofe. Okay, I'm really sorry to cut you off. I
have to do it, because of the time constraints.
Mr. Preston. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I think I know the answer to this question.
Did you compose, edit, or modify, in any way, the talking-
points information which were used by Ambassador Rice and the
White House?
Mr. Preston. No, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I didn't think you did.
But, nonetheless, I look at this, and I know that this
sounds like an extreme position, but I'm familiar with coverups
in the history of this country--and I'm talking about the
Pentagon papers, Iran-Contra, Watergate, and all of that--I
just can't think of one that is more egregious than this.
Because 5 days before she was sent to the American people, on
that Sunday, all of the intelligence people that we have talked
to before that knew, at the time, that it was an organized
terrorist attack and not an attack that had anything to do with
the video.
I say this because we have to keep talking about this. It's
something that everyone's hoping will go away, and it's not
going to go away.
The question I would have, you've already answered to my
satisfaction, in terms of your role or your lack of role.
Now, on GTMO, the Chairman had several questions. I, again,
have what is considered by some to be a pretty extreme position
on GTMO. For one thing, it's one of of the few good deals that
we have in the Government. I think we pay $4,000 a year, and
Castro doesn't collect, about half the time. The facility down
there, it's hard to go down and see what we have and ask the
question, why is it we're not using that? What is this aversion
to keeping people down there that this administration has?
Now, I bring this up because, obviously, you will be
dealing with this. I have statements that you've made, on
military commissions. You said, ``Military commissions are an
appropriate forum for trying offenses against the law and
order. Military commissions provide appropriate processes for
the trial of alien underprivileged enemy belligerents.'' And
``I am not aware of any need for changes to the 2009 Military
Commissions Act.''
Now, these are statements that you've made in the past. Do
you agree with these statements today?
Mr. Preston. I do.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I do, too.
I'm not a lawyer, so I feel a little insecure talking about
this in a lot of detail to someone who is, and who is a
professional. But, I do know what an expeditionary legal
complex is. I've been through this down there, and I've seen
the advantages that we have there. I also recall that, 4 years
ago, when this President--it may have been, actually, before he
took office--talked about the fact that we need to transfer
these people to the United States, one of the suggested
locations happened to be in my State of Oklahoma. It was in
Fort Sill. I went down and I talked to a Sergeant Major down
there by the name of Jackson, and she said, ``What is wrong
with the people in Washington?'' She had had two or three
deployments to GTMO and said, ``We have the ideal situation
there.'' Other than the fact that the terrorists and many
people who are our enemies think that this is something that we
should not keep open, can you think of any reason why we're not
using that today to its fullest capacity for detention and for
trials?
Mr. Preston. Sir, I think you make a good point in what has
been a ongoing and, I think, at times, intense policy debate.
For my part, if I'm confirmed, it'll be my duty and honor and
burden to see to the proper application of the law as it
relates to detainee operations and as it relates to the
military commissions process.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I do want to follow up with you in
some detail, as time goes by, and reconsider some of the
decisions that have been made, in private conversations.
Mr. Preston. I would welcome that.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral McGinn, you and I were together and
fought the unsuccessful Battle of Vieques some 12 years ago.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I can recall, at that time, the entire Navy
was very helpful to me. We had Vieques, a place that we could
use for joint training. The Marine Corps--you remember this,
John--the Marines and the Navy were--and because there was
one--an unfortunate thing that took place, and a lot of the
environmentalists said, ``No, we can't use this.'' I can
remember going over to Puerto Rico and saying, ``If you guys
insist on closing this thing down, it's going to have an
economic effect on Puerto Rico, on Roosevelt Roads, and all of
these things.''
Anyway, you were on my side on that. As I recall, we went
to San Clemente, and you were with me at that time--maybe some
other places. But, I also went all the way around the world,
trying to find a place--we couldn't find a place that could
replicate that type of training. I appreciate that.
I bring this up for two reasons. One is an issue that's
taking place right now at Twentynine Palms. I know that perhaps
if I were from California, I might have different feelings
about this--no, I doubt if I would, because that's a facility
that our marines use that I don't think we can replicate
anyplace else. Can you tell me any justification for not taking
the option--and we know the three options that are out there;
you're familiar with these?
Admiral McGinn. Right.
Senator Inhofe. Of expanding that area and the capability
of our Navy to train there?
Admiral McGinn. Based on my knowledge of Twentynine Palms
and my experience, having fired rockets and dropped bombs on
Twentynine Palms when I was getting ready for combat, I
recognize the critical need to do live-fire training and to
train like you fight. That is what the marines want to do, and
that's why we need to expand the training range at Twentynine
Palms----
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Okay, and I agree with that. I know
my time has expired. Just one last thing.
An area where we don't agree is in the use of a lot of our
funds, that would otherwise be used for readiness and for
defense purposes, for biofuels, and these other things. We'll
have a chance to talk about this in the future, and we have in
the past.
Admiral McGinn. I look forward to it, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. Thank you all for your willingness to serve.
I'd like to start off, this morning, by saying I can think
of no better nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment than
Admiral McGinn.
Admiral, you've served 35 years in uniform, and you've been
a steadfast advocate for our sailors, and you've been leader on
the national security issues, writ large, and you've earned my
deepest respect, and I think everybody's on the committee. I'm
not alone in that regard, and I have a letter from the Center
for Naval Analyses (CNA) Military Advisory Board, an
organization which consists of some of our finest retired
three- and four-star admirals and generals, Mr. Chairman, and
they've written to the committee in strong support of the Vice
Admiral's nomination, and I agree with them completely. I'd
like to submit the letter for the record, if I might.
Chairman Levin. Admitted. It will be made part of the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Udall. Thank you for that.
Again, Admiral, I look forward to working with you, as does
the committee, when you're confirmed.
If I could, I'd like to direct my questions to Mr. Preston,
to start. In your current role as General Counsel for the
Central Intelligence Agency, you've been at the table when some
important decisions have been made. I sit on both this
committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence, and I have
some concerns that I would like you to consider addressing.
In your prehearing questions for your 2009 nomination
hearing to be the CIA General Counsel, you said the following,
referring to the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) and the CIA's Office of General Counsel (OGC), and I'll
quote back to you what you said. ``Where OLC's analysis will
depend heavily on factual circumstances, as represented by the
Agency, it is important that the OGC ensure that the
information provided is as complete and accurate and current as
possible. I am not aware of any material deficiencies in this
regard, but wish to underscore the importance.''
Do you still agree with this view? What do you believe a
General Counsel's responsibility is if he discovers that his
Department or Agency provided inaccurate information? If the
resulting OLC opinion, based on inaccurate information, became
public, do you see a need to correct the public record?
Mr. Preston. Senator Udall, I think this is a very
important question. I believe that the description of the
responsibility, from my earlier question from 2009, would still
pertain. If anything, I have a much richer understanding and
appreciation for the importance of the communication between
Agency counsel and OLC. My own experience has been,
particularly for the most sensitive matters at the Agency, to
have near-continuous communication and one that's characterized
by ensuring that the factual basis that my colleagues at OLC
need in order to best inform and advise decisionmaking and
their own opinions is provided.
I think one of the things that the Agency has focused on in
recent years is an effort, not only to practice that, but to
try to institutionalize it in some fashion, with respect to our
most sensitive programs, to make sure that there is a
purposeful effort to ensure that opinions that we may be
relying on, that the factual basis for that opinion has not
materially changed.
Senator Udall. This is a very important topic, as you know
and you've referenced. I may want to follow up with some
additional questions for the record, but I appreciate your
initial comments.
Let me turn to the difference between covert action and
secret military operations. As I mentioned, I sit on this
committee, I sit on the Intelligence Committee, as well, and I
wanted to run through a series of questions and then ask you to
respond to them all at once. Let me start here.
In your view, when does a secret military operation meet
the statutory definition of ``covert action'' and require a
finding, and when does it not?
My second question: If the military refuses to answer the
public's questions about a reported operation, does it become a
covert action? If not, what is the basis for that denial? As an
example, why are unacknowledged 1208 assistance programs not
covert action?
Finally, in this easy set of questions for you----
[Laughter]
Finally, under what circumstances can a secret military
program, as distinct from a particular tactical operation, be
briefed only to the chairman and ranking member?
I know that's a big list of questions. I'm happy to restate
them, if necessary, but I'd like to hear your answers.
Mr. Preston. Let me start with the first question, and at a
general level.
What makes, I think, an action a covert action is laid out
in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, where action
is taken for the purposes of influencing certain conditions
abroad and done in a fashion where the role of the U.S.
Government is neither apparent nor acknowledged. Of course,
with respect to covert action, it's done pursuant to a finding,
and that's, historically, in an area in which the CIA operates.
I'm perhaps most familiar with the application of those
concepts to operations pursuant to finding, at least the
historical practices there.
Your questions raise, I think, an important issue about
secretive or clandestine military operations and the extent to
which they are neither apparent nor attributed to the
Government and would properly be under covert action
authorities. As I'm sure you know, that same provision of the
National Security Act does accept traditional military
activities, and there's quite a bit of law and lore that has
gone into, as I understand, what we consider traditional
military activities as an exception to covert action and the
requirement of proceeding under those authorities.
This is an issue I'm obviously familiar with in my current
position, but I haven't, to tell you the truth, really wrestled
with how one would advise the U.S. military on the precise
parameters of that concept and the precise concept of
attribution in the military context. This is an area that I
would expect to focus on early and intensely, if I have the
privilege of being confirmed.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Preston. What I think I'll do
is review your responses, and, if necessary, submit some
additional questions to you for the record.
Mr. Preston. Thank you.
Senator Udall. In the remaining time I have, I want to turn
to Admiral McGinn and just give him an opportunity to talk
about what would be your top priority as Assistant Secretary of
the Navy.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
As the title implies, it involves energy, installations,
and environment. Not in the title, but part of the
responsibilities are safety for operations afloat and ashore. I
want to make sure that the Navy meets near-term warfighting
readiness goals. We have a very fine group of men and women in
the Navy and Marine Corps that are out there on the tip of the
spear, as we say, and we have to make sure that they are well
supported, and those following them are fully ready to go out
there and relieve them. That's job one, that is the lens
through which I want to look at all of those areas of
responsibility.
We also have an obligation, I believe, to look to the
future, to try to create strategic and operational options for
our forces. This has been the primary focus area of Secretary
Mabus in establishing his energy goals. I intend to look at
that whole program intently to make sure that we are making the
right investments to balance the compelling needs of near-term
readiness with the compelling needs of looking over at the
strategic environment of the future and making sure that we
have the capability to fight the way we'll need to.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your service to the Nation,
and to your families, for everything you have done for our
country.
Mr. Rymer, I would just like to ask you about a recent DOD
IG audit of sexual assault cases, it discovered that more than
10 percent of the cases contain flawed investigations. Are you
concerned about that error rate? How do you think you'd change
that, moving forward?
Mr. Rymer. Yes, sir, I am very concerned about it. I think
the issues concerning sexual assault are certainly something
the IG has to pay more attention to than perhaps the office has
in the past. That particular report was completed pursuant to
the IG's responsibility to provide oversight over the military
criminal investigative organizations. That's the Army Criminal
Investigation Command (CID), Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS), and the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (OSI).
My concern is that 10 percent is a high number. Perhaps
more concerning, though, is the variations in process and
procedure used among the different Services to investigate
sexual assault crimes. I think the role of the IG is to
encourage consistency and identification of best practices, and
that's something I would try to do very strongly with those
organizations.
Senator Donnelly. Yes, I was just going to follow up with
the best-practices point that you just made. Do you intend to
look and say, ``This is working, this is producing the best-
quality information we could possibly have, the best, most
accurate information,'' and share it with each of the different
branches?
Mr. Rymer. Yes, sir. I think that report--which is a
lengthy report--contains a lot of statistics and a lot of
information that could help identify, coach, and counsel, which
of those investigative techniques may be the best. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Vice Admiral McGinn, in Indiana, our Active military base
is Crane Naval Warfare Center. One of the things that we do at
Crane is, it is shared with the Army ammunition activity, and
it is shared in order to maintain the infrastructure, reduce
costs by sharing costs, such as roads, power, distribution,
security, et cetera. I was wondering what your thoughts are on
joint basing as a means to mitigate costs for the Navy.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir. I think, where it makes sense,
Senator, we need to look at joint basing. I have visited Crane
several times during my time on Active Duty, and even since
then, and it is a national asset. The work that goes on there--
in addition to being a weapons storage and processing area,
they are what I would describe as a world-class battery
forensics facility, there's direct support for our Navy SEALs
and their technology needs. I would view any future
organization of Crane with the criteria of the ability to not
detract from the key missions that are being undertaken on a
daily basis by the folks at Crane.
Senator Donnelly. We look forward to your confirmation.
Once you are confirmed, we would like to invite you back. A
time that might be ideal is--Indiana University is playing Navy
in football, in Bloomington just about 15 miles away, on
September 7.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnelly. The Friday before, I assume everyone will
be busy at work at Crane----
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir. My only response would be, ``Go
Navy''. [Laughter.]
Senator Donnelly. I thought it would be.
Mr. Rymer, again, one of the things that this whole panel
has been working on, but that I have passionately tried to dig
into, has been suicide prevention for our military. We have
programs in place. I was wondering what oversight you intend to
provide on the suicide prevention programs we have in place.
Mr. Rymer. Sir, that is certainly something that I have
added to the list of priorities, if confirmed. It's a very
important issue for me. Having experience with that in the
military, I'm very familiar with the programs, at least that
the Army has in place, for suicide prevention. I think the role
of the IG, perhaps, could be to do an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the programs, and the money spent in each of
the Services, to compare those. There is some oversight role,
in terms of program effectiveness.
Senator Donnelly. I know you know this statistic, but we
lost more servicemembers to suicide last year than we did in
combat.
Mr. Rymer. Yes, sir. It's a national tragedy. Yes, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Mr. Preston, in regards to looking
forward and what we're dealing with in Syria at the present
time, and we see the al Nusra Front, which certainly has not
gotten weaker, may be picking up strength. I was wondering your
views in regards to the AUMF and its application to al Nusra,
do they directly affect the United States, or do you think that
the AUMF applies to al Nusra Front in Syria?
Mr. Preston. Senator, let me refrain from revealing any
current discussions on that score.
Senator Donnelly. Understood.
Mr. Preston. I think the question would be whether al Nusra
is al Qaeda or is an associated force within the confines of
how that term has been applied. That is a judgment that DOD
would make internally. I haven't previously participated in
that judgment, so I'm ill-equipped to provide a personal view.
But, again, I expect this is an area that I would be focusing
on, early and intensely.
Senator Donnelly. I appreciate that. The committee itself
is very focused on the Syrian issue and the challenges we face
there, and we look forward to your participation.
To all of you, thank you very much for your service to the
country. We look forward to continuing to work with you in the
years ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by joining my colleague, Senator Donnelly,
in thanking you for your service. A number of you have records
of military service, and appreciate the sacrifices that you've
made, all of you, in the course of your public service.
You will have positions that may not make you household
names. We frequently confirm people here, who are in the
headlines, but your jobs are as important as any to our
national security and national defense, and you know and we
know that we couldn't do the job that we do in the farflung
places of the world without the support that you give them,
day-in and day-out. That goes for the many hardworking people
who will be under you, under your command, as well as your
colleagues in the Pentagon and throughout this country in our
national defense. In thanking you, I thank them, and I think my
views are shared widely.
Mr. Preston, to begin with an area that I think is very
important to all of our men and women in uniform, the issue of
sexual assault in the military, you were asked, in the
questions that were submitted to you about this subject, and
particularly about taking the decisionmaking authority in
beginning prosecutions--the charging authority or convening
authority--out of the chain of command and having it go to a
specially-trained and independent prosecutor. Can you give me
your view, as an attorney and as one who may not have been a
prosecutor, but certainly is familiar with the skills and
training and expertise that's required--wouldn't it make sense
to have these decisions made by an individual who has a wealth
of experience, who's tried cases, who knows what the evidence
is going to be and has to be, and knows what the evidentiary
issues are? Doesn't that make sense to you, as an attorney?
Mr. Preston. Let me say that I appreciate the salutary
intent behind the idea. I have to say that I'm not sufficiently
informed on the various legislative proposals to have formed a
fixed personal view on it. I think the concern that has been
expressed about that relates to the role of the military
justice system as an integral part of the command structure.
There's a reason for that, because the military justice system
is one of the instruments by which command maintains military
discipline----
Senator Blumenthal. I understand that point where you know
a lot about the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, I am
certain, and I know that you don't have a fixed personal view.
Mr. Preston. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Maybe you have a flexible personal
view. But, I'm really asking about a more abstract question. I
know that one of the arguments against taking it out of the
chain of command is the good order and discipline of the
military unit, and the cohesion of the military unit. I respect
that argument. But, simply as an attorney, as the General
Counsel of the Department of Defense, wouldn't you value the
experience of a trained prosecutor in making these decisions?
Mr. Preston. I think that experience would be valuable,
either in the decisionmaker or in someone who is advising the
decisionmaker. I think you're right that that experience base
would have value.
Senator Blumenthal. I'd like you to examine these issues,
and perhaps supplement your response that you've given, which
is, ``I am not now in a position to express a personal view,''
much as you've just said right now, and perhaps articulate, in
a little bit more detail, what your views would be on the
proposals that are pending before Congress and that are likely
to be considered when the National Defense Authorization Bill
reaches the floor. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Preston. I'd be happy to take a crack at that. I know
this is a complex issue, and an incredibly important one. What
I hesitate to do is to express, as an informed, fixed view,
something that I haven't had, really, an opportunity to
formulate. But, I would be happy to try to be as responsive as
possible.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

As the Secretary of Defense has stated, eliminating sexual assault
from our Armed Forces is one of the Department's top priorities and, if
confirmed, I look forward to helping achieve that goal in my capacity
as the chief legal officer for the Department.
It is my personal view that there is great merit to many of the
proposals currently pending before Congress. In particular, I support
efforts to ensure that individuals convicted of sexual assault do not
serve in the military, to supplement the breadth and availability of
support services for victims, and to enhance and standardize the
oversight and investigation of sexual assault allegations. These
proposals represent concrete steps that should strengthen the
Department's overall sexual assault prevention and response programs
and efforts.
With regard to eliminating the authority of commanders to refer
charges or convene court-martials, I think special care should be taken
before removing commanders from the administration of military justice,
which would represent a fundamental change to the military justice
system that is likely to have second- and third-order effects. As I
understand it, significant questions have been raised about how such a
proposal could be implemented in practice and its potential effect on
the expeditious and efficient administration of military justice.
Secretary Hagel recently expanded the role of lawyers in the sexual
assault offense disposition process by requiring the Secretaries of the
Military Departments to mandate no later than December 1, 2013, that
judge advocates serve as investigating officers for all Article 32
hearings on such charges. As this illustrates, the role of lawyers in
the military justice system is not immutable, and no potential solution
to achieve the eradication of sexual assault in the military is off the
table, including increasing the role of lawyers and decreasing the role
of the commander. Indeed, the panel established by Congress to review
and assess the systems used to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate
crimes involving sexual assault has been tasked specifically to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of the current role of commanders in the
administration of military justice. (National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, Sec. 576(d)(1)(G), 126 Stat.
1632, 1760 (2013)). If confirmed, I will study the panel's conclusions
in advising the Secretary on this issue.

Senator Blumenthal. Turning to Mr. Rymer, if I may, are you
familiar with the Special Inspector General report on the MI-17
helicopter sale by the Russian export agency, Rosoboronexport,
to the Afghan Government, paid for by American taxpayer
dollars?
Mr. Rymer. Sir, I'm sorry, I'm not, other than what I've
read in the press. If I am correct, I believe that report was
done by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, an office separate and independent from the
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. I'm not,
sir, other than just what I've read in the press.
Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate your reviewing that
report. My view is that there is absolutely no justification
for the purchase of Russian helicopters, when there are no
Afghan pilots trained to fly them, no mechanics trained to
repair them. The United States will spend, eventually, more
than a billion dollars. We've already spent half a billion, and
we've just contracted for another half billion. If there are
any helicopters to be purchased and there is sufficient
justification, my view is, they ought to be American
helicopters. But, the first question is whether that sale of
helicopters to the Afghans makes any sense at all, in terms of
the national defense issues that are raised by the sale, and
particularly no justification for purchase of helicopters from
a Russian-controlled export agency that is also selling arms to
Syria, used for the slaughter of its own people by a dictator
whom we have vowed to overthrow. We are, in effect, supporting
Bashar Assad.
I would appreciate your reviewing that report and giving us
your views of it, in writing.
Mr. Rymer. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) assessed the extent to which the Afghan military has the
capacity to operate and maintain its current and planned fleet of Mi-17
helicopters and the effectiveness of U.S. Government oversight of two
task orders to provide maintenance, logistics, and supply support to
the Afghan military (Afghan Special Mission Wing: DOD Moving Forward
with $771.8 Million Purchase of Aircraft that the Afghans Cannot
Operate and Maintain, SIGAR Audit 13-13, June 2013). It would not be
appropriate for me to comment on the SIGAR report while my nomination
is pending; however, if confirmed, I will assess to what extent further
audit or inspection work by the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector
General (IG) regarding the purchase of Mi-17 helicopters would be
appropriate.
I am aware that the DOD IG has issued several reports that have
examined aspects of the Mi-17 helicopter program. On September 28,
2012, the DOD IG issued an assessment report, ``Assessment of U.S.
Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan
Air Force,'' (DODIG-2012-141), which, in part, addresses challenges
presented in training and equipping Mi-17 flight and maintenance
personnel. In an audit report, ``Mi-17 Overhauls Had Significant Cost
Overruns and Schedule Delays,'' September 24, 2012, (DODIG-2012-135),
the DOD IG recommended the U.S. Army consider whether suspension and
debarment is warranted for a Russian firm subcontracted to overhaul Mi-
17 aircraft.
Subsequent to this hearing, the DOD IG issued audit report DODIG-
2013-123, ``Army Needs To Improve Mi-17 Overhaul Management and
Contract Administration.'' The report recommended that the Army review
the contracting officer's performance for inappropriate actions, recoup
$6.2 million in advance payments to the contractor for services never
provided, and review the Program Office actions which established an
inappropriate $8.1 million parts inventory.

Senator Blumenthal. Since my time is expired, I want to
simply thank you again, every one of you, for your service to
our Nation. I look forward to working with you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
We're going to have a 3-minute second round. If we need
more than that, we'll have a third round.
Dr. Rabern, in your responses to the committee's advance
policy questions, you said that, while you recognize the
importance of having the Navy's book auditable by 2017, that
you're not familiar with the Navy's progress toward achieving
the statutory deadline of 2014 for a statement of budgetary
resources or of 2017 for auditability. Now, this committee's
placed a great deal of emphasis on having the Department--
indeed, all of our Departments--meet these deadlines. If
confirmed, will you commit to quickly becoming more familiar
with the Navy's progress towards these important deadlines?
Will you come back, within 60 days of your confirmation, to
report on the Navy's progress and any areas that need
improvement or attention?
Dr. Rabern. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to do that.
If confirmed, sustained audit readiness will be one of my
highest priorities. It is critical in making sound fiscal and
readiness decisions. I will rely on the expertise of the
military and civilian personnel who have that experience on the
staff within the Department of the Navy, in addition to my own
experience in other Government agencies. I look very much
forward to working with you and your staff in meeting these
audit readiness requirements.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Rymer, the Office of the Inspector General receives
many requests from congressional committees and from Members of
Congress for audits and investigations of matters of public
interest. Will you ensure that the Office of the Inspector
General continues to respond to congressional requests for
audits or investigations in a prompt manner and in a manner
consistent with past practices?
Mr. Rymer. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. Under what circumstances do you believe
it's appropriate for the Office of the Inspector General to
redact some of the contents of any information contained in a
report provided to Congress?
Mr. Rymer. Sir, I think the process that's in place now, is
that information is not redacted if the request is from the
chairman or the ranking member, in their capacity of acting on
behalf of the committee. If it's from an individual member, I
believe it's treated as a release to the public, and there are
redactions.
Chairman Levin. But, to the ranking member and to the
chairman, it is unredacted?
Mr. Rymer. It's my understanding, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
In October 2012, the President issued a policy directive
relating to the protection of whistleblowers who have access to
classified information. This directive is designed to ensure
that employees serving in the Intelligence Community or who are
eligible for access to classified information can effectively
report waste, fraud, and abuse while protecting classified
national security information. Are you familiar with this
directive? What do you understand will be your role, if
confirmed, in implementing it within DOD?
Mr. Rymer. Yes, sir, I am somewhat familiar with it. As I
understand, in the DOD Inspector General if complaints are
received, the role of the Inspector General in the
whistleblower process is to investigate any claims or concerns
about retaliation. That would be my main concern, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. But, if classified information
is presented to those of us that have clearance, which is all
of us, do you see any problem with the whistleblower presenting
to a person with clearance, including Members of Congress, that
information?
Mr. Rymer. I think that the process, sir, as I understand
it, is when the information comes to the IG, the IG tries to
make a determination as to whether it is classified and
presents an urgent need. Then I believe there's a role for the
Secretary of Defense to release the information to Congress.
Or, I may be confusing that with another process.
Chairman Levin. Well, you can clarify that for the record.
Mr. Rymer. Yes, sir, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]

Executive Order and Department of Defense (DOD) guidance that
establish the requirements for access to classified information permit
DOD employees, military personnel, and contractor employees to have
access to classified information provided the individual possesses a
valid and appropriate security clearance, have executed a nondisclosure
agreement, and have a valid need-to-know the information in order to
perform a lawful and authorized governmental function. Such individuals
provided access to classified information have a duty to protect that
information from unauthorized disclosure.
Congress has established the Intelligence Community Whistleblower
Protection Act (ICWPA) as the authorized means to disclose complaints
of classified wrongdoing to Congress. The ICWPA (title 5 U.S.C.
Appendix Sec. 8H) provides a secure way for employees, or contractor
employees, of the four DOD intelligence agencies--the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Security
Agency (NSA)--to tell Congress about classified wrongdoing. DOD IG
reviews the complaint, and if it determines it to be credible and
present an ``urgent concern,'' forwards it to the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF), who forwards it to Congress.
If the complaint or information does not meet ICWPA standards, the
complainant may contact Congress directly, but only after informing
SECDEF, through DOD IG, of their intent to contact, and getting SECDEF
guidance, through DOD IG, on the appropriate way to do so.
The ICWPA is basically a means to get complaints that involve
classified information to Congress. ICWPA does not provide protections
against reprisal, however, under the new protections provided by
Presidential Policy Directive-19 (PPD-19), a qualifying employee who
files an ICWPA complaint may not be reprised against for doing so.

Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just briefly touch on it.
Mr. Preston, I wasn't there, and I haven't talked to him,
but apparently, Congressman Ruppersberger made a request for
information from you, getting back to the Benghazi issue. I
believe your response was, ``In light of the criminal
investigation, we are not to generate statements with
assessments as to who did this, et cetera, even internally, not
to mention for public release.''
The question would be, why would you try to prevent
intelligence information to go to the Vice Chairman of the
House Intelligence Committee? Now, it's possible to do that in
a classified way. I would question that there's an
investigation going on, unless you were referring to the FBI
investigation. Is that what you were referring to?
Mr. Preston. Yes, sir. I'm pleased to respond to that.
As I indicated in your earlier question, I had no
substantive involvement with respect to the talking points--
that is to say, the preparation and the interagency
coordination of the talking points that the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) ranking member had
requested from the Agency. There is the one email that I would
like to flag in that regard, which is to say, in the course of
the Agency's responding to that HPSCI request, it came to my
attention, and I sent an email to the folks working on it,
essentially reminding them that there was a criminal
investigation pending and that we had been admonished not to
generate material that could complicate that investigation.
Typically, when you're in an evolving situation and there's
a criminal investigation been launched, you want to avoid----
Senator Inhofe. Was there a criminal investigation
launched?
Mr. Preston. That's my understanding.
Senator Inhofe. The only investigation that I heard--and
I'm asking this, because I don't know, Mr. Preston--was the FBI
investigation. Of course, they weren't even there until 15 days
after this took place. Is there an investigation, other than
that, going on?
Mr. Preston. No, it's the investigation initiated by the
FBI in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. We were informed
of that investigation and instructed that the FBI was
investigating, other agencies were not to investigate, not to
do anything that would interfere, generate material that would
complicate the investigation.
This is not atypical. When you have an investigation, early
on in an evolving situation, you want to avoid speculation or
tentative things that may complicate a later prosecution. You
want to avoid taking witness statements; let the investigators
do that.
What I was doing with this email was just alerting people
that we have been told there's an investigation, we've been
admonished not to generate material that would complicate it,
let's slow down and make sure that what we're doing is not
inconsistent with the guidance we've gotten.
Senator Inhofe. Considering that this individual is the
Vice Chairman of HPSCI over there, and made the request, do you
see any reason that you couldn't, even in a classified form,
respond to his questions, either now or if something should
happen in the future?
Mr. Preston. I should think that we could respond in a
classified form. These were public talking points, and my email
was only directed to this particular item that was being
prepared.
Senator Inhofe. If he were to re-ask you that question in a
classified form, could you respond to it?
Mr. Preston. If that request came from the Ranking to the
Agency, I expect they would respond.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That's fine.
Getting back, Mr. McGinn, there was a statement that was
attributed to Secretary Hagel, it appeared in Greenwire, I
believe it was, one of the publications--he said, ``Secretary
Hagel recently asked why, in the face of the devastating cuts
in civilian workers, carrier deployments, military training,
and equipment maintenance, the Defense Department would still
contribute $170 million to a massive Federal giveaway to
private biofuels companies to aid the construction of a
commercial biofuel refinery.'' Then it said, ``He was told by
the White House to stand down.''
You can do this for the record, if you'd like, unless you'd
like to address it now--the same $170 million could have been
used by the Air Force to prevent the 16 squadrons from flying
or could have saved some 60,000 civilians from being
furloughed. I have a list of things that could be done with
that $170 million.
I guess what I want to get from you--I know what's happened
in the past. You and I have disagreed on the whole green fleet
and all of that.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. But, that's an honest disagreement, and I
understand that. But, we also have a Department of Energy. I
remember when that was set up. It was set up just for such
purposes as experimenting to see what we could have.
Now, when people use the excuse that we are not energy
sufficient, I want to hasten to say, we could be, and we will
be, when we can change our policies in this country. But,
nonetheless, in the meantime, don't you think that those
dollars, that are so scarce right now of going into defending
America, should be used just for that purpose, for defense, and
let the Department of Energy carry on their function? What's
your thought about that?
Admiral McGinn. Based on my prior experience in uniform,
especially as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare
Requirements, I'm somewhat familiar with the process of having
to make choices to recognize that there are not only direct
costs for investments, but there are opportunity costs. If you
spend it on one thing, you're not going to be not going to be
able to spend it on other things. I look forward, if confirmed,
to really looking into all of our programs, including our
energy programs, to make sure that, not only the direct costs,
but the opportunity costs are carefully considered in making
those investments.
Senator Inhofe. In this case--and you can recall, because
we've actually used this, talking about the $26 a gallon that
could have been done for less. In specific instances like that,
I would request, if you are confirmed, that, when you see
things like that, that might be coming up, that we, on this
committee, could be a part of that decision, and it not just be
done in a vacuum. That would be a request that I would have.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir. Across the board, all of my
portfolio, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the
committee, and, indeed, the entire Congress.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very much for that
answer.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I have an additional question or two.
Admiral, before the committee authorizes appropriations for
a military construction project, that project has typically
been reviewed by the relevant Service and the Service, when
they designate that project as a priority, they then submit it
to Congress as part of the budget. Now, the committee's recent
review of overseas basing found that it is not the case for
projects built with in-kind payments from foreign governments.
This inquiry of our committee found that the in-kind payments
from Germany, South Korea, and Japan have been used to fund
questionable military construction projects. Are you familiar
with our investigation?
Admiral McGinn. No, sir. I am familiar that there is an
investigation, but not all of the details.
Chairman Levin. All right. If you would, after you're
confirmed, promptly read the report and make sure that in-kind
payments are utilized only for identified U.S. priorities to
offset costs that the Department of the Navy would otherwise
pay with appropriated funds, we would appreciate it.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir. I would just like to state that,
no matter what the source of precious resources, we have to
make sure that they're spent wisely. It doesn't matter whether
it comes from the support from some of our allies or from our
own appropriated funds. We have an obligation to spend them to
the best effect possible.
Chairman Levin. Or whether they're in-kind payments.
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Now, the committee, or at least many members, are very
concerned about the plans for the relocation of marines from
Okinawa to other locations in the Pacific; specifically, not
the idea of it, but more the affordability and the
sustainability and the operational viability of those plans. In
response to prehearing policy questions, you indicated that
Guam construction issues were among the most significant
challenges facing the next Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Energy, Installations, and Environment.
Now, the Marine Corps estimates its realignment plan would
cost $12.1 billion, but the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) recently reported that this estimate is not reliable;
it's based on limited data and will not be reliable until
environmental analyses and host-nation negotiations have
concluded.
Admiral, are you familiar with the GAO report?
Admiral McGinn. Not the details, but that there is a
report, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Will you, after you're confirmed, which we
hope will be prompt--will you give us a report about your level
of confidence in the reliability of that $12.1 billion cost
estimate put forward by the Marine Corps?
Admiral McGinn. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Also, will you let us know, in your report,
whether or not we should be funding military construction
projects to support the movement of marines to Guam before we
have commitments from host nations, in terms of their
participation in those costs?
Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you let us know that at the same time?
Admiral McGinn. I will.
Senator Inhofe. Just really briefly.
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Senator Inhofe. Let me correct the record. I had used the
wrong name. The Sergeant Major at Fort Sill that was really
somewhat of an expert in this area--was named Carter. I used
the wrong name. I wanted to make sure I got that correction.
One last thing. Mr. Preston, in statements that I read that
were statements you had made about military commissions, have
you been to GTMO and looked at the expeditionary legal complex
down there?
Mr. Preston. I've been down there once. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Did you go through this complex that they
have down there?
Mr. Preston. I went to some of the facilities down there.
Senator Inhofe. They had one major one. As I recall, it was
about a $15-million thing that they put together down there.
You're more familiar with it than I am--but I am not a lawyer,
as I've pointed out--with the difference between the tribunals
and the normal trials that we would have here. In terms of
security of information and all of that, would you just
reexamine that particular facility and then maybe visit with me
about any justification for not using it? I don't know of one
anywhere that is just like that, that is designed for that
purpose. Would you do that, and just look at that and visit
with me about it? I need to be educated a little bit more.
Mr. Preston. Sir, if I'm confirmed, I would be happy to do
that.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We have indicated that there are going to be questions for
the record, which we're going to need to get promptly answered,
particularly to you, Mr. Preston. I don't know if there are
other nominees that we had questions for, or might have
questions for, but I know there are some for you, Mr. Preston.
Some of those are going to be in a classified form and may
require classified answers, particularly relative to that
response from the CIA to the Intelligence Committee about the
intelligence investigation that I referred to--the Intelligence
Committee investigation.
We will try to get those questions to you, if we can, as
early as tomorrow. If so, you would then be able, both, where
appropriate, in a unclassified manner, but, where necessary, in
a classified manner, please get us your answers within a matter
of days, because that'll speed up the consideration of your
nomination. That goes for any other questions for any of the
other nominees, as well.
If there are no additional questions, we will stand
adjourned, again with thanks to you and your families.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Stephen W. Preston by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also
improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders
in the strategic planning process, in the development of requirements,
in joint training and education, and in the execution of military
operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions based on your experience in the Department of Defense?
Answer. I believe that Goldwater-Nichols and other reforms have
significantly improved the Department of Defense. At this time, I am
not aware of any need to amend Goldwater-Nichols. If am confirmed and
become aware of a need, I will recommend any changes I believe to be
warranted.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. See answer above.
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of both the formal and
informal relationship between the General Counsel of the Department of
Defense and the following offices?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. As the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense,
the General Counsel is the principal legal advisor to the Secretary of
Defense and, as such, advises on the full range of issues confronting
the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working very
closely with the Secretary and his immediate staff on these issues.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The General Counsel and attorneys reporting to the General
Counsel are responsible for providing sound and timely legal advice to
the five Under Secretaries of Defense and their respective offices.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. As with the Under Secretaries of Defense, the General
Counsel and attorneys in the Office of General Counsel are responsible
for providing sound and timely legal advice to the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense and their staffs.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman has his own lawyer, the Legal Counsel to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is a judge advocate in the
grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half). The Chairman
relies primarily on the Legal Counsel for legal advice. If confirmed, I
expect to meet regularly and work closely with the Chairman's Legal
Counsel on a wide variety of matters affecting the Department of
Defense and would be available to the Chairman as appropriate.
Question. The geographic combatant commanders.
Answer. The geographic combatant commanders have their own Staff
Judge Advocates, on whom they rely for legal advice. If confirmed, I
expect to work with the geographic combatant commanders and their Staff
Judge Advocates through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Joint Staff, including the Legal Counsel to the Chairman as
appropriate.
Question. The Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command.
Answer. The Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) has his own Staff Judge Advocate who provides legal advice to
him, in conjunction with the Staff Judge Advocate of the U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), as JSOC is a part of SOCOM. If confirmed, I
expect to work with the Commander and the Staff Judge Advocate of JSOC,
as well as the Commander and the Staff Judge Advocate of SOCOM, through
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff,
including the Legal Counsel to the Chairman as appropriate.
Question. The Judge Advocates General (TJAG).
Answer. The Judge Advocates General (TJAG) are responsible for
providing legal advice, along with the General Counsels of the Military
Departments, to the senior leadership of their respective Military
Departments. Title 10 expressly directs that ``[n]o officer or employee
of the Department of Defense interfere with the ability of the Judge
Advocate[s] General to give independent legal advice to'' the
leadership of their respective Military Departments. See title 10
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 3037, 5148, 8037. If confirmed, I expect to meet
regularly and work closely with all of the Judge Advocates General, as
well as the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
and I aim to have the same productive and collegial relationship with
the ``TJAGs'' and the JAG community as I enjoyed during my prior
service at the Department of Defense.
Question. The Legal Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. As noted above, the Legal Counsel to the Chairman is
responsible for providing legal advice to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I expect to have a productive and
collegial relationship with the Chairman's Legal Counsel, characterized
by frequent meetings and close collaboration, particularly with respect
to military operations.
Question. The Staff Judge Advocates to the Commanders of Combatant
Commands.
Answer. I understand that the relationship of the General Counsel
to the Staff Judge Advocates of the Combatant Commands is primarily
through the Chairman's Legal Counsel.
Question. The General Counsels of the Military Departments.
Answer. From my prior service as General Counsel of the Department
of the Navy and as Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department
of Defense, I appreciate the close working relationships among the
Military Department General Counsels and the DOD General Counsel. The
General Counsels of the Army, Navy and Air Force serve as the chief
legal officers of their respective departments and report to the
Secretaries of their respective departments. At the same time, the DOD
General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the entire Department of
Defense. If confirmed, I expect to meet regularly and work closely with
the Military Department General Counsels.
Question. The Counsels for the Defense Agencies.
Answer. The DOD General Counsel is also the Director of the Defense
Legal Services Agency (DLSA), and the General Counsels of the defense
agencies and DOD field activities are all part of DLSA. The General
Counsels of the defense agencies and DOD field activities report the
DOD General Counsel in his or her capacity as DLSA Director.
Question. The Counsel to the Inspector General.
Answer. Title 5 of the U.S.C. provides for a General Counsel to the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, who reports directly to
and performs duties as assigned by the Inspector General. If confirmed,
I expect to work closely with the General Counsel to the Inspector
General.
Question. The Joint Service Committee on Military Justice.
Answer. I understand that the DOD General Counsel designates a non-
voting representative to the Joint Service Committee on Military
Justice, provides taskings to the committee, and receives advice from
it.
Question. The Comptroller General.
Answer. It is my understanding that the General Counsel, on behalf
of the Secretary of Defense, may request advisory opinions from the
Comptroller General on the obligation and disbursement of public funds.
If confirmed, I expect to have a productive relationship with the
Comptroller General and his or her staff with respect to matters
involving fiscal law within the responsibility of the Comptroller
General.
Question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
Answer. By statute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
is located, for administrative purposes only, within the Department of
Defense. See title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 941. My understanding is that the DOD
General Counsel has historically served as an informal DOD liaison with
the Court. If confirmed, I expect to support the work of the Court
while respecting its independence.
Question. The Code Committee established under Article 146 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Answer. I understand that the Code Committee consists of the Judges
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Judge
Advocates General of the Military Departments, the Judge Advocate
General and Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard, the Staff Judge Advocate
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and two recognized authorities
on military justice appointed by the Secretary of Defense from public
life. The General Counsel has no formal relationship to the Code
Committee. However, the General Counsel may provide informal support to
the Code Committee when requested and regularly communicates with the
Code Committee with respect to the activities and recommendations of
the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice.
Question. The Attorney General.
Answer. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer and law
enforcement authority of the United States. As General Counsel of the
Central Intelligence Agency, I have worked closely with the Attorney
General and his staff on a number of matters. If confirmed, I look
forward to continuing the productive relationship that I have enjoyed
with the leadership of the Department of Justice.
Question. The Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice.
Answer. The Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel issues legal opinions that are binding on the executive branch,
including the Department of Defense, and regularly provides advice to
attorneys throughout the Executive branch. As a result, the DOD General
Counsel must work closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to ensure
that the best possible legal advice is provided to officials of the
Department of Defense. As General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency, I have had a very close and productive relationship with the
Assistant Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel, and, if
confirmed, I expect that relationship to continue.
Question. The Office of Legal Adviser at the Department of State.
Answer. Many national security matters require the Departments of
State and Defense to work closely together and coordinate efforts. As a
result, it is necessary for the DOD General Counsel and the Legal
Adviser of the Department of State, and their respective staffs, to
consult with each other on legal issues of mutual interest on a regular
basis. As General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, my
relationship with the Legal Adviser and the Legal Adviser's office has
been a close and productive one, and, if confirmed, I look forward to
continuing that relationship.
Question. The General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Answer. My service as General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency provides me with special insight into the appropriate
relationship between the incumbent of that position and the DOD General
Counsel. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense
share many common interests in significant national security matters,
intelligence activities and military operations, and it is therefore
critically important for the General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the DOD General Counsel to work well together
and communicate regularly. If confirmed, I am confident that I will
have a very close and productive relationship with my successor at the
Agency.
Question. The Interagency Legal Advisors Working Group.
Answer. Attorneys from the national security staff and departments
and agencies with national security responsibilities meet as needed or
directed to discuss legal issues of concern to multiple departments and
agencies or about which there may be differences of opinion. As General
Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, I have participated in
these discussions and will continue to do so as DOD General Counsel, if
confirmed.
qualifications
Question. Section 140 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense
and that the General Counsel shall perform such functions as the
Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that the
Secretary of Defense will prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate that the Secretary of Defense
will rely on me for legal advice on the full range of issues that he
and the Department must address and will expect me, as a member of his
senior leadership team, to share with him the benefit of my experience
generally.
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have spent most of my career, and the past 20 years
straight, working at the juncture of law and national security, both in
private practice and in government service.
I am currently General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate a
little more than 4 years ago. Before that, as a partner at WilmerHale
in Washington, I was co-chair of the firm's Defense and National
Security Practice Group, as well as a member of the firm's Regulatory
and Litigation Departments. During the Clinton administration, I served
as Deputy General Counsel for Legal Counsel, Principal Deputy General
Counsel and, for an extended period, Acting General Counsel of the
Department of Defense. I then joined the Department of Justice as the
Deputy Assistant Attorney General responsible for civil appellate
matters. Returning to the Department of Defense, I served as General
Counsel of the Department of the Navy, a Presidential appointment
requiring Senate confirmation.
These experiences have given me a deep understanding of legal and
policy issues relating to national defense. I have also gained valuable
insight into the critical role of the General Counsel in advising the
Secretary of Defense and representing the Department. For the past 4
years, I have dealt extensively with the terrorist threat and other
security challenges facing the United States. Perhaps most important,
my experience over a professional lifetime has instilled in me a
profound appreciation for the men and women who devote their lives to
defending our country.
client
Question. In your opinion, who is the client of the General Counsel
of the Department of Defense?
Answer. The client of the General Counsel of the Department of
Defense is the Department of Defense and, ultimately, the United States
of America.
duties and challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next General Counsel of the Department of Defense?
Answer. The major challenges I will face, if confirmed, relate
directly to the major challenges confronting the Department as a whole.
Among them are the conflict with al Qaeda and transition in
Afghanistan, as well as other national security challenges, and
continuing efforts to ensure full compliance with all applicable law in
addressing those challenges. Other priority areas with substantial
legal aspects include military detention operations and the military
commissions. There are also pressures caused by diminishing budgets and
the effects of sequestration, and resulting challenges in both the
acquisition and personnel areas. In the acquisition area, for example,
bid protests and other contract litigation may be expected to increase
as more companies compete for fewer contracts or decide to file
contract claims. Furloughs and anticipated reductions in personnel are
also likely to raise significant legal issues.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. The Department is well served by a cadre of experienced
attorneys who are experts in relevant areas of law, both in the Office
of General Counsel and in the larger DOD legal community. If confirmed,
my hope is to provide leadership and the support those attorneys need
to provide the best possible legal advice to their component clients.
For my part, I will do my utmost to assist the Secretary in meeting the
various challenges confronting the Department.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense?
Answer. I expect that I will have a better sense of any needs
relating to the performance of the DOD General Counsel's functions
after spending some time in the position, if confirmed. I understand
that current budget pressures, aging of the workforce, and difficulty
in replacing attorneys who retire without others having similar
expertise may pose significant problems.
Question. What management actions and timelines would you establish
to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to treat my colleagues with the
respect they so richly deserve, and to focus on resources, succession
planning and recruitment with reference to the workforce of my office.
Question. What do you see as the greatest legal problems facing the
Department in the coming year?
Answer. In addition to the challenges discussed above, one area
that has received a great deal of attention recently, which I expect
will draw continued attention in the coming year, would be intelligence
activities conducted by the Department of Defense that potentially
implicate privacy and civil liberties. DOD attorneys will, I expect,
continue to assist their component clients in finding lawful paths to
reach operational objectives, facilitating the national security
mission while ensuring full compliance with all applicable law and,
specifically, strict adherence to the standards and procedures
protecting privacy and civil liberties. I also see sexual assault in
the military as an urgent problem with substantial legal aspects that
will require sustained attention in the coming year, as discussed in
response to specific questions below.
Question. Does the Office of the General Counsel have the resources
to deal with these problems and do its everyday work?
Answer. I expect that I will have a better sense of any needs
relating to Office of General Counsel resources after spending some
time in the position, if confirmed. I understand that furloughs and
anticipated reductions in personnel may pose significant challenges in
this regard.
legal opinions
Question. Are legal opinions of the Office of the General Counsel
binding on all lawyers within the Department of Defense?
Answer. The DOD General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
Department of Defense. Accordingly, the legal opinions of the DOD
Office of General Counsel are controlling throughout the Department of
Defense. There is an exception for the lawyers in the Office of the
Inspector General, as the General Counsel to the Inspector General is
expressly exempted from the scope of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 140 by virtue of
section 907 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 A (title 5 U.S.C. App.
Inspector General Act of 1978 Sec. 8(h)). I note also that title 10
prohibits any officer or employee of DOD from interfering with the
ability of certain senior military lawyers to give independent legal
advice to their respective principals.
Question. How will you ensure that such legal opinions are
available to lawyers in the various components of the Department of
Defense?
Answer. Written opinions of the DOD Office of General Counsel are
disseminated throughout the Department in the ordinary course of
business, using normal departmental distribution processes. If
confirmed, I expect to continue this practice.
Question. If confirmed, are there specific categories of General
Counsel legal opinions that you expect to reconsider and possibly
revise? If so, what categories?
Answer. I am not aware of any specific categories of General
Counsel legal opinions that are in need of reconsideration or revision.
However, if confirmed and such a need arises, I would review those
opinions in consultation with the appropriate attorneys and subject
matter experts within the Department.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
development and consideration (or reconsideration) of legal opinions by
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice that
directly affect the Department of Defense?
Answer. While the Department of Justice is ultimately responsible
for the legal opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel, if confirmed, I
expect to work closely with the Office of Legal Counsel in the
development and consideration of legal opinions that directly affect
the Department of Defense. (I am not aware of any such opinions
currently in effect that are in need of reconsideration.)
Question. What actions would you take in response to an opinion
issued by OLC with which you disagreed as a matter of proper
interpretation of the law?
Answer. I would not hesitate to inform the Office of Legal Counsel
if I disagreed with one of its legal opinions. I would raise any
unresolved concerns directly with the Assistant Attorney General. If
necessary and as appropriate, I would be prepared to take the matter
all the way up to the Attorney General. I recognize, however, that the
Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the United States and
that his or her legal opinions are controlling throughout the Executive
branch.
independent legal advice
Question. In response to attempts within the Department of Defense
to subordinate legal functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates
General to the General Counsels of the Department of Defense and the
Military Services, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting any officer
or employee of the Department of Defense from interfering with the
ability of the Judge Advocates General of the Military Services and the
legal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide
independent legal advice to the Chairman, Service Secretaries, and
Service Chiefs. Congress also required a study and review by outside
experts of the relationships between the legal elements of each of the
Military Departments.
What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocates General of
the services, the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and the legal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to provide independent legal advice to Service Secretaries,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air
Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer. I believe that the ability of these senior military lawyers
to provide independent legal advice to their principals is critically
important. During my prior service as General Counsel of the Department
of the Navy and as Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department
of Defense, long before any legislation in this regard, it was my firm
expectation that the senior military lawyers with whom I worked would
provide independent legal advice to their principals, entirely without
hindrance. As a member of the 2005 Independent Review Panel to Study
the Relationships between military department General Counsels and
Judge Advocates General, I had an opportunity to reflect on these
issues and to reaffirm the independence of the ``TJAGs'' in providing
legal advice to the leadership of their respective military
departments. In my experience, the best legal advice is often the
product of consultation and, where possible, consensus. Accordingly, in
my view, the advice given by senior military lawyers should be informed
by consultation with other departmental lawyers as appropriate. If
confirmed, I expect to benefit from, and will insist on, the
independent views of the senior military lawyers with whom I will work.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge
advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent
legal advice to military commanders?
Answer. Judge advocates within the Services and joint commands must
provide military commanders timely legal advice that is independent of
improper external influence. While exercising their best judgment, the
advice given may be informed by consultation with other departmental
lawyers, as circumstances permit, such as more senior judge advocates
in the chain of command, and it should be governed by any relevant
legal guidance from authoritative sources such as the Department of
Justice or within the Department of Defense.
Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the
current relationships between the uniformed judge advocates and General
Counsels?
Answer. As I understand the current relationships, I would not
propose any changes, if confirmed.
detainee issues
Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or
under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of
nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.
In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United
States? Why or why not?
Answer. I believe this prohibition to be in the best interest of
the United States, consistent with the national security and with
fundamental American values.
Question. Do you believe that the phrase ``cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment'' has been adequately and
appropriately defined for the purpose of this provision?
Answer. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 define ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment'' as the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. I think this is an adequate and appropriate
definition.
Question. What role do you believe the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense should play in the interpretation of this
standard?
Answer. The General Counsel should play a primary role in advising
the Secretary of Defense and those who fall under his command on the
standards governing the treatment of persons detained by the U.S.
military, including regarding any interpretation, if necessary, of the
standard quoted above.
Question. What role do you believe the Judge Advocates General of
the military services should play in the interpretation of this
standard?
Answer. The Judge Advocates General and other military lawyers
should play a prominent role in the interpretation of standards related
to the treatment of detainees. I believe The Judge Advocates General
and the lawyers they lead bring experience and an important perspective
to these and many other matters, and they play a vital role in
supporting the operating forces worldwide. Judge advocates must be
depended on to provide timely day-to-day legal advice to military
commanders in the field. If confirmed, and if called on to offer any
guidance on this standard, I would expect to consult The Judge
Advocates General and the Chairman's Legal Counsel.
Question. If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all
relevant Department of Defense directives, regulations, policies,
practices, and procedures fully comply with the requirements of section
1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and
inhuman treatment.
In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that
provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S.
detainees in foreign custody and to foreign detainees in U.S. custody?
Answer. I believe the standard as defined in U.S. domestic law is
appropriate for purposes of protection from abusive treatment when
applied to detention at home and abroad.
Question. Do you believe that the United States has the legal
authority to continue holding alleged members and supporters of al
Qaeda and the Taliban as enemy combatants?
Answer. Congress and the Federal courts have recognized the
Executive branch's authority to detain individuals who were part of, or
substantially supported, al Qaeda or Taliban forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners, including any person who has committed a
belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such
enemy forces.
Question. Do you believe that the Federal courts have the
procedures and capabilities needed to fairly and appropriately review
the detention of enemy combatants, pursuant to habeas corpus petitions?
Answer. The Federal courts have established clear procedures for a
habeas petitioner to obtain extensive discovery from the government and
for the petitioner to participate in his case (during unclassified
proceedings). In the habeas litigation, the courts have provided
detainees with a meaningful opportunity to contest the lawfulness of
their detention, while protecting core national security interests,
such as the protection of classified information and the continued
detention of enemy belligerents who pose a threat to the United States.
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, under
the Periodic Review Board procedures for reviewing the status of
Guantanamo detainees and determining whether the United States should
continue to hold such detainees?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to provide legal advice to the
Secretary of Defense on the status of the Guantanamo detainees and
determinations whether such detainees should continue to be held. In
addition, the General Counsel appoints the legal advisor to the
Periodic Review Board and is in the legal advisor's supervisory chain.
Question. The Military Commissions Act of 2009 revised the 2006
procedures for military commission trials of ``alien unlawful enemy
combatants''.
In your view, does the Military Commissions Act of 2009 provide
appropriate legal standards and processes for the trial of alien
unlawful enemy combatants?
Answer. The Military Commissions Act of 2009 provides appropriate
standards and processes for the trial of alien unprivileged enemy
belligerents.
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in
determining whether Guantanamo detainees should be tried for war
crimes, and if so, in what forum?
Answer. The Convening Authority has the responsibility for
determining whether to refer charges to a military commission. The
General Counsel does not have a role in the referral of charges. If
confirmed, I would expect to provide legal advice, as necessary, to the
Secretary of Defense on these matters.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and the legal advisor
to the convening authority, the chief prosecutor, and the chief defense
counsel for the military commissions?
Answer. The Legal Advisor to the Convening Authority and Chief
Prosecutor are supervised by the Deputy General Counsel (Legal
Counsel). The Chief Defense Counsel is supervised by the Deputy General
Counsel (Personnel & Health Policy). Both the Deputy General Counsel
(Legal Counsel) and the Deputy General Counsel (Personnel & Health
Policy) report to the General Counsel.
coercive interrogation techniques
Question. As discussed in a 2008 report of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE)
techniques used to train members of our military were never intended to
be used by U.S. interrogators. Rather, the techniques--which are based
on Communist Chinese interrogation techniques used during the Korean
War to elicit confessions--were developed to expose U.S. soldiers to
the abusive treatment they might be subjected to if captured by our
enemies.
Do you believe interrogation techniques derived from SERE
techniques are an effective way to acquire useful intelligence?
Answer. While I have no expertise in either SERE training or
methods of interrogation, in my view, the fact that certain techniques
have been used to train servicemembers in withstanding abusive
treatment if captured is not indicative of the effectiveness of those
techniques in obtaining information from detainees, nor does it show
such techniques to be superior to conventional interrogation
techniques.
Under Executive Order 13491, issued January 22, 2009, departments
and agencies of the U.S. Government are prohibited from using any
interrogation technique that is not authorized by and listed in the
Army Field Manual. My understanding is that none of the interrogation
techniques contained in the Army Field Manual--FM 2-22.3, ``Human
Intelligence Collector Operations,'' September 2006--was derived from
SERE techniques.
Question. In your opinion, is there any comparability between a
friendly trainer exposing our troops to SERE techniques, including
waterboarding, for minutes to show what they could face if captured and
using these techniques on an enemy to in an effort to extract
intelligence?
Answer. While I have no expertise in either SERE training or
methods of interrogation, in my view, the two activities are
significantly different for purposes of meaningful comparison. They are
conducted for very different purposes, and they are carried out in very
different contexts/environments. Notably, the person subjected to such
techniques during SERE training is aware that he or she is
participating in a training exercise and not in fact undergoing
interrogation by hostile forces.
Question. In your opinion, does waterboarding constitute torture?
Answer. Under current law, waterboarding constitutes torture. As
waterboarding was banned by Executive order in January 2009, I have had
no occasion to independently examine the question with reference to any
CIA activities during my tenure as General Counsel. However, I believe
the law on this is now well settled: in addition to the President,
Attorney General Holder has stated that waterboarding is torture. That
is the law in my view, and I fully support the President's decision to
ban waterboarding and the other ``enhanced interrogation techniques''.
At the time the waterboard was used in connection with the former
detention and interrogation program, Agency personnel relied on then-
authoritative legal opinions issued by the Department of Justice. Of
course, those opinions have since been disavowed and withdrawn by the
Department of Justice. However, the Attorney General has repeatedly
made clear that anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of
the legal guidance given by the Justice Department would not be subject
to prosecution.
Question. Is waterboarding torture within the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. See answer above. For purposes of defining torture under
the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. military uses the definition of
torture under U.S. domestic law. See U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3. So
if an activity is torture under U.S. law, then it is torture for
purposes of the Geneva Conventions. Inasmuch as waterboarding is
torture under U.S. law, as noted above, waterboarding is torture within
the meaning of the Geneva Conventions.
military commissions act
Question. In your view, do military commissions constituted
pursuant to the Military Commissions Act of 2009 provide an effective
forum for trying violations of the law of armed conflict?
Answer. Military commissions are an appropriate forum for trying
offenses against the law of war and other offenses traditionally
triable by military commission. The applicability of certain offenses
to conduct occurring prior to 2006 is currently the subject of pending
litigation in Federal court.
Question. What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of
military commissions as a forum for trying detainees for terrorism-
related offenses?
Answer. The reforms of the Military Commissions Act of 2009 ensure
that military commissions provide appropriate processes for the trial
of alien unprivileged enemy belligerents. In addition, the Department
of Defense has made many improvements to the transparency of the
process, including closed-circuit transmission of all open proceedings
to the general public. Nonetheless, legal challenges remain,
particularly in light of the number of unsettled legal issues.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the Military
Commissions Act of 2009?
Answer. I am not aware of any need for changes to the 2009 Military
Commissions Act.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the U.S. military to use force, including deadly
force, against U.S. citizens?
Answer. Citizenship does not confer immunity on one who takes up
arms against our country. However, it is critically important to
respect the Constitutional rights of American citizens, even those who
may be plotting against the United States. The requirements of Due
Process and the circumstances in which the U.S. Government could
lawfully target an enemy belligerent/terrorist operator known to be a
U.S. person were outlined in the speech by the Attorney General in
March of last year and are discussed in some detail in the Department
of Justice white paper that has been released. In addition, the policy
standards and procedures announced in May of this year require that if
the United States considers an operation against a terrorist identified
as a U.S. person, the Department of Justice will conduct an additional
legal analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted against the
individual consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the U.S. military to use force, including deadly
force, inside the United States?
Answer. It is a mission of the U.S. military to defend the United
States from attack, and the performance of this mission could involve
the use of military force to repel an armed attack launched against our
homeland. In the conflict with al Qaeda and its militant allies, the
U.S. military does not employ deadly force in the United States. As a
policy matter, moreover, the use of military force is unnecessary
because well-established law enforcement authorities in this country
provide the best means for incapacitating a terrorist threat. The
United States has a long history of using the criminal justice system
to incapacitate individuals located in our country who pose a threat to
the United States and its interests.
international law
Question. In a speech at Columbia Law School and a similar address
at Harvard Law School, you discuss a ``four-box matrix'' which has been
used to assist in the legal review of proposed actions by the Central
Intelligence Agency. The second box in this matrix is designed to
evaluate the ``Authority to Act with reference to International Law
Principles.''
If a proposed action by the Department of Defense is fully in
compliance with U.S. law but there is a question of whether the
proposed action is permitted under international law, customary
international law or international law principles, does this ambiguity
effect, and if so to what extent, or negate the ability of the
Department to carry out the proposed action?
Answer. As a threshold matter, all U.S. military operations must be
authorized under U.S. domestic law. This authority could be conferred
by statute or, in the absence of congressional authorization, under
certain circumstances, the President may rely on his constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, as well as his
authority to conduct foreign relations, to authorize the use of
military force. There are significant constitutional and statutory
limitations on the scope and duration of military operations that the
President may authorize.
When the United States uses military force in a foreign country, it
complies with all applicable international law.
If confirmed, I would work closely with my colleagues, including
the Chairman's Legal Counsel and interagency lawyers, to ensure that
U.S. military operations abroad comply with both U.S. domestic and
applicable international law.
Question. In an address at Northwestern Law School in 2012,
Attorney General Eric Holder stated that the administration has
implemented special procedures to afford a level of due process review
before lethal force is taken pursuant to the Authorization for the Use
of Military Force of 2001 against a U.S. citizen.
What is your understanding of the extent to which the
administration intends to provide similar procedural due process
protections to potential targets outside areas of active armed conflict
who are not U.S. citizens?
Answer. The policy standards and procedures announced in May of
this year, which govern the United States' use of force in
counterterrorism operations outside the United States and areas of
active hostilities and are either already in place or will be
transitioned into place, apply generally to all terrorist targets,
regardless of whether they are American citizens. Particularly as
relates to non-U.S. persons abroad, the standards and procedures were
promulgated as a matter of policy rather than per requirements of due
process.
Question. During the Vietnam war some criticized the layers of
bureaucracy which obstructed the timely authorization for an attack on
legitimate military targets. In the current conflict, as in the Vietnam
war, targets of opportunity can come and go in a moment's notice.
Are you concerned that the procedures cited by the administration,
as summarized in the Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures
for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United
States and Areas if Active Hostilities, for targeting terrorists
outside active areas of armed conflict could similarly complicate and
add to the length of time required to target an overseas, non-U.S.
citizen al Qaeda member?
Answer. I agree that agility and timeliness are important
attributes in a decisionmaking process for approving military targets
and authorizing military action against such targets. My understanding
is that the policy standards and procedures announced in May of this
year were developed in close consultation with the departments and
agencies with national security responsibilities, including
specifically civilian and military leaders responsible for military
operations abroad, and with the objective of having a decisionmaking
process that would be practically workable and yield timely decisions.
In addition, the policy standards and procedures include a reservation
by the President permitting action to be taken in extraordinary
circumstances.
Question. How do you assess the risk that the procedures could lead
to targets of opportunity being missed or could unnecessarily obstruct
our ability to fight the war?
Answer. As noted, the policy standards and procedures were
developed with the objective of having a decisionmaking process that
would be practically workable and yield timely decisions. In addition,
risk in this regard should be mitigated by the reservation by the
President permitting a departure from otherwise applicable standards
and procedures in extraordinary circumstances.
authority for use of military force/law of armed conflict
Question. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 107-40), which
provides that ``the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.'' This AUMF remains in effect and provides
the legal authority for certain U.S. military actions.
What is your understanding of the role of the General Counsel in
interpreting the AUMF and in the application of the AUMF to military
activities?
Answer. I understand that the General Counsel, as chief legal
officer of the Department of Defense, is responsible for providing
advice on legal matters involving the Department of Defense and for
overseeing legal services provided within the Department of Defense.
The interpretation and application of the 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force to military activities is a legal matter on which the
General Counsel would provide advice to the Secretary of Defense, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense
organizations and, as appropriate, other Department of Defense
components.
Question. What is your understanding of how the AUMF intersects
with the international law of armed conflict?
Answer. It is my understanding that the interpretation of the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force, a domestic law of the United
States, is informed by principles of international law, specifically,
by the law of armed conflict.
Question. In your view, does the Department of Defense have the
legal authorities it needs to conduct military operations against
entities responsible for September 11 and against those who plan
further attacks against the United States?
Answer. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force provides
broad legal authority for military operations against those responsible
for the September 11 attacks and those harboring them, which authority
has been applied to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. In
addition, the President could order military action to stop further
attacks against the United States pursuant to his constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, even if the
terrorist threat was unrelated to al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an
associated force. My understanding is that the existing authorities are
believed to be adequate and appropriate for military operations to
counter the current and immediately foreseeable terrorist threat.
Question. In your view, do existing legal authorities provide the
U.S. military the legal flexibility it needs to respond to new and
emerging terrorism threats?
Answer. Current Department of Defense strategy calls for increasing
reliance on foreign partners as opposed to large-scale deployments of
U.S. forces to address new and emerging terrorism threats. If
confirmed, I look forward to examining whether new or revised legal
authority for the U.S. military to support the efforts of foreign
partners to respond to new and emerging threats is appropriate.
Question. Without the AUMF, would the U.S. military have the legal
authority to use force, including deadly force against members of al
Qaeda and associated forces? If so, under what circumstances?
Answer. The United States did, in fact, use military force against
members of al Qaeda before the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force was enacted. If there were no 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force, the President would have authority as Commander in
Chief and Chief Executive to order military action against al Qaeda and
associated forces if necessary to protect an important national
interest, as with an imminent threat of violent attack. There are,
however, significant constitutional and statutory limitations on the
scope and duration of military operations that the President may order
in the absence of congressional authorization.
Question. What is the impact of the President's Policy Guidance on
Counterterrorism on legal application of the AUMF with respect to
counterterrorism operations?
Answer. The policy standards and procedures announced in May of
this year, which govern the United States' use of force in
counterterrorism operations outside the United States and areas of
active hostilities, apply to military operations undertaken pursuant to
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, although they do not
apply to ongoing military operations in Afghanistan. Beyond the bedrock
requirement of a legal basis--where the use of force is authorized
under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force and hence
would be legally permissible--the standards and procedures set forth
additional requirements for when force should be used as a matter of
policy, with particular emphasis on whether the action will protect
American lives.
Question. In your view, would it be appropriate for the United
States to use military force against terrorist groups that have not
engaged in hostilities directly against the United States, but merely
shown an intent to do so? If so, under what circumstances?
Answer. The use of military force may be appropriate when necessary
to stop an imminent terrorist attack on the United States, U.S. persons
or interests abroad, or a U.S. ally by a group that has not previously
engaged in hostilities directly against the United States.
Question. What impact will the end of combat operations in
Afghanistan at the end of 2014 have on the application of the AUMF?
Answer. I understand that the U.S. and NATO roles in Afghanistan
after 2014 are still being discussed within the U.S. Government and
NATO and negotiated with the Government of Afghanistan. I also note
that the President recently committed to engaging Congress and the
American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force. Thus, I do not think one can
predict today whether or how the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force might be applied in Afghanistan after 2014.
Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the
DOD Law of War Manual and what steps will you take, if confirmed, to
complete this important document?
Answer. I am advised that the DOD Law of War Manual is in the final
revision process managed by the DOD Law of War Working Group. That
group is chaired by a representative from the DOD Office of General
Counsel and is composed of representatives of the Judge Advocates
General and the General Counsels of the military departments, the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Legal
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I understand that
significant progress has been made through the concerted efforts of
dedicated military and civilian lawyers within DOD and with assistance
from colleagues at the Departments of State and Justice. If confirmed,
I will support these efforts with a view to completing this important
manual as expeditiously as possible.
unmanned systems
Question. What are your views on whether the Department of Defense
should assume greater responsibility for the operation of unmanned
aerial systems (drones)?
Answer. The U.S. military has used remotely piloted aircraft since
they were first developed to conduct intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, as well as direct action during armed conflict. I
support the administration's policy as it relates to the responsibility
of the Department of Defense for the operation of such aircraft.
Question. What legal benefits or risks to national security would
be implicated if the Department were to take the lead role in operating
unmanned systems?
Answer. The role of the Department of Defense in operating remotely
piloted aircraft, and associated benefits and risks, are chiefly policy
considerations. If confirmed, my focus with respect to military
operations using remotely piloted aircraft will be on the legal basis
for such operations and compliance with applicable law in conducting
such operations.
contractors on the battlefield
Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S.
military operations. The extensive involvement of contractor employees
in a broad array of activities--including security functions--has
raised questions about the legal accountability of contractor employees
for their actions.
Do you believe that current Department of Defense regulations
appropriately define and limit the scope of security functions that may
be performed by contractors in an area of combat operations?
Answer. I am not familiar with the referenced Department
regulations in this area, but am prepared to review them, if confirmed.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to such
regulations?
Answer. See answer above.
Question. Do you believe that current Department of Defense
regulations appropriately define and limit the scope of contractor
participation in the interrogation of detainees?
Answer. I am not familiar with the referenced Department
regulations in this area, but am prepared to review them, if confirmed.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to such
regulations?
Answer. See answer above.
Question. OMB Circular A-76 defines ``inherently governmental
functions'' to include ``discretionary functions'' that could
``significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
persons''.
In your view, is the performance of security functions that may
reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly
hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently
governmental function?
Answer. I have not previously had any substantial involvement with
this set of issues and am not familiar with how the concept of
inherently governmental function has been defined and applied in this
context. I am advised that by incorporating the definition from the
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (title 31 U.S.C. 501 note),
section 2463 of title 10, U.S.C., defines inherently governmental
function as a function that is so intimately related to the public
interest that it must be performed by government employees. If
confirmed, I intend to look at the application of this provision with
considerable care.
Question. In your view, is the interrogation of enemy prisoners of
war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of hostilities an
inherently governmental function?
Answer. See answer above.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
addressing the issue of what functions may appropriately be performed
by contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be actively involved in
addressing the legal issues relating to the proper role of contractors
on the battlefield.
Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was
enacted in 2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts
to persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the
United States.
In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction for
alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other areas of combat operations?
Answer. I understand the importance of appropriate accountability
for all persons supporting our Armed Forces wherever located. I am
generally aware of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of
2000 (MEJA), but I am not familiar with the particular provisions and
how well they have served to provide criminal jurisdiction over
contractor employees in areas of combat operations.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA?
Answer. I am not now in a position to propose any changes to MEJA.
If confirmed, and if after further review I perceive a need, I will
recommend any changes I believe to be warranted.
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in
developing administration recommendations for changes to MEJA?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be actively involved in any
effort to develop administration recommendations for changes to MEJA.
Question. Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 extended criminal jurisdiction of the military courts
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to persons serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field during time of declared war or
a contingency operation, such as our current operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
In your view, does the UCMJ provide appropriate jurisdiction for
alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other areas of combat operations?
Answer. I support the position that civilians serving with or
accompanying our Armed Forces overseas who commit crimes should be held
appropriately accountable. I do not now have an informed view as to
whether the UCMJ currently provides the appropriate criminal
jurisdiction over contractor employees in areas of combat operations.
Question. What is your view of the procedures agreed upon by the
Department of Defense and the Department of Justice to reconcile
jurisdictional responsibilities under MEJA and the UCMJ?
Answer. I am aware generally that there are procedures to reconcile
these responsibilities reflected in a Secretary of Defense memorandum
of March 10, 2008. If confirmed, I am prepared to examine this
memorandum and give thought to whether it reflects the appropriate
balance.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to
ensure appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of
contractor employees?
Answer. I have no recommendations for any such changes to the UCMJ
at this time. If confirmed, and if after further review I perceive a
need, I will recommend any changes I believe to be warranted.
military justice matters
Question. Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives
primary responsibility for legal advice concerning military justice to
the Judge Advocates General.
What is your understanding of the General Counsel's functions with
regard to military justice and the Judge Advocates General?
Answer. I understand that the General Counsel has a limited role in
military justice, and no direct role in any particular military justice
cases. The Secretary of Defense may become involved in military justice
in limited circumstances. In those situations, the General Counsel
provides legal advice to the Secretary.
The General Counsel is also responsible for designating a non-
voting representative to the Joint Service Committee on Military
Justice and may serve as an informal DOD liaison with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces.
Question. In your view, how should the General Counsel approach
military justice matters--both in terms of specific cases and general
policy issues to provide useful advice without generating problems of
unlawful command influence?
Answer. As with other senior civilian and military leaders within
the Department, the General Counsel must avoid any action that may
constitute, or may appear to constitute, unlawful command influence.
Question. The May 30, 2013 Defense Legal Policy Board (DLPB) report
on military justice in combat zones recommended a change in joint
doctrine to specify that discipline is the responsibility of Joint
Force Commanders at all levels. The report recommended that this
proposal should be presented to the DOD General Counsel and Secretary
of Defense to be integrated into DOD and joint policy, and when
appropriate, reviewed by the Joint Service Committee on Military
Justice to be uniformly implemented by the Services.
In your view, is it essential to preserve the role of the military
commander, including the Joint Force Commander in deployed situations,
for disposition of military justice matters?
Answer. I understand that the May 30, 2013 report of the
Subcommittee on Military Justice in Combat Zones and the Defense Legal
Policy Board's June 14, 2013 memorandum transmitting that report to the
Secretary of Defense endorsed the preservation of the role of the
military commander, including the Joint Force Commander in deployed
situations, in the disposition of military justice matters. As a
general matter, I appreciate the central importance of the commander's
role in the military justice system historically, but I am not
sufficiently familiar with the subcommittee's report and the Board's
memorandum to express a view on any recommendations in this regard. I
look forward to reviewing them, if confirmed.
Question. What are your views on whether it would be appropriate to
preserve the role of the commander as disposition authority, for the
entire spectrum of military operations, from deployment to
redeployment, in combat areas as well as in garrison?
Answer. I am not now prepared to offer specific assessments of the
optimal command role in the disposition of allegations of crimes and
other misconduct committed by servicemembers. If confirmed, I intend to
look at this issue with considerable care.
Question. If confirmed, what action will you take to ensure that
the recommendations of the DLPB with respect to military justice in
combat zones are implemented by DOD and the services?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to review the recommendations of the
Subcommittee and the Board, advise the Secretary of Defense with
reference to those recommendations, and assist in seeking appropriate
changes in policy, regulations or statutes to implement such
recommendations as the Secretary adopts.
prevention of and response to sexual assaults
Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more
than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including
2,558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports
(restricted, meaning that, in accordance with the victim's request,
they were handled in a confidential manner and not investigated).
Moreover, a recent survey conducted by the DOD indicates that the
actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1
percent of Active Duty women and 1.2 percent of Active Duty men
surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual
contact in the previous 12 months.
What is your understanding of the role of the DOD General Counsel
in addressing the problem of sexual assault in the military?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to play an active role, as the
Department's chief legal officer and as a member of the Secretary's
senior leadership team, in the ongoing effort to eradicate this scourge
from the military. I will oversee the attorneys currently advising the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office, assisting in the implementation
of the 2013 DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Strategic Plan,
and supporting the important work of the Response Systems Panel. Beyond
that, I hope to work with the Secretary and other Department leaders--
and with this committee--to make sure that solving this problem remains
a top priority, that no effort is spared to get a demonstrably
effective system in place, and that any legal impediments are promptly
addressed.
Question. Do you believe the DOD General Counsel's role in
addressing the problem of sexual assault in the military is
appropriate, and, if not, how should it be modified?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look at the role of the DOD General
Counsel in addressing the problem of sexual assault in the military to
assess whether I or my office can do any more to assist.
Question. What is your assessment of the DOD sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. As I understand it, sexual assault against servicemembers
is a gravely serious problem and has been a longstanding one. The
problem goes beyond the incidence of crimes involving sexual assault
and includes concern about possible impediments to coming forward such
as fear of retaliation and lack of confidence that action will be
taken. The fact that the problem has persisted despite previous efforts
directed at both prevention and response is disturbing and I expect
deeply frustrating to those who have been working to end it. I am not
sufficiently informed to express a personal view on the current DOD
sexual assault prevention and response program. I understand that the
program has undergone numerous changes, that several provisions from
the past two authorization acts are being implemented, and that
additional legislative proposals are under active consideration. If
confirmed, I will do my level best working with DOD lawyers, Department
leadership and Congress to rid the military of sexual assault.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. While I am not now in a position to express a personal
view, I am advised that an unrestricted report of sexual assault allows
law enforcement involvement and investigation, while restricted
reporting allows a victim to disclose the details of the assault to
specific individuals and receive medical treatment and counseling
without involving law enforcement or triggering an automatic
investigation. The goal of restricted reporting is to give the victim
the support and confidence eventually to come forward with an
unrestricted report so the offender can be held accountable and to
strike an appropriate balance between the need for the prosecution of
sexual offenders on the one hand and the privacy and physical and
mental well-being of the victim on the other.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD
oversight of military service implementation of the DOD and Service
policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assaults?
Answer. While I am not now in a position to express a personal
view, it is my understanding that there is robust oversight of the
Department policies for the prevention of and response to sexual
assaults. I am advised that the Secretary of Defense has a weekly
accountability and assessment meeting with senior Department leaders
and that DOD participates in the White House Health of the Force Group
meetings to discuss DOD actions to combat sexual assault. I am also
aware that the Secretary issued a Strategic Plan directing the Services
to align their programs with the Strategic Plan, and that the Director,
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office hosts quarterly
integrated product teams attended by senior leaders from the Services,
National Guard Bureau, Office of Secretary of Defense, and Office of
the DOD Inspector General. I also understand that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff established a quarterly executive council to assess the
effectiveness of sexual assault prevention and response across the
joint force.
Question. What is your assessment of current DOD policy as it
pertains to the legal issues surrounding the investigation and
prosecution of sexual assault cases?
Answer. I am not now prepared to offer assessments with reference
to the legal issues surrounding the investigation and prosecution of
sexual assault cases. If confirmed, I will engage with the Judge
Advocates General and other civilian and military leaders and subject
matter experts to determine what issues, if any, need to be addressed.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. I think the chain of command is instrumental in changing
the military culture. Commanders are responsible for the good order and
discipline of their units and are indispensable to creating a zero
tolerance climate for sexual assaults. However, eradicating sexual
assault cannot be limited to the chain of command--everyone has a role
in changing military culture to ensure that servicemembers can serve
without fear of sexual assault.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring judge
advocates outside the chain of command, rather than commanders, to
determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted by
the military?
Answer. I am not now in a position to express a personal view
concerning the optimal roles of commanders and judge advocates in the
disposition of sexual assault allegations. I understand that this is
the subject of intense debate. If confirmed, I will examine the issue
and hope to play a constructive role in the debate.
Question. Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
requires the convening authority to take action on the sentence issued
by a court-martial and authorizes a convening authority, in his sole
discretion, to take action of the findings of a court-martial,
including setting aside a finding of guilty or changing a finding of
guilty to a finding of guilty of a lessor included offense.
What is your view about the authority of a convening authority to
set aside or modify findings of guilt and authority to reduce a
sentence imposed by court-martial?
Answer. I understand that the Department has proposed legislation
that would modify Article 60 by allowing convening authorities to amend
findings of guilt only in those cases where the servicemember was
acquitted of a more serious offense and the offense of which he was
found guilty is a minor offense, not normally disposed of by court-
martial. The Department's proposal would also require the convening
authority to explain in writing any modifications made to the court-
martial findings and sentence. I support this proposal. As to limiting
the authority of the convening authority to modify a court-martial
sentence, one would have to consider the consequences such a limitation
would have on the ability to reach plea bargains in appropriate cases,
such as where the victim wishes to avoid being called as a witness in a
contested trial.
religious activity in the armed forces
Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
programs of the Department of Defense and the military services
regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. I understand that the Department of Defense has a long
history of supporting, to the extent possible, the free exercise of
religion by those servicemembers who choose to do so, while respecting
the rights of those who do not.
Question. In your view, do policies concerning religious
accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual
expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different
beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to study the Department's
current policies in sufficient detail to allow me to make a judgment on
the appropriateness of those policies. I understand that the current
Department policy on religious accommodation is being revised. If
confirmed, I intend to become involved in that revision process.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and
good order and discipline?
Answer. Again, I am unable to make a judgment regarding the
Department's current policies. However, I believe this question
correctly highlights the considerations that must be balanced when
considering religious accommodation: the individual servicemember's
free exercise of religion or no religion, and the Department's
requirement to maintain unit cohesion, good order and discipline, and
the other elements that comprise military readiness.
Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious belief?
Answer. I believe that military chaplains perform a vital service
not only for servicemembers and their families, but also for commanders
as advisors. I also believe that military chaplains should be allowed
to perform religious services in accordance with the tenets of their
religions and without interference from the chain of command. While I
am not in a position to opine on the existing policies and practices, I
understand that the DOD policy governing the military chaplains'
program is being revised, and, if confirmed, I intend to become
involved in that revision process.
legal ethics
Question. What is your understanding of the action a Department of
Defense attorney should take if the attorney becomes aware of improper
activities by a Department of Defense official who has sought the
attorney's legal advice and the official is unwilling to follow the
attorney's advice?
Answer. All Department attorneys are under an obligation to
faithfully comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including
regulatory reporting requirements. DOD Directive 5505.06,
``Investigations of Allegations Against Senior Officials of the
Department of Defense,'' requires referral to the DOD Inspector General
of suspected misconduct by senior DOD officials, while DOD regulation,
DOD 5500.07-R (Joint Ethics Regulation), requires DOD personnel to
report suspected violations of the criminal and administrative rules on
ethics and conflicts of interest to appropriate DOD authorities, e.g.,
the Defense Criminal Investigative Service.
Generally, if a DOD attorney learns of improper activities by an
official who has sought his or her legal advice but is unwilling to
follow it, the attorney should immediately notify appropriate
authorities, usually his or her legal supervisor (or the senior
attorney in the next higher level of his or her organization), for
review and appropriate action by that higher level official. This is an
appropriate way to escalate concerns to ensure that suitable corrective
action is promptly taken.
Question. Do you believe that the present limits on pro bono
activities of government attorneys are generally correct as a matter of
policy or does the policy need to be reviewed?
Answer. In my judgment, participation in pro bono activities and
professional legal associations contributes in a meaningful way to the
continued professional development of the Federal legal workforce, and,
if confirmed, I would encourage DOD attorneys to participate in pro
bono activities consistent with the law. To my knowledge, the present
limits on pro bono activities are appropriate. I understand that my
predecessor issued a pro bono policy. If confirmed, I am prepared to
review that policy to ensure it meets the current needs of DOD and the
attorneys who wish to contribute their services.
As you may know, two Federal statutes prohibit (with only minor
exceptions) Federal personnel from representing clients before the
Federal Government, including the Federal courts. That said, I am aware
that there are a number of opportunities for DOD attorneys to
participate in a variety of pro bono activities, including drafting
wills and representing clients in domestic violence cases, landlord/
tenant disputes, and personal injury cases, when those matters are
before state rather than Federal courts.
Question. In your view, do the laws, regulations and guidelines
that establish the rules of professional responsibility for attorneys
in the Department of Defense provide adequate guidance?
Answer. To my knowledge, the laws, regulations, and guidelines that
establish rules of professional responsibility for DOD attorneys are
appropriate. If confirmed, I am prepared to examine the adequacy of the
professional responsibility rules for attorneys in the DOD Office of
General Counsel and the Defense Legal Services Agency, and make
appropriate modifications or issue supplemental guidance if warranted.
law of the sea
Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.
What are your views whether or not the United States should accede
to UNCLOS?
Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention,
and I know that the administration including Secretary Hagel strongly
supports accession. Although we have succeeded to date in preserving
and protecting our navigational freedoms through reliance on customary
international law, joining the Convention would place our national
security on a firmer legal footing. Customary international law changes
over time, subject to state practice. Treaty law remains the firmest
legal foundation upon which to base our global presence.
Question. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as
the legal advantages and disadvantages of the United States being a
party to UNCLOS?
Answer. I agree with Secretary Hagel that becoming a party to the
Law of the Sea Convention would enhance the U.S. security posture
around the globe in several significant ways. First, accession would
enable the United States to reinforce all of the rights, freedoms, and
uses of the sea and airspace codified in the Convention, including the
navigational and over-flight rights that are critical to the global
mobility of U.S. forces, as well as the right to submit extended
continental shelf claims that would help us preserve the rights to
potential resources. Additionally, accession would help the United
States promote a common rules-based approach in the resolution of
territorial and maritime disputes, particularly in East Asia, thereby
reducing international tension. Further, accession would add to the
Department's credibility in a large number of multilateral venues where
Law of the Sea matters are often discussed. Lastly, accession would
reassure some nations that have expressed concerns over the legality of
cooperative security efforts promoted by the United States, such as the
Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States has longstanding
interests in freedom of the seas and respect for international law, and
our accession to the Convention would further demonstrate our
commitment to those national interests.
I do not see national security disadvantages of being a party to
the Convention. Although some have suggested that the treaty could
subject our maritime forces to the jurisdiction of international
tribunals, the Convention expressly permits a party to exclude from
international dispute settlement those matters that concern ``military
activities.'' Thus, the United States could assert the exclusive right
to determine what constitutes a military activity.
Question. In your view, is customary international law alone
sufficient to safeguard U.S. navigational and overflight rights and
freedoms worldwide?
Answer. As noted above, accession would enable the United States to
reinforce all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace
codified in the Convention, including the navigational and over-flight
rights that are critical to the global mobility of U.S. forces.
Although we have succeeded to date in preserving and protecting our
navigational freedoms through reliance on customary international law,
joining the Convention would place our national security on a firmer
legal footing. Customary international law changes over time, subject
to state practice. Treaty law remains the firmest legal foundation upon
which to base our global presence.
processing the annual department of defense legislative request
Question. One of the current responsibilities of the General
Counsel of the Department of Defense is to coordinate the Department's
legislative program and to provide the Department's views on
legislative proposals initiated from outside the Department.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the
Department's legislative proposals are submitted in a timely manner to
ensure ample opportunity for consideration by Congress before markup of
the annual National Defense Authorization Act?
Answer. I understand that the Office of General Counsel and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
have worked, and continue to work, closely together on improvements to
the Department's Legislative Program--in consultation with the Office
of Management and Budget--to transmit the Department's legislative
proposals to Congress in a timely manner. If confirmed, I will monitor
these efforts and look for any ways in which the process can be
improved.
Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
Congress receives the Department's views on other proposed legislation
in a timely manner?
Answer. I understand that the Office of General Counsel has worked
closely with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs and the Office of Management and Budget to respond
to request for views on congressional bills expeditiously. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department provides Congress
with timely views on proposed legislation.
judicial review
Question. What is your understanding of the appropriate role of the
Article III courts in the review of military activities?
Answer. Judicial review of ongoing military operations would pose
difficult constitutional and practical difficulties. Many of the
military's other activities are appropriately subject to judicial
review, though the courts often exercise ``a healthy deference to
legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs.''
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981).
role in the officer promotion and confirmation process
Question. In your view, what is the role of the General Counsel of
the Department of Defense in ensuring the integrity and proper
functioning of the officer promotion process?
Answer. It is essential that the integrity and independence of the
promotion selection process be maintained. Based on my prior service at
the Department of Defense, I know that the Secretary of each military
department, in consultation with his or her General Counsel and Judge
Advocate General, has the initial responsibility to ensure that the
promotion selection process for both Regular and Reserve officers is in
compliance with law and DOD policy. However, I am also aware that all
reports of promotion selection boards are reviewed by the DOD Office of
General Counsel prior to final action on the report by the Secretary of
Defense or the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
If confirmed and I were to determine that a promotion selection
board failed to conform to law or policy, it would be my duty to inform
the Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness of the irregularities and to recommend appropriate
corrective action. Further, in providing advice to the Secretary of
Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
I would ensure that officer promotion policies promulgated in DOD
regulations fairly and accurately reflect the law.
Question. What is the role of the General Counsel of the Department
of Defense, if any, in reviewing and providing potentially adverse
information pertaining to a nomination to the Senate Armed Services
Committee?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD Office of General
Counsel reviews all nomination packages pertaining to officers with
attributed adverse information before the package is forwarded to the
Secretary of Defense for approval. The General Counsel ensures that any
adverse information attributed to such officers is supported by
evidence in the associated reports of investigation. I am informed that
the General Counsel frequently provides specific advice to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretary of
Defense concerning difficult or unusual cases.
litigation involving the department of defense
Question. In your opinion, what is the relationship between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Justice with respect to
litigation involving the Department of Defense?
Answer. Although the Department of Justice has statutory
responsibility to represent the United States, its agencies, and its
officers, including the Department of Defense, in all litigation
matters, Department of Defense attorneys often work directly with
counsel at the Department of Justice in cases in which DOD, or one or
more of its components or officials, is a party or has an interest.
Question. In your view, does the Department need more independence
and resources to conduct its own litigation or to improve upon its
current supporting role?
Answer. At this time, I am not aware that any changes are needed.
My understanding is that the Department's lawyers have exceptionally
strong relationships with their counterparts at the Department of
Justice, and that the current arrangement serves the Department well.
court of appeals decision
Question. On January 4, 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit decided the case of National Center for
Manufacturing Sciences v. Department of Defense, 199 F. 3d 507 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). The court concluded that ``Because of the existence of
title 10 U.S.C. section 114, it is clear that any monies appropriated
for NCMS by Congress for research must be authorized before they can be
appropriated and distributed''; and ``Because title 10 U.S.C. section
114(a)(2) requires authorization of these funds before they become
available, appropriation alone is insufficient.''
What is your view of the court's decision in this case and its
implications regarding the obligation of funds that are appropriated,
but not authorized?
Answer. I am aware of the concerns about whether funds can be
utilized that are appropriated but not authorized. In this regard,
situations where funds have been appropriated but not authorized are
often complex and may involve unique statutory language. The Department
has always been sensitive to the concerns that exist whenever the
amounts appropriated may exceed the amounts authorized and, even before
the 2000 decision cited in the question, has worked closely with the
authorizing and appropriating committees when such situations arise. If
confirmed, I hope and expect that the Department, and the DOD General
Counsel, will continue its practice of working closely with our
oversight committees whenever this situation appears to be presented.
role in military personnel policy matters
Question. What role, if any, should the General Counsel play in
military personnel policy and individual cases, including cases before
the service boards for the correction of military records?
Answer. The potential range of issues that might require legal
advice from the Office of General Counsel is very broad. The Office of
General Counsel provides legal advice on policy issues pertaining to
military personnel, working closely with the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, which has
responsibility for Department policy for the correction boards of the
military departments. The Office of General Counsel performs a pre-
publication legal sufficiency review of every DOD policy issuance
pertaining to military personnel.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
new law of war manual
1. Senator Levin. Mr. Preston, is there a consensus among the
senior military lawyers of the four Services that the new Law of War
manual, as it has been rewritten, accurately and adequately reflects
the law governing U.S. Armed Forces?
Mr. Preston. I have been informed that the draft DOD Law of War
manual is still in the final revision process. My understanding is that
senior military lawyers of the four Services are helping to revise it
and are integral to the review process, and that they will continue to
be actively involved until the manual is completed and ready for
publication. If confirmed, I intend to consult with the senior military
lawyers in this regard.
______

Question Submitted by Senators Carl Levin and Mark Udall
detention and interrogation issues
2. Senator Levin and Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, on June 27, 2013,
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) submitted its formal response to
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's (SSCI) Study of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. What was your role in the review
and approval of the CIA response to the SSCI's study?
Mr. Preston. My role with respect to the Agency's response to the
SSCI's study is perhaps best understood in the context of my broader
role as General Counsel of the CIA. For the past 4-plus years, my
highest priority as General Counsel has been working to ensure that the
Agency is and remains in full compliance with all applicable law in the
conduct of intelligence activities, with particular attention to
ongoing counterterrorism programs. With respect to the former detention
and interrogation program, which was ended by Executive Order prior to
my arrival, the primary focus of the Office of General Counsel during
my tenure has been on supporting the work of the Department of Justice
and the SSCI in their respective reviews of the former detention and
interrogation program, with particular emphasis on the document
production process, as well as supporting the U.S. Government's efforts
to criminally prosecute terrorist detainees.
The preparation of Agency comments following receipt of the SSCI
report was undertaken at the direction of the then-Acting Director and
performed by a team of senior career officers. The product of their
work was ultimately submitted to the Director, via the Deputy Director,
for approval. My involvement in this process was limited. I did not
personally participate in the team's formulation of substantive
comments, nor did I independently review the factual basis for their
findings and conclusions. I reviewed the comments, with particular
attention to the recommendations, and made suggestions, chiefly as to
presentation, in hopes of enhancing the utility of the comments, to the
agency and the committee, in the discussion between them that would
follow. My role was principally one of advising the Director and the
Deputy Director as they considered how best to engage with the
committee in light of its report and, of critical importance, how to
improve the Agency's conduct and oversight of other sensitive programs
going forward.

3. Senator Levin and Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, on November 20,
2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report titled,
Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody. Have you
reviewed this report?
Mr. Preston. I reviewed portions of the referenced report in 2009,
prior to my appointment as General Counsel of the CIA.

4. Senator Levin and Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, do you disagree
with any of the report's conclusions? If so, which ones and why?
Mr. Preston. I do not recall having any disagreement with the
report's conclusions. I should point out that I am not sufficiently
familiar with the facts or record underlying the report to offer a
personal view on factual propositions. As I recall, a central focus of
the report is on the U.S. Government's reliance on Survival, Evasion,
Resistance, and Escape (SERE) techniques in deriving interrogation
techniques that were used on detainees. While I have no expertise in
SERE training or methods of interrogation, it is my firm view that the
fact that certain techniques have been used to train servicemembers in
withstanding abusive treatment if captured is not indicative of the
effectiveness of those techniques in obtaining information from
detainees, nor does it say anything about the lawfulness or propriety
of using such techniques to interrogate detainees.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
bonuses paid to senior executive service employees of the department of
defense
5. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Preston, if confirmed, will you commit to
reviewing and changing, if necessary, the metrics used to determine the
performance level of Senior Executive Service (SES) employees in the
Office of General Counsel and provide information to this committee
regarding the progress and results of your review?
Mr. Preston. As General Counsel of the Department of the Navy and
the Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense, I
worked closely with the SES level attorneys in the DOD Office of
General Counsel. I was impressed by their uniform professional
excellence, selfless dedication, and commitment to the rule of law. My
view of the outstanding performance of these SES level attorneys has
been strengthened during my service as the CIA General Counsel. In a
period of furloughs, pay freezes, and hiring freezes, it is unlikely
that funds will be available to pay bonuses, increasing the challenge
of keeping the Office of General Counsel staffed with superb lawyers.
Nonetheless, if confirmed, I will review the criteria used to evaluate
the performance of SES level attorneys in the Office of General Counsel
and report the results of that review as you request. If I determine
that changes are necessary, I will implement them.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
law of war manual
6. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, it is my understanding that in 1995,
DOD decided to prepare a single, department-wide manual on the Law of
War. This was designed to be an authoritative, peer-reviewed statement
of the Law of War as recognized by the United States, based on both
treaty obligations and state practice. I also understand that a Law of
War Working Group, consisting of experts from the Services and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of the General Counsel
was formed in 1996 and charged with drafting the new manual. There were
experts from the State Department and law of war experts from a number
of other countries that provided input and advice during the drafting
process. The Department of Justice (DOJ) was invited to join the
process, but declined. I also understand that in 2009, a 1000 page
draft underwent international peer review by senior military law
experts from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
(U.K.) as well as experts from academic institutions in the United
States and the U.K. I also understand that in 2010, when the draft
manual was in the final stages, the DOJ intervened and requested an
opportunity to review the draft--despite having declined to participate
earlier. I also understand that despite commitments made to the DOD
General Counsel that the DOJ review would be limited to substantive
issues and would be conducted within a month, the DOJ review has yet to
be completed. I also have received information indicating that the
changes proposed by DOJ to date have been at odds with the tenets and
principles of the Law of War reflected in the peer-reviewed draft of
2010, to the point that it seems unlikely that the current draft as
changed would be able to gain consensus as an authoritative statement
of the Law of War either within DOD or more broadly. If confirmed, will
you commit to providing the committee as soon as possible information
detailing the current status of the draft Manual?
Mr. Preston. If confirmed, I will inquire into the current status
of the draft DOD Law of War manual and provide the committee
information detailing its status as soon as possible. As I noted in
response to an earlier question, it is my understanding that the Law of
War manual is undergoing internal review, and that that senior military
lawyers of the four Services are helping to revise it and are integral
to the review process, and that they will continue to be actively
involved until the manual is completed and ready for publication.

7. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, if confirmed, will you commit to
providing the committee in written form your independent assessment of
whether the background summary above is accurate, and, if you conclude
that some or all of the information above is inaccurate or incomplete,
to advising the committee in detail about which information is
inaccurate or incomplete, and what the correct information is?
Mr. Preston. If confirmed, I will inquire into the current status
of the draft DOD Law of War manual and provide the committee
information detailing its status as soon as possible. As I noted in
response to an earlier question, it is my understanding that the Law of
War manual is undergoing internal review, and that that senior military
lawyers of the four Services are helping to revise it and are integral
to the review process, and that they will continue to be actively
involved until the manual is completed and ready for publication.

8. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, if confirmed, will you commit to
taking such steps as may be necessary to ensure that content and form
of the draft Manual is such that it is suitable both as a peer-
reviewed, authoritative statement of the Law of War as accepted by the
United States, and as a practical guide, incorporating historical
examples, for Law of War practitioners, especially those deployed with
U.S. operational forces?
Mr. Preston. If confirmed, I will take such steps within my power
as may be necessary to ensure that the content and form of the draft
DOD Law of War manual reflects input from peer reviewers and is
suitable both as an authoritative statement of the Law of War as
accepted by the United States, and as a practical guide for Law of War
practitioners, especially those deployed with U.S. operational forces.
Historical examples should inform and illustrate the manual as
appropriate.

study on detention and interrogation program
9. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, having reviewed the SSCI's study and
participated in the CIA's response, do you believe that DOJ was always
provided accurate information about the CIA's detention and
interrogation program? If not, do you believe that any inaccurate
information was material to DOJ's legal analysis?
Mr. Preston. My understanding is that DOJ did not always have
accurate information about the detention and interrogation program in
that the actual conduct of that program was not always consistent with
the way the program had been described to DOJ. Of particular note, I
understand that, in a number of instances, enhanced interrogation
techniques, specifically waterboarding, were applied substantially more
frequently than previously had been described to DOJ. I cannot say what
DOJ would or would not have considered material at the time. I can tell
you that, if I were in a comparable situation, I would consider
information of this nature to be material.
While I have been General Counsel of the CIA, the relationship
between the Agency and DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has been
characterized by frequent and candid communication concerning the
Agency's sensitive programs, with particular attention to ensuring that
the OLC is provided complete and accurate information on which to base
its legal advice to the Agency. In addition, the Agency is developing
an internal mechanism for periodically and systematically reviewing OLC
opinions regarding sensitive programs to ensure that OLC is informed of
any material changes in facts or circumstances.

covert action/secret military operations
10. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, in your response to my questions
about the difference between covert action and secret military
operations, you noted that you had not yet ``wrestled with how one
would advise the U.S. military on the precise parameters of that
concept, and the precise concept of attribution in the military
context.'' I'd like to give you another opportunity to answer my set of
questions, which I'll list again here: In your view, when does a secret
military operation meet the statutory definition of covert action and
require a finding, and when does it not?
Mr. Preston. While as CIA General Counsel I have not been called
upon to advise with respect to the conduct of military operations, I
would consider a secret military operation to meet the statutory
definition of covert action: (a) if it were ``an activity or activities
of the U.S. Government to influence political, economic, or military
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the U.S.
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly,'' and (b) if
such activity did not fall under one of the four statutory exceptions:

(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire
intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional
activities to improve or maintain the operational security of U.S.
Government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine
support to such activities;
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by U.S.
Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such
activities; or
(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities
(other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of
other U.S. Government agencies abroad.

It is my understanding that the Department of Defense conducts
activities that fall under each of those four exceptions. Whether a
particular secret military operation falls within one of the statutory
exceptions to the definition of covert action or, absent attribution,
would constitute covert action that must be authorized by the President
under a Finding requires a fact-specific analysis, informed by
historical military practice and precedent. If confirmed, I look
forward to examining these matters with great care and attention.

11. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, if the military refuses to answer
the public's questions about a reported operation, does it become a
covert action? If not, what is the basis for that denial? As an
example, why are unacknowledged 1208 assistance programs not covert
action?
Mr. Preston. The fact that certain information regarding a military
operation is not discussed publicly does not necessarily mean that the
operation constitutes covert action. As defined by the statute, covert
action is an activity or activities to ``influence political, economic,
or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of
the U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly,''
subject to specific exceptions. Thus, for example, military operations
that are traditional intelligence, counterintelligence, or military
activities and routine support to such activities are excepted from the
statutory definition of covert action. Further, my understanding is
that a particular secret military operation conducted in the context of
broader campaigns that are publicly known is not regarded as covert
action, which by definition must be neither ``apparent'' nor
``acknowledged publicly''.
While I am not familiar with programs under section 1208, I
understand that certain aspects of the support provided under the
authority of section 1208 are classified to protect the operation and
the personnel involved. I am further advised that support provided
under the authority of section 1208 to operations by U.S. Special
Operations Forces to combat terrorism is not considered covert action
because it is explicitly authorized by Congress and because it falls
within the exception to section 503 of the National Security Act for a
``traditional military activity.'' I also understand that the
Department of Defense fully informs Congress about activities under the
authority of section 1208, in accordance with the reporting
requirements of that section.
If confirmed, I expect to examine these matters with great care and
attention.

12. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, under what circumstances can a
secret military program, as distinct from a particular technical
operation, be briefed only to the chairman and ranking member?
Mr. Preston. It is my understanding that in the context of special
access programs (SAPs) of the Department of Defense, there is a narrow
set of circumstances under which the Secretary of Defense may determine
that certain very sensitive information be reported only to the
chairman and the ranking member of the congressional defense
committees. Section 119 of title 10, U.S.C., ensures congressional
oversight of DOD SAPs by requiring, inter alia, annual reports to the
congressional defense committees on each SAP, as well as reports on
initiation and termination of individual SAPs. In addition, section
119(e) provides that, only on a ``case-by-case basis,'' the Secretary
of Defense may waive a SAP reporting requirement, if the Secretary
determines that the inclusion of the required information ``would
adversely affect the national security.'' If the Secretary exercises
this authority, the Secretary must provide the omitted information and
the justification for the waiver, jointly to the chairman and ranking
member of each of the defense committees. The congressional defense
committees that receive these reports (including those whose chairman
and ranking member receive the ``waived'' SAP information) are the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the
Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations,
and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives.
In the event that a secret military program consisted of activities
to be conducted pursuant to a Presidential Finding authorizing covert
action, then the congressional reporting requirements in section 503 of
the National Security Act would apply.

authority for use of military force/law of armed conflict
13. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, under what circumstances, if any,
can military operations be initiated outside a declared war zone
without the concurrence of the President, the Secretary of Defense, or
the U.S. chief of mission in the country?
Mr. Preston. The President and the Secretary of Defense are at the
top of the military chain of command and have full authority for
direction and control of military operations. I understand that, in
circumstances such as sudden attack or disaster, theater military
commanders have certain delegated authority to initiate appropriate
military responses as necessary to save lives and protect the forces
under their command. All such operations remain subject to the
direction and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense.
Chiefs of mission are not in the military chain of command. I
understand that, in some circumstances, the President or the Secretary
of Defense has approved military operations on the condition that, if
the chief of mission expresses disagreement with an activity, the
theater military commander will resolve the disagreement or seek
further guidance from the Secretary of Defense before proceeding with
the activity. This ensures that the views of chiefs of mission
regarding potential military operations outside a war zone are fully
considered while also preserving the military chain of command.

14. Senator Udall. Mr. Preston, in your advance questions for the
committee, you stated that ``If there were no 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force, the President would have authority as Commander-
in-Chief and Chief Executive to order military action against al Qaeda
and associated forces if necessary to protect an important national
interest, as with an imminent threat of violent attack.''
Please elaborate on your statement regarding the President's
authority to order military operations outside any Authorized for the
Use of Force (AUMF) to ``protect an important national interest.'' Do
you view this authority as broader than imminent threat?
Mr. Preston. In my response, I noted imminent threat in particular
as it would be the probable basis for ordering action against al Qaeda
or in the broader counterterrorism context. I am aware of opinions of
the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, that address the
President's authority to order certain military operations without the
prior, express authorization of Congress. Most recently, the April 2011
opinion regarding Authority to Use Military Force in Libya stated that
the Office of Legal Counsel has identified a variety of national
interests that, alone or in combination, may justify use of military
force by the President. I understand that an ``imminent threat'' is one
possible circumstance in which it might be lawful and appropriate for
the President to order military operations without prior congressional
authorization, but that imminent threat is not the only circumstance
when this may be appropriate. I also note that there are important
limitations on the scope and duration of military operations that the
President may order in the absence of congressional authorization.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
sexual assault in the military
15. Senator Manchin. Mr. Preston, DOD is adamantly opposed to
taking sexual assault cases out of the chain of command. If confirmed,
your advice to the Secretary of Defense on this matter will be very
important. Sexual assault is not a new challenge to the military. You
are familiar with this because you served as the Navy's general counsel
in the late 1990s. How has your experience with the Navy shaped your
views on the role of the chain of command in sexual assault cases?
Mr. Preston. My prior experience as General Counsel of the
Department of the Navy and as the Principal Deputy General Counsel of
the Department of Defense enhances my understanding of the importance
of the chain of command to a military organization and the historical
integration of the military justice system into the command structure.
However, I have not prejudged the optimal role of the commander in the
process of adjudicating sexual assault allegations in the military. I
am aware that the Response Systems Panel established under section 576
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 is
tasked with providing the Secretary of Defense and Congress with an
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the military's systems to
respond to sexual assaults. The Panel's work will include an assessment
of the roles and effectiveness of commanders at all levels. If
confirmed, I will consider with an open mind the appropriate role of
the chain of command in sexual assault cases and provide my best advice
to the Secretary.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
authorization for use of military force
16. Senator Kaine. Mr. Preston, what is your understanding of the
scope, duration, and limitations of the 2001 AUMF?
Mr. Preston. The 2001 AUMF encompasses those who are part of, or
substantially support, al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces.
Courts and Congress, in the context of detention, have endorsed the
Executive branch view that the AUMF applies to associated forces that
have joined the fight with al Qaeda and against the United States. My
understanding of the concept of associated forces is that it is narrow,
reaching only forces of an organized, armed group that has entered the
fight alongside al Qaeda and a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
With respect to geographic limitations, the enemy in this conflict
has not confined itself to any one country. The AUMF does not restrict
the use military of force against al Qaeda to areas of active
hostilities such as Afghanistan. Moreover, the United States can,
consistent with international law, prosecute the armed conflict with al
Qaeda outside such areas. U.S. military operations are conducted
consistent with international law and with respect for another State's
sovereignty. With reference to the use of force in counterterrorism
operations outside the United States and areas of active hostilities,
U.S. military operations are also subject to the policy standards and
procedures announced in May of this year.
The President has said that our systematic effort to dismantle
terrorist organizations must continue, but that the war against al
Qaeda, like all wars, must end. The President has also invited
engagement with Congress on the future of the AUMF. As for the duration
of the conflict with al Qaeda and continuing authority to counter
terrorist threats post conflict, I believe our system works best when
there is agreement between the two political branches on how the Nation
should proceed. If confirmed, I hope to play a constructive role in
that process.

17. Senator Kaine. Mr. Preston, is there a need for AUMF reform
now, given combat forces are being withdrawn from Afghanistan?
Mr. Preston. Although there will come a point when al Qaeda, the
Taliban, and associated forces have been so degraded and dismantled
that the United States is no longer be in an ongoing armed conflict,
the end of the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan will not necessarily
mark that point. However, it does draw attention to the duration of the
conflict with al Qaeda and continuing authority to counter terrorist
threats post conflict. The President has invited engagement with
Congress on the future of the AUMF. If confirmed, I look forward to
participating in that discussion.

18. Senator Kaine. Mr. Preston, does the President have the
authority needed to conduct operations ongoing anywhere else in the
world and, if not, should he come to Congress to get such an authority
on a case-by-case basis?
Mr. Preston. It is the considered view of the Department of Defense
that the President has adequate authority to conduct military
operations against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.
Consistent with the AUMF, the authority to use military force against
al Qaeda is not restricted geographically to ``hot'' battlefields like
Afghanistan. Indeed, as outlined in the President's recent War Powers
reports to Congress, such military operations have been conducted in
Yemen and Somalia, in addition to Afghanistan. My understanding is that
the existing authorities are believed to be adequate and appropriate
for military operations to counter the current and immediately
foreseeable threat. Although the President has the authority to respond
as necessary to new threats, I believe the President would consult with
Congress to determine if additional authority is appropriate.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
international law
19. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, if a proposed action by DOD is
fully in compliance with U.S. law but there is a question of whether
the proposed action is permitted under international law, customary
international law, or international law principles, does this ambiguity
affect or negate the ability of DOD to carry out the proposed action?
Mr. Preston. My understanding is that the United States complies
with all applicable international law when it uses military force in a
foreign country. Any question in this regard should be resolved if at
all possible, and any remaining ambiguity should be brought to the
attention of the decisionmaker. If confirmed, I would work closely with
my colleagues, including the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and counsel for the other national security agencies,
to ensure that U.S. military operations abroad comply with both U.S.
domestic and applicable international law.

authorized for the use of force
20. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, does the AUMF apply to groups
which formed after the events of September 11, 2001?
Mr. Preston. The AUMF applies to ``those nations, organizations or
persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons.''
A group that formed after the events of September 11, 2001, may be
within the scope of the AUMF if the group is an organized, armed group
that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda and it is a co-
belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners. The Executive branch refers to such groups as
``associated forces'' of al Qaeda, and this interpretation of the AUMF
to reach ``associated forces'' has been supported by the courts and
Congress.

21. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, does the AUMF only apply to those
groups which only believe in al Qaeda's ideology?
Mr. Preston. The AUMF applies to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces. The AUMF does not apply to groups solely because
they are ideologically aligned with al Qaeda. Instead, to be an
associated force, the group must be an organized, armed group that has
entered the fight alongside al Qaeda and a co-belligerent with al Qaeda
in hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners.

22. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, does the AUMF apply to groups
which support al Qaeda's ideology and have taken violent action, but
not against the United States, and the group has not received tangible
support from al Qaeda?
Mr. Preston. The determination of whether a group is an associated
force turns on whether the group has entered the fight alongside al
Qaeda and is engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners. Such a determination is necessarily dependent on
specific facts and circumstances.

23. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, do you foresee a time in which the
administration will support modifying the AUMF?
Mr. Preston. In his recent speech at National Defense University,
the President invited engagement with Congress in efforts to refine,
and ultimately repeal, the AUMF.

guantanamo bay detainees
24. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, if we were to close Guantanamo Bay
and transfer the detainees to the United States for trial in civilian
court would we not have to provide Miranda rights advice and warnings
to the detainees thereby greatly reducing our ability to collect
intelligence from them?
Mr. Preston. While I have not focused on this issue in the
performance of my current duties, my understanding is as follows.
Transferring detainees to the United States for prosecution would not
be expected to reduce our ability to collect valuable intelligence.
Most of the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay have been in U.S. custody
for at least 10 years, so there has already been significant
opportunity for intelligence collection. There is also no requirement
to provide Miranda warnings prior to intelligence questioning if
statements derived from that questioning are not used in a criminal
proceeding. Furthermore, a long and growing list of terrorism suspects
who have been prosecuted in our Federal courts--to include Najibullah
Zazi, Faisal Shahzad, David Headley, and Umar Faruq Abdulmutallab--have
provided extremely valuable intelligence while they were held by law
enforcement before trial. The prospect of a long prison sentence has
led many hardened terrorists to cooperate with our intelligence
professionals.

new counterterrorism procedures
25. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, during the Vietnam war some
criticized the layers of bureaucracy which obstructed the timely
authorization for an attack on legitimate military targets. In the
current conflict, as in the Vietnam war, targets of opportunity can
come and go in a moment's notice. Therefore, won't the new procedures
articulated in the administration's Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards
and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations
Outside the United States and Areas if Active Hostilities, complicate
and add to the length of time required to target an overseas, non-U.S.
citizen member of al Qaeda?
Mr. Preston. I agree that agility and timeliness are important
attributes in a decisionmaking process for approving military targets
and authorizing military action against such targets. My understanding
is that the policy standards and procedures announced in May of this
year were developed in close consultation with the departments and
agencies with national security responsibilities, including
specifically civilian and military leaders responsible for military
operations abroad, and with the objective of having a decisionmaking
process that would be practically workable and yield timely decisions.
In addition, the policy standards and procedures include a reservation
by the President permitting action to be taken in extraordinary
circumstances.

26. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, will these additional layers of
bureaucracy not lead to targets of opportunity being missed?
Mr. Preston. As noted, the policy standards and procedures were
developed with the objective of having a decisionmaking process that
would be practically workable and yield timely decisions. In addition,
risk in this regard should be mitigated by the reservation by the
President permitting a departure from otherwise applicable standards
and procedures in extraordinary circumstances.

27. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, do these policies unnecessarily
obstruct our ability to fight the war?
Mr. Preston. As noted, the policy standards and procedures were
developed in close consultation with the departments and agencies with
national security responsibilities, including specifically civilian and
military leaders responsible for military operations abroad. I would
defer to those leaders on this question, and I do not believe the
policy would have been adopted if those leaders believed it would
unnecessarily obstruct our ability to fight the war.

28. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Preston, it appears the administration has
implemented special procedures to address its concerns that U.S.
citizens who are members of al Qaeda or its affiliates should still be
afforded a level of due process review before lethal force is taken
pursuant to the AUMF of 2001. These procedures were outlined by
Attorney General Eric Holder in his address at Northwestern Law School
in 2012. Though this appears to be a sensible approach regarding U.S.
citizens, it now appears, as articulated in President Obama's May 2013
speech, that the administration will use a similar review before
targeting terrorists who are non-U.S. citizens and are located outside
areas of active hostilities. Does this create a situation in which
overseas terrorists are provided with similar constitutional
protections as overseas U.S. citizens who have taken up arms against
their own country?
Mr. Preston. In his recent speech at National Defense University,
the President noted that the targeting of a U.S. citizen raises
constitutional issues that are not present in other actions. The
President also described a threshold for taking lethal action outside
areas of active hostilities that applies regardless of whether the
terrorist target is a U.S. citizen. I understand that this threshold--
and the rest of the policy standards and procedures announced at the
time of the President's speech--have been instituted as a matter of
policy. To the best of my knowledge, neither the threshold, nor the
other standards and procedures constitutes or reflects any legal
judgment or intent to extend Due Process or any other rights to foreign
nationals abroad.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
drone policy
29. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Preston, based on your current role as
General Counsel for the CIA, from a perspective of how best to protect
our country and go after those who want to kill Americans, what are the
advantages and disadvantages of shifting most or all drone attacks from
the CIA to DOD?
Mr. Preston. With reference to this question and the two questions
that follow, I could not comment in this setting on any intelligence
activities.
I understand that attacking America's enemies in armed conflict is
a traditional competency of the U.S. military and that the U.S.
military has extensive experience in the use of remotely piloted
aircraft to conduct attacks during armed conflict. The appropriate role
of the Department of Defense in operating remotely piloted aircraft,
weighing advantages and disadvantages, is essentially a policy decision
for the President to make. If confirmed, my focus with respect to
military operations using remotely piloted aircraft will be on the
legal basis for such operations and compliance with applicable law in
conducting such operations.

30. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Preston, will drone attacks operated by DOD
confront more legal constraints?
Mr. Preston. The use of military force against the Nation's
enemies, whether by remotely piloted aircraft or other means, is
subject to the Constitution and U.S. laws, to the law of war, and to
the direction and control of the President and the Secretary of
Defense. I am aware that the U.S. military uses remotely piloted
aircraft to attack terrorists consistent with all applicable law and,
if confirmed, I would review such operations for compliance with all
applicable law.

31. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Preston, will fewer drone attacks be
conducted because of additional legal constraints?
Mr. Preston. The number of attacks by the U.S. military, whether
using remotely piloted aircraft or by other means, depends on a variety
of factors, circumstances and judgments, such that it would be
difficult to isolate the impact, if any, of legal constraints on that
number.

detainee policy
32. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Preston, President Obama has sought to
close Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay and has refused to put new
detainees there, despite the repeated testimony of our military leaders
that a designated detention facility for the long-term detention and
interrogation of foreign terrorists would be very helpful. This refusal
has put our military leaders in a difficult and dangerous situation.
The lack of a designated long-term detention facility has forced our
military to use sub-standard, ad-hoc workarounds as they did in the
case of Abdul Kadir Warsame. If we captured Ayman al Zawahiri tonight,
can you tell me where we would detain him for long-term Law of War
detention and interrogation?
Mr. Preston. First a determination would have to be made as to
whether or not he should be held in military custody for interrogation.
Eventually, a determination would have to be made as to disposition,
whether it be prosecution in Federal court, trial by military
commission or law of war detention long term. The appropriate place of
detention would depend on those determinations. At the President's
direction, the Department is in the process of identifying a secure
facility in the United States for holding military commissions. There
is also an outstanding indictment against al Zawahiri.

33. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Preston, in your opinion, are the detainees
held at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay being treated in a professional
and humane manner, which is compliant with U.S. law?
Mr. Preston. In 2009, a review was conducted to ensure that the
treatment of Guantanamo detainees fully complied with U.S. domestic and
international law. My understanding is that that review found that the
detainees were being treated in a professional and humane manner that
was fully consistent with all applicable law. To the best of my
knowledge, that remains the case today.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
national security agency
34. Senator Lee. Mr. Preston, the National Security Agency (NSA) is
under the jurisdiction of DOD. As the General Counsel for DOD, you will
have a large amount of influence over the programs at NSA that have
recently been in the news for collecting metadata on millions of
Americans in large databases. I am concerned that this information
might be used for purposes not originally contemplated when the
databases were created, not necessarily by this administration but in
the future, which may endanger the liberties of Americans. Do you
believe that at some point the collection and aggregation of metadata
implicates constitutional concerns?
Mr. Preston. Whether or at what point the collection and
aggregation of metadata regarding U.S. persons by the U.S. Government
implicates constitutional concerns is a question of great importance
and complexity. While the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland
is cited for the proposition that there is no protected privacy
interest in business records of this sort, I understand that some may
have doubts about the applicability of that decision in this context.
If confirmed, I expect to play an active role in any further
consideration of this issue, together with the appropriate attorneys at
the Department of Justice.

35. Senator Lee. Mr. Preston, what limiting practices do you
believe should guide the Government in determining the types and amount
of information it can collect about Americans?
Mr. Preston. Current law and policy strike a balance between
protecting the national security of our country and protecting the
constitutional rights of our citizens, and it is imperative that the
intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, particularly any
collection of information about U.S. persons, strictly adhere to all
applicable prohibitions and limitations aimed at safeguarding privacy
and civil liberties. Executive Order (EO) 12333, as amended, directs
U.S. Government departments and agencies to use all means, consistent
with applicable Federal law and this order, and with full consideration
of the rights of U.S. persons, to obtain reliable intelligence
information to protect the United States and its interests. EO 12333
provides that ``[t]he U.S. Government has a solemn obligation, and
shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this
order, to protect fully the legal rights of all U.S. persons, including
freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal
law.'' Intelligence Community elements are authorized to collect,
retain, or disseminate information concerning U.S. persons only in
accordance with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence
Community element concerned or by the head of a department containing
such element and approved by the Attorney General. Intelligence
Community elements are required to use the least intrusive collection
techniques feasible within the United States or directed against U.S.
persons abroad. Such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented
physical searches, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or
monitoring devices may be used only in accordance with procedures
established by the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned
or the head of a department containing such element and approved by the
Attorney General, after consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other
legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental
purposes.
The Department of Defense has implemented EO 12333 in procedures
approved by the Attorney General. The purpose of these procedures is to
enable the DOD intelligence components to accomplish their missions
effectively while protecting the constitutional rights and privacy of
U.S. persons. The DOD intelligence components may collect information
that identifies a U.S. person only if it is necessary to conduct a
function assigned to the collecting component and only if the
information falls within a specified category (e.g., the information is
obtained with the consent of the U.S. person concerned, is publicly
available, or is foreign intelligence or counterintelligence).

drones
36. Senator Lee. Mr. Preston, do you believe that the Constitution
allows for the U.S. Government to target an American citizen on foreign
soil with a drone if they are suspected of engaging in terrorist
activity and are perceived to be an imminent threat?
Mr. Preston. Citizenship does not confer immunity on one who takes
up arms against our country. However, it is critically important to
respect the constitutional rights of American citizens, even those who
may be plotting against the United States. The requirements of Due
Process and the circumstances in which the U.S. Government could
lawfully target an enemy belligerent/terrorist operator known to be a
U.S. person--whether using a remotely piloted aircraft or by other
means--were outlined in the speech by the Attorney General in March of
last year and are discussed in some detail in the Department of Justice
white paper that has been released. In addition, the policy standards
and procedures announced in May of this year require that if the United
States considers an operation against a terrorist identified as a U.S.
person, the Department of Justice will conduct an additional legal
analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted against the
individual consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.

37. Senator Lee. Mr. Preston, how do you define imminent threat?
Mr. Preston. Imminent threat is a concept long known in the law and
in practice as relates to the use of military force, but also a concept
that has evolved with the emergence of non-state actors planning and
executing terrorist attacks with tactics foreign to conventional
warfare. This is not the adversary of old, amassing forces on the
border, with troops in uniform and arms unconcealed, in advance of an
invasion, nor is it an adversary that pays any heed to the law of war,
instead hiding among and intentionally targeting innocent civilians.
In the current context, imminent threat would encompass those
engaged in planning, approving or carrying out violent attacks against
the United States. Additional considerations would include the window
of opportunity to act, the chance of reducing collateral harm to
civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks.
In any given instance, the determination whether a threat is imminent
is based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known at the
time.

detention
38. Senator Lee. Mr. Preston, do you believe the Constitution
permits the Government to apprehend a U.S. citizen on American soil and
detain that individual indefinitely in a military detainment facility?
Mr. Preston. I understand that the law is unsettled on this
question. As a matter of policy, the President has declared that the
U.S. Government ``will not authorize the indefinite military detention
without trial of American citizens'' and further stated that ``doing so
would break with our most important traditions and values as a
Nation.''

war powers
39. Senator Lee. Mr. Preston, did you support the President's
decision to use military force in Libya in 2011?
Mr. Preston. As General Counsel of the CIA, I had no role in the
decision to use military force in Libya in 2011. To the best of my
recollection, I did not participate in the substantive discussions
concerning the use of military force preceding the President's
decision. That said, I do not wish to suggest that I did not support
the decision once made. If confirmed, I expect to be actively involved
in the consideration of any contemplated use of military force in a
foreign country in the future.

40. Senator Lee. Mr. Preston, do you believe that he had the proper
authority to do so, and do you believe that the President needs
authorization from Congress to arm rebels in Syria?
Mr. Preston. With respect Libya, I had no role, as CIA General
Counsel, in addressing the authority to use military force, under U.S.
domestic law or international law, and I do not recall having any
material involvement in those discussions. As I understand it, the
President acted in Libya to protect U.S. national interests and prevent
a massacre. On March 21, 2011, in his report to Congress about the use
of military force in Libya consistent with the War Powers Resolution,
the President explained that the use of military force in Libya served
important U.S. interests in preventing instability in the Middle East
and preserving the credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations
Security Council. Although U.S. strikes in Libya exceeded 60 days, my
understanding is that the administration concluded, given that the risk
to U.S. forces was low and the mission and use of force limited, the
term ``hostilities'' did not apply and, therefore, continuing
operations were consistent with the War Powers Resolution. I understand
that U.S. and NATO operations in Libya had a basis in international law
by virtue of U.N. Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.
With respect to Syria, all U.S. military operations must be
authorized under U.S. domestic law. Without an authorization from
Congress, the President could have authority as Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive to order military action, depending on the particular
facts and circumstances. There are, however, significant constitutional
and statutory limitations on the scope and duration of military
operations that the President may order in the absence of congressional
authorization.

41. Senator Lee. Mr. Preston, do you believe that the current AUMF
from 2001 needs to be updated or changed at this point? If so, how?
Mr. Preston. It is the considered view of the Department of Defense
that the President has adequate authority to conduct military
operations against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. My
understanding is that the existing authorities are believed to be
adequate and appropriate for military operations to counter the current
and immediately foreseeable threat. The President has invited
engagement with Congress on the future of the AUMF. If confirmed, I
look forward to participating in that discussion.
______

Additional Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Stephen W. Preston
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 11, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Stephen Woolman Preston, of the District of Columbia, to be General
Counsel of theDepartment of Defense, vice Jeh Charles Johnson,
resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Stephen W. Preston, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Hon. Stephen W. Preston
Education:
Yale University

September 1975-May 1979
Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded May 1979

Trinity College, University of Dublin

September 1979-May 1980
Graduate Diploma awarded May 1980

Harvard University

September 1980-June 1983
Juris Doctor Degree awarded June 1983
Employment record:
Central Intelligence Agency

General Counsel
July 2009-present

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

Partner
March 2001-June 2009

Department ofthe Navy

General Counsel
September 1998-November 2000

U.S. Department of Justice

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division
September 1995-September 1998

Department of Defense

Principal Deputy General Counsel
Deputy General Counsel (Legal Counsel)
Consultant
August 1993-September 1995

Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering

Partner
Associate
January 1986-August 1993

Center for Law in the Public Interest

Visiting Fellow
September 1984-December 1985

Chambers of Hon. Phyllis A Kravitch, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, Savannah, GA

Law Clerk
August 1983-July 1984
Honors and awards:
Central Intelligence Agency Distinguished Intelligence Medal (2012)
National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal (2012)
Central Intelligence Agency Director's Award (2011)
Central Intelligence Agency Director's Award (2010)
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service,
bronze palm in lieu of second award (2000)
Department of the Navy Distinguished Public Service Award (2000)
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (1995)
Resolution, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review (1988)
Honoree, Women's Legal Defense Fund (1987)
J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard University (1983)
Editor, Harvard Law Review (1982-1983)
Graduate Diploma, with First Class Honors, University of Dublin
(1980)
B.A., summa cum laude, Yale University (1979)
Phi Eta Kappa (1979)
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Stephen
W. Preston in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Stephen Woolman Preston.

2. Position to which nominated:
General Counsel of the Department of Defense.

3. Date of nomination:
June 11, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
May 30, 1957; Atlanta, GA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married.

7. Names and ages of children:
Two children.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
1980-1983, Harvard University, J.D., June 1983
1979-1980, Trinity College, University of Dublin, Graduate Diploma,
May 1980
1975-1979, Yale University, B.A., May 1979
1971-1975, The Lovett School, High School Diploma, June 1975

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
2009-Present, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
2001-2009, Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLC

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
2005, Member, Independent Panel to Review Legal Services in the
Department of Defense
1998-2000, General Counsel, Department of the Navy
1995-1998, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice
1993-1995, Principal Deputy General Counsel Deputy General Counsel
(Legal Counsel), Consultant, Department of Defense
1983-1984, Law Clerk, Chambers of Hon. Phyllis A. Kravitch, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Savannah, GA

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
All Souls Memorial Episcopal Church
American Bar Association
American Bar Foundation
Council on Foreign Relations District of Columbia Bar
Harvard Club of Washington, DC.
International Association for the Study of Irish Literatures
Kalorama Citizens Association
Kennedy Center Membership Program
Metropolitan Club of Washington, DC.
Naval Historical Foundation
Navy League of the United States
Phi Beta Kappa
Smithsonian Institution Resident Associate Program
Saint Anthony Hall
The Elizabethan Club of Yale University
U.S. Navy Memorial
U.S. Naval Institute
Yale Club of Washington, DC

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Barack Obama Presidential Campaign--canvassing activity (2008).
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Barack Obama Presidential Campaign--contribution of $2,300 (2008)
Michael Bennet Senatorial Campaign--contribution of $500 (2009)
Michael Signer Virginia Lieutenant Governor Campaign--contribution
of $250 (2009)
Deval Patrick Gubernatorial Campaign--contribution of $500 (2010)

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Phi Beta Kappa (1979)
B.A., summa cum laude, Yale University (1979)
Graduate Diploma, with First Class Honors, University of Dublin
(1980)
Editor, Harvard Law Review (1982-1983)
J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard University (1983) Honoree, Women's
Legal Defense Fund (1987)
Resolution, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review (1988)
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (1995)
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service,
bronze palm in lieu of second award (2000)
Department of the Navy Distinguished Public Service Award (2000)
Central Intelligence Agency Director's Award (2010)
Central Intelligence Agency Director's Award (2011)
Central Intelligence Agency Distinguished Intelligence Medal (2012)
National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal (2012)

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Author, ``CIA and the Rule of Law,'' 6 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y
1 (2012)
Co-author, ``CFIUS and Foreign Investment'' in Homeland Security
Legal and Policy Issues, ABA Publication (2009)
Co-author, ``National Security Versus Business'' in The European
Lawyer (April 2008)
Co-author, ``The CFIUS Review Process: A Regime in Flux'' presented
at The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007: Navigating
the Regulations, ABA Conference (April 4, 2008)
Co-author, ``When Will Security Squelch a Foreign Investment Deal''
in Executive Counsel (March/April 2008)
Co-author, ``Many Transnational Deals Now Face a Security Review''
in Executive Counsel (January/February 2006)
Co-author, Legal Services in the Department of Defense: Advancing
Productive Relationships, DOD Report (September 15, 2005)

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Speaker, CIA and the Rule of Law, Harvard Law School (April 10,
2012) (drawn from informal remarks initially delivered at Columbia Law
School in October 2011)

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Hon. Stephen W. Preston was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on October 16, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Jon T. Rymer by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
These reforms have also improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders in the strategic planning process, in the
development of requirements, in joint training and education, and in
the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has strengthened our Armed Forces
by promoting joint operability, increasing readiness, and creating a
higher standard of warfighting efficiency. I am unaware of the need for
any modifications to this act at this time. If confirmed, I will notify
Congress if the Office of Inspector General identifies the need for
modifications to the act.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Please see response above.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be
with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Section 8(c) of the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978, as
amended (the IG Act) states that the IG shall ``be the principal
adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the
prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and
operations of the Department . . . '' If confirmed, I will seek to
maintain a strong and effective relationship with the Secretary that
enables me to carry out my statutory duties with the independence
required under the IG Act, while enabling the Secretary to exercise his
statutory supervisory authority.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Section 3(a) of the IG Act states that ``each IG shall
report to and be under the general supervision of the head of the
establishment involved or, to the extent such authority is delegated,
the officer next in rank below such head.'' DOD Directive 5106.01,
dated April 10, 2012, states that ``the IG of the DOD shall report to
and be under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense . . . '' Accordingly, if confirmed, my
relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense will be similar to my
relationship with the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief
Financial Officer).
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(C/CFO) to formulate
the IG's portion of the annual President's budget for submission to
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), as well as request required resources to conduct the IG's
mission. I will work with the USD(C/CFO) on areas of concern within the
financial management arena which have been a longstanding major
management challenge for the Department. I will conduct and supervise
audits, investigations, and inspections relating to the programs and
operations of the establishment in order to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L).
Answer. I have been advised that the office of the DOD IG has also
identified acquisition processes and contract management as a major
management challenges for DOD. It is therefore essential for the IG to
maintain an effective working relationship with the USD(AT&L). If
confirmed, I anticipate working closely with the Under Secretary
concerning the allocation of IG resources in the acquisition area, and
how best to implement audit recommendations pertaining to acquisition
processes. As IG, I would also recommend policies, in coordination with
the USD(AT&L) and the USD(Comptroller), to ensure that audit oversight
of contractor activities and financial management are coordinated and
carried out in an efficient manner to prevent duplication.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. I will work with the various Assistant Secretaries of
Defense in managing challenges faced by the Department.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the General Counsel of DOD
who serves as the Chief Legal Officer of DOD. I have been advised that
an Office of General Counsel within the Office of Inspector General was
established outside of the authority, direction and control of the
General Counsel of DOD on September 23, 2008. I believe that the
establishment of this independent Office of Counsel ensures that the IG
receives independent legal advice and is in accordance with the
provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2009 and
the IG Reform Act of 2008.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).
Answer. I have been advised that the IG and the DOT&E have a common
interest in ensuring that equipment and weapons systems provided to the
warfighter perform effectively and as planned. If confirmed, I would
expect to consult as appropriate with the Director concerning the
initiation of oversight efforts in these areas.
Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
Answer. I am told that the IG and the Director of Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation will have a common interest in ensuring that
acquisitions made by the Department undergo cost assessments and
program evaluations. I will seek to establish a cooperative working
relationship with this office.
Question. The Inspectors General of the Military Departments,
Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff.
Answer. Section 8(c)(2) of the IG Act states that the IG of DOD
``shall . . . initiate, conduct, and supervise such audits and
investigations in DOD (including the military departments) as the IG
considers appropriate . . . '' Section 8(c)(9) adds that the IG ``shall
. . . give particular regard to the activities of the internal audit,
inspection, and investigative units of the military departments with a
view toward avoiding duplication and ensuring effective coordination
and cooperation . . .'' If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG
coordinates and avoids duplicative efforts. As I understand it, the DOD
oversight community uses internal coordination mechanisms to deconflict
potential duplicative efforts. In addition, DOD directives govern
certain programs in which the IGs of the military departments
participate.
Question. The Inspectors General of subordinate commands.
Answer. My relationship with the IGs of subordinate commands will
be based on the IG role described above. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the other DOD IGs to carry out applicable policies and
guidance; avoid duplication, overlapping, and gaps; and work to build a
strong team.
Question. The Criminal Investigative Services of the Military
Departments.
Answer. Under the IG Act, the IG has the authority to initiate,
conduct, and supervise criminal investigations relating to any and all
programs and operations of the DOD. In addition, the IG is statutorily
mandated to develop policy, monitor and evaluate program performance,
and provide guidance regarding all criminal investigative programs
within the Department. It is my understanding that the DOD IG works
frequently in close coordination with the Military Criminal
Investigative Organizations (MCIOs) on joint investigations. If
confirmed, I will work closely with each of the MCIOs to ensure that
investigative resources are used effectively.
Question. The Audit Agencies of the Military Departments.
Answer. Section 4(a) of the IG Act establishes broad jurisdiction
for the IG to conduct audits and investigations within DOD, and section
8(c)(2) states that the IG ``shall . . . initiate, conduct, and
supervise such audits and investigations in the DOD (including the
military departments) as the IG considers appropriate.'' If confirmed,
I will work with the audit agencies of the military departments to
ensure audit resources are used effectively within the Department.
Question. The Defense Contract Audit Agency.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with DCAA, as prescribed in the
IG Act. Although DCAA reports to the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), it operates under audit policies established by the IG.
Question. The Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council.
Answer. As I understand it, the DOD IG regularly provides comments
to the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council on proposed changes to
the Defense Federal Acquisition System and also recommends changes as a
result of DOD IG work. If confirmed, I would expect to continue these
practices.
Question. The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy is responsible for oversight of a
large segment of the DOD's acquisition and contracting operations and,
accordingly, is a major recipient of reports provided by the IG. If
confirmed, I would expect to continue the current practice of working
with the Director.
Question. The Comptroller General and the Government Accountability
Office.
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD IG works very closely
with the Comptroller General and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to coordinate planned and ongoing audits and inspections to avoid
any duplication of efforts. I also understand that the DOD IG/GAO
liaison office serves as the central liaison between GAO and DOD
management during GAO reviews of DOD programs and activities. I have
served on both the yellow book and blue book advisory committees at
GAO. If confirmed, I would work to maintain these cooperative
relationships with the Comptroller General and GAO.
Question. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction.
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD IG scope of oversight
authority encompasses all DOD funded operations and activities in
Afghanistan and elsewhere, while the SIGAR focuses his oversight effort
only on funds designated for Afghanistan reconstruction. If confirmed,
and in keeping with the IG Act, I will ensure that the DOD IG
collaborates effectively with the SIGAR to ensure that we protect the
public expenditures in Afghanistan for which we have oversight.
Question. The Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency.
Answer. On October 14, 2008, the President signed Public Law 110-
409, which established the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency (CIGIE), replacing the PCIE. As the Inspector General of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation I serve as Chair of the Audit
Committee and as a Member the CIGIE Executive Council since 2008. If
confirmed, I plan to continue to be a very active participant in the
CIGIE
Question. The Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Answer. Sections 2 and 3 of the DCIE Charter state that, in
accordance with section 2(2) of the IG Act, the DOD IG, who is the DCIE
Chairman, is responsible to provide ``leadership and coordination and
recommend policies for activities designed (A) to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and (B) to
prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.''
If confirmed, I would organize meetings with the established members of
the DCIE to discuss issues of common interest and reinforce close
working relationships within the DOD oversight community.
Question. The Office of Management and Budget.
Answer. As chairman of the Audit Committee of CIGIE, I have worked
with OMB on numerous occasions on matters of accounting and audit
policy. If confirmed, I will ensure that this office works with the
Office of Management and Budget regarding budget and policy issues. In
addition, the Deputy Director for Management of the OMB serves as the
Executive Chairperson of the CIGIE.
qualifications
Question. Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 provides
that Inspectors General shall be appointed on the basis of their
``integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or
investigations.''
What background and experience do you possess that you believe
qualifies you to perform the duties of the Department of Defense
Inspector General (DOD IG), particularly in the area of oversight,
audit and investigation?
Answer. Since July 5 2006, I have served as the Inspector General
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). I am a Certified
Internal Auditor and a Certified Government Auditing Professional. I am
currently serving as the Chair of the Audit Committee of the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency and as Vice Chair of
the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight. I am a member
of the Comptroller General's Advisory Council on Government Auditing
Standards and Chair of the Green Book Advisory Council. I am also a
member of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board's Accounting
and Auditing Policy Committee. As the IG at the FDIC, I have led the
team that has ensured efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of
the policies, programs and performance at the FDIC.
I have served for over 30 years in the active and Reserve
components of the U.S. Army and I am a graduate of the U.S. Army's
Inspector General School. I worked for 7 years in consulting and
internal auditing at a major accounting firm and I have over 15 years
of experience as a senior manager in the the banking industry.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to meet with a broad cross-section of
officials and personnel within the Department of Defense, including
members of the Armed Forces here and overseas, to listen to their
concerns and identify issues that might merit action by the Office of
the Inspector General. Also, I plan to spend time listening to the
concerns of the Members of Congress and their staffs. If confirmed, I
also intend to continue to work closely with members of the CIGIE. I
also intend to spend time with all elements of the DOD IG office to
learn and benefit from their insights. I will maintain my professional
certifications as an auditor and complete all continuing professional
education requirement.
Question. Based on your background and experience, are there any
changes that you would recommend with respect to the current
organization or responsibilities of the DOD IG?
Answer. It would be premature to offer any recommendations for
change in these areas until I have had an opportunity to conduct the
necessary thorough evaluations of the current DOD IG organization and
policies and procedures.
major challenges, problems, and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
facing the next DOD IG?
Answer. The DOD IG identified the following seven management and
performance challenges facing the Department in fiscal year 2012:

1. Financial Management
2. Acquisition Processes and Contract Management
3. Joint Warfighting and Readiness
4. Information Assurance, Security, and Privacy
5. Health Care
6. Equipping and Training Iraq and Afghan Security Forces
7. The Nuclear Enterprise

Additionally, the issue of sexual assaults and suicide prevention
within the Armed Forces are serious issues that demand the attention of
the DOD IG. In the context of meeting these challenges, the OIG will
need to continue to provide extensive oversight in support of the
Department's efforts to address these challenges. It is difficult as a
nominee to identify specific problems I will confront if confirmed.
However, if confirmed, it will be my top priority to learn what
challenges and problems the DOD IG office needs to address and to
ensure the adequacy of resources required to accomplish its mission.
Question. If you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges and problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus audit, investigative, and
inspection efforts on the above discussed management challenges. I will
also work with senior DOD civilian and military officials and Congress
to identify emerging issues that the Department faces.
Question. If you are confirmed, what broad priorities would you
establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the DOD IG?
Answer. It is difficult as a nominee to formulate priorities
because I have not had access to the full range of information and
considerations that should inform them, however, I do plan to make sure
that the office stays aware that the foundations of an effective OIG
are independence and professional standards. If confirmed, I look
forward to consulting with senior officials of the Department of
Defense, DOD IG, and with Congress, in establishing broad priorities.
Question. If you are confirmed, what changes, if any, would you
expect to make in the organization, structure, and staffing of the
Office of Inspector General?
Answer. It would be premature to offer any recommendations for
change in these areas until I have had an adequate opportunity to
observe the operation of the office and conduct the necessary
evaluations.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the DOD IG?
Answer. The duties and functions of the DOD IG are specified in
sections 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the IG Act. Additional duties and
responsibilities of the IG are specified in DOD Directive 5106.01,
which was signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on April 20, 2012.
By statute, the DOD IG conducts and supervises audits and
investigations relating to the programs and operations of DOD. The DOD
IG also provides leadership and coordination, and recommends policy,
for activities designed to: (1) promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of DOD programs and operations; and
(2) combat fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition, the IG is responsible
for keeping both the Secretary of Defense and Congress fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies in defense programs,
the need for corrective action, and the status of such action.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense will
prescribe for me the full range of duties and functions set forth in
two DOD publications: DOD Directive 5100.1, ``Functions of the
Department of Defense and Its Major Components,'' and DOD Directive
5106.01, ``Inspector General of the Department of Defense.'' These
publications delineate that the DOD IG provides staff assistance and
advice in accordance with the responsibilities specified in the IG Act.
Significantly, these publications reinforce that the IG remains an
independent and objective unit within DOD. If confirmed, I will consult
directly with the Secretary to identify specific areas of concern and
emphasis.
Question. Section 2 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 states
that its purpose is to create independent and objective units to
conduct and supervise audits and investigations; to provide leadership
and coordination and recommend policies designed to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness; to prevent and detect fraud and abuse;
and to provide a means for keeping Congress and agency heads fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs and operations and the necessity for and
progress of corrective action.
Are you committed to maintaining the independence of the DOD IG, as
set forth in the Inspector General statute?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will maintain the independence of the
IG consistent with the provisions of the IG Act.
Question. Are you committed to keeping the Committee on Armed
Services ``fully and currently informed,'' and, if so, what steps will
you take, if confirmed, to ensure that this responsibility is carried
out?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, in accordance with section 2(3) of the
IG Act, I will keep the Committee on Armed Services ``fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for
and progress of corrective action.'' I will do so through the
dissemination of IG products such as the Semiannual Report to Congress
and reports on audits and inspections. In addition, I will provide
briefings for Members and staff, and testimony at hearings, when
requested, with the intent of maintaining a close relationship.
Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 provides that the
head of an agency, shall exercise ``general supervision'' over an IG,
but shall not ``prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or
from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or
investigation.''
What is your understanding of the supervisory authority of the
Secretary of Defense over the DOD IG with respect to audits and
investigations, in view of the independence provided by sections 2 and
3?
Answer. Section 2 of the IG Act creates independent and objective
units to provide a means for keeping the head of the establishment and
Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies
relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the
necessity for and progress of corrective action.
Section 3 states that each IG shall report to and be under the
general supervision of the head of the establishment involved or, to
the extent such authority is delegated, to the office next in rank
below such head, but shall not report, or be subject to supervision by,
any other officer of such establishment. Moreover, neither the head of
the establishment nor the office next in rank shall prevent or prohibit
the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or
investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any
audit or investigation.
Question. If confirmed, what action would you take if a senior
official of the Department sought to prevent you from ``initiating,
carrying out, or completing'' any audit or investigation within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the DOD IG?
Answer. If the action was taken outside the authority of the
Secretary of Defense in section 8 of the IG Act, I would notify the
Secretary and request his assistance in ensuring compliance with the IG
Act by the senior official involved. Failure to resolve the issue,
would, in my view, constitute a ``particularly serious or flagrant
problem, abuse, or deficiency'' under section 5(d) of the IG Act. Under
this section, the IG is required to report the matter to the head of
the establishment, who is then required to transmit the IG's report to
Congress within 7 days.
Question. Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 states
that the DOD IG shall ``be under the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary of Defense with respect to certain audits or
investigations which require access to information concerning sensitive
operational plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence matters,
ongoing criminal investigations by other administrative units of the
Department of Defense related to national security, or other matters,
the disclosure of which, would constitute a serious threat to national
security.
What is your understanding of the procedures in place to affect the
authority and control of the Secretary of Defense over matters
delineated in section 8 of the act?
Answer. To my knowledge, the procedure in place is to follow the IG
Act. Under 8(b)(1) or 8(b)(2) of the IG Act, the Secretary has the
``authority to stop any investigation, audit, or issuance of subpoenas,
if the Secretary determines that such a prohibition is necessary to
preserve the national security interests of the United States.'' I am
informed that this provision has never been exercised. However, in the
event that the Secretary exercises this authority, I would submit an
appropriate statement within 30 days to this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress, as required under section 8(b)(3).
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the
Inspector General has, as a matter of practice, initiated and conducted
audits or investigations covered by section 8 differently from other
audits or investigations?
Answer. It is my understanding that the practice of the DOD IG with
respect to the initiation and conduct of audits and investigations
covered by section 8 is the same as for other audits and
investigations.
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are needed in the
practices of the DOD IG for initiating and conducting audits or
investigations covered by section 8?
Answer. None to my knowledge.
Question. Sections 4 and 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 set
forth various duties and responsibilities of Inspectors General beyond
the conduct of audits and investigations.
What is your understanding of the supervisory authority exercised
by the Secretary of Defense with regard to these issues?
Answer. Beyond the conduct of audits and investigations, section 4
of the IG Act directs the IG to ``review existing and proposed
legislation and regulations'' and make related recommendations in
semiannual reports; recommend policies to promote economy and
efficiency in the administration of Department programs and operations,
and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse; keep the Secretary of
Defense and Congress fully and currently informed about fraud and other
serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies; recommend corrective
actions for such problems, abuses, and deficiencies; and report on the
progress made in implementing such corrective actions. Section 8(c)(1)
adds that the IG shall ``be the principal advisor to the Secretary of
Defense for matters relating to the prevention and detection of fraud,
waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department.''
The duties and responsibilities specified in sections 4 and 8 come
within the general supervisory authority of the Secretary of Defense
established under section 3(a).
independence
Question. The DOD IG must ensure that the independence of the
Office of the Inspector General is maintained, that investigations are
unbiased, particularly those involving senior military and civilian
officials, and promptly and thoroughly completed, and that the highest
standards of ethical conduct are maintained.
Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be
appropriate for the DOD IG to consult with officials in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (or other DOD officials outside the Office of
the Inspector General) before issuing a report, regarding the findings
and recommendations in the report?
Answer. In regards to audits and inspections, I understand it is
the current practice for the IG to offer officials in the OSD, or other
DOD officials, an opportunity to comment before issuing a report to
ensure that the information in the report is factually accurate and to
resolve or acknowledge disagreements on conclusions, findings, and
recommendations. This is not the practice with criminal investigations.
Additionally, it is not appropriate to discuss ongoing criminal or
administrative investigations.
Question. To the extent that you believe such consultation is
appropriate, what steps, if any, do you believe the Inspector General
should take to keep a record of the consultation and record the results
in the text of the report?
Answer. I believe it is necessary to consult with all parties to
gather the facts to develop findings and recommendations. The facts
that are relevant should be included in the text of the report, and a
written record of all interviews and consultations should be maintained
in the working papers.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG not
investigate or review a particular matter?
Answer. Under section 8 of the IG Act, the Secretary of Defense has
the authority to prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any audit or investigation. That authority may be exercised
when the audit or investigation requires access to information
concerning: sensitive operational plans, intelligence matters,
counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations by other
administrative units of DOD related to national security, or other
matters the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat to
national security. As noted previously, the Secretary of Defense has
never exercised his authority under section 8.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG not
issue a report on a particular matter?
Answer. No one, other than the Secretary of Defense under the
provisions delineated in Section 8 of the IG Act, has the authority to
ask the DOD IG not to issue a report on a particular matter.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG alter
findings, recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a
particular matter?
Answer. In the course of conducting audits and inspections, the IG
practice is to offer officials in the OSD, or other DOD officials, an
opportunity to comment before issuing a report to ensure that the
information in the report is factually accurate and to resolve or
acknowledge disagreements on conclusions, findings, and
recommendations. Additionally, in cases where an administrative
investigation substantiates allegations involving a senior DOD
official, the senior official is given an opportunity to comment on
findings and conclusions as part of fairness and due process. Those
comments may require that we alter the findings and are considered
before a final report is issued. However, for criminal investigations,
it is not appropriate to discuss the results of ongoing investigations.
The final decision on the content of reports rests with the IG.
Question. If confirmed, how would you react to a request, which you
believed to be inappropriate, to not investigate a particular matter,
not issue a report on a particular matter, or alter findings,
recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a
particular matter?
Answer. With respect to the initiation or completion of an audit or
investigation, if the request was inappropriate and made outside the
authority of the Secretary of Defense in section 8 of the IG Act, I
would reject the request. If and when necessary, I would notify the
Secretary and request his assistance in ensuring compliance with the IG
Act by the senior official involved. Failure to resolve the issue,
would, in my view, constitute a ``particularly serious or flagrant
problem, abuse or deficiency'' under section 5(d) of the IG Act. Under
this section, the IG is required to report the matter to the head of
the establishment, who is then required to transmit the IG's report to
Congress. (Additionally, the IG Act requires the Secretary to notify
Congress if he exercises his authority under section 8(b) (1) or (2))
congressional requests
Question. The Office of Inspector General frequently receives
requests from congressional committees and Members of Congress for
audits and investigation of matters of public interest.
What is your understanding of the manner in which the Office of
Inspector General handles such requests?
Answer. The DOD IG receives many requests from congressional
committees and Members of Congress for oversight reviews, but adheres
to the same principles of independence in responding to those requests.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Office of
Inspector General continues to respond to congressional requests for
audits or investigations in a manner consistent with past practice?
Answer. Recognizing Congress' oversight role and in keeping with
the DOD and DOD IG policy, I would continue to make appropriate
information available promptly and to cooperate fully with Members of
Congress and congressional committees and their staffs.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the Office of the Inspector General to redact the
contents of any information contained in a report it provides to
Congress?
Answer. Consistent with the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy
Act, it is the practice of the DOD IG to provide unredacted copies of
reports to oversight committees of Congress. Additional releases,
including those to the public, are redacted in accordance with
applicable laws.
Question. In past years, a number of audits and investigations
conducted by the DOD IG in response to congressional requests have
taken excessively long periods of time to complete. In some cases, the
individuals who have been the subject of such investigations have left
office by the time the DOD IG has completed its work.
What is your view of the timeliness and responsiveness of the DOD
IG's recent work in response to congressional requests?
Answer. I am unable to speak to the timeliness of specific DOD IG
reports. In general, I strongly believe that IG findings must be
provided to both management and to Congress in a timely manner while
professional standards for report production are maintained.
Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure the timeliness and responsiveness of such audits and
investigations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the timeliness of DOD IG
responses to congressional requests and require improvements if
necessary.
senior official investigations
Question. The Office of the DOD IG plays a key role in the
investigation of allegations of misconduct by senior officers and
civilian employees of the Department of Defense. The Committee on Armed
Services has a particular interest in investigations concerning senior
officials who are subject to Senate confirmation, and relies upon the
DOD IG, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to ensure
that these investigations are accurate, complete, and accomplished in a
timely manner.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the
investigations relating to senior officials are completed in a timely
and thorough manner and that the results of investigations are promptly
provided to this committee?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of conducting
timely, thorough, and accurate investigations. I will continue efforts
to promote efficiencies through training and streamlining of
investigative processes. I will ensure that cases with Congressional or
Secretariat interest--especially flag officers pending Senate
confirmation--receive additional resources and attention. I will obtain
regular updates from my staff on senior official investigations and
will ensure that all results of investigations are promptly provided to
the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the
Services for review and consideration in the confirmation process.
Question. Do you believe that the current allocation of
responsibilities between the DOD IG and the inspectors general of the
military departments is appropriate to ensure fair and impartial
investigations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the allocation of
responsibilities between the DOD IG and the Service IGs is appropriate
to ensure fair and impartial investigations. The DOD IG customarily
asserts investigative jurisdiction in senior official cases in which
allegations cross service lines, the subject outranks the Service IG,
or the Service IG encounters an impediment to independence. I will
insist my office continue prompt and thorough oversight reviews of the
Service IG reports of investigation. Vigilant oversight instills public
confidence in the integrity and accountability of DOD Leadership.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you think the DOD IG
should take to ensure that investigations carried out by the inspectors
general of the military departments are accurate and complete?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure my office continues the
vigorous oversight reviews of the Service IG reports of investigation
to ensure accuracy and completeness. The quality of the Service IG
investigations is enhanced by meetings with the Service IGs, semiannual
training symposiums, and daily interaction between OIG and Service IG
senior official investigators. These efforts strengthen professional
relationships, reinforce best practices, and improve the timeliness and
quality of investigative work. I will not hesitate to highlight
investigative deficiencies in Service IG reports and will offer
assistance or assume investigative jurisdiction when appropriate.
Question. At what point in an investigation and under what criteria
would you initiate action to ensure that a ``flag,'' or suspension on
favorable personnel action, is placed on a military officer?
Answer. If confirmed, I will promptly notify the Service IG of the
initiation of a senior official investigation. If a senior official has
a pending nomination or Senate confirmation, I will also notify the
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). The components
are responsible to ensure the senior officials are ``flagged'' and not
eligible for favorable actions. Upon receipt of an allegation against a
senior official, my office will promptly determine whether the
allegation is credible; that is, whether the alleged conduct violates
an established standard and whether the allegation includes sufficient
detail. If the allegation is determined to be credible, I will take
steps to ensure an investigation is initiated and make the appropriate
notifications.
resources and authorities of the dod ig's office and investigators
Question. Do you believe that the DOD IG's office has sufficient
resources (in personnel and dollars) to carry out its audit and
investigative responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the adequacy of the resources
available to the DOD IG. I would make it a priority to ensure that the
DOD IG's office has sufficient resources to carry out its audit and
investigative responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, will you communicate any concerns that you
may have about the adequacy of resources available to the Office of
Inspector General to Congress and this committee?
Answer. If confirmed, I will.
Question. Some Federal agencies have reacted to limited Inspector
General resources by using contractors to perform some audit and
investigative functions.
What is your understanding of the DOD IG's role in determining
whether the use of contractor resources to perform audit or
investigative functions is appropriate?
Answer. For the audit function, the IG Act, section 4(b)(1)(B)
establishes the authority of each IG to establish guidelines for
determining when it shall be appropriate to use non-Federal auditors.
In addition, section 4(b)(1)(C) of the IG Act states that the IG shall
take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal
auditors complies with the standards established by the Comptroller
General.
Question. With regard to the criminal investigative function, it is
considered inherently governmental and therefore contractors are only
utilized in very limited investigative support roles.
Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that the use of
contractor resources to perform such functions would be appropriate?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD Instruction 7600.02
establishes guidance on when it is permissible to use contractor
resources to perform audit functions. It specifically permits DOD
components to contract for audit services when applicable expertise is
unavailable, if augmentation of the audit staff is necessary to execute
the annual audit plan, or because temporary audit assistance is
required to meet audit reporting requirements mandated by Public Law or
DOD regulation. However, the instruction includes an approval process
to ensure the appropriate use of non-Federal auditors and that they
comply with the Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller
General of the United States.
Question. In recent years, the DOD IG has sought and obtained
increased authority to issue subpoenas, carry weapons, and make
arrests.
Do you believe that the authorities of the Office of Inspector
General and its agents are adequate in these areas, or would you
recommend further changes in the law?
Answer. In general, I believe the authorities provided by the
Inspector General Act, as amended, are adequate. If confirmed, I will
review those authorities as they relate to the mission of the DOD IG.
dod financial accounting and audits
Question. The performance of mandatory statutory duties, such as
the performance of financial audits, has consumed a growing share of
the resources of the Inspector General's office, crowding out other
important audit priorities.
What is your view of the relative priority of financial audits, and
the resources that should be devoted to such audits?
Answer. Financial audits will continue to be a high priority
consistent with the President's Initiatives, the Secretary of Defense's
top priorities, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, and the
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1994. As the Department
improves audit readiness, the requirements for financial statement
audits will increase, placing greater demand on DOD IG resources. If
confirmed, I will work with the Department and Congress to ensure that
the appropriate level of resources continues to be dedicated to
financial audits. I will also seek to ensure that resources committed
to financial audits do not come at the expense of other audit
priorities.
Question. What is your view of the requirements of section 1008 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2002, regarding resources directed to the
audit of financial statements?
Answer. Section 1008 directs the IG to significantly reduce the
level of audit work when the Department has asserted that the financial
statements are not reliable and do not meet accounting standards. This
allows the IG flexibility to redirect audit resources to other areas
within the Department. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the
Department and Congress to ensure that the appropriate level of
resources is dedicated to audit the Department's financial statements.
While audit resources have been redirected to other high priority
areas, as the level of audit readiness increases across the Department,
there will be a need to focus more resources on those financial
statements.
Question. Do you see any need for legislative changes to give the
Inspector General greater flexibility to target audit resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Department and Congress
to assess whether legislation in this area is appropriate.
Question. What is your view of the role of the DOD IG in evaluating
and contributing to improvements made in the Department's financial
management processes?
Answer. The role of the DOD IG is to serve as a catalyst for
improvements in the Department's financial management processes. That
role should be consistent with the Department's top priorities, and
statutory requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG
continues this vital function.
oversight of acquisition programs
Question. Problems with procurement, acquisition, and the ability
of the Department and the Military Departments to effectively oversee
acquisition programs have called into question the capability of
existing DOD oversight mechanisms.
What role, if any, do you believe the Office of the Inspector
General should play in achieving acquisition reform?
Answer. The role of the DOD IG is to serve as a catalyst for
improvements in the Department's acquisition processes and contract
management. That role should be consistent with the President's
Initiatives, the Department's top priorities, and statutory
requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG continues
this vital function.
Question. Over the last 15 years, the DOD IG has gone from having
one auditor for every $500 million on contract by the Department of
Defense to one auditor for every $2 billion on contract.
Do you believe that the DOD IG has the resources it needs to
conduct effective oversight over the Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, ensuring that the DOD IG has the resources
needed to conduct effective oversight over the Department's acquisition
programs will be one of my top priorities. The men and women of our
Armed Forces, and our Nation's taxpayers, have a right to expect that
the funds appropriated by Congress for defense acquisitions are being
utilized efficiently and effectively. I understand that Congress has
supported DOD IG efforts to increase its oversight resources. It is
essential that the IG, the Department, and Congress to work together in
a timely way to ensure that the IG has adequate resources to conduct
its essential oversight mission.
Question. The DOD IG has played an important role in advising the
Department of Defense and Congress on the sufficiency of management
controls in the Department's acquisition programs and the impact that
legislative and regulatory proposals could have on such management
controls.
How do you see the DOD IG's role in this area?
Answer. The DOD IG has an important role in helping the Department
to effectively and efficiently manage acquisition resources dedicated
to the support of the Department's mission, and in accounting for the
management of those resources to the taxpayer. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the DOD IG continues its important advisory role.
oversight of dod activities in afghanistan
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities and
activities of the Office of the DOD IG in investigating and preventing
fraud, waste, and abuse in the course of Department of Defense
operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. The DOD IG, in accordance with its legislatively mandated
mission, conducts audits, investigations and inspections aimed at
identifying and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse of funds
appropriated to the DOD for its operations in Afghanistan. I am aware
that conducting oversight of operations and activities associated with
an overseas contingency presents unique challenges. Nevertheless, as
with oversight elsewhere within the Department, the purpose of these
reviews should be to ensure our men and women in uniform are receiving
the right equipment and support to conduct successful operations.
I also understand that, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service,
the law enforcement arm of the DOD IG, and its military criminal
investigative counterparts, in particular the U.S. Army Criminal
Investigative Command (Army CID), investigate major frauds, corruption,
thefts, and other compromises of DOD assets in Afghanistan, and other
countries in that theater.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG continues to focus
oversight efforts to investigate and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of
U.S.-provided resources for reconstruction and other purposes in
Southwest Asia, in keeping with the IG Act.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you plan to
make to the DOD IG's oversight activities in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD IG activities in
Southwest Asia remain a top priority. I will also assess the current
level of oversight to ensure that adequate resources are being devoted
to this mission and that those resources are being allocated
appropriately.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your goals with respect to
the oversight, audit, and investigation of ongoing U.S. activities
Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, my goal would be to ensure that the oversight
provided by the DOD IG of ongoing DOD activities in Afghanistan is
consistent with the responsibilities in the IG Act and is sufficient to
provide assurance to Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and to the
American taxpayer that funds supporting DOD activities are expended
appropriately and effectively.
Question. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) has jurisdiction over contracts for the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, the SIGAR does not have primary
jurisdiction over contracts to support our troops in Afghanistan.
What role do you believe the DOD IG should play in the oversight,
audit and investigation of such contracts?
Answer. The DOD IG office should play an active role in ensuring
stewardship of taxpayers' dollars and effective contract support for
our troops through diligent oversight of the contracting function. This
would include audits, inspections, and investigations, as required. I
understand the DOD IG chairs the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group,
which is a forum for oversight agencies to coordinate audit efforts in
Southwest Asia.
Question. Do you believe that a significant on-the-ground presence
is necessary to perform this role?
Answer. Yes. While many oversight activities can be conducted from
the continental United States, effective oversight requires being on
site to assess conditions, examine documents and talk to witnesses and
sources. I am aware that the DOD IG currently maintains offices in
Afghanistan and Qatar. As the draw down in U.S. troops in Afghanistan
proceeds, we must continually assess personnel needs based on the
nature and scope of DOD operations and adjust our on-the-ground
presence as appropriate.
Question. What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the SIGAR?
Answer. See response to the previous section regarding
``Relationships''.
intelligence
Question. What is the role of the DOD IG with regard to
intelligence activities within DOD?
Answer. Responsibilities and functions of the Inspector General as
outlined in DOD Directive 5106.1, ``Inspector General of the Department
of Defense (IG, DOD),'' include the responsibility to audit, evaluate,
monitor, and review the programs, policies, procedures, and functions
of the DOD Intelligence Community to ensure that intelligence resources
are properly managed. I am informed that the Inspector General, through
the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program
Assessments, has responsibility for oversight of DOD intelligence
activities and components to include all DOD Components conducting
intelligence activities, including the National Security Agency/Central
Security Service (NSA/CSS), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the
Military Department intelligence and counterintelligence activities,
and other intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, staffs,
and offices, or elements thereof, when used for foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence purposes. Other organizations and components under
the Inspector General's oversight include the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD (I)), the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA).
The DOD IG performs an oversight and coordination role through the
Joint Intelligence Coordination Working Group (JIOCG). The JIOCG is a
DOD working group chaired by the Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and Special Program Assessments and includes
representatives from the Service audit agencies, military department
IGs, and the IGs of the Defense Intelligence Agencies. The primary goal
of the JIOCG is to avoid duplication of effort and enhance coordination
and cooperation among IGs and Auditors General inside the DOD, and
promote information-sharing among IGs whose functions include audits,
inspections, evaluations, or investigations of their respective
departments and agencies.
Question. What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the Special
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight?
Answer. DOD Directive 5106.01 requires that intelligence-related
actions be coordinated, as appropriate, with the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD(IO)) to determine
respective areas of responsibility in accordance with DOD Directive
5148.11, ``assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Oversight,'' dated April 24, 2013. (DOD Directive 5148.11 contains
similar language for the ATSD(IO) to coordinate with the IG, as
appropriate.) I am advised that the ATSD(IO) is a charter member of the
JIOCG, and that the IG has a long history of coordination and
cooperation with the ATSD(IO).
Question. What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the Inspector
General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence?
Answer. I understand that the DOD IG's primary relationship with
the Intelligence Community IG (IC IG) involves participation in the
Intelligence Community (IC) IG Forum. The IC IG Forum promotes
information-sharing among the IGs of the departments and agencies of
the IC whose functions include audits, inspections/evaluations, or
investigations of their respective departments and agencies. The IC IG
Forum also strives to avoid duplication of effort and enhance effective
coordination and cooperation among IC IGs. The IC IG chairs the IC IG
Forum.
In addition to the IC IG Forum relationship, the DOD IG
participates in various projects and initiatives undertaken by the IC
IG. The IC IG also coordinates with the DOD IG on all ongoing projects
relating to DOD intelligence organizations and activities. The IC IG is
an Ex-Officio member of the Joint Intelligence Oversight Coordination
Group (JIOCG). The JIOCG is a chartered organization which is the DOD
focal point for inspectors and auditors general collaboration and
deconfliction of project and planning activities.
Question. What is the role of the DOD IG with respect to detainee
matters?
Answer. The DOD IG has statutory responsibility for oversight that
extends to detainee and interrogation matters. It is my understanding
that the DOD IG prepares a summary report every 6 months on
investigations of detainee abuse conducted by the MCIOs which is
provided to the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Question. What is the role of the DOD IG with respect to
interrogation matters?
Answer. Please see my answer to the previous question.
whistleblower protection
Question. What is your understanding of the role played by the DOD
IG in investigating complaints of reprisal against members of the
military, DOD civilian employees, and DOD contractor employees, who
``blow the whistle'' on alleged fraud, waste, and abuse?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD IG maintains a robust
whistleblower protection program that seeks to ensure that
whistleblowers may report fraud, waste, and abuse within the programs
and operations of the Department of Defense without fear of reprisal.
The DOD IG is responsible for investigating or overseeing
investigations conducted by the DOD component inspectors general,
regarding allegations of whistleblower reprisal made by members of the
Armed Forces, appropriated and nonappropriated fund DOD civilian
employees, and DOD contractor/subcontractor employees. Disclosures
brought to light by whistleblowers are critical to DOD IG's mission of
providing independent, relevant, and timely oversight of the
Department.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the DOD IG and the Office of Special Counsel in the protection of DOD
civilian employee whistleblowers?
Answer. The Office of Special Counsel is a partner with the
Inspector General in the protection of DOD's civilian appropriated-fund
employees. OSC receives and has primary jurisdiction to investigate a
majority of the civilian whistleblower cases across the Federal
Government, pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), title
5, U.S.C., section 2302. Under the authority of the Inspector General
Act, DOD IG provides an alternate means by which DOD civilian
appropriated-fund employees may seek protection analogous to protection
from reprisal provided by the WPA.
Question. What is your understanding of the legal standards for
substantiating a whistleblower claim of reprisal by a member of the
military, a DOD civilian employee, or a DOD contractor employee?
Answer. In general, whistleblower reprisal is proven when the
evidence establishes that a protected communication or disclosure was a
factor in the decision to take, threaten to take, or withhold a
personnel action (or a security clearance determination), unless
evidence establishes that the action would have been taken, threatened
or withheld absent the protected communication or disclosure. There are
statute-specific variations though, including the standard of proof for
showing whether the action would have been taken, threatened or
withheld absent the protected communication or disclosure. Among the
statutes and programs administered by DOD IG, the appropriated-fund
civilian and contractor/subcontractor investigations require clear and
convincing evidence, whereas military and nonappropriated-fund
investigations require a preponderance of the evidence to prove that
the action would have been taken anyway.
Question. What is your understanding of the changes made by section
827 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, regarding DOD contractor employee
whistleblowers?
Answer. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, signed by President Obama on
January 2, 2013, contained numerous enhancements to the existing law
protecting Defense contractor employees from whistleblower reprisal,
the most significant of which were:

Extending coverage to employees of Defense
subcontractors and, as noted in earlier answers, elevating the
agency's burden of proof in rebuttal to clear and convincing
evidence.
Expanding the scope of what constitutes a protected
disclosure and to whom such disclosures can be made.
Prohibiting actions taken by the employer ``even if it
is undertaken at the request of a Department or administration
official'' (unless the request takes the form of a
nondiscretionary directive and is within the authority of the
Department official making the request).

Question. Do you see the need for any further legislative changes
to ensure that members of the military, DOD civilian employees, and DOD
contractor employees are appropriately protected from reprisal for
whistleblowing?
Answer. I am aware that significant enhancements to whistleblower
protection, including the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of
2012 and the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 amendments to the statute
protecting Defense contractor employee whistleblowers, have recently
been enacted. Prior to recommending further legislation, if confirmed,
I would assess the effectiveness of these changes and work with
Congress and others to identify potential gaps in the protections
afforded to whistleblowers.
Question. What level of priority will you give, if confirmed, to
the DOD IG's whistleblower protection responsibilities?
Answer. Whistleblowing, and the protection of the sources for our
investigators, auditors, inspectors and evaluators, will be one of my
top priorities. Whistleblowers perform an important public service--
often at great professional and personal risk--by exposing fraud,
waste, and abuse within the programs and operations of the Department.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the DOD IG plays a leading
role in creating an environment in the Department where whistleblowers
can disclose wrongdoing without fear of retribution.
general counsel to the dod ig
Question. What is your understanding of the history and purpose of
section 907 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009, regarding the General
Counsel to the DOD IG?
Answer. Section 907 provided for a General Counsel to the DOD IG
who would serve at the discretion of the IG, report exclusively to the
IG, and be independent of the Office of General Counsel, Department of
Defense. I am familiar with and fully support such an arrangement for
an IG to receive independent legal advice.
Question. What is your understanding of the role played by the
General Counsel to the DOD IG with regard to completed investigations?
Answer. With regard to administrative investigations, attorneys in
the Office of General Counsel (OGC) to the DOD IG perform legal
sufficiency reviews of senior official and reprisal reports of
investigation prior to the final report being submitted to the
Inspector General (IG) or Deputy Inspector General for Administrative
Investigations (DIG AI), as appropriate, for final approval. In
ensuring administrative investigations are legally sufficient, OGC
attorneys determine whether the relevant legal or regulatory standards
are identified and applied; evidence of record appears complete,
credible, and supports the findings of fact by the appropriate standard
of proof; findings of fact support the conclusions reached; and the
report is generally understandable.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address disputes between the
General Counsel to the DOD IG and a DOD IG investigative team as to
findings of fact and the appropriate weight to be given to such facts
in a completed investigation?
Answer. My understanding is that OGC and the Office of DIG AI have
a commendable working relationship and have established procedures for
resolving any disagreements related to sufficiency of investigations.
Cases where disagreements cannot be resolved between OGC and DIG AI are
rare and typically involve matters that impact the outcome of the
investigation or supportability of findings and conclusions. Matters
unresolved at the directorate level are elevated to the DIG AI, who
consults further with the attorney advisor or the General Counsel to
resolve the disagreement. If disputes remain unresolved on cases which
require OGC coordination prior to PDIG or IG review/signature, the DIG
AI notifies the PDIG or IG of the disagreement and provides additional
information as requested. The parties involved continue to address the
disagreement, aided by any feedback that the PDIG or IG chooses to
provide. I intend to continue that resolution process and provide my
advice and direction based on the evidence of the particular case.
audit oversight review and report cards
Question. In recent years, one congressional office has prepared an
annual report entitled an ``Audit Oversight Review and Report Card.''
These reports have been highly critical of the performance of the audit
functions of the DOD IG.
Are you familiar with these reports?
Answer. Yes
Question. What is your view of the findings and conclusions of
these reports?
Answer. The reports presented some valid concerns and opportunities
for improvement in the audit organization at the DOD IG.
Question. Are there additional steps that you believe the DOD IG
should take to address the findings and conclusions of these reports?
Answer. As an auditor by profession, audit selection and audit
quality are very important to me. It is my understanding that there has
been improvement over the past few years. If confirmed, I will work
with the audit organization to ensure that it continues to meet the
mission of producing timely, relevant, and accurate audit products.
Question. If confirmed, will you review the organizational
structure of the DOD IG, with the objective of streamlining the
organization, reducing duplication or redundancy, and increasing the
performance of the organization?
Answer. If confirmed, I will have the goal of having a model audit
organization. I will ensure we conduct audits that provide return on
investment that promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within
the Department. I will also ensure the audits are carried out in an
efficient manner to prevent duplication.
sexual assault investigations
Question. In June, 2011, the GAO issued a report entitled
``Military Justice Oversight and Better Collaboration Needed for Sexual
Assault Investigations and Adjudications'', GAO-11-579, finding that
the Department of Defense Inspector General has not performed its
designated policy development and oversight responsibilities for sexual
assault investigations. The GAO recommended that the DOD Inspector
General, in conjunction with the Military Services, develop and
implement (1) a policy that specifies procedures for conducting sexual
assault investigations and (2) clear goals, objectives, and performance
data for monitoring and evaluating the Services' sexual assault
investigations and related training.
What is the status of the implementation of the GAO's
recommendations?
Answer. In response to GAO's first recommendation the DOD IG
developed overarching guidance which establishes policy, assigns
responsibilities, and provides procedures for the investigation of
adult sexual assault within DOD. This guidance is captured in DODI
5505.18, ``Investigation of Adult Sexual Assault in the Department of
Defense'' which was published on January 25, 2013.
Regarding the second recommendation in June 2011, the DOD IG
established a unit dedicated to the oversight of sexual assault and
other violent crime investigations. The DOD IG has developed a program
of regular and recurring oversight of sexual assault investigations and
training. Since its establishment, the unit has evaluated both Military
Criminal Investigative Organizations' (MCIOs') sexual assault
investigation training and adult sexual assault investigations
completed in 2010. These reports were published in February 2013 and
July 2013, respectively. The unit is currently evaluating the MCIOs'
investigations of sexual assaults of children completed in 2012, and
DOD's compliance with the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification
Act.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure vigorous oversight and
evaluation of the Services' investigations of sexual assault and the
related training of investigators?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure the DOD IG
continues to provide optimum oversight and investigative and policy
support in this critically important area. I understand that the DOD IG
will evaluate the Department's sexual assault and other violent crime
investigations and investigative training on a continuing basis. In the
coming year the DOD IG intends to evaluate additional closed MCIO
sexual assault investigations, and evaluate MCIO sexual assault victim
interview training.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee and
other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
overpayments to contractors
1. Senator Nelson. Mr. Rymer, there have been numerous Department
of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) reports citing contractor
overpayments, such as Boeing overcharging for repair parts for
helicopters (DODIG-2013-103). How do we hold contractors accountable to
deliver products and services on time and at the agreed upon price?
Mr. Rymer. The DOD IG can assist the Department in holding
contractors accountable by identifying overcharges and requesting funds
be returned for goods and services not received; recommending the
contracting officer take immediate actions to correct the problems
through an appropriate contract remedy, and recommending, when
warranted by the contractor's inadequate performance, that the Military
Department's designated official start suspension or debarment actions.
The DOD IG also makes recommendations to DOD Senior Leadership to hold
the contracting official and contracting officer representative
accountable for their actions in making sure that the contractor is
delivering the products and services on time and at the price stated in
the contract. To obtain the maximum benefit of the recommendations that
have been made regarding spare parts, the Department should apply
lessons learned and operational improvement from the individual
contracts that the DOD IG has reviewed more broadly to other contracts
for spare parts.

2. Senator Nelson. Mr. Rymer, are these overpayments related in any
way to DOD's lack of auditability?
Mr. Rymer. While these overpayments may not be directly related to
DOD's lack of auditability, the Department's lack of effective
processes and controls creates an environment where overpayments are
less likely to be detected and corrected in the normal course of
business. If the Department were auditable, they would have systems
that talk with each other and processes that ensured that property was
properly valued and included in the inventory management system and the
financial statements.

3. Senator Nelson. Mr. Rymer, why is this report classified For
Official Use Only (FOUO)?
Mr. Rymer. It is my understanding that the report is marked FOUO
because it contains proprietary data protected by the Trades Secrets
Act. Proprietary information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant
to the Freedom of Information Act.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
office of the inspector general
4. Senator McCaskill. Mr. Rymer, the DOD Office of the Inspector
General (DOD OIG) has been critical in efforts to rein in runaway
spending and waste, fraud, and abuse at DOD. It has done a tremendous
job in what can be a difficult environment to succeed in. Would you let
me, or my staff, know if there are any tools that you believe you need
to help you do your job more effectively?
Mr. Rymer. If confirmed, I will review the audit, investigative and
inspections capabilities of the DOD IG to determine if they possess the
resources and authorities needed to provide effective oversight of the
Department of Defense. I will promptly advise your office if additional
authorities or capabilities are needed in order for the DOD IG to
perform its mission independently and professionally.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
dod audit
5. Senator Manchin. Mr. Rymer, today, DOD is the only Federal
agency that still cannot pass an audit. Along with my friend Senator
Coburn, I am working on the Audit the Pentagon Act and think it is long
past time for a clean audit on DOD's books. DOD accounts for almost 20
percent of the Federal budget, but we don't know exactly where the
money is spent. That makes absolutely no sense. If confirmed, what will
you do from day one to root out waste and ensure DOD audits its books?
Mr. Rymer. I share your concerns regarding DOD's inability to audit
its books. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD IG audit staff to
ensure that the financial management work continues to provide
actionable recommendations that will improve the Department's financial
management controls and reduce vulnerabilities to fraud waste and
abuse. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG conducts audits
focusing on identifying improper payments and that the auditors have
the necessary data analysis software to analyze high risk areas such as
delinquent debt, particularly related to healthcare services provided
to DOD personnel, dependents, and veterans.

6. Senator Manchin. Mr. Rymer, the Inspector General is absolutely
central to DOD's audit process. What will your approach be to ensuring
that DOD not only meets the audit standards and timetables, but also
that the integrity of the audit process is upheld?
Mr. Rymer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all DOD IG audit staff
are fully trained and qualified to perform their duties. Highly
qualified staff should have advanced degrees and/or professional
certifications to include Certified Public Accountants (CPAs),
Certified Internal Auditors (CIAs), Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs),
Certified Information Systems Auditors (CISAs), and Certified Defense
Financial Managers (CDFMs). In addition, if confirmed, I will ensure
the audit staff provide the appropriate oversight to CPA firms engaged
to assist with financial statement audits. I will also ensure that the
auditors are able to share knowledge about the Department as well as
audit standards and best practices in performing financial statement
audits.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
military whistleblowers
7. Senator Kaine. Mr. Rymer, do you feel that current law does
enough to protect Active Duty whistleblowers who witness fraud, waste,
abuse, or crime?
Mr. Rymer. Protection of whistleblowers must be a top priority for
the DOD IG. At this time, I am not prepared to comment definitively on
the sufficiency of current law but I do believe that continually
educating our military servicemembers on their rights and
responsibilities is critical to ensuring these protections are fully
exercised. If confirmed, this is a matter I would want to assess more
thoroughly. I believe the DOD IG should continually evaluate
protections for whistleblowers and suggest improvements, if necessary,
to ensure that all of our servicemembers receive the proper protections
for being courageous enough to come forward and report allegations of
fraud, waste, abuse, and crime.

8. Senator Kaine. Mr. Rymer, what else can be done to stamp out
retaliation against those who come forward as victims or witnesses?
Mr. Rymer. Continued outreach from the DOD IG and increased top-
down emphasis on whistleblower rights and protections within the
Department sends the message that reporting wrongdoing--including
reporting allegations of sexual assault--is the right thing to do, and
that whistleblowers are protected from reprisal. I am well aware that
even the perception of retaliation can reduce the trust and confidence
our servicemembers and civilian employees have in the Department. If
confirmed, I will continually review our outreach and education
programs to ensure we are doing all we can to protect whistleblowers
from reprisal. I would also work to ensure that investigations into
allegations of reprisal continues to be a high priority in the Office
of Inspector General and that all such investigations are conducted in
a timely and thorough manner.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
priorities
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Rymer, if confirmed as the DOD Inspector
General will you review DOD's use of scarce O&M funds for alternative
energy programs?
Mr. Rymer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the DOD IG continues
its audit efforts of the Department's programs to become more energy
efficient--including the use of various types of alternative energy. As
one of the largest consumers of energy in the world, the Defense
Department spends billions of dollars each year on fuel. Becoming more
energy efficient makes sense.

10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Rymer, if confirmed, will you agree to
apply your financial and auditing expertise to thoroughly review plans
to build a biofuel refinery in light of an April 2013 report by the
International Energy Agency that forecasts the United States is on pace
to become energy independent by 2030, and to report the results of your
review to this committee?
Mr. Rymer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG reviews the
various initiatives underway at the Department to become more energy
efficient and assesses DOD's progress toward meeting its energy
efficiency goals. As part of this effort, the DOD IG should assess the
use of various types of alternative energies--including biofuel. My
goal is to provide the Secretary and Congress with relevant and timely
information that can be used to guide policy decisions on various fuel
programs.

dod financial accounting and audits
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Rymer and Dr. Rabern, if confirmed, what is
your understanding of your role in finally establishing the level of
audit readiness that is required by law?
Mr. Rymer. The DOD IG must perform the audits required by the CFO
Act of 1990. However, section 1008(d) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 limits the DOD Inspector General
to performing only those audit procedures required by generally
accepted government auditing standards that are consistent with the
representations made by management. In practice this significantly
curtails the audit work because most of the Department has not asserted
that it is audit ready. It is important that other financial management
audits conducted by the DOD IG focus on identifying the necessary
improvements that the Department must make to reduce vulnerabilities,
improve its financial management operations and continue to progress
toward auditability of all the financial statements and meeting the
auditability goals for fiscal year 2014 and 2017.

senior official investigations
12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Rymer, if confirmed, what is your
understanding of your role in providing this committee with timely and
accurate information concerning senior officials who are subject to
Senate confirmation?
Mr. Rymer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all results of
investigations are promptly provided to Senior Management Officials in
the Department of Defense for review and consideration in the
confirmation process. I will also respond quickly to inquiries from the
committee regarding pending nominations of senior officials.

13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Rymer, what would be your role in
evaluating the processes within DOD and the Services to select for
promotion and assignment to positions of responsibility, only the best
and fully qualified, ethical, and accountable leaders?
Mr. Rymer. I recognize the importance of providing timely and
accurate information to DOD and the Services for use in the promotion
and assignment process. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD IG completes
its investigations in a timely and accurate manner, and continues its
vigilant oversight of senior official investigations conducted by the
Service IGs. I will promptly provide any adverse information in our
records regarding senior officials for the Department's consideration
during the selection and nomination process.
______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Jon T. Rymer follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 24, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred sequentially to
the Committee on Armed Services; when reported by the Committee on
Armed Services, pursuant to an order of January 7, 2009, to be
sequentially referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs for 20 calendar days:
Jon T. Rymer, of Tennessee, to be Inspector General, Department of
Defense, vice Gordon S. Heddell, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Jon T. Rymer, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Hon. Jon T. Rymer
Education:
University of Tennessee

September 1973-June 1975
September 1978-June 1981
Bachelor of Arts Degree, Economics, awarded 1981

University of Arkansas at Little Rock

September 1993-August 1996
Master of Business Administration Degree awarded 1996
Employment record:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Inspector General
July 2006-Present

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Interim Inspector General
May 2012-January 2013

Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency

Audit Committee Chair
August 2008-Present

U.S. Army

Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Reserve
Active duty, June 1975-June 1978, November 2004-
October 2005
U.S. Army Reserve June 1978-August 1992,
U.S. Army Reserve, U.S. Army National Guard, July
1997-June 2013

KPMG LLP

Director, Banking Advisory Services
June 1997-November 2004

Boatman's Bank of Arkansas

Executive Vice President
November 1992-January 1997

First American National Bank of Tennessee

Executive Vice President
June 1981-November 1992
Certifications:
Certified Government Auditing Professional
Certified Internal Auditor
Honors and awards:
Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Army Achievement Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters
Good Conduct Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Jon T.
Rymer in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Jon Thomas Rymer.

2. Position to which nominated:
Department of Defense Inspector General.

3. Date of nomination:
June 24, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
April 2, 1955; Knoxville, TN.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Debra Joanne Queen.

7. Names and ages of children:
Jon Thomson Rymer, age 17.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Bearden High School, Knoxville, TN, 1971-1973, diploma, 1973.
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 1973-1975, 1978-1981,
Bachelor Degree, 1981.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 1994-1996, Master of
Business Administration Degree, 1996.
University of Cincinnati, 2002-2003, no degree awarded.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
June 1997 to November 2004, KPMG LLP, Chicago, IL, Cincinnati, OH,
Director.
June 1975 to August 1992 and July 1997 to present, U.S. Army, U.S.
Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. Served in enlisted ranks
from Private to Command Sergeant Major.
July 2006 to Present, Inspector General, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Washington, DC. Served as Interim Inspector General at
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from May 2012 to January 2013.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Chairman of the Audit Committee and member of the Executive Council
of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency and Council of
Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency from 2008 to present.
Member of the GAO Advisory Committee of Government Auditing
Standards from 2009 to present.
Member of the GAO Advisory Committee of Government Internal
Controls Standards from March 2013 to present.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member of Institute of Internal Auditors
National Rifle Association

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
McCain for President--three contributions totaling $750 in 2008
Connelly for Congress--$100 - 10/16/2008
National Republican Party--$50 - 04/02/2012
Romney for President--$150 - 10/17/2013

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Army Achievement Medal, four Oak Leaf Clusters
Good Conduct Medal Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal, Three
Oak Leaf Clusters
Humanitarian Service Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Ohio Commendation Medal

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
A. IG Perspectives for the FBI, 9/3/2008
B. The FDIC IG-FDIC Accounting and Auditing Conference, 5/21/2008
C. Meeting the Challenges of the Crisis-Association of Government
Accountants, 7/13/2010
D. FDIC OIG Update, AICPA, 9/2010
E. The FDIC IG-University of Tennessee Corporate Governance
Seminar, 10/2010

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, ifconfirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Hon. Jon T. Rymer was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on September 17, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Susan J. Rabern by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in
these modifications?
Answer. I do not see the need to modify any provisions of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act.
duties of the assistant secretary of the navy (financial management and
comptroller)
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and
Comptroller)?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) directs and manages the financial activities of the
Department of the Navy. This means overseeing the management of the
annual budget, its execution, financial reporting and subsequent audit,
as well as providing independent analysis. The office provides informed
recommendations to the senior leadership of the Department of the Navy
regarding the efficient and effective allocation of assets, consistent
with the national security priorities of the President and the
Secretary of Defense. The office provides for the development of a
world-class financial management work force and is committed to the
American public for the proper stewardship of the resources they
entrust to the Department of the Navy.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have significant financial management experience in
multiple government agencies including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Agency for
International Development and while on Active Duty in the U.S. Navy.
Question. As Chief Financial Officer of the U.S. Agency for
International Development, I was responsible for all financial matters
related to the delivery of economic development and humanitarian
assistance programs through grants, contracts, and loans to
governmental and non-governmental organizations globally. I was
responsible for reform and refurbishment of financial systems,
implementing changes in the management of government expenditures,
trust funds, and loans in over 100 appropriations.
As Assistant Commissioner and Chief Financial Officer of the U.S.
Customs Service, I served as the key advisor to the Commissioner on all
matters relating financial and resource programs, construction and
procurement. I directed the formulation, presentation and execution of
the Customs Service budget, obligation of funds and employment
ceilings, managed annual appropriations, revenue, procurement, real
property and other assets in over 600 locations worldwide.
As the Chief Financial Officer for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, I was the principal advisor to the Director on all
financial matters, and responsible for all financial planning,
programming, budgeting, investment, and contracting, establishing
standards and procedures worldwide.
Question. Do you believe that there are any actions that you need
to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will quickly identify any shortcomings in
my knowledge regarding the many challenging issues facing the
Department of the Navy through discussions with subject matter experts
within the Navy and the broader Department of Defense.
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and
Comptroller) and each of the following:
The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) is the principal advisor to the Secretary and Under
Secretary of the Navy on fiscal and budgetary matters and performs such
other duties as the Secretary or Under Secretary may prescribe.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy/Chief Management Officer
of the Navy.
Answer. See response above.
Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) works directly with the other Assistant Secretaries of
the Navy to ensure that the financial management activities of their
respective organizations are supported.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) must collaborate with the General Counsel to ensure
all operations of the Department conform to fiscal law requirements.
Question. The Chief of Naval Operations.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) should make certain that the Chief of Naval Operations
has the financial support necessary to execute his statutory duties and
responsibilities.
Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. Likewise, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management and Comptroller) should make certain that the Commandant of
the Marine Corps has the financial support necessary to execute his
statutory duties and responsibilities.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) must work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) to ensure the appropriate development and execution of
budgetary and fiscal policies and initiatives of the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of
Defense.
Answer. Likewise, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management and Comptroller) must work closely with the Deputy Chief
Management Officer of the Department of Defense to ensure the
implementation of business systems architecture and to help identify
business process improvements.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the
Army and Air Force.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) must work closely with sister Service counterparts to
ensure that decisionmaking at all levels reflects the strongest
cooperation and collaboration (to include sharing of best practices)
among the Military Services.
Question. The Chief of Legislative Affairs for the Department of
the Navy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) should work closely with the Chief of Legislative
Affairs to ensure that all budgetary and legislative matters are
properly conveyed to the appropriate Members of Congress and
committees.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that confront
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and
Comptroller?
Answer. In sum, (1) balancing the budget while ensuring
requirements of the warfighter are met; (2) ensuring the financial
management workforce is recruited, retained, trained and developed; (3)
ensuring the financial statements within the Navy and Marine Corps are
audit-ready.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Standing alone, the challenges I enumerated above are
considerable. In the context of the constraints of the Budget Control
Act of 2011, the challenges are even more daunting and can only be
accomplished through close coordination with the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy,
and the Navy's Service Chiefs.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant problems
in the performance of the functions of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller?
Answer. I am aware that the specific impacts of furlough associated
with the Department's effort to manage the effects sequestration have
had a negative impact on the performance and functions of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. Specific solutions, which in turn would determine the
timeline, must be the product of collaboration with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and Congress. If confirmed, I will do everything
in my power to find solutions to the problems and/or to mitigate the
impacts.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)?
Answer. My priorities are aligned to what I perceive as the
Department's greatest challenges. In sum, (1) balancing the budget
while ensuring requirements of the warfighter are met; (2) ensuring the
financial management workforce is recruited, retained, trained and
developed; (3) ensuring the financial statements within the Navy and
Marine Corps are audit-ready.
civilian and military roles in the navy budget process
Question. What is your understanding of the division of
responsibility between the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management and Comptroller) and the senior military officers
responsible for budget matters in Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations and headquarters, Marine Corps, in making program and budget
decisions, including the preparation of the Navy Program Objective
Memorandum, the annual budget submission, and the Future Years Defense
Program?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) is responsible for all budget matters within the
Department. If I am confirmed, the senior military officers, including
the Director of the office of Budget, would serve as principal military
advisors to me in my capacity to oversee the development of the
Departments Program Objective Memorandum, annual budget submission, and
Future Years Defense Program.
financial management and accountability
Question. DOD's financial management deficiencies have been the
subject of many audit reports over the past 10 or more years. Despite
numerous strategies and initiatives, problems with financial management
and data continue.
What do you consider to be the top financial management issues that
must be addressed by the Department of the Navy over the next 5 years?
Answer. The top financial management issues include: (1) balancing
the budget while ensuring requirements of the warfighter are met; (2)
ensuring the financial management workforce is recruited, retained,
trained and developed; (3) ensuring the financial statements within the
Navy and Marine Corps are audit-ready.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to ensure that progress
is made toward improved financial management in the Navy?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working closely with my civilian
counterparts and military leadership within the Department of the Navy
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to properly
allocate resources, to improve our systems and processes, to recruit
and retain the right workforce and to achieve auditable financial
statements.
Question. If confirmed, what private business practices, if any,
would you advocate for adoption by the Department of Defense and the
Department of the Navy?
Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any private business
practices that I would advocate for adoption. If confirmed, I will
consider best financial practices from within the private sector and
other well-run Federal or State agencies.
Question. What are the most important performance measurements you
would use, if confirmed, to evaluate changes in the Navy's financial
operations to determine if its plans and initiatives are being
implemented as intended and anticipated results are being achieved?
Answer. The timely distribution and allocation of funds; the timely
obligation of funds; balance of funds with the Treasury, the percentage
of invoices that are paid in timely fashion, the amount of interest
penalties paid, and the timeliness of financial data are all
performance measures that I believe require close monitoring. If
confirmed, I would track these metrics along with the scheduled
timelines previously established within the Department of the Navy. I
would use these indices to evaluate where and how to make any
adjustments.
Question. Section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 establishes an objective for the Department of
Defense to ensure that its financial statements are validated as ready
for audit by not later than September 30, 2017. The provision requires
the Department to establish interim goals, including objectives for
each of the Military Departments.
What is your understanding of the status of Navy efforts to ensure
that its financial statement is validated as ready for audit by the
statutory deadline?
Answer. I understand that the Department has a Financial
Improvement Plan and is making progress toward achieving auditable
financial statements. However, a substantial amount of work remains to
be completed if the Department is to improve its business processes and
systems. Difficult issues must be addressed, including the valuation of
major weapon systems and equipment. While I support the 2017 goal, I
have not had the opportunity to review the plan and at this time could
not inform you of my confidence level that the September 30, 2017 goal
is achievable.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department of
the Navy should take to ensure that it meets the 2017 deadline?
Answer. Maintaining a steady focus and commitment on all Department
efforts enabling audit readiness will be critical to success in 2017
and lay the foundation for a sustainable audit environment well into
the future. If confirmed, I will review the objectives that have been
prepared and determine whether they appear to be reasonable and
effective.
Question. What is the role of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Financial Management and Comptroller) in this effort?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management
and Comptroller) provides the overall leadership within the Department
to achieve auditable financial statements. However, the ability to
produce auditable statements is influenced by all the business
operations and processes within the Department. If confirmed, I will
work with the civilian and military leadership, process owners and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to meet the
requirement for auditable financial statements.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the Chief Management
Officer of the Department of the Navy and the Navy Business
Transformation Office in this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief Management
Officer of the Department of the Navy and the Navy Business
Transformation Office to ensure that budget, finance, and accounting
operations are considered in changes to Department of the Navy business
processes. I will provide leadership and advice in the financial
management functional area and ensure that those efforts are aligned
with Department of Defense priorities to achieve and sustain auditable
financial statements.
supplemental funding and annual budgeting
Question. Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense has
paid for much of the cost of ongoing military operations through
supplemental appropriations, and the fiscal year 2014 budget included a
full-year request for overseas contingency operations.
What are your views regarding the use of supplemental
appropriations to fund the cost of ongoing military operations?
Answer. The longstanding practice of using supplemental
appropriation requests to fund contingency operations has allowed the
administration and Congress to specifically identify and review the
cost of military operations above those costs necessary to provide for
ongoing national security activities. While this has been an added
burden to the resource process, it should continue to diminish as
operations continue to wind down. I believe this method has been
helpful in allowing these two branches of government to fulfill their
respective roles and responsibilities.
budget control act and sequestration
Question. Due to the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) sequestration is
cutting the enacted fiscal year 2013 defense budget by more than $40
billion and, without changes to the BCA, sequestration will cut the DOD
budget request by approximately $52 billion.
What are your views regarding the Budget Control Act and
sequestration of budgetary resources?
Answer. The BCA is law until the President and Congress negotiate
an alternative solution. I agree with the general observations made by
those involved that ensuring compliance with BCA implementation
requirements has produced significant challenges to effective and
efficient DOD operations. I am also aware that the possibility exists
for implementation of the BCA in fiscal year 2014 if the law remains in
place.
If confirmed, it will be my responsibility to advise the Secretary
of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps how best to implement BCA reductions to lessen the adverse
impact that sequestration will have on the Naval enterprise and on
national security.
Question. What is your view of the impact that sequestration in
fiscal year 2014 and beyond would have in the Department of the Navy?
Answer. At this point, I am unfamiliar with the specific effects of
sequestration in fiscal year 2014 and beyond for the Department of the
Navy, but I generally understand and personally believe that
sequestration will in all likelihood, dramatically, and in very short
order, degrade readiness and adversely affect the health and morale of
the all volunteer force. If confirmed, it will be my responsibility to
advise the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps how best to implement BCA reductions to
lessen the adverse impact that sequestration will have on the Naval
enterprise and on national security.
furlough of navy personnel
Question. It was previously reported that the Navy believed it
could structure its available fiscal year 2013 funding to avoid having
any furlough days for Navy civilian workers. However, other parts of
DOD were not in a position to do the same for their own civilian
workers and, in the end, DOD's solution was to have all DOD civilian
workers, including Navy civilian workers, take up to 11 furlough days.
What is the impact on the Navy's various budget accounts, and on
Navy readiness, of the DOD decision to require Navy civilian workers to
be furloughed for up to 11 days?
Answer. While I am aware that the CNO and Commandant had to make
very tough choices, I do not have insight into the DOD decision process
that required them to direct the DON to furlough. If confirmed, I will
be able to study these impacts further and provide you greater insight
in the future.
Question. Now that the Navy has finally determined the impact of
the March 1, 2013, sequester on the Navy's fiscal year 2013 accounts,
was the impact of the sequester on the Navy along the lines of what
Navy and DOD officials originally expected and forecast?
Answer. I do not have insight into how the DON is implementing
sequestration versus its original forecasts. If confirmed, I will be
able to review fiscal year 2013 execution to assess the funal impact of
sequestration.
Question. What does the experience with the sequestration of fiscal
year 2013 accounts tell us about the potential impact of sequestration
later this year or early next year on the Navy's fiscal year 2014
accounts?
Answer. While the President's budget submitted for fiscal year 2014
did not assume the impacts of sequestration, it is my understanding
that the Department has been directed to prepare for the possibility of
sequestration continuing into fiscal year 2014. I am not aware of any
specifics.
authorization for national defense programs
Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section
114 of title 10, U.S.C., is necessary before funds for operations and
maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military
construction may be made available for obligation by the Department of
Defense?
Answer. Yes. Furthermore, if confirmed, I will respect the views
and prerogatives of the Department's oversight committees.
laboratory directed research and development (ldrd)
Question. Section 219 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 authorized
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of the
military departments, to ``establish mechanisms under which the
director of a defense laboratory may use an amount of funds equal to
not more than three per cent of all funds available to the defense
laboratory . . . to fund innovative basic and applied research and
several other purposes at these laboratories.'' Similar to the model of
the Department of Energy LDRD program, the purpose of section 219 is to
provide funding and discretion to the Navy's laboratory and technical
center directors, to support the continued infusion of new ideas that
support Navy missions, and in particular to authorize the directors to
exercise some discretion in investing in promising technologies and
other laboratory activities.
What should the role and authority of the Navy comptroller's
organization be in implementing this statute?
Answer. I agree that the Navy's laboratory and technical centers
are vital to supporting Navy's mission. The Navy Comptroller's role in
implementing this statute is to develop a budget strategy consistent
with the congressional direction, to ensure the implementation and
execution of this authority is done in accordance with the law, and to
ensure appropriate financial and accounting methods are in place to
support this program. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department's
budget strategy and policies are in accordance with the law.
Question. How would you intend to enable the laboratory director's
discretion over such funding to support its effective implementation,
similar to the Department of Energy model?
Answer. At this point, I do not have the necessary familiarity with
the Department of Energy model, but if confirmed, I will work with the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition)
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to ensure
effective and successful implementation.
budgeting to address operational needs and technological opportunities
Question. The Services often are often faced with situations in
which an urgent operational need or a new technological opportunity
arises on a timeline that is inconsistent with the relatively slow
budgeting and programming process.
How should the Navy change its processes so that its budgeting,
programming, and planning processes are more adaptable to emerging
operational needs and technological opportunities?
Answer. At this point, I do not have the necessary familiarity with
current processes to answer this question, but if confirmed, I will
review all current processes to see if there are adjustments to be made
that make us more adaptable to emerging operational needs and
technological opportunities.
in-kind military construction
Question. The committee released a report on April 15, 2013, titled
``Inquiry into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the U.S.
Military Presence Overseas.'' Among other things, the committee's
inquiry found that in-kind payments from Germany, South Korea, and
Japan have been used to fund questionable military construction
projects. The committee's version of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014 includes a provision (section 2801) that would
require that future military construction projects funded using in-kind
payments pursuant to bilateral agreements with partner nations be
submitted for congressional authorization in the Military Construction
Authorization Act.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that in-kind payments are
utilized only for identified U.S. priorities to offset costs that the
Department of the Navy would otherwise pay with appropriated funds?
Answer. At this point, I do not have a complete understanding of
the prevalence of this method of funding nor the specific details of
its prior use within the Department of the Navy. Upon receipt of this
question, I reviewed the Navy-specific sections in the referenced
report. If confirmed, I will ensure that gaining an understanding this
practice will become one of my immediate short-term priorities and that
my understanding is placed in the context of other legal authorities
and constraints.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes, I agree.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)?
Answer. Yes, I agree.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes, I agree.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes, I agree.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
bonuses paid to senior executive service employees of the department of
defense
1. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Rabern, in 2011, the Department of the
Navy (DON) was among the few Federal agencies that awarded, on average,
more than one bonus per Senior Executive Service (SES) employee. The
Navy was also one of the five agencies with the highest average
spending on SES bonuses, awarding more than $13,000 in bonuses per SES
employee. If confirmed, will you share with this committee the status
of bonuses paid to SES employees in the Navy in fiscal year 2012,
including the total amount paid, the amount per SES employee, the
number and percentage of SES employees receiving bonuses, and whether
any SES employees received aggregate pay above the statutory limit of
$230,700?
Dr. Rabern. Yes, if confirmed I will share with the committee the
status of SES bonuses in the Navy.

2. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Rabern, will you commit to reviewing, and
changing, if necessary, the metrics used to determine the performance
level of SES employees, and provide information to this committee
regarding the progress and results of your review?
Dr. Rabern. Yes, if confirmed I commit to reviewing the metrics
used to determine the performance level of SES employees and, if
necessary, will propose changes to the appropriate DON, Department of
Defense (DOD), or Office of Personnel Management officials.

department of the navy audit
3. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Rabern, Public Law 111-84, the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2010, enacted October 28, 2009, requires
auditable DOD financial statements by September 30, 2017. While
progress is being made, the current Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Financial Management and Comptroller) acknowledged several material
weaknesses related to the Navy's business processes and systems that
prevent the Navy from producing auditable financial statements. Given
the numerous weaknesses that have been identified, do you believe that
the Navy will be in a position to keep up its end of the bargain in
getting DOD to a point where it can be audited in the next 4 years?
Dr. Rabern. I understand that the Department has a Financial
Improvement Plan and is making progress toward achieving auditable
financial statements. However, I have not had the opportunity to review
the plan and at this time could not inform you of my confidence level
that the September 30, 2017, goal is achievable.

4. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Rabern, what gives you confidence that
the Navy can meet the 2017 goal?
Dr. Rabern. Even though I support the 2017 goal, I have not had the
opportunity to review the plan and at this time could not inform you of
my confidence level that the September 30, 2017, goal is achievable.

5. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Rabern, on July 18, the DOD OIG released
a report raising concerns about the Navy's use of the Navy Enterprise
Resource Planning System (Navy ERP). The DOD OIG found that while the
Navy has identified a material weakness in the its ability to account
for Navy military equipment, and has identified Navy ERP as the
solution, the Navy is in fact not using Navy ERP to account for this
equipment. Rather, the Navy continues to use what the DOD OIG called
``inefficient manual processes'' in its accounting procedures. The Navy
spent $870 million to develop and implement Navy ERP, and the Navy
needs to be fully utilizing its capabilities. If confirmed, will you
take a close look at this issue to ensure the Navy is appropriately
using the resources at its disposal to be accountable and achieve its
audit-ready obligations?
Dr. Rabern. If confirmed, I commit to working closely with my
civilian counterparts and military leadership within the Department of
the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to
properly allocate and account for resources, to improve our systems and
processes, and to achieve auditable financial statements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
contractor salaries
6. Senator Manchin. Dr. Rabern, since I've gotten to the Senate,
I've been asking DOD how many contractors there are, and how much money
they make. I still don't have an answer. What I do know is that
contractors can make up to $763,000--funded by the taxpayers. If we do
nothing, that figure will rise to nearly $1 million this year. What is
your opinion on paying our contractors nearly $1 million?
Dr. Rabern. In my experience, government contracts generally do not
specify a number of personnel required to satisfy the terms; rather,
the government contracts for performance of a specific set of tasks,
objectives, or services. I do not have in depth knowledge of the
salaries paid to Department of Navy contractor personnel. If confirmed,
I commit to looking at this issue and providing informed
recommendations to senior leadership of the Department of the Navy
regarding the efficient and effective allocation of resources
consistent with the national security priorities of the President and
the Secretary of Defense.

7. Senator Manchin. Dr. Rabern, would it have an impact on the
readiness of the military if we brought that figure to a more
reasonable amount?
Dr. Rabern. I do not have sufficient information to respond to this
question at this time. If confirmed, I commit to looking at this issue
and providing informed recommendations to senior leadership of the
Department of the Navy regarding the efficient and effective allocation
of resources consistent with the national security priorities of the
President and the Secretary of Defense.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
priorities
8. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rabern, do you believe the Navy's purchase
last year of 450,000 gallons of biofuels for $12 million using scarce
operations and maintenance (O&M) funds at a cost of over $26 a gallon
is an efficient, effective use of O&M funds and is an example of proper
stewardship?
Dr. Rabern. I am not familiar with the details of this purchase and
cannot provide an opinion on the matter at this time. If confirmed, I
will ensure that we develop and execute balanced budgets that are the
result of thorough and timely analysis and in support of the goals and
initiatives that Secretary Mabus has established for the Department.

financial management and control
9. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rabern, based on your extensive experience
in financial management do you believe it is prudent for any Federal
agency to submit their annual budget submission without including
consideration for the effects of the Budget Control Act?
Dr. Rabern. I have not been associated with any budget submissions
since passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011, but I believe that
agency budgets should be submitted consistent with the requirements and
constraints of the law.

dod financial accounting and audits
10. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rabern, if confirmed, what is your
understanding of your role in finally establishing the level of audit
readiness that is required by law?
Dr. Rabern. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management and Comptroller) provides the overall leadership within the
Department to achieve auditable financial statements. However, the
ability to produce auditable statements is influenced by all the
business operations and processes within the Department. If confirmed,
I will work with the civilian and military leadership, process owners,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to meet the
requirement for auditable financial statements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
navy facility backlog
11. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Rabern, section 2476 of title 10 requires 6
percent of annual capital investment for certain depots. Are you aware
of this requirement and will you commit to follow that requirement?
Dr. Rabern. I am familiar with this requirement, and if confirmed,
I commit to working with the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of
the Marine Corps, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition and Energy, Installations and
Environment to ensure that whatever funding may be available for shore
infrastructure, including shipyards and depots, is allocated
appropriately to meet mission critical needs.

dod audit
12. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Rabern, with DOD facing significant budget
reductions, it is more important than ever that we have reliable
financial data so we can differentiate between necessary budget cuts
and those that would harm our troops and endanger our national
security. Do I have your commitment that the Navy will meet the 2014
statement of budgetary resources deadline, as required by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013?
Dr. Rabern. If confirmed, I am committed to maintaining a steady
focus on all Department efforts towards clean audit opinions and
critical to that success is assertion in 2014. If confirmed, I will
review the objectives that have been prepared and determine whether
they appear to be reasonable and effective.

13. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Rabern, is the Navy creating systems and
processes that will be repeatable so that we avoid expending great
effort to ensure the Navy is audit ready--only to find that the Navy is
unable to sustain these efforts over the long-term?
Dr. Rabern. A crucial step in the DON plan to achieve audit success
is laying the foundation for a sustainable audit environment well into
the future. If confirmed, I will review the objectives that have been
prepared and determine whether they appear to be reasonable and
effective.
______

[The nomination reference of Dr. Susan J. Rabern follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 27, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Susan J. Rabern, of Kansas, to be an Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, vice Gladys Commons, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Susan J. Rabern, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Susan J. Rabern
Education:
University of Kansas

1970-1974
B.A. degree in Biology, 1974

Boston University

1979-1980
M.A. degree in Education, 1980

San Diego State University

1983-1986
M.B.A. (finance) degree, 1986

National Defense University

1995-1996
M.S. (strategic studies) degree, 1996

University of Virginia, Darden School of Business

2003-2009
Ph.D (ethics and entrepreneurship) degree 2998
Employment record:
Virginia Military Institute

Director, Center for Leadership & Ethics
2009-Present

U.S. Agency for International Development

Deputy Director, Office of Military Affairs
2007-2009

Virginia Military Institute

Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff and
Superintendent
2003-2007

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chief Financial Officer
2000-2002

U.S. Customs Service

Assistant Commissioner and Chief Financial Officer
2002

U.S. Agency for International Development

Chief Financial Officer
2002-2003

U.S. Navy (active duty, 1980-2000)

Retired in 2000 in rank of Captain (0-6)

U.S. Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy,

Counselor
1978-1980
Honors and awards:
Defense Superior Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (six awards)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Navy Commendation Medal
Commandant's Award for Excellence in Research & Writing, Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University (1996)
Boards:
Community Foundation of Rockbridge, Bath, and Alleghany Counties.

Board Member and Committee Chair (Grants/Audit)

Academy of Management

Member

Omicron Delta Kappa, National Leadership Society

Member
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Susan J.
Rabern in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Susan Jean Rabern (Susan Jean Wynn, Susan Jean Kite, Susan Jean
Blunt).

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and
Comptroller).

3. Date of nomination:
June 27, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
March 28, 1952; McPherson, KS.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to David William Rabern.

7. Names and ages of children:
Stacey Elaine (Blunt) Lobst, age 35.
Allison (NMN) (Blunt) Leigh, age 30.
Megan Lynn Blunt, age 28.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
University of Kansas, 1970-1974, BA (Biology), 1974
Boston University, 1979-1980, MA (Education), 1980
San Diego State University, 1983-1986, MBA (Finance), 1986
National Defense University, Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, 1995-1996, MS (Strategic Studies), 1996
University of Virginia, Darden School of Business, 2003-2009, Ph.D.
(Ethics & Entrepreneurship), 2009

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Director, Center for Leadership and Ethics, Marshall Hall, Virginia
Military Institute, Lexington, VA, 2009-present
Deputy Director, Office of Military Affairs, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, DC,
2007-2009
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff and Superintendent,
Virginia Military Institute, Intergovernmental Personnel Assignment
from U.S. Agency for International Development, Virginia Military
Institute, Lexington, VA, 2003-2007

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
U.S. Navy (Active Duty, 21 years, retired 2000, rank Captain)
Assistant Director and Chief Financial Officer, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2000-2002
Assistant Commissioner and Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Customs
Service, 2002
Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Agency for International Development,
2002-2003
Counselor, U.S. Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy, 1978-1980

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Board Member and Committee Chair (Grants/Audit), Community
Foundation of Rockbridge, Bath, and Alleghany Counties.
Member, Academy of Management
Member, Omicron Delta Kappa, National Leadership Society

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Defense Superior Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (six awards)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Navy Commendation Medal.
Commandant's Award for Excellence in Research and Writing,
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University
(1996)

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Doctoral Dissertation:

2009, University of Virginia. Leveraging the Feds: An
Assessment of the Effectiveness of Corporate Political
Strategies

Book Length Government Manuscripts:

2000 National Defense University, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, Philanthropy, Statesmanship, Innocence or
Greed? U.S. Engagement with the Former Soviet Union 1992-2000
1996, National Defense University, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, The Effect of Organized Crime on the Post-
Cold War Economy of Russia

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, ifconfirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies
ofelectronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested
by a duly constituted committee, orto consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Dr. Susan J. Rabern was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Dennis V. McGinn by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I believe the Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms have been
very effective, and I am not aware of the need for any modifications.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I am not aware of the need for any modifications to
Goldwater-Nichols, but if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of
the Navy and Under Secretary of the Navy on any proposed changes that
pertain to Navy energy, installations or the environment.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and
Environment?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations,
and Environment) formulates policy and procedures for the effective
management of the Navy and Marine Corps energy programs, real property,
housing and other facilities; environmental protection ashore and
afloat; and, safety and occupational health for both military and
civilian personnel. This position is also responsible for the timely
completion of closures and realignments of installations under base
closure laws.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. During my 35-year career with the U.S. Navy I served as a
naval aviator, test pilot, aircraft carrier commanding officer, and
national security strategist. My capstone assignment with the Navy was
as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and
Programs at the Pentagon, where I oversaw the development of future
U.S. Navy capabilities. In my previous operational leadership roles, I
commanded the U.S. Third Fleet.
In my civilian career I have served as co-chairman of the Center
for Naval Analyses (CNA) Military Advisory Board advising policy makers
on the nexus of energy and national security, and as an international
security senior fellow at the Rocky Mountain Institute. I served on the
Steering Committee of the Energy Future Coalition, as a member of the
United States Energy Security Council, and as a member of the
Bipartisan Policy Center Energy Board. I previously worked with
Battelle Memorial Institute, where I was a corporate officer and led
the energy, transportation, and environment division. While serving as
the CEO and President of the American Council On Renewable Energy
(ACORE), I led the advancement of the organization's mission of
building a secure and prosperous America with clean, renewable energy.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment?
Answer. I am confident that there is much that I can do to enhance
my abilities to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Energy, Installations and Environment). If confirmed, I will seek
to learn more about the individual programs and facilities within my
purview, as well as the different requirements associated with military
construction. Using my significant managerial experience, I would
expect to parlay the expertise and views of those within the Department
of the Navy, as well as those of the Secretary of Defense and the other
military departments, to develop efficient and effective policies for
the Department's use of our installations and the environment. If
confirmed, I will also seek and listen to the advice and counsel of
Congress, and the communities in which we operate, to find ways to be
the best steward of the Department of the Navy's properties.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of the Navy would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect the Secretary of the Navy to
prescribe the duties and functions stated above. Additionally, I would
expect that the Secretary will request that I rely upon my years of
operational experience to assist him in developing and implementing
programs to meet the energy goals he laid out for the Department.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would be your professional
relationship with:
The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to carry out the goals and
priorities of the Secretary of the Navy.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work directly with the Under Secretary
and seek his counsel and guidance as I work to support his efforts to
carry out the goals and priorities of the Secretary of the Navy.
Question. The Chief of Naval Operations.
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide the support that the Chief of
Naval Operations requires to execute his duties and responsibilities
and achieve the mission of the Navy.
Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide the support that the
Commandant requires to execute his duties and responsibilities and
achieve the mission of the Marine Corps.
Question. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Installations and Environment to develop and execute the
policies and initiatives of the President, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Secretary of the Navy.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy
Plans and Programs.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs to develop and
execute the policies and initiatives of the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy.
Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work as part of the team to ensure
that we present the best collaborative approach to supporting the goals
and priorities of the Secretary of the Navy.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Air Force for
Installations and Environment.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant
Secretaries of the Army and Air Force for Installations and Environment
to strengthen the cooperation between the Services. I will work to
foster a cordial and productive working relationship with these
colleagues.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel
of the Navy to ensure that the programs we execute, and the policies we
develop are consistent with the law.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy to ensure that the programs we execute and the
policies we develop are consistent with the areas of law contained
within her purview. I would also expect to work directly with the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy on areas of mutual interest.
Question. The Director of Naval Energy Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Naval Energy
Policy to identify and implement policies and practices that best
support the needs of the Department of the Navy.
Question. Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command to identify and implement policies and
practices that best support the needs of the Department of the Navy.
Question. Commander, Navy Installations Command.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander, Navy
Installations Command to identify and implement policies and practices
that best support the needs of the Department of the Navy, our sailors,
marines, and their families.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that confront
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and
Environment?
Answer. There are many significant challenges confronting the next
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations, and
Environment). The most significant of these includes the Guam military
construction projects, ensuring that the Department of the Navy has the
right infrastructure at the right time for the right cost to support
the country's warfighters and their families, and establishing the
programs necessary to meet the Department's energy goals.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with Congress, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of
the Marine Corps, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Environment), as well as other governmental and nongovernmental
organizations to devise solutions to address these challenges and
maximize successful outcomes for all parties involved.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant problems
in the performance of the functions of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment?
Answer. I am not aware of any significant problems in the
performance of the functions of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Energy, Installations and Environment.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary and
the Under Secretary of the Navy to develop a strategic plan to address
significant problems that arise.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment?
Answer. If confirmed, I will establish priorities consistent with
those of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of
the Navy. In broad terms, I will assist the Secretary of the Navy in
meeting the energy goals he laid out for the Department, work closely
with Members of Congress and State and local officials and the public
to remain fully transparent when considering projects and processes
with environmental impacts, and seek to allocate funding to develop the
right infrastructure at the right time at the right cost to support our
warfighters and their families.
Question. Do you have any specific plans to help improve the
quality of life for Navy and Marine Corps families who are under
considerable strain as a result of repeated deployments?
Answer. Not at this time, but as a 35 year Navy veteran, I am very
aware of the tremendous sacrifices made by Navy and Marine Corps
families. If confirmed, I will be committed to identifying and
implementing quality of life initiatives.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
Installations, and Environment has responsibility for, among other
things, enhancing energy security, construction and maintenance of
installations; family housing, and environmental protection.
In the competition for resources inherent in the Defense Department
budget process, how do you believe funding for these various
responsibilities should be balanced?
Answer. These important programs are not mutually exclusive.
Although they would certainly compete for the same limited resources,
the development of these programs must be done in conjunction with each
other. All of these programs must work hand-in-hand to further the
strategic vision and goals of the Secretary of the Navy.
military construction
Question. What would be your highest priorities, if confirmed, for
allocating military construction (MILCON) funding for the Department of
the Navy over the next several years?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to allocate funding to develop
the right infrastructure at the right time at the right cost to support
our warfighters and their families.
Question. Are you concerned that overseas initiatives, including
the realignment of marines in the Pacific, will consume an increasing
share of the Department of the Navy MILCON budget--thereby crowding out
other programs such as housing and quality of life programs for
sailors, marines, and their families?
Answer. Although we find ourselves in a challenging fiscal
environment, I am cautiously optimistic that we will be able to meet
all of these challenges and fund the right investments at the right
time.
guam
Question. The committee remains concerned about the plans for the
relocation of marines from Okinawa to other locations in the Pacific,
and specifically, the affordability, sustainability and operational
viability of those plans. In April of last year, the United States and
Japan announced a new plan for the marines--called the ``distributed
laydown''--that envisions about 4,500 in Guam, about 2,500 in
Australia, on a rotational basis, and some number in Hawaii. The
committee's version of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014 would continue a prohibition on the use of U.S. or
Japanese funds to implement the realignment of Marine Corps forces from
Okinawa until several conditions, including the development of a master
plan for the laydown of marines in Guam and Hawaii, are met.
What is your understanding of the status of the Department of the
Navy's plans for the realignment of Marine Corps forces from Okinawa?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to develop a thorough
understanding of the issues associated with the relocation of marines
and their families from Okinawa to Guam. From the information that I
have seen at this point, I understand the Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement (SEIS) and associated supporting studies are being
prepared and that the DON anticipates that the Draft SEIS will be
formally released for public comment in early 2014 with a Record of
Decision expected in early 2015.
Question. What is your understanding of the current estimated cost
to implement the realignment of Marine Corps forces from Okinawa?
Answer. Although I am not familiar with the official estimates, I
understand that the Department of Defense is identifying and
incorporating comprehensive cost estimates as they become available
upon completion of necessary environmental planning documents and the
conclusion of host-nation discussions on cost-sharing.
Question. When will the Department of the Navy provide the Senate
Armed Services Committee with the Guam Master Plan so that the costs
and timing of construction contracts for the entire project will be
totally transparent?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department will be able to
provide the Guam Master Plan after the Draft SEIS is released, sometime
next year.
futenma air station
Question. The committee understands that Futenma Marine Corps Air
Station on Okinawa will require significant investments to maintain
mission capability and readiness. In fact, the marines estimate that
current repair and construction demands will cost about $180 million.
What is your understanding of the current plan to fund the nearly
$180 million in repairs and construction?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department has been working
with the Government of Japan (GOJ) on a replacement facility for MCAS
Fuetenma. In the interim, the Department is working with the GOJ to
fund the repairs necessary to support operations at the base.
base closure and realignments
Question. The Department of Defense has requested another Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round.
Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why?
Answer. I believe it is prudent to objectively assess our shore
assets and make informed decisions about potentially excess
infrastructure. A new assessment would allow the Department to take
into account changes to the shore/platform interfaces as our weapons
systems capabilities, testing, and how we employ them have evolved over
time.
Question. If Congress were to authorize a another BRAC round, what
is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment in
formulating BRAC recommendations and implementing the decisions of the
BRAC Commission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will serve as the Department of the Navy's
primary senior leader charged with meeting our BRAC responsibilities.
Accordingly, I will work closely with Congress, the Secretary of the
Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment), as well as other governmental and nongovernmental
organizations as appropriate in order to execute these statutory
requirements.
Question. If confirmed and if Congress were to authorize another
BRAC round, how would you go about setting priorities for
infrastructure reduction and consolidation within the Department of the
Navy?
Answer. If confirmed and Congress were to authorize a BRAC, I would
first seek to gain a thorough understanding of the extent of the
Department's footprint ashore and how it supports the warfighter. I
would then ensure we have the necessary tools and resources to evaluate
what exists in terms of military value. I would also work with my
counterparts in the other Services for opportunities to consolidate or
co-locate functions, where it makes sense.
Question. If confirmed and if Congress were to authorize another
BRAC round, what is you understanding of the responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and
Environment in working with local communities with respect to property
disposal?
Answer. I believe that the Department of the Navy is responsible
for working with local communities to ensure an orderly and transparent
transition from public ownership to private ownership.
Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round
resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far
less money than originally estimated.
What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower
realized savings have occurred?
Answer. I am not familiar with the events leading cost growth in
implementing BRAC 2005.
Question. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a
future BRAC round?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the program is
implemented with management controls in place to help curtail excessive
cost growth.
overseas facilities
Question. Do you believe the Department of the Navy currently
maintains excess infrastructure overseas? If so, how would you seek to
address this issue?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to study Navy overseas force
structure, however, if confirmed I will work with the Secretary of the
Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant to make sure
Navy infrastructure is aligned with force structure to support naval
operations.
in-kind military construction
Question. The committee released a report on April 15, 2013, titled
``Inquiry into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the U.S.
Military Presence Overseas.'' Among other things, the committee's
inquiry found that in-kind payments from Germany, South Korea, and
Japan have been used to fund questionable military construction
projects. The committee's version of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014 includes a provision (section 2801) that would
require that future military construction projects funded using in-kind
payments pursuant to bilateral agreements with partner nations be
submitted for congressional authorization in the Military Construction
Authorization Act.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that in-kind payments are
utilized only for identified U.S. priorities to offset costs that the
Department of the Navy would otherwise pay with appropriated funds?
Answer. I do not have a complete understanding of this method of
funding within the Navy but I have reviewed sections of the report
mentioned in this question and I understand the issue and concerns. If
confirmed, I will make certain I will work with the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) and others within
the Department to respond to this question more completely.
investment in infrastructure
Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in the past have
testified that the military services under-invest in both the
maintenance and recapitalization of facilities and infrastructure
compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in
DOD installations has led to substantial backlogs of facility
maintenance activities, created substandard living and working
conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies
that could increase productivity.
If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for restoring and
preserving the quality of our infrastructure?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the way the Navy
manages inventory and will work with the Secretary of the Navy, the
Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant to make sure our
infrastructure supports the warfighter.
Question. This underinvestment in infrastructure is particularly
acute in naval shipyard facilities. According to the Navy's shipyard
modernization plan, it will take 17 years and $3.4 billion to clear the
maintenance and infrastructure repair backlog.
If confirmed, how do you plan on addressing this shortfall?
Answer. Materiel readiness is a key enabler to maintaining freedom
of the seas. I'm also aware of the fiscal challenges facing the
Department. If confirmed, I will advocate for and work with the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition) to ensure that whatever funding may be
available for shore infrastructure, including shipyards and depots, is
allocated appropriately to meet mission critical needs.
Question. How do you believe the difficult budget environment will
affect the Navy's shipyard modernization efforts going forward in light
of other competing priorities?
Answer. I believe the current fiscal environment will present
significant challenges across the entire Department. When faced with
reduced resources, any organization, whether a business or a household,
must assess its short- and long-term objectives and make prudent
expenditures and investments accordingly. I believe the same holds true
for the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I will look forward to
meeting the challenge of balancing the Department's infrastructure
investments across a broad array of requirements.
enhanced use leases
Question. Congress has provided the authority for each of the
Service Secretaries to lease underutilized non-excess property and to
use revenues generated by those leases to enhance infrastructure and
operating costs on those installations. This so-called ``enhanced use
lease'' (EUL) authority is being used in different ways and for
different purposes by each of the military departments.
What is your understanding of the EUL authority?
Answer. My understanding is that the enhanced use lease authority
is a valuable tool in the Department's infrastructure management
toolbox. My understanding is that the Navy can use this authority to
partner with industry and the outside community to maximize the use of
Department property
Question. What do you see as the future of the Department of the
Navy's EUL program?
Answer. I understand that there are several promising EUL
opportunities that the Department of the Navy is currently examining.
Question. What Navy and Marine Corps EUL projects do you see as
most viable in the near term?
Answer. Because I am not aware of all the current projects or those
projects being considered, I could not identify the most viable in the
near term. If confirmed, I will examine all of our projects more fully
before making such an assessment.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the
Department of the Navy's EUL program?
Answer. I do not have a sufficient level of understanding to
identify priorities at this time. If confirmed, I will examine all of
our projects more fully and discuss with Navy stakeholders before
making such an assessment.
Question. If confirmed, would you consider the authority to provide
support to energy initiatives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will utilize the EUL program to ensure our
warfighters and their families have the highest quality environment in
which to live and work and that the Department's real estate is put to
the highest valued uses.
Question. The Congressional Budget Office has expressed concern
that EUL authority could be used to acquire expensive facilities
through long-term leases that commit the Department of Defense to make
payments (rather than receiving payments) over an extended period of
time.
Do you believe that it would be appropriate to use EUL authority to
commit future-years Department of Defense funds for long-term projects
to acquire facilities that have not received approval through the
normal budgeting process?
Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to study this issue, but
if confirmed, I certainly will do so.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address proposals to use EUL
authority in this manner?
Answer. Since I have not had an opportunity to study this issue, I
do not know how I would address such proposals if confirmed.
base operating support
Question. What is your understanding of the base operating support
requirements of the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps?
Answer. My understanding is that Base Operating Support (BOS)
requirements of the Department of the navy are critical to the overall
mission readiness of our Navy and Marine Corps. BOS funding finances
shore activities that support ship, aviation, combat operations,
critical training, facilities infrastructure maintenance, public
safety, and family programs for both Active and Reserve components.
Question. In your view, is the Department of the Navy receiving
adequate funding for base operating support?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review BOS funding in
detail, but if confirmed, I will closely examine funding levels to
ensure the highest quality living and working conditions for our
sailors, marines, and their families.
Question. How might the Department of the Navy distribute base
operating funds to best ensure sound investment of constrained
resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to learning the methods and
processes in place across the Department to guide investment decisions
and distribution of resources.
family housing and privatization
Question. In recent years, the Department of Defense and Congress
have taken significant steps to improve family housing. The housing
privatization program was created as an alternative approach to speed
the improvement of military family housing and relieve base commanders
of the burden of managing family housing. If confirmed for the position
of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and
Environment you will have a key role in decisions regarding military
family housing.
What are your impressions of the overall quality and sufficiency of
Navy and Marine Corps family housing both in the United States and
abroad?
Answer. My understanding is that major improvements have been made
to the overall of the quality and sufficiency of family housing
inventory, both domestically and overseas.
Question. What are your views regarding the privatization of family
housing?
Answer. I believe the use of the housing privatization authorities
was an important and necessary tool to revitalize a large inventory of
homes in a relatively short period of time.
Question. What is your view of the structure and general goals of
the Department of the Navy's current housing privatization program?
Answer. I believe the structure and general goals of the
Department's housing privatization program are sound.
Question. Do you believe the housing program should be modified in
any way? If so, how?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the housing program
in detail to determine if it should be modified in any way, but if
confirmed, I will closely examine it to ensure the highest quality
living and working conditions for our sailors, marines, and their
families.
environmental restoration
Question. The Department of the Navy's environmental restoration
budget remains a significant part of the Navy's overall environmental
program budget.
What do you see as the main priorities for clean-up within the
Department of the Navy program?
Answer. The Department of the Navy's priorities for clean-up are
established by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment), and, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy
Under Secretary to ensure that those priorities are implemented
Question. What will you do to ensure that adequate funding is
requested and received so that clean-ups under the Installation
Restoration Program and under the Military Munitions Remediation
Program continue apace?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that I fully understand the
clean-up priorities, as established by the Secretary of the Navy, and
will work with the Secretary, as well as Members of Congress, to ensure
that adequate funding for clean-up is both requested and received.
past water contamination at camp lejeune
Question. For more than 12 years, the Department of the Navy has
been trying to understand and resolve issues associated with past water
contamination suspected at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. However,
aspects of this matter remain unresolved, including the nature and
extent of various scientific studies into the potential human exposure.
If confirmed, what will you do to help ensure that all reasonable
actions are taken to resolve this matter as expeditiously as possible?
Answer. The Department of the Navy is committed to ensuring the
health and safety of all its personnel--both past and present. I know
that the Department has commissioned numerous scientific studies to
inquire into a possible connection between past water contamination at
Camp Lejeune and health issues of personnel who served there. I have
not, however, been made privy to their results. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the Department, using the information from these studies,
acts promptly and in accordance with all applicable laws to resolve
this important matter.
encroachment on military installations
Question. Encroachment by commercial and residential development on
military installations can negatively impact Navy and Marine Corps
operations at military airfields, training ranges, and the development
of new facilities.
What do you see as the main constraints on the Department of the
Navy's ability to use its facilities, including training ranges?
Answer. I am not aware of any specific constraints on the
Department of the Navy's ability to use its facilities. I believe that
the Department has completed or is completing environmental impact
statements for its training ranges, and that these ranges are operated
in accordance with the results.
Question. If confirmed, what policies or steps would you take to
balance the trade-off between energy development and the impact on
operations and training?
Answer. I believe that military operations and energy development
are not mutually exclusive. If confirmed, I would work closely with
Federal, State, and local governments as well as the energy developers
to meet the needs of the Department while enabling access to new
sources of energy.
Question. How can the Department of the Navy address the issues of
encroachment around its bases in the United States, particularly with
respect to encroachment caused by residential development?
Answer. I believe the Department of the Navy must take a two-
pronged approach to addressing issues of encroachment around its bases.
First, it is important to communicate concerns with local communities.
Second, where appropriate, the Department should seek additional land
surrounding its bases.
Question. One significant issue for the Navy has been the potential
interference to aircraft radars of wind farms installed around military
installations and ranges.
Given your qualifications, including as a former naval aviator,
what would you propose as objectives and goals to address this issue?
Answer. As a naval aviator, I know that while wind turbines can
physically interfere with aircraft operations and military training
routes, that problem is a merely matter of proper siting. The much more
difficult issue is the electromagnetic interference caused wind
turbines which can impact radars many miles away. I'm aware the
Department of Defense has created a body to assess the impact of these
projects and if confirmed I will work to ensure we can reap the
benefits from alternative energy development without impacting training
and operations.
Question. What is your understanding of the Navy's ability to
receive information and plans from potential developers in a timely and
effective manner?
Answer. I believe the Department of Defense has established
procedures to assess the impact of these proposed projects and that
while the process is still fairly new and developing, it does afford an
opportunity for the Navy to review these plans. If confirmed, I would
work to ensure this system continues to improve.
pending land withdrawal requests
Question. As part of the President's budget request for fiscal year
2014, the Department of Defense has requested legislation for a number
of land withdrawals, including the reauthorization of the land
withdrawals at the Chocolate Mountains and at China Lake, as well a
land withdrawal to support an expansion at the Marine Corps base at
Twentynine Palms.
What is your understanding of these requests and why are each of
these withdrawals important to the Department of Navy missions and
capabilities?
Answer. My general understanding is that the Department of Defense
seeks to control only the minimum amount of property necessary to meet
the military requirement. From my experience, I know the Chocolate
Mountain range, the test center at China Lake and the Marine Corps base
at Twentynine Palms are key DON installations.
energy policy
Question. If confirmed, what would your responsibilities be for
setting and implementing energy policy within the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, my responsibilities would be to support the
Secretary's Navy Energy Office and work towards meeting the Secretary's
shore and operational energy goals.
Question. Do you support the Department of Defense policy on
alternative fuels released in July 2012 that the Department of Defense
will not make bulk purchases of alternative drop-in replacement fuels
unless they are cost competitive with petroleum products?
Answer. Yes, I support the DOD policy to only make bulk purchases
of alternative drop-in fuels that are cost competitive with
conventional fuel.
Question. In your view, how does the bulk use of alternative drop-
in replacement fuels improve the military capabilities of the fleet?
Answer. In addition to reducing reliance on foreign sources of
energy, ``drop-in'' fuels would not require any infrastructure or
operational changes to bring on line.
Question. Given recent forecasts about oil production in the United
States over the next 30 years, what do you see as the national security
implications, if any, of a dependence on fossil fuels?
Answer. Fossil fuels, whether imported or domestically produced,
are subject to price volatility and uncertainty of supply. Deriving
fuels from other than petroleum sources adds to the supply and helps
mitigate fluctuating prices.
Question. In your opinion, are the statutory and regulatory goals
for the Department of the Navy regarding the use of renewable energy
and alternative fuels realistic and achievable?
Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to study this issue, but
if confirmed, I will review the Department's progress towards meeting
the statutory and regulatory goals regarding the use of renewable
energy and alternative fuels. If confirmed, it is my intention to meet
these goals unless otherwise directed.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of Department of the
Navy funding to meet statutory and regulatory energy conservation
goals?
Answer. At this point, I do not have in-depth knowledge of the
Department's budget, but I am aware of the significant fiscal
challenges it faces. If confirmed, I will advocate for and work with
the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, the Commandant, the General
Counsel, and the Judge Advocate General, to ensure statutory and
regulatory conservation goals are met.
Question. Do you believe that significant additional funding will
be needed in future years to meet such goals?
Answer. At this point, I do not have in-depth knowledge of the
Department's budget, but I am aware of the significant fiscal
challenges it faces. Further, energy security directly enhances
national security. If confirmed, I will advocate for and work with the
Secretary of the Navy, the CNO and the Commandant to ensure the
continued support of the Department's energy goals while meeting the
needs of the warfighter.
Question. If confirmed, what energy goals and policies will you
promote for the Department of the Navy for investments and initiatives
that provide direct and tangible benefit to the warfighter or less cost
for the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I will establish priorities consistent with
those of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of
the Navy. In broad terms, I will assist the Secretary of the Navy in
meeting the energy goals laid out for the Department in 2009. I will
promote energy policies that provide energy security for fleet and
shore units, enable additional combat capability for operational
forces, and leverage opportunities to reduce the energy cost of
operating shore infrastructure.
implications of climate change
Question. What do you see as the national security implications of
climate change, if any, for the United States?
Answer. Climate change will affect food production and living
conditions to varying degrees worldwide. Rising sea levels will impact
coastal communities as well as critical Navy infrastructure located in
these communities.
Question. What do you believe will be the impact of climate change,
if any, on the Navy and Marine Corps mission?
Answer. I believe the Navy and Marine Corps mission will remain the
same however, we will need to enhance Navy capabilities to operate in
Arctic waters, including weather and sea-condition forecasting. There
is also likely to be a growing number of requests for help responding
to natural disasters, food shortages, and government instability caused
by climate change.
department of the navy laboratory and test center recapitalization
Question. There has been concern over the adequacy of
recapitalization rates of the Department's laboratory facilities and
test centers. Historically, Navy technical centers, laboratories and
test centers do not appear to have fared well in the internal Navy
competition for limited military construction and facility sustainment
funds.
What metrics would you use to assess the amount of investment in
the recapitalization of Navy technical centers, laboratories and test
centers to determine its adequacy?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to assess the amount of
investment required, but if confirmed, I will closely examine the issue
and work with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)) to determine the appropriate
metrics to use.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with ASN(RD&A) and other
stakeholders to properly recapitalize the Navy's technical centers,
laboratories and test centers?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work directly with the ASN(RD&A) to
gain a better understanding of the requirement and with the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) to
ascertain what are the available financing mechanisms and constraints.
section 2808 authority
Question. Section 2808 of title 10, U.S.C., allows the Secretary of
Defense, in the event of a declaration of war or national emergency, to
undertake military construction projects supporting the use of Armed
Forces with otherwise unobligated military construction funds.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. I believe this authority is vital to provide construction
projects necessary under a national emergency or declaration of war.
Question. From a policy standpoint, what restrictions do you
believe are appropriate for the use of this authority?
Answer. I am not fully versed in the policy regarding this statute.
If confirmed, I will ensure the Department is executing any projects
under this statute in accordance with applicable guidance.
Question. Do you believe it is appropriate to use this authority
outside theaters of armed conflict? If so, in what instances?
Answer. I believe the statute is necessary to allow the department
flexibility in executing urgent construction projects in the event of a
declaration of war or national emergency. I have not had an opportunity
to study it in detail and cannot today provide an example of a
hypothetical situation.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
sugar grove
1. Senator Manchin. Mr. McGinn, I wanted to talk about Sugar
Grove--a Navy base in West Virginia. This is a world-class facility
that has contributed immensely to our national security, especially in
the last decade during the war on terror. But, the mission is changing
there. Sugar Grove is not going away, it's just going to have a
different mission. We have been working with the Navy, and the
community, and other governmental agencies, to find a new tenant and a
new mission. Could you give me an update on how that process is going?
Is there anything we can do to help move the process along?
Mr. McGinn. I understand that the Navy is the installation host to
another Government agency which has plans to leave the installation in
a few years and that the Navy is currently looking for an alternative
use for the installation after the NSA departs in a few years. I don't
know what point in the process the Navy has reached, but if confirmed,
I will ensure the Navy proceeds without undue delay and that I will
keep you updated of any progress.

navy biofuels
2. Senator Manchin. Mr. McGinn, the Navy has been pushing for
greater usage of biofuels to cut its dependence on foreign oil. But, a
RAND report published in 2011 raised serious questions regarding the
ability to produce biofuels at a large enough scale to make a positive
impact to military operations. However, that report did identify the
production of fuel from a combination of biomass and coal as a near-
term pathway to low-greenhouse gas, affordable fuels that can be
produced at a large scale. Have you read that RAND report?
Mr. McGinn. Yes, I have read the report and am familiar with the
assertions stated therein.

3. Senator Manchin. Mr. McGinn, please comment on whether you will
pursue near-term pathways such as coal and biomass-to-liquids
technologies with real, near-term benefits.
Mr. McGinn. It is my understanding that the Military Departments
are testing and certifying pathways that will serve as a drop-in
replacement for liquid fuels on our operational platforms. I am not
aware of each pathway that has been tested and certified for use but
would support all pathways that meet technical and legal standards.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
navy laboratory and test center recapitalization
4. Senator Kaine. Mr. McGinn, historically, Navy technical centers,
laboratories, and test centers do not appear to have fared well in the
internal Navy competition for limited military construction and
facility sustainment funds. These centers and laboratories are crucial
to developing the next generation of capabilities for the warfighter
and the quality of research facilities influences the ability of the
Navy to attract the best scientists and engineers. DOD is increasingly
in competition with the private sector for the best and brightest. If
confirmed, what will you do to adequately resource the Navy's
laboratories and technical and test centers?
Mr. McGinn. I agree that the Navy's laboratories and technical test
centers are a crucial component of developing our future capability and
readiness. The current fiscal environment will present significant
investment challenges across the entire Department. If confirmed, I
look forward to meeting the challenge of balancing the Department's
infrastructure investments across a broad array of requirements,
including laboratories and test centers.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
priorities
5. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, in October 2009, before the
Environmental and Public Works Subcommittee, you testified: ``[Climate
change] will magnify existing tensions in critical regions, overwhelm
fragile political, economic and social structures, causing them to
fracture and fail. The predictable result: much greater frequency and
intensity of regional conflict and direct threats to our United States'
interests and national security. . . . The science community has clear
consensus in concluding that human activities are the most significant
cause of climate change.'' Do you still believe this?
Mr. McGinn. Yes, I do.

6. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, you also testified: ``But unlike
what many believe--it is not just foreign oil that jeopardizes our
energy security. It is all oil. We simply do not have enough
sustainable oil resources in this country to free us from the
stranglehold of those who do . . . we will never have enough domestic
supply to meet our need for this fuel so we must deliberately and
effectively wean ourselves from it.'' Do you still believe this?
Mr. McGinn. Yes, I continue to be concerned about our energy
security and the global oil market, even with the welcome and positive
projections of greatly increased domestic production to occur over the
next 10 to 15 years. As a part of the global oil market, I believe it
is in our national interest to minimize our vulnerability to supply
interruptions and price spikes due to geo-political events, terrorism
and natural disasters, in part by diversifying our sources of
transportation energy.

7. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, do you plan to formulate polices for
the Navy to address these beliefs?
Mr. McGinn. If confirmed, my formulation of energy policies for the
Department of Navy will be guided by the policies of the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy. I will apply my
very best judgment to determine how best to balance the investment of
available resources to achieve the best outcomes for both near-term
mission readiness and future readiness and capabilities.

8. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, what changes would you propose to
Department of the Navy programs?
Mr. McGinn. If confirmed, I will take a deliberate and
collaborative cost, benefit and risk analysis approach to determine
whether changes to Navy programs are necessary.

responsibility for national energy policy
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, which Federal agency, the Department
of Energy (DOE) or DOD, is responsible for developing and promoting a
national energy policy?
Mr. McGinn. It is my understanding that the President establishes
national energy policies which are then executed by multiple parts of
the administration. I believe that a sound energy policy incorporates
energy security and that both DOD and DOE have key roles to play as
defined in several inter-agency agreements.

10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, in your opinion, given the
devastating impact of sequestration occurring now to the readiness and
capabilities of the Armed Forces, why should DOD be the primary source
of funds and leadership for the construction of a commercial biofuels
refinery?
Mr. McGinn. A declining defense budget coupled with the elevated
petroleum prices is the primary reason that DOD, the single largest
consumer of fossil fuel in the Federal Government, is interested in
accelerating the establishment of a domestic biofuels industry. It is
my understanding that the agreement signed by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Navy
in 2011 to stand up a commercial scale, domestic biofuels industry that
will produce drop-in alternative fuels at a price competitive with
petroleum calls for equal contributions from each department. This
investment figure will then be matched by private industry investment.

views on national security
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, given the range of national
security threats facing this Nation, how would you rank the threat of
climate change?
Mr. McGinn. I consider climate change to be a threat to our
national security. It is one of many threats that our Navy and Marine
Corps will confront and, in many ways, has the potential to act as a
threat multiplier for instability, serving in some cases to augment and
accelerate the underlying causes of conflict.

12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, how would you rank the threat of
our Nation's dependence on fossil fuels?
Mr. McGinn. I consider the Department of the Navy's reliance on
petroleum products to fuel our ships and aircraft as a supply
vulnerability. Despite the very good news about increasing U.S
production of natural gas and petroleum, I am concerned by the increase
in global demand, rising prices and potential supply disruptions. I
support the Secretary of the Navy's efforts to lessen this
vulnerability by increasing the energy efficiency of training and
operations and the supply of domestically produced alternative fuels.

13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, are you familiar with the
President's Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012?
(Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense)
Mr. McGinn. Yes, I am familiar with this guidance.

14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, how many additional hours will have
to be dedicated to bring all these units and its aircrews back up to
mission ready status?
Mr. McGinn. While I understand that sequestration and Continuing
Resolutions have had a significant negative impact on the Department's
mission readiness, I have not had the opportunity to develop a thorough
understanding of those effects and, if confirmed, will study this
critical readiness issue and work to help alleviate it.

15. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, how much will that cost?
Mr. McGinn. I am not familiar with the official costs and, if
confirmed, will work diligently with the operators in the Navy and
Marine Corps to determine priority investments for the Department.

16. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, do you know what is says about the
national security implications of climate change, energy independence,
and a domestic reliance on fossil fuels?
Mr. McGinn. While the Defense Strategic Guidance does not directly
address the security implications of climate change, energy
independence and domestic reliance on fossil fuels, it does address the
need to maintain an adequate industrial base and our investment in
science and technology as these do contribute to our overall security
posture.

17. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, if confirmed, would you be
committed to promoting the core defense priorities for the Department
of the Navy in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance?
Mr. McGinn. If confirmed, I will support the priorities of the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy as
expressed in multiple defense policy and guidance documents.

supposed military capabilities of the green fleet
18. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, the committee specifically asked
you in advance for your view, given your impressive Navy career and
military expertise, how the bulk use of alternative drop-in replacement
fuels improves the military capabilities of the fleet. You responded:
``In addition to reducing reliance on foreign sources of energy, `drop-
in' fuels would not require any infrastructure or operational changes
to bring on line.''
How exactly does your answer translate into an enhanced or improved
military capability for Navy ships, planes and submarines?
Mr. McGinn. Liquid alternative fuels are not being considered as a
drop-in replacement for our nuclear-powered submarine fleet. However,
for our ships, vehicles and aircraft, a drop-in alternative fuel will
provide strategic and operational benefits by providing commanders with
additional refueling resources to help dampen the volatility of fossil
fuel prices that now strain our operational readiness budgets.

19. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, in your view, should Navy
investments in alternative fuels be justified with the same rationale
that led the Navy to invest billions in the development of nuclear
powered ships?
Mr. McGinn. While I fully support the Department's efforts to
invest in alternative liquid fuel supplies, especially from multiple
feedstocks, I do not believe the costs of that investment will be on
the same scale, nor for the same strategic rationale, as past
investments in nuclear energy.

the fallacy of fuel price volatility
20. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, you responded to an advance policy
question about the national security implications of a dependence on
fossil fuels by noting that, ``Fossil fuels, whether imported or
domestically produced, are subject to price volatility and uncertainty
of supply. Deriving fuels from other than petroleum sources adds to the
supply and helps mitigate fluctuating prices.'' Given the fact that the
use of ethanol over the last 15 years has not affected the volatility
of petroleum prices, what analysis do you have that supports your
assertion?
Mr. McGinn. The use of ethanol for transportation fuel in the
United States has played an important role in accounting for about 10
percent of our domestic gasoline supply mix. Incorporating ethanol in
our gasoline supply acts as a useful blending component and expands
supply diversity. Diversity of supply helps to cushion our exposure to
the price fluctuations and volatility driven by the dynamics of a
global market.

21. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, to what degree of confidence do you
have that DOD investments in the development of alternative fuels will
directly result in a reduction in the volatility of petroleum prices?
Mr. McGinn. I am confident that our investments in alternative
fuels will increase the overall supply and diversity of liquid fuel
products suitable for use in our ships, vehicles and aircraft, and
thereby helping to cushion our exposure to the price fluctuations and
volatility driven by the dynamics of a global market.

22. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, do you assume that a demand for
alternative fuels will not result in the same type of price volatility?
Mr. McGinn. I believe that the price of every commodity can rise
and fall in response to supply and demand. As a major consumer of
liquid fuel vital to our national security, DOD would greatly benefit
from a competitive, domestic renewable fuel industry capable of
broadening the fuel supply base by using multiple feedstocks.

pending land withdrawal requests
23. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, one of the top priorities for the
Department of the Navy this year is to renew or initiate a series of
land withdrawals for ranges supporting the Navy and Marine Corps,
including the expansion of the combat center range Marine Corps Base,
Twentynine Palms, CA. Can you provide for the record your personal
assessment of the need for these withdrawals?
Mr. McGinn. As a Naval Aviator with 35 years of active service and
command experience at the squadron, carrier, and fleet level, I
understand the critical need to conduct realistic, coordinated live
fire training and to train like we fight. I cannot overstate the
importance of renewing the land withdrawals at the Chocolate Mountain
range and the test center at China Lake, as well as expanding the
combat center range at Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms. These three
training and testing installations are vital to maintaining our current
readiness and to ensuring we are ready to fight and win our Nation's
wars.

guam
24. Senator Inhofe. Mr. McGinn, on the issue of billions of dollars
planned for investment on Guam, do you support this committee's
position that U.S. or Japanese funds should not be spent until we have
a clear and detailed assessment of the plans and costs for the laydown
of marines in Guam and Hawaii?
Mr. McGinn. The realignment of marines to Guam is the right
strategic move to support the United States posture in the Pacific. A
construction effort of this size will take over 10 years to complete.
While it is prudent to understand the entire plan and costs, I believe
it makes sense to start now on projects for which all required
environmental planning is complete, in order to prepare for a larger
construction surge when the final planning and environmental studies
are complete. Starting some of these projects will reinforce our
commitment to allies in the region and will help facilitate our
negotiations with the Government of Japan on continued funding for the
realignment.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
installation maintenance
25. Senator Ayotte. Mr. McGinn, there has been a significant impact
on facility sustainment because of sequestration and an additional cut
of $53 billion in fiscal year 2014 will further degrade important
facilities. Deferred facility repairs are not savings, but an
assumption of greater risk that contributes to lower military
readiness. How will you recover deferred repairs at critical facilities
accumulated in 2013?
Mr. McGinn. I understand that facility sustainment accounts were
hit hard due to sequestration in fiscal year 2013. I agree that
deferred facility maintenance comes with risk of higher repair bills in
the future. To recover from deferred repairs, the Navy will have to be
prudent when deciding how to expend diminishing resources to strike the
right balance between operational requirements and risk to our shore
infrastructure.

26. Senator Ayotte. Mr. McGinn, can you describe specific impacts
to installations, environment, and energy programs if sequestration
continues into 2014?
Mr. McGinn. If sequestration continues into 2014, I expect there
will be similar reductions in funding for facility sustainment and base
operations and support accounts. These continued reductions would have
a compounding impact on the state of our facilities. At this time, I
cannot describe any specific cuts or impacts. If confirmed, one of my
highest priorities will be to understand the impacts of sequestration
on the entire energy, installations, and environment portfolio and to
ensure we are evaluating every investment to balance current and future
readiness with risk to our shore infrastructure.

navy facility backlog
27. Senator Ayotte. Mr. McGinn, in April, the Navy submitted an
investment plan for the modernization of Naval Shipyards required by
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. The report
indicated that the overall condition of the infrastructure is below the
Navy average, and there is a $3.5 billion maintenance backlog
associated with infrastructure, which includes $1.2 billion in
deficiencies at mission essential facilities. The report also stated
that the Navy will need about 17 years, at current funding rates, just
to clear the current maintenance backlog. The Navy is examining ways to
accelerate facility investment to fix the backlog under a 10-year plan.
Do you know what additional annual funding you will need to achieve
this goal?
Mr. McGinn. Materiel readiness is a key enabler to maintaining
freedom of the seas. I am aware of the investment plan and the Navy's
commitment to address the backlog. I don't know what specific level or
type of additional funding would be required to accelerate the plan. If
confirmed, I will advocate for and work with the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition) to ensure that whatever funding may be
available for shore infrastructure, including shipyards and depots, is
allocated appropriately to meet mission critical needs.

28. Senator Ayotte. Mr. McGinn, how will sequestration in 2013 and
2014 affect this plan?
Mr. McGinn. I can't address any specific impacts to the plan from
sequestration in 2013. If sequestration continues into 2014, it will
challenge investments across the entire Energy, Installations and
Environment portfolio. When faced with reduced resources, any
organization, whether a business or a household, must assess its short-
and long-term objectives and make prudent expenditures and investments
accordingly. I believe the same holds true for the Department of the
Navy. If confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be to understand
the impacts of sequestration on the entire Energy, Installations, and
Environment portfolio and to ensure we are evaluating every investment
to balance current and future readiness with risk to our infrastructure
investments across a broad array of requirements.

family housing
29. Senator Ayotte. Mr. McGinn, I am troubled about recent reports
regarding concerns expressed by residents at Admiralty Village--a
public-private family housing facility that supports personnel working
at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Some residents have expressed concerns
regarding black mold that may be causing health problems in residents,
water dripping from ceiling light fixtures, and old appliances that are
leaking gas. I want to make sure Captain William Greene, Commander at
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, is receiving all of the support and
resources he needs from the Navy in order to address this problem. Are
you aware of these reports and if confirmed, will you ensure that
Captain Greene, and commanders like him around the Navy, receive the
support and resources they need to ensure our military families have
military housing that is worthy of their service?
Mr. McGinn. I am aware of the reports in the press regarding
Admiralty Village and I share your concern for the safety and well-
being of our servicemembers. If confirmed, I will ensure our commanders
have the support and resources they need to provide the highest quality
living and working conditions for our sailors, marines, and their
families.
______

[The nomination reference of Mr. Dennis V. McGinn follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 9, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Dennis V. McGinn, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, vice Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Dennis V. McGinn, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of VADM Dennis V. McGinn (USN, ret.)
Education:
U.S. Naval Academy

1963-1967
B.S. degree in naval engineering 1967

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

National security program
1998

U.S. Naval War College

Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Fellow
1990-1991
Employment record:
American Council On Renewable Energy (ACORE)

President and CEO
May 2011-Present

Remote Reality

CEO and Chairman
Jan. 2008-Present

Battelle Memorial Institute

Corporate Officer, Energy, Transportation and
Environment Division
2002-2007

U.S. Navy: 1967-2002

Naval aviator, test pilot, aircraft carrier commanding
officer, national security strategist
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare
Requirements and Programs at the Pentagon
Commander of U.S. Third Fleet
Honors and awards:
Air Medal (three awards)
Navy-Marine Corps Commendation Medal (eight awards, all with Combat
V)
Distinguished Flying Cross (two awards)
Meritorious Service Medals (one award)
Legion of Merit (four awards)
Defense Superior Service medal (one award)
Distinguished Service Medal (one award)
Boards:
CNA Military Advisory Board

Vice Chairman
2007-Present

Rocky Mountain Institute

International Security Senior Fellow
2002-Present

Energy Future Coalition

Steering Committee Member
2011-Present

National Conference on Citizenship

Director, Chairman of Strategy Committee
2005-Present

U.S. Energy Security Council

Member
2011-Present

Bipartisan Policy Center

Energy Board Member
Jan. 2012-Mar. 2013
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Dennis V.
McGinn in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Dennis Vincent McGinn.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and
Environment.

3. Date of nomination:
July 9, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
August 26, 1945; Attleboro, MA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Susan Kelly (Harris) McGinn.

7. Names and ages of children:
John McGinn, 45.
David McGinn, 43.
Daniel McGinn, 37
Susan Yekstat, 36.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
U.S. Naval Academy, 1963-1967, B.S., June 7, 1967.
U.S. Naval Test Pilot School, 1973-1974
U.S. Naval War College, 1990-1991, CNO Fellow

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
President/CEO, American Council on Renewable Energy, 1600 K St.,
NW, Washington, DC, 2011-Present
CEO and Chairman, RemoteReality, Inc, 1700 West Park Drive,
Westborough, MA, 2008-Present
Senior Vice President, Energy, Transportation, Environment,
Battelle Memorial Institute, 505 King Ave, Columbus, OH, 2003-2007
Schott North American, 2451 Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA, 22202,
2011-2012

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Member of the Department of Energy Electricity Advisory Board,
2012-present
National Commission on Disabled Veterans Benefits, Member, 2004-
2007

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
National Conference on Citizenship, Director and Chair of Strategy
Committee, 2005-Present
Naval Institute, Member, 1970-Present. Chairman of the Board, 2001-
2002
American Renewable Energy Institute, Director, 2012-Present

Air Medal (three awards)
Navy-Marine Corps Commendation Medal (eight awards, All with
Combat V)
Distinguished Flying Cross (one award)
Meritorious Service Medals (one award)
Legion of Merit (four awards)
Defense Superior Service medal (one award)
Distinguished Service Medal (two awards)

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Reports (Co-Authored):

America's Energy Resurgence: Sustaining Success,
Confronting Challenges, Bipartisan Policy Center, February 27,
2013
Ensuring America's Freedom of Movement: A National
Security Imperative to Reduce U.S. Oil Dependence, CNA Military
Advisory Board, October 2011
Powering America's Economy: Energy Innovation at the
Crossroads of National Security Challenges, CNA Military
Advisory Board, July 2010
Powering America's Defense: Energy and the Risks to
National Security, CNA Military Advisory Board, May 2009

Op-Eds/Blog Submissions:

American Renewable Energy Is Powering the American
Energy Transformation (The Hill, July 4, 2013 reprinted by
Huffington Post, July 9, 2013)
Level the Playing Field for Renewables (Politico, June
24, 2013)
ACORE Salutes Tesla for Repaying Loan Guarantee Nine
Years Early, Showing Success of LGP Program (States News
Service, May 23, 2013)
Congress Can Jolt Renewable Energy (National Journal
Energy Experts Blog, April 29, 2013)
More Renewables for States (Politico, April 4, 2013)
Bullish on Biofuels (National Journal Energy Experts
Blog, March 29, 2013)
Opinion: Dennis McGinn of ACORE (Recharge, March 4,
2013)
The Year For Bipartisan Energy Policy (National
Journal Energy Experts Blog, January 9, 2013)
Long Term Thinking For PTC (National Journal Energy
Experts Blog, December 17, 2012)
Jobs and Manufacturing At Stake (National Journal
Energy Experts Blog, December 12, 2012)
Together We Move Forward (National Journal Energy
Experts Blog, November 14, 2012)
Get Past Politics and Back to Business (National
Journal Energy Experts Blog, November 5, 2012)
A Real ``All ofthe Above'' Strategy (National Journal
Energy Experts Blog, October 17, 2012)
The Supply and Demand of Renewable Energy (Huffington
Post, September 26, 2011)

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I have delivered several speeches and interviews over the past 5
years related to energy, economic and environmental security in the
context of national security. I do not retain hard copies but speak
from notes.
I also have a record of written and oral testimony all of which
included in the Congressional Record.
Specifically, I testified before the House Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warming on 1 December 2010 and 18 April
2007. I testified before the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee on 28 October 2009 and 30 July 2009. I testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 21 July 2009. The topic of my
testimony in each instance was relevant to the position for which I
have been nominated.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to Congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Mr. Dennis V. McGinn was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013.]

NOMINATIONS OF ADM CECIL E.D. HANEY, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND; AND LTG
CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES KOREA

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman), presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Udall,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Chambliss,
Ayotte, and Fischer.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel; Ozge Guzelsu, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel;
Mariah K. McNamara, special assistant to the staff director;
Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; William S.
Castle, minority general counsel; Thomas W. Goffus,
professional staff member; Anthony J. Lazarski, professional
staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; and
Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Lauren M. Gillis and Daniel J.
Harder.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Fatora,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator
Udall; David LaPorte, assistant to Senator Manchin; Marta
McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Karen Courington,
assistant to Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant to Senator
King; Paul C. Hutton IV, assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood
Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant
to Senator Chambliss; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte;
and Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets this morning to consider military
nominations for two critically important command assignments.
We welcome Admiral Cecil Haney who is nominated to be
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and Lieutenant
General Curtis Scaparrotti who is nominated to be Commander,
United Nations (U.N.) Command, Combined Forces Command, and
U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Thank you both for your decades of
service to our Nation and for your willingness to continue to
serve in these positions of great responsibility.
We would also like to welcome and to thank your family
members, some of whom are here this morning. Our military
families are essential to the overall success and the well-
being of our Armed Forces, and we appreciate greatly their many
sacrifices, particularly during the course of long military
careers. In this regard, as is the tradition of this committee,
we invite each of you, during your opening remarks, to
introduce the family members or others who are here with you
this morning.
It is most appropriate that these nominees appear together
because the responsibilities of the positions to which they
have been nominated intersect, particularly as they relate to
the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the
potential threats from North Korea.
Unfortunately, as has been evident from the words and
actions from North Korea in the last several months, the
leadership change in North Korea, occasioned by the death of
longtime dictator Kim Jong-il, has not yet resulted in any
meaningful, positive change in North Korea's policies. North
Korea continues its reckless pursuit of ballistic missiles,
nuclear weapons, and continues to threaten its neighbors and
the overall peace and stability in the region. The regime
remains determined to defy the international community to the
detriment of its own prosperity and growth and with little
concern for the well-being of its own people.
STRATCOM is responsible for our deployed nuclear
deterrence, integrating global missile defense, managing
military space systems, and countering weapons of mass
destruction. STRATCOM also oversees Cyber Command, a sub-
unified command tasked with managing military operations in
cyberspace, and is charged with coordinating the Department of
Defense's (DOD) electromagnetic spectrum. If confirmed, Admiral
Haney will be a key player in the overall strategic posture and
policy of the United States.
Admiral, we will be interested in your views on the U.S.
nuclear employment strategy, your priorities for missile
defense, and the status of Cyber Command. With regard to North
Korea in particular, we would be interested in your thoughts on
the various steps announced earlier this year by Secretary
Hagel to improve Homeland missile defense capability, including
the planned deployment of 14 additional ground-based
interceptors (GBI) in Alaska by 2017.
Lieutenant General Scaparrotti is currently the Director of
the Joint Staff where he assists the Chairman and Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with many of the most challenging
issues facing our military and our country today. If confirmed,
he will bring his breadth of experience to bear on maintaining
a military force on the Korean Peninsula that is ready,
willing, and able to respond to any aggression from North
Korea. General, we would be interested in your assessment of
the security situation on the peninsula, the posture of U.S.
Forces there, and the plan for the transfer of wartime
operational control from the United States to the South Koreans
in December 2015.
Admiral and General, we again welcome you today. We look
forward to your testimony.
I now call on Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming General Scaparrotti and Admiral
Haney. I thank both of you for the time that you have spent
coming over in personal visits.
General Scaparrotti, you have been nominated to replace
General Thurman as Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea, and
General Thurman and the men and women under his command have
done a tremendous job in standing with our South Korean
partners to ensure stability in the Korean Peninsula.
However, this stability is at risk. Tensions over the last
year have risen dramatically, and as a result, Kim Jong-un's
belligerent behavior, including the testing of nuclear weapons
and launching of ballistic missiles, his provocative actions
threaten to overturn the peace, stability, and prosperity of
the entire region.
Our military capabilities in the region must be designed to
deter North Korean aggression, but should deterrence fail, it
has to be ready to punish aggression, to protect vital U.S.
interests, partners, and allies. However, I am greatly
concerned that further defense cuts under the sequestration
will put these capabilities at risk, undermine our influence in
the region, and will encourage Kim Jong-un's reckless behavior.
Admiral Haney, you have been nominated to serve as the next
Commander of STRATCOM. If confirmed, your principal
responsibility will be to ensure the effectiveness of our
Nation's nuclear deterrent force. This requires a credible
nuclear strategy backed by capable nuclear forces. There is
cause for concern in both respects. Not only are our nuclear
modernization programs facing funding cuts and increasing
schedule delays, but the President's insistence on reducing the
role and number of nuclear weapons could also undermine
deterrence and make our allies nervous.
The current Commander of STRATCOM told Congress earlier
this year that as the sequester impacts continue to grow, he
said, ``Reduced readiness and curtailed modernization damage
the perceived credibility of our capabilities, increasing the
risks to achieve our primary deterrence and assurance
objectives.'' These cuts are likely to have real negative
consequences on our ability to deal with the crisis around the
world which, in turn, may increase rather than reduce the role
of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.
We also face a growing and increasingly complex threat with
cyberspace, and despite the reality, this administration has
failed to implement an effective cyber deterrence strategy that
dissuades those seeking to hold our economic and national
security interests at risk in cyberspace. While the White House
has been quick to blame Congress on the need for cyber
legislation, it has been slow in developing and implementing
the far more important strategy for exposing, countering, and
deterring our adversaries.
Finally, the Department is currently debating the elevation
of the Cyber Command from its current position under STRATCOM
to become its own unified command. We will want to talk about
that, and I look forward to your comments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Admiral Haney?

STATEMENT OF ADM CECIL E.D. HANEY, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND

Admiral Haney. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to come before you today. It is my sincere honor to
appear as the nominee to lead STRATCOM.
I am honored to be here also with some of my family
members. First, my wife Bonnie, who sits behind me here, has
been with me throughout my military career, and has raised
three wonderful children who could not be here today. She is
also representative of all the spouses that support our
military servicemembers.
Second, my sister, Dr. Yvonne Coates is here, who has
worked tirelessly in my hometown, Washington, DC, here as a
public school educator for many years.
Our All-Volunteer Force is sustained by our families that
support us and allow us to serve.
I am also honored to be here with Lieutenant General
Scaparrotti.
I would like to thank the President and the Secretary of
Defense for nominating me. I also thank the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for expressing his confidence in my
ability to serve as a combatant commander. If so confirmed, I
look forward to working with this committee to address the
strategic challenges that face our Nation. They are complex and
compelling, and STRATCOM plays a key role in each. I know that
this committee knows and respects the strategic challenges we
face today and the ones over the horizon that must be
addressed. Complex threats provide opportunities for terrorism
and raise significant security concerns. We must address
nuclear issues today to include both state and non-state
actors, proliferation, and weapons of mass destruction.
Space, though a vast operational area, is a complex
environment that is competitive, congested, and contested.
Addressing the cyber threat is critical to our national
security. Intensive and extensive cooperation across the whole
of government and the governments of our allies, partners, and
friends is required to prepare for and respond to these
developments. Our ability as a Nation to shape events to our
interests will continue to depend on the skill and dedication
of the great men and women who serve our Nation.
Leading STRATCOM is a significant responsibility and a
unique opportunity. If confirmed, I pledge to you that I will
devote all of my energy, commitment, and focus to address these
challenges.
I am very fortunate to have had assignments to include
operational experiences and command opportunities that align
with STRATCOM's mission set. I believe they have prepared me
for this challenge. If confirmed, I will also be fortunate and
deeply humbled to follow the paths blazed by some of our truly
great national leaders that have mentored me such as Admiral
Hank Chiles and Rich Mies and General Kevin Chilton, prior
commanders of STRATCOM who have helped in shaping my intellect,
experiences, and understanding. I also want to thank the
current Commander, General Bob Kehler, whose leadership has
been deeply important in these past critical years to shaping
our national posture, and I am grateful to have served with him
as his deputy.
Of course, as always, if confirmed, I look forward to
working with and caring for the world's best soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and civilians and their families.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, distinguished committee
members, it is a privilege to be before you here today, and I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you very much.
General?

STATEMENT OF LTG CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND
COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S.
FORCES KOREA

General Scaparrotti. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and
other distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here
today, and I also want to thank you for the support that you
have provided to our servicemembers, our Department of Defense
civilians, and their families who selflessly serve in the
defense of our great Nation and defense of our way of life.
I would also like to thank the Secretary of Defense and the
President for their trust and confidence and for nominating me
to be the next Commander for United Nations Command, Combined
Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
committee, with our civilian and military leadership, and with
Republic of Korea military and civilian leadership to advance
our national interests and to address the opportunities and
challenges in the Korean theater.
If confirmed, I commit to the servicemembers serving in
Korea that I will do all that I can to ensure their readiness
for the mission and to provide the support that they and their
families deserve. I look forward to working with this committee
to realize this commitment.
Finally, I would like to introduce and thank my wife Cindy,
who is here with me today. She has been by my side for nearly
34 years and has been an essential part of my service. Cindy
has supported me during multiple deployments, cared actively
for our servicemembers and their families, and raised our
children.
Also with me today, Stephanie, our youngest child, is here
with her husband, Captain Luke High, presently a company
commander in the 82nd Airborne Division. They have given us two
grandchildren, Ava and Jacob. My son Michael, who could not be
here today, lives and works in Ann Arbor, MI.
I am blessed with this family who has given so much, like
other military families, so that I may serve.
I thank the committee again for the opportunity to appear
today, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
We now ask our witnesses standard questions, and you can
respond together to these questions.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Haney. I have.
General Scaparrotti. I have.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
Admiral Haney. I do.
General Scaparrotti. I do.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Haney. No, sir.
General Scaparrotti. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Admiral Haney. I will.
General Scaparrotti. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Haney. I will.
General Scaparrotti. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Haney. They will.
General Scaparrotti. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Admiral Haney. I do.
General Scaparrotti. I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Haney. I do.
General Scaparrotti. I do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let us have a 7-minute round this morning to start with for
our first round of questions.
Admiral, let me ask you about the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) which is now being implemented. It was
ratified in the Senate in December 2010. Do you support the New
START treaty?
Admiral Haney. Senator, yes, I do.
Chairman Levin. On the question of missile defense, in your
answers to the prehearing policy questions, Admiral, about the
idea of possibly deploying a future east coast missile defense
site, you made several important points as follows.
First, you said you support proceeding with the
environmental impact statement process that we required in last
year's law in order to inform future decisions about such a
site.
Second, you said you agree with General Dempsey and Admiral
Winnefeld that additional analysis is needed, including
analysis of the missile threat from Iran, before making a
decision on whether to deploy such a site in the future.
Third, you said you agree with the assessment of Vice
Admiral Syring and Lieutenant General Formica on the importance
of enhancing our future missile defense sensor and
discrimination capability, which they see as a more cost
effective and less expensive near-term alternative to deploying
an east coast site.
Can you explain this issue of sensor and discrimination
capabilities and how they would benefit our Homeland defense?
Admiral Haney. Senator, thank you for that question.
As we work missile defense and look to the future, it is
very important that we are able to discriminate what is coming
at us, whether it is a decoy, whether it is a warhead, and be
able to address that threat at the right opportunity with our
missile defense capability. As we look at prioritizing our
efforts, it is so important that we invest properly in the
sensing part of this because that way we can balance the
equation of our concept of operations and how we address the
threat missile per missile.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, in the missile defense area,
Secretary Hagel and other senior leaders have said that before
we deploy any more GBIs, we will first have to conduct
successful intercept flight testing to demonstrate that they
will work as intended.
Do you agree that we need to make sure that the ground-
based midcourse defense system, including both the CE1 and the
CE2 kill vehicles, and demonstrate the success of the system in
intercept flight test before we deploy any more GBIs?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think it is important that we
continue to deploy our CE1s, which have been proven through
tests. I also think it is important that we fly before we buy
as we look at the CE2 variant so that we can assure we have the
reliability that is required in order to address the threats
now and into the future.
Chairman Levin. General, relative to Korea, I believe it is
important that we see to it that the primary responsibility for
defending South Korea during a time of war lies with South
Korea and that the responsibility for wartime operational
control be turned over to the South Koreans as soon as
practicable. It is a sovereign nation and sovereign nations
should be responsible for their own national defense in time of
war, particularly after the length of time that they have been
gaining in capability.
Right now, the plan for the transfer of wartime operational
control to the Republic of Korea is set for no later than 2015.
Do you agree with that timetable?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you.
Yes, I do agree with the timetable. It is a bilateral
agreement, Strategic Alliance 2015, to turn over operational
control by December 2015. I think it is a good plan and it
includes milestones that ensure the capability and our
integration of forces together to provide the readiness that is
needed on the peninsula at the time of that transition. I think
we should move forward with it.
Chairman Levin. Will you do everything you can, if
confirmed, to ensure that the transfer is not delayed any
further? It has been delayed two or three times before.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. If confirmed, I will do
everything possible to ensure that we stay on track with
Strategic Alliance 2015.
Chairman Levin. Now relative, General, to Camp Humphreys,
the Army has proposed a public/private venture to build family
housing called the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Project
(HHOP). Essentially private developers would build the housing
complex and DOD would pay rent in the form of an overseas
housing allowance (OHA) for servicemembers that live in the
units.
The problem is that the Army has proposed a rental rate of
$3,900 per unit per month, which represents a huge increase in
the housing allowance rate for servicemembers assigned to the
Camp Humphreys area, a rate which currently averages around
$1,500 per month. If HHOP were built as planned, a soldier
assigned to Camp Humphreys and living off base would receive on
average about $1,500 per month while a soldier living in HHOP
housing would receive on the average $3,900.
The committee's analysis suggests that the rent paid to the
private developer for HHOP units would cost $630 million more
than the standard overseas housing rate over 20 years.
Moreover, the approval of that higher rate would set a very
troubling precedent by using personnel pay accounts to finance
a military construction project where the project costs are
considered too high to be funded through military construction
accounts.
Now, in the current budget environment, it is hard for me
and a number of other members of this committee to see a
persuasive rationale for a plan that would commit the United
States to pay out of DOD personnel accounts an OHA rate two and
a half times greater than what has been determined to be
reasonable in the Camp Humphreys area and that would then cause
this inflated cost to be included in the personnel accounts
over the next 20-plus years.
I do not know whether you have had a chance to review this
project or not, General, but first, if you have a comment,
would you share it with us? In any event, will you get back to
us with a more detailed assessment?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I have reviewed the Senate Armed
Services Committee's review of this issue, and I have taken a
look at U.S. Forces Korea's review of the issue. If confirmed,
I will take a close look at this issue and consider other
options to ensure that we can care for our command-sponsored
families, as well as maintain the readiness that we need in the
Peninsula. I will come back to the committee, if confirmed.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Haney--well, both of you. One of the problems we
have in confirmation hearings is it is hard to get answers when
they have not assumed that position yet, but you both have a
background in the positions that you are going to be moving to.
I think you are both excellent choices for those positions.
Admiral Haney, you had stated in response to the chairman
here, his question about whether you supported the New START
treaty, and you said that you did. I have to say that I did
not.
I look at the New START treaty--and there were a lot of
commitments that were made at that time in order to get the
votes necessary to pass it. It was a close call in the U.S.
Senate. Recently, General Kehler said, ``I remain concerned
that maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent
requires a substantial modernization effort that comes in the
midst of a very difficult financial period.'' Modernization is
what we were talking about. That was a commitment that was made
that has not yet reached its fruition in terms of modernizing.
I am concerned about this.
The other concern I had about the START 10 treaty was in
the area of the tactical nuclear weapons. Now, would you have
supported it more had that been included in terms of the ratio
or the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons that Russia has as
opposed to what we have? The ratio is about 10 to 1. What is
your feeling about the tactical nuclear weapons?
Admiral Haney. Senator Inhofe, as you have addressed,
modernization is important to us, and I would hope that we can
continue to do the modernization of weapon warheads, platforms,
as well as the industrial base that supports it.
With regards to the tactical nuclear weapons, as we went
into New START and with any treaty, it is important that we are
able to not just reduce but be able to also verify that the
obligations per that agreement are, in fact, able to be carried
out. We were able to do that from the basis of warheads,
strategic warheads, as well as launchers in the New START
treaty.
Personally, I would love to see the world with less
tactical nukes, nuclear weapons. The same type of rigor has to
be in place in order to have an agreement by which we can
reduce tactical nuclear weapons such that they are verifiable,
negotiated where they make sense. I would not sit here and even
attempt to debate the importance of the reduction of tactical
nuclear weapons----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, well, the question then was would you
have supported it more vigorously if they had included the
tactical nuclear weapons in the New START treaty?
Admiral Haney. Senator, only if we had verifiable means by
which we could verify both the other side, Russia, was carrying
out an appropriate obligation.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. The warheads are going to be reduced,
I think 1,550. As we move down and we are reducing, it would
seem to me that the modernization program is more important, as
we are going through a reduction. Would you agree with that?
Admiral Haney. Yes, Senator, I would agree.
Senator Inhofe. Now, there has been some discussion about
doing a unilateral reduction. I cannot remember the exact
words, but it was whether they do or not. What is your feeling
about a unilateral reduction that would be done outside of the
treaty that would be addressed by this committee?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think it is very important that
any further reductions are negotiated. Period.
Senator Inhofe. That is good, and I agree with that.
The chairman covered the CE1 and the CE2. I would only say
that for us to be in a position where our GBIs are going to be
where we want them to be, it is going to require more testing.
Would you not agree with this?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I absolutely support more testing.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
General Scaparrotti, we just returned not long ago from
Korea. That is a tough one. You are dealing with a guy that is
not a rational person. He does all these things that I
mentioned in my opening statement. To start out with, would you
think dealing with such a person as that, that our current
strategy of diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions would
stop someone like Kim Jong-un from acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think that our present
strategy is correct. I think that we have to be persistent and
consistent with that strategy. I also believe that in terms of,
if confirmed for the position that I will take there, I will
have to do everything that I can in military-to-military
relations in order to bring other countries in the region to
bear as well. I think the more influence we have both in the
region and internationally--and I will have an opportunity to
help with that, if confirmed, as the Commander of the United
Nations Command--will be helpful in our strategy as well. I
share with you the concern about his uncertainty.
Senator Inhofe. That is a kinder way of putting it than I
would.
I think when we are looking at sequestration, we are
looking at budget cuts, and this does not happen in isolation.
There will likely be a reduced carrier presence and U.S.
warship presence in the Pacific. Do you think that makes
someone like Kim Jong-un more likely to miscalculate or to be
more militarily aggressive? What kind of reaction do you think
he would have to our reduction of our fleet?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think that the potential
impacts of sequestration, in terms of the reduction of our
naval forces, which you mentioned, would likely undercut our
deterrence in his eyes and may lead at least to a greater
possibility of miscalculation.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. That is a scary thought.
My time has expired, and I appreciate your response.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral Haney and your family, and thank you for
your service.
General Scaparrotti, welcome and to your family. I have had
the privilege of working with General Scaparrotti for about 10
years now very closely from his days as commandant of cadets at
West Point through the Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division.
Thank you for your service, sir, and your family's.
Admiral Haney, one of the issues that we face is
modernization of our nuclear deterrence. My understanding is
the bulk of our deterrent missiles are at sea now. Is that a
fair estimate?
Admiral Haney. Senator, that is a fair estimate in terms of
warheads.
Senator Reed. The modernization of our submarines, which
deliver and launch those, potentially, missiles, is a key
priority for the national defense in terms of the Ohio-class?
Admiral Haney. Senator, the replacement of the Ohio SSBN is
critical to our nuclear deterrent strategy and capability.
Senator Reed. We are committed, I believe, to maintain the
triad of air-launched missiles as well as ground-launched
missiles, but since we have the bulk of our assets at sea in
terms of warheads, that would seem to me to be sort of the
first priority in terms of modernization of the delivery system
at least. Is that consistent with your views and the strategy?
Admiral Haney. Senator, first, the flexibility of having a
triad is also very important to our deterrence strategy. Since
the Ohio-class platform is nearing its end of life, it is very
important that we replace it in addition to the calculus you
just mentioned.
Senator Reed. One of the things that is going to be
required is support from the Department of Defense to do that
because the issues you deal with cut across Service lines.
There has to be, I think, a national commitment to
modernization of the whole triad. But, again, since most of
our--with no pun intended--eggs are in these submarines, we
have to do that first and we have to do it with defense-wide
resources. Is that your view too?
Admiral Haney. Senator, it is not in my purview as far as
how they are paid for in terms of defense-wide, but very
important that we in fact move forward with that critical
platform.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Just a final question. We are in the midst of a doctrinal
shift similar to the late 1970s and early 1980s when we
developed the air-land doctrine. Now it is the air-sea battle.
You gentlemen will be in the midst of that. General Scaparrotti
will be in Asia in South Korea, and the bulk of our pivot
diplomatically and strategically is towards the Asia-Pacific
area. The air-sea battle is comparable in terms of that
doctrine.
One of the key factors that we did not have to worry about
quite as much back in the 1970s-1980s with the air-land battle
was cyber. As part of your responsibility, are you fully worked
in--you and your staff--with developing this new doctrine
particularly when it comes to cyber?
Admiral Haney. Senator, if I have your question right, you
are asking relative to air-sea battle and cyber. I would say
that the air-sea battle is a concept. It is a concept I work in
my current capacity as the Commander of the Pacific Fleet
across the Joint Services and with the Pacific Command
Commander, Admiral Locklear, and his team. It includes all of
our capabilities and effort to include cyber.
Senator Reed. Let me go ahead and I will, for the record,
ask additional questions on this point. But a concern I have is
that, air power, sea power--we have been doing that for about
200 years. This is a brand new, relatively speaking, dimension.
It seems also, given what we have read in the press, that some
of our potential competitors have very sophisticated asymmetric
powers with respect to cyber. When we develop this air-sea
battle--and it will pertain to General Scaparrotti too--we have
to make sure that we can communicate, that we can command, we
can control, et cetera. That might be the most key aspect of
this new doctrine. I would hope that you and your command would
be very much engaged in it.
Let me turn to General Scaparrotti now. General, we have a
series of joint exercises with the South Korean forces in Foal
Eagle, Key Resolve, and others. Can you give me just a
preliminary estimate of, one, their value and, two, your
intentions going forward with these joint exercises?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, these exercises, they are large,
they are joint, they are combined. We do those regularly
throughout the year. I think they are essential to the
readiness that we need to maintain on the peninsula. I also
think they are essential in terms of the integration that we
are trying to attain and the improvement in both our forces and
of Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. The very milestones that are
laid out in Strategic Alliance 2015, for instance, can be best
tested and developed through the use of those exercises because
those are the times when we can bring together all of the
Services as well as combined forces of both us and the ROK
military.
Senator Reed. Again, as has been mentioned before in
previous questions, one of the key actors that influence the
Korean Peninsula is China. Recently, they have made some
statements or the statements have been attributed to them as
suggesting to the world and to the North Koreans that their
ultimate goal is denuclearization, which would be a positive
step forward. Just in general, your view on their role and your
view of how you can help facilitate the diplomacy between not
just South Korea and the United States but South Korea, China,
Japan, and the United States.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. I agree. I think China is
key to the influence here on North Korea. As a part of my
present duties as Director of the Joint Staff, I took part in
the talks that were just held with China on economics and
security, and they did make the commitment to a denuclearized
peninsula.
I think, if confirmed in my next duty, I have a
relationship now that I have begun to establish with the deputy
chief of staff of Chinese forces. They know me. Second, in
terms of my position, if confirmed, I also have that military-
to-military relationship that I will develop with South Korea
and with the other countries in the region. I think those
military-to-military relationships are very important to
progressing to our objective of denuclearization of the
peninsula.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you,
gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you, Admiral Haney and General Scaparrotti,
for your service and for the sacrifice of your families too. We
appreciate it.
I wanted to follow up, Admiral Haney, on the question that
Senator Inhofe asked you about reduction of our nuclear
deterrent and particularly our deployed strategic nuclear
weapons.
The President recently did announce that he was going to
seek a one-third reduction of our deployed strategic nuclear
weapons. It was not clear in his speech at all whether that was
something that he would only accept through negotiated
reductions with countries like Russia or whether this would be
something he would consider doing unilaterally.
If you were to seek to do that unilaterally, what would
your advice be to him on a unilateral reduction of our nuclear
deterrent?
Admiral Haney. Senator, thank you for that question.
My advice would be that we negotiate a bilateral agreement
that also has verifiable components to it so that we can ensure
that the said reduction would work.
Senator Ayotte. Just to be clear, you would oppose a
unilateral reduction?
Admiral Haney. Senator, that is correct.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
How important do you believe it is before we seek any
further reductions that we fulfill the modernization
requirements of the New START treaty in section 1043? I know
that you were well aware, of course, as the deputy commander of
those requirements that you have already been asked about. How
important do you believe that we fulfill that modernization
requirement before we seek further reductions?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think it is very important that
we modernize our industrial base in order to maintain and
sustain the weapons that we have. Each will be even more
critical as you reduce the number. It is so important that we
have a secure and a safe and effective nuclear deterrent, and
that industrial base supports that.
Senator Ayotte. If we are continuing to diminish the
resources toward our modernization efforts, which is
essentially what is happening right now under the New START
treaty, do you think it is advisable that we further reduce our
nuclear deterrent without meeting those responsibilities?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think the reductions relative to
the New START treaty, as agreed upon, is satisfactory. I
believe from the knowledge I have--I do not currently work in
that business, but from what I understand, for the fiscal year
2014 budget, the President's budget supports the modernization
of that industrial base. With sequestration, it is a question
in my mind to how well we will be able to do that with further
cuts across the board in all our accounts to include this
modernization you mentioned.
Senator Ayotte. My point is this, when the President
announces that he is going to seek a third reduction, it seems
to me that unless we further fulfill our commitments to
modernize our current deterrent pursuant to the existing treaty
obligations, then that would, in my view, not be advisable
particularly if we do not know that we have modernized what we
have now, which we know is important to do to make sure it
works.
In that regard, I wanted to ask you about the recent
Missile Defense Agency test that the chairman asked you about
of the CE1 kill vehicle. One of the issues that I see with that
is that this issue of our missile defense program needs to be
prioritized. In fact, is it not true that the last time the CE1
kill vehicle had been tested was 2008?
Admiral Haney. Senator, it is my understanding that the CE1
has gone through a number of tests, and as a result of the
combined tests, it is an effective and operational capability
today.
Senator Ayotte. The first flight test we have had, General,
was since 2008. Here we are, 2013, and the last time we had a
flight test of it was 2008. It seems to me that if we are going
to have a commitment to our missile defense and making sure
that the capabilities are there, that we need to put resources
in it that are going to further testing. In fact, what troubles
me is the administration, even prior to sequestration, was
cutting funding for this program.
As we go forward, what do you believe the priorities should
be in terms of making sure that our missile defense programs
are supported?
Admiral Haney. Senator, my priorities would be the day we
invest in sensors, we invest in reliability of the missiles
that we are using, both CE1 and CE2, and we do adequate testing
to ensure that reliability exists.
Senator Ayotte. With regard to an east coast missile
defense site, you said to the chairman that you felt that there
were further analysis of the missile threat to Iran. Do you
dispute what has been the report from the National Air and
Space Intelligence Center from earlier this month that
concluded Iran could develop and test an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States
by 2015?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I am not here to dispute what you
just said.
Senator Ayotte. What further analysis do we need to
conduct? We missed it when it came to the North Korean nuclear
threat, and I would hate to see us in that position with regard
to Iran. Would you agree with me that if we had an east coast
site, particularly with the cancelation of the SM-3 Block 2B
program, that it would provide additional battle space in
response to an ICBM missile from Iran to the east coast of the
United States?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I believe we have to continue to
study how we are going to address that. As I mentioned earlier
and truly believe, that we have to also get the sensing right
so that as we fire our individual missiles to address this
problem, that we have the right targeting with that. I also
support, as far as the east coast launch site, that we move
forward with the environmental impact statement (EIS) in order
to allow us an option in the future.
Senator Ayotte. General, my time is up, but I will follow
up because in the written answers and also to the chairman you
have talked about additional analysis about the Iran threat.
With the reports that 2015 is when they may have ICBM
capability, I am not sure what we are waiting for around here
for additional analysis because we know, even with the EIS
going forward, it will take several years for us to stand that
type of site up, and by then, they have the missile and the
east coast does not have the battle space opportunity that it
should have to fully protect the east coast of the Nation. I
appreciate it, and I will follow up with you on that.
I want to thank you both. I will have a follow-up for the
record with you, General Scaparrotti. I appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Udall?
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. I want to also add my voice to the
members of the committee to thank you, and I think more
importantly, you all agree, your families for your service and
the way in which you have been supported by them.
Admiral Haney, I chair the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I
look forward to working with you in that capacity, when you are
confirmed, on these important issues that have not only
military but historical significance.
General Scaparrotti, it is good to see you again. I know we
are going to work together too given the proclivities of the
North Korean leadership and the challenges that you will face
as the head of USFK.
Admiral Haney, if I could turn to you initially, and I want
to pursue the same line of questioning you have been hearing
this morning from all of us. Are you confident that the
President's proposal to reduce the number of deployed strategic
nuclear weapons will allow us to maintain an effective nuclear
deterrent and to be able to fully respond to a nuclear attack?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I fully support, as stated in my
earlier questioning, that the New START treaty numbers make
sense to me and that we ought to continue to march toward that
goal.
I also fundamentally believe that we should always, as good
stewards, look for the right balance in all of our capability.
I have not studied this piece, and if so confirmed, I would be
willing to come back to this committee in a classified setting
to further address this balance of our capability that we will
need for the future.
Senator Udall. Let me follow that with a question, and I
think you can respond up to a point, given this is an open
hearing.
If reductions were made, we would be able to maintain those
weapons that were reduced in a status that would allow them to
be redeployed if a situation demanded. Is that correct?
Admiral Haney. Senator, it would really depend on any
future agreement that we would have in terms of what were the
basis and parts and components of said agreement relative to
what we would retain and what we would not.
Senator Udall. Some of the present agreements, if I am
correct, do allow that, though, as an option. Is that fair to
say? Some of the treaties that are in place today.
Admiral Haney. Yes, sir, that is my understanding.
Senator Udall. The weapons are kept in a warm status if
they are kept in a stockpile?
Admiral Haney. That is correct. The New START treaty
addresses both deployed and nondeployed warheads and also
addresses launchers.
Senator Udall. Talk about the benefits, as you see them,
that are associated with the proposed changes to our nuclear
employment strategy. Do you believe the benefits, in other
words, outweigh the risks?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I believe the benefits relative to
the New START treaty provide us the adequate numbers of nuclear
weapons and launchers to address the threats now and into the
future.
Senator Udall. Let me move to modern conventional weapons.
There are some who I respect and I think many respect who say
that modern conventional weapons have provided us with the
capabilities that once would have been required by nuclear
weapons. Am I correct in saying because of those advanced
conventional weapons, we simply do not need as many nukes as we
once did to accomplish the same objective?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I would say that as you look at the
number of nukes, our combined capability is also important as a
country. When you look at how many nukes we had--nuclear
weapons--during the Cold War and just the significant
quantities we have had, if you were to look at that graph from
about the 1950s on, it is pretty interesting in how we have
made significant reductions while still retaining quite a few
weapons.
I fundamentally believe that we have to be careful and look
at all of our capability, similar to what was stated in the
Nuclear Posture Review in 2010, that that is also part of our
country's capability and what we can bring to bear if so
threatened. But as long as other countries have nuclear
weapons, we are required to have a safe, secure, and effective
means to address that.
Senator Udall. I think we all agree on that point. You are
saying that the conventional arsenal that we have today is
advanced and it complements our nuclear weapons capability as
well. Is that what you are saying?
Admiral Haney. It complements. What I am also saying is I
do not have a magic equation that says this number of precision
guided munitions equal this capability because we are talking
about a significant difference in destructive capability when
we look at a nuclear weapon.
Senator Udall. Admiral, let us turn to the modernization of
the B-61 bomb. Do you support that current modernization plan?
What would be the consequences if the United States did not
modernize the B-61?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think the B-61-12 modernization
program is very important to our Nation, and I fully support
it. I also believe that we will be at risk if we do not support
it because through its modernization, it also reduces the
number of other nuclear weapons that we have today and brings
it down to one type model series for nuclear surety and in
order to have a safe, secure platform for our use, but
particularly in terms of the tactical nukes associated with our
dual-capable aircraft program.
Senator Udall. You paid me the honor of a visit and we
talked about this particular plan. We also talked about your
willingness to work with Senator Sessions, who is my ranking
member on the subcommittee, and myself to bring down the costs
of the B-61-12 program. I heard you imply but I want to make
sure for the record that you have a chance to clarify further.
You will work with us to bring down that price tag and do
everything possible to create some efficiencies. Is that
correct?
Admiral Haney. Senator, if so confirmed, I will work hard
to look at costs in every program STRATCOM is associated with.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that answer.
Chairman Levin. Let me interrupt you, Senator Udall. We
only have a minute left in this vote. There was a
miscommunication here. At any rate, we are right at the end of
the vote. We only have about 5 minutes to get there. We are
going to have to recess for 10 minutes or so because none of us
have voted yet. We will call the cloak rooms and let them know
that we are on our way. We are going to have to recess. Sorry
to interrupt you. If you get back, then we owe you a minute or
2.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Okay. We are going to hold off on that.
Senator Donnelly is here and he can continue.
Do you want to finish?
Senator Udall. Could I just finish the question for the
record, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Senator Udall. Then I would be happy to defer to my wise
colleague from the Hoosier State, Senator Donnelly.
I will ask this for the record, Admiral. On the issue of
electromagnetic (EM) spectrum management, I think you are well
aware of the discussion that is underway. I think if we had
public access to that bandwidth, it would be a great economic
benefit. I know we also cannot negatively affect DOD mission.
Do you believe that the lower 25 megahertz of that spectrum
could be vacated within the currently proposed timeline without
unduly affecting our military and our military missions?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think as we go forward here in
the electronic spectrum, as much as it is also becoming
extremely utilized, that we have to be very careful that costs
associated with taking the EM spectrum away in areas where the
military is using right now because there will be a cost
associated with migrating those equipments to a different EM
band.
Senator Udall. I hear caution in your answer but I want to
continue to work with you on this important what I think is
opportunity but we also have to do it right.
Thanks again, gentlemen, to both of you. I look forward to
working with you after you are confirmed. Thank you.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is great to be with both of you. I want to thank you for
your service to the country and to your families for everything
you have done on behalf of this Nation. We are very grateful to
all of you.
Last Saturday, July 27, marked the 60th anniversary of the
Korean War armistice. I would like to recognize our
servicemembers who currently serve and have served in the
Republic of Korea and thank them for their service.
One such Korean War veteran was Army Lieutenant Colonel Don
Faith, a Hoosier who was posthumously awarded the Medal of
Honor and was buried in Arlington Cemetery just recently. His
body was recovered from North Korea in 2004 as part of a joint
U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea recovery team.
Currently 5,500 U.S. servicemembers are still missing in
action in North Korea. General Scaparrotti, what conditions are
necessary for resuming recovery operations in North Korea so
our missing-in-action soldiers can be brought home to their
families?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, first let me say that I fully
support efforts for repatriation of our servicemembers, their
remains. It is an obligation that we have, I believe, as a
Nation. If confirmed as the U.N. Commander, as a part of those
duties, I will have particular duties regarding the
arrangements for the repatriation of remains.
I think in terms of what we should do, I think to go
forward, we should ensure that it is within the priority of our
other national interests and, second, that we can assure the
security of those individuals that we would put into North
Korea to retrieve the remains and do the operation there.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Admiral Haney, recently the National Air and Space
Intelligence Center put out a report regarding ballistic
missile systems and said China has the most active and diverse
ballistic missile development program in the world. It is
developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional
missile units, qualitatively upgrading missile systems, and
developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
When we look at that and we know that with our missile
defense systems, the last three tests have failed, how do we
rectify that situation?
Admiral Haney. Senator, as we look to the future here, it
is very important that we are able to continue to work our
missile defense solutions across the board but, in particular,
to get our GBI solution set operating with the confidence we
expect. We have had numerous tests over the years of the CE1
variant and it is operational, and it is operational to the
extent that it is currently protecting our country. As we look
at the future, it is important that we get the CE2 portion of
this also correct and that we look at the full range of options
as we look at addressing the missile defense threat.
Senator Donnelly. One of the other concerns that I have is,
as we look at the east coast missile defense system more, the
suggestion of whether or not we need one, folks have said there
is no point in going further with that because we do not have
the other system even working right. I think we are able to do
two things at one time. Do you see a need for an east coast
missile defense system?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I see a need for us to look at
other options, options in general, of how we address this
problem. I am fully supportive of moving forward with the
environmental impact statement, which is fully supported, as we
go forward while at the same time making sure we get our
sensing right so that we can further refine our capability in
terms of being able to attack these missiles with our current
programs.
Senator Donnelly. You were kind enough when we met to talk
a little bit about this issue with me, but I just wanted to
mention it again and that is in regards to counterfeit parts.
It is an extraordinarily dangerous situation when these parts
are used in equipment that protects our soldiers, that our
servicemembers depend on.
Is there a way to use facilities like Crane Naval Warfare
Center in Indiana to minimize DOD's risk of receiving
counterfeit parts in the military supply chain?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think it is very important that
we continue to work hard as a country and as a military to look
and avoid counterfeit parts. This is a very important area as
we look at our current posture but also as we look at the
future with the number of systems with chips of various
capabilities in so much of our military apparatus.
With regards to how we do that, if so confirmed, this is an
area I will look at and from that standpoint, if so confirmed,
come back to you relative to Crane. I have not been to Crane.
This is one of the areas in the early months, if so confirmed,
that I will want to get around to see our various capabilities
in the country and be able to address that more formally.
Senator Donnelly. We would be honored to have you come.
General, in regards to North Korea's ballistic missile
systems, what do you think their intent is?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I think North Korea has an
aggressive ballistic missile program. They have hundreds of
short- and medium-range missiles. They are developing
intermediate-range and ICBMs. They see that as prestige for
their regime. They see it as a means of extending the regime's
security. They see it as a manner of deterrence against the
United States and our influence in the region, as well as the
other regional partners. I think the regime itself sees their
ballistic missile systems as very important.
In recent years, their conventional forces have been
declining in capability, and it is the money that they are
putting into asymmetric systems like the ballistic missile
system, their special forces, cyber, et cetera that I think
they have changed their strategy toward us.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much, General, Admiral.
Thank you both for your service.
Mrs. Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you, Admiral, and thank you, General, for being here
today, and I thank you for your service. I thank your families
for their sacrifice through the years. I can see you should be
very proud of the families that you have raised while serving
your country. Thank you very much.
Admiral, I want to thank you again for taking the time to
come and visit me in my office. I thought we had a great
discussion, and I would like to just follow up, if I could, a
little bit on the issues that we touched upon in my office.
I had asked you about our relationship with Russia and your
views on that relationship, but we did not have the opportunity
to discuss their views on missile defense. I would ask you, how
do you think the United States should deal with the Russians'
repeated demands for legal limits on our missile defenses? How
do you define the term ``legal limits''?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I do believe, as we have
articulated from the Nuclear Posture Review and the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review and continued on a journey, we have
continued to articulate how our missile defense system is
designed to be a limited missile defense system that should not
be conceived as a threat to Russia's deterrence capability.
I think as we continue to work with the Russians, we will
have to continue the dialogues that have been started to
continue to make sure their questions are in fact answered, but
at the same time, we have to be mindful that it is important
that we defend and have adequate capability to defend our
assets, both deployed and our Homeland. As I see Russia, that
is also a country that is doing some investment in their
capability. The combination of continuing to have discussions
and negotiations I think is important for our future.
In terms of defining the legal limit piece, that is an
area, if so confirmed, I would like to look at more closely and
come back to you.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that it should be our
decision as a country, as a Nation, on where we deploy our
defense systems and the numbers that we use in those
deployments?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think it is important, as we
deploy any of our capability, that we work through our
associated analysis as well as work with our allies and
partners and countries like Russia in terms of how we come with
an integral solution. But as we do that, we clearly have to
prioritize what we are trying to achieve is part of that
calculus.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that we should support or
do you support sharing classified data on our missile defenses
with the Russians? If so, would you draw a line and where would
you draw the line on how much to share?
Admiral Haney. Senator, that is a very good question. The
business, in terms of information sharing, is one that has to
be looked at closely, both looked at from a standpoint of how
we look at the world today and how we look at the world in the
future. I think as we look at information sharing, which we do
with a variety of countries on different subjects, for missile
defense, that is one that, again, has limits and bounds. As I
sit before you, I could not in an unclassified forum talk about
that but would look forward, if so confirmed, in the future to
have an opportunity to continue that discussion.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. I appreciate your offering to
do that. I think it is an important point and it is one that we
need to have a conversation about. I thank you for that.
You mentioned that you support more testing for missile
defense. Do you believe that our current budget can adequately
do that? Do you think we need more resources, especially given
some recent test failures? What would you advise if you are
confirmed?
Admiral Haney. Senator, if so confirmed, this will be an
area that I would want to look at closely. Number one, whenever
we talk about adding more resources, it is very important first
we look at what our resources we currently have are doing for
us, and I am a big believer that we have to be careful before
we just come out and ask for more without doing some rigorous
reviews of what we are spending money on.
I do believe, though, when we look at testing, testing
covers a full gamut, partially testing that you can do without
launching in space as you narrow down and do the analysis
associated with componentry. I know this last test is under
review and, until so confirmed, I am unable to see the results
of that work, it is hard for me to give you an answer that
would be substantial. I look forward to that, if so confirmed,
in the future.
Senator Fischer. I would assume from some of your previous
statements, though, that you do believe that we need to have
equipment that is going to work and make sure that it can do
the job. Is that correct?
Admiral Haney. Senator, that is very important for us to be
able to achieve for the future of the defense of our country
and for our deployed forces as well as our allies.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
We talked a little bit about the new facility that is being
constructed at STRATCOM in my State and that hopefully it is on
schedule and it will continue to move forward at the speed that
it needs to move forward at so that we can update the resources
that we have there at STRATCOM. Do you have anything you want
to add on that about the value that that facility will have for
STRATCOM? I know you were assigned to STRATCOM. I believe it
was in 2010. You are familiar with the area, and I know you are
familiar with the planning of that facility. What would you add
to that and the value that it has for the mission?
Admiral Haney. Senator, thank you for that question.
The command and control complex that is being built right
now is very important to our Nation in terms of all the
missions of STRATCOM and, in particular, strategic deterrence.
It is important, as we have talked about here, the warheads,
the weapons, the platforms, and the sensors, but without the
command and control that connects the relevant information to
our leadership, the decisions could not be made in a prompt
time. That is such an important part of our infrastructure and
capability going forward.
I thank Congress for its support for that command and
control complex.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral. I look forward to
working with you to make sure that it continues to move
forward. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Now I believe that Senator King is next.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to the
country and your joining us this morning.
Admiral Haney, I have heard a number of witnesses over the
course of the past 6 or 7 months characterize cyber as the most
serious, immediate threat that we face. The term I have heard,
which stuck with me, was the next Pearl Harbor will probably be
cyber.
Given that, do you think that the Cyber Command, which is
under your proposed command, should be set apart and elevated
to its own unified combatant command?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I am a fan of a command and control
structure that allows us to win would be my first overarching
statement.
As we look at how we are aligned today with Cyber Command
as a sub-unified command under STRATCOM, I believe the work is
ongoing and in fact is working in a very synchronized fashion
with delegated responsibilities to U.S. Cyber Command.
My first principle would be the first part that we have to
keep intact is the National Security Agency and Cyber Command
under the same hat, as we have it today, and that that synergy
is so important to our country going into the future. That
piece we have to continue and we have to get it right. As we
look at a future and particularly as we grow our cyber
capability, I believe there may come a time where Cyber Command
as a separate combatant command will be appropriate. But I
think as we are applying our next dollars in terms of the
manpower we need to address this threat and in terms of the
tool sets we need to address this threat, that that is
important because as we do step into moving Cyber Command as
its own combatant command, there is also a price to be paid
there as well in overhead. Right now, I think we are fine in
our current alignment but I am not opposed for some time in the
future for Cyber Command to become its own combatant command.
Senator King. Since the 1950s, our strategy with regard to
nuclear weapons has been deterrence, mutually assured
destruction, and that presumes a level of rationality in one's
enemy. What is our strategy for deterrence of madmen with
nuclear weapons, people that are not necessarily rational,
whether they are state or particularly non-state actors? What
is our sort of overall strategic thinking about, as I say,
particularly non-state actors who at some point in the
reasonably near future may be able to obtain nuclear weapons?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think that is an area
particularly where the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010
articulated a strategy which we continue, point one being that
it is important that our efforts in terms of combating weapons
of mass destruction continue. We have had the initial operating
capability of the standing joint force headquarters for
elimination, for example, in the business of having that
capability, the business of being able to have our country's
capability of knowing where the nuclear weapons, as well as the
other weapons of mass destruction, are and to work hard to
avoid having this kind of capability fall in the wrong hands.
Senator King. It is an intelligence function. Is that what
you are saying? Principally our defense against non-state
nuclear weapons is essentially knowing who has them and how to
prevent them?
Admiral Haney. I think, Senator, this is also in the spirit
of reducing the number of weapons that exist in the world. It
has been part of that Nuclear Posture Review and the strategy
that our country has been striving to achieve. It is not just
an intelligence function. It is a whole-of-government function.
It is a function that STRATCOM is also heavily involved in to
detect, deter, and prevent utilization of that type of weapons.
Senator King. But you understand what I am saying. The
strategy of deterrence may work with Russia but an Iranian
terrorist cell who thinks that if they die in a holy war, they
are going to go straight to heaven--deterrence is not
necessarily a viable strategy. What is the strategy?
Admiral Haney. The strategy is to continue to work across
our whole-of-government apparatus in terms of ensuring that
countries that harbor folks that want to do harm to us in
whatever means--there is some work that occurs diplomatically.
There is work that occurs militarily. This business of knowing
where things are is also a very important part of that strategy
to address the threat in addition to the elimination of that
threat.
Senator King. Thank you.
General, in the full preparation of our committee, I want
you to know that we are preparing you today for Korean
winters--the air conditioning in this room. We want you to be
ready for cold weather. [Laughter.]
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, sir.
Senator King. This past Saturday I had the honor to visit
with a number of Korean War veterans at the 60th anniversary of
the signing of the treaty at Panmunjom. I have a little
statement. Of course, you know Korea is often characterized as
``the forgotten war''. But in looking at the situation where we
have a very vigorous country of 50 million people in the south
and a miserable despotism in the north, I cannot think of too
many wars that made as much difference as that war did if you
look at the stark difference on the two sides of that narrow
line. It certainly should not be a forgotten war.
A question that I am sure you are going to have to deal
with in the next several months is, to what extent is the
sequester going to affect readiness in Korea?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think it will affect
readiness in Korea at some point. Presently USFK enjoys a very
high priority in terms of funding and resources. Just after the
forces deployed in harm's way, Korea is on that level because
we have to be ready to fight in Korea tonight. It is that
uncertain. We have enjoyed that kind of funding.
If confirmed, I intend to keep a very close watch on our
readiness levels, the resources that we have. I think my
concern would be as we reduce our funding, particularly if we
go into full sequestration, we know that we have seen a
reduction in the forces now already or their readiness, and
that would be extended into the next year and, of course,
become worse over time. The forces in Korea depend on
potentially a rotation of forces, but certainly the forces that
would come forward if there is conflict on the peninsula. I
think that is the impact as we look to the future.
Senator King. I hope perhaps for the record you could
provide some analysis--because it is now looking more and more
like full sequester in 2014 is a likelihood if not a
certainty--of what the impact would be and how it would be
allocated because it is very important for us to know, as we
are debating and discussing sequester and what the alternatives
are, that we have a realistic picture of the impact. My
understanding, from talking to other people in the Pentagon, is
that the sequester in 2014 is going to be a much more serious,
widespread impact than it was in 2013 because of the lack of
low-hanging fruit, if you will, of unexpended funds and those
kinds of things. It is going to be a higher level of impact.
Perhaps for the record you can give us some serious analysis of
the impact on Korea. We need to have that information.
General Scaparrotti. Senator, presently we already see the
impact on readiness just in this fiscal year, as you mentioned,
in fiscal year 2013. You know that the Army has the majority of
its brigades now at a lower training level focusing on company-
level training, for instance. For those brigades who are either
not deployed or those who are about to deploy, those two
categories maintain the training levels they need to be ready
for that deployment. But all other brigades have come to a
lower proficiency level and resourcing.
The Air Force, you are aware, has already grounded 12 air
squadrons, as I understand it. The Navy has cut back on ships
going to sea and the maintenance that they are providing. That
is the short term.
But as we take those cuts today, you will see a much deeper
cut in readiness as we go into 2014 and beyond because that
begins to compound itself. Pilots who have not flown take much
longer to get back up to combat proficiency. Brigades who have
not trained in the fundamentals, particularly the integration
of combined arms at a higher level, take much longer to train
and it is more expensive. I think as time goes on, we see our
readiness coming down and that is of concern.
How does that impact USFK? First of all, it is the forces
that we may rotate there. They would take longer to be ready
for the mission that they are going to do. If it were forces
that had to be deployed in response to, say, a provocation, we
would probably take some time here in the States to train that
unit to the readiness level that we believe they need to be at
to do the job before they deploy. Arriving forces might be
delayed as a result.
Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that, and any
additional information you could provide us for the record
would be helpful. Thank you.
General Scaparrotti. I will, sir. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

I will continue to review and evaluate the readiness of U.S. Forces
in Korea and what impact, if any, full sequester could have on those
forces.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator McCain?
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Haney, you will be leaving the command of the
Pacific fleet. How is the littoral combat ship working out?
Admiral Haney. Senator, we had the USS Freedom deployed
today in the western Pacific.
Senator McCain. Based out of Singapore?
Admiral Haney. Operating out of Singapore, sir. In fact, it
has been involved in a variety of exercises and operations
since it has been out there.
We also have two other littoral combat ships, the
Independence and the Fort Worth, that are operating out of San
Diego and working, in the Independence's case, the mine warfare
module. I am happy to report we have three out in the Pacific
today, sir.
Senator McCain. My question was how is it working out?
Admiral Haney. Senator, it is working out very well in
terms of our ability to take this first platform, a research
and development model, and get it out in the Pacific to do real
work. Clearly with it, we have learned a lot, but we are right
now about to swap the second crew to that platform about
halfway through its 8 months deployment in the case of the
Freedom. The other two are continuing to work through the
various----
Senator McCain. I would like for the third time to ask you
how is it working out. Are you satisfied with its performance?
Are the modules being replaced on time? Are the cost estimates
what they should be? Please answer the question, Admiral.
Admiral Haney. Senator, I would----
Senator McCain. I can get a status report whenever I want
one. I want to know your view as to how the littoral combat
ship is working out as far as its ability to defend our
interests in the Pacific.
Admiral Haney. Senator, currently it is working out very
well from an ability to deploy it and get it to do its work.
The platform itself, both varieties, have moved forward, and my
personal view is that that part is also working out well. We
have learned some things that have been incorporated from
Freedom, LCS-1 to LCS-3, and those improvements I believe are
right on target.
If there is one area that requires more work and that we
have been working as a Navy to get there is the mission modules
of the different varieties. The current module deployed with
the littoral combat ship number one is working fine, and it is
a little early for me to give you the prognosis on the
Independence mine warfare mission module, sir.
Senator McCain. General, there have been plans to move our
troops in South Korea to a base further away from Seoul. How is
that progressing?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, presently those plans are
underway. They are being worked with our ROK counterparts as
well. Primarily right now, we are making plans for the ability
to make those moves to----
Senator McCain. Have we gotten cost estimates yet as to how
and who would bear those costs?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, there are cost estimates at
this point. It is shared costs with our ROK counterparts as
well as our own payment. I am aware of the issues with the cost
today. As I said, we are----
Senator McCain. Roughly what costs are we talking about to
complete the contemplated move?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, in terms of the Land Partnership
Plan, which is the one that we pay probably the most part of,
it is about $880 million for our portion of that Land
Partnership Plan move, and that has to do with the forces north
of Seoul.
The Yongsan Relocation Plan is a plan paid primarily by the
Republic of Korea for the move of the services and the forces
right around Yongsan in the headquarters area.
Senator McCain. Now in, ``paying for the move,'' does that
mean paying for all of the installation that is necessary
there?
General Scaparrotti. My term, sir. In those plans, it is
the payment for the construction of facilities to support the
troops, and there is also housing included in this as well for
families, et cetera.
Senator McCain. Do you think it is a wise move at this time
for the South Koreans to reopen that facility, manufacturing
area, north of the Demilitarized Zone?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I think that if the two countries
can come to terms on their agreements and, as South Korea said,
so that it would not be used as leverage again, that is a
platform that can be used then to perhaps develop communication
and reduce the tension between North Korea and South Korea.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service, your extraordinary careers
of service, to our Nation. Thank you to your families as well
for their contribution and service.
Let me begin, Admiral Haney, by asking you about the Ohio-
class ballistic missile submarines. I know that you have today,
in fact, called then critical to our national defense, and yet
as you also know, the program has been delayed by at least 2
years. Is that a wise move?
Admiral Haney. Senator, the delay with the program has
incurred some risk, and that is a risk that we are working
through. I would say we can ill-afford to have another delay
with this program.
Senator Blumenthal. Another delay would be unacceptable?
Admiral Haney. That is correct, Senator. Particularly as
you look at the aging of the current platform that is beginning
to reach its end of life, 42 years is a long time to be
operating a submarine.
Senator Blumenthal. My understanding is that the official
explanation has been that the delay will enable more refined
development of the weapons platform, of the technology, and
ultimately some prospect of cost savings. Is that the reasons
that you understand the delay has been implemented?
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think the delay was implemented
for some of that, but it was also a matter of prioritization of
resources.
Senator Blumenthal. Cost savings, in other words, the
unavailability of funds.
Admiral Haney. Yes, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. In a more perfect world--not a perfect
world necessarily, but a more ideal world, that program would
be implemented without the delay.
Admiral Haney. Senator, that is correct. I will say I know
that there is some work that continues to go on in research and
development and design development for that platform. I think
in the interim time, good work continues.
Senator Blumenthal. If possible, though, we would
recalculate and eliminate that delay, if possible.
Admiral Haney. Senator, I think we have already started the
delay, and you cannot make up for what is already lost. We are
already in that phase.
Senator Blumenthal. But there is no question that we need
that Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine and that we need to
provide sufficient resources without additional delay.
Admiral Haney. Senator, that is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. General, if I could ask a few more
questions about the relocation. Given the stringency--and you
have heard a number of my colleagues talk about the possible
continuing of the sequester even though many like myself
believe that it would be unwise and really unjustified to apply
it as it would be to the defense budget--can you tell me
whether canceling the relocation is an option that perhaps we
should consider?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I cannot say for sure whether
that would be an option we would consider. It seems to me that
we have made, as a part of the Strategic Alliance 2015,
agreements with our ROK allies, and those moves are tied to
that. From the position I am in now, I cannot really comment on
whether that is really an option.
But I would say too that those moves help us posture our
forces better. To the extent that we can continue on that line,
my judgment is it would be good for the readiness of the force
as well.
Senator Blumenthal. You have said it would be good. It is
essential for the readiness of the force?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, if confirmed, I will certainly
review that and be willing to come back to you. I do not
believe that from this position I have the capability to answer
that question fully, but I will be able to once I am on the
ground and I can see the impact of both the moves and also the
importance with respect to our bilateral agreements.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you have an estimate as to what the
cost of canceling or delaying the relocation would be?
General Scaparrotti. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you be able to provide one to the
committee?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, if confirmed, I am willing to
provide one to the committee.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I would appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Currently, I understand a reliable cost estimate for cancelling the
transformation initiatives does not exist. With that said, I understand
that there would be potential political sensitivities with our Republic
of Korea allies if this effort is cancelled, as they are paying for
over 90 percent of the costs of the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land
Partnership Plan. Additionally, over $500 million of U.S. Military
Construction has been invested in building infrastructure to support
the relocation efforts.

Senator Blumenthal. I must say I do not have too much doubt
you will be confirmed. I expect you have heard much the same
from others on this committee. I certainly will be supporting
you in that vote.
What is the overall cost of the project? I have heard the
number $10 billion.
General Scaparrotti. Of that project?
Senator Blumenthal. Yes. I am sorry. Of the relocation
project.
General Scaparrotti. Sir, again, I would like to come back
on the record. I have heard a lower number than that, but I do
not know if that is the entire cost of the project.
[The information referred to follows:]

The total U.S. and ROK costs of the Yongsan Relocation Plan and
Land Partnership Plan initiatives are $10.7 billion.

Senator Blumenthal. Finally, we hear a lot about readiness
and about the impact of sequester on readiness. Could you
maybe, to give us a little bit more concrete or factual basis
for what the impact is, talk about what the effect is on the
troops on the ground in Korea who will be under your command,
the captains and lieutenants, the sergeants and staff
sergeants, how their everyday training, life, and so forth is
affected?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, if I could, I would like to take
that as a general question, not specific to USFK.
Senator Blumenthal. Sure.
General Scaparrotti. I have done some checking but I have
not checked with those serving today in Korea. Second, they
enjoy a very high resource category right now.
But across the force, the reduction thus far in resources
and the impact of sequester has resulted in the reduction of
training that is being done. The troops are training every day
but they are training at a much lower level.
Senator Blumenthal. I know I have heard this numerous
times, which is why I wanted to specify it to Korea. Does that
mean that they are out in the field less, that they are sitting
in classrooms rather than firing live rounds somewhere?
General Scaparrotti. They may be in the field less. They
are likely going to the range less. They are likely qualifying
with weapons systems and the vehicle systems that they have
less. The pilots are likely flying less.
Now, you asked about morale. That also impacts morale
because our young men and women are very proficient. They are
very experienced. They know what it takes to be ready for
combat across all the Services. They have been in a fight for
10 years. So when we start to delay their ability to reach or
maintain that kind of proficiency, it affects their morale as
well. Also, they are concerned about their future in our force.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time has expired but I think this topic obviously is
supremely important. I want to thank both of you for your very
helpful and insightful answers. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
I just have one additional question for you, General
Scaparrotti. It has to do with the various approaches to the
intense determination of all of us to reduce the number of
sexual assaults and inappropriate sexual conduct.
Given your experience at West Point and as a commander,
should we take the chain of command out of that decision to
prosecute courts martial?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you.
I strongly believe that we should not take the commander
out of the process in terms of dealing with disciplinary
issues, in particular in this case, sexual assault. In the
military, the commander is central to all that we do. The
commander, in fact, is held responsible for his unit, all that
it does or fails to do, and he or she is the most important
person establishing the climate within that command of whatever
size it is. It is the climate in my opinion that is fundamental
to preventing sexual harassment and sexual assault. They are
key to that.
I believe strongly that our commanders take this seriously
and that we can through training, through oversight, some of
the initiatives that have been presented by members of this
committee, perhaps some legislation, that can also help us
strengthen our ability to deal with this with our commanders in
the chain of command.
In the end, I would just say I think it is a matter of
integrity. We entrust them with great responsibility, special
trust as it says in their obligation that they take, and we
entrust them with the lives of our young men and women. To not
trust them with a portion of this to me does not follow through
with what we say and then what we do. I say that we hold them
accountable, train them properly and give them the tools to do
that oversight, and then maintain integrity of the system.
Chairman Levin. Any other questions?
Senator Inhofe. One.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, just one follow-up.
I appreciate your answer very much to that question,
General. Did you happen to see the compromise that the chairman
and I and this committee put together that would maintain the
integrity of the commander but also give some relief in the
event that some abuse takes place? Did you see that?
General Scaparrotti. I did, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. What do you think about that?
General Scaparrotti. I agree with that. As I said, I think
there are some initiatives here that have been proposed that
retain the commander in the process, but there are things that
we can do in Article 60, for instance, which I think yours also
contains, that provides less authority but proper oversight. In
other words, in this case they would not retain the capability
of changing a charge after a court martial is found, which they
have today as a convening authority. But that would be left to
judicial authorities on appeal. I think there are things like
that that have been proposed in your bill that is acceptable,
in the long run will be helpful to this problem.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I may follow up again just very briefly. In your career,
General, have you acted as a convening authority and decided to
prosecute cases of sexual assault?
General Scaparrotti. In my time, I believe I have acted as
a convening authority in terms of sexual assault. I know that I
dealt with this issue as the commander or the commandant at
West Point. That is the age group that we have the greatest
challenge in in the military, and it happens to be the age
group that we have at West Point as cadets. I became very
involved in every aspect of this issue.
Senator Blumenthal. Did you take a course in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, I have both in the courses
that we go through as part of our career, but I personally made
it a point to go to our legal school both before the time I
became a battalion level commander and again before I became a
brigade level commander and obtained special court martial
convening authority. I purposely did that to ensure that my
understanding and training was honed.
Senator Blumenthal. Using that training, did you decide to
prosecute individuals under your command for sexual assault?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, I have, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. On how many occasions would you say?
General Scaparrotti. I could not give you the number, sir.
I know that I dealt with cases at West Point in particular. I
would have to go back and review. In I Corps, I probably did,
just given the number of cases and the size of the element.
Senator Blumenthal. Did you ever decide to prosecute
despite a recommendation to the contrary from the judge
advocate?
General Scaparrotti. No, I never have. I cannot remember an
occasion that I have disagreed with my judge advocate.
Senator Blumenthal. So that when you received a
recommendation to go forward and prosecute, you did so.
General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. On every occasion?
General Scaparrotti. I would like to say one of the
initiatives that we have talked about within the Services is
the use of judge advocates and those who are specialized in
particular crimes. In the case of sexual assault, for instance,
I can tell you clearly that I have dealt with it as a convening
authority in cases that had to do with murder, and in those
cases, I sought not only my judge advocate's opinions, but I
also asked that he go to the Army. We had their specialist in
that area provide me advice as well. I think that is something
that we can do in this area with those specially trained.
Senator Blumenthal. You would like to see prosecutors who
are specially trained and experienced with expertise in this
area of sexual assault because it is a very challenging and
sometimes difficult one not just to decide but also to actually
proceed and prosecute and try and convict. Am I correct?
General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you also like to see those types
of trained and experienced prosecutors involved in the decision
to prosecute?
General Scaparrotti. I would. As I have said, I sought that
kind of help when I was a convening authority.
Senator Blumenthal. I very much appreciate your answers to
my questions. As you may know, there is another point of view
on the convening authority issue, and I personally deeply
respect the solution that the chairman and ranking member have
helped to lead. It has been great leadership on this issue in
seeking a change. But I also think that we need to treat this
crime as, in fact, a predatory heinous crime and that someone
with the prosecutorial expertise and experience that you have
described may be in a better position to make these decisions.
I say that with all due respect. I really appreciate your
answers to my questions.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Just to be very, very clear here, now the
alternative proposal is to transfer the decisionmaking as to
whether to proceed to a trained and experienced judge advocate
or prosecutor. That is not what you support, I gather.
General Scaparrotti. That is correct, sir. The Senator said
``assist,'' and I believe the commander should still be in the
chain.
Chairman Levin. When you say that you would like to consult
with such a trained and experienced Judge Advocate General
officer and for that person to be involved in that sense to be
consulted, that does, I take it from your testimony, in no way
diminish your belief that the decisionmaking needs to remain in
the chain of command.
General Scaparrotti. Mr. Chairman, you are correct.
Chairman Levin. Anything else?
Senator Blumenthal. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
We are all done. Thank you both. Thanks to your families.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Cecil E.D. Haney, USN,
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also improved cooperation between the Services and the
combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. No. I believe that Goldwater-Nichols as it stands is
effective.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)?
Answer. The Commander, STRATCOM, is responsible for the plans and
operations for U.S. Forces conducting strategic deterrence and the
Department of Defense (DOD) space and cyberspace operations. These
responsibilities include the following missions: deter attacks on U.S.
vital interests, ensure U.S. freedom of action in space and cyberspace,
deliver integrated kinetic and non-kinetic effects in support of U.S.
Joint Force Commander operations, synchronizing planning and
coordinating operations support for global missile defense, synchronize
regional combating weapons of mass destruction plans, provide
integrated surveillance and reconnaissance allocation recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense and advocate for assigned capabilities.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. My 35 year career includes assignments and responsibilities
involving operational and staff assignments in the U.S. Navy, the Joint
Staff, and STRATCOM. I have completed various operational, leadership,
and strategic deterrence assignments within the submarine force, to
include assistant squadron deputy at Submarine Squadron Eight before
taking command of USS Honolulu (SSN 718) and commanded Submarine
Squadron One, and Submarine Group Two. I have served as the Deputy
Chief of Staff of Plans, Policies and Requirements, U.S. Pacific Fleet
(N5N8); and Director, Submarine Warfare Division (N87); Director, Naval
Warfare Integration Group (N00X) and Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command.
As the Deputy Commander, STRATCOM, I gained experience in
delivering effects with the broad range of strategic capabilities for
combatant commanders engaged across the spectrum of conflict around the
world. As Commander, Pacific Fleet for the past 3 years, I organized,
trained and equipped pacific theater operational naval assets in space,
cyberspace, intelligence, missile defense, and strategic effects in
support of the missions of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), STRATCOM,
North American Aerospace Defense Command and other combatant commands.
I have also served as Commander, Joint Task Force 519 for Commander,
PACOM. If confirmed, I will leverage my experience to lead STRATCOM in
fulfilling its responsibilities.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command?
Answer. I will seek to continue to enhance my expertise in
STRATCOM's broad range of missions. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with all the combatant commanders and the many organizations
STRATCOM depends on for continued success, many of whom I worked with
during my tour as the Deputy Commander, STRATCOM. I intend to establish
clear lines of communication, define relationships and become more
familiar with these organizations (e.g. Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Energy-National Nuclear Security
Administration, Missile Defense Agency, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, and the Nuclear Weapons Council) and their contributions to
mission success.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C., section 164, subject to the
direction of the President, the Commander, STRATCOM, performs duties
under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense
and is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of
the command to carry out assigned missions.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 132, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform such duties and exercise
powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of
Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary on appropriate
matters.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy is the principal staff
assistant (PSA) and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and
defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and
plans to achieve national security objectives.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Intelligence is the PSA and advisor
to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters
regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive
activities and other intelligence-related matters.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics is the PSA and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense for all matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System;
research and development; modeling and simulation; systems integration;
logistics; installation management; military construction; procurement;
environment; services; and nuclear, chemical and biological programs.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic
Affairs.
Answer. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
Strategic Affairs (ASD/GSA) is a newly configured directorate in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense that develops policy for the
Secretary on countering weapons of mass destruction, nuclear forces and
missile defense, cyber security and space issues. GSA is currently
tasked with three major congressionally-mandated reviews: the Nuclear
Posture Review, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the Space
Posture Review. In addition, GSA is the Defense Department's lead in
developing a cyber-security strategy for the Department and for
crafting the policy for the standup of the new Cyber Command. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for ASD/GSA in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy on matters in the area of U.S. Strategic Command.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Americas' Security Affairs.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs under the authority, direction and control
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, serves as the principal
civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy on Homeland defense activities, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities, Western Hemisphere security matters and provides
overall supervision of homeland defense activities of DOD. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Security and Americas' Security in coordination
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on matters in the area
of U.S. Strategic Command.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Programs advises the Secretary of Defense on
nuclear energy, nuclear weapons and chemical and biological defense;
serves as the Staff Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council; and
performs such additional duties as the Secretary may prescribe. If
confirmed, I will work closely with this office and the Nuclear Weapons
Council in support of the nuclear deterrence mission.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 163, clearly establishes the
Chairman as the principal military advisor to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and the
Secretary of Defense. In this role, he is the most senior ranking
member of the armed forces but does not exercise command over any
military forces or serve in the Chain of Command between the President
and Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders, although the
President may transmit communications through him. By law and as
directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman consults with the
combatant commanders, evaluates and assists in achieving their
requirements and plans. The Chairman provides a vital link between the
combatant commanders and other elements of DOD. If confirmed, I will
keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on
matters for which I am personally accountable as Commander, STRATCOM.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 165, subject to the
authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and
support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.
The authority exercised by a combatant commander over Service
components is quite clear but requires close coordination with each
Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful
responsibilities which a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I
look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with each
of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service
Chiefs no longer serve in the operational chain of command. They now
serve to provide organized, trained and equipped forces to be employed
by combatant commanders in accomplishing their assigned missions.
Additionally, these officers serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and have a lawful obligation to provide military advice.
Individually and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a tremendous
source of experience and judgment. If confirmed, I will work closely
and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs.
Question. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Answer. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is a DOD
organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition,
launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to
meet the needs of the Intelligence Community and of the DOD. According
to the Unified Command Plan, STRATCOM is the responsible combatant
command for both space operations and for planning, integrating and
coordinating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in support
of strategic and global operations, as directed. In these capacities,
the Commander, STRATCOM must maintain a close relationship with the
Director of the NRO to coordinate and represent requirements in these
mission areas. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of
the NRO on matters of shared interest and importance.
Question. The combatant commanders, particularly Commander, U.S.
Northern Command, and Air Force Global Strike Command and U.S. Cyber
Command.
Answer. The Commander, STRATCOM has both supported and supporting
relationships with other combatant commanders, largely identified
within the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Forces for Unified Commands
Memorandum, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, specific command
arrangement agreements, Operations Plans and Concept Plans. Air Force
Global Strike Command is an Air Force major command that provides
combat ready forces to STRATCOM to conduct nuclear deterrence and
global strike operations as directed. U.S. Cyber Command is a
subordinate unified command to STRATCOM. U.S. Cyber Command plans,
coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts activities to direct
the operations and defense of specified DOD information networks.
STRATCOM supports U.S. Northern Command's mission to conduct homeland
defense to secure and defend the United States and its interests. In
many cases, STRATCOM is a supporting combatant commander for other UCP
assigned missions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other
combatant commanders to broaden and enhance the level and range of
these relationships.
Question. The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
Answer. According to title 50, U.S.C., section 2402, the Department
of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security serves as
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The
Administrator is responsible for all Department of Energy programs and
activities related to nuclear weapons, including the stockpile
stewardship program. Although the Administrator serves outside the
DOD's operational control, he does serve on the Nuclear Weapons Council
and executes duties which closely concern and support STRATCOM. If
confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the
Administrator.
Question. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency.
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the missile
defense systems engineering and development organization for DOD. It
provides the research, development, testing and evaluation of the
missile defense and associated systems that would be employed by
combatant commanders. The current Unified Command Plan charges STRATCOM
with synchronizing planning for global missile defense including
coordinating global missile defense operations support, and developing
and advocating for missile defense and warning capabilities. Given
these closely aligned responsibilities, both the Commander, STRATCOM,
and its Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense must continue their close working relationship with MDA. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of MDA to ensure that
combatant commanders' required ballistic missile defense and warning
capabilities are appropriately and effectively represented to MDA.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C, section 139, provides for a Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, who serves as the principal advisor to
the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on operational test and
evaluation in DOD and the principal operational test and evaluation
official within the senior management of DOD. The Director, as allowed
by law and departmental regulations, formulates policy, provides
guidance, coordinates, reviews, monitors and makes recommendations
regarding test and evaluation matters under his purview. If confirmed,
I will work closely with and seek the advice of the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing the progress of command
programs of interest.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, U.S. Strategic Command?
Answer. The missions of STRATCOM are at the heart of U.S. national
security and that of our allies and friends abroad. Today's national
security environment is far more complex and diverse than ever before.
Wider access to advanced technology, newly assertive states with rising
aspirations regionally and globally, and still emerging vulnerabilities
created by transnational linkages all fuel threats requiring
synchronized efforts of many departments and agencies and other
countries as well. Ensuring mission readiness and the proper policies,
decision authorities and organizational relationships are in place to
rapidly respond to complex and diverse threats will be a major
challenge.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with other Federal departments,
agencies and allied partners to advance the policies and relationships
needed to enhance a cooperative and collaborative approach. I will
assess the STRATCOM organizational structure and work to streamline
processes and enhance flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency.
Question. What are your priorities for the U.S. Strategic Command?
Answer. The first priority is to provide a safe, secure and
effective strategic nuclear force providing strategic deterrence for
the United States and its allies. STRATCOM has a unique responsibility
regarding the country's deterrent force in setting requirements and
translating national guidance into operational readiness. Second,
ongoing combat operations require many of the capabilities provided by
STRATCOM and, if confirmed, I will consult with the Commander, U.S.
Central Command and the other combatant commanders to provide
capabilities for today's conflict. Third, in line with the new National
Space Policy, STRATCOM must preserve U.S. access to space and freedom
of action in space by improving awareness and providing resilient
capabilities for the joint fight. Fourth, relationships across Federal
agencies with cyberspace responsibilities need to be defined to enhance
the Nation's cyber security and support to joint operations.
strategic threats
Question. In your view, what are the most serious strategic threats
facing the United States today?
Answer. As repeatedly stated by administration leaders, the pursuit
of nuclear weapons by violent extremist groups and the proliferation of
nuclear weapons technology to additional states are the greatest
strategic threats to the United States. Beyond this is the immense
challenge of defining strategic relationships to ensure stability
involving new and emerging powers. Also, the pace of technology--
especially in the realms of space and cyberspace--is so rapid it could
outpace our ability to maintain our strategic edge. Finally, we are
faced with ever changing traditional and nontraditional threats that
pose serious consequences to U.S. global interests. Some of these
threats--such as anti-access/area denial weapons and strategies--are
understood and the United States is addressing them, others are not as
well understood or acknowledged and will take time to address.
Question. What future strategic threats should the United States
prepare for?
Answer. Our potential adversaries have studied the U.S. way of
warfare and are actively developing asymmetric responses. We will need
flexible and adaptive capabilities to respond to these unknown
abilities.
u.s. strategic command missions
Question. In an overarching sense, how do you define the U.S.
Strategic Command mission?
Answer. STRATCOM promotes global security for the United States and
its interests through strategic deterrence, ensuring U.S. freedom of
action in space and cyberspace and through dedicated planning, advocacy
and operational execution efforts to advance our warfighting
priorities.
Question. U.S. Strategic Command has absorbed multiple new missions
since its creation, with the most recent addition being the
establishment of the Cyber Command, as a sub-unified command of the
Strategic Command.
How successful has U.S. Strategic Command been at integrating these
new missions and acquiring the expertise needed to perform them?
Answer. My sense is that STRATCOM is on track with integrating
mature missions, like space, while emerging missions, like cyberspace
and missile defense, continue to advance. There is still more to be
done among all the Services, and recruiting, training and retaining the
personnel with the right expertise is very important. If confirmed, I
will move quickly to assess the scope of all mission areas, integration
and expertise, and take appropriate action as needed.
Question. What organizational challenges remain at U.S. Strategic
Command related to these new missions? Specifically, what additional
work, if any, remains to be done and what expertise, if any, needs to
be acquired for these new missions?
Answer. Cyberspace capabilities and capacity are still maturing
across DOD and the national security enterprise. If confirmed, I will
assess the status of capabilities and determine the proper course of
action to align personnel and resources to address the issues.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes
in the missions currently assigned to U.S. Strategic Command? If so,
what changes would you recommend?
Answer. Not at this time. As my understanding of the missions
evolved and integration matured, I would assess command mission
effectiveness and recommend changes as appropriate.
Question. Are you aware of any additional new missions that are
being contemplated for the Strategic Command?
Answer. No. I am not aware of any new missions being considered for
Strategic Command.
organization
Question. In addition to the Cyber-Command, the Command is
organized into a series of joint functional component commands that
correspond to the mission areas of the Strategic Command.
If confirmed, would you anticipate maintaining or modifying this
structure?
Answer. I would not anticipate any immediate changes; however, as
relationships across Federal agencies are defined and cyberspace
capabilities are matured, there may be a need to make organizational
changes. It is important to keep a flexible organizational structure
that is capable of responding to a constantly changing threat
environment and technology advances.
ballistic missile defense
Question. How do you view the roles and responsibilities of the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, related to ballistic missile
defense?
Answer. The UCP charges STRATCOM with responsibilities for
synchronizing planning for global missile defense, including
coordinating global missile defense operations support and developing
and advocating for missile defense characteristics and capabilities
desired by combatant commanders. If confirmed, I will ensure STRATCOM
and its Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense (JFCC-IMD) continue their close working relationship with MDA,
the geographic combatant commanders, and Services to integrate
capabilities across combatant command boundaries and to serve as the
Joint Functional Manager for global force management of BMD forces.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate function of the
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense?
Answer. JFCC-IMD's mission is to synchronize missile defense
planning, conduct BMD operations support, and advocate for missile
defense capabilities, in support of STRATCOM, other combatant commands,
the Services, and appropriate U.S. Government agencies, to deter and
defend the United States, deployed forces, and its allies against
ballistic missile attacks. In addition, JFCC-IMD serves as the MDA
counterpart to represent warfighter equities in the BMD development and
integrates BMD test, training, and exercise activities. If confirmed, I
look forward to reviewing the current activities of JFCC-IMD to ensure
that this is the most appropriate function for today's national
security environment.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes
in the authorities of Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as they relate
to ballistic missile defense?
Answer. As of today, I would not make any changes. If confirmed, I
will continue the close working relationships with the combatant
commanders and the Missile Defense Agency and make recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense regarding the appropriate authorities to
support the defense of the United States and its allies.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in
the assessment of the military utility of U.S. ballistic missile
defenses against short-, medium-, intermediate-, and long-range
ballistic missiles?
Answer. In response to UCP 05 and DODD 5134.09 guidance, STRATCOM
conducted and reported a Military Utility Assessment of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) from 2006 to 2010. The intent of the MUA
is to conduct assess the utility of the delivered capability--which is
being replaced by the Operational Readiness & Acceptance (OR&A) process
to formalize the acceptance of the delivered capability based on their
operational utility. We are now working on the Global IAMD Assessment
as a companion document to the OR&A to define operational risks
associated with BMD operations.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in
representing and advocating for the views and needs of the combatant
commanders for missile defense capabilities, and how do you believe
that warfighter perspective should inform our missile defense program?
Answer. The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program exists to meet
the limited defense of the United States and the theater defense needs
of combatant commanders. STRATCOM sponsors the missile defense
Warfighter Involvement Process to capture and articulate warfighter
capability needs to inform the BMD program development. STRATCOM also
manages the development of the Global Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Assessment to articulate combatant commanders' operational
risks that must be remedied in the BMD development. If confirmed, I
will consult fellow combatant commanders and advocate for their mission
needs, always mindful of the joint warfighter.
Question. Please describe your view of the appropriate roles for
the Joint Staff and the Missile Defense Executive Board in guiding
decisions on the development, acquisition, and deployment of effective
missile defense capabilities.
Answer. The Joint Staff is responsible for defining required
systems interoperability and operational architectures while validating
joint theater missile defense capabilities through both simulation and
technology demonstrations. The role of the Missile Defense Executive
Board is to provide oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode
involving all missile defense stakeholders in DOD and other agencies
and departments. Important considerations for both entities include the
necessary transition of tested systems from MDA to a military Service
to be organized, trained, and equipped for eventual combatant command
employment.
Question. Do you agree that any ballisic missile defense systems
that are deployed must be operationally effective and cost-effective?
Answer. Yes. The joint warfighter requires fielded systems with
military utility. I agree with the Secretary of Defense Ballistic
Missile Defense Report which established metrics to measure ballistic
missile defense systems cost effectiveness through comparison with
available options, affordability, and comparison of incurred vice
avoided costs.
Question. Do you agree that ballistic missile defense flight tests
need to be operationally realistic, and that operational testing is
necessary, in order to demonstrate the capabilities of our systems and
provide confidence that they will work effectively?
Answer. I agree with the Missile Defense Agency testing approach
outlined in the Integrated Master Test Plan that the tests will be
conducted as operationally realistically as possible, exercising
Warfighter Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures against operationally
realistic threats. If confirmed, I will support this approach and
assess the capabilities of ballistic missile defense systems.
Question. What are your views on the relationship between ballistic
missile defenses and nuclear deterrence?
Answer. Ballistic missile defenses protect the United States
against the threat of a limited intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) attack by a regional actor such as North Korea or Iran. Through
deployment of limited defenses, the United States seeks to dissuade
such states from developing an ICBM, deter them from using an ICBM if
they develop or acquire such a capability, and defeat an ICBM attack by
such states should deterrence fail denying them the benefits of
possessing or using such systems. Ballistic missile defenses will also
defend U.S. deployed forces from regional missile threats while also
protecting our allies and partners and enabling them to defend
themselves. Present plans for missile defense do not contemplate
protection of the United States against large scale nuclear strikes.
The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force of ICBMs, bombers and
ballistic missile submarines will remain the primary deterrent of
nuclear attacks against the United States, our allies, and partners.
Question. Do you support the policies and priorities stated in the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review report of February 2010?
Answer. I support the current Ballistic Missile Defense policies
and priorities.
Question. Do you support the homeland ballistic missile defense
initiatives announced by Secretary Hagel on March 15, 2013, including
the planned deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors
(GBIs) in Alaska?
Answer. Yes. I support all initiatives. Of note, the additional 14
GBIs in Alaska will add capacity to U.S. Homeland defense against new
and evolving adversary ICBM capabilities. Another important initiative
is the deployment of an additional AN/TPY-2 radar into the PACOM area
of operations which will also improve our capabilities to defend the
United States while also enhancing regional BMD.
Question. Do you support proceeding with the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) process required by section 227 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 to inform future decisions about
deployment of a possible additional homeland ballistic missile defense
site in the United States, in case the President determines to proceed
with such an additional deployment?
Answer. Yes. With the restructuring of the SM-3 Block IIB program,
continuing to explore the possibility of another CONUS interceptor site
is a prudent measure. The completion of the EIS will reduce the
timeline to implement this option should such a decision be made.
Question. Do you agree with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that additional analysis is needed, including
analysis of the missile threat from Iran, before making a decision on
whether to deploy such an additional missile defense site in the
future?
Answer. Yes. We will need to carefully consider the threat to
clearly understand the potential operational benefits that can be
realized for the associated costs of enacting such an option. While an
additional missile defense site provides operational utility, the cost
should also be carefully considered, as well as the warfighter's
priority to improve the sensor capability.
Question. Do you believe that it may be possible to assess the
advisability and feasibility of deploying an additional homeland
ballistic missile defense site before the EIS is completed?
Answer. I believe that the Department of Defense can conduct
preliminary assessments in advance of an EIS. STRATCOM and U.S.
Northern Command are assisting the Missile Defense Agency with such
preliminary assessments in compliance with National Defense
Authorization Act direction. We would be more confident in the
assessments with an EIS completed.
Question. Do you agree with the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency and the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense on the importance of enhancing our missile
defense sensor capabilities to improve discrimination and kill
assessment for homeland ballistic missile defense?
Answer. Yes. I agree.
Question. Do you agree there is no significant funding in the
fiscal year 2014 Presidential Budget request for the foregoing
activities?
Answer. There is substantial funding in Missile Defense Agency's
fiscal year 2014 budget request to continue to research, develop and
improve sensor and discrimination capabilities, however I agree there
is no significant funding contained in the budget to acquire any
additional sensors. Additionally, a study has been initiated to
determine how best to support future sensor requirements and Missile
Defense Agency is exploring technologies to improve the capabilities of
ground, air, and space sensors.
Question. Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defense in Europe (EPAA), and do you believe this approach will provide
a timely and effective capability to address existing and emerging
Iranian ballistic missile threats to Europe?
Answer. Yes. The work is ongoing and, if confirmed, I will continue
to assess our progress and make recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. What capability was lost with the decision to cancel
Phase IV of the EPAA, and how does it compare to the capability of
deploying 14 additional GBIs in Alaska by 2017?
Answer. The cancellation of EPAA Phase IV resulted in the potential
loss of early engagement opportunities (i.e. Defense in Depth) for
Iranian ICBM threats to the United States. Deploying an additional 14
GBIs to Alaska will add capacity to U.S. Homeland defense.
Question. What role do you believe Strategic Command should play in
the development and implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach to
missile defense in Europe and other regions?
Answer. STRATCOM's role is to synchronize global missile defense
plans, coordinate global missile defense operations support, and
through the JFCC IMD, act as the Joint Functional Manager for global
force management of missile defense capabilities.
Question. Do you believe it is in our interest to cooperate with
Russia on ballistic missile defense, including the possibility of
sharing radar early warning data?
Answer. Yes. To quote the BMDR, ``The United States will also
continue in its efforts to establish a cooperative BMD relationship
with Russia. . . . The administration is committed to substantive and
sustained dialogue with the leadership of Russia on U.S. missile
defenses and their roles in different regions. . . . Our goals are to
enlist Russia in an new structure of deterrence that addresses the
emerging challenges to international peace and security posed by a
small number of states seeking illicit capabilities.''
What do you believe are the most promising opportunities to work
collaboratively with Russia to address emerging ballistic missile
threats?
Answer. As agreed by President Obama and President Medvedev at the
July 2009 Moscow Summit, the most promising opportunity to work with
Russia is in the joint assessment of the ballistic missile threat. If
the Russians are willing, open and transparent bilateral or
multilateral wargames or exercises, and sharing of early warning
information are also options that may lead to a better relationship
with Russia.
cyber security
Question. What are your priorities for the U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. Our reliance on cyber capabilities, the many and varied
threats, and the rapid rate of technological change all demand we place
an initial and enduring focus on defense of our information networks.
Priorities beyond defense include assuring the warfighting mission,
strengthening and expanding partnerships in the domain, building
capacity and capability to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations
and developing processes to integrate cyberspace capabilities into
combatant command plans operations and across DOD.
Question. In your view, what are the most important unmet
priorities for the development and deployment of cyber security tools
and capabilities?
Answer. U.S. Strategic Command, as a global combatant command, is
in a unique position to favorably influence two essential priorities in
this area. The first is to advance the development of a multi-Service
cadre of cyber professionals, with emphasis on technical and tactical
competence. This includes continuous training and education and focused
career path development. The second is to accelerate the fielding of
shared cyber situational awareness tools, taking advantage of emerging
technologies to know friendly and threat activity within the network
while understanding intent; and display and disseminate that
information in an operationally relevant manner.
Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in establishing
policy for U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. If confirmed, I will exercise combatant command over U.S.
Cyber Command, engage and advise senior leaders within the Department
of Defense, Federal agencies, and with Members of Congress to advocate
for the appropriate policies regarding cyberspace operations.
Question. What are your views on the issue of elevating U.S. Cyber
Command to a full unified command, including the timetable for
elevating the Command?
Answer. I believe the current command relationship is working.
However, if a decision is made to make U.S. Cyber Command a unified
command, we should not break the current dual-hatted relationship
between the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. This
relationship is central to mission success.
space
Question. What is your view on the responsiveness of current space
systems to meet warfighter needs and what are the opportunities for the
Operationally Response Space program to meet military and other space
requirements?
Answer. National Security Space systems are responsive to
warfighters' needs. As the speed of warfare increases and military
decision cycles decrease, space systems need to continue to evolve in
their ability to deliver capability sooner. The increasingly congested,
contested, and competitive nature of space will require continual
improvements in the responsiveness and resilience of our space
infrastructure. The Operationally Responsive Space initiative is one
tool at our disposal to meet urgent combatant command needs or leverage
developed technology to meet anticipated warfighter needs.
Question. What is your view of the ability of DOD to develop and
deploy space systems in a cost-effective and timely manner?
Answer. DOD has worked extensively to reverse troubling acquisition
trends. Significant strides are being made with a concentration on
program stability, increasing the quantity and quality of the
acquisition workforce and strengthening the requirements process to
allow for incremental system development and increased technology
maturation. Architectural work to conceptualize the space enterprise of
the future is increasingly considering factors such as resilience,
affordability, and responsiveness in addition to the historical
emphasis on performance and reliability. This groundwork should
significantly improve our ability to field future space capabilities
that are both cost-effective and timely.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe might be necessary to
improve the responsiveness of current space systems?
Answer. Responsiveness, as measured by the speed, capacity and
fusion of data to the warfighter, are important in the evolution of
warfare to counter adaptive adversaries. Providing the warfighter with
dynamic situational awareness, such as for tailored Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance, while optimizing stressed
communications and networks, will increase the value of current space
systems. Lowering the cost of space systems and launch systems is a key
element for improving responsiveness. Low cost space solutions permit
us to move rapidly, practice risk-management vs risk-avoidance, and
consequently have the ability to respond to immediate needs.
Question. In your view, what are the most important unmet
requirements for space systems?
Answer. Guaranteeing mission assurance, which includes resilience
and space protection, is critical. Central to this is developing
adequate Space Situational Awareness in a domain that is increasingly
competitive, congested and contested. Geographic combatant commanders
require a sustained emphasis on meeting Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance needs and satisfying increased military satellite
communication requirements in support of global military operations.
Question. Do you believe any urgent needs or capability gaps exist?
If so, please specify in detail.
Answer. Urgent needs and capability gaps will continue to exist in
a constantly changing battlespace and a fiscally constrained
environment. Persistent ISR and increasing satellite communications
bandwidth are continuing needs identified by the regional combatant
commands. If confirmed, I will work through the Joint Staff and Service
components to mitigate capability gaps and respond to combatant
commanders' urgent needs.
Question. What do you believe should be done to meet those
requirements, and what space programs should be accorded highest
priority?
Answer. If confirmed, I will articulate national and joint
warfighter imperatives, including a judicious blend of alliances,
partnerships and commercial relationships. I will also press for
improved space situational awareness and ensure the highest priority is
accorded to meeting continuing needs for assured communications,
uninterrupted missile warning, persistent positioning, navigation, and
timing and overhead Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR). Additionally, I will advocate through the Services for greater
investments in scientific and technical advancement to maintain our
space systems advantages well into the future.
Question. How important, in your view, is persistent surveillance,
and what programs do you believe are best able to provide this
capability?
Answer. Combatant commanders identify persistent surveillance as an
enduring priority needed to detect, collect, disseminate, and
characterize activity in the battlespace. Space, airborne, maritime,
and terrestrial programs contribute to ISR, but where persistent
surveillance can be achieved is through integration of sensors on
multiple platforms, with space-based ISR providing unique contributions
over deep and denied areas.
Question. What is your view on the effectiveness of efforts to
cooperate with the commercial space sector to improve space situational
awareness and how could this effort be expanded and made more
successful?
Answer. The Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Sharing Program at
U.S. Strategic Command has been the lynchpin of international
engagements with spacefaring nations and industry. In 2012, STRATCOM
provided 10,000 satellite conjunction warnings. This high fidelity
information was instrumental in ensuring spaceflight safety for over
one thousand active satellites orbiting the Earth. Today, STRATCOM
supplies SSA information through SSA Sharing Agreements with 38
commercial firms. This year, STRATCOM negotiated and concluded the
first international SSA Sharing Agreements with Japan and Australia.
These agreements are the first in what will be a series of
international SSA Sharing Agreements with our partners and allies
These ongoing endeavors result in improved data-exchange between
U.S. Strategic Command, the commercial sector and space faring nations
and, as such, reduces the risk of collisions in space leading to a
safer space environment.
Question. What are your views on disaggregation of space sensors
systems and has your experience with SBIRS HEO-1 and HEO-2 affected
that?
Answer. Disaggregation of space systems should consider cost,
schedule, performance and resiliency across a range of threat
environments. We need to do a better job of leveraging the inherent
resiliency embedded within our current systems. The Department is
beginning early analysis to understand the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats of disaggregated architectures which will
provide a basis for investment decisions.
Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, Congress approved a national policy to support two space launch
vehicles, or families of launch vehicles, capable of launching national
security payloads into space. The two launch vehicles have been
combined into one company to provide launch services to the U.S.
Government with the expectation that this would improve both the
efficiency of space launch and reduce the cost.
What are your expectations with respect to future space launch
efficiencies and cost savings?
Answer. Low cost launch is an important enabler for an entire
emerging class of space capabilities. In the experimental/demonstration
realm (programs typically executed by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Air Force Research Laboratory, Naval Research
Laboratory, or Space and Missile Defense Command) low cost launch
provides access to space for S&T missions requiring very tight budgets.
These missions demonstrate key technologies or concepts of operations
that lead to more effective operational capabilities in the future. In
the operational realm, low-cost launch enables one-off responsive space
systems (e.g. ORS-1 satellite providing ISR for U.S. Central Command),
emerging operational cubesats/nanosats, and perhaps even some alternate
space architectures currently under consideration.
Question. In the next several years the rate of space launches is
expected to increase, what new approaches to space launch, in your
view, should be implemented to handle this increased rate of launch?
Answer. Recent Service-led improvements in the range manifest and
scheduling process, such as the concept of matching boosters with
satellites when there is a higher confidence of being ready for launch,
will maximize the probability of meeting launch demands consistent with
national priorities.
Question. What, in your view, should the United States do in the
future, and what steps would you take if confirmed, to ensure continued
reliable access to space?
Answer. I will continue to advocate for cooperative development of
launch and range transformation initiatives by and between the
Services, NRO, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA).
Question. Do you believe that the Nation should sustain redundant
space launch capabilities?
Answer. Robust access to space is a national imperative requiring
flexible capability to ensure continuity of access. Additional service
and commercial capabilities are emerging. If confirmed, I will continue
to review the viability of these approaches and advocate appropriately
assuring the Nation's access to space.
Question. What do you see as the greatest problem implementing a
new entrant strategy?
Answer. I am confident the Air Force, NRO, and NASA will support
their Launch System Certification agreement with new launch entrants.
The certification process will ensure all launch providers and all
proposed launch vehicle configurations meet rigorous standards of
demonstrated flight reliability, process controls, design margins, and
mission assurance in order to receive non-recurring certification.
Question. Recent decisions, and probably future decisions, about
launch capabilities made by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration will impact national security space launch cost and
capacity.
What, in your view, should the Strategic Command do to coordinate
civil and national security space launch?
Answer. Assured access to space is a national imperative that, in a
fiscally constrained environment, could benefit from a whole-of-
government approach. Strategic Command should continue its
participation in the development of a national space transportation
policy.
Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges
that the United States faces in military and national security space
programs and policy?
Answer. Our challenges are rooted in the increasingly congested,
contested and competitive nature of the space domain. If confirmed,
I'll continue to address the following top challenges: (1) threats to
U.S space capabilities; (2) threats from adversary space capabilities
to U.S. military forces; and (3) maintaining our national security
space programs in a difficult budget environment.
Question. Training of U.S. military personnel to understand and to
incorporate space assets into all aspects of operations is critically
important to future military success.
While much has been done to incorporate space assets into all
aspects of military operations, in your view are there additional steps
that should be taken to address this challenge?
Answer. The availability of space capabilities to Joint Force
Commanders is essential towards the United States' ability to win our
Nation's conflicts. We are now faced with an era of fiscal uncertainty
that causes us to reevaluate how we incorporate space assets into the
fight. As we look to partner with our allies and leverage their
capabilities through combined space operations, we must reassess our
disclosure policies to ensure each side has the ability to capitalize
on the partnership.
Question. What role does the National Security Space Institute play
in the training process, and how could their training programs be
improved?
Answer. Since its establishment in 2004, the National Security
Space Institute (NSSI) has been an important part of the Space
Professional Development Program and the advancement of space expertise
across the Department of Defense. In 2012, STRATCOM conducted a Joint
Space Individual Training and Education Needs Assessment to analyze
joint space training and education requirements of personnel performing
joint space missions. This assessment identified some areas where there
are shortfalls in the current space training and education programs.
Recommended solutions incorporate both joint and service authorities,
personnel systems, and education and training refinements. I anticipate
the NSSI will be one of the key organizations responsible for
implementing the training and education recommendations to meet space
professional needs across the Department of Defense.
Question. What, in your view, are the priorities for improving
space situational awareness?
Answer. To improve space situational awareness, we should
accomplish the following. First, the United States must have the
ability to quickly characterize events (natural and manmade) that
threaten our space assets. Second, we must ensure we have improved
capabilities to detect, track, and identify space objects. Finally, we
must invest in capabilities and partnerships that increase our
resilience while also maintaining our leadership.
Question. What programs and policies, in your view, should be
changed or added to ensure adequate space situational awareness?
Answer. The legacy space surveillance network is nearing its
maximum capacity to detect, track, and identify space objects. We must
invest in new capabilities that meet the needs of today's contested and
congested space environment. Furthermore, recognizing the utility in
incorporating other non-U.S. systems, we must establish partnerships
which allow access to space surveillance data. Finally, the systems
responsible for processing this data are in dire need of modernization.
Capabilities such as the Space Fence and the Joint Space Operations
Center Mission System will help the United States meet tomorrow's
challenges.
Question. What are your views on how military and national security
space should and could be better integrated?
Answer. Significant synergy exists in those common, underlying
``enablers'' such as the space industrial base, research and
development, science and technology and the space workforce. My
understanding is that we have made significant progress in integrating
these enablers to include the Intelligence Community with the standup
of the Space Security and Defense Program. If confirmed, I will
continue advocating along these lines to best meet the needs of the
Nation.
Question. In your view, what role should the National Security
Space Office play in integrating military and national security space?
Answer. I understand that over the past 2 years, there has been a
reorganization of the management and coordination of the national
security space enterprise, including the establishment of the Defense
Space Council, and the re-validation of the Secretary of the Air Force
as the Executive Agent for Space. This reorganization has had a
positive impact on government-wide coordination of space activities.
If confirmed, I will continue to foster close working relationships
amongst fellow members of the Defense Space Council to facilitate unity
of effort across the space enterprise.
Question. In your view, should the role of the National Security
Space Office be modified or expanded in any way?
Answer. I understand that over the past 2 years, there has been a
reorganization of the management and coordination of the national
security space enterprise, including the establishment of the Defense
Space Council, and the revalidation of the Secretary of the Air Force
as the Executive Agent for Space. This reorganization has had a
positive impact on government-wide coordination of space activities.
If confirmed, I will continue to foster close working relationships
amongst fellow members of the Defense Space Council to facilitate unity
of effort across the space enterprise.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges in the area of
counter space?
Answer. The greatest challenge is maintaining comprehensive real-
time/near-real-time space situational awareness (SSA) to assure the
earliest possible detection of a threat and enable accurate attribution
of actions against our space assets. Successfully meeting this
challenge will enable us to take timely and effective actions to
protect our assets and clearly identify the source of the threat to
allow an appropriate whole-of-government response to those responsible.
cruise missile defense
Question. In your view, how serious is the vulnerability of our
Nation and deployed military forces to the cruise missile threat?
Answer. Cruise missiles represent a credible threat to our Nation
and forces abroad.
Question. What role do you believe U.S. Strategic Command should
play in the cruise missile defense of our Nation and our deployed
military forces?
Answer. STRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for
global missile defense to include coordinating global missile defense
operations support and advocating for missile defense capabilities.
Additionally, as the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority,
STRATCOM should continue advocating for cruise missile defense
capabilities desired by the warfighters.
prompt global strike
Question. In your view, how adequate are current efforts to
establish requirements and develop a prompt global strike capability?
Answer. Current efforts are sufficient. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) recently revalidated the prompt strike initial
capabilities document and requirements. The Department continues to
make progress through investments in the development and testing of
prompt strike capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that adequate analysis is being conducted
to determine whether a prompt global strike capability should be
launched from air, land, maritime surface or subsurface platforms, or a
combination thereof?
Answer. Yes. the Air Force completed a comprehensive Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA) that considered a range of prompt strike deployment
options. In addition, the JROC recently directed a review of
technology, operational concepts, and costs as part of an independent
review or AOA update. Current development efforts are aimed at
technology solutions that could be fielded in a range of operational
concepts.
nuclear deterrence
Question. If confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command,
you would be involved in implementing the new Nuclear Posture Review
and the reductions under the New START treaty.
Do you support the New START treaty?
Answer. Yes. New START provides the United States with insight into
Russian strategic nuclear forces. The treaty has a verification regime
that is effective, robust, enhances transparency, and builds confidence
with Russia.
Question. Do you support the recent revision to our nuclear
employment strategy?
Answer. Yes. the objectives support deterrence of adversaries and
assurance of our allies and partners.
Question. Do you believe we need a fleet of 12 ballistic submarines
to replace the Ohio-class submarines?
Answer. Yes. based on current and future projected strategic
environments, 12 SSBNs is the minimum required to meet deterrence
mission requirements.
Question. What in your view are the most pressing modernization
requirements for the Minuteman III ICBM, following completion of the
current upgrades?
Answer. The Air Force is conducting sustainment programs to take
the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 as directed by Congress. I will
advocate for sustaining planned life extension programs, including
arming, firing and fuzing upgrades, guidance modernization, and support
equipment replacements.
Question. Do you support the development and fielding of a follow-
on program to the Minuteman III ICBM? If so, when will a decision be
necessary for pursuing the development of a follow on ICBM?
Answer. Yes. land-based ICBMs are an integral and enduring part of
the nuclear triad, and the Air Force is scheduled to begin an AOA this
year. Following completion of the AOA, we will work closely with the
Air Force to develop a resource strategy to recapitalize our ICBM force
beyond 2030.
Question. Do you support and intend to advocate for the
modernization of all legs of the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles?
Answer. Yes. modernization of all legs of the triad is essential
given our aging systems. The triad's complementary capabilities
encourage restraint, deny benefits and, if deterrence fails, impose
costs on adversaries. The triad also provides the United States
resiliency and flexibility in the event of technical or geopolitical
surprise.
Question. In your view, is there a relationship between U.S.
nuclear deterrence policy and nonproliferation policy? If so, please
describe the relationship.
Answer. Yes. there is a relationship. By extending our deterrent to
other nations we provide them an alternative to developing their own
nuclear capabilities to meet their security needs. Thus, our extended
deterrent contributes to meeting our nonproliferation policy goals.
Question. What are your views on nuclear command and control?
Answer. Today's Nuclear Command and Control systems underpin
strategic deterrence and they provide an assured capability for the
President to execute nuclear forces under any scenario. Current
portions of our architecture are largely a product of the Cold War
resulting in some obsolescent and aging elements to the infrastructure,
including some elements that are passing their end of life. Despite the
growing age of the infrastructure, we are fully capable in executing
our nuclear mission. However, to ensure this capability remains viable
in the future, continued investment and modernization of the Nuclear
Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) architecture is necessary.
Current emphasis is required on space-based detection, conferencing,
and force direction.
Question. How will you advocate modernizing our nuclear command and
control and what aspects in particular in light of the new nuclear
employment strategy?
Answer. Today's NC3 systems provide assured and resilient
capabilities for the President to execute nuclear forces under any
scenario through all phases of conflict. To ensure this capability
remains viable in the future, continued investment and modernization of
the NC3 architecture is necessary. Current emphasis is required on
space-based detection, conferencing, and force direction.
Continued investment for NC3 capabilities, a robust net-centric C2
infrastructure, and insertion of new technologies (such as Internet
Protocol-based solutions) will maintain senior leaders' ability to
respond deliberately and appropriately to any situation.
We have set a course to modernize NC3 systems to enable secure,
enduring, and continuous communications with respect to the current
threat environment, as well as emerging threats we are likely to
confront (where man-made or natural).
Question. What is your view of the significance of non-strategic
nuclear weapons in the nuclear balance between the United States and
Russia?
Answer. I believe it is important to consider both strategic and
non-strategic weapons and their associated infrastructure when
examining questions of nuclear balance between the United States and
Russia. Further, we must consider the geo-strategic environment in
which each country exists to better understand their force composition
decisions and thus the implications for force balance.
Question. Do you believe the U.S. Government understands today how
to verify reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons?
Answer. It depends on the nature of what is to be verified. The
U.S. Government was able to verify the eliminations of non-strategic
platforms made under the INF Treaty. Procedures to verify warhead
eliminations, which have not yet been part of treaty, may require
further study.
nuclear weapons council
Question. If confirmed you would become a member of the Nuclear
Weapons Council.
What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC)?
Answer. My top priority is to continue to sustain and modernize the
nuclear enterprise, including weapons, platforms and infrastructure. I
support the NWC recently approved strategy and implementation plan for
stockpile management and supporting elements.
Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the
organization, structure, or function of the NWC?
Answer. None at this time. The NWC is composed of the appropriate
members and assigned responsibilities to provide effective oversight of
the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Question. What role is the NWC playing or should it play in the
discussion with respect to any future nuclear arms control treaties?
Answer. NWC principals provide policy, military, and technical
recommendations.
maintaining a safe, secure and reliable stockpile
Question. If confirmed you would play a major role, in conjunction
with the National Nuclear Security Administration, to maintain the
safety, security, and reliability of the U.S stockpile of nuclear
weapons.
What are your priorities for implementing that responsibility?
Answer. My top priority is to ensure the stockpile remains safe,
secure, and effective to support the Nation's deterrence missions. My
priorities include providing an annual assessment of the stockpile's
military effectiveness, establishing stockpile requirements and
providing military advice on strategy and implementation plans for life
extension programs and the nuclear industrial complex.
Question. The Strategic Command is an integral part of the annual
certification process for nuclear weapons.
Would you recommend any changes in the Strategic Command's role in
the annual process or the process generally?
Answer. Not at this time. I will closely monitor this process and
will recommend appropriate changes, if necessary.
stockpile stewardship program
Question. What is your view of how well the Stockpile Stewardship
Program is proceeding towards its goal of being able to continuously
assess and annually certify the U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile
as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear
testing?
Answer. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is meeting its goal of
effectively and continuously assessing the nuclear weapon stockpile. It
provides sufficient data and analysis to allow the annual certification
of the stockpile without underground nuclear testing.
Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges for the
Stockpile Stewardship Program?
Answer. The Stockpile Stewardship Program's most significant
challenge is sufficient and stable funding to ensure understanding of
the stockpile as it ages, confidence in that understanding in the
absence of underground nuclear testing, and timely responsiveness to
technical issues that arise.
Question. Do you believe that all nuclear weapon life extension
methods, refurbishment, reuse, and replacement, should be given equal
consideration?
Answer. I support considering the full range of options as directed
in the Nuclear Posture Review. Strong preference will be given to
options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components
would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals
could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the
President and approved by Congress.
Question. The administration is proposing overhauls of the B-61
gravity bomb, and an interoperable warhead to provide for hedging
between different legs of the triad.
What are your greatest concerns with the B-61 life extension
program?
Answer. My greatest concern is the weapon remains safe, secure, and
effective and capable of meeting its strategic and extended deterrence
commitments. The current life extension program addresses the timely
replacement of aging components. It is imperative that the program
remains adequately funded and on schedule.
Question. The National Nuclear Security Administration estimates
the cost of the first version of the interoperable warhead will exceed
$14 billion.
Do you support evaluation of straight life extensions of the W-78
and W-88 warheads if either the cost or technical issues with the
interoperable warhead become too great?
Answer. I support studying the technical feasibility and cost of an
interoperable nuclear explosive package for the W78/88-1. Further, I
believe that the W78-1 and W88-1 warhead options should be examined for
comparative purposes, so an informed recommendation can be brought to
the NWC.
military-to-military cooperation programs
Question. The U.S. Strategic Command has a long history of
conducting military-to-military exchanges and discussions with its
counterparts in Russia, but in recent years these exchanges and
discussion have stopped for the most part.
If confirmed, would you seek to continue or expand this dialogue?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consult extensively with the
Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Commander, U.S.
European Command to see what steps would be appropriate to engage
Russia.
Question. Would you seek to establish military-to-military programs
to include other countries, such as China?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consult extensively with the
Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command to see what steps would be appropriate to engage China.
strategic forces and missions
Question. During the Cold War, the primary mission for strategic
forces was to deter the Soviet Union from using its nuclear weapons
and, more broadly, to contribute to U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet
Union. Strategic forces were therefore synonymous with nuclear forces.
This isn't the case today, as the wide-ranging missions assigned to
U.S. Strategic Command make clear.
What, in your view, is the primary mission for U.S. Strategic
Forces today and in the future?
Answer. Our strategic forces include our Global Strike (nuclear and
conventional), space, cyber, global intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance and ballistic missile defense capabilities. Their
primary missions are to assure allies and partners, deter potential
adversaries and if necessary, defend against and defeat adversary
attacks on the United States, our allies, and partners.
Question. With the decline in numbers of U.S. and Russian strategic
nuclear weapons, is it now more important to take into account non-
strategic nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes. Nuclear weapons regardless of their delivery method
are important to consider.
Question. Should we think differently about the use of strategic
forces today?
Answer. Yes. Strategic forces today are no longer just nuclear
forces. They include our Global Strike (nuclear and conventional),
space, cyber, global intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and
ballistic missile defense capabilities. Thus our thinking about their
use must be different.
Question. Given the mission for strategic forces, as you define it,
what capabilities are still needed to carry out that mission?
Answer. Required strategic deterrence capabilities include warning,
attribution, assured command and control, forces, weapons, and the
infrastructure to sustain them. The Triad is the cornerstone of
deterrence and strategic stability. Sustainment and recapitalization of
strategic nuclear forces and stockpile, space, cyber, National Command
and Control systems, and infrastructure are required to deter
adversaries, assure allies and partners, and manage risk.
Question. The nuclear weapons in Europe are under the command of
the Commander of European Command.
How would you plan to work with that command with respect to
nuclear weapons security, and policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the Commander, U.S.
European Command, to understand his needs and I will work with him to
advocate for safe, secure and effective nuclear weapons to meet those
needs.
nuclear weapons security and handling
Question. What in your view are the most challenging aspects of
maintaining security in the handling of nuclear weapons?
Answer. Ensuring nuclear forces are secure from attack, physical
damage, theft and misuse, and denying unauthorized access continues to
be the standard for nuclear security, and if I am confirmed, this will
be one of my top priorities. Our continuing challenge is to ensure our
security forces are always provided the capabilities to detect, delay
and defeat any adversary while capitalizing on the lessons learned from
the past decade of conflict. At the core of this challenge is
maintaining a culture of instant readiness in our strategic force
personnel for a mission that has a low probability of execution, but
only because they are ready in the deterrence role.
Question. What role do you think the Strategic Command should play
in ensuring that nuclear weapons are securely stored, transported, and
handled when in control of the Military Services?
Answer. As the combatant command responsible for all strategic
nuclear forces and now accountable for the security of the U.S. Air
Force's strategic nuclear resources, U.S. Strategic Command has an
increased role in ensuring a safe, secure and effective nuclear
deterrent. If confirmed, I will ensure our security forces continue to
have the resources, guidance and training required to maintain a secure
environment for our nuclear weapons.
science and technology
Question. In the past, STRATCOM had a stand-alone Science and
Technology (S&T) advisor--as other COCOMS currently have, but that role
has been subsumed into other staff positions.
If confirmed, what would be your views on reconstituting a STRATCOM
Science and Technology advisor and if that is not necessary, what
priorities would be assigned to that individual?
Answer. This is something I plan to review if I am confirmed as the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
u.s. cyber security strategy
1. Senator Reed. Admiral Haney, does the Air-Sea Battle concept
account for the very significant cyber threat to our command and
control capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region?
Admiral Haney. Yes, the Air-Sea Battle concept does incorporate and
account for cyber threats in the Asia-Pacific region. While the
Concept's title names only two of the warfighting domains, the Concept
describes integrated operations across all five domains--air, land,
sea, space, and cyberspace--to create advantages for U.S. Forces. In
Air-Sea Battle, we must be capable of attack and defense in each
warfighting domain.
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is working diligently to ensure that
the cyberspace component to Joint operations is prepared to conduct,
integrate with, and support both offensive and defensive operations by
any Service and in all domains. A significant aspect of CYBERCOM's work
is the establishment of cyber mission and support teams specifically
focused on understanding regional cyber threats and executing
operations to defend our networks against these threats.

2. Senator Reed. Admiral Haney, as Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), is it your understanding that you would develop the
strategy and operational plans to combat these cyber threats, not just
in the Pacific but across all combatant commands?
Admiral Haney. Yes, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command is tasked in
the Unified Command Plan to exercise combatant command over U.S. Cyber
Command and synchronize planning for cyberspace operations in
coordination with other combatant commands, the Services, and as
directed, appropriate U.S. Government agencies. This includes both
offensive and defensive cyberspace operations, directing the Department
of Defense network operations and defense, and providing defense
support to civil authorities as directed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
missile defense of the homeland
3. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, do you agree that defending the
Homeland against a limited long-range ballistic missile attack should
be the first priority of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?
Admiral Haney. Yes, the first priority of the MDA should be defense
of the homeland against a limited long-range ballistic missile attack.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Review clearly states this as the top
priority.

4. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, will you work with the Director
of MDA to ensure he has the funding to modernize the ground-based
midcourse defense system and to increase testing?
Admiral Haney. Yes, I will work with the Director of MDA to ensure
adequate Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funding supports
ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system modernization and
operationally realistic testing. I support MDA stockpile reliability
and fleet upgrade activity plans and I also concur with current MDA
flight test plans to conduct two GMD intercept tests in fiscal year
2014 and one per year in each subsequent year.

east coast missile defense
5. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, in your responses to the advance
policy questions you state, ``With the restructuring of the SM-3 Block
IIB program, continuing to explore the possibility of another
continental United States (CONUS) interceptor site is a prudent
measure.''
Why do you believe exploring a third CONUS interceptor site is a
prudent measure?
Admiral Haney. Missile defense is comprised of three major
components: interceptors, sensors, and command and control. Exploring a
third CONUS site focuses on the first element, interceptors, to include
their location and potential battlespace. At the completion of the
CONUS Interceptor Site Study we'll have a better understanding of the
degree of potential capability/capacity a third site might offer as
well as the necessary implementation and sustainment costs for the MDA
and the Army. The study will provide a useful basis for evaluating a
broad range of alternatives among and between all three missile defense
components, particularly improved sensor discrimination.

6. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, what types of preliminary
assessments are STRATCOM and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
conducting regarding an east coast missile defense site?
Admiral Haney. STRATCOM and NORTHCOM are providing an operational
perspective to a Missile Defense Agency study to identify at least
three possible candidates for an additional CONUS interceptor site. We
are also assessing potential added operational capability and capacity,
level of risk reduction that could be achieved, and Service sustainment
ability and cost requirements.

7. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, in light of the National Air and
Space Intelligence Center's July report that concluded that ``Iran
could develop and test an ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile]
capable of reaching the United States by 2015'', would you agree with
me that if we had an east coast site, particularly with the
cancellation of the SM3 block 2B program, that it would provide
additional battle space in response to an ICBM missile from Iran to the
East Coast of the United States?
Admiral Haney. Yes, an east coast site could potentially provide
additional battle space against a limited ICBM launch from Iran. We'll
know more once the CONUS Intercept Site Study is complete. While an
additional missile defense site may provide operational utility, the
most critical near-term priority is to improve sensor capabilities such
as coverage and discrimination to maximize the operational utility of
the current interceptor inventory. Additionally, consideration of cost
versus operational utility and a clear understanding of the threat must
be integrated into the decisionmaking process.

8. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, do you agree with the June
Homeland Defense Hedging Policy and Strategy report to Congress that
said, ``The addition of a new missile defense base in the Northeast or
Upper Midwest would add battlespace to a potential engagement, allowing
for additional decisionmaking time and supporting the future option to
employ a Shoot-Assess-Shoot engagement strategy''?
Admiral Haney. A new missile defense base in the Northeast or Upper
Midwest could potentially expand the battlespace and allow for
additional decisionmaking time. However, a future option to employ a
Shoot-Assess-Shoot engagement strategy involves many more factors such
as improvements in discrimination and reliability.

nuclear priorities
9. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, in 2012, the U.S. National
Intelligence Council wrote: ``Nuclear ambitions in the United States
and Russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions.
Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy is a
U.S. objective, while Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities
for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy.
Other nuclear powers, such as Pakistan and potential aspirants Iran and
North Korea, desire nuclear weapons as compensation for other security
weaknesses.''
What are the potential strategic implications of these divergent
views?
Admiral Haney. As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
one of our key policy objectives is ``reducing the role of U.S. nuclear
weapons in U.S. national security strategy'' to the fundamental role of
deterring nuclear attacks. The NPR, however, stated there ``remains a
narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still
play a role in deterring conventional or CBW attack against the United
States or its allies and partners. The United States is therefore not
prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring
nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to
establish conditions to which such a policy could be safely adopted.''
As some potential adversaries increase their reliance on nuclear
weapons, we will continue to evaluate the role nuclear weapons in our
own national security strategy. As long as we maintain sufficient safe,
secure, and effective nuclear forces to deter nuclear attacks on the
United States, its allies, and partners, the relative dependence of
others on nuclear weapons should not alter the strategic balance.

10. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, how might this impact the
relative balance of power between the United States and Russia?
Admiral Haney. Whether nuclear threats emanate from Russia or any
other nuclear power, the United States will retain a force structure
appropriate to deter the employment of nuclear weapons and to control
escalation in the event any aggressor chooses to cross the nuclear
threshold. I do not believe the relative balance of power between the
United States and Russia, will shift as long as we maintain sufficient,
safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces.

11. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, how might allies, who depend on
U.S. nuclear security guarantees, view this divergence?
Admiral Haney. As our allies confront new security challenges, we
must ensure the U.S. deterrent remains credible while demonstrating our
ability and willingness to honor our extended deterrence commitments.
Military investments, policies, force posture, and exercises serve to
mitigate our allies' potential apprehension of divergent security
policies. The B-2 demonstration flight in March 2013, for example,
assured our South Korean partners because our mutual belief is it
contributed to the deterrence of North Korean aggression.

nuclear deterrence and assurance
12. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, what is your view of the role of
nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy?
Admiral Haney. Nuclear weapons are the cornerstone of our
military's deterrent force and underpin our national security strategy.
The 2010 NPR states, ``The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is
to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and
partners.'' The NPR, however, acknowledges that it may be some time
before we can reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons solely to this
fundamental role. As a result, there remains a ``narrow range of
contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in
deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States, or
its allies and partners.''

13. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, what would happen in the event
our allies lost confidence in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella?
Admiral Haney. In a worst case scenario, allies could take
unilateral actions to address perceived threats in the form of direct
military action, pursuit of their own nuclear capabilities, or
accommodation of potential aggressors. All these actions could
destabilize the security environment increasing the potential for armed
conflict, proliferation cascades, or other effects harmful to U.S.
national security interests.

14. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Haney, what must the United States do
in the coming years to ensure our allies retain their confidence in the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella?
Admiral Haney. Our allies will remain confident in our security
commitments as long as we maintain an appropriate extended deterrence
strategy, a nuclear force structured and sized to support it, and
demonstrate its effectiveness and flexibility to counter current and
emerging nuclear threats. Continued support for the modernization of
our nuclear forces, through efforts such as the B61-12 Life Extension
Program, is indicative of our long-term commitment and is equally
important in instilling confidence among our allies.
______

[The nomination reference of ADM Cecil E.D. Haney, USN,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 20, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Admiral.

ADM Cecil E.D. Haney, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of ADM Cecil E.D. Haney, USN,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
------

Transcript of Naval Service for ADM Cecil Eugene Diggs Haney, USN

07 Jun 1978 Ensign
07 Jun 1980 Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 Jul 1982 Lieutenant
01 Sep 1988 Lieutenant Commander
01 Jun 1993 Commander
01 Jul 1999 Captain
01 Jul 2005 Rear Admiral (lower half)
01 Jan 2008 Rear Admiral
03 Nov 2010 Vice Admiral
20 Jan 2012 Admiral, Service continuous
to date

Assignments and duties:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Recruiting District, Jun 1978.......... Jul 1978
Washington, DC (Assistant
Officer Recruiter).
Naval Nuclear Power School, NTC, Jul 1978.......... Feb 1979
Orlando, FL (DUINS).
Naval Nuclear Power Training Feb 1979.......... Aug 1979
Unit, Windsor, CT (DUINS).
Naval Submarine School, New Aug 1979.......... Dec 1979
London, CT (DUINS).
USS John C. Calhoun (SSBN 630) Dec 1979.......... May 1983
(Main Propulsion Assistant).
USS Frank Cable (AS 40) May 1983.......... Jun 1983
(Prospective Radiological
Controls Officer).
Navy Shipyard, Puget Sound, WA Jun 1983.......... Jul 1983
(DUINS).
USS Frank Cable (AS 40) Jul 1983.......... Jul 1985
(Radiological Controls Officer).
Naval Post Graduate School, Aug 1985.......... Oct 1987
Monterey, CA (DUINS).
Naval Submarine School, Groton, Oct 1987.......... Apr 1988
CT (DUINS).
USS Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 709) May 1988.......... Jul 1991
(Engineer Officer).
Naval Submarine School, Groton, Jul 1991.......... Aug 1991
CT (DUINS).
XO, USS Asheville (SSN 758)..... Aug 1991.......... Mar 1993
Commander, Submarine Squadron Mar 1993.......... Jun 1993
Eight (Assistant Squadron
Deputy for Training).
Naval Reactors, Department of Jun 1993.......... Jun 1995
Energy, Washington, DC
(Administrative Assistant for
Enlisted Affairs).
Naval Reactors. Department of Jun 1995.......... Sep 1995
Energy, Washington, DC
(Prospective Commanding Officer
Refresher Course).
Commander. Submarine Force, U.S. Sep 1995.......... Dec 1995
Pacific Fleet (DUINS).
CO, USS Honolulu (SSN 718)...... Dec 1995.......... Jun 1999
National War College, Jun 1999.......... Jun 2000
Washington, DC (DUINS).
Office of the Under Secretary of Jun 2000.......... May 2002
Defense (Congressional
Appropriations Liaison Officer).
Commander, Submarine Squadron May 2002.......... Jul 2004
ONE.
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Jul 2004.......... Oct 2006
(Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans, Policies, and
Requirements) (N5/N8).
Commander. Submarine Group TWO.. Oct 2006.......... Mar 2008
Office of the Chief of Naval Mar 2008.......... Apr 2010
Operations (Director, Submarine
Warfare Division) (N87).
Office of the Chief of Naval Apr 2010.......... Nov 2010
Operations (Director, Naval
Warfare Integration Group)
(NOOX).
Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Nov 2010.......... Jan 2012
Command.
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet... Jan 2012.......... To Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medals and awards:
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with four Gold Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with two Gold
Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with one Gold Star
Meritorious Unit Commendation
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with two ``E'' devices
Navy Expeditionary Medal
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with three Bronze Stars
Navy Arctic Service Ribbon

Special qualifications:
BS (Ocean Engineering) U.S. Naval Academy, 1978
MS (Systems Technology) Naval Post Graduate School, 1987
MS (Engineering Acoustics) Naval Post Graduate School, 1987
MS (Foreign Affairs) National War College, 2000
Designated Qualified in Submarines. 1981
Designated Surface Warfare Officer, 1985
Designated Joint Qualified Officer. 2003
Awarded the Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale Leadership
Award, 1998
Capstone, 2006-4

Summary of joint duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Under Secretary of Jun 00-May 02..... Capt
Defense (Congressional
Appropriations Liaison Officer).
Deputy Commander. U.S. Strategic Nov 10-Jan 12..... VADM
Command.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Cecil E.D.
Haney, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Cecil Eugene Diggs Haney.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

3. Date of nomination:
June 20, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
December 1, 1955; Washington, DC.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Bonita Kay Haney, formerly Bonita Kay Thompson.

7. Names and ages of children:
Elizabeth Ann Haney, 33 years old.
Thomas Alexander Haney, 29, years old.
Joseph Andrew Haney, 23 years old.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed above.
Commissioner assigned as the Active Duty Navy Representative to the
Military Leadership Diversity Commission (http://mldc.whs.mil/).

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
None.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the
service record extract provided to the committee by the executive
branch.
2006 Black Engineer of the Year Career Achievement in Government
Award.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of ADM Cecil E.D. Haney, USN, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 20, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also improved cooperation between the Services and the
combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. No. I do not see the need for modifications at this time.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Not Applicable.
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S.
Forces Korea and what is your understanding of how these different
command responsibilities interrelate?
Answer. The Commander, United Nations Command (UNC), serves as
commander of the International Command and is responsible for
maintaining the United Nations Armistice Agreement on the Korean
Peninsula. The Commander, UNC is also responsible for the operational
control, strategic direction and combat operations of the UNC member
nations' forces during contingencies. The Commander, UNC acts in
accordance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions and directives;
and also the directives of the U.S. Government as transmitted by
Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
keeping the U.S. Pacific Command Commander informed.
The Commander of Combined Forces Command (CFC) leads the bi-
national U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) force and is responsible to
support the Armistice Agreement, to deter aggression against the ROK
and if deterrence fails, defeat the external threat to the ROK. The
commander acts on the direction from the U.S.-ROK Military Committee,
which is the strategic interface between the United States and the ROK
national authorities.
The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), is a sub-unified command
of U.S. PACOM and is responsible for all duties and functions assigned
by title 10, U.S.C. and the Unified Command Plan. The Commander, USFK,
supports the Armistice Agreements, provides forces to Commander, CFC
and UNC, and provides administrative and logistic support necessary to
maintain their readiness. Commander, USFK reports through the U.S.
Pacific Command Commander to the Secretary of Defense.
These three commands mutually support each other's missions. The
CFC and USFK can both provide support to the Armistice functions of the
UNC. Similarly, both USFK and UNC can provide support to CFC for the
latter's deterrence and defense missions. International support to the
CFC is coordinated through the UNC. The close consultative partnership
with our ROK ally and the member nations of UNC ensure that these
commands are leveraged in a complementary fashion in order to support
the national interests of the Republic of Korea and the United States.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform
these duties?
Answer. If confirmed, my first priority as the UNC/CFC/USFK
Commander must be to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined joint and
combined forces that are prepared to fight and win. My extensive
experience in operations and in command, and with multiple operational
deployments prepared me well to assume these duties. I have commanded
troops at battalion level during operational deployments to Africa and
Bosnia; as Deputy Division Commander of 1st Armored Division in Iraq;
the 82d Airborne Division Commander/and Commander of RC-East in
Afghanistan, a multi-national command with 26,000 troops and
responsible for approximately 40 percent of Afghanistan including the
key border region with Pakistan; and most recently in Afghanistan as
the U.S. I Corps/ISAF Joint Command Commander responsible for the day-
to-day operations of a multi-national force with contributions from 50
Nations. Between these command experiences, I've served in key joint
leadership positions such as the Operations Officer for U.S. Central
Command and now as the Director of the Joint Staff. These joint,
coalition, and interagency experiences provide me the knowledge, skills
and insight necessary to lead a large complex, multinational
organization and to ensure their readiness to meet the demanding
mission in Korea.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea?
Answer. I have gained invaluable experience serving as the Director
of the Joint Staff, and during my previous command of the U.S. Army I
Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. I also recognize that there are many
individuals in both the ROK and U.S. Governments who have vast
experience and knowledge of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. If confirmed, I will
seek in depth discussions with experts in our Government, the ROK
Government, nongovernmental organizations, and educational/research
institutions to develop my personal political, military, economic and
cultural knowledge. Also, if confirmed, I will continuously build
strong professional relationships that are essential to success as the
USFK, UNC, and CFC Commander.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander,
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea with
the following officials: the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chiefs of
Staff of the Services, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, other combatant
commanders.
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is composed of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint
Staff, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense, the combatant commands, the Military Departments, the Defense
agencies, Department of Defense Field Activities, and such other
offices, agencies, activities, organizations, and commands established
or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of
Defense, in accordance with sections 111, 113, and 192 of title 10,
U.S.C. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the
Secretary of Defense in accordance with existing law. The Commander UNC
reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and through the Secretary of Defense to the President, while
at the same time, keeping the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, informed
of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A validated
combined U.S.-ROK document provides further guidance on Commander CFC's
unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military
Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the
authorities contained in title 10, U.S.C., and except as expressly
prohibited by law or order of the President or Secretary of Defense,
has full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to
exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense upon any and all
matters concerning which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to act
pursuant to law.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the Principal
Staff Assistant and Advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and
defense policy, and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and
plans to achieve national security objectives.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the
Principal Staff Assistant and Advisor to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence,
security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Commander UNC
communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are
responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all
affairs of their respective Departments, including: recruiting;
organizing; supplying; equipping to include research and development;
training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering to include
the morale and welfare of personnel; maintaining; construction,
outfitting, and repairs of military equipment; and the construction,
maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities as well
as the acquisition, management, and disposal of real property and
natural resources.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the
organization, training, and equipping of the Services under title 10,
U.S.C. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. The Service
Chiefs of Staff also provide military advice to the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
Answer. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, as commander of a sub-
unified command of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), reports directly to
Commander, PACOM, on matters directly pertaining to USFK areas of
responsibility. Commander, United Nations Command and Commander,
Combined Forces Command, keep the Commander, PACOM, informed of any
communications with U.S. national authorities.
Question. Other combatant commanders.
Answer. The commanders of the combatant commands are responsible to
the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the
military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority
over assigned forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The
operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary
of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of command by
transmitting to the commanders of the combatant commands the orders of
the President or the Secretary of Defense.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces
Command/U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)?
Answer. Based on my study of the security situation on the Korean
Peninsula and vital U.S. national interests in Northeast Asia, there
are four major and enduring challenges that confront any UNC, CFC, and
USFK Commander.
The first challenge is to maintain the Alliance Agreements and to
deter the DPRK. Second, to ensure force readiness to fight and win a
war with North Korea and to simultaneously prepare for the consequences
of a DPRK regime collapse. Third, to maintain a strong U.S.-ROK
Alliance to achieve the Security Objectives on the Peninsula. Finally,
to execute a cohesive and effective transformation of the Alliance in
accordance with the Strategic Alliance 2015. This transformation
includes an operational control (OPCON) transition as outlined in
Strategic Alliance 2015 Base Plan (SA 2015).
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges and problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will build strong relationships with the
ROK leadership in order to ensure strength, cohesion and confidence in
our alliance and our strategy.
If confirmed, I will focus on the readiness of the U.S. and ROK
forces in Combined Forces Command to fight tonight and emphasize
challenging, realistic and effective joint and combined training
required to ensure readiness.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the ROK leadership to
develop detail and agreement on the planning, conditions, and metrics
required to succeed in the transition of operational control in
accordance with Strategic Alliance 2015.
Finally, if confirmed, I will work closely with our Ambassador to
provide the leadership necessary to realize U.S. and ROK objectives.
north korea
Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term
threats to regional security and stability. The seriousness of the
threat is seen by North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles. Even without these capabilities, however, North
Korea's conventional military force coupled with its history of
aggressive and unpredictable behavior underscore the dangerousness of
the situation.
What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
Korean peninsula?
Answer. I believe North Korea remains the primary threat to
security in Northeast Asia. Over the past few years, the security
situation on the Peninsula has reached high levels of tension following
the March 26, 2010 attack on the ROK navy vessel Cheonan and the
artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on 23 Nov 10. In recent months,
North Korea defied the will of the international community by
conducting tests associated with its nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile programs.
North Korea has hindered the progress of Six-Party denuclearization
talks; adopted a policy of provocative actions in an attempt to secure
concessions and continues its nuclear program. Although its
conventional force threat continues to decline, it has compensated by
repositioning and redistributing its inventory of conventional
artillery, while investing in asymmetric capabilities, such as
ballistic missiles, special operations forces, and cyber technology.
I believe our primary concern is the potential for additional North
Korean provocations, which is a tool of choice as part of its coercive
diplomatic strategy designed to safeguard the regime, maintain internal
control, and extort foreign aid. Also, Kim Jong-un's youth and
inexperience increase the likelihood of miscalculation, as does the
imperative for him to maintain credibility with the military
hardliners. These factors make him less predictable in the near-term.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to South
Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile
and weapons of mass destruction capabilities?
Answer. North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear programs pose a
direct threat to security in Northeast Asia and could provide an
increased threat to the U.S. Homeland in the future. The Kim Regime
continues to use these two programs to shape conditions and to gain
leverage during negotiations, to extract concessions, and ensure regime
survival. North Korea views its WMD and theater ballistic missile
programs as sources of international power and prestige, strategic
deterrent against the ROK, United States, and Japan, a means of
exerting regional influence, and a source of currency derived from
export sales.
North Korea possesses extensive short- and medium-range ballistic
missile programs with an inventory of several hundred ballistic
missiles. North Korea continues to build these missiles of increasing
range, lethality, and accuracy, while enhancing the survivability of
its missile forces. North Korea's research and development of an
Intercontinental ballistic missile, and possible fielding of an
intermediate range missile, is a threat to the western United States,
Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska. The successful space launch in December 2012
demonstrates an increasing capability as well as an intent to target
the United States.
Despite severe fiscal difficulties, North Korea commits significant
resources to develop and produce ballistic missiles for both deployment
within North Korea and export. This missile development program
presents a threat which cannot be ignored.
North Korea reaffirmed its ability to produce a nuclear weapon with
its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013 at Punggye. The Intelligence
Community assesses that North Korea has sufficient plutonium to produce
weapons.
Additionally, there are indications that North Korea has pursued a
highly enriched uranium program in the past, and it is likely the
effort continues today. In November 2010, North Korea displayed a
uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon to foreign visitors. The
facility's purpose, ostensibly, is to produce fuel for a light water
reactor currently under construction at the facility. However, this
capability could provide an alternative source of highly enriched
uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
Question. What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional
capabilities and readiness?
Answer. North Korea conventional capabilities (particularly air,
naval, ground mechanized, and armor) continue to decline due to
shortfalls in equipment modernization and advanced training. However,
North Korea boasts the fourth largest Army in the world with more than
70 percent of its forces near the demilitarized zone (DMZ). I also
understand that North Korea has adjusted its strategy to focus on
asymmetric capabilities with deployments and development of new
ballistic missiles and increased emphasis on specialized light infantry
and Special Operation Forces.
Question. What, if anything, should be done to strengthen
deterrence on the Korean Peninsula?
Answer. I believe the most important factors in strengthening
deterrence on the Korean Peninsula are the maintenance of a strong
U.S.-ROK Alliance and the readiness of our Joint and Combined Force.
Both the ROK and United States continue to invest in improved military
capabilities while working toward the transition to a ROK-led allied
defense of the Peninsula. In order to strengthen deterrence, the
Alliance needs to increase the interoperability between ROK and U.S.
Forces, refine command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence (C4I) relationships and capabilities following OPCON
transition, and improve the ROK's ballistic missile defense capability.
Question. Do you believe you have adequate resources to defend our
allies and national interests if North Korean forces were to move
across the DMZ?
Answer. Yes, as I understand it, the U.S. contribution to the
combined defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) is adequate to deter
North Korea aggression and to provide decisive joint reconnaissance and
operational fires in support of South Korean ground forces if
deterrence should fail. Also, the ROK ally has made great strides in
modernizing and improving their military readiness. If confirmed, I
will conduct a careful and thorough review of the command's readiness
and available resources as well as the impact of fiscal realities to
ensure we have what is needed to defend our allies and national
interests.
Question. What capabilities are the most critical to mounting an
effective defense against a North Korean move across the DMZ?
Answer. There are several critical capabilities important in
mounting an effective defense, the first of which is a trained and
ready ROK force. Also, the United States provides critical ballistic
missile defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, C4I,
and joint operational fires capabilities in support of the Alliance.
The CDR United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command Commander, and
the U.S. senior leaders, provide vital leadership for the combined ROK-
U.S. Alliance.
I am aware of the command's ongoing day-to-day engagements with our
ROK civil and military counterparts that seek to balance U.S.
contributions against existing and emerging ROK capabilities and U.S.
national priorities. U.S. augmentation of in-place USFK capabilities
also remains an essential component to defeating a potential North
Korean aggression and restoring stability to the Korean Peninsula.
Question. What do you perceive are the differences, if any, between
Kim Jong Un and his father?
Answer. As I understand it, the main differences between Kim Jong-
un (KJU) and his father, Kim Jong-il (KJI), are in the areas of
leadership of the military and experience with internal politics. There
is a lot we do not know about the new leader. KJU's youth,
inexperience, and lack of a track record make it difficult to predict
his intentions, actions, and reactions. There is a generational shift,
and KJU has been balancing his ideals with a regime effort to reflect
his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. Overall, however, I do not believe there
has been any significant shift in North Korean regime interests, and do
not anticipate any near-term changes in North Korean pursuit of nuclear
or missile capabilities.
Question. How do you think increased assertiveness by South Korean
and Japanese leadership affects the situation on the Peninsula?
Answer. Cooperation between South Korea and Japan is vital for
stability and security in Northeast Asia, and United Nations Command
rear bases in Japan are critical for the defense of South Korea. Along
with U.S. Ambassador Sung Kim, I will, if confirmed, continue to
encourage South Korean and Japanese bilateral and multilateral security
cooperation despite recent public friction. I understand the historical
and territorial disputes that hinder public support for Korea-Japan
bilateral initiatives. However, I am confident that in time of crisis
and conflict with North Korea, the United Nations Command will have
Japanese support, and the ROK and Japan will work closely together. If
confirmed, I will continue to encourage close military cooperation but
recognize these issues are heavily dependent upon bilateral discussions
between Seoul and Tokyo.
Question. Do you think budget cuts and sequestration will result a
reduced carrier presence and U.S. warship presence in the Pacific, and
if so, do you think that makes Kim Jong Un more likely to miscalculate
or to be more militarily aggressive?
Answer. I know that DOD is committed to the rebalance to the
Pacific. However, the effects of full sequestration may lead to a
reduction of U.S. warship presence. The presence of U.S. warships in
the Pacific has a significant deterrent effect on North Korean military
aggression. Pyongyang has not committed a major provocative action when
a U.S. carrier group was present in the Korean Theater of Operations.
North Korean rhetorical threats against U.S warships and other U.S.
capabilities clearly indicate their concern, for which they have no
viable military response.
Question. What is your assessment of China's role in managing North
Korean behavior and ambitions?
Answer. The China-North Korea relationship has a major impact on
North Korean behavior and ambitions. The United States and South Korea
continue to pursue diplomatic and security dialogue with Beijing on
North Korea issues. I understand China recognizes and shares our
interest in stability and a nuclear-free North Korea. It is important
for China to recognize the benefits of close coordination with the
international community in its efforts to prevent North Korean
aggression and encourage responsible behavior.
north korean nuclear program
Question. In 2010, North Korea disclosed that it has a functioning
uranium enrichment program and earlier this year it announced the
intention to restart plutonium production at Yongbyon. These
developments, coupled with its underground nuclear tests--the third of
which was conducted this year--make it clear that North Korea is
determined to pursue nuclear weapons. So, while there may be
disagreement on the current status of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program, there is general consensus that North Korea will eventually
possess nuclear weapons, if they do not already. Moreover, North Korea
has a history of proliferating missile and nuclear technology. The
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a means to interdict suspect
shipments, including shipments of nuclear or missile items to and from
North Korea.
Would you recommend any improvements to the organization or
capability of the PSI member nations to improve the ability to
interdict prohibited shipments to and from North Korea?
Answer. I fully support this initiative, and if confirmed, I will
emphasize the need for multinational cooperation, interest, information
sharing, and commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
Proliferation prevention is a critical issue for the Korean Theater
of Operations. The Republic of Korea has demonstrated their commitment
to and leadership in the PSI through their participation in multiple
multinational planning events and training exercises, including the
Eastern Endeavor Livex Table Top Exercise in September 2012, and the
U.S.-UAE Leading Edge 13 exercise this past February.
Recent events have reinforced the need for multinational support in
combating the proliferation of WMD. This month, a North Korean-flagged
ship was intercepted by the Panamanian military carrying what appeared
to be ballistic missiles and other arms en-route from Cuba to North
Korea.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Derived from an open source article in The Korean Times
published on 17 July 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take, including with our allies and partners, to ensure that North
Korea does not proliferate missile and nuclear technology to countries
such as Syria, Iran and others?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether United States or
Combined ROK-U.S. Forces can more effectively contribute to the PSI, or
other U.S. Pacific Command initiatives. Further, effective counter-
proliferation requires interagency and international cooperative
efforts integrated with the critical intelligence assets. To
effectively deter North Korea's proliferation efforts, it is vital that
the current sanctions levied against North Korea be maintained and
enforced. This includes not only the United States but also regional
and international partners.
Question. In your view, how does the lack of progress in diplomatic
efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear
weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the
region?
Answer. North Korea continues to make progress in its pursuit of
nuclear weapons and delivery systems. We need to be consistent and
persistent, and we need to continue our diplomatic efforts to close
gaps and increase pressure in the regime. I understand the Department
is holding ongoing bilateral Extended Deterrence Policy Committee
meetings to develop a new ROK-U.S. Alliance tailored deterrence
strategy to deal with this growing challenge. I support diplomatic
efforts to denuclearize North Korea, and if confirmed, I would ensure
that we are prepared to deter and defend against any North Korean
nuclear threat.
Question. Do you think North Korea poses a near-term, mid-term, or
long-term nuclear threat?
Answer. I believe North Korea's nuclear capabilities pose a long-
term threat to U.S. interests.
usfk ballistic missile defense priorities
Question. Recent developments in the North Korean ballistic missile
program--the successful space launch of a satellite in December 2012
and the display of a road-mobile missile launcher during a parade last
year--coupled with the unpredictability of the North Korean regime
place a premium on a robust, coordinated missile defense capability in
the region.
What is your assessment of the highest priority missile defense
needs of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command?
Answer. As I understand it, the levels of interoperability we
achieved with our partners in the Korean Theater during the most recent
North Korean missile launch was unprecedented, however, there is more
work to be done. Our ballistic missile defense needs an organic Upper
Tier ballistic missile defense capability such as Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or Theater Ballistic Missile capable
Aegis ships in order to fully address the North Korean missile threat.
While THAAD's temporary deployment to Guam bolsters the PACOM AOR
overall ballistic missile defenses, it does not specifically address
the ballistic missile defense shortfalls for the Korean Theater of
Operations.
Question. What missile defense capabilities do you believe are
needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of these
commands, and what systems are available to provide such capabilities?
Answer. As I understand, the evolving ballistic missile threat in
Korea requires an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense
approach. The addition of an upper-tier intercept capability such as
the THAAD or ballistic missile defense capable Aegis ships in the near
term would complement the Patriot's existing terminal defense
capability and significantly enhance ballistic missile defense on the
Peninsula. Also, I understand the U.S. and ROK teams continue to
identify improvements to the missile defense capability. If confirmed,
I will conduct a thorough review of the missile defense capabilities to
ensure we are prepared to defend against the North Korea missile
threat.
Question. In addition to the deployment of Patriot, THAAD, and
Aegis BMD capable ships to the Pacific, what other steps, if any, do
you think are necessary to provide adequate protection for U.S.,
partner, and allied assets?
Answer. We must continue to work on the interoperability and
integration of existing and emerging ballistic missile defense systems
with our allies and partners. The ability to rapidly and seamlessly
share ballistic missile warning, tracking, and engagement information
is crucial to providing a missile defense that maximizes protection
while preserving scarce resources.
Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review
established a policy of pursuing a Phased Adaptive Approach to regional
missile defense, including in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.
This approach is intended to provide timely and effective defense of
existing and emerging missile threats with a flexible set of missile
defense capabilities, tailored to each region.
Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, and
do you believe it is an appropriate approach to providing missile
defense capabilities for the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula?
Answer. Yes, I do support the Phased Adaptive Approach and believe
that it is the appropriate approach to continue to improve the missile
defense capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.
Question. In Europe the Phased Adaptive Approach is geared towards
protecting additional territory of partners and allies as the Iranian
threat capabilities grow.
Since the North Korean capability already threatens partners and
allies, what are the phases of the Phased Adaptive approach in the
Pacific?
Answer. Specific to the Republic of Korea, I understand that Phase
I has been completed through the stationing of U.S. and ROK Patriot
forces to defeat short and medium range missiles. Phase II, which is
underway, involves increasing partner capabilities and integrating
capabilities. The Republic of Korea has committed to upgrading its
Patriot forces, and we have made significant strides towards the
integration of our ballistic missile defense systems. Phase III is the
addition of upper-tier systems such as THAAD or Aegis BMD and more
powerful sensors such as AN/TPY-2 to defeat medium and intermediate
range missiles.
Question. Do you believe it would be in our security interests to
seek a cooperative missile defense relationship with South Korea as a
means of enhancing security on the Korean Peninsula and the region?
Answer. Yes, I believe it is in our interest, and I understand that
the command is actively seeking a cooperative missile defense
relationship. If confirmed as Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, I
would continue to follow through on Alliance agreements reached during
the Counter-missile Capabilities Committee to enhance an integrated,
comprehensive Alliance counter-missile capability based on a strategy
of detecting, defending against, disrupting, and destroying North
Korean missile assets.
role of other regional countries
Question. North Korea's provocative behavior threatens not just
security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but also the security
and stability of the entire region.
In your view, what are the roles and responsibilities of other
regional countries in helping to manage the threat posed by North
Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs?
Answer. Not only regionally but internationally, countries have a
responsibility to help deter against the North Korean threat. This is
why, if confirmed, I would strengthen the role and visibility of the
United Nations Command. I believe there is deterrent value in
highlighting the UNC role and presence--the Alliance is prepared to
fight tonight, but the entire international community has a stake in
stability in Northeast Asia.
united states-republic of korea (rok) alliance
Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has
been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This
relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.
What is your impression of the current U.S. security relationship
with the ROK?
Answer. It is my understanding the current U.S. security
relationship with the ROK is very strong, based on mutual respect and
trust and grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty. In June 2009, the
United States and ROK signed a Joint Vision statement that commits both
nations to building an alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and
prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region,
and the world at large. And recently, President Obama and President
Park validated the Joint Vision Statement during their 2013 summit,
issuing a Joint Declaration that add impetus to our efforts to
modernize and strengthen our Alliance in the service of both of our
Nation's interests.
Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?
Answer. I will, if confirmed, continue the work of my predecessors
focused on sustaining strong ties with the ROK military and other
security-related organizations in the ROK Government. Regular and
consistent, in-depth engagement at multiple levels is essential to
building mutual understanding and habits of cooperation that will serve
our mutual interests and maintain a strong and vibrant relationship in
a complex environment.
If confirmed, I will also work to build broader and deeper
relationships with the Korean people. In particular, I will encourage
continued exchange and cooperation activity between the Command and the
people of local Korean communities--activity that form strong Americans
and Korean bonds.
Finally, I will work closely with the U.S. Ambassador to Korea and
other elements of the U.S. Government to take a flexible, adaptable,
and expansive approach to designing and executing Alliance-building
initiatives that promote the continuation of a strong U.S.-ROK security
relationship.
Question. What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability
trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in
ROK equipment and training?
Answer. The ROK military remains a capable and motivated force.
However, I understand recent USFK assessments indicate the ROK military
has critical capability gaps across all the services in
interoperability, materiel, manning, and training. The ROK Government
in recent bilateral talks has committed to an acquisition timeline and
training plan to resolve capability shortfalls. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the ROK leadership to assess and validate ROK
progress during annual combined joint exercises and other bilaterally
agreed forums. Meanwhile, the United States will bridge capability gaps
until the ROK military has acquired the capability. There are U.S.
capabilities like extended deterrence that the United States will
provide for the duration of the Alliance.
Question. What is your understanding of the command relationships
between U.S. and ROK forces?
Answer. Based upon my understanding, the current command
relationships provide very close cooperation, collaboration, and
transparency to fully leverage combined capabilities. The U.S.-ROK
command relationships are structured to address the distinct
requirements of Armistice, crisis, and wartime conditions. Our crisis
action relationships provide the required flexibility to allow a
tailored Alliance response to a military crisis on the Peninsula.
Today, the ROK Chairman is responsible for the conduct of ROK forces
and the defense of South Korea in the Armistice environment. In
wartime, the current Alliance command relationships dictate that a U.S.
General, Commander of CFC, exercise operational control of Alliance
forces, both United States and ROK.
Question. Since the 2010 North Korean attacks against the ROK--the
sinking of the South Korea Navy ship Cheonan and the artillery attack
on the South Korean island--South Korea has been adamant that it will
responded ``firmly'' to the next such provocation. A main topic during
subsequent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings has been the
development of a joint counter-provocation plan, which was reportedly
formalized earlier this year.
What is your understanding of how the attacks on the Cheonan and on
Yeonpyeong Island changed the ROK and U.S. security posture on the
Peninsula?
Answer. These attacks highlighted the threat from North Korea. The
Command has since signed a combined Alliance counter-provocation
contingency plan that improved the readiness posture and allows for a
timely, decisive, proportionate, and coordinated Alliance response to
future provocations. CFC/USFK/UNC lines of communication with ROK JCS,
U.S. DOD and U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) have been improved
and exercised as a result of these two most recent provocations. If
confirmed, I would continue such efforts to ensure we are always
improving deterrence and, in the event of another provocation, our
ability to respond.
Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the
event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what
circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed
to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?
Answer. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty and through our Alliance,
we have deterred a major North Korean attack, and maintained our
commitment to defend South Korea from external aggression. There are a
number of plans that outline specific U.S. commitments and South Korean
obligations to coordinate responses to a North Korean provocation or
attack.
transfer of wartime operational control
Question. In June 2010, the United States and ROK agreed to further
delay the transfer of OPCON until December 2015. This delay was
purportedly agreed to because of the evolving security situation on the
Peninsula and in order to more closely synchronize the transfer with
other transformation initiatives. According to a recent article in the
Washington Post, the ROK has reportedly requested to delay the transfer
of beyond December 2015.
Do you favor transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK no
later than December 2015?
Answer. Yes, I do favor the transfer of wartime operational control
no later than December 2015. The very real threat presented by North
Korea, however, dictates that this transition be executed in a manner
that does not accept any unnecessary risk to the national security of
the ROK. In short, the ROK must meet a detailed set of certification
requirements that are, I understand, in accordance with our Strategic
Alliance 2015 plan. Although these requirements are based on meeting
milestones leading to December 2015, it is important to note that the
transition is conditions-driven.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to help ensure full OPCON
transfer is not delayed beyond December 2015?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to execute our Strategic
Alliance 2015 plan as directed by agreement of the Secretary of Defense
and ROK Minister of National Defense. A principle objective of the
theater exercise program in Korea is to train and certify OPCON
transition, and I do not anticipate that will change. If confirmed, I
will work aggressively with the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to meet Strategic Alliance 2015 milestones and report progress to
the U.S. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the ROK Minister. As
we continue forward with OPCON transition, if confirmed, I will
continue to provide the best military advice to senior civilian
leadership.
Question. Following the decision to delay OPCON transfer to 2015,
the United States and ROK entered into an agreement referred to as
Strategic Alliance 2015 which is described in the U.S. Forces Korea
October 2010 Strategic Digest as ``an overarching and synchronized
Alliance transformation roadmap, containing mutual Alliance end states
and milestones, ensuring a smooth transition of the lead for the
combined defense of the Republic of Korea.''
What is your understanding of the ROK's current and projected
military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater
role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for
command and control of the readiness, operations and warfighting of
their own forces in wartime (``OPCON Transfer'')?
Answer. It is my understanding that the ROK has a highly-trained
and capable military that is continuously improving. Their ground force
is fully capable of defending the ROK from aggression and defeating a
North Korean conventional attack, and they possess an outstanding Fires
force that is fully digitized and stands ready to neutralize enemy
artillery. ROK naval forces are highly trained and rapidly expanding
capabilities to operate in deeper waters. The addition of Aegis-class
destroyers aids their ability to control local seas and also improves
ballistic missile defense. The ROK Air Force has made great progress in
both training and capability in recent years and is fully able to
integrate with U.S. Air Force to form a decisive team that, I
understand, provides perhaps our largest advantage over our adversary.
In the coming years, both ROK Marines and ROK Special Forces will
vastly increase their capability and capacity levels, enabling an even
more lethal joint and combined team.
With regard to assuming a greater leadership role, I understand the
ROK already lead much of the operation in Korea. During routine
operations, ROK JCS commands and controls its armed forces. They are
responsible for the day-to-day training and readiness of the force.
During contingency operations the ROK provides leadership for the
ground component. As we move toward OPCON transition, I understand
their role in leading theater contingency operations will continue to
expand until they assume the overall command and control lead in late-
2015.
Question. What is your understanding of the purpose and scope of
the Strategic alliance 2015?
Answer. I understand that, in 2009, the U.S. and ROK Presidents
agreed the leadership role of defending the ROK in wartime would
transfer from a U.S.-led combined command to a ROK-led combined defense
structure. To meet this, U.S. and ROK civilian and military leaders
developed the Strategic Alliance 2015 initiative to provide an
overarching Alliance roadmap containing joint endstates and milestones.
It is my understanding that SA 2015 combines the transition of wartime
operational control with other Alliance transformational initiatives
including the relocation of U.S. Forces south of Seoul and the
consolidation of U.S. Forces in Korea into two enduring hubs.
Question. How will it help ensure that the OPCON transfer takes
place no later than December 2015, as it is now scheduled?
Answer. In addition to identifying and programming the milestones
required to achieve the transition of wartime operational control,
Strategic Alliance 2015 also includes a bilateral governance process
that allows Alliance civilian and military leadership to monitor and
assess progress. This process enables Alliance leadership to engage
across the ROK and U.S. Governments as necessary to gain and preserve
the required commitments of energy and resources to keep this
transformation on track. If confirmed, I will be an active and
energetic leader in this process.
Question. South Koreans may be concerned as much or more about U.S.
commitment than South Korean capabilities in December 2015.
What steps do you recommend to assure South Korea of U.S.
commitment?
Answer. I understand South Korea has raised a number of questions
about U.S. commitment in light of the U.S. rebalance to Asia, our
fiscal situation, and plans to transition to a ROK-led defense of South
Korea. I firmly believe the United States should reassure our ally by
maintaining a credible, ready U.S. Force posture and the capability
required to meet our Alliance commitments. The United States should
also continue to support robust and realistic training exercises, which
assure our ROK ally and deter North Korea. Finally, we should sustain
close communication through forums such as the Extended Deterrence
Policy Committee, the Counter-missile Capabilities Committee, and the
Military Committee Meetings.
consolidation of u.s. forces
Question. The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the
combat brigade and supporting elements of the Second Infantry Division
in and around Camp Humphreys, south of Seoul. U.S. costs associated
with implementing the LPP are estimated at $3.2 billion, and that does
not include hundreds of millions of dollars in transition costs for
sustaining facilities until the move is completed. The Yongsan
Relocation Plan (YRP) proposes to move most of the U.S. Forces
currently stationed at Yongsan compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey as
well. The YRP relocation is to be largely funded by the Republic of
Korea (ROK) Government, but the United States will face potentially
significant costs as well.
What is the current status of the two consolidation plans and the
timeline for completion?
Answer. It is my understanding that both the YRP and Land
Partnership Plan (LPP) are on track to meet Strategic Alliance 2015
milestones. Construction will be complete by the end of 2015 and unit
moves complete by the end of 2016. This multi-billion dollar bilateral
program is receiving close USFK oversight that is accountable to both
the U.S. and Republic of Korea Governments in order to continue to keep
it on track. If confirmed, I will continue to provide critical
oversight of these relocation efforts.
Question. In your opinion, does the consolidation better support
the warfighting mission? If so, how?
Answer. Yes, consolidation better supports the warfighting mission
in several ways: it postures forces, specifically the 8th Army and 2nd
Infantry Division, to increase readiness through better coordination,
synchronization, and oversight of its subordinate units; postures
forces to better execute contingency missions; and, through co-
location, it increases the cohesiveness of our force in Korea. I do
have a couple concerns for specific units. If confirmed, I intend to
review these planned moves.
Question. What do you anticipate to be the total costs, including
transition costs, to be incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out
the two consolidations?
Answer. The estimated U.S. appropriated costs related to the LPP
program are $884.6 million, which includes U.S. military construction,
moving services, furniture, fixtures, equipment, and C4I requirements.
These cost estimates were recently validated by the Army Staff in March
2013. The remaining costs are paid for through host nation burden
sharing or directly by the Republic of Korea Government. The costs for
executing YRP will be funded completely by the Republic of Korea
Government. I understand this is a sensitive issue. If confirmed, I
will conduct a thorough review of the associated costs to ensure the
judicious use of taxpayer funds.
Question. Given that the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement states
that the United States is not obligated to restore facilities and areas
to their original condition when they are returned to the ROK, to what
extent to you believe the United States should compensate the ROK for
the costs related to environmental clean-up at bases being vacated as a
result of the LPP?
Answer. I take environmental protection, human health and public
safety issues very seriously. DOD policies are straight forward and
clear regarding overseas environmental remediation. If confirmed, I
will ensure those policies are fully implemented. It is also my
understanding that the Republic of Korea and U.S. Governments have an
established and effective means of communication regarding
environmental issues. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to
cooperate closely and transparently with the Republic of Korea on all
environmental matters.
Question. During its review of U.S. costs and allied contributions
to support U.S. military in Korea and elsewhere, the Senate Armed
Services Committee reviewed the full list of construction projects
under consideration at Camp Humphreys. Some of those projects appear to
be of questionable value and necessity. Others raised questions as to
whether they were the most economical way to meet requirements.
If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that the full list of
construction projects planned at Camp Humphreys is focused on meeting
mission critical requirements and doing so in the most cost effective
way?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) report, review our plans, and ensure all construction
resources are focused on the highest priority U.S. operational and
force readiness requirements across all services and all bases in
Korea. USFK's comprehensive campaign plan, to include the theater
infrastructure master plan, appears to be an effective mechanism to
prioritize these requirements.
host nation burden-sharing programs
Question. The United States and ROK currently operate under a
``Special Measures Agreement'' (SMA) in which the ROK contributes
toward U.S. costs associated with maintaining U.S. Forces in the
country. A recent SASC review, entitled Inquiry into the U.S. Costs and
Allied Contributions to Support the U.S. Military Presence Overseas,
found that ROK SMA contributions are not keeping pace with the growth
in U.S. costs.
What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the
burden-sharing arrangement?
Answer. It is my understanding that the ROK provides cost sharing
support for U.S. Forces stationed in Korea through the SMA program. SMA
contributions are divided into three categories: labor, supplies and
services, and construction. SMA support plays a key role in developing
and maintaining force readiness by providing the Korean workers needed
to support the force, making valuable supplies and services available,
and building and modernizing facilities. Since negotiations are
underway over a new SMA, I will refrain from commenting on this issue,
but believe that the ROK should provide an appropriate level of support
to maintain U.S. Forces in Korea.
Question. The Department has said that it expects negotiations for
a new SMA to begin this summer.
What steps will you take to ensure those negotiations result in a
fair sharing of the costs of maintaining the United States' military
presence in ROK?
Answer. It is my understanding that the United States is pursuing a
requirements-based approach during ongoing State Department led
negotiations over a post-2013 SMA. If confirmed, I will examine
opportunities to ensure that our ROK ally provides fair and appropriate
levels of cost sharing support.
Question. A significant percentage of burden-sharing funds in
recent years have been used to carry out construction supporting the
consolidation of U.S. Forces at Camp Humphreys.
Do you believe this funding trend should be continued, or that
funding should be spread to critical requirements at other U.S. bases
in the ROK?
Answer. I have been informed that some ROK SMA contributions will
continue to go to U.S. construction obligations under the Land
Partnership Plan into 2014. This allows the United States to meet its
obligations under the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan and the Land
Partnership Plan. My intention, if confirmed, is to use ROK SMA
contributions to continue to resource the highest priority U.S.
operational and force readiness requirements across all Services and
all bases in Korea. USFK's comprehensive campaign plan, to include the
theater infrastructure master plan, appears to be an effective
mechanism to prioritize these requirements.
Question. The committee's review of U.S. costs and allied
contributions to support U.S. military in Korea and elsewhere raised
concern about the manner in which USFK accounts for host nation
contributions in some cost benefit analyses. For example, the economic
analyses of certain projects at Yongsan do not consider costs paid with
host nation contributions, in effect, treating those contributions as
``free money''.
Do you agree that, in conducting cost benefit analyses, USFK should
account for host-nation contributions, whether they be in cash or in-
kind, in the same manner as appropriated funds?
Answer. I believe these contributions are a vital component of
covering the costs of stationing U.S. Forces in Korea. This valuable
resource must be managed in a responsible and effective manner. If
confirmed, I will ensure that I understand how ROK burden sharing funds
are incorporated into cost benefit analysis that support proposed
courses of action.
Question. What steps would you propose to improve oversight of how
host nation funds are spent in the ROK?
Answer. I agree that oversight of host nation cost sharing support
is essential to ensure this valuable resource is used in the most
effective and efficient manner. If confirmed, my intention is to comply
with all policy and statutory requirements. Additionally, I intend to
ensure we continue oversight procedures for U.S. military planning
efforts in the ROK in close coordination with U.S. Pacific Command, the
Joint Staff, and DOD.
training of u.s. forces in the republic of korea
Question. One of the challenges for the U.S. troops on the Korean
Peninsula is training, particularly the access to training ranges for
large ground unit maneuver and fires and for close air support
missions.
What is your understanding of the training challenges for U.S.
Forces in the ROK, including the availability and access to training
ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, close air support, and
other Air Force training requirements?
Answer. Availability and access to training ranges, I understand,
continues to create significant challenges for Air Force Units on
peninsula. The limited number of ranges and the requirement to share
range time with our ROK partners causes significant training
shortfalls. Range restrictions further limit opportunities to maintain
proficiency in certain mission sets. 7th Air Force (7AF) units mitigate
these shortfalls through off-peninsula deployments and training
exercises.
For ground, maritime, naval, and special operations components, I
understand, ranges and training areas are sufficient to achieve both
service standards in training as well as unique mission training
requirements with few exceptions. Live fire and maneuver training is
conducted on U.S. Army, ROK Army, ROK Air Force, ROK Navy, ROK Special
Forces, and ROK Marine Force ranges and training maneuver areas. The
training areas notably include maritime forcible entry operations (over
the beach maneuver) as well as blue water maneuver areas.
Question. In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet
the training requirements of U.S. Forces?
Answer. It is my understanding that conditions for a fully trained
force are met across all the components through innovative training
both on and off the Peninsula. For all components, CFC is capable of
executing tremendous live, virtual, constructive, and gaming
capabilities to exercise bilateral, joint, and combined operations.
This capability is showcased biannually during exercises Key Resolve
and Ulchi Freedom Guardian, and the result is a highly trained force at
the operational and high tactical level of war.
For ground, maritime, naval, and special operations components,
ranges and training areas are sufficient to achieve both service
standards in training as well as unique mission training requirements
with few exceptions. Live fire and maneuver training is conducted on
U.S. Army, ROK Army, ROK Air Force, ROK Navy, ROK SOF, and ROK Marine
Force ranges and training maneuver areas. The maneuver and live fire
exercise training areas are capable of supporting reinforced Company
size elements. The training areas notably include maritime forcible
entry operations (over the beach maneuver) as well as blue water
maneuver areas.
The air component has the greatest challenges with on-Peninsula
training ranges due to local restrictions and language barriers on the
ROK-only ranges. The 7AF has mitigated these challenges through
innovative use of the two dual-use ROKAF and Air Force training ranges
and integration of off-Peninsula training exercises to cover local
training gaps.
Question. How will the overall readiness reduction of U.S. Forces
due to budget cuts and sequestration, as forecast by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Chiefs, impact U.S. Force
capabilities in Korea?
Answer. U.S. Force capabilities in Korea are inherently joint and
require contributions from all services across all domains. I
understand that USFK depends on Service providers to meet capability
requirements; any impact to the Services will impact current theater
capabilities, and the capabilities of planned reinforcements which are
instrumental to mission accomplishment.
tour normalization in south korea
Question. Prior to 2012, the Defense Department had contemplated
full tour normalization for U.S. military personnel assigned to the
Korean Peninsula. In March 2012, USFK's Commander said that DOD was
``not able to afford Tour Normalization at this time.''
Do you agree that full Tour Normalization is unaffordable? Please
explain.
Answer. Yes, Tour Normalization is unaffordable and unnecessary
considering USFK's mission and posture. USFK determined that the cost
of the initiative is not affordable, and there may be other options to
improve readiness. PACOM agreed with the assessment and removed it from
the PACOM 2012 Theater Posture Plan. Subsequently, DOD stopped pursuing
Tour Normalization as an initiative for Korea.
Question. USFK continues to face the challenge of funding
infrastructure to support the large increase in Command Sponsored
Families that resulted from Phase I of Tour Normalization--including
the cost of family housing. The Committee's recent review of U.S. costs
and allied contributions to support U.S. military in Korea and
elsewhere concluded that approval of the U.S. Army's plan for a public-
private partnership to build family housing at Camp Humphreys ``would
substantially increase long-term costs for U.S. taxpayers and set a
troubling precedent for future military housing plans.''
Given the unaffordability of the previously proposed Army's plan
for family housing at Camp Humphreys, if confirmed, will you
investigate alternate plans for providing family housing for
servicemembers assigned to Camp Humphreys?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will investigate alternative plans,
which is necessary to meet USFK's readiness requirements.
quality of life
Question. Through investment in quality of life amenities, to
include housing, health care, and recreation, the Department has worked
to achieve the goal of making South Korea an ``assignment of choice''
for U.S. Forces.
What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life
programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if
confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?
Answer. I believe the most essential quality of life programs for
servicemembers and their families serving in the Republic of Korea are
access to quality living and working conditions and facilities, quality
health care, and quality educational opportunities for dependent family
members. If confirmed, I will advocate for and take actions to provide
our servicemembers and family members with the best possible living and
working environment, health care services, and educational
opportunities for dependent family members.
Question. What is your understanding of the capacity of DOD schools
in South Korea to accommodate the increase in families/children
associated with tour normalization?
Answer. I understand the schools in Korea are being constructed to
support a student population based upon the currently authorized 4,645
command sponsored families.
medical care for u.s. forces in korea
Question. One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea
is ensuring access to high quality medical care for servicemembers of
all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of
command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-
command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other
factors, have presented challenges.
If confirmed, how would you assess the management and delivery of
health care services in South Korea for both command and non-command
sponsored family members?
Answer. Command sponsored family members are enrolled in TRICARE
Prime and receive the same health benefits as active duty
servicemembers and activated National Guard/Reserve members.
Additionally, the host nation system accepts TRICARE and is robust
enough to provide care to both Command Sponsored and non-Command
Sponsored Families.
I understand South Korea's advances in specialty care--to include
surgical care, imaging, and therapeutics--is among the best in the
world, with six institutions with whom U.S. Forces Korea conducts
business certified in the Joint Commission International Surveys the
last 2 years.
If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and assess the
availability and quality of health care for our servicemembers,
civilians, and their families serving in the Republic of Korea.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. DOD and the Military Services have developed
comprehensive policies and procedures to prevent and respond to
incidents of sexual assault, including providing appropriate resources
and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidences of
sexual misconduct involving military personnel continue to occur. In
2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more than 3,000 reported
cases of sexual assault in the military, including 2,558 unrestricted
reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports. Moreover, a recent
survey conducted by the DOD indicates that the actual number of sexual
offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent of active duty
women and 1.2 percent of active duty men surveyed reported having
experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 12
months.
What is your assessment of the current sexual assault prevention
and response program in USFK?
Answer. USFK takes the prevention of sexual assaults very
seriously. Sexual assault is a crime that violates basic human dignity
and the standards of decency that we are sworn to uphold and protect.
We cannot allow sexual assaults to injure our servicemembers and
families, erode trust in each other and our institutions, or compromise
readiness.
All Services have commander-driven programs, with engaged
leadership at all levels. These programs focus on education and
culture, positive changes to the environment, and strict enforcement of
standards to eliminate sexual assaults in our formations.
Commanders will continue to aggressively investigate every
allegation of sexual assault and hold accountable those who cannot live
by our standards.
Question. In your view, does the current sexual assault prevention
and response program in USFK adequately address issues regarding sexual
assaults involving DOD contractor personnel?
Answer. Yes, as I understand it, the sexual assault prevention and
response program in USFK adequately addresses issues regarding sexual
assaults involving DOD Contractors.
I understand that DOD Contractors serving in Korea have access to
USFK sexual assault prevention and sexual assault response training
resources and command policies. Additionally, contractors that are
sexual assault victims have access to most USFK victim advocate
resources.
In Korea, I understand the Command often partners with local law
enforcement in investigating and prosecuting sexual assaults committed
by contractor personnel and either they will be prosecuted under Korean
Law or they will be returned to the United States and prosecuted by the
Department of Justice under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act (MEJA).
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual
assault in the USFK area of responsibility?
Answer. I understand that the training and resources in place to
investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault in the USFK
area of responsibility is high-quality. U.S. Criminal Investigation
Command (CID) recently stationed a Sexual Assault Investigator in Korea
who provides direct guidance, review, and management of all CID sexual
assault investigations in Korea. Each CID office in Korea has assigned
multiple agents trained for interviewing sexual assault victims in
support of sexual assault investigations. Trial Counsel works closely
with agents as the agents investigate these offenses. If confirmed, I
will closely review the adequacy of these resources.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? Are you aware of any problem
with the manner in which confidential reporting has been implemented
and applied?
Answer. I agree with the current reporting options and am not aware
of any systemic problem with the manner in which confidential reporting
has been implemented and applied.
Protecting victims is paramount to ensuring that we get timely
reports of sexual assaults and gain confidence within our ranks that
leadership will do what is right. The recent change in DOD strategic
plan guidance has helped eliminate barriers to reporting sexual
assaults within our formations.
The use of restricted and unrestricted reports serve as valuable
options to our overall sexual assault program. They improve the
military justice process to ensure more timely, thorough and efficient
reporting, investigations and accountability.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
commanders to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
Answer. Commanders care very deeply about this issue and they are
up to the task. The commander is central to all we do in military
units. We entrust them with tremendous responsibility and special trust
and we must hold them accountable for reinforcing the highest standards
of respect and trust. A foremost responsibility of all commanders is to
maintain good order and discipline. Sexual assault eats at the core of
the trust, respect, cohesiveness, and readiness that sustains our
military. There is no doubt that all commanders must redouble their
efforts to eliminate this problem; there are no shortcuts. I am
confident, though, of the ability and willingness of our commanders to
tackle the problem.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. Commanders at every level are responsible for the behavior
of their personnel and for the climate in their unit. Leaders must lead
by example and instill the importance of standards, values and
discipline in our formations.
I understand USFK Headquarters has established a USFK Sexual
Assault Task Force co-chaired by the USFK Deputy Chief of Staff and
Command Sergeant Major. Established in June 2012, this working group
meets monthly to coordinate efforts with components and experts on
prevention measures, training factors, and sharing of best practices.
Results and required actions are briefed directly to the USFK
Commander.
If confirmed, I plan to use this working group to review policies
and programs that directly affect our sexual assault prevention and
response program.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. The commander's role in military justice is longstanding
and essential to the effectiveness of command in our forces. Removing
commanders from the military justice system would signal a lack of
confidence in our commanders that would undermine good order and
discipline. It would foster doubt in our servicemembers in the
competency and abilities of their commanders that are entrusted with
their lives. The maintenance of good order and discipline is the
responsibility of the commander. Removing this responsibility would
certainly erode the ability of a commander to effectively command his
unit.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond
to sexual assaults and to hold assailants accountable for their
actions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead by example. I will immediately
review the associated policies and regulations and ensure effective
prevention, reporting and response; including the establishment of
critical and prioritized reporting requirements that ensure my
immediate awareness of an assault in the command.
I am confident that commanders take the responsibilities and
authorities they have under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, with
the utmost seriousness and will hold assailants accountable for their
actions.
If confirmed, I will publish in writing and communicate in multiple
means my priorities and guidance.
I will personally check the execution of my directives and the
health of the environment through personal engagement with
servicemembers and commanders.
I will emphasize the importance of a healthy command climate and
require accountability of commanders for their environment.
I will form a multi-functional team that continuously explores
prevention and response actions to close gaps and the implement best
practices.
prevention of human trafficking
Question. Following media reports connecting prostitution and human
trafficking in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, U.S. Forces
Korea, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal
activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy,
all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and
their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including
observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and
establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.
What effects have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal
laws implemented by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and
human trafficking in Korea?
Answer. It is my understanding that U.S. and USFK policy has
significantly increased education and awareness of prostitution and
human trafficking activity, but recorded incidents are too few to note
statistically meaningful changes.
USFK maintains a zero tolerance policy and places establishments
suspected of prostitution and/or human trafficking activity off-limits
via the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board process.
The Air Force component has been especially aggressive in recent
months and has been successful in eliminating prostitution and human
trafficking activity in the majority of establishments outside one
base, and are aggressively pursuing action at another location.
USFK heads a Combating Trafficking in Persons Task Force and works
closely with each component and the U.S. Embassy staff to monitor
prostitution and human trafficking activity and work cooperatively to
combat it.
Question. What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) and military regulations are needed in your
judgment to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?
Answer. I believe the UCMJ is well equipped to meet the challenges
of indiscipline in our Armed Forces, to include allegations of
prostitution and human trafficking. It is a crime under the UCMJ to
engage in pandering and prostitution, and patronizing a prostitute.
While the UCMJ does not specifically address human trafficking, human
trafficking crimes are prosecuted under the UCMJ through charges of
unbecoming, violation of a General Order, or violation of existing
Federal laws criminalizing trafficking through assimilation.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to further
enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will reinforce efforts of the Armed Forces
Disciplinary Control Board which is the Department of the Defense
program to address problems with off-post establishments, through
training and public awareness efforts. I will ensure my area commanders
continue to work with local communities to eliminate prostitution and
human trafficking.
north korea-pow-mia recovery efforts
Question. From 1996-2005, the United States worked with the North
Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American
servicemembers who perished on the Korean peninsula. In the spring of
2005, the United States halted the program and, despite efforts last
year to restart the program, there has been no recovery operations
since.
In your opinion, under what conditions should the United States
work with North Korea to repatriate the remains of American
servicemembers found in North Korea?
Answer. Although I cannot speak for national-level policy makers,
from an operational perspective, I believe that a successful resumption
of remains recovery operations in North Korea should be based upon
North Korean guarantees for the safety and security of the U.S.
servicemembers and civilians participating in the recovery operations
and that the repatriations should be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.
regional posture
Question. In your opinion, how should the United States employ its
forces in ROK to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to
best respond to regional threats, provide support for out-of-area
contingencies, and maintain readiness?
Answer. Readiness to ``Fight Tonight'' is the number one priority
and focus for USFK. I understand U.S. Forces in the ROK currently
provide regional presence and engagement through participation in
regional exercises.
Employment must primarily support Deter, Defend, and Defeat in
armistice and crisis on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. and ROK force
employment will remain flexible enough to support U.S. Pacific Command
Theater Security Cooperation in limited increments, in order to support
response to regional threats and out-of-area contingencies.
Employment and regional exercises will continue to promote regional
peace and support U.S. regional partners and allies. These engagement
efforts will best train our forces for contingency operations to
respond to regional threats and also maintain readiness.
Question. What adjustments, if any, do you anticipate having to
make to your strategy if current budget cuts and sequestration cuts
remain in place?
Answer. I believe the fundamental strategy of UNC, CFC, and USFK
will remain unchanged--we will continue to deter, maintain readiness,
and engage with our ROK allies and U.N. Sending State partners. We
will, however, have to carefully prioritize our resources to maintain
readiness and capabilities within cost constraints.
Question. What additional strategic risks do you think you will
have to assume over the next 5 years in your area of responsibility if
the current budget cuts and sequestration cuts remain in place?
Answer. I see increased risks in terms of Alliance military
readiness to meet increasing North Korean investments in asymmetric
capabilities in various areas, including cyber and nuclear-capable
missiles. Additionally, a reduction in resources could erode the
confidence of our ROK allies in the strength of our deterrent and
warfighting capabilities, and our commitment to their defense.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations
Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes, I do.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
recovery efforts in north korea
1. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Scaparrotti, the United
States estimates there are 43 servicemembers missing who served in
North Korea. Do you commit to working with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
and Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (MIA) Accounting Command
(JPAC) in order to support efforts to resume MIA recovery operations in
North Korea?
General Scaparrotti. I remain committed to working with PACOM and
JPAC to resume the MIA recovery operations in North Korea. From an
operational perspective, I believe that a successful resumption of
remains recovery operations in North Korea should be based upon North
Korean guarantees for the safety and security of the U.S.
servicemembers and civilians participating in the recovery operations
and that the repatriations should be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

sequestration impact on u.s. forces korea
2. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Scaparrotti, what are your
concerns regarding the impact of sequestration on readiness of U.S.
Forces in Korea?
General Scaparrotti. Although U.S. Forces Korea currently has a
very high priority for funding and resources, I see increased risks on
Alliance military readiness to meet increasing North Korean investments
in asymmetric capabilities in various areas, including cyber and
nuclear-capable missiles. Additionally, a reduction in trained and
ready resources could erode the confidence of our ROK allies in the
strength of U.S. deterrent and warfighting capabilities. In particular,
full sequestration will ultimately reduce the readiness of response
forces in CONUS that would deploy to Korea if deterrence fails.
USFK will continue to carefully prioritize resources and work
diligently with the Services to maintain readiness and capabilities
within cost constraints. I intend to closely monitor readiness levels.

combat operations and impact on u.s. national security interests
3. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Scaparrotti, according to the
2012 Strategic Guidance, the United States now seeks to be able to
conduct one major combat operation while only denying the objective of
an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. This is a reduction from
the longstanding goal of being able to conduct two simultaneous major
combat operations.
As the next Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, how does this change
from two major combat operations to one and a half, impact your
thinking?
General Scaparrotti. This construct is based on recognition of
limited resources resulting from our constrained fiscal environment.
These constraints can lead to greater risk, demanding a continual
assessment of the strategic landscape and effective balance of
resources. As the next Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, my priority
is to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea and if deterrence
fails, defeat the threat. Maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula
and the Northeast Asia region requires the ability to ``Fight
Tonight''. If U.S. Forces in Korea are called upon to act, we will need
priority access to the resources required to undertake these missions.
I will continue to evaluate the risk on the Peninsula and work closely
with the U.S. Pacific Commander and the Services to ensure we have
forces trained and ready.

4. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Scaparrotti, if our national
security interests require us to intervene in Syria or Iran, does this
1.5 assumption for defense planning undercut the resources you might
have available should hostilities break out on the Korean peninsula?
General Scaparrotti. Current plans take into account realistic
force availability. Depending on the type and number of forces required
if intervention in Syria or Iran is directed, it could have an adverse
effect on resources available.

5. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Scaparrotti, would this 1.5
assumption make it more likely that North Korea might undertake
opportunistic aggression if we intervene elsewhere?
General Scaparrotti. South Korean and U.S. military capabilities on
the Peninsula have effectively deterred major North Korean military
aggression for 60 years. We believe that Pyongyang recognizes these
capabilities and knows it lacks the resources and foreign support
necessary to execute a major attack should the United States be
committed elsewhere.
______

[The nomination reference of LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti,
USA, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 20, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General.

LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA

Source of Commissioned Service: USMA

Educational Degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
University of South Carolina - ME - Administrative Education

Military Schools Attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
U.S. Army War College

Foreign Language(s): None recorded

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Date of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 7 Jun 78
1LT....................................... 7 Jun 80
CPT....................................... 1 Jan 82
MAJ....................................... 1 Jul 89
LTC....................................... 1 Jul 93
COL....................................... 1 May 99
BG........................................ 1 Jan 04
MG........................................ 9 Jul 07
LTG....................................... 15 Oct 10
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aug 12.......................... Present........... Director, Joint
Staff,
Washington, DC
Oct 10.......................... Jul 12............ Commanding
General, I Corps
and Joint Base
Lewis-McChord,
Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, WA/
Commander,
International
Security
Assistance Force
Joint Command/
Deputy Commander.
U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan,
Operation
Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan
Aug 10.......................... Sep 10............ Special Assistant
to the Commanding
General, XVIII
Airborne Corps
Oct 08.......................... Aug 10............ Commanding
General, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC/
Commanding
General, Combined
Joint Task Force-
76 and Operation
Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan
Jul 06.......................... Sep 08............ Director of
Operations, J-3,
U.S. Central
Command, MacDill
Air Force Base,
FL
Aug 04.......................... Jun 06............ Commandant of
Cadets, U.S.
Military Academy,
West Point, NY
Jun 03.......................... Jul 04............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Jul 01.......................... Jun 03............ Assistant Deputy
Director for
Joint Operations,
J-3, Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Jun 99.......................... Jun 01............ Commander, 2d
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jun 98.......................... Jun 99............ Chief, Army
Initiatives
Group, Office of
the Deputy Chief
of Staff for
Operations and
Plans, U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
Aug 97.......................... Jun 98............ Student, U.S. Army
War College,
Carlisle
Barracks, PA
May 96.......................... Jul 97............ G-3 (Operations),
10th Mountain
Division (Light),
Fort Drum, NY
May 94.......................... Apr 96............ Commander, 3d
Battalion, 325th
Infantry
(Airborne Combat
Team), U.S. Army
Southern European
Task Force,
Vicenza, Italy
and Operation
Support Hope,
Zaire/Rwanda,
Operation Joint
Endeavor. Bosnia-
Herzegovina and
Operation Assured
Response, Liberia
Feb 93.......................... May 94............ Executive Officer
to the Director
of Management,
Office of the
Chief of Staff,
Army, Washington,
DC
May 92.......................... Feb 93............ Lieutenant
Colonels
Assignment
Officer, Infantry
Branch, U.S.
Total Army
Personnel
Command,
Alexandria, VA
May 91.......................... May 92............ Chief, Operations
Branch, G-3
(Operations),
10th Mountain
Division (Light),
Fort Drum, NY
May 90.......................... May 91............ S-3 (Operations),
1st Brigade, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), Fort
Drum, NY
Jun 89.......................... May 90............ S-3 (Operations),
1st Battalion,
87th Infantry,
10th Mountain
Division (Light),
Fort Drum, NY
Jul 88.......................... Jun 89............ Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
May 85.......................... Jun 88............ Tactical Officer,
later Aide-de-
Camp to the
Superintendent,
U.S. Military
Academy, West
Point, NY
May 84.......................... May 85............ Student,
University of
South Carolina,
Columbia, SC
Oct 83.......................... May 84............ Student, Infantry
Officer Advanced
Course, Fort
Benning, GA
Apr 82.......................... Sep 83............ Commander, B
Company, 3d
Battalion
(Airborne), 325th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Nov 80.......................... Apr 82............ S-3 (Air), 3d
Battalion
(Airborne), 325th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Dec 79.......................... Oct 80............ Anti-Tank Platoon
Leader, Combat
Support Company,
3d Battalion
(Airborne), 325th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
Apr 79.......................... Dec 79............ Rifle Platoon
Leader, A
Company, 3d
Battalion
(Airborne), 325th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Director, Joint Staff, Aug 12-Present.... Lieutenant General
Washington, DC.
Commanding General, Combined May 09-Jun 10..... Major General
Joint Task Force-76, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.
Director of Operations, J-3, Jul 06-Sep 08..... Brigadier General/
U.S. Central Command, MacDill Major General
Air Force Base, FL.
Assistant Deputy Director for Jul 01-Jun 03..... Colonel
Joint Operations, J-3, Joint
Staff, Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of operational assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commanding General, Combined May 09-Jun 10..... Major General
Joint Task Force-76, Operation
Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.
Assistant Division Commander Jun 03-Jul 04..... Colonel/Brigadier
(Maneuver), 1st Armored General
Division, U.S. Army Europe and
Seventh Army, Germany and
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
Commander, 3d Battalion. 325th May 94-Apr 96..... Lieutenant Colonel
Infantry (Airborne Combat
Team), U.S. Army Southern
European Task Force, Vicenza.
Italy and Operation Support
Hope, Zaire/Rwanda, Operation
Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Operation
Assured Response, Liberia.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Action Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Curtis M.
Scaparrotti, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Curtis M. Scaparrotti.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S.
Forces Korea.

3. Date of nomination:
May 20, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
March 5, 1956; Logan, OH.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Cindy S. (Bateman) Scaparrotti.

7. Names and ages of children:
Michael L. Scaparrotti, 31.
Stephanie M. (Scaparrotti) High, 27.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
I am a trustee in two living trusts which were created as part of
our estate planning. The trusts are:

The Curtis M. Scaparrotti Living Trust
The Cindy S. Scaparrotti Living Trust

My wife and I are listed as trustee in both trusts. The contents of
the trusts are all our personal property and home furnishings.
Additionally, our investments listed in the SF 278, on pages 6 thru 8
of 18, as Living Trust items 7.0 to 7.19, are in her trust. None of the
contents of either trust create a potential conflict of interest.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Association of the U.S. Army
Life Member, 82nd Airborne Division Association
Life Member, 1st Airborne Division Association
Life Member, U.S. Army War College Alumni Association

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes, I do agree.

[The nomination of LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 30, 2013, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013.]

NOMINATIONS OF HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES TO BE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE;
HON. JESSICA GARFOLA WRIGHT TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
PERSONNEL AND READINESS; MR. FRANK G. KLOTZ TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY; MR. MARCEL J. LETTRE II TO BE PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; AND MR. KEVIN A.
OHLSON TO BE A JUDGE OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED
SERVICES

----------

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, McCaskill,
Udall, Hagan, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine,
King, Inhofe, McCain, Chambliss, Wicker, Ayotte, Graham,
Vitter, Blunt, and Lee.
Other Senator present: Senator Conrad.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel; Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel;
Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; Mariah K.
McNamara, special assistant to the staff director.
Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority
staff director; Daniel C. Adams, minority associate counsel;
Steven M. Barney, minority counsel; William S. Castle, minority
general counsel; Samantha L. Clark, minority associate counsel;
Allen M. Edwards, professional staff member; Anthony J.
Lazarski, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Daniel J. Harder and Kathleen A.
Kulenkampff.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Jason Rauch, assistant to Senator
McCaskill; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall;
Christopher Cannon, assistant to Senator Hagan; Mara Boggs,
assistant to Senator Manchin; Patrick Day, assistant to Senator
Shaheen; Moran Banai and Brooke Jamison, assistants to Senator
Gillibrand; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly;
Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Steve Smith,
assistant to Senator King; Paul C. Hutton IV, assistant to
Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
Ayotte; Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer; Craig
Abele, assistant to Senator Graham; Joshua Hodges, assistant to
Senator Vitter; Robert Moore, assistant to Senator Lee; and
Jeremy Hayes, assistant to Senator Cruz.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to consider the nominations for a number of
important and challenging assignments within the Department of
Defense (DOD).
We welcome Deborah James, who is nominated to be Secretary
of the Air Force; Jessica Wright, who is nominated to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Frank Klotz,
nominated to be the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear
Security; Marcel Lettre, nominated to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and Kevin Ohlson,
nominated to be a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces.
We also welcome your family members here this morning. The
committee recognizes the immense contribution which are made by
families and other friends for the success of the efforts which
you undertake. We thank them for joining us today.
Our witnesses, during their opening statements, should feel
free to introduce family members and others who are here to be
with them today.
We're especially pleased to welcome back to our committee
Senator Conrad, who is a--I won't say an ``old friend,''
because he still looks a lot younger than he did when he left
the Senate. I hope there is a connection between the two, for
personal reasons. [Laughter.]
But, he's been a dear friend of all of us, and he made such
a contribution here, when he was here, that we think about him
all the time. Please feel welcome here as you introduce Mr.
Klotz, and say hi to Lucy for us, too, if you would.
The positions to which the witnesses have been nominated
are some of the most demanding in the Department of Defense. We
thank all of our nominees for their commitment and dedication,
and especially for their willingness to continue to serve our
country.
The Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for seeing to
all Department of the Air Force affairs, including organizing,
training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of nearly
330,000 Active Duty men and women, 176,000 Air National Guard
and Air Force Reserve members, 186,000 civilians and their
families. If confirmed, Ms. James will assume control at a time
of immense fiscal challenge. Her responsibility to oversee the
Air Force's annual budget of more than $110 billion is going to
require the wise balancing of risk across the force while also
ensuring core Air Force capabilities remain robust.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
is the Secretary of Defense's senior policy advisor on a range
of issues, including total force management, military and DOD
civilian personnel policy, healthcare, and compensation. If
confirmed for this position, Ms. Wright will play a critical
role in the Department's efforts to address many difficult
issues; chief among them, eliminating the scourge of sexual
assault and sexual harassment in our military. Ms. Wright is no
stranger to the rigors of this position, having already served
in an acting capacity for several months.
If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear
Security, Mr. Klotz will be the administrator for the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). His responsibilities
will include overseeing the safety, reliability, and
performance of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and
promoting international nuclear safety and nonproliferation.
Mr. Klotz has held numerous positions in the fields of arms
control and nuclear policy, including advising the President as
the Director for Nuclear Policy and Arms Control on the
National Security Council staff, experiences that will surely
serve him well.
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence is a new position that will serve as the primary
staff assistant and advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence. His responsibilities will include policy and
strategic oversight of all DOD intelligence activities,
counterintelligence and security policy, plans and programs,
and exercise planning. Mr. Lettre has spent several years in
the halls of the Pentagon, where he's currently serving as the
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and, prior to
that, as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs.
Mr. Ohlson, if confirmed, will join four other civilian
judges as a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, the highest court for military personnel on Active Duty
and others subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) and others subject to the UCMJ beside personnel who are
on Active Duty. The court exercises jurisdiction over all
appeals from U.S. military courts and is a vital part of the
military justice system. Mr. Ohlson has many years of relevant
experience, serving currently as the chief of the Department of
Justice's Professional Misconduct Review Unit and previously in
the Office of the Attorney General and as a Judge Advocate
General (JAG) in the Army. This extensive background makes Mr.
Ohlson a strong candidate for this judicial role.
Again, we welcome all of our nominees today. We look
forward to your testimony.
I now will call on Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've done a good
job of describing what you guys are going to be involved in,
but, at the risk of sounding negative, I look at some of the
problems that you'll be faced with. General Klotz, you'd be
taking the reins of the NNSA at a time that is really difficult
right now. I think you know that, and I'm anxious to hear your
testimony.
Congress has serious concerns about the management of the
administration, especially in respect to the cost-growth
schedule slippage in all of that. We look forward to your
thoughts on that.
Ms. Wright, again, I apologize for not having been there
when you were at our scheduled visit, but we had a chance to
visit vicariously anyway. You've served as the Acting Under
Secretary since January of this year, and have been involved in
a lot of important but controversial things. I am concerned
about your thoughts on sexual assault, religious expression.
I'm troubled by your September 4, 2013, decision concerning
administrative leave. I'm also concerned about the impact of
our civilian personnel furloughs. I know that we suffered some
24,000, just in my State of Oklahoma, 14,000 just at Tinker Air
Force Base. It is serious, and I'm just wondering what we are
accomplishing from that.
Ms. James, the Air Force is forced to ground a third of its
combat-coded Active squadrons for a time during 2013. According
to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, it will now cost a
minimum of 10 percent more for flying hours to recover, back
where we were. It's a tough time that you're getting into that
position.
It's also been reported that the Air Force is considering
the retirement of its entire fleets of aircraft, including the
A-10s, F-15Cs, B-1s, and the KC-10s. I'm very much concerned
about this. It's a disarming of America that bothers me a great
deal.
Mr. Lettre, if confirmed, you'll be confronted with a
number of significant challenges, including the ongoing
uncertainty in Syria, and then the challenges in Iran, which
have always concerned me more than the problems in Syria, quite
frankly. The cyber operations, the development of a national
cyber force, are also things that are going to be--you're right
in at the ground floor of that--a matter of keeping up with the
competition. It's going to be tough.
Finally, Mr. Ohlson, in terms of military justice, I know
there are people like Senator Graham and others who have had a
lot more personal experience. I go all the way back to before
you guys were born, when I was in the Army and was a court
reporter for the justice system, and I've developed some pretty
strong feelings about it since that time.
I look at you, and I wonder why in the world you're doing
this, but I'm glad you are, and we're anxious to hear your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
I'm going to ask the standard questions of all of our
civilian nominees first, then I'm going to call on Senator
Conrad, who is going to introduce Mr. Klotz, and then I'm going
to go to the order in which we've indicated on our hearing
notice, calling first on you, Ms. James.
First let me start with the questions that I ask all of our
civilian nominees.
In order to exercise its jurisdiction, we must receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information;
and so, these questions and their answers become very important
to us.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[All five witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process?
[All five witnesses answered in the negative.]
Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines
established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
[All five witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
[All five witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
[All five witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon
request, before this committee?
[All five witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Finally, do you agree to provide documents, including
copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner
when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult
with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay
or denial in providing such documents?
[All five witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Thank you all.
Now let me call on Senator Conrad.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENT CONRAD, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
NORTH DAKOTA, RETIRED

Senator Conrad. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
acknowledge the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Inhofe.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to introduce General
Klotz. I might say that I miss very much our association after
retiring.
I want to acknowledge that General Klotz is here with his
wife, Nancy, as well as his son, Justin. His son, Justin,
actually runs a nursing home, which may have special relevance
for me now that I've left the Senate, may have special
relevance for some of you who are about to leave.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for reminding us. [Laughter.]
Senator Conrad. It is so good to be back with colleagues
that I like and respect.
I am here to commend to you General Frank Klotz, somebody
that I've known for more than 20 years and have grown to
greatly respect.
Frank Klotz is a renaissance man. He's extremely well
educated, he has a distinguished service in the military, and
he has a remarkable record of accomplishment in the diplomacy
of arms control.
Let me just briefly remind you of part of his life story:
In 1973, he graduated with distinction from the U.S. Air
Force Academy. He was named a Rhodes Scholar and holds a Ph.D.
from Oxford. In 1983, the U.S. Jaycees [U.S. Junior Chamber]
named him one of the ten outstanding young men of America. In
1986, he became commander of the Strategic Missile Squadron at
Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. In 1990, he was
made the chief of the Nuclear Biological and Chemical Plans
Branch at the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium. In 1991, he became
commander of the 321st Operations Group at Grand Forks Air
Force Base, ND. In 1993, he became director of the Chief of
Staff's Operations Group at the U.S. Air Force Headquarters
here in Washington. In 1995, he became commander of the 91st
Missile Group at Minot Air Force Base, ND.
Notice a pattern, here? [Laughter.]
North Dakota--Grand Forks, ND; Minot, ND.
In 1999, he was our Defense Attache in Moscow. He was the
senior U.S. military officer based in Russia. In 2001, he
became the Director for Nuclear Policy and Arms Control at the
National Security Council in the White House. In that position,
he advised the President on all aspects of nuclear weapons
policy. He represented the White House in talks leading to the
2002 Moscow Treaty that reduced deployed weapons by two-thirds.
As I recall, that treaty passed the Senate on a vote of 95 to
0. Pretty good.
In 2003, he became Commander of the 20th Air Force. In that
position, he led 9,500 men and women of our intercontinental
ballistic missile forces. In 2005, he became Vice Commander of
U.S. Space Command, so he was second in command of over 39,000
men and women. In 2006, he was awarded the General Thomas D.
White Trophy for Most Outstanding Contribution to Aerospace. In
2007, he became the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and Director
of the Air Force staff--again, here at headquarters.
In 2009, he became Commander of Global Strike Command at
Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. He stood up that
command. In that position, he led 23,000 Americans, men and
women, and oversaw all nuclear-capable bombers and missiles.
In 2011, he won the prestigious General Larry D. Welch
Award for his leadership. In 2011, he became a senior fellow at
the Council of Foreign Relations.
This is an uncommon man with a common touch. He is smart,
with remarkably good judgment, who has dedicated his life to
the defense of our country. I could not be more honored than to
recommend to you General Frank Klotz to be Under Secretary of
Energy for Nuclear Security. I know of no one more qualified or
more prepared for the position than General Frank Klotz.
Thank you very much for this time. It's good to see you all
again, and I hope I'll have other chances to see you in the
future.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Conrad, for a
very powerful and heartfelt introduction. We know you have to
leave, so please feel free to do that.
Ms. James.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES, TO BE SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE

Ms. James. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe,
other members of the committee. I am deeply, deeply
appreciative of the opportunity to appear before all of you
today. I want to also thank Secretary Hagel for his support, as
well as President Obama for the confidence that he has placed
in me by putting my name forward as the nominee to be the 23rd
Secretary of the Air Force.
Needless to say, I view this opportunity as the privilege
and an honor of a lifetime. If confirmed, I will work very hard
to ensure that I live up to what is an enormous amount of trust
that may be placed in me.
I'd also like to take just a moment to say to all of the
airmen who may be with us today here in the committee room, or
who may be listening from elsewhere--I want to wish them all a
very happy 66th birthday. I think I speak, certainly, for all
of this panel and all of America to say that we are very proud
of our Air Force. I know I am.
I also want to recognize some very important people who are
in my life. They're very important to me, personally, and they
give me great joy every day. Seated behind me is Frank Beatty,
my husband, and three of our four children. With me today is
Sam Lee, Regina Lee, and Michelle Beatty. Paul, our fourth
child, could not be with us here today. He is in school at
George Mason University, and he was not going to cut class. I
thought that was a good decision on his part.
Chairman Levin. Well, what is the excuse for these kids who
are with you, then? [Laughter.]
Ms. James. But, anyway, you guys, thank you so much for
being here and supporting me. I love you all very much.
Incidentally, Senators, I would love you to know that Sam
and Regina were here with me almost precisely 20 years ago when
I first appeared before this committee to be considered as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. If you take
a real good look at them now, I think you will agree with me
that they are a whole lot taller and much less squirmy than
they were 20 years ago.
I also notice that I have quite a few friends and
colleagues who turned out to support me, so a quick shout-out
and thanks to Michelle and Tom, Amy, Jim, Mason, Linda,
Seileen, Paula, Larry, Louise, Mick, Tom--I have quite a gang
back there. Thank you all very much; it means a great deal that
you've taken the time to be here.
Senators, I have worked for more than 3 decades as a
civilian in support of our military. I've had experience in the
executive branch, on Capitol Hill; I've been in the world of
think tanks; and I've been in the defense industry. I've also
been a volunteer in some of the wonderful nonprofit
organizations that help our military, our veterans, and their
families in ways that the Government simply cannot.
Specifically, I've served 17 years in the Government and 15
years in the private sector. My prior Government service
includes a decade where I served on the staff of the
professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee, and
then I was 5 years in the Pentagon as the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
Currently, I'm serving as a member of the Defense Advisory
Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), which is an
advisory body to the Secretary of Defense on matters affecting
our women in uniform. While in the private sector, I've spent
the bulk of my time with the company which is my current
company, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).
I'd like to now come right to the point and give you my
bottom line and that is, I'm coming before you today absolutely
committed to keeping the U.S. Air Force the very best air force
in the world. Now, what does this mean to me? If confirmed, it
means that I want to focus on people. As you said, Senator,
there's more than 690,000 Active Duty, Reserve, Guard, and
civilian airmen who form the backbone of everything that we do.
It also means taking on that which will most assuredly be
program budget decisions, making tradeoffs, finding the right
balance between preserving the Air Force of today and building
toward the Air Force of tomorrow. I have no illusions, this is
going to be very hard, and we'll need everybody's help to get
there from here.
It means ensuring that our Air Force is ready to take on
whatever missions our leaders may task, missions to protect us
and our interests overseas, as well as missions to protect
Americans here at home.
Since virtually all missions nowadays are joint, it also
means being an effective partner with the Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard. Ultimately, here's what it means. This
would be my goal, if confirmed, and that would be to leave our
Air Force, some years from now, on a path toward greater
capability and better affordability for our taxpayers and with
the people, who underpin everything, who are second to none. I
pledge to you to work on all of these areas very hard, if
confirmed.
I'd like to close by thanking the members of this
committee, as well as the professional staff, personal staff
that I see in the background, because I know that our military
would not be the military that it is today had it not been for
all of your efforts and all that has happened that has brought
us here today.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ms. James.
Secretary Wright.

STATEMENT OF HON. JESSICA GARFOLA WRIGHT, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Ms. Wright. Good morning. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
Inhofe, members of the committee, I am humbled to be sitting
before you, and I thank you for the opportunity to be here
again. I'm very grateful for the confidence that President
Obama has placed in me, first to nominate me as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and now the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I want to
thank Secretary Hagel and Deputy Secretary Carter for their
support of my nomination.
It's been my great honor to serve this Nation, first in
uniform, for 35 years, and the last 2-plus years as a civilian
with the Department of Defense.
My career in public service would not have been possible
without my family. My husband, Chuck, who is here with me
today, is my most avid supporter and my champion. He's a
combat-tested Army officer who retired with 24 years of
service. Our son, Mike, is an Army lieutenant, and he is
presently serving in Afghanistan. I have a great pleasure to
recognize my mom, Cass. She's here with me today, too. She's
the reason that I clearly have grown into an independent woman.
A few days ago, our family buried our dad, John Garfola. My
dad served in World War II as a combat medic in the China-
Burma-India campaign. He was the role model for my family, and
he is my hero.
I've enjoyed the tremendous opportunity of serving as the
Acting Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness since
January of 2013. In this role, I have the responsibility of
advocating for the outstanding men and women of our Active,
Guard, and Reserve components, and their families, and the
dedicated Department of Defense civilians. It is evident to me
that our people, and those that support them, are the
Department's greatest asset and their strength.
I fully acknowledge that there are many challenges facing
the Department, and the most pressing challenge is the
constrained fiscal climate. The Department has two sacred
obligations. One is to care for its people, who are willing to
sacrifice their lives in order to protect the national
interest, and the second is to ensure the national security of
the United States. Having had the privilege of wearing our
country's uniform for 35 years, I bring a special understanding
to both obligations. Our servicemembers and their families
selflessly put the interests of our Nation first. Because of
the sense of duty, the America's military remains one of the
most trusted institutions in our society. If confirmed, I look
forward to supporting Secretary Hagel, to ensure that the
Department honors both of its obligations, and to sustain an
agile, capable force.
One of the most significant challenges we face is the
stress on our force as a result of the long, continuous period
of armed conflict. For more than a decade, we've repeatedly
deployed servicemembers to combat zones, hotspots, and areas of
the world that are devastated by natural disaster, separating
them from their loved ones for months and years at a time.
Although our servicemembers never hesitate to answer the
Nation's call, this call causes the toughest challenges on the
battlefield and here at home. Our servicemembers and their
families are under significant strain. Their minds, their
bodies, their spirits require healing. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the efforts necessary to provide care for our
people are continued.
This year, the Department celebrated the 40th anniversary
of the All-Volunteer Force. This force helped win the Cold War,
stood against aggression in the Persian Gulf, kept peace in the
Balkans, fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the next several
years, we, as a Nation, will be further challenged by shifting
operational requirements abroad, evolving threats to national
security, and significant budget challenges. If confirmed, I
will be vigilant and ensure the Department provides the
leadership and vision necessary to rebalance, adapt, and
involve the All-Volunteer Force as it has done so well over the
last 40 years. I'm also committed to ensuring that we maintain
the military's status as the strongest, most capable, most
respected fighting force in the history of the world. I'm
grateful to the members of this committee for your continued
leadership for the support of our military forces, their
families, and the civilian employees of the Department of
Defense. If the Senate confirms me for this position, I pledge
that I will work diligently with you to best serve the men and
women of the Department and their families. I'm deeply honored
for this nomination and the potential to continue to serve our
Nation.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Wright.
General Klotz.

STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK G. KLOTZ, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY

Mr. Klotz. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
Inhofe, distinguished members of this committee. It's a great
honor to again appear before the Senate Armed Service
Committee. The uniform I'm wearing today may be different this
time, but my desire to serve our Nation remains as strong as it
ever was. For that reason, I'm enormously grateful to President
Obama and Secretary Moniz for their trust and confidence in
putting forward my nomination as Under Secretary and
Administrator of the NNSA.
I'm also thankful to Senator Kent Conrad for his very
generous and gracious introduction. Senator Conrad has been a
mentor, a role model, and a dear friend for many years. I had
the opportunity to work closely with him on several challenges
confronting our Nation's nuclear deterrent forces, and always
in a very open and candid and collaborative manner. I like to
think that we did some very worthy and noble work together.
I'd also like to thank my wife, Nancy, for her loving and
steadfast support, not just today but for the nearly 40 years
we shared on Active Duty, including the 29 times that she had
to uproot home and family as we moved to new assignments.
Our oldest son, Justin, who lives in Philadelphia and, as
you heard--Senator Conrad said, is administrator of a long-term
care facility, is also here today. Our youngest son, David, is
watching in Boston via webcam.
The spouses and children of those who wear our Nation's
uniform serve in countless and often unrecognized ways, and
routinely deal with many difficulties and hardships. They, too,
deserve our deepest respect and our gratitude for their own
invaluable contributions to our country. I'm certainly very
proud of my wonderful family and their accomplishments.
I'm also delighted to be joined by my best friend and
classmate of the Air Force Academy, the Class of 1973, which,
as we speak, is convened out in Colorado Springs for our 40th
anniversary. Steve was the first graduate of any Service
Academy to become a Catholic priest, and today he is the
President of Saint Luke Institute in Silver Spring, MD.
Finally, but certainly not least, Oliver Bloom, who serves
as my research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations,
is also here. He's a recent graduate of Princeton University
but hails from the State of New Hampshire.
The NNSA has a unique and special responsibility for
pursuing two different but complementary principles that have
traditionally guided American nuclear weapons policy:
The first is that the United States must continue to lead
international efforts to limit and reduce nuclear arsenals,
combat nuclear proliferation, and secure nuclear materials
across the globe.
The second principle is that appropriately sized nuclear
forces still play an essential role in protecting U.S. and
allied security interests even as we seek to reduce the overall
number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security
policy. As President Obama and congressional members have
repeatedly emphasized: as long as nuclear weapons exist, we
must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
If confirmed to be the Under Secretary and the
Administrator of the NNSA, my highest priority will be to
ensure that the NNSA delivers on the commitments made to
Congress and to its many stakeholders in sustaining our nuclear
weapons stockpile, both now and in the future, in conducting
leading-edge scientific research and preventing nuclear
materials from falling into the hands of terrorists and would-
be proliferators, in supporting the Navy's nuclear reactor
program, in modernizing our facilities to meet the demands of
the future, and in protecting the safety and security of our
sites, our employees, and the public.
The Military Services often say that people are their most
important asset. It's true. It applies to the NNSA, as well.
Highly-trained, experienced, and motivated scientists,
engineers, technicians, and security personnel are essential to
performing the highly complex and technically challenging task
associated with the nuclear security enterprise. If confirmed,
I will be guided by the principle of ``mission first, people
always''. To this end, I will be an unrelenting champion for
the professional development and personal welfare of everyone
associated with the NNSA, including recruiting and mentoring
the next generation of leaders and scientists.
The NNSA performs enormously important work each and every
day. Its many successes go largely unheralded. It has made
tremendous progress in helping to achieve the President's goal
of securing vulnerable nuclear materials around the globe. It
is delivering the life-extended W76-1 warhead to the Navy on
schedule and is currently transferring work at the Kansas City
plant into a new, modern facility that will greatly improve
efficiency. That plant, by the way, has been constructed on
time and on budget.
That said, escalating costs in several major programs are a
cause for serious concern, especially as pressures mount on
overall government spending. Restoring trust in the NNSA's
ability to deliver on its commitment requires strong leadership
focus on managing cost to deliver capability for less expense.
It also requires rebuilding partnerships between the
headquarters and the field, between Federal employees and the
laboratories and plants, and between the NNSA and Congress and
DOD.
In dealing with these priorities, I expect to draw upon
recent experience as the first commander of Air Force Global
Strike Command. When we established the Command in 2009, our
task was to establish clear lines of authority, responsibility,
and accountability. We also placed strong emphasis on
strengthening the safety and security culture while, at the
same time, streamlining processes and eliminating needlessly
burdensome non-value-added activities that stood in the way of
our people and their incentive to innovate. Finally, we
continually stress that everyone in the organization,
regardless of job, rank, seniority, was a valued member of the
team, and that her or his work was absolutely essential to
success. If confirmed, this is the leadership approach I intend
to bring to the NNSA.
I, again, thank you for inviting me to appear before this
committee today. It truly is an honor. I stand ready to answer
any questions you may have now and, if confirmed, to address
any questions you or your terrific staffs may have in the
future in a very open and candid way.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Klotz.
Mr. Lettre.

STATEMENT OF MR. MARCEL J. LETTRE II, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

Mr. Lettre. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the
committee, I'm honored to be with you here this morning as you
consider my nomination as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence.
Let me introduce to the committee, Mr. Chairman, my guests
here with me today, to my left and just behind me: my wife,
Simmons; my daughters, McKinley, age 11, and Amelia, age 9; my
mother, Mary Lettre, a proud Army wife and teacher; and my
father, Marcel Lettre, Senior, who is a retired Army colonel,
airborne ranger, and Vietnam combat veteran, who, I might add,
successfully and quite proudly avoided a Pentagon tour during
his 26 years of service. Any opportunities I've had in life are
because of this family, this team, and I'm grateful you all
could be here today.
I also want to thank several tireless public servants who
have served as mentors and colleagues over many years: Senator
Harry Reid, Congresswoman Jane Harman, Deputy Secretary Ash
Carter, former Under Secretary Michele Flournoy, and Under
Secretary Jim Miller, and my good friend, Assistant Secretary
of Defense Liz King.
I'm also pleased that a number of other friends and
colleagues are in attendance today. Those that I saw include
Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Griffin, Dave Muhlbaum, Jason
Forrwester, Stuart Irvin, and some others that I probably
didn't get a chance to say hello to. Thank you for being here.
I'm deeply humbled that President Obama has nominated me as
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Since 2009, I've been honored and privileged to serve three
Secretaries of Defense: Chuck Hagel, Leon Panetta, and Bob
Gates. If confirmed, I'll be proud to serve Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel and Under Secretary Mike Vickers as they
lead the Department of Defense and the Defense Intelligence
Community through a critical period of challenge and
opportunity. But, most of all, I'll be proud to serve and
support the men and women of the U.S. military. Their interests
will be my interests, if confirmed.
Mr. Chairman, I believe we're facing the most consequential
period for defense intelligence in perhaps a generation. The
choices we make now as we draw down from 10 years of war and
reshape our enterprise to meet new strategic and budgetary
challenges will set us on a multi-decade trajectory for our
defense intelligence capabilities. If confirmed, I will keep in
mind three major priorities as I support Secretary Hagel, Under
Secretary Vickers, and the Defense Intelligence Community:
First, to provide the best intelligence possible to those
who are fighting in current operations, operations we're in
today and possible contingencies in the near future. The
Defense Intelligence Community must maintain its focus on the
needs of our deployed men and women, conducting an incredible
range of intelligence-driven, precision operations, and the
needs of the President and the senior national security team,
for the best intelligence possible to address today's threats.
Second, to prepare for a challenging period of budget
uncertainty. This will require us to become leaner, to trim
overhead, reduce duplication, and shed underperforming
activities. It will not be painless or pretty, but we must make
tough choices and become stronger and better even as we become
smaller.
Third, to push vigorously to innovate and invest. Even as
resources fall, we must sharpen the impressive capabilities
that keep America's superior technological edge and protect its
advantages over its adversaries. That means strengthening
capabilities in counterterrorism, cyber security, and
countering weapons of mass destruction. We must ensure we
maintain global reach and global understanding. These
priorities will require a close partnership and strong and
regular dialogue between defense intelligence leaders and this
committee. I look forward to contributing to that partnership.
We must implement our priorities in defense intelligence
while also being ever vigilant about the need for vigorous
protection of the principles, rights, and freedoms from which
America gains its strength. Those of us privileged to serve in
these positions of responsibility recognize that we owe our
citizens and our families our full focus and our full energy on
keeping the Nation safe and secure.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Lettre.
Mr. Ohlson.

STATEMENT OF MR. KEVIN A. OHLSON, TO BE A JUDGE OF THE U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED SERVICES

Mr. Ohlson. Mr. Chairman, it's a great privilege to appear
before this committee as a nominee to be a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. I would like to thank
you and the members of this committee for considering me for
this important post.
I would also like to thank the President for nominating me
for this position. If confirmed, I will do my level best to
vindicate his trust.
Of course, I would like to thank my wife, Carolyn, who is
here today, behind me to my left, as well as our two children,
Matthew and Katherine, who are in school. I would not be
sitting here today if it were not for their enduring love and
support.
Mr. Chairman, if I am confirmed for a position on the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces, I pledge to this committee
that I will bring to bear on every case I handle all of my
military and criminal justice experiences so that I may be the
best judge that I can possibly be. For example, I will be
mindful of when I stood shoulder-to-shoulder with some of the
finest people I've ever known and rappelled out of helicopters,
parachuted out of airplanes, deployed to four foreign
countries, and served in the Persian Gulf War. Those
experiences taught me indispensable lessons about the men,
women, mission, and ethos of our exceptional Armed Forces.
Further, I will be mindful of my service as a trial counsel
prosecuting cases at Fort Bragg, as the Article 32
investigating officer in a case involving a serial rapist and
murderer who was ultimately sentenced to death, as a Federal
prosecutor for many years here in the Nation's capital, and now
as the head of the office that punishes prosecutors who have
engaged in professional misconduct. These experiences have
taught me about the vital importance of the strength, fairness,
and integrity of our criminal justice system.
Finally, if I am confirmed, I will be mindful of the men
and women in uniform who so proudly and effectively serve our
Nation today, such as my nephew, who just returned from a tour
of duty as an infantryman in Afghanistan, as well as the many
commanders I have known over the years. These experiences have
taught me of the importance of striking the right balance
between the need to ensure good order and discipline and the
need to protect the rights of individual members of our Armed
Forces.
In sum, if I am confirmed, I pledge that I will be mindful
of all these factors and that I will approach every case with
an open mind, guided solely by the facts and the law and by the
interests of our U.S. Armed Forces and all those who serve in
it.
Thank you for your consideration.
Chairman Levin. Thank you all.
We'll have a 7-minute first round of questions. We have
timers in front of us in this room.
Let me ask you, Mr. Lettre, we've had the adequacy of our
security clearance procedures raised, with tragic impact, in
recent days. In your new position, if you're confirmed, there's
going to be some real responsibility for DOD facility
clearances in your job.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2014 that we approved in committee a few months ago
requires the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence to reform the personnel security clearance
investigation, adjudication, and transfer processes to improve
security as well as to reduce cost. I'm wondering whether you
are familiar with the language in that bill.
Mr. Lettre. Senator, I'm generally familiar with it. I
haven't had a chance to study it or give it deep thought yet.
Chairman Levin. All right. Do you have any views on the
need for improved security process reform, greater cost
transparency in this area?
Mr. Lettre. I do, Senator. There have been a number of
episodes over the last several years that have pointed to a
need to take a hard look at our security clearance and security
processes. Just this week, as we all know, 12 families are
grieving and dealing with a tragedy that occurred at the
Washington Navy Yard. Secretary Hagel directed, yesterday, that
Deputy Secretary Carter would undertake an immediate review of
both facility security, as well as security clearances, as well
as standing up an independent panel to look at those issues. I
strongly support both of those.
It would be my view, going into the position, if confirmed,
Senator, that I would want to take a strong role in doing what
I can to be of support to those reviews while also taking into
account the direction of the committee to look at those issues
as part of the bill. I look forward to doing so.
Chairman Levin. All right. Obviously, we thought it was
extremely important, even before these recent events, so I
think you can take that as a challenge and a charge.
Secretary Wright, you have served in the military for 35
years before retiring as a major general in the Pennsylvania
National Guard. I think you're familiar with the major effort
which we're making to end sexual assault and sexual harassment,
and the provisions that are in our bill as they come to the
floor, and the added emphasis that we are placing on ending
this scourge. One of the issues that we did not agree upon was
the question of transferring responsibility to a prosecutor
outside of the chain of command to determine whether or not
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted. I'm
wondering whether you have a view on the role of commanders in
changing the military culture in which sexual assaults take
place, and also whether we should remove those commanders from
the decisionmaking process as to whether or not to charge
someone with an offense that would go to a general court-
martial.
Ms. Wright. Sir, I do have an opinion. Clearly, the
Department has an opinion, and that is to hold the commander--
--
Chairman Levin. You give us your personal opinion, though.
Ms. Wright. My opinion is that the command needs to be
clearly involved, and the disposition of the sexual assault
needs to stay within the command, which is exactly the same
position as the Department's.
Chairman Levin. What is the reason for your opinion?
Ms. Wright. Sir, I have served as a commander, and I have
also served in the position here as an Acting, and I have
worked diligently to expunge sexual assault from our
organization. Secretary Hagel has also made this is a top
priority of the Department.
The reason I believe it should stay in the command is
because the command does have the responsibility for the
discipline, the accountability, and the management of their
command. Saying that, the commanders also have to be held
accountable for what happens in their command.
Secretary Hagel has put a multitude of changes in place
that will increase the commanders' accountability. The one
thing he has done is, he has raised the disposition authority
to a colonel. The second thing he has done is, when a sexual
assault occurs and a victim comes forward--it's not a high
probability that a victim comes to the commander. The victim
normally comes to the sexual assault coordinator, the medic,
the chaplain, and then they take it from there, based upon the
restricted or unrestricted report.
But, another thing that he has done is, if there is a
sexual assault filing within a command, the first general
officer in that chain of command must be aware or told that
this is happening and to have oversight of what is going on
with the case.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, Ms. James, you mentioned that you have been on the
advisory board for the DACOWITS. I'm wondering if you, there in
that position, but also as an Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs in the 1990s, whether you have a view on
that question, about whether we should take away from the chain
of command that decision as to whether or not to prosecute a
sexual assault offense or other offenses.
Ms. James. I do have a view, Senator. My personal view is
identical to that of Secretary Wright. I concur that it is
extremely important to keep that authority with the commanders,
but equally important to hold those commanders accountable for
the climate and what goes on in their units. Command is an
honor and a privilege in this country; it's not an entitlement.
Those who do not live up to our values simply need to be
removed from that command.
It has also been my observation, just as someone who has
watched the military for my entire professional life--and part
of it, at times, as a civilian--is that the military has been
extraordinarily effective through the chain of command when
there is persistent and constant focus, unrelenting focus. I
give you the examples of racial integration and drug use in the
Vietnam era. When ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' was repealed, and
the implementation of the new rules and expectations, the
military chain of command was very, very effective. I think the
reason why it hasn't been as effective on this particular
matter over the decades is because that consistency of focus
has been lacking.
I believe it was Chairman Dempsey who said, before this
committee, some months ago at a hearing, that--and I'm
paraphrasing--``We took our eye off the ball.'' I think that
means we lost focus. There were wars, there were other things
that captured that focus.
If I am fortunate enough to actually get this job and
become the Secretary of the Air Force, that will be a top job
that I will carry forward, is to keep that focus strong, as it
will be for the person who would succeed me. It has to be kept
up, and I do believe the chain of command has to be
responsible.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would ask General Klotz and Mr. Ohlson--you've heard the
comments by Secretary Wright and Ms. James concerning the
integrity of the role of the commander. Would either of you
want to comment on that, or do you agree with them?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, I left the military 2\1/2\ years ago,
so my comments are based on those experiences. I think the
fundamental responsibility of the commander is to maintain good
order and discipline of her or his organization and enforcement
of the UCMJ. Investigating and prosecuting those people who
have violated or are suspected of having violated the UCMJ is
one of the paramount duties that any commander must have.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, all right, that's a good answer.
Mr. Ohlson. Senator Inhofe, if I were to be confirmed,
serving in my role as a judge, it would be my responsibility to
apply whatever law all of you come up with. I'm not sure it
would be appropriate for me to opine on any specific
legislative changes.
Senator Inhofe. That may be true. I have a bias in this
area, in having, many, many years ago, served as a court
reporter in that system. It never occurred to me, during that
time, that the commander would not be supreme in that process.
Secretary Wright, first of all, I appreciate the time you
spent with our staff and had a chance to visit. When I first
saw the Department of Defense sexual assault survey, I had a
lot of things going through my mind. Those of us who are in
elective office are pretty familiar with what surveys are, and
the integrity of surveys. I looked at that, and when I saw the
26,000 unwanted sexual contacts--the turnout or those who are
responding to a survey, are those the ones that actually
represent the thinking of the entire population? Do you have
any comments to make about that? Because if we're going to do
surveys, let's do a better one than we already have behind us.
What do you think?
Ms. Wright. First, I will tell you that we do have
qualified statisticians that work in the personnel and
readiness field that do the surveys. But, saying that, there
are a couple of other things that I would like the committee to
know.
One, I think our force is about surveyed out. There are at
least 400 surveys, I know, that go out to the field, and I'm
convinced that there are some that the Department does that
don't go through----
Senator Inhofe. Do you know what the response ratio was of
this particular survey?
You're saying something I was not aware of, now.
Ms. Wright. No, sir, not off the top of my head. But, I
will get back to you what the response was.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty
Members (2012 WGRA) was sent to 108,478 Department of Defense (DOD)
Active Duty members and received completed surveys from 22,792 eligible
respondents, for an overall weighted response rate of 24 percent. In
contrast, the 2010 WGRA was sent to 85,614 DOD Active Duty members and
received completed surveys from 24,029 eligible respondents, for a
weighted response rate of 31 percent. This does represent a decline in
response rates since 2010. While similar declines in response rates
have been seen across military surveys, The Defense Manpower Data
Center continues to obtain some of the highest response rates for
surveys on military populations. Despite this, the response rate
obtained in the 2012 WGRA does not diminish the statistical accuracy of
the survey estimates.

Ms. Wright. Also, I know the surveys go out in an email
force portion. So, if you get three surveys that day, and two
of them don't apply to you, and one does, and you have a few
minutes, you're going to do the one that applies to you.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's a good answer. That did answer
the question that I have. I think that does kind of single out
individuals.
One of the statements you had made--and this is a quote--
is, ``The Department's policy is to treat all military
personnel equally and to make the same benefits available to
all qualified members.'' That was a quote by you. The
memorandum then goes on to authorize the administrative absence
of servicemembers, offering a different opportunity for same-
sex marriage as other marriage. Is that an inconsistency, or
where are you on that?
Ms. Wright. I believe, sir, you're referring to the 4
September memo where I talk about, if you're going to get
married, and you are not able to get married with a 100-mile
radius, that the command can grant you an administrative
absence to a place where you can get married, and that would
apply to both same-sex couples and heterosexual couples.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Ms. Wright. I will be very honest with you. The times that
it would apply to heterosexual couples will be probably few and
far between. But, in a meeting that the Secretary called--he
was away, he revisited the policy when he was away, he called
me, and the next day that he got back, he called a meeting with
the Service Chiefs and with the Service Secretaries and with
the Chairman, and we discussed this, and we discussed this at
great lengths. He believes--they believe--we developed that
policy then, and they believe that the policy is fair and
equitable to all. Granted that there is a slimmer possibility
for a heterosexual couple to run up against this issue.
Senator Inhofe. That is the perception.
Ms. Wright. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. I don't want to spend any more time on that
issue, because we're running out of time, here.
Ms. James, I think we should give serious consideration to
having a Senate Strategic Choices and Management Review
hearing. I think a lot came from that, where we're trying to
get a hearing from the Chiefs as to how the sequestration's
going to directly affect them. We might give some consideration
to have a similar hearing here in the Senate.
Ms. James, General Welsh made this statement yesterday,
saying, ``The damage will be insidious, but, should we face a
high-end threat in the future, the impact of not modernizing
will be blatant and deadly. While failing to achieve national
objectives in the next counterinsurgency fight would be
distressing, losing a major full-spectrum fight would be
catastrophic.''
Are you sure you want to get into this? There are some real
problems. Having a background and knowing a little bit about
flying airplanes, back on April 9, when they made the decision
to ground--approximately 16 squadrons, is it your agreement
with some I have talked to and who have testified here that the
cost savings of that 2- or 3-month period were not--it's going
to cost a lot more than the savings that they achieve from
that. Have you given any thought to that?
Ms. James. My understanding, Senator, is, digging out from
under the readiness hole, if you will, actually will cost us
more money than had we funded it the way it was originally
intended to be funded from the beginning. Yes, I agree with
that, and I would like to concur with the spirit of what you're
saying. I, too, am troubled by the readiness profile. Of
course, hard decisions had to be made. As some of you have
already pointed out, combat fighter squadrons were not able to
fly for a period of time, depot maintenance was deferred, there
were many civilians furloughed. It's very troubling that those
actions had to be taken, and I am hopeful, still, though it is
sometimes discouraging to wake up and read your morning
newspaper, that there can be some agreement reached so that the
entirety of our Government can get beyond sequestration and
that we can get to some figure for spending, albeit a lesser
figure--we know we all have to be much more affordable for our
taxpayers--but to know what that figure will be so that we can
execute and we can plan to a single number and have a certain
degree of certainty. That is my hope.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate it.
My time has expired, but I'm going to send a question for
the record, General Klotz, concerning the B-61 and the
difference in treatment between the House position and our
position. I'm inclined to agree more with the House. I have
some questions I'd like to send for the record to both of you
who we didn't get a chance to visit.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of the nominees, not only for their
willingness to serve, but their already distinguished public
service. Thank you all very much.
Secretary Wright, one of the areas that is directly under
your responsibility is the cost of all the personnel programs,
and not just pay and wages, but also, particularly, TRICARE and
other benefits. Every year, in the last few years, the
Secretary has sent over some suggestions, along with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Sometimes we follow them, many
times we don't. But, the question still looms out there: As
this costs increase as a percentage of your budget going
forward, it gets larger and larger each year, cutting back, in
terms of operations, training, maintenance, investment in new
technologies. Just a very general question is, one, I presume
this is going to be one of your highest priorities, to try to
deal with these issues of accelerating costs, and, two, how do
you propose to go about setting up a constructive dialogue with
all the stakeholders--Active, retires, beneficiaries, the
people that have to train, plan, and deploy the forces? Can you
comment on those two points?
Ms. Wright. In reference to TRICARE, sir?
Senator Reed. TRICARE and other issues under the personnel
costs. The generic sort of issue of the personnel costs.
Ms. Wright. Oftentimes--and we have done this already three
times since I have been in the acting role--the Veteran Service
Organizations (VSO) and the Military Service Organizations
(MSO)--and our family council that we have--is a venue that I
use to get the word out about what we're doing in the
Department. I have met with the VSOs three times since I have
been the acting, and that is a very good venue to relate the
changes that we're doing and also the issues that we're facing,
and to hear them out about their issues and the things that we
want the Department to do.
On the family side of the house, we have a Military Family
Readiness Council that is made up of the Services, but it's
also made up of spouses and members of all components. I use
that as another venue.
We also use public affairs--George Little and I work
diligently together to get our message out, no matter what the
issue is within personnel and readiness, of the change of
policy.
Senator Reed. Can I just follow up on a quick point? I
appreciate those efforts, and they're designed to communicate
what you propose to do. But, there's another level here, and
that is trying to build a consensus upon changes that have to
be at least accepted or tolerated by many of the different
groups. Are you in the active consensus-building or simply
saying, ``This is what we're proposing?''
Ms. Wright. Sir, sometimes we have to direct things to
happen.
Senator Reed. I understand that.
Ms. Wright. But, it's much easier to direct something to
happen if you have explained why you're doing it and you take
their opinions and see if you can mitigate some of the concerns
that they have as you are writing the policy. That is what we
do.
The meetings with all of these people are not me being
dictatorial in nature and flowing one way. I am gathering their
opinion, because they're really the boots on the ground out in
the population that we serve.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Lettre, you will be Principal Deputy to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and obviously this issue
of contracting, with respect to intelligence services, has come
up, with huge implications--Mr. Snowden, and now the tragedy at
the Washington Navy Yard. The first question is that the
concept of contractors is the purest--is that they do things in
the military are not essentially military. A lot of the
intelligence efforts are, really, military. Is there any
thought that you've given and advice you're prepared to give
with respect to redefining what roles would be appropriate for
intelligence contractors versus what roles will be necessary to
be filled by direct employees--military, civilian, or the
Government?
Mr. Lettre. Senator, the role of contractors, particularly
in the Intelligence Community, but also across the Department,
is something that the leadership team needs to put a lot of
focus on in the next couple of years as we go through budget
uncertainty and the budget trajectory that we're looking at.
Within the Intelligence Community, there are jobs performed
by Active Duty military, jobs by career civilians, and then by
contractors. I do think there are instances where contractors
bring in quite unique capabilities, from a technology and an
innovation perspective, that make it hard to see us being able
to get that capability through any other way than through a
contractor, because of the rapid-changing nature of technology.
I think in the Intelligence Community, one of the guiding
principles we need to look at all of the use of contractors
through as we work our way through this in the next year or 2
is exactly that: How can we ensure that anything that can only
be uniquely done through a nongovernmental sector or expertise
is really driving our use of contractors? As we make tough
choices about how to deal with the budget challenges of the
next couple of years, we keep that principle in mind.
Senator Reed. Let me follow up. These incidents have also
raised the issue of how we screen these contractors, to speak
generally. It raises a question, one, who is responsible for
what? Is it purely the responsibility of the Department of
Defense to ensure the reliability and the stability of the
contractor, or are the companies that employ these individuals
responsible, contractually or otherwise? It would seem to me
that both cases should apply, but it also seems to me, now,
there's some confusion as to who really is the ultimate
validator of the reliability, competence, and dependability of
these individuals who have access to secrets and to facilities.
Can you comment very briefly?
Mr. Lettre. Senator, I do think it's time to take another
look at the accountability of contractors and the executives
who lead contracting firms in the private sector with respect
to the responsibilities they may have on security clearances.
Secretary Hagel's announcement, yesterday, that he's directing
Deputy Secretary Carter to take a look at security clearances,
as well as establishing an independent panel to look at this
issue, I think provides a good opportunity to do that.
Senator Reed. Thank you all very much, and, again, thank
you for your service to the Nation, and good luck.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, ladies
and gentlemen.
Ms. James, we had a great visit last week. Thank you for
that. At that meeting, I briefly mentioned my concerns
regarding the concept and implementation of the Air Force's
Total Force Plan (TFP). As I mentioned to Secretary Donley and
General Welsh during the Air Force posture hearing earlier this
year, I believe that some elements of the TFP were shortsighted
and may adversely impact our intra-theater airlift capability
at a time when our Services are evolving toward more rotational
deployment model. As ranking member of the Airland
Subcommittee, I am very pleased that your answers to our
committee's advance policy questions acknowledge that the
decisions made last year regarding the TFP were made without
adequate consultation of the various stakeholders who are now
feeling the negative impacts of the plan's implementation. Ms.
James, this is a very important answer, and I appreciate your
acknowledging that fact.
Let me just ask you, there will be a national commission on
the structure of the Air Force. It's scheduled to report back
to Congress with findings and recommendations next year. Would
the Air Force, under your leadership, consider modifications to
the TFP based on the commission's findings and recommendations?
Ms. James. Senator, if I may begin by saying, based on my
time, both on the committee staff on the House side as well as
when I served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, I'm a deep, deep believer in the value of the total
force. I would just like to say that up front.
I would also like to say that, in some ways, it's painful
to me to see some of the frictions that have been happening
between the air components. Back in the 1990s, I used to refer
to the air components, with respect to their utilization of the
Guard and Reserve, as the superstars of the Guard and Reserve,
and I still think that's so. But, clearly, there are fences to
be mended, and we need to do some work here.
I absolutely welcome the work of the commission. I'm
fortunate that I consider myself to be a good friend of some of
the commissioners. I know General McCarthy, I know Ms. Conaton.
I know several of them. I think we'll have a good working
relationship. I look forward to hearing their ideas. Again, if
I am confirmed into this job, I would like to think a hallmark
of what I will bring to the table will be very close
consultations, bringing in all of the components, talking to
adjutants generals, talking to Members of Congress, and trying
to come up with a go-forward proposal which will basically meet
the country's needs as well as the States' needs for the very
real desirability of being able to respond when disaster
strikes.
With that said, I'm equally sure that we will have to take
reductions. We've talked about this budget situation that we're
facing, so it won't be easy. But, we need everybody's input and
best efforts, and that will certainly be what I will work
toward.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Should the committee recommend
modifications, you would consider those recommendations?
Ms. James. I'm completely openminded and will welcome their
report.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. If confirmed, will you commit to
working with our committee to ensure that future Air Force
manning and force-structure decisions are fully considered
within the broader national strategic context?
Ms. James. I do give you that commitment.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. As we discussed last week, I'm
very proud of all of our installations in Mississippi. I
particularly would call to your attention Keesler Air Force
Base, which won the Air Force Installation Excellence Award,
the leading Air Force Base in the entire Air Force.
I'm committed to ensuring that Keesler, which is a training
base, maintain a flying mission. If confirmed, will you work
with me to ensure that Keesler maintains an enduring flying
mission?
Ms. James. What I know of Keesler is all topnotch, and I
look forward to visiting Keesler--with you, I hope.
Senator Wicker. Very soon, perhaps.
Ms. James. You said perhaps that we should do that, could
do that, so I welcome that opportunity.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Now, let me shift, then, Ms. James, to unmanned aerial
systems (UAS), such as the very successful RQ-4 Global Hawk.
These UASs are providing critical support to deployed forces
around the world. Combatant commanders continue to stress the
importance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR), and have identified ISR shortfalls in key areas around
the world. Many, if not all, members of the committee view UAVs
as ``the'' cost-effective future of airborne ISR.
In Mississippi, we not only have the Global Hawk, but we
have the Orion UAS. Orion just completed its first test flight
last month at China Lake. It is designed to stay aloft for up
to 5 days while carrying a 1,000-pound payload of sensors. If
confirmed, I urge you and your team to be briefed on what I
consider to be a very promising program in the Air Force.
What is your assessment of the potential for long-endurance
unmanned systems to help meet combatant commander ISR
requirements? If confirmed, would you provide to this
committee, say, within 30 days, a briefing and written report
of the Air Force's investment strategy to provide unmanned
long-endurance airborne ISR capability to our combatant
commanders?
Ms. James. First, Senator, I would say yes, I certainly
will get back to you in 30 days after confirmation, if I am
confirmed, to give you my best assessment that I can after that
30-day period, even if it may be incomplete still at that
juncture.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Ms. James. I do recall our discussion about Orion, and I
would very much welcome learning more about that in a briefing.
As to the overall issue of unmanned systems versus manned
systems, I have some familiarity with that. It's an area that I
need to look into and study more deeply to understand the costs
and benefits of both. My initial take is that we certainly need
both in our force. We need a complement of both, and we need to
ensure that we're looking at costs and capability and
survivability. Because my understanding is, it's somewhat
different, depending on which system you're looking at.
But, it's an important area, and I believe in it, and I
will look into it further.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Let me just ask, real briefly,
about the common support helicopter to replace our aging UH-1N
fleet. As reflected in our committee-reported text, the 2014
DOD authorization bill, this committee believes that the UH-1N
is critical to the nuclear security and continuity-of-
government missions, and can be achieved by leveraging existing
DOD production capacity.
I would commend to you, Ms. James, and to you, General
Klotz, the American Eurocopter Global Strike aircraft. If
confirmed, will you provide to this committee and my office,
within 30 days, a briefing and written answers to the questions
of, why is the Air Force not funding a UH-1N replacement
program, when the Air Force states that protection of the U.S.
nuclear enterprise is a top priority? How will the Air Force
and the NNSA ensure that resource allocations accurately
reflect our stated commitment to protect the U.S. nuclear
enterprise?
Ms. James?
Ms. James. Yes, I will absolutely come back to you in 30
days and give you my best answer to that, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
General Klotz?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, I will, as well.
Chairman Levin. Okay?
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Thanks for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the distressing things that has occurred in the
honest disagreement and debate around how we work on the
problem of sexual assault in the military is a narrative that
has developed, unfortunately, that somehow this is about whose
side you're taking, the victims or the commanders. I want to
try to clarify that that is not an accurate description of
discussions in the policy changes that are being debated.
Rather, this is an honest disagreement over which reforms will
better protect the victims and which reforms will result in
more prosecutions.
I hope I have time to get back to some of the additional
work we want to do. You all are aware of the body of work that
Senator Gillibrand and I, together, have accomplished in this
bill, along with the help of a lot of others, including the
Chairman, that are going to remove commanders from in any way
having authority to change the outcome of a military trial.
You're aware of the fact that all victims, like the Air Force
has role-modeled, are going to have their own lawyers. I won't
go through all the changes we've made.
The Chairman and I continue to work on ways that we can
hold the commanders accountable. If I get time to get back to
that, I would like you to give, now or later, your specific
recommendations on how we can hold commanders accountable for
this important problem that they have to get after.
Also Article 32 and reforms that I think need to occur
within Article 32. It became a weird amalgamation of a
preliminary hearing, discovery, trial-run trial, it's evolved
of this just over the last decade, and would like your input on
that.
But, I really want to focus now on the two problems that
we're all trying to get at, and that's retaliation and
reporting. I know you all are aware that all of our allies that
have removed commanders entirely from this decision have not
seen an increase in reporting. None of them have. We know that
is not the key, just doing that, in terms of increasing
reporting. We know that they do not have to report to the
commanders now, and they certainly won't over the reforms that
are embedded in the NDAA that is going to be debated on the
floor.
But, retaliation is one I would like you to address. Any of
you--and if you have had experience as a JAG, and, Secretary
Wright, as you've had experience as a commander--I'm trying to
assess, if a victim is going back into a unit, when is the
likelihood of retaliation higher, when a JAG lawyer a half a
continent away has signed off on pursuing charges or when the
commander of that unit has signed off, in terms of pursuing
charges? Which would create an environment that would be more
likely for there to be retaliation?
Secretary Wright?
Ms. Wright. Ma'am, honestly, at first blush, I couldn't
tell you. What I can tell you is, the victim can ask for--if
the victim files an unrestricted report, and it is public--even
with a restricted report--they can ask for a transfer out of
that particular unit. That is one right that we have for the
victim. We even now if the alleged perpetrator is in that unit,
we can transfer the alleged perpetrator out of the unit.
Retaliation is real. I agree with you 100 percent. Maybe
not in every case, but if it's in one case, that's one too
many. I believe what we need to work at, and I think that our
commanders, from Secretary Hagel on down, is working at, is
what I call ``social courage''. I put it into the aspect that,
if you're in combat with someone, and your battle buddy in
combat is doing something that will get you killed, you
immediately will say something to that person, no matter what.
You won't think about it twice.
If you are in a social situation with that same person, and
that person is either drinking too much or not acting up to the
values that our system wants you to act up to, and looks like
something may go sour, if you will, with someone else, that
social courage is there to say to that person, ``Let's go home.
You're drinking too much, you're being foolish.''
I think that our commanders, our people, our lowest grades
of enlisted, need to learn that social courage to hold that
them, themselves, responsible and also hold their battle buddy
responsible.
It's prosecution, and it's also holding people responsible
for their actions.
Senator McCaskill. Ms. James, I know that there have been a
number of changes already enacted in the Air Force--is there
anything about a lawyer making a decision to go forward that
would provide an extra level of protection, as opposed to a
commander deciding to go forward?
Ms. James. I, personally, don't think so. I, if I may,
wanted to offer up the core, I think, of your question is, we
have to instill more confidence in members of the force, that
if they are victimized, we want them to come forward.
Senator McCaskill. Correct.
Ms. James. We want them to report. All reports are good,
but unrestricted reports are better, because then followup can
occur.
Based on my DACOWITS experience--and DACOWITS does
installation visits, we do focus groups with men and women--the
sampling of people that I have talked to, some of whom have
been victims, others of whom know those who have been victims--
they tell me they don't come forward for a number of reasons.
They feel personally ashamed, they feel that they may be blamed
for what has happened. They do fear retaliation, sometimes from
chain of command, sometimes from their buddies in the unit, and
they just simply don't want people to know, and they're not
sure that anything will be done, or at least not enough will be
done.
I agree with Secretary Wright, to have the option of either
transferring the alleged perpetrator or transferring the
victim, to be able to go either way with that, I think, is a
good thing.
I'd like to offer a specific couple of ideas. These are
ideas that the DACOWITS has recommended. It goes to the issue
of accountability of commanders. I believe, from every job I
have ever held, either in government or in the private sector,
that aligning a person's incentives and looking at what they
are measured on, getting all of that into alignment, is
terribly, terribly important.
The DACOWITS has recommended that it be put into the
performance reviews of commanders how well or poorly they are
doing in the area of the climate within their unit, and how
well or poorly they are doing with respect to being a leader
against sexual harassment. To the degree that each and every
commander understands that his or her career is on the line to
do well in this regard, people pay attention to what they're
measured on. That is one idea.
Senator McCaskill. I thank you for that. I know my time is
up, but I would look to all of you, and especially, Mr. Lettre,
with your experiences as doing Article 32s and--did you say
that you were one of the investigators--did I hear that in your
introductory remarks? Or was that you, Mr. Ohlson?
Mr. Ohlson. Actually, that was me, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. Oh, well, you can't do this, then,
because of the position you're nominated to. Thank goodness,
though, we have civilian courts of appeals now that will be the
sole arbiter of whether or not due process has been achieved
within the UCMJ, instead of having these weird situation where
judges could overturn jury verdicts. I'm glad that that is
definitely going to get fixed.
But, any specific ideas you have about Article 32 and how
we can make some reforms there.
I would mention, as I close, Mr. Chairman, that we have
given victims the choice of expressing that they would prefer
the charges to be done in the civilian system. Once again,
giving the victim more power, empowering the victims so they do
not feel like that they are being swept up in a system that
nothing's going to happen and they have no control over. That
also is part of our reform that I think is essential.
I thank you all and look forward to your specific
suggestions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Two quick comments on that.
One is, for the first time, retaliation is a crime, if we
can get our bill passed, because, in our bill, we would make
retaliation a crime, for the first time.
Second, that suggestion of DACOWITS, about the performance
review containing a review of a commander who's being reviewed
as to the climate in that command, is now, by a number of us,
being looked at for inclusion in our bill, when it gets to the
floor, as an amendment. There's a number of us who have looked
at that recommendation and feel that it's a very important
recommendation, and are working on language so that it can be
incorporated, hopefully, in our bill when we get to the floor.
Senator Blunt is next.
Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. James, I didn't get a chance to visit with you before
today, and I'm assuming that's probably my fault, but I look
forward to talking to you more as this process goes on. I just
have a couple of questions, basically, their future asset and
equipment questions. We have Whiteman Air Force Base in the
State that Senator McCaskill and I represent, and clearly
important in our overall strategy.
The only new aircraft, I believe, out there is the long-
range stealth bomber that's being considered right now.
Obviously, that's an important part of our projection, maybe an
important platform that other equipment can look to, to be
built around. But, are you concerned that, in the decade in
front of us, that's the only plane we're talking about right
now as a new addition to the Air Force?
Ms. James. Senator Blunt, there's really three top
modernization programs that are very important to the Air
Force. One is the F-35, the other is the new tanker, and the
third, as you said, is the new long-range bomber. Of the three,
the new long-range bomber is in the earliest phases of
development.
Senator Blunt. Right. That's what I meant, the one that is
the newest thing we're launching. There's nothing that follows
that in the line of talking about new--well, go ahead.
Ms. James. As far as I know, those are the three top
priorities. Based on what I know about those three top
priorities, it seems right to me--based on the strategy that we
are pursuing, based on the thrust of the rebalance toward the
Pacific. You need longer range, we need more bomber forces.
It's important for the triad, and so forth. These seem like the
correct programs, to me, at this point.
Senator Blunt. Now, as those are being developed, there's
some discussion, of course, of taking some of the workhorse
equipment, like the A-10s, and just totally eliminating entire
groups of planes as we look at the money available. I think
when General Welch was up here, before the House Armed Services
Committee, he said that the Air Force may be forced to
eliminate entire fleets that have less relevance in contested
airspace, including the A-10. This would be one of the planes--
I don't know, until we have something that fully meets that
need, we can make that decision. That's a decision that
eventually would come up to you. Do you have anything to say
about that?
Ms. James. I do. I am not privy to any of the predecisional
work, at this point, but, as you point out, I, too, have read
accounts that everything essentially is on the table. I don't
know specifically about that, but I read it in my morning
newspaper, as well, that this was commented upon yesterday by
the chief. My understanding is that these are part of the hard
decisions that are being looked at as options, but that there
are no final decisions.
I do agree with you, though; if we're going to eliminate an
entire aircraft which is currently serving a particular
mission, we'd better be sure that we have something else that
will serve that mission in the interim until one of the
futuristic programs comes online.
These are all areas that I will need to delve into much
more deeply if I'm confirmed, but I think this points out some
of the very difficult challenges that we're going to have to
work through together of how to make ends meet with the budget
figures that we may be faced with.
Senator Blunt. All right. It's going to be a big job, and
these questions will get to your desk, assuming you're at that
desk. I believe you will be. But, thanks for those answers.
General Klotz, we talked yesterday about the NNSA facility
in Kansas City. You mentioned it again today. I think one of
the things you're going to have to deal with there is, What do
you do with the property that you're leaving that goes back to
World War II airplane production? Do you want to get some
thoughts on how that move is going to occur, when it'll be
finished, and then what happens to the property that you leave
behind?
Mr. Klotz. Yes, Senator. The move into the new facility is
currently underway and will very soon be completed, and it is
an exciting facility that will not only reduce the overall
footprint, or the amount of space, it takes to do the work
that's been done at the Kansas City plant, but will do it much
more efficiently.
You're right, there will be a facility that we will be
vacating, along with the General Services Administration (GSA),
in the same location on Bannister Road. The Kansas City plant
has been a part of the nuclear weapons enterprise for decades.
The NNSA and the people who work in the Kansas City plant
consider themselves part of the social fabric of that part of
the State of Missouri. As I committed to you when we met, we
will be good stewards in making sure that facility is turned
over as quickly as possible so that it can be reused by the
citizens who live in that particular part of the State.
Senator Blunt. Yes. Not to comment on, but just for me to
say, I think, at some point, those two pieces of property that
really are part of the same complex are going to, in order to
allow something to happen there, probably one of the two of you
needs to become the lead agency and the controlling agency. I
think that'll be an early decision that you may be asked to
make, whether you want to be the lead agency or whether you
want the GSA to be.
I don't believe you had a chance to comment on Senator
Reed's question about contractors. One, are there a lot of
contractors? Two, after these recent incidents that we've seen
with contractors--Edward Snowden and now the contractor at the
Navy Yard--what are your thoughts about the necessity of
contractors and how to better deal with this overall issue?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, the NNSA relies extensively on
contractors, and has for a number of years. There are roughly
1,800 Federal employees in the NNSA, but there are nearly
30,000 contractor employees that work in the National Security
Laboratories, in the plants, and on various other facilities,
doing on it a Government-owned contractor-operated basis. They
are indispensable, integral members of the team, in terms of
delivering the product and the capabilities that the NNSA has
to have.
The security, particularly personal security and cyber
security, is an extraordinarily serious concern with respect to
the NNSA, given the very sensitive nature of the information it
handles, as well as the intellectual material that it also must
deal with.
I have said, on several occasions, that security and safety
are going to be my top priorities, if confirmed, and we need to
take a very close look, given the events of the past few
months, whether it's a failure in terms of security of
individuals or failures in terms of securing facilities, to
ensure that we have the right organization and the right tools
to protect against any breaches of security.
Senator Blunt. Okay, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blunt.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for being here and for your
commitment to public service. I know that your individual
commitment to public service means your families, also. I want
to certainly welcome the families that are behind you today.
I want to follow it up on Senator McCaskill's question on
sexual assault, Ms. James. In your response to questions from
the committee regarding sexual assault, you stated that,
``Senior military and civilian leaders, beginning with the
Secretary and Air staff, must focus on promoting an environment
that does not tolerate sexual assault.'' Obviously. We
appreciate that. But, you are aware that, twice in the past 6
months, uniformed military officials, whose job it was to
prevent sexual assault, were arrested for committing sexual
assault, themselves, including the head of the Air Force's
program. The screening process in this area certainly needs to
be discussed.
If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that the best-
qualified and appropriately screened individuals are placed in
these positions and billets, not only at the top, but within
all levels of the Department?
Ms. James. With respect to the people who are serving in
those very critical positions for the area of sexual assault, I
will look forward to reviewing what the current criteria is for
selection and training and so forth. I have not delved into
that particular aspect deeply at this juncture.
Senator Hagan. Obviously, it's a critical position.
Let me talk about pivoting to the Pacific, as far as the
military. In the fall of 2011, the administration outlined a
long-term strategy for expanding our role in the Asia-Pacific
region. There's been some speculation that this pivot would
require a shift of some military assets from the east to the
west coast.
Ms. James, from your understanding of the President's
initiatives, do you believe that the Air Force will need to
physically shift assets to support the strategy? Would such a
shift perhaps leave us less ready to respond to contingencies
outside of the Asia-Pacific region, or even in parts of the
United States?
Ms. James. On that latter point, I certainly hope not, and
it would be part of my job to ensure that that was not the
case. That is, in terms of leaving other parts of the world or
other parts of the country at greater risk. I certainly would
not wish to see that happen, and I would be an advocate to not
let that happen.
In terms of the overall strategy of rebalance to the
Pacific--of course, we're military witnesses, we talk about a
great deal about the military programs, but it really is
comprehensive--it's economic, it's diplomatic, it's military,
it's all of that, that our Government would be focused on for
that rebalance. I think that's a recognition of the importance
of the Pacific, economically and from a threat perspective, and
so forth.
We'll have to be looking at all of that, and I certainly
will do that, on behalf of the Air Force, if confirmed.
Senator Hagan. This committee's markup of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2014 prohibits authorization of a future Base
Realignment and Closure round until, at the very least, DOD
completes and submits to Congress a formal review of the
overseas military facilities structure. The committee is
signaling, and I firmly believe, that the Department does need
to prioritize domestic military bases over foreign bases,
especially when you look at the fiscally constrained
environment that we're in.
Once again, Ms. James, and the last question for you, what
are your thoughts on this issue? Do you agree that we should
continue to take a hard look at our overseas military
facilities before considering looking at similar actions back
home?
Ms. James. I do agree we need to take a very strong look at
the overseas bases, and I believe that that review is ongoing.
I'll have to look into the due date of that review, but that is
happening.
With respect to the overall base-closure issue, I will say
that I have been briefed and I do believe that there is excess
capacity in all of the Military Services. I believe the Air
Force has put that excess capacity at about 20 to 24 percent.
Senator Hagan. Does that include overseas, or are you
talking now just specifically on U.S. soil?
Ms. James. I believe that is the entirety, U.S. Air Force
bases worldwide. As you point out, the overseas piece is
important, and that part is getting a very big scrub at this
point.
But, I do believe it's part and parcel of our being able to
reduce overhead functions, consolidate facilities, free up
money so that we can plow that money back into other resources
over time. I do think it is something that we need, and we need
to reduce infrastructure as best as possible across the board.
Senator Hagan. Tell me that number one more time, you said
24 percent?
Ms. James. I believe it's between 20 and 24 percent excess
capacity that the Air Force has talked about.
Senator Hagan. Oh.
Secretary Wright, the Department of Defense and the defense
industry are facing challenges seeking new graduates with
advanced degrees in scientific and technical fields to help
develop the complex military systems. Some of these challenges
include a lack of interest in traditional defense sectors by
our new graduates: Federal hiring issues, budget pressure, the
length that typical defense programs take to execute, and then,
obviously, the competition for talent with other, not only
government agencies, but the corporate sector, too. If
confirmed, what would you do to ensure that the Department of
Defense has access to the best and the brightest future
scientific and technical talent? How would you measure the
effectiveness of these efforts?
Ms. Wright. Ma'am, part of the issue that we're dealing
right now is, with the budgetary constraints that we're under,
we are under a hiring freeze. There is, in the Department, the
ability to waive some of those very important positions, and
some of them would fall in the categories that you just talked
about.
It is our responsibility to screen the applicants, and it's
our responsibility to kind of market the positions that we have
to make sure that we get the best applicants to apply.
The Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM)
program starts from the bottom up and works from the bottom up
for people to realize how important science, technology,
engineering, and math is. That's a program that I think is
worth its weight in gold as we continue to move people through
the system, through graduate degrees and applications in to the
Department of Defense.
Senator Hagan. I think we can all understand that we're not
doing enough in the STEM fields in our public education schools
around the country now, and I think we have to have a greater
emphasis, especially beginning in middle school. It seems we
lose many of the young girls in middle school.
But, this is a critical problem, and, I think, from
corporate America to the national security issues, that the
individuals that we must have in DOD, that we really take a
very keen and strong interest to be sure that we are competing
worldwide for this talent. I know how important it is, from the
national security aspect, that we do get the best and the
brightest, and that we keep them. I think that's an issue that
I know you'll be giving it a lot of study and action.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for being here, and your
families, for your service to our country, and for the
important positions you're about to take on.
Ms. James, you and I had a chance to meet the other day and
talk in person, and first of all, I want to reiterate what I
told you, which is, I look forward to working with you on the
basing of the KC-46A tanker at Pease Air Force Base. We're very
proud of the work done by our 157th Refueling Unit. I look
forward to being a partner with you on that. As we mentioned in
our meeting, Senator Shaheen and I would love to have you up to
New Hampshire to see that unit and also to see what is a great
association between an Active Duty and a Guard unit, which I
think, is a model for the country. Thank you, and I look
forward to working with you on that.
I wanted to also follow up in the discussion we had--I know
that Senator Blunt had asked you about the A-10s, and you said
that there had not yet been a decision on A-10s. One of the
concerns that I have is, I was given a slide, I believe, that
came from Air Combat Command, that actually says that the A-10
fleet would be divested by fiscal year 2015, on this slide. Why
that makes me concerned is that there already has been a
decision made on the A-10. As you and I talked about in our
meeting, the A-10 has a very important function, in terms of
close air support. In fact, most recently in July, 60 soldiers
were saved in Afghanistan because of the important close air
support provided by the A-10.
I'm going to submit this article for the record. I hope
that you will look at that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Ayotte. I will ask you again: To your knowledge,
has there been any decision made to divest the A-10? Because
I'm not sure why these types of slides would be put out there
by Air Combat Command if this decision hadn't already been
made.
Ms. James. Senator, first of all, I, too, look forward to
visiting Pease and working with you on the base, the KC-46, and
all of the other important issues that you and I talked about.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no decision on
divesting A-10s or anything else, for that matter, because all
of this is predecisional. However, it is my belief that
planners and people who are looking at budget and possible
scenarios are looking at options, and everything, including
complete divestitures of aircraft fleet, these things are
possibilities, they are on the table.
Senator Ayotte. One of the issues that you and I talked
about which I think is very important--I'm certainly a strong
supporter of the F-35 and our fifth-generation fighter, but,
until the F-35 is operational, we can't be giving up our
capacity, particularly important capacity that protects our
troops. What I would ask for you, as a nominee of this
important position, will you agree to come and speak to
Congress and brief us when the decisions are made, if there is
a decision made to divest from the A-10 or any other airframe,
so that we can weigh in on this important decision? Then we'll
have the opportunity, of course, to ask you questions and for
us to have a very important dialogue about this on all of the
airframes.
Ms. James. Yes, I will.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, I appreciate that.
I appreciated the meeting that we had, Mr. Klotz, in terms
of the important positions that you've held for our country.
One of the issues that is very important to me is the
modernization of our nuclear deterrent. Certainly as part of
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), many of the
individuals--I wasn't here at the time--who agreed to endorse
that treaty were very concerned about modernizing our nuclear
deterrent.
In your position, when you're confirmed, will you be an
advocate for making sure that we modernize our nuclear
deterrent? How important do you believe that is, to make sure
that we have a strong triad?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, I think it's absolutely essential that
we modernize and extend the life and maintain the nuclear
weapons that are currently in our arsenal for a triad of
forces. We currently have the oldest stockpile, in terms of
average age, that we've ever had as a Nation, and there needs
to be scientific work and an awful lot of touch labor to ensure
that those nuclear weapons that we retain are still fully safe,
fully secure, and fully effective.
I will be an ardent champion for getting the resources,
whether that's funding or people or facilities in our
laboratories and in our plants, in order to carry out that most
important mission, and hopefully will be persuasive with the
administration and with the committees of Congress.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that very much.
I also wanted to follow up, based on your prior experience
in the important positions that you've held in the past that
are so critical to our nuclear deterrent, you and I talked
about this--there's been some discussion of the potential for
further reducing our nuclear deterrent. Certainly, the
President has given some speeches that suggest that that may be
a possibility. Would you recommend that we do that
unilaterally?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, my view has always been, throughout my
military career, that the best way to pursue any sort of arms
control agreement is part of a negotiated treaty.
Senator Ayotte. A treaty that would come before Congress so
that Congress could weigh in on this important issue?
Mr. Klotz. Yes, Senator, a treaty that would come before
the Senate for consent to ratification.
Senator Ayotte. Absolutely. I appreciate that, and I think
that's important, that we weigh in on it, but also that, if
there's going to be any further efforts to reduce our nuclear
arsenal, that certainly it not be done unilaterally,
particularly with what we see happening right now around the
world with some of the individuals and rogue actors who are
also seeking to have their own nuclear capability. I appreciate
that. You're taking on a very important position for the
Nation. Thank you for your prior experience in this area, as
well.
I want to thank all of you for being here.
Let me just reiterate, Mr. Lettre, that I very much look
forward to the important work that I know that you are going to
do in reviewing the security clearances. All of us on this
committee are very troubled by what appears to be some
significant lapses, in terms of a contractor getting access who
had a fairly significant history of misconduct and other flags
that worry us, in terms of the security clearances of our
contractors and the safety of our personnel. I look forward to
working with you on that, and this is a very important review
that I know that you'll be a big part of. Thank you.
Mr. Lettre. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to working
with the committee on that.
Senator Ayotte. Great.
Thank you all.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to give my sympathies, and that of everyone in
Indiana, to the families and victims of those killed and
injured at the Navy Yard. We owe a debt of gratitude to these
patriots for their work on behalf of the United States and for
sacrificing their lives in the service of our country.
To all the members of our panel, we want to thank you for
the sacrifice you have made, and to your families for
everything you have done for this Nation.
Secretary Wright, I thank you for taking the time for
visiting with me earlier in this week to discuss the importance
identifying servicemembers and veterans in need of mental
health care. I have introduced the Jacob Saxton Military
Suicide Prevention Act, and it seeks to improve identification
of servicemembers at risk, and creates a career-long mental
health history to help professionals provide the best possible
care.
I just want to make sure of your commitment to work forward
on this legislation, and to really dig deep in this area to
make sure that we can end this scourge.
Ms. Wright. Sir, you have my full commitment. It is not
only the Department's job, but to work hand-in-glove with
Congress and, truly, everyone. It's everyone's responsibility
to work towards solving the suicide problem.
Senator Donnelly. You've heard questions from my colleagues
about the A-10s and about the Reserve Force. In fiscal year
2013, the Air Force submitted a budget in which 17 percent of
the cuts came from the Active component, despite the fact that
67 percent of Air Force personnel is the Active component. We
went through, in Indiana, as many of my colleagues have, a
situation where we were providing services at 28 cents on the
dollar, and were notified that there was going to be an effort
to try to remove all of those services from what we were doing.
What we're looking for is, for want of a better way of
putting it, a fair shake, that when a judgment is made, it is
made on the numbers, it is made on who can provide the best
service at the lowest cost. Obviously, I'm talking in reference
to the Air Guard and others. I'm wondering what efforts you
have undertaken and what you will do to ensure that DOD finds a
balance between the Active Duty and the Air Guard.
Ms. Wright. Sir, we are in on all the meetings that discuss
the force structure as it relates to the budget and the balance
and the mission prosecution that we have to do. Not only my
office, but also the office that falls within my purview as in
Reserve Affairs.
One of the other things that the Secretary has done is, he
meets with the Council of Governors that represents the
National Guard and, in turn, represents the Reserve
components--the title 10 Reserve components within their State,
and he has assured them that we will be transparent in what we
decide to do, and he has personally met with them, and the
Deputy has met with them, for the balance of the Reserve
components, as it applies to the force structure and how we
structure both the Reserve and the Active.
Senator Donnelly. Ms. James, I'd like to hear your thoughts
on this, as well.
Ms. James. I certainly concur with what Ms. Wright just
explained. I hope I, too, will get to meet with the Council of
Governors. I think this kind of crosstalk is important, work
with Members of Congress, and, very importantly, pull in the
Guard, the Reserve, along with the Active, to include some of
the adjutants general, so that we can put together a go-forward
plan, which makes sense, both from the standpoint of the
national mission that the Air Force has as well as responding
when disaster strikes here at home. Both are very important.
Senator Donnelly. I can tell you that, before, when this
happened, it basically was just dropped in our laps and told
us, ``This is what's going to happen,'' and, ``Good luck with
it.'' Obviously, we were not willing to sit still for that kind
of thing.
What I would like to also see, and I know my other
colleagues have asked you this, as well, so you're going to
have an active travel schedule, but we'd love to have you both
come to Indiana and see the quality of the installations that
we have so when you make these judgments, that you're not just
making it from a piece of paper, but you're making it from
actual knowledge of what you're looking at.
Ms. Wright. I would love to, sir.
Ms. James. Me, too.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Mr.--and I apologize, I wasn't here at the start--
``LaTray''?
Mr. Lettre. ``Leh'-truh,'' Senator.
Senator Donnelly. ``Leh'-truh,'' okay. I didn't know how
French you are----[Laughter.]
Senator Donnelly. Something of very significant concern to
me is counterfeit microelectronics. A lot of work is done in
our State, at Crane, on that. But, I think they're a troubling
problem for the military supply chain. The committee has done a
very comprehensive investigation of this, but one of the
difficulties we face is in identifying manufacturing facilities
or foundries that produce the counterfeit parts and then put
them into the DOD supply chain. I'm wondering what efforts,
that you can talk about here, that the Intelligence Community
has taken to gather information on this, because one of our
fighter planes is only as good as its worst part that is in the
plane. I'd be interested in your comments on that.
Mr. Lettre. Senator, the sourcing of counterfeit
microelectronic parts and our intelligence assessments on that
is not something I've had a chance to really dig deeply into.
If confirmed, I would like to do so. I'm familiar with the
committee's work on counterfeit parts over the last couple of
years. It's been a serious contribution to shedding light on
this important security risk. What I would like to do is
continue the dialogue with the committee to make sure that we
are putting the right capabilities to bear within the
Intelligence Community to address this challenge.
Senator Donnelly. Okay. Any efforts and emphasis you can
put on this, I think, is critical to our national security.
Mr. Klotz, I was wondering what efforts you can talk to us
about in regards to the partnering, for instance, that's
undertaken at Crane between the Air Force and the Navy to
reduce recapitalization costs as it modernizes strategic
ballistic systems, working to make sure we have a stronger
nuclear effort. How important do you think that is to be able
to combine efforts, not only cost-saving, but also possibly
having a stronger product, a stronger result, at the end of the
day?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, I think that all options ought to be on
the table, particularly as we begin the process of modernizing
the warheads which are associated with both the Air Force and
the Navy. I am aware that considerable work is already being
done under the auspices of the Nuclear Weapons Council, which
combines the efforts of both the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy and between the Air Force and the Navy,
looking for ways in which they can achieve greater commonality
and, in the process, perhaps make for more efficient use of our
facilities and, at the same time, reduce costs of the life
extension program.
I think this is an area which is ripe for a lot of work.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Just to follow up on the commitment you made, Mr. Lettre,
to Senator Donnelly on the counterfeit parts. The law, as we
wrote it, has certain requirements. First of all, it holds the
contractors responsible for replacing parts. It can't be passed
along to the Government to pay for those replacements. Second,
we require that the parts have to be purchased from the
original manufacturer. We're talking, here, about these
microelectronic parts, but it applies broadly. You have to buy
it from the original manufacturer or their certified suppliers
and representatives or trusted vendors.
Now, there's an effort being made to weaken this provision.
It has been, the provision that Senator Donnelly is referring
to that we wrote into the law. We're going to need you to tell
us, in the next--within a month after you're confirmed--as to
whether or not those provisions in our law to address this
issue are being implemented. As part of your response to
Senator Donnelly's question for the record, we'd appreciate
that.
Mr. Lettre. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I will.
Chairman Levin. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to all of you, for being here today.
Ms. James, why don't we start with you. Thank you, first of
all, for stopping by my office earlier this week. I enjoyed our
visit a great deal.
I want to follow up on some of the conversations that we
had. First, let's talk about the F-35 for a minute. I think the
acquisition of this system, of this aircraft, is really
important for the Nation's security and for the Air Force. I
know that I and a lot of other people are looking forward to
seeing it roll out. It has, of course, been a project that has
been plagued with a lot of cost overruns and schedule delays.
These things do happen, especially with a big long-term
project, a very complex weapon system like this one. But, I'm
really afraid that it could threaten the program, especially
during a time like this, where we're dealing with a lot of
really thorny budgetary issues. Those things tend to make
everything much worse in this kind of economic climate than
they might otherwise.
Can you just give me your assessment of where we are with
this program, and what you could do, if confirmed, to make sure
that everything proceeds as smoothly as possible within the
cost parameters and the timeframes contemplated?
Ms. James. Senator, this is, of course, one of the top
three most important modernization programs that the U.S. Air
Force has today. It's critical that we maintain the air
superiority and the capability that we have had for the last 50
years. This particular program is an integral part of all of
that.
First of all, one thing I'll do, if confirmed, is, I'll
continue to advocate for this program, the importance of it,
and be a spokesman for the fact that the threats out there are
real and that we need this program to help us counter those
threats.
As far as the cost growth, the schedule slips and whatnot,
I agree with you, it's been a long time, it's an enormously
expensive program, and we owe the taxpayers our very best.
What I know so far about recent times with this program is
that things are trending in the right direction. That is to say
that the program manager, General Bogdan, has reported that the
costs are coming down. Can more be done? I hope so. I don't
know yet. But, it's at least trending in the right direction.
We're starting to come up on some important, I'll call it,
``developmental decisions,'' I think, particularly software.
There's a software decision that will have to be made soon.
Software is critically important. It can make or break a
program. Ensuring that that is done correctly is another
important facet.
If confirmed, in addition to advocating for this program, I
will do my best, from my perspective as the Secretary of the
Air Force, to work with the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, to work with the program manager of
the program, and with the Secretary of Defense, to make sure
that we give value back to the taxpayer, that we watch those
costs, that we birddog it every single day, have dialogue with
industry--that's another important thing that's been happening
lately--so that industry takes on its fair share of the risk,
going forward.
Senator Lee. Thank you. Following up on that, with the F-
35--we talked a little bit the other day about the F-35 basing
decision; specifically, the record of decision pertaining to
basing of the F-35 OPS-1. As I mentioned the other day, I was
disappointed in the multiple delays in the decision. I was
told, in January, that we would have a decision by March. Then
I was told, a month or 2 after that, that we would have a
decision either sometime this summer or, at the latest, I was
told, by October. Recently, there was some indication that it
might not happen in October.
I was encouraged to hear General Welsh state, yesterday,
that we can still expect a decision sometime this fall. It
still makes me a little bit nervous. There's still a fair
amount of wiggle room in that.
Can you just tell me, as best you understand of the
situation, what the reason is for the multiple delays and when,
specifically, you anticipate the record of decision might be
announced?
Ms. James. I, too, Senator, believe that it is the fall, so
that's October-November timeframe, I would say. That's based on
my best understanding.
I don't know why there have been so many delays, other
than, of course, it is a complex decision, there's input from a
variety of sources, a lot of data has to be reviewed. But, I
know it's been a frustration, and I hope it won't be too much
longer.
Senator Lee. Okay. Thank you. Given your experience both
within Government and outside of government, this does have all
kinds of ramifications, especially for the warfighter
community, as a result of the uncertainty all of this creates.
I'm also worried about all of the related decisions, the
military construction actions that have to be taken, all of
which turn on the record of decision issuing, with regard to
the basing decision.
My time's running short. Let's turn to General Klotz. Thank
you, as well, for coming by my office recently. I enjoyed my
visit with you, as well, General.
Congress continues to have some serious concerns with
regard to cost growth and delays, as well as planning issues,
at the NNSA. I assume you're familiar with the recent
Government Accountability Office report that said that the NNSA
has $16 billion in cost overruns across 10 major projects, and
that that could result in a combined 38-year backlog. I assume
you don't intend to be in this job for 38 years. But, a Member
of Congress should never accuse an agency of doing that,
because, by some measures, we're more like 1,000 or 1,500 years
behind what we need to do in Congress. I just want to ask: If
confirmed, how will you address some of these issues related to
backlog and cost overrun?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, I, too, have read a number of different
reports that have been written over the past 10-12 years that
have taken to task the NNSA for shortcomings in program
management, cost estimation, and large capital construction.
I've been encouraged, as I have been preparing for the
possibility of being confirmed, to learn that some significant
steps have been taken in the past year or so, and since
Secretary Moniz has been confirmed and entered into office as
the Secretary of Energy, that are designed to enhance the
internal skills of the NNSA to do cost estimation and program
management, to include bringing in a lot of people who have had
experience in the past with large capital construction, say, in
the Navy or with the Corps of Engineers, into its own
workforce.
There have also been efforts to work more closely with the
Department of Defense, particularly in the area of cost
estimation, to share best practices and to get an independent
review of what the NNSA is anticipating will be the case with
costs and as well as the scope of what the Department of
Defense expects, in terms of its own requirements and the
requirements of our military.
My objective will be to continue this process that has
begun, to drill down even further into the processes by which
we do cost estimation, project managing, and capital
construction, to ensure that all alternatives are laid out and
carefully vetted, and that we hold both Federal employees and
contractors responsible and ensure that there are clear lines
of authority and responsibility for them doing their task.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much. Thanks, to all of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lee.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to address a general question to--I guess it would
be the right side of the panel: Ms. Wright, Ms. James, and Mr.
Klotz.
Is the budgetary chaos around here threatening the national
security of the United States?
Ms. James?
Ms. James. I think it's a very, very serious concern. If I
may echo something I said earlier, it is extremely time-
consuming and unsettling to be executing the way that we are
executing. We're not making as good a judgments as we otherwise
could if we had a fixed number to work with and the flexibility
to implement. That's number one: execution is not what it could
or should be.
Then, trying to plan for the future is incredibly difficult
and enormously time-consuming when you are trying to plan for
different scenarios.
To get beyond this point, to come to an agreement for the
entirety of our Government, which I would hope could lift
sequestration, give each of our Departments a new number--I'll
speak for the Air Force; I hope to be able to speak for the Air
Force--we would like to know what we are really executing for
and planning for, and have a greater degree of certainty than
what has been the case.
Senator King. Ms. Wright?
Ms. Wright. Yes, sir, I will add to what Ms. James has
said. Frankly, yesterday, the Service Chiefs testified, and,
really, what they said was that they all voiced their grave
concern over the readiness of our force, based upon the
sequestration, the potential Continuing Resolution (CR), and
the budget, that we----
Senator King. Does that make the answer to my question
``yes''?
Ms. Wright. Yes, sir, it does. We clearly focus on those
individuals that we are sending into harm's way. We make sure
they're trained, we make sure they're the best-equipped, and
that they have what they need. But, we have a very unready
force, because of the sequestration that we have just gone
through, and because of the potential sequestration and the CR
in 2014.
Senator King. ``An unready force'' is a term that should
strike fear into everyone that is listening to us today and
everyone in this enterprise around here. ``An unready force.''
Ms. Wright. Yes, sir. Readiness is just not training;
readiness is equipment modernization, readiness is equipment
repair, readiness is collective and individual training,
readiness is personnel risk reduction--the suicides, the family
programs. That whole ball of readiness is affected because of
the uncertainty of the budget.
Senator King. Lack of readiness, lack of training, lack of
all those things that you just listed, put American lives at
risk, do they not?
Ms. Wright. I would agree. Yes, sir.
Senator King. General Klotz, you've been in this business
for a long time. Have you ever seen anything like what we're in
right now?
Mr. Klotz. No, Senator, I don't believe I have, except
perhaps for the immediate years after the end of the Vietnam
war, when there was a significant drawdown; there was a lot of
pressure.
I would concur with what my two colleagues said. I also
think there is an important personal dimension to that; and
that is, the civilian employees of the Department of Defense,
who are stalwart patriots and have given, in many cases, their
entire adult lives to serving our Nation through service as
civilian employees. To the extent that they were adversely
affected, both in terms of the number of days they had to take
furlough, but, more importantly, the hit that they took in
terms of their morale and sense of importance to the mission, I
think is something that we ought to bend over backwards never
to repeat again, and to continuously remind them of the
extraordinary contribution that they and their families make to
the Department of Defense and to our national security.
Senator King. Would you concur that the current chaos
threatens national security?
Mr. Klotz. It certainly makes it extraordinarily difficult
for those people who are responsible for carrying it out to do
the work that they need to do, whether it's operations and
maintenance day-to-day on a flight line, or whether it's
developing the plans and programs that are going to position
our Services and the NNSA for contributing to the national
security in the future.
Senator King. I think, Ms. James, you said something very
important, and that is, it's not only the number, it's the
uncertainty; it's the not knowing what the number is. I used to
be in business. If we know what the rules are, you can manage
to those rules. If the rules are unclear or change or
uncertain, that's as much of a problem as whatever the number
turns out to be.
Ms. James. Absolutely, Senator. In direct answer to your
question, I think this current uncertainty and, as you said,
chaos does threaten our national security, because, again, I
will say what I believe about the Air Force. We have the best
air force in the world, and I have complete confidence in them
that they will step up to the plate and do whatever we ask of
them. But, in situations where you have not been able to put
the resources into readiness that otherwise should have been
put, it means that there's increased risk.
Senator King. I think what's going on around here is an
insult to the word ``chaos''. Chaos is too mild a term.
Ms. Wright, one quick, not really a question, but a
suggestion. A lot of effort is put into recruiting people into
the armed services; not as much effort, in my judgment, is put
into helping them get out. We have a huge problem, in Maine and
across the country, of veterans who are unable to navigate the
system, the kind of outplacement counseling, if you will, that
would be equivalent to the recruiting. I hope you'll pay some
attention to that. I know that there are programs, but I think
that's a place where we can improve, because the system is
complex. A young man or young woman leaves the Service at the
age of 22 or 23, how to navigate that and the interplay with
the Veterans Administration, I hope is something you'll pay
some close attention to.
Ms. Wright. Sir, may I answer?
Senator King. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Wright. We've worked diligently on it, and I agree with
you, that is something that we really needed to do. We have 206
transition sites across the Nation where servicemembers are
required to go through a Transition Assistance Program. As they
go through that program, we have married up with the Department
of Labor and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), to the point
where we make the servicemembers fill out--it's mandatory that
they fill out a financial sheet so we know what their finances
will be when they transition, we know if they have an
education, we know if they have a job lined up. If they are in
that at-risk category of not having those things that would
create a livelihood, the Veterans Affairs community does a warm
handoff.
The example of that is, if they get out at Fort Hood, but
they're going back to Maine, we do a warm handoff to the
veterans community that is in Maine, so they can get the
benefits that they have worked hard for and that they deserve.
We have started this program, and we are in the process of
making very positive changes, and have, now, some classes that
will be effective, 1 October, for them to be involved with,
should they need to learn how to write a resume, should they
need to get a job. Again, sir, we're doing it with the
Department of Labor and VA.
Senator King. Excellent, thank you very much.
I know I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to submit a
question for the record to Mr. Lettre involving better
coordination between the military intelligence and the rest of
the Intelligence Community. We're spending $75 billion in 2012
on intelligence, over $20 billion in the military, over $50
billion in the rest of the Intelligence Community. I would hope
that there will be opportunities for working together,
cooperation, coordination, and maybe saving a little of that
money.
I'll submit the question for the record.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
Ms. James, I share your concern, and that of the other
witnesses, about the chaos that my friend and colleague from
Maine just pointed out. It makes it a little harder for me to
make that argument when the F-35 is now the first trillion-
dollar weapon system in history, a consistent series of cost
overruns that have made it worse than a disgrace. It's hard for
me, when a aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, is $2
billion over the estimated cost, and no end in sight.
I keep hearing that we have reduced the F-35, and the next
batch we have will have significant controls. It's still one of
the great national scandals that we have ever had, as far as
the expenditure of taxpayers' dollars are concerned.
I hope that you will stay on top of these cost overruns.
They're throughout the Services, and I can tell you, my
constituents, when they hear about the fact that the F-35 has
consistently, over many years, exceeded any cost estimate that
was ever begun, it's a little hard for me to get the kind of
support and concern that the Senator from Maine and I share. It
is still not under control.
I'm sure you know, we still have not had an audit of the
Department of Defense. Yet, time after time, we mandate it here
in our Defense authorizations bills, and yet, that audit is
never able to be completed. The American people at least
deserve an audit of what the U.S. military is doing.
Now, I want to say, one of your major tasks, as has
probably already been mentioned in the hearing--I'm sorry I had
to bounce back and forth--is the whole issue of sexual
assaults. Can this committee have confidence that this is one
of your highest priorities and that you can come to this
committee and present to all of us a plan and a policy that
will put this issue on a sharp decline and lead to a renewed
confidence in the American people that young women who join the
U.S. Air Force will have confidence that they will not be
subject to a sexual assault?
Ms. James. This will be one of my top priorities. I intend
to work on it very, very hard, and I absolutely welcome the
opportunity for that.
Senator McCain. Got any ideas?
Ms. James. One I put forth, and the Chairman says that you
all are actively considering it, and that is to hold commanders
more accountable, to include in their performance assessments a
measure of the climate within their unit and how well they're
doing. Because, sir, being a commander, it's not an
entitlement, it's an honor and a privilege; and if they're not
living up to the measure, they need to go. That is an idea that
the DACOWITS has put forth, and I'm a member of that DACOWITS,
so I offered that up as one suggestion.
Senator McCain. Thank you. There was a time in the military
where we had severe racial problems, and we embarked on a very
long and exhaustive period of indoctrination of the men and
women who were serving in the military. Not only that, that if
there was racism exhibited, the punishment was swift and sure.
That has to be part of any program that you will propose in
order to cure this terrible situation which dishonors all of
us.
Ms. James. I absolutely agree with you.
Senator McCain. Secretary Wright, in 2010, then-Defense
Secretary Robert Gates said the Pentagon needed to cut staff
sizes. He made this part of his efficiency initiatives. That
was August 9, 2010. In 2010, the Joint Staff was 1,286 people.
That was in 2010. Now we have 4,244 in 2012, a 230-percent
increase. Now Secretary Hagel, I understand, is ordering a 20-
percent cut in uniform and civilian personnel, officers on
military command staffs. Now, where's the credibility, here,
Secretary Wright?
Ms. Wright. Sir, I will tell you that Secretary Hagel was
very serious about cutting 20 percent of his force.
Senator McCain. What's your plan?
Ms. Wright. What is my personal plan for personnel and
readiness?
Senator McCain. What will be your plan--not your personal
plan--what will be the plan that will be implemented by the
Department of Defense to achieve the 20-percent cut that
Secretary Hagel is advocating?
Ms. Wright. Each one in the Department has the
responsibility to turn in to the Deputy Secretary, Secretary
Carter, an understanding and specific methods of where we are
cutting. The cut comes from dollars, so we have a dollar
account, it will be cut 20 percent, and we will match full-time
equivalents, we will match military to that cut, by name, of
positions that we will cut that will equal 20 percent. In our
other items, in our travel account, in our other accounts----
Senator McCain. What would be the time target for when this
20-percent cut would be completed?
Ms. Wright. Sir, I have to give Secretary Carter, by the
end of the month, this 20-percent cut. I believe the 20-percent
cut will go into effect 2015 to 2019.
Senator McCain. We can plan on this taking until 2019 to
enact a 20-percent cut in a increase that is a 230-percent
increase between 2010 and 2012?
Ms. Wright. Sir, I would like to get back to you on the
specific timeline. I don't want to say something that is
incorrect, so I will make sure----
Senator McCain. You're waiting until 2019 before completing
a 20-percent cut. That is totally unsatisfactory, Madam
Secretary. What I would like to hear from you is a plan and a
date certain for when this plan would be executed. If there's
skepticism on the part of members of this committee, it goes
back to 2010, when the Secretary of Defense said that there
would be a 20-percent cut; in fact, we have had a dramatic
increase. The Joint Staff is just one small example. I can show
you--U.S. Africa Command, 15-percent increase; U.S. Central
Command, 19-percent increase; the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 9.5. Not a single decrease has taken place in any of
the major commands. One of the great charades, of course, was
when the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk was closed; they just
shifted everybody over to another command. That wasn't
reduction in staffs, that was a movement in staffs.
I would appreciate it if you would submit to this committee
a plan that we can count on that doesn't take until 2019 to
implement.
Ms. Wright. Yes, sir, I understand.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Secretary of Defense recently directed a 20 percent reduction
in funding for certain headquarters (HQ) activities (Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Service Secretariats, and military
staffs, and most 3/4-star commands). This HQ reduction is to be taken
in addition to civilian reductions already reflected in the fiscal year
2014 President's budget. This 20 percent HQ reduction will be
implemented beginning in fiscal year 2015 and completed by fiscal year
2019; it will be reflected in the Department's submission to the fiscal
year 2015 President's budget.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of the nominees, for your commitment to
service.
Ms. James, I have a question for you. A lot of us are very
concerned about what, in our opinion, is political correctness
run amuck on steroids, quashing legitimate exercise and
expression of religion in the military. Things like: not
quashing active proselytizing, but telling somebody they can't
have a Bible on their desk; that's a documented case. Telling a
Christian chaplain he can't end a prayer, ``In Jesus' name'':
that's a documented case.
Do you think these sort of issues are a problem? If so,
what would you do about it?
Ms. James. Senator, actually, Senator Lee talked to me
about this, as well.
Senator Vitter. I apologize. I wasn't here.
Ms. James. No, no, I mean in the office call.
Senator Vitter. Yes.
Ms. James. I've heard about this in the last few days.
Here's what I know. I have actually read the policy of the
Department of Defense, and I know what that policy says. It
says that the open ability to worship, there shall be freedom
of all religions, as long as within good order and discipline.
I know that the chaplains, the whole point that they put forth
is that there shall be dignity and respect for everyone in the
force.
He mentioned the same point that you mentioned--I'm not
familiar with those cases. Of course, it's a question of--you
have a policy, the policy seems good, to me, but then you have
some people who don't follow the policy. These individual
cases, we'll have to look into.
Senator Vitter. To take my two examples, let's say they're
hypotheticals, not specific cases. Do you think those actions
should be barred in the military?
Ms. James. Having a Bible on your desk? That doesn't seem
like it should be barred, to me, no.
Senator Vitter. A Christian chaplain ending a prayer, ``In
Christ's name''?
Ms. James. It does not seem bad, to me, and if you'll allow
me to consult with the Chaplaincy Corps to find out if there is
some reason I'm not thinking about--but, no, it certainly does
not trouble me.
Senator Vitter. Okay. We're going to give you about 42
specific examples as a followup, and I'd really urge you to
look into these, because many of us, a majority on this
committee, according to a vote we had recently, think this is a
real issue. Thank you.
Mr. Klotz, I just have a couple of questions for you. I
appreciate your experience with Global Strike Command, and I
think that's very valuable. I am concerned that DOD may be
weighing some major realignment and the possible restructuring
of smaller commands, like Global Strike. Have you seen anything
to indicate that current or future threats would not require
the benefits of a strong Global Strike Command?
Mr. Klotz. Senator, I have to admit a fair degree of bias
on this issue, as one of the individuals who helped stand up
that command, and had the great privilege and honor of being
the first commander. The reason we stood up the command in the
first place was, at the end of the Cold War, we had divested
responsibility for the Air Force's nuclear delivery systems
between two different commands, commands which had an
extraordinary workload and were not able to provide dedicated,
focused attention to the nuclear enterprise. As a result of
that, we lost focus.
As I indicated earlier, we're going to have nuclear weapons
for a very long time. They must be safe, secure, and effective,
and it requires focused, dedicated leadership to ensuring that
is being done. That is the role of Air Force Global Strike
Command.
Senator Vitter. Great, thank you.
Also, as part of the discussions about the New START
treaty, the President made a very specific commitment to
modernize or replace our strategic triad, and a specific dollar
commitment. Unfortunately, that dollar commitment has not come
close to being met, where he, in his proposals, is at least a
third short. Is that a problem for our nuclear structure?
Mr. Klotz. If confirmed, Senator, my role will be to be the
principal advocate for taking those steps that are necessary to
ensure that the stockpile that we have is, as I said, safe,
secure, and effective, and that we're taking all the steps, in
terms of modernizing and extending the life of the nuclear
weapons that we currently have.
I will certainly be a champion for every dollar, every
person, every capability with a facility to make that happen,
and hopefully, as I said earlier, will be persuasive with other
agencies of the administration, as well as with committees of
Congress, in making that case.
Senator Vitter. Great. Again, just for the record, I want
to underscore--this was a clear commitment made as part of the
New START treaty passage through the Senate discussions, and it
just hasn't been kept. There are no big surprises. Everybody
who was part of that discussion knew the budget climate. That
isn't something that came up in the last 6 months; everybody
knew it was a tough budget climate. But, the commitment was
made for these dollars for modernization, which is essential to
keep the nuclear arms we do retain safe and effective as a
deterrent. We're 34 percent short of that. That really, really
concerns me. I urge you to help rectify that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Vitter.
On one of the questions which Senator Vitter raised about
the allegation that somebody was not allowed to have a Bible on
their desk, we've tried to get that information, and it's
important that it be found so that it can be corrected if it's
accurate. Ms. James, as part of your commitment to Senator
Vitter, I hope that, on that one, in particular, you would see
if you can identify the event and see what action was taken to
correct it, because we've had difficulty confirming it. That
doesn't mean it didn't happen; our staff has been unable to get
that done.
In terms of the reference to, in a prayer, I think,
depending on where a prayer is made--if it's made to a general
audience, it could be a different responsibility on a chaplain
than if it's made to an audience of his own religion, for
instance. But, this is a very sensitive area, because we want
to protect freedom of religion for chaplains and for our
troops, but we also want to protect the freedom of religion for
people who are listening to chaplains.
Ms. James. Right.
Chairman Levin. It's a very serious subject which has been
raised, and it's deserving of all of our attentions. It's
gotten a lot of attention from some of us. Hopefully you'll
look into the issue that Senator Vitter has raised in his--I
think he said there'll be--what?--40 examples or 42 examples.
If you'll get back to the full committee on what you find in
that regard, we would appreciate it.
Ms. James. I absolutely will, Senator.
Senator Vitter, if you have a specific example, please,
give it to me, and I will ask the Air Force, as well, for
information.
With respect to the other point, Senator, I totally agree
with you that something that may or may not be troubling to me,
personally, may be to others, and the idea of dignity and
respect for all religions, to include those who have no
religion at all, it's all equally important. I agree with you
very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

While I am unfamiliar with the specific cases you have cited, to my
knowledge there is no Air Force Instruction or policy prohibiting
military members from displaying a Bible on their desk. Additionally,
for Federal employees, the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission Compliance
Manual explicitly allows for the display of religious texts for use
during breaks. By itself, this act would not be considered religious
harassment and would not create an impermissible or hostile work
environment. With regard to public prayer, I do not have a problem with
chaplains ending prayer's with ``in Jesus' name'' and I understand
chaplains are trained to respect others while leading prayer. If
confirmed, I will work with the Chaplain Corps regarding these issues
to ensure all Air Force members are abiding by and are afforded freedom
of religion under all applicable laws, regulations, and policies.

Chairman Levin. Now, you've been asked about force
structure of the Air Force and the problem which occurred here
when there was just a proposal that was dropped on us and the
rest of the country on the restructuring and on force structure
changes. We've been hearing the Air Force from time to time, or
at least members, say that this was a ``messaging problem,''
and that a better rollout strategy would have avoided the
problems that they had in presenting or selling their
proposals.
Now, this was not a problem of messaging, it was a problem
with the substance of the Air Force decision in addition to the
problem with the process, the decisionmaking process, where
most of the stakeholders are just left out of the
decisionmaking process.
You've indicated that you're going to take steps to restore
confidence within Congress about the quality of Air Force
decisions and decisionmaking process. I just want to add my
voice to that issue, because it had a huge effect, I think, on
almost all of our States, the way it was done and the substance
of what was done.
Now, there's a national commission on the structure of the
Air Force. A report is due in February 2014. Would you let us
know, as soon as you're confirmed, which we hope will be prompt
for you and all of our nominees today, whether or not, in your
judgment, that date is going to be met? I'm not asking for you
now; I'm saying, after you're confirmed, if you would let us
know that.
Do you have a question, Senator Vitter? Senator King?
Secretary Wright, just a question on the Integrated
Disability Evaluation System (IDES) and the transition of
wounded warriors. We, in our wounded warrior legislation,
really took some major steps to integrate the DOD and the VA
disability systems. The processing time under the integrated
program was established in order to reduce the processing time,
but also to get the right standard applied, which would be the
more liberal standard from the perspective of the veteran, in
our judgment. That was the VA standard. We wanted that to be
uniform between DOD and the VA.
There were some additional encouraging reports about
processing time, but now our servicemembers and our veterans
are mired in long VA disability rating and case disposition
wait times, and the VA's portion of the system now appears to
be overloaded.
Have you gotten into this, as Acting Secretary? What are
you going to do to ensure that the collaboration between DOD
and the VA takes place to achieve the objective of providing a
timely transition of wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers?
Not only that, but also the most favorable standard to our
vets?
Ms. Wright. Yes, sir, absolutely, I have gotten into it. We
have about 33,000 members within the entire IDES, presently.
The Army is our biggest customer. The Army had a large group of
individuals going through IDES that they worked diligently to
make sure that they got the benefit they deserved and also the
medical treatment that they deserved. They processed them
through the system of the Medical Evaluation Board and the
Physical Evaluation Board. The next step after that is the VA,
and the way the VA is set up, all Army records go to a Seattle
site, where they are processed in the VA section of the IDES.
Yes, there is a backlog within the VA, and I will tell you,
the VA is working diligently to work through this backlog. But,
one of the things that we, DOD, has done to help the VA is, we
have sent soldiers, at their request, up to the Seattle VA
site. Now, the soldiers cannot process the disability claims,
but they can work to do the administrative work that, if the
claim adjusters were not doing the disability claims, they had
to do all of the administrative work, too. What we have done is
take that burden, if you will, off of the claim adjusters so
they can focus in on the disability claims that the Army is
sending to the Seattle site.
In addition, the VA has recognized that the Seattle site is
overwhelmed and cannot necessarily handle all of them in a
timely manner, so they are now sending these claims out to
other sites that can adjudicate the claims on a quicker, faster
timeframe for the individual that is getting out of the system.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
Senator King.
Senator King. Just one quick fact you might pass on to the
VA, in terms of their backlog. Eisenhower retook Europe in 9
months. I don't see any reason that this shouldn't be cleared
up in 9 months.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Now, Senator Gillibrand was here for a long time, but she
had to leave. She's going to be submitting her questions for
the record. A number of us will be submitting questions for the
record. Whoever takes that opportunity, I think we should
express the hope that they would get questions for the record
in by, let's say, next Monday--close of business, Monday. If
that doesn't work for somebody, let our staff know.
If there are no further questions, we want to thank our
witnesses. We hope that the committee can take up your
nominations very promptly and that you would all be promptly
confirmed. That's always a chairman's dream. Let's hope it
takes place.
Thanks to you, your families, and your friends who are all
here today, and those who aren't here because they had to go to
school. [Laughter.]
We'll stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Deborah Lee James by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I agree with the goals of these defense reforms; indeed
they have yielded a demonstrated improvement in the joint warfighting
capabilities of the U.S. military. I do not currently see the need for
any modifications.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. None at this time.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the Service Chiefs under
the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and
processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with
regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
Answer. No.
relationships
Question. Section 8013 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the
responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of the Air Force. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, also establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Secretary of the Air Force to
the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for all matters
within the Department of Defense (DOD). The Secretary of the Air Force
is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assists the Secretary of
Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and performs
those duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense or by law. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on
all matters.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) is DOD's most senior acquisition official. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this official on all matters
related to acquisition, technology, and logistics programs impacting
the Department of the Air Force.
Question. Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force,
presides over the Air Staff, and is a principal advisor to the
Secretary. In addition, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he is
a military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. The relationship between the Secretary and
the Chief of Staff is extremely important. If confirmed, I would foster
a close working relationship with the Chief of Staff to ensure that
policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Air
Force and respect his additional responsibilities as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject
to the Secretary of the Air Force's direction and control, to act for
and with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters
for which the Secretary is responsible; that is, to conduct the affairs
of the Department of the Air Force.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Chairman through the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all joint
matters affecting the Air Force.
Question. The Combatant Commanders.
Answer. I will work with the Chief of Staff to ensure that the Air
Force is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide the
capabilities the combatant commanders need to execute their missions.
This goal can be achieved through forthright dialogue which I will
encourage.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and in this capacity serves as a military advisor
to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and
is the DOD's official channel of communication to the Governors and
State Adjutants General on all matters pertaining to the National
Guard. He is responsible for ensuring that Army and Air National Guard
personnel are accessible, capable, and ready to protect the homeland
and to provide combat resources to the Army and Air Force. If
confirmed, I will work with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to
find ways for the Air Force to capitalize on the talent available in
the Reserve components in order to strengthen the Total Force.
Question. The Director the Air National Guard.
Answer. The Director of the Air National Guard serves as the
principal advisor on guard matters to the Secretary of the Air Force
and the Air Force Chief of Staff and is responsible for formulating,
developing, and coordinating all policies, plans, and programs
affecting more than 108,000 Guard members and civilians in more than 88
flying wings and 175 geographically separated units across 213
locations throughout the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. If confirmed, I will work with the
Director of the Air National Guard to find ways for the Air Force to
capitalize on the talent available in the Reserve components in order
to strengthen the Total Force.
Question. The Director of the Air Force Reserve.
Answer. The Chief of the Air Force Reserve serves as the principal
advisor on Reserve matters to the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Air Force Chief of Staff. As commander of Air Force Reserve Command, he
has responsibility for the supervision of all U.S. Air Force Reserve
units around the world. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
the Chief of the Air Force Reserve in a continued effort to maximize
the effectiveness and efficiency of the Total Force.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition is
the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) for the Air Force. However, the
position is currently vacant and the former Secretary of the Air Force,
Michael Donley, delegated SAE authority to the Principal Deputy,
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition). If confirmed, I
will work closely with the Principal Deputy on acquisition matters
until the Assistant Secretary position is filled.
Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief
ethics official of the Department of the Air Force and serves as the
senior legal advisor to Air Force leaders. He is responsible, on behalf
of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and efficient
provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I would
look forward to developing a good working relationship with the General
Counsel.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), per title 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 8037, is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and
of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. He is
also responsible for directing judge advocates in the performance of
their duties. If confirmed, I will endeavor to maintain the close
working relationship the Secretary of the Air Force has historically
enjoyed with the Judge Advocate General.
Question. The Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Answer. The Academy functions as a separate field operating agency,
reporting through the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Air Force.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the Superintendent to address
issues faced by the Academy and to promote the Academy's sustained
commitment to excellence and fulfillment of its mission to train and
educate future Air Force leaders.
Question. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Answer. Under current organizational relationships, the Under
Secretary of the Air Force is no longer dual-hatted as the Director,
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). However, a strong collaborative
relationship between the Air Force and the NRO remains essential to
facilitate continuing Air Force technical and personnel support for the
NRO's mission. If confirmed, I would be dual hatted as the Executive
Agent for Space and I would chair the Defense Space Council where I
would have the responsibility of achieving unity of effort across the
DOD space enterprise. I would use these and other forums to maintain a
close relationship with the Director, NRO, to increase cooperation on
space matters.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. It is also vital that a strong collaborative working
relationship exist between the Air Force and the Director of National
Intelligence. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of National
Intelligence to foster that relationship, particularly in coordination
of national security space matters.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. Pursuant to title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 8013 and subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for and has the authority
necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force.
These functions include organizing, supplying, equipping, training,
maintaining, and administering the Air Force.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I would
expect the Secretary of Defense to assign duties to me consistent with
the responsibilities outlined above.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of the Air
Force?
Answer. Title 10 provides for two staffs in the same headquarters,
a predominantly military Air Staff and a predominantly civilian
Secretariat. My intention is that these two staffs will function
effectively together as a single headquarters team supporting the needs
of both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, while protecting the
Chief of Staff's independent advisory role as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. I will foster close working relationships between the
civilian and military staffs and work with them on matters within their
areas of responsibility in order to more effectively lead and manage
the Department of the Air Force.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have worked for more than 3 decades as a civilian in
support of our military--from the executive branch, to Capitol Hill, to
the world of think tanks, to the defense industry, and as a volunteer
in some of the wonderful non-profits which help our military, veterans
and their families in ways that government cannot.
Specifically, I served 17 years in the Government, first for the
Department of the Army, followed by service on the House Armed Services
Committee Staff, and then in the Pentagon as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs. Subsequently, I worked for 15 years in the
private sector with United Technologies Corporation, the Business
Executives for National Security and, Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC). Throughout this time, I served on
boards as a volunteer with the USO, the Tragedy Assistance Program for
Survivors, the Pentagon Federal Credit Union Foundation, and other
military charities, as well as serving on the Defense Advisory
Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), an advisory body to the
Secretary of Defense on matters affecting our women in uniform.
I am absolutely committed to keeping the U.S. Air Force the very
best Air Force in the world.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. The top challenges for the next Secretary of the Air Force
are near-term readiness and building the most capable, affordable Air
Force for 2023. The Air Force must always be prepared to answer the
Nation's call, and that means we need airmen with the right training
and the right equipment that can complete the difficult tasks and
missions they are asked to do when they are asked to do them. If
confirmed, I will do everything in my power to ensure our Air Force is
ready to take on near-term missions as well as build toward the
challenges of the future.
The next Secretary of the Air Force will also face challenges with
regard to strategy and execution in today's difficult fiscal reality.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure Air Force strategy is focused on
supporting the President's National Security Strategy, the Defense
Strategic Guidance, and within budgets provided, I will work to ensure
the ability to execute the strategy. At this time in our country's
history--when airmen have been in the fight for more than 2 decades, as
aging aircraft and other critical equipment have reached or will soon
reach the point of needing modernization or replacement, and as Federal
budget resources decline--program and budget decisions and tradeoffs
cannot be avoided.
No matter what challenges confront us, our force must be confident
that leaders are focused on taking care of our airmen and their
families. If confirmed, my approach to decisionmaking will always keep
an eye toward taking care of our airmen.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, the commanders of the Service's major commands, and the
Headquarters Air Force staff to identify the most urgent readiness
concerns in the short- , medium-, and long-term. We must address these
concerns in tandem with a realistic assessment of the Service's ability
to execute the defense strategy, coupled with a realistic assessment of
the current fiscal environment. We must take these issues into account
during future program and budget planning.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. I am impressed with the professionalism and expertise of
the men and women who serve in the U.S. Air Force. If confirmed, I will
gather data to understand priorities and work with leaders to determine
solutions. Additionally, I will strive to foster an environment that
encourages communication within the Air Force and DOD, across the
interagency, and with the legislative branch. Good communication is an
important part of any effort to addressing issues that affect our
airmen and our Nation.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will begin an extensive internal Air Force
communication effort on my first day. From that point on, I will seek
to establish a stronger communications foundation that builds on
existing relationships with external stakeholders, including Congress,
national security experts, and airpower advocates.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on three broad priorities.
First, I will be committed to taking care of people. This priority
includes: recruiting and training a quality force; focusing on ending
the blight of sexual assault in the Air Force; finding the right
balance between the Active Duty, Reserve component, and civilian airmen
who make up the Total Force; and taking care of airmen and military
families.
Second, if confirmed, I will make it a priority to balance today's
readiness with tomorrow's modernization needs, while supporting the
requirements of combatant commanders. The nuclear enterprise will
receive special attention as will increasing confidence in the
acquisition process.
Third, if confirmed, I will work to ensure that the world's best
Air Force is the most capable and at the lowest possible cost to the
taxpayer.
readiness levels
Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the
Air Force to execute its assigned missions?
Answer. It is my understanding that readiness has suffered,
particularly under sequester. Reductions to the fiscal year 2014
President's budget would further harm readiness.
Question. How do you believe sequestration may have affected
readiness?
Answer. I am aware the Air Force stood down 13 Active Duty combat
squadron equivalents and 18 institutional squadrons in fiscal year
2013. I have been briefed that recovering the readiness levels of these
units will take well into fiscal year 2014. The Air Force cancelled one
of two Weapon Instructor Courses and curtailed or cancelled three of
six Red Flag exercises. This advanced training is critical to gain and
maintain readiness at the high-end of training requirements.
Curtailing and or cancelling this advanced training results in a
readiness deficit ``bathtub''--the Air Force cannot make up these
events.
Question. Can the Air Force meet all combatant command requirements
with its current readiness status?
Answer. Air Force leadership has said no, the Air Force cannot
currently meet all combatant command requirements. Air Force leadership
has also stated the Air Force can meet current combatant commander
requirements only with the use of rotational forces. In doing so, the
Air Force has few if any ready forces for emergent combatant command
requirements.
Question. What do you view as the other major readiness challenges
that will have to be addressed by the Air Force over the next 5 years,
and, if confirmed, how will you approach all of these issues?
Answer. In addition to working toward a restoration of full
spectrum training levels, the next 5 years will be critical for
building the readiness and capabilities of tomorrow. Capability
includes the requisite technology and weapons necessary to prevail in a
highly-contested, anti-access/area-denial environment. If confirmed, I
will focus on the critical and unique capabilities the Air Force
provides to our Nation and the joint warfighters.
annual increase in rates of basic pay below the employment cost index
Question. The Department has requested an across-the-board pay
raise for 2014 for military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8
percent rise in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) benchmark, and has
indicated that in order to restrain the growth of personnel costs,
similar below-ECI pay raises may be necessary over the next several
years.
What is your assessment of the impact a 1 percent pay raise would
have on recruiting and retention in the Air Force for 2014? What would
be the impact of a 1 percent pay raise in 2015 through 2017?
Answer. I believe military compensation is, and must remain,
competitive to sustain the recruitment and retention of high caliber
men and women to meet readiness requirements and accomplish the
national security mission; however, in light of the current economic
crisis and overall reductions in defense spending, the Air Force must
look at balancing personnel costs to avoid reductions to force
structure and modernization efforts critical to support the warfighter
and national defense.
In the short term, I am hopeful that a 1 percent pay raise will
have a negligible impact upon overall recruiting and retention. I
believe that sustained pay raises below ECI warrant close monitoring of
the force, given the expected improvements in the economy.
force structure changes
Question. For fiscal year 2013, the Air Force proposed major
changes in the force structure, with the cuts falling more heavily in
the Air National Guard. These proposals were soundly rejected by
Congress, based on both the content of the decisions and the way the
decisions were made.
If you are confirmed as Secretary of the Air Force, what steps
would you propose to take to restore confidence within Congress about
the quality of the Air Force's decisions and decisionmaking process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress on all
issues relating to the Total Force. I believe the Air Force is
committed to the Total Force (Active, Guard, Reserve) and, through
efforts like the Total Force Task Force and a detailed, analytically
rigorous Force Composition Analysis process, the Service will
strengthen its decisionmaking in this area.
If confirmed, I plan to ensure that the decisionmaking process is
highly collaborative and involves all key stakeholders from the Active
component, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. The
components are key participants throughout the development,
integration, and defense of the Air Force Program Objective Memorandum
and implementation of the congressionally-approved budget.
Additionally, a newly established consultative process involving DOD,
Council of Governors, and individual States promises an even more
enhanced, interactive relationship. Taken collectively, I believe these
efforts will help the Air Force continue to improve the quality and
transparency in its' decisionmaking process and will help restore
Congress's confidence in the Air Force's firm commitment to the Total
Force. Finally, I look forward to working with the National Commission
on the Structure of the Air Force to provide a Total Force solution.
Question. If sequestration continues through 2018, what would be
the impact, in your view, on the Active Duty and Reserve end strengths
of the Air Force and how would the mix between the Active and Reserve
Forces be affected?
Answer. I cannot make an assessment at this time on the future mix
between Active and Reserve Forces, but if confirmed, I will work
closely with Congress, State Governors, and the Reserve components to
determine the right balance between Active and Reserve Forces to most
efficiently satisfy force structure requirements. If sequestration
continues, I would expect the end strength of both the Active Duty and
the Reserve to decrease.
reserve deployment and mobilization
Question. We understand that the Air Force may be implementing a
policy of filling deployments assigned to Air Guard and Air Reserve
units by ordering those units to Active Duty while specifically
excluding the use of volunteers from outside those units.
What effect do you believe this policy will have on the ability of
the Air Force Reserve and Air Guard to meet deployment commitments and
fulfill combat missions?
Answer. I have been briefed that this new construct does not impact
the ability of the Reserve component to meet their deployment
commitments. If confirmed, I will dig more deeply in to this approach.
Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively
to the Reserve?
Answer. At this time I cannot definitively answer this question.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more
than 3000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including
2558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports.
Moreover, a recent survey conducted by DOD indicates that the actual
number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent
of Active Duty women and 1.2 percent of Active Duty men surveyed
reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in
the previous 12 months. This survey has been criticized by some because
its conclusions are extrapolated from an unscientific sample set and
the questions asked in the survey were too imprecise. The Air Force
recently addressed numerous allegations of sexual misconduct by
Military Training Instructors at Basic Military Training at Joint Base
San Antonio-Lackland. The Air Force addressed similar allegations of
sexual misconduct at the Air Force Academy nearly a decade ago.
What is your assessment of the Air Force response to the
allegations of sexual assault at Basic Military Training at Joint Base
San Antonio-Lackland?
Answer. Sexual assault is an egregious and horrific crime wherever
and whenever it occurs. The instances and allegations of sexual
assault, unprofessional relationships, and other misconduct at Basic
Military Training have been particularly troubling to me.
My assessment is that the Air Force acted aggressively to
investigate, prosecute, punish perpetrators; and hold leaders
accountable for the incidents at Lackland. Although we were able to
take decisive action once senior leaders became aware of the crimes, I
am concerned about that many victims did not feel comfortable reporting
and there was a substantial delay in reporting many of the incidents at
Lackland.
Over the past year, there appears to have been steady and positive
progress. To the best of my knowledge, there has not been an allegation
of recent Military Training Instructor sexual misconduct for more than
13 months. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Air Force
leadership to ensure that Basic Military Training is a safe, secure
environment and the most professionally executed training program in
the world for Air Force trainees. I am committed to ensuring that the
Air Force training environments foster a culture of respect where this
behavior is not tolerated and victims are empowered to report any
crime.
Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force's implementation
of the Secretary's new policies?
Answer. It is my understanding of the Secretary's 6 May
initiatives, the Air Force has implemented a legal advocacy program for
victims, required that judge advocate general officers conduct pre-
trial investigations and provide commanders the option to temporarily
remove members accused of sexual assault from the unit. The Air Force
is on track to complete the remaining three additional reforms in the
next year. These include standardizing processes by which sexual
assault allegations are elevated to a general or flag officer, ensure
consistent standards prohibiting inappropriate conduct by trainers and
recruiters, and submit to regular audits to ensure military
investigations of sexual assault cases meet DOD-wide standards. I will
work with the other Services and the Secretary of Defense to ensure we
implement these coordinated efforts as soon as possible. One of these
key reforms, the Special Victims Counsel program, was an Air Force
program and illustrates the innovative and progressive efforts to
enhance victim advocacy and protection. The Air Force established this
as a pilot program in January 2013 and the 14 August Executive Action
memo directed its adoption across DOD.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. In my view, the chain of command has, and should retain,
ultimate responsibility for the morale, welfare, good order,
discipline, and effectiveness of military units. In the past the chain
of command has been effective in dealing with issues such as racial
integration, drug use during the Vietnam war, and the ``Don't Ask/Don't
Tell'' policy. We need to ensure they place the same focus and emphasis
on sexual assault. The chain of command must be held directly
responsible for the climate and behavior of their airmen and women.
They must be given both the incentives and the tools to ensure a
climate of respect permeates their command.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. I have not found sufficient evidence to support the
proposal that removing commanders from the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) process and replacing them with judge advocates outside
the chain of command will improve the sexual assault response or
accountability processes.
Judge advocates are already a huge part of the process. I have been
briefed that in nearly every case in the last 3 years Air Force
commanders agreed with their staff judge advocates' recommendations to
send allegations of sexual assault to court-martial. Therefore, it does
not appear that removing commanders from their UCMJ disposition role
will result in a large increase in prosecutions.
Additionally, I do not believe we can solve the sexual assault
problem by reducing commanders' authority to hold airmen accountable.
The challenge we face regarding sexual assault in the military is
complex and requires commanders be fully involved in its solution.
Rather than remove commanders' authority to send airmen to a court-
martial for committing sexual assault, I believe commanders must be
held more accountable for failing to adequately respond to sexual
assaults in their units or for failing to maintain a healthy unit
climate necessary to safeguard against the rise of sexual assault.
Commanders must be fostering an environment in which victims are
encouraged to report any crimes and feel safeguarded from any risk of
reprisal or career consequences.
Question. What is your view of the protections afforded to victims
who are required to testify at Article 32, UCMJ, investigations that
are required before charges can be referred to a General Court-Martial?
Answer. I am not satisfied. I have been disturbed by recent press
reports from the Article 32 process in the Naval Academy sexual assault
case and I feel the Article 32 process needs to be improved to ensure
better protection of victims' rights.
I would note that one improvement to the Article 32 hearing process
is already being undertaken. Secretary Hagel has directed that all
Article 32 Investigating Officers for sexual assault charges must be
judge advocates. This has long been the practice in the Air Force. I
believe we could enhance the effectiveness of judge advocates by
ensuring they receive better training specifically tailored to the host
of challenging issues in sexual assault cases.
Question. What is your understanding of the resources and programs
the Air Force has in place to provide victims of sexual assaults the
medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
Answer. As I learned about the programs the Air Force provides for
victims of sexual assault, I was impressed with the whole-person
concept employed for healing. The Air Force recognizes resiliency is
built through having a strong physical, mental, spiritual, and social
core. In response to both restricted and unrestricted reports, the Air
Force provides physical, psychological, spiritual, legal, and social
support to victims. This support continues until the victim feels
stronger in the healing process and decides they no longer require
those services. The Air Force recognizes healing is unique to every
person and provides victims the necessary time and resources to
recover. Air Force medical personnel, lawyers, sexual assault response
coordinators (SARC) and victim advocates (VA) are dedicated to victim
well-being and returning the victim to a healthy state. This care is
provided both in garrison and deployed.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Air Force has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults? In your view, are these steps
adequate?
Answer. I believe the Air Force is absolutely committed to fighting
sexual assault in its ranks. It has a new directorate-level sexual
assault prevention and response (SAPR) office led by a two-star general
with a team of cross-functional dedicated experts and is dedicating
other resources to attack this crime. If confirmed, a top priority for
me will be to focus on institutionalizing the changes passed by
Congress and ordered by Secretary Hagel as well as any new tools
Congress gives along the way. I will:

- Make sure victims know it's not their fault--report if it
happens
- Take care of victims with compassion and without retaliation
- Aggressively weed out, investigate and prosecute offenders
- Hold commanders more accountable for what goes on in their
units
- Make clear there are consequences for individuals who engage
in violence and disrespect of other airmen. We don't want them
in the Air Force
- Work with DOD and Air Force leaders, Congress, and the Panel
on Military Justice to review other ideas

The Air Force implemented the Special Victims Counsel program which
has proven to be a benchmark for all of DOD. The Air Force implemented
new administrative discharge provisions in July 2013, under which
commanders must initiate involuntary administrative discharge
processing for any airman, officer or enlisted, who commits sexual
assault, sexual assault of a child, or attempts to commit these crimes.
Additionally, an Air Force member who engages in an unprofessional
relationship while serving in a special position of trust (i.e.,
recruiter, faculty member, or staff member) is specifically subject to
administrative discharge for misconduct. The Air Force is currently
developing a Basic Military Training Transition Program which will
reinforce Air Force core values and emphasizes appropriate behavior.
The Air Force developed the bill of rights for all airmen, ensuring
they understand how they should be treated and how to treat others. The
National Organization of Victim Assistance provides credentialing for
Air Force counselors. Its continuing education requirements ensure
ongoing support from diverse civilian as well as military institutions
which will give our SARC and victim advocates (VA) expanded resources
to stay abreast of best practices emerging in prevention and care.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Air Force has in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. It is my understanding every Air Force Office of Special
Investigation (AFOSI) special agent is trained and credentialed at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to handle myriad felony
investigations, including sexual assaults. In addition, the Air Force
added 24 civilian AFOSI sexual assault trained special agents at high
threat installations and designated 9 senior trial counsels with
advanced training to prosecute these cases. The Air Force developed
training in fiscal year 2013 that JAGs now attend jointly with AFOSI.
These training courses are the Sex Crimes Investigation Training
Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and the Advanced
Sexual Assault Litigation Course at the Air Force JAG School.
AFOSI and JAGs attend both courses, focusing on the investigation
and prosecution stages.
Question. Do you consider the Air Force's current sexual assault
policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
to be effective?
Answer. The policies are broad and appear comprehensive yet not
enough victim's report--so more needs to be done to ensure victims
understand that if a crime occurs, the Air Force will hold those
responsible accountable for their crime. The Air Force also needs to
make clear that it is never the victim's fault and that in addition to
prosecution, the Air Force is committed to providing compassionate care
for victims and protecting them against any risk of retaliation.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of resources in the Air
Force to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and to hold
perpetrators accountable for their actions?
Answer. I am aware the Air Force has dedicated additional resources
over the last few years; if confirmed, I will make a more complete
assessment of adequacy.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?
Answer. Not enough victims report--this is obviously a problem. I
will need to dig more deeply into ``why'', if I am confirmed. My
experience says that victims fear they will not be believed, they feel
ashamed and they may be worried that they will be ostracized or
retaliated against by leadership and peers.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior
military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Air staff in
overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating
to sexual assault?
Answer. Senior military and civilian leaders, beginning with the
Secretariat and Air Staff, must focus on promoting an environment that
does not tolerate sexual assault. Eliminating the stigma of reporting
this crime is essential. Senior leaders must instill the belief that if
an assault occurs, reporting is necessary and expected, whether
unrestricted or restricted. Airmen need to believe their chain will
support them through the legal and healing processes, while holding
perpetrators appropriately accountable.
Currently, the Air Force's SAPR Council joins the most senior
members from across the Service for monthly discussion of program
initiatives, issues, and best practices. If confirmed, I will expect
all leaders to be personally engaged in Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response.
Question. Do you believe that sexual assault continues to be an
underreported crime within the Department for the Air Force?
Answer. Sexual assault is likely a highly underreported violent
crime in American society, and yes I believe it continues to be an
underreported crime within the Air Force as well. The sexual assault
prevalence survey performed by Gallup in 2010 also confirmed this view.
The Air Force remains committed to improved reporting and will
administer a follow-up prevalence survey this spring.
Question. If so, what are the barriers that discourage or prevent
victims from coming forward?
Answer. Based on my experience from DACOWITS working groups and
briefings, victims not wanting fellow airmen to know and victims not
wanting their families to know are significant barriers to reporting.
Victims may also fear for impact on their career if they report at
about a fellow servicemember.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to
remove these barriers to reporting sexual assaults?
Answer. If confirmed, I will build on the core values of the Air
Force by demanding an environment that identifies perpetrators and
holds them appropriately accountable, a climate where victims feel
empowered to come forward to report this crime.
Additionally, I believe commanders should be ``graded'' on their
performance reports for the sexual assault reporting climate in their
unit.
I think we can affect change; we have to stay on it each and every
day. One of the greatest challenges will be helping airmen of all ranks
assess personal roles in preventing this crime and understand how to
improve decisionmaking. This will take time, but I will work closely
with the Air Force team to focus on this complex issue.
air force policies regarding drug and alcohol abuse
Question. What is your understanding of the Air Force's policy with
respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of
soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you
agree with this policy?
Answer. Air Force policy states that drug abuse is incompatible
with Military Service and airmen who abuse drugs one or more times are
subject to administrative separation for misconduct. In fact,
administrative separation processing is mandatory for drug abuse unless
a waiver is granted. This seems to be the appropriate policy to me. The
Air Force recently adopted the same discharge policy for sexual
assault, which I also believe will help deter and combat sexual assault
in the Air Force.
Question. What is your understanding of the Air Force's policy with
respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who
have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or
prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
Answer. It is my understanding that only in very limited
circumstances does the Air Force retain airmen who we determine have
used illegal drugs, including illegal use of prescription drugs. In
order to be retained, airmen have the burden of proving that retention
is warranted by meeting a number of criteria, to include such drug use
was a departure from the airman's usual behavior and is not likely to
recur, does not involve recurring incidents, and does not involve
distribution.
I would like to ensure that the Air Force has a robust Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT) Program. If confirmed, I
look forward to reviewing this program to determine its adequacy.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force has devoted sufficient
resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and
objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?
Answer. I cannot say at this time, but look forward to reviewing
this program, if confirmed.
suicide prevention
Question. The number of suicides in the total Air Force continues
to be of concern to the committee.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide
prevention programs and policies for the Air Force, the Air National
Guard, and the Air Force Reserve, to prevent suicides and increase the
resiliency of airmen and their families?
Answer. I believe that effective suicide prevention programs start
at the top and require engaged leaders and communities to be effective.
If confirmed I will champion the Air Force's continuing efforts in
building a strong wingman culture where leaders at every level
establish a command climate where airmen know that they should seek
help early, before problems become unmanageable.
Of the airmen lost to suicide over the last year, causes included
relationship difficulties, legal and financial problems. These very
personal factors highlight the need for continuing vigilance and an
effective culture of airmen looking out for one another. When required,
I will ensure that all of our airmen have access to the counseling and
support services they need to help them through any difficult times.
If confirmed, I will work with Air Force and DOD leaders to ensure
that we look for and adopt best practices in suicide prevention for all
components of the Air Force, always emphasizing that concerned, engaged
leaders and communities are the solution.
religious guidelines
Question. In your view, do policies concerning religious
accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual
expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different
beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. I believe so. The policies are intended to protect both the
free exercise of religion for all airmen and avoid the appearance of an
official endorsement of any particular religion. Air Force policy
presently communicates that all airmen have the freedom to choose to
practice their particular religion or subscribe to no religious belief
at all.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and
discipline?
Answer. This is certainly my understanding. Current law and
policies allow for accommodation of individual airmen's expressions of
belief so long as such expressions do not adversely impact good order
and discipline.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. It is my understanding Air Force chaplains are well trained
to provide prayers offered in pluralistic settings. This requires
sensitivity to their audience which includes individuals from various
religious traditions as well as those who profess no religious belief
at all. The guidance provided by Air Force leaders also makes clear
that supervisors respect each chaplains' right to adhere to the tenets
of his or her faith and thus not require chaplains to participate in
religious activities, including public prayer, which are inconsistent
with their faith tradition.
family readiness and support
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of
the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for Air Force personnel and their families, and, if confirmed,
how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced?
Answer. I understand that a primary concern for airmen and their
family members is their ability to do the mission and simultaneously
support their families. Specific areas of concern include access to
quality specialized child care and education. Also, for those
transitioning to the civilian sector, military members are concerned
about being prepared for employment and/or continuing their education.
Families are concerned about the civilian spouse finding employment as
they relocate from installation to installation. Finally, I believe the
work/life balance is a major issue. If confirmed, I will ensure a
thorough review of all available resources to support valuable family
programs.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. I understand the Airman and Family Readiness Centers serve
as a resource hub for Air Force families prior-to, during, and
following deployments. The deployment programs the Airman and Family
Readiness Center have in place for the airmen and family members are
crucial in supporting the Mission. If confirmed, I will seek input from
a variety of sources including from family members themselves and will
work to ensure the Air Force programs adequately support Air Force
families.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. The Air Force is a Total Force, and provides resources and
support to all components through various Airman and Family and Child
and Youth programs. Geographically separated servicemembers (and their
families) have immediate access to many resources online that enable
them to remain connected to their units and support services. I look
forward to exploring the adequacy of existing programs in this area.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to sustain Air
Force family support, given current fiscal constraints?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Chief of Staff and Chief
Master Sergeant of the Air Force to engage Air Force families on the
support they feel is most needed.
I will review current manpower and staffing for family programs and
support programs that enhance Mission Readiness. I would like to see
sufficient staffing and training for family readiness staff as we
partner with community organizations to continue building support for
airmen and their families.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and sometimes lengthy
deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all
eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, retirees,
and families.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Air Force MWR
programs, particularly in view of the current fiscal environment, and
if confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve?
Answer. MWR programs help the Air Force to maintain ready,
resilient airmen and families, and sustained reductions to these
programs may negatively impact future readiness and unit cohesion. If
confirmed, my goal would be to determine how best to provide the most
critical family and MWR programs and base-level support services
possible in today's budget-constrained environment.
Regardless of constrained budgets, I am committed to supporting our
airmen and their families and will make adjustments based on available
funding in an effort to focus our resources where they are needed most.
management and development of the senior executive service (ses)
Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward
thinking management of senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Air
Force's senior executive workforce, especially in the critically
important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the
scientific and technical fields?
Answer. I believe that the members of the Senior Executive Service
are an integral and critical component to the continued success of
these vital career fields.
Question. Over the last 10 years, the Air Force budget has almost
doubled, but the number of senior executives in the Department of the
Air Force has remained almost unchanged.
Do you believe that the Air Force has the number of senior
executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department in
the future?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to review the number of
Air Force senior executives and their associated proficiency levels in
critical competencies. If confirmed, I will look into the issue.
balance between civilian employees and contractor employees
Question. In recent years, the Air Force and DOD have become
increasingly reliant on services provided by contractors. In many
cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same
projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as
Federal employees.
Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees
and contractor employees is in the best interests of the Air Force and
DOD?
Answer. It is difficult to make a macro-level statement about this
issue at this time. I do believe we must continue to ensure that
inherently governmental functions are not outsourced and scrutinize
those areas where the distinction has been blurred. It is also
important to step back and look at all work accomplished by military,
civilian, and contractor to achieve the correct balance. If confirmed,
I will work with leaders across the Air Force to assess this matter to
ensure compliance with the law and with the President's policy.
Question. In your view, has the Air Force become too reliant on
contractors to perform its basic functions?
Answer. Once again, I cannot offer a macro-level view at this time.
I recognize this is an area of concern and will address it if
confirmed.
Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
services contracts is in the best interest of the Air Force?
Answer. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and title 10 U.S.C.,
section 129, restricts the use of personal services contracts. I
believe these regulations best serve the interests of the Air Force. If
confirmed, I would continue to work with leaders across the Air Force
to ensure compliance with applicable law and policy. I believe my
experience in both the private and public sector can help in this area.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force and DOD should
undertake a comprehensive reappraisal of ``inherently governmental
functions'' and other critical government functions, and how they are
performed?
Answer. The Department's ``sourcing'' of functions and work between
military and civilians, or through contracted services, must be
consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness
and management needs, as well as applicable laws and statutes. The Air
Force should ensure that military or Federal civilians are performing
all inherently governmental jobs, and that sufficient levels of
civilians are available to perform critical oversight, management, and
readiness functions of the Air Force. I am not convinced a
comprehensive review of ``inherently governmental functions'' is
necessary, but I do believe more rigorous oversight where we apply
contracted services is necessary across the Department.
Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate
officials in DOD to address these issues?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with other Air
Force leaders to ensure these matters are addressed in the best
interest of the Air Force and DOD.
Question. Section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 requires DOD to implement a freeze on spending for
contract services, comparable to the freeze on civilian personnel
required by the efficiencies initiatives.
What is your understanding of the impact that the freeze on
spending for contract services has had on the Air Force?
Answer. Specific to fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013, the
period covered by the NDAA, my understanding is the limitation is a
broad brush that puts an overall ceiling on not only management support
contracts, but also other mission critical contracts such as Weapon
System Sustainment, Ranges, and Critical Infrastructure. If the
limitation is so broad that it encompasses all contracts, there may be
unintended consequences that we will need to monitor. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with Air Force leaders to balance acceptable
risks and available budgets to ensure future mission capability as
freezes to civilian personnel and contract services are carried out.
Question. What is your understanding of Air Force plans for
spending for contract services over the next 5 years?
Answer. At this time I am unfamiliar with the specifics of Air
Force plans for contract services over the next 5 years. If confirmed,
I will work with Air Force leaders to properly balance contract
services spending with other Air Force priorities.
Question. What is your view on the feasibility and advisability of
further reductions in spending for contract services over the next 5
years?
Answer. Without an understanding of specific Air Force plans for
contract services over the next 5 years, I cannot at this time assess
the feasibility and advisability of further reductions. Any budget
adjustments must be made carefully and with full understanding of the
accepted risks and impacts to mission capability.
air force civilian personnel workforce
Question. Section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 required the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to
reduce the size of the civilian personnel workforce by 5 percent over
the next 5 years. The plan developed by the Secretary does not meet
this objective. Since the time that section 955 was enacted, the
Department has implemented hiring freezes and furloughs due to
sequestration.
As a result, the DOD civilian personnel workforce is substantially
smaller than it was when section 955 was enacted or at the time the
plan was submitted.
Do you agree that the Air Force's civilian employee workforce plays
a vital role in the functioning of the Department of the Air Force?
Answer. The U.S. Air Force would not be the best in the world
without the daily contributions of civilian airmen as vital members of
the Air Force family and the joint team. They are integral to nearly
every part of the Air Force mission, from processing recruits and
running family programs, to managing budgets and developing strategy.
They fix airplanes, sustain infrastructure, design and develop future
systems, and deploy to support combatant commanders. The Air Force
could not get by without its civilians.
Question. Do you agree that if sequestration continues through
fiscal year 2014 and beyond, the Air Force will need to further reduce
the size of its civilian workforce?
Answer. This seems extremely likely, in my opinion.
Question. In your view, would it be preferable for the Air Force to
make planned, prioritized reductions to its civilian workforce, or to
downsize using arbitrary reductions based on hiring freezes and
workforce attrition?
Answer. In my view, planned and prioritized reductions always are
preferable to arbitrary reductions.
acquisition issues
Question. Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in the Air
Force and the other Military Services continue to be subject to funding
and requirements instability.
Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives
up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon
systems?
Answer. Yes, instability in funding and requirements contributes to
increases in program cost and schedule delays. A major imperative of
mine would be to improve the acquisition process.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should
take to address funding and requirements instability?
Answer. I believe that it is incumbent on the acquisition community
to work with the requirements and resource communities to ensure
programs have clear, achievable requirements and realistic funding
profiles. The acquisition community must bring its technical expertise
to the discussion of requirements and funding throughout the
acquisition progress to enable requirements and funding profiles that
are inherently stable because they are realistic and affordable.
I support USD(AT&L)'s affordability initiative to establish goals
and caps to ensure funding limitations are identified early and
revalidated at milestone decisions. If confirmed I would work closely
with the Air Force and DOD leadership to assess root causes and sources
of instability, and work to put in place measures to limit their
occurrence.
Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported
that the use of insufficiently mature technologies has resulted in
significant cost and schedule growth in the MDAPs of the Air Force and
the other military departments. Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C.,
requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to certify that
critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity
before Milestone B approval.
Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature technologies
drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major
weapon systems?
Answer. Yes, it is my understanding that premature pursuit of
insufficiently mature technologies can result in schedule and cost
growth. The growth would likely occur as one works to overcome
technology challenges that were not adequately budgeted for at the
outset of the development or production activity.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that
the Air Force complies with the requirements of section 2366a?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate strongly for the nomination
of a qualified acquisition executive. I will work to ensure we have the
right people in place to oversee and address the maturity of
technologies and work closely with USD(AT&L) on other initiatives.
Question. GAO has reported that the use of unrealistically
optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Air Force and the other
military departments is a major contributor to cost growth and program
failure.
Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and
schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up program
costs and delay the fielding of major weapon systems?
Answer. Yes, I do. Ensuring we have realistic weapon system cost
and schedule estimates, to include a comprehensive understanding of
total life-cycle costs, better informs decisionmakers as they manage
current acquisition programs. Realistic estimates are critical to
prevent pursuit of systems that are later abandoned or reduced in
capabilities because of an unacceptably high cost. Cost and schedule
estimating methodologies that combine historical data with the best
information available on new industry and government acquisition
practices produce more accurate estimates, preventing cost growth and
fielding delays.
Question. What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to
ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent and
provide a sound basis for Air Force programs?
Answer. Since the passage of Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act
of 2009, I believe the Air Force has made progress in improving the
quality of its cost estimates and also in more rigorously budgeting to
the best cost estimates. New policy guidance and procedures have been
adopted that require annual, independent cost estimates on all major
acquisition programs. This has resulted in more realistic, objective
cost estimates in support of the budget process and acquisition
decisions.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics has issued a memorandum directing the military
departments to institute new ``Configuration Steering Boards'' to
review and approve new requirements that could add significantly to the
costs of major systems.
Do you support this process?
Answer. I am not familiar with the USD(AT&L) Configuration Steering
Board (CSB) policy memorandum. I understand, however, that CSBs are
important to good program oversight and cost control. I also understand
they are legislated requirements. If confirmed I will ensure the Air
Force complies with all Federal statutes.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics has also issued a memorandum directing that
the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo competitive prototyping to
ensure technological maturity, reduce technical risk, validate designs,
cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine
requirements.
Do you support this requirement?
Answer. Yes, I support the requirement that the largest DOD
acquisition programs undergo competitive prototyping, where practical
and affordable.
Question. Numerous acquisition reviews over the last decade have
identified shortcomings and gaps in the acquisition workforce of DOD.
Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to provide
the resources needed to begin rebuilding the Department's corps of
acquisition professionals.
Do you believe that a properly sized workforce of appropriately
trained acquisition professionals is essential if the Air Force is
going to get good value for the expenditure of public resources?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. How would such a priority compete within the context of
implementing sequestration?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Air Force maintains
a properly sized and well trained acquisition workforce, even in tough
budgetary times.
contract management
Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year
for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of
products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places
far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition
of services than it does on the acquisition of products.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to
improve the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of
services?
Answer. I understand the Air Force is focused on improving its
acquisition of services but I am not familiar with specific
initiatives. If confirmed, I will work with Air Force leaders to assess
the state of services acquisitions.
Question. Do you agree that the Air Force should develop processes
and systems to provide managers with access to information needed to
conduct comprehensive spending analyses of Services contracts on an
ongoing basis?
Answer. I agree in principle, as decisionmakers must have sound
metrics that guide their decisionmaking throughout the life cycle a
program, but I would need to better understand the current state before
offering a specific view.
Question. The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of
government-wide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the
largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85
percent of the dollars awarded under one of the largest programs. The
DOD Inspector General (IG) and others have identified a long series of
problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition
planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials
contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures,
and failure to monitor contractor performance.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to
ensure that its use of interagency contracts complies with applicable
DOD requirements and is in the best interests of the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to dig more deeply into the analysis
performed by the DOD IG and others or the specifics of their findings.
If confirmed I would work with Air Force and DOD leaders to better
understand the challenges associated with the implementation of
interagency contracts, as well as the role and authorities of the Air
Force in implementing them. I believe it is important to first
understand the root causes of the challenges and the measures being
implemented before offering any proposed solutions or corrective
actions.
air force acquisition system flaws
Question. Over the past several years, GAO protests have resulted
in the reversal of a number of significant Air Force contract award
decisions, including award decisions on the KC-X tanker replacement
contract; the Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement Program
(CSAR-X) contract; the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP)
contract; the Small-Diameter Bomb contract; the Thunderbird video
contract; and a contract for F-15 training simulators.
Do you believe that significant problems remain in the Air Force
acquisition system today?
Answer. These reversals certainly point to problem areas. On the
other hand, it is my understanding that the Air Force has made
regaining acquisition excellence a top priority. I have seen strong
evidence of this in its recent successes with the KC-46 Air Refueler,
C-130J aircraft, Space Launch program and its rapid fielding of wartime
capabilities, but this is an area that requires constant vigilance. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Air Force Service
Acquisition Executive to address these three issues and to make the
pursuit of acquisition excellence among the Service's highest
priorities.
Question. If so, what are those problems and how would you propose
to address them?
Answer. It is my understanding that there are three major themes
coming from the GAO protests of these programs. First, resources and
requirements match. Achieving a high level of technology maturity by
the start of system development is an important indicator of whether
this match has been made. This means that the technologies needed to
meet essential product requirements have been demonstrated to work in
their intended environment. In addition, the developer has completed a
preliminary design of the product that shows the design is feasible.
Second, product design is stable. This point occurs when a program
determines that a product's design will meet customer requirements, as
well as cost, schedule, and reliability targets. A best practice is to
achieve design stability at the system-level critical design review,
usually held midway through system development. Completion of at least
90 percent of engineering drawings at this point provides tangible
evidence that the product's design is stable, and a prototype
demonstration shows that the design is capable of meeting performance
requirements. Third, manufacturing processes are mature. This point is
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the developer can
manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A
best practice is to ensure that all critical manufacturing processes
are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable,
and capable of consistently producing parts within the product's
quality tolerances and standards at the start of production. I can
assure you that going forward I would apply the lessons learned from
previous challenges and continue to pursue excellence within the
acquisition portfolio.
Question. If not, why do you believe that the Air Force has been
the subject of so many adverse bid protest decisions?
Answer. Not Applicable. See above answer.
expeditionary combat support system
Question. An Air Force Acquisition Incident Review (AIR) team
recently completed a report on the failure of the Air Force's
Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS). The AIR report discusses
root causes for ECSS's failure and includes several recommendations.
Does the Air Force agree with the AIR team's findings?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Air Force is in agreement
with the AIR Team's findings. Several root causes and contributing
problems were identified spanning near-to-long-term corrective actions
related to governance and how the Air Force structures its business IT
programs for success. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Air Force
applies the lessons learned in the findings to current and future
initiatives.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Air
Force plans to take to implement the report's recommendations?
Answer. It is my understanding that Air Force senior leaders are
following through on the recommendations of the report. This includes a
review of existing major Air Force business systems based on the AIR
Team's specific findings and lessons learned.
encroachment on military installations
Question. Various Air Force Bases have encroachment issues, some of
which are significant. These include population growth near military
installations, environmental constraints on military training ranges,
airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, and conflicts
with civilian users over the use of radio frequency spectrum.
In your opinion, how serious are these problems for the Department
of the Air Force?
Answer. I believe these problems are quite serious. As I understand
it, the Air Force is proactively working with State and local
communities to address current and potential encroachment issues.
Question. If confirmed, what policies or steps would you take to
curtail the various encroachment issues?
Answer. It is my opinion that encroachment issues are best resolved
at the lowest level. The Air Force instituted an Air Force Encroachment
Management (AFEM) program that provides an overarching framework to
address potential impacts to Air Force missions, safety, the
environment and critical infrastructure. This framework is designed to
identify issues at the installation-community level; elevate when
appropriate through Major Commands; then to the Headquarters Air Force
staff which further assesses potential impacts and recommends ways to
resolve or mitigate. If confirmed, I will emphasize to our installation
leaders they must continue to proactively engage with local community
leaders so they are aware of Air Force mission needs and identify ways
to retain or improve mission compatibility.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in
addressing these challenges?
Answer. For those issues that are identified and assessed as posing
significant adverse impact to critical Air Force missions; local,
State, DOD, and other agency stakeholders will be made aware and I will
provide guidance as appropriate.
energy conservation and use of alternative fuels
Question. In the past year, the Department of the Air Force has
assumed a leadership role within the Federal Government for the
advocacy, research, and testing of alternative fuels for use in
military aircraft. In addition, the Air Force has encouraged proposals
for the use of Federal property to construct refineries and power
plants to include nuclear power.
In your view, which energy alternatives, to include fossil fuels,
offer the greatest potential for benefit to Air Force programs and
operations?
Answer. The Air Force needs to have assured access to reliable
supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient
energy to meet operational needs. Because of this, it is important for
the Air Force to be flexible in the types of energy it can use and
secure the quantities necessary to perform its missions, both for near-
term benefits and long-term energy security. This flexibility is
important for both weapon systems and installations.
Question. Do you support the goals adopted by the Air Force related
to the increased use of alternative fuels? Does this include
alternative fossil fuels?
Answer. In principle, I support the Air Force's goal to broadly
pursue alternative fuels that are cost competitive with traditional
petroleum-based jet fuels and that meet environmental and technical
specifications. I look forward to digging into this area more deeply,
if confirmed.
Question. In your opinion, what constraints does the Air Force face
in carrying out initiatives to reduce reliance on fossil fuels?
Answer. I feel that the benefits of energy investments should be
carefully weighed against the initial and recurring costs. Doing so
will allow energy initiatives to be evaluated and appropriately funded
along with other Air Force priorities in order to maximize the use of
Air Force resources.
investment in facilities
Question. Air Force leaders have stated in testimony, ``MILCON is
an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to fiscal
constraints, we must reduce funding and accept greater risk in
facilities and infrastructure in order to continue our efforts to
recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment.''
In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for
facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force?
Answer. I believe Air Force installations are the platforms from
which we fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. Therefore,
it is critical to balance risk to facilities and infrastructure against
mission readiness. If confirmed, I will ensure Air Force leadership has
the tools it needs to assess and mitigate risk to facilities and
infrastructure, as well as airmen and mission, while ensuring we can
deliver the decisive combat power this country expects.
Question. If confirmed, would you support goals established by DOD
for certain levels of funding dedicated to the recapitalization and
sustainment of facilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support DOD goals with respect to
funding the recapitalization and sustainment of facilities. I fully
understand, however, that in a fiscally constrained environment, the
Air Force will have to continue to make challenging decisions to strike
the right balance with respect to infrastructure requirements,
readiness, and mission capability.
Question. What is your position on the use of public-private
ventures to address critical deficiencies in family housing and utility
infrastructure?
Answer. I have seen this approach work very well in some
localities. If confirmed, I will evaluate any and all opportunities
available to bring airmen and their families the exceptional housing
and installation infrastructure they deserve.
long-range bombers
Question. The B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s will begin to be retired in the
2030 timeframe.
When do you believe that the United States needs to develop a new
manned bomber?
Answer. I understand the new bomber is in the top 3 of Air Force
modernization priorities. Given the aging bomber fleet and what I
understand about the nature of the future threat environment it is
important that the Air Force make the appropriate investments today to
ensure a viable warfighting capability in the mid-2020 timeframe.
Question. Do you believe the Air Force needs to continue to manage
the Long-Range Strike-Bomber Program as a special access program? If
so, why?
Answer. It is my understanding that enhanced security is important
to protecting critical technologies and capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that, regardless, it needs a reporting
structure in content similar to the Selected Acquisition Reports?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with Air Force and DOD
leaders to ensure the Service provides information on the Long-Range
Strike-Bomber consistent with Selected Acquisition Reports at the
Special Access Program level.
nro and the air force
Question. The responsibilities of the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) were once included in the responsibilities
of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Dual-hatting the Under
Secretary ensured that there was close cooperation between the NRO and
the Air Force.
What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD space
programs and NRO programs are managed in a coordinated fashion?
Answer. Currently there are various relationships and mechanisms in
place that ensure DOD and NRO space programs are managed in a
coordinated fashion. The Deputy Director of the NRO is an Air Force
General Officer who in his role as the Commander, Air Force Element,
manages all Air Force personnel and resources assigned to the NRO and
serves as the senior adviser to the Director of the NRO on all military
matters.
If confirmed, I would be dual hatted as the Executive Agent for
Space and in that role would be responsible, in coordination with
USD(I), for fostering a close working relationship between DOD and the
Intelligence Community with regards to space programs. In the
Secretary's role as the Executive Agent for Space I would also chair
the Defense Space Council (DSC) where I would have the responsibility
of achieving unity of effort across the DOD space enterprise. The
National Reconnaissance Office is a member of the DSC while the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence is also regularly represented.
Other forums which meet several times a year, such as the Air Force/
NASA/NRO Summit, reconfirm the mission interrelationships and foster
collaboration and synchronization in areas of mutual interest. As the
Secretary of the Air Force and the DOD Executive Agent for Space I
intend to continue to use these and other forums to maintain a close
relationship with the NRO and the Intelligence Community.
Question. The Air Force rotates personnel through the NRO, which
has proven useful in developing synergy between space programs serving
both intelligence and military needs. Proposals have been given to
develop a core set of personnel at the NRO which maintains core service
functions and maintains a long-term institutional memory and
capability.
Would you support this proposal by putting a subset of Air Force
personnel on a long-term basis at the NRO?
Answer. The Air Force has historically had a close working
relationship with the NRO. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
this working relationship with rotations of Air Force personnel through
the NRO. Overall it is important to create a cadre of space
professionals with breadth of knowledge across mission areas balanced
with technical depth and focused mission expertise as required. I also
look forward to working with Air Force and NRO leadership to determine
the best balance of meeting mission needs while developing a robust
space professional cadre.
space acquisition
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to ensure that the
space acquisition process is successfully revamped to deliver future
systems within promised costs and schedules?
Answer. Continuing to improve the space acquisition process is a
priority for the Air Force and for the DOD. If confirmed, I will
continue to support space acquisition process improvement, in the
spirit of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act and in cooperation
with the USD(AT&L).
Question. Milestone decision authority for space programs currently
resides with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics. If confirmed will you seek to return this authority to
the Air Force or are you comfortable with this authority residing with
the Under Secretary?
Answer. I am unfamiliar with the background associated with the
decision to place the milestone decision authority for space programs
with the USD(AT&L). I do understand many of these capabilities exist to
support national security objectives. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Under Secretary in managing and delivering space
capabilities to the warfighter.
Question. The Air Force is developing a New Entrant strategy for
medium and heavy launch of military and intelligence payloads. Do you
support the NRO developing a separate new Entrant strategy different
from what the Air Force is developing?
Answer. At this time, I am unfamiliar the specifics and current
agreements associated with the Air Force and NRO new entrant
strategies. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to understand the
Air Force and NRO new entrant strategies, their differences and
opportunities to partner together to ensure success in the Service and
NRO missions.
air force science and technology
Question. What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of
the Air Force science and technology programs?
Answer. I understand the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)
conducts in-depth reviews of the Air Force Research Laboratory's
science and technology portfolio. If confirmed I will consult with the
SAB to learn more about their ratings and seek their advice to help
guide and improve the effectiveness of our Air Force science and
technology programs.
Question. What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of
the Air Force's basic research programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to identify,
nurture and harvest the best basic research to transform leading-edge
scientific discoveries into new technologies with substantial military
potential. Combined with this focus I would ensure the appropriate
effectiveness metrics are in place.
Question. Do you believe the current balance between short- and
long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force
needs?
Answer. At this time, I am unfamiliar with the specifics of the Air
Force's investment balance between short- and long-term research. If
confirmed I look forward to assessing the Air Force's Science and
Technology (S&T) Program investments to attain a balance between near-
term quick-reaction capabilities; mid-term modernization technologies
and long-term revolutionary technologies.
Question. What metrics will you use to assess the adequacy of
investment levels in Air Force science and technology programs?
Answer. At this time, I am unfamiliar with the Air Force's
investment levels in Air Force science and technology programs or the
metrics used to assess the adequacy of those investments. If confirmed
I would make it a priority to execute a balanced, integrated S&T
program that supports the current fight while advancing breakthrough
S&T for tomorrow's fight, ensuring adequate funding in basic research
and the right level of investment to mature technologies for transition
into acquisition programs.
Question. What role do investments in science and technology play
in reducing costs and technical risk of acquisition programs?
Answer. It is my understanding that Air Force investments in
science and technology leverage research and development efforts within
academia and industry, including small businesses and government
laboratories, all of which help lower risk in Air Force acquisition
programs.
test and evaluation
Question. What are your views on the effectiveness of the Air
Force's test and evaluation activities?
Answer. I am not yet able to assess the effectiveness of the Air
Force's Test and Evaluation (T&E) activities, but if confirmed, I would
be committed to a sustaining a vibrant test and evaluation program.
This capability is crucial to Air Force acquisition programs, tactics,
techniques and procedures development, and assessing the combat
capability of forces.
Question. What are the major weaknesses and deficiencies with the
Air Force test and evaluation enterprise in meeting current and
emerging Air Force testing requirements?
Answer. I am not in a position to assess major weaknesses and
deficiencies in the Air Force T&E enterprise at this time. If
confirmed, I will work with Air Force and DOD leadership to ensure the
Air Force is prepared for current and emerging test and evaluation
requirements.
Question. The Air Force has recently contemplated a number of steps
to reorganize both development and operational test activities. Some of
these proposals included significant government and contractor
workforce reductions and potential closures of test assets.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that any
reorganizations or closure of test assets or reductions in test
workforce result in actual cost reductions and do not entail undue risk
to Air Force or other DOD current or future acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the acquisition and T&E
communities to establish a formal relationship between modernization
priorities and T&E resources, so that the Air Force has a logical,
defensible T&E program to fully support the needs of our highest
priority acquisitions.
Question. What is your view of the role of the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (DASD(DT&E)), Developmental Test and Evaluation and the
Director of the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) in ensuring that
such reductions do not undermine the ability of the Air Force to carry
out needed test programs?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DASD(DT&E) and the
Director, TRMC for developmental testing, and DOT&E for operational
testing, play an important role in ensuring the Air Force T&E program
is responsive to the needs for Developmental and Operational Testing
(DT and OT) for the Department's oversight acquisition programs. If
confirmed, I will work closely with these oversight organizations to
ensure the Air Force provides all of the support necessary to ensure
successful DT and OT for acquisition programs.
Question. The Air Force has some unique requirements with regard to
prompt global reach and affordable, responsive space lift missions.
In your view, are changes in current test range structure,
operations, and mission assurance parameters required to accommodate
Air Force experimentation and small launch needs?
Answer. I am not familiar with this area at this time. If
confirmed, I will evaluate launch ranges with respect to the Air
Force's experimentation and small launch needs.
air force research laboratories
Question. What are the major challenges facing the Air Force
Research Laboratory?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
specific Air Force Research Laboratory challenges and providing my
leadership to help overcome them.
Question. How do you plan to address these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will actively work with Science and
Technology and Laboratory leadership to address challenges and
encourage continued innovation.
Question. Are you supportive of efforts of the Air Force Research
Laboratory to expand and enhance their unique laboratory personnel
demonstration program to ensure that they can attract and retain the
finest technical workforce?
Answer. Yes. While I am not aware of the specifics of the Lab
Demonstration Program, from past experiences it is clear the Air Force
Research Laboratory operates in a very competitive market for highly-
qualified scientist, technologist, engineer, and mathematician (STEM)
talent. With domestic and international competition for people with
these skills intensifying, I support efforts to actively attract and
retain STEM talent.
airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Question. The airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets developed and operated by the Air Force
form an indispensable part of the Nation's overall intelligence
architecture. These assets are often referred to as high demand, low
density systems because of the extensive number of requirements and
high operational tempo on their systems and crews.
In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR
assets to meet current and projected requirements?
Answer. My understanding is there are not enough assets to meet all
the requests of the combatant commanders (COCOMs). However, the Air
Force meets the highest priority demands.
Question. What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to
current plans for the development and acquisition of airborne ISR
platforms? Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the ``high-
demand, low-density'' category?
Answer. In this fiscal environment, my goal would be to ensure we
maintain our ISR capabilities to provide decisive advantages to COCOMs.
I would also enhance, if fiscally possible, our current ISR
capabilities with advanced technologies and improved interoperability
between existing ISR systems, to include those in the joint arena, to
ensure our ISR dominance. However, it still may not be possible to
satisfy all COCOM ISR demands.
u.s. africa command
Question. On numerous occasions, the committee has expressed
concern that the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) lacks the
necessary air support to execute effectively his mission in a continent
comprised of 53 countries, spanning a geographic area larger than the
United States, China, and Western Europe combined. The Commander of
AFRICOM recently indicated before the Air Force Defense Strategy
Seminar this shortage of aircraft remains.
If confirmed, what would you do to support AFRICOM, given the
demand on existing assets within other geographic combatant command
AORs?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
AFRICOM and the other combatant commanders to ensure requirements are
met.
The demands for airpower are likely to continue to exceed the
resources available. The requirements of each combatant commander are
adjudicated through what I understand to be a fair and consistent
process based on national priorities.
nuclear matters
Question. Based on the 2007 Minot incident, Air Force has
exhaustively studied and made strong organizational changes to its
management of the nuclear weapons it is charged with maintaining and
deploying.
What will you do to strengthen the nuclear programs at the Air
Force Weapons School for airmen who choose a long-term career to
maintain and deploy nuclear weapons beyond the few that currently
attend it?
Answer. The nuclear mission is vital to the Air Force and the
Nation and we cannot succeed in it without highly trained personnel. If
confirmed, I will explore ways to strengthen the nuclear programs at
the Air Force Weapons School. Additionally, I look forward to visiting
the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapons Squadron in the near
future.
Question. The Air Force is the primary maintainer and implementer
of the Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3) System. This
NC3 system is aging, yet it is vitally important to ensuring the
President has direct control over nuclear weapons and their use. The
cost overruns and failure in deploying the Family of Beyond Line of
Sight Terminals (FAB-T) on nuclear capable airborne delivery platforms
reflects poorly on the Air Force's first foray with a new generation of
NC3 acquisition programs.
What actions will you take to ensure the FAB-T acquisition program
corrects its cost over runs and eventually is deployed on airborne
platforms?
Answer. Strengthening the Nuclear Enterprise is a top Air Force
priority. I also understand that NC3 systems are important to the
effectiveness of that mission. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with Air Force leaders to learn more about FAB-T and other NC3
acquisition programs and to ensure that they are properly executed in
this tight fiscal environment.
Question. What actions will you take to ensure there is a long-term
road map and acquisition strategy to ensure the NC3 system meets
requirements consistent with the President's recent Nuclear Employment
Strategy?
Answer. I understand the Air Force is currently working with DOD in
support of its effort to develop an NC3 architecture to support the
President's recently updated nuclear employment strategy. Once
finalized, the Air Force will develop an Air Force specific roadmap
that supports the new architecture. In the meantime, the Air Force is
refining a NC3 Sustainment Roadmap to provide a more comprehensive
approach to sustaining current Air Force NC3 systems.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of the Air
Force?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly
constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the
basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
air force modernization
1. Senator Udall. Ms. James, you mentioned in your advance policy
questions that one of your priorities is to balance today's readiness
with tomorrow's modernization needs. Would you expand on some of the
ways you'd propose to achieve that balance?
Ms. James. I am concerned about today's readiness and believe we
need to reinvest in this area to make up for the impacts of fiscal year
2013 sequestration. Keeping a ready force today is essential to ensure
the Air Force can answer the call. At the same time, I believe the Air
Force should continue its long-term recapitalization effort with an
emphasis on developing the capabilities the Service uniquely provides
to the Joint Force; such as, global/long-range and non-permissive
capabilities, exemplified in the F-35, Long-Range Strike Bomber, and
KC-46A programs.

2. Senator Udall. Ms. James, what do you see as the Air Force's
core missions--and are there any missions or systems that you believe
the Air Force should divest?
Ms. James. Airmen bring to the Nation's military portfolio, five
interdependent and integrated core missions that have endured since
President Truman originally assigned airpower roles and missions to the
Air Force in 1947. These are: air and space superiority; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; rapid global mobility; global strike;
and command and control. although the way the Air Force performs these
mission swill constantly evolve, the Air Force will continue to perform
these missions so that our military can respond quickly and
appropriately o unpredictable threats and challenges. If confirmed, I
will carefully review all systems.

air force space systems
3. Senator Udall. Ms. James, for fiscal year 2013 the
administration proposed terminating the Operationally Responsive Space
program, which the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) rejected. In
fiscal year 2014, the administration again proposed to terminate the
office and once again, SASC rejected this proposal. I understand that
we are in a stark fiscal crisis but I hope the Air Force takes into
account that this office is the one that first proposed low cost, quick
to build satellite coupled with a low cost launch. If confirmed, I want
you to realize that from the SASC perspective it does not look good to
terminate one of the few programs that may actually reduce the cost of
space systems in a time of sequestration. Will you commit to re-examine
any such proposals for fiscal year 2015?
Ms. James. Yes, I give you this commitment, if confirmed.

4. Senator Udall. Ms. James, General Shelton has mentioned
previously to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee that space systems and
ground systems are usually contracted for and managed separately. This
has resulted in disconnects between two programs that should be fully
integrated. As we look to reduce costs and redundancies, will you agree
to take a hard look at how we do space acquisition in order to achieve
savings and speed up delivery?
Ms. James. Yes. Although I am not familiar with General Shelton's
comments, I believe that continuing to improve the space acquisition
process is a priority for the Air force and for the Department of
Defense (DOD).
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
future scientists and engineers for dod and the defense industry
5. Senator Hagan. Ms. James, DOD and the defense industry are
facing challenges seeking new graduates with advanced degrees in
scientific and technical fields to help develop complex military
systems. Some of these challenges include a lack of interest in
traditional defense sectors by new graduates, Federal hiring issues,
budget pressure, the length that typical defense programs take to
execute, and competition for talent with other government agencies. If
confirmed, what would you do to ensure that DOD has access to the best
and brightest future scientific and technical talent?
Ms. James. I have been made aware of the science, technology,
engineering and mathematics (STEM) workforce challenges facing our
Nation and particularly the U.S. Air Force. If confirmed, I will convey
to airmen the need to improve technical skills and do my best to
inspire youth to pursue STEM disciplines and an Air Force career.
It's my understanding that the former Air Force Secretary and Chief
signed an Air Force STEM Workforce Strategic Roadmap called Bright
Horizons and that the Air Force is currently updating that document to
capture progress made and new initiatives. If confirmed, I plan to
review the Air Force's updated plan and ensure the Service implements a
STEM Roadmap which optimizes its scientific and technical skills base.

6. Senator Hagan. Ms. James, how would you measure the
effectiveness of these efforts?
Ms. James. I understand that the Air Force tracks the number of
publications accomplished linked to research funding, as well as
students supported by our funding outreach activities. If confirmed, I
will make sure such measurements continue so as to drive business
behaviors across the Air Force that are consistent with the vision and
goals of the updated Air Force STEM Workforce Strategic Roadmap.

modular airborne fire fighting system
7. Senator Hagan. Ms. James, the Air Guard and the Air Force
Reserve have been successfully flying and controlling the Modular
Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) mission to combat wildfires for
over 40 years. One reason this mission is so successful is the fact
that Reserve component personnel have had the opportunity to volunteer
in a variety of statuses, most importantly under title 32. However, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (and his deputy)
are now attempting to make MAFFS a title 10 mission, not a title 32
502(f) status National Guard controlled mission, even if/when a Dual
Status Commander is available for 2014. This would bring numerous
negative personnel issues and command and control issues, possibly
compromising the mission. All three States that fly MAFFS: North
Carolina, Wyoming, and California, and the National Guard Association
oppose this move as needlessly restrictive. Seeing as the National
Guard has been flying and controlling this mission for 40 years and the
Air Force has determined MAFFS is best suited for the Reserve
component, will you support continuing the use of title 32 as the
primary duty status for the MAFFS mission?
Ms. James. I am not familiar with this program. However, if
confirmed I will work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs to resolve the
personnel and command and control issues to ensure Air Reserve
component airmen have the flexibility and proper authority to support
the MAFFS mission.

information support squadrons
8. Senator Hagan. Ms. James, with the constant threat of cyber
attacks upon governmental organizations and commercial enterprises,
there is a high demand for personnel with the training and experience
to successfully protect our Nation's secrets and infrastructure. This
demand leads to a very competitive market for such expertise, a market
in which the playing field is certainly not level for Government
agencies, such as DOD, in terms of matching compensation with civilian
competitors. But there is one positive option for DOD in attracting and
retaining such personnel, and that is with the National Guard, where
its servicemembers can aspire to have a civilian career while
simultaneously serving one's country. In this environment, will you
support the placement of Information Support Squadrons for cyber
operations within the National Guard?
Ms. James. As a general principle, I believe Guard and Reserve
personnel in our Total Force bring cyber expertise from private
industry that is critical to our Nation's and Air Force cyber
operations. The 262nd Network Warfare Squadron, a guard squadron
supporting the Active 688th Cyberspace Wing, is an example of an Air
National Guard (ANG) unit that is one of our Air Force's premier cyber
operations squadrons made up of personnel who work in the commercial IT
industry and also serve as a guardsman. I will explore the opportunity
of doing more, if confirmed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
mental health
9. Senator Gillibrand. Ms. James, if confirmed, what will you do to
ensure the Air Force is providing appropriate mental health care to
airmen and their families?
Ms. James. The Air Force's focus is on provision of quality and
timely mental health support for airmen and their families. This same
support extends to all military servicemembers and families wherever
they are supported by Air Force hospitals and clinics. Meeting the
operational mental health needs of our servicemembers will be one of my
top priorities. I will ensure integration of mental health support with
our community partners to identify sources of stress and help reduce
the impacts of stress to promote health and family wellness. I will
place strong emphasis on a tightly coordinated program of mental health
support between the three military medical services, the TRICARE
network, and the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide a full scope
of mental health services for our airmen and their families.

cyber
10. Senator Gillibrand. Ms. James, the Air Force is scheduled to
add more than 1,000 cyber professionals between fiscal years 2014 and
2016. In light of sequestration and current budgetary constraints do
you foresee being able to meet these goals?
Ms. James. I certainly hope so, as I believe this to be an
important area. However, the Air Force could face significant
challenges depending on the outcome of budget deliberations and whether
there is a Continuing Resolution or full appropriation in fiscal year
2014.

11. Senator Gillibrand. Ms. James, do you see room for cost savings
in using more of the National Guard and Reserves to build your cyber
force?
Ms. James. The cyber mission strikes me as a good one for the
National Guard and Reserve. If confirmed, I will delve into this more
deeply. I also would like to explore ways to better identify new
recruits who may have a particular aptitude for the cyber mission.
Finally, it may be appropriate to target bonuses and advertising
resources to this career area.

12. Senator Gillibrand. Ms. James, the cyber field is a fast-paced,
ever-changing arena. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure
we are recruiting the best and the brightest to this field?
Ms. James. I am aware the Air Force advocates and supports
cyberspace and computer training and education programs nationwide to
encourage high school and college students towards technical career
fields. This strikes me as a good start. I look forward to working on
this area, if confirmed.

13. Senator Gillibrand. Ms. James, what authorities will be needed
to keep the U.S. military on the cutting edge of cyber?
Ms. James. I am not aware of any current gaps in authorities;
however, if confirmed, I will need to review this area fully.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
readiness
14. Senator Hirono. Ms. James, what are the impacts of
sequestration on recruitment and retention for the uniformed military?
Ms. James. I don't have the exact figures, and it may be too early
to tell, but I would expect some adverse impacts to Air Force
recruiting in light of budget cuts to advertising, marketing and
outreach programs.

15. Senator Hirono. Ms. James, for our valued civil servants in
DOD, the furloughs have created difficult situations for many. What are
the impacts on recruitment and retention of our civil service
employees?
Ms. James. I believe the most significant immediate impact of
furlough has been on morale of the workforce. I also understand the Air
Force expects a surge in retirements that could lead to one of the
largest retirement years in recent memory. Furloughs, continued pay
freezes, and reductions in force could have long-term effects on the
workforce and recruitment if future furloughs occur.

rebalance to the pacific
16. Senator Hirono. Ms. James, the Air Force will continue to play
a significant role within the U.S. Pacific Command team as we move
forward with the Pacific rebalance. What is your view of the Air
Force's role in the future?
Ms. James. The U.S. Air Force will rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region in conjunction with other regional and global
commitments. The Air Force will continue to play a vital role in
securing U.S. economic and security interests in the Pacific region.
Specifically, the preservation of peace, stability, and the free flow
of commerce in the Pacific region will be a top U.S. priority.

17. Senator Hirono. Ms. James, how important will total force
integration be to continue and where possible expand the partnership
between the Active Duty and Reserve components?
Ms. James. Total Force Integration is essential to reinforce the
interdependencies between Active and Reserve components of the Air
Force. Collaboration between Air Force leadership from both the Active
and Reserve components is and will remain vital to building a Total
Force Air Force that delivers air, space, and cyber power that the
Nation and the joint force have come to expect from our Air Force; this
is especially true in an environment of decreasing resources.

command climate
18. Senator Hirono. Ms. James, a command climate survey can go a
long way in determining how effective a unit is and whether or not
negative actions such as sexual harassment are tolerated and/or
reported. What is your opinion of the current climate surveys?
Ms. James. I understand that the Air Force Climate Survey is
conducted biennially and, if confirmed, the results will be briefed to
me and released to the units. Commanders with 10 or more respondents
are provided survey results along with a guide containing specific
recommendations and lists of resources to improve their unit climate.
If confirmed, I will review the survey more fully to see if there are
needed improvements.

19. Senator Hirono. Ms. James, should climate surveys be kept to
monitor potential long-term issues?
Ms. James. I believe so. Unit Climate Assessments are essential to
monitoring the engagement of the organization, and electronic copies of
organizational climate surveys are maintained by the Equal Opportunity
Office. Additionally, climate surveys should be maintained by
commanders to monitor trends, to track progress on recommended actions,
and to address long-term issues which cannot be promptly resolved.
Commanders are encouraged to pass climate survey results to incoming
commanders to ensure continuity on long-term issues.

20. Senator Hirono. Ms. James, should climate surveys be tied to
the commander's permanent personnel records so as to monitor
performance as a leader? What about other assessments such as 360
evaluations?
Ms. James. I am very interested in tying climate surveys to
performance reviews and I am told DOD is currently evaluating the
methods used to assess the performance of military commanders for
establishing command climates of dignity and respect and incorporating
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response into their commands to ensure
standardization across the Services.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
air force readiness
21. Senator Inhofe. Ms. James, what are your thoughts on tiered
readiness and the ability of the Air Force to meet combatant commander
(COCOM) requirements, maintain overall readiness, and the impact to
morale and retention of personal?
Ms. James. According to the briefings I have received so far, I am
told the Air Force cannot maintain a tiered-readiness posture and still
meet the current defense guidance. That said, the Air Force may have
reached a point where large force structure cannot be sustained at
requisite readiness levels while also preserving critical modernization
programs needed for the future. This is a very difficult problem to
resolve going forward and one that I will need to study carefully, if
confirmed.

22. Senator Inhofe. Ms. James, based on current and projected
readiness levels of the Air Force, do you believe the Air Force can
meet current COCOM Operational Plan requirements? You may provide a
classified answer for the record if you chose.
Ms. James. The Chief of Staff stated in a September 16 interview
with Air Force Times, ``There is not a mission that the Nation could
ask that the Air Force would not be capable of doing.'' I believe this
statement is accurate. However, I am concerned that if readiness is
lessened the Air Force may have to perform missions with greater risk,
and I prefer this not happen.

23. Senator Inhofe. Ms. James, depot maintenance has been delayed
on our aircraft--equipment that is on average over 20 years old and
worn down by over a decade of war. Based on your experience both in DOD
and out in industry, how does this impact the readiness and safety of
the Air Force?
Ms. James. Based on my experience, I believe the impacts caused by
fiscal year 20l3 reduction in depot maintenance will likely impact
future aircraft availability/sortie generation rates, thereby
negatively affecting overall readiness recovery efforts. The depot
recovery from sequestration will likely require a multi-year effort and
additional funding to halt the decline in aircraft availability.
Regarding safety, I know the Air Force considers safety a top
priority in all operations and strives to mitigate and manage risk.

24. Senator Inhofe. Ms. James, has DOD budgeted additional money in
fiscal year 2014 to pay for delayed fiscal year 2013 Air Force depot
maintenance?
Ms. James. My understanding is the Air Force has not budgeted
additional money in fiscal year 2014 to pay for delayed fiscal year
2013 depot maintenance requirements. The delayed requirements have been
added to the overall 2014 depot maintenance program and will be
prioritized against the remaining weapon system sustainment portfolio
to best maximize warfighter readiness based on available fiscal
resources.

25. Senator Inhofe. Ms. James, what is your assessment of the F-35
program as it is executing today based on budget and schedule?
Ms. James. It is my understanding that the program went through a
technical baseline review a few years ago and since then has been
tracking well to its planned schedule baseline. It has been reported
that the recent Low Rate Initial Production contract awards have
resulted in reductions to air vehicle costs. Based upon that, it would
seem the program should be executing below cost. Efforts to address
technical issues and life cycle costs are encouraging, but I understand
that software remains a watch-item. Additionally, I'm aware that the
DOD Inspector General conducted a quality assurance assessment on the
program. In their report, they assessed the Government's oversight of
the contractor as inadequate and ineffective which is a concern to me.
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the program to see firsthand
how well it is executing to its cost, schedule, and technical
performance baselines.

26. Senator Inhofe. Ms. James, is the F-35 needed to meet U.S.
national security requirements?
Ms. James. Yes. The F-35 represents the future of the Air Force
fighter fleet. It will provide critical capabilities required to
accomplish Air Force missions in the threat environment of the future,
and enables true Joint and Coalition operations. The air superiority
this Nation has enjoyed for 60 years is not an accident and gaining and
maintaining it is not easy. It requires trained proficient and ready
airmen and it requires credible, capable and technologically superior
aircraft. The F-35 is essential to ensuring we can provide that air
superiority in the future.

27. Senator Inhofe. Ms. James, what is the impact if the United
States cuts the number of F-35s it plans to procure?
Ms. James. It is my understanding that a cut in the procurement of
F-35s will increase the per-unit cost. Therefore, the impact to the
overall cost will depend upon the final number of aircraft to be
procured.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
small business contracts
28. Senator Chambliss. Ms. James, while I appreciate and support
the objectives and intent of the Small Business Act, I am concerned
that often the requirement to reach a small business percentage goal
outweighs the requirement to produce the most effective products and
services for our warfighters. This goal to achieve a certain percentage
quota for small businesses can lead to inappropriate pressure being
brought to bear on defense contracting officers to make decisions which
result in the government buying a product or service at higher total
procurement cost.
In some instances, these pressures are contrary to existing
provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) that contain
specific exceptions allowing contracting officers' greater flexibility
for specified contract tasks. Unfortunately, I am aware of cases in
which these exceptions are not considered or are improperly excluded
during the contract review process.
In particular, FAR 6.302.3 (Exception 3) applies specifically to
engineering, research, or development capabilities that are provided to
the Government by an educational or other nonprofit institution or a
Federally Funded Research and Development Center. These contracts do
not compete with large or small businesses and are well-recognized by
the Air Force as providing unique capabilities at very low costs.
Often, these Exception 3 contracts deliver a work product that is
itself used to generate contract solicitations for small businesses.
In this climate of tight budgets, the Air Force must take full
advantage of the best products or services at lower costs. University
research, engineering, or development centers which are non-profit can
provide these lower costs with greater continuity in expertise,
unbiased analysis, along with advanced academic training. The Air Force
has long acknowledged that we must improve the training available to
both current and future government employees so that they will be
better prepared to do their jobs. That is another reason that the
Exception 3 academic component is part of the FAR provisions.
To this end, the Air Force should establish a plan in which
contracts awarded under a valid FAR Exception 3 are not counted against
the percentage of total awards made to small businesses when
determining small business set-aside, award goals.
Furthermore, the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Small
Business Programs office, should immediately direct local Air Force
commands to educate, emphasize, and enforce the intent of FAR
exceptions and make it clear to both local Procurement Contracting
Officers and Small Business Offices that valid FAR 6.302 Exception 3
contracts are not subject to Small Business disapproval because they
are viewed as detracting from small business contracting goals.
If confirmed, do you believe that you can create a system where
awards made under a FAR Subpart 6.302 Exceptions 3 will not count
against Air Force small business percentage goals?
Ms. James. As I understand it, the methodology for what is or is
not counted in the Small Business Goaling percentage is established by
the Small Business Act and its implementing regulations and policies.
The type of action you propose may require a change in legislation
(i.e., Small Business Act). If confirmed, I will look into the issue
more closely.

29. Senator Chambliss. Ms. James, if confirmed, will you and your
Small Business Programs office, in the next 90 days, work directly with
my staff to craft a solution that ensures the Air Force will actively
enforce the intent of FAR 6.302 Exceptions 3 so that we are not
excluding a valid process that results in lower total procurement
costs?
Ms. James. If confirmed, I will look into FAR 6.302-3 sole source
exceptions to ensure processes are being followed according to all laws
and regulations.

30. Senator Chambliss. Ms. James, within 180 days, will you
establish a Service-wide directive where awards made under FAR 6.302
Exception 3 are not subject to local Small Business office review for
approval and allocation to small business contracting quotas if this
valid exception is considered to be in the best interest of the
Government as determined by the Government requirements and procurement
personnel?
Ms. James. I will certainly review the policies under the Small
Business Act, Section 8, 15, and 31 and FAR 19.402 and consult with the
Small Business Administration regarding their statutory and regulatory
policies on this issue.

31. Senator Chambliss. Ms. James, in accordance with FAR 19.702,
since subcontracting plans are required for solicitations greater than
$650,000 ($1.5 million for construction), and because prime contractors
are required to electronically submit subcontractor reports (SF 294 and
SF 295) after award, will the Air Force include dollar totals from
these subcontractor reports towards the small business goals since the
subcontracts are also federally funded and the data is already
available?
Ms. James. As I understand it, IAW FAR 19.702, they will count
towards the Subcontracting Goals.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
a-10 warthog
32. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, has the Air Force made the decision
to divest A-10s from the Air Force inventory?
Ms. James. To the best of my knowledge, no final decisions have
been made. This question is predecisonal (and I am not privy to
predecisional matters).

33. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, has General Welsh signed the fiscal
year 2015 program objective memorandum (POM) and does it call for the
divestment of A-10s by 2015?
Ms. James. I don't know. However, I do know that Air Force budget
decisions are not final at this point, as they have yet to go through
the full process.

34. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, is the divestment of the A-10
primarily a budget-driven decision or does the Air Force believe the A-
10 is no longer needed for the close air support mission? If the Air
Force believes the A-10 is no longer needed, please provide a detailed
justification.
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on the fiscal year 2015 POM, but
it my understanding there are other weapon systems in the Air Force
inventory that provide capabilities similar to that of the A-10. If
confirmed, I will explore the matter thoroughly.

35. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, does the Air Force believe it will
need congressional authority or appropriations to divest A-10s?
Ms. James. Any Air Force divestiture proposals will be forwarded as
part of the President's budget for congressional consideration. If
confirmed, I will take no action on fleet divestures without consulting
all stakeholders.

36. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, have the Army and Marine Corps
provided an opinion to the Air Force on any potential plan to divest
the A-10s?
Ms. James. I don't know. However, the normal process would be for
the Air Force to brief the Army and Marine Corps as well as the other
DOD components on the Air Force's fiscal year 2015 budget
recommendations. Additionally, DOD leads an extensive review of each
Service's budget proposals as part of the annual Program Budget Review.
This process has not yet fully played out.

37. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, has the Army expressed a desire to
maintain and operate the A-10?
Ms. James. I don't know. Personally, I have not communicated with
the Army about this program.

38. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, how does the Air Force plan to
replace the capabilities that will be lost if the A-10 is divested by
fiscal year 2015?
Ms. James. I am told that the A-10 capabilities already exist on
multi-role platforms. The evolution of targeting pods, precision-guided
munitions, and the refinement of tactics, techniques, and procedures
have enabled other platforms to provide the capabilities once
considered unique to the A-10. I will delve into this more deeply if
confirmed.

39. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, how does the Air Force plan to
replace the A-10s role in close air support, combat search and rescue
(CSAR) support, strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR), and as a
forward air controller (airborne)?
Ms. James. I am told that these missions are already accomplished
using multiple aircraft in the Air Force inventory. Multi-role fighter
platforms already perform most of these missions. I agree that this is
a critical question to review more thoroughly if confirmed.

40. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, if the A-10 is divested, does the
Air Force anticipate a degradation of capability in any of these areas?
Ms. James. If the A-10 is divested, it will be critical that these
capabilities be provided through alternate means. I would be committed
to this if confirmed.

41. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what would be the timeline for A-10
divestments?
Ms. James. I do not have any information on this.

42. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, will F-35s come into the inventory
at the same rate or faster than A-10s would be divested?
Ms. James. I don't know.

43. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, are Air Force F-35 pilots receiving
formal training for the following missions: close air support, CSAR
support, Special Operations Forces support, air interdiction, armed
reconnaissance, forward air controller (airborne), non-traditional
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and SCAR?
Ms. James. My understanding is that pilots either are, or will be
trained, in all these areas.

44. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, has the Air Force developed plans to
end or curtail A-10 pilot training?
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on this.

45. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, is the Air Force curtailing A-10
pilot training in fiscal year 2014? If so, how?
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on this area.

46. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, would all bases that lose the A-10
receive a new airframe? If not, which bases will not receive
replacement airframes?
Ms. James. I have no information on this.

47. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, which operations plans (OPLANS)
explicitly call for the use of A-10s and how will these OPLANS be
supported without the A-10? (a classified response is acceptable)
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on classified matters. I can
provide, if confirmed.

48. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, has the Air Force sought the formal
opinions of COCOMs regarding the potential divestment of the A-10?
Ms. James. I do not know specifically, but if not, it should be
part of the normal process.

49. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what have COCOMs said?
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on this.

50. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, have they expressed concerns about
the ability to support OPLANs?
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on classified matters.

51. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, will every A-10 removed from South
Korea be replaced by an F-35?
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on this.

52. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, in South Korea, would there be any
gap between the removal of A-10s and their replacement with F-35s?
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on this.

53. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what are the strategic assumptions
that are guiding the Air Force's decision to potentially divest the A-
10?
Ms. James. My understanding is that the Air Force is looking to
achieve savings where possible in single mission aircraft when multi-
mission aircraft can fulfill that mission.

54. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, how has the A-10 performed in
Afghanistan?
Ms. James. As far as I know, the A-10 performed superbly in
Afghanistan.

55. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, how did the A-10 perform in Iraq?
Ms. James. Superbly, to the best of my knowledge.

56. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what is the best Air Force close air
support platform in Afghanistan?
Ms. James. I don't have information on this, but I have been
briefed that the following additional aircraft provide close air
support in Afghanistan: F-15E, F-16, B-1, B-52, AC-130.

57. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, how much does it cost to operate and
maintain the current fleet of A-10s?
Ms. James. I am told that in fiscal year 2012, the Air Force owned
346 A-10C aircraft that flew a total of 101.6K hours. The associated
operational costs were $1.8 billion (based on Air Force Total Ownership
Cost fiscal year 1303 data).

58. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what is the potential Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) savings associated with divesting the A-10
fleet?
Ms. James. I have not received any FYDP briefings.

59. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what is the FYDP savings associated
with divesting only the Active Duty A-10s while maintaining all the
ANG/Air Force Reserves (AFRES) A-10 fleet?
Ms. James. I don't know.

60. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, how does the planned A-10 Programmed
Flying Training (PFT) for fiscal year 2014 compare to the PFT in fiscal
year 2013? How does this change compare with other aircraft?
Ms. James. My understanding is that the fiscal year 2014 A-10C PFT
is reduced 18 percent from the fiscal year 2013 levels. The Air Force
has explained to me that this is a result of the fiscal year 2013
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration-directed conversion of
a Formal Training Unit (FTU) squadron to Air Force Reserve component
and flying hour reductions associated with current fiscal challenges.
Apparently, while other FTUs may have seen small flying hour
reductions, no other FTUs are showing a noticeable difference in
production between fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014.

61. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, when has Headquarters (HQ) Air
Combat Command (ACC) directed that the last scheduled Active Duty A-10
FTU ``B Course'' to occur? Please provide start and end dates.
Ms. James. Based on my understanding, A-10 B-courses are still
funded and planned.

62. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, has HQ ACC canceled any Active Duty
B Courses programmed for fiscal year 2014?
Ms. James. To the best of my knowledge--no.

63. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, is the Air Force still assigning new
pilots to A-10 formal training and operational units?
Ms. James. As I understand it, the Air Force is still assigning new
pilots to the A-10.

64. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, when does the Air Force assignment
system currently project the last A-10 pilots will enter formal
training?
Ms. James. Logically speaking, it would seem that the Air Force
would only cease A-10 B-course training if the A-10 fleet is to be
removed from the inventory.

65. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, is the Air Force maintaining the
health of the A-10 fleet commensurate with other major weapons systems
in terms of personnel flow, and logistics, and operations and
maintenance (O&M) funding? Please include a side-by-side comparison
with other major weapons systems.
Ms. James. As I understand, yes. A-10 funding levels and aircraft
availability (AA) rates are commensurate with other legacy fighter/
attack weapon systems. However, the A-10 manning levels decreased
approximately 10 percent from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2012.
This is partly due to the closing of the A-10 squadron at Spangdahlem
AB, Germany. Overall, the health of the A-10 fleet, in terms of AA,
improved from fiscal year 2010-2012. Total O&M costs less MILPERS are
included in the comparison below.

66. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, in the event of A-10 fleet
divestment, will the Air Force mobilize ANG/AFRES A-10 units to fulfill
this gap?
Ms. James. Logically speaking, it would seem that a fleet
divestment would include ANG and AFRES units.

67. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, how long will they be mobilized?
Ms. James. Divestiture, if it were to happen, would include the
ANG, AFRES and the active units.

68. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what was the cause of the F-15E
mishap that occurred during the Libya operations? (a classified
response is acceptable)
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on this, but I will look in to
it, if confirmed.

69. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, which legacy close air support (CAS)
platforms have a Common Missile Warning System installed?
Ms. James. My understanding is that there are no Air Force legacy
CAS platforms that have this specific system installed. However, legacy
Air Force platforms are equipped with a number of systems to protect
against missile threats to include infrared and radar warning
receivers, countermeasures, jammers and decoys. The F-35 will also have
advanced warning and defensive systems.

70. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, which legacy CAS platforms are
considered ``threshold'' for the ALQ-131 Pod Upgrade Program (PUP)?
Ms. James. I have not been briefed on the PUP.

f-35 joint strike fighter
71. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, do you believe that our Nation needs
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter? If so, why?
Ms. James. Yes, we need a fifth generation fighter aircraft to
ensure air dominance.

72. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, do you believe it is important to
execute the planned increase in production in fiscal year 2015 and
beyond?
Ms. James. I am unfamiliar with Air Force 2015 budget plans or
specific F-35 production buy profiles. Intuitively an increase in
production should continue to drive down unit cost, address legacy
fleet recapitalization needs and provide capability sooner to help
address threats. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Service
2015 budget plans. From what I understand, the Air Force, like the rest
of DOD, is reviewing all programs closely as it develops its future
budgets against the backdrop of an uncertain fiscal environment.

auditability
73. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, Secretary Hagel has said that DOD
needs ``auditable statements . . . to reassure the public, and
Congress, that we are good stewards of public funds''. Do you share
Secretary Hagel's belief that we need auditable statements to ensure
the Air Force is a good steward of our tax dollars--especially in this
period of difficult budget cuts?
Ms. James. Yes. Auditable financial statements provide Congress and
the American public confidence that the Air Force is producing useful
and reliable fiscal information, as well as spending taxpayer funds
judiciously. Our current budget environment makes this effort even more
urgent. Audit readiness will improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of the funds entrusted to the Air Force.

74. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, do you understand that submitting an
audit-ready statement of budgetary resources by September 30, 2014 is
not just a goal, but it is the law?
Ms. James. Yes. I fully understand that the September 30, 2014
deadline for validating the audit readiness of the statement of
budgetary resources was mandated in National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013.

75. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, in light of the cancelation late
last year of the failing Expeditionary Combat Support System, do you
believe the Air Force is on track to meet the 2014 and 2017 audit
deadlines?
Ms. James. While I don't have detailed insight into the current Air
Force audit readiness plan, I know the Air Force is committed to
meeting the near- and long-term audit readiness goals. I intend on
ensuring this remains a priority for the Air Force, if confirmed.

76. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what are the greatest challenges in
meeting the audit readiness requirement and how can Congress help?
Ms. James. I look forward to becoming more knowledgeable about Air
Force audit readiness plans and goals. The ``longest pole in the tent''
likely will be legacy systems. Without doubt, the effort is substantial
and impacts the entire enterprise. I am committed to identifying the
most significant challenges, as well as practical solutions to
overcoming those challenges.

77. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, do I have a commitment from you that
the Air Force will meet the 2014 statement of budgetary resources
deadline, as required by the 2013 NDAA?
Ms. James. You have my full commitment to work this hard. I
understand this is a legal requirement and will give it full attention
and priority. Once confirmed, I will look more closely into where the
Air Force stands today.

sequestration and its impact on readiness
78. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, General Welsh has recently said that
under sequestration, the Air Force would be unable to execute the 2012
Strategic Planning Guidance that requires the military to fight one
major adversary and deter another. General Welsh also told airmen
stationed in Japan that the Air Force would ``not be as ready as we
would like'' if ordered to take action against the Syrian regime. Do
you agree with General Welsh's assessments?
Ms. James. I agree with General Welsh especially with respect to
those forces that stopped flying due to sequestration.

79. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, what are your greatest readiness
concerns if sequestration goes forward in 2014?
Ms. James. If confirmed, I will focus on returning units stood down
in fiscal year 2013 to operational levels of readiness.

80. Senator Ayotte. Ms. James, General William Shelton, Commander
of Air Force Space Command, recently said that sequestration threatens
to ``break every program'' in the U.S. military space enterprise. Do
you share his concern?
Ms. James. I have not been briefed fully on space programs, but I
agree in principle sequestration is very damaging.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
religion in the military
81. Senator Lee. Ms. James, the current Air Force Instruction (AFI)
1-1, Section 2.12.1 regarding the free exercise of religion states that
airmen are free to practice the religion they choose. It goes on to
state that they may ``confidently practice beliefs while respecting
others whose viewpoints differ from their own''. What action or actions
by airmen would you consider show a lack of respect for the viewpoints
of others?
Ms. James. Ridiculing someone because of their religion or because
they are non-religious would be contrary to the AFI you reference and
counter to the wingman culture the Air Force values. It would also be
disrespectful to continue pressing an unwelcome religious discussion on
someone.

82. Senator Lee. Ms. James, can you please describe when the
practice of faith may be restricted by the viewpoints of others?
Ms. James. The practice of faith should never be restricted by the
personal viewpoints of others. Accommodation of particular religious
practices will be granted unless a commander determines military
necessity justifies limitation of the requested accommodation.
Commanders and supervisors at all levels are expected to ensure that
requests for religious accommodation are dealt with fairly.

83. Senator Lee. Ms. James, what do you understand to be the
difference between evangelizing, which is allowed by DOD, and
proselytizing, which is not allowed?
Ms. James. My understanding is that the Air Force and DOD have no
policy that directly addresses religious evangelizing and
proselytizing. However, there is an Air Force policy on Free Exercise
of Religion and Religious Accommodation. Basically, servicemembers may
share their faith with other servicemembers, but may not forcibly
attempt to convert others of another faith or no faith to their own
beliefs. Concerns that may arise regarding these issues are handled on
a case-by-case basis by the leaders of the unit involved, in
consultation with chaplains and legal advisors.

84. Senator Lee. Ms. James, how are these differences explained to
commanders in the military, and do you believe it is consistently
applied?
Ms. James. I believe that Air Force Chaplains are directly involved
in the training of squadron and wing commanders. This training includes
a discussion of the commander's role in ensuring the religious freedoms
of airmen. It also includes a discussion of the commanders own
religious practices. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing this
area more with the Chief of Air Force Chaplains and to inquire about
consistency.
______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Deborah Lee James
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
August 1, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Deborah Lee James, of Virginia, to be Secretary of the Air Force,
vice Michael Bruce Donley, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Deborah Lee James, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Deborah Lee James
Education:
Duke University

1976-1979
Bachelor of Arts Degree, Comparative Area Studies,
awarded 1979

Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs

1979-1981
Master of International Affairs Degree, awarded 1981
Employment record:
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)

President for Technical and Engineering Sector
February 2013-present

Executive Vice President for Communications and
Government Affairs
August 2010-February 2013

Senior Vice President/Business Unit General Manager
February 2004-August 2010

Senior Vice President
January 2002-February 2004

Senior Vice President and Director for Homeland
Security
January 2002-January 2002 (1 month)

Business Executives for National Security

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
May 2000-December 2001

United Technologies

Vice President of International Operations and
Marketing
April 1998-May 2000

U.S. Department of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs
May 1993-April 1998

U.S. House of Representatives

Professional Staff Member
1983-1993

Department of the U.S. Army

Presidential Management Intern, Army Materiel Command
September 1981-April 1983
Honors and awards:
Profiles in Diversity Journal ``Women Worth Watching'' 2010 and
2012
Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, 1997 and
1998
Meritorious Civilian Service Medals awarded by Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Coast Guard
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Deborah
Lee James in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Deborah Roche Lee James.
Deborah Lee James.
Deborah Roche Lee.
Deborah Lynn Roche.

2. Position to which nominated:
Secretary of the Air Force.

3. Date of nomination:
August 1, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
November 25, 1958; Long Branch, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Frank Joseph Beatty.

7. Names and ages of children:
Samuel Phillips Lee II, 29.
Regina Blair Lee, 27.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Rumson Fair Haven Regional High School, High School Diploma, June
1976.
Duke University, A.B. Comparative Studies, May 1979.
Columbia University, MIA (International Affairs), May 1981.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
President, Technical and Engineering Sector (SAIC), McLean, VA,
February 2013-present.
Executive Vice President, Communications and Government Affairs
(SAIC), McLean, VA, August 2010-February 2013.
Senior Vice President/Business Unit General Manager (SAIC), McLean,
VA, February 2004-August 2010.
Senior Vice President (SAIC), McLean, VA, January 2002-February
2004.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Trustee, Deborah R. Lee James Revocable Trust (my personal trust)
Advisory Board Member, Pentagon Federal Credit Union Foundation
(2008-Present), Alexandria, VA
Advisory Board, Woman's Memorial Science, Technology, Engineering
and Math (STEM) Campaign (2010-Present), Arlington, VA
Advisory Board, College of Charleston School of Language, Culture
and World Affairs (2010-Present), Charleston, SC
Member, Board of Directors, Tragedy Assistance Program for
Survivors (TAPS) (2011-Present), Washington, DC
Member, Advisory Board, Citadel School of Engineering Advisory
Board (2010-Present), Charleston, SC
Board Member, Women in International Security (WIIS) Executive
Circle (2012-Present), Washington, DC
Board Member, Atlantic Council of the United States (2012-Present),
Washington, DC
Advisory Member, Business and Professional Women's Foundation--
Joining Forces for Women Veterans Mentorinig Advisory Council (2011-
Present), Washlngton, DC

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Executive Mosaic 4x24 Leadership Program, Potomac Officers'
Club (2013-Present), McLean, VA (note: this is not a charity)

Candidate/PAC
Date Amount

4/16/2008.......................... $500 SAIC Inc.-Voluntary Political Action Committee of SAIC
5/9/2008........................... $250 Ketner, Linda
10/21/2008......................... $2,300 Obama, Barack
10/31/2008......................... $500 Ketner, Linda
8/12/2009.......................... $1,000 SAIC Inc.-VPAC
9/2/2010........................... $3,000 SAIC Inc.-VPAC
10/25/2010......................... $500 Skelton, Ike
9/30/2011.......................... $250 Douglass, John
3/19/2012.......................... $1,000 Connolly, Gerry
4/17/2012.......................... $4,000 SAIC Inc.-VPAC

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service (1997 and
1998)
Meritorious Civilian Service Medals awarded by Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Coast Guard
Profiles in Diversity Journal ``Women Worth Watching,'' 2010 and
2012

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
N/A

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Hon. Deborah L. James was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 24, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on December 13, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Jessica G. Wright by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I do not see the need for any modifications. I believe that
the Goldwater-Nichols Act has significantly contributed to the strong
framework for today's joint warfighting capabilities. It has
considerably improved inter-service and joint relationships, promoting
greater effectiveness of the military departments and combatant
commands.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Currently I am unaware of any areas where modifications are
needed. If I am confirmed, I will continue to assess any further need
to legislative modifications.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. In October 2012, I was designated as the acting Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Further,
in December 2012, I was named the acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness. In both of these roles, I supported the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in the areas of Total Force
Management as it relates to readiness; National Guard and Reserve
component affairs; health affairs; training; and personnel requirements
and management, including equal opportunity, morale, welfare,
recreation, and quality of life matter. I have been responsible for the
recruitment, career development, pay and benefits of 1.4 million Active
Duty military personnel, 1.3 million Guard and Reserve personnel,
680,000 DOD civilians, and was responsible for overseeing the overall
state of military readiness.
In addition, I served this country in uniform for over 35 years, a
large part of that time in key leadership positions as an Active Guard
Reserve officer as well as a traditional Reserve component member. My
last assignment for over 7 years was as The Adjutant General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Commander of the Pennsylvania National
Guard where I worked with a wide variety of officials at the Federal,
State, and local levels. During that time, I was responsible for a vast
array of programs including the personnel, equipping, training,
mobilizations, deployment and demobilizations of over 20,000 guards men
and women, the management and implementation of the PA National Guard
responsibility for the National Special Security Event G-20, the role
the PA National Guard played in providing support to Hurricane Katrina,
and several aspects of the Presidential Inauguration in January 2009,
to name just a few. I was also responsible for all of the Veterans
programs within the Commonwealth as well as our Family support
networks, Yellow Ribbon and Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
(ESGR) Programs.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (P&R)?
Answer. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the All-Volunteer
Force and it must remain our highest priority to maintain the quality
and readiness of our Nation's Total Force. With shifting operational
needs abroad and the difficult fiscal realities at home, we will need
to rebalance, adapt and evolve our workforce to meet these challenges.
We must do this also by providing commensurate compensation, benefits,
support and medical care to our servicemembers and their families. As
we face programmed reductions in military end strength, civilian
workforce, and contract services, we must be vigilant in order to
sustain force readiness and retain our high quality military and
civilian personnel that have made our military the strongest, most
capable, and respected fighting force in the history of the world.
The Department leadership is collectively focused on eliminating
sexual assault from the Total Force. Even one sexual assault is one too
many and out of step with the core values of the American military.
Likewise, P&R must keep, at the forefront, preventing suicide and
addressing mental health as we complete our mission in Afghanistan and
assist our transitioning servicemembers to be successful and productive
in their civilian life.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the force
readiness and personnel risk reduction priorities of Secretary Hagel
and Deputy Secretary Carter. I will further assess range of challenges
and issues confronting the Department in these areas. I fully recognize
this is a team effort and that significant progress cannot be made
without leadership and close partnerships. I intend to continue to work
closely with Congress; colleagues in the Office of Secretary of
Defense, Joint Staff, and the Military Departments and Services; as
well as with critical partners across the interagency and advocacy
groups to make progress on these challenges.
duties
Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall perform such
duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of Defense may
prescribe in the areas of military readiness, total force management,
military and civilian personnel requirements, military and civilian
personnel training, military and civilian family matters, exchange,
commissary, and non-appropriated fund activities, personnel
requirements for weapons support, National Guard and Reserve
components, and health affairs.
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect to be
assigned to you?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to carry out my responsibilities,
functions, relationships, and authorities, in accordance with the law
and consistent with DOD Directive 5124.2, ``Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).'' I would be the Secretary of
Defense's principal staff assistant and advisor in all matters relating
to the management and well-being of military and civilian personnel in
the DOD Total Force and for oversight of the readiness of this force. I
would develop policies and provide oversight for the direction of plans
and programs governing Total Force management as it relates to
manpower; force management; planning; program integration; readiness;
National Guard and Reserve component affairs; health affairs; training;
personnel requirements and management; and compensation. This also
includes equal opportunity, morale, welfare, recreation, and quality of
life matters for both civilian and military personnel and their
families.
Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your
relationship with the following officials?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to serve the Secretary as his
principal advisor and advocate for Total Force Management as it relates
to readiness; National Guard and Reserve component affairs; health
affairs; training; and personnel requirements and management, including
equal opportunity, morale, welfare, recreation, and quality of life
matters.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect my relationship with the
Deputy Secretary to be fundamentally the same as that with the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
(ASD(HA)).
Answer. If confirmed, ASD(HA) will be my principal advisor for all
DOD health policies, programs, and force health protection activities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
(RA).
Answer. If confirmed, ASD(RA) will be my principal advisor for all
Reserve component matters in the Department of Defense (DOD).
Question. The Department of Defense General Counsel.
Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate regular communication,
coordination of actions, and exchange of views with the General Counsel
and the attorneys assigned to focus on personnel policy matters. I
would expect to seek and follow the advice of the General Counsel on
legal and procedural matters pertaining to the policies promulgated
from the off ices of the USD(P&R) office.
Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General.
Answer. The DOD Inspector General is in charge of promoting
integrity, accountability, and improvement of DOD personnel, programs
and operations to support the Department's mission and serve the public
interest. If confirmed, I will fully assist in any investigations or
issues that relate to personnel and readiness.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. If confirmed, I would hope to work closely with the
Secretaries of the Military Departments on all matters relating to the
management, well-being, and readiness of military and civilian
personnel in the DOD Total Force structure.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. If confirmed, I would hope to work closely with the
Secretaries of the Military Departments on all matters relating to the
management, well-being, and readiness of military and civilian
personnel in the DOD Total Force structure.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Answer. If confirmed, I would intend to further strengthen the
partnership with these officials in carrying out the human resource
obligations of the Services for the Total Force.
Question. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for
Personnel, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Commandant of
the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to partner in effective working
relationships with these officers to ensure that DOD attracts,
motivates and retains the quality people it needs.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. If confirmed, I would hope to work closely with the
Combatant Commanders on all l matters relating to the management, well-
being, and readiness of the DOD Total Force.
Question. The Joint Staff, particularly the Director for Manpower
and Personnel (J-1).
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to partner a close coordinating
relationship with the Joint Staff regarding manpower and personnel
policy issues.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to
the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces and
on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I look forward to a continued strong relationship, through
ASD(RA), to ensure effective integration of National Guard capabilities
into a cohesive Total Force.
Question. Director, Defense Health Agency.
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the Director of
the Defense Health Agency (soon to be established), through ASD(HA), in
all matter relating to the Military Health System and common medical
services shared across all Services.
Question. Director, Office of Personnel Management.
If confirmed, I intend to partner a close coordinating relationship
with the Director, Office of Personnel Management on matters regarding
civilian personnel policies.
systems and support for wounded warriors
Question. Servicemembers and civilians who are wounded or injured
in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service
and the Federal Government for support services, healing and
recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful
transition from active duty if required, and continuing support after
retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and
renewed emphasis over the past several years, many challenges remain.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
Answer. DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) continue to
make progress in this area. We have reduced the overall disability
evaluation time from over 500 days to 400 days and are reducing the
post-separation wait for VA disability determination. We are also
actively collaborating on the establishment of joint DOD/VA policy
guidance, processes, and metrics for coordination of case management
and care coordination programs within the two Departments related to
the delivery of care, benefits and services to wounded, ill or injured
servicemembers and their families. Efficiencies we have made toward
expediting the paperless transfer of medical, personnel and financial
data to VA and the electronic exchange of information to the Veterans
Benefits Management System have both contributed to elimination of the
current backlog of disability benefit claims and will benefit future
Veterans by enabling VA to process claims faster and more accurately,
thereby allowing those Veterans to receive earned benefits more quickly
If confirmed, I will continue to ensure an electronic and seamless
transition from recovery to reintegration for our wounded, ill or
injured servicemembers. Additionally, I would continue the Department's
collaborative efforts with the VA on compensation and benefits,
transition assistance and care coordination.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based?
Answer. The greatest strength is the DOD's commitment to take care
of its wounded warriors and their families. That commitment will guide
continued efforts by DOD and VA. Fine tuning case management and
automation of certain aspects of the process will aid in reducing
processing times.
Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. The DOD and VA have undertaken a total review and revamping
of our approach to case management--policy, process and IT. For
example, DOD, VA and the Military Departments Care Coordinators are
piloting a case management tool in the National Capital Region and
Texas. The goal is to gain insights, and use these insights; to
integrate non-medical and medical case information to assist recovering
wounded, ill and injured servicemembers obtain a new-normal life
outcome; link data transfer between recovery care and disability
evaluation; and ensure quality assurance across the continuum of care.
The pilot is ongoing and will conclude by summer 2014.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. If confirmed, working closely with Congress and the
military departments, I will continue to evaluate what additional
support, including resources and/or authority, is necessary to address
the needs of the wounded servicemembers, their families and caregivers.
For example, in addition to the above pilot, we are taking first steps
to expand our Operation Warfighter and Education and Employment
Initiative opportunities beyond the government sector to include the
private sector. Additionally, we have a robust adaptive sports and
rehabilitation program, including such activities as gardening, arts,
and team and individual sports.
Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at
Walter Reed Army Medical Center in 2007 pointed to the need to reform
the disability evaluation system. The Integrated DES (IDES) program was
established to integrate the DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) disability systems to improve and expedite processing of
servicemembers through the disability evaluation system. While the
processing times under the IDES were initially encouraging,
servicemembers are now mired in long VA disability rating and case
disposition wait times, and the VA's portion of the system appears to
be overloaded.
What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
improve the IDES?
Answer. DOD has made great progress in increasing staffing and
improving the performance of our portions of the IDES processes. DOD is
completing its IDES core processes in 148 days against a 105-day goal.
Our sustained improvement has resulted in moving a large case load
downstream to VA increasing their IDES backlog. As a result, VA's
inventory of cases awaiting preliminary rating has increased 46 percent
since January 2013, to 9,192 cases and the VA IDES core process
timeliness has increased to 272 days against a 100-day goal.
We are helping VA improve service delivery by ensuring the case
files presented to them are as complete as possible. DOD is piloting an
electronic case file capability to eliminate mailing and accounting of
paper records by the VA and the Army has stationed 20 servicemembers at
VA's Seattle rating site to help fill the gaps in DOD case files when
they are identified. The intended affect is to help VA have cases
``ready to rate'' to allow them to adjudicate IDES cases more quickly.
If confirmed, I plan to continue to look at all aspects of the system
to see where opportunities exist for improvement.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
Answer. DOD continues to work toward a more efficient IDES using
senior-level work groups and leadership councils as well as
capitalizing on the information presented to us by the Recovering
Warrior Task Force, Government Accountability Office, and Military
Department Inspector Generals. DOD is currently undertaking several
congressional studies that will give us further opportunities to
enhance IDES processes. Where there are efficiencies that can be
achieved by changing policy, we will do so. Additionally, we will
continue our work with our VA partners to align our programs and
resources together to agree on the proper paperless IT system and
streamlined process changes and appropriately address them across our
Departmental boundaries.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in
ensuring that the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs achieve
the administration's objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?
Answer. In my capacity as Acting Under Secretary, I have been
personally involved with DOD and VA collaborative efforts to achieve
the administration's objectives and all other joint efforts with VA. If
confirmed, I expect to continue to take a personal role. I will
continue to provide oversight and strategic guidance, and require the
staff to maintain constant contact with their VA counterparts at all
echelons. I will continue to personally meet with my VA counterpart on
a regular and frequent basis, formally and informally, and engage with
the Secretary and Congress, and the White House staff.
repeal of ``don't ask, don't tell''
Question. What is your assessment of the effect on the force of the
repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy?
Answer. The repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' has had no impact
on military readiness, effectiveness, unit cohesion, recruiting, or
retention of the Armed Forces. We attribute this success to our
comprehensive pre-repeal training programs, combined with the
discipline of our servicemembers and continued close monitoring and
enforcement of standards by our military leaders at all levels.
Question. What military benefits are currently being provided to
same-sex spouses and to same-sex partners?
Answer. It is the Department's policy to treat all married military
personnel equally. Therefore, the same benefits are available to all
military spouses, regardless of whether they are in same-sex or
opposite-sex marriages. No benefits are provided to domestic partners,
regardless of whether they are in same-sex or opposite-sex domestic
partnerships.
Question. Are there any additional military benefits that should be
considered for same-sex spouses and partners?
Answer. No, it is the Department's policy to treat all married
military personnel equally. The same benefits are available to all
military spouses, regardless of whether they are in same-sex or
opposite-sex marriages.
Question. What is your assessment of the current and projected
future impact to resourcing that will be required to provide military
benefits to same-sex spouses and partners?
Answer. The costs associated with same-sex benefits are not
significant from a cost perspective and will be absorbed within the
existing Department budget.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you pursue in
this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that all military
personnel and their spouses are treated equally with access to the same
benefits.
Question. According to press accounts, two States--Texas and
Mississippi--are refusing to allow same-sex spouses to apply for
Federal benefits in State-supported facilities, citing conflicts with
State law.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that members of
the National Guard of the United States will receive the Federal
benefits to which they are entitled?
Answer. Identification cards are currently available in all Federal
facilities for all military spouses, regardless of whether they are in
same-sex or opposite-sex marriages. The Department is currently
examining the matter of those National Guard sites that are not issuing
identification cards to same-sex spouses with our legal counsel and
evaluating options to address the issue. In the meantime, we are asking
same sex spouses desiring cards to go to the nearest Federal facility.
Question. On September 4, 2013 you signed a policy memorandum that
authorized ``administrative absence to obtain a legal marriage'' when a
member is part of a couple that desires to get married and is assigned
to a duty station located more than 100 miles from a U.S. State, the
District of Columbia, or other jurisdiction that allows the couple to
get married. This memorandum revoked an August 13, 2013 change to DOD
Instruction 1327.06 that authorized uncharged leave for same-sex
couples to travel from the area of a permanent duty station for the
purpose of obtaining a legal marriage. The authority established in
your September 4th memo, while neutral on its face, appears to only
benefit same sex couples who want to be married and not heterosexual
couples.
What is your understanding concerning whether there are any
circumstances in which heterosexual members who want to obtain a legal
marriage would be eligible for uncharged leave under the policy set
forth in your September 4, 2013 memorandum?
Answer. We have identified several situations in which heterosexual
members who want to obtain a legal marriage would be eligible for
administrative absence under the current policy. The nature of military
service often involves short notice deployments and temporary duty to
far off or foreign locations. That Service does not always allow a
member to meet the requirements necessary to obtain a marriage license
in the State in which the member is assigned. Some States have age
restrictions which require that one or both members of a couple be of a
certain age or to obtain a parent's or guardian's permission before
marrying. This permission may not be obtainable within the limited
timeframe that military service sometimes allows. Finally, several
States impose a waiting period to obtain a marriage license which may
not be achievable for a deploying member of the Armed Forces. All of
these are examples in which a commander may grant an administrative
absence to facilitate a legal marriage.
Question. In your view is the use of regular leave accrued by all
members of the Armed Forces at the rate of 2\1/2\ calendar days for
each month of Active service, as authorized by title 10, U.S.C.,
section 701(a), inadequate for the purpose of allowing leave for all
servicemembers who want to be married to be married?
Answer. The current accrual rate of annual leave is sufficient for
most servicemembers who choose to obtain a legal marriage. This policy
however, was crafted to allow flexibility for those members who cannot
obtain a legal marriage within 100 miles of their assignment. Because
laws differ around the globe, providing members time to ensure their
relationships are recognized under law is a reasonable accommodation.
In addition, the Department has committed to conduct annual reviews to
determine if this policy remains necessary.
Question. What is your understanding of the authority of the
Secretary of Defense to create a new category of administrative
absence, for 7 to 10 days in a paid status, for members of the armed
services in circumstances where the member could otherwise use earned
leave?
Answer. The authority for approved absences from duty already
exists under current OSD policy (DODI 1327.06), and there is
longstanding precedent that commanders have discretionary authority to
grant administrative absence to servicemembers. Examples of similar
administrative absences include house hunting, attendance at
professional meetings, and time off to officiate at a retirement
ceremony.
Question. How does the policy in your September 4 memorandum
promote the express goal of treating all military personnel equally and
making the same benefits available to all qualified members?
Answer. In an effort to treat everyone equally, and after careful
consideration and consultation with the Chiefs and Secretaries of the
Services, as well as the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, our
September 4th policy was expressly crafted so that it applied equally
to both same sex and opposite sex couples.
religious guidelines
Question. In your view, do DOD policies concerning religious
accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual
expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different
beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes, in my view, current DOD policies appropriately
accommodate the free exercise of religion for all servicemembers in the
pluralistic environment that is the U.S. military. DOD does not endorse
any one religion or religious organization, and provides free access of
religion for all members of the Military Services. The Department
respects (and supports by its policy) the rights of others to their own
religious beliefs, including the right to hold no beliefs.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and
discipline?
Answer. Current law and policy ensure servicemembers' rights to
observe the tenets of their respective religions, as well as to hold no
specific religious conviction or affiliation. The Chaplaincies of the
Military Departments advise and assist commanders in the discharge of
their responsibilities to provide for the free exercise of religion in
the context of military service as guaranteed by the Constitution,
assist commanders in managing Religious Affairs and serve as the
principal advisors to commanders to ensure these expressions of belief
do not adversely impact mission accomplishment, including good order
and discipline.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. Existing DOD policies provide military chaplains with
sufficient guidance that allows them to balance to the extent their
religious beliefs allow, in both formal and informal settings, their
own faith practices with the rights of others who may hold different or
no religious beliefs. The Chaplaincies of the Military Departments
train and equip chaplains with the knowledge and skill to help them
make this proper balance.
Question. Section 533 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239) protects rights of
conscience of members of the Armed Forces and chaplains of such
members, and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the
basis of any adverse personnel action, discrimination, or denial of
promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some
religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in opposition to
same-sex marriage.
In your view, may a member of the armed forces who has a sincerely
held belief in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse
personnel action or similar other adverse action, if he or she shares
those personal views on the subject in an official capacity?
Answer. The issue--a servicemember expressing personal views when
speaking in his/her official capacity, is significant. Servicemembers
speaking in their official capacities are expected to express official
views, especially when dealing with subordinates. Expressing personal
views while speaking in an official capacity can create confusion, and
may give the impression of encouraging disagreement with DOD policy or
the law. Servicemembers are entitled to have personal views and to
express them in personal conversations; however, servicemembers are not
entitled to use their official capacity as a forum to express their
personal views. Servicemembers who express personal views when speaking
in an official capacity may be held accountable for what they say.
Question. Can he or she be subject to adverse personnel action if
they express personal views on same sex marriage in their personal
capacity?
Answer. Expressions of personal views by servicemembers in their
private capacities generally are permissible because they are integral
to the free speech and the free exercise of religion. Traditionally,
private conversations in the barracks have included expressions of
views contrary to DOD policy. However, personal expressions which
disrupt the mission or have an adverse impact on good order and
discipline may cause the member to be counseled by his/her chain of
command, not for the views but for the disruption to the mission.
Question. The Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that
``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations
urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for
religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to
task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-disciplinary
study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-
radicalization . . . ''.
What action has the Department taken with respect to these
recommendations?
Answer. Ensuring appropriate accommodations for the free exercise
of religions and protecting servicemembers from violence and harm are
both of vital importance. Pursuant to Recommendation 2.7, the
Department updated its policy on religious accommodation to ensure
religious freedoms and practices are accommodated to the fullest extent
possible considering mission readiness, discipline and unit cohesion.
This policy is in the final stage of revision to incorporate language
from the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, section 533, which protects the
rights of conscience of members of the Armed Forces and chaplains.
Regarding Recommendation 2.8, the Department did task the Defense
Science Board (DSB) to undertake a study.
prevention of and response to sexual assaults
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address the problem of sexual assaults in the military?
Answer. We recognize there is no single solution to solving the
problem of sexual assault and have adopted a multi-disciplinary
approach that includes a variety of initiatives in prevention,
investigation, accountability, victim assistance and assessments. If
confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure our program prevents
crimes from occurring in the first place. But, when crimes do occur, we
must have comprehensive, effective, accessible and responsive
investigative and victim assistance services available. I will work to
ensure that our program continues to educate all servicemembers,
frontline commanders and leaders and hold them accountable in
establishing a culture of dignity and respect; fully implements our DOD
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Strategic Plan and the 16
recently-announced Secretary of Defense directives; and sustains our
current level of attention, focus, and emphasis throughout the entire
Department.
Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more
than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including
2,558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports.
Moreover, a recent survey conducted by the DOD indicates that the
actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1
percent of Active Duty women and 1.2 percent of Active Duty men
surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual
contact in the previous 12 months. This survey has been criticized by
some because its conclusions are extrapolated from an unscientific
sample set and the questions asked in the survey were too imprecise.
What is your assessment of the scientific accuracy of the DOD
survey?
Answer. The Defense Manpower Data Center's (DMDC) survey division
has conducted surveys of the military and DOD community using
stratified random sampling for over 20 years, subscribing to
methodological best practices promoted by the American Association for
Public Opinion Research. The scientific method of stratified random
sampling is the principal method used by government statistical
agencies and private survey firms that conduct surveys, such as the
Army Research Institute (ARI), Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Gallup, RAND, WESTAT, RTI, Pew, and Roper.
For this survey, DMDC worked with DOD's legal experts here at
Headquarters and in the field to ensure behaviors prohibited in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) were appropriately captured in
the unwanted sexual contact (USC) survey question. The behaviorally-
based question includes a range of physical behaviors prohibited by the
UCMJ (from unwanted sexual touching of the breasts or buttocks through
completed sexual intercourse), but does not include unwanted touching
of non-sexual areas of the body (e.g., the shoulder, back, legs, or
arms) or offensive verbal remarks or gestures (these behaviors are
captured separately).
Question. What is your assessment of the scientific accuracy of the
interpretation of the results of that survey in the 2012 report?
Answer. The accuracy of survey results are dependent on whether the
sample used is randomly drawn and conforms to scientific ``best
practices'' for sampling and weighting procedures. Criticism of the
2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members
(WGRA) as ``unscientific'' and unreliable is uniformly false and based
on a basic lack of understanding of the scientific sampling and
weighting methods employed by DMDC. DMDC uses state-of-the-art
scientific statistical techniques to draw conclusions from random,
representative samples of the active duty population and can accurately
generalize to the full active duty population using a complex, but
precise, scientific weighting process that accounts for sampling error,
nonresponse, and the necessary oversampling of smaller populations
within the sample. In conducting this research, DMDC has a decided
advantage over many public and private opinion pollsters since DMDC is
the DOD repository for all military personnel data and is able to use
demographic data to inform the sampling and weighting process. It also
allows respondents the ability to answer sensitive questions without
disclosing identifying demographic information--a strategy strongly
encouraged by experts in the field, but rarely available to other
polling organizations.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to obtain better
data on sexual assaults in the military?
Answer. DMDC is already working closely with the Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office, the Services, and senior DOD leaders to
look for ways to continue to improve the 2014 WGRA survey and refine
the metrics and measures that scientifically and effectively evaluate
sexual assault within DOD. DOD is also working with other agencies,
such as CDC, to help increase the comparability of DOD data to other
sexual assault victimization data collected about civilians across the
United States.
I have also directed that DMDC and the Services coordinate their
survey efforts to minimize burden on servicemembers and maximize the
sharing of information from each survey effort. Coordination of survey
efforts to minimize respondent burden is critical as we must recognize
the adverse impact from over-surveying the same population, which has
caused a decline in response rates across DOD surveys.
DMDC is also currently conducting a scientific review of non-
response to these DOD surveys. This analysis will identify whether
those who did not respond to the survey would have provided
significantly different answers than those who did respond. Findings
from this analysis may contribute to improving the sampling methodology
for future WGRA surveys. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure we use
the most scientific and effective survey methods to assess sexual
assault in DOD.
Question. What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. Our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program is
dynamic and we are consistently assessing it and striving to benefit
from our lessons learned, best and promising practices, and inputs from
stakeholders across our Nation. When methods are identified that can
advance our efforts to build trust and improve our response, we act to
implement these upgrades when they are within the Department's
authorities; when a best practice is identified, we work to make it a
common practice throughout the Department. If confirmed, I will
continue to work closely with Members of Congress to assess current
policy and identify needed changes.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. When a victim makes the difficult decision to come forward
and report, we need to provide multiple reporting options. I support
offering victims two reporting options, based on previous studies and
commissions that found that some victims choose to forgo reporting and
support services for fear of automatically initiating a criminal
investigation. To address this barrier, the Department instituted two
reporting options: Restricted and Unrestricted Reporting. Initiated in
2005, the Restricted Reporting option allows victims to confidentially
access medical care and advocacy services without initiating an
official investigation or command notification. This differs from the
Unrestricted Reporting option, in which when a victim makes an
Unrestricted Report, it is referred for investigation, and command is
notified. As with Restricted Reporting, victims may receive healthcare,
counseling, and advocacy services. Since 2005, over 5,000
servicemembers have used the Unrestricted Reporting option.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of DOD oversight of
military service implementation of the DOD and Service policies for the
prevention of and response to sexual assaults?
Answer. In my view, we are providing extensive oversight and
accountability of this important mission, and are continuing to employ
multiple accountability tools to assess the issue of sexual assault
prevention and response (SAPR) in DOD. The Department publishes two
accountability reports on sexual assault each year: the DOD Annual
Report on Sexual Assault in the Military and the Annual Report on
Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies (MSA).
These comprehensive reports serve as the Department's primary means for
evaluating and communicating oversight of its SAPR program, and provide
transparency and accountability for every report of sexual assault.
In addition, DOD Inspector General (DOD IG) reviews are a valuable
tool used to ensure accountability, integrity, and efficiency. To date,
the DOD IG has conducted three separate reviews to assess different
aspects of how the overall system responds to and handles sexual
assault cases. Additionally, in 2011, the DOD IG formed a new Violent
Crime Division focused on evaluating and improving the quality of the
Department's violent crime investigations, including sexual assault.
This unit evaluates the sexual assault investigation training and
compliance with DOD policy in the Military Criminal Investigative
Organizations.
The Secretary of Defense hosts weekly meetings of the senior
leaders in this Department to hold the entire prevention and response
system accountable. Also, the Director of the SAPR Office chairs an
Executive Integrated Product Team consisting of General and Flag
Officers and members of the Senior Executive Service from OSD, the
Military Departments, and the Services every other month providing
detailed review and oversight of the SAPR program. Finally, OSD
provides subject matter expertise and analysis to a quarterly SAPR
Joint Executive Council convened by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
designed to review SAPR program performance and effectiveness across
each of the Military Services.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. As we have seen in other recent military culture changes,
culture change starts at the top with commanders and leaders leading by
example and enforcing standards of conduct. The role of the chain of
command in changing the military culture is paramount. Central to our
approach is requiring leaders at all levels to foster a command climate
where sexist behaviors, sexual harassment, and sexual assault are not
condoned or ignored; where dignity and respect are core values we live
by and define how we treat one another; where victims' reports are
treated with the utmost seriousness, their privacy is protected, and
they are treated with sensitivity; where bystanders are motivated to
intervene to prevent unsafe behaviors; and where offenders know they
will be held appropriately accountable by a strong and effective system
of justice. Commanders and leaders at every level are the key to
eliminate and enforce standards and in achieving these goals as we have
seen in other culture change in the military as the repeal of ``Don't
Ask Don't Tell.''
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
Answer. Commanders and frontline leaders are responsible for
mission accomplishment and for caring for the women and men assigned to
their commands. This is a core axiom of leadership in the profession of
arms. Commanders and leaders at all levels are responsible and must be
held accountable for supporting victims' full range of timely and
responsive care, as well as for establishing a command climate where
victims are treated with the sensitivity and privacy they deserve. If
confirmed, I will continue to emphasize these central elements of
leadership.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. In my view, taking the disposition decision in the
administration of military justice from the commander would undermine
readiness and leave the chain of command without the necessary tools to
develop a cohesive fighting force by enforcing good order and
discipline. I agree with Secretary Hagel that this authority must
remain in the command structure and that we must continue to make it
more accountable. We need commanders more involved not less involved to
solve the issue of sexual assault. That said, we look forward to the
report of the Response Systems Panel's review of this issue.
Question. What is your view of the protections afforded to victims
who are required to testify at Article 32, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, investigations that are required before charges can be
referred to a General Court-Martial?
Answer. In my view, we must continue to work on building victim
confidence, and that includes process improvements to prevent potential
revictimization during the Article 32 process. Recently, the Secretary
directed a number of changes that I support, including ensuring that
Judge Advocates serve as investigating officers for all Article 32
hearings on sexual assault charges and providing legal representation
to victims of sexual assault in an attorney-client relationship,
similar to the Air Force pilot program begun in January of this year.
service academies
Question. What do you consider to be the policy and procedural
elements that must be in place at each of the Service Academies in
order to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults and
sexual harassment and to ensure essential oversight?
Answer. Sexual assault has no place at the Military Service
Academies and is antithetical to their core values and missions.
Prevention and response to sexual assault must be completely integrated
into the full spectrum of Service Academy life and learning. The
Department will continue to assess the Academies efforts to develop and
refine prevention and response programs in order to establish a culture
free of sexual harassment and assault. If confirmed, I will review
those programs and partner with the Academies to continue to better
educate and train the cadets and midshipmen, and to ensure the
Department provides appropriate response and support for the victim if
a crime does occur.
Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Service
Academies to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and to prevent
sexual assaults and sexual harassment?
Answer. The Academies continue to put considerable effort into the
development and implementation of policies and procedures designed to
address religious tolerance. The Academies do not endorse any one
religion or religious organization, and provide free access of religion
for all members of the Military Services. In the past few years, the
Academies' leadership has emphasized the need for greater respect for
the rights of others to their own religious beliefs, including the
right to hold no beliefs.
While the Service Academies have made great efforts, more needs to
be done to reduce the level of sexual harassment and sexual violence.
It will require continued persistence and innovative measures at each
institution. If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring that
prevention efforts are strong, victims receive care, offenders are held
appropriately accountable and proper support is offered to cadets and
midshipmen throughout their academic career.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. The Department in January rescinded the policy
restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the
primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has
given the military services until January 1, 2016, to open all
positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to
policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that
must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense. The services are working now to develop gender-
free physical and mental standards for all military occupations,
presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender,
to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.
If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these
standards?
Answer. The Services and U.S. Special Forces Command (SOCOM) are
working with various scientific and research agencies (Ex: U.S. Army
Research Institute for Environmental Medicine, Center for Naval
Analyses, Air Education and Training Command, and RAND) to review and
validate occupational standards to ensure they are occupationally and
operationally relevant and are applied gender-neutrally by September
2015.
Along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Service Chiefs, I will monitor the progress the Services and SOCOM are
making toward integration of females into previously closed occupations
and positions. The Department will provide notification to Congress
before opening any additional positions.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are
realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission
capability?
Answer. DOD is aware of Public Law 103-160, section 543, which
prohibits the Department from changing an occupational performance
standard for the purpose of increasing or decreasing the number of
women in that occupational career field. We are working with RAND to
ensure physical standards are gender neutral and accurately correlate
with the requirements of the position or occupation
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you
take to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis?
Answer. It is in the best interest of the Department to allow both
men and women who meet the standards for military positions and units
to compete for them. Rescission of the 1994 policy provides a way
forward to fully integrate women without compromising our readiness,
morale, or warfighting capacity. By removing gender as a disqualifier
for certain positions, all servicemembers will have the opportunity for
assignment to positions for which they qualify.
Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about
assigning women to what are currently male-only combat units.
To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the
implementation of this policy?
Answer. I understand, and appreciate, family members may have these
concerns for their loved ones. I expect our commanders to select the
best qualified personnel, male or female, and create a command climate
that focuses on mission accomplishment and treat each person with
dignity. We have had a number of women in newly opened units since mid-
2012, and have already experienced successful integration of women into
formerly male-only units. We will leverage this experience moving
forward.
Question. If it is a problem, what steps would you take to address
it?
Answer. We require the Services to provide us feedback on their
elimination of gender-restrictive policies, including the status of
women in these newly opened positions. If problems are encountered, I
will, if confirmed, examine the issue and address it considering all
dimensions and all recommendations consistent with sustaining
readiness.
rising costs of medical care
Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
In April 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force
Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive.'' In recent
years, the Department has attempted to address this growth through fee
increases for military retirees, while also attempting to identify and
implement other means to ensure the viability of the military health
system in the future.
What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical
costs on future DOD plans?
Answer. I realize the health care benefit contributes to the
retention of our men and women in service. But the reality is that
health care costs are a serious problem for the Department, consuming
nearly 10 percent of the budget. Simply stated, rising health care
costs pose a real threat to our readiness and modernization efforts. If
confirmed, I will continue to work with beneficiaries, advocacy groups,
Congress and our medical establishment to find workable solutions to
sustain the benefit in a realistic and affordable way without breaking
faith with our troops and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you initiate or recommend
to the Secretary of Defense to mitigate the effect of such costs on the
DOD top-line?
Answer. Managing health care costs is a shared responsibility among
the government, providers and the beneficiary. In addition to seeking
reasonable beneficiary cost share reforms, if confirmed I will work
with key stakeholders to pursue promising cost saving initiatives such
as emphasizing wellness and prevention and working with our medical
leadership to capitalize on internal efficiency opportunities.
Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
the costs of military health care?
Answer. I firmly believe that we must adopt a holistic approach to
addressing the rising costs of health care. Responsible benefit reform
should be one part of the solution, but not the only solution. If
confirmed, I will continue to look for ways to optimize our medical
infrastructure to include leveraging the work of the recent
Modernization Study. I see great opportunities to reduce overhead
through the implementation of the Defense Health Agency and shared
services. Finally, there are numerous cost saving opportunities in such
areas as logistics, provider payment reform, and anti-fraud efforts,
just to name a few.
annual increase in rates of basic pay below the employment cost index
Question. The Department has requested an across-the-board pay
raise for 2014 for military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8
percent rise in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) benchmark, and has
indicated that in order to restrain the growth of personnel costs,
similar below-ECI pay raises may be necessary over the next several
years.
What is your assessment of the impact a 1 percent pay raise would
have on recruiting and retention for 2014? What would be the impact of
a 1 percent pay raise in 2015 through 2017?
Answer. I recognize the sacrifices made by the men and women in our
Armed Forces. A 1.0 percent military basic pay increase ensures their
pay continues to compare favorably with that of American workers. The
Department does not believe a 1 percent military basic pay raise will
materially affect recruiting and retention in 2014. At this time, the
Department does not have sufficient data to determine the long-range
impacts of a 1 percent pay raise beyond 2014 on retention and
recruiting.
Question. Some have suggested that the difference between the 1
percent pay raise requested by the administration, and the 1.8 percent
increase based on the ECI could be paid for by realizing efficiencies
within DOD.
What is your assessment of the ability of the Department to fund
the full 1.8 percent increase in basic pay through efficiencies?
Answer. The Department is continually searching for efficiencies,
and the pay raise proposal was a tough decision reached by our senior
leaders after carefully weighing other options and efficiencies for
savings. The Department is working diligently to ensure our
servicemembers receive fair compensation that recognizes the sacrifices
they make for our country, while still adhering to our budgetary
constraints.
Answer. Currently, military compensation compares favorably with
compensation in the private sector. The Department believes a 1 percent
military basic pay increase is preferable to having to reduce military
end strength by thousands of additional troops on top of the drawdown
already planned, or further cut funds for training and equipping our
forces to achieve these savings.
Question. The Department has traditionally compared Regular
Military Compensation against comparable civilian salaries to devise a
percentile as a way to assess the relative attractiveness of military
pay versus civilian pay.
What is the current comparable percentile of military pay versus
civilian pay for officers and enlisted personnel?
Answer. The Department's most recent study, performed by the 11th
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, compared regular military
compensation for officers and enlisted members with pay for civilians
with comparable education and experience levels. Its report found that,
on average, regular military compensation for officers was at the 83rd
percentile and for enlisted members the 90th percentile.
Question. How do these percentiles compare to the base level at
which the Department feels military compensation must be to effectively
recruit and retain the highest quality personnel possible for military
service?
Answer. The Report of the 9th Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation evaluated military compensation levels and found that
compensation at approximately the 70th percentile of comparably
educated and experienced civilians was necessary to enable the military
to recruit and retain the appropriate quantity and quality of
personnel. Measured against that benchmark, current military
compensation compares favorably with private-sector compensation.
mental health care
Question. Senior military leaders have long recognized the need to
reduce the stigma for military personnel and their families and
veterans in seeking mental health care, yet we continue to hear from
servicemembers that the stigma persists.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to reduce the stigma
associated with seeking mental health care by military personnel and
their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support ongoing Department efforts to
combat stigma and increase help-seeking behavior among servicemembers,
their families, and affected civilians. Both the Department and the
Services are currently heavily engaged in this effort. I am also
prepared to provide the Service Chiefs with whatever resources are
necessary to expand the breadth of the outreach efforts. I fully
support the Department's efforts to improve health and mental
healthcare services, and reduce the stigma of mental healthcare for our
men and women in uniform, their families, and affected civilians.
Question. In your view, are DOD's current mental health resources
adequate to serve all active duty and eligible Reserve component
members and their families, as well as retirees and their dependents?
Answer. Yes, after making significant investments in infrastructure
and capacity over the last decade, DOD's current mental health
resources are adequate to serve our active duty, family and veteran
populations. Within DOD, strategies for hiring and retention of mental
health providers resulted in a 40 percent increase in mental health
providers over the last 3 years. This includes a 40 percent increase in
the number of psychologists, a 26 percent increase in the number of
psychiatrists, a 42 percent increase in the number of social workers,
and a 27 percent increase in the number of mental health nurses. This
represents a fill rate of 99 percent of funded positions, which
compares favorably to industry averages.
suicide prevention
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue
to be of great concern to the committee, though military suicide rates
appear to remain lower than suicide rates for the same age groups in
the civilian sector.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to
help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase
the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with the
Services, VA, and other public and private organization and experts to
further foster best practices in the prevention of suicide and build
resilience within our force. During my tenure as Acting Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the first DOD-wide
comprehensive suicide prevention policy was issued. We recently
established a Peer Crisis Hotline in Afghanistan to support our
servicemembers in theater and expanded our Military Crisis line to
Europe and Korea. I have ensured that the Vets4Warriors peer support
program continued and was extended to all servicemembers and their
families this year. I also implemented a program evaluation methodology
aligning the DOD's suicide prevention strategy with the National
Strategy for Suicide Prevention to ensure its effectiveness and
efficiency. I will continue to work with the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
regarding our joint Suicide Data Repository, which now hosts mortality
data on all who have served dating back to 1979.
Increasing the resiliency of all DOD Personnel--military and
civilian--and their families remains one of the key factors in the
prevention of suicide and one of the central tasks assigned to the
newly established Defense Suicide Prevention Office under my purview.
Question. Recent media articles have raised concerns about the
possible role of Servicemembers Group Life Insurance (SGLI) proceeds to
survivors as a contributing factor in suicide attempts by
servicemembers.
Has the Department examined whether SGLI proceeds, or other
monetary benefits associated with the death of servicemember, could
impact a servicemember's decision to commit suicide?
Answer. The Department has examined the issue and found that the
research on the association between insurance coverage and suicide is
not conclusive. The Department of Veterans Affairs, which oversees the
SGLI program, adheres to a determination standard that suicide victims
were not of sound mind and adjudicates insurance claims based on that
policy. Hence, there should not be any restrictions on coverage to the
survivors.
readiness responsibilities
Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., gives the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) certain
responsibilities for military readiness. Some important issues that
affect military readiness, however, such as logistics and materiel
readiness, have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Under
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
What is your assessment of the impacts and challenges to DOD
readiness as a result of sequestration?
Answer. Sequestration has significantly limited the Services'
ability to generate ready forces to meet a broad range of mission
requirements. We are meeting current operational requirements with well
trained and equipped units, but this is getting more difficult. The
brunt of the sequester effects is in our ability to generate forces to
meet contingency surge requirements and this is a serious concern. Some
of these effects will take considerable time and resources to reverse.
Question. What is your assessment of how the recent DOD furloughs
have impacted readiness?
Answer. A ready unit is the product of myriad personnel, training,
and equipment pipelines. Our DOD civilian labor force keeps these
pipelines moving. They are the technicians at our depots, the support
for our training ranges, and the instructors at our schools--we cannot
generate ready forces without them. We know that furloughs just
completed increased maintenance backlogs at our depots and reduced the
quantity and quality of our training. These effects will take time to
resolve. We are concerned that as the budget uncertainty persists, the
most skilled of this workforce will simply leave Federal service,
thereby creating permanent degradations in critical skill areas.
Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of our
Armed Forces to execute the National Military Strategy?
Answer. Today our forces are postured globally, conducting
counterterrorism, stability, and deterrence operations, maintaining a
stabilizing presence, conducting bilateral and multilateral training to
enhance our security relationships, and providing the crisis response
capabilities required to protect U.S. interests. The investments made
in our Armed Forces have helped maintain our military's standing as the
most formidable force in the world.
We remain able to meet the most critical ongoing operational and
presence requirements that the Nation asks of us, however this is
getting more difficult as the effects of sequester materialize. What is
at risk is our ability to generate the surge required for a high-end
emergent crisis and this is a serious concern.
Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges to
the current readiness of our Armed Forces?
Answer. The defense strategy requires that our force meet a growing
number of global security concerns as it recovers from 12 years of
direct combat. We are concerned that current budget constraints will
thwart the Services' efforts to regain full-spectrum readiness in order
to successfully meet the tenets of the defense strategy. The Services
made deliberate plans to shift from counterinsurgency (COIN) focused
operations to address more globalized, full spectrum warfighter
requirements. Those plans are at risk if sequestration remains in
effect. Specifically, training opportunities and equipment condition
are our primary concerns in preserving readiness across the force.
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the
USD(P&R) and relationship to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness in ensuring military readiness,
including materiel readiness?
Answer. The responsibilities of the USD(P&R) are to develop
policies, plans, and programs for the Total Force to ensure efficient
and effective support of wartime and peacetime operations, contingency
planning, and preparedness. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness oversees material readiness. Force
readiness and materiel readiness have a symbiotic relationship, and as
such, I have actively sought to sustain and strengthen this
relationship in my current capacity. If confirmed, I will continue to
work closely with my Department counterpart in this area.
Question. What are the most critical objectives to improve
readiness reporting and monitoring of the military forces, and if
confirmed, how would you work with the Military Departments as well as
other Office of the Secretary of Defense offices to achieve them?
Answer. The most critical element of readiness management is the
ability to monitor not just the status of unit readiness, but the
health of the pipelines that support it. These downstream metrics not
only provide a more complete picture of readiness, but they are also
the key to forecasting problems. In my current capacity, I have
overseen dramatic improvements in the Department's ability to monitor
readiness along these lines.
If confirmed, I will continue partnering with the Services, the
Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, and other OSD partners to
systematically monitor these pipelines, articulate the likely
operational consequences, and provide mitigation options.
Question. Do you believe the current readiness reporting system
accurately shows if our forces are not only ``ready'' but ``ready for
what''?
Answer. Yes. The Defense Readiness Reporting System directly
addresses the ``ready for what'' question by focusing on mission
capability. It assesses the readiness of all organizations throughout
the Department to perform their assigned missions.
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the
USD(P&R) with respect to the Global Response Force?
Answer. The USD(P&R) provides policy guidance for monitoring the
readiness levels of units assigned to the Global Response Force.
USD(P&R) also collaborates with the Joint Staff to identify readiness
deficiencies within the Global Response Force and recommends mitigation
options for the Secretary's consideration. Finally, as the resource
sponsor for the Department-wide joint training, exercise and engagement
program, the USD(P&R) also facilitates the leveraging of Service or
Combatant Command training events to exercise the Global Response
Force.
end strength reductions
Question. The Department last year laid out a defense strategy that
proposes eventual end strengths of 490,000 for the Army and 182,000 for
the Marine Corps over the next 5 years.
What is your understanding of the Army's and Marine Corps' ability
to meet these goals without forcing out many soldiers and marines who
have served in combat over the past 10 years with the implicit promise
that they could compete for career service and retirement?
Answer. Based on the current rate of drawdown and projected losses,
I am confident the Army and Marines Corps will meet their fiscal year
2018 prescribed end strengths. Unfortunately, due to many years of war,
the size of our personnel reductions, and deep budget cuts, it may be
difficult for the Services to properly shape their force without
separating some of our combat veterans. Voluntary and involuntary
separations may be necessary to ensure the military is postured
correctly for mission readiness and to meet national security
objectives during this time of budgetary constraints. As we become a
leaner Force, it is imperative the Services have the best qualified
individuals available to ensure mission success.
Question. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and
retiring servicemembers are as prepared as they can be as they enter a
struggling economy?
Answer. The 2011 Vow to Hire Heroes Act requires a pre-separation
counseling assessment and counseling, Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) benefits briefing and Department of Labor employment workshop
(with some exceptions). This has been in place since November 2012. An
enhanced Transition Assistance Program (TAP), which will be completed
in March 2014, provides a 2-day higher education track (complete
college application); a 2-day technical track (complete technical
training application); and a 2-day entrepreneurship and business plan
education track.
Question. How fast can the Army and Marine Corps responsibly and
fairly reduce end strength while maintaining the integrity and
readiness of combat units?
Answer. The Department expects a significant drawdown in Army and
Marine Corps forces over the next several years. I understand that
sequestration cuts will likely force the consideration of even steeper
reductions than we've previously planned. Regardless of the actual
target, my concern remains the same--in making the forces leaner, the
Department should take care to learn the lessons of previous drawdowns.
Our military must remain able to respond to any large-scale contingency
operation. This will require careful consideration by Services about
their organizational structures and their ability to reconstitute and
mobilize forces. These reductions must be done with an eye toward those
who have already served in combat and for those with families who have
experienced extended separations, by maximizing voluntary programs and
using the full range of authorities provided by Congress.
Question. If sequestration continues through 2018, what will be the
impact on the Active Duty and Reserve end strengths of all the
Services, and how would the mix between the Active and Reserve Forces
be affected?
Answer. Future rounds of sequestration will be devastating and will
limit our ability to generate healthy, prepared forces especially in
the near term. It is also forcing a difficult decision between a larger
unready force, or a smaller ready force. Neither option is without
concern. It is too soon to tell exactly how these decisions will
manifest across capabilities or components.
I do know that a healthy Reserve Force is an absolutely critical
element of both homeland and overseas operations. We cannot revert back
to past practices of gutting the capabilities of our Reserves. If
confirmed, this is a concern that I will follow closely.
Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional
force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has
provided the past 2 years?
Answer. The Department has been granted the Total Force shaping
tools necessary to meet the drawdown in its current plan. However,
continued budget reductions may make it necessary to revisit the size
of all components of the Total Force--Active Duty military, Reserve
component military, DOD civilians, and contractors. Future assessment
may require requesting additional congressional authorization for force
shaping tools to meet reduced end strengths.
medical personnel recruiting and retention
Question. DOD continues to face shortages in some critically needed
specialty medical personnel in both the Active and Reserve components.
A recent USA Today article asserts that over 3,000 civilian medical
doctors, nurses, and other health workers decided to leave their jobs
this year during the period of time when furloughs were either being
threatened or being carried out.
What is your understanding of the current shortages of health care
professionals in DOD, the true effects of sequestration on the
retention of medical professionals, and the sufficiency of plans to
meet recruiting and retention goals?
Answer. DOD is in the midst of evaluating ongoing requirements for
medical professionals in the context of a military drawdown and a
modernization study. Preliminary information from the Army indicates
civilian losses may have increased to a rate of 2-3 times greater than
expected during the period of sequestration-related furloughs. We are
polling all of the Services to see whether this trend is more
widespread, and plan to continue monitoring medical personnel losses as
related to Military Health System needs.
Question. What legislative and policy initiatives, including
bonuses and special pays, do you think may be necessary to ensure that
the Military Services can continue to meet medical support
requirements?
Answer. With the Authority to Consolidate Special Pay provided by
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, we have adequate financial tools to
improve retention and recruitment of our uniformed health professions
officers. We have some flexibility to improve compensation for our
uniformed providers, if needed, under current authorities. For non-
uniformed military civilian physicians, we have the Physicians and
Dentists Pay Plan (PDPP). The PDPP allows us to compensate our
physicians and dentists at rates consistent with VA because we are
allowed to use their pay table under delegation agreement by OPM. The
agreement is not limited to physicians and dentists. We will closely
monitor health compensation trends and coordinate with other Federal
agencies, to see if we must make adjustments to our future pay plans.
military accessions vital to national interest program
Question. Under the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest
(MAVNI) program, the Services may recruit non-permanent resident aliens
who have certain high-demand medical or linguistic skills for service
in the armed forces, and offer them an expedited path to citizenship.
Although the Services have enjoyed extraordinary recruiting and
retention in recent years, some specialties remain under strength.
While limited in scope, the program appeared successful and worthy of
expansion, but was halted after the initial quota was reached so the
Department could assess its utility and perform a security review. The
program was to restart last summer for 2 additional years.
What is the status of the MAVNI program?
Answer. The MAVNI program was reinstated in May 2012 following
required security reviews by Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence. The pilot will continue through fiscal year 2014.
Question. How many individuals have been recruited under the
program since its restart, and in what occupations?
Answer. Since the program reopened in May 2012, Army has recruited
43 healthcare professionals and 1,024 critical language speakers.
medical marijuana
Question. What is your assessment on the need for legitimate
scientific study of the efficacy of medical marijuana in alleviating
the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) experienced by
servicemembers and veterans?
Answer. DOD does not have any plans to sponsor research on the use
of marijuana to treat wounded, ill, or injured servicemembers. The Army
Medical Research and Materiel Command, which leads our Defense Health
Program PTSD research, has not reviewed any proposals to investigate
the use of marijuana for the treatment of PTSD. However, it is
important to understand that for research studies to be helpful, they
must be rigorously designed, scientifically sound, and meet the
requirements for the protection of human subjects. If research were
proposed that met these criteria, was feasible, and was aligned with
programmatic requirements, then the study would be considered. DOD is
supportive of any scientifically rigorous, lawful research efforts that
have the potential to help improve the lives of patients who have been
adversely affected by PTSD.
mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves
Question. Over the past 12 years, the National Guard and Reserves
have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since
World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures
for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening
and medical readiness, monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited
transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access
to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management
policies and systems have been characterized in the past as
``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely
affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
do problems still exist?
Answer. Over the past 12 years, the Department has implemented
policy changes governing the utilization of the Guard and Reserves and
expanded pre- and post-benefits for Active Duty periods which have
served to enhance predictability and morale among servicemembers.
Providing Reserve component personnel the ability to anticipate and
plan for periods of utilization as well as periods of inactive duty at
home contributes to readiness and improves communication among
servicemembers, their families and employers.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
Answer. Significant enduring changes include the new title 10,
section 12304b mobilization authority provided by Congress in the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2012, enabling continued focus on readiness and Reserve
component (RC) utilization for non-named contingencies. Other enduring
features include the exceptional RC performance record and support of
the American people and employers. In my opinion, the readiness for
future mobilization by Reserve and National Guard members has its
greatest support in the actions of the American people and employers.
This willingness has been borne through the long-term adoption of
standardized policies and procedures governing Reserve mobilization
combined with adequate dwell periods that have served to increase
confidence and overall morale on the part of servicemembers and their
families.
Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
Answer. Current authorities are appropriate, and enable effective
National Guard and Reserve utilization. I appreciate the authorities
and support this committee has provided in this matter.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD programs to assist members
of the National Guard and Reserves as they transition from a mobilized
status?
Answer. Predictability and open communications are two key elements
in the sustainment of readiness and morale of Reserve component
servicemembers and their families. Since 2008, the Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program (YRRP) has provided invaluable deployment and
reintegration support for the Reserve components. Its efforts, in
collaboration with partners like Employer Support of the Guard and
Reserve, Transition GPS (Goals, Plans, Success), the Department of
Veterans Affairs and the community-based network of care, provide
information, access, referrals and outreach to military members, their
families, employers, and immediate support network.
enhanced reserve mobilization authorities
Question. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress authorized the
Service Secretaries to mobilize units and individuals in support of
pre-planned combatant command missions for up to 365 consecutive days.
In the current defense strategy, the President and Secretary of Defense
have stated that while conventional ground forces will be reduced,
Special Forces will be increased over the next 5 years, and a key
component of the new strategy seems to be the establishment of a
rotational presence in Europe, the Middle East, and anywhere U.S.
interests are threatened. Some in the press have called this a ``lily
pad'' approach, and it potentially dovetails with an operational view
of the Reserve components.
What is your assessment of the operational reserve and how it will
fit into this paradigm of smaller, more lethal forces rotating into and
out of many locations of strategic interest?
Answer. The operational reserve has a role in a paradigm of
smaller, more lethal rotational forces. Services should fully leverage
the new authorities that allow for planned Reserve component
mobilizations when making decisions on restructuring and employing
their forces. Utilization of the Guard and Reserve in the rotational
support to COCOMs will not only reduce the infrastructure required of a
permanent presence in theater but also relieve stress on the Total
Force, thereby making the Reserve component an economical and viable
partner in the force mix. I consider this critical to sustaining the
readiness that we have achieved in the past 12 years.
Question. What is your understanding of the appropriate size and
makeup of the Reserve components in light of the defense strategy?
Answer. The Department continues to coordinate closely with the
Services to determine the correct/appropriate mix. Both Active and
Reserve component forces are essential to supporting the national
defense strategy, and the Reserve components continue to provide
trained, ready, and cost-effective forces that can be employed on a
regular operational basis, while also ensuring strategic depth for
large-scale contingencies or other catastrophic national crises. The
Department will further examine the appropriate size and makeup over
the next several months during the Quadrennial Defense Review and the
fiscal year 2015 program reviews.
military quality of life
Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare, and recreation services, especially as DOD's budget declines.
How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
and retention and quality of life programs and your own top priorities
for the Armed Forces?
Answer. The emphasis and resources the Department dedicates to our
quality of life programs reflect the importance we place on our most
valuable resource--our people. If I am confirmed, the programs that
support our people will remain one of my top priorities. If we do not
care for our people, our ability to continue to recruit and retain the
best America has to offer will become increasingly more challenging.
Question. If confirmed, what military qualify of life programs
would you consider a priority, and how do you envision working with the
Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to
sustain them?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on the well-being
and resilience of our servicemembers, their families, and their
survivors, including access to non-medical counseling programs such as
Military OneSource and Military and Family Life Counselors aimed at
preventing the development or exacerbation of mental health conditions
that detract from military and family readiness. I will also promote
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation fitness opportunities and child care
support to help minimize stress on the force. The Department leadership
is working together with advocacy groups and Congress to efficiently
close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and to communicate
effectively to ensure that families know how to access available
support when they need it.
family readiness and support
Question. Servicemembers and their families in both the Active and
Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of
the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced?
Answer. The most important family readiness issue for
servicemembers and their families is ensuring that we continue to
deliver the support they need at the right time using the most
effective method. Following 12 years of war and the impending surge of
servicemembers transitioning from military to civilian life, it is
critically important that servicemembers, their families, and their
survivors receive information about available support services and
resources, when they need it, through communication vehicles they
prefer and trust. Therefore, we must leverage technology as a means to
communicate and engage our families. It is imperative that the
Department continues outreach, education, awareness and engagement
strategies to promote servicemember and family readiness programs. If
confirmed, I will continue to be a strong advocate to ensure family
support programs are properly resourced and effectively managed in DOD.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and future reductions in
end strength?
Answer. I will continue to work closely with the Services to
identify and deliver the right balance of family readiness programs and
support when and where it is needed. Our ongoing mission is to enable
services, staff, and resources to be surged or evolved, as needed, to
respond swiftly and effectively to the changing needs of servicemembers
and their families during peacetime, war, periods of force structure
change, relocation of military units, base realignment and closure,
crisis, natural disaster, and other emergency situations. Sharing
information with the Services on family support needs and best
practices to address them will ensure that we continue to provide
timely support while finding the most effective and efficient ways of
doing so.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services and
the National Guard Bureau to ensure that we continue to be responsive
to the needs of geographically dispersed military families to include
those who serve in the Reserve component. The Joint Family Support
Assistance Program that began in 2007 continues to lead our support
efforts to this population. While the frequency and tempo of Reserve
component deployments may slow, we know that the needs of these
families will continue to emerge and evolve. For that reason, part of
our work through the Joint Family Support Assistance Program entails
building capacity to identify and meet evolving needs at the local
community level where these families live, work, and attend school,
focusing on local institutions they naturally turn to for support when
they need it. To augment and enable that local support, Military
OneSource will continue to provide support to all military families,
military leadership, and military and civilian service providers
through delivery of information, referrals, and non-medical counseling.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to sustain family
support programs, given current fiscal constraints?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the
implementation of flexible family support programs that communicate and
coordinate with interagency and nongovernmental family services to meet
the enduring needs of our servicemembers and their families whether
they live on, near, or far from military installations.
Question. In your view, does the U.S. Special Operations Command
have unique family readiness and support requirements? If so, in your
view, are those needs adequately being met by each of the Military
Services at this time? If they are not adequately being addressed, if
confirmed, how would you address these unique needs?
Answer. We expect U.S. Special Operations Command's operating tempo
will continue to be significant as their units continue to deploy
throughout the world conducting joint missions. If confirmed, I will
work with SOCOM to identify family support requirements that are unique
to this community, offer an analysis of current support provided by the
Services, and identify gaps in family support provided to the SOF
community
department of defense schools in conus
Question. Some have questioned the continuing need for DOD-operated
schools for military dependent children within the continental United
States (CONUS).
In light of the administration's request for additional Base
Realignment and Closure authorities and fiscal constraints, should DOD
establish or update its criteria for the continued operation of DOD
schools within CONUS?
Answer. The President and the Department view preserving and
strengthening military families as critical to our national security.
Military families bear an extraordinary burden for our freedom and
education is a critical quality of life factor affecting readiness and
retention.
DOD is committed to providing educational opportunities for all
military children--balancing quality and cost while exploring all
options and alternatives.
Therefore, the Department is in the process of commencing a study
to evaluate the mission of continuing the operation of DOD schools
within CONUS. The study will examine and provide alternatives that most
effectively balance cost and quality considerations for the education
of kindergarten through 12th grade students at 15 CONUS installations
where the Department operates schools or contracts the education for
military dependents. DOD Schools in Guam and Puerto Rico are not
included in this study.
Question. If so, and if confirmed, how would you approach this
task?
Answer. The Department is currently evaluating the need to continue
the mission of DOD Schools in the United States. This comprehensive,
deliberate, and objective study will include input from all
stakeholders. The study will consider the full range of options for
meeting the elementary and secondary educational needs of military
dependents. We owe it to our military families to ensure that the
decisions concerning the education of our military-connected children
are the result of sound research findings. The research findings and
recommendations will be reviewed by OSD senior officials, in
consultation with the Military Departments. If confirmed, I look
forward to discussing the recommendations of the study with you.
office of community support for military families with special needs
Question. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Congress required the
establishment of an Office of Community Support for Military Families
with Special Needs within the Office of the USD(P&R). The purpose of
this office is to enhance and improve DOD support for military families
with special needs, whether educational or medical in nature.
In your view, what should be the priorities of this Office of
Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs?
Answer. A key priority for the Office of Community Support for
Military Families with Special Needs should be and is to strengthen
personal readiness for military families with special needs through a
comprehensive policy, oversight of programs that support military
families with special needs, identification of gaps in services to such
families, and the accessibility to appropriate resources. Presently,
over 126,000 military family members are enrolled in the Exceptional
Family Member Program (EFMP). The EFMP supports military families with
special medical and/or educational needs in three component areas:
identification/enrollment, assignment coordination to determine the
availability of services at a projected location, and family support to
help families identify and access programs and services.
The Department has recently completed a detailed functional
analysis of the EFMP to standardize the three components of the Program
across the Military Services. Standardization will enable military
families with special needs to have the same level of access to
services in the three areas of the EFMP regardless of Service
affiliation and location (for example, at a joint or sister Service
installation).
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those
military families with special needs dependents so they are able to
obtain the support they need?
Answer. Communication with military families with special needs and
the provision of information about the EFMP is a major focus of DOD. If
confirmed, I will continue ensure that we implement a comprehensive
communication and marketing plan designed to deliver consistent
information about the EFMP to families, service providers, and
leadership. We will also continue to solicit input from families
through a variety of outreach methods.
voluntary education programs
Question. The Department continues to seek ways to improve
oversight of its tuition assistance programs, including standardizing
eligibility criteria among the Services and requiring all schools who
accept tuition assistance funding, whether for online courses or on-
post, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department which
will, among other things, subject online schools to Departmental
audits.
What is your assessment of the tuition assistance program in light
of the needs of the Services and the current budget environment?
Answer. The Tuition Assistance program is important to DOD because
it enables the professional and personal development of our
servicemembers and facilitates their transition to the civilian
workforce when they are ready to leave the military. If confirmed, I
will work with the Services to sustain the appropriate level of
resources for this program.
Question. What is your view of tuition assistance as a transition
benefit for servicemembers to obtain civilian licenses and credentials?
Answer. The Tuition Assistance program currently facilitates the
transition of our servicemembers to the civilian workforce after they
separate or retire. In 2012, over 47,000 servicemembers earned college
degrees which are especially important to those servicemembers whose
military specialty does not have a direct civilian counterpart. In
addition, Tuition Assistance supports the academic coursework in
preparation for any exams required of specific certifications or
licenses, and over 1,700 servicemembers earned certificates that were
not related to a degree program. All of these were from institutions of
higher learning accredited by an accrediting body recognized by the
Department of Education.
Question. What is your view of proposed changes to the so-called
90/10 rule that would require academic institutions to derive no more
than 85 percent of their revenue from Federal sources, including DOD
tuition assistance and VA GI Bill funding?
Answer. I have no objection to the proposal to include title 10
Tuition Assistance funds in the Federal portion of the 90/10
calculation. However, it is appropriate for technical assistance and
oversight of any statutory changes to the proposed 90/10 rule to reside
with the Department of Education.
medical research programs
Question. What do you see as the highest priority medical research
investment areas for DOD?
Answer. The highest priority areas of medical research investments
are: hemorrhage control and resuscitation; traumatic brain injury
diagnosis and treatment; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder prevention,
diagnosis, and treatment; suicide prevention and intervention; and
rehabilitation and regenerative medicine.
Question. How will you assess the amount of investment made in
these research areas to determine if they are sufficient to meet DOD
goals and requirements?
Answer. The Military Health System has implemented a plan to
conduct annual reviews and analyses of the different research
portfolios, ensuring research efforts are aligned to capability gaps
and requirements, assessing the current state of research and science,
and identifying research gaps and needs that require future funding
strategies to achieve DOD goals.
Question. How will you ensure that DOD medical research efforts are
well coordinated with similar research programs within the private
sector, academia, the Services, DARPA, the Department of Veterans
Affairs, and the National Institutes of Health?
Answer. Critical to the development of our medical research
investment strategy is an understanding of the related research
activities in other Federal agencies. This is accomplished by annual
joint reviews of Federal-agency-specific research portfolios in which
research investments and results are presented and shared to best
inform future DOD research investments. Agency participation includes
the DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of
Education, and the National Institutes of Health.
Question. How will you ensure that new medical technologies
(including drugs and vaccines) are independently and adequately tested
before their use by DOD organizations and personnel?
Answer. DOD requires that products be used in a manner consistent
with FDA rules and procedures. The ASD(HA), under the USD(P&R)
direction, has the primary responsibility for the oversight of this
policy's compliance.
Question. There have been growing privacy and security concerns
raised about the use of online social networks for medical research
purposes.
How will you ensure that the increasing use of social networking
media for medical research purposes will protect the privacy and
security of patients?
Answer. The Department has policies in place that ensure that DOD
conducted, contracted, sponsored, supported, or managed research
involving human subjects is conducted in accordance with Federal, DOD,
and international regulatory requirements. Research protocols,
including internet research protocols, must be reviewed and approved by
Institutional Review Boards, and privacy protection is a key element of
that review. At present, there is no DOD policy regarding the
protection of privacy for internet research beyond the current privacy
protections for human subjects of research. The ASD (Research &
Engineering) who is the DOD lead for the human research protection
portfolio intends to update the policy that governs human research
protection to include a section on internet research (including
recruitment of subjects as well as collection of data).
Question. What are your biggest concerns related to the DOD medical
research enterprise?
Answer. The biggest concern is the impact of instability of medical
research funding due to budget uncertainty. Stability and thoughtful
management in medical research funding are necessary to maintain a
robust scientific community to improve health care outcomes in the
vital areas of hemorrhage control and resuscitation, traumatic brain
injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicide prevention, extremity
injury and amputee care and rehabilitation.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of deployments. These programs should be
relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty
and Reserve personnel, retirees, and their families.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining MWR programs,
particularly in view of the current fiscal environment and, if
confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve?
Answer. Changes in our basing, deployment patterns and force
structure will continue to have a significant impact on our ability to
deliver quality of life programs to our military families. With more
than 75 percent of military families now living off installation, there
is an increasing need for partnerships and support from local
governments, school systems, and businesses to ensure we continue to
provide comprehensive, accessible, and affordable quality of life
programs. Additionally, we are conducting a major assessment of MWR
programs to ensure they are being operated in as efficient and cost-
effective manner as possible.
The continued vitality and relevance of MWR programs depend on
sound management, meeting command and customer needs, a predictable
stream of nonappropriated revenue and solid appropriated fund support
of mission essential and community support programs. We must develop
and maintain a strong network of community-based providers and maximize
our information and referral resources through internet and social
networking avenues. We also have the opportunity to improve the
effectiveness of outreach programs, to better meet military families
where they live. If confirmed, I will evaluate these opportunities, and
how we can better coordinate efforts among the various entities
providing support to our military members and their families.
commissary and military exchange systems
Question. Commissary and military exchange systems are significant
quality of life components for members of the Active and Reserve
Forces, retirees, and their families.
What is your view of the need for modernization of business
policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems, and what
do you view as the most promising avenues for change to achieve
modernization goals?
Answer. Both the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) and the military
exchanges are progressive organizations seeking to reduce costs within
their respective businesses. DeCA, for example, has a proven history of
reducing the costs of the commissary system without decreasing the
value of the benefit provided. Since its beginning in 1991,
efficiencies have allowed DeCA to reduce its workforce by 6,700 full
time equivalent positions and operating costs by approximately $1.4
billion in constant fiscal year 1992 dollars, which include savings due
to BRAC closures and inventory reduction. In fact, when measured in
constant dollars, DeCA's operating costs are only slightly more than
one-half of what they were when the Agency was created.
Today's exchanges have gone beyond the traditional brick and mortar
environment, embracing e-commerce and mobile retail channels to satisfy
customer demands. The exchanges continue to exceed the DOD Social
Compact on savings for servicemembers. For the Exchanges, there are
mechanisms for modernization through the Cooperative Efforts Board.
Promising areas for change include non-resale procurement, logistics
and distribution, exchange select/private label, and seasonal and one
time buys. If confirmed, I will continue to look for ways to modernize
business policies and find efficiencies in the commissary and exchange
systems.
Question. What is your view of the proposals by some to consolidate
or eliminate Commissaries and Exchanges in certain areas where they are
underused or duplicative of services readily available at reasonable
cost in the community?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review any proposals aimed at
reducing overhead, which may include closing underutilized locations or
eliminating duplicative services. I recognize that commissary and
exchange programs are an important element of the servicemembers'
compensation package and contribute to the quality of life of military
personnel and their families. In fact, commissaries are repeatedly
rated by military personnel as one of their most valued non-pay
benefits. Selling groceries at cost means that the customer pays the
same price DeCA pays its supplier plus a 5 percent surcharge which pays
for replacing, maintaining, and renovating commissaries.
There are currently 247 commissaries; 55 percent of these
commissaries are small stores located in remote or overseas locations,
but they account for only 20 percent of sales. These stores are often
the most appreciated stores because there are generally limited options
available outside the gate of the military installation. With over 98
million shopper visits annually and approximately $6 billion in sales
it is evident that people are using this benefit. Eliminating
commissaries in some areas may be possible but we must fully appreciate
the impacts on the servicemembers and the community
Question. In the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005,
Congress required the Secretary of Defense to establish an executive
governing body for the commissary and exchange systems to ensure the
complementary operation of the two systems.
What is your understanding of the purpose and composition of the
executive governing body?
Answer. To fulfill the requirement of the law, the Department
established the DOD Executive Resale Board as the governing body to
provide advice to the USD(P&R) regarding the complementary operation of
the commissary and exchange systems. The Board reviews and advises on
cross-functional matters important to the military resale system. The
Board is invaluable in leading cooperative efforts and resolving issues
of concern resulting in increased efficiency and effectiveness of the
overall system.
The Board is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Readiness and Force Management, and members include both the senior
military officers and civilians who oversee and manage the commissary
and exchanges systems.
Question. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to the
governing body, and what would your expectations be for its role?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Board meets regularly to
review operational areas of mutual interest to the military resale
system.
civilian personnel systems
Question. Section 1113 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 provides
DOD with extensive personnel flexibilities for its civilian employees
that are not available to other agencies. In particular, section
9902(a) of title 5, U.S.C., as added by section 1113, directs the
Department to establish a new performance management system for all of
its employees. Section 9902(b) directs the Department to develop a
streamlined new hiring system that is designed to better fulfill DOD's
mission needs, produce high-quality applicants, and support timely
personnel decisions.
What is your understanding of the current status of the
Department's efforts to implement the authority provided by section
1113?
Answer. The Department's plans for the performance management
system, workforce incentives, and hiring flexibilities were informed by
recommendations developed by DOD employees, supervisors, and managers
representing labor and management from across the Department and
submitted to the Armed Services Committees at the end of March 2013.
The collaborative labor-management pre-decisional recommendations for
the personnel authorities were widely adopted by the Department.
The Department continues to make good progress on the personnel
authorities. We are developing the new appraisal system, which will be
a multi-level rating pattern characterized by a uniform appraisal
period for covered employees, and the ability to make meaningful
distinctions in levels of performance. If confirmed, I will continue to
support the work that is underway to comply with statute.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
these flexibilities in a manner that best meets the needs of the
Department and promotes the quality of the Department's civilian
workforce?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will make it my priority to implement
those flexibilities that would promote the quality of the Department's
civilian workforce to ensure accomplishment of the Department's
missions.
Question. Section 1112 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the
Department to develop a Defense Civilian Leadership Program (DCLP) to
recruit, train, and advance a new generation of civilian leaders for
the Department. Section 1112 provides the Department with the full
range of authorities available for demonstration programs under section
4703 of title 5, U.S.C., including the authority to compensate
participants on the basis of qualifications, performance, and market
conditions. These flexibilities are not otherwise available to DOD.
Do you agree that the Department needs to recruit highly qualified
civilian personnel to meet the growing needs of its acquisition,
technical, business, and financial communities?
Answer. I completely agree that recruiting highly qualified
civilian personnel both in mission critical occupations, such as
acquisition, information technology, and financial management, and in
leadership positions across the Department is essential to mission
success.
Question. In your view, has the existing civilian hiring process
been successful in recruiting such personnel and meeting these needs?
Answer. Although I believe the Department currently has a highly
talented workforce, I wholeheartedly support the initiatives to
streamline the civilian hiring process. The Department embraces a
simplified, transparent hiring system that meets the needs of
stakeholders, attracts quality candidates, and reduces fill-time. We
are making progress, but there is still work to be done in this area.
If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to actively engage
in aggressively pursuing continued improvements in the civilian hiring
process.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
the authority provided by section 1112 in a manner that best meets the
needs of the Department and promotes the quality of the Department's
civilian workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to implement the
authority provided by section 1112. The Department recognizes the need
for a sound leader-development model to attract, retain, and develop
civilian leaders to support pipeline readiness, enhance bench strength,
and promote the quality of the Department's civilian workforce. The
Department has successfully completed two pilot cohorts under the
authority provided in section 1112 from which approximately 240 leaders
have graduated, and who are now credentialed to lead teams and
projects. If confirmed, I will continue implementing the authority
provided to ensure a successful framework for developing the next
generation of innovative leaders to meet the Department's future needs.
human capital planning
Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., as added by section
1108 of the NDAA for 2010, requires the Secretary of Defense to develop
and update in every even-numbered year a strategic human capital plan
that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's civilian
workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. Section 115b
requires that the plan include chapters specifically addressing the
Department's senior management, functional, and technical workforce and
the Department's acquisition workforce.
Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies
gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key
step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and
capabilities needed to meet future challenges?
Answer. Yes. I believe such planning would well position the
Department to acquire, develop, and maintain the workforce it needs to
meet current and future mission challenges.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements
for a strategic human capital plan under section 115b?
Answer. At this time we appreciate the help of past legislation
that put the Department on a biennial reporting cycle. We continue to
progress on meeting the requirements for a strategic human capital plan
under section 115b, and will continue to institutionalize our processes
and assess the need for any changes as we continue in this important
endeavor.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies
with these requirements?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will continue to work toward ensuring
the Department fully complies with statutory strategic workforce
planning requirements.
Question. Since the time that the Department's most recent
strategic human capital plan was issued, its civilian workforce plans
have been significantly altered by the changed budget environment and
extensive efficiencies initiatives.
What role do you believe human capital planning should play in
determining where reductions in the civilian workforce can be taken
with the lowest level of risk?
Answer. Any reductions in the civilian workforce should be informed
by the Department's long-term strategic workforce plan to determine
where reductions can be taken with the lowest level of risk, with the
understanding that short-term exceptions may be necessary due to
emerging dynamics in the budget environment. Forecasts for the
Department's workforce must be based on validated mission requirements
and workload, both current and projected, and any reductions in the
civilian workforce must be made in the context of the Total Force and
directly linked to workload so as to not adversely impact overall
mission capabilities.
Question. Would you agree that the strategic human capital plan
required by section 115b should be updated to more accurately reflect
the Department's current workforce plans and requirements?
Answer. Yes. The plan should be updated to be more aligned and
integrated with the Department's programing and budget process, and
meet the requirements for a total force mix and competencies
assessments. In preparing for fiscal year 2013 through 2018, we
conducted a pilot study that examined the total force mix based on the
workforce requirement and relationships in high risk mission critical
occupations. We are also testing and preparing to launch a tool to
collect competency gap information that will lead to strategies to
mitigate identified gaps. These processes will take several planning
cycles, and functional communities are preparing for further assessment
and implementation.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that civilian workforce levels are determined on the basis of careful
planning and long-term requirements, rather than by arbitrary goals or
targets?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize that civilian
workforce levels must be planned based on long-term strategic planning
requirements. Forecasts for the Department's workforce must be based on
validated mission requirements and directly linked to workload so as to
not adversely impact overall mission capabilities.
dod civilian personnel workforce
Question. Section 955 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 required the
Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to reduce the size of the
civilian personnel workforce by 5 percent over the next 5 years. The
plan developed by the Secretary does not meet this objective. Since the
time that section 955 was enacted, the Department has implemented
hiring freezes and furloughs as a result of sequestration. As a result,
the DOD civilian personnel workforce is substantially smaller than it
was on the date of enactment or at the time the plan was submitted.
Do you agree that DOD's civilian employee workforce plays a vital
role in the functioning of the Department?
Answer. Yes, the DOD's civilian employee workforce plays an
instrumental role in the functioning of the Department as part of the
Total Force across a range of missions. The civilian workforce performs
key enabling functions for the military, such as critical training and
preparation to ensure readiness, equipment reset and modernization.
Civilians also provide medical care, family support, and base operating
services--all vital to supporting our men and women in uniform.
Additionally, civilians are on the ``front lines'' supporting missions
such as intelligence, cyber, reconstruction, and security force
assistance.
Question. Do you agree that if sequestration continues through
fiscal year 2014 and beyond, the Department will need to further reduce
the size of its civilian workforce?
Answer. While there is some flexibility afforded the Department in
managing the steep reductions to the budget required by sequestration,
the across the board impact of those reductions would likely require
the Department to further decrease the size of its civilian workforce.
If confirmed, and to the extent allowed by the sequester, I will work
to ensure that any reductions to the civilian workforce are balanced
and executed in the context of the Department's Total Force management
principles, ensuring the appropriate and most cost effective alignment
of work.
Question. In your view, would it be preferable for the Department
to make planned, prioritized reductions to its civilian workforce, or
to continue with arbitrary reductions based on hiring freezes and
workforce attrition?
Answer. Planned and prioritized reductions to the civilian
workforce are preferred, such as those reflected in the Department's
budget request for fiscal year 2014. Those proposed reductions were
based on a comprehensive workforce to workload analysis. Unfortunately,
the across the board impact of the sequester along with continued
budget uncertainty surrounding the Department's annual appropriations
request has resulted in the need to take extraordinary actions, such as
the implementation of hiring freezes and furloughs.
balance between civilian employees and contractor employees
Question. In recent years, DOD has become increasingly reliant on
services provided by contractors. As a result of the explosive growth
in service contracts, contractors now play an integral role in the
performance of functions that were once performed exclusively by
government employees, including the management and oversight of weapons
programs, the development of policies, the development of public
relations strategies, and even the collection and analysis of
intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same
offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many
of the same functions as Federal employees.
Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees
and contractor employees is in the best interests of DOD?
Answer. I believe the Department must have a properly sized and
highly capable civilian workforce that guards against an erosion of
critical, organic skills and an overreliance on contracted services,
particularly in such areas as acquisition program management,
information technology, and financial management. If confirmed, I will
continue to support the administration's and Department's focus on
reducing inappropriate or excessive reliance on contracted support,
particularly for work that is critical in nature or closely associated
with inherently governmental functions.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that DOD is not excessively reliant on contractors to perform its basic
functions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
administration's and Department's focus on gaining a better accounting
of contracted services. We will review such services annually and
reduce inappropriate, excessive, or more costly reliance on such
services. This is of particular importance in instances where
contractors are found to be performing work that is critical in nature
or closely associated with inherently governmental functions.
Question. Section 2330a of title 10, U.S.C., requires DOD to
maintain an inventory of contract services. Section 321 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2011 amended this provision to give the USD(P&R) a key role
in implementing this provision.
What is your understanding of the current status of the
Department's efforts to implement the requirements of section 2330a?
Answer. Since 2011, the Department has made significant
improvements to its Inventory of Contracts for Services to implement
the requirements of title 10, U.S.C., section 2330a. Specifically, we
have improved the accuracy of the required data set by directing cross-
functional (acquisition, financial management, manpower, and requiring
activities) involvement in the process. We have issued data collection
guidance and, as recommended by Congress and deployed the Army's proven
Contractor Manpower Reporting Application software across the entire
Department. We have also issued specific guidance on how components are
to review their inventories in order to reduce inappropriate,
excessive, or more costly reliance on contract services. Also,
beginning in fiscal year 2014, contractors supporting all components
will be able to report their labor dollars and related cost
information, as required by law. We still have more to do. If I am
confirmed, in order to make the best use of our resources, we will
continue working with AT&L to improve visibility and accountability of
contracts for services.
Question. What additional steps if any will you take, if confirmed,
to ensure that the Department fully implements the requirements of
section 2330a?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue working with my colleagues in
AT&L and Comptroller to improve visibility and accountability of our
contracted services as required by title 10, U.S.C. section 2330a. We
will soon finalize a governing instruction for managing contract
services as a part of the Total Force, and, as requested by Congress,
implement across DOD the Army's standardized service contract approval
process to be used when considering funding contract support. I will
also continue to work, as requested by Congress, on implementing the
Army's automated Contract Manpower Reporting Application across the
Department, which will help ensure a comprehensive inventory review and
permit component heads to make greatly improved budget projections for
contracted services.
acquisition workforce
Question. Section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 established
an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address
shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund provides a
continuing source of funds for this purpose.
Do you believe that the DOD acquisition workforce development fund
is still needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees
with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. The acquisition workforce development fund has been
instrumental in the Department's efforts to recapitalize its
acquisition workforce and improve oversight, management, and
accountability in the procurements of goods and services. The fund is
still necessary to further enhance and sustain the training and
expertise of our dedicated acquisition workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to ensure
that the money made available through the workforce development fund is
spent in a manner that best meets the needs of DOD and its acquisition
workforce?
Answer. While the management and execution of the acquisition
workforce development fund is a joint responsibility of AT&L and
Comptroller, if confirmed, I will work with those offices to ensure
that the application of resources is done in a manner that is
consistent with the training, development, and sustainment needs of the
acquisition workforce.
Question. Section 872 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
codifies the authority for DOD to conduct an acquisition workforce
demonstration project and extends the authority to 2017.
Do you believe it would be in the best interest of the Department
to extend and expand the acquisition workforce demonstration project?
Answer. DOD components have expressed a strong interest in an
expansion of the acquisition workforce demonstration project to better
meet the workforce challenges they are facing under current budget
constraints. Testing alternative personnel authorities and processes
under these difficult conditions will be a true test of their
effectiveness and I believe there is value in extending and expanding
this demonstration project. Our role in P&R is to provide the
warfighter and support staffs with the manpower and personnel
authorities, processes and tools they need to enable them to carry out
their missions. If confirmed, I will continue to work with and support
AT&L in ensuring the demonstration project supports the needs of the
components and mission of the Department.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to implement
section 872?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
USD(AT&L) and other Department components to ensure the Department is
effectively positioned to appropriately extend and expand the
Acquisition Demonstration project.
gi bill benefits
Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
Assistance Act in 2008 (``Post-9/11 GI Bill) that created enhanced
educational benefits for servicemembers who have served at least 90
days on Active Duty since September 11. The maximum benefit would
roughly cover the cost of a college education at any public university
in the country. One purpose of the act was to recognize and reward the
service of those who served voluntarily after September 11,
particularly those who do not serve full careers and qualify for
retirement benefits.
What is your assessment of the impact of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on
recruiting and retention, including the provision of transferability
for continued service?
Answer. While the Post-9/11 GI Bill program is only 4 years old,
there are strong indications the program has already had a profound,
positive impact on recruiting and retention. In fact, as of September
4, 2013, over 368,875, career servicemembers have transferred their
Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits to over 795,000 family members.
personnel policy implementation
Question. What is your understanding of your responsibility, if
confirmed, to inform and consult with this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of policies
directed by law?
Answer. I understand that I must comply with all requirements to
inform and consult with requisite congressional committees on the
implementation of personnel and readiness policies as directed by law.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's obligation
and authority to implement personnel policies to improve efficiency
within the Department?
Answer. I understand that the Department, under the direction of
the Secretary, has both the authority and obligation to evaluate and
implement personnel policies to improve efficiency within the
Department. That these policies must not compromise mission readiness
or essential support of the Total Force.
Question. What is your understanding on the timeframe in which
personnel policies directed by law must be implemented by the
Department?
Answer. I understand that personnel policies directed by law must
be implemented by the Department in the timeliest manner possible given
the available resources and while ensuring the most effective and
efficient outcome for the Total Force.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(P&R)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
living quarters allowance for civilian employees overseas
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Wright, the committee is aware that the
Department of Defense (DOD) directed an audit of the pay accounts of
many employees in overseas locations who were receiving a Living
Quarters Allowance (LQA), and that the audit found that a total of 659
DOD civilian employees were erroneously paid LQA after having been
hired overseas. While the authority to provide LQA is found in
Department of State Standardized Regulations (DSSR), in a May 15, 2013
memo you announced that DOD would continue to provide LQA for up to 1
year for affected employees due to unusual circumstances. In addition,
DOD is providing relief for past LQA debts if employees seek a waiver
of indebtedness. Did DOD consider extending the waiver of recovery of
an advance payment of LQA for unusual circumstances beyond the 1-year
currently granted?
Ms. Wright. Yes, we considered the LQA eligibility beyond the 1
year currently granted. However, we also considered that granting
eligibility for LQA beyond that time could be viewed as an abuse of
discretion with respect to taxpayer dollars being spent on incentives
for which employees are otherwise ineligible. We believe that 1 year of
LQA eligibility is a sufficient period for affected employees to make
personal decisions in this situation.

2. Senator Levin. Secretary Wright, are there any legal impediments
to providing such an extension for the duration of an employee's term
overseas, and in your view, would it be appropriate to do so?
Ms. Wright. Up to 1 year of temporary eligibility for LQA has been
authorized as a means to provide adequate time for employees to make
arrangements to adjust to the loss of LQA. Continuing beyond that
period is not appropriate as the affected employees do not meet the
standard eligibility criteria under the DSSR, DOD Instruction 1400.25,
Volume 1250, or both.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
military lending act
3. Senator Reed. Secretary Wright, the Military Lending Act (MLA)
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to write regulations defining the
types of consumer credit products to which the law's 36 percent annual
percentage rate cap applies, and DOD is currently in the process of
updating its regulations to close loopholes. These loopholes, such as
structuring a credit product as an open ended one, have allowed
predatory lenders to evade the protections afforded to our
servicemembers under the MLA and, in some cases, charge our
servicemembers exorbitant triple digit effective interest rates. Are
these predatory loans that currently fall out of the MLA's purview
problematic in terms of assuring military readiness?
Ms. Wright. Predatory lending and abusive lending practices
compromise our readiness and are of great concern to the Department.
The passage of the MLA curbed many abusive industry practices. We
recognize, however, the credit market has changed since our initial
regulation was published. The Department is, therefore, working closely
with the prudential regulators including the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Federal
Trade Commission, along with other consumer and enforcement agencies.
We are conducting a top to bottom review of our MLA rules, with a view
towards strengthening the protections available to military families.
This rigorous interagency rulemaking process is being further
informed by public comment and a survey of DOD personnel, legal
assistance officers, and financial counselors to identify appropriate
statutory, regulatory, and training responses to problematic practices.
We anticipate the revised rule will be ready for public comment by the
end of the calendar year. We are committed to directing servicemembers
and their families away from potentially harmful credit products and
towards educational, training, and personal counseling resources that
the Department provides to support their financial stability.

4. Senator Reed. Secretary Wright, do you agree that DOD should
provide our servicemembers with the greatest level of protection under
the MLA by closing these loopholes?
Ms. Wright. The Department has revisited and is revising these
regulations to ensure servicemembers and veterans are protected against
the credit products that they use most. We recognize the current
definitions of credit in the regulation are no longer adequate to cover
the products that are potentially causing concern. Accordingly, DOD has
organized and led an interagency working group, including all of the
prudential lenders, to review the regulation with a view toward
strengthening protections for military consumers. This process is well
underway and we are making substantial process.
Our rulemaking efforts are being further informed by public comment
and a survey of DOD personnel, legal assistance officers, and financial
counselors to identify appropriate statutory, regulatory, and training
responses to problematic practices. Relying on this comprehensive data
from our ``boots-on-the-ground'' subject matter experts in the field,
we anticipate the revised rule will be ready for public comment by the
end of the calendar year.
The Department is also fully engaged in educating servicemembers
concerning their rights as consumers, so that they are familiar with
their protections under Federal consumer law, the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act, and the MLA. Our efforts to educate servicemembers and
their families center around installation readiness facilities,
predeployment and redeployment process facilities, and Reserve
component mobilization and demobilization processing centers. This
comprehensive education and training is more sophisticated and detailed
than it has even been. Therefore, we are confident that our interagency
rulemaking process, combined with our ongoing financial readiness
campaign, will provide greater safeguards for our servicemembers and
their families against predatory and abusive lending practices.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
living quarters allowance
5. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wright, in response to the loss of
overseas LQA for Government civilians, DOD offered those affected the
opportunity to transfer to the United States under the Priority
Placement Program (PPP). Can you confirm the priority placement level
granted to the civilians affected by the erroneous payments of LQA?
Ms. Wright. Affected employees are being enrolled in the PPP as
Priority 3 registrants. Priority 3 is generally assigned to registrants
who are not facing involuntary separation. Higher priority registrants
are being involuntarily separated, i.e., losing employment altogether.
As of September 26, 2013, the DOD components have reported that 71
affected employees have registered in PPP, 4 have accepted job offers,
and 1 has declined an offer.
We have taken additional steps for affected employees who choose to
return Stateside in the absence of LQA. Specifically, we have
authorized a temporary exception to standard PPP clearance requirements
that allows DOD components to reassign LQA-affected employees directly
to State-side vacancies that would otherwise not be filled due to a
hiring freeze. As of September 26, 2013, the DOD components have
reported that nine employees have accepted management-directed
reassignments under this special exception.

6. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wright, does this category grant the
affected constituents any advantages over civilians who are not
affected by the LQA?
Ms. Wright. Affected employees who choose to register in the PPP
are registered as a Priority 3. Priority 3 is generally assigned to
registrants who are not facing involuntary separation. Higher priority
registrants are being involuntarily separated, i.e., losing employment
altogether. Unlike other Priority 3 registrants, LQA-affected employees
may register in the PPP at any time. In order to facilitate as many
placements as possible, PPP registration procedures were modified to
accelerate expansion of the registrant's area of referral. Further, the
Department has authorized a temporary exception to standard PPP
clearance requirements that allows DOD components to reassign LQA-
affected employees directly to State-side vacancies that would
otherwise not be filled due to a hiring freeze. As of September 26,
2013, the DOD components have reported that nine employees have
accepted management-directed reassignments under this special exception
to PPP. Also, the components reported that 71 affected employees have
registered in PPP, 4 have accepted job offers, and 1 has declined an
offer.

7. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wright, in light of the sequester and
hiring freeze, can DOD guarantee available positions for all who choose
this option?
Ms. Wright. In an effort to further mitigate the effects of LQA
cessation, the Department has developed special PPP procedures to
facilitate the timely rotation of those affected employees who choose
to return Stateside in the absence of LQA. Most notably, we have
authorized a temporary exception to standard PPP clearance requirements
that allows DOD components to reassign LQA-affected employees directly
to State-side vacancies that would otherwise not be filled due to a
hiring freeze. As of September 26, 2013, the DOD components have
reported that nine employees have accepted management-directed
reassignments under this special exception to PPP. In addition, the
components have reported that 71 affected employees have registered in
PPP, 4 have accepted job offers, and 1 has declined an offer.

8. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wright, will all affected constituents
who participate in the PPP be able to do so by May 1, 2014?
Ms. Wright. Yes. We expect affected employees who indicate in a
timely manner that they wish to return Stateside will be offered
positions either through PPP or other DOD component reassignment action
by May 1, 2014. Employees identified in the audit as receiving LQA
erroneously who choose to return Stateside in the absence of LQA became
eligible to register in the PPP on June 27, 2013. As of September 26,
2013, the DOD components reported that 71 employees have registered in
PPP, 4 have accepted job offers, and 1 has declined an offer. In
addition to placement through PPP registration, the Department has
authorized a temporary exception to standard PPP clearance requirements
that allows DOD components to reassign LQA-affected employees directly
to State-side vacancies that would otherwise not be filled due to a
hiring freeze. As of September 26, 2013, the DOD components have
reported that nine employees have accepted management-directed
reassignments under this special exception to PPP.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
citizen soldier support program
9. Senator Hagan. Secretary Wright, section 706 of last year's
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized the Secretary of
Defense to carry out a pilot program to work with community partners on
this critical health issue. We need to work with local authorities and
local programs to more effectively tackle this problem. North Carolina
has such a program--the Citizen Soldier Support Program. Can you please
assure this committee that you will support and vigorously carry out
this pilot program that was part of last year's NDAA?
Ms. Wright. We greatly appreciate the intent of section 706 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 to improve the care for the National Guard
and Reserve members through community partnership. The Department is
actively working with the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and
Health and Human Services to respond to the President's Executive Order
#13625, ``Improving Access to Mental Health Services for Veterans,
Servicemembers, and Military Families,'' dated August 31, 2012. Under
the Executive order, the VA is developing enhanced partnerships and
fielding pilot programs with community providers to enhance mental
health services. In addition, DOD and the VA published a National
Research Action Plan in August 2013, which, among other things,
recommends strategies, evaluates current efforts, and ensures mental
health providers in communities nationwide are trained in the most
current evidence-based methodologies.
Due to severe budget limitations under the Budget Control Act, the
Department has not made plans to initiate a separate competitive and
merit-based award process for a new program under the discretionary
authority of section 706.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
living quarters allowance
10. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wright, please explain DOD's reason
for not employing the ``unusual circumstances'' clause beyond May 1,
2014 to enable the 659 civilians to receive LQA until the end of their
assignment or until DOD is able to place the person via PPP.
Ms. Wright. While we consider that 1 year of LQA eligibility is a
sufficient period for affected employees to make personal decisions
concerning this situation, we also consider that granting LQA beyond
that time could be viewed as an abuse of discretion with respect to
taxpayer dollars being spent on incentives for which employees are
otherwise ineligible. We expect that employees indicating in a timely
manner their desire to return State-side will be placed before their
LQA terminates.

11. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wright, would DOD consider putting
those affected into a higher PPP category than level 3? If not, please
explain.
Ms. Wright. Enrolling the affected employees with a higher priority
was considered but not adopted. Priorities 1 and 2 in the PPP are
reserved for employees who are being involuntarily separated through no
fault of their own, which is not the case of employees identified in
the audit as receiving LQA erroneously.
However, in an effort to mitigate the effects of LQA cessation, the
Department has authorized a temporary exception to standard PPP
clearance requirements that allows DOD components to reassign LQA-
affected employees directly to State-side vacancies that would
otherwise not be filled due to a hiring freeze. As of September 26,
2013, the DOD components have reported that nine employees have
accepted management-directed reassignments under this special exception
to PPP. In addition, the components have reported that 71 affected
employees have registered in PPP, 4 have accepted job offers, and 1 has
declined an offer. The Department has also committed to re-evaluating
these procedures, as needed, to determine if more aggressive measures
are necessary to affect the return of these employees from overseas.

12. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wright, please provide specifics
regarding the mechanisms in place that would allow DOD to fill vacant
positions during a hiring freeze. Are human resources (HR)
professionals able to see those jobs listed and effectively match
someone from this group to those jobs?
Ms. Wright. The Department has authorized a temporary exception to
standard PPP clearance requirements that allows DOD components to
reassign LQA-affected employees who choose to return Stateside in the
absence of LQA directly to State-side vacancies that would otherwise
not be filled due to a hiring freeze. Operational guidance regarding
these PPP flexibilities was distributed to the Department's human
resources community on June 27, 2013. As of September 26, 2013, the DOD
components have reported that nine employees have accepted management-
directed reassignments under this special exception to PPP. In
addition, the components reported that 71 affected employees have
registered in PPP, 4 have accepted job offers, and 1 has declined an
offer. DOD components are responsible for procedures that will result
in assignments for their employees.

13. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wright, other than being an LQA
recipient, were there any additional parameters and guidelines used to
select a target population for erroneous LQA?
Ms. Wright. Yes. By memorandum of January 3, 2013, I directed DOD
components to complete an audit of the pay accounts of all locally
hired employees currently receiving LQA.

14. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wright, are the details of the audit
publicly available to this group under the Freedom of Information Act?
Ms. Wright. Yes, an employee may request the details of the audit
as it affects the employee through the Freedom of Information Act
process.

15. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wright, has Thomas v. United States
(September 7, 2011) played any role in how DOD is handling the current
LQA issue?
Ms. Wright. No. Thomas v. United States has not played a role in
how the Department is addressing the LQA issue. However, we agree with
the Thomas opinion that if an employee satisfies all the eligibility
requirements for receiving LQA as established in the DSSR, as well as
the supplemental criteria established by the DOD in its LQA regulations
(DODI 1400.25, Volume 1250), that employee may be eligible to receive
the incentive provided that the Department has made a determination
that there is a need for the incentive. As noted in Roberts v. United
States (April 30, 2012), the DSSR expressly delegates authority to
heads of Federal agencies to implement additional regulations in this
area. Under that delegation, the Secretary of Defense issued DOD
Instruction 1400.25, volume 1250, which includes LQA eligibility
conditions in addition to those outlined in the DSSR. In this
situation, affected employees either did not meet the DSSR eligibility
requirements, or those established in Volume 1250, or both.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
autism
16. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, during our meeting we
discussed the various options for care for special needs dependents,
especially those on the autism spectrum. I consider this a readiness
issue when we start to see servicemembers leave the military in order
to find better care for their children. After our discussion I still
have concerns with the level of commitment from TRICARE to adequately
address the needs of our special needs dependents. If confirmed, do I
have your commitment to work with me to reform and improve upon the way
that TRICARE cares for special needs dependents?
Ms. Wright. I agree that this is a readiness issues and, if
confirmed, I will work closely with you and other Members of Congress
on improving TRICARE programs for special needs dependents. DOD
provides one of the most generous autism benefits in the United States
through the TRICARE program. All TRICARE family members with a
diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder are eligible for autism services.
Active Duty family members are also eligible for Applied Behavior
Analysis (ABA) reinforcement under the ECHO Autism Demonstration.
I want to assure you that the Department fully recognizes that
having a child diagnosed with autism can present significant challenges
to any family and burden them with changes to nearly every aspect of
daily family life. TRICARE will continue to pursue efforts to take care
of our families with special needs and will proceed accordingly based
on analysis of the best medical evidence available and the results of
our own demonstration and pilot project.

17. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, more than once I have
heard the excuse that medical data is not available to prove the
necessity of a specific autism treatment option that is routinely used
in the civilian sector. Will you commit to reviewing the way TRICARE
makes these determinations to ensure TRICARE is routinely reviewing the
latest medical data available?
Ms. Wright. Yes, we are committed to routinely reviewing the latest
medical data available. As you may be aware, TRICARE completed the most
recent review on June 28, 2013. However, TRICARE has deferred a final
decision pending reassessment based on experience under the ABA Pilot
and any other pertinent new information. During this interim period,
TMA will continue ABA coverage under the Basic Program per existing
policy as well as continue periodic reviews as new data and evidence
become available.

mental health
18. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, the last issue we
discussed was the issue of mental health, including the stigma
surrounding post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as the rates
of suicide in our Services. I receive the monthly suicide data and am
saddened to see the number of servicemembers who fall through the
cracks in the system. If confirmed, what are your plans to improve upon
suicide prevention throughout DOD?
Ms. Wright. At every level of leadership, DOD recognizes the
complex nature of suicide and the widespread outreach effort that is
needed to tackle this problem. My plan to improve suicide prevention
across the Department has already begun on several fronts. First, we
are working closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs on a
standard and consistent message for the Military Crisis Line, which is
available in the United States, Europe, Korea and Afghanistan. I plan
on adding Japan.
We have adopted a peer support model through Vets4Warriors that
offers case management, referrals, and support to all who need it. We
have provided a multitude of training and educational events worldwide
to prevent suicide and build resilience among our military and civilian
workforce and to involve their families. I intend to continue our
support for these events and will ensure that the Defense Suicide
Prevention Office (DSPO) is fully engaged in providing materials and
resources. Suicide prevention research is a priority and efforts to
better understand the nature of military suicide risk factors and
interventions are underway. Finally, I am committed to working with the
Services to ensure that access to care is available for all who seek
it, regardless of where they are located.

19. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, I am also concerned about
the reports of suicide among military dependents. What is DOD doing to
prevent these suicides?
Ms. Wright. The Department is equally concerned and extremely
saddened by these reports. We are moving quickly with our outreach
efforts to increase awareness and ensure that the right resources and
programs are brought to bear at the right time to address the
challenges of our families. Our military families have done all that
has been asked of them, serving honorably and faithfully in support of
their servicemember. Now it is part of the Department's solemn
commitment to them that we do everything in our power to reach out and
help those family members.
The provisions of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 section on Suicide
and Military Families helped focus the efforts of the Defense Suicide
Prevention Office (DSPO) to determine the prevalence of and prevention
strategies for military family member suicides. DSPO facilitates a
working group of subject matter experts charged with developing a
deliberate and comprehensive strategy for measuring the prevalence and
incidence of suicides among military dependents. DSPO has identified
several surveillance options that would give us a clearer understanding
of the risk factors involved and is continuing to work with the Defense
Manpower Data Center and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) to also examine a possible relationship between military
dependent and servicemember suicides. This critical work will inform
what the suicide prevention needs of our military families are to
better align programs and resources to help those in need. The results
of these efforts and a plan to assess suicide among military families
and its impact on servicemembers will be presented in a report to
Congress due by April 1, 2014.
In addition to providing a full spectrum of resources available to
help military families with the stressors they face before they face a
crisis, DOD is directing both servicemembers and families to the
``Supporting Military Families in Crisis'' guide which provides family
members with information on suicide warning signs and risk factors,
actions to take when a family member is in crisis, and available
resources to promote a healthy lifestyle and build a resilient family.
The guide is available online at www.suicideoutreach.org.

20. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, what resources are needed
to improve suicide prevention among military dependents?
Ms. Wright. DOD is committed to providing and promoting a wide
range of programs and services that enhance Service and family member
resilience which help eliminate or manage many of the stressors that
can contribute to crisis behaviors including suicidal ideation. This
multidisciplinary approach includes Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
(MWR) programs that alleviate stress; financial readiness counseling,
child care solutions, relationship management and spouse employment
initiatives; as well as suicide prevention support, crisis counseling,
and direct intervention programs to rescue and restore families in
crisis. We are currently assessing these programs to determine what
additional efforts are required to provide the most effective suite of
resources to our servicemembers and their families. We will continue to
inform and work with Congress if we need additional resources or
authorities to better support our servicemembers and dependents.

21. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, just this week General
Dempsey said, ``Men and women should have the opportunity to overcome
their mental disorders or their mental health challenges and shouldn't
be stigmatized. A man or woman should have the ability with treatment
to overcome their challenges and then to have a fruitful life and gain
employment, including inside the military.'' What is being done to
ensure our servicemembers are getting the appropriate screening for
PTSD and the appropriate follow-up care?
Ms. Wright. DOD enacted a deployment mental health assessment
process that requires comprehensive person-to-person mental health
assessments at four time points: (a) within 120 days of deployment; (b)
between 90 and 180 days after return from deployment; (c) between 180
days and 18 months after return from deployment; and (d) between 18-30
months after return from deployment. These assessments comply with
requirements in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, section 702, and NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2013, section 703, and are performed either by licensed
mental health professionals or by designated individuals trained and
certified to perform the assessments. To date, more than 9,000
providers have been trained and certified to administer deployment
mental health assessments.
The deployment mental health assessments include an analysis of
self-reported responses to mental health questions on symptoms of
depression, PTSD, and alcohol misuse; detailed follow-up on positive
responses to previous mental health diagnoses and medication use; and
exploration of other reported emotional, life stress, and mental health
concerns. During a confidential dialog with the servicemember, the
provider conducts an assessment of the risk for suicide or violence,
offers education on relevant mental health topics, administers brief
interventions, and makes recommendations for follow-up assessment and
care, when indicated. Servicemembers who are identified as needing
additional assessment or treatment for PTSD are referred for
appropriate follow-up care at a military medical treatment facility,
Veterans Affairs Medical Center or Vet Center, through the TRICARE
Purchased Care Network, or in the community, depending on the
servicemember's duty status and personal preference.
In addition to these pre- and post-deployment mental health
assessments, symptoms of PTSD, depression, alcohol abuse, and other
mental health concerns are routinely assessed during annual health
assessments and during regular medical appointments with primary care
providers. DOD has increased mental health staffing by 35 percent over
the last 3 years, and has embedded mental health providers within
primary care clinics to increase access to care and support early
identification of PTSD and other mental health concerns.

cyber
22. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright and Ms. James, the cyber
field is a fast-paced, ever-changing arena. If confirmed, what steps
will you take to ensure we are recruiting the best and the brightest to
this field?
Ms. Wright. The growth, sustainment, and long-term career
progression of a talented cyberspace workforce is critical to defend
the Nation in this domain. If confirmed, I will continue to support
ongoing initiatives for identifying and recruiting personnel with the
appropriate cyberspace talents. I will also review current recruiting
and retention challenges and explore options for meeting these
challenges. My focus will include both military and civilian workforce
concerns.

23. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright and Ms. James, what
authorities will be needed to keep the U.S. military on the cutting
edge of cyber?
Ms. Wright. The Department is currently reviewing the authorities
required to maintain superiority in this domain.
If confirmed, I will explore human capital or specialty shortfalls
in the cyberspace defense career fields and, where needed, pursue
recruiting and retention authorities which allow the Department to
ensure we are recruiting and keeping the best and brightest in this
field.

dod-va records transfer
24. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, in your advance policy
questions you were asked several questions about how DOD is
coordinating with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) on records
transfers. I am grateful for your strong commitment to this issue, and
would like to continue to work with you to ensure our transitioning
servicemembers do not fall through the cracks. While I understand that
each side has issues to work through in coordinating with the other,
what more can DOD do to ensure our veterans have a smooth transition
from DOD to the VA?
Ms. Wright. The most important thing DOD can do to assist VA is to
ensure the information needed to reduce disability claims processing
times is available in a timely and accurate manner. We have done
everything VA has asked us to, and we continue to meet regularly with
them to seek ways to further refine information exchange processes. We
have a number of key information sharing enablers, which include the
electronic health record and the Health Artifact and Image Management
Solution, and the paperless DD Form 214 initiative, that are being
developed for both personnel and medical record data. As these enablers
become available, we will continue to collaborate with VA to refine
processes to realize the full potential of these initiatives.
We work closely with VA to ensure servicemembers understand the
benefits for which they are eligible and how to apply for and access
those benefits. We have recently implemented a new Transition
Assistance Program and VA is a key part of that curriculum. We continue
to register new recruits and transitioning servicemembers for DOD Self-
Service (DS) Logon Accounts that allow access to the VA eBenefits
portal.
We anticipate that these enhancements to data exchange and greater
servicemember access to the benefits for which they are eligible will
be smooth and make their transition from the military a seamless
experience. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor these efforts as
one of my priorities.

25. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, is there a need for
increased resources?
Ms. Wright. No, not at the current time. However, we will continue
to inform and work with Congress if we need additional resources or
authorities to better support our servicemembers and dependents.

integrated electronic health records
26. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wright, I would also like an
update on where plans stand for an integrated electronic health records
system. I know that earlier plans for a shared system were scrapped in
favor of finding a way to link the existing systems at DOD and the VA.
Has there been progress in this new plan?
Ms. Wright. Yes. Under the leadership of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, we have established
both a program office and appointed a full-time, dedicated Program
Executive Officer to ensure timely and efficient execution of our
Integrated Electronic Healthcare Records (IEHR) near-term efforts and
our Defense Healthcare Management System Modernization (DHMSM) program.
In addition to continuing the near-term IEHR efforts, we are
aggressively working on the DHMSM acquisition and contracting strategy
with a goal of releasing an initial draft of the Request For Proposal
by the end of this calendar year.
The Department is committed to the seamless transfer of electronic
health care data between DOD and VA. Continuity of care is a key
component of quality health care, and interoperability between DOD and
VA's electronic health record data is essential to enabling this
continuity. Achieving health record data interoperability and exchange
is possible regardless of the software systems used by DOD and VA. A
critical near-term effort we are undertaking is the data
interoperability ``accelerators'' initiative. The first increment of
these ``accelerators'' is on track to complete by December 2013, so
providers have improved access to data. Near-term progress includes:

In partnership with the VA, we identified the national
standards-based data formats and initiated the DOD and VA data
mapping required to standardize patient data for seven of the
highest priority data domains.
DOD and VA have agreed to use a common Health Data
Dictionary as a mechanism to translate current DOD and VA
medical information into national standards. This will further
increase our data sharing and interoperability moving forward.
We have completed the deployment of the Janus Joint
Viewer to nine sites, including the five VA Polytrauma and
Rehabilitation Centers and two Level-5 Military Treatment
Centers, and expanded the use of the Joint Viewer at two
additional sites. This viewer provides clinicians with easier
access to healthcare data from all the sites where the patient
has been treated in the DOD or VA.

Modernizing both Departments' legacy clinical information systems
is the next step in providing seamless interoperability. VA is planning
to modernize its VistA system and use it as the basis of its future
health care management system core software. There are logical business
reasons for VA's decision to stay with VistA: VA has a large installed
VistA base, a large in-house staff that maintains and programs software
for VistA, and a workforce that is experienced and trained to manage
the system. DOD is not in the same position and has operational
requirements that differ from those of the VA. Under the restructured
DHMSM program, DOD will pursue a competitive process to select its core
from the vibrant EHR marketplace to deliver a best-value solution. DOD
will leverage national standards and open architecture design
principles to preserve flexibility, and help foster a thriving,
competitive marketplace. It is worth noting that our recent market
analysis has identified some VistA-based offerings from multiple
companies. These offerings are technically mature EHR solutions, and we
will like see proposals from them for DOD consideration.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
recruiting and retention
27. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wright, what are the impacts of
sequestration on recruitment and retention for the uniformed military?
Ms. Wright. Recruiting and retaining the All-Volunteer Force
requires the commitment to adequately resource our efforts.
Sequestration has created a level of budget uncertainty that makes this
much more challenging. The improving economy will provide potential
recruits and members currently serving in the military greater
opportunities to work or serve outside the military. This, compounded
by reduced discretionary funds for enlistment and retention bonuses,
will make attracting and retaining the highest quality force more
challenging.
Furthermore, the negative impact of sequestration on operations and
training may discourage the best and brightest from joining the
military and discourage retention of our most talented service men and
women. Any negative impacts to recruitment and retention will impact
the ability of our servicemembers to execute our national security
strategy, which is hinged upon being the most technologically advanced,
best equipped, and most highly trained force in the world.

impacts of furlough
28. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wright, for our valued civil servants
in DOD, the furloughs have created difficult situations for many. What
are the impacts on recruitment and retention of our civil service
employees?
Ms. Wright. Although the full effects may take time to materialize,
but we know sequestration has negatively impacted the morale of our
civilian workforce and caused significant stress for them and their
families. We also expect that the continued budget uncertainties the
Department faces will inhibit our ability refresh the workforce and may
cause our most experienced workers to consider leaving the Department.
The impact on recruitment and retention will affect readiness across
the Department. The Department hopes that Congress will enact a
balanced deficit reduction plan that the President can sign that
eliminates sequestration and the resulting impact to our civilian
workforce.

command climate
29. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wright, a command climate survey can
go a long way in determining how effective a unit is and whether or not
negative actions such as sexual harassment are tolerated and/or
reported. What is your opinion of the current climate surveys?
Ms. Wright. The Defense Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (DEOCS) is
designed specifically for the purpose of assessing organizational
climate and works exceedingly well. The survey can be administered in
different ways (on-line or paper/pencil) and the results are produced
in minimum time. The DEOCS has evolved over several years and was
developed by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute in
coordination with the Defense Manpower Data Center.
The DEOCS is well-validated and continues to evolve to address
current human relations issues. It is currently the survey instrument
of choice by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Air Force, which has
used its own unit climate assessment instrument in the past, plans to
begin using DEOCS in the near future.

30. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wright, should climate surveys be
kept to monitor potential long-term issues?
Ms. Wright. The Department currently maintains historical survey
data which help us identify potential long-term issues and provide
organizational-wide insight into the effectiveness of leadership
actions. We would expect climate survey to be used in the same manner
by component leadership.

31. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wright, should climate surveys be
tied to the commander's permanent personnel records so as to monitor
performance as a leader? What about other assessments such as 360
evaluations?
Ms. Wright. I do not believe it is necessary to include climate
survey results or assessments in an officer's permanent record. With
the recent Secretary of Defense mandate requiring that annual command
climate survey results be provided to the next level up in the chain of
command we will be better postured to assess unit climate.
Additionally, there are other measures in evaluation and performance
reports that give us a clear understanding of individual's leadership
capability and potential. For example, an officer's overall annual
performance evaluations which are tied to effectiveness with regard to
meeting organization objectives and goals.
Currently used by some DOD organizations, 360 evaluations also
provide a comprehensive feedback of overall management style and assess
broad competencies such as teamwork, leadership skills, and
communication effectives; however are used primarily for assessing
future professional development and are not generally included in
permanent personnel records.

commissary benefit
32. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wright, what is your assessment of
the current state of the Defense Commissary System?
Ms. Wright. The commissary continues to be one of the most popular
non-pay compensation benefits enjoyed by military members and their
families. As an integral element of the total compensation package,
commissaries enhance quality of life for military families and provide
an excellent return on investment. Last fiscal year, the commissary
provided direct savings to customers of over $2.8 billion for a
taxpayer cost of $1.4 billion.
However, between the Department-wide hiring freeze and employee
furloughs, commissary customer service has suffered. With the high
turnover rate of lower-graded employees in commissaries, the hiring
freeze quickly reduced the manning in 69 percent of stores below the 90
percent level. Over a dozen stores fell below 75 percent manning; and
two were manned at 60 percent or lower. The recent sequestration-driven
furlough, which led to the closing of most stores for 1 day a week for
6 weeks, further impacted customers. Customer complaints rose by over
50 percent and hit an all-time high during the furlough. Excellent
commissary customer service suffered as customers found long check-out
lines, empty shelves, and employees dealing with their own personal
economic challenges due to a 20 percent pay reduction. That reduction
was particularly hard on store-level employees, many of whom are part-
time employees.

33. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wright, what is the benefit as a
value in terms of recruiting and retention?
Ms. Wright. A number of surveys have concluded that commissaries
rate highly among quality of life factors contributing to retention in
the military. A GAO survey found that commissaries ranked #2 by
enlisted personnel and #3 by officers as a reason to stay in the
military. In our 2009 Status of Forces Survey, 90 percent of Active
Duty personnel report they use the commissary, and 81 percent of those
who use the commissary shop monthly or more frequently. Our surveys
also show a majority of Active Duty members believe the commissary
offers better safety and security than other stores in the community.
The commissary gives military personnel peace of mind, particularly
when we place them in harm's way, knowing that their families have the
support they need in a safe and secure shopping environment. Also, the
commissary employs a large number of military dependents and provides a
sense of community. Military personnel appreciate that commissary
managers and employees understand the challenges and sometimes
difficult life borne by military families. Therefore, I believe that
this benefit has a great value to our servicemembers and their
families.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
sexual assault survey
34. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, if confirmed, will you commit
to directing that an independent survey be conducted on sexual assault
in the military, using an experienced outside organization that
specializes in surveys, to design, conduct, and analyze survey results,
with a goal of establishing clear, objective data and metrics that can
be used to measure progress on eliminating sexual assault in the
military?
Ms. Wright. If confirmed, I agree to look at this issue. I am
firmly committed to improving the Department's efforts to prevent and
respond to sexual assaults in the military. If confirmed, I will look
at how the Department conducts its sexual assault survey, to include
the methodology used.

hollow force
35. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, are you concerned about the
reemergence of a hollow force?
Ms. Wright. The potential for hollowing of the force is always a
concern in times of fiscal constraint and drawdown. Readiness
degradations driven by manpower, equipment and training shortfalls are
of prime importance to us and we work constantly with the Joint Staff
and Services to monitor trends and indicators related to potential
hollowing. ``Hollowness'' in the 1970s and 1990s was driven primarily
by excess force structure, recruiting/retention shortfall, increased
optempo, and underfunded training accounts. If confirmed, I intend to
monitor these potential problems closely to ensure we do not hollow our
great force.

36. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, as the President's nominee
what guidance or instruction, if any, were you provided on how to
address the onset of a hollow force?
Ms. Wright. The Secretary of Defense made readiness an imperative
as we began planning for lower budgets and reduced endstrength nearly 3
years ago. Since then, the imperative to monitor, manage, and protect
both near- and long-term readiness remains strong. If confirmed, I will
be responsible for providing the Secretary and Deputy Secretary a
regular accounting of our current readiness status, the associated
risks, and options for mitigating that risk. In executing this
responsibility, I would be required to focus not only the status and
risks of the units, but also the status and the risks associated with
the pipelines that support our ability to properly man, train, and
equip our forces. Historically, it has been problems in these pipelines
that create the most durable readiness degradations.

37. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, if confirmed, what measures
would you use to identify the extent of a hollow force for the
Secretary of Defense?
Ms. Wright. In order to preserve the health and viability of our
All-Volunteer Force, we must ensure that our readiness, force structure
and modernization remain balanced. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Services to ensure their force management plans fully optimize
both short-term readiness and long-term modernization/procurement
efforts as they implement force structure reductions.
Additionally, we must give particular attention to protecting the
Services' pipeline processes that are critical to generating
warfighting capabilities. Metrics gauging the health of these pipelines
are the most valuable readiness/hollowness metrics because they cover
the breadth of man/train/equip concerns and typically provide our best
forecasts. Manpower metrics include measures of individual training,
recruit quality, experience, and manning levels for critical
occupations. Equipment metrics include availability rates, failure
rates, repair rates, spares fill, unit fill, and depot throughput.
Training metrics include individual and unit proficiency, graduate-
level (collective training) unit/individual training accomplishment,
and even range viability metrics.

civilian workforce
38. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, how will DOD manage the
civilian workforce in the next fiscal year under sequestration?
Ms. Wright. The Department must continue to effectively manage our
civilian workforce to ensure we maintain the appropriate mix of skill
sets, and related experience, to maintain the readiness of our
military. Our goal is to shape the workforce in a manner that minimizes
adversity to our valued and talented civilian workforce. The Department
hopes that Congress will enact a balanced deficit reduction plan that
the President can sign which eliminates sequestration.

39. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, what workforce management
tools may DOD use if faced with another year of a sequestered budget--
more furloughs, reductions in force, or early retirements?
Ms. Wright. The Department must continue to effectively manage our
civilian workforce to ensure we maintain the appropriate mix of skill
sets, and related experience, to maintain the readiness of our
military. Our goal is to shape the workforce in a manner that minimizes
adversity to our valued and talented civilian workforce.
The Department is currently operating under hiring restrictions and
will continue to do so under sequestration. Workforce management tools
such as Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay and Voluntary Early
Retirement Authority, have been authorized and encouraged, both of
which are valuable in reducing involuntary separations and associated
costs.
The Department hopes that Congress will enact a balanced deficit
reduction plan that the President can sign which eliminates
sequestration.

40. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, will DOD consider exempting
working capital fund employees from furloughs if it still faces a
sequestered budget in fiscal year 2014?
Ms. Wright. At the present time there is no plan to
administratively furlough DOD employees in fiscal 2014. The Department
hopes that Congress will enact a balanced deficit reduction plan that
the President can sign which eliminates sequestration.

41. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, pay freezes and furloughs may
cause young people not to consider a career in DOD. What tools can DOD
use to incentivize young professionals to choose a career of service in
DOD?
Ms. Wright. The Department continues to use available recruiting
methods and programs, such as Pathways, to attract young professionals.
In addition, the Department continues to offer the Student Loan
Repayment Program, Training and Professional Development opportunities,
and many other benefits that promote a healthy work life balance.

42. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, does DOD need additional
recruiting authorities to compete for top young talent in the current
job market?
Ms. Wright. The Department has adequate authorities in place to
assist us with competing for top young talent in the current job
market. However, the time it takes to hire Federal employees as well as
hiring restrictions under which the Department is currently operating,
impact our ability to compete for top talent. The Department is
continuously reviewing our authorities and programs so that we remain
an employer of choice among young professionals.

43. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, we have received reports of
medical professionals leaving DOD because they are fed up with pay
freezes and furloughs. We also hear that DOD doctors and nurses have
chosen to leave DOD to work for the VA. If confirmed, will you advocate
for exemption of civilian medical professionals from furloughs if DOD
faces another year under sequestration?
Ms. Wright. During the past furlough period, I asked my staff to
carefully monitor Medical Treatment Facility operations and advise me
if they saw any evidence that we were experiencing challenges in
meeting our health care obligation to our beneficiary population,
including Wounded Warriors. After the first few furlough days, a need
to request additional furlough exceptions began to take shape. At the
same time, due to a combination of Congressional approvals and
Departmental budget management efforts, we were able to reduce furlough
for most DOD civilians from 11 days (88 hours) to 6 days (48 hours).
Our civilian medical professionals are back to their pre-furlough
schedules providing all of the critical services.
We are still assessing the extent of damage caused by sequestration
and the associated furloughs and, while no decisions have been made
about the need for future furloughs or exceptions at this time, I will
continue to be vigilant in maintaining our health care obligations and
apply the lessons learned from the past furlough experience. I am
committed to our patients and our staff and seek to minimize their
inconvenience and maintain an exceptional ``care experience'' and
``work experience'' for both groups. This commitment will remain the
Department's core theme as we address financial challenges in the
future.

44. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, in your opinion, does DOD
need additional pay authorities to better compete with the VA civilian
medical professionals?
Ms. Wright. The Department does not need additional pay authorities
to better compete with the VA civilian medical professionals. DOD has
the authority of section 1599c of title 10, and DOD and the Office of
Personnel Management have a July 31, 2006, Delegation Agreement
authorizing the use of title 38 (VA) pay tables for DOD civilian health
professionals.

religious expression
45. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, in your answer to the advance
policy questions, you responded that ``[s]ervicemembers are entitled to
have personal views and to express them in personal conversations;
however, servicemembers are not entitled to use their official capacity
as a forum to express their personal views. Servicemembers who express
personal views when speaking in an official capacity may be held
accountable for what they say.'' Is it your understanding of DOD policy
that sincerely held beliefs cannot be expressed if they differ from DOD
policy?
Ms. Wright. Expressions of sincerely held religious beliefs in
personal conversations are permissible and considered as protected
religious speech until such expressions disrupt the mission, have an
adverse impact on good order and discipline, have the appearance of
coercion, or can reasonably be regarded as suggesting DOD endorsement
of religion.

same sex benefits
46. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, you stated in your
confirmation hearing that the September 4 same-sex policy memorandum
would only apply to opposite-sex couples in very rare cases. What
important military interest is advanced by a policy that benefits same-
sex couples but not opposite-sex couples?
Ms. Wright. The September 4 memorandum on the policy clarification,
which applies to same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, allows
administrative time off for individuals who cannot get legally married
within 100 miles of where they are assigned. As I acknowledged during
my confirmation hearing, there may well be a few occasions where an
opposite-sex couple would run up against this issue, but that does not
invalidate my belief that the policy is fair and equitable to all.
We have bases and installations in all 50 States and around the
globe. However, many servicemembers are assigned in remote or isolated
locations, and we learned that not all local laws are equal when it
comes to marriage-regardless of sexual orientation. While this policy
may apply in fewer situations for opposite sex couples than it might
for same sex couples, it facilitates travel for any disadvantaged
servicemember seeking a legal marriage, when local laws or policies
prevent that member from obtaining a legal marriage locally.

pay
47. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, what would be the impact on
readiness if Congress authorizes a 1.8 percent pay increase instead of
the 1 percent requested by the administration?
Ms. Wright. The 1 percent basic pay raise requested in the
President's budget recognizes the sacrifices by the men and women in
our Armed Forces, while adhering to the current budget constraints
faced by DOD. This pay raise proposal was a tough decision reached by
the senior leaders of the Department (including the uniformed military
leadership) after carefully weighing other options for saving the $0.6
billion in fiscal year 2014 and nearly $3.5 billion through fiscal year
2018 generated by this 0.8 percent pay raise adjustment. If Congress
authorized the full 1.8 percent military basic pay increase, the
Department would have to impose deeper reduction to troop levels as
well as to readiness and modernization accounts for training or
equipping our forces.

48. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, what would you do, if
confirmed, to mitigate the impact of a 1.8 percent pay increase for
military personnel and a 1 percent increase for civilian personnel, on
overall military readiness?
Ms. Wright. The administration requested a 1.0 percent basic pay
increase for military personnel. Because military compensation today
compares favorably with compensation in the private sector, the
Department does not believe the additional 0.8 percent military basic
pay increase is necessary to sustain recruiting and retention. If
Congress were to authorize an additional 0.8 percent increase in basic
pay for military personnel, it would cost an additional $580 million in
fiscal year 2014 (including $40.0 million for Contingency Operations
funding) and nearly $3.5 billion through fiscal year 2018. As these
costs are not offset, the Department would be forced to pay for this
additional military pay increase by reducing military end strength
beyond the drawdown already planned and further cutting funds for
training and equipping our forces. At a time when statutory spending
caps require defense reductions, there is no viable means to mitigate
these readiness impacts if the higher pay raise is enacted.
In regards to a 1.0 percent increase for civilian personnel, the
administration included this increase in its budget for fiscal year
2014, the Department does not believe it will adversely affect military
readiness, thus mitigation will not be necessary. However, if confirmed
I will work with my staff to ensure any impacts to overall military
readiness are mitigated.

family support programs and services
49. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, what impact has sequestration
had on: (1) child development center programs; (2) child and youth
programs; (3) commissary and exchange services; (4) recreation
programs; and (5) civilian spouse employment programs?
Ms. Wright. (1) (2) Child development center programs at the
installation level were excepted from civilian furloughs and child and
youth programs continued to operate with no change in service. The
Military Services reduced the weekly cost of care for families affected
by the furlough. Child and youth recreation programs saw little to no
effect since these programs are primarily funded through
Nonappropriated Funds (NAF).
(3) Sequestration had a direct impact on our commissary patrons and
employees. With the Department-wide hiring freeze and employee
furloughs, commissary customers often found long checkout lines, closed
registers, and empty shelves. The closure of most stores for 1 day a
week for 6 weeks because of the furloughs impacted customers further.
Customer complaints rose by over 50 percent and hit an all-time high
during the furlough. While Defense Commissary Agency employees
struggled to continue their previously excellent customer service, they
could not always overcome the challenges. The impact of sequestration
on the exchange services has been minor because they operate as
nonappropriated funded activities and receive little appropriated fund
support.
(4) Sequestration has caused sustained reductions to recreation
programs (MWR) that negatively impact future readiness, resilience, and
retention. The Military Services indicate they are energetically
working to identify economies and efficiencies to minimize the fiscal
uncertainty created by sequestration driven funding cuts, and are
focusing the limited appropriated fund dollars available on their most
essential programs and services. However, we are seeing reductions to
hours of operation and staff, increased user fees, and consolidation of
similar facilities and programs. Installation MWR programs are also
collaborating with local communities, schools, and business entities to
maximize the availability of programs and services, and many are
evaluating low usage programs for potential elimination.
(5) Spouse employment programs at military installations were not
able to provide full career and education services due to a shortage of
personnel and reduced operating hours resulting from civilian furloughs
and hiring freezes. Services for military spouses provided by the
Spouse Education and Career Opportunities Program were generally not
impacted by civilian furloughs because it is under an already funded
contract.

50. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, how will family support
programs and services be affected if sequestration continues in the
future?
Ms. Wright. We have seen the impacts of sequestration across all
programs through reduced levels of service, hours, and higher prices
directly impacting our servicemembers and their families. We will
strive to protect family programs; however, the continuation of
sequestration will limit our ability to maintain the current levels of
family support and to respond to new requirements resulting from
continued deployments and the downsizing of forces. Programs that
promote well-being and enhance readiness are often provided by civilian
employees who are especially vulnerable to hiring freezes, furloughs,
and reduced funding.
A symbiotic relationship exists between the commissaries,
exchanges, and MWR programs that comprise the complex interdependent
military resale system. MWR programs depend on the dividends generated
through the exchange services. Appropriated fund reductions in any area
would have negative impacts on the entire military resale system
jeopardizing the availability, quality, and savings of these to the
military servicemembers and their families.
We continue to review more efficient and cost effective ways of
doing business while providing the programs and services valued by our
servicemembers and their families. No one wants to negatively impact
the lives of servicemembers and their families; however, the fiscal
realities of sequestration are forcing the Department and the Military
Services to make some very tough decisions.

military health systems
51. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, earlier this year, DOD issued
a Resource Management Decision directing the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs to conduct a comprehensive review of
Military Health System's (MHS) capabilities and requirements. Recently,
the Navy advised the committee that it plans to realign eight medical
treatment facilities to enhance efficiency, improve quality of care,
and enhance provider training opportunities. When will this committee
receive a briefing on the outcome of the comprehensive review of MHS
capabilities and requirements?
Ms. Wright. The review of the MHS's capabilities and requirements
is ongoing and the results will feed into the fiscal year 2015 Program
Review. The results of this review of capabilities and requirements
will be available during the rollout of the fiscal year 2015
President's budget. We look forward to briefing the committee of the
review outcome after the submission of the fiscal year 2015 President's
budget.

52. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, was the Navy's decision to
realign facilities a result of this review?
Ms. Wright. The Navy's assessment of their facilities was completed
prior to the start of the MHS's capabilities and requirements review.
Their results were included as a part of the review's deliberations.
The Navy, along with the Army and Air Force, continuously evaluate the
match between beneficiary demand and medical capabilities. Our
assessments and results will be included in the fiscal year 2015
President's budget.

53. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, how has this review impacted
the medical facilities of the Army and Air Force?
Ms. Wright. The assessment is still ongoing and the final results
will be included in the fiscal year 2015 President's budget.

54. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, will any Army or Air Force
medical facilities be realigned in the future?
Ms. Wright. The assessment is ongoing and the final results will be
included in the fiscal year 2015 President's budget.

integrated disability evaluation system
55. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wright, in your opinion, what can DOD
and the VA can do to further reduce disability claims processing times?
Ms. Wright. The most important thing DOD can do to assist VA is to
ensure the information needed to reduce disability claims processing
times is available in a timely and accurate manner. In order to meet
this goal we will actively pursue a long-term vision of a paperless
record keeping environment. If confirmed, I will continue to work
closely with the VA to refine processes to take full advantage of
information sharing we are putting in place.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
living quarters allowance
56. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wright, my staff is working with
several Georgia constituents who are DOD civilians affected by a
January 2013 DOD audit which determined they were no longer eligible to
receive a LQA. The audit determined that, through no fault of their
own, 659 DOD civilians in Europe ``erroneously'' received this
incentive pay and that DOD would attempt to recover the overpayments,
in many cases in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Most of these
civilians accepted their Federal positions with an understanding that
LQA, and other associated benefits, were a term or condition of
employment--they would not have accepted the job otherwise. Moreover,
this incentive pay was certified, and often certified multiple times,
by HR personnel who are intimately familiar with governing regulations
and policies.
As you can imagine, this determination is having significant impact
on the affected employees and their families. While I appreciate DOD
efforts to mitigate the impact--an expedited process to waive the debt,
exceptions to the hiring freeze under the PPP, and a 1 year extension
of LQA through May 2014--the worst case scenario would find us in June
2014 with a sizable number of affected civilian employees still at the
current duty station, unable to find suitable employment elsewhere due
to hiring restrictions, responsible for moving their families and
personal property at their own expense, and living under the shadow of
repaying a large debt. In my opinion, this is not how we should treat
our civilian employees, in particular on the heels of the fiscal year
2013 DOD civilian furlough.
If confirmed, will you make it a personal priority to ensure that
the affected employees are extended every possible opportunity to
secure follow-on employment with return travel and transportation
agreements covered under Joint Federal Travel Regulations?
Ms. Wright. Yes, if I am confirmed this will continue to be a high
priority of mine and has the full attention of my office. So far, the
waiver process is proving successful in alleviating debt for employees
who file requests for relief of the debt. Additionally, we have offered
a temporary exception to the PPP to facilitate return placements.
Return travel and transportation may still be provided to employees
meeting the return transportation conditions upon hiring or,
alternately, though management-directed reassignment or PPP placement.

57. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Wright, ultimately the error for
this overpayment falls on DOD--either through an incorrect policy
determination or by the officials who incorrectly certified LQA
eligibility. How did this happen and who is being held accountable?
Ms. Wright. This situation occurred through process errors made at
a local DOD component servicing human resources offices. We are in the
process of addressing the matter. Looking forward, we want to ensure
that our LQA regulations are clear. To that end, by the end of this
year, my staff will complete a comprehensive review of the Department's
overseas benefits and allowances regulation. Further, the DOD
components with the responsibility to train servicing human resources
specialists on making benefits and pay determinations must ensure they
are doing so correctly through audits or similar oversight means.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
national guard youth challenge program
58. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, what is your plan to provide
standardized, national training for the frontline staff of the National
Guard Youth Challenge Program (NGYCP) in fiscal year 2014?
Ms. Wright. I understand the importance of frontline staff
training; therefore, if I am confirmed, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs will continue to work with the
Office of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the State Adjutant
Generals to identify ways to provide standardized training to the NGYCP
staff in an efficient and cost-effective manner. During these difficult
budgetary times and uncertainty, the Department's first priority is to
try to fully support funding of the NGYCP at the maximum DOD cost share
of 75 percent to ensure continued operations and cadet development.
This work will involve reviewing all current methods implemented by the
National Guard Bureau for delivering NGYCP staff training, including
existing training programs funded by DOD and other Federal, State, and
local agencies that may be provided to NGYCP staff. Once requirements
are validated, we will be able to determine best method, schedule, and
provider.

59. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, for years, mental health
training was provided to National Guard Youth mentors but now that is
no longer the case. Will you examine the possibility of restoring
mental health training for National Guard Youth Challenge mentors?
Ms. Wright. Yes, as part of our fiscal year 2014 review of the
standardized training for the NGYCP, we will work with the Office of
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the State Adjutant Generals
to examine the possibility of restoring mental health training for
mentors participating in the NGYCP.

sequestration and its impact on readiness
60. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, General Welsh has recently
said that under sequestration, the Air Force would be unable to execute
the 2012 Strategic Planning Guidance that requires the military to
fight one major adversary and deter another. General Welsh also told
airmen stationed in Japan that the Air Force would ``not be as ready as
we would like'' if ordered to take action against the Syrian regime. Do
you agree with General Welsh's assessments?
Ms. Wright. I agree with General Welsh's assessments regarding the
Air Force's ability to respond to emerging contingencies. The Air Force
entered sequestration at historically low readiness levels. This steady
readiness decline resulted from over 20 years of high operational tempo
supporting combatant commanders' requirements fighting the ``low-end''
wars of the last decade, coupled with reduced funding to their
readiness accounts. Sequestration made this situation worse by forcing
combat units to stand down and the cancellation of exercises and
training courses.

61. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, what are your greatest
readiness concerns if sequestration goes forward in 2014?
Ms. Wright. My primary concern is the Department's ability to
maintain a force that can satisfy both our current operational
commitments as well as provide ready forces for contingencies that are
critical for responding to an emergent major theater operation. So far,
we have gone to great lengths to protect our ability to do current
operations; our risk and my main area of concern lies with our ability
to surge a ready force.
In keeping with this concern, we know that sequestration has forced
the Department to make hard choices between drawing down force
structure and paring back modernization programs. Furthermore,
reductions in our training and professional development programs will
have a long-term detrimental effect on maintaining proficiency and
experience within our ranks. These short-term effects will have longer-
term implications that will not be easily reversed even with additional
resources.

62. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, General William Shelton,
Commander of Air Force Space Command, recently said that sequestration
threatens to ``break every program'' in the U.S. military space
enterprise. Do you share his concern?
Ms. Wright. I share General Shelton's concerns regarding the
effects sequestration may have on numerous Defense programs. The
immediate effects of sequestration are beginning to be felt and are
impacting programs throughout the Department.

living quarters allowance
63. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, DOD has been working with
Congress and the employees in U.S. European Command to achieve a
workable solution to the LQA issue. I am concerned that the employees'
concerns are not being addressed completely. Many of the employees are
concerned with future employment opportunities and the cost associated
with moving back to the United States. How many employees have been
given Priority 3 or 3a status?
Ms. Wright. All employees identified in the audit as receiving LQA
erroneously who choose to return Stateside in the absence of LQA have
been eligible to register in the PPP since June 27, 2013. As of
September 26, 2013, the DOD components have reported that 71 affected
employees have registered in PPP, 4 have accepted job offers, and 1 has
declined an offer.
The Department has also authorized a temporary exception to
standard PPP clearance requirements that allows DOD components to
reassign LQA-affected employees directly to State-side vacancies that
would otherwise not be filled due to a hiring freeze. As of September
26, 2013, the DOD components have reported that nine affected employees
have accepted management-directed reassignments under this special
exception to PPP.
In addition, an affected employee generally will be eligible for a
paid move back to the United States if returned Stateside as a result
of a directed reassignment by the employee's DOD component, if placed
through the PPP, or if the employee is a retired military member whose
final authorization for return travel has not expired.

64. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, how many employees have been
given Priority 1 or 2 status?
Ms. Wright. All employees identified in the audit as receiving LQA
erroneously have been eligible to register in the PPP since June 27,
2013, as a Priority 3. Priorities 1 and 2 are reserved for employees
who are being separated involuntarily, i.e., losing employment
completely. As of September 26, 2013 the DOD components have reported
that 71 affected employees have registered in the PPP, 4 have accepted
job offers, and 1 has declined an offer. This is not the only procedure
to facilitate the timely rotation of those affected employees who
choose to return Stateside in the absence of LQA. Most notably, the
Department has authorized a temporary exception to standard PPP
clearance requirements that allows DOD components to reassign employees
directly to Stateside vacancies that would otherwise not be filled due
to a hiring freeze. As of September 26, 2013, the DOD components have
reported that nine affected employees have accepted management-directed
reassignments under this special exception to PPP.

65. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, in Thomas v. United States
(Sept. 7, 2011), the court ruled that ``The Court disregards the other
regulations and guidance's implemented pursuant to the DSSR insofar as
they conflict with the DSSR. DODI [Department of Defense Instruction],
the Army Corps Memorandum, and AER 690-500.592 conflict with the DSSR
because they give the agency discretion to disallow a living quarters
allowance when the DSSR provisions would otherwise mandate the
allowance.'' Did the Thomas case play a role in how DOD is addressing
the LQA issue?
Ms. Wright. No. Thomas v. United States has not played a role in
how the Department is addressing the LQA issue. However, we agree with
the Thomas opinion that if an employee satisfies all the eligibility
requirements for receiving LQA, and if the Department makes a
determination that there is a need for LQA, the incentive may be
properly paid, as evidenced by those employees properly granted LQA
after being recruited from the United States. Eligibility criteria
include that which is stated in the DSSR, as well as the criteria
established by the DOD in its LQA regulations. In a subsequent opinion
to Thomas, the Court noted in Roberts v. United States (April 30,
2012), that the DSSR expressly delegates authority to heads of Federal
agencies to implement additional regulations in this area. Under that
delegation, the Secretary of Defense issued DOD Instruction 1400.25,
volume 1250, which includes LQA eligibility conditions in addition to
those in the DSSR. In this situation, affected employees either did not
meet the DSSR eligibility requirements, or those established in volume
1250, or both.

66. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, given the Office of Personnel
Management Compensation Claim Decision (OPM File No. 12-0020), is DOD
concerned about pecuniary liability due to the Thomas ruling?
Ms. Wright. No, as affected employees in this situation either did
not meet the DSSR, or those established in DOD Instruction 1400.25,
Volume 1250, or both.

67. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, has DOD received any
reimbursement claims related to Thomas? If so, how many?
Ms. Wright. To my knowledge, there have been no reimbursement
claims received by the Department.

68. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, has DOD estimated potential
liability due to the Thomas case? If so, what is the cost estimate?
Ms. Wright. The Department has not estimated potential liability.
However, we have estimated that it will cost approximately $23 million
to grant temporary LQA eligibility to affected employees for 1 year.

69. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, in Roberts v. United States
(April 30, 2012), the Court stated that the LQA-granting authority has
been further delegated within DOD, but in addition to having met the
DSSR requirements, the DOD agency ``must first designate the position
as eligible for LQA''. Were any of the positions held by the employees,
who were deemed to have erroneously received LQA payments, designated
as LQA eligible?
Ms. Wright. DOD Instruction 1400.25, volume 1250, delegates
authority to the Heads of DOD components to make LQA determinations.
Each DOD component may determine in advance of filling an overseas
position whether there is a need for LQA, and which is normally based
on an ability to fill the position without the incentive. However,
employees filling positions deemed appropriate for LQA must meet the
eligibility requirements in order to receive the incentive.

70. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, in both the DSSR and DODI
1400.25 there is an allowance for a waiver based upon ``unusual
circumstances''. Was this the basis for the 1-year waiver that you
granted to all LQA audit affected employees?
Ms. Wright. Yes, the DSSR provision for waivers based on unusual
circumstances was used for authorizing temporary LQA eligibility for
affected employees. I believe that 1 year is sufficient time for the
employees to make personal decisions concerning their situations, and
to be placed in a State-side position, if they so choose. Providing the
incentive beyond that time could be viewed as an abuse of discretion
with respect to taxpayer dollars being spent on incentives for which
employees are otherwise ineligible.

71. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, does the DSSR or the DODI
1400.25 place any time condition or constraints upon this waiver?
Ms. Wright. No. To mitigate the financial effects of loss of LQA, I
granted all employees identified in the audit as receiving LQA
erroneously temporary eligibility for LQA for up to a 1-year time
period to allow them opportunity to plan a future without the
incentive. This period was determined to be reasonable under the
circumstances. Further, the Department has supported individual
employee requests for waivers of the indebtedness as long as there is
no evidence of misrepresentation, fraud, or deception on the part of
the employee to receive LQA initially; delayed collection of the
indebtedness created by the receipt of LQA erroneously (for those
employees who choose to request a waiver) until the waiver process is
complete; and authorized flexibilities under the PPP to assist
employees who choose to return Stateside in the absence of LQA. As of
September 26, 2013, 400 waiver requests have been submitted, 112 full
waivers have been approved, and no requests have been disapproved.

72. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, is there any legal reason
that would stop you from utilizing this waiver in order to solve this
issue on a more long-term basis?
Ms. Wright. To mitigate the financial effects of loss of LQA, I
granted all employees identified in the audit as receiving LQA
erroneously temporary eligibility for LQA for up to a 1 year time
period to allow them opportunity to plan a future without the
incentive. This period was determined to be reasonable under the
circumstances. Further, the Department has supported individual
employee requests for waivers of the indebtedness as long as there is
no evidence of misrepresentation, fraud, or deception on the part of
the employee to receive LQA initially; delayed collection of the
indebtedness created by the receipt of LQA erroneously (for those
employees who choose to request a waiver) until the waiver process is
complete; and authorized flexibilities under the PPP to assist
employees who choose to return State-side in the absence of LQA. As of
September 26, 2013, 400 waiver requests have been submitted, 112 full
waivers have been approved, and no requests have been disapproved.

73. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, U.S.C. title 10, chapter 163,
section 2773a, gives DOD the authority to hold processing officials
pecuniary liable. DOD Regulation 7000 further states that ``The
Secretary of Defense may subject a departmental official to pecuniary
liability for an improper or incorrect payment made by DOD, if the
Secretary determines that such payment resulted from information or
services provided'' to a certifying official. Has DOD scrutinized the
certifying or authorizing officials who made, according to a DOD
Inspector General report, $57 million in erroneous payments?
Ms. Wright. The DOD Financial Management Regulations (FMR)
7000.14R, volume 5, chapter 33, section 3309, which states a certifying
officer is pecuniarily liable for payments resulting from improper
certifications, is not applicable in this situation. A certifying
officer as defined in the FMR does not certify the supporting document
authorizing the LQA entitlement, and thus is not liable for these
erroneous payments.

74. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Wright, when an individual who
received the erroneous payments signs the waiver form, does this waiver
also release DOD officials from any liability in association with that
payment?
Ms. Wright. No, signing of the waiver form by an individual only
affects the individual employee.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
religion in the military
75. Senator Lee. Secretary Wright, what do you understand to be the
difference between evangelizing, which is allowed by DOD, and
proselytizing, which is not allowed?
Ms. Wright. DOD has no policy that directly addresses religious
evangelizing and proselytizing. Servicemembers may exercise their
rights under the First Amendment regarding the free exercise of
religion unless doing so adversely affects good order and discipline,
or some other aspect of the military mission; even then, the Department
seeks a reasonable religious accommodation for the servicemember. In
general, servicemembers may share their faith with other servicemembers
in unofficial settings, but may not forcibly attempt to convert others
to their own beliefs. Concerns that may arise regarding these issues
are handled on a case-by-case basis by the leaders of the unit
involved, in consultation with Chaplains and legal advisors.

76. Senator Lee. Secretary Wright, how are these differences
explained to commanders in the military, and do you believe it is
consistently applied?
Ms. Wright. Chaplains from the Military Departments are directly
involved in the training of commanders. This training includes
discussion and guidelines concerning the balance of freedoms for
servicemembers with religious beliefs as well as those with no
religious belief. Due to this training, expressions of free speech and
religious practice are consistently applied across the Military
Departments.

erroneous living quarters allowance
77. Senator Lee. Secretary Wright, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and your office have stated that the erroneous payments to
civilian employees living overseas and receiving LQA payments were made
``through no fault of the individual''. Why did DOD give these payments
erroneously and who is being held at fault for the erroneous payments?
Ms. Wright. This situation occurred through errors made by
individual employees assigned to a DOD component servicing human
resources offices, and we are in the process of addressing the matter.
Looking forward, we want to ensure that our LQA regulations are clear.
By the end of this year, my staff will complete a comprehensive review
of the Department's overseas benefits and allowances regulation.
Further, the DOD components with the responsibility to train servicing
human resources specialists on making benefits and pay determinations
must ensure they are doing so correctly through audits or similar
oversight means.

78. Senator Lee. Secretary Wright, when the employee who has
received erroneous payments signs the waiver for their debts, does the
waiver also release DOD officials from any liability in association
with the payment?
Ms. Wright. No, signing of the waiver form by an individual only
affects the individual employee.
______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Jessica G. Wright
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 18, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Jessica Garfola Wright of Pennsylvania, to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, vice Erin C. Conaton, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Jessica G. Wright, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Jessica L. (Garfola) Wright
Education:
Alderson Broaddus College, September 1971-June 1974

Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded June 1974
Honorary doctorate in Public Service awarded 2004

Webster University, St Louis, MO, School of Business and Technology

Masters Degree in Management awarded June 1993

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Military Fellowship at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC, June 1997
Employment record:
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness
January 2013-present

Acting Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness
October 2012-January 2013

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
May 2012-0ctober 2012

Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Reserve Affairs)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs (Manpower and Personnel)
November 2010-May 2012

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Army National Guard

Adjutant General of Pennsylvania and Commander of the
Pennsylvania National Guard
February 2004-November 2010

Assistant Adjutant General/Deputy Adjutant General-
Army, Pennsylvania Joint Force Headquarters
May 2000-February 2004

State Army Aviation Officer, Headquarters, State Area
Command
October 1998-May 2000

Commander, 28th Combat Aviation Brigade, 28th Infantry
Division, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
June 1997-November 1998

U.S. Army War College

Military Fellowship at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC
August 1996-June 1997

National Guard Bureau, Headquarters

Chief of the Personnel Service Division, Army National
Guard personnel directorate
Chief of the Tours Management Office, Army National
Guard personnel directorate
Executive Officer and Chief of the Budget and Services
Branch
Personnel Staff Officer
February 1989-August 1996

State of Georgia, Army National Guard

Assistant Professor of Military Science, Georgia
Southern College, Statesboro, GA
November 1986-January 1989

State of Georgia, Army National Guard

1160th Transportation Company (Heavy Helicopter),
Flight Operations Platoon Commander
September 1985-November 1986

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Army National Guard

1028th Transportation Company (Heavy Helicopter),
Flight Operations Platoon Commander
Eastern Army National Guard Aviation Training Site,
Assistant Operations and Training Officer and Flight Operations
Officer
January 1982-September 1985

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Army National Guard

228th Aviation Company, UH-1 and CH-47 pilot
28th Aviation Battalion, Adjutant
September 1979-December 1981

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Army National Guard

CH-47 Aviator Qualification Course
CH-54 Aviator Qualification Course
Officers Rotary Wing Aviator Course at Fort Rucker, AL
February 1977-August 1979

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Army National Guard

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Press
Officer, Recruiting and Retention/Equal Opportunity Operations
Officer, Staff Advisor
Women's Army Corps Officer Orientation/Officer
Candidate School at Fort McClellan, AL
January 1975-January 1977
Honors and awards:
Distinguished Public Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (with one Silver Oak Leaf
Cluster and one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
National Defense Service Medal (with one Bronze Star)
Global War on Terror Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Gold Hourglass)
Army Service Ribbon
Army Staff Identification Badge
Senior Army Aviator Badge
Pennsylvania Commendation Medal
Pennsylvania Service Ribbon (with two Silver Stars)
Pennsylvania 20 Year Medal (with two Silver Stars)
Major General Thomas R. White Jr. Medal
General Thomas J. Stewart Medal
Governor's Unit Citation
Lithuanian Medal of Merit
Order of St. Michael
Order of St. Joan of Arc
ATHENA Recipient
Gold Medallion - Chapel of the Four Chaplains
Law and Justice Award - Sons of Italy
Gold Medal Award - Pennsylvania Association of Broadcasters
Honorary Doctorate - Peirce College
Haym Solomon Award
Military Person of the Year - Veteran Community Initiatives, Inc.
Distinguished Soldier Award - Union League of Philadelphia
Founders Day Award - Lebanon Valley College
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Jessica
G. Wright in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Jessica Lynn Wright, Maiden Name: Garfola.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness).

3. Date of nomination:
July 18, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
November 2, 1952; Charleroi, PA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Charles Edwin Wright.

7. Names and ages of children:
Philip Michael Wright, age 23.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Alderson-Broaddus College. 1970-1974, BA, May 1974
Webster University, 1991-1993, MA, June 1993

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
1 January 2013-Present: Acting Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness), The Pentagon
16 Oct 2012-31 Dec 2012: Acting Principal Deputy, Under Secretary
of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), The Pentagon
25 May 2012-15 Oct 2012: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, The Pentagon
08 November 2010-24 May 2012: Department of Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, RA (Manpower and Personnel); 1 June
2011 also assumed the duties ``Acting'' Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, The Pentagon
February 2004-November 2010: The Adjutant General Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
June 2000-February 2004, Deputy Adjutant General--Army Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
National Guard Association of the United States--Member
Pennsylvania National Guard Association of the United States--
Member
Association of the U.S. Army--Member
Army Aviation Association of America--Member

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Distinguished Public Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (with one Silver Oak Leaf
Cluster and one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
National Defense Service Medal (with one Bronze Star)
Global War on Terror Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Gold Hourglass)
Army Service Ribbon
Army Staff Identification Badge
Senior Army Aviator Badge
Pennsylvania Commendation Medal
Pennsylvania Service Ribbon (with two Silver Stars)
Pennsylvania 20 Year Medal (with two Silver Stars)
Major General Thomas R. White Jr. Medal
General Thomas J. Stewart Medal
Governor's Unit Citation
Lithuanian Medal of Merit
2000 ATHENA Recipient
2004 Honorary Doctorate - Alderson Broaddus College
2005 Gold Medallion - Chapel of the Four Chaplains
2005 Law and Justice Award - Sons of Italy
2006 Gold Medal Award - Pennsylvania Association of Broadcasters
2008 Honorary Doctorate - Peirce College
2009 Military Person of the Year - Veteran Community Initiatives,
Inc.
2009 Distinguished Soldier Award - Union League of Philadelphia
2010 Founders Day Award - Lebanon Valley College

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
One article on ARNG Aviation published in the National Guard
Association of the United States magazine. (2010)

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I gave multiple speeches during my time as Adjutant General of the
PA National Guard. I do not have copies. I have given speeches as ASD-
RA and Acting USO-PR from talking points and notes.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Hon. Jessica G. Wright was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 24, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was returned to the President at the end of the first session
of the 113th Congress, on January 6, 2014, under provisions of
Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6, of the Standing Rules of the
Senate.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Frank G. Klotz by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform the duties of the Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA)?
Answer. I served on Active Duty in the U.S. military for nearly 39
years. The majority of my assignments dealt either with nuclear field
operations--including maintenance, security, and safety--or with
nuclear policymaking at the national and international levels.
I have also had extensive experience leading large organizations
with technically-complex missions and a diverse, highly-skilled
workforce. As the first commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, I
helped establish and lead a brand new organization that merged
responsibility for all U.S. nuclear-capable bombers and missiles under
a single chain-of-command. Within the space of only 14 months, we
defined the organization's vision and values, recruited 800 highly-
talented professionals into a new headquarters, took charge of 5 major
installations and 23,000 people; and strengthened accountability at all
levels. Earlier in my career, I was second in command of Air Force
Space Command when it had responsibility for the Nation's
intercontinental ballistic missile force. At that time, AFSPC comprised
39,400-persons charged with responsibility for developing, acquiring
and operating a global network of launch, satellite control,
communications, and missile warning facilities.
Since retiring from Active Duty, I have worked as a Senior Fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations and participated in several ``Track
2'' conferences and workshops, most notably with the Committee on
International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences. These activities have deepened my understanding of the
nuclear capabilities and policies of other nations, as well as the
dangers posed by nuclear proliferation, regional arms races, and the
threat of nuclear terrorism.
All of these experiences bear directly on NNSA's broad mission set,
as well as the challenges of leading an organization of its size and
scope. I am grateful to President Obama and Secretary Moniz for their
trust and confidence in providing me an opportunity to continue to
serve and contribute to the critically important tasks of ensuring that
our Nation's nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, and effective, and
enhancing nuclear security across the globe.
Question. What changes, if any, do you anticipate in these duties,
if you are confirmed for the position?
Answer. I do not anticipate any changes to these duties of Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security or NNSA Administrator if I am confirmed.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security?
Answer. Based on my previous operational and policymaking positions
within the Nation's nuclear enterprise--including leadership of large,
technically complex organizations--I personally believe that I am ready
now to assume the duties of Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.
However, I have always believed in the need for and value of life-long
learning and constantly seeking new, innovative solutions. If
confirmed, I will immediately and continuously engage with all elements
of the NNSA enterprise--specially the directors of the national
security laboratories, plants, headquarters, and field offices--to
broaden and deepen my understanding of NNSA's capabilities,
requirements, and challenges. I also intend to regularly consult with
Members of Congress and their staffs to better understand their
concerns and to benefit from their insights on NNSA, its mission, and
its issues.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional or new duties
and functions, if any, do you expect that the Secretary of Energy would
prescribe for you other than those described above?
Answer. The Secretary of Energy has not indicated to me that he
intends to prescribe any additional or new duties and functions.
However, if confirmed, I would serve at the pleasure of the President
and Secretary of Energy and in accordance with the laws enacted by
Congress, and would obviously perform any additional or new duties and
functions they might assign.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the following
officials in carrying out your duties:
The Secretary of Energy.
Answer. I share Secretary of Energy Moniz's strong belief in the
importance of NNSA's mission and its many contributions to the Nation's
security, as well as the urgent need to address program management,
cost overruns, and security. If confirmed, I will work with him in a
collaborative manner and, as stipulated in the NNSA Act, ``subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary.''
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will also work closely with Deputy
Secretary Dan Poneman and subject to the ``authority, direction and
control'' delegated by the Secretary to the Deputy Secretary in
accordance with the NNSA Act.
Question. The Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
Answer. I consider the Deputy Administrators--along with the
directors of the national security laboratories, plants, and field
offices--as an integral part of NNSA's leadership team. If confirmed, I
will work with the Deputy Administrators and Associate Administrators
to promote better internal communication and collaboration; clarify
lines of authority, responsibility and accountability; eliminate
duplication of effort and streamline processes; and, professionally
develop the NNSA workforce and recognize its employees for their
important contributions to the organization and to the Nation.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the USD(AT&L)
on a wide range of issues, including sustaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent; countering the threat of nuclear terrorism
and nuclear proliferation; and, enhancing capabilities to manage
nuclear incidents both domestically and abroad. Additionally, I am
committed to fostering a renewed sense of trust and partnership between
the NNSA and the Department of Defense, both through the effective
operation of the Nuclear Weapons Council, as well as open and
collaborative interaction by the staffs of both departments. I have
worked closely with OSD(AT&L) in the past and have enormous respect for
the expertise and professionalism of its leadership and personnel.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the USD(P) in
providing technical advice on nuclear weapons systems and capabilities
to help inform their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on
issues related to the Nation's current and future nuclear weapons
requirements, countering the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and
providing assistance and extending deterrence to allies and partner
nations. I have worked closely with the USD(P) in the past, including
Under Secretary Jim Miller, and have enormous respect for the expertise
and professionalism of its leadership and personnel.
Question. The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Navy and Air
Force. Both are major ``customers'' of NNSA. In addition to formal
interaction though the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and the NWC's
Standing and Safety Committee, I will emphasize the importance of
maintaining open lines of communications between NNSA headquarters, the
national security laboratories, and the plants, on the one hand, and
the military services, on the other, to ensure the latter's
requirements are fully understood and properly met in NNSA's plans,
programs, and operations.
Question. The Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S.
Northern Command.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
by building upon past associations and understanding of their mission,
and promoting collaboration in dealing with current and future
requirements.
During the course of my military career, I worked extensively with
STRATCOM on several different levels, including as commander of its
Task 214 and as commander of a major service component. I also
previously worked with NORTHCOM in developing plans for nuclear/
radiological incident response and consequence management, and
participating in NORTHCOM-led exercises.
In addition to formal interaction with the Vice Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and STRATCOM though the NWC, I will emphasize the
importance of maintaining open lines of communications between the
NNSA, the national security laboratories and the plants, on the one
hand, and STRATCOM and NORTHCOM, on the other, to ensure the latter's
requirements are fully understood and properly met in NNSA's plans,
programs, and operations.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)).
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the ASD(SOLIC)
on matters related to joint DOD-NNSA capabilities to counter the threat
of nuclear terrorism. Though I have not yet been briefed on the
details, I understand that the partnership between the special
operations community and NNSA is unique in government, and vital to
protecting our national security interests.
Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)).
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD(NCB) on key
issues on the agenda of the NWC and its Standing and Safety Committee.
I have worked closely with ASD(NCB) in several past assignments,
including Assistant Secretary Andy Weber, and have enormous respect for
the expertise and professionalism of its leadership and personnel.
Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA).
Answer. As the implementation arm of the DOD's Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program and as a major research and development partner, it
will be essential to maintain a close and productive working
relationship with the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
I understand that cooperation between NNSA and DTRA is facilitated
through regular program coordination meetings under which a variety of
working groups collaborate on specific program development, ranging
from joint research to developing the most effective ways to implement
border security programs. I have worked closely with DTRA in the past,
including its Director Ken Myers and have enormous respect for the
expertise and professionalism of DTRA's leadership and personnel.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence and other senior
leaders of the Intelligence Community.
Answer. I understand that NNSA has a close and longstanding
relationship with the Intelligence Community based on NNSA's unique
understanding of nuclear weapon capabilities and the contributions of
the national security laboratories to broader national security
missions. If confirmed, I will continue and strengthen this
relationship.
Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with
responsibilities for nuclear homeland security matters.
Answer. I understand that NNSA has a close and longstanding
relationship with the Department of Homeland Security based on NNSA's
unique understanding of nuclear weapon capabilities and the
contributions of the national security laboratories to broader national
security missions. If confirmed, I will work closely with DHS officials
on nuclear counterterrorism issues, radiological/nuclear incident
consequence management, and support to National Operations Center
(NOC).
Question. Officials in the Department of State with responsibility
for nuclear nonproliferation matters.
Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate closely with the Department
of State on issues related to arms control, nuclear nonproliferation,
export controls, securing nuclear and radiological materials worldwide,
and border security. I have worked closely with the State Department in
the past, including serving as Special Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of State, two assignments to overseas diplomatic posts (U.S.
Mission to NATO and U.S. Embassy Moscow), as a consultant to Acting
Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, and currently as a member
of the Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board. I
have enormous personal respect for the expertise and professionalism of
its leadership and personnel.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA?
Answer. The NNSA has a unique responsibility for pursuing two
different, but complementary principles that have traditionally guided
American nuclear weapons policy. The first is that the United States
must continue to lead international efforts to limit and reduce nuclear
arsenals, prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and secure
nuclear materials across the globe. The second is that appropriately-
sized nuclear forces still play an essential role in protecting U.S.
and allied security interests, even as the United States seeks to
reduce the overall number and role of nuclear weapons in our national
security policy. As President Obama and leaders in Congress have
repeatedly emphasized, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United
States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
In discharging this responsibility, NNSA performs enormously
important work each and every day. Its successes go largely unheralded.
It has made tremendous progress in helping to achieve the President's
goal of securing vulnerable nuclear materials around the globe. It is
delivering the life-extended W76-1 warhead to the Navy on schedule. It
is currently transferring work at the Kansas City plant into a new,
modern facility that will greatly improve efficiency--and that was
constructed on time and on budget.
That said, escalating costs in several major programs and capital
construction projects are cause for serious concern, especially as
pressures on government spending continue to mount. Additionally, a
widely-publicized security lapse at a key NNSA facility last year
raises questions about the overall health of the security and safety
culture within the broader enterprise.
Restoring trust in NNSA's ability to deliver on its commitments
requires strong leadership focus on managing costs to deliver
capability for less expense. It also requires rebuilding partnerships
between the headquarters and the field; between Federal employees and
the contractor workforce at the laboratories and plants; and between
NNSA and Congress and the Department of Defense.
It is critical that all of these issues are addressed while placing
a strong priority on improving security and safety across the NNSA
enterprise.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. To accomplish those things, NNSA must improve its
accountability; performance--including project management, planning and
cost estimating processes; improve the way it does business; and invest
in the future of its enterprise. The NNSA must meet a host of nuclear
security requirements while ensuring the best value for taxpayer
dollars and balancing priorities among many unique nuclear security
activities.
I expect to draw upon my recent experience as the first commander
of Air Force Global Strike Command. In the wake of security incidents
and cost overruns, NNSA currently faces a situation similar in many
respects to what the Air Force encountered in 2007 when several widely-
publicized lapses raised concerns about its stewardship of the nuclear
enterprise. When we subsequently established Global Strike Command, our
first task was to establish clear lines of authority, responsibility,
and accountability. We also placed strong emphasis on strengthening the
safety and security culture, while at the same time streamlining
processes and eliminating needlessly burdensome, non-value-added
activities that stood in the way of our people and their incentive to
innovate. Finally, we continually emphasized that everyone in the
organization, regardless of job, or rank, or seniority was a valued
member of the team and that her or his work was absolutely essential to
success. If confirmed, this is the leadership approach I intend to
bring to NNSA.
The Military Services often say that people are their most
important asset. It's true; and, it applies to NNSA as well. Highly
trained, experienced and motivated scientists, engineers, technicians,
and security personnel are essential to performing the many highly
complex and technically challenging tasks associated with the nuclear
security enterprise. If confirmed, I will be guided by the principle of
``Mission first, people always.'' To this end, I will be an unrelenting
champion for the professional development and personal welfare of
everyone associated with NNSA--including recruiting and mentoring the
next generation of leaders and experts.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will place immediate emphasis in working
with the Secretary, as well as the directors of the national security
laboratories, plants and field offices, to: (1) clarify lines of
authority, responsibility, and accountability within the entire NNSA
enterprise, and (2) identify steps to streamline business processes and
eliminate needlessly burdensome, non-value-added activities that stand
in the way of NNSA's people and their incentive to innovate. I will
likewise focus with intensity on adopting measures to dramatically
improve NNSA's capabilities for cost estimation, program management,
and oversight of capital construction projects. I will ensure full
attention is being devoted at all levels to ensuring the safety and
security of NNSA's people and facilities, particularly in light of the
security breach at Y-12 National Security Complex last summer. Finally,
I will personally reach out to as many NNSA employees as possible and
in as short a time as possible to communicate the continued importance
of NNSA's work, to hear their views and concerns, and to thank them for
their contribution to our Nation's security.
Question. Do you believe it is important to ensure a unique
organizational identity for the NNSA within the Department of Energy
(DOE)? What steps would you take to ensure such an identity if
confirmed?
Answer. I do. Through the NNSA Act, Congress established NNSA as a
semi-autonomous part of DOE. In my past assignments, I have always been
an ardent champion of the organizations and people entrusted to my
leadership and care. I am committed to doing the same as Under
Secretary for National Security and NNSA Administrator. At the same
time, I also believe that common, enterprise-wide standards and best
practices that reduce costs and improve efficiency, safety and security
should be adopted and implemented when they make sense. I will work
closely with the Secretary of Energy and consult with Members of
Congress and their staffs in considering such opportunities while at
the same time and ensuring that NNSA fulfills its unique role and
responsibilities.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
to address the issues that confront the Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security and Administrator of the NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, my highest priority will be to ensure that
NNSA delivers on its commitments to national security objectives. This
includes ensuring the Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile is safe,
secure, and effective now and in the future. It also includes working
to ensure the NNSA is conducting leading-edge scientific research,
preventing nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists
and would-be proliferators, supporting the Navy's nuclear reactor
program, modernizing NNSA's capabilities and organization in today's
fiscally constrained environment, and in protecting the safety and
security of its sites, its employees, and the public.
overall management
Question. What is your view on the relationship and the relative
duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy as found in the
Atomic Energy Act and the Administrator of the NNSA?
Answer. By statute, the Secretary of Energy is responsible for
establishing policy for the NNSA and may also direct the DOE officials
who are not within the NNSA to review the programs and activities of
NNSA and to make recommendations to the Secretary regarding
administration of those programs and activities, including consistency
with similar programs and activities of DOE. The provisions governing
the duties and responsibilities of the NNSA Administrator provide broad
authority to manage the administration, under the authority, direction,
and control of the Secretary. I fully share Secretary Moniz's strong
commitment to ensure that NNSA fulfills mission tasks enumerated in
section 3211 of the NNSA Act, while ensuring that all operations and
activities are consistent with the principles of protecting the
environment and safeguarding the safety and health of the public and
workforce of NNSA.
Question. Do you believe that there are any organizational
structure issues in the NNSA that should be addressed to improve
management and operations of the NNSA, or that you would address if
confirmed?
Answer. NNSA faces several challenges, from concerns with project
management and cost overruns to serious security lapses, which will
need to be addressed. If confirmed, I plan to draw upon my recent
experience as the first commander of Air Force Global Strike Command to
establish clear lines of authority, responsibility and accountability,
while also placing a strong emphasis on strengthening the safety and
security culture. Additionally, I believe the partnerships between the
headquarters and the field, and between Federal employees and the
laboratories and plants must be strengthened.
Question. The NNSA and DOE have been plagued by cost overruns and
project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
facilities, nuclear weapons modernization programs, and nuclear
stockpile stewardship facilities.
How serious are these cost overruns in your view?
Answer. It is critical that NNSA's weapons modernization and
infrastructure modernization efforts, including capital asset projects,
deliver on cost and schedule; otherwise, it puts at risk its
fundamental ability to execute its mission.
I understand that NNSA has recently taken steps designed to improve
acquisition and project management for capital asset projects, and that
projects less than $750 million have been removed from the Government
Accountability Office's High Risk List. If confirmed, I will focus on
how the NNSA can apply the same acquisition and project management
rigor to projects over $750 million.
With regard to weapons modernization, the United States now has the
oldest stockpile in its history and the smallest stockpile since the
Eisenhower administration. As the NNSA enters a period increased work
activity not seen since the Cold War, it must incorporate sound
engineering judgments in even its earliest cost estimates. If
confirmed, I will remain committed to these project management
principles across all of NNSA's acquisitions and projects.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure they
are not repeated in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, and in following the Secretary's vision, I
will support strengthening and improving contract and project
management across NNSA by:

Strengthening rigorous and well-justified alternative
assessments and evaluations;
Strengthening cost estimating;
Providing independent dedicated acquisition, project
management, and oversight that aligns contract incentives with
taxpayer interests;
Providing clear lines of authority and accountability
for Federal and contractor personnel;
Managing assigned projects within the original scope
and cost baselines, ensuring completed projects meet mission
requirements; and
Improving cost and schedule performance.

Question. Do you believe that the expertise of DOE personnel
serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed? If so, how
do you expect to utilize this expertise if you are confirmed?
Answer. Yes. DOE possess a wealth of talent and innovative ideas
across its entire enterprise. Its laboratory, plant, and Federal
employees work on some of the most technically complex projects in the
Nation, delivering high quality projects safely. The NNSA should draw
on DOE best practices, especially in the areas of planning, cost
control, and project delivery.
Question. Are you aware of any limitations on your authority, if
confirmed, to draw on that expertise?
Answer. I am not aware of any limitations on my authority, if
confirmed, to draw upon that expertise.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is
bound by the existing rules, regulations, and directives of DOE and
what flexibility, if any, do you believe you would have in implementing
such rules, regulations, and directives?
Answer. I understand the DOE has an order that governs program and
project management for the acquisition of capital assets. While I have
not been briefed, pending confirmation, on its detailed application to
NNSA activities, I certainly agree with the precept that rigorous
project management principles should be applied and that the Federal
staff must be given the tools they need and then be held accountable
and responsible for delivering the work.
Question. NNSA, in large measure, was created in response to
security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. However,
security lapses, particularly in 2012 at the Y-12 nuclear plant, have
continued to occur. Section 3212(b)(10) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 provides that ``the
Administrator has authority over, and is responsible for all programs
and activities of the administration, including administration of
contracts, including the management and operations of the nuclear
weapons production facilities and the national security laboratories.''
If confirmed, what would be your plan to make sure that security
lapses do not continue at the NNSA facilities?
Answer. The 2012 security incident at Y-12 was totally
unacceptable. The accounts of the DOE Inspector General, the ``three
wise men,'' and Major General Sandy Finan describe a security culture
in which responsibility for the protective force and the physical
security system was divided, security equipment was not repaired in a
timely fashion, compensatory measures were inadequate and improperly
executed, multiple nuisance alarms led to an attitude of complacency,
and security was neither rigorously nor routinely exercised and
evaluated. Security and safety are, in my opinion, paramount. If
confirmed, strengthening security at NNSA facilities will be the top
priority. I intend to draw on my experience as the first Commander of
Air Force Global Strike Command to address the security culture that
exists at NNSA. Working with the Secretary of Energy, I will ensure
that authority is aligned with responsibility and effective
communication exists between the NNSA headquarters and the field, and
that there is accountability for performance at all levels. My
understanding is NNSA is in the process of implementing improved
oversight mechanisms, which include clarifying roles, authorities, and
functions for the organization.
Question. If confirmed, what policies would you institute to
improve the manner in which managers of NNSA facilities deal with
security matters?
Answer. Security of the nuclear enterprise is the responsibility of
every employee of NNSA, regardless of job or rank, or in the field or
headquarters. If confirmed, I will insist on strict adherence to DOE
security standards and clarify lines of authority, responsibility, and
accountability for meeting and maintaining those standards. The status
of security systems (including all outages and estimated time of
repair) will be monitored daily at NNSA headquarters; security
deviations and corresponding compensatory measures will be reviewed by
Federal officials both at the field and headquarters levels; security
procedures and responses to alarms will be rigorously trained,
exercised, and evaluated.
defense nuclear nonproliferation programs
Question. What do you see are the highest priorities of the nuclear
nonproliferation programs at the NNSA?
Answer. One of the NNSA's most critical roles and responsibilities
is developing policies and programs with other departments on behalf of
the U.S. Government to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
materials, technology, and expertise. This includes international and
domestic activities such as removing and eliminating excess weapons
usable material; consolidating and securing vulnerable nuclear
material; strengthening physical protection and material control;
implementing a second line of defense to interdict nuclear trafficking;
and controlling the export and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) expertise. The NNSA is nearing completion of a
remarkable 4-year effort to implement the vision and call to action by
President Obama and the Nuclear Security Summits. I understand NNSA is
intently focused on a strategy and game plan for nuclear
nonproliferation program for the coming years. If confirmed, I will
fully support and champion these critically important mission.
Question. The United States recently renewed the bilateral
agreement with Russia for joint nuclear nonproliferation activities but
a growing number of programs are focused on states other than the
former Soviet Union.
Do you believe that there are additional opportunities for
cooperation with states outside of the former Soviet Union,
particularly the Middle East and North Africa? If confirmed what would
be your priorities in these areas?
Answer. Yes. I understand that NNSA is actively engaged in more
than 120 countries, including in the Middle East and North Africa, with
projects to secure and remove nuclear and radiological materials;
convert civilian research reactors and medical isotope production
facilities from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium;
safeguard and secure nuclear materials from theft; control the spread
of WMD-related material and expertise; cooperate on Nuclear Security
Centers of Excellence; and detect and interdict nuclear and
radiological trafficking. If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize
nonproliferation efforts and ensure that NNSA programs achieve
sustainable threat reduction.
Question. What do you believe is the greatest challenge in the
nuclear nonproliferation programs with Russia?
Answer. The greatest challenge with Russia is to ensure that Moscow
fully assumes responsibility for all aspects of its own nuclear
security by the end of 2017 (a deadline for the CTR Russia programs
established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011). While Russia has made, and continues to make, significant
improvements in its support for nuclear security, there is concern
about the long-term ability and willingness of the Russian government
to adequately fund nuclear security needs at the site and national
levels. The level of risk-reduction achieved with U.S. support is
significant and has been maintained through continued U.S. engagement
and sustainability assistance. Continued engagement at the highest
levels of government will be extremely important. If confirmed, I will
ensure that NNSA continues to work with its Russian counterparts to
prepare as fully as possible for the phase-out of U.S. financial
assistance.
Question. What do you believe are the greatest challenge in nuclear
nonproliferation programs with countries other than Russia?
Answer. I believe there are a number of challenges outside of
Russia, including significant stockpiles of HEU, global inventories of
plutonium, and high-activity radiological sources that remain
vulnerable to theft around the world. The existence of this material,
in combination with the increasing sophistication of trafficking
networks and the continued interest by states and non-state actors in
acquiring nuclear materials, poses a serious threat to the security of
the United States and its allies and partners.
Another significant challenge lies in promoting the benefits of
peaceful nuclear energy while reducing the risks of nuclear
proliferation. To this end, NNSA works in over 70 countries around the
globe to strengthen nuclear safeguards and security and works closely
with DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy to ensure that new technology and
security advance together.
Finally, a major challenge NNSA faces in many of its international
programs is the lack of infrastructure, resources, and technical
capabilities in partner countries that often inhibit the level of
cooperation or amount of assistance a country can or is willing to
absorb.
Question. In your view what are the three greatest unmet nuclear
nonproliferation problems? Would you propose to address these needs if
confirmed? What resources or cooperation would you need to meet such
needs?
Answer. In my view, the three greatest unmet nuclear
nonproliferation problems are: (1) non-compliance with international
agreements and U.N. Security Council Resolutions, particularly by Iran,
North Korea, and Syria; (2) ensuring terrorists never acquire a nuclear
weapon or weapons-usable material; and (3) minimizing the proliferation
risks associated with the expansion of nuclear energy, including
limiting the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology
and ensuring that newcomer states have the resources and training to
develop safe and secure nuclear programs.
If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that NNSA maintains the
technology, policy, and implementation competencies needed to inform
and support a whole-of-government nonproliferation strategy as well as
the rapid-response ability needed to mitigate threats at a moment's
notice. The national security laboratories play a critical role in this
regard.
megaports
Question. The megaports program is coordinated with other work that
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is carrying out in foreign
ports.
In your view are there opportunities to improve cooperation with
DHS?
Answer. I understand that NNSA's Office of the Second Line of
Defense (SLD) and DHS' Container Security Initiative (CSI) closely
coordinate on their complementary yet distinct efforts at foreign
seaports. To formalize this cooperation, SLD and CSI developed and
implemented a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) document in December
2012. This SOP outlines areas of cooperation and specific actions that
each program can undertake to ensure continued close cooperation and
coordination. If confirmed, I will monitor this SOP to ensure it
provides the necessary framework to ensure close cooperation between
the SLD and CSI programs.
Question. One of the continuing challenges to the megaports
program, as well as other programs designed to detect nuclear and
radiological materials, is that the materials that could pose the
greatest risk, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are the most
difficult to detect. NNSA has the responsibility for basic detection
research and development programs. While other agencies, such as DHS,
have responsibility for near-term development efforts, and the
Department of Defense has responsibilities as well.
Are the various detection efforts fully coordinated, or do you
believe that additional efforts at coordination are needed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that NNSA's detection
efforts are well coordinated among NNSA, DHS, and DOD. I understand
that NNSA maximizes the equipment it currently deploys to focus on this
type of material.
nonproliferation research and development
Question. In addition to the detection technologies mentioned
above, NNSA has responsibility for a broad range of research and
development efforts.
If confirmed what would be your nonproliferation research and
development priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA will continue to
prioritize research and development that supports implementation of the
President's nuclear security priorities and the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review. This research and development includes developing technical
capabilities to detect foreign nuclear weapons development, detect
nuclear detonations, detect the movement or diversion of special
nuclear materials, monitor compliance with nuclear arms control and
nonproliferation agreements, discourage the unnecessary spread of
enrichment technology, and inform policymakers of current and future
technical capabilities available for meeting potential nuclear
nonproliferation and arms control treaty objectives.
Question. Do you believe that there are research and development
areas that need more attention or funding?
Answer. NNSA seeks to sustain commitment levels for research and
development of both unilateral and multilateral technical capabilities
to detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear weapons programs,
the illicit diversion of special nuclear materials, and foreign nuclear
detonations. For this last focus area, NNSA must sustain funding that
permits production of nuclear detection satellite payloads at a rate in
accordance with the delivery schedule negotiated with the Air Force.
fissile materials disposition
Question. The United States and Russia have each committed to the
disposition of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium so that it will not
be used for weapons purposes. This is a very expensive program and has
had many difficulties associated with it.
What is your understanding of the current status of the U.S. and
Russian efforts to agree upon a mutual date to complete disposition of
the respective 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium?
Answer. The United States is fully committed to eliminating surplus
nuclear material and to the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement (PMDA). While I understand that the PMDA provides
a target start date and minimum annual rate of disposition, it is
silent on a completion date.
Question. What plans are there to dispose of additional amounts of
weapons grade plutonium?
Answer. I am aware of the U.S. 2007 declaration of additional
surplus plutonium beyond the 34 MT covered by the PMDA and that the
PMDA does include provisions whereby the United States and Russia could
dispose of additional material. However, I am not personally aware of
any agreement between the United States and Russia to dispose of
additional material above the 34MT.
weapons programs personnel
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the
contractor workforce?
Answer. The key to recruiting and retaining top-flight personnel,
in my mind, is to provide them challenging and intrinsically
interesting work, as well as world-class laboratory equipment and
diagnostic tools. Additionally, leaders at all levels--both in
Washington and in the field--must regularly communicate the importance
of NNSA's mission and that they value the contribution NNSA people make
to the organization and to the Nation. NNSA also needs to support a
strong connection with the academic community to ensure future
generations are trained in technical areas relevant to NNSA's mission.
Question. Do you support retaining the capability to remanufacture
every component expected to be found in the stockpile in the near term?
Answer. Nuclear deterrence and responsiveness depend on the
immediate capabilities of NNSA's people and infrastructure. Many
components can be re-used to support stockpile requirements in the
near-term, and in those instances I will advocate for that option.
However, the current stockpile is the oldest in the Nation's history
and may require a cost-effective option to re-manufacture certain
components to meet specific needs. As such, NNSA must preserve the
fundamental capability to re-manufacture components, when necessary to
support a lean, modern, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile.
Question. What is your understanding of the most pressing
remanufacturing needs?
Answer. Today, NNSA faces several critical needs (in terms of its
total remanufacturing capability). However, it is my understanding that
the most pressing capability at this point is the means to re-
manufacture plutonium pits. Additionally, the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review confirmed the need for a modern physical infrastructure that can
support the base workload and provide a modest capacity to surge
production if directed to do so by the President. NNSA has implemented
management strategies, to include improved energy sustainability that
ensures existing facilities and infrastructure are sustainable, safe,
efficient, and reliable. These facilities include the recently
constructed Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure Manufacturing and
Sourcing; the High-Explosive (HE) Pressing Facility (which will become
the DOE Center of Excellence for HE pressing when complete in 2016);
the planned Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project; and implemented
Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications.
stockpile stewardship program
Question. The Stockpile Stewardship program has successfully
supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last
20 years.
What impact do you believe not achieving sustained ignition or burn
at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) will have on the stockpile
stewardship program?
Answer. Scientific experiments that probe the physical properties
and dynamics of nuclear weapons are vital to ensuring confidence in the
safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile. A broad range of
experimental facilities develop the data that underpin the assessments
of the current health of the stockpile and approaches to life extension
programs. These include NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion facilities--
the NIF at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Z machine at
Sandia. The ability to correctly model ignition processes is an
important part of that evaluation. While ignition has not yet been
achieved at NIF, experiments conducted at the facility are still
vitally important to developing the scientific understanding of the
nuclear weapons characteristics that is essential to successfully
implementing the stockpile stewardship program.
Question. If confirmed, what are your long-term plans for the NIF?
Answer. NIF will remain an essential experimental capability for
understanding of the physical properties and characteristics of nuclear
weapons that cannot otherwise be accessed short of a resumption of
nuclear testing.
Question. Other than the NIF what capabilities, if any, would be
needed to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable
without nuclear weapons testing?
Answer. I am aware that the directors of the national laboratories
rely on the data provided by a wide array of capabilities located
throughout the enterprise to assess different aspects nuclear weapons
and their safety, security and effectiveness. While on active duty, I
had an opportunity to visit several of these facilities, including NIF;
Los Alamos National Laboratory's DARHT; the Nevada National Nuclear
Security Site's U1a complex, JASPER and Device Assembly Facility; and
Sandia National Laboratory's Z facility. These and other NNSA
capabilities are essential to ensuring that the stockpile is safe,
secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing.
Question. In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship program fully
coordinated with the Department of Defense?
Answer. It is my understanding the NNSA is meeting its customer's
requirements in partnership with DOD and through the Nuclear Weapons
Council, while managing scope requirements and fiscal constraints. NNSA
has continued to issue the biannual Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan, the most recent version having been signed out by
Secretary Moniz in June 2013.
Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule over
the next 20 years that involves numerous demands on the NNSA, these are
the B-61 life extension program (LEP), the interoperable warhead, the
W-88/87 joint fuse program, the warhead for the long-range stand-off
weapon, in addition to the maintenance of the existing stockpile
systems (W-88, W-87, W-76, W78, B-61, B-83, and W-80).
What issues do you see in this ambitious schedule that concern you?
Answer. Our Nation is currently facing an acute dilemma brought on
by the need for continued investment in an aging nuclear weapons
stockpile and infrastructure in a fiscally-constrained environment. The
specific budget measures and higher-than-anticipated program costs have
led the NWC to agree to defer needed modernization efforts. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the NNSA commits to a series of
programmatic decisions for future improvements by baselining the
alignment of nuclear delivery platforms with warhead life extension
programs and supporting infrastructure; supporting implementation of a
long-term vision for the stockpile; and embarking upon a series of key
modernization initiatives. The sheer number of life extension programs
and modernization efforts planned over the next 20 years will create a
significant workload. Adhering to carefully laid out schedule will be a
critical factor in achieving success. Programs must stay on track, and
that in turn requires constancy of purpose, as well as consistent and
predictable funding levels.
Question. Are you concerned this schedule is achievable if
sequestration continues?
Answer. Yes. Absolutely. Any organization executing technically
complex, unique, and long-term acquisitions needs sufficient and stable
funding so as to plan and execute the agreed upon program of work.
Sequestration is just one challenge.
I'm well aware from my military experience that Continuing
Resolutions also exact a toll by increasing uncertainty while reducing
flexibility for program adjustments as activities are completed and new
ones need be initiated. This is particularly harmful to life extension
programs having multiple phases of work. I am sure it will be a great
challenge, if not downright impossible, for the NNSA to meet current
commitments to the Department of Defense if sequestration continues.
Yearly sequestration cuts cause additional, unnecessary and costly work
to re-plan the complex integration between design laboratories and
production plants supporting each of the LEPs and other sustainment
activities as well as to re-negotiate delivery schedules with DOD. I am
also greatly concerned that additional delays may be unavoidable in the
event of fiscal year 2014 sequestration. Adequate budgets and budget
stability and sustainment are essential to meeting program delivery
objectives.
Question. The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop
an interoperable warhead for the W-88 and W-78 systems.
If the cost of the interoperable warhead become prohibitive would
you support life extensions of the existing systems?
Answer. This should be a decision made by the Nuclear Weapons
Council, reflecting military requirements, technical feasibility, and
cost and schedule risk. I fully support the need for life extension
programs to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the
Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. I understand that the W78/88-1 LEP
is the first interoperable warhead concept supporting the 3+2 nuclear
strategy of three ballistic missile warheads and two air-launched
warheads to reduce the numbers and types of nuclear weapons, consistent
with the Nuclear Posture Review. I understand work is underway that
will culminate in a Weapon Development and Cost Report which would
inform a decision to continue the program as scoped or pursue alternate
courses of action.
Question. Do you support the current scope of the B-61 mod 12 life
extension program (LEP)?
Answer. As a former commander who had direct responsibility for the
long-range bombers capable of delivering the B-61, I fully support the
need for the B-61-12 life extension program. I understand that the
Nuclear Weapons Council evaluated options ranging from a full scope LEP
to replacing only aging components, and ultimately chose the lowest
cost option to meet military requirements. In addition to providing for
both strategic deterrence and extending deterrence to our allies, the
currently envisioned LEP will also result in fewer total weapons and
less material in the nuclear stockpile.
Question. Are you concerned about the overall cost of the B-61 mod
12 life extension program and if so what particular issues are of
concern?
Answer. While I understand current cost estimates for the B-61-12
LEP are significant, modernizing the nuclear stockpile is critical to
achieving the President Obama's direction to maintain a safe, secure,
and effective deterrent while reducing the overall number of nuclear
weapons. Furthermore, I understand that the B-61-12 was chosen as the
lowest cost option to meet threshold military requirements; Delaying
this LEP would almost certainly drive up lifecycle costs and could
necessitate additional LEP activities in order to maintain credible
strategic and extended deterrence capabilities.
Question. The Senate Appropriations Committee has proposed a
reduction of $168 million to the President's fiscal year 2014 request
for the B-61 life extension program. What impact would this reduction
have on the B-61 LEP in terms of cost and schedule? How might it affect
other planned LEPs?
Answer. While I am aware of proposed cuts to the B-61-12 LEP from
the public record, I am not yet privy to the details of the potential
impacts. Based on my experience in previous assignments, I am sure, if
sustained, they would most certainly affect schedule and cost, as well
as other LEPs employing the same facilities and workforce.
facilities and infrastructure
Question. In fiscal year 2013, the NNSA ``deferred for at least 5
years'' the construction of the Chemistry, Metallurgy Research
Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF).
Do you support this deferral?
Answer. I understand that the decision to defer the CMRR-NF
construction for at least 5 years was necessary at the time due to
reductions in the NNSA's budget request in the fiscal year 2012 cycle,
competing priorities, and a further reduction of funding under the
Budget Control Act. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring the
NNSA can deliver the plutonium capabilities--including the underlying
analytical capabilities and infrastructure--required to ensure the
safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear weapon stockpile.
Question. What impacts is the CMRR-NF deferral likely to have on
the plutonium sustainment mission at Los Alamos when the existing CMR
building is scheduled for removal in 2019?
Answer. Though I am not yet privy to all the details, I understand
that the NNSA has developed a plutonium strategy, that if executed,
would ensure continuity in plutonium operations at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory.
Question. Due to this uncertainty with the deferral, are you
concerned about retaining the core competency of plutonium scientists
and other specialized personnel at Los Alamos related to it plutonium
mission and what will you do to improve it?
Answer. Maintaining the core competency of the workforce at each
site must be a priority for the NNSA, particularly as many scientists,
engineers and technicians are approaching retirement. I firmly believe
that the key to recruiting and retaining top-flight personnel is to
provide them challenging and intrinsically interesting work, as well as
world-class laboratory equipment, diagnostic tools, and facilities in
which to work. Additionally, leaders at all levels--both in Washington
and in the field--must regularly communicate the importance of the
mission and that they value the contribution NNSA people make to the
organization and to the Nation. Implementation of a plutonium strategy
will allow for continuity in plutonium operations at Los Alamos and
will assist in the retention of critical skills related to plutonium
dependant missions. If confirmed, I will closely consult with Members
of Congress and their staffs on the requirements for maintaining the
Nation's plutonium capabilities and expertise.
Question. If alternative construction strategies such as a modular
approach to CMRR-NF prove feasible will you strongly advocate for them?
Answer. I understand that the NNSA and Department of Defense are
developing a business case analysis of the potential alternatives to
constructing CMRR-NF, including the so-called modular approach. If
confirmed, any approach I advocate will be based on this joint analysis
and consultations with the Secretary of Energy.
Question. DOE and NNSA often build one of a kind or first of a kind
buildings, the most recent being the Uranium Processing Facility. The
NNSA recently found the project underestimated the floor space needed
and had to raise its roof by some 13 feet, increasing the cost by at
least $500 million. The General Accountability Office estimates to
complete the full scope of the project as envisioned would be $10
billion vice the upper bound of $6.5 billion.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that NNSA
construction projects are managed to be completed within budget and on
time?
Answer. I have always subscribed to the principle that hiring the
right people and giving them the tools they need to do their jobs is
critical to achieving mission success.
If confirmed, I would be committed to assigning certified Federal
Project Directors (FPDs) to all projects at the point where the
important planning and design work leading to baseline development is
accomplished. I understand that the NNSA has revised change control
procedures to achieve visibility on potential scope increases, allowing
the NNSA to manage the work proactively. As the project progresses to
the construction phase, NNSA will ensure the FPDs have the appropriate
training, experience, and certification level to lead the project
through successful execution. NNSA has also adopted a peer review
process to provide critical independent assessments of its work
throughout the project life cycle.
In addition, if confirmed, I would want the NNSA to take full
advantage of contracts and contract language to ensure that the best
interests of all stakeholders are being met through performance
requirements. NNSA has recently issued a policy that requires nuclear
facilities achieve 90 percent design completion prior to the
establishment of the project's baselines. The NNSA will need to clearly
articulate its expectations to the contractor partners and to use the
contract to hold them accountable for deficient work.
Question. What additional costing, project management, and design
skills do you believe are needed in the NNSA?
Answer. NNSA must develop its Federal infrastructure and workforce
to better estimate project costs, to rigorously analyze alternatives,
and to more effectively manage design and construction contracts. If
confirmed, I will direct NNSA's Office of Acquisition and Project
Management to ensure NNSA has a solid and executable plan in place for
bolstering Federal expertise in this area.
I understand that NNSA, in the interim, has an agreement with the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that will allow NNSA to draw upon the
Corp's experience to support NNSA in terms of Subject Matter Expertise.
NNSA is also using a Enterprise Construction Management Services
contract to place Subject Matter Experts, with commercial design and
construction experience, in the field to mentor and train NNSA's
Federal Project Directors and Integrated Project Teams in the skills
necessary to effectively manage NNSA's capital assets.
Question. At what point in the Critical Decision timeline do you
believe an independent cost estimate should be performed for a
construction project, and why?
Answer. I understand NNSA's current position is that an independent
cost estimate should be completed at Critical Decision 2 which is the
point at which the project's cost and schedule baseline is determined.
At this point, the design should be sufficiently mature to more
realistically estimate the total project cost.
operational safety
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that
nuclear and other operational safety issues are fully addressed in the
design of new NNSA buildings?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be absolutely committed to the safe
operation of NNSA facilities and to the protection of workers who work
in them and the people who reside in the surrounding communities. I
will be actively engaged in ensuring that safety is incorporated into
the design and construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. Key elements
would clearly include the selection of qualified nuclear design and
construction firms to lead these projects, as well as a properly
staffed and technically-capable Federal project team. Ensuring that
appropriate safety systems and controls are identified early in the
design process and are validated throughout construction is also
critical to reducing rework and controlling costs during design and
construction.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that
nuclear operational safety issues are identified by the Defense Nuclear
Safety Board early in any construction design process and promptly
resolved?
Answer. I understand that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (DNFSB) has a statutory responsibility to review the design of
new DOE defense nuclear facilities before construction to ensure
adequate protection is afforded to public health and safety. If
confirmed, I would welcome DNFSB input and advice on the safety aspects
of the design and construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. As indicated
previously, I believe that the identification of required safety
controls early in the design process is an important element to
ensuring safety and to controlling project costs. I would work closely
with the DNFSB to identify any significant design concerns early in the
design process and meet routinely with the Board to ensure that issues
are resolved in a timely and effective manner.
notification of congress
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to promptly notifying
Congress of any significant issues in the safety, security, or
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to promptly notifying Congress
of any significant issues affecting the safety, security, or
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. I agree.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security?
Answer. I agree.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. I agree.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. I agree.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
support for the facility for rare isotope beams
1. Senator Levin. Mr. Klotz, in March of this year, the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) submitted a report to Congress
on the use of Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science facilities
in support of its stockpile stewardship program. One of the facilities
it found important was the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams being
constructed at Michigan State University. This facility will produce
isotopes to help the NNSA better understand the physics of a nuclear
weapon without testing. It will help the NNSA's nonproliferation
mission by determining isotopes from an improvised nuclear device.
Finally, it will help produce a future nuclear physics workforce that
is so important to your overall mission. Do you agree that this isotope
facility, once completed, will be important to the stockpile
stewardship program?
Mr. Klotz. The Facility for Rare Isotope Beams (FRIB) is a new
national user facility for nuclear science, funded by the Department of
Energy Office of Science (DOE-SC) and operated by Michigan State
University. FRIB will enable scientists to explore the properties of
rare isotopes in order to, inter alia, better understand the physics of
nuclei. Modeling atomic nuclei and their interactions can also help
lead to breakthroughs in security, the environment, high energy
physics, and nanoscience--all of which are relevant to important
missions of NNSA. Additionally, FRIB will, as top priority, help
educate the next generation of scientists. For all these reasons, I
fully agree that once completed, this isotope facility will be
important to the stockpile stewardship program, as well as sustaining
the intellectual capital it needs for the future.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
nuclear modernization funding
2. Senator Udall. Mr. Klotz, it has been suggested that the
administration has underfunded the NNSA nuclear modernization program
relative to the administration's November 2010 plan, provided to
Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, by some 34 percent. Can you please
tell the committee the sequence of events to date between requested and
appropriated modernization funding since the section 1251 plan, and the
amount of the fiscal year 2014 NNSA request relative to that plan?
Mr. Klotz. I understand that the fiscal year 2014 Stockpile
Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) reflects a $2 billion increase in
funding over the projections made in fiscal year 2011 SSMP as the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty was being considered.
The fiscal year 2014 projections also represent a 27 percent increase
in NNSA's purchasing power for the Weapons Activities account from
fiscal year 2010-fiscal year 2018. Therefore, while the fiscal climate
has changed significantly since the time of New START treaty
ratification, including the NNSA having to absorb additional funding
reductions in fiscal year 2013 as a result of sequestration under the
Budget Control Act, significant resources are being put towards nuclear
modernization activities across the stockpile; the science, technology
and engineering base; and the infrastructure. If confirmed, I will
strongly support the funding required to carry out NNSA's varied
missions, both now and in the future.

3. Senator Udall. Mr. Klotz, can you please compare the NNSA
modernization funding from fiscal year 2009 to date as compared to the
funding during fiscal years 2000-2008?
Mr. Klotz. Nuclear modernization funding is critical to ensure the
safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Funding for the sustainment of the stockpile and infrastructure was in
decline from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2009. Following
release of the Nuclear Posture Review in April 2010, President Obama's
budget requests for NNSA have included significant increases since
fiscal year 2010 for nuclear modernization funding. Compared to fiscal
year 2004 through fiscal year 2009, the fiscal year 2014 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan reflects a 27 percent increase in
NNSA's purchasing power for the Weapons Activities account from fiscal
year 2010-fiscal year 2018, which funds nuclear modernization
activities across the stockpile; the science, technology and
engineering base; and the infrastructure. If confirmed, I will strongly
support the funding required to ensure that military requirements are
met and that the infrastructure for maintaining the Nation's nuclear
stockpile is modernized to meet current and future demands.

4. Senator Udall. Mr. Klotz, there has been a lot of discussion
about the cost of the B-61 modernization program. I understand this is
an administration and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
priority, but some have proposed other options--including the one
called ``triple alt'' which has less safety and security features than
what the administration proposed. What is your opinion of these
proposals?
Mr. Klotz. The B-61 is one of the oldest nuclear weapons in the
stockpile and requires a life extension program. The B-61-12 Life
Extension Program (LEP) will consolidate four variants of the B-61 (-3,
-4, -7 and -10) into a single mod 12 which will provide strategic and
extended deterrence for an additional 20 years following the first
production unit in 2019. On February 27, 2012, the Nuclear Weapons
Council (consisting of representatives of the Department of Defense,
U.S. Strategic Command, and NNSA) authorized the Air Force and NNSA to
begin Phase 6.3 Engineering Development for the B-61-12 (the Option
3B), adopting the lowest-cost approach of the options evaluated by the
Nuclear Weapons Council that fully meets military requirements to
address weapon aging, safety, security and delivery system integration
issues. This variant will allow the United States to reduce the number
of weapons currently in the stockpile; reduce the cost of maintaining
the B-61 in the future; set conditions for the future retirement of the
B83 bomb; reduce the amount of special nuclear material in the
stockpile; maintain the air leg of the triad; and, increase the safety
and security of a critical component of the U.S. strategic and extended
deterrent capabilities, both now and for the foreseeable future. The
Nuclear Weapons Council rejected the proposed ``Triple Alt'' option as
not meeting military requirements because it did not address all aging
issues, it would require the immediate start of a second LEP to address
those issues, and it would risk a potential capability gap until the
second LEP was completed. Additionally, the Triple Alt would drive up
life-cycle costs, and would not provide the critical nuclear security
benefits that could lead to reductions in the technical hedge.
Accordingly, I believe the approach endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons
Council is the best option.

5. Senator Udall. Mr. Klotz, the administration has proposed a
large number of life extensions of our weapons systems--in addition to
trying to rebuild some of the NNSA facilities that date back to the
Manhattan Project. This is all happening in a time of tight budgets.
Are you worried about trying to do too much without the necessary
funding?
Mr. Klotz. There is certainly cause for concern. The fiscal
uncertainty caused by sequestration under the Budget Control Act and by
a series of Continuing Resolutions (in lieu of regular appropriations)
creates a very challenging environment across all NNSA missions. Any
organization executing technically complex, unique, and long-term
programs and construction projects needs sufficient and stable funding
in order to plan and execute an agreed upon program of work. The sheer
number of life extension programs and modernization efforts planned
over the next 20 years entails a significant workload that must be
integrated across multiple laboratories and plants. Adhering to a
carefully laid out schedule will be a critical factor in achieving
success. Programs must stay on track, and that in turn requires
constancy of purpose, as well as consistent and predictable funding
levels.

6. Senator Udall. Mr. Klotz, the administration is proposing to
combine an intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, the W-78, and a
submarine missile warhead, the W-88, into a common system. Are you
concerned about the level of risk and cost of the undertaking as
compared to performing straight life extensions of the existing
warheads?
Mr. Klotz. If confirmed, I will gain a better understanding of all
the technical details and, therefore, the risks and costs associated
with this program. I am aware that work on an interoperable warhead for
the Air Force and the Navy is still within the feasibility and option
down-select study phase (phase 6.2) of the Nuclear Weapons Council
acquisition process. Consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review, it is
the policy of this administration to look at ways to reduce the number
and types of weapons and the interoperable warhead concept, if
realized, would achieve this goal. Managing the technical risks and
ensuring sustained funding to finish the initial studies will be
critical to determining the viability of this option going forward. In
multiple previous assignments, I had responsibility for the operation,
maintenance and security of deployed nuclear warheads, so I am keenly
interested in this issue and, if confirmed, will carefully oversee
NNSA's work on it.

department of energy laboratories
7. Senator Udall. Mr. Klotz, DOE national laboratories make
significant contributions to national security through various DOE,
DOD, Department of Homeland Security, and Intelligence Community
efforts. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 officially designated the three
NNSA nuclear weapons labs (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories) as
``national security'' labs. However, the committee provided
clarification in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 that this designation
did not preclude the Federal Government from accessing and leveraging
any and all DOE national laboratories, such as Idaho National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, for the purpose of national security. As
Administrator, how do you plan to ensure that these and the other
national laboratories are fully and directly engaged in the national
security efforts undertaken by NNSA?
Mr. Klotz. If confirmed, I will strive ensure that the best
capabilities and brightest minds are brought to bear on NNSA's national
security missions, including stockpile stewardship, nonproliferation,
and reducing nuclear threats. I understand that the NNSA
nonproliferation mission, for example, already draws upon the talent
and expertise resident at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and other
laboratories. It is vitally important these and other national
laboratories are fully engaged in the national security efforts
undertaken by NNSA.

8. Senator Udall. Mr. Klotz, the administration has proposed
deferring indefinitely the plutonium facility at Los Alamos and using a
temporary alternative. Are you at all concerned about this temporary
strategy on the long-term plutonium science mission of Los Alamos and
is there reason to be worried that under the current fiscal conditions,
the temporary strategy will become permanent?
Mr. Klotz. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the NNSA
delivers plutonium capability--including the underlying analytical
capabilities and infrastructure--required to ensure the safety,
security and effectiveness of the nuclear weapon stockpile. I
understand that the NNSA and Department of Defense are developing a
business case analysis of the potential alternatives to constructing
the CMRR-Nuclear Facility (NF), including a so-called modular approach.
If confirmed, any approach proposed by NNSA will be informed by this
joint analysis and consultations with the Secretary of Energy, as well
directors of the laboratories, plants, and field offices. A successful
long-term plutonium mission at Los Alamos is essential to meeting
mission deliverables and maintaining a top-flight workforce consisting
of scientists, engineers, and technicians and providing them with
challenging and intrinsically interesting work, as well as world-class
laboratory equipment, diagnostic tools, and facilities in which to
work.

department of energy/national nuclear security administration
relationship
9. Senator Udall. Mr. Klotz, last year, because of poor mission
performance there was debate regarding whether the NNSA should continue
to report to the Secretary of Energy as a semi-autonomous agency within
DOE. What are your views on this issue?
Mr. Klotz. My view is that the NNSA should continue to report to
the Secretary of Energy as a semi-autonomous agency within DOE, as
provided for by law. I believe the mission of the NNSA benefits
significantly by having a cabinet-level representative in the Secretary
of Energy. The well-documented challenges confronting the NNSA--from
project management concerns, to cost overruns, to serious security
lapses--can and must be addressed using existing authorities granted to
the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA through the
Atomic Energy Act and the NNSA Act, respectively. I fully share
Secretary Moniz's strong commitment to ensure that NNSA fulfills
mission tasks enumerated in section 3211 of the NNSA Act, while
ensuring that all operations and activities are consistent with the
principles of protecting the environment and safeguarding the safety
and health of the public and workforce of the NNSA and its contractors.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
nuclear nonproliferation in the middle east and north africa
10. Senator Hagan. Mr. Klotz, in addition to the proliferation of
chemical weapons, there is concern in this committee about the
proliferation of nuclear material and know-how in the Middle East and
North Africa region. The NNSA maintains personnel at a number of
embassies around the world to work with the host nation and the U.S.
Embassy on joint nonproliferation efforts. If confirmed, will you
report back to this committee on whether you can post NNSA personnel in
this region of the world to work on nonproliferation issues?
Mr. Klotz. Yes, if confirmed, I will report back to the committee
on whether the DOE/NNSA can post personnel in the Middle East and North
Africa region to focus on these critical nonproliferation issues. I
also understand that NNSA's nonproliferation programs are actively
engaged in more than 120 countries, including in the Middle East and
North Africa region. I pledge to remain committed to these activities.

emergency response
11. Senator Hagan. Mr. Klotz, the NNSA is a unique resource in the
Federal Government for responding to radiological emergencies. The most
recent example was the use of NNSA's sophisticated detectors to track
the radioactive plume from the stricken Fukushima reactor in Japan. The
NNSA's Second Line of Defense program helps countries around the world
install radiation detectors at airports and other ports of entry. It
seems to me that an important extension of this mission would be
helping other countries develop emergency response capabilities for
detecting nuclear materials from an accident or a terrorist incident.
If confirmed, will you report back to the committee on efforts you are
taking or could take in this particular area?
Mr. Klotz. If confirmed, I will report back to the committee on
efforts the NNSA is taking and could take to support the development of
international emergency response capabilities to detect nuclear
materials from an accident or a terrorist incident. The NNSA has
complementary divisions that devote resources to different
international nuclear and radioactive challenges. These include the
NNSA's Second Line of Defense Program which installs radiation
detection systems at a variety of sites and assists countries with the
development of national response plans for emergency nuclear and
radiological events. The NNSA's Office of Emergency Operations also
currently works with other countries and the International Atomic
Energy Agency to develop nuclear/radiological emergency response
capabilities. If confirmed, I will work to continue to provide
assistance to countries around the world to support a compatible,
effective, and efficient worldwide nuclear/radiological emergency
response capability.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
nuclear modernization
12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Klotz, Congress has serious concerns about
the management of the NNSA in areas such as cost growth, schedule
slips, security and planning. If confirmed, how do you propose to
establish confidence in NNSA's ability to manage major construction
projects and life extension programs for our aging nuclear force?
Mr. Klotz. It is critical that the NNSA's weapons modernization and
infrastructure modernization efforts, including capital construction
projects, be completed on cost and on schedule. Otherwise, NNSA's
fundamental ability to execute its mission is put at risk. If
confirmed, I will place immediate emphasis on working with the
Secretary of Energy, as well as the directors of the national security
laboratories, plants and field offices to: (1) clarify lines of
authority, responsibility, and accountability within the entire NNSA
enterprise; and (2) identify steps to streamline business processes and
eliminate needlessly burdensome, non-value-added activities that may
undermine the NNSA enterprise and its incentive to innovate. I will
likewise focus on adopting measures to significantly improve NNSA's
capabilities for more complete front-end project planning, cost
estimation, project management, and oversight of capital construction
projects and life extension programs.

13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Klotz, the B-61 has already been delayed 3
years--what are the implications for U.S. security if the Senate
Appropriations Committee mark becomes law?
Mr. Klotz. Based on my prior experiences at the Department of
Defense, I fully understand that schedule delays and budget uncertainty
in any major weapons systems acquisition program drive up overall costs
and adversely impact the recruitment and retention of the workforce
needed to successfully complete technically complex projects. If the
NNSA does not have sufficient funding to move forward with the B-61-12
LEP, as endorsed by the interagency Nuclear Weapons Council, NNSA's
ability to meet scope and schedule will be put at risk, with serious
implications for the Nation's strategic and extended deterrence
capabilities, as well as its ability to sustain a safe, secure, and
effective stockpile and to retire weapons that are no longer needed.

14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Klotz, how would you propose to work with
the administration and Congress to restore full funding for the B-61?
Mr. Klotz. The B-61 is one of the oldest nuclear weapons in the
stockpile and requires a life extension program. The B-61-12 LEP will
consolidate four variants of the B-61 (-3, -4, -7 and -10) into a
single mod 12 which will provide strategic and extended deterrence for
an additional 20 years following the first production unit in 2019. On
February 27, 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council (consisting of
representatives of the Department of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command,
and NNSA) authorized the Air Force and NNSA to begin Phase 6.3
Engineering Development for the B-61-12 (the Option 3B), adopting the
lowest-cost approach of the options evaluated by the Nuclear Weapons
Council that fully meets military requirements to address weapon aging,
safety, security and delivery system integration issues. This variant
will allow the United States to reduce the number of weapons currently
in the stockpile; reduce the cost of maintaining the B-61 in the
future; set conditions for the future retirement of the B83 bomb;
reduce the amount of special nuclear material in the stockpile;
maintain the air leg of the triad; and, increase the safety and
security of a critical component of the U.S. strategic and extended
deterrent capabilities, both now and for the foreseeable future. The
Nuclear Weapons Council rejected the proposed ``Triple Alt'' option as
not meeting military requirements because it did not address all aging
issues, it would require the immediate start of a second LEP to address
those issues, and it would risk a potential capability gap until the
second LEP was completed. Additionally, the Triple Alt would drive up
life-cycle costs, and would not provide the critical nuclear security
benefits that could lead to reductions in the technical hedge.
Accordingly, I believe the approach endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons
Council is the best option.
If confirmed, I will work with the Department of Defense (primarily
through the Nuclear Weapons Council), the National Security Staff, as
well as Members of Congress and their staffs to ensure the facts
regarding the B-61 life extension program and the serious implications
of reduced or delayed funding are fully understood.

15. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Klotz, will you be a forceful advocate for
those nuclear modernization commitments that were made to secure the
New START treaty?
Mr. Klotz. Yes. If confirmed, I will be a forceful advocate for
nuclear modernization funding as related to the ratification of the New
START treaty, and as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and
the 2013 updated Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United
States.

16. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Klotz, on April 29, the Government
Accountability Office upheld a procurement protest regarding the
combined Y-12 National Security Complex and Pantex Plant management
contracts. Press reports suggest that some scores were changed at the
11th hour of the process, which had an impact on the result. Can you
assure us, if you are confirmed, you would look into this award and
protest to ensure the integrity of the procurement process moving
forward?
Mr. Klotz. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on any
ongoing government contract competition. However, it is my long-held
personal view that all government contracting activities must be
conducted fairly, with integrity, and in a manner that allows all
stakeholders to have full confidence in the process.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
new strategic arms reduction treaty ratification
17. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Klotz, in your advance policy questions
you stated that ``the NNSA has a unique responsibility for pursuing two
different, but complementary principles that have traditionally guided
American nuclear weapons policy. The first is that the United States
must continue to lead international efforts to limit and reduce nuclear
arsenals, prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and secure
nuclear materials across the globe. The second is that appropriately-
sized nuclear forces still play an essential role in protecting U.S.
and allied security interests, even as the United States seeks to
reduce the overall number and role of nuclear weapons in our national
security policy.'' While these statements seem solid in principal, I'm
concerned they conflict with our agreement to maintain a nuclear
arsenal as defined in the New START treaty, especially your stated
second responsibility of reducing the overall number and role of
nuclear weapons in our national security policy. In particular, I am
concerned the administration is backing away from promises made to
modernize the entire nuclear enterprise--warheads, delivery platforms,
and supporting infrastructure--in order to secure Senate ratification.
If confirmed, will you aggressively advocate modernization of the
nuclear enterprise to guarantee the United States maintains a safe,
reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent?
Mr. Klotz. I have personally been associated with the nuclear
deterrent mission for nearly 4 decades, including leading the major
command responsible for all Air Force nuclear-capable long-range
bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. I strongly believe
that the U.S. nuclear deterrent forces still play an essential role in
protecting U.S. and allied security interests, and will do so for many
years to come. Accordingly, the United States must maintain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. The NNSA plays a critical role
in achieving this objective through its stewardship of the nuclear
weapon stockpile. If confirmed, I will aggressively advocate and pursue
the programs and funding necessary to successfully complete nuclear
weapon life extension programs to meet national policy goals and
military requirements; to assess the health and safety of the
stockpile; and, to modernize the aging infrastructure associated with
critical plutonium, uranium, and other stockpile-related operations.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
national nuclear security administration security of critical
infrastructure
18. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Klotz, in July 2012 at its Y-12 site, NNSA
suffered a multifaceted security failure that allowed three trespassers
to deface one of agency's newest and most secure facilities. Though
steps have been taken to correct deficiencies, NNSA's efforts to
establish the right kinds of security at its headquarters and field
sites are still developing some 14 months after the Y-12 incident. In
your view, what led to the Y-12 incident?
Mr. Klotz. I have carefully reviewed the publically available
accounts of the Y-12 security failure provided by the DOE Inspector
General, the review conducted by Major General Sandy Finan, and the
expert opinions requested by former Energy Secretary Chu. In my view,
based on this information, the incident occurred because of a
multifaceted, systemic failure of the approach to security at the plant
and within NNSA headquarters: responsibility for the protective force
and the physical security system was divided, security equipment was
not repaired in a timely fashion, compensatory measures were inadequate
and improperly executed, multiple nuisance alarms led to an attitude of
complacency. Furthermore, oversight of security was neither rigorously,
nor routinely, exercised and evaluated.

19. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Klotz, does it suggest anything to you
about the NNSA's security culture?
Mr. Klotz. Because safety and security are paramount to the NNSA's
mission, it will be my responsibility, if confirmed, to ensure the
process of implementing improved oversight mechanisms, which include
clarifying roles, authorities, and functions for the organization, is
completed successfully. I want to emphasize that the 2012 security
incident at Y-12 was totally unacceptable. Security of the nuclear
enterprise is the responsibility of every employee of the NNSA,
regardless of job, or rank.

20. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Klotz, if culture plays a role, what
actions do you plan to take to instill cultural change?
Mr. Klotz. If confirmed, strengthening security at NNSA facilities
will be one of my top priorities. I intend to draw on my experience as
the first Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command to address the
security culture that exists at the NNSA. Working with the Secretary of
Energy, I will insist on strict adherence to DOE security standards and
clarify lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for
meeting and maintaining those standards. In my experience, it is
critical to remind all levels of the organization that security is an
urgent mission, and that complacency will not be tolerated. To
accomplish this, the status of security systems (including all outages
and estimated time of repair) must be monitored daily at NNSA
headquarters; security deviations and corresponding compensatory
measures will be reviewed by Federal officials both at the field and
headquarters levels; security procedures and responses to alarms will
be rigorously trained, exercised, and evaluated.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
global supply of mo-99
21. Senator Blunt. Mr. Klotz, I understand ensuring a stable and
reliable supply of medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) for the
benefit of physicians and patients is a key priority for your office. I
am hopeful that, if confirmed, you would work constructively with
affected stakeholders to ensure the transition to non-highly enriched
uranium (HEU) based production occurs smoothly and without jeopardizing
patient access to much-needed diagnostic tools. How are you monitoring
the global supply of Mo-99 and working with foreign governments to
ensure the U.S. Government continues to provide needed material while
this transition is underway?
Mr. Klotz. If confirmed, I intend to continue NNSA's efforts to
accelerate the establishment of reliable Mo-99 supplies produced
without HEU, so that patients have uninterrupted access to sources of
this important medical isotope that are also consistent with
international HEU minimization commitments. Regular interaction with
foreign government, commercial industry, and medical community
stakeholders are essential. If confirmed, I will be committed to this
interaction and to monitoring the global supply.

disposition of bannister complex
22. Senator Blunt. Mr. Klotz, what is your vision for the eventual
disposition of the Bannister Federal Complex in Kansas City regarding
its remediation and redevelopment?
Mr. Klotz. The NNSA has successfully developed a new, highly
efficient facility for Kansas City Plant operations. Upon full
transition to the new facility, the NNSA will work to transfer the
previous facility--the Bannister Federal Complex (BFC)--to a new owner
for redevelopment under established protocols. The goals for
disposition are transfer of the property providing for demolition of
obsolete facilities, remediation of legacy environmental contamination,
and successful redevelopment of the property to continue contributing
to the economy of Kansas City. If confirmed, you have my commitment to
work closely with you, the other members of the Missouri and Kansas
congressional delegations, and community leaders to ensure the BFC
disposition process is undertaken as expeditiously and effectively as
possible.
______

[The nomination reference of Mr. Frank G. Klotz follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
August 1, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Frank G. Klotz, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, vice Thomas P. D'Agostino, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Frank G. Klotz, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Summary:
Achieved the rank of Lieutenant General (three-star) in the U.S.
Air Force. Extensive experience leading large organizations with
technically-complex missions and a diverse, highly-skilled workforce.
Policymaking roles at the highest levels: from Brussels to Moscow to
the White House. Proven track record in successfully empowering peers
and multi-functional teams to solve critical challenges with
constrained resources. Specialized expertise in space and nuclear
policy, arms control, U.S.-Russian relations, and Polar Regions.
Academic Degrees:
D. Phil., Politics, Oxford University
M. Phil., International Relations, Oxford University
B.S., International Affairs, Air Force Academy (Distinguished
Graduate)
Work Experience:
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011-present,
Washington, DC. As Senior Fellow for Strategic Studies and Arms
Control, responsible for directing a roundtable series on nuclear
security policy; researching and writing op-eds and articles; preparing
grant proposals; and, participating in institutional outreach and the
annual budgeting process.
Independent Consultant, 2011-present, Washington, DC. Advise
government and business organizations on national security issues,
corporate leadership, and strategic planning. Participate in ``Track II
diplomacy'' on strategic stability and arms control with former Indian
and Pakistani officials, and with Russian and Chinese experts.
Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, 2009-2011, Barksdale
Air Force Base; Shreveport, LA. Established and led a brand new
organization that merged responsibility for all U.S. nuclear-capable
bombers and missiles under a single chain-of-command. Defined vision
and values; recruited 800 highly-talented professionals into a new
headquarters; took charge of 5 major installations and 23,000 people;
strengthened accountability--all within just 14 months.
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff & Director of the Air Staff, 2007-
2009, Headquarters Air Force, Washington, DC. Oversaw the
administration and organization of the Air Force's headquarters staff.
Day-to-day interaction with the Air Force's ``CEO,'' major functional
heads, and senior peers in managing policies, plans, and resources to
support the Air Force's worldwide mission.
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command, 2005-2007, Peterson Air
Force Base, Colorado Springs, CO. Second in command of a 39,400-person
organization charged with responsibility for developing, acquiring and
operating a global network of launch, satellite control,
communications, and missile warning facilities. Awarded the prestigious
General Thomas D. White Trophy by the Air Force Association for the
most outstanding contribution to progress in aerospace in 2006.
Commander, 20th Air Force, 2003-2005, F.E. Warren Air Force Base,
Cheyenne, WY. Led the 9,500 personnel of the Nation's intercontinental
ballistic missile force. Completed deactivation of 50 Peacekeeper
missiles in compliance with the START I treaty. Partnered with Wyoming
National Guard to develop a security training center at Camp Guernsey.
Director for Nuclear Policy & Arms Control, National Security
Council, 2001-2003, The White House, Washington, DC. Advised the
President and the National Security Advisor on all aspects of nuclear
weapons policy. Represented the White House in talks leading to the
2002 Moscow Treaty to reduce deployed U.S.-Russian weapons by two-
thirds.
Defense Attache, Russia, 1999-2001, U.S. Embassy Moscow. As the
senior U.S. military officer based in Russia, advised the Ambassador
and senior U.S. officials in developing positions on a wide-range of
bilateral defense issues, including funding for the. disposal of
weapons of mass destruction and cooperation in Arctic search and
rescue.
Previous work experience: In addition to leading organizations at
every operational level within the Air Force, served at senior
policymaking levels in the State Department as a White House Fellow and
at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. While on the Air Force Academy
faculty, directed courses on Congress and the Presidency. A list of all
prior positions is available at http://www.af.mil/information/bios/
bio.asp?biolD=6081.
Honors and awards:
General Larry D. Welch Award, Air Force Association, 2011
U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School Class of 2011
``Exemplar''
Gen. Thomas D. White Space Trophy, Air Force Association, 2006
Heritage Hall of Fame Inductee, U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory
School, 2002
Military Fellowship, Council on Foreign Relations, NY
Senior Research Fellow, National War College, Washington, DC
White House Fellowship, Washington, DC
One of the Ten Outstanding Young Men of America, U.S. Jaycees, 1983
Rhodes Scholarship (Colorado and Trinity, 1973)
Affiliations:
Member, Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board
Member, Committee on International Security and Arms Control
(CISAC), National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC
Member, Committee on Human Spaceflight, National Academy of
Sciences, Washington, DC
Member, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY
Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Life member, Air Force Association, Washington, DC
Life member, USAF Academy Association of Graduates, CO
Member, Association of American Rhodes Scholars, Vienna, VA
Life member, Friends of the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force,
Dayton, OH

______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Frank G.
Klotz in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Frank Graham Klotz.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security/Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration.

3. Date of nomination:
August 1, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
September 7, 1950; Lubbock, TX.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Nancy Hopper Klotz (maiden name: Hopper).

7. Names and ages of children:
Justin Michael Klotz, age 33.
David Matthew Klotz, age 31.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Oxford University, 1973-1976, M. Phil., International Relations
(1975) and D. Phil., Politics (1980)
U.S. Air Force Academy, 1969-1973, S.S., International Affairs
(1973)

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, July
2011-present
Owner/Member, Klotz Consulting Group, LLC, Alexandria, VA, June
2011-present
Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale AFB, LA,
August 2009-January 2011
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and Director of the Air Staff, HQ
USAF, Pentagon, August 2007-August 2009
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, CO, October
2005-August 2007
Commander, 20th Air Force, F.E. Warren AFB, WY, May 2003-October
2005
Director for Nuclear Policy and Arms Control, National Security
Council, The White House, Washington, DC, July 2001-May 2003

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Member, Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board
(ISAB), 2012-present Consultant, Department of State, 2011-2012

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY
Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK
Life Member, Air Force Association, Arlington, VA
Life Member, USAF Academy Association of Graduates, CO
Member, Association of American Rhodes Scholars, Vienna, VA
Member, Association of Air Force Missileers, Breckenridge, CO
Friends of the National Museum of the USAF, Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
General Larry D. Welch Award, Air Force Association, 2011
U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School Class of 2011
``Exemplar''
Gen. Thomas D. White Space Trophy, Air Force Association, 2006
Heritage Hall of Fame Inductee, USAF Academy Preparatory School;
2002
Military Fellowship, Council on Foreign Relations, NY
Senior Research Fellow, National War College, Washington, DC
White House Fellowship, Washington, DC
One of the Ten Outstanding Young Men of America, U.S. Jaycees, 1983
Rhodes Scholarship (Colorado and Trinity, 1973)
Several military awards and decorations, including the
Distinguished Service Medal (with three oak leaf clusters), the Defense
Superior Service Medal (with two oak leaf clusters), and the Legion of
Merit (with one oak leaf cluster)

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Books:
America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1990)
Reports:
Space, Commerce, and National Security (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1998)
Achieving Consensus for a Sustainable U.S. Nuclear Posture
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April
2013) [Contained within Stephanie Spies and John K. Warden, Forging a
Consensus fora Sustainable U.S. Nuclear Posture: A Report of the CSIS
Nuclear Consensus Working Group] http://csis.org/frles/publication/
130422 Spies ForgingConsensus Web.pdf
Chapters:
``The President and the Control of Nuclear Weapons,'' in David C.
Kozak and Kenneth N. Ciboski, eds., The American Presidency: A Policy
Perspective from Readings and Documents (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1985)
``Future Soviet-American Arms Control: Implications for NATO,'' in
William H. Kincade, et al., eds., Approaches to East-West Arms Control
(Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 1979)
Articles, Op-Eds, etc.:
``The Future of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent,'' The National
Interest (7/24/2013)
``Berlin and the Arms-Control Debate,'' The National Interest (6/
27/2013)
``France Isn't Aiming for Nuclear Zero,'' The National Interest (5/
8/2013)
``Pakistan's Nuclear Past as Prologue,'' The National Interest (3/
12/2013)
``The U.S.-Russian Antarctic Thaw,'' The National Interest (12/12/
2012)
``Trouble at the Ends of the Earth,'' The National Interest (10/8/
2012)
``China's Growing Space Power,'' The National Interest (7/26/2012)
``The New Space Race,'' The National Interest (6/6/2012)
``GPS and the Politics of Scarce Resources,'' The National Interest
(4/17/2012)
``Scientists Report on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,''
cfr.org (4/2/2012)
``Defense Budget Tug of War,'' The National Interest (3/27/2012)
``Military Bases and the American Community,'' The National
Interest (2/15/2012)
``American Interests in Antarctica,'' The National Interest (1/17/
2012)
``India, Pakistan, and Nuclear Confidence Building,'' cfr.org
(12123/2011)
``Unfinished Business,'' International Herald Tribune (12/14/2011)
(with Susan Koch and Franklin Miller)
``Obama's Nuclear Arms Control Agenda: Progress and Prospects,''
cfr.org (10/17/2011)
''The Future of Strategic Deterrence and the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile,'' High Frontier, Vol. 2, No. 4, Aug. 2006

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Mr. Frank G. Klotz was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on September 24, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was returned to the President at the end of the first session
of the 113th Congress, on January 6, 2014, under provisions of
Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6, of the Standing Rules of the
Senate.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Marcel J. Lettre II by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(PDUSD(I))?
Answer. My understanding is that the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I)) is responsible for
assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) in
supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-
related responsibilities and authorities under title 10 and title 50 of
the United States Code (U.S.C.).
This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the
Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on
behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations
within the Department of Defense (DOD); ensuring that intelligence
organizations in DOD are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to
support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DOD
components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, are
responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the
execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant
commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of
the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support;
ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are
conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other
sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are
conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense
Department personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure
efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the
Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DOD Components
funded by the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and
in compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring
that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-
related information sufficient to execute its oversight
responsibilities.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe I have the proper background and
experience to effectively perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I have been honored to
serve as Special Assistant under three Secretaries of Defense from 2011
to the present. In that capacity, I advised the Secretary of Defense on
a range of matters pertaining to U.S. national security, including
intelligence-related matters. With functional responsibilities as the
civilian deputy chief of staff to Secretary Panetta, I supported the
Secretary of Defense on defense strategy, budget development,
acquisition oversight, national security policy initiatives, and crisis
management. I also led two Secretary of Defense transition teams. For
my work in support of Secretary of Defense priorities, I am honored
that Secretary Panetta awarded me the Defense Distinguished Public
Service Award.
As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, I had responsibilities on a team executing legislative
programs on Departmental priorities including the defense budget and
policy; Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; strategic nuclear arms control
matters, including the ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty; acquisition and export control reforms; information operations,
and Secretary Gates' efficiencies initiative. For my work on strategic
nuclear arms control matters, Secretary Gates awarded me the
Exceptional Public Service Award.
As Senior Defense and Intelligence Advisor and then as Senior
National Security Advisor to the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, I handled
all ``Gang of Eight'' intelligence matters for the Leader, and shaped
legislation and policy initiatives in areas including: Iraq and
Afghanistan strategy; counterterrorism; enhancing foreign intelligence
collection and sensitive intelligence operations; countering
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and assisting in
securing passage of defense and intelligence authorization bills,
appropriations bills, and war supplementals.
As a Professional Staff Member on the U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I supported the
intelligence after-action reviews on the September 11 terrorist attacks
and on Iraqi WMD, and advised on the 2004 Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act which created the Director of National
Intelligence.
Prior to these positions, I served in the private sector, the
foreign policy research sector, and on a congressional commission
examining the organization and efficiency of the U.S. Government
regarding intelligence and programs to counter WMD.
Serving in both the legislative and executive branches of the
Government has given me a multi-faceted appreciation for the role of
intelligence. I have served as an intelligence consumer, ensuring the
Nation's senior decisionmakers are supported with intelligence products
on important decisions. I have gained an appreciation of the statutory
roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National
Intelligence, and other senior leaders in ensuring effective
intelligence capabilities. I have familiarity with a range of
intelligence operations and capabilities. I have experience working
intelligence resourcing issues through the National Intelligence
Program and Military Intelligence Program, knowledge of key
trajectories for our acquisition and investment programs, and some
awareness of key counterintelligence and security priorities. I am
personally committed to supporting the Secretary of Defense in focusing
on the needs of the warfighter, particularly in intelligence support.
Finally, my experience has given me a deep appreciation for the
important role of oversight, from within the executive branch as well
as by the legislative and judiciary branches.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the PDUSD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe the most significant action that I
would need to take would be to assist Under Secretary Vickers in
executing his priorities, consistent with the priorities of the
Secretary of Defense, by enhancing my understanding of, and assessing
the effectiveness of, plans and activities to implement and
operationalize those priorities. I also believe that I need to more
deeply understand the challenges posed by the new fiscal environment,
the resource constraints that will be faced ahead, and the
opportunities for further efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise, as we sustain and strengthen OUSD(I)'s budgetary oversight.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to speaking with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense
about how best I could support them. I anticipate that my duties and
functions would include advising and assisting the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense on intelligence
planning, policy and resources. I believe they would expect me to
assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in ensuring full
intelligence support for ongoing operations; ensuring that intelligence
operations conducted by DOD are effective and in compliance with all
relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; ensuring that
the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic
surprise; ensuring, without abrogating the Secretary's statutory
responsibilities, that the DNI has visibility and oversight over the
full range of intelligence activities in the Department; and ensuring
that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible.
They may also assign me other duties as their priorities and my
background and experience warrant.
relationships
Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
following:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), as the USD(I)'s
principal assistant, if confirmed as the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence I will serve as an advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I)), I will provide support to the
Deputy Secretary similar to that which I would provide to the
Secretary, as described above.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will provide my full support to
the USD(I) in carrying out his duties as the principal advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on intelligence, counterintelligence, and
security. I will keep him informed, seek his guidance and direction,
and support him as he advises the Secretary of Defense on how to
exercise his oversight authority on intelligence, counterintelligence,
and security-related matters throughout the Department. At the outset,
I will ascertain which responsibilities the USDI delegates to me,
including a range of internal management functions within the Office of
the Under Secretary, and focus on implementing his and the Secretary's
priorities within the Office and across the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise.
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Each of the Under Secretaries has vital functions to carry
out. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will work closely with each of them
and their Principal Deputies and senior teams. A close relationship
between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I), and
their Principal Deputies, is particularly important, so I intend to
fully support those relationships. In both of my former positions
within the Department, both as Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, I had positive relationships with a number of the
Under Secretaries. If confirmed, I would continue to build on these
relationships.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and
Information Integration/Successor Organization.
Answer. The Chief Information Officer (CIO), like its predecessor
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration, has had oversight of enabling capabilities which are
central to the conduct of intelligence and security-related activities.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the CIO to ensure that this
support remains robust.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for Rule of
Law and Detainee Policy on the intelligence aspects of detainee policy
and operations.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities (ASD
SOLIC&IC).
Answer. USD(I) and the ASD SO/LIC&IC work closely together on
several important matters, and this close partnership has grown
substantially during Dr. Vickers' tenure as USD(I). If confirmed as the
PDUSD(I), I will contribute to ensuring that this close partnership
continues.
Question. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence
Directors.
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will support the USD(I) as the
Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program. As
appropriate, I will work with the Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure their
intelligence requirements are met, that the Military Departments and
Services develop intelligence capabilities appropriate for the current
and future security environment, and that the intelligence
organizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their
respective Military Department/Service, the Joint Force, the
Department, and the Nation.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. In my previous positions in DOD, I have worked closely with
the General Counsel and his staff. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will
continue to work closely with the General Counsel, and seek his advice
on the legal issues that impact USD(I)'s duties and functions.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. In my previous positions in DOD, I have worked closely with
the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other
senior leaders on the Joint Staff, on a range of issues. If confirmed
as PDUSD(I), I would seek to continue this close relationship to ensure
that Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Community meet the
requirements of the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands.
Question. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, including U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command.
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will support the USD(I) in
ensuring that the intelligence needs of the commanders of the combatant
commands, including the Commanders of U.S. Special Operations Command
and U.S. Cyber Command, are met.
Question. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies.
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will assist the USD(I) in his
exercise of the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and
control over the National Security Agency (NSA), the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). I will also
help sustain the excellent relationship that the USD(I) has with the
DNI by working with the Office of the DNI to ensure clear and
consistent guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence agencies.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. The USD(I) has an excellent relationship with the DNI. If
confirmed as PDUSD(I), I intend to fully support the USD(I) and the DNI
in their mutual goal of greater Intelligence Community integration.
Because the USD(I) is dual-hatted as the DNI's Director of Defense
Intelligence, if confirmed, I will support the USD(I) as he advises the
DNI on Defense Intelligence capabilities.
Question. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will work to sustain the
already close relationship that the USD(I) has achieved with the
Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and their senior team.
Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC).
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will work to sustain the
already close relationship between USD(I) and the NCTC.
Question. The Director of the National Counterproliferation Center.
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will work to sustain the
relationship with the Director of the NCPC.
Question. The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National
Intelligence.
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will fully support the USD(I)'s
relationship with the Deputy and Assistant Directors of National
Intelligence to ensure integration and unity of effort in the direction
and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with
intelligence responsibilities.
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will assist the USD(I) as he
serves as the Secretary of Defense's focal point for intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security matters for senior officials from the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the PDUSD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed as the PDUSD(I), the major challenges that are
likely to confront me are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of
global operations and unmet demand for intelligence in an era of
intelligence-driven operations; the need to adapt to a rapidly changing
intelligence environment; the need to address longer-term challenges to
prevent strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations;
and the need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment.
Additionally, we must improve on protecting intelligence sources and
methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of information. The next
PDUSD(I) will have to help the USD(I) overcome these challenges while
ensuring Defense Intelligence is postured with the IC to continue to
provide world-class intelligence.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If I am confirmed as the PDUSD(I), given the importance of
intelligence to ongoing operations, I would do my best to assist the
USD(I) in ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise, and that intelligence is shared as widely as
possible while also ensuring that it is properly protected. I would
also reinforce and seek to effectively implement the USD(I)'s
priorities across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems
in the performance of the functions of the PDUSD(I)?
Answer. The primary near-term challenge to be faced in performing
the functions of the USD(I) and, by extension, the PDUSD(I) is
preparing for a period of defense budget uncertainty, which will also
impact the Defense Intelligence enterprise and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
A second serious challenge that continues to confront the USD(I)
and, by extension, the PDUSD(I) is the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information, particularly as it relates to the insider
threat, and the risks therefore posed to our forces, our military
operations, and our foreign relations.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed as the PDUSD(I), I would support Dr. Vickers
in managing budget uncertainty as guided by Congress and the Secretary
of Defense. I would support the USD(I) in ensuring we continue to
provide the best possible intelligence support to current operations,
look for opportunities to become more efficient while maintaining and
increasing effectiveness, and continue to push to innovate and invest
in key capabilities that maintain America's superior technological and
operational edge.
In addition, I would support Dr. Vickers' commitment to
implementing comprehensive technical, personnel, and administrative
solutions to the challenge of unauthorized disclosures, particularly as
it relates to the insider threat. I would work with OUSD(I), other DOD
leaders and ODNI leadership as appropriate to ensure that the steps
taken to correct and mitigate recently exploited vulnerabilities
effectively deter and prevent future unauthorized disclosures.
priorities
Question. How would you anticipate developing priorities for
allocating your time as the PDUSD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would develop priorities for allocating my
time consistent with Dr. Vickers' priorities. In general, I would
anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of intelligence
operations, the development of intelligence capabilities, and internal
management of OUSD(I) operations, and other duties as the Secretary and
the USD(I) may assign. In what will continue to be a resource-
constrained environment, I will assist the USD(I) in seeking to ensure
that resources are strategically allocated to, and across, the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the PDUSD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assist Dr. Vickers in continuing to
execute what I understand are his overarching priorities, including:
(1) ensuring that the full weight of Defense intelligence capabilities
are brought to bear to achieve the President's objective of disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda, creating and sustaining stability
in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, and supporting other ongoing
operations in which the Department is engaged or may be engaged; (2)
ensuring that intelligence operations conducted by DOD are effective
and in compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives,
and policies; (3) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
postured to prevent strategic surprise and fully exploit emerging
opportunities; and (4) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise is as efficient as possible. As Dr. Vickers has done, I
would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that: we have the
right collection and analytical priorities; that we have a robust ISR
architecture (both space and airborne), today and in the future; that
the Department's clandestine operations are fully integrated with those
of the CIA and National Clandestine Service (NCS); that the President's
highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced; that
analysis addresses the needs of policy makers and operational
commanders; that intelligence is timely, accessible and protected; and,
where appropriate, that we aggressively exploit advances in technology
to improve our intelligence capabilities.
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff risk assessment (cra)
Question. Section 153 of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually provide Congress with ``an
assessment of the risks associated with the most recent National
Military Strategy (or update).''
What is your understanding and assessment of the CRA and the role,
if any, of the OUSD(I) staff in supporting or participating in the
preparation of this risk assessment?
Answer. The same legislation mandating the CRA also requires the
Secretary of Defense to plan for mitigating risks the Chairman
identifies as significant. My understanding is that while OUSD(I) does
not directly participate in the CRA's development, as the principal
staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all intelligence
matters, USD(I)'s role is to support the Secretary's risk mitigation
plan by ensuring the Defense Intelligence Enterprise meets national and
Department requirements. USD(I) is also responsible for ensuring it has
balanced investments towards delivering the right mix of intelligence
capabilities to support the combatant commanders in accomplishing their
missions and mitigating the risks identified in the CRA.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of how the CRA
is used in DOD's strategic analysis process that informs the National
Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military
Strategy, or any other department strategic decisionmaking processes?
Answer. My understanding is that the CRA, a congressionally-
mandated report from the Chairman, is used to inform departmental
strategic decisionmaking processes by providing the Chairman's
assessment of the nature and magnitude of strategic and military risk
in executing the missions called for in the National Security Strategy,
Quadrennial Defense Review and National Military Strategy. By
considering the range of operational, future challenges, force
management, and institutional factors, the CRA provides a holistic
assessment of the ability of U.S. Armed Forces to meet strategic
requirements in the near-term. The Chairman submits the CRA through the
Secretary of Defense, who then forwards it to Congress along with his
congressionally-mandated annual Risk Mitigation Plan, and additional
comments as necessary. The Chairman may also include in the report his
recommendations for mitigating risk, such as changes in strategy,
development of new operational concepts or capabilities, increases in
capacity, or adjustments in force posture or employment.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose in
how OUSD(I) supports the CRA or how it is used to support other
strategy decision processes?
Answer. At this time, I do not recommend any specific changes in
how OUSD(I) supports the CRA process. However, the CRA may prove useful
during the Joint Staff's annual Capability Gap Assessment by
underpinning Joint Requirements Oversight Council decisions related to
mitigating Combatant Commands' most critical capability gaps. The CRA
would be helpful in prioritizing capability gaps and informing Joint
Requirements Oversight Council recommendations on where to apply
resources or other risk-reduction activities to mitigate the most
critical DOD capability gaps. As an advisory member of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council and the DOD Program Executive for the
Military Intelligence Program, the USD(I)'s role is to ensure all parts
of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture are
integrated and optimized to meet warfighter needs.
combating terrorism
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism, both at
home and abroad?
Answer. The President's stated goal to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates is supported by the Department's
counterterrorism strategy which focuses first on operational and
regional defeat and then strategic and global defeat. Operational
defeat of al Qaeda and its affiliates requires conducting operations to
render these organizations incapable of planning and conducting
attacks, denying them sanctuary and severing relationships to groups
providing support to al Qaeda. Strategic defeat could then be achieved
by preventing al Qaeda's resurgence.
Achieving both operational and strategic defeat of al Qaeda
requires a sustained global counterterrorism campaign with mutually
reinforcing direct and indirect lines of operation. Building the
capacity of our partners, preventing the acquisition and use of WMD,
and countering radicalization is necessary, in addition to conducting
operations to directly disrupt and dismantle terrorist groups.
Within areas of hostilities, the Department has a lead role in
conducting these activities, along with our international partners.
Outside such areas where named operations authorized by the President
are being conducted, the Department plays a complementary role to other
instruments of national power. Recognizing that al Qaeda and its
affiliates remain the most dangerous threat to the United States, my
assessment is the Department--in conjunction with the whole of U.S.
Government and our international partners--has the correct
counterterrorism strategy in place, and it is increasingly more
effective.
Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities
related to combating terrorism?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise is fully engaged in the Department's counterterrorism
strategy and supportive of all efforts to defeat al Qaeda. The goal is
to ensure we have the intelligence capabilities we need to achieve the
President's counterterrorism objectives, by working closely with
Military Departments and Services, the Combat Support Agencies,
combatant commanders, the wider Intelligence Community, and our
international partners.
Question. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure
that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?
Answer. Close collaboration among U.S. departments and agencies and
with our international partners is essential to our counterterrorism
success. One example of this was the establishment of the Joint
Interagency Task Forces, which have ensured full interagency
contributions to the fight. The Department has developed a close
operational partnership with the CIA and the Intelligence Community,
and substantially strengthened our international capacity building
efforts. I believe these types of actions posture the Department to
effectively combat terrorism.
Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
agencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to build on and extend these
interagency and partner collaborations. These previous efforts have
resulted in significant improvements in coordination of operations and
interagency concurrence; I would work hard to move the Department and
its partners toward further integration of intelligence operations and
counterterrorism efforts.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence
activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are adequately
coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the
Intelligence Community?
Answer. Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence
activities with the Intelligence Community as required by applicable
law, policy, and agreements. My understanding is that SOCOM liaises
with members of the Intelligence Community in the Washington, DC, area,
at the Headquarters in Tampa, FL, and on the battlefield. If confirmed,
I would work to ensure the demonstrable gains achieved in intelligence
coordination with the interagency and international partners over the
last 12 years are not only sustained, but continue to improve in order
to achieve the U.S. Government's counterterrorism goals.
combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
Question. What is your assessment and understanding of the
Department's strategy for countering the proliferation of WMD, and how
that strategy fits into the broader national strategy to counter WMD
proliferation?
Answer. Because of my previous experience on the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, I know that the Department's strategy
pursues robust counterproliferation policies and capabilities to
prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to WMD threats. The DOD
strategy supports the National Strategy to Combat WMD and related
national strategic guidance through military force planning and
doctrine to organize, train, exercise, and equip U.S. Armed Forces to
combat WMD, in addition to preparing appropriate plans to address the
defense-related aspects of combating WMD.
Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities
related to countering the proliferation of WMD?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(I) to provide
guidance and oversight to Defense Intelligence organizations and ensure
that the Defense Intelligence organizations respond to the direction
and priorities of the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary
of Defense, and DOD components with respect to WMD threats.
Furthermore, I will support USD(I) efforts to evaluate the
effectiveness of Defense Intelligence capabilities in identifying and
assessing WMD threats.
Question. How can the Department best structure itself to support
the mission of countering the proliferation of WMD?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to make this question a
focus, just as I understand it has been for the USD(I). Based on my
previous experience on the OSD staff, it is my sense that, consistent
with national strategy, the Department has efforts in place to support
the mission of countering WMD proliferation in a number of key ways,
including interdiction and elimination operations, active and passive
defense, consequence management, security cooperation and partner
activities, and threat reduction cooperation.
These missions rely on timely and actionable intelligence in a
number of areas, including: the state of nations' WMD programs;
terrorists' interest in those efforts; existing proliferation networks;
national proliferation activities; and the security status of WMD
facilities, including possible threats and vulnerabilities.
Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
coordinate its efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD with those
of other Federal agencies?
Answer. We must continue robust efforts to counter proliferation of
WMD using all available national and international authorities and
apply all elements of national power--diplomatic, economic,
intelligence, law enforcement, and military. Collaboration and
integration among all relevant departments and agencies are key factors
for the administration's strategy to combat WMD. Senior level attention
can help ensure Federal agencies--as well as other key partners such as
at the State and local level and internationally--remain synchronized
and focused on the top priorities. If confirmed, I look forward to
studying the opportunities for USD(I) to contribute to this important
priority.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence
activities carried out by DOD entities and forces are adequately
coordinated with other activities carried out by other elements of the
Intelligence Community?
Answer. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I look forward to working with IC
partners in global layered defenses to prevent, detect, and respond to
the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. We must continue to develop
tools and capabilities with IC partners to detect and disrupt the
movement of WMD including precursor materials. Because we can never be
certain of our ability to prevent or protect against all potential WMD
terrorist attacks, collaboration among IC partners to manage and
mitigate the consequences of such attacks continues to be necessary, as
is improving our capabilities to attribute their source. Thus,
continued work is necessary to harness, in an effective multinational
way, all relevant collective resources to establish more coordinated
and effective capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to
the global threat of WMD terrorism.
rpa - title 10 vs. title 50 operations
Question. According to published reports, U.S. Special Operations
Forces (SOF) and the CIA conduct counterterrorism strikes using armed
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA). For example, RPA strikes by both U.S.
SOF and the CIA have reportedly been conducted in Yemen. Other
published reports indicate the Presidential Policy Guidance on
Counterterrorism dictates a shift in all lethal RPA operations to DOD.
In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages from a
legal and operational perspective of moving all lethal RPA operations
to DOD?
What is your understanding of the milestones that would need to be
achieved for such a shift to occur? How long do you believe it will
take to achieve these milestones?
Do you expect responsibility for certain geographic areas will
transition more rapidly than others? If so, which ones?
Do you expect aircraft and/or personnel will be transferred from
the CIA to the operational and tactical control of DOD in the near term
as part of this transition?
If confirmed, how would you ensure that lessons learned, including
tactics, techniques, and procedures, for the use of armed RPA are
captured and transferred to DOD?
In response to a series of questions about counterterrorism
operations on Meet the Press, former-Secretary Panetta indicated that
``a lot more of this [counterterrorism operations] can be put under
title 10'' and that ``the advantage to it is that it becomes much more
transparent in terms of what we're doing.''
Do you share former-Secretary Panetta's observation that there has
been a limited amount of transparency with respect to title 50 U.S.
counterterrorism operations?
Do you believe additional transparency would better enable the
United States to push back against claims of civilian casualties
resulting from drone strikes?
Answer. With reference to this question set, I am not able to
comment in this medium on such activities other than to say that I
support the President's policy on the operation of such aircraft, as
articulated in his May 23, 2013, speech at the National Defense
University and in related Presidential Policy Guidance. I understand
the U.S. military has extensive experience in the use of remotely
piloted aircraft to conduct intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, as well as direct action during armed conflict. The
appropriate role of DOD in operating remotely piloted aircraft,
weighing the advantages and disadvantages, is essentially a policy
decision for the President to make. If confirmed, my focus will be to
provide the best counsel possible on the intelligence and operational
value for such operations and help ensure compliance with applicable
policy in conducting such operations. I also look forward to supporting
the USD(I) and other senior administration officials in a constructive
ongoing dialogue with the committee on this and related issues.
counterterrorism cooperation
Question. Non-DOD elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) and
the military offer unique strengths with regard to intelligence
collection against terrorism targets, spanning across the various forms
of intelligence (e.g. human and signals intelligence).
What is your understanding of the extent to which the military and
non-DOD IC elements collaborate on counterterrorism objectives?
Answer. My understanding is there is extensive collaboration on
counterterrorism objectives with the non-DOD IC elements. This is done
in several ways: participation in Joint Interagency Task Forces,
sharing information on intelligence sources and methods, and exchanging
officers at all levels of operations. I believe the Department and non-
DOD IC elements should continue to look for opportunities to leverage
each other's strengths and improve collaboration.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to strengthen this
collaboration?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek, in concert with counterparts at
the DNI, to enable better, faster, and deeper sharing of
counterterrorism data, while remaining cognizant of the problem we face
with respect to risks of unauthorized disclosure of classified
information. There has been significant progress in this area that can
stand as an example for future efforts. For instance, my understanding
is the move to a common, integrated network in Afghanistan--the Afghan
Mission Network--and one common database--the Combined Information Data
Network Exchange--supports intelligence, military operations, command
and control and logistics across all U.S. entities and 46 partner
nations. This approach of establishing a common network and common
database has allowed us to ensure that all releasable national,
tactical and commercially available data from across the DOD and IC is
available and discoverable.
Question. What are the major obstacles to achieving greater
collaboration?
Answer. Two of the longstanding challenges to integrating the
intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of
Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local
agencies have been IT system compatibility and effective guidance on
sharing classified information. With the issuance of Executive Order
13549, Classified National Security Information Program for State,
Local, Tribal, and Private Sector (SLTPS) Entities, we have made
significant progress on the latter. The Executive order establishes the
right balance between sharing classified information with SLTPS
entities in support of homeland defense, while ensuring proper
safeguards are in place for protecting information from unauthorized
disclosure. If confirmed, I will seek to achieve similar progress
against the challenge of IT system compatibility.
cyber and information operations
Question. Information operations, as currently defined by DOD,
include electronic warfare, operational security, computer network
operations, psychological operations, and military deception. Each of
these lines of operations is unique and complex, and, in some cases,
they are interwoven.
The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command organizationally separated
cyber operations from the other elements making up ``information
operations.'' How does this separation complicate integration across
these elements, and what is your understanding of the Department's
efforts to mitigate its impact?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to studying this question
further. My current understanding is that Information Operations as
currently defined refers to the integration of various information
activities to achieve effects across the information environment, which
includes the cyber domain. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command does
not change the relationship of cyberspace operations to the other
capabilities necessary for DOD to conduct information and cyber-related
operations. It will, however, enhance our ability to conduct
information operations in the cyber domain.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 (S. 1197) includes a provision (section 941) that would require
the Secretary of Defense to designate a Senate-confirmed official
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to
provide oversight and resource management of U.S. Cyber Command's
offensive cyber mission.
What are your views on the roles assigned to USD(I) and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy with respect to information operations,
and particularly offensive computer network operations? If confirmed,
what changes, if any, would you consider recommending to the Secretary
of Defense and the USD(I)?
Answer. My current understanding is that the information operations
policies as outlined in Directive 3600.01 adequately define the roles
and responsibilities of both the USD(P) and the USD(I). If confirmed as
PDUSD(I), I will endeavor to support the USD(I) in fulfilling these
responsibilities and support the efforts of the USD(P) in the execution
of all assigned responsibilities under this Directive. Additionally, I
will view it as a priority to play an appropriate role in the oversight
of offensive computer network operations, now termed offensive cyber
effects operations.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 (S. 1197) includes a provision (section 901) that would transfer
supervision from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI)
to the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the Information Assurance
Directorate (IAD) of the National Security Agency (NSA). This action is
recommended because the cybersecurity mission of the NSA IAD falls
under the CIO and not the USD(I).
What are your views on the most appropriate oversight of the
information assurance and information systems security program by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. My understanding is that currently the DOD CIO is
responsible for providing policy guidance to the Director, National
Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, regarding network
operations and cybersecurity matters in consultation and coordination
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I believe that
this relationship is effective and allows for proper oversight of these
functions.
information sharing
Question. There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing
access to, the mass of raw intelligence data that has not been included
in finished reports or analyses and approved for dissemination within
the Intelligence Community. Countervailing the objective of sharing
more broadly is the need to protect sources and methods and the privacy
of U.S. persons.
Despite these barriers, we have also seen recent examples of
leaking massive amounts of data by DOD employees and contractors who
have been given access to data shared across organizations. Leaking
such information has the potential to do serious damage to our national
security.
What are your views about whether it is possible to provide greater
access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while
adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing
exposure of U.S. persons' information?
Answer. During my tenure on the OSD staff, I have seen the
Department make progress towards increasing access to counterterrorism
data for those who demonstrate a need for it, while also recognizing
both our responsibility to protect sensitive sources and methods and to
respect U.S. civil liberties and privacy laws. Mechanisms continue to
be developed to better recognize U.S. person information and minimize
the chances of human error. These mechanisms include the development of
better policies, improved processes, smart systems, and active
oversight by both the Intelligence Community and components of the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Collectively, these mechanisms can
help maximize access while minimizing risk.
Question. How should we achieve the proper balance between sharing
of information more broadly and protecting sensitive sources and
methods?
Answer. I believe that a careful balance should exist between the
need to share intelligence information and protecting sources and
methods. I agree with an observation Dr. Vickers has made that the need
to share cannot trump the need to know, nor can the fear of protecting
sources and methods override the necessity to provide necessary
information when it is needed most. Finding the proper balance between
sharing information and protecting sources and methods is not a static
target; it is, in fact, constantly moving, depending upon specific
situations, risks, and urgency. The key to success is recognizing the
threshold and circumstances for sharing certain information and making
sure others recognize it as well.
Question. What role do you expect to play in addressing this issue
if confirmed to be PDUSD(I)?
Answer. If confirmed as the PDUSD(I), I will seek to foster
continued policy refinements and refinements in training and capability
development to help change behaviors and culture within the DOD
enterprise. I will ensure that ``need to share'' remains in healthy
tension with ``need to protect''. I will continue to drive the DNI's
and USD(I)'s ``Write for Release'' policy by ensuring its tenets are
taught at our schoolhouses, incorporated into our systems, and
practiced at our analytic centers. I will work closely with our DOD and
non-DOD partners to identify best practices and develop new incentives
to reward prudent and effective information sharing.
homeland defense
Question. In your view, what progress has been made in integrating
the intelligence capabilities of the DOD with those of the Department
of Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local
agencies?
Answer. From my experience on the OSD staff, I believe DOD
considers itself a valuable partner and enabler to the greater homeland
defense effort. DOD works with its partners in the Intelligence
Community to ensure relevant intelligence information is shared
appropriately with domestic law enforcement and security agencies.
Recent initiatives include DOD funded interagency collaboration in the
areas of counterterrorism, countering transnational organized crime
(CTOC), and maritime domain awareness. DOD also provides domestic
agencies with valuable instruction in the detection of improvised
explosive devices, conducting terrorism analysis, and mapping cultural
terrain. Lastly, DOD fosters interagency integration via the embedding
of DOD personnel in other agencies, including the National
Counterterrorism Center, FBI Field Intelligence Groups, and FBI joint
terrorism task forces.
In addition, DOD has moved forward in formally integrating DOD
intelligence capabilities with those of our Federal, State, and local
partners. For example, in October, 2012, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense designated the USD(I) as the DOD Senior Agency Official to
implement Executive Order 13549, Classified National Security
Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector
Entities (SLTPS). Pursuant to this responsibility, DOD is negotiating a
memorandum of understanding with DHS to allow State, Local, and Tribal
Fusion Centers to access the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network to
support the Fusion Centers' mission of ensuring the safety of the U.S.
Homeland.
Question. What challenges lie ahead for achieving better
integration?
Answer. I believe that successful integration demands that we
promulgate effective guidance for sharing classified information and
sustain attention at both leadership and operational levels. The recent
publication of Executive Order 13587 ``Structural Reforms to Improve
the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and
Safeguarding of Classified Information'' helps enable the sharing of
classified information. In addition, the DNI has promulgated guidance
that further mandates effective information sharing practices. As
architectures and systems connect the Intelligence Community to new
partners in national security, ensuring guidance remains current,
applicable and fully-coordinated across the U.S. Government will be of
continuing importance.
Question. Does the DOD's existing process for setting requirements
adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for
the homeland defense mission?
Answer. My understanding is that DOD's current intelligence
requirements process includes the Homeland Defense mission. DOD
intelligence requirements continue to compete for finite resources, so
ensuring that Homeland Defense priorities are incorporated in Defense
intelligence priorities is a challenging, yet worthwhile endeavor. DOD
is exploring ways to reconcile these diverse intelligence requirements
and is actively working to improve the process.
defense clandestine service
Question. DOD announced an initiative last year to establish a
Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) that would be patterned after the
National Clandestine Service (NCS).
Do you support the expansion of the DCS? If so, why?
Answer. The implementation of the DCS is an important initiative to
improve the operational effectiveness of defense human intelligence
(HUMINT) operations and I fully support this initiative. My
understanding is the DCS initiative is not an expansion, but a
realignment of existing resources, a repositioning and rebalancing of
capabilities to improve the Department's collection against our highest
priorities. The implementation of the DCS will also incorporate other
benefits to the Department by enhancing our strategic partnerships with
other Intelligence Community agencies, and by improving the career
management and utilization of our clandestine military and civilian
collector cadre. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(I)
in a continued dialogue with the oversight committees about achieving
our shared goals of enhancing U.S. HUMINT collection in the defense
context.
Question. In imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and
overhead reconnaissance, the Intelligence Community operates through a
single consolidated agency to meet the needs of national policymakers
and DOD. In HUMINT, however, there are two separate organizations
funded by the National Intelligence Program budget, one run by the CIA
and one managed by DIA.
What is the justification for two organizations in this mission
area in a time of severe budget austerity?
Answer. DOD maintains organic HUMINT collection capabilities
because it operates under different authorities than the CIA and also
responds to different customers, priorities, requirements, and targets.
Under title 50, U.S.C., DOD must satisfy the overall intelligence needs
of the Department, including the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the combatant commanders. The Secretary of Defense established DCS on
20 April 2012 to provide enhanced collection against high priority
national and defense requirements. It is my current understanding that
the DCS will operate within existing resources and will complement
rather than duplicate the collection activities of the CIA.
Question. Would you be supportive of a pilot program to assess the
feasibility, advisability, and cost effectiveness of establishing a
military division within the NCS that is responsive to the needs of the
Defense Department yet resides within and utilizes the resources of the
Central Intelligence Agency?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my key responsibilities in my new
position will be to monitor the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of
many different DOD intelligence programs, to include the DCS, and to
make program adjustments as necessary. It is my current sense, however,
that it is premature at this time to consider a pilot program
establishing a military division within the CIA. The Department has
provided Congress with a 5 year DCS implementation plan that proposes
increased operational integration with CIA. I believe at this time that
the Department should first be given the opportunity to assess the
performance of DCS and efforts towards enhanced integration with IC
partners before trying a pilot program. I believe the Department's
assessments of DCS performance should be shared with Congress, and if
confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(I) in a continued
dialogue with the oversight committees about achieving our shared goals
of enhancing U.S. HUMINT collection in the defense context.
usd(i) role in intelligence personnel, acquisition, and policy
Question. DOD senior leaders include Under Secretaries responsible
for personnel, policy, and acquisition matters, yet the OUSD(I)
includes staff with responsibilities for each of these areas as they
apply to the intelligence mission.
In your view, should the OUSD(I) staff continue to duplicate the
functions and resources of these other Under Secretaries? If so, why?
Answer. In support of the USD(I), I look forward to assessing this
in more detail, if confirmed, as the current fiscal environment does
require a careful look to ensure inefficiencies and unnecessary
duplication are eliminated across headquarters elements. As I have
observed from my current and previous capacities on the OSD staff, I
have not viewed the OUSD(I) staff functions as duplicative, but instead
complementary. The USD(I) focuses on the unique authorities and
requirements of the Intelligence Community workforce, managing the
Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) under title 10
that is designed to respond to the unique requirements of the Defense
Intelligence workforce. For the goals of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to be realized, the Defense
Intelligence personnel system must work in tandem with those of other
IC members (the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc.)
My understanding also is that OUSD(I) provides advice and
assistance to OUSD(AT&L) concerning acquisition programs and processes
that significantly affect Defense intelligence, counterintelligence,
and security components. Specifically, intelligence analysts with
acquisition experience provide acquisition decisionmakers the clearest
picture of intelligence capabilities, the cost to address shortfalls,
and the risk if the intelligence needs cannot be met. In this climate
of ever-changing threats, rapid technological advancement, and reduced
resources this cross-functional analysis ensures discovery of cross-
enterprise efficiencies. Additionally, OUSD(I) works closely with
OUSD(AT&L) and ODNI on programs that are funded by the National
Intelligence Program and executed in the Department. This advice and
assistance is integral to OUSD(I)'s Military Intelligence Program
oversight and Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management
responsibilities.
impact of sequestration
Question. What is your assessment of the impact that sequestration
would have on intelligence capabilities to support the combatant
commands and the Leadership of the Department if it is sustained in
fiscal year 2014?
Answer. In a period of unprecedented fiscal uncertainty, the
Department, including its intelligence components, has had a
significant challenge over fiscal year 2013 to operate as good stewards
in meeting near-term operational requirements. The technical mechanism
of sequestration--reducing discretionary spending proportionally across
all programs, projects, and activities without regard to their relative
impacts on national security--creates systemic waste and inefficiency,
significantly impeding the ability to support the intelligence
requirements of the Combatant Commands and the Department's leadership.
I would urge Congress to pass the President's budget as soon as
possible to preserve our critical intelligence capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of sequestration on
intelligence capabilities to support the combatant commands and the
Leadership of the Department if it is sustained for the full duration
outlined in the Budget Control Act?
Answer. There is a strong case to be made that the threat
environment we are facing in the face of fiscally-driven force
structure reductions will require greater investments in intelligence.
Others advocate a proportionate reduction to intelligence with force
structure. It is premature to predict how the Department will resolve
these strategic decisions, but we are on a path to provide an answer
with the 2015 budget submission and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review.
From an intelligence specific perspective, however, although
technology is critical to our Nation's intelligence capabilities,
ultimately it is the quality of the intelligence workforce that
determines the quality of intelligence support. I am deeply concerned
with the impact of long-term fiscal uncertainty on the training,
compensation, morale, and retention of the intelligence workforce.
need for independent intelligence analysis
Question. Intelligence Analysis should be independent and free of
political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a
conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts
within DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not
part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such
pressure?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with IC leaders to reinforce
analytical tradecraft standards as established in Intelligence
Community Directive 203 (Analytical Standards), and reaffirm the
importance of objective and independent analysis at all levels. There
is and should be no tolerance for pressure of any kind on analysts to
reach certain conclusions.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think
intelligence officers and analysts should be able to testify to
Congress on their professional conclusions regarding a substantive
intelligence issue even if those views conflict with administration
positions?
Answer. If Congress requires testimony on a substantive
intelligence issue, it should be provided, whether or not it conflicts
with an administration position.
control of intelligence agencies within the dod
Question. The IRTPA of 2004 granted the DNI control over the
preparation and execution of the National Intelligence Program budget
and tasking of national intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also
contained language asserting that nothing in the act should be
construed so as to impair the authorities of secretaries of cabinet
departments, and the Secretary of Defense has delegated ``direction,
control, and authority''--the highest form of authority in the
executive branch--over the national intelligence organizations within
DOD to the USD(I).
What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA
to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of
Defense?
Answer. In my view, IRTPA struck a proper balance of authorities in
that it gave the DNI strong authority over core intelligence functions
for the National Intelligence Program, such as setting requirements and
budgets, as well as determining priorities for and managing the
analysis and dissemination of national intelligence. The Secretary of
Defense retains the responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence
activities, and has primary responsibility for leadership and
management. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
significantly increased the authorities of the DNI regarding leadership
and management functions in the IC. DOD and the ODNI staffs have
together devoted considerable time and attention to implementing these
authorities in a manner that gives full effect to the act while
avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort and preserving the Secretary
of Defense's ability to execute his statutory responsibilities with
respect to DOD's intelligence components.
Question. What are your views on the extent of the grant of
``direction, control, and authority'' to the USD(I) over DOD national
intelligence organizations?
Answer. Statutory provisions in both title 10 and title 50, U.S.C.
assign authority, direction, and control to the Secretary of Defense
over DIA, NSA, NGA, and NRO as components of the Department, consistent
with the statutory authorities of the DNI. In my view, this balance of
authorities is appropriate. This is also clearly stated in the current
USD(I) charter.
Question. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities,
processes, and structures in place between the DOD and the DNI provide
sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence
capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare for and conduct
military operations will be developed and acquired through the National
Intelligence Program?
Answer. Yes. I believe that current relationships, authorities,
processes and structures in place between DOD and the DNI have produced
highly effective support by NIP resources for military operations.
analytic capabilities and capacity
Question. The DOD Inspector General (IG) recently issued an
assessment of DOD long-term intelligence analysis. The assessment
concluded that the Department has significant problems in three areas.
One is broadly termed ``nontraditional support'' to the combatant
commands in such areas as shaping the environment and deterring
potential adversaries, partner engagements, long-term analysis for
campaign planning, and evaluation of cyber threats. A second is
scientific and technical intelligence support to the acquisition
process. A third problem area is lack of in-depth expertise in the
analytic workforce.
Do you agree with the IG's assessment? If so, how do you believe
the Department can address these problems despite declines in budgets
and personnel levels, while sustaining support for counterterrorism and
other transnational requirements, and the pivot to the Pacific?
Answer. I am not familiar with this assessment, but if confirmed, I
will review it and discuss the IG's observations with Dr. Vickers to
ascertain the best way to address the issues raised. In general, I know
that the impact of budget and personnel reductions will be factored
into the design of these efforts, but I am committed to ensuring that
the capabilities of the analytic workforce are systematically and
systemically improved. If confirmed I will continue to look for ways to
improve effectiveness and efficiency in these areas.
Question. Similarly, the National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development (R&D) Programs of the U.S. Intelligence
Community recently concluded that the Intelligence Community makes only
a ``limited effort'' to discern and exploit the strategic research and
development intentions and capabilities of our adversaries.
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) recently
established a new Defense Intelligence Officer for Science and
Technology Intelligence. Why was this position established; what is the
mission of this office; and how does it relate to the findings of the
IG and the National R&D Commission?
Answer. My understanding is the Defense Intelligence Officer for
Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DIO S&TI) was established in
December 2012 in response to a DIA Director Advisory Board
recommendation as well as the DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence
Framework--both of which informed the National Commission for the
Review of the Research and Development Programs of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. The DIO S&TI is the Defense Counterpart to the
National Intelligence Mission Manager for Scientific and Technical
Intelligence.
The DIO S&TI is charged with developing the first Defense
Intelligence Enterprise Scientific and Technical Intelligence Strategic
Intelligence Plan (SIP). The SIP is an advisory document to posture and
align, over the next 7 years, DIA, the Combatant Command (CCMD) J2s,
and the Military Service Intelligence Centers to discern and exploit
the strategic research and development intentions and capabilities of
our adversaries. It is designed to reduce the risk of strategic
technical surprise and assist program and resource managers with
mission prioritization across the General Defense Intelligence Program,
DIA Military Intelligence Program, and the Department of Defense
Foreign Counterintelligence Program. In addition to the SIP, the DIO
S&TI directly supports and partners with USD(AT&L) and ASD(A) to
improve scientific and technical intelligence support to the
acquisition process.
The DIO S&TI has met with members of the National R&D Commission
and is sponsoring a meeting with Commission members and the DIA
Director and Deputy Director in October 2013. In discussions with
members of the Commission, they indicated their support to the DIO
S&TI's efforts regarding the SIP. Specifically, both the Commission
members and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence have
indicated that the SIP will serve as the roadmap to address foreign
strategic research and development and support the identification of
areas for U.S. exploitation.
science and technology
Question. What technical challenges does the Intelligence Community
face that in your opinion are currently not being addressed adequately
by DOD science and technology (S&T) efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to address challenges in
making the best use of existing and planned sensors in a rapidly
changing environment, and then exploiting data coming from those
sensors to answer the hard intelligence questions. The Department must
continue its significant efforts to protect our critical space systems
and data networks from our adversaries.
In my view, however, there are several emerging S&T shortfalls on
the horizon that the Department will need to address. The impact of
next-generation communications, cryptography, sensors, and computing
requires an understanding of adversarial investments and capability
developments, as well as whether the Department has the appropriate
investment strategy to maintain U.S. capability advantage. The
Department needs to better understand the impacts and accelerating rate
of change of developing open-source and social media on both offensive
and defensive intelligence capabilities and threats. DOD must
reinvigorate S&T investments in counterintelligence capabilities to
detect and counter the insider threat; identify, track, and counter the
cyber activities of Foreign Intelligence Entities; and protect U.S.
intelligence personnel from active discovery and targeting.
Question. How should the S&T portfolio contribute to rationalizing
intelligence capability as we draw down forces after Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure an appropriate focus on the
development of sources, tools and techniques for new and diverse
operating environments. Understanding the complexity of intelligence
support to small units in distributed operations while working through
international partners is important to shaping the environment for
campaign planning. Information sharing with nontraditional partners,
law enforcement and coalitions provide additional challenges. Finally,
there are lessons learned for the IC across the board from
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations that will need to be
reflected in future partnerships.
The S&T portfolio must support the development of novel collection
and analysis capabilities tailored to the future operating environment.
We must rationalize intelligence sharing policies with nontraditional
partners, law enforcement and coalitions, and ensure we deliver
intelligence systems that meet those operational requirements. We must
also improve our capacity to ingest and process intelligence
information provided by such partners for use in our Defense
Intelligence Enterprise.
Question. What are your views on the specific missions, concepts of
operation, technical viability, and affordability of airships as long-
duration, high altitude ISR sensor platforms?
Answer. The Department recognizes persistence as a key development
capability for future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
fleet and continues to advocate for research in the area of
stratospheric airships. Theoretically, the potential exists to
accomplish multi-year, wide area surveillance, long stand-off distance,
airship missions at relatively low operating cost. However,
technological and financial hurdles remain before the Department
commits to fielding a high altitude airship.
Question. What specific S&T-related efforts should DOD be pursuing
to understand the human, social, cultural terrain of adversaries?
Answer. In my time on the OSD staff, I have witnessed the
Intelligence Community make significant progress in developing new
concepts and methodologies that include social and cultural insight
into the operating environment. I believe these concepts and
methodologies have proven critical to understanding our national
security challenges, and if confirmed, I would support pursuing the
necessary science and technology developments to transition these
efforts from a labor intensive process today to a more automated
process in the future. Advanced automated processing would allow for
the automatic ingestion and processing of diverse sources of audio,
text, and imagery in order to extract meaning and context from all
sources, enabling more rapid and accurate analysis of the human,
social, and cultural terrain, enhancing our intelligence capabilities
role of the dod inspector general in supervising the defense
intelligence agencies' inspectors general
Question. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
(Public Law 111-259) established the Inspectors General of the DIA, the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Security Agency (NSA),
and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) as statutory IGs.
The committee has learned that the IG of the NRO has taken the position
that the DOD IG has no authority over the NRO IG as a result of this
legislation, even for the purpose of establishing DOD-wide IG policy
and directives.
What are your views on the relationship between the DOD IG and the
IGs of the Defense Intelligence Agencies?
Answer. My understanding is that the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 to
establish the IGs at the Defense Intelligence agencies as statutory IGs
and gives them the authority to function independently with respect to
the agency they serve. However, the Intelligence Authorization Act did
not change the statutory authorities and responsibilities of the DOD IG
for the entire department, to include the four Defense Intelligence
agencies. Section 8 of the IG Act provides the DOD IG with specific
duties and responsibilities relating to its oversight role in DOD. As
Defense Agencies, the programs and operations of all four of the
Defense Intelligence agencies, to include NRO, fall within those
statutory responsibilities. Clearly, all agencies directly concerned
and the Department as a whole will benefit from day-to-day cooperation
and collaboration between the DOD IG and DIA IGs, and I will certainly
encourage a strong relationship among those organizations.
security clearance reform
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 (S. 1197) includes a provision (section 931) that would require
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence to
reform the personnel security clearance investigation, adjudication,
and transfer processes to improve security and reduce costs.
What are your views on the need for improved security, process
reform, greater cost transparency, and cost reductions in this area?
Answer. Based on my previous experience on the OSD staff, I know
that the USD(I) and the Secretary of Defense have been and remain
committed to examining every opportunity to improve security, process
reform, greater cost transparency, and cost reductions. If confirmed, I
will work in support of the USD(I) with the DNI, who is the Security
Executive Agent responsible for developing uniform and consistent
policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely
completion of investigations and adjudications relating to
determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or
to hold a sensitive position.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
intelligence budget
1. Senator King. Mr. Lettre, the executive branch reported an
unclassified combined intelligence budget in fiscal year 2012 of $75.4
billion ($53.9 billion for the National Intelligence Program and $21.5
billion for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Please provide
your view on how, if confirmed, you plan to work with Under Secretary
Vickers to identify duplication and increase efficiency within the
intelligence budget while still providing all of the necessary
intelligence support required for our national security.
Mr. Lettre. Senator King, I appreciate the opportunity to address
this important topic. Just as the Department's senior leadership is
focusing on realigning the overall defense budget, identifying and
eliminating duplication and increasing efficiency, we must do the same
in the intelligence budgets. As I mentioned in the committee's hearing,
I believe current budget times require us to become leaner, to trim
overhead, reduce duplication, and shed underperforming activities. It
will not be painless or pretty, but we must make tough choices and
become stronger and better even as we become smaller.
During this critical period of declining budgets and shifting focus
away from combat operations in Afghanistan, we need to ensure we retain
today's intelligence advantage and that Defense Intelligence is aligned
with future changes to the Department's larger force structure.
If confirmed, I will aggressively support Under Secretary Vickers'
efforts to increase Joint interoperability across the Service
intelligence systems and integration with the Intelligence Community.
These efforts create efficiencies by improving discovery of existing
intelligence, prioritizing collection and enabling analysis to operate
as an enterprise. For example, Under Secretary Vickers hosts Defense
Intelligence Offsites twice a year to address the Department's most
critical intelligence issues, including how to make the Department's
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities more
effective and efficient.
Further, I will engage fully in the proven processes by which the
Office of the Under Secretary for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) identifies
duplication and increases efficiency while still providing the
necessary intelligence support required for our national security.
OUSD(I) currently prioritizes, optimizes and eliminates wasteful
redundancy in ISR capabilities via their yearly Battlespace Awareness
(BA) Portfolio programming and MIP budgeting processes in order to
obtain a collaborative investment strategy with the Services and
Defense Agencies. These results are then leveraged through the BA
Capability Integration Board (which includes the COCOMs) and the ISR
Deputies Council--which, if confirmed, I will chair--to ensure that the
budget maximizes efficiencies. Our process culminates yearly when the
Under Secretary provides his recommendations to the Secretary on
prioritized enhancements and risks for the Department's key ISR
capabilities.
In addition to their aggressive engagement in the Department's
budget process, OUSD(I) ensures the Departments' intelligence
investments are closely synchronized with the investment of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the National
Intelligence Program (NIP). If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Under Secretary in constructing the joint NIP--MIP Consolidated
Intelligence Guidance which coordinates the yearly actions and
investments between the two programs. In addition, OUSD(I) participates
in the ODNI's Strategic Program Reviews and senior budget review
processes, where I will be the representative to the Deputy's Executive
Committee. Lastly, I will provide oversight on our joint three-Star
forum--the NIP-MIP Integration Group (NMIG)--which is charged with
ensuring OUSD(I) and the ODNI are in lock-step on all Department-IC
related activities. The NMIG has within the last 24 months finalized
NIP-MIP Rules for the Road to help guide resource binning, signed
several resource cost share Memoranda of Agreement and helped identify
areas where the greater Intelligence Community might reduce duplication
and achieve efficiencies.
The Under Secretary of Intelligence is well-positioned to lead
changes to Defense Intelligence because it has a leadership role in
both the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community resource
decision processes. By engaging in these aforementioned processes and
forums across both the Department and the greater Intelligence
Community, I am confident we can closely manage the budget and our
critical investments to reduce duplication and achieve the maximum
effectiveness required for national security.
______

[The nomination reference of Mr. Marcel J. Lettre II
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 25, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Marcel J. Lettre II, of Maryland, to be a Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (new position).
______

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Marcel J. Lettre II, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Marcel J. Lettre II
Education:
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge,
MA

1998-2000
Masters in Public Policy Degree awarded May 2000

University of the South, Sewanee, TN

1990-1994
Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded May 1994
Employment record:
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
2011-present

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs)
2009-2011

Office of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (Minority Leader 2005-
2006)

Senior National Security Advisor
2007-2009

Senior Defense and Intelligence Advisor
2005-2007

U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence

Professional Staff Member
2002-2005

Booz Allen Hamilton

Associate
2000-2001

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to
Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Senior Policy Analyst
1998-1999

Office of the President, American University

Senior Staff Assistant
1995-1997

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Junior Fellow/Program Associate, Nuclear
Nonproliferation Project
1994-1995
Honors and awards:
Department of Defense Recognitions

Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public
Service (2013)
Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for
Exceptional Public Service (2011)

Academic Recognitions
Award for Excellence in Student Teaching (2000)
Nominee for Best Policy Analysis Exercise (2000)
Phi Beta Kappa (1994)
Bachelors Degree awarded Magna Cum Laude, with Honors
(1994)
Pi Sigma Alpha Political Science Honor Society (1994)
Order of the Gown Academic Honor Society (1991-1994)
Wilkins Scholarship (1990-1994)
Eagle Scout (1989)
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Marcel J.
Lettre II in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Marcel John Lettre II.

2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

3. Date of nomination:
July 25, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
August 9, 1972; Gainesville, GA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Simmons Covington Lettre (Simmons), (Maiden name: Renee
Fitzsimmons Covington).

7. Names and ages of children:
McKinley Covington Lettre, age 11 (``McKinley'').
Amelia Mills Lettre, age 9 (``Amelia'').

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Terry Sanford Senior High School, Fayetteville, NC, 1987-1990, High
School Diploma (June 1990)
University of the South, Sewanee, TN, 1990-1994, Bachelor of Arts
in Political Science (May 1994)
American University, Washington, DC, 1995-1996, Non-Degree
Coursework (two classes in economics)
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge,
MA, 1998-2000, Masters in Public Policy (May 2000)

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
April 2011-Present, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, The
Pentagon, Washington, DC
April 2009-April 2011, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Legislative Affairs), Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, DC,
October 2007-April 2009, Senior National Security Advisor, Office
of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, U.S. Senate, The Capitol,
Washington, DC,
April 2005-0ctober 2007, Senior Defense and Intelligence Advisor,
Office of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (2007), Office of Senate
Minority Leader Harry Reid (2005-2006)
March 2002-April 2005, Professional Staff Member, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, The Capitol,
Washington, DC

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
University and Earlier
Eagle Scout
Phi Beta Kappa
Bachelors Degree awarded Magna Cum Laude, with Honors
Wilkins Scholarship
Pi Sigma Alpha Political Science Honor Society
Order of the Gown Academic Honor Society
Graduate School
Award for Excellence in Student Teaching
Nominee for Best Policy Analysis Exercise
Department of Defense Recognitions
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service
Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public
Service

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Ashton B. Carter, with Marcel Lettre and Shane Smith, ``Keeping the
Technological Edge,'' Chapter 6 in Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense
for the Future. Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense Project, Belter
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School,
2001.
Marcel Lettre, ``Observations During the Early Response to the
World Trade Center Incident, September 11th, 2001'', Personal narrative
available on the internet, September 2001.
Marcel Lettre and James Anderson, eds. Passing the Torch:
Recommendations to the Next President on Emerging National Security
Issues, New York, NY: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs,
November 2000.
Marcel Lettre, ed. Former-Soviet Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive
Export Status Report, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and Monterey Institute, July 1995.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Mr. Marcel J. Lettre II was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 24, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on October 31, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Kevin A. Ohlson by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. Subchapter XII of chapter 47 of title 10, U.S.C.,
establishes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF) and
provides for its organization and administrative procedures.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
USCAAF and its judges?
Answer. The duty of the judges on the USCAAF is to ensure
independent civilian oversight of the military courts. This
responsibility is accomplished through appellate review of the
decisions of the military courts of criminal appeals. The judges also
have the duty of serving on the Code Committee which meets annually for
the purpose of making an annual survey of the operations of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This committee also is responsible for
preparing an annual report that, among other things, provides
information about the number and status of pending cases in the
military court system.
The function of the USCAAF is to provide independent civilian
oversight of the military justice system through appellate review of
the decisions of the military courts of criminal appeals. In exercising
this responsibility, the USCAAF is responsible for reviewing those
cases where a military court of criminal appeals has affirmed a death
sentence, where a service Judge Advocate General orders a case to be
sent to the USCAAF after it has been reviewed by a military court of
criminal appeals, and where, upon petition of the accused and for good
cause shown, the USCAAF has granted review of a decision rendered by a
military court of criminal appeals.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. First, I served as a judge advocate officer in the U.S.
Army for 4 years. During that time I not only became familiar with the
military justice system by serving as a trial counsel and prosecuting a
number of criminal cases, I also became familiar with the men, women,
mission, and ethos of the U.S. Armed Forces. I achieved the latter by
attending Air Assault school, attending Airborne school, being on
``jump status'' as a parachutist at Fort Bragg for 4 years, deploying
to four foreign countries, and serving in Saudi Arabia (with two very
brief forays into Iraq) during the Persian Gulf War and being awarded
the Bronze Star.
Second, I served as a Federal prosecutor in the United States
Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. In that capacity I
indicted and prosecuted a wide variety of cases in a fast-paced, high-
volume office, and I became very familiar with the criminal justice
system and the duties and responsibilities of prosecutors.
Third, I was appointed as a member of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. In that position I served in a judicial capacity deciding
appeals in immigration cases. This professional opportunity enabled me
to gain an understanding and appreciation of the role and function of
adjudicators at the appellate level.
Fourth, I served as a senior manager within the Department of
Justice, and the experiences I had in those positions would help me to
run an efficient and productive chambers if I were to have the honor of
being confirmed by the Senate.
Fifth, I served for 2 years as the Chief of Staff and Counselor to
the Attorney General, which provided me with a broad appreciation of
the policy issues that confront any criminal justice system.
Sixth, I currently serve as the Chief of the Department of
Justice's Professional Misconduct Review Unit. In collaboration with
the attorneys who work for me, I review instances where Federal
prosecutors have been accused of misconduct, I determine whether
misconduct actually occurred, I write detailed memoranda explaining my
reasoning, and then I impose discipline, if appropriate. Serving in
this position has reinforced for me the vital importance of performing
one's duties consistent with the highest standards of honor,
excellence, integrity, and fairness.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of a judge on the USCAAF?
Answer. Being considered for a position that is as important, as
challenging, and as consequential as serving as a judge on the USCAAF
is a tremendous honor, and I would very willingly take any steps that
may be helpful in enhancing my ability to perform those duties.
Accordingly, if I have the privilege of being confirmed by the Senate,
and even during the confirmation process, I will endeavor to obtain a
more in-depth knowledge of the legal issues facing the USCAAF by
reviewing and refreshing my memory of the UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-
Martial, and the Military Rules of Evidence, and by reading key
decisions of the USCAAF and scholarly articles about the military
justice system.
relationships
Question. What are the respective roles of each of the following
with respect to the military justice system, and if confirmed, what
would your relationship be with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to be a convening
authority for general or special courts-martial, and may promulgate
orders and regulations that are actionable under the UCMJ. Further,
because the Secretary is responsible for the formulation of policy
related to matters directly affecting the Department of Defense,
working through the Joint Services Committee the Secretary may propose
legislative or other changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial and the
UCMJ.
However, Article 141 of the UCMJ clearly states that the USCAAF is
located in the Department of Defense ``for administrative purposes
only''. Therefore, although it is unlikely that I would have any
interaction with the Secretary of Defense even if I were confirmed, if
I did so I would treat him or her with the greatest respect and
courtesy, but I would always be mindful of the fact that, when it comes
to my professional duties and responsibilities, USCAAF judges are
wholly independent of the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Chief Judge of the USCAAF.
Answer. The Chief Judge of the USCAAF is selected based on
seniority of commission among those judges on the court who have not
previously served in that position. The term of service is 5 years. The
Chief Judge presides at court sessions, and oversees the administrative
functions of the court. If confirmed, my relationship with the Chief
Judge would be both collegial and respectful, but when it comes to
decisionmaking in cases, I would fully exercise my independent
judgment.
Question. Judges of the CAAF.
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect my relationship with the other
judges on the court to be very collegial, and I would closely listen to
and consider their points-of-view on all issues that come before the
court. However, when it comes to a vote on a petition, a writ, or a
case, if confirmed I would exercise my independent judgment in each and
every matter.
Question. The military courts of criminal appeals.
Answer. The USCAAF reviews all cases where a military court of
criminal appeals has affirmed a death sentence, where a service Judge
Advocate General orders the case to be sent to the USCAAF after it has
been reviewed by a military court of criminal appeals, and where, upon
petition of the accused and for good cause shown, the USCAAF has
granted review of a decision rendered by a military court of criminal
appeals. If confirmed, I would give full and due consideration to the
analysis and reasoning of members of the military courts of criminal
appeals in each and every case that comes before me. However, I
ultimately would exercise my independent judgment in deciding each
case.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. Although the General Counsel is the chief legal officer of
the Department of Defense, Article 141 of the UCMJ states that the
USCAAF falls under the Department for administrative purposes only.
Thus, the court does not fall under the purview, management, or
supervision of the General Counsel. However, the General Counsel does
have the authority to exercise those delegated duties as the Secretary
may prescribe, and thus coordinates any proposed legislative changes to
the UCMJ that the Joint Services Committee may recommend. If confirmed,
my relationship with the General Counsel would be respectful and
cordial, but I would act independently in my role as a judge.
Question. The Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps.
Answer. The Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, provide advice on military justice matters to the Service Chiefs
and to the Commandant, respectively. They are responsible for such
actions as supervising the administration of military justice,
overseeing the judge advocates and military judges within their
service, and reviewing and taking action on certain records of trial.
Additionally, a Judge Advocate General may certify questions to the
USCAAF, and serves as a member of both the Joint Services Committee and
the Code Committee. If confirmed, my relationship with these senior
officers would be collegial and respectful, but I would always maintain
my judicial independence and neutrality.
legal issues
Question. What do you anticipate would be the most significant
legal issues you will be called upon to address if confirmed as a judge
of the USCAAF?
Answer. If confirmed, undoubtedly one of the most significant legal
issues I would be called upon to address would be the changes to
Article 120 of the UCMJ regarding the offense of rape. I also firmly
believe that when deciding cases, the judges on the USCAAF must
continue to be vigilant about protecting the integrity of the military
justice system from the corrosive effects of command influence and
ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, I believe the court will be
confronted with issues arising from the use of emerging technology as
it pertains to such issues as possession of child pornography and the
right of privacy.
jurisdiction of the u.s. court of appeals for the armed force
Question. In your view, has the USCAAF fulfilled the expectations
of Congress when the Court was established in 1951?
Answer. Yes, very much so. Not only has the court provided the
necessary civilian oversight of the military justice system, it also
has provided independent judicial review in military justice cases and
has served as a bulwark against unlawful command influence.
Question. In your view, are there any legislative changes needed
regarding the role and responsibilities or the jurisdiction of the
USCAAF?
Answer. I am not aware of the need for any changes at this time.
ucmj jurisdiction over civilians
Question. Section 552 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 amended the UCMJ to clarify that
persons serving with or accompanying an Armed Force in the field are
subject to the UCMJ during a contingency operation as well as in a time
of declared war.
What challenges, if any, do you anticipate that the armed services
and the USCAAF will encounter in implementing the UCMJ with regard to
persons serving with or accompanying an Armed Force in the field?
Answer. As with any new law that has not been thoroughly reviewed
by the courts, there likely will be a number of challenges to this
piece of legislation when and if it is invoked in any additional cases
in the future. First and foremost, if it is a United States citizen who
is prosecuted pursuant to this provision of the UCMJ, the issue will
undoubtedly arise whether its application to a civilian violates a
defendant's constitutional guarantees, such as the right to a trial by
a jury of one's peers. Second, the CAAF will have to wrestle with
determining the scope of the law. For example, issues that may arise in
any specific case will likely include determining the definition of
such phrases as ``serving with or accompanying an Armed Force,'' ``in
the field,'' and ``contingency operation.'' Third, there will be issues
about whether the appropriate person within the military command
structure exercised jurisdiction in any particular case.
The armed services also will likely encounter challenges when
implementing this UCMJ provision. I anticipate that when confronted
with a case where this UCMJ provision is potentially applicable, the
Armed Services may become concerned about the need to delay taking
action until the Department of Justice has reviewed the case to
determine whether the Department of Justice will exercise jurisdiction.
Further, when a particular case arises, depending upon the
circumstances of the alleged offense, the American public may express
concerns about the invocation of this provision of the UCMJ and the
resulting prosecution of a civilian who is a United States citizen in
the military justice system.
decisions of the uscaaf
Question. Please describe the three decisions of the USCAAF since
2005 which you believe to have been the most significant.
Answer.

United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
This case reiterates the fact that unlawful command influence
is the mortal enemy of military justice and that, where it is
found to exist, judicial authorities must take those steps
necessary to preserve both the actual fairness, and the
apparent fairness, of criminal proceedings.
United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338 (2010). In this
case the accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault for
engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who was
substantially incapacitated. The court held that an accused's
burden to prove the affirmative defense of consent by a
preponderance of the evidence unconstitutionally shifted the
burden onto the defense to disprove an element of the offense.
United States v. Lee, 66 M.J. 387 (2008). After
conviction at court-martial, the accused alleged that his
detailed defense counsel failed to adequately disclose a
conflict of interest. The USCAAF held that counsel provided to
or retained by the accused must provide reasonably effective
assistance, and that where a constitutional right to counsel
exists, there is a correlative right to representation that is
free from conflicts of interest.

Question. What is your view of the role of stare decisis in terms
of prior decisions of the USCAAF?
Answer. The doctrine of stare decisis is an essential guiding
principle for any appellate court. In the military justice system this
doctrine is especially important because it provides both commanders
and servicemembers with needed stability, consistency, and
predictability regarding the handling of criminal offenses. However,
there may be rare instances where applicable precedent should be
overturned. This step should only be taken after long and careful
consideration, and in those instances when it does occur, I believe the
judges of the USCAAF are obligated to explain their rationale for doing
so clearly, fully, and persuasively.
Question. In view of Article 36 of the UCMJ, what is your view as
to the hierarchy of sources of law that must be applied by the USCAAF
in determining appropriate rules of evidence and procedure in courts-
martial?
Answer. First and foremost, the USCAAF must ensure that its
decisions are consistent with the Constitution. The USCAAF is also
bound by the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Next, the court
should look to the provisions of the UCMJ, other applicable Federal
statutes, and its own precedents. Then the court should apply the rules
and procedures set forth in the Manual for Courts-Martial. Finally, the
court should look to DOD and Service regulations.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate standard for
determining when the USCAAF should apply a rule that is different from
the rule generally applied in the trial of criminal cases in the
Federal district courts?
Answer. When the Manual for Courts-Martial and the Military Rules
of Evidence provide guidance in a particular matter, and when that
guidance is not contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution,
binding Supreme Court precedent, or the UCMJ, then those rules are
applicable. It is only when the Manual for Courts-Martial or the
Military Rules of Evidence are silent on an issue that the court should
look to analogous rules applicable in the Federal civilian courts.
military justice system
Question. In your view, what are the major strengths and weaknesses
of the military justice system?
Answer. In my view, the following are the major strengths of the
military justice system. First, every accused in the military is
entitled to a free, qualified defense counsel at every step of the
judicial process. Second, there are sufficient resources devoted to
criminal cases in the military so that every case receives the
necessary and proper amount of attention. Third, in the military
justice system there is no undue pressure for either the Government or
the defendant to plea bargain a case. Fourth, the accused's right to be
present at, and to participate in, the Article 32 proceeding far
exceeds any rights that a similarly-situated defendant would have in
the civilian justice system. Fifth, the jurors in the military are
uniformly educated, informed, and engaged.
In my view, the two greatest weaknesses of the military system are
the potential for command influence to play a role in the ultimate
outcome of a criminal case, and the flawed perception among some that
the military system doles out ``drumhead justice'' because of their
mistaken belief that the rights of the accused are not adequately
protected.
Question. What is your view of the relationship between the rights
of service personnel and the disciplinary role of commanders?
Answer. At the core of the UCMJ is the delicate balance that exists
between the rights of servicemembers on one hand and the need for
commanders to maintain good order and discipline on the other hand. In
the military justice context, an effective military force is grounded
both on the high morale that is sustained by the knowledge and belief
of the average servicemember that he or she will be treated fairly and
that his or her rights will be protected, and on the ability of
commanders to enforce high standards of behavior in a wide variety of
situations, some of which are not analogous to those found in civilian
society. In striking this balance, the UCMJ empowers a commander to
take such steps as serving as the convening authority and selecting
court members, while at the same time providing servicemembers with a
variety of rights and with strong protections against command
influence. The fact that fundamental changes to the military justice
system have been relatively rare over the last 6 decades serves as a
testament to the fact that the UCMJ has struck this balance correctly.
Question. Do you think that changes to the military justice system
are called for in light of the experiences of the armed services in
Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe the military justice system has proven itself to
be remarkably adept at adjusting to the varied situations arising out
of the many operations, missions, and deployments of our Armed Forces
during the last decade. Accordingly, I am not currently aware of any
changes that are needed in light of the experiences of the Armed
Services in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, if confirmed I would always
be keenly interested in any recommendations that may be generated by
the Joint Services Committee or the Code Committee, as well as any
legislative proposals that may be made by, or to, Congress, including
the Senate Armed Services Committee.
capital cases in the armed forces
Question. The ability of the military justice system to provide
qualified personnel and resources necessary to capably defend and
prosecute death penalty cases and respond to the constitutional
requirements associated with such cases has come under scrutiny.
What is your understanding of the requirements under constitutional
precedent for the defense of a capital case?
Answer. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
Supreme Court established a framework for determining whether the
performance of a defense counsel in a capital case was constitutionally
adequate. Specifically, Strickland requires the defendant to prove both
that the counsel's representation was deficient, and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's deficiency, the
outcome of the trial would have been different. In later cases the
Supreme Court held that failure to conduct a thorough investigation of
potential mitigating factors may constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. (See Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003); Porter v.
McCollum, 130 S. Ct 447 (2009).)
Question. Based on your review of military jurisprudence regarding
death penalty cases since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Furman v.
Georgia, what are the issues or errors that have most frequently
resulted in overturning of death sentences on appeal?
Answer. In the vast majority of death penalty cases in the military
that have been overturned on appeal, the reason for the reversal has
been due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Question. What do you consider to be the essential elements in
preparing court-martial practitioners for the prosecution and defense
in capital cases?
Answer. In capital cases it is critically important for both the
trial counsel and the defense counsel to be top-notch lawyers of the
highest caliber. Next, these lawyers must receive the necessary
training in order to ensure that they are fully aware of all the facets
of handling a capital case so that they will be informed and effective
advocates at each stage of the proceedings. Further, these lawyers must
have significant experience litigating cases; training is vitally
important, but there is no substitute for hands-on litigation
experience in the courtroom when handling a capital case. Next, the
lawyers must have ready access to assistance and support in handling
certain legal aspects of issues that are unique to capital cases.
Lastly, the lawyers on both sides must have adequate time to prepare
their cases. Even great lawyers with great training, great experience,
and great access to resources cannot perform at a level commensurate
with what we must demand in all capital cases unless they have adequate
time to analyze and prepare the case.
command influence
Question. The problem of command influence, including instances
involving judge advocates as well as commanders, is a constant threat
to the military justice system.
What is your view as to the role of the USCAAF in addressing this
problem?
Answer. As the USCAAF reiterated in United States v. Lewis,
unlawful command influence is the mortal enemy of military justice, and
where it is found to exist, judicial authorities must take those steps
necessary to preserve both the actual and apparent fairness of criminal
proceedings. Accordingly, the USCAAF has been, and must continue to be,
vigilant against the corrosive effects of unlawful command influence at
every stage of legal proceedings. Further, the court must ensure that
all allegations of unlawful command influence are fully litigated at
trial and on appeal. Finally, in those cases where unlawful command
influence has occurred, the court must take strong, appropriate action
to remedy the problem.
precedent under military commissions act
Question. The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA) provides that
the judicial construction and application of the UCMJ, while
instructive, is ``not of its own force binding on military commissions
established under this chapter.'' In addition, the MCA amended Article
39 of the UCMJ to provide that the findings, holdings, interpretations,
and other precedents of military commissions ``may not form the basis
of any holding, decision, or other determination of a court-martial.''
What is your understanding of the relationship between the judicial
construction of the UCMJ and the judicial construction of the MCA?
Answer. The rules of evidence and procedure in the Manual for
Military Commissions (MMC) differ in several important respects from
those in the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). For example, the MMC
allows for admission of certain hearsay evidence ``not otherwise
admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general
courts-martial''. The Manual notes that these differences ``reflect the
[Secretary of Defense's] determinations that departures are required by
the unique circumstances'' arising out of the conduct of certain
military and intelligence operations. However, despite these
differences, the procedures for military commissions are generally
based on the procedures for trial by general courts-martial under the
UCMJ. Nonetheless, as noted above, while the judicial construction and
application of the UCMJ are to be considered instructive, they ``are
not of their own force binding on military commissions.'' Therefore,
the judges within the military commission system are authorized to
interpret the MMC provisions that are the same or similar to provisions
in the UCMJ in a different manner than they otherwise would be required
to interpret them if USCAAF precedential decisions were binding upon
them.
______

[The nomination reference of Mr. Kevin A. Ohlson follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 21, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Kevin A. Ohlson, of Virginia, to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces for the term of 15 years to expire on the
date prescribed by law, vice Andrew S. Effron, term expired.
______

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Kevin A. Ohlson, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Kevin A. Ohlson
Education:
Washington and Jefferson College

September 1978-May 1982
Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded May 1982

University of Virginia School of Law

August 1982-May 1985
Juris Doctorate Degree awarded May 1985
Employment record:
U.S. Department of Justice Professional Misconduct Review Unit

Chief
January 2011-present

Office of the Attorney General

Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General
January 2009-January 2011

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Director
Deputy Director
Member of the Board of Immigration Appeals
March 2001-January 2009

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General
June 1997-March 2001

Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia

Special Counsel to the U.S. Attorney
Assistant U.S. Attorney
December 1989-June 1997

Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, Saudi Arabia

Judge Advocate Officer
October 1990-April 1991

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Bragg

Judge Advocate Officer
January 1986-December 1989
Honors and awards:
Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2011)
Department of Justice Distinguished Service Award (2010)
Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2001)
Bronze Star (1991)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (1991)
Southwest Asia Service Medal (1991)
National Defense Service Medal (1991)
Army Achievement Medal (1989)
Honduran Parachutist Badge (1988)
Army Parachutist Badge (1986)
Phi Beta Kappa (1982)
James G. Blaine Political Science Prize, Washington and Jefferson
College (1982)
George C. Marshall Award (1981)
Army Air Assault Badge (1980)
Four-Year Army R.O.T.C. College Scholarship (1978)
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Kevin A.
Ohlson in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Kevin Alan Ohlson.

2. Position to which nominated:
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

3. Date of nomination:
March 21, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
March 29, 1960; Town of Holden, Worcester Couty, MA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Carolyn Florence Davis.

7. Names and ages of children:
Matthew Edward Ohlson, age 16
Katherine Elizabeth Ohlson, age 14

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Wachusett Regional High School; attended 1974 to 1978; high school
diploma received in June 1978
Washington and Jefferson College; attended 1978 to 1982; Bachelor
of Arts degree received in May 1982
University of Virginia School of Law; attended 1982to1985; Juris
Doctorate degree received in May 1985

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Deputy Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review. I
supervised the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge; my employer was the United States Department of
Justice; my office was located at 5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA;
I served in this position from December 2002 to March 2007.
Director. Executive Office for Immigration Review. I served as the
head of the agency which is responsible for adjudicating all
immigration cases nationwide; my employer was the U.S. Department of
Justice; my office was located at 5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA;
I served in this position from March 2007 to January 2009.
Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General. I advised the
Attorney General on legal issues, and I managed the attorneys and staff
who worked within the Office of the Attorney General; my employer was
the U.S. Department of Justice; my office was located at 950
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC; I served in this position from
January 2009 to January 2011.
Chief, Professional Misconduct Review Unit. I handle disciplinary
actions and State bar referrals in all instances where the Office of
Professional Responsibility has made a preliminary finding that a
Federal prosecutor has engaged in professional misconduct; my employer
is the U.S. Department of Justice; my office is located at 800 Follin
Lane, S.E., Vienna, VA; I have served in this position from January
2011 to the present.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
I served on Active Duty as an officer in the U.S. Army from January
1986 to December 1989. I then was recalled to Active Duty from October
1990 to April 1991 and served overseas during the Persian Gulf War. I
also served on inactive Reserve duty from January 1990 to September
1990, and from June 1991 to October 1995.
I served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia
from December 1989 until June 1997 (with a break in service during the
time I was recalled to Active Duty, as mentioned above).
I served as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General at the
Department of Justice from June 1997 to March 2001.
I served as a member of the Board of Immigration Appeals at the
Department of Justice from March 2001 to November 2002.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, American Legion (1992 to present)
Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars (1992 to present)
Member, Virginia State Bar (1985 to present; on inactive status
since 1995)
Member, Bar of the District of Columbia (1992 to present)

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
Not applicable.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Not applicable.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
06/27/2008, $1,000 contribution to Obama for America
07/01/2008, $200 contribution to ActBlue
02/15/2012, $250 contribution to Dwight Holton for (Oregon)
Attorney General
09/17/2012, $500 contribution to the Obama Victory Fund

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Four-year Army R.O.T.C. college scholarship (1978)
Phi Beta Kappa (1982)
James G. Blaine Political Science Prize, Washington and Jefferson
College (1982)
George C. Marshall Award (1981)
Bronze Star Medal (1991)
Southwest Asia Service Medal with Two Bronze Service Stars (1991)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (1991)
National Defense Service Medal (1991)
Army Achievement Medal (1989)
Army Air Assault Badge (1980)
Army Parachutist Badge (1986)
Honduran Parachutist Badge (1988)
Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2001)
Department of Justice Distinguished Service Award (2010)
Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2011)

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Co-author of ``Dealing with the Media in High Profile White Collar
Crime Cases: The Prosecutor's Dilemma,'' in the 1995 edition of the
American Bar Association's publication, White Collar Crime.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Mr. Kevin A. Ohlson was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on September 24, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on October 16, 2013.]

NOMINATIONS OF MR. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; HON. JAMIE
M. MORIN TO BE DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
(CAPE), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND HON. JO ANN ROONEY TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

----------

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2013

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Hagan, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, McCain,
and Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, general counsel;
Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Mariah K. McNamara, special
assistant to the staff director; William G.P. Monahan, counsel;
Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; Steven M. Barney, minority counsel;
William S. Castle, minority general counsel; Allen M. Edwards,
professional staff member; Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff
member; Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff member; Daniel
A. Lerner, professional staff member; Natalie M. Nicolas,
minority staff assistant; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: John L. Principato and Brendan J.
Sawyer.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn A. Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher M. Cannon, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Mara L. Boggs, assistant to Senator Manchin;
Chad R. Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Moran Banai
and Brooke Jamison, assistants to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan A.
Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; David J. Park,
assistant to Senator Donnelly; Mary A. Naylor, assistant to
Senator Kaine; Stephen M. Smith, assistant to Senator King;
Paul C. Hutton IV, assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood A.
Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd P. Harmer,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Bradley L. Bowman, assistant to
Senator Ayotte; and Craig R. Abele and Marissa Prianti,
assistants to Senator Graham.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets this morning to consider the
nominations of Jamie Morin to be Director of Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Michael Lumpkin to be the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), and Jo Ann Rooney to be Under
Secretary of the Navy.
Before we proceed, we all wish our colleague, Jim Inhofe,
well. He is doing well. I spoke to him shortly after his
operation. It was quite amazing actually. He sounded in great
shape. He was raring to go, and it was not too many hours after
his operation. We all look forward to his rejoining us soon. In
the meantime, we have our former ranking member with us again.
We are delighted that Senator McCain is able to fill in for
him.
We welcome our witnesses and their families. We extend our
gratitude to the family members who support our nominees
through the long hours, the countless demands of their careers
in public service. We all recognize the essential role that
families play. Without support, our nominees and the people who
hold these offices just simply cannot succeed. Our witnesses,
during their opening statements, should feel free to introduce
family members or others who are here to support them.
We are delighted to welcome Senator John Hoeven. John,
there you are. You will be introducing Mr. Morin in a few
moments following Senator McCain's remarks.
The positions to which our witnesses have been nominated
are some of the most demanding in the Department of Defense
(DOD).
The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
provides independent analytic advice to the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense on issues spanning the entire
defense landscape. In some ways this is an unenviable role as a
truly independent cost estimating director will never be
popular in the Department, but he will make our acquisition
system stronger and more precise by forcing the Department to
take a hard look at current requirements and highlighting those
that are unrealistic.
Mr. Morin, we are pleased to note, is a Michigan native, by
the way. We are very proud of you and that qualification alone,
as far as I am concerned, would be enough for your
confirmation, but you are also well qualified for this
undertaking because you have served as Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller and as
the Senior Defense Analyst for the Senate Budget Committee
prior to that.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) has one of the most
demanding and diverse portfolios in the Department. If
confirmed, Mr. Lumpkin will have policy responsibility for DOD
efforts in many critical areas, including counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, stability operations, building partner
capacity, counterthreat finance, and transnational criminal
organizations.
Fortunately, Mr. Lumpkin is no stranger to these issues,
having served previously as Principal Deputy ASD(SO/LIC), and
the committee looks forward to hearing how he would balance the
various responsibilities that he would have.
The Under Secretary of the Navy serves as the Deputy and
Principal Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and is
responsible for the day-to-day management of the Department. If
confirmed, Dr. Rooney will be tasked to lead and manage the
Navy's Senior Executive Service and undertake the role of Chief
Management Officer for the Navy charged with improving
departmental business practices in support of its warfighting
mission. This vital management function is made all the more
essential by the austere budget environment that we currently
face.
Dr. Rooney will surely draw on her experience in the
private sector as a former university president and financial
attorney, as well as draw on her time as the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
All of our nominees are well-qualified for the positions to
which they have been nominated. We look forward to their
testimony.
Senator McCain?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I echo your
sentiment and hope for the speedy recovery of Jim Inhofe. He
says he feels like an Olympian, and I do not doubt it. We wish
him well and hope to have him back here soon, which I am told
will be very soon, and we certainly look forward to his
continued energetic and informed participation as ranking
member of this committee.
I welcome the families and thank Senator Hoeven for his
testimony on behalf of Dr. Morin. That may bring his nomination
into doubt in my mind. [Laughter.]
If confirmed, these nominees will enter DOD in the midst of
great difficulty, caused in large part by the failure of
Congress to address budget sequestration or authorize and
appropriate in a timely and predictable way, but also by
systemic departmental shortcomings which contribute to a
``culture of inefficiency'' that is robbing warfighters of
reliable equipment and absolutely failing the taxpayers.
Mr. Lumpkin, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, you will be
asked to set policies and practices for our Special Operations
Forces. As we draw down conventional forces in Afghanistan, the
worldwide demand for special operations remains high. Threats
to American interests and international stability persist and
grow.
In Syria, Bashar Assad placates the international community
with overtures about destroying stocks of chemical weapons, his
country fractures, threatening our friends and allies in the
region.
Iran's new figurehead, President Hassan Rouhani, has
commenced a charm offensive that does nothing to change the
fact that the Ayatollah's regime continues to destabilize the
Middle East, support terrorist organizations that have killed
Americans, espoused the destruction of Israel, oppressed its
own people, developed ballistic missiles, and assists Assad in
the slaughter of more than 110,000 Syrians.
All the while, our forces continue to distinguish
themselves prosecuting operations against terrorists throughout
the world.
We as a Government have been, as Secretary Bob Gates
articulated so well, utterly unable to predict what future
threats we may face and what forces we will need to respond to
them. We will look to you to ensure that our asymmetric
military capabilities remain strong.
Unfortunately, some of the most serious risks to the
institution of DOD and, by extension, our national security are
right here in our Government. Congress has provided the
Government with precious little certainty about future funding,
which has caused untold amounts of scrapped planning,
administrative double work, and waste. The sequester, an
embodiment of a divestiture of moral courage, has created
budgetary instability that is causing well-performing programs
to be cut, program officials to be furloughed, and readiness
accounts to be plundered, all of which undermine any attempts
to properly husband taxpayers' dollars.
In the midst of these across-the-board reductions, Congress
and the White House have pushed the Government into a partial
shutdown, replete with examples of how we are failing our
troops and our constituents.
But DOD's own difficulty in efficiently and effectively
managing large programs and business processes have also
contributed to the position it finds itself in. After more than
a decade of profligate spending and lax internal oversight,
senior defense leaders must now impel cultural change
throughout the Department regarding procurement practices,
financial improvement, and business transformation.
Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, as Under Secretary of the Navy,
you will be charged with executing the full scope of the
Department of the Navy's business activities, a requirement
akin to being the chief operating officer at a Fortune 500
company. You would be responsible for changing a Navy culture
that permits inefficient buying of goods and services and
management of resources. The Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier
and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) are only the most recent
examples of programs that have been undertaken without regard
for affordability or what our combatant commanders and
servicemembers actually need. The Navy faces severe management
challenges that require, perhaps more so than ever, world-class
skill and judgment of those in management. We are keen to know
what about your background qualifies you to manage such an
organization at a time when the Navy not only needs established
leadership but demonstrated results.
Dr. Morin, in this era of declining budgetary resources,
the need for independent, unbiased, and auditable cost
assessments of current and future programs is paramount. We
simply cannot afford to pour treasure into programs that under-
perform, deliver unreliable capability, or for which we are
unable to determine lifecycle costs. If confirmed as Director
of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, one of your most
important functions will be to provide accurate cost and
schedule analysis of major defense acquisition programs. This
analysis is vital since cost estimates prepared by the Services
for major weapons systems have historically proved inaccurate.
You are well aware that this committee created the position
you have been nominated to fill, and I believe CAPE has
demonstrated some success in driving cost-consciousness into
the Services. But as budgets continue to shrink and entrenched
interests fight even harder for resources, your job will be
more difficult than your predecessors. I look forward to
hearing how you attempt to accomplish your charter.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this hearing. DOD
desperately needs strong leadership, and I hope to leave today
confident that our witnesses will provide it.
I'd like to submit a statement on behalf of Senator Inhofe.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator McCain. The
statement will be entered into the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator James M. Inhofe
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
today and thank them and their families for their willingness to serve
our great Nation.
Mr. Lumpkin, this administration has repeatedly downplayed the
threat from al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates to our national
security. Just the other week before the United Nations General
Assembly, the President made a statement that I found deeply troubling.
He stated that ``The world is more stable than it was 5 years ago.'' I
couldn't disagree more. Over the last decade, the number of countries
al Qaeda and its affiliates operate from has increased dramatically.
Rising chaos throughout the Middle East and Africa is allowing al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups to regain their balance and expand their
spheres of control. From newfound safe havens, these groups remain
determined to plan and launch attacks against the United States and our
interests. Despite premature claims by this administration about the
demise of al Qaeda and its affiliates, it's increasingly clear that the
threat from these groups isn't declining, it's evolving. As such, we
must remain vigilant and on the offensive. Underpinning these efforts
must be a comprehensive strategy to combat what are increasingly global
terrorist networks. We cannot simply kill our way to victory. We must
attack their safe havens by empowering regional partners through
sustained security assistance and engagement and we must enhance our
efforts to disrupt the illicit financial networks that fund their
operations. I look forward to hearing your assessment of our current
efforts and how you believe we can improve their effectiveness.
Dr. Rooney, if confirmed you will be the second-highest ranking
civilian in the Navy and will serve as the Navy's Chief Management
Officer. In this capacity, you will be responsible for the overall
performance of the Navy's business operations. To be candid, I am
concerned by your lack of experience with the Navy and apparent lack of
qualifications for this position. I look forward to hearing why you
feel you are qualified for this position and the right person to help
lead the Navy as it confronts unprecedented budget uncertainty,
declining readiness, and mounting strategic instability.
Mr. Morin, if confirmed as the Director of the Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, you will be responsible for providing the Secretary
of Defense with unbiased analysis and cost and schedule assessments for
the entire defense program. To date, this program has been plagued by
cost overruns and schedule delays, withholding important capabilities
from the battlefield. A significant contributing factor to these
problems has been a lack of accountability throughout the acquisition
process. Without accountability, our ability to provide the best
possible equipment for our men and women in uniform on budget and on
schedule will be severely undermined. As Director, you will play a
vital role in informing the decisions of the acquisition community by
conducting upfront risk assessments and feasibility studies to ensure
we maximize each of our increasingly scarce acquisition dollars. I
believe your time as Comptroller of the Air Force will serve you well
in as you take on these challenges.
Again, I thank our nominees for being with the committee today and
look forward to their testimony.

Chairman Levin. Senator Hoeven, we are really delighted to
have you here today, and we know that you have the kind of
schedule that we all have. We are going to call on you first
for your introduction, and then you are free to leave.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HOEVEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
NORTH DAKOTA

Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be
with you, also the former ranking member, Senator McCain.
Like both of you and all of our colleagues, I want to
extend my best wishes for a full and speedy recovery to Ranking
Member Senator Inhofe. From what I have heard, the doctor said
he will have two or three times as much energy as he had before
the bypass surgery. That is bad news for his staff. I am
telling you right now. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. As though we did not have enough problems
before his surgery.
Senator Hoeven. Yes, because he went full speed before.
It is an honor to have this opportunity to make a few
comments and to introduce and to recommend very strongly to you
Dr. Jamie Morin. If I could take a few minutes to do that, I
would appreciate it very much.
I am here to strongly support the nomination of Dr. Jamie
Morin to be the second Director of CAPE for DOD. I know that
you and your staffs know Jamie from his work over the last 4
years as Air Force Comptroller, and before that, you know him
from his 6 years working for our friend and former colleague,
Senator Kent Conrad, as the senior defense analyst on the
Budget Committee. I think it goes without saying that he is
very highly regarded in this chamber.
The Director of CAPE--and Senator McCain made, I think,
some comments that are absolutely right on the mark in regard
to CAPE. But the Director of CAPE is a critical person in the
Pentagon. He or she needs to be clearly independent, needs to
be a strong analyst, a leader, and above all, needs to be fair.
I think that goes exactly to what Senator McCain was talking
about in terms of understanding both costs and lifecycle
capabilities for our weapons systems.
I have had the pleasure of working with Jamie for almost
the entire 10 years he has been working in Washington,
including most of my tenure as Governor of North Dakota.
Although he has never worked for me, there have been many times
that I have relied on his absolutely well-informed and first-
rate advice.
Based on my experience, I think he has exactly those
attributes that we need in CAPE, attributes like independence,
fairness, and skill in leading analysis and, Mr. Chairman, as
you have said, at such a critical time for our armed services.
Truly we need somebody with his skill and background to provide
people with your skill and background with the information that
you need to make these important decisions.
He is an excellent match for Secretary Hagel's needs in
these very challenging times. His past experiences provide him
with the best possible preparation to become the CAPE Director.
Based on his experience in Congress, Jamie understands that it
is vital for DOD to estimate costs as accurately as possible.
The time he spent as Comptroller of the Air Force only
reinforces the large fiscal challenges facing the Defense
Department and the critical need to make the right choices now
to preserve and enhance our armed services for the coming
years. That is the perspective we need in a CAPE Director.
As I was thinking through this introduction today, I spoke
with Senator Conrad, and he emphasized that Jamie has
exceptionally good judgment that will serve him very, very well
in this position. In fact, he told me that Jamie developed his
great interest in the military as a youngster because he used
to sit and read the encyclopedias, something I know that
Senator McCain did extensively as well. In reading the entire
encyclopedia set, the thing that really grabbed his interest
was military power, air power, aviation, military equipment,
and that has been a passion of his ever since. Who better, with
that kind of interest and passion, to be the leader at CAPE?
From my personal experience, I would note that I have heard
over and over from our military leadership about the great work
Jamie has done for our Air Force, and I have witnessed it
firsthand. He has kept a strategic perspective and a calm head
in today's very turbulent times, and I can attest that Jamie
has provided excellent, unbiased information and assessment to
me whenever I have asked him about Air Force programs.
Not surprisingly, Jamie also hasa very strong academic
background, a Ph.D. from Yale, a master's degree in public
policy from the London School of Economics, and a bachelor's
degree in the foreign service studies from Georgetown.
Outside of Government, he has worked as a strategist, an
analyst, and an economist. Our country needs able people to
volunteer for public service, and our military needs the
support of dedicated civilians like Jamie. I am very glad to
see that he has been nominated for this important position, and
I am very confident that this committee will see more great
contributions from him in the years to come. It is my hope that
this committee can act quickly on his nomination and that we
can move with similar speed on the Senate floor so that the
Defense Department can benefit from his expertise as soon as
possible in this very critical time.
One other personal note that I will mention in closing is
that I can remember about 8 years ago during the base
realignment and closure (BRAC) process, Jamie was extremely
involved in that very difficult and arduous process putting
together incredible amounts of information not only for Senator
Conrad. At that time, I was Governor and we were working with
BRAC. It was, needless to say, a difficult, challenging
environment, one that required a tremendous amount of
information, intelligence, somebody that knew what was going on
and could work well with many different people in many
different capacities. I would have to say that Dr. Morin went
24/7 for I do not know how long, but at the very same time, his
son Liam, who is here today, was born. I think that just
reflects on the kind of dedication that this individual has for
our country and for our Armed Forces. Isn't that just exactly
what we want in the people that work at DOD in these very, very
important positions, so important not just for our armed
services but for our country?
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Acting Ranking Member
Senator McCain. Thank you so much for this opportunity to
provide some comments.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, that might be one of the
longest introductions of a witness----[Laughter.]
But I loved every word of it. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Hoeven, your reference to Senator
McCain reading the encyclopedia will be placed in the
classified portion of this record. [Laughter.]
Thanks so much.
First, we are going to ask our standard questions at this
time. I think all three of you know that because of our
legislative and oversight responsibilities, we must be
confident that we are going to receive testimony, briefings,
and other communications and information that are accurate,
prompt, straight from the shoulder. Let me ask you all the
following questions.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes.
Dr. Morin. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Lumpkin. No.
Dr. Morin. No.
Dr. Rooney. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes.
Dr. Morin. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes.
Dr. Morin. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes.
Dr. Morin. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes.
Dr. Morin. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes.
Dr. Morin. Yes.
Dr. Rooney. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. We will start with Dr.
Morin.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMIE M. MORIN, TO BE DIRECTOR OF COST
ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. Morin. Chairman Levin, Senators, it is a delight to
come before this committee again today as a nominee of
President Obama, in this case for Director of Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before a committee that continues to make a real difference for
our Nation and our men and women in uniform.
I, of course, want to join each of you in wishing a very
speedy recovery to Ranking Member Inhofe and we all look
forward to seeing him back.
It was a real honor to be nominated by the President to be
just the second Director of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, to have the chance to support Secretary Hagel in
these very challenging and interesting times. If this committee
and the Senate consent, I will certainly be privileged to serve
in that position and to continue the progress that has been
made to institutionalize CAPE and to implement the
recommendations of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act
that occurred under Christine Fox's leadership as the first
director.
CAPE is a remarkable organization really that builds on the
history of two incredibly important groups in DOD that have
done great work over many years. The systems analysts, who
started out life as Secretary McNamara's whiz kids and became
the respected and sometimes feared gurus of program analysis
and evaluation, have I think been recognized widely as the best
analytic team in Government. It would be a privilege to lead
them. The hard-core number crunchers in cost assessment are
also world-class and sometimes the first in DOD to see problems
with our major programs and a crucial check on what can be
undue optimism in starting and carrying out our acquisition
programs.
I have had the pleasure of working over the last 4 years
closely with both of those teams, and again, it is humbling to
be asked to be the leader of such an impressive group of
dedicated public servants.
I appreciated very much Senator Hoeven's generous
introduction, maybe too generous of an introduction. It was a
pleasure getting to know him and Senator Conrad during my
tenure working for the Budget Committee and, by extension, the
great people of the State of North Dakota. I think team North
Dakota was always a very tight-knit group, and I appreciate
that tight-knit group coming forward to introduce me here. Even
as a proud Michigander that never lived in the State, I am
honored to have a second State to call my home.
I do think my time observing those two leaders, Senator
Hoeven and Senator Conrad, I got to see them in action quite a
bit, and despite the fact they did not always agree on specific
positions or policies, they managed to get a remarkable amount
done for their State and for the Nation. I think that should be
an example to all of us about how we can partner to do better
to serve this Nation and to serve the men and women who take an
oath to defend us and our Constitution.
I wanted to take just one moment to introduce some family
members here today, if I may. My wife Megan sitting behind me
here has been just a wonderful partner throughout my time in
public service. She is making her own distinguished
contributions to this Nation. She and my son Liam, sitting next
to her, returned just a year ago from a 2-year Foreign Service
assignment in Ethiopia.
Chairman Levin. Your son we are talking about? A 2-year
assignment.
Dr. Morin. He is a distinguished diplomat. [Laughter.]
He has cocktail party stories, too. [Laughter.]
They did great work there and they did it despite the fact
that Meg had to carry a lot of weight without an accompanying
spouse. They have put up with my unpredictable schedule both in
the Senate and at the Pentagon.
I am also deeply grateful that my parents, Bridget and
Michael Morin, were able to come out from Michigan to be with
us here today, as well as a number of other family and friends
to support me in this hearing, including my brother-in-law,
Rick Baker.
Mr. Chairman, I will just close briefly by saying this
committee has vested very serious responsibilities in the
Director of CAPE. They are going to require first-class
analysis. They are going to require very much an independent
attitude to the problems that come before me. As a scholar of
the defense budget process and now after 4 years in the
Pentagon, I know that, if confirmed, my job will be to support
the Secretary of Defense in developing a program and a budget
in a time of extraordinary uncertainty.
The most helpful thing that could come to DOD right now
would be greater certainty and ability to plan. Planning in the
face of this level of uncertainty is extraordinarily difficult.
But if I am confirmed, you can have confidence that I will
continue to provide the top leadership of DOD and this Congress
with independent, responsive, analytically rigorous advice on
the toughest issues facing our military and our Nation.
Again, my thanks to the President and to Secretary Hagel
for their confidence, and I look forward to the committee's
questions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
We will now go to Mr. Lumpkin.

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
members of the committee. It is a privilege to appear before
you this morning. I appreciate the opportunity to answer any
questions you may have regarding my nomination as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict.
I wish to thank President Obama, Secretary Hagel, and Under
Secretary Miller for their support of my nomination.
I would like to thank my family and friends whose continued
support through the years has been essential.
Also, I would be remiss if I did not thank the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and their families with whom I have
had the honor to serve during my career in the special
operations community. Their selfless commitment to our Nation
and to each other is a testament to the strength of our
military community and to our Nation. If confirmed, it will be
my deepest honor to serve.
The mission of the Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict Secretariat is critical to national defense.
Succeeding at the tip of the spear requires intensive training,
state-of-the-art equipment, speed, agility, and also important
is the decisive so-called soft skills such a problem-solving,
relationship-building, and collaboration. I believe my
operational and policy background as Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and as Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with my career as a U.S.
Navy SEAL in both wartime and peace, has prepared me for this
nomination. Additionally, my work in the private sector has
equipped me with executive level management capabilities that
are required to be successful in today's constrained fiscal
environment.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee
and Congress as a whole to address the national security
challenges we face in order to keep America safe, secure, and
prosperous. I will make every effort to live up to the
confidence that has been placed in me.
I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to
your questions. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Lumpkin.
Dr. Rooney?

STATEMENT OF HON. JO ANN ROONEY, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY

Dr. Rooney. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Levin,
Senator McCain, other members of the committee. I also join in
wishing a continued speedy recovery for Senator Inhofe.
I would also like to thank Secretary Mabus and Secretary
Hagel for their support, as well as President Obama for the
confidence he has shown by placing my name into nomination to
be the next Under Secretary of the Navy.
This opportunity is both a privilege and an honor, but it
is also very humbling. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to
ensure that I live up to what is an enormous amount of trust
that will be placed in me.
I would like to take a moment to recognize some very
important people in my life who have traveled from Florida,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania to be with me here this
morning. My mom, Patricia Rooney, is with me today and I want
to introduce her and offer her my heartfelt and special thank
you. It is because of her support and that of my late dad John
that I am with you today. My dad, an Army veteran, and my mom,
a retired public school elementary teacher, taught me that
anything is possible, I must embrace opportunities and
challenges, and that I should always strive to leave an
organization and the people in it better for my efforts.
I am also so fortunate to have several other special people
in my life here today. My dearest friend of over 30 years and
sister of the heart, Linda Pitsorni, along with her daughter
Veronica, a freshman in college, are here. Veronica, along with
her sister Alessia, who is completing a semester abroad and
here in spirit, are in so many ways my nieces.
Father Jim Rafferty, a very dear friend and extended family
member, is someone with whom I have logged many nautical miles
sailing the waters throughout New England and the East Coast.
A retired teacher, John Danes, a retired engineer from the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, traveled with
mom from Florida to lend their support.
Finally, Ann McGill and Teresa Bacola, also retired public
school teachers, have been special friends for many years.
Thank you all for being here.
Particularly in the next few years, the role of Under
Secretary of the Navy will require a breadth of experience and
perspective to support many key priorities, including the
number one asset, our people: sailors, marines, civilians, and
their families. We must assure they are supported and we
acknowledge their service and sacrifices through our actions;
that we maintain operational readiness for today's
requirements, as well as those into the future, even in an era
of fiscal uncertainty; that the shipbuilding and industrial
base are strengthened, supporting a fleet that is affordable
and sustainable for the long term; that the acquisition process
is efficient, effective, and maintains the highest level of
integrity and accountability. Being good stewards of taxpayer
dollars is particularly critical given the fiscal realities we
face now and into the future.
I have had the privilege of serving under and learning from
both Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta. The experiences
from my service in Personnel and Readiness, addressing many
difficult issues, as well as the opportunities I have had to
work side by side with senior military and civilian leadership
in the development of the strategic plan and supporting budgets
are invaluable. My work as a university president, business
executive, and board member for numerous nonprofit and for-
profit organizations, along with my educational background,
provide me with the range of experiences and perspectives
needed to bring to this role, if confirmed. Along with the
dedicated team of men and women in the Department of the Navy,
I am confident that this breadth and depth of experience to
think strategically, foster innovation, improve effectiveness,
enhance accountability, and address changes both in the fiscal
and operational environments will support the priorities of
people, platforms, power, and partnerships.
My goal, if confirmed, is to ensure that the decisions made
and the plans executed over the next few years further support
the Navy and Marine Corps for missions now and into the future,
retaining our place as the world's most capable and most
versatile expeditionary fighting force.
In closing, I would like to thank all the members of the
committee for their time and consideration both during this
hearing and in our previous conversations. If confirmed, I
pledge to work diligently and give my best efforts to serve the
men and women and their families who are all part of the
Department of the Navy.
I am sure I speak not only for myself but also for many
others in extending my appreciation and gratitude to all of our
sailors and marines for their selfless service. We are all so
very proud of you and cannot thank you and your families enough
for all of your sacrifices.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. We are going to start with an 8-minute
round this morning. Let me start with you, Secretary Morin,
with a question on sequestration.
Tell us what you expect the impact of sequestration and the
Secretary's directive to reduce staffing by 20 percent is going
to have on the organization and staffing of the Office of the
Director of CAPE.
Dr. Morin. Mr. Chairman, it is very clear to me that the
Secretary's direction to make a roughly 20 percent reduction in
headquarters budgets to include substantial reductions in all
of the human resource sources that we use to do the
Department's mission will have an effect on CAPE if we do not
do a good job of structuring and managing the organization in
order to apply the incredibly talented staff to the top
priorities of the Department. As I understand it, the current
leadership of CAPE has worked with former Secretary Michael
Donely, who was charged by the Deputy Secretary of Defense with
leading the Office of the Secretary of Defense staffing review
to lay out some options.
I have not been briefed in detail on those options, but I
will certainly approach that problem, if confirmed, in the same
way that I have approached the need as Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force to make some very significant reductions in the
size of my own organization there by looking at the business
processes we follow and the practices that we use in order to
find ways to prioritize and to take out wasted effort. That is
hard in a smaller organization like CAPE, but I think we can
make it happen.
Chairman Levin. We, a few years ago, passed the Weapons
Systems Acquisition Reform Act, and I am wondering if you are
familiar with it?
Dr. Morin. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you know whether it has achieved some
benefits yet already? It is still fairly young, but can you
tell us what your knowledge is about that?
Dr. Morin. Senator, I have seen enormous progress inside
DOD over the last 4 years. I had the privilege of sitting on
the Senate floor actually as a number of the debates on the
Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act were taking part. I was
struck when I arrived in DOD by the degree to which the
unification of the cost assessment and the program evaluation
shops into CAPE had made a difference.
Senator McCain spoke at the outset about the degree to
which we need the Military Services to be rigorous about cost
estimates, and I have tracked that data, in fact, with regard
to the Air Force and have found that over the last 4 years, the
range between independent cost estimates out of CAPE and the
Air Force service cost positions coming out of the Air Force
Cost Analysis Agency have narrowed significantly. It is a
limited number of observations, so you cannot do a lot of great
statistics----
Chairman Levin. I think it would be helpful, when you get
there, that you write that up for us because we are interested
in tracking what the impacts of our legislation have been.
Dr. Morin. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask you, Mr. Lumpkin, about the
authorization for the use of military force (AUMF), the 2001
authorization, and whether you believe that the current legal
authorities, including that AUMF enabled the Department to
carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at the
level that you believe is necessary and appropriate.
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Department's position is that the AUMF meets the needs
to be able to do what needs to be done in the ongoing
counterterrorism efforts.
Chairman Levin. Is your position the same or is it
different or do you not have a position?
Mr. Lumpkin. No, no. I agree with it.
Chairman Levin. Now, do you share the views of Secretary
Panetta and Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan
that many of the counterterrorism operations conducted by the
United States today could better be carried out under title 10
Department of Defense authorities?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think that title 10 is the preferred way to
do things when we can, and I think we should strive to make
title 10 the principal method of conducting these operations.
Chairman Levin. Now, earlier this year, the office of
ASD(SO/LIC) completed a report on authorities used by the
special operations forces to engage with partner nation
security forces and said, among other things, that, ``The
existing patchwork of authorities taken together is inflexible
and incoherent.'' Do you believe that there are gaps in the
current engagement authorities?
Mr. Lumpkin. Mr. Chairman, I think there are probably some
gaps in seams, and if confirmed, I would look to identify what
those would be and to work with this committee in order to
rectify that.
Chairman Levin. All right. Would you do that promptly,
please, when you are confirmed?
Mr. Lumpkin. If confirmed, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let me ask you now, Dr. Rooney. What does your
understanding of the impact that the shutdown is having on the
Department of the Navy, including the morale of military,
civilians, and contractors serving there with the department?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. The impact has been significant in
all areas, and let me break that down a little bit more. In
terms of the military and the readiness and, frankly, the
morale, it is the uncertainty of the ability to have repair
work done and the work done to support them, the programs that
support the families, which impacts the readiness directly.
That uncertainty, along with the cost, is a concern there.
The civilian workforce. Particularly on top of the budget
uncertainties, the known caps and furloughs that have occurred,
we are starting to lose some of the most senior people in the
Department and also we know that there have been continuing
challenges to staff up in the areas of experienced acquisition
people, program managers, medical personnel, and that will
continue to be exacerbated.
In terms of the contractor workforce, any work stoppages or
anything that would slow down the production will go right to
that industrial base and jeopardize our ability to keep those
contractors engaged and keep those people employed and moving
to conclusion of the program.
Frankly, it is across all three levels, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, Dr. Rooney, your experience as President of Mount Ida
College and Spalding University and your experience as the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness and Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness give you a unique experience on the issue of
sexual assaults involving young women and young men in the
military, as well as in colleges and in universities. Does the
military have an advantage over colleges and universities in
preventing and responding to sexual assaults?
Dr. Rooney. You are correct, sir, and I share everyone's
concern that sexual assault in the military and elsewhere in
the colleges and universities is a significant issue.
The advantage, if you can call it that, that the military
has is several-fold.
One, the ability to get data across the Services is an
opportunity that is unique. Colleges and universities do not
have that ability to look across every college and university
and gather that data in a central area. There is the ability to
get good information going in.
Also, there is a different structure of command and control
and oversight that commanders have in military installations
that, frankly, university presidents, deans of students, and
others do not have.
However, I think on the other hand, there are lessons to
learned from both. I think that while the military is in a
position to get good information, influence through our command
structure, there is the opportunity to look out to especially
colleges and universities and see what they have done in the
area of alcohol and substance abuse programs, which we know are
critical factors that often are tied to issues of sexual
assaults. What programs have worked in those settings to
educate students, to develop bystander programs, and all of
these, the military has already incorporated in terms of
training programs and bystander awareness. But I think that
ongoing awareness, frankly, can help both sides really go after
a problem that is very, very significant.
Chairman Levin. Just to conclude, you made reference to the
commander. Does the role of the commander give the military and
should it give the military a special capability of dealing
with sexual assaults?
Dr. Rooney. It should for a number of reasons. The
commander has a number of tools that they can use not just
judicial but also non-judicial type of punishment and tools.
The commander is also very responsible and must be held
accountable for the command climate, what is actually going on,
what are the attitudes and the behaviors of the people around
him or her in command. Yes, in fact it does create a
significant tool and ability to influence.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain?
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In other words, Dr. Rooney, do you support the commander's
role in disposing of Uniform Code of Military Justice
violations, including the case of sexual assault?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, I believe the commanders do need to be in
that chain, sir.
Senator McCain. In your response to written committee
questions, you said you did not have enough information to say
whether the Navy will meet its legal obligation to meet the
financial audit deadlines for 2014 and 2017. What is your
opinion today?
Dr. Rooney. I still, sir, do not at this point have the
detailed information. I know that they have a number----
Senator McCain. Until you find out, then I will not be
supporting your nomination. I want an answer whether the Navy
can meet its legal obligations. If you do not know the answer,
then you are not qualified for the job yet.
[The information referred to follows:]

Dr. Rooney. Based on the Department's currently favorable risk
assessment of the remaining efforts, today I am cautiously optimistic
that the Navy will achieve the fiscal year 2014 mandate.A brief summary
Department of the Navy's progress toward achieving audit readiness on
its Statement of Budgetary Activity (SBA) by the end of fiscal year
2014:

The Marine Corps' portion of this statement has been
under audit for several annual cycles, and has made great
strides towards obtaining a favorable opinion.
In addition to the Marine Corps effort, the Navy has
asserted audit readiness on seven SBA-related business areas.
These areas include: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP), Appropriations Received, Civilian
Pay, Transportation of People (TOP), Reimbursable Work Orders
(RWO), Military Pay, and Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT).Of
these seven, four (E-2D MDAP, Appropriations Received, Civilian
Pay, TOP) received favorable opinions after independent
examinations were completed on them.
Exams on two more of these SBA-related areas (RWO,
Military Pay) are currently underway, and the Navy expects the
third examination (FBWT) to commence soon.
Three remaining business areas (Contract/Vendor Pay,
Requisitioning, and Financial Statement Compilation/Reporting)
comprising the SBA are on schedule to be asserted in fiscal
year 2014.

Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, last month, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) provided an analysis of the
personnel strength, and the GAO said the Navy, ``could not
provide how many civilians it has as of July 2013 because,
according to Navy officials, there is a problem with its
information system.'' We are telling the taxpayers we do not
even know how many civilian employees we have?
Dr. Rooney. Sir, I am familiar with that GAO report, but
data I have seen and even the input that the Navy has had into
the contractor analysis has been significant, and I have not
seen a direct evidence of their inability to count. But if
confirmed, I would clearly make sure that that system is in
place because the human resource and being able to understand
not only our civilians but our contractors is critical.
Senator McCain. I think our taxpayers ought to at least
know how many employees the Department of the Navy has.
The LCS. The GAO recently criticized the program as being
over budget, behind schedule, deficient in proven capabilities
needed by the warfighter. The report concluded--and I quote
from the GAO--``The apparent disconnect between the LCS
acquisition strategy and the needs of the end users suggested
that a pause is needed.'' Do you agree with that conclusion?
Dr. Rooney. Sir, I am familiar with the recommendations. I
think that the LCS had several mission-driven platforms to it.
I know there has been some controversy in it. But I am also
aware that every Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) since Admiral
Vernon Clark have supported the program because it provides the
capability that they need, and chief among that is forward
presence. However, I also share the concern that the
acquisition must be based on very stringent requirements going
forward.
Senator McCain. I hope you will answer the question, and
that is, do you believe a pause is needed as recommended by the
GAO?
Dr. Rooney. The concern with a pause at that point was any
gains that have now been achieved, particularly in the
production with the unit cost--and at this point, that cost
curve since the GAO report has continued to go down, but if
that program is slowed down, those efficiencies in the building
will also suffer and again those costs will go up.
Senator McCain. Mr. Lumpkin, your response to a request
from this committee for an assessment of al Qaeda was, ``As the
President said, the remaining operatives in al Qaeda--we now
confront a less capable but still lethal threat from
geographically diversified groups affiliated with al Qaeda.''
Do you stand by that statement? ``Less capable''?
Mr. Lumpkin. I do in the sense of the core al Qaeda in
itself.
Senator McCain. I am not asking about core al Qaeda. I have
heard that dodge a number of times. Do you believe that al
Qaeda is more capable or less capable today than they were 5
years ago, whether it is the core or not? I am talking about al
Qaeda.
Mr. Lumpkin. I would argue less capable to attack the
Homeland directly, but U.S. interests--it still has the
capability to hit U.S. interests abroad.
Senator McCain. Al Qaeda is gathering strength in the
ungoverned regions of northern and eastern Syria. The
Washington Post reports that fewer than 1,000 Syrian rebels
have been trained. Do you think the training cited by the
Washington Post is capable of altering any balance of power in
Syria?
Mr. Lumpkin. As it sits right now, I do not see a
significant balance changing based on that.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that the surge was a success
in Iraq?
Mr. Lumpkin. I do believe the surge was successful in Iraq.
Senator McCain. Did you support it at the time?
Mr. Lumpkin. I did.
Senator McCain. On al Qaeda again, is it true that al Qaeda
in Iraq has now grown into a larger organization called the
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham or ISIS, which now enjoys a
safe haven in the area encompassing parts of Iraq and Syria?
Mr. Lumpkin. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. They operate active terrorist training
camps in Iraq and Syria?
Mr. Lumpkin. That is my understanding.
Senator McCain. Is it correct that the ISIS senior leaders
are believed to be in Syria?
Mr. Lumpkin. I do not have an answer to that one, to be
honest with you, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that situation might have
been different if we had left behind a residual force in Iraq
than it is today?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think the preference would have been to have
a residual force, absolutely. As we look as an exit strategy in
Afghanistan, the benefit of a residual force is absolutely
there.
Senator McCain. That is not coming along very well in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Lumpkin. There are challenges, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you think maybe Mr. Karzai is looking at
what happened in Iraq and what is happening in Syria and what
is happening all over the Middle East and maybe drawing the
appropriate lessons from that?
Mr. Lumpkin. Senator, I cannot speculate to what President
Karzai is thinking or his motivation.
Senator McCain. I see.
You do believe, though, that we should leave a residual
force behind in Afghanistan?
Mr. Lumpkin. I do.
Senator McCain. Do you have an estimate of the size of that
force that should be left behind?
Mr. Lumpkin. I do not. I would have to do some analysis,
and candidly, Senator, I have not dug into that. If confirmed,
I would be happy to look at that with the rest of the
Department.
Senator McCain. Maybe you can look at it before you are
confirmed.
[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Lumpkin. Our core goal--to defeat al Qaeda and prevent its
return to Afghanistan and Pakistan--remains unchanged. Over the past 4
years, due to the dedication and sacrifices of our forces, our
coalition partners, and the Afghan security forces, I have been
encouraged by the progress made toward our goal and believe this
progress can continue beyond 2014.
The executive branch is reviewing options for the size of our
contribution to the post-2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
mission, as well as a limited U.S. counterterrorism mission, and that
decision will be based on a number of factors, including:

Conclusion of a U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security
Agreement and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement;
Progress toward our core goal of disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and preventing its return
to Afghanistan and Pakistan;
Continued progress and development of the Afghan
National Security Force;
A peaceful Afghan political transition centered on the
elections in April 2014;
The potential for peace talks between the Afghan
Government and the Taliban.

If confirmed, one of my priorities would be to confer with our
operational commanders to get their views of the situation at hand. I
would then work with colleagues to provide my recommendations and
participate in this review process to help senior leaders continue to
make informed decisions that protects U.S. interests in Afghanistan and
the region.

Senator McCain. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rooney, could you talk about the issue of readiness in
the Navy and your perspective as you prepare to assume these
responsibilities?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. I believe Admiral Greenert is
certainly on the record as saying that there is definite
concern of readiness among the Navy at this point and,
particularly under the current budget and uncertainty of the
budget, some risks going forward to the overall readiness. That
remains a concern. Being able to get equipment repaired on time
and be able to get people deployed on those ships is a concern
if it slows down, the training. Training budgets have been
greatly affected, and frankly at this point, we are sacrificing
potentially some long-term readiness in order to meet short-
term needs, and that is a grave concern to everyone in the
Department.
Senator Reed. Another issue that you will have to face in
your particular responsibilities, in your managerial
responsibilities is the shipbuilding program which is related
to readiness, obviously, but has a longer term typically. With
respect to shipbuilding, any comments on the decisions you
might have to make going forward, given the budget constraints?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, and it is not only the budget
constraints, but it is also based on some of the historical
facts and the cost challenges and issues that I know this
committee has looked at and other committees have looked at and
raised a concern. It points to the necessity for any of our
shipbuilding programs to make sure that we have the appropriate
requirements initially, that we are engaging industry earlier
on in the process so that we get better cost estimates and
better cost controls. We build in a process to make sure that
what is being built is meeting requirements so that, more
importantly, those requirements continue to meet the needs
outlined by the warfighters.
Senator Reed. One of the issues that Senator McCain brought
up and I think very correctly as the ranking member of the
Seapower Subcommittee is the Ford carrier program, the
significant cost increases on the first ship to be built and
additional cost added in as complications arose. We are on the
point of negotiating a second ship.
Can you comment specifically about--and that might be just
emblematic of the overall challenges, as he alluded to of
managing better the resources you have. Given a $580-plus
billion budget, most Americans believe there are ways through
management that some money can be saved. That is not the silver
bullet, but I think one of the major things you are going to
have to do is manage better the resources you have, whatever
they are.
Dr. Rooney. I agree, Senator, and if confirmed, will
certainly do that and definitely build on the lessons from the
past, particularly in that case of what was learned from that
first one before any second contract or actually construction
on a CVN-79 is started.
Senator Reed. Dr. Morin, recently the Pentagon Inspector
General (IG) released a report on the F-35 and the construction
particularly in the Lockheed Martin facility at Fort Worth
suggesting that the attention to detail necessary and just the
dedication to the task was not only inadequate but it was
costing the program millions of dollars in avoidable costs. The
company indicated that information might be out of date, that
changes have been made. But one of your key challenges will be
not just this program but many other programs. But can you
comment on that report? You had quite a bit of interest, I
think, on the Budget Committee also.
Dr. Morin. Yes, sir. I have looked at the Inspector
General's report in brief, although I have not seen the
detailed analysis of the contractor and the program office's
response to it yet. Based on my reading of that report, though,
it appears that the ISO-9001 quality control processes 2-3
years ago were deficient. I understand, based on the program
office's response and DOD's response to the Inspector General's
analysis, that a great deal of actions have been taken to close
those specific deficiencies and that the program office is
using the report as a tool to identify the continued
deficiencies that need to be closed out, which is exactly what
I would expect them to be doing. I view IG and GAO reports as a
tool for the public to have visibility but also a tool for the
management of the Department to identify problems and rectify
them.
Senator Reed. There are many different ways you have deal
with the issue, and it goes to some of the questions I raised
with Dr. Rooney.
But two are having contracts in which the contractor has
skin in the game, as well as the Government--and I think we are
moving that way from a cost-plus to cost-share--and also
provisions in the contract where there are, indeed, penalties
if good practice is not adhered to.
The other aspect is having the people who monitor these
contracts, DOD personnel or contractors, but hopefully DOD
personnel, who really on a day-to-day basis are there with
their feet on the ground making sure that everyone is working
hard.
Do you have any comments on those two dimensions?
Dr. Morin. Absolutely, Senator. I will start by noting just
given recent experience that furloughing all of those personnel
does not contribute to a mission accomplishment, and that it is
unfortunate that we were in that position. It will set back
numerous programs.
There has been a great deal of effort over the last 4 years
by both Under Secretary Hale and former Under Secretary, now
Deputy Secretary Carter and Under Secretary Kendall in working
their two respective parts of the acquisition process, contract
audit and contract management, to ensure that we are providing
better incentives and that we are holding people to account.
Those workforces have grown as part of the acquisition
improvement efforts, although, of course, with the Department-
wide reductions in staffing, a lot of planned growth is now not
going to occur.
But I have seen what I think is real improvement in the
Department's acquisition performance over the last 4 years,
some of which is clearly attributable to the Weapons Systems
Acquisition Reform Act and some of which I believe is
attributable to an aggressive management effort. But it is
clear there is much more work to be done.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Lumpkin, first, thank you for your dedicated service in
the U.S. Navy to the Nation.
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is scheduled to
increase its force structure of about 65,000 to 71,000 because
of the enhanced missions and, indeed, the worldwide global
missions that you are going to undertake. Do you see any
obstacles to achieving that force level and maintaining the
extraordinary quality of the force?
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Senator. Actually I do. One of our
challenges, of course, is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
in 2006. What it did is basically scoped the size of the
operational force, and it saw a glide slope of growth. The QDR
2010 showed that there are enabling requirements of those
forces of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and
things to support the force. Sequester is putting some of those
gains the program of the QDRs in jeopardy to achieve the growth
of the force the way we had originally programmed in those two
QDRs.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for being here today.
Dr. Rooney, I want to congratulate you on your nomination
for this position. You and I have had a chance to meet
previously when you came to New Hampshire and was able to learn
about our deployment cycle support program and what we are
doing in New Hampshire to help those who are returning from the
war and particularly our Guard and Reserve members who go back
to a civilian type setting. I wanted to get your impression of
whether that is a program that, given your new position, you
would take some of those experiences as a model of what we
might be able to do in other States.
Dr. Rooney. Senator, thank you. The short answer on that is
yes for a number of reasons. First of all, it is critical that
the programs that we put in place and whether those are
personnel programs or acquisition programs, that we have some
accountability and measures and we use those things that are
working. Anytime that there is a working model that we can show
has effective results, that is not only good for the
individuals but, frankly, it gets us to the point of use of
resources. We have to be very critical when we have programs in
place that we cannot have outcomes. To use the models such as
the one there--and I thank you for that time in New Hampshire.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you.
Dr. Rooney. I learned a great deal, and it is exactly that
type of thing. If confirmed, one of the key areas that I will
spend time on is looking even outside of the Department to the
industries. I have worked in the financial industry, health
care, education--and see if there are some models for both
people, as well as acquisitions, that we could use those best
practices.
Senator Ayotte. Great.
Also now in the position that you are nominated for, one of
the important roles you have in the Navy is maintaining our
attack submarine fleet. Of course, the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard plays a key role as one of our four public shipyards
in doing that.
Senator Shaheen and I, who both serve on the committee,
obviously feel very strongly about particularly the workforce
at the shipyard, the skills they have, the apprenticeship
program we have in place. I am very worried about the impact
that the furloughs have had on the civilian workforce, and
obviously the uncertainty because of the Government shutdown. I
look forward to working with you to maintain that tremendous
workforce.
I am going to invite you to come to New Hampshire again, on
behalf of Senator Shaheen and I, to come to the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard to see the excellent work. Oh, I forgot Senator
King. How could I forget Senator King? It is technically in
Maine. [Laughter.]
Yes. Most importantly, I see Senator King here, and I know
how much pride he takes in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, too.
We would love to have you come up--jointly the three of us on
the committee and I am sure Senator Collins would as well with
the years spent on this committee--to our shipyard. That is the
invitation that I am extending in your new role to come to New
Hampshire again and then see the work that is being done here
by a very talented workforce.
Dr. Rooney. Thank you, Senator. If confirmed, I will
certainly take all of you up on that and do share personally,
but also I know the Department shares the concern about losing
the key civilians, losing the expertise. It is not easy then,
if you do lose it, to try to gain that back. In the period of
uncertainty we are now, that remains a very, very critical,
critical concern going forward.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you, Dr. Rooney.
Mr. Lumpkin, let me just say thank you so much for your
distinguished service to our country.
I want to commend the Special Forces and the Intelligence
Community and the administration for the recent capture of al-
Libi. That was tremendous work, obviously important raids that
were recently done in Somalia and Libya. How important is the
capture of someone like al-Libi with regard to our fight
against al Qaeda? Is he a pretty significant player?
Mr. Lumpkin. He is, and we will know more as the
intelligence is gathered after his capture and we will find out
how significant he really was and has been.
Senator Ayotte. We certainly know that he has had prior
associations with Osama bin Laden and also with al Zawahiri. Is
that right?
Mr. Lumpkin. That is my understanding, yes.
Senator Ayotte. In terms of the intelligence gathering, how
important is it that we have the opportunity to gather
intelligence from someone like al-Libi to find out what
knowledge he has about al Qaeda and obviously any of the
associates or members of al Qaeda?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think it is absolutely crucial. Whenever we
can capture somebody of that stature, the intelligence we can
and will gain is significant that can lead to future operations
that ultimately save American lives.
Senator Ayotte. Let's assume we do not know, obviously,
what this individual knows, but given his, as I understand it,
decades of involvement in al Qaeda, that it is important in
terms of the interrogation. Do you think that we should put a
timeline on that interrogation?
Mr. Lumpkin. I am always hesitant on timelines.
Senator Ayotte. Why is that?
Mr. Lumpkin. Because as things flow, you do not know
necessarily what you are going to get and you do not want to be
up against a clock. Candidly, in my current capacity at the
Department, I was not involved in the planning or have not been
debriefed on the operations that happened over the past
weekend. On these particular operations, I can provide no
granularity or fidelity. I am sorry.
Senator Ayotte. But in terms of a timeline, you would agree
with me that it is best to take as much time as you need to
interrogate someone that may have valuable information to shed
light on al Qaeda and perhaps prevent future attacks.
Mr. Lumpkin. From an operational standpoint, that is the
preferred methodology, yes.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you very much, and I appreciate the
question that Senator Reed asked about the impact on SOCOM of
sequester. Obviously, I think the role of SOCOM has become even
more important. I look forward to working with you in your new
position.
I would also like to ask Secretary Morin where are we on
the audit with regard to the Air Force and how do you see us
meeting those timelines for a statement of budgetary resources
and then moving forward from there?
Dr. Morin. Senator, the Air Force is continuing to press
forward aggressively on the 2014 and 2017 audit readiness
timelines. Candidly we lost progress last year due to a 6-month
contract protest that took our independent public accountant
(IPA) advisors out of work. So that was unfortunately timed,
and we have resolved it now. We have a contract awarded and
IPAs, public accountants, on site helping us with certain
tasks.
We have made some continued progress in identifying the
actions we need to take in the near term with our existing
legacy information technology (IT) systems, our legacy
financial systems in order to give ourselves the best chance at
meeting that 2014 deadline. As I have testified to this
committee and subcommittees before, that is not a sustainable
long-term approach, and we will not have our objective future
financial systems fully fielded by the 2014 deadline. There is
some risk in the 2014 deadline. Pressing aggressively on the
2014 deadline for the budgetary resources, though, has helped
us significantly reduce the risk on that 2017 deadline for full
audit readiness.
Senator Ayotte. I know my time is up, but would you agree
with me that this is a very important thing for us to get done?
Dr. Morin. Absolutely. It has been certainly a core focus
area of mine over the last 4 years and the Department as a
whole. Secretary Panetta, during his tenure, put just enormous
attention on this issue based, in part, on the feedback he
received from members of this committee about how crucial it
was. We saw really significant progress that is now continuing
under Secretary Hagel's leadership. The American taxpayer has a
right to expect that the Department will be good stewards of
the taxpayer resources, that we will get the most combat
capability out of each dollar. Part of giving them that
confidence is getting to audit readiness and getting to that
clean audit opinion. It is an enormous enterprise and it is a
challenging undertaking, but it is crucial.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank all of you. I appreciate
it.
Chairman Levin. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. First of all, thanks to all of you for your
public service.
Dr. Rooney, please pay attention as you look at the issue
of sexual assault, that it is not just an issue for DOD with
regard to the military, but also in the contractors. This
Senator had found, back during the Iraq War, quite a few
examples of sexual assault among contractors of where nothing
was done. The most recent examples we have seen in the actual
Active Duty military personnel, but there were a number of
issues when I chaired a hearing on this back in the Iraq War
where it was completely swept under the rug with regard to
contractors.
Now, I think we, as a result of that, got the U.S.
attorneys sensitized to this so that they would start their
investigations and prosecutions. But since the contractors were
basically overseen by DOD, this problem surfaced first there
and then we see it later in all of the discussion. Please keep
that in mind.
Mr. Lumpkin, the attention rightly is being given to the
Special Operations Forces, as it should be, as we meet the new
threat of a new type of enemy. What is the relationship that
you will have in your position as a civilian in DOD with our
Special Operations Forces and Admiral McRaven in the SOCOM?
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Senator.
The relationship between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander
of SOCOM--it is a civilian oversight and it is a Service
Secretary-like relationship, and this is overseeing the
operations and budgetary and acquisition programs within SOCOM.
Senator Nelson. That is pretty key, and of course, it is
going to be these kind of raids that we are going to hear in
the future as we are meeting this new kind of enemy and we have
to find them. Of necessity, that is going to be the special
operations working with their counterparts in some of the
civilian agencies.
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank each of you for your service in both civilian and
military roles and your willingness and your families'
willingness to take on this new responsibility.
Let me begin, Dr. Morin--by the way, I understand your wife
is a native of Connecticut which, for me as for the chairman,
is more than ample reason to support your confirmation.
Chairman Levin. You have two votes so far. [Laughter.]
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I would vote to confirm your
wife, not you necessarily. [Laughter.]
I want to thank her for her service in Ethiopia as well.
I am sure you are familiar with the M-17 helicopters that
the U.S. taxpayers are funding to buy from Russia.
Rosoboronexport is selling those helicopters to Afghanistan for
purchases with U.S. funds. DOD, evidently, is continuing with
the policy of making use of the exception that we made in the
last National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the purchase
of those helicopters. I strongly disagree that those purchases
should continue. I think they should stop. The Afghans cannot
use them because they do not have people trained to fly them or
to maintain them, and if we buy helicopters for the Afghanistan
Army, they should be U.S. helicopters.
Could you give me an update on the review, and would you
agree and can you commit that you will undertake a review of
those purchases before they are made?
Dr. Morin. Senator, if I am confirmed in the position, I
will certainly look forward to working with my teammates in the
acquisition enterprise and the policy community that have come
to the judgments about that program so far to ensure you get
full answers to any questions on it.
Senator Blumenthal. I would like to press you a little bit.
I would like to know that you will undertake a review of those
purchases and come back to the committee and to me with your
view as to whether or not they are, in fact, justified under
that national security exception.
Dr. Morin. Sir, I can personally take a look at it. I think
the legal judgments on the national security exception are not
typically made in the cost assessment and program evaluation
sphere, but I am happy to make a commitment to you to look at
it. I will be, of course, relying on others in the Department
with the specific expertise on the policies, though.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Dr. Rooney, I have been informed that as of this morning,
Naval Superintendent Vice Admiral Mike Miller has referred for
general court martial two of the three midshipmen who have been
potentially charged with sexual assault or other improper
activities in connection with the alleged wrongdoing involving
Midshipman Bush, the assault on her that has been alleged.
I am sure you are familiar with the process that took
place, the Article 32 proceeding. As a lawyer and also as
someone who knows the military system, would you agree with me
that the current Article 32 procedures really need complete
revision and change?
Dr. Rooney. Sir, I would definitely agree with you that the
Article 32 process needs significant revision in regards to the
issues for two reasons, both in terms of ensuring that we do
not discourage future reports or future victims to come forward
and also to ensure that we maintain that balance between both
the victim and accused and also the necessary privacy in these
matters. I absolutely agree that Article 32 does need to be
reformed.
Senator Blumenthal. I strongly support an alternative to
the current command structure, complete responsibility for the
charging process. I believe it ought to be taken out of the
command structure and that it ought to be the responsibility of
a separate trained, experienced prosecutorial office, which is
contrary to the view that you have expressed here. I respect
that view, and obviously it has substantial support from other
members of this committee. The proposal I support has been
advanced by Senator Gillibrand.
But is the problem with the current Article 32 process not
reflective of some of the deficiencies and weaknesses in the
current system more fundamentally as a whole?
Dr. Rooney. Sir, I would think that the Article 32 by
itself is something that can be reformed very quickly.
In terms of the overall process, I am aware that there has
been a panel convened to look at independently this entire
process. I would look forward to seeing what they saw in terms
of that process, any weaknesses that they identified, as well
as any strengths, and based on that, then make a very informed
decision going forward and ensure that as we correct the system
and as we create greater support and attack this problem quite
bluntly that we are doing it in a manner that we are aware of
all of the implications and ramifications. I remain open and
really would look forward, if confirmed, to that panel report
and working with this committee to really solve this problem.
Senator Blumenthal. Working with the committee to solve the
problem in terms of considering additional measures besides the
Article 32 reform and perhaps besides the revisions that have
been suggested so far by the committee in the NDAA?
Dr. Rooney. Absolutely. I think what we need to do is
definitely be open to look at what does work, as I mentioned to
Senator Ayotte, to really step back and see what types of
measures can we put in place and how can we assure that what is
changed--that we are able to track that and make sure we are
getting the results that we need, that there is the
accountability in there. As a result, yes, I would definitely
be willing to work with this committee, if confirmed, and find
a solution.
Senator Blumenthal. I welcome your willingness to work with
the committee and your openness to additional ideas. I think
the more the public understands about the differences between
the civilian and the military system and the more we
understand, the more support there will be for ending the kind
of really abusive and intolerable questioning that took place
in the Article 32 proceeding involving this midshipman case and
probably countless other cases where victims of sexual
assaults, survivors are subject to this kind of interrogation
without counsel, without support, and without advocacy. I hope
that you will take a very active interest in the sexual assault
problem and in encouraging and emboldening additional
reporting, which is necessary for the kind of data, the full
and complete and accurate data, that you suggested is very
important in these cases.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To all of you, thank you for your service to the country,
and to the families, thank you for coming up here today and
being with your loved one.
Mr. Lumpkin, in your questions that we had asked you and
information that you had given us, you talked about SOCOM's
ability to conduct rapid evaluations of technology and the
emerging off-the-shelf technologies as well.
Being from Indiana, I wanted to invite you. In Dr. Rooney's
continuing travel log going to New Hampshire and Maine--we
talked about you going to Indiana as well to see Crane Naval
Warfare Center. Mr. Lumpkin, I think that would be a great spot
for you to come by to see. The work that is done there is the
very cutting-edge technology work that SOCOM uses for much of
the operations. I just wanted to invite you to come by and see
the place where much of what our fighting force will be using
is made, is put together, and for you to be able to sit down
and tell them what else you might need.
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Senator. In my previous assignment
within SO/LIC, when I was the Principal Deputy, I did have a
chance to visit Crane and to see the amazing work that is being
done there on behalf of the special operations community. You
have my commitment, if confirmed, that I will make a trip out
to Crane in short order.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Dr. Rooney, this year's NDAA will require DOD to provide a
report outlining the effectiveness of computer-based testing in
the identification of individuals at risk of suicide. We lost
more Active Duty young men and women to suicide than in combat
last year. You have great academic experience. We would value
your input into this report, and I ask that in the role as
Under Secretary of the Navy, that you keep an open mind to
recommendations as to how to turn this around, how to put this
in a better place, how to have each of our service men and
women come home safe at the end of their service.
Dr. Rooney. Sir, if confirmed, I would definitely pledge to
do that. As you said, it is a problem for which there is no
single solution, but it is one that we have to continue to work
and find better ways, obviously, to support our men and women
because those numbers are not acceptable.
Senator Donnelly. Doctor, you saw or I presume you saw the
series of articles in the papers here regarding the pretrial
testimony of the young midshipman and the incident there. What
it brings to mind is who would ever report sexual assault
again, to follow up on my colleague, Senator Blumenthal? Who
would ever report that that happened to them if they knew that
kind of treatment awaited them by making that report and trying
to protect their dignity?
Dr. Rooney. Sir, you absolutely hit upon the reason why my
response was, if confirmed--but I know the Department is
already looking at it--how to in a very short order, reform at
least Article 32 so that we do not do exactly what you are
suggesting, which is discourage other people from coming
forward. The only way that this issue will be changed, we will
be able to attack this issue, the climate will be changed is in
fact people come forward, they feel comfortable coming forward,
they are protected coming forward, and we are able to continue
to successfully prosecute and hold people accountable for it.
That is a critical aspect of solving this issue.
Senator Donnelly. We have taken an extraordinary interest
in this because it is an extraordinary problem. One of my
colleagues in past hearings mentioned that if they had a
daughter, they would not recommend to them at this time that
they go into the Service. I cannot think of a more damning
indictment than that. We are going to make this right, work
nonstop to make this right. I know we have your commitment, if
you are confirmed, to make sure that that happens as well.
There have to be significant changes made because for that
young man or woman--it could be either--to undergo hours and
hours, whether it was 23, 24, or 25, 30, without their own
counsel, without their ability to be treated with a certain
dignity, something is very wrong with the way the process is
handled now.
Dr. Rooney. I agree, Senator, and I will reiterate my
pledge, if confirmed, to work tirelessly on this issue, but
also work directly with this committee and others, so together
we are able to move forward and address the many issues
surrounding this.
Senator Donnelly. Secretary Morin, the Active versus
Reserve makeup that we have, the CAPE report, similar things. I
had mentioned to you in a meeting we had about how they tried
to close down the A-10 base in Fort Wayne, IN. At a time when
they were delivering the same services that could be delivered
by Active Duty, the Reserve was doing it at 28 cents on the
dollar. We have to look to ways to fund our military better, to
lessen the pain of sequestration, but we also have to save
money where we can and where it makes sense.
I want your commitment that you are going to take a look at
this and try to make decisions not based on this group or that
group but where the numbers fall, where it is right for our
Nation, and where it is right for our fighting force moving
forward that there be no protection of one group or the other
in this process, but that we make the decisions that make the
most sense.
Dr. Morin. Senator, you have that commitment from me. This
is exactly the sort of issue where independent, unbiased,
rigorous analysis is critical. The specific cost factors
associated with any particular force element depend on a number
of assumptions about how you are going to use it, when you are
going to use it, and how intensely you will use it. But it is
clear, as the Department grapples with significant reductions
in our top line budget, that we need to optimize across the
total force.
Senator Donnelly. Primarily for Dr. Rooney and yourself
but, Mr. Lumpkin, if you would like to chime in on this too. I
am getting a little short on time.
I met recently with some Navy folks who said that within a
certain number of years looking forward, two-thirds of the
funds that go to the Navy every year for operations would be
for personnel costs, health costs, similar things. In effect,
what you have is a health and personnel plan with a couple of
ships in the water as well. How do we change that destiny?
Dr. Rooney. The numbers you cite, based on information that
I have seen, are accurate, that the personnel costs are quickly
escalating to the point where they are not sustainable because
they are, in fact, taking away not only from short-term but
long-term investments. It comes down to making sure that we are
understanding what is driving those costs and having the
difficult decisions based, as you indicated, on analysis, on
facts, and on an understanding of where we can make adjustments
in those budgets so that we can have sustainability and having
those very difficult conversations.
I had seen that information when I was in Personnel and
Readiness. It was something that we were tracking very, very
closely. While our people are our number one asset, it cannot
be at the expense of a balance in terms of total force and the
necessary equipment.
We would have to very closely look at it and, frankly, be
very open and honest and work with this committee and having
those discussions about where those levers are that we can
actually pull and understanding what the ramifications are not
only in just one budget cycle year, but quite frankly going
forward.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you. I am out of time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
With the understanding, I hope, of my colleagues, just on
the Article 32 to embellish just for one moment. Would you
agree, Dr. Rooney, that we have to look at Article 32 in
addition to the sexual assault victim who is put through a
wringer on Article 32, but that it is broader than that in
terms of the way Article 32 is used in general? Would you agree
with that?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I absolutely would. If I implied
differently----
Chairman Levin. No, no. You did not. You did not imply
anything at all. I just think it is important, while we were on
that subject, anyway, I think it clarifies it.
Senator Kaine is next.
Senator Kaine. I have two general questions that I would
like to ask, and maybe with Dr. Rooney to begin, if you could
each respond.
The first deals with planning. My service on the committee,
though brief, has made me more and more aware that good
planning is at the core of so much of our military success,
whether it is planning about a battlefield operation or a
special operation or planning about a weapons system
acquisition. I am increasingly disturbed about the budgetary
uncertainty and how that messes up planning in each of your
corners of the world and how it takes the planning expertise,
and instead of having that expertise devoted toward proactive
missions and responsibilities, the planning expertise kind of
gets diverted toward, we do not know what the budget will be
and so we have to run all these scenarios because of the
uncertainty of the budget operation.
I would just like you to each talk about how you see the
budgetary uncertainty, sequester, shutdown, et cetera affecting
planning functions in your current capacities.
Dr. Rooney. Sir, I will speak to, if confirmed, the issues
that I am aware of that Navy would face, and they are several-
fold.
Senator McCain had asked if I felt that I could state
emphatically whether in fact Navy would have audit readiness by
2014, and I said I did not have the information to make that
determination. Part of that is because with the inability to
make sure that there is the appropriate hiring to fill those
slots--and those have been difficult to fill--as you indicated,
with the uncertainty in budgets and how to make last-minute
adjustments and not be working towards a strategy but frankly
moving towards a budget role, moving people off of the
planning, that has exacerbated that issue.
In order to do good planning, you have to start with a good
base whether that is understanding your inventory, whether that
is understanding your people. As we continue with not only the
fiscal uncertainty but also the uncertainty with our people and
being able to allow them that opportunity to sit back and think
on a time horizon that is longer term with certainty, we are
going to continue to have an ever-increasing problem with
planning, not a decreasing problem.
Dr. Morin. Senator, I would just add that one of the key
reasons that our DOD is the envy of the world and our military
establishment is the envy of the world is the really robust
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process that we
use. I have been approached in my job as Air Force Comptroller
by senior officials from other nations, ministries of defense,
saying we would love if you would have people come over and
educate us as to how the Air Force, how DOD does this long-
range plan.
The Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation organization is
the keeper of what is called the Future Years Defense Plan, the
database of the programmatic decisions that the Department is
making for that 5-year time horizon. I can tell you very
directly that the rigor and intelligence that needs to be put
into making those choices sensibly is enormously demanding. The
process of simultaneously doing that sort of planning at
multiple budget levels, while you do not know what your
previous year's jumping off point is--so right now, we are in
the midst of 2015 to 2019 planning horizon with absolutely no
idea what we are going to be doing in 2014, if and when we end
the shutdown and get to start executing 2014--that is
enormously difficult. I think the instability really puts at
risk that entire well-articulated, effective set of
institutions that strive to squeeze that maximum amount of
combat capability out of each taxpayer dollar. It is doing
enormous and untold damage to the institution.
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you for the question, Senator, because I
think this one is absolutely key, especially with regard to the
special operations community. Special operations cannot be
massed produced. It is not one of those things that you can
just turn it on and off like a light switch. It takes time and
there is a significant process that goes into making a special
operator who tends to be more seasoned, older, more experienced
than what we see in the general purpose forces.
The plans that we had developed in QDR 2006, which I had
mentioned earlier, about growing the force and then those
enablers that were identified in the 2010 QDR--we are just now
seeing a lot of those operationally hit into our units that we
can deploy and use in the future. To shrink and scale that
back, there is what we call the ``flash to bang''. There is a
delay to get those people on the front lines. If we retract
from where we are at right now, it takes a long time to turn it
back on. The uncertainty causes significant problems with force
management and overall readiness as we go into the future,
especially in these uncertain times.
Senator Kaine. Let me just extend the discussion. I want to
talk about morale of your people. Last week I was asked and I
was honored to be asked to give someone the oath of office for
a promotion in the Air Force from major to colonel. It was an
exciting thing, but it happened 2 days after the individual had
been furloughed from his job as a DOD civilian. He was an Air
Force veteran C-17 pilot but now working as a civilian in the
Pentagon. He gave a couple of comments with friends and family
gathered around on a day that should have been a day of just
unalloyed pride and happiness. It kind of had a worm in the
apple there because of the furlough.
He said something that really kind of struck everybody. He
said we hear a lot of talk about American exceptionalism. I was
furloughed earlier this year because I am serving my country,
and there was a sequester, and I have just been furloughed a
second time because I am serving my country and there is a
shutdown. I am not feeling that we are that exceptional right
now. It really struck me as there has to be significant morale
effects of all this uncertainty, wondering whether the
political leadership is behind you or not. That has to have a
short-term morale effect and a long-term as well. Do I want to
stay and do this? Do I want to keep making the sacrifice?
Again, maybe starting with Mr. Lumpkin and working back
across, if you would each explain how you see this affecting
the folks that you are working with.
Mr. Lumpkin. I will talk on two different fronts with
regard to morale. Within the special operations community--we
will talk about that first--we have some highly energetic men
and women who want to do great. They want to serve this Nation.
When they see the uncertainty of the future, they are
wondering. I cannot speak for everybody, but there is
apprehension about what does the future hold and what is my
perceived value.
Now, if you look in the civilian workforce, which I am
surrounded by at the Pentagon as well now, the furloughs took
their toll on morale. The shutdown has even been greater. The
certainty of what is ahead is not there, of where is this going
to end and what is it going to look like in the future and
where do they fit in. I have real concerns about the morale of
both our Armed Forces and the Federal workers based on the
current climate.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but could
the other two witnesses briefly respond?
Chairman Levin. Sure, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Dr. Morin. Senator Kaine, the impacts have been very
serious. I spent a couple hours yesterday walking through and
talking with members of the really impressive staff that
supports me in my current job as Air Force Comptroller, a staff
that makes me look good and makes the Air Force very effective
and efficient. It is a group I rely on enormously, about two-
thirds civilian and a third military.
Both parts of that community are under enormous strain.
What we have asked the military folks to do in a time of
successions of civilian furloughs and the uncertainty we have
asked our civilians to take on is heartbreaking, and it is
deeply disruptive. People are holding together well and they
are pulling together as a team. I saw that now that a large
portion of our workforce has been recalled, and there were
actually people in the office. But it has been one blow after
another, and we are asking a lot of our mid-level supervisors
to keep their teams focused in the face of all of that.
Again, it is very hard to quantify the effect that it will
have. I am sure we will see more retirements of highly valued
performers. We have seen that across the Air Force already. I
am sure we will see people seeking greener pastures. The
American public needs dedicated public servants willing to come
into Government and put up with some of the unique challenges
working there for the purpose of the mission. If we keep giving
them this level of uncertainty, this level of personal pain, we
may lose them, and we will not know that damage until we have
seen it and we will deeply regret it then.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Rooney?
Dr. Rooney. Sir, it is interesting. I bring a slightly
different perspective than my two colleagues because I have
been out of the Department for just over a year. Looking at the
difference between when I left the Department where people were
working tirelessly long hours, but as Secretary Morin said,
some of the best people that make all the senior leadership
look good, to go back now and see the angst, the uncertainty,
key people discussing that they think it is time to be able to
move on because the uncertainty is affecting them not only in
the work arena but home has been absolutely heartbreaking to
see. These are critical people.
If I could just look at the Navy, of the roughly 200,000
civilians in the Department of the Navy, over half of those
people are engineers, acquisition specialists, scientists,
technology. Over 50 percent are veterans. I have heard the same
thing. Retired colonels, who would be exactly the kind of
people you want on your team, saying I would go to private
industry because I just cannot face that uncertainty, really
creates not only the problem now, but it is a problem that I do
not think we even will see the results of for years to come,
and at that point it is going to be virtually impossible
recover.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Now a 100 percent Mainer, Senator King.
Senator King. I could say that New Hampshire is technically
a State, but I would not say that. [Laughter.]
Especially not with Senator Ayotte here.
I want to associate myself with Senator Kaine's questions.
I am infuriated that we are in this situation. We are now
seeing the fruits of--I do not know--25 or 30 years of
disparaging Government employment, bureaucrats, and that kind
of talk.
Senator Levin and I went to the Middle East this summer,
and people have asked me about my reaction to that trip. There
are lots of policy reactions, but the most overwhelming
reaction that I have told my friends of that trip was the
amazing quality of the young people that we have working for
this country, whether it is in the Intelligence Community, the
military, or the State Department. They are wonderful people
who are idealistic and trying to serve their country, and we
are treating them shabbily. These are people who have not had a
raise in 3 years. They have been furloughed. They have now been
furloughed again.
It is beyond my comprehension why we are not doing better
on solving the problems. I mean, the most serious threat to
national security right now is the U.S. Congress, and it is
shocking that we cannot do this. I understand maybe some are
talking about something and we may postpone these deadlines for
another month or so, but that we cannot do better by our people
is terrible. I think part of it is this public repeating of
this disparagement of public servants, and it includes
teachers, by the way, I mean, some of our most important public
servants. It is shameful.
I am sorry. That is not a question because you have all
answered the question.
I do, Dr. Rooney, want to follow up. As I understand it,
one of the big problems with the projection of costs, which is
moving toward two-thirds being personnel, is health care costs.
Is that in fact the case?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, it absolutely is.
Senator King. That points up the fact that--and there are
two ways to deal with those health care costs. One is for the
Government to shift those costs to somebody else. I believe the
more important role that we have is to try to figure out how to
lower those costs for everyone, not just for the Government or
for Social Security or for Medicare, but for the entire
society.
I am worried about the shipbuilding program. We have a 30-
year shipbuilding plan supposedly to go to 306 ships, but we
are not going to make it during much of that 30 years. If we do
not replace sequestration and get this budget situation in
order, is that not going to be one of the casualties?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, absolutely. In fact, I think the CNO
came in front of this group or Members of Congress and started
to outline the immediate impacts of shipbuilding that would be
extended, useful lives of equipment hopefully being extended,
early decommissioning of potential ships because it just comes
down to an affordability and choices. Again, any of these
impacts that we are talking about have, of course, a short-term
impact, but I do not think we are taking the time to recognize
the long-term implications of that not only for the immediate
readiness of our forces and our ability to defend around the
world, but also from the industrial base and the shipbuilding
skills necessary to move it forward. He was very clear, I
believe, in outlining that.
Senator King. In the State of Maine, we have two naval
facilities, the Brunswick Naval Shipyard and a civilian
facility in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I can tell you once
those welders go somewhere else, you cannot get them back. That
is not something that you can turn off and on. It is a capacity
that we are losing, and people are going to look back in 10
years--Congress is very good at making problems and then
looking back 10 years later or 5 years later and blaming other
people for creating the problems. We are going to look back and
say what happened, why did we not have a ship available to go
to the Gulf or whatever it was.
Mr. Lumpkin, to change the subject rather dramatically, I
think September 11 was the first battle of World War III, and I
think we are in a fundamentally different military situation
and you are right in the middle of it. The question I want to
ask--and it is a question I asked the day before yesterday in
the Intelligence Committee--is how do we rethink our strategy
for dealing with worldwide terrorism which seems to be
spreading and multiplying. We now have groups we never heard of
a few years ago, al Shabaab and al Nusra and these other groups
associated with al Qaeda. The strategy of trying to kill these
people one at a time is like dealing with the Hydra. You cut
off one head and two grow back.
Talk to me about a broader strategy for dealing with
worldwide terrorism because it is going to be with us, and I
just do not know if we are going to be able to afford to or
will be able to effectively cut it off by strikes and raids.
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, sir.
I think you are absolutely correct. We are not going to be
able to kill our way to victory in the sense of one at a time
and getting one ``eaches'' work forward. I think the key is,
through building partner capacity, we need to reduce areas
where there are security vacuums for groups like al Qaeda or al
Shabaab to exist and to flourish. I think the key for us, as we
build our strategy moving forward, is to make sure we focus on
those security reforms that we can help in other nations
through building partner capacity to remove the environment
that fosters such behaviors that al Qaeda has. If confirmed, I
will do my part to shape that strategy.
Senator King. The implication of what you just said--part
of that leads logically to Afghanistan and 10 or 12 years of
occupation in order to do that. I hope you are not suggesting
we need to occupy Somalia, Mali, Lebanon, you name it.
Mr. Lumpkin. No, I am not. I am not advocating nation
building in a sense. I am talking about building a capacity
with selected partners who can bring security to where there
are security vacuums. This is not a one-size-fits-all. Rather,
it has to be a tailored approach based on the specific region
and/or country in question.
If you look at the in securities we had in Colombia back in
the 1980s and 1990s, it has been a concerted, sustained effort.
But I would argue that we have made significant progress with
Colombians as partners to make that a much more stable and
vibrant economy and allowed more of a secure situation for the
populace and the people of that area, subsequently reducing the
flow of narcotics and creating stability within the region.
Senator King. One of the answers would be to study that
situation and figure out how to replicate it.
Mr. Lumpkin. I think it is a good case study to look at.
Senator King. Dr. Morin, you are in an incredible job
because I hate to tell you this, but I do not think there is
going to be a lot more money. Nobody is going to wake up
tomorrow morning and say, gee, I want to pay more taxes so we
can spend more money. I hope the sequester is not going to stay
with us, but certainly limits are going to stay with us. You
have to be rigorously objective, it seems to me. You are in one
of the most important jobs in DOD in my view because you are
going to be dealing with constrained resources from the day you
walk through the door.
Dr. Morin. Yes, sir.
Senator King. There was not a question there.
But I think acquisition costs--the taxpayers just are not
going to tolerate it. You did not have the pleasure of Senator
McCain, I do not think, talking to you about the F-35, but you
probably will before it is all over and it is not going to be
fun, I can tell you.
Thank you very much. Thanks to all of you for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Hagan?
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I echo Senator King's comments and that is, we thank all of
you for your service. Thank you very much for your past service
and your current.
Mr. Lumpkin, I want to build on Senator Nelson's question.
Title 10 states that the principal duty of the ASD(SO/LIC) is
the overall supervision, including oversight of policy and
resources of our special operations activities. In other words,
the ASD(SO/LIC) is to provide civilian oversight of
acquisition, budget, and related matters for SOCOM. In recent
years, these responsibilities have competed with current
operations for the main attention of the ASD(SO/LIC).
If confirmed, will you make oversight of SOCOM a top
priority?
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Senator.
Absolutely. Being in SO/LIC when budgets were increasing,
the opportunity presented itself to focus, I am sure, on
operations. As we are in this fiscally constrained environment,
civilian oversight of SOCOM and the major force program 11
funding line is absolutely key and paramount.
Senator Hagan. How will you be different than in the past?
Mr. Lumpkin. I think it is about time. For me this is one
of those issues, if confirmed, I will put significant time,
effort, and resources against making sure we can do the proper
oversight for SOCOM.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Mr. Lumpkin, again. The Commander of our U.S. Special
Operations, Admiral McRaven, has publicly highlighted the
contributions that women have made to our special operations
missions, including serving as members of the cultural support
teams, military information support teams, civil military
support elements, and in other roles. The Department earlier
this year eliminated its so-called ground combat exclusion
policy and will open all positions to service by women by 2016,
unless excepted. The Department continues to study occupational
standards required of all of our military specialties, and I
expect this effort will eventually open up thousands of new
positions to women, possibly including many in special
operations.
I also want to note that we just lost one female cultural
support member who was killed in the improvised explosive
device attack this past week with the three other
servicemembers. We certainly have women not only being a part
of these teams, but certainly giving the ultimate sacrifice as
part of this effort.
Mr. Lumpkin, what is your understanding of the current role
of women in supporting our special operations missions, and if
confirmed, what criteria would you use in assessing whether our
special operations units should remain closed to service by
women?
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you for that question.
Women are ever-present in the special operations community.
When I commanded a team, I had numerous women who were within
the structure of that team. I think that the special operations
community has been very open to having women within its ranks.
I do know that Admiral McRaven have been charged to do a
study, and his results are due, I think, by January 2016 on
where the community is and where the assimilation of women
throughout the ranks within special operations. If confirmed, I
will work with Admiral McRaven to make sure that SOCOM does a
complete and comprehensive study to make the best
recommendation forward.
Senator Hagan. The study is not due until January 2016. It
is another 2-plus years?
Mr. Lumpkin. My understanding is that that is when the
recommendations or exclusions need to be submitted. But I can
take that for you and confirm that date.
[The information referred to follows:]

The study on occupational standards is expected to be completed by
July 2015. As I understand, the goal is to implement the findings by
January 2016.

Senator Hagan. It seems like that is a long time for a
study. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Rooney, in the current budgetary environment, there are
significant pressures facing the broader DOD--of our science
and technology (S&T) community. There are two significant
challenges that I am sure you are aware of, given your last
position. The first is the decreasing ability to recruit and
retain our best scientists and engineers that obviously are
being drawn into other competitive and lucrative sectors. The
second is the decreasing ability to revitalize, much less
maintain the infrastructure of the DOD's laboratories and our
warfare centers to the standards being set in academic and
private sector facilities.
If confirmed, what would you do specifically working with
the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and
Installations and Environment to really ensure that the Navy's
S&T enterprise can hire, can retain the best and the brightest
scientists and engineers to work in a world-class environment
that allows them to develop the next generation of capabilities
for our future sailors and marines?
It really concerns me greatly that our education system is
not up to the speed it needs to be from a science, technology,
engineering, and math (STEM) background and a STEM education,
our K-12 and our universities. We typically lose our girls in
the middle school going into these engineering and math and
science programs, but also the fact that there is such a
competitive environment for these limited numbers of
individuals. We certainly want to be sure we have the best and
the brightest within DOD to be sure that we can compete on a
global basis in this area.
Dr. Rooney. Senator, I agree that it has been a problem in
the past. In order to attract, as well as retain, because I
think this is a two-pronged problem, we have to make sure that
we have an environment in which these individuals can work,
that they are supported in their creativity, that they have the
tools that they need to work on new designs and the
opportunities to do that, all of the areas of STEM. There have
been STEM programs within the Department.
The problem comes in that we are in a competitive
environment, and frankly the uncertainty of the last few years,
the budgets, the lack of being able to have raises or have some
of the tools that are available in private industry are only
making this challenge even greater. It is very difficult to
recruit. As I mentioned, over half of the Department of the
Navy civilians fit in many of the categories you described. It
is very difficult not only attracting newer and our younger and
maybe our very creative different thinkers, but retaining when
we are putting people on furloughs. We have challenges with
hiring, and we have had little or no raises through the years.
We cannot compete with private industry, similar concerns
that, frankly, I faced in higher education where you were
trying to attract the best of the scientists and medical people
to be not only researchers but your teachers, and you had to
provide that level of environment and really show that you not
only were willing to engage but that you valued the service. I
think we have some basic foundational work to do in order to be
an attractive place long-term for these individuals.
Senator Hagan. Can you give me any recommendations that you
think you might be sharing with us in the near future I hope?
Dr. Rooney. I was going to say if confirmed, I absolutely
will dive deeper into our specific programs, look at the types
of things, particularly since I have been away from the
Department for a year, that we have been trying to do, look at
the data of who have we lost. Have they been our most senior
people? Have we not recruited? That way we can tailor those
tools. This is not a case of saying just throw money at it.
There are specific things.
Senator Hagan. Do you know what the retention is?
Dr. Rooney. I do not, Senator, at this point, but if
confirmed, I would definitely look into it. I started off as an
engineer in college, and I was encouraged in math and science.
I know the challenge. I challenge that young woman back there,
who is the freshman in college, to do the same.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to direct my questions to the Honorable Jo Ann
Rooney.
I understand earlier in your testimony Senator McCain asked
you your views on sexual assault in the military, and your
stated opinion was that you would like the decisionmaking about
whether to go to trial to be done within the chain of command.
I have looked at your written statement, and I am extremely
troubled by what you said. The question is, ``In your view what
would the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the
chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual
assault should be prosecuted? Your answer is, ``A judge
advocate outside the chain of command will be looking at a case
through a different lens than a military commander. I believe
the impact would be decisions based on evidence rather than the
interest in preserving good order and discipline. I believe
this will result in fewer prosecutions and therefore defeat the
problem that I understand it seeks to address.''
You are an attorney. Correct? Under what world would you
recommend the decision about whether a serious crime, meaning a
conviction could mean more than a year or more, should not be
based on the evidence?
Dr. Rooney. That statement meant that someone outside the
chain of command--and often as an attorney, you are bound by
the rules of evidence as to whether you will take a case
forward for any prosecution. A commander also must look at
evidence, and the implication was not that the commander would
not, but a commander also has some additional tools that they
could use that are non-judicial punishment in order to be able
to address that command climate and change the attitudes
towards it. That is what that statement----
Senator Gillibrand. Under our proposed legislation, Article
15, non-judicial punishment, is retained by all commanders, as
are all crimes of mission. I am highly concerned that you
believe there should be any context or that decision should not
be based solely on evidence about whether you try a case.
Members of the military still retain civil liberties. They
still have basic rights of justice, and if you are trying to
tip the scales in favor of a defendant or in favor of a victim,
that is also inappropriate. You want cases going forward that
have evidence that merit a prosecution. You want nothing else
because if you drive cases forward because you feel like it or
because you do not like the perpetrator or do not like the
accused or really like the victim, you are using bias. Bias is
not effective in making a prosecutorial decision. You should
have an objective review based only on the evidence because we
do not want a justice system that favors victims. We do not
want a justice system that favors defendants. We want an
objective justice system that provides justice for an accused,
for a perpetrator who is going to be reviewed fairly and for a
victim who is looking for a fair shot. You need an objective
justice system.
I do not believe that the chain of command should be using
the threat of prosecution as a cudgel or a tool to manipulate
or determine how their troops will behave. They have other
means to do that. They are the ones solely responsible for
command climate, solely responsible for good order and
discipline. But that decision point, that legal decision point,
should be made solely on the basis of evidence.
Do you believe a commander should base that decision on
something other than evidence about whether to go to trial for
a serious crime?
Dr. Rooney. No, ma'am. As I just said, they must look at
the evidence, of course. That is key to it. They have legal
teams around them that can help them understand those. But they
also have other tools and other ways to impact what is clearly
an issue that also goes to command climate and also goes to
changing a culture. We have to be able to hold that commander
accountable.
Senator Gillibrand. Those tools remain within the
commander's purview entirely. That commander is solely
responsible for good order and discipline. That commander is
solely responsible for command climate. Those responsibilities
will never change. What we are urging is that the legal
decision that requires training, legal training, prosecutorial
discretion, prosecutorial judgment, and an objective review. A
review that does not entail knowing the perpetrator and knowing
the victim, having preconceived notions of whether women should
be in the armed services, having preconceived notions about
whether you can serve if you are from the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender community.
Have you reviewed this legislation, this proposed change?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, I am aware of the legislation, and I am
also aware of the panel that has been put together to have an
independent assessment, be able to outline both the challenges
and the implications going forward. As I mentioned to Senator
Blumenthal, I would remain very open to the information that
comes out of that group in order that, if confirmed, I would
work with this committee and Congress to move forward on a
sustainable and true solution going forward.
Senator Gillibrand. When Dick Cheney was the Secretary of
Defense some 20-odd years ago, he said there was zero tolerance
for sexual assault in the military. Since that time, there have
been dozens of reports. Have you reviewed those reports and
recommendations? Do we really need another report and
recommendation to finally protect victims within the armed
services?
Dr. Rooney. I believe that what that panel's job to do is
to really take the time now not just to make a report, but to
outline just so all of us are basing any conversations and
decisions and best paths forward on an independent assessment.
It is not, from my understanding, designed to either slow this
process down or come to a foregone conclusion. That is why
seeing what that group did and working together on a common
solution is something, if confirmed, I would be very open to
doing.
Senator Gillibrand. I have seen boxes of reports, boxes,
over 25 years on the same issue.
Are you familiar with what the Defense Advisory Committee
on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) panel is?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, I am.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you understand that they have just
issued a report recommending this change?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, I am.
Senator Gillibrand. What do you think the value of that
recommendation is since the sole responsibility of the DACOWITS
panel is to recommend to Secretary Hagel ideas about how to
protect and preserve and to maintain a strong armed services
with regard to women in particular?
Dr. Rooney. I believe that they have fulfilled their role
to make that recommendation going forward. I also know that
based on what I have seen in the history of our military, that
they have been using the existing command structure and using a
commander's ability to influence climate and control have been
very successful in making some very significant changes,
whether it was integrating the forces on down to the recent
implementation of the repeal of Don't Ask/Don't Tell. There is
also support for how that command structure can be part of and,
frankly, drive significant cultural change.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you remember what the response was
from our commanders when we tried to repeal Don't Ask/Don't
Tell, when we tried to integrate women into the Services, when
we tried to integrate the Services with African Americans? Do
you remember what their response was?
Dr. Rooney. Not word for word.
Senator Gillibrand. You cannot possibly do this because it
will undermine good order and discipline.
Do you know what their response was when we had a hearing
on sexual assault in the military and we suggested that Article
60 should be removed, the authority to overturn a jury verdict?
Do you know what the response was? From the commanders that
testified, it was you cannot possibly do this because it will
undermine good order and discipline.
The day after Secretary Hagel recommends that Article 60
authority is no longer necessary, the commanders said that is
fine. It is a vestige of pre-World War I. Of course, we can
implement that.
I think this is the same excuse we have heard over and over
again. To have the DACOWITS panel, who has been investigating
these issues for 20 years, to make a recommendation to the
Secretary of Defense that not only should you take the
decisionmaking for all serious crimes out of the chain of
command, but you should give that decisionmaking to trained
military prosecutors as a way to create a more objective system
so justice is possible is a recommendation I think you should
take seriously.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
We are going to have a brief second round.
Following up on Senator Gillibrand's questions, you have
been a university president. Is that correct?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I have.
Chairman Levin. You have had situations where you have had
sexual assaults and have had to deal with civilian prosecutors
and what their attitude is towards prosecuting sexual assaults.
Is that correct?
Dr. Rooney. Unfortunately, sir, yes, I have.
Chairman Levin. What has been that experience?
Dr. Rooney. It has actually been mixed. It has not been an
unwillingness of prosecutors to take on cases, but if they felt
they did not have very strong evidence going forward, they were
unwilling, frankly, to move those forward. I do not mean to
imply that that is all prosecutors. I am just narrowing that
down to my experience in two different university settings. It
really was not a tool we were able to use to actually impact
what was happening on the campuses.
Chairman Levin. Because of the reluctance of civilian
prosecutors in difficult cases to proceed?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, and for the victims to feel that nothing
was going to happen at that level. It was not something that
they used as a way to feel confident that moving forward,
something would be done. It continues to remain a vexing
challenge.
Chairman Levin. In the civilian world?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. A commander does not have that same kind of
reluctance in tough cases. He can proceed or she can proceed
because it needs to be prosecuted in their judgment. Is that
correct?
Dr. Rooney. That is it. If there is not the ability to take
it forward on a prosecution, again there are other ways to be
able to make sure that that climate is changed and victims are
protected and that no tolerance for that type of behavior is
reinforced. It is the commander's job.
Chairman Levin. Are you familiar with the decision which
was made relative to race that we were going to get rid of
racism in the military? Commanders were ordered and because
they are commanders and in a chain of command, that they in
fact implemented finally a policy against racism and prejudice
in the military with some real success, as a matter of fact.
Are you familiar with that?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. In fact, that was one of the examples
that I mentioned, that as well as the most recent one that I
have had the most direct experience with.
Chairman Levin. Are you familiar with the Don't Ask/Don't
Tell situation where, although we had commanders, in fact, top
commanders right here, urging us not to do it, that we did it
anyway, and that they then directed their commanders to
implement the repeal of Don't Ask/Don't Tell and end
discrimination against gay people in the military? They have
done it with real success because of the power of the
commanders.
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I am very familiar with that, in
fact, was very much involved during my tenure in the Department
with that initiative.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask Mr. Lumpkin this question. You
have testified that from an operational point of view, it is
helpful that an interrogation not have a fixed deadline. In
your view, is it also important that an interrogation comply
with the requirements of common article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and that the detainee or detainees not be subject
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment at any time?
Mr. Lumpkin. Absolutely, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. I have just one question, Mr. Chairman, for
Mr. Lumpkin.
Mr. Lumpkin, as we are pursuing a troop drawdown in
Afghanistan, the special forces have been deeply instrumental
in training efforts of Afghan security around special
operations and others. What is your current assessment of
Afghan readiness and force effectiveness in preparation for
2014 and beyond?
Mr. Lumpkin. Significant strides have been made during the
past decade of building the Afghan capability. We are going to
make use of the remainder of the known time we have because
there is always further progress that can be made. I think one
of the reasons why we would want to keep some sort of force
there is to continue that partnership to make sure we can
continue to work with them post-2014, if possible.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Senator King?
Senator King. Dr. Rooney, just another follow-up on this
question. I find this question of chain of command and sexual
assault a very difficult one. I have decided to come down on
the side of not making that change.
One of the things that convinced me was I want the
commander to feel responsible for this issue. Is that a
legitimate way of thinking about this?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, it absolutely is. I know in
particular in the Navy, the commander's ability and the result
of their command and control and command climate is a critical
piece that is considered for any promotion or any future
command. That is absolutely true. There are many ways to hold
that commander accountable. As I said, that is their job.
Senator King. I am sure you are aware, but in the National
Defense Authorization Bill that has been reported out of this
committee, there are numerous changes in the law in regard to
this problem. The one that is not made is the one that we have
been discussing about taking the decision out of the chain of
command, but there are many other changes to strengthen the
military.
On the other hand, you are bearing the brunt of this
because you are here today for the Navy. This is clearly a DOD
issue. But Senator Gillibrand's point is well taken, that this
has been a problem for a long time and at some point, this
committee and Congress is going to say enough is enough and we
are going to make much more dramatic changes. I hope that as
you are working with the naval commanders, that you will make
it clear that this really does require a culture change and it
has to start right away because time is running out on patience
for this problem to be resolved.
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. All of our collective patience should
be challenged on this to get a solution that works and that we
can prove that works moving forward.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Rooney, in terms of the experience you
have had with the Department at large, you have been, as I
understand it, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness and the Acting Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, I gather at the same time.
Is that correct?
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, it is.
Chairman Levin. For how long a period was it?
Dr. Rooney. The overlap was for a period of----
Chairman Levin. No, not the overlap, but together how long?
Dr. Rooney. Oh, together? Just under 2 years.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Rooney, you were asked a question by
Senator McCain and you committed to get an answer for the
record about the audit schedule I believe for the Navy.
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay, and that was a very important
question, an appropriate question. If you can promptly get us
that answer for the record as to whether that audit schedule
for 2014 and 2017 I believe. You did not know the answer here
as to whether it is on schedule, but if you could promptly find
out as much as you can and then give us your opinion the best
you can as to whether or not it is on schedule and do that for
the record, it would be very helpful in terms of proceeding
with this.
Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir.
Senator King. That is another area where patience is
wearing thing.
Chairman Levin. Where patience has not worn thin this
morning is Liam. You have really been a big help to your dad
because you have sat there now for I do not know many hours
looking interested in every single question that was asked, and
you have been a big help to your dad. I want to commend you. I
know how proud your parents are of you and your grandparents
sitting here are of you. I have six grandchildren, one of whom
is a boy just about your age. I know he would be just as
patient and supporting as you have been. I do not want to
compare it in any way.
Thank you to all of the people who have come with our
nominees today. We thank you and I know they thank you for your
support. We thank our nominees.
We will stand adjourned and hope we can proceed with these
nominations very expeditiously. Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Michael D. Lumpkin by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the special operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
or special operations reform provisions? If so, what areas do you
believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
Answer. No. The Goldwater-Nichols Act and current special
operations authorities have served the Department and our Nation well
and enhanced the Department's capabilities to respond when required. If
confirmed, I will make proposals for modifications if and when
required.
duties
Question. Section 138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., describes the
duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
ASD(SO/LIC)?
Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict
matters. The ASD(SO/LIC) has overall supervision (to include oversight
of policy and resources) of special operations and low-intensity
conflict activities which encompass policies pertaining to Department
of Defense special operations' capabilities and authorities,
counternarcotic efforts and resources, humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, strategies for building partner capacity, and
stability operations in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy's priorities and guidance.
Question. What Department of Defense (DOD) activities are currently
encompassed by the Department's definition of special operations and
low-intensity conflict?
Answer. Special operations and low intensity conflict activities,
as defined section 167 of title 10 U.S.C., include direct action,
strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal
defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism,
humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other
activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of
Defense.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, in the duties and
functions of ASD(SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary of Defense
would prescribe for you?
Answer. At present, I do not expect the Secretary of Defense would
make any changes to the duties and functions assigned of ASD(SO/LIC).
Question. In your view, are the duties set forth in section
138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., up to date, or should changes be
considered?
Answer. Yes, I believe the duties of the ASD(SO/LIC) as prescribed
in section 138(b)(4) of title 10 continue to remain relevant and
provide the ASD(SO/LIC) appropriate and clear authority to serve as the
principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special
operations and low intensity conflict matters. I do not believe any
changes are needed at this time.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASD(SO/LIC)?
Answer. Not at present, but if confirmed I would make an assessment
of this and provide recommendations as needed to improve my oversight
of Special Operations.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I believe I am uniquely qualified for this position because
of my broad background in all aspects of the SO/LIC portfolio.
I have been directly involved in the arena of special operations
since the 1980's when I began a career as a naval officer and U.S. Navy
SEAL. During my time on active duty, I served throughout the world in
places such as Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador, the Horn of Africa,
and Iraq. As a U.S. Navy SEAL, I held every leadership position from
Platoon Commander to Team Commanding Officer. During my time in
uniform, I garnered significant experience in counternarcotics,
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and security sector assistance.
After my military service, in addition to serving in other Federal
departments, I served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Acting
ASD(SO/LIC).
Additionally, I have a strong management background and served in
the principal leadership positions of Chief Executive Officer and
Director in the private sector.
relationships
Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
following:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will perform my duties as the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all special operations,
assisting the Secretary in the development and employment of Special
Operations Forces (SOF) to achieve U.S. national security objectives. I
will engage the Secretary on U.S. counterterrorism strategy and
operations, offer policy guidance and oversight of international
efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and transnational organized
crime, and inform the Secretary regarding the Department's support to
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and stability operations across
the globe.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will keep the Deputy Secretary informed as
well as provide advice and support on current and future special
operations activities, capabilities, plans, and authorities, ongoing
and projected counterterrorism efforts and priorities, and the
development and employment of stability operations, counternarcotic
programs, and peacekeeping efforts.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work very closely supporting the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will keep the Under Secretary
informed as well as provide advice and support on current and future
special operations activities, capabilities, plans, and authorities,
ongoing and projected counterterrorism efforts and priorities, and the
development and employment of stability operations, counternarcotics
programs, and peacekeeping efforts.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. Special operations and intelligence are mutually
supporting, so, if confirmed, I will continue to foster the close
working relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the regional
Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, providing advice regarding special operations
and stability operations that are ongoing or in the planning stage. We
would also work together on policies to build partner capacity,
counternarcotics, and combat global threats. I would also anticipate
working very closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
Security Affairs on our counterproliferation and cyber policy efforts.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to maintain a close working
relationship with the Chairman, the Chiefs, and the Chairman's staff.
Effective policy and resource oversight of special operations to
include successful implementation of our counterterrorism strategies
requires continued close coordination and collaboration with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff, and the
Chairman's staff.
Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Department
Secretaries and Service Chiefs to ensure that the requirements to
organize, train, and equip personnel and units that enable or support
Special Operations Forces are met and maintained. I would also work
with them to ensure adequate resourcing of Service-common requirements
and infrastructure for Special Operations Forces.
Question. The Geographic Combatant Commanders.
Answer. The geographic combatant commands are at the forefront of
the global fight against terrorists and violent extremists. They are
responsible for maintaining a forward posture to deter and dissuade
adversaries and assure and build the capabilities of our allies. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the geographic combatant commands
in all of these areas.
Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
Answer. The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and
the ASD(SO/LIC) have a close relationship in defining and meeting the
needs of our Special Operations Forces. If confirmed, I am committed to
maximizing that relationship in order to fulfill my responsibilities in
accordance with the ASD(SO/LIC)'s statutory requirement to oversee the
policy and resources for special operations activities.
Question. The Commanders of the Service Special Operations
Commands.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service special
operations commands to ensure they have the policies and resources
needed to develop and provide the capabilities needed by the Commander,
SOCOM, and the regional combatant commanders.
Question. Chief, National Guard Bureau.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National
Guard Bureau, to ensure they have the policies and resources needed to
develop and provide the capabilities supporting the priorities of our
geographic combatant commands.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. As mentioned above, special operations and intelligence are
mutually supporting. If confirmed, I will work closely to support the
Director of National Intelligence and his subordinates ensuring both
parties are appropriately engaged and informed on items of shared
national security interest.
Question. The Director of Central Intelligence.
Answer. Again, special operations and intelligence are mutually
supporting. If confirmed, I will work closely to support the Director
of Central Intelligence and his subordinates ensuring close, continuing
collaboration on items of shared national security interests.
Question. The Director, National Counter Terrorism Center.
Answer. SOF activities are central to counterterrorism; the NCTC
helps ensure coordination of all U.S. Government counterterrorism
activities. If confirmed, I will maintain ASD(SO/LIC)'s role as the
primary Office of the Secretary of Defense's interface on SOF and
counterterrorism matters.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the ASD(SO/LIC)?
Answer. With growing fiscal constraints in the Department, it will
be a challenge to protect our vital defense capabilities. ASD(SO/LIC)
must continue to ensure SOF has the adequate resources, training, and
equipment as well as authorities to execute and support U.S.
counterterrorism strategies as an essential component of our U.S.
national security policies. As the Department rebalances efforts and
resources toward the Asia Pacific region coupled with the approaching
draw down of forces in Afghanistan, ASD(SO/LIC) must continue to shape
policies and provide expertise on all special operations and Department
of Defense (DOD) support to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and
stability operations across the globe. Terrorism remains a persistent
threat to our national security, and while al Qaeda core has been
degraded, the evolving threat of al Qaeda-affiliated networks endures.
Many of these terrorist networks that directly threaten American
interests are not confined to the geographic boundaries of any one
country; therefore, it is vital that the Department remain focused on
denying al Qaeda and its affiliate's their transnational safe havens.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the Department and the
interagency to ensure that programs key to effective counter terrorism
operations are properly supported. While ASD(SO/LIC) will remain the
focal point for coordinating the Department's strategic
counterterrorism guidance, I would engage my counterparts across the
interagency to implement effective programs building our partner's
capacity and thereby advancing mutual security interests. I will
balance my effort to ensure the Department remains capable of
supporting peacekeeping, humanitarian, and stability operations across
the globe.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to balance
responsibilities for operational issues within your portfolio with the
``Service Secretary-like'' responsibilities for Special Operations
Forces?
Answer. Balance is very important as we enter into a resource
constrained environment. Ensuring that our SOF retains their
qualitative advantage into the future and that they and their families
are taken care of is a top priority. To achieve this, SOF must be
properly resourced to include having the best equipment and training
available, and a well-educated force. If confirmed as ASD(SO/LIC), I
will make every effort to assert the ASD(SO/LIC) role in the resourcing
process. This would include participation in SOCOM's Commander's
Roundtable which is the SOCOM resource decision forum. Through constant
collaboration with the senior leadership at SOCOM, we would ensure that
Major Force Program (MFP) 11 funds are used to maintain a strong and
ready force. I would also work closely with the Services to ensure that
service common support is identified and provided.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD(SO/LIC)?
Answer. If confirmed, my broad priorities would be to ensure our
Nation continues to have the world's premier special operations
capabilities to win the current fight against al Qaeda and its
affiliates, while shaping the force for future operations in a very
uncertain global security environment. Drivers of success--namely the
operational readiness of the force, the care of our people, and
sustainment of resources will be among the key issues I will address.
civilian oversight of the u.s. special operations command
Question. The legislation creating the U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) assigned extraordinary authority to the commander to
conduct some of the functions of both a military service and a unified
combatant command.
Which civilian officials in the DOD exercise civilian oversight of
the ``service-like'' authorities of the Commander, SOCOM?
Answer. Per title 10, U.S.C. Sec. 138 and DOD Directive 5111.10 (in
accordance with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy priorities and
guidance), the ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian oversight for all
special operations activities. Other DOD civilian officials also
exercise oversight in some capacity:

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))
coordinates on intelligence issues
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) coordinates on
acquisition issues
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
(USD(P&R)) coordinates on personnel policies such as SOF-unique
incentives and readiness issues
Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller (USD(C))
coordinates on SOF budget and year-of-execution program issues
Military Department Secretaries coordinate on SOF
manpower issues
Director, OSD/Cost Assessment Program Evaluation
(CAPE), coordinates on SOF Program development and issues

Question. In your view, what organizational relationship should
exist between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM?
Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special
operations matters as required by title 10, U.S.C. Sec. 138. As such,
the ASD(SO/LIC) provides Service Secretary-like oversight of special
operations policy and resource matters and advice to implement
Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
priorities. The relationship with the Commander, SOCOM should be
collaborative and cooperative to develop the best possible special
operations forces and employ them effectively. Ultimately, the ASD(SO/
LIC) represents the Secretary of Defense and provides recommendations
regarding special operations that are in the best interest of the
Department.
Question. What should be the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in preparation
and review of Major Force Program (MFP) 11 and SOCOM's Program
Objective Memorandum (POM)?
Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy oversight for the
preparation and justification of the Special Operations Forces' program
and budget. Ensuring that the SOCOM POM is aligned with national
priorities and in support of the national defense strategy is key. The
ASD(SO/LIC) currently attends the SOCOM Commanders' Roundtable--the
SOCOM resource decision forum--to help ensure the POM is aligned to the
Department's guidance. During program reviews, the ASD(SO/LIC) works
closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director, CAPE, to
resolve issues across the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely
with all parties to ensure our Nation sustains a ready, capable Special
Operations Force, prepared to meet the fiscal, operational, and global
challenges we face today and into the future.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
research and development and procurement functions of SOCOM?
Answer. The appropriate role of ASD(SO/LIC) is to provide policy
oversight in resolving special operations acquisition issues. As the
lead Office of the Secretary of Defense official for SOF acquisition
matters, the ASD(SO/LIC) represents SOF acquisition interests within
DOD and before Congress. The responsibilities and relationships between
the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM are defined and described in a
Memorandum of Agreement between the ASD and Commander, SOCOM. The ASD
directs and provides policy oversight to technology development
programs that address priority mission areas to meet other
departmental, interagency, and international capability needs.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
operational planning of missions that involve special operations
forces, whether the supported command is SOCOM, a geographic combatant
command, or another department or agency of the U.S. Government?
Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) serves as the principal advisor to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense for
all aspects of employment, deployment, and oversight of special
operations and counterterrorism capabilities. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides
policy oversight of SOCOM's mission planning and geographic combatant
commanders' employment of SOF to ensure compliance with law and DOD
priorities. The ASD(SO/LIC) coordinates deployment authorities and
plans involving SOF within DOD and with interagency partners as
required.
impact of sequestration
Question. The President's budget request and the fiscal year 2014
spending bills for the Department of Defense considered by Congress to
date assume an agreement that would avoid sequestration for fiscal year
2014. In the absence of such an agreement, the Department of Defense
will face a second year of sequestration and an across-the-board
reduction of approximately $52 billion.
What are your views on the impact sequestration is having on the
readiness of special operations forces and how would those impacts be
exacerbated if sequestration continues in fiscal year 2014 and beyond?
Answer. Sequestration has a negative effect on readiness across the
Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, the DOD
Comptroller, and SOCOM to assess the particular impact of sequestration
on SOF, particularly to ensure we can sustain the right level of
capability, capacity, and readiness across the Future Years Defense
Program, aligned to current strategy and available resources.
special operations command acquisition authorities
Question. SOCOM is unique within the DOD as the only unified
command with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the
Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate
senior acquisition executive.
If confirmed, how would you ensure SOCOM requirements are
adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before
moving forward with an acquisition program?
Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is closely involved in all facets of the
SOCOM Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system, providing
oversight of these matters. Other forums used by the ASD(SO/LIC)
include: the USD(AT&L) Acquisition Review of Department Systems, the
SOCOM Commanders' Roundtable, the SOCOM Integrated Concept Team
Reviews, and SOCOM Budget and Acquisition Reviews. Additionally,
through the annual DOD Program Budget Review process, the ASD(SO/LIC)
is able to ensure that SOCOM's priorities and resource allocation are
in alignment with the Department's strategic and policy imperatives.
Question. What role can SOCOM's development and acquisition
activities play in broader service and DOD efforts?
Answer. SOCOM can continue to serve as an incubator for developing
new equipment and capabilities that initially are for special
operations-specific needs but often transition to the General Purpose
Force. Noteworthy is SOCOM's ability to conduct rapid evaluations of
technology, systems, and concepts of operations, and the ability to
integrate emerging off-the-shelf technologies.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that special
operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall
DOD research, development and acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support the regularly-
convened SOCOM-led ``Acquisition Summits'' with OSD, drawing together
SOCOM, USD(AT&L), and the Service Acquisition Executives where all
elements discuss acquisition issues of common interest.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources
are dedicated to the development of special operations-unique
platforms, when required?
Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) is closely involved and integrated with SOCOM's
planning, resourcing, and execution. Additionally, the ASD(SO/LIC)
attends the SOCOM Commanders' Roundtable quarterly meetings, which
allows the ASD to maintain awareness of matters of concern and import
to SOCOM and its subordinate commands. Finally, ASD(SO/LIC)
representatives sit on the SOCOM Special Operations Requirements Board
to ensure SOF requirements are ready for funding. If confirmed, I will
advocate for steady and predictable resourcing of SOCOM and oversee the
investment strategy. If confirmed, I will also provide advice and
support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as he sits on
critical resource decisionmaking bodies.
Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the
effectiveness of SOCOM technology development investments and whether
SOCOM is investing sufficient resources in these efforts?
Answer. SOCOM has created a series of technology roadmaps that are
effective in identifying promising solutions to meet operational
requirements. These roadmaps have quantifiable metrics (e.g., cost,
schedule, performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them and
allow the ASD(SO/LIC) to oversee and monitor progress and identify
obstacles that may require Department-level involvement.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that SOCOM has an
acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience
needed to develop and manage its acquisition and research and
development programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support SOCOM's efforts to manage the
SOF acquisition workforce, which is similar to the process used by the
Service Acquisition Executives. SOCOM's acquisition workforce experts
are professionally trained and certified, and have substantial
experience in the SOF-unique processes needed to meet the equipping
needs of SOF. I would also support SOCOM's efforts with USD(AT&L) to
expand its organic acquisition workforce, as well as to create a unique
identifier for SOF acquisition positions.
special operations personnel management
Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have
greater influence on special operations personnel management issues
including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special
operations forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10,
U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from ``monitoring''
the readiness of special operations personnel to ``coordinating'' with
the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that
directly affect Special Operations Forces.
What is your view of this proposal?
Answer. Personnel policies and management are arguably the most
effective tool for incentivizing characteristics and culture in an
organization. Currently, Commander, SOCOM, provides input to Service
personnel policies that effect SOF, but has no direct influence or
control over the assignment, promotion, or command selection of SOF
personnel. Changing section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to reflect the
word ``coordinating'' rather than ``monitoring'' would give SOCOM more
influence over Service personnel policies that affect SOF accessions,
assignments, compensation, promotions, professional development,
readiness, retention, and training. However, I believe that additional
coordination and study should be done within the Department to fully
understand the impact of this proposal.
size of special operations forces
Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have
mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and
enablers that directly support their operations.
Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of Special
Operations Forces can and should be maintained in light of current
fiscal challenges?
What do you believe would be the impact on the ability of Special
Operations Forces to meet global requirements if QDR-directed growth is
not realized? What if special operations end strength is reduced below
current levels?
Answer. I believe the uncertain security environment necessitates a
review of our SOF force structure, balanced against our strategy and
resources, during each QDR and program review. If confirmed, I will
work closely with colleagues in DOD and with the SOCOM Commander to
ensure our Nation has a ready, capable Special Operations Force to
address current and future threats.
special operations missions
Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
extremist organizations, including those related to information and
military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
divested by SOCOM, and why?
Answer. I fully support the 2010 QDR's strategic shift toward
expanding general purpose forces' capabilities and capacity for
irregular threats. However, I believe that SOF must maintain a very
robust capability to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces
as part of ensuring SOF capability to conduct operations in politically
sensitive environments, ensuring access for other SOF activities, and
ensuring the ability to train, equip, and advise either Special
Operations Forces or irregular forces. At this time, I do not advocate
significant changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions. If confirmed, I will
make recommendations of any mission divestitures if and when required.
Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
them?
Answer. No. If confirmed, I will make recommendations of any
additional missions for SOF if and when required.
combatting terrorism
Question. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the
need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the
capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also
underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al
Qaeda-linked threats ``that continue to emerge from beyond its core
safe haven in South Asia.'' The President signed new Policy Guidance on
Counterterrorism on May 22, 2013, that established a framework
governing the use of force against terrorists.
How do you view DOD's role under the National Strategy for
Counterterrorism?
Answer. The President's National Strategy for Counterterrorism
maintains the focus on pressuring al Qaeda's core while emphasizing the
need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our
resilience. Overarching goals are to protect the American people,
Homeland, and interests; disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda; prevent terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass
destruction; eliminate safe havens; build enduring counterterrorism
partnerships; degrade links between al Qaeda and its affiliates and
adherents; counter al Qaeda's ideology; and deprive terrorists of their
financial support and other enablers.
The U.S. Government remains engaged in a multi-departmental,
multinational effort. DOD continues to undertake activities to support
this strategy including training, advising, and assisting partner
security forces; supporting intelligence collection on al Qaeda;
conducting information operations against al Qaeda; and, when
appropriate, capturing or killing al Qaeda operatives. However, DOD is
also committed to enabling its intelligence and law enforcement
partners, both in the United States and overseas, in their efforts to
counter this threat.
Question. What is your understanding of the impact of the
President's guidance for the use of force in counterterrorism
operations outside the United States and areas of active hostilities on
DOD's role within the U.S. Government's counterterrorism strategy?
Answer. The President's guidance formalizes and strengthens the
administration's rigorous process for reviewing and approving
operations to capture or employ lethal force against terrorist targets
outside the United States and outside areas of active hostilities. By
establishing a clear set of criteria that must be met before lethal
action may be taken, the guidance will help focus DOD's planning and
preparation for these operations. If confirmed, I will make a formal
assessment of the impact of the new guidance and provide my best advice
to the Secretary and the President to ensure we're doing everything we
can to protect our Nation from terrorist attacks.
Question. Will DOD see its role increase or decrease as a result of
the President's counterterrorism guidance?
Answer. The guidance establishes standards and procedures that are
either already in place or will be transitioned over time. As such, I
do not anticipate a significant change in the Department's role. If
confirmed, I intend to ensure we conduct counterterrorism operations
lawfully, and in accordance with this policy.
Question. If the role increases, what, if any, are the commensurate
increases in capabilities or capacities that are required?
Answer. If there is an increase in our role, if confirmed, I will
work closely with colleagues to ensure our department has the requisite
capabilities to execute our counterterrorism responsibilities in
accordance with the policy.
Question. Will DOD require any new authorities?
Answer. At this time, it is my understanding the Department of
Defense does not require any new authorities to carry out our
counterterrorism responsibilities.
Question. Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its
efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and
agencies?
Answer. I believe the Department of Defense routine coordination
with other Federal departments and agencies adequately addresses its
efforts to combat terrorist networks and threats to American interests.
Question. What do you view as the role of DOD in countering al
Qaeda and affiliated groups in cyberspace?
Answer. It is important that DOD retain the resources and expertise
to counter al Qaeda's propaganda and recruitment efforts in cyberspace,
in order to effectively complement the State department's primacy of
communications outside of combat zones.
the 2001 authorization for use of military force
Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)?
Answer. The AUMF was enacted by Congress on September 18, 2001
(Public Law 107-40), and it provides ``that the President is authorized
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons.'' The AUMF remains law; it has not
been amended or repealed.
Question. What factors govern Department of Defense determinations
as to where the use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant
to the AUMF?
Answer. Outside of Afghanistan, without touching on matters that
may be classified, I would note that targeting decisions are made based
on careful, fact-intensive assessments, and review, in order to
identify those individuals and groups that are appropriately
targetable. This review continues up the chain of command through the
four-star combatant commander and to the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Do you believe that current legal authorities, including
the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism
operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary
and appropriate?
Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD's current legal authorities,
including the AUMF and the President's constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, are necessary and appropriate.
special operations authorities
Question. Reportedly, the Commander of SOCOM has sought more
control over the deployment and utilization of Special Operations
Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance
for the combatant commands earlier this year that gave SOCOM, for the
first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing
guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic
combatant commanders (GCC) and Special Operations Forces assigned to
them. It has been reported that the Commander of SOCOM is also seeking
new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move special
operations forces between geographic combatant commands.
Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are
appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control
of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic
combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.
Answer. On February 11, 2013, the Secretary of Defense approved an
update to the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum for Fiscal Year
2013 that assigns all Special Operations Forces to Commander, SOCOM.
This improved command relationship gives Commander, SOCOM, the
flexibility to meet geographic combatant commander requirements with
sustained, persistent SOF capabilities and capacities more effectively
in order to accomplish regional objectives in support of national
strategic end states. GCCs continue to exercise operational control of
Special Operations Forces once deployed into a GCC area of
responsibility.
intelligence operations
Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
by special operations personnel different from those carried out by
others in the Intelligence Community?
Answer. In my view, SOF intelligence operations are complementary
and mutually supporting to those carried out by the Intelligence
Community (IC). These operations comply with the policies and
regulations guiding DOD and interagency activities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence
activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are coordinated
adequately with other activities carried out by those in the
Intelligence Community?
Answer. I believe that interagency collaboration is the most
important contributing factor to many of SOF's achievements. If
confirmed, I will oversee, maintain, and build upon the important
relationships SOCOM has developed with the Federal intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military
personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in
title 50, U.S.C.?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense has authority under title 10 and
title 50, U.S.C. to conduct operations vital to our national defense.
DOD activities conducted under title 50 support intelligence collection
for the Department as well as for the Nation. U.S. military personnel
are employed across the spectrum of tactical to strategic operations in
support of these requirements.
information operations
Question. The Government Accountability Office reports that DOD has
``spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year'' to support its
information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are
in support of operations in Afghanistan, but Military Information
Support Teams (MISTs) from SOCOM also deploy to U.S. embassies in
countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the
efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development. Further, the geographic combatant commands
are increasingly moving into this operational space.
What are your views on DOD's military information support
operations and influence programs and their integration into overall
U.S. foreign policy objectives?
Answer. I believe the Department of Defense must be able to
influence foreign audiences in environments susceptible to the messages
of U.S. adversaries. Military Information Support Teams (MIST) are
trained in developing culturally appropriate messages to counter
hostile information and propaganda, as well as assisting with building
the capacity of partner nations to conduct these activities themselves.
Question. What is the role of DOD versus the Intelligence Community
and the State Department?
Answer. The Department of Defense, like all Departments and
agencies of the executive branch, takes its lead from the President,
and relies heavily on the Department of State, in re-enforcing the
Nation's message. I understand that Department of Defense influence
activities, including those conducted by MISTs, are coordinated closely
with the Embassies in the areas where they operate, both inside and
outside of areas of conflict, and at times can support common efforts
of other agencies. Chiefs of Mission must concur on all MIST
deployments. MIST activities are fully coordinated with the U.S.
country team to ensure message consistency and maintain State
Department leadership in presenting the face of the U.S. overseas.
Question. How do you believe the success of these programs should
be measured, especially in light of the constrained budget environment?
Answer. I understand the Department has taken significant steps to
address congressional concerns related to policy oversight, budgeting,
and effectiveness of information support operations and influence
programs. These programs remain a special interest item for Congress,
and as such must continue to be carefully managed and overseen. If
confirmed, I intend to continue to be responsive to Congress on this
matter, as well as to continue the Department's efforts to improve
coordination of our information activities across the interagency.
civil affairs operations
Question. Civil Affairs activities carried out by U.S. Special
Operations Forces in partnership with host nation personnel play an
important role in developing infrastructure, supporting good governance
and civil societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including
medical and veterinary services to needy populations.
In your view, does SOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to
conduct the range of Civil Affairs missions required for today's
operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Civil Affairs (CA) force
structure and work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the
combatant commands to determine any shortfalls and how best to address
them.
Question. Civil Affairs activities are most effective when
coordinated with other U.S. Government efforts, most notably those
carried out by U.S. Agency for International Development.
If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs activities by
special operations personnel are integrated into larger U.S. Government
efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will meet regularly with my interagency
counterparts in order to harmonize U.S. Government CA efforts as
required.
Question. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) can have
an amplifying effect on Civil Affairs activities by actively promoting
the efforts of the U.S. military and host nation and by communicating
truthful messages to counter the spread of violent extremist ideology
among vulnerable populations.
If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and Military
Information Support Operations are adequately coordinated to achieve a
maximum impact?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support SOCOM in its role as a joint
proponent over both CA and MISO. This will enable unity of effort and
the coordinated execution of CA and MISO. CA and MISO force
representation at the operational and strategic levels will also remain
critical in achieving a coordinated impact. At the tactical and
operational level, (e.g. country teams at the U.S. Embassies where CA
and MISO are working), this is accomplished as a matter of course. CA
and MISO personnel receive similar training and understand that their
specialties are mutually supporting.
render safe proficiency
Question. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a
growing and especially concerning threat to our Nation. Countering this
threat through actions taken to locate, seize, destroy or capture,
recover and render such weapons safe is a core activity of SOCOM.
If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are
adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be
heavily engaged in Afghanistan and elsewhere?
Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the
danger of nuclear terrorism as being the single greatest threat to
global security. If confirmed, I will work closely with SOCOM and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on this
important issue. I will carefully monitor and assess the impact of our
operational tempo on DOD's render safe capabilities and ensure that
these capabilities are maintained.
Question. Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are
needed within SOCOM?
Answer. Not at this time, I believe SOCOM has the capabilities now
to accomplish its render-safe mission.
supported combatant command
Question. Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by
the President or Secretary of Defense, SOCOM may operate as a supported
combatant command.
In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct
operations as a supported combatant command?
Answer. As authorized by section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., the
President or the Secretary of Defense may direct SOCOM Commander to
exercise command of selected special operations missions, which may
involve highly sensitive targets and circumstances. The Secretary of
Defense has also designated SOCOM as the supported combatant command
for planning and synchronizing global operations against terrorist
networks.
training capability
Question. What capabilities do you consider most important for
effective training of special operations personnel?
Answer. The human component of SOCOM is where its strength lies and
to develop our special operations personnel we must be willing to
invest the necessary time and resources in advanced, realistic
training. Specialized individual training, including language
proficiency and development of technical skills, together with a robust
joint and international exercise program, is a proven recipe for
building and sustaining our cutting-edge capabilities. These are best
achieved through SOF-based authorities, such as the Joint Combined
Exchange Training programs, as well as other exercise programs
administered by the Combatant Commands and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Question. What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance
training for special operations personnel?
Answer. Despite steady growth in SOCOM since 2001, operational
demands continue to stress the force. As we continue to transition in
Afghanistan, we need to establish a sustainable rotation model for SOF
that allows for deliberate training cycles for individual and unit
level training in between operational deployments.
Question. What are the most significant challenges in achieving
effective training of special operations personnel?
Answer. SOF are deployed at an extremely high rate around the
world. Deploying persistently and for long durations results in
significant experience for special operations personnel, but in many
cases a focused mission may result in the atrophy of other skill sets.
For example, aircrews may conduct repetitive air-land missions on a
long deployment, but may not conduct a specific airdrop mission due to
deployment constraints. SOCOM's development of a SOF force generation
model is intended to ensure there is enough time to train in the
deployment cycles to maintain proficiency in core SOF capabilities.
Additionally, since most SOF missions require non-SOF support, time
must be added to work closely with Service counterparts supporting SOF.
Question. What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. Special
Operations Forces from training foreign military personnel?
Answer. SOF gain significant training benefit from training foreign
personnel. These training benefits include: enhanced language
proficiency, cultural awareness, real world experience conducting
foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. These activities
help expose SOF to new tactics, techniques, and procedures while also
encouraging the development of communication and intelligence-sharing
mechanisms that enable CT operations. Training foreign military units
helps build trusting relationships and fosters familiarization that in
return enables our SOF to work in foreign countries with greater
success and confidence.
Question. To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the
United States to rely upon contractors for training foreign military
personnel? What do you see as the primary risks and advantages in such
contractor training?
Answer. SOF cannot be replaced by contractors. However, in some
instances utilizing contractors may make sense and could be a viable
course of action, particularly if there's a requirement for a certain
technical skill not resident in our force. For example, there may not
be a SOF aviator trained on a certain aircraft that is essential to a
partner nation's mobility fleet. In these cases, a contract solution
might be the best option to ensure an important mission is still
conducted. Contractors can also fill a gap in cases when U.S. foreign
policy restrictions do not permit deployment of U.S. military
personnel. Contractors can also help provide logistics, administrative
support, and technical/computer expertise which in turn free special
operations personnel for more SOF-unique training opportunities and
operational missions. DOD is obligated to maintain strong oversight
over contractors, and contractors are not permitted to represent the
U.S. Government.
language and cultural awareness capabilities
Question. Deployed special operations personnel remain heavily
concentrated in the Central Command theater of operations, including
many who have been deployed outside of their regional area of
expertise.
Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among
special operations forces have been degraded because of repeated
deployments outside their regional area of expertise?
Answer. Yes. For more than a decade, 80 percent of all SOF
deployments have been to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
operations. This has taken a toll on the language, regional expertise,
and cultural awareness capabilities of those units deployed outside
their aligned regions. SOCOM has made great strides to correct this
imbalance, and I expect the trend towards greater regional alignment to
continue as we move towards a transition in Afghanistan.
Question. If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do
to ensure these unique skills are adequately maintained?
Answer. I support SOCOM's initiative to implement higher
requirements for language capability as well as to improve the training
processes for its components. If confirmed, I would seek to continue to
pursue several key policy issues in close coordination with SOCOM,
including: native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and regional
capabilities in selections and promotions, and language testing and
incentives. I will also strongly encourage the continued alignment of
SOF with regional areas of focus, consistent with our national
strategies and aligned to the threat.
capabilities of special operations and general purpose forces
Question. The 2010 QDR called for increased counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the
general purpose forces (GPF). The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of
2011 did not modify this policy. However, the Strategic Capabilities
and Management Review (SCMR) released this year identifies a range of
general purpose force reductions that would likely result in little or
no significant or consistent capability for these missions.
What is your assessment of the QDR, DSG, and SCMR with regard to
the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and special
operations forces, particularly with respect to security force
assistance and building partner military capabilities?
Answer. I understand the Services are increasingly improving their
capabilities to conduct these operations, including the Army's
development of regionally-aligned forces and the Marine Corps
deployment of a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force for Crisis
Response (MAGTF-CR). In many cases, SOF and the GPF are working side-
by-side to build the military capability and capacities of our partners
around the world. I expect this trend to continue, despite budget
cutbacks, given the importance our strategy places on helping our
partners and allies develop assume greater responsibility for security
abroad.
Question. Do you believe that our GPF need to become more like
Special Operations Forces in mission areas that are critical to
countering violent extremists?
Answer. The partnership between general purpose and Special
Operations Forces is strong. The extensive combat employment of both
forces in shared battle spaces has increased the need to coordinate our
operations closely. This has resulted in a sharing of tactics,
techniques, and procedures between SOF and GPF that has helped to
increase the Services' capabilities to execute counterinsurgency and
combating terrorism operations. The Services can continue to complement
SOF's capabilities by providing those combat enablers that are not
organic to SOF units or that are not available in adequate quantities.
These combat enablers, including intelligence and combat service
support, are vital to the success of SOF, especially in today's complex
operating environment.
Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved
for Special Operations Forces only?
Answer. Yes. Although the Joint force has evolved significantly
since 2001, and SOF and GPF are highly interoperable, they are not
interchangeable. Special operations and low intensity conflict
activities, as defined in title 10, U.S.C., section 167, include direct
action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign
internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations,
counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue,
and such other activities as may be specified by the President or
Secretary of Defense. SOCOM focus should remain in these defined areas
of experience and expertise while integrating Service enablers as
appropriate.
special operations enabling capabilities
Question. While SOCOM maintains organic enabling capabilities to
support short duration missions, most special operations missions
require supporting capabilities provided by the Services to be
successful.
What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling
capabilities facing Special Operations Forces?
In your view, how should the responsibility for providing
supporting capabilities for special operations missions be divided
between SOCOM and the Services?
What in your view are the critical supporting capabilities in each
of the Services that must be preserved to minimize risk to special
operations missions today and into the future?
Answer. Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often
similar to the shortage of high-demand enablers that challenge the rest
of the deployed forces (e.g., intelligence, explosive ordnance
disposal, communications, medical, security).
SOCOM's organic enabling capabilities are those that provide SOF
the ability to self-sustain for short durations while maintaining the
agility to deploy forces quickly in support of the combatant
commanders. Longer-term support of Special Operations Forces, by
doctrine, and except under special circumstances, becomes the
responsibility of each Service's theater logistic command and control
structure and are critical to the success of SOF.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support
(including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces,
irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military
operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. Section 1208 authority has been a very effective tool for
U.S. Special Operations Forces to leverage and enable willing partners
to conduct operations to combat terrorism. Combatant commanders
strongly support 1208 programs. Given the changing global threat
environment, I anticipate that the need for these programs will
continue to grow.
al qaeda
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
and its associated forces to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests
overseas, and western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of
most concern?
Answer. The pressure exerted by the United States and its partners
has isolated the core of al Qaeda. As the President has said, the
remaining operatives in the al Qaeda core spend more time thinking
about their own safety than plotting against us. But we now confront a
less capable, but still lethal threat from geographically diversified
groups affiliated with al Qaeda. The most well-known of these groups is
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which continues to plot
against the United States. Increasingly, however, new groups of loosely
affiliated extremists have also emerged, but the threat they pose to
the United States is more localized.
The upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East has contributed to
a permissive environment for such extremist networks to exploit. Unlike
the al Qaeda core in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or even AQAP, these
groups are most focused on the countries and regions where they are
based. They work together through existing familial and tribal networks
and focus on acting locally, as we saw in Benghazi and the BP oil
facility in Algeria attacks. As we strive to work with our partners in
the region, we see the political changes ushered in by the Arab Spring
present challenges as well; although many of the governments in the
region are friendly to our interests, they struggle to exert a monopoly
of force within their own borders.
afghanistan
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current
effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?
Answer. I am cautiously optimistic that we are going to accomplish
our objectives in Afghanistan prior to completion of the transition.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan
partners have made important security gains over the past 12 years,
reversing violence trends in much of the country, and beginning the
process of transition to the Afghan Government. The Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), particularly the Afghan CT Forces such as the
Afghan SOF and Special Police Units (who fall under the MOI) have been
integral to this success. These units are demonstrating substantial
growth in quantity, quality, and operational effectiveness. The Afghan
Special Operations Forces and it's the Special Police Units have
demonstrated particular competence, and are well regarded within the
country.
We must remain cautious, however, as U.S. and allied forces begin
to retrograde in 2014. Al Qaeda's safe havens in Northeast Afghanistan
and the limited capacity of the Afghan Government remain the biggest
threats to consolidating security gains to enable an enduring, stable
Afghanistan that can prevent terrorist groups from using these areas to
launch attacks against the U.S. Homeland. Additionally, the threat of
attacks against U.S. interests within Afghanistan is likely to increase
as U.S. and allied direct support to security decreases; this is a
threat against which our personnel in-country must remain vigilant.
Nevertheless, this partnered campaign has provided increased security
and stability for the Afghan population, and the United States
continues to build upon this success.
Question. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan depend on
general purpose forces for many enabling capabilities, including
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and
medical evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of SOCOM, has said ``I
have no doubt that special operations will be the last to leave
Afghanistan'' and has predicted that the requirement for Special
Operations Forces may increase as general purpose forces continue to be
drawn down.
If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities
for Special Operations Forces as general purpose forces continue to
draw down in Afghanistan?
Answer. I have not yet reviewed the mission planning and analysis
to form a view regarding the appropriate number of U.S., coalition, and
Afghan troops necessary to fulfill key missions including force
protection. I do believe that sufficient forces should be provided to
do the job assigned to them, while protecting themselves. If confirmed,
I will seek to ensure that all Special Operations Forces are supported
by sufficient enablers, informed by military advice from the Joint
Staff and the Commander, CENTCOM.
Question. In April 2012, the United States and Afghanistan signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the ``Afghanization'' of direct
action counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan--reflecting the shared
intention of having Afghan security forces in the lead in the conduct
of such operations with U.S. forces in a support role.
What is the status of efforts to put Afghan Special Operations
Forces in the lead for such operations and why do you believe such a
transition is important?
Answer. In my view, both unilateral and partnered direct actions
are an essential and highly effective element of our strategy to defeat
al Qaeda and those that enable it in Afghanistan. Wherever possible, we
should strive to maintain a reasonable degree of freedom of action
within our post 2014 force structure that will allow us to achieve our
objective of preventing terrorists from using Afghanistan as a
sanctuary from which to attack the U.S. Homeland.
I understand that Afghanistan's highly-trained Special Operations
Forces are steadily growing, and that Afghans currently play a key role
in coordinating and partnering in the vast majority of these
operations. Of course, direct action operations must continue to be
conducted with due respect for cultural sensitivities and great care
for the prevention of civilian casualties. Ultimately, the goal must be
to ensure that Afghan and international forces have the capabilities
and authorities necessary to achieve the transition to a post-2014
structure, while also being mindful of the goal to increase Afghan
ownership throughout the transition process.
Question. The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local
Police (ALP) programs--both U.S. Special Operations missions--have been
consistently praised by U.S. military leaders as critical elements of
the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
What are your views on the value of these programs and do you
believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan
(i.e. post-2014)?
Answer. Village Stability Operations (VSO) are a critical component
of the International Security and Assistance Force's (ISAF) campaign
plan. VSO uses Afghan and ISAF special operations forces embedded in
the community full-time to help improve security, governance, and
development in more remote areas of Afghanistan where the Afghan
National Security Force and ISAF have a limited presence. I understand
that, since its inception, VSO has greatly expanded Afghan Government
influence in key rural areas and has enabled small-scale infrastructure
development. Across Afghanistan, increasing numbers of local
communities are requesting to participate in this program.
The ALP, the armed local security program associated with VSO and
established by President Karzai, has reportedly expanded to more than
8,000 members. ALP are empowering local communities and have proven to
be a significant threat to the Taliban by denying them safe-haven, and
ultimately creating the conditions for long-term stability.
pakistan
Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
with regard to Pakistan?
Answer. I believe the United States and Pakistan share common
interests in long-term regional stability; which includes disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda, a durable political settlement in
Afghanistan, and the safety and security of the Indian Ocean.
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is clear in stating that
the United States will only achieve the strategic defeat of al Qaeda
through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. In my view, the
military-to-military relationship is an important part of this
partnership as it facilitates mutually beneficial counterterrorism
goals. U.S. military assistance to Pakistan has helped the Pakistan
Military (PAKMIL) achieve success in its counterinsurgency efforts.
Despite recent setbacks in this relationship, it is important that we
continue to engage our PAKMIL counterparts to reestablish and rebuild
the relationship and continue achieving these successes.
Question. Does the United States have a strategic interest in
enhancing military-to-military relations with Pakistan? Why or why not?
Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is clear in
stating that the United States will only achieve the strategic defeat
of al Qaeda through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. U.S.
military assistance to Pakistan has helped the PAKMIL achieve a level
success in its counterinsurgency efforts. I support efforts to increase
military-to-military relations in support of counterterrorism efforts
with Pakistan, as feasible.
Question. If so, what steps would you recommend, if confirmed, for
enhancing the military-to-military relationship between the United
States and Pakistan?
Answer. I understand unit-level relationships are strong, and I
believe we should be making every attempt to ensure that our tactical
and operational level leaders are able to maintain these ties however
possible.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's cooperation with
the United States in counterterrorism operations against militant
extremist groups located in Pakistan?
Answer. The internal domestic counterterrorism concerns of Pakistan
are significant. I understand our current counterterrorism cooperation
is good and we continue to improve the level and quality of this
cooperation.
Question. In your view, how will the continued availability of safe
haven for various terrorist organizations within the tribal areas of
Pakistan impact our long-term strategy in Afghanistan?
Answer. Terrorist sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan will
continue to challenge Afghan security. Both unilateral and partnered
direct actions are an essential and highly effective element of our
strategy to defeat al Qaeda and those that enable it in Afghanistan,
particularly in northeastern parts of the country.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to counter
the threat of improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack
the network, and go after known precursors and explosive materials?
Answer. I recognize the actions of the Government of Pakistan to
ban the export of products utilized in the production of improvised
explosive devices (IED). The improved border coordination between ISAF,
Pakistan and Afghanistan and the ongoing discussions on the development
of a comprehensive border security strategy are encouraging. This is a
critical area for cooperation that could have had significant impact if
it results in action.
syria
Question. What is your assessment of the situation in Syria and its
impact on the region?
Answer. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad has lost legitimacy and
must step aside to enable a political solution that ends the bloodshed,
and meets the aspirations of the Syrian people. I support working
closely with allies, partners and multilateral institutions to achieve
this goal through diplomatic and economic pressure on the Asad regime.
Hundreds, if not thousands of foreign fighters, predominantly from
North Africa and Middle Eastern countries, are traveling to Syria to
support the Syrian insurgency against the Asad regime. However, as
history demonstrates, relationships and experience gained by these
fighters could yield benefits for al Qaeda and endanger the stability
of surrounding countries.
Question. What is your assessment of Jabhat al Nusra and other
like-minded groups?
Answer. Al Qaeda affiliated groups, Jabhat al Nusrah and al Qaeda
in Iraq, as well as other extremist groups, are a growing problem
inside Syria as the security vacuum caused by the instability has
allowed these groups to make modest gains. Jabhat al Nusra has sought
to portray itself as a part of the legitimate Syrian opposition, while
also attempting to hijack the aspirations and struggles of the Syrian
people for its own malicious purposes.
Question. In your view, what is the most appropriate role for the
U.S. military in assisting regional friends and allies respond to the
situation in Syria?
Answer. The United States is working with our allies to achieve a
peaceful and orderly political transition in Syria and to end the
bloodshed as quickly as possible. Our NATO Allies are closely
monitoring the situation in Syria, especially as the conflict touches
on NATO's border in Turkey, and like us, are extremely concerned about
the deteriorating humanitarian conditions on the ground. NATO's
ultimate task is the protection and defense of NATO members. To that
end, I support NATO's decision to augment Turkey's air and missile
defense capabilities in order to defend the population and territory of
Turkey and contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the
Alliance's border. This includes the recent deployment of NATO Patriot
batteries to Turkey from the United States, Germany, and Netherlands. I
understand the administration has also been working with our
international partners, including NATO Allies, to ensure that the
appropriate humanitarian assistance is reaching those Syrians in need,
both inside Syria and in neighboring countries. If confirmed, I would
support improved coordination and information sharing on al-Nusrah
Front and foreign extremist flows. I would also continue to work with
Syria's neighbors, especially Jordan and Israel, to ensure their
stability during this turbulent time in the region.
Question. In your view, what--if any--role should the U.S.
military, including Special Operations Forces, play with respect to the
situation in Syria?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue planning for a
variety of contingencies in order to provide the Secretary and the
President with options. I will review these plans and, if necessary, I
will direct additional planning on this and any other potential
contingencies.
iraq
Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by al
Qaeda in Iraq? How has the threat changed since the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Iraq at the end of 2011?
Answer. The increased levels of violence in Iraq in recent months
are disturbing, and are a constant reminder of the formidable
challenges Iraq continues to face on the security front.
Over the past 2 years, the operational tempo of al Qaeda in Iraq
has increased in part due to the destabilizing influence of the crisis
in Syria. I consider the Government of Iraq an essential partner in a
common fight against al Qaeda. We have an ongoing dialogue with the
Government of Iraq to help facilitate its capacity to degrade and
defeat the al Qaeda network and to neutralize its ability to prey on
Iraqi citizens of all communities.
Question. What is your assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi
security forces to respond to the threat posed by al Qaeda and other
security challenges?
Answer. Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to
maintain its internal stability. While the Iraqi Security Forces are
competent at conducting counterterrorism and stability operations, the
security situation they face is serious and poses a challenge to their
ultimate success. If confirmed, I would remain committed to working
with the Iraqi Government to develop its military and security
abilities and address regional challenges.
Question. What are the main ``lessons learned'' from Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn as they pertain to Special
Operations Forces?
Answer. I believe that the United States has learned many lessons
through its past operations in Iraq and its ongoing operations in
Afghanistan. Some of these lessons include: the need to maximize
combined operations with partner forces, the necessity of culturally
attuned forces, the need for a unified U.S. Government approach, and
the need for active and integrated interagency coordination.
Question. What are the lessons learned from the drawdown and post-
combat operations in Iraq that should be applied to the drawdown and
post-combat operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. We need to continue our relationships and capacity building
for the Government of Afghanistan's efforts against al Qaeda to
succeed. Information sharing, technical assistance, and enabling
resources will allow our partners to effectively disrupt al Qaeda
operations, especially external operations against Western interests.
We have productive engagement across the globe, in many different
countries that help and support our interest in protecting the Homeland
and U.S. persons. We should apply all the lessons we are learning to
our CT threats that will continue to emanate from Afghanistan in the
future.
yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)?
Answer. I am very concerned about the threat that AQAP poses to the
Homeland. AQAP has attempted at least three attacks on the United
States since December 2009, and in my view fully intends to attack
again. AQAP has shown some very sophisticated and innovative
techniques, such as the development of concealed explosive devices and
printer cartridge bombs. AQAP is also attempting to recruit and
radicalize would-be terrorists in the West through its extensive media
outreach.
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in
Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that
strategy?
Answer. The U.S. strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP is
a collaborative U.S.-Yemeni effort. I understand the current strategy
also includes supporting the Yemeni political transition, marshaling
international economic and humanitarian assistance, and building
Yemen's counterterrorism capabilities through training and assistance.
As part of this whole-of-government strategy, DOD continues to
collaborate extensively with Yemeni forces and remove key AQAP
leadership and operatives from the battlefield. The Department's
programs to train, advise, and equip Yemeni forces are also critical to
long-term efforts against AQAP.
Question. Given the continuing political instability and slow
progress of the national dialogue in Yemen, what are your views on the
United States continuing to provide security training and assistance to
Yemeni counterterrorism forces?
Answer. The Yemeni Government has made a number of gains against
AQAP over the past 2 years, including driving AQAP from some of its
territory in southern Yemen and enabling operations to capture and kill
AQAP operatives. However, Yemeni counterterrorism capabilities remain
limited, and Yemeni security forces will require continued U.S.
training and assistance to enable them to effectively combat AQAP. This
assistance has been and will continue to be a part of a comprehensive
U.S. strategy that includes support for the Yemeni Government's reform
efforts including the ongoing National Dialogue.
somalia and al shabaab
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al
Shabaab?
In your view, does al Shabaab pose a threat to the United States
and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area?
Answer. My understanding is that successful operations by the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have reduced al Shabaab's
freedom of movement in south and central Somalia, but al Shabaab
remains a threat to the U.S. Homeland and to U.S. and western interests
in the Horn of Africa. Al Shabaab leaders have claimed affiliation with
al Qaeda since 2007 and formally merged with the group in February
2012. Al Shabaab has demonstrated the intent and capability to conduct
terrorist acts throughout eastern Africa, and it presents a threat to
the Homeland through links into Somali diaspora communities in the
United States and Europe.
Al Shabaab continues to stage high profile attacks in Somalia
against Western and international targets and has claimed
responsibility for the attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. If
al Shabaab did conduct the Westgate attack, it shows al Shabaab's
capability to stage complex, high-profile attacks against Western
targets outside of Somalia and its ability to harm U.S. citizens
abroad.
Question. What is your understanding of al Shabaab's activities to
recruit foreigners, including Somali-Americans, to join their efforts?
Answer. I understand that al-Shabaab has successfully recruited
foreign recruits for training in Somalia, including Somali-Americans.
Although the exact numbers and nationalities of foreign fighters in
Somalia remain unclear, reports indicate that several hundred foreign
recruits have come to Somalia to support al Shabaab and other extremist
groups since 2008. Foreign fighters threaten the Somalia National
Government and the AMISOM and undermine their efforts to build a stable
and peaceful Somalia.
Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy
in Somalia and the role of DOD in that strategy?
Answer. U.S. policies toward Somalia support the Somali National
Government and AMISOM's efforts to deliver security and basic services
and lay the foundation for an enduring government. However, Somalia's
historical lack of governance and sparse population make it an
appealing safe haven for al Shabaab and elements associated with al
Qaeda.
I understand that DOD's primary missions in the Horn of Africa are
to combat terrorism and to build partner capacity to promote regional
security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I
believe this mission is appropriate. DOD's ultimate goal should be a
fully integrated strategy under which security assistance, capacity
building, operational collaboration with regional partners, and
counterterrorism actions are synchronized to provide the regional
security and stability that are in the interest of both the United
States and our regional partners. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
our strategy is developed as part of a coordinated U.S. national
security policy towards the Horn of Africa, and to determine how DOD
can and should best support this policy.
Question. Should the United States establish military-to-military
relations and consider providing assistance to the Somali national
military forces?
Answer. The United States can play a guiding and mentoring role in
the development of Somalia's security sector. It is in our interest to
ensure that Somalia's new government has a competent and professional
military to provide security to its citizens and play a constructive
role in the region. Formally recognizing the Somalia National
Government earlier this year was an important first step to developing
military relations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure DOD's
relationship with the Somalia National Army progresses appropriately.
al qaeda in the islamic maghreb
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?
Answer. My understanding is that at this time, there is no credible
evidence that AQIM is a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland. However, as
seen in hostage situations in Algeria and other attacks in the region,
AQIM and its associates do threaten U.S. persons and interests abroad,
as well as our European Allies.
Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions
threatening U.S. interests?
Answer. AQIM's immediate operational area includes pockets of
ungoverned territory across North and West Africa. Though AQIM has not
conducted an attack outside of this area, we must be proactive in
denying a terrorist a safe haven throughout the region, from which
direct attacks against the United States, our partners, or our
interests outside of North and West Africa would be possible.
Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent
expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's
capacities and aims?
Answer. The expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali
is not new. It has been a serious concern to the United States and our
partners. France's operations in Mali and the regional and United
Nations' peacekeeping forces have made significant progress in
stabilizing the situation. We remain concerned about AQIM's freedom of
action in Mali and throughout the region and will continue to work with
partners, including the newly-inaugurated President of Mali, to address
the threat.
operation observant compass & the lord's resistance army
Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces
(UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support
them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)--including Joseph
Kony--continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian
populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational
concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are
trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of
California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical
support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and
Intelligence Community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations
continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations
personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations,
thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.
In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass
(OOC)?
Answer. Under OOC, U.S. SOF seeks to enhance the capacity of local
forces to end the threat posed by the LRA. It is my understanding that
U.S. military advisors are working with these forces to strengthen
information-sharing and synchronization, enhance their operational
planning, and increase overall effectiveness. While OOC is important in
the effort to counter the LRA threat, there is not a purely military
solution to this problem. The U.S. strategy to counter the LRA outlines
four pillars for continuing support: increasing the protection of
civilians; apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and senior commanders
from the battlefield; promoting the defection, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and
increasing humanitarian access and providing continued relief to
affected communities. If confirmed, I would support the current U.S.
policy of pursuing a comprehensive, multi-faceted strategy to help the
governments and people of this region in their efforts to end the
threat posed by the LRA and to address the impacts of the LRA's
atrocities.
Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD's current level of
support to this mission?
Answer. DOD's support to regional counter-LRA efforts helps to
advance regional security cooperation and security sector reform. If
confirmed, I would seek to continue the U.S. commitment to deepen our
security partnerships with African countries and regional organizations
by expanding efforts to build African military capabilities through
low-cost, small-footprint operations.
At the same time, I would work with the Department of State and
other U.S. agencies and departments to seek to strengthen the capacity
of civilian bodies and institutions to improve the continent's ability
to provide security and respond to emerging conflicts. I would also
regularly assess and review DOD's contributions to this mission to
ensure our personnel are best supporting U.S. strategic interests.
republic of the philippines
Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance
provided through the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to
the military of the Republic of the Philippines in its fight against
terrorist groups?
Do you expect the necessity for or mission of the Joint Special
Operations Task Force-Philippines to change in the coming years? If so,
how?
Answer. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines as executed by our
Joint Special Operations Task Force has been very successful and serves
as an excellent model for a partnership between the United States and a
host nation for combatting a terrorism threat. Due to the success of
this partnership, the Philippine Military is now transitioning its
focus toward external threats and the security issues remaining in the
south will be addressed primarily through a combination of civil and
police actions.
stability and peacekeeping operations
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, then U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations (U.N.), stated that the United States ``is willing
to consider directly contributing more military observers, military
staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel--
including more women I should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers
in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. I am supportive of contributing personnel to function in
staff positions or as military observers providing the mission aligns
with the national security priorities of DOD and the United States.
Successful U.N. peacekeeping operations are in the core national
security interest of the United States, as they generally are cost
effective, reduce the burden on U.S. forces, and in many cases directly
advance U.S. strategy security interests. Additionally, U.S. military
personnel can have a significant, positive, impact on U.N. peacekeeping
operations, and provides the United States with an opportunity to shape
these missions.
Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to
requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the
United Nations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be supportive of exploring ways where
the Department could more effectively respond to requests for personnel
support, bearing in mind any applicable legal requirements and the
current operational tempo of U.S. forces.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. Our efforts abroad over the past decade have brought much
attention to the importance of collaborative interagency efforts. The
interagency collectively established procedures and relationships to
successfully conduct counter-insurgency and counterterrorism
operations. As we transition, the interagency must now look to maintain
and improve upon the hallmarks of previous successful interagency
efforts--well-informed, transparent, constant communication and
collaboration at multiple levels. The interagency must ensure that all
departments and agencies are operating under a common national
strategic framework in support of achieving sustainable outcomes
overseas and building long-lasting relationships with our global
partners. With unity of effort, the interagency can implement broader
foreign policies and national security objectives through fostering
good governance, restoring public infrastructure, assisting economic
activities, and/or enabling a secure environment through a capable,
equipped armed force. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure
that interagency collaboration is as effective as possible.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. One area of improvement concerns our government's approach
to the immediate requirements of basic public order among foreign
civilian populations when the rule of law has broken down. DOD has
learned after hard experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that securing and
protecting a population is not only an immediate military mission, but
one that is essential for preventing insurgencies from growing and for
a sustainable transition to host-country control. A whole-of-government
approach is vital to assist in training foreign security forces and it
takes a robust interagency effort to maintain those capacities and
institutions that can educate, equip, and enable them for these
missions.
Question. Should these informal and ad hoc arrangements be made
more formal (i.e. through legislation, DOD Directives or Instructions,
et cetera . . . ) or is their ad hoc nature the reason for their
success?
Answer. Formality and standardization are perhaps most important at
the highest levels, where clearly prioritized objectives--or the lack
thereof--can have the most positive or pernicious effects on operations
and campaigns requiring the close coordination of multiple instruments
of national power. The President signed a Presidential Policy Directive
(PPD) on Security Sector Assistance (SSA) in April to improve the U.S.
Government's collective ability to address security sector assistance
issues as a shared responsibility. To this end, the PPD prescribes
interagency roles, responsibilities, and collaborating principles for
developing and implementing SSA activities. On the other hand,
organizations and teams operating at the tactical level need maximum
flexibility to achieve mission success as current requirements, driving
factors, and threats continuously change. Rather than attempting to
standardize the roles and relationships of tactical-level operators
from different departments and agencies, we should--instead--be working
to familiarize them with each other and the responsibilities of their
respective departments and agencies. Operational flexibility must be
buttressed with the familiarity and education derived from constant
interaction, particularly interaction in the forms of joint/interagency
training and education.
Question. Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical
level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than
on a regional basis (e.g. international terrorists departing Mali for
safe havens in Libya).
How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in
individual countries can best be coordinated in the interagency arena?
Answer. I understand that the recent security sector assistance
policy guidance from the President emphasizes a ``deliberate and
inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of
activities and resources with our national security priorities.'' In
order to synchronize planning for these activities, I believe the
interagency must link efforts in individual countries to the broader
regional approach. I also believe the regional strategies developed by
the members of the interagency should complement each other. Any
security sector assistance strategy is largely impacted by the degree
to which the interagency can plan, synchronize, and execute particular
activities in a region. With prescribed interagency roles,
responsibilities, and collaborating guidelines the interagency is best
prepared to share plans, develop and implement programs, and monitor
and evaluate the progress of our efforts in individual countries.
special operations personnel in embassies
Question. SOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a
number of priority countries where the United States is not engaged in
direct action operations, but rather trying to counter the spread of
violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the
Ambassador and the combatant commander's theater campaign plan against
terrorist networks.
If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure the goals of special
operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned closely
with those of the Ambassadors they are working with?
Answer. In your view, what is the value of these special operations
personnel to their respective geographic combatant commands and the
country teams they are supporting.
The sustained partnership among our geographic combatant
commanders, Ambassadors, and deployed special operations forces has
been strong throughout the past 12 years. Special operations personnel
deployed to embassies help provide a network-based approach to
assessing threats, formulating options, and improving the country
team's situational awareness. They bring specialized equipment and
offer significant expertise in contingency operations that augments the
Ambassador's resident capabilities. If confirmed, a priority of mine
will be to continue working with SOCOM, the geographic combatant
commanders, and State Department colleagues to further strengthen these
trusted partnerships.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes. Ensuring individuals in the custody of U.S. forces are
treated humanely is consistent with the applicable U.S. laws and the
laws governing armed conflicts.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all U.S.
Special Operations Forces continue to receive the necessary education
and training in the standards established in the Army Field Manual,
relevant DOD Directives, and other applicable requirements of U.S. and
international law regarding detention and interrogation operations.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under
the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality
or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. We hold our forces accountable to treat those
we capture and detain with dignity, respect, and humanity. We do this
as a matter of principal and following our moral compass. Our hope
would be for our enemy to treat our personnel in a similarly humane
manner, but regardless of how our captured forces are held, we will
continue to maintain the high standard of treatment currently provided
to detainees we hold.
dod counternarcotics activities
Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department's CN
operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around
the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that
DOD ``does not have an effective performance measurement system to
track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.'' This is the
second such finding relating by GAO to DOD CN in the last decade.
What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?
Answer. Having recently served as the Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict,
I understand and appreciate the importance of DOD counterdrug
activities in support of broader U.S. Government counternarcotics goals
as well as the accomplishment of other key national security
objectives. The DOD counterdrug program is providing critical support
to our national security objectives in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico,
Central America, Northwest Africa and elsewhere. I also recognize how
the counternarcotics program supports the broader objectives of the
office of the ASD for SO/LIC. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring
that these activities continue to be well-integrated into the overall
SO/LIC strategy, and to ensure that they are as cost-effective as
possible.
Question. Do you believe DOD's current CN strategy has proven
effective in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics?
Answer. In support of The President's National Drug Control
Strategy, DOD plays a key role in supporting U.S. and partner-nation
counternarcotics efforts that have achieved major and sustained
progress against cocaine use and distribution throughout the Western
Hemisphere. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy,
DOD counternarcotics efforts have helped reduce the amount of cocaine
reaching the United States, which has contributed to declines in
cocaine overdose deaths, positive workplace drug tests, retail drug
purity, and cocaine seizures in the United States. Through efforts such
as the establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force-South and support
to Plan Colombia, the Department of Defense has played a critical role
in this success. Nevertheless, continued high levels of cocaine,
heroin, methamphetamine trafficking, and the growing threat of
synthetic drugs, continues to present an extraordinarily difficult
challenge, and DOD brings unique capabilities to bear against these
threats.
Question. In what ways can the effectiveness of DOD CN programs be
better evaluated?
Answer. Over the past several years, the DOD CN program has made
significant progress in improving its performance evaluation framework
and has developed standardized operating procedures to apply across the
wide range of combatant commands, armed services, and defense agencies
that implement the Department's CN efforts. The performance data
provided is now being used to inform policy and budgetary decisions.
However, we continue to work to move beyond measuring performance based
on inputs and outputs (e.g. numbers of personnel trained) rather than
on the outcomes these programs are seeking to achieve. These types of
evaluations can be much more difficult but would ultimately provide a
better assessment of the value of these efforts.
Question. In your personal view, what role should DOD play in U.S.
efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?
Answer. The Department of Defense's role in U.S. counterdrug
efforts is, and should continue to be, to employ militarily unique
knowledge, skills, and capabilities to confront the wide range of
national security threats associated with drug trafficking and related
forms of transnational crime. Since the late 1980s, when DOD was
designated as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring
of drug trafficking bound for the United States, DOD has provided
critical counterdrug support to State, local, Federal, and foreign law
enforcement partners to combat the flow of illicit drugs into our
country. Narcotics and other forms of transnational organized crime
also provide key financial support to terrorists, insurgents, and other
threat forces, and contribute to global instability by undermining
legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, and
distorting legitimate economic activity. Accordingly, DOD counterdrug
efforts support the National Security Strategy, the National Drug
Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime.
DOD's efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of partner-
nation security forces serves to prevent and deter broader conflicts
that could require a much more costly military intervention in the
future. In today's increasingly austere budgetary environment, these
programs can serve as cost-effective tools to accomplishing key
national security objectives. Given the interwoven nature of threats we
face today, we are increasingly seeing that the expertise, authorities,
and experience of our law enforcement partners are essential to
accomplishing national security objectives.
counter threat finance
Question. Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and
facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism,
production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other
significant national security threats could have an outsized impact on
confronting these threats. In August 2010, the Department issued a
Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy Directive which recognized the CTF
discipline as an essential tool in combating criminal networks and
terrorist organizations and called for the integration of CTF
capabilities into future force planning and the continued support to
interagency partners conducting CTF operations.
What is your assessment of DOD efforts to date to institutionalize
and support these capabilities?
Answer. The DOD CTF Directive, which was updated in November 2012,
drives the institutionalization of CTF within the Department. Since our
Nation's adversaries, from drug traffickers to terrorists, insurgents
and rogue nations rely upon the flow of money to enable their
activities, upsetting their financial supply lines is a proven means of
disrupting threats to national security. CTF is an important capability
in the Department as evidenced by our success with the Iraq and
Afghanistan Threat Finance Cells. We've also seen increasing success
from the CTF units established at each of the combatant commands. These
CTF units coordinate across the government and work in support of the
interagency to counter national security threats. Ultimately, success
in CTF will depend on DOD's continued ability to integrate with,
support, and complement other U.S. Government, multinational, and host
nation activities. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD continues to
collaborate with and support other U.S. Government departments and
agencies to conduct counter threat finance activities.
Question. What is your assessment of the current ability of the
Department to provide support to other U.S. Government departments and
agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?
Answer. It is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track
and halt the flow of money and to fight our adversaries' ability to
access and use global financial networks. Although DOD is not the lead
U.S. agency for CTF, it does work with and support other departments,
agencies, and partner nations through a unique set of capabilities,
including long-term planning, network analysis, and intelligence
analysis. The Department's senior leadership recognizes the
significance, both strategically and tactically, of a capable and
robust CTF posture. I do not anticipate an immediate need to expand the
support DOD is providing, but, if confirmed, I will work to ensure the
Department remains fully engaged in the interagency process on counter
threat finance activities and is postured to provide additional support
if necessary.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's
current counter threat finance efforts?
Answer. I understand the Department is in the process of examining
and evaluating its counter threat finance capability, and I believe
there are improvements that can be made. Principally, the Department's
CTF capability should be better integrated into the policy and strategy
of the Department, including COCOM theater campaign plans. I understand
that the Department is conducting a capabilities-based assessment for
CTF that will help identify and institutionalize these capabilities
across the COCOMs, the armed services, and defense agencies. This
assessment should help us to identify the full range of capabilities
the Department could bring to bear in support of broader U.S.
Government efforts.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of
SOCOM in supporting counter threat finance activities?
Answer. SOCOM is well suited to support and augment interagency
efforts to counter threat finance. Experiences since 2001 have led to
the development of a robust capability to analyze insurgent, terrorist,
and transnational threat networks, and SOF are already integrated at
many levels with interagency partners across the intelligence and law
enforcement domain. SOF contributions to these agencies enables them to
identify sources of insurgent, criminal, and terrorist finances;
disrupt front companies; develop actionable financial intelligence;
freeze and seize illicit funds; and build criminal cases.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National
Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ``an
abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,'' and
stated that ``rising drug violence and corruption are undermining
stability and the rule of law in some countries'' in the Western
Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to
National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the
strategy is ``enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law
enforcement.''
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime applies to all elements of national power to protect citizens and
U.S. national security interests from the convergence of 21st century
transnational criminal threats. It declares transnational organized
crime a threat to national security and includes a clear call to build,
balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat
transnational organized crime, and urge our foreign partners to do the
same. The end-state the U.S. Government seeks is to reduce
transnational organized crime from a national security threat to a
manageable public safety concern.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role
within the President's strategy?
Answer. The President's strategy acknowledges DOD's role in
providing support to law enforcement. DOD brings many unique supporting
capabilities in support of broader U.S. Government efforts to combat
transnational organized crime, principally through the employment of
the Department's counternarcotics authorities. These capabilities
primarily include military intelligence support and counter-threat
finance support to U.S. law enforcement. We therefore must ensure that
DOD is organized, resourced, and appropriately authorized to provide
vital support to law enforcement and foreign partners to confront the
national security threats associated with transnational organized
crime. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring what additional U.S.
support is appropriate under existing authorities.
Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support
to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters
related to transnational organized crime?
Answer. Yes. Due to the national security implications of drug
trafficking and related forms of transnational organized crime, the
Department should continue to provide support to our interagency
partners, including Federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence
agencies. For example, DOD currently supports law enforcement through
intelligence analysis at the Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support
Center--an action specifically highlighted in the President's strategy.
DOD also provides unique supporting capabilities including military
intelligence support to law enforcement, counter threat finance,
partner nation capacity building, and operational activities against
threats to the United States.
building partner capacity
Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
nations.
In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the
capacities of partner nations?
Answer. In my view, the department's ability to effectively build
the capacities of partner nations is a strategic necessity for the
United States. It enables the Department to directly provide training,
equipment, and other support to partners to encourage and enable them
to share security responsibilities. This includes enabling partners to
act alongside of, in lieu of, or in support of U.S. forces across the
globe. In our fiscal climate, we should continue these capacity
building activities so that we can achieve our defense objectives while
reducing risks of sending U.S. forces into harm's way.
Question. In light of demands for defense budget cuts, how would
you assess the trade-offs between providing funding for U.S. military
forces and providing assistance to build the capacity of partner
nations' security forces?
Answer. I believe one goal of building the capacity of a partner
nation is to transform them from a security consumer to a security
provider. The decision on where the trade-off is lies in the
prioritization of U.S. strategic interests. We must continue to ensure
U.S. military forces receive the appropriate resources, equipment, and
training in order to serve effectively and be prepared to respond at
any given notice. At the same it is still important to sustain
engagement with key partners and building partner capacity to meet
shared challenges provides a forward presence to enable operations and
deter threats and, if and when necessary, to conduct future
contingencies. During these uncertain times, we should continue to
improve military-to-military and defense-civilian relations, while
continuing to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and substance of our
relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S. values and
advance U.S. vital national interests. If confirmed, it is my aim to
ensure our assistance programs to partner nations will fulfill defined
strategic requirements and vitally important capability gaps that are
directly in line with the President's and the Defense Secretary's
strategic guidance.
Question. What is your assessment of the sufficiency of existing
security assistance authorities to address the evolving nature of
global security threats?
Answer. Developing partner capacity through security sector
assistance is important because every one of our primary missions
involves collaborating with partners to some extent. These investments
buy down risk and ease the burden of U.S. forces by improving our
partners' ability to provide for their own security, to contribute to
larger regional and combined security efforts, or to enable U.S.
operations consistent with our national objectives. In some cases,
partners are better positioned than U.S. Forces to conduct security
operations due to cultural affinity or political sensitivities. I
understand that Congress has provided the Department of Defense
security sector assistance authorities that have improved our partners'
capabilities and capacity to contribute to security around the globe.
There may be requirements where additional or more agile authority is
needed to address emerging security challenges. If confirmed, I will
look forward to working with Congress to develop appropriate
legislative remedies where appropriate.
Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the section
1206 train and equip authority? What is your assessment of the
implementation of the global train and equip program?
Answer. The section 1206 authority builds capacity for
counterterrorism operations and stability operations where U.S. forces
are a participant. The program has been successful in responding to
annual requests by the combatant commanders and Chiefs of Mission for
near-term assistance to overcome critical shortfalls in partner
capabilities. This includes providing training and equipment to nations
deploying forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan. Although the 1206 program has done a great job
delivering equipment, we need to do more work on assessing the effects
this has on improving partner capacity over the long term. If
confirmed, I will continue development of assessment metrics and work
closely with Department of State colleagues to integrate 1206
capabilities into our overall foreign assistance programs for partner
nations.
Question. The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) was
established in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 to create a joint
Department of Defense-Department of State administered program to build
partner nation capacity in the areas of security and rule of law. What
is your assessment of the implementation of this authority? Do you
believe it's achieving its intended objectives? If not, do you believe
modifications are required?
Answer. The GSCF enables the Departments to address emergent
opportunities and challenges in partner's security sectors that could
not be planned for but that have a direct bearing on our national
security interests and do so in a more collaborative and integrated
approach.
While I have not been involved in the implementation of the GSCF, I
understand that the Departments of Defense and State have made
significant progress towards improving joint implementation of the
program and intend to incorporate a robust monitoring and evaluation
framework to assess each individual GSCF project, as well as the
overall program in the country of interest. If confirmed, I look
forward to sharing the results of the assessment effort with Congress,
and specifically this committee. I will welcome your help and continued
guidance as we continue to mature the GSCF.
Question. What is the relationship of the train and equip authority
to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics
assistance, foreign military financing, and other title 22 authorities?
What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority
does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?
Answer. U.S. security sector assistance authorities across programs
are complementary, and I will strive to avoid unnecessary duplicative
efforts. The counternarcotics authorities are focused on providing the
Department of Defense the ability to support U.S. or other Government
efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. If confirmed, the
GSFC, section 1206, and counternarcotics authorities would fall under
my purview, and I would monitor their implementation to ensure they
continue to be used appropriately, and in keeping with their intent. I
understand that the President issued new guidance on security sector
assistance in April. If confirmed, I will strive to strengthen our
capacity to plan, synchronize, and implement security sector assistance
through a deliberate and inclusive process that ensures alignment of
activities and resources with our national security priorities.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will appear before this committee and
other appropriate committees of Congress when called upon to do so.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD(SO/LIC)?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide this committee or members
of this committee accurate and appropriate information to the best of
my ability when called upon to do so.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the necessary information
to this committee and other appropriate committees and their staff when
asked to do so.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the committee the
necessary documents when appropriate and will consult with the
committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing documents.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
current state of global terrorism
1. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Lumpkin, in remarks to the United Nations
General Assembly on September 24th, President Obama stated that, ``the
world is more stable than it was 5 years ago.'' Do you believe the
world is more stable than it was 5 years ago?
Mr. Lumpkin. I agree with President Obama's assessment that the
world is more stable than 5 years ago, but I also agree with his next
sentence in that speech, which stated: ``But even a glance at today's
headlines indicates that dangers remain.'' The President outlined these
dangers, particularly those related to global terrorism, in his address
to the National Defense University on May 23. In this address he said
our Nation is still threatened by terrorists--``From Benghazi to
Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we have to
recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that
came to our shores on September 11.'' I agree with the President that
we will counter the threat of global terrorism through a combination of
efforts, including targeted action against terrorists, effective
partnership with allies and friends, and diplomatic engagement and
assistance. Through this comprehensive strategy we can significantly
reduce the chances of large-scale attacks on the Homeland and mitigate
the threats to Americans overseas.

al qaeda threat assessment
2. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Lumpkin, does the growth of al Qaeda in
Syria indicate al Qaeda is less capable?
Mr. Lumpkin. The continued civil war in Syria provides al Qaeda and
other extremist groups with an opportunity to expand their influence
and develop a cadre of experienced fighters. Al Nusrah Front has
clearly grown and become more capable in Syria, but to date has not
shown capability to conduct external attacks.

3. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Lumpkin, Charles Lister, an analyst for IHS
Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Center, said: ``Syria is the biggest al
Qaeda opportunity in a decade to establish a foothold in the Middle
East.'' Do you agree?
Mr. Lumpkin. Al Qaeda's affiliated groups, al Nusrah Front and al
Qaeda in Iraq, as well as other extremist groups, are a growing problem
inside Syria. Al Qaeda has seized an opportunity created by the absence
of security in Syria and become one of the most dominant opposition
groups. That said their long-term viability remains in question, as
does their potential to garner popular support in a post-Assad Syria.
Broadly speaking, al Qaeda's message has failed to resonate with new
governments in other Arab Spring countries, and I would expect the same
outcome in Syria.

4. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Lumpkin, what do you think we should do
about it?
Mr. Lumpkin. The United States should continue to engage and work
with our partners and allies to provide stability in the region. These
efforts aim to stem the flow of foreign fighters and support the
moderate factions of the opposition who represent the majority of the
Syrian opposition. The United States is working with our allies to
accelerate political transition in Syria and to end the bloodshed as
quickly as possible. If confirmed, I will work with my interagency
partners to develop recommendations for appropriate lines of operation
to combat al Qaeda's foothold in the Middle East and to protect U.S.
presence and interests in the region.

5. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Lumpkin, al Qaeda is clearly gathering
strength in the ungoverned regions of northern and eastern Syria, the
Washington Post reports that fewer than 1,000 Syrian rebels have been
trained this year. As the moderate opposition grows weaker, the
extremists, and al Qaeda in particular, grow stronger and Assad has
less incentive to participate in the political negotiation the
administration says will result in his departure. Do you think the
training cited by the Washington Post is capable of altering any
balance of power within Syria?
Mr. Lumpkin. Training is and has been helpful in supporting the
moderate opposition secure areas under its control. However, training
is only part of the equation and we must continue to work with allied
partners to attain a political solution supporting the moderate Syrian
opposition. If confirmed, I will work with our partners across the
interagency and with our allied partners in order to explore
comprehensive, coordinated, unified approaches that will support
meeting U.S. objectives in the region.

6. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Lumpkin, what strategy do you suggest to
contain the growth of extremism in Syria--of Hezbollah and Shia
extremism on the one hand under Assad and al Qaeda and al Nusra in
ungoverned spaces on the other?
Mr. Lumpkin. To combat the growth of extremism in Syria, a
political solution to the Syrian conflict is necessary. We need to
continue to explore avenues with our allied partners for supporting the
moderate opposition to ultimately increase their ability to provide a
legitimate government to the Syrian population. If confirmed, I will
work with the interagency to develop recommendations for appropriate
lines of operation to combat the growth of extremism in Syria and to
protect U.S. presence and interests in the region.
______

Question Submitted by Senator John McCain
afghanistan
7. Senator McCain. Mr. Lumpkin, what force size do you recommend
the United States should leave behind in Afghanistan after 2014?
Mr. Lumpkin. Our core goal--to defeat al Qaeda and prevent its
return to Afghanistan and Pakistan--remains unchanged. Over the past 4
years, due to the dedication and sacrifices of our forces, our
coalition partners, and the Afghan security forces, I have been
encouraged by the progress made toward our goal and believe this
progress can continue beyond 2014.
The Executive Branch is reviewing options for the size of our
contribution to the post-2014 NATO mission, as well as a limited U.S.
counterterrorism mission, and that decision will be based on a number
of factors, including:

Conclusion of a U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security
Agreement and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement;
Progress toward our core goal of disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and preventing its return
to Afghanistan and Pakistan;
Continued progress and development of the ANSF;
A peaceful Afghan political transition centered on the
elections in April 2014;
The potential for peace talks between the Afghan
Government and the Taliban.

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
al-libi and lack of a detention policy
8. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Lumpkin, can you describe Abu Anas al-Libi's
al Qaeda background and his potential intelligence value?
Mr. Lumpkin. Abu Anas al-Libi is a legacy al Qaeda member likely
possessing information of value to the intelligence and law enforcement
communities. He has been indicted and presented in the Southern
District of New York in connection with his alleged role in the attacks
on our embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998.

9. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Lumpkin, why was the decision made to take
the risk and to attempt to capture al-Libi, rather than killing him?
Mr. Lumpkin. Wherever possible, our first priority is and always
has been to apprehend terrorist suspects, and to preserve the
opportunity to collect valuable intelligence that can help us protect
the American people. Additionally, the prospect of gathering further
operational and strategic information of other terrorist individuals,
organizations, and networks is a top consideration when determining the
risk mitigation strategy.

10. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Lumpkin, do you agree that when we kill--
rather than capture--a high value detainee we lose valuable
intelligence?
Mr. Lumpkin. Valuable intelligence can be collected during lethal
or capture operations. Capture operations allow for the ability to
directly interrogate the detainee and exploit any sensitive site
materials discovered with the high value target. Lethal operations,
whether involving an assault force or an aerial strike, also provide
opportunities for either first-hand or second-hand sensitive site
exploitation of where the high value target was killed. Previous lethal
operations have yielded valuable tactical and strategic information.
______

[The nomination reference of Mr. Michael D. Lumpkin
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
September 11, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Michael D. Lumpkin, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense, vice Michael A. Sheehan.
______

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Michael D. Lumpkin, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Michael D. Lumpkin
Education:
University of California, San Diego

September 1982-June 1986
Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded June 1986

Naval Postgraduate School

June 1994-December 1995
Master of International Affairs Degree awarded
December 1995
Subspecialty in Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict awarded December 1995
Employment record:
U.S. Department of Defense

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
May 20-present

Industrial Security Alliance Partners, Inc.

Chief Executive Officer
September 2012-March 2013

Pistris, LLC

Director of Business Development
June 2012-September 2012

The O'Gara Group

Technical Analyst
May 2012-September 2012

U.S. Department of Defense

Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
April 2011-May 2012

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs

Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
August 2010-April 2011

The O'Gara Group

Technical Analyst
July 2009-August 2010

Aardvark Tactical, Inc.

Director of Business Development
April 2008-August 2010

U.S. Special Operations Command Office of Legislative Affairs

Maritime Director
August 2006-September 2007

Special Boat Team Twelve

Commanding Officer
August 2004-August 2006

Naval Special Warfare Group One

Operations Officer
February 2003-August 2004

Naval Officer at Various U.S. Navy Commands

October 1986-September 2007
Honors and awards:
The Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
(2012)
Department of Veterans Affairs Commendation (2011)
American Defense Preparedness Association Award (1994)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal - seven awards
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal - two awards
Joint Service Achievement Medal - two awards
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal - three awards
Joint Meritorious Unit Award - two awards
Meritorious Unit Commendation - two awards
National Defense Service Medal - two awards
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Afghanistan Campaign Medal
Iraq Campaign Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal
Global War on Terrorism Medal
Combat Action Ribbon
Humanitarian Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon - seven awards
Korean Service Medal
Navy Overseas Service Medal - two awards
Navy Pistol Expert Medal
Navy Rifle Expert Medal
Naval Special Warfare (Authorized to wear USN SEAL Trident)
Surface Warfare (Authorized to wear Surface Warfare insignia)
Command at Sea (Authorized to wear Command at Sea pin)
Shore Command (Authorized to wear Shore Command pin)
Navy Parachutist (Authorized to wear Gold Parachutist insignia)
Patrol Officer (Authorized to wear Combatant Craft Patrol Officer
pin)
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Michael D.
Lumpkin in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Michael David Lumpkin.
``Mike'' David Lumpkin.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict.

3. Date of nomination:
September 11, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
October 14, 1964; Oceanside, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Jill Louise Powell.

7. Names and ages of children:
Stepson: Luke Elliot Powell; July 9, 1976.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Vista High School: 09/1979-06/1982, High School Diploma
University of California, San Diego: 09/1982-06/1986, Bachelor of
Arts
Naval Postgraduate School: 06/1994-12/1995, Master of Arts

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
05/2013-Present; Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense,
1000 Pentagon Defense, Washington, DC.
09/2012-03/2013; Chief Executive Officer, Industrial Security
Alliance Partners, USA, 3033 5th Avenue, Suite 400, San Diego, CA.
06/2012-09/2012; Director of Business Development, Pistris, LLC.,
P.O. Box 105, Hull, MA.
05/2012-09/2012; Technical Analyst, The O'Gara Group, 700 W. Pete
Rose Way, Suite 4N,Cincinnati, OH.
04/2011-05/2012; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Department of
Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC.
08/2010-04/2011; Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of Veterans
Affairs, 810 Vermont Ave, NW, Washington, DC.
07/2009-08/2010; Technical Analyst, The O'Gara Group, 700 W. Pete
Rose Way, Suite 4N, Cincinnati, OH.
04/2008-08/2010; Director of Business Development, Aardvark
Tactical, 1002 W. Tenth Street,Azusa, CA.
08/2006-09/2007; Maritime Director, SOCOM Office of Legislative
Affairs, 400 Virginia Ave., SW, Washington, DC.
08/2004-08/2006; Commanding Officer, Special Boat Team Twelve, 3402
Tarawa Road, San Diego, CA.
02/2003-08/2004; Operations Officer, Naval Special Warfare Group
One, 3632 Guadalcanal Road,San Diego, CA.
10/1986-02/2003; Naval Officer at Various Navy Commands.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
N/A.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Fraternal Order of UDT/SEAL: Member.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for whichyou have been a candidate.
Candidate U.S. House of Representatives (CA-52) in 2008.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Civilian Federal Service:
The Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
Military Awards:
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal - seven awards
Navy Commendation Medal - two awards
Joint Service Achievement Medal - two awards
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal - three awards
Joint Meritorious Unit Award - two awards
Meritorious Unit Commendation - two awards
National Defense Service Medal - two awards
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Afghanistan Campaign Medal
Iraq Campaign Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Combat Action Ribbon
Humanitarian Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon - seven awards
Korean Service Medal
Navy Overseas Service Medal - two awards
Navy Pistol Expert Medal
Navy Rifle Expert Medal
Designated: U.S. Navy SEAL (Authorized to wear SEAL Trident)
Surface Warfare (Authorized to wear Surface Warfare device)
Command at Sea (Authorized to wear Command at Sea pin)
Shore Command (Authorized to wear Shore Command pin)
Navy Parachutist (Authorized to wear Gold Wings)
Patrol Officer (Authorized to wear Combatant Craft Patrol Officer
pin)
Other Awards:
1994 - Recognized for Outstanding Performance in support to
national security during Counterdrug Operations by Armed Forces
Preparedness Association.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis (1995): Microviolence at Sea.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Mr. Michael D. Lumpkin was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on October 31, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on November 14, 2013.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Jamie M. Morin by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I am familiar with the history of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
and believe it has been extremely successful to date. The Act has
benefitted over the years from periodic incremental changes to reflect
lessons learned and the changing world situation. It is possible that
pending analysis of potential process changes to increase headquarters
efficiency and allow reductions in headquarters staff and budgets will
depend on legislative changes, but those initial analyses are still
underway and I have not been briefed on any recommendations.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. At present, I do not have any concrete proposals for
modifications. If I am confirmed and I identify areas that I believe
merit changes, I will propose those changes through the established
process. I believe it is important that the Director of Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation (CAPE) be a trusted independent advisor to the
Secretary and Deputy.
duties and responsibilities
Question. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009
established the position of Director of CAPE and makes that official
``responsible for ensuring that cost estimates are fair, reliable, and
unbiased, and for performing program analysis and evaluation functions
currently performed by the Director of Program Analysis and
Evaluation.'' The duties and responsibilities of this position are set
forth in section 139c of title 10, U.S.C. and in section 2334 of such
title (addressing independent cost estimation and cost analysis).
What is your understanding of the primary duties and
responsibilities of the Director of CAPE?
Answer. I have read the WSARA, and in my past role as a Senate
staffer closely observed the floor debate where it was adopted. Based
on the law and practice in the Department of Defense (DOD) over the
last 4 years, I understand that CAPE is responsible for providing
unbiased, independent cost estimates for all major acquisition
programs; ensuring that program cost and schedule estimates are
properly prepared and considered in the Department's deliberations on
major acquisition programs; providing guidance and oversight for
Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) to ensure that the Department considers
the full range of program and non-materiel solutions. Additionally, the
Director of CAPE is responsible for leading the development of improved
analytical skills and competencies within the CAPE workforce of DOD.
Finally, the Director has served as a key advisor to the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense especially for the programmatic development
of the Department's Future Years Defense Program.
Question. Do you believe that the Director of CAPE has the
authority needed to carry out the duties and responsibilities assigned
by statute?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see any need for modifications in the duties and
responsibilities of the Director of CAPE?
Answer. Not at this time. If confirmed, I will evaluate any need
for modifications to the duties and responsibilities in the law.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if
any, do you expect the Secretary of Defense to assign to you in
accordance with sections 113 and 139c(b)(1)(B) of title 10, U.S.C.?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me the
duties and functions commensurate with the position, and any others he
may deem appropriate.
qualifications
Question. If confirmed as Director of CAPE, you will be the
principal official in DOD responsible for cost estimation and cost
analysis for acquisition programs; for review, analysis and evaluation
of acquisition programs; and for related matters.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have over 10 years of experience in government as a
defense analyst and executive, with particular focus on budgetary and
programmatic issues. This hands-on experience built on my academic
research, focused on the challenges of defense budgeting during times
of budgetary decline and included significant training in quantitative
and qualitative methods.
For the last 4 years, I have served as the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller, and in this
role I oversee the operation of the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency
(AFCAA). With my support and advocacy, the AFCAA team was able to
expand their analytical agenda, enhance their workforce, and thereby
produce rigorous cost estimates of a much wider range of Air Force
programs. Additionally, AFCAA's work became much more central to the
Air Force's corporate decisionmaking, resulting in much narrowed gaps
between the authoritative cost estimates (whether they were done by
CAPE or AFCAA) and the actual amounts funded in the Air Force budget
request. This gap was $11.9 billion in fiscal year 2011 President's
budget (PB) and has dropped to $1.3 billion in the fiscal year 2014 PB.
We also expanded AFCAA's capability to estimate the full life-cycle
costs of major weapons systems by including operating and support
costs, and helped to inform an Air Force-wide effort to contain cost
growth in weapons systems sustainment. Finally, during 10 months as the
Acting Under Secretary of the Air Force, I was deeply immersed in the
development of the Air Force program and in DOD-wide debates on
efficiency efforts.
Earlier in my career, I worked as an economist and strategy
consultant. I have also held fellowships from various public policy and
defense think tanks and spent 4 months during graduate school in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy working on
requirements and planning issues.
Question. What background and experience do you have in the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. I have been a part of major acquisition decisions in both
my Air Force roles, including my comptroller role as the co-signer
(with SAF/AQ) of Air Force full-funding certifications for acquisition
programs meeting milestone decisions. In this capacity, I have closely
reviewed numerous acquisition program cost estimates and discussed
their details with both cost estimators and program management. As
Acting Under Secretary, I was deeply exposed to space acquisition
efforts in my role as the Headquarters Air Force ``focal point'' for
space programs. I have served as a member and a co-chair of the Air
Force Council, which is the Air Force's senior-most corporate
decisionmaking body, as well as a member of the Special Programs
Oversight Council that reviews classified Air Force acquisition
programs. As part of earning the Certified Defense Financial Manager
designation, I studied the acquisition process with particular focus on
financial management responsibilities. However, I have not served in a
direct program management or line acquisition position.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Director of CAPE?
Answer. The WSARA of 2009 is intended to reform defense acquisition
processes and to bring cost growth under control. The CAPE organization
continues to mature in response to this legislation and Department
management's need for rigorous, unbiased advice on where DOD can find
necessary savings in a difficult budget environment. I have seen the
organization perform exceptionally good work for the Secretary on a
wide range of difficult issues, but given the scale of the budget
challenges even better analytical support will be essential. I believe
the primary challenge for the Director of CAPE, given the current
reality of sequestration and the stark choices that the sequester
compels us to make, will be to ensure independent, thorough, and
insightful analysis is used to develop a comprehensive set of options
for informed leadership decisions.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to immediately undertake a review of
the organization and its ability to fully meet statutory requirements,
with the goal to provide clear recommendations regarding changes to
organizational structure and additional resource demands. I believe I
will need to review the size, shape, and organization of the CAPE
workforce in detail to ensure the organization is aligned to meet
current and future needs. Given the significant statutory
responsibilities under WSARA and the relatively limited growth of CAPE
staffing since its enactment, I plan to be both an active manager of
organizational resources and a strong advocate for the organization's
mission. In supporting the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in
their decisionmaking on very tough resource allocation issues, I will
intend to build on my relationships with the DOD senior leadership team
to help form consensus on priorities and acceptable risks, informed by
the best possible analysis from CAPE, the Joint Staff, the military
services, and other stakeholders across the Department.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship
with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Director of CAPE provides the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense unbiased advice, supported by strong analysis, on
how to make rational trade-offs in a resource constrained environment.
The Director is the principal advisor to the Secretary for CAPE. If
confirmed, I will closely interact with the Secretary to ensure his
directives, goals, and themes are reflected in the programs of DOD.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will expect to interact with the Deputy
Secretary to provide unbiased recommendations concerning resource
allocation, programmatic alternatives, and cost assessments.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to ensure that
acquisition plans and decisions are appropriately supported with
accurate and unbiased estimates of the costs to develop and procure
weapon systems. The CAPE director must also provide the USD(AT&L)
frequent input about the viability, execution ability, and
affordability of programs that support the national military strategy.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) to ensure the necessary integration of
developing the Future Years Defense Program with budget plans.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense (Intelligence) to coordinate assessments of special access
and compartmented intelligence programs since the CAPE Director has
oversight of all DOD resource allocation, including intelligence
programs. The central importance and complexity of intelligence to our
tactical, operational, and strategic operations requires regular
interactions with the primary intelligence official, and his staff.
Question. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work as an advisor to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council for assessing the resource requirements
and programmatic risk of desired capabilities. I will not be a member
of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), however I will
attend meetings and provide assessments of programs if invited. The
importance of requirements to the acquisition process makes interaction
with the JROC members a key imperative for the Director of CAPE.
Question. The Defense Business Systems Management Committee
(DBSMC).
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure regular interaction with the
DBSMC, providing assessments and advice.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure a close working relationship
with the Director of DOT&E, and ensure that CAPE and DOT&E freely share
information and data. I believe that operational testing is critical to
ensuring that weapon systems developed within DOD meet requirements,
are reliable, and are cost effective. Careful consideration of
operational testing results often point to weaknesses inherent in
programs that impact costs, as well as pointing to considerations
important for later programs.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. Service Secretaries provide critical oversight of their
departments, particularly regarding plans, programs, and policies.
Based on more than 4 years of experience as part of Service-level
leadership, I have a good understanding of the critical role that the
Services and Military Departments play in the efficient and effective
functioning of the defense establishment. If confirmed, I will endeavor
to establish close working relationships with Service Secretaries,
working together to solve key problems relating it each Service.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services.
Answer. Service Chiefs have responsibilities to organize, man,
train, and equip their services to meet warfighting requirements and
support combatant commanders. Their title 10 responsibilities for
planning and programming of resources, as well as to develop
acquisition programs, ensure regular interaction between the Director
of CAPE and Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services. If confirmed, I
will ensure that I quickly develop close working relationships with
Service Chiefs in order to jointly meet the many challenges within DOD.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders are the key consumers of the
``products'' developed in the Pentagon--the forces, programs, and other
capabilities necessary to implement the National Security Strategy. If
confirmed, I will endeavor to understand the needs of the combatant
commanders and to advocate for the programs that support their
requirements most efficiently and effectively. I will ensure that I
know and react to their needs.
Question. The heads of the Defense agencies.
Answer. The Defense agencies have responsibilities to develop
programs and budget to meet their requirements. If confirmed, I will be
sensitive to the needs of the Defense agencies and be available to help
address their challenges.
Question. The service acquisition executives.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with service acquisition
executives to provide analysis, to meet the challenges of troubled
programs and if required, develop alternatives to meet Defense needs.
Question. The program executive officers and program managers of
major defense acquisition programs.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with program executive
officers and program managers to provide analysis to help meet the
challenges of troubled programs and if required, develop alternatives
to meet Defense needs.
Question. The cost estimating offices of the Military Departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure a close working relationship
with the cost estimating offices of the Military Departments, ensuring
that independent cost estimates fully represent the Service acquisition
plans. The cost estimating offices of the Military Departments provide
the baseline data and plans that form the basis for cost estimates for
acquisition programs, and I believe that close collaboration between
CAPE and the service cost estimating agencies is especially helpful
when it comes to sharing analytic best practices, building robust data
sets necessary for developing good cost estimating relationships, and
testing critical assumptions that underpin program cost estimates.
organization and staffing
Question. What steps do you believe you will need to take, if
confirmed, to ensure that the office of the Director of CAPE is fully
functional and organized in a manner consistent with statutory
requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to implement and refine the
strategic plan to transition the organization into fulfilling its
expanded roles and responsibilities in a way that both meets the intent
of WSARA and the needs of the Department. I will review the
organization to determine whether or not additional staff will be
needed along with organizational changes to fulfill the expanded CAPE
responsibilities and fully comply with the statutory requirements of
WSARA.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the structure,
organization, or reporting relationships of the office of the Director
of CAPE?
Answer. Not at this time. If confirmed, I will evaluate the current
structure, organization, and reporting relationships of the office of
the Director of CAPE and recommend adjustments, if needed. If
confirmed, I will assess these issues and recommend changes as
necessary.
Question. Section 139c(d)(8) of title 10, U.S.C., requires the
Director of CAPE to lead ``the development of improved analytical
skills and competencies within the CAPE workforce of the Department of
Defense.'' Section 2334(f) of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Secretary
of Defense to ensure that the Director of CAPE has sufficient staff of
military and civilian personnel to enable the Director to carry out the
duties and responsibilities of the Director under this section.''
Do you believe that the office of the Director of CAPE currently
has sufficient staff of appropriately qualified and trained personnel
to carry out its duties and responsibilities?
Answer. It is my understanding that along with the reorganization,
when Program Analysis and Evaluation transformed into CAPE as mandated
by WSARA, there was a transformation of the managerial style. The goal
of this managerial shift was to move to a more agile and flexible
organizational structure and enable CAPE to provide the capability to
carry out its duties and responsibilities without the growth in
personnel that was initially expected. If confirmed, I will move
rapidly to evaluate the management and staffing of CAPE and take
appropriate steps to ensure that CAPE will continue to help the
Department realize the program performance goals established by the
President and Congress.
Question. What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to assess
the staffing needs of your office and ensure that you have sufficient
staff of appropriately qualified and trained personnel to carry out
your duties and responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the assessments and planning
done to date, and will provide further guidance as required to ensure
continued adherence to WSARA.
Question. What is your view of the current staffing of cost
assessment and cost estimating functions of the Military Departments
and defense agencies?
Answer. The cost estimating workforce is distributed among several
organizations throughout the Department. Consequently, identifying and
remedying issues with the size, education experience and organization
of the DOD cost estimating workforce requires an integrated and
collaborative effort, with the Director, CAPE as the leader and primary
advocate for the entire DOD cost community. Efforts toward that end
began last year with activities to gather data on the workforce size,
grade, and demographics, as well as experience and education levels.
Beyond that, there is interest in measuring projected workload volume
and content (i.e., what the cost assessment community is actually
doing), to help assess whether scarce resources are properly focused on
strategic priorities. However, these efforts are currently suspended,
due to the tremendous uncertainty in the projected DOD budget and
personnel levels. OSD and the Military Departments are for the most
part currently operating under a hiring freeze, and face the
possibility of civilian furloughs or reductions. I intend to resume
these activities next year if there is more stability in the budget
environment. From my Air Force experience, the Air Force is currently
short approximately 200 cost estimating billets based on an Air Force
manpower study.
Question. If confirmed, what role if any do you expect to play in
ensuring that the cost assessment and cost estimating functions of the
Military Departments and defense agencies have sufficient staff of
appropriately qualified and trained personnel to carry out their duties
and responsibilities?
Answer. In my view, the CAPE has made appropriate use of the
expertise and resources of the Military Departments, especially in the
area of data collection. The Military Departments have undertaken a
long-term initiative to collect actual operating and support cost
information through the VAMOSC systems. This has resulted in better
quality cost estimates throughout the Department. For Milestone
reviews, CAPE instituted a policy that a signed, dated service cost
estimate must be delivered to the CAPE prior to delivery of an ICE
which gives CAPE a point of departure and cross-check. This increased
rigor has resulted in overall better cost estimates prepared by the
Military Departments. Also, during the Department's Program Budget
Review, CAPE teams with the Military Departments to ensure MDAP/MAIS
programs are funded to the appropriate, defendable, and realistic cost
estimate.
Question. In your view, has the office of the Director of CAPE been
making appropriate use of the expertise and resources of the cost
assessment and cost estimating offices of the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies?
Answer. I am aware of the coordination between CAPE and the other
DOD offices. I believe that close collaboration between CAPE and the
service cost estimating agencies is especially helpful when it comes to
sharing analytic best practices, building robust data sets necessary
for developing good cost estimating relationships, and testing critical
assumptions that underpin program cost estimates. If confirmed, I will
ensure that CAPE maintains the statutorily required independence in its
cost estimates, while partnering to the fullest extent possible with
the cost estimating offices of the Military Departments, so that the
Department receives the best possible cost estimates.
impact of sequestration
Question. What impact do you expect sequestration (and the
Secretary's directive to reduce staffing by 20 percent) to have on the
organization and staffing of the office of the Director of CAPE?
Answer. I understand that the process for addressing the directive
within CAPE is ongoing, and at this time, I do not have sufficient
knowledge to offer a complete assessment of the impact. However, if
confirmed, I will quickly evaluate the organization and staffing and
take appropriate steps to ensure that CAPE's staff will remain able to
meet the performance goals established by the President and Congress.
Question. What impact do you expect these measures to have on the
office's ability to carry out its statutory duties, including the
requirement to provide cost estimates for all major defense acquisition
programs?
Answer. I do not have sufficient knowledge to offer a complete
assessment of the impact at this time. However, if confirmed, I will
quickly evaluate the staffing and take appropriate steps to ensure that
CAPE is resourced to carry out all statutory duties.
Question. What impact do you expect sequestration to have on the
costs of major defense acquisition programs (including multi-year
contracts for such programs)?
Answer. Impacts will vary from program to program and will depend
on many variables. It is reasonable, though, to assume some program
unit costs will increase as orders are reduced to meet the funding
levels mandated by sequestration. Budget instability makes it difficult
to take advantage of the cost savings gained in multi-year procurement
strategies. It is my understanding that CAPE and the Services are
already working to identify the risks posed by sequester-level
reductions. If confirmed, I will work to proactively address and
mitigate issues that may arise.
Question. Do you foresee a need for new or revised cost estimates
for such programs to take into account the impact of sequestration?
Answer. Yes. Cost estimates are regularly revised as programs pass
through milestone events or experience significant changes. It is my
understanding that sequestration impacts are currently being (and will
continue to be) captured in updates to existing cost estimates.
acquisition process
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Director of
CAPE in the acquisition process?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Director of CAPE plays
multiple key roles in the acquisition process. The Director is
responsible for providing guidance and oversight for Analyses of
Alternatives to ensure that the Department considers the full range of
program and non-materiel alternatives that could provide the needed
military capabilities, as quickly as possible, at the lowest possible
cost. The Director is also responsible, throughout the entire
acquisition process, for ensuring that program cost and schedule
estimates are properly prepared and considered in the Department's
deliberations on major acquisition programs. The Director also is
responsible for assessing whether a program is likely to achieve the
desired capabilities.
Question. What is your view of the significance of sound, unbiased
cost estimating throughout the acquisition process?
Answer. It is my personal view and clearly the view of the authors
of WSARA, that independent, rigorous, unbiased cost and schedule
estimates, paired with thorough risk assessments, are essential for
effective acquisition decisionmaking and oversight. Achieving the goal
of reducing cost and schedule growth in the Department's portfolio of
acquisition programs requires that good cost estimates be available and
considered throughout the acquisition process.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Director of
CAPE in the requirements and resource-allocation processes?
Answer. The Director is an advisor to the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council for assessing the resource requirements and
programmatic risk of a desired capability. The Director is primarily
responsible for executing the planning and programming phases of the
Department's planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system,
and coordinates closely with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) throughout the budget and execution stages of that
process.
Question. Do you see the need for any additional processes or
mechanisms to ensure coordination between the budget, acquisition, and
requirements systems of DOD and ensure that appropriate trade-offs are
made between cost, schedule, and performance requirements early in the
acquisition process?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to use the authorities granted by
WSARA to ensure that programs are properly initiated and are postured
for success. I will evaluate and recommend adjustments, as needed, to
facilitate informed discussion of trade-offs.
Question. Do you see the need to review the existing processes and
mechanisms to determine those parts of the process which do not
contribute significant or, on balance, create adequate value to the
system?
Answer. I understand that CAPE is an important participant in the
acquisition process and also believe that achieving significant
efficiencies in headquarters operations will require redesigning
processes to be less labor intensive and timeconsuming. For many
acquisition programs in development or production lengthening schedules
can drive significant cost increases. If confirmed, I will evaluate and
look to improve CAPE's role in the DOD 5000 processes while adhering to
the requirements of WSARA.
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
major systems, costs of current operations, the need for asset
recapitalization, and the impact of sequestration?
Answer. Given the current reality of sequestration, all major
systems budgets will need to be re-evaluated. While there are some
preliminary indications that recent reforms may have helped slow
weapons system cost growth, much work remains to be done. Additionally,
the slow process of reducing costs for personnel and infrastructure, as
laid out by the Strategic Choices and Management Review, means that
investment and readiness may have to significantly decrease in the next
several years in order to achieve the reduced funding levels mandated
by the sequester. If confirmed, I would intend to focus attention on
analyzing trade-offs between the current investment budget and the
other pressures on resources across the entire Department.
Question. If not, what role do you see for the Director of CAPE in
addressing this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate these trade-offs and
recommend adjustments, if needed, and provide management direction as
necessary to ensure that we have an affordable, long-term investment
strategy.
Question. Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD
acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly
optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance
expectations. As Senator Levin explained at a June 2008 hearing,
``contractors and program offices have every reason to produce
optimistic cost estimates and unrealistic performance expectations,
because programs that promise revolutionary change and project lower
costs are more likely to be approved and funded by senior
administration officials and by Congress.''
Do you agree with the assessment that overly optimistic cost and
schedule estimates and unrealistic performance expectations contribute
to the failure of major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the Department's cost, schedule and performance estimates are
realistic?
Answer. To ensure the Department's cost, schedule and performance
estimates are realistic, it is important to have a systematic and
institutionalized cost data collection throughout DOD to support
estimates for current and future acquisition programs. The Defense Cost
and Resource Center (DCARC) is the OSD office responsible for
administrating the CSDR system, used for acquisition cost data. I
understand from my AFCAA staff that this year, the DCARC continued to
update and strengthen the procedures, report formats, and detailed
implementation guidance for CSDR. Additionally, CAPE's annual report
has found that the quality of the cost estimates for MDAPs provided by
the military departments continued to improve this year due to the
increase quality of data.
In addition, as part of the Department's program and budget review
process, CAPE--in conjunction with USD(AT&L)--reviewed each acquisition
program with significant funding changes from the latest baseline or
prior year's President's budget to determine the source of the cost
estimate supporting the revised program and to ensure that the program
remained fully funded. This process of tracking to the approved
estimate will be even more important in the future, as the Department
faces significant funding constraints, resulting in more reductions to
program quantities and annual procurement rates, and more pressures to
budget programs at less than full funding.
Question. Do you believe that early communication between the
acquisition, budget and requirements communities in DOD can help ensure
more realistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
assist in such communication?
Answer. I do not yet have a detailed plan for changes to the early-
stage acquisition communication and decision process. If confirmed, I
would consult with relevant stakeholders to understand the full range
of considerations. I understand that CAPE has played an important role
in facilitating joint deliberations between the acquisition,
requirements, and PPBE processes and remain committed to improved
sharing of information between these communities to enhance
transparency within the Department.
Question. In the Budget Blueprint that supported the fiscal year
2010 President's budget request, the administration committed to
``set[ting] realistic requirements and stick[ing] to them and
incorporat[ing] `best practices' by not allowing programs to proceed
from one stage of the acquisition cycle to the next until they have
achieved the maturity to clearly lower the risk of cost growth and
schedule slippage.''
What role do you see for the Director of CAPE in helping to ensure
that the Department makes good on this commitment?
Answer. The Director is the principal official in DOD responsible
for cost and schedule estimation and for assessing expected program
effectiveness.
Question. Over the last several years, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has prepared a series of reports for this
committee comparing the DOD approach to the acquisition of major
systems with the approach taken by best performers in the private
sector. GAO concluded that private sector programs are more successful
because they consistently require a high level of maturity for new
technologies before such technologies are incorporated into product
development programs. The Department has responded to these findings by
adopting technological maturity goals in its acquisition policies.
How important is it, in your view, for the Department to mature its
technologies with research and development funds before these
technologies are incorporated into product development programs?
Answer. In my view it is critical for programs to reach the
appropriate level of maturity before proceeding to the next acquisition
stage.
Question. What role do you see for the Director of CAPE in helping
to ensure that the key components and technologies to be incorporated
into major acquisition programs meet the Department's technological
maturity goals?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that technology risks and
maturity levels are fully incorporated in the cost and schedule
assessments, including Independent Cost Estimates, prepared for all
major programs.
Question. DOD has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition
and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule,
and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.
Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development
can help improve the performance of the Department's major acquisition
programs?
Answer. Yes. I believe that incremental acquisition and spiral
development can be one effective way to reduce acquisition risk and
should be considered when appropriate across DOD's portfolio of
acquisition programs.
Question. In your view, has the Department's approach to
incremental acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or
why not?
Answer. I believe that the use of this approach must be considered,
on a case-by-case basis, with all factors assessed and weighed in the
decision. If confirmed, I will advocate for the consideration and
evaluation of spiral development and incremental acquisition strategies
in applicable situations. There have been improvements in the
Department's acquisition performance after the enactment of WSARA. For
example, the number of Nunn-McCurdy breaches has steadily decreased
since fiscal year 2010, with only three significant breaches and no
critical breaches in fiscal year 2013. Also, since passage of WSARA,
the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) appear to have improved due to
improvements in AoA guidance, study plans, and compliance.
Question. What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure
that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can
accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches?
Answer. I do not have sufficient knowledge to offer a detailed
assessment at this time; however, I believe that these areas need to be
flexible enough to support incremental acquisition and spiral
development approaches.
Question. How should the Department ensure that the incremental
acquisition and spiral development programs have appropriate baselines
against which to measure performance?
Answer. The Department is required to prepare and measure
performance against rigorous acquisition program baselines for major
acquisition programs, including acquisition programs that employ these
concepts. If confirmed, I will ensure realistic independent cost and
schedule estimates are prepared for all major acquisition programs,
including the programs that employ these concepts.
Question. The poor performance of major defense acquisition
programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and
requirements. In the past, DOD has attempted to provide greater funding
stability through the use of multi-year contracts. More recently, the
Department has sought greater requirements stability by instituting
Configuration Steering Boards to exercise control over any changes to
requirements that would increase program costs.
What are your views on multi-year procurements? Under what
circumstances do you believe they should be used?
Answer. In general, I believe that multi-year procurement
strategies can result in savings. I recognize that multi-year contracts
offer the possibility of cost savings from economic order quantities.
If confirmed, I will ensure the CAPE organization prepares unbiased
analyses to quantify the resultant savings from the use of multi-year
procurement strategies, and to assess the impact on the Department of
reductions in acquisition and budget flexibilities.
Question. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that
constitute ``substantial savings'' for purposes of the defense multi-
year procurement statute, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. It is my understanding that CAPE provides the estimates of
the savings to be achieved by multi-year procurements, and that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics
determines if the savings are substantial. I understand that past
practice and Congressional guidance has often focused on 10 percent as
a cost savings threshold for justifying multi-year procurements. While
10 percent is often a reasonable standard the merits of the multi-year
procurements should be considered on a case-by-case basis. I believe
that such consideration should include the potential trade-off between
cost savings and reductions in acquisition and budget flexibilities.
Sometimes less than 10 percent savings may suffice for a program, while
at other times retaining budgetary flexibility may argue for foregoing
a multi-year that could generate more than 10 percent cost savings.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a
multi-year contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that
have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost,
scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply
with the requirements of the defense multi-year procurement statute, 10
U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. I believe multi-year strategies should be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis, and past program performance is one key factor in
deliberations on possible employment of multi-year procurement
strategies.
Question. How would you analyze and evaluate proposals for multi-
year procurement for such programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that proposals for multi-year
procurement will be carefully and fairly assessed and then compared
with acquisition strategies that do not employ multi-year procurement.
In evaluating those projections, I will also ensure that multi-year
savings projections are compared with actual savings achieved from
historical programs.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in assessing
whether procuring such a system under a multi-year contract, is
appropriate and should be proposed to Congress?
Answer. Among other issues, I would recommend including a review of
all statutory and regulatory requirements and an assessment of the
trade-offs between cost savings and reductions in acquisition and
budget flexibilities. The specific implementation would likely vary
from program to program.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should DOD ever break a
multi-year procurement?
Answer. In my view, exceptional circumstances that lead to the
break of a multi-year procurement should be carefully considered case
by case. Some factors that would warrant this consideration could
include dramatic changes to the national security situation,
significant changes to the fiscal environment facing DOD, or
significant changes in the acquisition program itself.
Question. What other steps, if any, would you recommend taking to
increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take actions in concert with USD(AT&L)
to ensure that independent cost estimates developed or approved by the
Director are fully funded in the Future Years Defense Program, that
changes to programs and cost estimates are properly tracked over time,
that program cost performance is tracked consistent with the metrics
specified in WSARA, and that proposed changes to programs that
influence costs are fully evaluated and considered prior to
implementation of changes to programs.
If confirmed, I will also recommend a careful examination of the
Operations and Support costs for the Department. Optimistic forecasts
of these costs sometimes contribute to instability in acquisition
programs by demanding a greater percentage of available resources than
originally expected, thereby undermining acquisition plans.
Realistically funding these accounts, and controlling cost growth where
possible, may help stabilize mid- and long-term acquisition plans.
Question. The JROC recently issued guidance which ``encourages
Program Managers, Program Executive Officers and Component Acquisition
Executives, in coordination with the requirements sponsor, to
officially request requirements relief, through the appropriate
requirements validation authority, where Key Performance Parameters
(KPP) appear out of line with the appropriate cost-benefit analysis.''
The JROC stated ``[w]hile there are no limitations for requesting
requirement relief, KPP relief should be considered especially
appropriate in cases where significant cost savings may be achieved
with marginal impact on operational capability (i.e., spending 15
percent of a program's budget to get the last 3 percent of KPP
performance).''
Do you support the new JROC guidance?
Answer. Yes. I believe that if a KPP of a program is out of line
with an appropriate cost-benefit analysis, it is proper to consider
granting relief to correctly align the cost to the capability. Refining
requirements can be highly beneficial to achieving balance between
cost, schedule, and performance. Despite the benefit of reduced costs,
we must ensure that we are not placing unacceptable risk on the
warfighter in order to relax requirements.
Question. Are there additional changes the JROC should consider, in
your view?
Answer. I am not aware of the need to make any additional changes
or improvements to the JROC guidance at this time.
Question. The current acquisition system is intended to avoid
fragmentation by providing that program managers report only to program
executive officers, who report only to service acquisition executives,
who are subject to the management and supervision of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Do you support the chain of command for the acquisition system, as
currently structured?
Answer. I believe the current structure of the acquisition system
has helped to reduce fragmentation in the process. If confirmed, I will
work with the service acquisition executives and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to seek out ways to
further reduce fragmentation and other inefficiencies in the
acquisition system.
Question. The Independent Panel charged with reviewing the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review recommended increasing the role of the
respective services in the management of acquisition programs through a
system called ``In-Line Management.'' Specifically, the recommendation
called for increasing the role of the Service Secretaries in the
acquisition process. In addition, the Defense Business Board's (DBB)
fiscal year 2012 report titled: Linking and Streamlining the Defense
Requirements, Acquisition and Budget Process also advocated for the
``Military Service Chief'' to have a greater role in the acquisition
process.
What are your thoughts about value of increasing the management
responsibilities of Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs in the
acquisition process?
Do you believe adding the Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff
to the acquisition chain of command would help address the underlying
causes of cost, schedule, and performance problems in the acquisition
system?
Do you believe that such a change would increase, or decrease,
fragmentation of authority in the acquisition system?
Answer. To ensure optimal use of funds provided to the Department,
it is critical to minimize cost, schedule, and performance problems. I
believe the key to minimizing these problems is identifying the correct
requirements early in the process, influenced by an unbiased, realistic
assessment of their viability. The experience and insights of the
Service Chiefs and Secretaries would be very helpful in discussions of
requirement trade-offs and continued relevance. Based on a preliminary
assessment, I support the Department's response to the DBB
recommendation and I would welcome an increased role for the Service
Chiefs and Secretaries in the process. If confirmed, I would expect to
have more firsthand experience and develop a more fully informed view.
This would require close, early alignment between CAPE, the
Services, the JROC, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology.
cost assessment
Question. Section 2334 of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Director
of CAPE to prescribe policies and procedures for the conduct of cost
estimation and cost analysis for the acquisition programs of DOD.
What are the major issues that you believe should be addressed in
policies and procedures for the conduct of cost estimation and cost
analysis for DOD acquisition programs?
Answer. CAPE policy should enforce consistent methodologies,
improve education and training, define process timelines, enhance risk
analysis, and identify roles and responsibilities for cost estimating
across the weapon system life cycle. Consistent cost estimating methods
across departments, coupled with a trained workforce employing those
methods, reduces review time, reconciliation, and associated rework
which can save schedule time for acquisition programs and reduce costs.
Question. What is your view of DOD policies and procedures
currently in place for the conduct of cost estimation and cost analysis
for DOD acquisition programs? Are there any significant gaps that you
would like to fill or significant changes that you would like to make?
Answer. The current DOD policies and procedures are being updated
to codify the requirements of WSARA. CAPE is now working to complete
DOD Manual 5000.04-M, Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures. This
Manual will be the primary vehicle for implementing the cost assessment
provisions of WSARA. In particular, it will provide guidance to the
military departments and defense agencies concerning the preparation,
presentation, and documentation of life-cycle cost estimates for
defense acquisition programs
Question. Section 2334(a)(6) requires the Director to conduct
independent cost estimates and cost analyses for certain major defense
acquisition programs and major automated information system programs at
key points in the acquisition process and ``at any other time
considered appropriate by the Director or upon the request of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.''
In your view, does the office of the Director currently have the
staffing and resources necessary to perform this function, or will
additional resources be required?
Answer. If confirmed, I will quickly evaluate the staffing and
resource levels and take appropriate steps to ensure that CAPE's cost
assessment staff will be fully able to continue to help the Department
realize the aggressive program performance goals established by the
President and Congress.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which it would be
appropriate to use Federally Funded Research and Development Centers or
other contractors to assist in this function?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is still working
to reestablish the capabilities of the government acquisition
workforce, though the fiscal environment has curtailed much planned
growth in acquisition workforce capabilities. Even with this trend,
however, there are numerous functions, such as cost analysis research,
that an FFRDC or a support contractor could provide to assist the
Department in meeting its cost estimating requirements provided we
remain compliant with the 2013 NDAA that requires each MDAP/MAIS lead
cost estimator be a member of the armed forces or a full-time employee
of DOD.
Question. Are there particular points in the acquisition process,
other than those required by statute, at which you think that
independent cost estimates and cost analyses would be appropriate?
Answer. The current acquisition process in the Department is event-
driven and episodic in nature, and is driven primarily by the key
milestones identified in statute. In my view, the WSARA requirements
drive the Department to a model involving more continuous involvement
of the cost analysis community, and this is the approach I have sought
to follow with AFCAA. If confirmed, I will support a more continuous
involvement of CAPE in following and tracking program performance,
updating cost and schedule estimates, and in evaluating new program
risks as they are identified, though I recognize that resource
constraints will limit my ability to fully achieve this vision.
Question. The Director is required to ``[r]eview all cost estimates
and cost analyses'' conducted by the military departments and defense
agencies for major defense acquisition programs and major automated
information system programs other than those covered by section
2334(a)(6). At certain points in the acquisition process, the Director
is required to determine whether such estimates are reasonable.
In your view, does the office of the Director currently have the
staffing and resources necessary to perform this function, or will
additional resources be required?
Answer. If confirmed, I will quickly evaluate the staffing and
resource levels and take appropriate steps to ensure CAPE's cost
assessment personnel will be fully able to continue to help the
Department realize the aggressive program performance goals established
by the President and Congress. I recognize that all headquarters
functions across DOD are under pressure to reduce staffing and
resources and do not expect that CAPE will be exempt from this
pressure.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which it would be
appropriate to use Federally Funded Research and Development Centers or
other contractors to assist in this function?
Answer. There are numerous functions, such as cost analysis
research, that an FFRDC or a support contractor could provide to assist
the Department in meeting its cost estimating requirements. All the
Department's cost analysis agencies use contract/FFRDC support to some
degree. In general, I support the current effort to enhance the
government's organic cost estimating capability. However, the current
fiscal pressures will likely result in reductions to both the CAPE
staff and funding for the contract/FFRDC support.
Question. What action would you expect to take, if confirmed, if
you were to determine that a cost estimate or cost analysis conducted
by one of the military departments or defense agencies in connection
with a major defense acquisition program or major automated system
program was not reasonable?
Answer. If confirmed, in this situation I would direct the Deputy
Director for Cost Assessment in CAPE to prepare a separate independent
cost estimate and would recommend that the program not be permitted to
proceed until the new independent cost estimate was completed,
considered, and properly funded in the Future Years Defense Program. In
my experience overseeing AFCAA, I found that situations where Program
Office Estimates and independent cost estimates were likely to diverge
greatly could generally be identified in advance and issues avoided by
bringing analysts together to examine assumptions and models--saving
time and avoiding unnecessary costs without sacrificing analytic
independence.
program evaluation
Question. Section 139a (d)(5) of title 10, U.S.C., makes the
Director of CAPE responsible for ``[r]eview, analysis, and evaluation
of programs for executing approved strategies and policies, ensuring
that information on programs is presented accurately and completely.''
Section 139a(d)(7) makes the Director responsible for ``[a]ssessments
of alternative plans, programs, and policies with respect to the
acquisition programs of the Department of Defense.''
What is your view of the significance of independent review,
analysis, and evaluation of programs, and assessments of alternative
programs, to the effective management of DOD?
Answer. Independent analyses and evaluation of programs help
identify underlying risk in programs sometimes not seen in the service
position--whether cost, schedule or performance risk. I believe that
identifying these risks and offering the means to mitigate them will
position the Department leadership to make informed decisions for
acquiring and resourcing program plans.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes or improvements to
the organization, process, or methodology used by the Department for
such review, analysis, and assessments?
Answer. I am not aware of the need to make any changes or
improvements to the process or methodology at this time. It is possible
that additional decision support will be necessary to fulfill this,
either via new staff or a reorganization of missions within existing
staff. However, if confirmed, I will review the process and methodology
and make recommendations for improvements, as appropriate.
Question. Does the Director of CAPE have the staffing and resources
needed to carry out this function?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to evaluate the need for the
organizational changes necessary to fully comply with the intent of the
legislation and the resulting impact on resources.
Question. How do you believe that the Director of CAPE should
interact with Service acquisition executives, program executive
officers, program managers, and other program officials in preparing
independent evaluations of major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Preparation of independent evaluations of major defense
acquisition programs is highly dependent on gaining unfettered access
to information about the programs. I believe that it is incumbent upon
the Director of CAPE to create strong relationships across the
Department with service acquisition executives and other program
subordinates to ensure continued access to this information. At the
same time, I believe that the Director must make clear that the
analyses done by the CAPE organization maintain the required
independence and continue to be unbiased and reliable in developing
recommendations based on the analyses.
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, on matters
relating to the planning and programming phases of the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system?
Answer. I expect that I will be one of Secretary Hagel's closest
advisors on all program evaluation matters. Further, I expect that I
will coordinate the performance of the Program Review and ensure a
close working relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) as he coordinates the performance of the Budget Review.
In my role I expect to analyze, evaluate, and provide alternative plans
and programs for U.S. defense objectives and evaluate programs to
ensure execution of approved strategies and policies. I anticipate
performing critical reviews of requirements, capabilities, and life-
cycle costs of current and proposed defense programs, with an eye
toward making recommendations and identifying options for the Secretary
of Defense.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
preparation of materials and guidance for the PPBE system?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct preparation for overarching
guidance for the programming phase of PPBE. I also expect that I will
prepare and coordinate closely with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) in the preparation of Fiscal Guidance to the Defense
components. Further, I will expect to coordinate with the Under
Secretary of Defense (Policy) in implementation of strategic policy
decisions reached through processes such as the Quadrennial Defense
Review. I expect that I will continue to prepare and deliver to
Congress the Future Years Defense Program for DOD.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes or improvements to
the PPBE system?
Answer. The PPBE system has seen virtually constant, incremental
change throughout much of its recent history, but I do not have any
concrete recommendations to make at this time. If confirmed I will work
with other stakeholders to ensure that the PPBE system best supports
the efficient and effective allocation of taxpayer dollars to the
highest national security priorities of DOD.
analyses of alternatives
Question. The Director of CAPE is responsible for the formulation
of study guidance for analyses of alternatives for major defense
acquisition programs and the performance of such analyses, as directed
by the Secretary of Defense.
Do you believe that DOD has been making appropriate use of AoA in
connection with major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. While at this time I do not have sufficient knowledge to
offer an assessment of the Department's use of AoAs, I believe analyses
of alternatives can identify areas where trade-offs can be made to
reduce cost, schedule, and performance risk.
Question. Do you see the need for any change in the timing,
content, or approach that the Department takes to analyses of
alternatives in connection with major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. No. The AoAs is usually done prior to Milestone A, thereby
offering the earliest opportunity to influence the acquisition strategy
and program content. If confirmed, I will ensure that the AoAs
continues to be updated, as appropriate, as the program proceeds to a
full-rate production decision.
Question. Do you believe that the office of the Director of CAPE
and other relevant components of the Department are appropriately
organized and staffed to carry out effective analyses of alternatives
in connection with major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Properly organized, yes. If confirmed, I will quickly
evaluate and take appropriate steps to ensure that CAPE is properly
organized to fulfill the responsibilities and fully comply with the
statutory requirements of WSARA.
operating and support costs
Question. Section 2334(e) of title 10, U.S.C., requires the
Director to review and report on existing systems and methods of DOD
for tracking and assessing operating and support costs on major defense
acquisition programs.
Do you think that the Department is currently doing an adequate job
of estimating operating and support costs for major defense acquisition
programs?
Answer. I appreciate the challenges of estimating operating and
support costs of increasingly complex weapon systems with ever-changing
operational missions. The WSARA of 2009 requires a review of systems
and methods used for developing estimates of operating and support
costs. It is my understanding that a division has been established in
CAPE to analyze the adequacy of systems and methods used for developing
estimates of operating and support costs. If confirmed, I will review
their analyses and recommend adjustments, if needed.
Question. Do you think that the Department is currently doing an
adequate job of tracking and assessing operating and support costs for
major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I recognize that effective systems and methods must be in
place to ensure that budgets and programs reflect the most current
experience in operating and support costs. The WSARA of 2009 requires a
review of systems and methods used for tracking and assessing operating
and support costs. In my role as the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Financial Management and Comptroller, an Operating and
Support estimating division was created in AFCAA to perform independent
assessments of the operating and support costs of AF major defense
acquisition programs. It is my understanding that a new division has
been established in CAPE that will track and assess operating and
support costs for major defense acquisition programs. If confirmed, I
will review their analyses and recommend adjustments, if needed.
Question. What would be your view of a ``Nunn-McCurdy''-type system
for programs that substantially exceed estimates for operating and
support costs?
Answer. I understand the importance of controlling the operating
and support costs of our major weapon systems. I also know that this is
a complicated problem--many factors contribute to increases in
operating and support cost growth. I am advised that the CAPE
directorate has worked to assess the feasibility and advisability of
establishing some form of baseline for operating and support costs, as
required in the Weapon System Acquisition and Reform Act of 2009.
Increased visibility of operations and support costs is very important
to enable management action to contain costs, regardless of whether a
formal breech process is established. If confirmed, I will make a
review of the team's progress on this question a near-term priority.
Question. What is your view on the role that the office of the
Director of CAPE does and should play in assessing operating and
support costs on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I recognize that operating and support costs are a
significant driver to both major defense acquisition program costs and
the department's budget. The Weapon System Acquisition and Reform Act
of 2009 requires CAPE to ensure that the cost estimation and cost
analysis processes of the department provide accurate information and
realistic estimates of costs for acquisition programs. I understand a
new division in CAPE has been established that will track and assess
operating and support costs for major defense acquisition programs. I
am also aware that an operating and support cost estimating guide has
been written and that the Department maintains operating and support
cost databases. If confirmed, I will review their analyses and
activities and recommend adjustments, if needed while partnering with
USD(AT&L) to make operating and support costs more visible in the
milestone decision process.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Director of CAPE?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
coordination of requirements, acquisition and budgeting
1. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Morin, in a July 3, 2013, letter to Congress
General Dempsey, ``acknowledged the need to improve coordination among
the requirements, acquisition and budgeting process.'' Toward that end
a ``quarterly leadership forum'' was created which includes the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) Director. General Dempsey
wrote: ``The Department will use this forum to ensure roadblocks are
promptly addressed, continue ongoing efforts to better align
requirements and acquisition processes and further engage Service
Chiefs in the acquisition process.'' If confirmed, what do you view as
your role on the forum?
Dr. Morin. It is my understanding that the Quarterly Leadership
Forum is a series of meetings dedicated to improving the coordination
between the requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes.
Attendees include the leadership of the Joint Staff, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the
Director of CAPE. The explicit purpose of these meetings is to link the
requirements, acquisition, and budgetary processes to help provide
timely delivery of warfighter capabilities at a reasonable cost.
I have not participated in this forum in my current role, but if
confirmed will look forward to taking part and contributing CAPE's
insights to the group. I believe CAPE insights will include ensuring
lessons are incorporated into the processes to enable the Department to
more easily recognize and break through process-driven impediments to
the development and fielding of warfighter capabilities in an effective
and timely manner.
The ability of the DOD leadership to coordinate requirements,
acquisition, and budgeting has been strained due to the enormous fiscal
uncertainty facing the Department, which makes frank and timely
discussions across these communities all the more important.

2. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Morin, what ideas do you think are important
for the quarterly leadership forum to address and consider?
Dr. Morin. The Quarterly Leadership Forum should include and
consider the following ideas:

The importance of streamlining process time and
providing clear lines of accountability without sacrificing
discipline or key oversight, and
Expectations for rigorous cost estimates and the
budgetary discipline to fully fund programs to valid estimates,
in line with key priorities.

accurate cost estimates
3. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Morin, to help ensure the Services submit
more realistic cost estimates CAPE instituted policies requiring
greater accountability from the Services. These new requirements
included an obligation for the Services to produce a ``signed'' cost
estimate to be reviewed by CAPE and to reaffirm the Services commitment
to fully fund an acquisition program during the preparation of the next
5-year spending plan. What are your plans and strategies to use the
capabilities of CAPE to achieve even more savings in the future?
Dr. Morin. Following the passage of the Weapons System Acquisition
Reform Act in 2009, I understand CAPE instituted new business processes
for consideration of cost estimates prepared by the military services
for major acquisition programs. These processes require: (1) each cost
estimate be submitted and explained in a signed and dated document; and
2) financial and acquisition leaders of the military departments
provide a commitment (to fully fund programs to their Service Cost
Position in the next Future Years Defense Program. I have seen these
new processes improve both the accountability and transparency
associated with the cost estimates prepared in the Military
Departments.
If confirmed, I plan to use and expand several ongoing initiatives
in CAPE to improve the Department's cost estimates and achieve even
greater savings in the future, specifically through guidance rewrites,
increased analytical emphasis on multi-year procurements, and
integration/enhancements of cost collection systems to increase analyst
productivity. First, I understand CAPE is coordinating with the
Military Departments to update its manual, DOD 5000.4-M, Cost Analysis
Guidance and Procedures. Once complete, this update will provide
authoritative guidance to the military departments and defense agencies
concerning the preparation, presentation, and documentation of life-
cycle cost estimates for defense acquisition programs, which in turn
should increase cost analyst efficiency. The new version of DOD 5000.4-
M will focus on identifying decisions that offer the opportunity to
save money rather than just preparing an independent cost estimate for
the program of record and stopping there.
Second, CAPE has instituted a rigorous analytic process to support
certification of the savings associated with multi-year procurement
contracts. This process involves direct interaction of CAPE analysts
with program office personnel, within each of the military departments,
as well as involvement of cost analysis personnel from the military
service cost centers and the system commands, to support improved
understanding of costs in support of negotiation of the best possible
business contract arrangement for the Department. It also involves
direct interaction of CAPE with the leadership of the prime contractor
for the program, to show them the cost analyses and demonstrate the
strengths and weaknesses of their initial contract proposals. This
process, which was initiated 3 years ago, has resulted in expected
contract savings of 10-19 percent on a number of aircraft programs that
have employed multi-year contracting strategies. I understand CAPE is
working on a number of other initiatives in this area, and if
confirmed, I will delve further into these issues.

collaboration and partnership
4. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Morin, the current Director of CAPE stated
in 2011 that, ``we found cases where the program managers, the
acquisition executives, the partners in industry and the analysts in
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation all working together--those are
the places where we've seen the most success in program's going
forward.'' Do you agree with that approach?
Dr. Morin. I have seen multiple cases where Air Force and CAPE
analysts have been able to work closely together to develop rigorous,
independent estimates that are credible to program management and the
acquisition executives, and which provide a good baseline for budgeting
and for developing cost savings proposals. Collaboration with industry
has been very helpful in developing more rigorous and consistent cost
accounting standards and work breakdown structures for earned value
management. Early engagement between the various responsible analysts
and acquisition professionals can help streamline acquisition
timelines, thereby saving cost.

5. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Morin, do you believe CAPE should be more
detached in order to maintain the independence of its analysis?
Dr. Morin. I believe that the cost assessment team has an
appropriate level of independence and find their estimates to be
credible and unbiased. The WSARA statute provides that the CAPE
Director reports directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense and can provide views directly to those leaders without the
approval of any other official, ensuring that independent views on cost
estimating are shared directly with top DOD leadership. Continued work
is required to improve the quality of estimating and hence the accuracy
and precision with which analysts are able to predict the cost of
future programs.
______

[The nomination reference of Dr. Jamie M. Morin follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
Senate of the United States,
September 11, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Jamie Michael Morin, of Michigan, to be Director of Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation, Department of Defense, Christine H. Fox,
resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Jamie M. Morin, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Dr. Jamie M. Morin
Education:
Georgetown University

September 1993-December 1996
Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service Degree awarded
cum laude December 1996
Peter Krogh Scholar of the School of Foreign Service
1994-1996

London School of Economics

September 1997-September 1998
Master of Science in Public Administration and Public
Policy Degree awarded with distinction June 1994

Yale University

September 1998-May 2003
Master of Arts in Political Science awarded May 2001
Master of Philosophy in Political Science awarded May
2001
Ph.D. in Political Science awarded May 2003
Employment record:
U.S. Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial
Management and Comptroller)
July 2009-present
Acting Under Secretary of the Air Force, July 2012-
April 2013

U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget

Senior Defense Analyst
July 2003-July 2009
Additional duties as senior analyst for foreign
affairs at various times during this tenure.

Miller Center for Public Affairs (University of Virginia)

National Fellow in Public Affairs
July 2002-July 2003

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Visiting Fellow
June 2001-September 2001

J.E. Austin Associates

Economist and Strategy Specialist (May 2000-September
2000)
Research Assistant then Research Associate and then
Consultant (October 1995-September 1997)
October 1995-September 1997; May 2000-September 2000

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Intern
June 1999-September 1999
Honors and awards:
Air Force Meritorious Civilian Service Medal (2013)
Named a ``Young Global Leader'' by the World Economic Forum's Forum
of Young Global Leaders (2013)
Dirksen Center--Congressional Research Award (2003)
Miller Center (UVA)--National Fellow in Public Affairs (2002-2003)
Yale University--Yale University Fellowship (1998-2002),
Dissertation Fellowship (2002-2003)
Smith-Richardson Foundation--Research Fellowship (2001, 2002)
Nominated by students for the Yale College Teaching Prize (1999)
DACOR Bacon House Foundation--Tutthill Fellowship (1997)
Krogh Scholar, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
(1995-1996)
Eagle Scout, Boy Scouts of America (1992)
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain
senior military officers as determined by the committee, to
complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and
other information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr.
Jamie M. Morin in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Jamie Michael Morin.

2. Position to which nominated:
Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

3. Date of nomination:
September 11, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
May 28, 1975, Southfield, MI.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Megan Anne Baker-Morin
(Note: she uses the hyphenated version for some purposes, Megan
Anne Baker professionally).

7. Names and ages of children:
William (Liam) Morin, age 8.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University, 2003. Attended 1998-
2003.
M.Phil., Yale University, 2001.
M.A., Yale University, 2001.
M.Sc. in Public Administration and Public Policy, London School of
Economics, 1998. Attended 1997-1998.
B.S.F.S in International Security and Diplomacy, Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service, 1996. Attended 1993-1996.
High School Diploma, University of Detroit Jesuit High School,
1993. Attended 1989-1993.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Acting Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington DC (July 2012
to April 2013).
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and
Comptroller), Washington DC (June 2009 to present).
Senior Defense Analyst, U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget,
Washington DC (July 2003 to June 2009).
National Fellow in Public Affairs, Miller Center for Public
Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA (July 2002 to July
2003) .

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
As a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, I assisted with research and writing of a study for the
Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment.
As a consultant with J.E. Austin Associates, I participated in
several U.S. Agency for International Development economic development
projects.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member of Yale, Georgetown, and University of Detroit Jesuit High
School alumni associations
Member of American Society of Military Comptrollers
Member of Air Force Association
Member of the Forum of Young Global Leaders of the World Economic
Forum
Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations
Member of the ``Term Member Advisory Committee,'' with no
fiduciary or management responsibilities.
Den Leader, Cub Scout Pack 98, St Anthony's Catholic Church,
Washington DC

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for whichyou have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Volunteer advisor on defense budget policy, Obama for America,
2007-2008.
Volunteer, Virginia Campaign for Change, November 2008.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
$200 - Obama for America, October 22, 2011
$200 - Obama for America, February 24, 2012
$800 - Obama for America, ($100 per month from April-November 2012)
$250 - Barack Obama (General Election), October 22, 2008
$200 - Barack Obama (Primary), July 9, 2008
$200 - Barack Obama (Primary), January 8, 2008 (estimated)

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Air Force Meritorious Civilian Service Medal (2013)
Named a ``Young Global Leader'' by the World Economic Forum's Forum
of Young Global Leaders (2013)
Dirksen Center - Congressional Research Award (2003)
Miller Center (UVA) - National Fellow in Public Affairs (2002-2003)
Yale University - Yale University Fellowship (1998-2002),
Dissertation Fellowship (2002-2003)
Smith-Richardson Foundation - Research Fellowship (2001, 2002)
Nominated by students for the Yale College Teaching Prize (1999)
DACOR Bacon House Foundation - Tutthill Fellowship (1997)
Krogh Scholar, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
(1995-1996)
Eagle Scout, Boy Scouts of America (1992)

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Quarterly articles in Air Force Comptroller Magazine: 2009-2013
``Making Every Dollar Count,'' Armed Forces Comptroller, Spring
2013
``Deepening U.S.-Asian Relationships by Expanding Military
Partnership'' Blog post at the World Economic Forum blog, http://
forumblog.org/2013/03/deepening-us-asian-relationships-by-expanding-
military-partnership/
``Achieving Acquisition Excellence in the Air Force: A Financial
Management Perspective,'' Armed Force Comptroller, March 2010.
Squaring the Pentagon: The Politics of Post-Cold War Defense
Retrenchment, Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University Department of
Political Science, 2003.
``The Politics of Post-Cold War Defense Retrenchment,'' Paper
presented to the New Faces in International Security Conference,
Triangle Institute for Security Studies, (2003).
``Did Congress Shape America's Post-Cold War Defense? Measuring the
Politics of Budgetary Retrenchment,'' Paper presented to the American
Political Science Association's 2003 annual conference.
``Explaining the Shape of the Post-Cold War U.S. Military,'' Paper
presented to the Miller Center Fellows. Conference, May 2003.
``Congressional Assertion in Defense Budgeting During
Retrenchment,'' Presentation to the Miller Center Fellows Kick-off
Conference (2002).
``Comment on Josef Joffe's `Who's Afraid of Mr. Big,' '' The
National Interest (Fall 2001).
``European Economic and Monetary Union and Trans-Atlantic Security
Relations,'' International Security Review (London, RUSI: 1999).
``EMU and U.S. Troops in Europe,'' Royal United Services Institute
Newsbrief (London, RUSI: April 1998).

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Air Force Financial Services Office Worldwide Conference - November
4, 2009
American Society of Military Comptrollers, Corporate Board
Breakfast - December 3, 2009
American Society of Military Comptrollers, National Professional
Development Institute - June 2, 2010
American Society of Military Comptrollers, Washington Chapter -
June 14, 2010
American Society of Military Comptrollers, National Professional
Development Institute - June 1, 2011
Address to Research Corridor Unmanned Aircraft Systems Summit - May
22, 2012
The Fletcher School Lecture and Luncheon - October 16, 2012
TechAmerica - December 5, 2012
Government Executive Media Group: ``Focus on Defense'' - December
6, 2012
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Industry Outreach Event - December
17, 2012
The State of Small Business - December 17, 2012
Air Force Association Breakfast Series - January 15, 2013
Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board - January 30,
2013
Georgetown Asia Rebalance Forum - February 27, 2013
National Defense Industrial Association Luncheon - March 11, 2013
Northwest Florida Defense Coalition Fly-In - March 12, 2013
Energy Media Teleconference - March 21, 2013
Space Budget Rollout - April 15, 2013

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Dr. Jamie M. Morin was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on October 31, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was returned to the President at the end of the first session
of the 113th Congress on January 6, 2014, under provisions of
Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6, of the Standing Rules of the
Senate.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Jo Ann Rooney by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I do not see the need to modify any provision of the
Goldwater Nichols Act.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I do not see the need to modify any provisions of the
Goldwater Nichols Act.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. If confirmed, I will bring over 25 years of senior
leadership experience to this position along with education credentials
in finance, law, taxation, and education. In my most recent role inthe
Department of Defense (DOD), I had the honor and privilege to serve as
Acting Under Secretary/Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(USD/PDUSD) for Personnel and Readiness. In this role, I was
responsible for Total Force Management as it relates to Health Affairs,
National Guard and Reserve Affairs and Readiness and Force Management
including: military personnel policies, civilian personnel policies,
readiness, military, community and family programs, equal opportunity,
morale, welfare, recreation and quality of life matters. I had direct
responsibility and accountability for over 30,000 employees and a
budget of $73 billion including: the oversight and administration of
the $50 billion Defense Health Program (including all military
treatment facilities (59 hospitals and 360 clinics), the Graduate
Medical University and Tricare Management Activities); Defense
Commissaries and Exchanges with $14.5 billion in annual sales; the
Defense Education Activity which supports over 100,000 students
worldwide; and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. In
addition, as Acting USD/PDUSD and a member of the Secretary's senior
leadership team, I actively participated alongside uniformed service
leaders in the development of the Defense Strategy and defense budget
for fiscal years 2013-2017. During my tenure, we worked closely with
senior military and civilian leaders across all Services on the
implementing the repeal of ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' and the review of
benefits post-repeal; completion of the Women In the Service Report;
development of the initial rollout of enhanced sexual assault
prevention programs and policies; directing the Dover Port Mortuary
task force and response (including direct meetings with family
members); ongoing improvements to the Disability Evaluation System for
wounded, ill and injured servicemembers across each of the uniformed
services including enhancement of programs for treatment and diagnoses
for PTSD and TBI; reviewing military compensation including retirement
reform; developing a new policy and program resulting in a fundamental
redesign of the manner in which servicemembers are transitioned to
veterans status (TAP); and developing the risk mitigation plan for the
Secretary of Defense in response to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's risk assessment. Along with the DepSecVA, I co-chaired the DOD/
VA Joint Executive Council (JEC) bringing together military and
civilian leadership from both departments to make decisions addressing
key issues involving both agencies.
During 8 years as president of a doctoral level university, we
successfully addressed serious financial challenges enabling the
institution to realize significant operating surpluses after years of
deficits. In addition, we developed an innovative educational model
that directly impacted retention, graduation rates and student success.
Various corporate and civic engagements have enabled me to lead
organizations through dynamic structural and financial challenges
allowing them to better serve their constituents. In particular, my
work on the Jewish Hospital and St. Mary's HealthCare (JHSMH) health
care system board of trustees as vice chair, allowed me to be directly
involved in developing policies and procedures impacting patient care,
safety, operating efficiencies and human resource policies across a
system of approximately $1 billion encompassing ambulatory, community
hospital and tertiary care facilities, an inpatient psychiatric
hospital, comprehensive rehabilitation facility, and clinical research.
duties
Question. Section 5015 of title 10, U.S.C., states the Under
Secretary of the Navy shall perform such duties and exercise such
powers as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under
Secretary of the Navy?
Answer. The statutory duties and functions of the Under Secretary
of the Navy are broadly defined to ``perform such duties and exercise
such powers as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe.'' By statute,
the Under Secretary is first in succession in the event of the
Secretary of the Navy dies, resigns, is removed from office, is absent
or is disabled. By regulation, The Under Secretary is designated as the
deputy and principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and acts
with full authority of the Secretary in managing the Department of the
Navy. The Under Secretary serves as the Chief of Staff of the
Secretariat and the Chief Operating Officer of the Department. In
accordance with section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the Under Secretary is also the Department's
Chief Management Officer.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy, as set
forth in section 5015 of title 10, U.S.C., or in DOD regulations
pertaining to functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy?
Answer. I have reviewed the statutory and regulatory functions of
the Secretary of the Navy and presently do not recommend any
modification. If confirmed and I identify areas that I believe merit
changes, I will propose those changes through the appropriate
established processes.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if
any, do you expect will be prescribed for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary
of the Navy to further his vision and goals for the Navy and Marine
Corps. I expect the Secretary will assign me duties consistent with my
background, my strengths, and the present needs of the Department of
the Navy.
Question. Section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008, directs the Secretary of a military department to
designate the Under Secretary of such Military Department to assume the
primary management responsibility for business operations.
What is your understanding of the business operations
responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the Navy?
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is responsible for
overseeing all business operations of the Department. More
specifically, the Under Secretary of the Navy directs the shaping of a
leaner, more integrated, and simplified business environment and guides
opportunities to streamline processes.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Under Secretary of the Navy to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to DOD. The Secretary of the Navy
reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and ensures that his
priorities are implemented in the Department of the Navy. When acting
as the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary would do the same.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as
Acting Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense also
serves as the Chief Management Officer of DOD. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on a range of matters
to include supporting the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his role as
Chief Management Officer of DOD.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of DOD.
Answer. The Deputy Chief Management Officer is the principal staff
assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for matters
relating to the management and improvement of integrated DOD business
operations. If confirmed, I will work directly with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense (DOD CMO) and the DOD DCMO on the full range of
matters involving the management of DOD. If confirmed, I will assist in
the development of a comprehensive Departmental transformation plan and
business systems architecture and oversee the identification and
implementation of potential business process improvements.
Question. The Director of the Business Transformation Agency.
Answer. I understand that this agency was disestablished by the
Secretary of Defense in 2011 and transferred functions to the DOD
Deputy Chief Management Officer.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Chairman through the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the
Marine Corps on appropriate matters affecting the Navy and Marine
Corps.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and
obligations as other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When
performing duties as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's
relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that
of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Vice
Chairman through the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the
Marine Corps on appropriate matters affecting the Navy and Marine
Corps.
Question. The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for, and
has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of
the Navy. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the deputy and principal
assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and acts with full authority of
the Secretary in managing the Department of the Navy.
Question. The Chief of Naval Operations.
Answer. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) performs his duties
under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy
and is directly responsible to the Secretary according to title 10. The
Under Secretary deals directly with the CNO in all Department
leadership meetings and when acting in the Secretary's stead. The Under
Secretary works most closely with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
(VCNO). If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with
the CNO and the VCNO to ensure that policies and resources are
appropriate to meet the needs of the Navy and respect the CNO's
additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. The Commandant of the Marine Corps performs his duties
under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy
and is directly responsible to the Secretary according to title 10. The
Under Secretary deals directly with the Commandant of the Marine Corps
in all Department leadership meetings and when acting in the
Secretary's stead. The Under Secretary works most closely with the
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. If confirmed, I would foster
a close working relationship with the Commandant and the Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure that policies and resources
are appropriate to meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, and
respect the Commandant's additional responsibilities as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. There are four Assistant Secretaries of the Navy performing
statutory functions and such duties as the Secretary prescribes. If
confirmed, I will work with each of the Assistant Secretaries of the
Navy to achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. The General Counsel of the Navy serves as the senior
civilian legal advisor to the Department of the Navy, the Secretary's
chief ethics official and performs such functions as the Secretary of
the Navy shall direct. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
General Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The Inspector General of the Navy.
Answer. The Navy Inspector General is in the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy. When directed, the Navy Inspector General
inquires into and reports upon any matter that affects the discipline
or military efficiency of the Department of the Navy. He shall make
such inspections, investigations, and reports as the Secretary of the
Navy directs. He also proposes programs of inspections and
investigations as appropriate. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Inspector General to achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The Surgeon General of the Navy.
Answer. The Surgeon General provides direction, guidance and
management of Navy medical personnel worldwide. The Surgeon General
advises the Secretary of the Navy as well as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs on matters pertaining to Navy and Marine
Corps force and the health of personnel. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Surgeon General to achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The Director of the Navy's Business Transformation
Office.
Answer. The Director of the Navy's Office of Business
Transformation is currently designated as the DoN DCMO. If confirmed, I
would work closely with the DCMO to determine needed changes to
Departmental transformation plans, business systems architecture, and
to identify needed business process improvements.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy is the senior
uniformed legal advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, provides
independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Naval Operations and performs duties relating to any and all Department
of the Navy legal matters assigned to her by the Secretary. If
confirmed, I look forward to developing a good working relationship
with the Judge Advocate General and her staff.
Question. The Under Secretaries of the Military Services.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work diligently to develop close
working relationships with the Under Secretaries of the Army and Air
Force, particularly in our capacities as Chief Management Officers for
our respective Services.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, that
you would confront if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Navy?
Answer. DOD and all of the Services are facing numerous challenges
brought on by over 10 years of war and fiscal uncertainty. These
factors directly impact decisions on current programs, support for the
warfighter and investment in future capabilities and requirements. The
Navy and Marine Corps are deployed around the world engaged in the full
spectrum of military missions, from direct combat operations to
providing security in the maritime domain to humanitarian assistance.
Determining the best balance between meeting current challenges,
building a relevant and capable future force, enabling and supporting
sailors, marines, their families, and the civilian workforce will pose
the most significant challenges in the years ahead. It is also critical
to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars, being accountable for ensuring
these resources are invested wisely and efficiently. In the role as
Chief Management Officer, continued improvement to program and budget
development and the cost effectiveness of the acquisition program, will
remain major challenges and priorities.
If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to address these issues and
would work closely with DOD, Navy and Marine Corps leadership, and this
committee to develop and execute strategies to address these
challenges.
Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize and what plans
would you have, if any, for addressing these challenges?
Answer. In response to the strategic guidance from the President,
the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of
the Marine Corp have articulated clear priorities focused on people,
platforms, power and partnerships. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Secretary of the Navy, senior Military and DOD
leadership, and this committee to meet these challenges and priorities
including but not limited to:

Ensuring the readiness of our force to meet current
and future missions around the world by recruiting, training,
and retaining highly-skilled sailors and marines, and
supporting the families of the servicemembers;
supporting a diverse and well-trained civilian
workforce;
continuing to address the critical issues of sexual
assault and suicides among our sailors and marines;
maintaining a long-term ship building program that
supports the needs for modernization and future capabilities,
supports a robust industrial base, and is both achievable and
fiscally sustainable;
promoting acquisition excellence, stewardship,
accountability and innovation; and,
supporting the enhancement of enterprise-wide business
systems to improve core business operations, performance
metrics and accountability.
duties and responsibilities as chief management officer
Question. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Navy as the
Navy's Chief Management Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the CMO of each
of the military departments to carry out a comprehensive business
transformation initiative, with the support of a new Business
Transformation Office.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the Under Secretary in his capacity as CMO of the Department of the
Navy?
Answer. If confirmed, my most important duty as CMO will be to
ensure that the Department of the Navy has a pragmatic and well-thought
out comprehensive business transformation plan with measureable
performance goals and objectives. In addition, I will continue to
support a well-defined enterprise-wide business systems architecture. I
would work with the DCMO to:

Fully analyze the budget, finance, accounting, and
human resource operations of the Department of the Navy in an
effort to identify, streamline, and ultimately transform these
related processes;
Eliminate or replace systems whose business case
analyses are determined not to be cost effective or otherwise
inconsistent with business enterprise architecture transition
plans;
Monitor the implementation of the Department of the
Navy's Business Transformation Plan.

Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?
Answer. The Under/CMO must have a thorough knowledge of the
Department of the Navy; to include the culture of both services, the
government employees that support them and the industrial base. The
Under/CMO should also have or develop knowledge on the way programs and
budgets are developed and be a strong leader and manager. I have served
as the Acting Under Secretary/Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, as well as the deputy senior
policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on recruitment, career
development, pay and benefits for 1.4 million Active Duty military
personnel, 1.3 million Guard and Reserve personnel, nearly 700,000 DOD
civilians, and was responsible for overseeing the overall state of
military readiness. In years past, I have served as chief counsel,
chief operating officer, and chief financial officer in the private
sector. I have taken a struggling university to financial success while
simultaneously implementing major programmatic, changes, IT
transformation and infrastructure upgrades and have also served in a
leadership role on the board of a major hospital system undergoing
significant operational and organizational change. I believe that my
background along with formal education, particularly in law and
finance, provides a solid foundation for the position as CMO but I
accept that I must continue to learn, and will rely greatly on the
knowledge and advice of the team in the Departments of Defense and
Navy.
Question. Do you believe that the CMO and the Business
Transformation Office have the resources and authority needed to carry
out the business transformation of the Department of the Navy?
Answer. I believe the CMO and the Business Transformation Office
have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business
transformation of the Department. If confirmed, I would consult with
the Secretary of the Navy, DOD DCMO, and DOD CMO if I discover that
those resources and authorities were insufficient.
Question. What role do you believe the CMO and the Business
Transformation Office should play in the planning, development, and
implementation of specific business systems by the military
departments?
Answer. I believe the CMO and DCMO/BTO should serve as guides and
enablers for implementing sound best practices regarding planning,
development, and implementation of business systems, and verify those
policies are being followed appropriately in accordance with DOD
guidelines. If confirmed, I would work with the DCMO/BTO to institute
rigorous investment management and business process reengineering (BPR)
procedures for their managed business systems.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
statutory provisions establishing the position of CMO and creating the
Business Transformation Office?
Answer. At this time, I do not believe that any changes are
necessary, but if confirmed, I would consult with the Secretary of the
Navy, DOD DCMO, and DOD CMO if my experience led me to believe that
changes were warranted.
Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the
Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise
architecture and transition plan to guide the development of its
business systems and processes. The Department has chosen to implement
the requirement for an enterprise architecture and transition plan
through a ``federated'' approach in which the Business Transformation
Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the
military departments to fill in most of the detail. The Navy's business
systems, like those of the other military departments, remain incapable
of providing timely, reliable financial data to support management
decisions.
If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the
Navy develops the business systems and processes it needs to
appropriately manage funds in the best interest of the taxpayer and the
national defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the proper business case
analyses and appropriate establishment and application of business
enterprise architectures support the capability of providing timely,
reliable data to support management decisions. I will approach this
responsibility mindful of our role as public servants to be guardians
of the public fiscal resources.
Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated,
enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the
successful transformation of the Navy's business systems?
Answer. I am skeptical that a single architecture for an
organization as large and complex as the Department of the Navy is
practical or efficient. This does not mean that all standards,
policies, and processes should not be established to rival the best of
those in the private sector. It does mean that, if confirmed, I am
accountable to ensure the appropriate analysis and process development
occur to transform outdated and inefficient business operations into
those that are streamlined, cost effective, and well-planned.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Navy's enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the
requirements of section 2222?
Answer. I understand that much progress was made last year to
ensure conditions for fiscal year 2014 obligation of funds for covered
defense business system programs met the requirements of section 2222.
The fiscal year 2014 Department of the Navy Organizational Execution
Plans and Precertification memo was completed on time and met or
exceeded requirements. If confirmed, I will continue that work with the
Business Transformation Council, Investment Review Board, and DOD DCMO
to fully meet the requirements specified in law.
Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely
and accurate financial and business information in managing operations
and holding managers accountable?
Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information is
essential in managing the Department's business operations. In order to
make informed decisions, the Department's senior leaders must have
credible, reliable, authoritative information at the right time.
Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that
reliable, useful, and timely financial and business information was not
routinely available for these purposes?
Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize their requirement to have
processes in place and appropriate systems subsequently needed to
produce the data.
Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in
managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial
and business information available to Navy managers?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of
the Navy DCMO and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Financial
Manager/Comptroller to confirm the establishment of specific
requirements and execute measures required to improve the quality of
financial information used for decisionmaking.
auditable financial statements
Question. Section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Chief Management Officer of DOD to
establish a plan to ensure that DOD's financial statements are
validated as ready for audit by not later than September 30, 2017. The
Secretary of Defense has established the additional goal of ensuring
that the statement of DOD's budgetary resources is validated as ready
for audit by not later than September 30, 2014.
In your opinion, is the Department of the Navy on track to achieve
these objectives, particularly with regard to data quality, internal
controls, and business process re-engineering?
Answer. I do not yet have enough information to form an opinion on
this matter; however, I understand that the Department has a Financial
Improvement Plan and is making progress toward achieving auditable
financial statements. I am aware that difficult issues must be
addressed, including the valuation of major weapon systems and
equipment. I have not had the opportunity to review the plan and at
this time could not inform you of my confidence level that the
September 30, 2014 goal is achievable.
Question. If not, what impediments may hinder the Navy's ability to
achieve this goal and how would you address them?
Answer. I do not yet have enough information to form an opinion on
this matter; however, I expect that the impacts of past, present and
any future furlough of Government civilian personnel could serve as an
impediment. Likewise, the budget uncertainty for fiscal year 2014 and
beyond is a likely impediment. If confirmed, I will maintain a steady
focus and commitment on all Department efforts to enable audit
readiness consistent with the statutory requirement and to ensure they
are built on a foundation that results in sustainable audit
environments well into the future.
Question. In your view, are the steps that the Navy needs to take
to meet the 2014 goal consistent with the steps that DOD needs to take
to achieve full auditability?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to maintaining a steady focus
on all Department efforts towards audit readiness and achieving clean
audit opinions. This consistent focus is critical to the success of the
2014 goal. If confirmed, I will review the objectives that have been
prepared and determine whether they appear to be reasonable and
effective.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Navy moves to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or
unsustainable level of one-time fixes and manual work-arounds?
Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain a steady focus and commitment
on all Department efforts to enable audit readiness and to ensure they
are built on a foundation that results in sustainable audit
environments well into the future. This includes documentation and
standardization of business processes across the Navy to ensure they
are traceable, sustainable, and auditable.
navy policies regarding drug and alcohol abuse
Question. What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with
respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of Navy
and Marine Corps personnel who have been determined to have used
illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
Answer. The Department of the Navy has a zero tolerance policy
regarding illegal drug use and that this policy is clearly understood
by all sailors and marines from the moment they enter the Service. Zero
tolerance, in this context, means that sailors and marines that use
illegal drugs, which includes unauthorized use or abuse of prescription
drugs, will be held accountable, as appropriate, under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice and unless discharged by a court-martial, subjected
to mandatory administrative processing for separation from the Service.
I agree with this policy.
Question. What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with
respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of members of
the Navy and Marine Corps who have been determined to have used illegal
drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this
policy?
Answer. I agree with the Department's drug and alcohol policy. I
understand that while Navy and Marine Corps personnel who violate the
Department of the Navy's drug policy will be appropriately punished and
processed for separation, they will also be screened for counseling
prior to administrative processing, and they will be given the
opportunity to benefit from whatever treatment is deemed necessary.
As for alcohol abuse, I understand that the Department of the
Navy's policy is to de-glamorize use, and to treat and track alcohol
abuse. I further understand that there is a zero tolerance policy for
driving while under the influence and that all alcohol-related vehicle
incidents are reviewed prior to an officer's promotion to determine
whether that officer is suitable for advancement to the next higher pay
grade. Irrespective of how alcohol abuse is identified, I understand
that Navy and Marine Corps personnel will be screened and provided an
opportunity to participate in treatment, up to and including inpatient
care.
I believe there is a duty to ensure sailors and marines receive the
care they need. However, failure to obey the rules results in
consequences and I fully support the Department of the Navy's policy.
Question. Do you believe that the Navy has devoted sufficient
resources for implementation of its rehabilitation policies and
objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways have resources been
insufficient?
Answer. Based on the information I have, I believe the Navy has
devoted sufficient resources for implementation of its rehabilitation
policies and objectives. If confirmed, I commit to developing a more
thorough understanding of the resources the Navy has devoted to these
policies and objectives.
religious guidelines
Question. In your view, do Department of the Navy policies
concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately
accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including
individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have
different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Based on the information I have, I am aware that all
requests for religious accommodation are evaluated and given due
consideration. I do believe that current Defense Department policies
appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other
beliefs but are balanced against the interest in avoiding adverse
impact on good order and discipline as well as mission accomplishment.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and
discipline?
Answer. Consistent with the law, every religious accommodation
request requires individualized analysis. I believe that under current
law and policy, religious accommodation is appropriately balanced
against the interest in avoiding adverse impacts on good order and
discipline.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by Navy and Marine Corps chaplains in
a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance
between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her
religious beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different
beliefs, including no religious beliefs?
Answer. Current law protects chaplains from being required to
perform any rite, ritual, or ceremony that is contrary to the
conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs of the chaplain. I
believe that current policies strike an appropriate balance for
military chaplains acting in a pluralistic environment while
simultaneously protecting their religious freedoms.
Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Naval
Academy to ensure religious tolerance and respect?
Answer. I understand that the same policies implemented throughout
the Navy are also instituted at the Naval Academy and that religious
tolerance and respect is afforded to all midshipmen, faculty and other
assigned personnel.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more
than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including
2,558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports.
Moreover, DOD's most recent survey indicates that the actual number of
sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent of active
duty women and 1.2 percent of active duty men surveyed reported having
experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 12
months. This survey has been criticized by some because its conclusions
are extrapolated from an unscientific sample set and the questions
asked in the survey were too imprecise. Both former Secretary of
Defense Panetta and Secretary Hagel have implemented new initiatives
for addressing sexual assault in the military.
What is your assessment of the Navy's implementation of the new
policies for addressing sexual assault offenses?
Answer. By their new policies, some of which are unique among the
services, the Navy has demonstrated that sexual assault prevention and
response is a priority. It is apparent to me that the Navy is
constantly looking for ways to confront this criminal activity and
create an environment that facilitates prompt reporting and enables
victim care. There have been a series of focused changes in place
dealing directly with sexual assault prevention and response, such as:
raising the disposition authority for a sexual assault case to an O-6
with special court-martial convening authority; ensuring a judge
advocate is the investigating officer in an Article 32 hearing;
implementing a Victims' Legal Counsel program; hiring additional Sexual
Assault Resource Counselors and victim advocates; and in the case of
the Navy service, hiring resiliency counselors to deploy with larger
platforms, among others. However, the Navy is also addressing some of
the other risk factors to include alcohol abuse. I am not yet in a
position to assess the efficacy of these programs. If confirmed, I
expect this assessment will be among my top priorities.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. My view is that commanders set the tone of their command.
They are responsible and should be accountable for the health, safety,
and morale of their units--to include the command climate with regard
to gender issues and sexual assault. Their daily actions and comments,
as transmitted through the chain of command, are visible models that
inform subordinates of our true standards and expectations. Local
commanders and chains of command are also the most effective way to
ensure compassionate support individuals in need--something hard to do
from afar. While Commanders do indeed need consistent and effective
policy guidance and resource support from senior leadership, no
strategy to combat sexual assault, no matter how well-founded, could
ever succeed without the active engagement of commanding officers and
their chains of command.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. A judge advocate outside the chain of command will be
looking at a case through a different lens than a military commander. I
believe the impact would be decisions based on evidence rather that the
interest in preserving good order and discipline. I believe this will
result in fewer prosecutions and therefore defeat the very problem that
I understand it seeks to address. I understand that the Response
Systems Panel directed by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 is looking at
this very issue and I would appreciate the opportunity to review data
and recommendations they have before considering a change of this
magnitude.
Question. What is your view of the protections afforded to victims
who are required to testify at Article 32, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, investigations that are required before charges can be
referred to a General Court-Martial?
Answer. The Rape Shield Law applies to victims at an Article 32
investigation hearing. This protects the victims from intrusive
questioning about their sexual history unless there is a specific
exemption. While I'm not opposed to considering changes in the Article
32 process to afford greater protections, I am concerned that as
victims and witnesses receive enhanced statutory and regulatory
protection there is a risk of eroding the Constitutional protections of
a criminal accused. I strongly believe we must work through any
substantive changes deliberately so that we are fully informed, and I
believe that the panels established in section 576 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2013 were wise and welcome requirements of Congress that
will, if given the opportunity, better inform us all.
Question. What is your understanding of the resources and programs
the Navy has in place to provide victims of sexual assaults the
medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
Answer. The Navy service is adding a Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response (SAPR) officer at the rank of Commander or higher to major
naval commands, has completed the hiring of Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators and Victim Advocates and took the additional step of
hiring Deployed Resiliency Counselors (DRC) to serve on larger
warships. Additionally, the Navy service is in the process of
implementing a Victims' Legal Counsel Program wherein Judge Advocates
will help protect a victim's rights through the investigative and
adjudicative stages of the military justice process.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults? In your view, are these steps
adequate?
Answer. Sexual assaults involving sailors and marines are
completely unacceptable. Unfortunately, there are no simple answers. I
am encouraged by the focused, persistent effort of the Department of
the Navy.
Since 2009, the Department and each Service has worked to structure
its sexual assault organizations. The Department of the Navy Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office (DON-SAPRO) provides independent
visibility and reports directly to the Secretary.
Each Service has implemented strategic plans to combat sexual
assault and developed new training tools. All sailors and marines have
received state-of-the-art sexual assault prevention training--most of
them more than once. Both Services have adopted more aggressive
campaigns against alcohol and everywhere emphasized the importance of
bystander intervention to break up sexual assault situations. In doing
so, they've underscored the importance of core values and the
responsibility of every sailor and marine for both their own behavior
and also to actively protect each other from harm.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Navy has in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. I am aware that the Department has undertaken a number of
initiatives to improve training, investigate and respond to sexual
assault including: special training for Navy Criminal Investigation
Service (NCIS) agents and lawyers. Over the past 1-2 years, a cadre of
approximately 18 criminal investigators has been hired--in most cases,
individuals with extensive civilian experience in sexual assault
investigations. The Department is now supplementing that commitment
with the hiring of an additional 54 new NCIS agents to focus on sexual
assault investigations--specifically in response to the increased NCIS
workload resulting both from policy requirements to investigate all
allegations of sexual assault of any nature, and from the success of
Department-wide efforts to make sailors and marines more comfortable in
reporting sexual assaults in the first place. If confirmed, I would
continue to monitor the effectiveness of these initiatives and seek
opportunities to advance additional training and resources to address
the needs in this area.
Question. Do you consider the Navy's current sexual assault
policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
to be effective?
Answer. I do. Substantial increases in both restricted and
unrestricted reporting during fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 in
both the Navy and Marine Corps demonstrate the emphasis the Department
has placed on sexual assault victim support and the intensity of
training initiatives to address the problem of under-reporting.
Additionally, there are reporting procedures in place that require a
commanding officer to report a complaint of sexual assault to the first
Flag officer in the chain of command. They also must immediately
initiate a situational report that is sent to JAG and NCIS channels as
well as to all echelons of leadership. This increases visibility and
accountability.
I understand the concept behind restricted reporting, but I also
understand the criticism. We want to hold perpetrators of sexual
assault responsible, but we cannot do that unless we know who they are.
I believe that with the implementation of the Victims' Legal Counsel
Program and with Victim Advocates in place, the rate of unrestricted
over restricted reporting will improve.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of resources in the
Navy to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and to hold
perpetrators accountable for their actions? What problems, if any, are
you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting
procedures have been put into effect?
Answer. NCIS investigates all allegations of sexual assault. This
requires resources. The Secretary has authorized the hiring of 54
additional NCIS agents to focus on sexual assault questions. In order
for a report of sexual assault to remain a restricted report, a victim
can only notify certain individuals. Once NCIS is notified of a sexual
assault complaint, they must investigate whether or not the victim
wants to cooperate; however, an investigation without a cooperating
victim is very difficult.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior
military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat, the Navy staff and
the Marine Corps staff in overseeing the effectiveness of
implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?
Answer. Sexual assault prevention and response is a responsibility
of leadership up and down the organization. In 2009, the Secretary of
the Navy was the first to establish a Secretariat level office to
oversee sexual assault prevention and response in the Department. The
office is led by an SES who reports directly to the Secretary. This
Secretariat-level SAPR strategy focuses on consistent top-down
leadership message. Each Service also has their own program offices,
led by a one-star Flag or General Officer who is responsible for
overseeing the implementation of Service-specific programs.
Question. Do you believe that sexual assault continues to be an
underreported crime within the Department for the Navy?
Answer. Yes--I believe it is the most under-reported crime.
However, as the Navy implements new programs and policies, I would
expect to see an increase in reporting as victims feel more comfortable
coming forward to report these crimes.
Question. If so, what are the barriers that discourage or prevent
victims from coming forward?
Answer. I believe the biggest challenges relate to the personal
concerns of victims about embarrassment, self-blaming, and how victims
feel they will be viewed by their friends and peers. These are tougher
matters to overcome, and they ultimately depend on developing a culture
that is simultaneously intolerant of sexual assault and focused on
compassionate support of sexual assault victims.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to
remove barriers to reporting sexual assaults?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to focus on victim care.
Victims of sexual assault need to feel safe and cared for and that
their needs are being met. As more victims feel comfortable coming
forward and reporting sexual assault, we will see the barriers to
reporting begin to dissolve.
Question. In response to the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and
Violence at the Military Service Academies for Academic Program Year
2011-2012, the Secretary of Defense wrote to the Service Secretaries
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness stating:
``Despite our considerable and ongoing efforts, this year's Annual
Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service
Academies demonstrates that we have a persistent problem. I am
concerned that we have not achieved greater progress in preventing
sexual assault and sexual harassment among academy cadets and
midshipmen. These crimes and abhorrent behavior are incompatible with
the core values we require of our Armed Forces' future officers. A
strong and immediate response is needed.''
What has the Navy done to respond the Secretary of Defense's
requirement for a strong and immediate response?
Answer. I understand that the Secretary and the Chief of Naval
Operations both place a personal high priority on issues at the Naval
Academy. Earlier this year there was an extensive review of SAPR
program structure and staffing. As a result, the Academy has assigned
two civilian full-time Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and
two civilian full-time Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim
Advocates (VAs). The SARCs now report directly to the Superintendent
and no military personnel are assigned SARC responsibilities. The VAs
report directly to the SARCs. Additionally, an experienced Judge
Advocate and trial attorney was recently put in place as the first
Victim's Legal Counsel in the Navy.
In addition, a survey was conducted of all Midshipmen to explore
perspectives on sexual assault circumstances, the command climate, and
barriers to reporting. Those results helped inform the Academy's own
efforts to engage local stakeholders in confronting key issues.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
address the findings contained in this report?
Answer. Senior military and civilian leaders at all levels from the
Secretariat down must continue to focus on promoting environments at
the Naval Academy and all commands that prevent sexual assault. If
confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and service leaders to
maintain a focused and persistent commitment on these issues.
annual increase in rates of basic pay below the employment cost index
Question. The Department has requested an across-the-board pay
raise for 2014 for military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8
percent rise in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) benchmark, and has
indicated that in order to restrain the growth of personnel costs,
similar below-ECI pay raises may be necessary over the next several
years.
What is your assessment of the impact a 1 percent pay raise would
have on Navy and Marine Corps recruiting and retention for 2014?
Answer. Military compensation is highly competitive today, and the
President's proposed slowdown in base pay growth is not likely to cause
recruiting or retention problems in the near term provided recruiting
bonuses and retention pays are preserved. With the modest increases in
the pay table as proposed in the President's budget, servicemembers
will still realize sizable pay increases through promotions and
longevity. In the current fiscal environment, there is room to slow
down base pay growth, thereby helping to mitigate further cuts to force
structure, readiness and modernization.
Question. What would be the impact of a 1 percent pay raise in 2015
through 2017 on recruiting and retention? What level of savings would
you anticipate achieving relative to pay raises equal to ECI for those
years?
Answer. Total military compensation has to be sufficient to attract
and retain the numbers and quality the services need in uniform to
fulfill our missions. Military compensation has gained ground relative
to comparable civilian compensation in recent years. In my view,
military pay raises below ECI for a few years would not cause major
recruiting or retention problems for the Department of the Navy.
Assuming a comparison between a 1.8 percent ECI increase and a 1
percent proposed increase from 2015 to 2017 and that service end
strengths remain at fiscal year 2014 requested levels, I would expect
the Department of the Navy to save $900 million in Active Duty basic
pay and $130 million in Reserve component pay for those 3 years.
end strength reductions
Question. The Department last year laid out a defense strategy that
proposes an eventual end strength of 182,000 for the Marine Corps over
the next 5 years.
What is your understanding of the Marine Corps' ability to meet
these goals without forcing out marines who have served in combat over
the past 10 years with the implicit promise that they could compete for
career service and retirement?
Answer. The promise of a military retirement is one of the solemn
pledges made to compensate our servicemembers when they volunteer for a
full career. However, it is time for a review of this system. I fully
support Congress' establishment of the Military Compensation and
Retirement Modernization Commission to conduct a comprehensive review
of military compensation and retirement systems. Keeping faith with
those currently serving is a high priority, and in my view the
Commission and Congress should ensure that any resulting reforms
protect our current servicemembers through grandfathering those who
prefer the current retirement structure.
That said, I understand that the Marine Corps desires and intends
to keep the faith with marines and only use voluntary separation tools.
Whether these voluntary force shaping tools result in the necessary end
strength will determine the need for any involuntary force shaping
methods.
Question. To what extent will the Marine Corps have to rely on
involuntary separations in 2014 through 2018? How will sequestration
affect this?
Answer. It is not yet clear to me to what extent the Marine Corps
will rely on involuntary separations during this time period.
Sequestration, Continuing Resolutions, and government shutdowns
exacerbate all problems.
Question. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and
retiring sailors and marines are as prepared as they can be as they
enter a struggling economy?
Answer. The newly redesigned Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is
intended to prepare sailors and marines to make a successful transition
from military to civilian life and help shorten their time to post-
service employment. Transition GPS includes a 5 day common core
curriculum, an option of participating in additional tailored
curriculum depending on the members' follow-on interest and a ``warm-
handover'' to government agencies and organizations that provide
transitioning members with continued benefits, services and support as
veterans.
The Department of the Navy's new transition program will also
incorporate career readiness and transition preparation into the entire
span of a servicemember's career. In the past, transition and
preparation for the civilian workforce occurred late in a
servicemember's lifecycle--near the point of separation. Under this new
program, these concepts will be incorporated earlier as a way to ensure
that the counseling, assessments, and access to resources to build
skills or credentials occur at earlier stages.
Question. How fast can the Marine Corps responsibly and fairly
reduce end strength while maintaining the integrity and readiness of
combat units?
Answer. I am not equipped with sufficient information to
effectively respond to this question at this time, but the Marine Corps
will almost certainly need a balanced program of reduced accessions and
lower retention to achieve the proposed strength reductions while
maintaining readiness.
Question. If sequestration continues through 2018, what will be the
impact on the Active Duty and Reserve end strengths of the Navy and
Marine Corps, and how would the mix between the Active and Reserve
Forces be affected?
Answer. In the case of the Marine Corps, I understand that the
Commandant's adjusted end strength goal of 182,100 marines by the end
of fiscal year 2016 assumes risk. If sequestration continues, I expect
the Marine Corps will be required to further reduce end strength and
will put the Nation's ability to respond to crisis at risk. In the case
of the Navy, Active and Reserve end strength is linked to force
structure and would almost certainly decrease as force structure
changes are made. As to the planned mix of Active and Reserve Forces, I
am not yet equipped with the information necessary to respond to this
question but as DOD looks to slow the growth of personnel costs this
will be an area that I expect would be evaluate carefully.
Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional
force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has
provided the past 2 years?
Answer. I am unaware of a need for additional force shaping tools
beyond what Congress has provided over the past 2 years.
navy and marine corps recruiting and retention
Question. The retention of quality sailors and marines, officer and
enlisted, Active Duty and Reserve, is vital to the Department of the
Navy.
How would you evaluate the status of the Navy and Marine Corps in
successfully recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel?
Answer. I understand that both services have met their recruiting
goals in recent years and have brought in exceptionally high quality
cohorts of new sailors and marines. I understand that recruit quality
has been so high that attrition of new recruits has been at record
lows.
Question. How would you evaluate the recruiting and retention of
uniformed and civilian health care professionals?
Answer. Healthcare professionals are always challenging to recruit,
but I understand that the Active component Navy has met both recruiting
and retention goals this year.
Question. What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further
improve Navy and Marine Corps recruiting and retention, in both the
Active and Reserve components, including health care professionals?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be mindful of the effects of
sequestration on efforts to recruit and retain the high-quality sailors
and marines in our All-Volunteer Force and will recommend any necessary
improvements after consultation with the Service Chiefs or their
designees, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs and the Surgeon General.
sequestration
Question. What would be the impact on the Navy and Marine Corps if
another round of sequestration were to take effect during fiscal year
2014?
Answer. Sequestration in fiscal year 2014, particularly when
combined with the absence of an appropriation and the restrictions
associated with a potential Continuing Resolution, will reduce service
readiness in the near-term and continue to negatively impact programs
in the long term. I would expect reductions to operations and
maintenance funding to impact the Navy's near-term forward presence and
depot maintenance and training, which will in turn, affect future
operational rotations. In investment accounts, I expect tradeoffs and
reduced quantities of ships, aircraft, and weapon systems will likely
be required.
Question. What would be the specific impact on Navy and Marine
Corps civilian and military personnel; on family programs; on morale,
welfare and recreation programs; and on the delivery of health care to
service personnel, retirees, and their families?
Answer. Even though military personnel accounts are exempt from
sequestration many of these programs are funded from the Operations and
Maintenance Accounts. I am not aware of specific impacts at this time
but I would expect there will be negative impacts.
suicide prevention
Question. The number of suicides in the total Navy and Marine Corps
continues to be of concern to the committee.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide
prevention programs and policies for the Department of the Navy to
prevent suicides and increase the resiliency of service personnel and
their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would commit to leading on this issue and
to advance the Department's goal to reduce the number of Navy and
Marine Corps suicides by accelerating reviews of successful initiatives
both inside and outside the Services to incorporate evidence-based best
practices.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and sometimes lengthy
deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all
eligible users, including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, retirees,
and families.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Navy MWR programs,
particularly in view of the current fiscal environment, and if
confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve?
Answer. Sustaining Navy and Marine Corps MWR programs will be
challenged by reductions in appropriated fund support to those MWR
programs not funded fully by non-appropriated funding, and the changing
needs of sailors, marines, and their families based on the fluctuating
fiscal environment and any future reductions in end strength. If
confirmed, I will assess whether there are ways to improve the
sustainment of our most important MWR programs.
family readiness and support
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of
the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their families, and, if
confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are
addressed and adequately resourced?
Answer. I recognize our sailors and marines can achieve and
maintain their peak readiness only when their families are also
prepared to handle the mental and emotional rigors of military service.
In my view, continuing to prepare and support our sailors, marines,
and their families before, during, and after deployment to promote
positive adjustment to deployment, family separation, and family
reunion remains one of our most important family readiness issues. By
continuing to emphasize the importance of this subset of family
readiness programs, the Department can assist commanding officers,
sailors, marines, and their families to manage the demands of the naval
service lifestyle of ongoing deployments and increasing operational
tempo.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. Global rebasing, increasing operational tempo, and future
reductions in end strength will necessitate continuous assessment of
the needed level and nature of services to ensure the health and well-
being of our sailors, marines, and their families. Annual assessments
of family support programs conducted by the Services allow the
identification of changing needs and adjustment and realignment of
services as necessary.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. A number of information and referral services such as
Military OneSource and Military and Family Life Counseling Services are
available to both Active Duty and Reserve sailors, marines, and family
members and should continue to be resources for servicemembers and
family members.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to sustain Navy
and Marine Corps family support, given current fiscal constraints?
Answer. If confirmed I would evaluate the balance of appropriated
and non-appropriated funding levels for different programs and ensure
the services have identified improved effectiveness, efficiency, and
economy in the delivery of programs to include exploration of shared
services or similar models for common support with the other military
departments as opportunities to provide family readiness programs at
needed service levels.
systems and support for wounded warriors
Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat
operation deserve the highest priority from the Navy, Marine Corps, and
the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation,
rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition
from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement
or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis
over the past several years, many challenges remain.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the
Department of the Navy to improve the care, management, and transition
of seriously ill and injured sailors and marines and their families?
Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy is currently
meeting the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) goal of 295
days, but the Department should continue to improve system performance
by leveraging available IT systems that increase process visibility and
active leadership to better manage workflow.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based?
Answer. For the serious wounded, ill, and injured, a smooth
transition from the Department of the Navy to the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) remains the most important goal. The Department
of the Navy is presently coordinating with the DOD-VA interagency task
force to better prepare sailors and marines to make a successful
transition from military to civilian life and Veteran status and
progress here should continue.
Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. As fiscal resources become increasingly limited it will
become more difficult to maintain education, training, and
certification for Physical Evaluation Board Liaison Officers,
physicians and IDES staff--each of which are critical components to
maintaining timeliness and program quality. Challenges remain to
improve/develop viable IT solutions that minimize staff workload while
delivering the data needed to avoid process delays and post-service
benefit gaps.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase the Navy's and Marine
Corps' support for wounded personnel and their families, and to monitor
their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. To meet the presidential directive to develop a
comprehensive plan for a ``career ready military'', and to comply with
the Veterans Opportunity to Work to Hire Heroes Act of 2011 (``VOW
Act''), which requires mandatory participation in all elements of the
Transition Assistance Program (TAP), the Navy and Marine Corps are
fully engaged in implementation of a redesigned TAP.
The Navy is coordinating with the DOD-VA interagency task force to
better prepare sailors and marines to make a successful transition from
military to civilian life and Veteran status. All eligible separating
servicemembers are required to participate in the TAP program; however,
wounded, ill, and injured recovering servicemembers may be exempt from
the Department of Labor Employment Workshop, provided they are enrolled
in the Education and Employment Initiative (E2I) or a similar
transition program intended to improve career readiness.
navy and marine corps civilian personnel workforce
Question. Section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 required the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to
reduce the size of the civilian personnel workforce by 5 percent over
the next 5 years. The plan developed by the Secretary does not meet
this objective. Since the time that section 955 was enacted, the
Department has implemented hiring freezes and furloughs due to
sequestration. As a result, the DOD civilian personnel workforce is
substantially smaller than it was when section 955 was enacted or at
the time the plan was submitted.
Do you agree that the Navy and Marine Corps civilian employee
workforce plays a vital role in the functioning of the Department of
the Navy?
Answer. I have made a deliberate effort to understand the critical
roles the civilian workforce plays in the Department of the Navy.
Question. Among the Department's 198,000 civilian employees, more
than half are engineers, scientists, logisticians, information
technology specialists, and acquisition specialists many with critical
certifications and advanced degrees. 7,000 are in the medical
community, and 35,000 are blue collar artisans. Over 57 percent of the
Navy's civilian workforce are veterans and 15-20 percent of new hires
are wounded warriors and disabled veterans.
There are civilian career employees in every single State in more
than 558 different occupational series across the country helping to
solve fleet issues--whether a malfunction in a ship's main propulsion
or a combat system out of alignment. Simultaneously, you have hundreds
more developing and manufacturing the critical specialty ordnance items
and men and women carefully repairing and maintaining our nuclear
submarines and ships. They answer the call, 24/7, providing a rapid
response to ensure that our warfighters get what they need, when they
need it.
Question. Do you agree that if sequestration continues through
fiscal year 2014 and beyond, the Navy and Marine Corps will need to
further reduce the size of its civilian workforce?
Answer. I expect that will be the case, but I am not equipped with
information to respond to that question at this time. At the very
least, I would expect continued hiring freezes and potential furloughs
to occur.
Question. In your view, would it be preferable for the Navy and
Marine Corps to make planned, prioritized reductions to the civilian
workforce, or to downsize using arbitrary reductions based on hiring
freezes and workforce attrition?
Answer. Given the ever-changing demands on mission, there must be
careful consideration of the analysis of the workload with a strategic
approach to ultimately create an affordable workforce which still meets
the critical demands placed on the workforce.
tactical aviation
Question. Several years ago, the Navy and Marine Corps began to
integrate their tactical aviation units.
What is your assessment of this initiative?
Answer. I understand that Naval Aviation force projection is
accomplished by the balanced integration of Marine Corps tactical
aircraft (TACAIR) squadrons into Carrier Air Wings and, when required,
Navy squadrons into Marine Aircraft Wings. I believe that the continued
integration of Naval Aviation provides the framework for the Navy and
Marine Corps to further enhance core combat capabilities to provide a
more potent, cohesive fighting force that is sustainable.
Question. The Department of the Navy is facing a potential
shortfall of strike fighter aircraft in the next decade even if the
Navy continues to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft at the
rate projected in this year's budget.
What is your assessment of this situation and what actions should
the Department of the Navy take to address this potential shortfall?
Answer. I understand that the strike fighter shortfall is projected
to fluctuate throughout the next 20 years.
To date, the Department of the Navy has been able to mitigate its
shortfall with the successful execution of its Legacy F/A-18 A-D high
flight hour inspection and repair program, and a reduced utilization
rates across the F/A-18 A-F fleet. The continued efforts of the Navy/
Marine Corps team will further define necessary actions required to
manage aging F/A-18 A-D aircraft, address discovery of potentially
greater than expected fatigue and corrosion, and ensure required
availability of aircraft until JSF Fleet Introduction.
The Navy and Marine Corps continue to adjust transition plans as F-
35 procurement ramps are flattened. The Marine Corps is taking
advantage of higher service life remaining in its AV-8B inventory by
delaying the majority of their transitions to the end of the transition
plan. This is expected to reduce the demand for F/A-18 A-D in the later
years. I believe that sustainment and relevancy funding will be
imperative to maintain the requisite operational capability of the AV-
8B throughout the 2020s.
Question. What other potential alternatives do you see for
maintaining sufficient strike assets if there were any additional
slippage in the initial operating capability date for the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter?
Answer. Future delays in the JSF program will make strike fighter
inventory management more difficult.
Without additional investments in other strike fighter production
lines, the delay of the F-35C or F-35B would make the strike fighter
shortfall more difficult to manage potentially resulting in a
significant loss of capability that a multi-role mix of fourth- and
fifth-generation aircraft provides across the full spectrum of combat
operations.
The timely delivery of the JSF is critical to the Department of the
Navy's ability to meet operational demands for sea control,
expeditionary strike and to establish and maintain a complementary mix
of strike fighter aircraft.
shipbuilding plan
Question. The Navy annually submits a 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Do you agree that the 30-year shipbuilding plan should, in fact,
reflect realistic cost estimates and include all important shipbuilding
efforts for that document to be useful for decisionmakers?
Answer. Yes, the 30-year shipbuilding plan should reflect the
Navy's best estimate of costs to procure the balanced fleet to meet the
Nation's security requirements. The Navy has placed a great emphasis on
improving cost performance in shipbuilding through the use of expanded
competition, fixed price contracts, and multi-year procurements and
block buys. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I would continue to
emphasize achieving our affordability goals and providing transparency
to Congress on the Navy's progress in achieving those goals.
Question. What level of funding do you think the Navy will need to
execute this plan, and considering competing priorities, do you believe
this level of funding is realistic?
Answer. I think that the level of funding needed to execute the
plan varies each year but averages approximately $16.8 billion per year
in fiscal year 2013 constant dollars. I understand that this level of
funding is higher than recent historical averages but must be provided
to ensure the Navy can procure the vessels to meet the Nation's
maritime security requirements. The Defense Strategic Guidance called
for a rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific regions, and there has been a
renewed focus on naval assets. Secretary Mabus and service leadership
have prioritized shipbuilding and those positive trends can be seen in
ship procurement and budget requests. I expect that sequestration
continues to pose a significant risk to the Navy's ability to purchase
the ships needed to execute the strategy. If sequestration or other
competing priorities cause the funding levels called for in the
shipbuilding plan to not be met, then adjustments to force structure
will necessarily have to be evaluated.
Question. Cost growth continues to be a prevalent problem in Navy
shipbuilding programs, particularly for the first ships in new classes.
Some experts have taken the position that DOD could improve the
performance of its acquisition plans by adopting commercial practices,
such as: retiring all major risk prior to signing a procurement
contract; fixing the cost and delivery date at contract signing;
competing all basic and functional design prior to starting
construction; and having a disciplined construction process that
delivers ships on cost and on schedule.
To what extent should such commercial shipbuilding best practices,
and any others you may be aware of, be incorporated into Navy
shipbuilding programs?
Answer. Over the past 4 years, I understand that the fleet numbers
have stabilized and the primary causes of cost growth have been
addressed in the shipbuilding programs. As part of this, commercial
shipbuilding's best practices should be exercised to the maximum extent
feasible to achieve cost savings in shipbuilding while still meeting
military requirements. I understand that the Navy has expanded use of
commercial standards in shipbuilding contracts and has aggressively
pursued competition wherever possible.
aircraft carriers
Question. We are now in a 2-year gap between the decommissioning of
the USS Enterprise and the availability of a new aircraft carrier, CVN-
78 (USS Gerald R. Ford). During this period only 10 aircraft carriers
will be operational.
What is your view of the Secretary Gate's plan to permanently
change the aircraft carrier force structure to 10 from the current
number of 11? Is this still the plan?
Answer. In his recommendations for the fiscal year 2010 budget,
Secretary Gates directed a shift in the time between construction
starts for Ford-class carriers to 5 years. I believe that rebasing the
build rate on 5-year centers provides a more stable and predictable
funding plan for carriers, as well as for the other platforms in the
Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. This restructured procurement plan
also enables a steady state force structure of 11 carriers through 2040
by more closely aligning delivery of Ford-class carriers with the
notional 50-year service life of the Nimitz-class ship each will
replace. I understand that the adjustment to 5-year centers does
results in a reduction of the aircraft carrier force structure from 11
to 10 CVNs in 2040 and beyond.
Question. How would the aircraft carrier presence requirements of
combatant commanders be met with only 10 operational aircraft carriers?
Answer. Navy would look to balance presence requirements with
projected operations and maintenance schedules, similar to what the
service has been doing since the inactivation of USS Enterprise (CVN
65) in December 2012. I understand that the Navy has determined the
risk to be acceptable, although moderate, during the relatively short
period of operating with a 10-carrier fleet between the inactivation of
CVN 65 and the commissioning of Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78).
When the force structure is permanently reduced to 10 carriers in
2040, Navy will have to determine how best to mitigate the risks at
that time associated with a reduced force and to properly prioritize
worldwide presence requirements. While the inherent flexibility
provided by the current Fleet Response Plan will enable the Navy's
carrier force to meet some emergent demands, it may not be able to meet
all of them.
marine corps ground combat vehicles
Question. Over the 2 years the Marine Corps has been working on a
ground combat vehicle fleet mix study to refine and link its combat
vehicle requirements to sea-lift and ship-to-shore capabilities, and
estimate the life-cycle costs of various alternatives in light of the
fiscal challenges of the future.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Marine Corps'
current and future ground combat vehicle fleet and mix of capabilities?
Answer. I understand that the Marine Corps combat vehicles are at
the front end of much needed recapitalization. The Corps' ground combat
tactical vehicle strategy includes developing and procuring the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV); developing a modern Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV); sustaining a portion of the Humvee fleet through 2030;
initiating an upgrade program for the legacy assault amphibious vehicle
as a bridge to the ACV; and managing procurement of vehicles to reduce
acquisition objectives, a net reduction of about 20 percent based on
the more recent force structure reviews.
I understand that the JLTV program remains on track with the 2014
budget request continuing development in support of procurement
commencing in 2015 though there may be impacts from fiscal year 2014
sequestration.
The Amphibious Combat Vehicle is, as the Commandant stated in
testimony earlier this year, a top Marine Corps priority. The execution
of amphibious operations requires a self-deploying amphibious vehicle
to seamlessly project ready-to-fight Marine units from sea to land in
permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. This capability
enables the Corps to maximize available amphibious lift and accelerate
the buildup of power ashore, which is key to overcoming access
challenges posed by either the lack of improved infrastructure or the
threat of an adversary.
The marines are conducting a combined requirements definition
feasibility study assembling the best of Government and industry
requirements, systems engineering design, and cost experts. The intent
is to bring the best talent and best information together to build on
the tremendous body of knowledge possessed across all vehicle programs
to determine how to deliver the capability needed by the Marine Corps
with high confidence in the affordability of the defined requirements.
Question. What, in your view, are the greatest risks, if any, to
the readiness of the current fleet and the realization of a modernized
fleet sometime in the future?
Answer. Reductions to operations and maintenance funding is
directly impacting the Marine Corps near-term forward presence and
depot maintenance and training, which will affect future operational
rotations, as well as reducing the readiness of non-deployed forces.
In investment accounts, the biggest risk is to future readiness. I
understand that the Marine Corps is weighing alternatives to mitigate
this through legacy equipment sustainment and bridging efforts,
quantity reductions, scheduled delays and the cost impacts to each of
its programs.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in the oversight of
the Marine Corps' combat vehicle modernization program to ensure that
requirements are relevant, up-to-date, and stable, and that
technologies are achievable and affordable?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to emphasize the key lessons
the services have learned, which begin with getting requirements
appropriately defined and scoped. Affordability targets must be
established with an understanding of both opportunity costs and service
impacts and must endeavor to hold those targets in a dynamic and
uncertain fiscal environment.
risk in the ground vehicle industrial base
Question. Since the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle in 2011, the USMC's ground equipment modernization program has
been restructured to orient on developing a technologically achievable
and affordable amphibious combat vehicle, continued development of the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, while at the same time upgrading or
extending the life of current combat and tactical vehicles.
Given the general slowdown of ground vehicle development,
procurement, and maintenance programs across the Marine Corps and the
Army, what, in your view, are the risks to the combat and tactical
vehicle industrial base that could undermine Marine Corps readiness
and, if confirmed, what actions, if any, are you taking to manage these
risks?
Answer. I understand that the Marine Corps went line by line
through their programs to mitigate the effects of the slowdown and
sequestration in 2013 recognizing some of the bow wave effects into the
out-years.
Delays in the JLTV and the ACV programs are concerning and bear
close scrutiny as affordability is a major factor in both of those
programs.
The ACV is the Commandant of the Marine Corps number one priority
for ground modernization. Of course, this does impact other Marine
Corps lift requirements, and that too bears close scrutiny.
The Marine Corps has also developed a bridging strategy until the
ACV is able to be fielded, and that is to selectively sustain a number
of AAVs, which are in the fleet right now. I understand that these
efforts will focus on increasing survivability of the vehicles.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria or indications in the
industrial base, if any, will you monitor to alert you to potential or
imminent loss of capability or capacity to meet the Marine Corps' needs
into the future? How would you propose to respond to evidence of an
unacceptable increase in this risk or the imminent loss of capability
or capacity?
Answer. Preserving the Ground Vehicle market is very important to
ensuring current and future capability for the Marine Corps, but I
understand that the Marine Corps is only a small piece of the total
Ground Vehicle customer base, with the U.S. Army being the larger part.
Because of the cross-service demand for Ground Vehicles, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base
Policy (DASD(MIBP)) closely monitors the industrial base.
Maintaining close collaboration with DASD(MIBP) and the other
services will be crucial to monitoring and addressing the issues of the
supplier base. Many of the critical suppliers are lower tier vendors--
in depth monitoring of the supply chain is required to ensure overall
health of the market. In the event of imminent loss of essential
capability, it may be necessary to employ strategies to preserve key
suppliers such as fostering greater Foreign Military Sales volume to
partner nations.
navy force structure
Question. The Chief of Naval Operations has publicly stated that
the Navy has a requirement for 306 ships.
Do you agree with this requirement?
Answer. The Navy's plan for a fleet of 306 ships maintains a
flexible, balanced force that will prevail in a wide range of combat
situations. The fleet is designed to support the current Defense
Strategic Guidance and combatant commanders' presence requirements and
reflects a reduced number of vessels from the 313 ship plan due to
increased forward basing of ships and an increase use of rotating
civilian and military crews.
science and technology program
Question. Do you believe that the current balance between short-
and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future
Department of the Navy needs?
Answer. I have not yet been briefed on the specific long and short-
term balance. In principle, however, I believe a robust research and
development (R&D) effort that makes the right investments--and not
merely investments in science for the sake of science--is vital to the
future capability of the Navy and Marine Corps team. If confirmed, I
will work with the Secretary of the Navy to evaluate the Navy's Science
and Technology Program and find the right balance of long and short-
term investments for the Departmental R&D program.
Question. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding
the importance of innovative defense science in meeting Navy and Marine
Corps missions?
Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps rely upon the technical
superiority of our forces to discourage or destroy our enemies. Our
challenge is that the rate of technology change continues to accelerate
across the world. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of the
Navy and the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
Corporate Board to ensure the Department of the Navy adequately
addresses this critical area. I would also work closely with the
Director of DARPA, the Office of Naval Research, industry, and academia
to leverage their technology investments.
Question. If confirmed, what guidance would you give to ensure
research priorities that will meet the needs of the Navy and Marine
Corps in 2020?
Answer. The Department of the Navy RDT&E Corporate Board was
established specifically for this purpose. If confirmed, I would use
this board to actively engage the Department of the Navy's leadership
in defining and setting priorities essential to success.
military space
Question. Do you believe that the current DOD management structure
for space programs sufficiently protects Navy space equities?
Answer. My understanding is that the 2003 designation of the
Secretary of the Air Force as the DOD Executive Agent for Space created
an overarching DOD space oversight function, allowing the Navy access
to critical DOD decisions on major space systems and capabilities. The
Defense Space Council, which represents this body, affords the Navy the
opportunity to review and participate in a variety of cross-cutting
space issues in areas from acquisition oversight to requirements
generation to studies and analysis. The Navy also participates in most
Major Defense Acquisition Program milestones and Joint Requirements
Oversight Council opportunities, providing avenues of influence for all
space programs, regardless of service or interagency ownership.
Question. In your view, how actively should the Navy be engaged in
the management of space programs?
Answer. Space is increasingly becoming constrained, congested, and
contested. I expect the Navy's involvement in the definition,
management, and execution of space programs is especially important for
a Navy increasingly constrained fiscally while at the same time very
much reliant on the global distribution of Positioning, Navigation &
Timing, Communications, Missile Warning, Environmental and
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance information provided
through space-based systems. Active Navy engagement in space should
continue as DOD finds better ways to manage, access, distribute, and
utilize information derived from space-based systems and seek to
mitigate the challenges to the use of space our adversaries present
both now and in the future.
Question. In your view, is the Navy adequately involved in the
requirements process for space programs?
Answer. Yes. I understand that the Navy evaluates all capability
gaps through internal requirements process as well as existing DOD and
Intelligence Community (IC) formal requirements processes.
Question. What is the Navy's appropriate long-term role in space
systems, other than as a user of space information and products?
Answer. Space systems are essential to modern warfare and integral
to Navy's plans for achieving Information Dominance (ID) through
Assured Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness, and Integrated
Fires. I understand that Navy is a major user of satellite services and
a key consumer of space-derived data within DOD, but most space systems
today are acquired and operated by non-Navy organizations, including
the U.S. Air Force, the Intelligence Community (IC), the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency, and various U.S. and foreign
commercial space providers. This unique arrangement requires a
continuous and proactive Navy approach to ensure that space systems
under development are optimized for maritime operations and able to
support current and future Fleet operations. I expect Navy to continue
to develop, acquire, and operate narrowband communication satellites
for DOD, and maintain a nationally-recognized center for space
technology at the Naval Research Lab, supporting Navy, DOD, and IC
needs.
investment in infrastructure
Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in recent years
have testified that the Military Services under-invest in their
facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-
investment in installations has led to increasing backlogs of facility
maintenance needs, substandard living and working conditions, and has
made it harder for the Services to take advantage of new technologies
that could increase productivity.
Do you believe the Department of the Navy is investing enough in
its infrastructure? Please explain.
Answer. I believe our supporting systems, including shore
infrastructure, are key enablers to executing the Department's
warfighting missions. I'm also aware of the fiscal challenges facing
the Department. If confirmed, I will look forward to meeting the
challenge of balancing the Department's investments across a broad
array of requirements to include shore infrastructure.
acquisition issues
Question. What are your views regarding the need to reform the
process by which the Department of the Navy acquires major weapons
systems? If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve that
process?
Answer. The Navy has implemented several initiatives to improve the
acquisition process. The Navy has improved oversight and reporting
with;

Continuing refinement of Naval Two-Pass/Six-Gate
Review process for early and continuous leadership awareness of
requirements and affordability in terms of Total Ownership
Costs (TOC) throughout the Acquisition process.
Implement Better Buying 2.0 Initiatives and improved
oversight
Implemented Policy for Should Cost initiatives to be
integral to program planning and execution
Systems Engineering improvement to bring more mature/
complete designs prior to MS B which can then be integrated
into better requirements for Industry to give better estimate
and proposals.
Developing partnerships with Industry to support the
industrial base and secure investment
Budgeting and Contracting activities to stabilize
funding and maximize multi-year procurements where beneficial.

I fully support these efforts and other efforts to ensure a
predictable funding profile for programs. This visibility is
particularly important with the current strains on budgets.
Question. Department-wide, nearly half of DOD's 95 largest
acquisition programs have exceeded the so-called ``Nunn-McCurdy'' cost
growth standards established in section 2433 of title 10, U.S.C. Many
of those programs are being executed by the Department of the Navy.
What steps, if any and if confirmed, would you take to address the
out-of-control cost growth on the Department of the Navy's major
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Many of the oversight and acquisition reform efforts have
already bent the curve on the overall performance of our acquisition
portfolio. I believe better requirements definition, early design
maturity, stable funding are critical. I would continue working with
the Warfighter on requirements generation. Navy-Industry teamwork
throughout the process is essential.
Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to
recommend terminating a program that has experienced ``critical'' cost
growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
Answer. A key principle for me is an assessment of whether the
existing program is still the best approach to meet the requirement and
why we have confidence that the adverse cost growth can be contained?
One must cast a critical eye at programs that have not delivered on
their promises to the warfighter. I believe in the recertification
requirements within Nunn-McCurdy: the program is essential to national
security, that no suitable alternative of lesser cost is available, new
estimates of total program costs are reasonable, and management
structure is (or has been made) adequate to control costs.
Question. Many experts have acknowledged that DOD may have gone too
far in reducing its acquisition work force, resulting in undermining of
its ability to provide needed oversight in the acquisition process.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the
Navy should take to address this problem?
Answer. The Navy needs to look at how it recruits, incentivizes and
retains our acquisition workforce. For example, the Navy needs to
protect and expand the use of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund. The Office of Personnel Management rules governing
recruitment and retention incentives are not flexible enough to
maximize the use of Section 852 Incentive funds. Other examples
include:

Lifting the hiring freeze
Provide entry level hiring flexibility through
multiple means of recruitment
Retired annuitants and Intergovernmental Personnel Act
(IPA) programs
Incorporate changes to expand applicant pool for
acquisition workforce personnel opportunities
Retention incentives in the form of bonuses, post-
graduate education opportunities, paying off student loans,
etc.
Recruitment bonuses for interns
Fund developmental opportunities for mid- or senior-
level staff

The vast majority of the contracting commands are seeing an
increase in seasoned, experienced personnel retiring. I would expect
this to create a tremendous amount of corporate knowledge drain from
DoN.
Question. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)
was intended to ensure that future weapon systems move forward on a
sound footing by addressing unrealistic program cost and schedule
estimates, the absence of clearly defined and stable requirements, the
inclusion of immature technologies that unnecessarily raise program
costs and delay development and production, and the failure to solidify
design and manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in the
development process.
Do you support the approach taken by WSARA?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the
Department of the Navy should take to address these problems?
Answer. In response to WSARA, I understand that it has been
beneficial for spurring acquisition reform. The Navy has been engaged
in an aggressive review of the acquisition process and overview.
Specifically:
I understand that the Navy has improved oversight and reporting
with;

Continuing refinement of Naval Two-Pass/Six-Gate
Review process for early and continuous leadership awareness of
requirements and affordability in terms of TOCs throughout the
acquisition process.
Implement Better Buying 2.0 Initiatives and improved
oversight
Implemented Policy for Should Cost initiatives to be
integral to program planning and execution.

These are not static initiatives and I would agree with their
continuation and expansion.
Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year
for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of
products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places
far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition
of services than it does on the acquisition of products.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to improve
the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of services?
Answer. The Navy recognizes services contracts are a significant
portion of the Navy's acquisition budget. To that end, I understand
that the Department is working to reduce its services spending by up to
$4 billion in fiscal year 2014, building on the decrease achieved in
fiscal year 2013. I consider service contracting to be ``Commander's
Business'' and we must hold all stakeholder's accountable. I expect the
Navy will continue its use of Services Requirement Review Boards (also
called Services Courts) and accompanying ``Tripwires'' to better
understand our existing efforts, improve future requirements, and help
ensure these activities receive appropriate oversight.
Question. Do you think the Navy should develop processes and
systems to provide managers with access to information needed to
conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an
ongoing basis?
Answer. Yes. I expect the Navy will continue to support Defense
Procurement Acquisition Policy's efforts to deploy a Services Spend
Analysis tool based on Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation
data.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.
What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?
Answer. Nearly every maritime power and all the permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council except the United States have ratified the
convention. In my view, our absence as a Party weakens our position and
impacts our military, diplomatic, and economic efforts worldwide. Only
as a Party to the Convention can the United States fully secure its
sovereign rights to the vast resources of our continental shelf beyond
200 miles from shore. I strongly support accession to the LOS
Convention.
Question. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as
the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?
Answer. I do not see any disadvantages to becoming a Party from a
national security standpoint. As a non-party to the Convention, the
United States must assert our navigation and overflight rights and high
seas freedoms on the basis of customary international law which is more
subject to dispute and change than norms established by treaty.
Becoming a party to the treaty would give an immediate boost to U.S.
credibility as we push back against excessive maritime claims and
illegal restrictions on our warships or commercial vessels.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the
Navy?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
sexual assault prevention and response
1. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, you said in your advance policy
questions that you fear that if decisions are made by Judge Advocates
General (JAG) based on evidence, prosecutions might go down. If
commanders push cases forward to court martial based on good order and
discipline--with evidence as a secondary concern--is it not likely that
the conviction rate will drop?
Dr. Rooney. Consideration of the evidence is not a secondary
concern. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. section 834 (Article 34 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice), a military commander, prior to directing the
trial of any charge by a general court-martial, must refer the charge
to, and receive the consideration and advice of, a staff judge
advocate. Included in this written advice is an assessment of whether
the charges and specifications are warranted by the evidence.
Commanders do consider the evidence. However, because of the very
nature of command, commanders must also consider other factors such as
the impact that discipline may have on the future behavior of the unit.
Therefore, if the evidence is insufficient to convict the accused at a
court-martial or if the victim does not want to cooperate, commanders
have other administrative options available to them if warranted by the
evidence.
Holding offenders accountable is a priority; and I acknowledge that
a higher conviction rate is one factor among many that may increase a
victim's confidence in the system and, thereby, his or her propensity
to report a sexual assault. This willingness to report is a critical
element in addressing the crime of sexual assault. At the same time,
however, both to reduce the prevalence of sexual assault and to
increase a victim's confidence in the system, we also need to continue
focusing significant, widespread energy on changing the culture. It is
the relentless pursuit of education and training, coupled with
effective leadership from the deckplate up, that will have the most
impact on culture and behavioral changes. I believe no single focus,
whether prosecution, legislation, or training will be sufficient in and
of itself to adequately address this issue. It must be a thoughtful and
measured combination of all three.

2. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, please explain, in your view,
how a lower conviction rate will improve confidence in the system?
Dr. Rooney. In my view, victim confidence in the system begins with
knowing that unit commanders will respond appropriately. This includes
ensuring victims receive the support and services they need and
immediately referring all unrestricted reports of sexual assault, and
other serious offenses, to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service for
an independent and professional investigation. In my view, the
important metric in this regard is not just the conviction rate,
particularly if it results from fewer prosecutions, but the reporting
rates by victims. Other factors that have an important impact on a
victim's confidence in the system include adequately protecting the
privacy of the victims, regular consultation with victims throughout
the process, and ongoing support given to victims including but not
limited to expedited transfers, the provision of victim's legal
counsel, and the availability of sustained counseling.

3. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, please explain how commanders
who are under pressure to push more cases forward to court martial,
regardless of whether evidence exists, can make a fair determination on
which cases to move forward?
Dr. Rooney. Commanders are not under pressure to push more cases
forward to court-martial. Commanders have been charged with promoting a
positive command climate where sexual assaults are not tolerated,
preventing sexual assaults from occurring in the first place, and
ensuring victims are taken care of when a sexual assault does occur.
When it comes to matters of discipline, commanders are to exercise
their responsibilities to ensure fairness and justice based on the
specific factual circumstances of each individual case.

4. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, if cases are sent to trial based
on the good order and discipline of a unit, do you think that
maintaining good order and discipline might mean keeping an alleged
perpetrator in a unit because he serves an essential function?
Dr. Rooney. I do not believe that maintaining good order and
discipline means keeping an alleged perpetrator in a unit just because
he serves an essential function. Good order and discipline includes
holding individuals appropriately accountable for their actions,
irrespective of whether they serve an essential function. When making
decisions about who should remain in or depart from a unit while
allegations are under investigation, a primary concern should continue
to be the safety and welfare of the alleged victim.

5. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, do you believe that serving in
that essential function is more important than justice?
Dr. Rooney. No. Everyone is replaceable--from the top commanders
down the ranks to include those who have special technical skill sets.

6. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, do you believe that allowing
sexual predators to remain in the military can be consistent with
maintaining good order and discipline?
Dr. Rooney. Criminal conduct of any kind is not consistent with
good order and discipline.

7. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, would it contribute to good
order and discipline for a commander to send an innocent servicemember
to court martial to prove a point to the rest of the unit as opposed to
making the decision based on the evidence and the facts of the case?
Dr. Rooney. No, doing so would undermine good order and discipline.
We must ensure all servicemembers know that our system of justice is
fair, effective, and efficient. Furthermore, it would be a violation of
the law for a commander to refer a servicemember to court-martial if
there was not sufficient evidence to support a prosecution. Under title
10, U.S.C., section 834 (Article 34 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice), a military commander, prior to directing the trial of any
charge by general court-martial, must refer the charge to, and receive
the consideration and advice of, a staff judge advocate. Included in
this written advice is an assessment of whether the charges and
specifications are warranted by the evidence. Commanders do consider
the evidence.

8. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, if evidence is not the only
basis for making a decision on the disposition of a case, please
explain on what basis commanders should be evaluated on their handling
of sexual assault cases. Would commanders be rewarded for sending any
case forward even if the evidence suggests that perhaps a crime was not
committed?
Dr. Rooney. Commanders should be and are evaluated on their actions
in fostering a command climate that does not tolerate sexual assault
and that is conducive to victim reporting and support.

9. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, in your testimony during your
nomination hearing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee you
stated that in the Navy, ``commanders' ability and result of command
and control on command climate is a critical piece that is considered
for any promotion or future command.'' In August, the Navy released
public guidance in NAVADMIN 216/13 Navy Performance Evaluation Changes,
that officers and enlisted servicemembers must be evaluated based on
their contribution to climate in regard to sexual assault. It appears
as if this guidance only applies to enlisted sailors and officers of
ranks O-6 and below. Is there a separate directive that applies to flag
officers? If so, please provide me with a copy of that directive. If
not, please explain why one does not exist, whether and how flag
officers are evaluated on command climate with regard to sexual
assault, and how this position is consistent with keeping flag officers
accountable.
Dr. Rooney. The Navy is committed to accountability for command
climate at all pay grades, particularly for flag officers. I am aware
that there is a process for evaluating the performance of flag officers
but that it differs from the process used for officers in the grade O-6
and below. I am also aware that there is a different process depending
on the grade of the flag officer. O-7s receive written fitness reports
and the guidance for completing those reports is contained in Bureau of
Naval Personnel Instruction 1610.10C, which specifically requires flag
officers to demonstrate that they have created or maintained a command
climate that does not tolerate discrimination of any kind. In addition
to fitness reports, annual command climate surveys are required. The
results are shared with the next senior flag officer in the chain of
command. While O-8s through O-10s do not receive written fitness
reports, they are evaluated personally by the Chief of Naval Operations
and annual command climate survey results are fully discussed with the
next senior flag officer in their chain of command. Finally, I am aware
that the Navy convenes quarterly Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
meetings to evaluate trends across the Fleet. These meetings focus on
where flag officer leadership is having positive or negative impacts.

10. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, you have served as Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness beginning
June 2, 2011 and as Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness from November 2011 to June 2012. This service afforded you
the unique opportunity to take concrete measures to address the growing
problem of sexual assault in our military. Outside of any initiatives
mandated through statutes passed by Congress, or those statutes
currently being proposed by Congress in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, please specify what initiatives
or programs aimed at reducing the number of sexual assaults and
ensuring the effective prosecutions of these types of assaults have you
personally played an instrumental role in creating or implementing?
Dr. Rooney. During my tenure as the Acting Under Secretary of
Defense (Personnel and Readiness) the Department implemented a variety
of initiatives to change the way we prevent the crime of sexual assault
and how we respond when that crime occurs. Those initiatives include
the following:

The Department elevated initial disposition decisions
to O-6 level (Colonel or Navy Captain) for cases of rape,
sexual assault, forcible sodomy, and attempts.
The Department launched the Safe Helpline to give
victims 24/7 global access to crisis support staff.
The Department implemented an expedited transfer
policy for victims making such a request.
We implemented a Department of Defense (DOD) policy to
retain investigative documentation for 50 years for
Unrestricted Reports.
The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
expanded its outreach and engagement with experts from advocacy
groups, legal, educational and law enforcement communities in
order to gain constructive criticism and share best practices.
We revised the Sexual Assault Forensic Exam kit to
improve victim care and align evidence collection with national
standards.
In 2011, we established the Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response (SAPR) Integrated Process Team, comprised of
senior Office of the Secretary of Defense and Service SAPR
program managers, as a standing body that meets regularly to
review and advise on SAPR matters.
The Department expanded SAPR Restricted Reporting
support services to include adult military dependents.
The Department expanded SAPR services during emergency
care for DOD civilians stationed overseas and for DOD U.S.
citizen contractors in combat areas.
In January 2012, Military Rule of Evidence 514 was
enacted providing protected communications between victims and
advocates.
In April 2012, we added sexual assault questions to
DOD Command Climate Surveys and implemented policy to conduct
assessments within 120 days for new commanders and annually
thereafter.

11. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Rooney, what were the goals and metrics
of these initiatives/programs?
Dr. Rooney. DOD implemented specific initiatives to enhance its
efforts to prevent the crime of sexual assault and delineated how all
should respond when that crime occurs. The mission is twofold: to
reduce the prevalence of sexual assault and to increase official
reports of sexual assault. Assessment measures were developed to focus
on these two elements. As Department leadership has stated before, one
sexual assault is one too many. That goal was the guiding principle
throughout the announcement and implementation of these initiatives and
also served as the basis for assessing outcomes of programs supporting
this target.
The Department uses two specific metrics to assess its efforts in
preventing sexual assaults and responding to sexual assault when it
does occur. Official reports of sexual assault are entered into the
Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database which yields information on
actual reports filed. Information derived from the Workplace and Gender
Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA) conducted by the Defense
Manpower Data Center provides additional data elements. The Department
uses findings from the WGRA as a source of information to evaluate
prevention and response programs and to assess the gender-relations
environment in the Active-Duty Force. The WGRA survey assesses the
prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the Active-Duty
Force.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
civilian and contractor personnel
12. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) projects the Department of the Navy has overstated its
fiscal year 2014 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) budget requirement for
civilian personnel by $128 million. What problems does the Navy have
with its information technology (IT) systems that preclude an accurate
accounting of its civilian personnel?
Dr. Rooney. methodology in calculating civilian personnel
requirements, and therefore with its determination that the requirement
is overstated by $128 million. Since the GAO calculates costs based
solely on civilians on board at a particular point in time (end
strength), the Navy is unable to compare those calculations to pricing,
which is based on hours worked (full-time equivalents) and compensation
paid for the entire year.
When estimates are submitted for review by the Secretary of
Defense, more than a year before the beginning of a new fiscal year,
they only reflect any known impacts at the time they are being
prepared. The estimates continue to be updated, as new information and
new impacts are identified, until the budget is submitted to Congress
for approval. In some years, changes occur after the point of
submission which may have significant impact on total civilian
personnel costs. For example, during fiscal year 2013, a hiring freeze
was imposed at the end of January and continued for 8 months through
the balance of the fiscal year. While it would seem that a hiring
freeze would dramatically reduce funds spent for civilian personnel,
the Navy has not found that to be the case. In fact, although the
number of people on board has been reduced, compensation costs are
slightly higher than planned due to a higher than anticipated number of
Voluntary Separation Incentive Payments/Voluntary Early Retirement
Authority and lump sum leave payouts. I understand that one effect of
the hiring freeze is that the Department will begin the year with fewer
civilians on board than planned when the fiscal year 2014 budget was
originally submitted to Congress.
Historically, the Navy has had no problems reporting budgeted or
actual civilian personnel End Strength and Full-Time Equivalents. I
understand that a recent system upgrade resulted in loss of access to
actual end strength counts. However, Full-Time Equivalent and
Compensation data, used by the Department to track actual costs, is
captured in a different system and has remained available throughout
this fiscal year.

13. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, what actions will you
take to ensure that the Navy's civilian personnel budget requirements
in the President's budget submissions will be accurate in the future?
Dr. Rooney. The Department of the Navy conducts a rigorous budget
review prior to submission of the President's budget to Congress each
year. Civilian personnel are priced based on prior year execution and
any anticipated pay raises for the coming year. Benefits (including
health and life insurance, retirement, leave, et cetera) are priced at
current rates, and increased costs are specifically excluded from the
budget to contain costs and encourage efficiencies. Since the budget
review is conducted more than a year ahead of the beginning of the
fiscal year, it is impossible to accurately predict and accommodate
changes that may affect estimates after the budget has been submitted
to Congress. Estimates reflect any known impact at the time cost
figures are being prepared. The hiring freeze and 6-day furlough which
occurred in fiscal year 2013, as well as the impact of sequestration on
the budget, are examples of changes occurring during the execution year
of a budget which will likely affect estimates submitted for the next
year's budget.

efficiencies plan for civilian and contractor work force
14. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, do you support the reduction of
Navy civilian and contractor personnel to achieve additional savings in
the Navy's O&M budget?
Dr. Rooney. All expenditures should continue to be examined in
light of the need to properly balance all components of the work force
to achieve efficient and effective results. Every requirement should
continue to be validated and prioritized with budget adjustments made
as warranted. This includes labor requirements and associated budgets
for the Total Force which is comprised of military, civilian and
contractor personnel.

15. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, what percentage reductions in both
civilian and contractor personnel end strengths would you support?
Dr. Rooney. As a result of budget reductions required by the Budget
Control Act, I understand that the Department of the Navy is in the
process of reviewing and balancing mission capabilities, Total Force
(military, civilian, and contractor) manpower requirements and
available funding. If confirmed, I support making adjustments to
personnel manning levels based on necessary tradeoffs between mission
capabilities and funding restrictions rather than a specific percentage
target.

16. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, in your view, will the Navy meet
the requirement in section 955 to achieve savings in total funding of
the civilian and contractor workforce by at least the percentage
savings for military personnel over the Future Years Defense Program?
Dr. Rooney. I understand that the Navy worked with DOD and provided
the data required to facilitate the initial ``120 day'' report in
response to section 955. I understand that the Navyhas the capability
to manage the workforce to achieve the savings required by section 955.

17. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, will you have the
requisite authorities to reduce Navy civilian and contractor personnel?
Dr. Rooney. The Navy has significant although not unlimited
authority to make manpower reductions deemed necessary with appropriate
notifications. In the case of Navy civilians, title 10, U.S.C., section
129, allows military departments to make reductions when necessary due
to a reduction in funds available. The Budget Control Act represents
such a reduction in funds. The Department does not, however, have
authority to conduct public/private competitions if they are deemed
necessary due to the current moratorium. In the case of contractors,
Service Contracts have mechanisms in place which include termination
clauses and fixed expiration dates. The Navy is able to make reductions
(but not conversions) due to funding limitations or changing mission
requirements.

tricare fees
18. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, what is your current position on
TRICARE fee increases for working-age military retirees?
Dr. Rooney. Personnel costs are the fastest-growing part of the
overall DOD budget and health care costs are going up at the most
dramatic rate in comparison to other personnel costs. As such, I
believe that these rising costs need to be mitigated in order for long-
term personnel costs to be sustainable. I do support modest TRICARE
premium increases for working-age retirees from the military to help
maintain a high quality, sustainable benefit package. Even with the
proposed increases, working-age military retirees would have one of the
most comprehensive health benefits available, while still significantly
less expensive than a competing commercial policy.

19. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, why do you think the administration
has been unsuccessful convincing Congress to legislate the DOD's fee
increase proposals?
Dr. Rooney. Congress is understandingly reluctant to impose
additional costs on military retirees, but the proposals are reasonable
in scope, appropriately differentiated through tiers, and necessary for
the Department to deliver long-term sustainable health benefits. It is
important to recognize that these proposals are largely focused on the
retired military population and, even with the proposed increases, the
amount of beneficiary cost-sharing remains far below the levels
experienced by retirees in the mid-1990s. The TRICARE fee proposals do
not affect Active Duty servicemembers, and specifically exempt
medically-retired servicemembers and their families, as well as
survivors of military members who died on Active Duty. Even with these
proposed increases, beneficiaries will continue to have access to one
of the most comprehensive and exceptionally affordable health benefits
available.
These proposals are important to maintaining our obligations to
beneficiaries and ensuring our commitment to improving the long-term
fiscal stability of the Military Health System. Under the leadership of
the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments have worked
carefully to develop these proposals. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Defense has articulated the potential risks to other programs should
these proposals not be authorized.

20. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, do you believe that the
administration should wait on the Military Compensation and Retirement
Commission to report its recommendations before asking Congress to make
legislative changes to personnel benefits including health care?
Dr. Rooney. I support the TRICARE Premium increases for working-age
retirees which were first proposed in fiscal year 2012. Even with the
proposed increases, working-age military retirees would have one of the
most comprehensive health benefits available while still significantly
less expensive than a competing commercial policy. I also believe that
the Commission will provide other valuable information that can be
considered for additional future proposals which may extend beyond
health care.

efficiency expert
21. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, while serving as Principal Under
Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, what actions did you take to cut
costs in the personnel and readiness portfolio?
Dr. Rooney. Within the Office of the Under Secretary, I oversaw the
identification of cuts in staff and overhead. Through zero-based
management reviews, we streamlined operations within our Defense Agency
and Field Activities ensuring successful performance of core priorities
while reducing overhead. Additional plans were initiated to reduce
civilian manning within the immediate headquarters. I oversaw plans for
significant reductions in our service support contracts both within the
Headquarters and at the field activities. Finally, we initiated plans
to reduce advisory studies, eliminated non-essential, lesser-value
reports, and initiated efforts to reduce advisory board and commission
requirements.

22. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, what efficiencies did you implement
and how much did you cut DOD's costs in the role as the Under
Secretary?
Dr. Rooney. In response to fiscal realities our country was facing,
I oversaw Personnel and Readiness' participation in a series of efforts
to increase efficiencies and reduce overhead expenditures across the
Department while maintaining readiness. These efforts covered a broad
spectrum of activities falling under the P&R portfolio. In the area of
civilian personnel, the Military Services and Defense Agencies were to
maintain Department-wide civilian full-time equivalents at fiscal year
2010 authorized levels. Through process improvements and overhead
reductions, impacts were to be minimized. Health care reforms were
proposed to better manage cost growth, recognize a shared commitment
for health care with beneficiaries, and better align the Department
with the remainder of the country. We directed significant reductions
in both our civilian senior executive servicemembers and general/flag
officers across the Department. Where possible we eliminated positions.
When necessary and appropriate, we maintained positions, but at a lower
level (i.e., GS-15, O-6) which provided cost savings in immediate
staffs.

23. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, what will you do to
make the Navy more efficient and cost-effective?
Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I will continuously strive to assure all
organizations and processes are managed as efficiently and effectively
as possible. Obtaining a clean financial audit statement for the
Department will be a top priority. A major challenge will be to
optimize the organization as budgets are reduced in the out years. A
major focus will be to avoid across-the-board reductions and focus
instead on optimizing organizations, procedures, and processes. An
additional focus will be insuring a regular review of new and ongoing
contract requirements is undertaken to insure costs are managed in a
timely and reasonable manner. Another major focus will be completing
the implementation of the Secretary of Defense's efficiency
initiatives.

priorities in the navy
24. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, how do you characterize the current
readiness of the Navy?
Dr. Rooney. The Department of the Navy remains globally deployed
every day, ready to respond to challenges to our national security
interests, building cooperation with allies and other potential partner
nations, as well as meeting all Operation Enduring Freedom and
validated global force management requirements with highly ready
forces. I understand that sustaining combat operations for more than a
decade has required the use of a large share of the available assets
from home bases and stations. The Navy, as the CNO has recently
testified, is taking risk in the capacity to surge additional forces
forward in response to contingency requirements as a result of funding
reductions from sequestration. In addition to the obvious strategic and
operational risk, this has a long-term impact on overall readiness that
must be resolved. For the Marine Corps, I understand that over half of
nondeployed Marine units are experiencing degraded readiness due to
portions of their equipment being redistributed to support units
deploying forward. I understand that this unbalanced readiness across
the force has degraded the Corps' ability to respond to major
contingencies within required timelines.

25. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, what trends cause you concern?
Dr. Rooney. I am most concerned about readiness trends and the
impact of operating tempo on personnel.
From a readiness perspective, the most critical concern is the
underfunding of readiness accounts that is continuing now into fiscal
year 2014, as a result of extended Continuing Resolutions and
sequestration. Cuts within the magnitude of a long-term sequestration
and/or Continuing Resolutions will have a significant impact on the
global security climate, the perceptions of our enemies, and the
confidence of our allies.
As a nation we have asked a great deal of the young men and women
serving our country over the last 12 years. While proud to answer the
call, they have endured shortened turn-around times, double deployments
in a single operational cycle, or frequently extended deployments to
provide the force levels required. The Navy and Marine Corps team must
remain globally deployed to accomplish its mission, but will need to do
so in a manner which provides some predictability in the lives of our
sailors, marines, and their families.

26. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, are you concerned about the
potential of hollow forces in the Navy and Marine Corps?
Dr. Rooney. I am most concerned about the potential for reduced
readiness and the compounding effects which can occur in those
circumstances. The Navy and Marine Corps provide the capability to
respond to today's crises anywhere in the world. The force is required
to maintain high levels of readiness, so they can deploy on short
notice and protect our national security. A hollow force cannot be an
option.
Our operational readiness is preserved through a careful balance of
high quality people, well-trained units, modernized equipment, well-
maintained installations, and a force level sufficient to accomplish
our many missions. Failure in any one of these pillars of readiness
begins to set the conditions for an eventual hollowing of the force. I
am specifically concerned about the reduction of Marine Corps end
strength and the need for precision in how those reductions are
implemented. If confirmed, I will assist the Department of the Navy and
work with Congress to ensure we are doing all within our power to
execute budget reductions in a manner that avoids hollowing the force.

27. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, do you believe the Department of
the Navy has the right funding priorities in place to address these
readiness concerns?
Dr. Rooney. The Secretary has been very clear that his first
priority is to sustain a ready force today. In the context of the
Budget Control Act's revised discretionary caps and reduced Overseas
Contingency Operations accounts, that is the right priority--but the
Navy must also continue to build new platforms and modernize existing
ones that sustain our asymmetric advantages, as well as our industrial
base, to refocus training for future security environments and keep
faith with marines, sailors, and their families. I am aware that there
are not only direct costs for investments, but opportunity costs. If
you spend it on one thing, you can't spend it on another. If confirmed,
I look forward to looking into all of our programs to make sure that
not only the direct cost, but the opportunity costs are carefully
considered in making investment decisions.

manning policy during a shutdown
28. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, based on your prior service as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, what is
your understanding of the current policy during the Government shutdown
for the determination of which DOD civilians should be at work and
which ones should be furloughed?
Dr. Rooney. In the case of a government shutdown and absent an
express appropriation to the contrary, civilian personnel, and military
technicians who are not necessary to carry out or support excepted
activities, are to be furloughed. Only the minimum number of civilian
employees necessary to carry out excepted activities will be exempted
from furlough. Positions that provide direct support to excepted
positions may also be deemed excepted if they are critical to
performing the excepted activity. Senate confirmed officials appointed
by the President are not subject to furlough and their immediate office
personnel necessary to support excepted activities may also be
considered excepted at the discretion of the appointee. Foreign
national employees paid with host country funds are exempt from
furlough as are those where our bilateral agreements prohibit furlough.

29. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, during the Government shutdown
should shipyards and depots be fully manned and operating?
Dr. Rooney. Assuming that the question is about public shipyards
and depots funded with appropriated funds, only a minimum number of
civilian employees necessary to carry out excepted activities would be
excepted from furlough. This decision is not discretionary but is
controlled by the policy defining excepted activities as well as the
use of appropriated funds.

littoral combat ship
30. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, we are planning to buy 52 Littoral
Combat Ships (LCS) for almost $40 billion with no confirmation of how
the ship will be used. Do you share this concern?
Dr. Rooney. I understand that the concept of operations and design
specifications for LCS were developed to meet capability gaps in the
areas of Surface Warfare, Mine Counter Measure and Anti-Submarine
Warfare with focused mission packages that deploy manned and unmanned
vehicles to execute a variety of missions within those broader areas. I
also understand that the Navy is in the process of testing and fielding
the Mine Counter Measure and Surface Warfare mission packages while the
Anti-Submarine Warfare mission package completes its initial
development phase. Finally, USS Freedom (LCS 1) is currently deployed
to Singapore with a Surface Warfare mission package and the ship is
executing its intended mission that includes demonstrating the U.S.
commitment to maintain security and stability in the vital Asia-Pacific
region. USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) is scheduled to deploy to Singapore in
the fall of 2014. Based on this information, I do not share your
concern, however I do acknowledge the need to continue to closely
monitor both test results and ongoing requirements as additional ships
are constructed.

31. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, what would you
recommend to address the concerns about capabilities, survivability,
manning and sustainment costs regarding LCS?
Dr. Rooney. I understand that the LCS program is on track to meet
all the approved requirements for capability, survivability, manning
and sustainment costs. Since the 52 ship LCS program is a key component
of the Navy's current and future force, rigorous oversight by me and my
staff will continue to be exercised to ensure the program remains on
its path to success and meets our Nation's needs. If confirmed, I will
ensure Congress is apprised of program progress as future program
decisions are made.

aircraft carriers
32. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, the Department of the Navy recently
announced a delay in the award of the design and construction contract
for the next aircraft carrier CVN 79 in order to look for ways to
reduce costs. This is a good first step in looking for lessons from the
first carrier to save taxpayer funds for the next two. Do you support
the delay in the award of a construction contract?
Dr. Rooney. I understand the Navy is negotiating the award of the
Detail Design and Construction contract for CVN 79. I also understand
that until these negotiations conclude, the Navy intends to extend the
current Construction Preparation Contract to authorize planning,
material procurement, and discrete work that are aligned with the
ship's optimal build plan. This extension should mitigate impacts to
the ship's delivery schedule and the industrial base. Continued
negotiations on the design contract will afford an opportunity for the
shipbuilder to incorporate further construction process improvements
into the construction plan. I support this effort to drive
affordability into the ship and protect the industrial base.

33. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Rooney, do you believe the Navy can afford
an aircraft carrier costing more than $12.8 billion?
Dr. Rooney. I understand that actions taken by the Navy and the
shipbuilder to reverse the trends in cost growth have yielded improved
performance on the CVN 78 Program; however, cost growth incurred
earlier in the construction of the lead ship could not be undone. In
addition, the approach to carrier construction has undergone an
extensive affordability review and resulted in changes on CVN 79 that
will significantly reduce the cost to build the ship. If confirmed, I
will continue efforts to drive cost reductions through lessons learned
from the first of class and innovative approaches to carrier
construction to reduce the cost to build CVN 79 and beyond.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
littoral combat ship
34. Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, in response to my questions in the
hearing about whether you agree with the GAO recommendation that, ``The
apparent disconnect between the LCS acquisition strategy and the needs
of the end user suggest that a pause is needed.'' You confirmed the
controversy with the program and the need for very stringent
requirements, but stated that you were concerned that a pause would
cause the costs to go up. Please provide me your description of very
stringent requirements you would base future acquisition decisions.
Dr. Rooney. If confirmed I would ensure future acquisition
decisions will be informed by progress to achieve program milestones as
well as rigorous analysis of the cost of ships and a ``should cost''
assessment. Contracts for ships beyond the Block Buy should also be
informed by actual cost returns, not estimates, for all ships delivered
as well as ships under construction.

35. Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, would you advocate
for continued funding of the LCS if controversy or questions continue
to persist about the ship's capabilities?
Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I would ensure that prior to moving
forward with future major acquisition decisions and the associated
funding, that the program continues to demonstrate progress towards
meeting the requirements for Initial Operational Capability of each
seaframe and associated Mission Packages.

36. Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, I am extremely concerned that we
are planning to buy 52 of these ships for $37 billion with no
confirmation of how the ship will be used or to what extent it will
satisfy the requirements of combatant commanders. Do you share these
concerns?
Dr. Rooney. I understand that the concept of operations and design
specifications for LCS were developed to meet capability gaps in the
areas of Surface Warfare, Mine Counter Measure and Anti-Submarine
Warfare with focused mission packages that deploy manned and unmanned
vehicles to execute a variety of missions within these areas. I further
understand that the Navy is in the process of testing and fielding the
Mine Counter Measure and Surface Warfare mission packages while the
Anti-Submarine Warfare mission package completes its initial
development phase. Finally, USS Freedom (LCS 1) is currently deployed
to Singapore with a Surface Warfare mission package. The ship is
executing its intended mission that includes demonstrating the U.S.
commitment to maintain security and stability in the vital Asia-Pacific
region. USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) is scheduled to deploy to Singapore in
the fall of 2014. Based on this information, I do not share your
concern, however I do acknowledge the need to continue to closely
monitor both test results and ongoing requirements as additional ships
are constructed.

navy auditability
37. Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, in your response to written hearing
questions, you said you didn't have enough information to say whether
the Navy will meet its legal obligation to meet the financial audit
deadlines for 2014 to 2017. What is your opinion today?
Dr. Rooney. Based on the Department's currently favorable risk
assessment of the remaining efforts, today I am cautiously optimistic
that the Navy will achieve the fiscal year 2014 mandate. A brief
summary of the Department of the Navy's progress toward achieving audit
readiness on its Statement of Budgetary Activity (SBA) by the end of
fiscal year 2014 follows:

The Marine Corps' portion of this statement has been
under audit for several annual cycles, and has made great
strides towards obtaining a favorable opinion.
In addition to the Marine Corps effort, the Navy has
asserted audit readiness on seven SBA-related business areas.
These areas include: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP), Appropriations Received, Civilian
Pay, Transportation of People (TOP), Reimbursable Work Orders
(RWO), Military Pay, and Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT). Of
these seven, four (E-2D MDAP, Appropriations Received, Civilian
Pay, TOP) received favorable opinions after independent
examinations were completed on them.
Exams on two more of these SBA-related areas (RWO,
Military Pay) are currently underway, and the Navy expects the
third examination (FBWT) to commence soon.
Three remaining business areas (Contract/Vendor Pay,
Requisitioning, and Financial Statement Compilation/Reporting)
comprising the SBA are on schedule to be asserted in fiscal
year 2014.

38. Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, can the Navy meet its legal
financial audit obligations?
Dr. Rooney. I am cautiously optimistic that the Department will
achieve the fiscal year 2017 mandate of full financial auditability.
Reaching audit readiness on the Statement of Budgetary Activity will be
a big step toward the fiscal year 2017 goal, and the Navy has a sound
approach to known remaining challenges, including: sustaining the
auditability gains made so far; strengthening mission essential asset
accountability and valuation; and improving the controls in relevant
financial systems, including those managed by service providers.

personnel strength
39. Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, last month the GAO provided an
analysis of the personnel strength, and the GAO said the Navy ``could
not provide how many civilians it has as of July 2013, because
according to Navy officials there's a problem with its information
systems.'' How many civilian employees does the Department of the Navy
have?
Dr. Rooney. As of the end 30 September 2013, the Navy civilian
population was 254,240. This includes 195,665 U.S.-Direct employees,
44,817 Non-appropriated Fund Instrumentality employees and 13,758
Foreign National employees.
______

[The nomination reference of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
September 11, 2013.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Jo Ann Rooney, of Massachusetts, to be Under Secretary of the Navy,
vice Robert O. Work, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney
Education:
Boston University School of Management

September 1979-May 1983
Bachelor of Science Degree awarded May 1983

Suffolk University Law School

September 1984-February 1987
Juris Doctor Degree awarded February 1987

Boston University School of Law

August 1989-May 1991
Master of Laws Degree awarded May 1991

University of Pennsylvania

August 2003-May 2005
Doctorate of Education awarded in May 2005
Employment record:
Huron Consulting Group

Managing Director
September 2012-present

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense

March 2011-September 2012

March 2011-May 2011, Senior Advisor to the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
June 2011-September 2012, Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
(Confirmed by Senate May 2011 after hearing before SASC
on February 2011)
November 2011-June 2012, Acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

Mount Ida College, Newton, MA

July 2010-December 2010
July 2010-December 2010, President
July 2010-December 2010, Professor of Business
Administration

Spalding University, Louisville, KY

President and Professor of Business Administration
August 2002-June 2010

Emmanuel College, Boston, MA

Adjunct Faculty
August 1994-August 2002

The Lyons Companies, LCC, Waltham, MA

Corporate General Counsel/Chief Financial Officer/
Partner
September 1994-August 2002

Maselan and Jones, PC, Boston, MA

Tax Attorney
July 1993-September 1994

Stearns, Rooney & Associates

July 1992-December 1993
Partner

Cigna Companies, Boston, MA and While Plains, NY

June 1991-July 1993

July 1992-July 1993, Staff Attorney
June 1991-June 1992,Technical Manager
Honors and awards:
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service,
September 2012
Today's Woman Magazine, 2006 Most Admired Woman in Education
Business and Professional Women/River City, 2006 Woman of
Achievement
Business First, Partners in Health Care Award 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, and 2010
Scholar House, Lucy Award 2009 (outstanding achievement supporting
educational opportunities for women and families)
Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville,
February 1, 2010 (presented for distinguished and outstanding service
to the City of Louisville)
Beta Gamma Sigma
Lock Honorary Society
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Jo Ann
Rooney in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Jo Ann Rooney.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of the Navy.

3. Date of nomination:
September 11, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
March 23, 1961; Hazleton, PA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Single.

7. Names and ages of children:
None.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of Education, August
2003-May 2005, Ed.D. (Doctorate in Education) Higher Education
Management, May 2005.
Boston University School of Law, August 1989-May 1991, LL.M.
(Master of Laws) in Taxation, May 1991.
Suffolk University Law School, September 1984-February 1987, J.D.
(Juris Doctorate) February 1987.
Boston University School of Management, September 1979-May 1983,
B.S. Business Administration, Finance Concentration, Summa Cum Laude,
May 1983.
West Hazleton High School, September 1975-June 1979, High School
Diploma, June 1979.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
9/2012-present, Managing Director, Huron Consulting Group, Chicago,
IL
3/2011-9/2012, U.S.Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC.
11/2011-6/2012, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness
6/2011-9/2012, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (hearing before U.S. Senate Armed Services
Committee 2/2011, confirmed by the U.S. Senate May 2011)
3/2011-5/2011, Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense
Comptroller
7/2010-12/2010, President of Mount Ida College, Newton, MA
7/2010-12/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Mount Ida
College, Newton, MA
8/2002-6/2010, President of Spalding University, Louisville, KY
8/2002-6/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Spalding
University, Louisville, KY

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Bar Association
Massachusetts Bar Association and Massachusetts Board of Bar
Overseers
Rhode Island Bar Association
Florida Bar Association
Beta Gamma Sigma National Honor Society
Member - Trustees of the Reservations (MA)
Member - Boat U.S.
Member - U.S. Rowing
Member - Hull Lifesaving Museum
Penn Alumni Association (University of Pennsylvania)
Suffolk University Alumni Association
Boston University Alumni Association
St. Paul Parish (Hingham, MA)

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service -
September 2012
Today's Woman Magazine, 2006 Most Admired Woman in Education
Business and Professional Women/River City, 2006 Woman of Achievement
Business First, Partners in Health Care Award 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, and 2010
Scholar House, Lucy Award 2009 (outstanding achievement supporting
educational opportunities for women and families)
Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville,
February 1, 2010 (presented for distinguished and outstanding service
to the City of Louisville)
Beta Gamma Sigma
Lock Honorary Society

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
November 1, 2012 - University of Michigan - 6th annual Susan B
Meister Lecturer in Child Health Policy ``Our Military's Children:
Insights From Over a Decade of War'', Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo
Ann Rooney
Dissertation - Spring 2005 - Navigating in a Building Sea of
Change: Successful Growth Strategies of Two Private Higher Education
Institutions, Author: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney
April 2009 - Association of Governing Boards (AGB) National
Conference on Trusteeship, ``Board Engagement in Major Academic
Change'', Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney and Dr. L. Randy
Strickland
May 2008 - Kentucky Council on Post Secondary Education (CPE) 8th
Annual Conference on the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning -
Challenging Student to Think Critically and Learn Deeply, Keynote
Address ``Boomers vs. X vs. Y: Educating Across Generations'', Prepared
and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney
April 2008 - Association of Governing Boards (AGB) National
Conference on Trusteeship, ``Fostering Active Board Participation in
Academic Governance'', Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney and
Dr. L. Randy Strickland
February 2008 - Kentucky Council on Post Secondary Education (CPE)
Adult Learner Summit, ``Best Practices in Retention in Accelerated
Programs'', Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney
December 2007 - Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association
of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, ``Reaffirmation 101: A
Case Study of Spalding University'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo
Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette, and Victoria
Murden McClure
December 2007 - Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association
of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, ``General Education
Assessment ASAP'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L.
Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette
November 2007 - Council for Accelerated and Experiential Learning
International Conference, ``Demonstrating the Effectiveness of
Accelerated Programs'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney,
Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I have given several speeches during the last 5 years. Three
representative speeches are provided, and additional speeches can be
made available upon request. I also have a record of written and oral
testimony before congressional oversight committees all of which are
included in the Congressional Record.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on October 31, 2013, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was returned to the President at the end of the first session
of the 113th Congress on January 6, 2014, under provisions of
Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the
Senate.]
APPENDIX

Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
Information Requested of Civilian Nominees

------

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
through F will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
committee.

Name:

Part B--Future Employment Relationships
1. Will you sever all business connections with your present
employers, business firms, business associations or business
organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service
with the government? If so, explain.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after
completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or
practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or
organization?

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
capacity after you leave government service?

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until
the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?

Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial
transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for
yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in
any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the
position to which you have been nominated.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have
engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the
passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the
administration and execution of law or public policy.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
nominated and by the Attorney General's office concerning potential
conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
position?

Part D--Legal Matters
1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to
any court, administrative agency, professional association,
disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide
details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance,
other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
connection with your nomination.

Part E--Foreign Affiliations
1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g.,
employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with
or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled
by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such
relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a
law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization,
have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any
capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an
entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe
such relationship.

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any
compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business
transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a
foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

Part F--Financial Data
All information requested under this heading must be provided for
yourself, your spouse, and your dependents.

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of
which you, your spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the
case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of
the trust agreement.

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power
of attorney which you hold for or on behalf of any other person.

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from
deferred income arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and
other future benefits which you expect to derive from current or
previous business relationships, professional services and firm
memberships, employers, clients and customers.

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past
10 years? If not, please explain.

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed
and paid) as of the date of your nomination?

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax
return? If so, what resulted from the audit?

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed
against you or against any real property or personal property which you
own either individually, jointly, or in partnership?

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax
returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made
available only to Senators and the staff designated by the Chairman.
They will not be available for public inspection.)

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This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20------.
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Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
Information Requested of Certain Senior Military Nominees

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UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES FOR
CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS
Instructions to the Nominee:
Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an
additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number
(i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military
nomination, you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a
new form. In your letter to the Chairman, add the following paragraph
to the end:

``I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments
contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee form
`Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees
for Certain Senior Military Positions,' submitted to the
Committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all
such commitments apply to the position to which I have been
nominated and that all such information is current except as
follows: . . . .'' [If any information on your prior form needs
to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the
question number and set forth the updated information in your
letter to the Chairman.]

Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.
Also include your office telephone number.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including
wife's maiden name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
through E will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
committee.

Name:

Part B--Future Employment Relationships
1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military
service. If so, explain.

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
capacity after you leave military service?

Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential
conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
position?

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other
than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
proceeding or litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
connection with your nomination.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

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This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20------.