[Senate Hearing 113-458]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-458
EVALUATING U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN ON THE 35TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAIWAN
RELATIONS ACT (TRA)
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 3, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BARBARA BOXER, California RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Denmark, Abraham M., vice president for political and security
affairs, the National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, DC. 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Russel, Daniel R., Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Marco Rubio................................................ 34
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator John
Barrasso................................................... 36
Schriver, Randall G., president and chief executive officer,
Project 2049 Institute, Arlington, VA.......................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 26
(iii)
EVALUATING U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN ON THE 35TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAIWAN
RELATIONS ACT (TRA)
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin, Murphy, and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, good morning, and welcome to the
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Our hearing today will be to evaluating the U.S. policy on
Taiwan on the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act.
Let me say from the outset I know that Senator Rubio will
be joining me shortly. He indicated he may be a few minutes
late getting here. I know Senator Murphy will also be joining
me. There is a great deal of interest, I can assure you, in the
United States Senate and on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on United States-Taiwan relations. It has been some
time since we have held a hearing. I think it was 1999, the
last hearing that we held on Taiwan. So this is a particularly
important hearing.
I say from the beginning on an apologetic note this is a
pretty busy time in the United States Senate. As this committee
is meeting, two other committees that I serve on are holding
markups on legislation, including the Senate Finance Committee
and Environment and Public Works Committee. So for the sake of
the people of Maryland who I represent, I am going to have to
dodge out of here during the hearing to offer certain
amendments that are important to not only Marylanders but to
our country. So I apologize to the witnesses that I will not be
here for the entire hearing, but I can assure you that the
importance of this hearing is top on our agenda.
And I thank all of our witnesses for being here and for
their participation in this hearing.
Last month, the subcommittee held a hearing on our
alliances in Northeast Asia. So today we will be evaluating
another important part of our Rebalance to Asia, the
relationship that we have with Taiwan.
On April 10, 1979, Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations
Act, a bill designed to help maintain peace, security, and
stability in the western Pacific and to promote the foreign
policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of
commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of
the United States and the people of Taiwan. The act also led to
the establishment of the American Institute of Taipei. Thirty-
five years later, the framework provided by this legislation
continues to govern U.S. policy in the region.
Taiwan has been and remains one of our most important
partners in Asia. Taiwan has a vibrant democracy, shares common
values with the United States, boasts an advanced economy, and
serves as a strong security partner and leader in the region.
Within this context of shared values, let me just note that
within our thriving democracy, there will be disagreements and
there will be differences of opinion among people, as we have
seen recently in Taiwan. Democracies allow for this kind of
vigorous political dialogue. Through constructive and peaceful
discussions with all sides, these differences can be resolved.
Taiwan is the 12th-largest U.S. trading partner. Thousands
of people visit the United States from Taiwan each year,
contributing over $1.2 billion to the U.S. economy in 2012. And
on a personal note, let me say the relationship between the
people of Maryland and the people of Taiwan has been very
strong. The commerce that goes through the Port of Baltimore
from Taiwan is very important to the economy of our region.
And President Ma has demonstrated leadership and creativity
in handling and resolving disputes with Taiwan's neighbors,
particularly with the historical agreement in 2012 between
Japan and Taiwan over the fishery resources near the Senkaku
Islands. This agreement serves as an important model for the
region and indicates the important role Taiwan can and should
play on the international stage.
My colleagues in both the Senate and House have supported a
role for Taiwan within the international stage. I was pleased
to cosponsor legislation introduced last year in the Senate to
further this goal by directing the Department of State to
develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan in the
International Civil Aviation Organization. I hope we see
positive progress in this area.
We also see a growing and positive relationship between
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China over the last 6
years. Taiwan and the PRC have signed 21 economic or functional
agreements, including the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement. In February, officials from Taiwan and PRC in charge
of cross-strait affairs held their first formal meeting since
1949, opening the doors for further communication. There is
progress being made for security in that region. The United
States has long welcomed steps such as these to improve
relationships and reduce tensions. And we certainly hope cross-
strait relations progress will continue on a positive
trajectory.
Although relations have improved, we continue to see an
expansion of the People's Republic of China's military
capabilities, which are often aimed at Taiwan. This is
troubling. In this context, the United States-Taiwan security
relationship must remain a priority.
The challenges and opportunities in the region have changed
since 1979. Nevertheless, the TRA continues to provide a solid
foundation to guide our policy.
The United States has an interest in maintaining a
peaceful, prosperous, and secure East Asia, and recognizing
this, the Obama administration has made a commitment to
rebalance toward Asia. The United States relationship with
Taiwan is a critical piece in this strategy, and as such, it is
important for the United States Government, both the executive
and legislative branches, to regularly reaffirm our enduring
commitment to Taiwan.
As I mentioned earlier, the last time this committee held a
hearing on the Taiwan Relations Act was 1999. Today provides an
important opportunity to assure our partners that the United
States remains committed to this important relationship.
So I look forward to hearing from both of our panels today
as to how the current state of affairs are between Taiwan and
the United States and how that fits into the Rebalance to Asia
and security and prosperity within that region.
We have been joined by Senator Murphy, and as I explained
earlier, Senator Murphy will take the gavel a little bit later
on in this hearing. And I thank him for being here and would
yield if he would like to make some opening comments.
Senator Murphy. I look forward to hearing from the
witnesses.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
On our first panel, we are pleased to have Mr. Daniel
Russel. He is no stranger to this committee. He has appeared
before our committee on several occasions. The Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs at the Department of State, Mr. Russel, began his tour
as Assistant Secretary on July 13, 2013. He previously served
at the White House as Special Assistant to the President and
National Security Staff Senior Director for Asian Affairs.
I know that Secretary Russel is going to be very busy with
the President's planned trip to Asia coming up shortly. I know
that he will be very busy planning to make sure that visit is
as productive as possible in terms of our Rebalance to Asia.
Secretary Russel, it is a pleasure to have you.
As is the custom of this committee, all the witnesses' full
statements will be made part of the record, and you may proceed
as you wish.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. RUSSEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Murphy, for this opportunity to testify on United States-Taiwan
relations.
The United States relationship with Taiwan is based on the
three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, the TRA,
which as you noted was signed into law 35 years ago next week.
The framework that Congress established in the TRA has
fostered the development and resilience of our relations with
Taiwan over the past 35 years. The United States-Taiwan
relationship is grounded in history and shared values and our
common commitment to democracy and human rights. Taiwan and the
TRA enjoyed genuine bipartisan support. The Taiwan Caucus in
the Senate and House contains one-fourth of sitting Senators
and Representatives, divided about equally by party. And I
think that is important.
I am here to report that the United States-Taiwan
unofficial relations have never been better. Let me give you
four reasons why.
First, we share prosperity. Taiwan is now our 12th-largest
trading partner and has invested almost $8 billion in the
United States. That creates jobs here.
Second, we learn from each other. Taiwan is the sixth-
largest sender of students to the United States.
Third, we each have an interest in promoting and improving
cross-strait relations. The enduring United States support for
Taiwan and for its self-defense helps give Taiwan the
confidence to strengthen its relations with the PRC which, in
turn, supports regional peace and stability.
Fourth, we work together. We work together in the
international community. For example, Taiwan's quick assistance
to the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan complemented United
States relief efforts there.
Taiwan is one of the world's largest economies. Taiwan is a
focus market under the Commerce Department's SelectUSA program
to promote investment in the United States. Consultations
tomorrow under our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement,
TIFA talks, offer the prospect of important progress supporting
United States stakeholders, supporting President Ma's own
economic reforms, and importantly, supporting the
diversification of Taiwan's economy.
Congress created the American Institute in Taiwan, AIT, in
part to advance these economic ties, as well as cultural ties,
and this strategy has worked. Taiwan now sends more students to
the United States than Japan or than Mexico.
Taiwan also participates in about 60 international
organizations, as well as hundreds of international
nongovernment organizations. The United States supports
Taiwan's membership in international organizations that do not
require statehood for membership and meaningful participation
in others. Congress, with strong bipartisan and bicameral
votes, support Taiwan's participation in the triennial
International Civil Aviation Organization, the ICAO, assembly
last year in the resolution that you cosponsored. We welcome
Taiwan's participation and we support Taiwan's expanded
participation in the future.
We also encourage the United Nations, its agencies, and
other international organizations to increase Taiwan's
participation in technical or expert meetings.
And as I said, Taiwan's role as a responsible global player
is shown by its disaster relief efforts. Taiwan was quick to
contribute to the initial search in the South China Sea for
Malaysian Airlines 370 and quickly provided assistance to other
nations following Typhoon Haiyan. Simply put, Taiwan is a
reliable partner and a capable friend who contributes to
regional peace and security.
Mr. Chairman, the maintenance of peace across the Taiwan
Strait is crucial to stability and prosperity throughout the
Asia-Pacific. The Obama administration has notified over 12
billion dollars' worth of arms sales to Taiwan, a testament to
how seriously we take our obligation to assist Taiwan in
maintaining a sufficient self-defense force.
Beyond arms sales, the United States engages in a wide
range of important security consultations and exchanges in
order to assist Taiwan Armed Forces as they maintain, train,
and equip themselves.
I am convinced, as I said, that strong United States
support for Taiwan helps give our friends the confidence to
strengthen cross-strait relations. We welcome those improved
relations in trade, travel, science, and other forms of
cooperation unimaginable a decade ago. They benefit both sides.
They benefit regional security. They benefit the United States
relationship with China, and they benefit our unofficial
relations with Taiwan.
And to reiterate our long-held position, resolution of
differences across the strait must be peaceful and without
coercion in accordance with the wishes of the people on both
sides.
So thank you for allowing me to help mark the 35th
anniversary of the TRA. The United States sees a future of
increased cooperation and flourishing unofficial relations
between the people of the United States and the people of
Taiwan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel R. Russel
introduction
Thank you for inviting me to this special subcommittee meeting on
Taiwan. Next week is the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA). I wish to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership and
many years of strong interest on behalf of U.S.-Taiwan relations and
their role in regional prosperity and stability.
The unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship has never been stronger
than it is today, and it underscores our firm commitment to the Taiwan
Relations Act. Strengthening our relations with Taiwan and our
longstanding friendship with the people on Taiwan remains a key element
of the U.S. strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. U.S.-Taiwan
relations are grounded in history, respect for democracy and human
rights, respect for international rules and norms, a growing economic
partnership, and enduring security cooperation.
Taiwan's status today as a top-20 world economy is a testimony to
the diligence of the people on Taiwan and to the success of the TRA. It
is a leading player in regional development, conservation, and
assistance efforts--as it confidently engages the People's Republic of
China.
The United States has an abiding interest in peace and stability
across the strait. Toward that end, the United States supports and
encourages improvements in cross-strait relations, albeit at a pace
acceptable to the people on both sides. Strong United States support
for Taiwan autonomy also helps give our friends in Taiwan the
confidence to strengthen their cross-strait relations, as we have seen
in recent years. At the same time, we support Taiwan's effort to
participate in the international community in a manner befitting a
large economy and modern society with a great deal to contribute.
economic and cultural ties
The United States substantive and robust unofficial relations with
Taiwan have developed markedly under the framework of the TRA over the
past 35 years, allowing us to cooperate in a wide range of mutually
beneficial areas including energy, the environment, and scientific
research, to name a few. Over the past 35 years, Taiwan has grown to be
one of the world's largest economies; today Taiwan is our 12th-largest
trading partner and a top-10 destination for U.S. agricultural and food
exports. There also is significant two-way direct investment that spurs
growth in both of our economies, with over $16 billion of direct
investment positions by U.S. firms in Taiwan in 2012 and close to $8
billion of foreign direct investment from Taiwan in the United States
during the same period.
Taiwan was the sixth-largest source of international students in
the United States through the 2012-2013 academic year. On a
proportional basis, Taiwan sends more students to the United States
than even mainland China or India. In terms of absolute numbers, Taiwan
sends more students to the United States than Japan, Mexico, Turkey,
Brazil, or the U.K. do.
The Visa Waiver Program (VWP), to which Taiwan was admitted in
November 2012, has led to increased tourist and business travel from
Taiwan. Foreign visitors to the United States generate stateside jobs,
and we are pleased that in the 8 months after Taiwan joined the VWP
Taiwan travel to the United States increased more than 29 percent.
We work cooperatively with Taiwan on many issues of importance to
the region and the international community, to include WHO efforts on
pandemic prevention, detection and treatment; APEC and WTO efforts to
expand trade and investment opportunities; and U.N. and NGO efforts to
promote responsible civil aviation and environmental protection.
We have a very busy and active agenda with Taiwan to discuss
substantive areas of cooperation and mutual interests. For example,
just recently:
A Commerce Department Deputy Assistant Secretary
participated in an APEC Working Group meeting hosted by Taiwan
and then worked with the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) to
promote U.S. exports to Taiwan and encourage more business
investment in the United States from Taiwan. Taiwan has been
identified as a focus market under the SelectUSA program to
promote and facilitate foreign direct investment to the United
States. A single Taiwan company is now engaged in a $2 billion
expansion of its petrochemical facilities in the United States,
and promotion of the United States as an investment destination
could generate several billion more dollars in Taiwan
investment in the coming years.
One of my State Department colleagues participated in a
regional meeting of Fulbright Executive Directors, hosted in
Taiwan this year, to promote scholarly exchanges, international
education, and people-to-people outreach. Taiwan's mature
Fulbright program serves as a model of cultural exchange to the
region and the world.
And another State Department colleague met with AIT and
Taiwan authorities to discuss Taiwan's meaningful participation
in international organizations and Taiwan's ability to
contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
efforts in the region. We were pleased in September 2013 to see
Taiwan invited to participate in the General Assembly of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and we would
like to build on that success in a variety of organizations.
We are also very active on the economic and commercial front. In
March 2013, we resumed our engagement with Taiwan under our Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Through the TIFA we are
addressing a number of U.S. and Taiwan trade and investment concerns,
including in the areas of agriculture, intellectual property rights
(IPR), investment, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and technical
barriers to trade. We have made progress in this forum since its
resumption last year and look forward to a productive TIFA meeting on
April 4. We look forward to learning more about Taiwan's economic
reforms spurred by President Ma's New Year Address.
The Department of Commerce leads the SelectUSA program that
promotes business investment in the United States. For our part, we
encourage U.S. State and local governments to include Taiwan among the
destinations for their business development missions. Among the factors
that are luring corporate leaders in Taiwan to take a close look at the
United States as a manufacturing hub or as an export platform are the
strong rule of law and protection for intellectual property rights that
we enjoy in the United States; the research and development
capabilities of U.S. companies, universities, and laboratories; and the
price and supply of natural gas in the United States.
In October 2013, Taiwan sent one of the largest delegations to the
SelectUSA summit organized by the Department of Commerce. In November,
Taiwan's former Vice President, Vincent Siew, led an impressive
delegation of Taiwan CEOs to the United States, with over $2 billion of
new or ongoing investments in the United States announced during the
visit. We are now looking at how to regularize these kinds of business
exchanges.
The United States remains by far the largest investor in Asia, as
well as on Taiwan. The number of registered Americans living on Taiwan
increased 2.7 percent in 2013 to 67,510 people. The United States
remains one of Taiwan travelers' most popular tourist destinations.
In 2013 the United States and Taiwan celebrated 20 years of
environmental cooperation, during which time Taiwan made huge strides
in reducing pollution and becoming a regional leader in environmental
best practices. We are working with Taiwan authorities to identify
productive ways for them to share their experiences and lessons learned
in this field with countries in the region and beyond.
In addition, we enjoy ongoing and robust exchanges with Taiwan
defense and military service leadership personnel.
security ties
Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the United States one
China policy including the three communiques, the United States makes
available to Taiwan defense articles and defense services in such
quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
self-defense capability. This longstanding policy contributes to the
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
The TRA states that peace and stability in the Western Pacific area
``are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United
States, and are matters of international concern.'' This is as true
today as it was in 1979, if not more so. It also asserts a U.S. policy
to ``maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.'' The United
States is firmly committed to this policy.
As China's economy and military spending grow, and China continues
to carry out military deployments and exercises aimed at Taiwan, it is
more important than ever for Taiwan to invest sufficiently in a
professional military force that uses asymmetry, innovation, and other
defensive advantages to deter potential attempts at coercion or
aggression. For its part, the Obama administration has notified to
Congress over $12 billion of sales of defensive equipment and materials
to Taiwan. This is a tangible sign of our determination to assist
Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense.
Our security relations with Taiwan are about much more than arms
sales. The United States engages in a wide range of consultations and
exchanges with Taiwan in order to assist Taiwan Armed Forces as they
seek to maintain, train, and equip a capable, effective self-defense
capability.
Taiwan does not formally participate in international coalitions or
exercises. However, Taiwan uses defensive materials and services
provided by the United States to enhance its humanitarian assistance
capacity. Taiwan plays an increasingly significant role in disaster
relief, such as after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake; after the 2011
earthquake and tsunami in Japan; after Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013
in the Philippines and in Palau; and immediately after the
disappearance last month of Malaysia Air 370 when international
participants were focusing on searching the South China Sea.
Our support for Taiwan's security and its defensive needs has given
Taipei confidence in its engagements with Beijing, leading Taiwan to
sign an unprecedented number of economic and cultural cross-strait
agreements. Soon there will be more than 800 direct flights a week
between Taiwan and the mainland, something unthinkable a decade ago.
Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Office Director Wang Yu-chi recently traveled
to the mainland for meetings with his PRC counterpart, Director Zhang
Zhijun of the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office. The United States continues
to support these and other cross-strait dialogues at a pace acceptable
to people on both sides of the strait, and remains committed to
supporting Taiwan's ability to engage in such discourse free from
coercion.
The United States welcomes Taiwan's efforts to resolve disputes
peacefully, approach territorial and maritime disputes pragmatically,
and share resources in these disputed areas. For example, in 2013
Taiwan reached a fisheries agreement with Japan that allows both sides
to fish in the East China Sea, and also resolved a fisheries incident
with the Philippines through consultation. These examples serve as a
model for the region of Taiwan's ability to peacefully resolve maritime
issues through diplomatic means.
international space for taiwan
As a top-20 world economy and a WTO and APEC member, Taiwan has a
strong role to play in the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide. Taiwan
participates in about 60 international organizations as well as
hundreds of international NGOs.
We are pleased that since 2009 Taiwan has been invited each year to
participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer, and we
expect Taiwan to participate in next month's WHA as well. We think
Taiwan's status at the WHA also should allow for more meaningful
participation in the work of the World Health Organization, through
greater inclusion in technical and expert meetings, including those
related to the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIP) and the
International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN). In September
2013, Taiwan was invited as a guest to the triennial ICAO Assembly in
Montreal, and we look forward to Taiwan's expanded participation in
ICAO. Through a Taiwan NGO, Taiwan also observes and participates in
the United Nations (U.N.) Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The United States supports Taiwan's membership in international
organizations where statehood is not a requirement for membership, and
we encourage Taiwan's meaningful participation in other organizations.
U.S. goals for supporting Taiwan's participation include: enabling the
people on Taiwan to comply with international regulations and safety,
addressing transborder health issues, facilitating international
travel, giving and receiving appropriate international assistance and
advice, and assisting in capacity-building.
Consistent with this longstanding policy, the State Department
encourages the U.N., its agencies, and other international
organizations to increase Taiwan's meaningful participation in
technical and expert meetings. Taiwan has the resources and expertise
to play a constructive role in the work of those agencies.
conclusion
AIT and many U.S. departments and agencies have meaningful,
substantive engagements with Taiwan as part of our strong commercial,
cultural and other relations. Looking forward, we see increased
opportunities for cooperation on issues concerning trade, health,
cultural exchanges, and security, and we remain committed to seizing
them.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you again for
the opportunity to appear today to highlight the strength and
durability of ties between the people of the United States and the
people on Taiwan. Taiwan has earned a respected place in the world.
Thanks to the Taiwan Relations Act, over the past 35 years, the United
States and Taiwan have enjoyed a firm foundation of friendship that we
continue to build today.
Senator Cardin. Well, again, Secretary Russel, thank you
for your service. Thank you for your testimony.
The language that you used in regards to the cross-strait
issues is very similar to the maritime security issues. We want
these issues resolved, direct discussions among the parties
involved, peacefully with respect for the rights of all the
people in the region. So I could not agree with you more.
I mentioned in my opening statement the agreement reached
between Taiwan and Japan in regards to fishing rights. Can we
learn something from the way that Taiwan and Japan handled that
particular issue that could be helpful in dealing not just with
the cross-strait issues but dealing with maritime security
problems in that region?
Mr. Russel. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you
that that agreement between Japan and Taiwan on fisheries in
the East China Sea is very important. We see it, frankly, as a
model for the peaceful resolution through diplomatic means of
practical problems relating to resources that derive from
underlying disputes over maritime claims.
The existence of territorial claims does not, and should
not, preclude the ability of claimants to make common cause to
find peaceful and effective ways to work together and
particularly to responsibly share and manage the resources in
the waters of the South China Sea or the East China Sea,
whether we are talking about marine life and fishing or whether
we are talking about undersea hydrocarbon, oil and gas.
This principle, which was also enunciated in President Ma's
own East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative--this principle
of peaceful resolution is germane to all of the disputes, and
it is incumbent on all of the claimants to foreswear
intimidation, coercion, and other nondiplomatic or extra-legal
means.
Senator Cardin. Help me understand how we are going to
reconcile the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, and our economic
relations with Taiwan and Taiwan's economic relations in the
region. We all hope that we will be able to reconcile 10
countries in the Pacific on an agreement. We are including many
of our major trading partners in the TPP agreement. Taiwan has
a robust economic relationship with the United States. And I
think Taiwan has expressed interest in what is going on, as far
as the TPP is concerned.
What is the administration's position as it relates to TPP
and our economic ties with Taiwan and Taiwan's ties with the
Pacific?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our long-term priority throughout the entire Asia-Pacific
region is to help create an environment that is genuinely open
to U.S. exports of goods and services. We stand for free trade,
and we are working for free trade.
In particular, my good friend and colleague, Ambassador
Mike Froman, and my other colleagues at the U.S. Trade
Representative are hard at work with 11 of our partners in the
TPP process in an effort to conclude the current round.
Now, the first job at hand for us is to successfully
conclude TPP among the existing 12 members, but it is true, as
you point out, Mr. Chairman, that Taiwan is an extremely
important economy in the region and is an important trading
partner for the United States. And on that basis, we have
indicated that we welcome Taiwan's interest in the TPP.
Now, as a practical matter, tomorrow, as I mentioned in my
testimony, the same colleagues at the U.S. Trade
Representative's office will be meeting with Taiwan
representatives under the TIFA talks, the Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement. I think it is very important that these
talks have restarted, that this effort is underway. Our
principal focus is and should be on addressing the outstanding
issues between the United States and Taiwan through this
framework. We can, by doing so, build momentum for expanding
our trade and investment regimes and demonstrating Taiwan's own
ability to take necessary reform measures on the trade front.
I would add, if I may, that the United States and Taiwan
have made great strides also in terms of investment and that
the active, robust, and effective participation of an
impressive delegation from Taiwan in the SelectUSA forum,
hosted by President Obama with Secretary Kerry and Secretary
Pritzker late last year, opened the door to a hoped-for
increase in Taiwan investment in the United States.
Senator Cardin. We talked about the fact that we want
matters resolved peacefully. We have talked about the fact that
we want people sitting at the table resolving issues. So Taiwan
needs to have a seat at the table in international discussions.
We have strongly supported their ability to participate in
aviation.
How do you see the ability of Taiwan to have a meaningful
role on the international stage to be able to protect the
rights of the people that live in Taiwan, as well as the
regional security, economic, and safety issues?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are convinced that Taiwan has a great deal to contribute
to the international community. Taiwan has tremendous
resources. It has tremendous experience and tremendous
expertise. The world needs Taiwan's help in addressing a
plethora of global challenges and issues, and consistent with
the legislation that you cosponsored, but more importantly as a
function of fundamental United States policy, we have and
continue strongly to support Taiwan's active participation in
international organizations for which statehood is not a
requirement, but active and meaningful roles in other
organizations as well. And we partner closely with Taiwan in a
number of areas.
In terms of organizations, as you know, Taiwan and we were
successful in enabling its participation in the ICAO meetings
late last year, and that is an area where we will continue to
work. There are other organizations as well where we strongly
advocate for an appropriate role for Taiwan.
We think that increasing Taiwan's international space also
affords its people dignity and helps provide it with the
confidence it needs to engage China in cross-straits relations.
And we make the case to the Chinese, Mr. Chairman, that it is
in China's interest as well from our perspective to enable
Taiwan appropriately to contribute.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being with us today. We appreciate it very
much.
We have read a lot and heard a lot about this rebalance
toward Asia and we have seen some actions in that regard. Of
course, we are reevaluating our defense relationship with Japan
and seeing how we can increase cooperation. They have got some
internal constitutional issues they have to work through, but
we have seen that. We have certainly seen a reinvigoration or a
re-upping of our situation with South Korea and, of course,
have a free trade agreement with them. And even with the
Philippines, there is now talk about creating a rotational
presence in terms of the United States being involved. We know
they have now gone to arbitration on their claims with regard
to China. So we have seen activity there.
Tell us a little bit. What is the role of Taiwan in the
United States rebalance or pivot toward Asia?
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much, Senator, for all of your
work on these issues and for your thoughtful question.
The Obama administration has placed a high priority on
strengthening our own official relations with Taiwan as part of
our overall rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region in part
because Taiwan shares our values and our commitment to
democracy, in part because of the important history and ties
that bind us, but also in part because of the dynamism and
potential of the Taiwan economy. And therefore, our security
cooperation, our economic cooperation, our people-to-people and
other forms of cooperation, including multinational
cooperation, has continued to grow and we see further room to
grow.
One outstanding example has been the role that Taiwan
played in assisting in the relief efforts in response to Super
Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. Another is the readiness
with which Taiwan responded to the loss of Malaysian Air Flight
370 and actively contributed initially to the search and rescue
efforts.
We have reached an agreement last year on a visa waiver
program, a status for Taiwan that has opened the door to
tourism and the people-to-people exchange that will deepen ties
and benefit the United States, including through educational
exchange. The TIFA talks that begin again in Washington
tomorrow help us strengthen and expand our economic
relationship, and the former Vice President of Taiwan, Vincent
Siew, late last year led an extraordinary delegation of top
CEOs interested in finding ways to expand investment in the
United States. So I think that the economic connection between
the United States and Taiwan relates directly to the economic
underpinnings of our rebalance.
Senator Rubio. Because I do not want to run out of time,
let me ask you in specific because in the world everything is
interrelated. I would venture to guess and, in fact, I am
pretty sure of the fact that Taiwan has watched with great
interest what has happened with Crimea where both the economic
leverage that Russia has on Europe as a whole and in particular
on Ukraine and, of course, its military abilities in comparison
to the Ukraine allowed Russia to basically invade and take a
piece of land away from a neighbor and annex it and basically
occupy it as they do today. And I would venture to guess that
the similarities for the Taiwanese is pretty striking to the
fact that in--for example, even as late as last year, our own
defense analysis found that the primary purpose behind the
military investment by China is to prepare for a conflict in
the Taiwan Strait.
So what are we doing in that regard to ensure that that
calculation does not change to the point where China believes
they can move aggressively on retaking Taiwan without having
any sort of consequence for it, in essence, their belief that
they could pretty much replicate what Russia did to Crimea?
What steps have we taken to ensure that that does not happen,
that that balance is not unsettled to the point where you are
actually inviting China to do something like that?
Mr. Russel. Thank you, Senator.
First and foremost, the key underpinning of our policy
rooted in TRA is our opposition to any effort to resolve the
differences pertaining to Taiwan through intimidation, through
coercion, or through military force. And maintenance of peace
and stability in the cross-strait is a top priority.
That is why the Obama administration, long before the
crisis in Crimea at the beginning of the President's first
term, has taken such robust steps to enable Taiwan to maintain
a sufficient self-defense capability by providing arms of a
defensive character. The Obama administration has notified over
$12 billion in arms sales to Taiwan already. And at least as
important, the United States has intensified our dialogue and
consultations with Taiwan on defense issues and on defense
strategy.
We similarly have a robust dialogue with China. Now, we do
not, as a matter of policy, ever discuss or consult in advance
with China regarding weapons sales to Taiwan or possible sales,
but we do discuss the situation in the strait regularly with
China and make very clear to them our commitment not only to
our One China Policy and the three United States-China joint
communiques but also to the Taiwan Relations Act.
Senator Rubio. I do not know if we are going to do a second
round since there are not that many folks here. But let me just
ask you this, again, because the world is interrelated. If, in
fact, the United States reaches an agreement with Iran that
allows Iran to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, at that
point how would we go to Taiwan and say you should never do
this, however? We allow our enemies and our adversaries to
enrich and to reprocess, but our friends like you who are
similarly threatened or feel threatened, I should say, are not
allowed to provide--how do we go to Taiwan or Korea or Japan
for that matter and argue to them that they should continue to
walk away from a nuclear weapons capability or an enrichment
capability when we are basically--if, in fact, we acquiesce to
other countries with hostile intentions having that sort of
capability?
Mr. Russel. Senator, I do not accept the premise that the
security of either Taiwan or Japan or Korea would be enhanced
by an advancement or transformation of their peaceful civil
nuclear programs into a nuclear weapons program, and I see no
evidence that the leaders in Taiwan or Japan or Korea are of
that view either.
In the case of Taiwan, as I said, we have an extensive
ongoing set of consultations regarding Taiwan's legitimate
self-defense needs. It begins with the software. It begins with
the strategy, and we have significantly advanced our
discussions about the steps that Taiwan can and should take
with regard to recruitment, retention, doctrine, asymmetric
warfare capabilities, and decisions about necessary weapons
flow from that strategy.
More broadly, I think that the lesson that our allies,
Japan and Korea, derive from the Iran experience is that strong
unity and resolve can compel an unwilling nation to make the
decision to pursue serious negotiations as the way out. And
this very much informs our approach and our strategy to North
Korea which is perhaps the----
Senator Rubio. By the way, I do not dispute that the
current leadership in South Korea and Japan and Taiwan do not
want to pursue a weapons program, but I think that is largely
built on the security assurances that the United States has
historically made to all three of those countries over time.
And I would just say that if, over time, those assurances erode
either because our own capabilities are eroded through budget
cuts and other means or because they come to question how
committed the United States is to actually following through on
these sorts of things, I think that people's calculations could
change.
And that is a concern that I have about the region as a
whole. I mean, there is a reason why both India and Pakistan
now have nuclear weapons. There are multiple examples around
the world where countries decide that they must provide for
their own security.
And I point to the situation in Crimea simply because the
Ukraine possessed the world's third-largest nuclear weapons
stockpile at the end of the cold war and decided to walk away
from that on assurances from the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Russia that that coalition would provide for their
security. As it turns out, one of the three countries that was
supposed to provide for their security ended up invading them.
So I do think that over time this could have an impact on
the thinking of leaders, and I just think that is important for
us to keep in mind as we discuss why it is so important for the
United States to have a robust commitment and capability to
provide mutual defense of our allies in the region--Taiwan,
Korea, and Japan. And that was the point I was trying to get
to. If, in fact, that is ever eroded, in combination with any
sort of agreement that allows hostile countries to enrich or
reprocess, it could lead countries to conclude in the future
that perhaps they are on their own, and if they are on their
own, then they may need to pursue these sorts of, what they
would view, insurance policies.
Mr. Russel. Senator Rubio, I think you are making an
extraordinarily important point, and I could not agree more
that the credibility and the sustainability of the U.S.
commitment that the Asia-Pacific is a strategic priority and
that our presence, including as a security guarantor, is not in
question is a paramount objective for U.S. foreign policy and
for the Obama administration.
That conviction underlies the President's decision to
travel later this month to Japan, to Korea, to Malaysia, to the
Philippines, three treaty allies and a close friend and
security partner of the United States. We are determined for
the reasons that you stated and simply for the longer term U.S.
interest to demonstrate our resolve and the robustness of our
active engagement and participation both as a security partner
and as an economic partner.
Senator Rubio. I have one more question.
Senator Murphy [presiding]. Yes, sure. Go ahead.
Senator Rubio. Here is my last question. It is not an
unreasonable hypothetical. This could have an impact on the
whole region, but this is a region you oversee in general.
So as you are aware, the Philippines is currently involved
in a dispute with China over some territory, and as a result,
they have taken that case to arbitration before a panel that I
believe will rule in their favor, or they are hopeful, will.
The Chinese, of course, have made very strong threats against
that and what that could mean.
Do you believe it is possible that at any time in the near
future we could see China by force take these territories that
they are disputing now with the Philippines? And if so, if they
did so, what do you think the United States response would be
and how would that be viewed by Taiwan and others in the region
in particular? What impact would that have?
In fact, let me ask it this way. If, in fact, China
basically just by force took Scarborough away from the
Philippines and nothing happened, there was no impact of it? As
I have heard some say, we are not going to go to war over some
rocks. How would that impact the thinking in Taiwan and in
other nations in the region with regard to the United States
security commitment?
Mr. Russel. Well, Senator, as your question implies, there
is no doubt but that the United States allies in the region
watch carefully how we are dealing with China in areas of
potential dispute, the Taiwan Straits being one, the East China
Sea and the South China Sea being others.
Right now, the South China Sea and the East China Sea have
heated up, and there is a particular focus by the Chinese who
are deploying large numbers of Coast Guard vessels to the area
of the Second Thomas Shoal where the Philippines since 1999
maintained an outpost and conducting problematic behavior,
including efforts to interfere with and interdict the routine
resupply of the small garrison at the outpost.
Without treading on the treacherous ground of answering a
hypothetical question per se, let me tell you this. I know that
the President of the United States and the Obama administration
is firmly committed to honoring our defense commitments to our
allies. There should be no doubt about the resolve of the
United States. We stand by our allies and we stand by our
commitments.
That said, there is no reason why the issues pertaining to
the South China Sea cannot be resolved through peaceful means.
Diplomacy is the preferred vehicle, and when diplomacy does not
yield results, states parties to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea have the legitimate right to access the existing
international legal mechanisms. That access, the filing of a
claim under the tribunal at UNCLOS, occurred last weekend and
is perhaps the proximate reason why the Chinese are expressing
their anger and discontent on the sea through what to us
appears to be intimidating steps.
The President of the United States met with President Xi
Jinping of China in the Hague earlier this month. He has had
something on the order of 17 or 18 meetings with Chinese
Presidents and Prime Ministers since he took office. To the
best of my knowledge, in every single meeting, President Obama
made clear to his Chinese counterparts that the use of force,
the use of coercion, the threat of force, and other means of
intimidation are unacceptable as vehicles for advancing China's
territorial claims. And the President has left the Chinese
leadership in no doubt of our resolve.
Now, all that said, Senator, the fact is that there are
diplomatic steps underway between China and the 10 ASEAN
countries. There are also important discussions underway among
the four ASEAN claimants themselves. We are confident that
there are diplomatic paths to move forward on the disputes
relating to the South China Sea, and we hope, although we do
not take a position on the claims, that the net effect of the
Philippine filing in the tribunal will be to encourage China to
clarify its own claims in ways that are consistent with
international law and remove the ambiguity that is
destabilizing in our view.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
I think this is a really important line of questioning, and
so I want to continue it with you, Mr. Secretary, and ask you
one of Senator Rubio's questions in just a slightly different
way. I am filling in for Senator Cardin here, but I normally
chair the Subcommittee on European Affairs. So I have spent a
good deal of the last 3 months in Ukraine and thinking about
Ukraine. And so let me sort of make that connection again here.
There is a theory that suggests that if Russia gets away
with this extraterritorial incursion into Crimea without
consequences and without serious, crippling consequences, more
likely to be on the economic side than on the military side,
then that sends a message to other countries that may be
considering similar extraterritorial action. It may send a
message to elements within those countries that are trying to
push for extraterritorial action that you can move on a
disputed area or on another country without consequence. And
the country that is most frequently brought up with respect to
how this psychology may work is clearly China.
And so you have answered some of these questions, but I
want to ask you directly about that suggestion that people have
made, that if Russia effectively gets away with this without
the United States and Europe delivering a substantial blow to
Russian interests, do you agree that that sends a message to,
maybe, not China at-large, but elements within China that may
be contemplating the kind of action that Senator Rubio is
talking about with respect to the Philippines or the Senkaku
Islands or, God forbid, Taiwan that would give them additional
reason to consider that kind of action given how the next
several weeks and months play out in Crimea, Ukraine, and
Russia?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you very much, Senator.
And of course, this is a question that we are looking at
very carefully.
For my part, I approach it from the perspective of the
Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, and so I
will stipulate at the outset that I am no expert on the
Ukraine, Crimea, or Russia.
What I can report, Senator, is that the widespread
perception in the region is one of, in the first instance,
alarm at Russia's behavior and a deep interest and an intense
attention on the response taken by the United States and the
European Union acting in concert to rebuke the action, to
condemn it, and to begin to impose consequences as a result.
I would characterize the response broadly within East Asia
and particularly among the Southeast Asian countries where
there are contentious territorial claims with China as one that
has heightened their concern about the possibility of China
increasingly threatening force or other forms of coercion to
advance their territorial interests.
The net effect of this I think is to put more pressure on
China to demonstrate that it remains committed to the peaceful
resolution of problems. That is China's asserted position. And
the tolerance in the region for steps by China that appear to
presage a more muscular approach has gone down as their alarm
over Russian action and annexation of Crimea has increased.
Senator Murphy. I certainly understand what the reaction
would be from China's neighbors. I guess my question is more
putting on your China expert hat. What do we know about China's
interpretation of the events that have taken place and how will
they interpret the consequences that flow or do not flow to
Russia moving forward? Or are they just not thinking about it
in those terms?
Mr. Russel. Thank you, Senator.
There is no doubt that China is thinking hard about the
implications of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the
international response. Of course, I would have to let the
Chinese speak for themselves. It is difficult to guess what is
in their heart of hearts.
But it is fair to say, Senator, that the extent of Chinese
interdependence in economic terms with the United States and
with its Asian neighbors is such that the prospect of the kind
of incremental retaliatory steps that are gradually being
imposed on Russia in terms of its banks, in terms of cronies,
and in other areas should have a chilling effect on anyone in
China who might contemplate the Crimea annexation as a model.
Senator Murphy. Let me ask for your thoughts on the
protests that have erupted in Taiwan with respect to this new
economic agreement with China. There are reports out today that
there is a new piece of legislation that would require the
Cabinet to regularly engage with lawmakers and the public on
future agreements with China. There are some initial reports
that the protestors are suggesting that is not enough for them
to end their occupation of government buildings.
I would appreciate an update on these protests from the
State Department's perspective and maybe your take on what this
says about the broader disagreement within Taiwan about the
future course of relations with China.
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Senator.
I mean, in the first instance, what it says is that Taiwan
is a very robust democracy with a high tolerance for the
expression of political views. Now, obviously, the United
States very much hopes that the students and demonstrators will
use that freedom responsibly, that they will behave in a civil
and in a peaceful manner and certainly to avoid violence. But
it is a reflection of a very open society in which debate is
not only allowed but encouraged.
There are several issues at play. In the first instance, I
would say that one issue under contention has to do with the
mechanism and the procedure by which the cross-strait agreement
in question, which is an agreement on trade and services, has
been moved through the Legislative Yuan, through the Taiwan
Parliament. That is something of a procedural issue.
There is also undoubtedly a substantive issue at play with
mixed views within the Taiwan community, as you allude to, to
the pace and the scope of agreements being reached between
Taiwan and the PRC.
As a general matter, we very much welcome and applaud the
extraordinary progress that has occurred in cross-strait
relations under the Ma administration. And I should add that
because it takes two to tango, that on the Beijing side, there
is real credit due as well. The current Foreign Minister, Wang
Yi, is a former head of the Taiwan Affairs Office. The current
head of the Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing is a good friend
of ours, former Vice Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang. There is
an extremely productive and deep dialogue underway across the
strait which recently culminated in a visit by the Mainland
Affairs Office Minister Wang to China, which was an
extraordinary and historic milestone.
We do not, however, take a view on any particular
agreement, and we believe strongly that the pace and the scope
of movement in cross-strait discussions must be one that is in
accord with the comfort level and the wishes of the people on
both sides of the strait.
Senator Murphy. Just to finish up, I really appreciate the
way in which you framed the answer to that question. We are,
obviously, watching these protests closely.
But it does demonstrate the initial point you made I think
in the answer to Senator Rubio's first question about Taiwan's
role with respect to our Rebalance to Asia and that it is a
nation, maybe uniquely, that shares American values about the
ability and the right of individuals to take part in
government, protest their government. And as concerning as it
may be to read about people occupying government buildings, at
the same time it is a symbol of the important connection that
we have with Taiwan regarding their ability to allow folks in
that part of the world to speak for themselves.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. I just have one final comment. Sorry I
neglected to ask it. We were having a good conversation about
the other issues.
Does the Obama administration remain committed to President
Reagan's so-called Six Assurances to Taiwan? Is that still our
position?
Mr. Russel. Senator, thank you.
The underpinning of our policy is our One China Policy, the
three United States-China joint communiques, and the Taiwan
Relations Act. But the ``Six Assurances'' that you are
referring to continue to play an important part as an element
of our approach to Taiwan and the situation across the strait.
Senator Rubio. All six of them remain the policy of the
United States?
Mr. Russel. What I would say, Senator, is that in the
context of the agreements that I mentioned, what is known as
the Six Assurances comprise an ongoing element of our approach
to the Taiwan question.
Senator Rubio. I guess my concern now is why cannot the
answer be, yes, we remain committed to all six of them as
elements of our foreign policy. Why are you unable to say that?
Mr. Russel. Well, what I am trying to communicate, Senator,
is that the underpinning of our approach to Taiwan is the One
China Policy, the three communiques, and the Taiwan Relations
Act. That having been said, what is known as the Six
Assurances, which date back to the Reagan administration, as
you say, are things that we take seriously and remain important
elements as we formulate practical policies vis-a-vis----
Senator Rubio. I am concerned about the answer because on a
number of occasions, after meeting with the President, the
Chinese have actually misrepresented. In fact, in one instance,
the Chinese actually said that the United States policy toward
Taiwan was evolving and changing. I understand you are not the
decisionmaker about what our policy is, but I must say I am
concerned that I am unable, from the administration, today to
get a statement that the Six Assurances--all six--remain things
we are firmly committed to as opposed to simply things that
inform us or elements of our policy.
So I am not wrong then to leave here today and say that all
Six Assurances remain elements of our policy, but they are no
longer necessarily the cornerstone of our policy? The
administration is not prepared to say that we remain committed
to all six in their totality as understood by President Reagan
when he enunciated them.
Mr. Russel. I am not familiar with categorical statements
of that nature in this or in recent administrations, and I
think, Senator, that it is wisest to approach the challenges of
Taiwan based on the agreements and the legislation that I have
described, but mindful of the important elements that are
captured in what you refer to as the Six Assurances including,
for example, principles that we continue to abide by such as
our unwillingness to engage in any sort of prior consultations
or discussions with the Chinese regarding arms sales just as an
example.
Senator Rubio. All right. So let me just ask this. Does it
continue to be the policy of the United States that we will
maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort
to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security or the social or economic system of the people on
Taiwan? That remains our policy.
Mr. Russel. Yes, it is.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Secretary Russel, thank you
very much. Again, we appreciate it and have a safe trip to
Asia.
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin. We will now move to our second panel. We
first have Mr. Abraham Denmark, vice president for Political
and Security Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research.
Mr. Denmark manages a team of experts and staff to bring
objective, detailed analysis of geopolitical trends and
challenges in Asia to the attention of Congress and other
policymakers.
He is joined by Mr. Randy Schriver, president and chief
executive officer of Project 2049 Institute, a nonprofit
research organization dedicated to the study of security
trendlines in Asia. He is also a founding partner in the
Armitage International, LLC and a senior associate at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
We welcome both of you and we will start with Mr. Denmark.
And as I have indicated earlier, your full statements will be
made part of the record, and you may proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM M. DENMARK, VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLITICAL
AND SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Denmark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for this opportunity to testify on the important
issue of United States-Taiwan relations and the 35th
anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. And I should add as a
resident of Silver Spring, it is especially a pleasure to be
here today.
Senator Cardin. That is why you are going first.
Mr. Denmark. I appreciate it. [Laughter.]
I would also like to thank the subcommittee for holding a
hearing on the TRA, the Senate's first in 15 years.
The National Bureau of Asian Research was founded 25 years
ago in the memory of Senator Henry M. Jackson. Senator Jackson
voted in favor of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, as did a
bipartisan group of 85 Senators.
Since that vote, the TRA has been instrumental in
preserving the stability in the Taiwan Strait and the rest of
the region, fostering the growth of a robust democracy,
enabling the emergence of the world's most innovative
economies, and sustaining American presence and influence in
the region. The TRA has also provided the strategic environment
in which Taiwan and the PRC have been able to pursue stronger
ties in recent years.
Relations between the United States and Taiwan are founded
upon common interests in regional stability, shared commitments
to the principles of economic and political liberalism, and a
mutual respect for international law.
Taiwan was America's 12th-largest trading partner in 2013
with two-way trade surpassing $63 billion.
Taiwan is also a major security partner of the United
States. Since 2009, the executive branch has notified Congress
of over $12 billion in new defense articles and services for
Taiwan, making Taiwan one of our top foreign military sales
customers in Asia and one of the largest in the world.
In recent years, the TRA has also enabled Taiwan to emerge
as an important player in regional geopolitics. Taiwan's
international behavior exemplifies that of a responsible power
from contributing to international disaster responses in Japan
and the Philippines to demonstrating a constructive approach to
addressing maritime disputes through its East China Sea Peace
Initiative.
Today relations between Taipei and Beijing are quite
positive. Since 2008, Taiwan and the PRC have reduced cross-
strait tensions and focused on building economic and cultural
ties. The results have been quite extraordinary. In 2013, for
example, cross-strait trade rose to $197 billion.
Still, despite the cross-strait rapprochement, all is not
well in the cross-strait relationship. The PRC's investment in
military capabilities positioned across from Taiwan has
continued unabated, and Beijing has refused to renounce the use
of force. The PLA has amassed a force of more than 1,100
ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait as part of a
layered, multidimensional military
capability that remains primarily focused on Taiwan-related
contingencies.
At the same time, Taiwan's investment in its own military
capabilities has been stagnant. Taiwan's official defense
budget for 2013 was $10.5 billion, while in the same year the
PRC spent more 10 times that of $112 billion. The result has
been an increasingly unbalanced cross-strait military dynamic.
To address this imbalance, Taiwan's military has begun to
pursue innovative asymmetric strategies to deter the PRC.
The United States and Taiwan should continue to work
closely with one another to enhance Taiwan's ability to defend
itself. Moreover, policy coordination on political and military
issues should also be an important part of the bilateral
relationship. Taiwan could potentially play a significant role
in shaping the security environments of both the East and South
China Seas.
Further, progress should be made in formalizing a bilateral
investment agreement with the United States and bringing Taiwan
into the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This would encourage Taipei
to make significant progress in the liberalization of its
economy while also diversifying Taiwan's economic relationships
and diluting the PRC's ability to coerce Taiwan in a time of
crisis.
The future of the cross-strait dynamic is uncertain. How
Beijing's leaders may react to a DPP electoral victory and will
ultimately calculate the success of its current engagement
strategy with Taiwan and how it will weigh that strategy
against alternatives is unclear.
To conclude, the Taiwan Relations Act has for 35 years been
the foundation for a robust relationship between Washington and
Taipei that has grown to include all elements of national
power. Preserving and expanding the benefits of the TRA will be
a necessary element in America's efforts to sustain its power
and influence in the Asia-Pacific, to maintain regional
stability, and to promote its interests and valued throughout
the region.
Thank you again for inviting me today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Denmark follows:]
Prepared Statement of Abraham M. Denmark
introduction
Mr. Chairman and other members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify on the important issue of U.S.-Taiwan
relations and the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). I
would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership and strong
support for U.S.-Taiwan relations, as well as robust U.S. economic and
strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific as we rebalance toward the
region. As a resident of Silver Spring, it is a special privilege to be
here with you today. I would also like to thank the subcommittee for
holding a hearing on the TRA--the Senate's first in 15 years.
My institution, The National Bureau of Asian Research, was founded
25 years ago in the memory of Senator Henry M. Jackson. Senator Jackson
voted in favor of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, as did a bipartisan
group of 85 Senators that included our current Vice President, Bill
Bradley, Bob Dole, Barry Goldwater, Jessie Helms, Daniel Inouye, Ted
Kennedy, and Sam Nunn.
The TRA has enjoyed robust bipartisan support ever since, through
six administrations. This support naturally flows from the TRA's
strategic significance to American interests and its value as the
foundation for U.S. relations with Taiwan--one of our nation's key
strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific.
strategic importance of the tra
The Taiwan Relations Act was one of the most consequential foreign
policy acts of Congress during the cold war. It established six
features of American foreign and national security policy that remain
highly relevant today, asserting the following U.S. policies:
1. To preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly
commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of
the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the
people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the
Western Pacific area;
2. To declare that peace and stability in the area are in the
political, security, and economic interests of the United
States, and are matters of international concern;
3. To make clear that the United States decision to establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China [PRC]
rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be
determined by peaceful means;
4. To consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan
by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or
embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
5. To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
6. To maintain the capacity of the United States to resist
any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of
the people on Taiwan.
Combined with the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques and the ``Six
Assurances,'' the TRA constitutes the bipartisan foundation for our
``one China'' policy. America's approach to Taiwan and the PRC has
proven to be remarkably consistent. We insist that cross-strait
differences be resolved peacefully and according to the wishes of the
people on both sides of the strait. We do not support Taiwan
independence and are opposed to unilateral attempts by either side to
change the status quo. We welcome efforts on both sides to engage in a
dialogue that reduces tensions and increases contacts across the
strait. And we are committed to preserving peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait. As part of our commitments under the TRA, we continue to
provide Taiwan with defensive military systems based on its needs and,
following our longstanding policy, make decisions about arms sales
without advance consultation with the PRC.
It is important to note that, as much as it may try, China cannot
``reinterpret'' U.S. policies toward Taiwan. As you may recall, after a
meeting in the Pentagon between Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and
Chinese Minister of Defense General Chang Wanquan in 2013 a Chinese
military spokesman stated that the United States had agreed to
establish a joint task force on the issue of arms sales. More recently,
China's Foreign Ministry misrepresented discussions between President
Obama and President Xi to suggest the U.S. policy toward Taiwan had
changed. In both cases, U.S. officials clarified that U.S. policies
regarding Taiwan had not changed.
These policies have enabled Taiwan to prosper in every sense of the
word. The TRA has been instrumental in preserving stability in the
Taiwan Strait (and, as a result, the region more broadly), fostering
the growth of a robust democracy as well as one of the world's most
vibrant cultures and innovative economies, and preserving American
presence and influence in the region. The TRA has also provided the
strategic environment in which Taiwan and the PRC have been able to
nurture stronger political and economic ties in recent years.
While over the past 35 years the relationship between Taiwan and
the United States has evolved and deepened, and cross-strait dynamics
have changed dramatically, the continued relevance and importance of
the TRA is a testament to the wisdom and foresight of those who wrote
and approved it in 1979.
current status of u.s.-taiwan relations
While some in 1979 worried that the TRA represented the end of
U.S.-Taiwan relations, the reality has been the opposite. Indeed, since
1979, U.S.-Taiwan relations have flourished. As the TRA makes
abundantly clear, the United States has an abiding interest in
maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, values robust
engagement with Taiwan, and sees a Taiwan that is able to defend itself
as firmly within American interests.
Relations between the United States and Taiwan are founded upon
common interests in regional stability, shared commitments to the
principles of economic and political liberalism, and a mutual support
for international law. Taiwan's open politics and its exuberant
democracy are remarkable, and are regularly put on display through open
elections and the exercise of an independent judiciary and media. Most
recently, popular protests in Taiwan against a proposed services
agreement with the PRC have served both as a reminder of the importance
of free speech and peaceful assembly, as well as the vital need for the
rule of law.
Contacts between the U.S. Government and the governing authorities
on Taiwan are robust, as senior-level officials from both sides meet
regularly. Taiwan was America's 12th-largest trading partner in 2013,
with two-way trade surpassing $63 billion. In October 2013, Taiwan sent
one of the largest delegations to the SelectUSA summit hosted by the
Department of Commerce. In November, Taiwan's former Vice President,
Vincent Siew, led an impressive delegation of Taiwan CEOs to the United
States, announcing over $2 billion of new or ongoing investments in the
United States. The economic relationship hit a major milestone in March
2013 when talks under our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA) were restarted after a 6-year hiatus. While pork and beef remain
difficult issues, our bilateral economic relationship encompasses a far
broader set of industries and services.
Taiwan is also a major security cooperation partner for the United
States. Since 2009, the executive branch has notified Congress of over
$12 billion in new defense articles and services for Taiwan--making
Taiwan our top foreign military sales customer in Asia and one of the
largest worldwide. In particular, the United States has worked with
Taiwan to enhance its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, which has recently been included as
a core mission of Taiwan's Armed Forces. Taiwan has attended the MAHANI
PAHILI exercise in Hawaii for the last 5 years, and the Hawaii National
Guard is expanding its
HA/DR relationship with Taiwan. Since 1997, the U.S. Air Force has also
trained Taiwan's F-16 fighter pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.
The U.S. policy to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific has been
significantly beneficial to Taiwan's sense of security and confidence.
This policy has reaffirmed America's commitment to sustain its
influence and power in the region, and has reassured its allies and
partners in the Asia-Pacific of America's continued presence and
engagement. Overall, U.S. policy objectives for Taiwan--sustaining its
ability to defend itself, deepening its economic and political
engagement with the global economy, and expanding its diplomatic
space--are fully compatible with Taiwan's own interests.
In recent years, the TRA has also enabled Taiwan to emerge as an
important player in regional geopolitics. With its successful
transition to a democratic form of government and its embrace of
economic liberalism as a stable path for sustainable development,
Taiwan has become a model for the entire region. Moreover, its
international behavior exemplifies that of a responsible stakeholder--
from contributing to international disaster responses in Japan and the
Philippines to demonstrating a responsible approach to addressing
maritime disputes through its East China Sea Peace Initiative. This
initiative has not only demonstrated a roadmap for peaceful engagement,
it has also enabled Taiwan to responsibly manage maritime incidents
with Japan and the Philippines.
current state of cross-strait relations
Today, relations between Taipei and Beijing are generally very
positive. Due to the policy decisions of the leadership on both sides,
Taiwan and the PRC have since 2008 decided to reduce cross-strait
tensions and focus on building economic and cultural ties. They were
able to pursue such a rapprochement due to their mutual acceptance of
the ``1992 Consensus,'' in which both sides recognized that there is
only one China but agreed to differ on its definition. The results have
been extraordinary--almost 3 million mainland Chinese visited Taiwan in
2013, up from just 300,000 in 2008. Cross-strait trade has risen by
more than 50 percent since 2008, to $197 billion in 2013. Most
recently, in February 2014, the heads of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs
Council and China's Taiwan Affairs Office met for talks, representing
the first formal meeting between ministers in their government
capacities since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.
Still, despite this rosy picture, all is not well in the cross-
strait relationship. Beijing initially approved of this approach with
the expectation that improving cross-strait economic and cultural ties
would gradually pull Taiwan more closely into the PRC's orbit, thus
enabling eventual unification. Yet trends have so far not born this
out--according to polling in December 2013 by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs
Council, 84.6 percent of the Taiwan people support the status quo for
either the short or long term, and 51.9 percent see Beijing as hostile
toward the Taiwan governing authorities. Political support for
unification, therefore, remains minimal amongst Taiwan's population.
Moreover, despite significant warming in relations between Taipei
and Beijing, the PRC's investment in military capabilities positioned
across from Taiwan has continued unabated, and the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) has experienced several years of double-digit annual growth
in its budget. Beijing continues to refuse to renounce the use of force
to compel unification, and has amassed a force of more than 1,100
ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait as part of a layered,
multidimensional military capability that remains primarily focused on
Taiwan-related contingencies.
Despite the PRC's continued robust investments in the PLA, Taiwan's
investment in its own military capabilities has been stagnant for
several years. Taiwan's official defense budget for 2013 was $10.5
billion, a decrease from the previous year. Taiwan spends 2.1 percent
of its GDP on defense--far lower than historic levels and even lower
than the 3 percent pledged by President Ma. Further force reductions
are on the horizon, as the Ministry of National Defense has announced
its goal to reduce total forces from 215,000 to between 170,000 and
190,000 during the period from 2015 through 2019.
These trends have led to an increasingly unbalanced cross-strait
military dynamic. While Taiwan's defense budget in 2013 was $10.5
billion, the PRC (according to the International Institute for
Strategic Studies) spent 10 times more that year--$112 billion. By way
of acknowledging that direct competition with the PLA is unfeasible,
Taiwan's military has begun to pursue innovative, asymmetric strategies
to deter a possible Chinese effort to invade, coerce, or attack Taiwan.
strengthening u.s.-taiwan relations
The Taiwan Relations Act should, along with the three Joint
Communiques and the Six Assurances, continue to serve as the foundation
for future engagement, cooperation, and coordination between the United
States and Taiwan in the economic, political, and security spheres.
Such interaction will necessarily be based on the shared interests on
both sides to more deeply imbed Taiwan into the global economy, to
build its international space, and to enhance Taiwan's ability to
defend itself.
To more deeply imbed Taiwan into the global economy, progress
should be made in formalizing a bilateral investment agreement with the
United States and making progress toward bringing Taiwan into the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While participation in TPP would
require the approval of all members, including the United States, such
a move would encourage Taipei to make significant progress in the
liberalization of its economy--a process that, while painful in the
short-term, would have tremendous benefits for Taiwan over the medium
and long term. Joining the TPP will not only help Taiwan further
integrate itself into the regional economy, it will also help keep
Taiwan's economy globally diversified and competitive. While this is a
natural economic imperative, it is also a strategic requirement--
diversification will dilute the PRC's ability to economically coerce
Taiwan in a time of crisis.
International space is also an important issue for future U.S.-
Taiwan cooperation. As described by Bonnie Glaser of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, several opportunities exist for
Taiwan to expand their meaningful participation
in organizations focused on civil aviation, climate change, promoting
regional stability and prosperity, and telecommunications. While energy
for this expanded profile will need to come from Taipei, Beijing can
also play an important role in enabling greater space for Taiwan. For
the United States, progress on this issue will mean working with both
Taipei and Beijing--as well as other members of key institutions--to
identify more opportunities for Taiwan to play a constructive role in
organizations where issues of sovereignty do not apply.
On security issues, the United States and Taiwan should continue to
work closely with one another to enhance Taiwan's ability to defend
itself. Taiwan's recent decision to pursue an indigenous submarine
capability is a positive development, and American strategists and
naval experts should work closely with their counterparts in Taiwan to
identify the capabilities necessary to enhance Taiwan's self-defense.
Additionally, both sides must recognize that friendship occasionally
requires the telling of hard truths. In this case, Washington should be
clear with Taipei that Taiwan's flat defense budget is a persistent
problem. The budget issue is particularly flummoxing in that both
President Ma and the opposition Democratic People's Party (DPP) have
publicly endorsed a defense budget at 3 percent of GDP. If there exists
broad political support for such a budget level, why has spending
continued to fall short of this benchmark in the face of a rapidly
intensifying military challenge from the mainland? Addressing this
issue should be a top priority for the U.S. and Taiwan defense
establishments.
While issues of arms sales and enhanced planning will continue to
be important in U.S.-Taiwan security relations, policy coordination on
political-military issues should also be an important part of the
bilateral relationship. Taiwan can potentially play a significant role
in shaping the security environments of both the East and South China
Seas. Beyond setting an example as a responsible regional stakeholder,
Taiwan can help clarify the PRC's ambiguous claims in the South China
Sea. As proposed by Jeffrey Bader, the former senior director for East
Asian affairs on the National Security Council, Taiwan should clarify
whether its claims in the South China Sea are consistent with
international law.
Finally, continued cooperation on defense investments and changes
to military planning should remain at the center of U.S.-Taiwan
military relations. Both sides have a profound interest in enhancing
Taiwan's ability to defend itself, and this is a realizable goal if
both Washington and Taipei remain committed to pursuing asymmetric and
innovative military strategies and translating words on a page into
real-world capabilities.
assessing future cross-strait dynamics
As with any democracy, political power in Taiwan will eventually
change hands as the result of democratic processes. As former Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell stated
in 2011, no single party or leader on Taiwan has a monopoly on
effective management of cross-strait relations. The United States
should not take sides in this election and commit to working closely
with whomever should win future free and fair elections in Taiwan. Yet
we do have interests in Taiwan and in the cross-strait dynamic, and we
should make those interests known.
Given that Taiwan's next Presidential election will be held in
2016, any prediction about the outcome of that election will be far
from reliable. Yet the possibility that the DPP may regain power in
Taiwan is a possibility that requires some consideration. There are
lingering questions, in Beijing and elsewhere, about the DPP's ability
to effectively and reliably manage cross-strait relations if and when
it regains political power in Taipei.
The DPP's future direction remains unclear. DPP officials have
recently sought to adjust the Party's approach to cross-strait
relations, and this process is still ongoing. While the United States
should refrain from inserting itself into Taiwan's electoral process
and should continue to encourage and congratulate Taiwan on its
democratic system of governance, the United States does have an
interest in seeing that cross-strait stability and communication are
maintained. This need not be the 1992 Consensus, but rather any
formulation upon which Beijing and Taipei can continue their peaceful
engagement.
China's reaction to a DPP election is also an issue deserving some
consideration. There were several reports of attempts by China to
influence past elections, though Beijing has certainly learned the
lessons of 1996 that attempts at intimidation can backfire. My sense is
that China will look to sustain cross-strait engagement and
communication in if the DPP comes back to power, provided that a
mutually acceptable concept for engagement can be found. Yet how
Beijing's leaders will ultimately calculate the success of its current
engagement strategy, and how it will weigh that strategy against
alternatives, is very unclear.
While relations between Taiwan and the PRC may have improved since
2008, the recent protests in Taipei--as well as the largely symbolic
nature of the first round of direct meetings--signal the domestic
political limits on the potential for unification and the speed at
which progress may occur. Since the cross-strait rapprochement has been
based on pursuing easier issues (economic and cultural engagement)
before difficult issues (politics and Taiwan's official status), the
pace of engagement between the two sides may be plateauing.
While Xi Jinping has publicly stated that China supports Taiwan's
``social system and lifestyle,'' he has also stated that ``the
longstanding political division between the two sides will have to be
eventually resolved step-by-step as it should not be passed on
generation after generation.'' Beijing's assessment of progress toward
their goal of unification and Taiwan's continued structural
unwillingness to change its de facto status will fundamentally define
cross-strait dynamics over the long term.
conclusion
For 35 years, the Taiwan Relations Act has been the foundation for
a robust, if unofficial, relationship between Washington and Taipei
that has grown to include all elements of national power. The human,
economic, political, and strategic benefits of the TRA have been
tremendous. Preserving and expanding the benefits of the TRA will
depend on skilled statecraft from both sides and will be a necessary
element in America's efforts to sustain its power and influence in the
Asia-Pacific and to promote economic and political liberalism
throughout the region.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Mr. Schriver.
STATEMENT OF RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE, ARLINGTON, VA
Mr. Schriver. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this
opportunity and thank you for seating me with a colleague who I
admire and respect a great deal, Mr. Denmark.
In the interest of time, I would just like to draw from my
statement and just make a few observations on cross-strait
relations, the United States-Taiwan relationship, and maybe
some recommendations for going forward.
As I think both Secretary Russel and Mr. Denmark stated,
the cross-strait relationship has enjoyed a lot of positive
developments in recent years, and I believe President Ma
deserves enormous credit for that, the ECFA agreement, the 21
agreements that have been achieved between the two sides.
But there are some concerning trends, and I would just make
note of four trends. And one has already been addressed I think
quite eloquently and that is the security environment. The
military buildup opposite Taiwan continues apace. There has
been no move to reduce the threat posture. In fact, it has
continued to build despite the political improvements and the
economic progress the two sides have made.
I think we are also concerned about Taiwan's need for
international space and the continuing pressure from Beijing on
other countries and on international organizations to prevent
Taiwan from enjoying greater participation in international
organizations and the international community.
Number three, I think we should also be concerned about
these demonstrations, but more broadly what it says about the
public and their views of the cross-strait relationship right
now. Having just been in Taiwan last week, former Deputy
Secretary Armitage and I took a group to Taiwan and had a
chance to wander through some of these areas. And what is
really at the core of the protest, I think, is very deep-seated
anxiety about the future of the cross-strait relationship and
what that might mean for Taiwan's status. So, yes, the
proximate cause is this cross-strait service trade agreement
but I think there is a very deep-seated anxiety, if not
neuralgia, about where things are going, and that could put a
brake a bit on future cross-strait progress and that is
certainly something to be mindful of.
Then lastly, I think we need to look ahead of the coming
2016 election and look at China's behavior in the past. As
Taiwan has held national elections, they in the past have
conducted provocative missile exercises. They have made
intimidating gestures and speeches to the public in Taiwan. And
I think we should expect, particularly with where the polls are
today, that China will try to put its thumb on the scales and
influence the outcome of that election. And I think it is in
our interest to do what we can to ensure that Taiwan has the
ability to make decisions about its future by itself free of
coercion to the extent possible.
Now, I think each of these trends that I mentioned suggest
a role for the United States to support Taiwan and address
Taiwan's needs. And I think they fall into several categories.
I think in the security area, we should be moving forward
with some of the major weapons systems. I would cite
submarines, a program that--I was part of the decisionmaking in
2001 in the Bush administration when we said that Taiwan needed
these platforms and committed the United States to helping
Taiwan acquire the platforms. But yet, here we are 13-plus
years later and there is no program to speak of. And I think
the requirement has only gotten more strong given China's
submarine development and other military modernization efforts.
I think the United States should make a Cabinet-level visit
to Taiwan. The Clinton administration sent three Cabinet
Secretaries to Taiwan in 8 years. This administration has sent
zero, like the administration just before it, the Bush
administration.
I think the United States should be more positive and more
open about Taiwan's interest in TPP. We should be talking about
a roadmap and the ability of Taiwan to join that organization,
not just welcome their interest in it. I understand the TIFA
process is being resumed this week, but we should articulate a
stronger interest in Taiwan joining that organization and
provide a clear roadmap for their participation down the line.
And then finally, on arm sales more generally--I mentioned
the submarine program in particular. I think this country
should be committed to Taiwan's defense in a way that we have
regular congressional notifications. The previous witness from
the administration's comments notwithstanding about all the
support we have given to Taiwan's military, it has, in fact,
been the longest period of gap in congressional notifications
in the history of the relationship since the Taiwan Relations
Act was passed, 2\1/2\-plus years since the last congressional
notification. I think this should be remedied. Taiwan not only
needs the military systems, they need that show of support from
the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randall G. Schriver
Mr. Chairman and esteemed committee members, I would like to
express my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before your
committee to address the landmark legislation that has governed
relations between the United States and Taiwan for the last 35 years.
Since its enactment in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has
been the foundation upon which the United States and Taiwan have
maintained their dynamic and enduring ties. For over 35 years, the
United States has played an important role in ensuring Taiwan's
security while maintaining constructive relations with the People's
Republic of China (PRC). Enabled by the TRA, continuity in U.S. policy
has preserved American credibility within the Asia-Pacific region and
enabled the island's nascent democracy to flourish. U.S. support for
Taiwan has served as a visible symbol of U.S. commitment to peace and
security in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan also has an important role
to play in the comprehensive U.S. Rebalance to Asia that was announced
in 2011.
u.s.-taiwan relations
Taiwan's continued success as a democracy, free market economy, and
responsible regional and global actor is a core interest of the United
States. The United States and Taiwan engage cooperatively over a wide
range of economic, security, and diplomatic issues. Our strong trade
relationship alone demonstrates just how important the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship is for U.S. interests. Taiwan is the United States 12th-
largest trading partner and 16th-largest export market for U.S. goods.
There are many recent developments in U.S.-Taiwan trade relations
that are positive. The resumption of the U.S.-Taiwan Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) discussions, after a prolonged
hiatus, has the potential to revitalize our trade ties. Taiwan's
efforts to join the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) can also be an
opportunity for U.S.-Taiwan relations. As an export-oriented economy
with the world's 21st-largest GDP, Taiwan's membership would
significantly enhance the trade pact by further integrating Taiwan's
economy with that of the United States and other partners in the
region. The TPP is an integral part of the U.S. rebalance and we have
an important stake in ensuring that Taiwan is a part of it. In
addition, through a reinvigorated bilateral economic relationship with
the United States, Taiwan may be able to engage counterparts across the
Taiwan Strait with greater confidence.
There is also a growing web of people-to-people exchanges between
the United States and Taiwan. Taiwan's designation for participation in
the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) in 2012 led to a significant rise in
visits between the two countries. Recent visits by three U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretaries to Taiwan was an encouraging and refreshing sign
of U.S. commitment to Taiwan, especially considering the dry-spell of
high-level U.S. visits to Taiwan. These diplomatic and economic ties
are augmented by an increasingly robust U.S.-Taiwan military-to-
military relationship. Forging and nurturing these relationships
between our militaries is not only important for our ability to address
common challenges, but also reinforcing the security commitments to
Taiwan that the United States affirmed with passage of the TRA 35 years
ago.
While the above-mentioned areas of U.S.-Taiwan relations are
progressing well, more could be done. Despite closer cross-strait
engagement, there is understandable consternation in Taipei and around
the region regarding PRC military modernization and deployments
opposite Taiwan, particularly in light of the PRC's refusal to renounce
use of force against Taiwan to resolve differences. Forwarding of the
Six Assurances under the Reagan administration to Taiwan in 1982
reinforced language contained in the TRA to provide Taiwan with arms
according to its defensive needs. It also provided Taiwan with a
guarantee that we would not hold prior consultations with the PRC
regarding arms sales to Taiwan. This assurance should remain central to
U.S. decisionmaking on security assistance to Taiwan. The prolonged
absence of a congressional notification on Taiwan arms sales could be
perceived as accommodating Chinese positions and potential reaction to
a formal announcement, as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues
to develop and deploy capabilities intended to coerce and/or facilitate
use of force against Taiwan.
This administration needs bolder and more visible measures to
fulfill U.S. obligations to Taiwan consistent with notification
requirements under the Arms Export Control Act. The United States
should avoid allowing interests in preserving positive atmospherics in
the China relationship to come at the cost of relations with Taiwan and
its legitimate defense needs.
Guided by the TRA and Six Assurances, Taiwan is not simply an
``issue to manage'' in U.S.-China relations. There are significant
opportunity costs to treating Taiwan as a subordinate issue in U.S.-
China ties rather than as legitimate government able and willing to
help resolve a broad range of shared challenges faced by the
international community. Opportunities for cooperating with Taiwan are
significant in areas ranging from climate change, disaster response, to
counterproliferation, In short, Taiwan and its people have intrinsic
value to the United States and broader international community separate
from the context of U.S.-China relations. Given the comprehensive goals
of the U.S. rebalance policy, Taiwan should be seen as a potential
partner across the full spectrum of activities that support the
rebalance.
cross-strait relations
Cross-Strait relations have enjoyed positive developments in recent
years. Since entering office in 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou's
administration has prioritized the improvement of cross-strait
relations. Since then, the two sides have established direct commercial
flights between Taiwan and China, promoted bilateral tourism, and
signed an Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA).
The most recent breakthrough in cross-strait ties occurred on
February 11, 2014, when Taiwan and China held their first official
government-to-government talks since 1949. The meeting was historically
significant in its own right, particularly because PRC government
representatives were willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of
government counterparts from Taiwan and meet on the basis of equality.
From Beijing's perspective, there may be a greater sense of urgency to
pressure Taiwan into political talks as the next national election in
2016 draws closer.
Despite political and economic gains in cross-strait relations,
security issues continue to be a contentious issue. Last November,
Beijing's announced an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the
East China Sea, which overlapped with those of Taiwan, Japan, and South
Korea. Two months ago, in response, Taiwan conducted a rescue exercise
in an area where ADIZs of Taiwan, Japan, and China overlap to challenge
the legitimacy of China's ADIZ. These events were a prominent reminder
of the continuing tensions that underlie cross-strait relations.
Moreover, recent protests in Taipei demonstrate limitations in
public willingness to further deepen economic links across the Taiwan
Strait. Irrespective of how the government and students resolve
disagreements, what these protests reveal is a deep-seated anxiety and
suspicion on Taiwan toward further integration with the mainland.
Taiwan's requirement for defense articles and services are driven
by the nature of the challenge posed by the PLA's continued military
buildup opposite Taiwan. Buoyed by a 12.2-percent increase in its
defense budget from the previous year, the PLA continues to modernize
and expand its military capabilities that could be arrayed against
Taiwan. As the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review notes, `` the rapid pace
and comprehensive scope of China's military modernization continues,
combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness from China's
leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions.''
Chinese military modernization has yielded significant increases in
the PLA's power and advantages. According to analysts in the United
States and Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense, China has more than
1,500 missiles targeted at Taiwan. The PLA has also developed and
deployed other military capabilities in areas such as electronic
warfare, counterspace, advanced fighter aircraft, and undersea warfare.
Ultimately, Chinese military leaders seek capabilities that could
support an attempt to physically occupy Taipei should a decision be
made to do so.
The PLA is developing the capability to coerce political leaders on
Taiwan to settle political differences on Beijing's terms, while
simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny U.S. intervention in
case of conflict. Barring deeper and broader U.S. support, the dynamic
balance of military forces across the Taiwan Strait may further
embolden authorities in Beijing to consider use of force.
impact of the 2016 election
Looking ahead to the 2016 Presidential elections in Taiwan, our
overriding interest is to see Taiwan complete another free and fair
election, and to then proceed with the subsequent peaceful transfer of
power to a new President. The United States should remain neutral on
the outcome and remain steadfast in our support for furthering shared
democratic values between the United States and Taiwan. In doing so, we
would improve upon the approach taken in the lead up to the 2012
election when the Obama administration took a number of steps that
provoked suspicions of leaning to one side in the election. The United
States should not choose sides in Taiwan's Presidential election.
Rather, it should support processes that help Taiwan deepen the
resiliency of its own democracy.
In past election cycles China has taken steps to try to put their
``thumb on the scales'' and impact the outcome of elections. In March
1996, China test-fired ballistic missiles in the waters surrounding
Taiwan in a brazen attempt to intimidate voters. Four years later,
then-Premier Zhu Rongji infamously used a finger wagging gesture on
television threatening Taiwanese voters not to reelect then-President
Chen Shui-bian.
The PRC's methods of influencing public policies on Taiwan have
become less overt but in many ways more sophisticated through the use
of political warfare and other forms of coercive persuasion. We should
remain vigilant against potential attempts by China to influence the
democratic process on Taiwan as we approach the 2016 elections.
No matter which party governs the ROC after the March 2016
election, we have reason for high confidence that the next leader in
Taipei will be capable of managing cross-strait relations. Both sides
of the political spectrum on Taiwan have expanded contacts and dialogue
with counterparts across the Taiwan Strait and both major parties are
earnest in establishing policies that will preserve peace across the
strait. We must hold the Chinese Communist Party to account for any
actions not conducive to peace and stability after the election on
Taiwan.
areas to strengthen the relationship
There are several where the United States should seek to strengthen
ties with Taiwan. First, while we enjoy many benefits of strong U.S.-
Taiwan relations, our default mode has been to keep them low-key and
quiet. The United States should be open and transparent in its dealings
with Taiwan, highlighting meetings as routine and normal interactions
between two legitimate governments.
Second, the United States needs to raise the level of its
interactions with Taiwan, including Cabinet-level visits to Taiwan.
Such visits offer opportunities to be more vocal and demonstrate our
pride in the strength of our bilateral ties.
Third, we should fulfill our longstanding commitment to assist
Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines. Options
include forwarding the congressional notification for a design program
through Foreign Military Sales channels that has been frozen for over 5
years; or alternatively, providing a clear roadmap to support U.S.
defense industry assistance to a Taiwan indigenous submarine program.
Either way, diesel electric submarines would provide Taiwan with a
credible and survivable deterrent and therefore is in the best
interests of the United States.
Fourth, and independent of the submarine issue, congressional
notifications under the Arms Export Control Act serve as a visible
demonstration of U.S. support under the TRA. Therefore, we should be
intentional about forwarding congressional notifications on a routine
and frequent basis in support of Taiwan's defense needs. Long gaps
between congressional notifications create uncertainties in Taiwan, and
may embolden leaders of the Chinese Communist Party to think they can
cause coerced solutions to their differences with Taiwan.
Fifth, consistent with progress made in the TIFA process, the
United States should endorse Taiwan's candidacy and create a roadmap
for Taiwan's membership in the TPP.
Sixth, the United States should continue to support Taiwan's
meaningful participation in international organizations such as
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The United States
should endorse Taiwan's full membership in ICAO, and should also seek
creative approaches to increasing Taiwan's international profile in
other areas.
Our commemoration of the 35th anniversary of the TRA is an
excellent opportunity to reflect on current and past successes in U.S.-
Taiwan relations. It is also an opportunity to chart a future path for
our ties that is grounded in our legal obligations under the TRA to
provide necessary support to allies and friends in a region where hard-
power still matters. In midst of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship should be leveraged as a
fundamental component of the U.S. rebalance and not a subissue in U.S.-
China ties. Taiwan possesses intrinsic value as a flourishing
democracy, an economic powerhouse, and most importantly, a longstanding
security partner in East Asia.
I hope the Obama administration and friends in Congress will share
this outlook. Thank you again Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to
participate in your hearing today, and to offer these thoughts.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you both for your testimony.
The 35th anniversary of the formal agreement in regards to
Taiwan--the Taiwan Relations Act--it is pretty specific as to
our commitments in regards to Taiwan and our strong interest to
make sure that peaceful relations exist in the region--and on
the cross-strait issues, that Taiwan has the right of self-
defense and our commitment to help them in self-defense. We
have the three communiques and then we have President Reagan's
comments on the assurances.
Are the fundamental agreements still sound today? This is
35 years later. There seems to be some hesitation in regards to
some of the areas that we thought were pretty clear. You point
out that high-level visits have not taken place as frequently
if there are arms sale issues. Is there a need for any formal
changes in your view on the underlying documents that underpin
the relationship between the United States and Taiwan?
Mr. Denmark. Thank you, Senator.
There have been several calls from the academic community
here in D.C. and around the country for some sorts of changes
to the Taiwan Relations Act, some saying it needs to be
weakened, some saying that it needs to be strengthened. In my
opinion, overall the Taiwan Relations Act is actually very
sound in that it provides a robust foundation for engagement
but also gives the administration enough room to maneuver to be
flexible for existing and emerging contingencies. So overall,
my assessment is that the Taiwan Relations Act in itself does
not need to be revised, although the continuing discussion
between the Congress and the administration, with this
administration and previously, about the pace of arms sales,
the size of arms sales, the pace of visits, the pace of
contacts I think is very welcome in terms of pushing the
relationship forward.
But if you look at how this administration has engaged
Taiwan, I think it has actually been fairly robust. My friend,
Randy, was very correct in the delay that we have seen, the
lack of arms sales notifications that we have seen for the last
2 years, but I would say that a lot of that is because of the
size of the significant notifications that came for a few years
before that, leading to very significant notifications of arms
sales and continued high-level meetings between political
leadership on both sides, not a visit of a Cabinet Secretary to
Taiwan yet, but continued regular senior-level meetings between
the two sides.
I guess I do not see the visit of a Cabinet-level officer
to Taiwan as being the litmus test for what constitutes a
robust relationship. Rather, it is the regular meeting. The
regular interaction of high-level officials across multiple
elements of our two governments to me is the more important
measure of our relationship, and to me the current
administration has been fairly robust in its engagement.
Senator Cardin. Let me ask you about United States-China
relations as it relates to Taiwan. The United States has a
somewhat complex relationship with China today. They are
critically important in many of our discussions globally. How
do you see what the United States does with Taiwan? This has
been longstanding. Does it have impact on the bilateral
relationship between China and the United States?
Mr. Schriver. It certainly can, but my sense is many
administrations, not just this one, try to overcorrect,
overcompensate for the perceived reaction that we may get from
China and place some limitations on what we would do with
Taiwan. I think if you look at the actual record--we can stick
with the subject of arms sales. I think if you actually look at
the reaction, the fallout on the United States-China
relationship has been consistent, quite predictable and quite
manageable. So I think that should not really temper what we do
with Taiwan.
And I would add on a Cabinet Secretary, I think that has
been one of the points of reluctance is the fear that that
particular Cabinet Secretary may not have continuing access to
China should he or she visit Taiwan. But again, I think the
past track record does not necessarily support that, and I
think we should proceed. I obviously have a disagreement. I
think it is important. We tell every other country it is
important when our Cabinet Secretaries go. So I think this
would be a very strong signal to Taiwan particularly in light
of what they are facing right now in the cross-strait
relationship.
Senator Cardin. I think that is very important.
One of the things I think Senator Rubio and I will agree is
that President Reagan was pretty definitive with his
assurances. I personally think China respects that, a clear
understanding of where the United States is, consistent with
our historical commitments to the people of Taiwan. So I think
a clear indication of where we stand helps not just the people
of Taiwan but also helps in our bilateral relationship with
China.
I want to ask one more question before turning it over to
Senator Rubio, and that came up with Secretary Russel. One of
the positive impacts of a better relationship between Taiwan
and China is that Taiwan is a democracy. It is an open society.
China is struggling on how to deal with more rights for its
citizens. It has had an inconsistent path toward the type of
democratic reforms that a country needs to do if it wants to be
a major player on the world stage. And yet, the recent protests
in Taiwan raises questions as to how effective Taiwan is in
dealing with these issues.
How do you see these protests affecting the view in China
as to the success of the Taiwan democracy?
Mr. Schriver. Well, I think in this particular instance, it
is probably a bit too soon to tell, but I think it is part of
an overall picture that China is getting. They watch the
elections. They watch the speeches of losing candidates and are
amazed that people of wealth and privilege are willing to
concede defeat and step away from power. They visit in greater
numbers through tourism. And so they are seeing an awful lot,
and I cannot help but to think that it is impacting them.
That said, what we see in China is I think a bit of a
heavier hand on the Internet, on religious freedom, on human
rights organizations. So I believe just sort of intuitively
that the lessons are sinking in and are impacting people in
China, but it has certainly yet to show up in how the
authorities in Beijing are governing the PRC.
Senator Cardin. I am going to turn the gavel over to
Senator Rubio. As I indicated earlier, we have a markup going
on in one of the committees I serve on. Senator Rubio, take as
much time as you want.
Senator Rubio [presiding]. Thank you.
And I too have to go to a meeting, but there are a couple
important questions that I wanted to ask you and Senator Cardin
just outlined this. I wanted to get back to this topic of the
Six Assurances under the Reagan administration because I think
to be clear and unequivocal with regard to that is critically
important in terms of the message that we send and, quite
frankly, the balance in the region.
I asked that question of Secretary Russel a moment ago. You
were both in the audience and you heard his answer. And I
wanted to get your impressions after hearing--I tried multiple
different ways to get someone from the administration to tell
me that the Six Assurances remain the cornerstone of our policy
and that we still stand by those assurances. I do not think I
got that, and I wanted your interpretation of the answer that
we got with regard to that question.
Mr. Schriver. I was surprised that it was not a more direct
response and that it could not be made in the affirmative.
Certainly when we were in Government, we would have said,
absolutely yes, and did on many occasions. So I hope the
administration has the opportunity to clarify that because I
think the signal that it sends is a reassuring one if our
friends in Taiwan know that they still apply in their totality
as your question asked.
Senator Rubio. Mr. Denmark, did you have a comment?
Mr. Denmark. Thank you, Senator.
I think the Six Assurances, as you said, are incredibly
important in our relationship. I certainly cannot speak for the
administration. It is my sense that United States policy
regarding Taiwan, including the Six Assurances, have not
changed. There were some public comments from other
administration officials a few weeks ago on this topic,
specifically after the Chinese Foreign Ministry misreported
interactions between President Obama and President Xi which
stated explicitly that United States policy toward Taiwan had
not changed. And I assume that that is still the guiding
remarks from the administration.
Senator Rubio. I would hope that that is the case. I again
tried on multiple occasions to get a direct answer, a yes or
no, yes, they remain part of our strategy. And it seems like
they are elements of our strategy that might inform us
according to the answer that I got. And I hope we can bring
some clarity to it because I was surprised by the answer
myself, and I did not think it was a hard question. I just
wanted to get it in the record, and unfortunately, we did not
get the answer we want, which I think actually is
counterproductive.
In fact, I think that in China that answer that was given
here today could potentially be misinterpreted as, in fact, an
opening of some sort for a change in the United States posture
toward Taiwan. I am very concerned about the answer that we
got, and I hope that we can bring some clarity to it over the
next few days. And I intend to ask that question as well in
writing of the Secretary of State to get clear assurances that
that remains a cornerstone of our policy.
I wanted to ask one more question. Mr. Denmark, this ties
to your statement, although I would love to hear from both of
you about it. You talked a little bit about the relations
between Taipei and Beijing are generally very positive due to
policy decisions of the leadership of both sides that, since
2008, decided to reduce the tensions and focus on building
economic and cultural ties. And you say in your written
statement that Beijing initially approved of this approach with
the expectation that improving cross-strait economic and
cultural ties would gradually pull Taiwan more closely to the
PRC's orbit, thus enabling eventual unification.
Yet trends so far have not borne this out given, for
example, even the events that are going on today with student
protests regarding potential increased links with China.
Given that assessment, what impact do both of you think
that now has on Chinese thinking? In essence, they have allowed
this little opening to occur under the hopes that this would
slowly but surely bring Taiwan closer to them until ultimately
there would be a mutually agreed-to unification. Now they are
seeing this sort of dynamic internally where people are saying
we do not want to be closer to China. What impact could that
have in your mind on how China approaches this relationship
moving forward?
Mr. Denmark. Thank you, Senator. It is a fascinating set of
issues, a very difficult set of questions.
Overall, my sense is that Beijing remains committed to its
approach in terms of engaging Taiwan, although with all due
caveats of anybody's ability outside of Zhongnanhai in Beijing
to read the thinking and feelings of Chinese senior leadership.
So with that as a caveat, my sense is that they remain
committed to engagement because they do see benefits--
political, economic, and strategic benefits--for the
engagement, but also the counterpart, the alternatives to that
strategy remain very unclear in terms of if they would be more
beneficial to China's overall strategy.
My sense, talking to scholars in China and from what I have
read coming out of China, is that there is a lot of focus on
the results of the election in 2016, that there is a lot of
concern in China that if the DPP were to win power back, that
Taiwan may revert back to the policies of Chen Shui-bian.
My sense is that the DPP is actually moving beyond that
approach, that that would probably not happen again if the DPP
were to win the next election. The DPP is actually going
through a process of internally thinking about its own cross-
strait policy, its own approach to these issues, and is working
on a new formulation. And my sense is that Beijing, should the
DPP win, would try to find some way to continue to work with
them to continue this form of engagement.
As Randy pointed out earlier, I think it is very important
that there have been reports of the mainland attempting to
influence elections, and I suspect that this would probably
continue because they see the importance of the election to
Taiwan's behavior and how, post-2016, the mainland may
calculate its options, may calculate the continued
attractiveness of its engagement strategy I think is one too
far for anybody to predict, especially outside of Zhongnanhai,
but also the variables, the calculations are just far too
complicated at this point to see really how Beijing may react
to that scenario.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator.
I think China's policies have not changed and probably will
not for the foreseeable future, but with the trends in Taiwan,
particularly the public polling about how people feel about
their eventual status after the current status quo, one wonders
does Beijing have unlimited patience. I suspect they do not
because their ultimate objective appears to be getting further
away. Their ultimate objective is clear. They want unification
or what they call reunification. The polling suggests that goal
is getting further away, which is why I think our support for
Taiwan's security needs remain very relevant even in this era
when there are improvements in the cross-strait political and
economic relationship. If Beijing understands its policies are
not bringing it closer to its ultimate objective, then the
option of the use of force could become more attractive
particularly if we are not doing our part in helping Taiwan
with its defense needs.
Senator Rubio. First of all, I appreciate both of you being
here today and thank you for your testimony and thank you for
your time.
That is exactly our concern, that any sort of weakening or
questioning or equivocation on the part of the United States
stance toward Taiwan, in fact invite miscalculation or
recalculation on the part of the Chinese. And if people think
that what is happening in Crimea is complicated, they have no
idea what any sort of territorial dispute in this part of the
world would look like. It would be incredibly destabilizing. It
would have an immediate impact on the way Japan and South Korea
and other nations portray themselves.
And I think the two nations right now who feel the most
immediately threatened by the aggressiveness of the Chinese
Government--one is the Philippines because they simply do not
have the capability, and the other is Taiwan. I think that any
sort of weakening or any sort of confusion about where the
United States stands and our commitment to this relationship
invite potential aggressiveness and aggression in a way that
could end up finding us in a conflict that is much more
complicated and in fact much more dangerous than even what we
are seeing around the world today.
Again, I thank you both for being here and for your time
and for your testimony.
The record for this hearing will remain open until the
close of business Friday. Members and others will be allowed to
submit stuff for the record or ask questions. And I would just
ask for your cooperation that if you receive any questions
between now and Friday, that you would answer them for the
committee promptly so we can include it in our record.
And with that, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Assistant Secretary Daniel R. Russel to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Is the administration committed to President Reagan's so-
called ``Six Assurances'' to Taiwan?
Answer. The United States remains firmly committed to the U.S. one-
China policy, the Three Joint Communiques, and our responsibilities
under the Taiwan Relations Act. The so-called ``Six Assurances'' also
are an integral part of our overall approach to Taiwan. Taken together,
these commitments and assurances form the foundation of our relations
with Taiwan.
The United States has long maintained that cross-strait differences
are matters to be resolved peacefully, without the threat or use of
force, and should be acceptable to the people on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait. There is no change in our position. Our commitments and
assurances to Taiwan are firm and long-standing.
Question. Do you expect a resumption of U.S. Cabinet-level visits
to Taiwan this year? If so, which ones and when? If not, why?
Answer. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator
Gina McCarthy traveled to Taipei April 13-15, 2014, to highlight 20
years of environmental cooperation between the United States and the
Taiwan authorities and promote environmental education. The EPA
Administrator holds a Cabinet-rank position.
Question. As Taiwan is likely to retire some of its older fighter
aircraft in the next 5 to 10 years, do you believe that sales of
advanced aircraft and other weapon systems are an important, next step
in this commitment?
Answer. The United States is firmly committed to the policy
reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act enacted 35 years ago, which forms
the basis of U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan. The TRA declares
that it is U.S. policy to provide arms to Taiwan of a defensive
character and that peace and stability in that area of the world are in
the United States interest. The United States one-China policy, based
on the Three Joint Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, has been
consistent for the past 35 years, including six consecutive U.S.
Presidencies.
We have a robust dialogue with the Taiwan authorities focused on
military preparedness, threat perceptions and means to deter perceived
threats.
The President and the Congress determine the nature and quantity of
defense articles and services to sell to Taiwan-based solely upon their
judgment of the needs of Taiwan. The volume of our arms sales to Taiwan
is substantial. Consistent with our one-China policy, the Obama
administration has notified Congress of its intent to sell Taiwan over
$12 billion worth of new defense articles and services. Such sales
support both our commitments to Taiwan and our interest in maintaining
stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the region.
Signed contracts include an extensive retrofit and modernization of
Taiwan's
F-16 fleet, and the sale of Apache attack and Blackhawk transport
helicopters, Patriot PAC-3 Air and Missile Defense Batteries, P-3C long
range ocean surveillance and antisubmarine aircraft, Harpoon antiship
missiles, Osprey-class coastal mine hunters, and a variety of other
systems, training, upgrades, and advanced weapons and equipment.
We support Taiwan's efforts to develop innovative and asymmetric
capabilities to deter coercion or intimidation, and we encourage Taiwan
to increase its defense budget to a level commensurate with the
security challenges it confronts. We do not comment on pending or
potential arms sale requests.
Question. In 2001, The U.S. Government pledged to support Taiwan in
its acquisition of diesel electric submarines. Today, it appears more
and more likely that Taiwan will pursue a domestic submarine program
with advice and support from foreign defense industry experts.
Would the administration support U.S. industry working with
Taiwan on an indigenous program?
Is there any reason to think U.S. companies would be denied
opportunities to support Taiwan's submarine program?
Answer. We do not comment on pending or potential arms sale
requests.
The U.S. decision about diesel submarines is still under
consideration. No decision has been made.
Question. Defense News recently reported that, despite the
cancellation of the combat avionics programmed extension suite (CAPES),
Taiwan will be able to progress with radar upgrades for its fleet of F-
16s through savings in the contracting process. While this is good news
for Taiwan in the short term, it is hard to believe that the long-terms
costs for the radar and avionics won't spiral out of control without
the additional 300 U.S. F-16's planned upgrades moving forward that
would have kept supply chain and life-cycle costs low.
What options are we providing our partner to ensure that we
are fulfilling our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act?
Does the Department of Defense support allies and partners
exploring competitions for these critical programs, to keep
costs down?
Answer. The Taiwan Relations Act states that it is U.S. policy:
``to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other
than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern
to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist
any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize
the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on
Taiwan.''
U.S. Foreign Military Sales regulations state that programs for our
foreign partners, to include Taiwan, are treated as if the program is
for a U.S. Military Service. Therefore, all options are explored to
keep costs down. However, U.S. law prohibits the United States from
losing any money on such sales programs.
United States Air Force (USAF) funding for the CAPES program will
continue through FY 2014. The USAF F-16 program office has determined
that the lack of USAF participation beyond FY 2014 will not have a
significant impact on the Taiwan program, and that any additional
funding required and in commitments to this retrofit program can be
covered in Taiwan's current Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA).
The CAPES cancellation is expected to have no impact to the
operational capability of Taiwan's Retrofit Program. Taiwan's F-16
Retrofit Program continues to execute as planned in terms of
performance, schedule and cost. While Taiwan will be solely responsible
for funding the radar development for FY15 and beyond, no additional
costs to Taiwan beyond the topline dollar figure in the LOA will be
required.
Question. There have been suggestions that the easing of tensions
between Taiwan and China has allowed China's People's Liberation Army
(PLA) to concentrate on other contingencies such as the East China Sea
and the South China Sea--and that increasingly a Taiwan scenario is
less and less a driver for PLA modernization.
Do you agree with this view?
Is Taiwan still central to the PLA modernization goals?
Answer. We continue to carefully monitor China's military
developments and encourage China to exhibit greater transparency with
respect to its capabilities and intentions. In the absence of greater
transparency, it is difficult to understand the motivations and goals
of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), in particular, China's military
leaders have not explained what scenarios are current within the PLA's
contingency planning. We encourage China to use its military
capabilities in a manner conducive to the maintenance of peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
We urge China to continue its constructive dialogue with the
authorities on Taiwan, which has led to significant improvements in the
cross-strait relationship. We welcome the steps authorities on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait have taken to reduce tensions and improve
relations. However, China has never renounced the use of force against
Taiwan and its military deployments across the strait from Taiwan
continue to produce tension and uncertainty.
We will continue to encourage China to be transparent about its
military spending and modernization. As part of that effort, we support
the continued development of military-to-military relations as a key
component of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, characterized by
sustained and substantive dialogue, a commitment to risk reduction, and
practical, concrete cooperation in areas of mutual interest.
Question. What is the administration's view on inviting Taiwan to
join the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations?
Answer. We welcome Taiwan's interest in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), and we note Taiwan's ongoing efforts to assess its
readiness to take on the TPP's ambitious commitments. The TPP is open
to regional economies that can demonstrate this readiness and gain
consensus support of the current TPP members for them to join. Right
now, the original 12 TPP members are focused on concluding the
negotiations of the TPP agreement.
In the near term, consultations under the Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) provide a substantive opportunity for Taiwan
to resolve existing U.S. trade and investment concerns, demonstrate its
preparations to take on new trade commitments, and set itself on a path
of liberalization of its economic regime.
Question. What steps will the administration take to ensure that
the United States does not interfere in the internal democratic process
in Taiwan in the runup to the 2016 Presidential elections, especially
given the unfortunate leak to the Financial Times in 2012 that implied
that the United States favored one Presidential candidate over the
other?
Answer. Free and fair elections are essential to a healthy
democracy. As in the past, we will refrain from any action likely to be
perceived as showing favoritism among candidates for elected office on
Taiwan. Respect for democracy and the practice of democratic elections
are among the treasured values that the people of the United States
share with the people on Taiwan. Through American Institute in Taiwan
(AIT) offices in Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Washington, we will reach out
to all political parties in Taiwan to learn about candidates and the
parties' and candidates' prospective policies, conducting such outreach
in a manner consistent with the unofficial nature of our relations with
the authorities and people on Taiwan.
______
Response of Assistant Secretary Daniel R. Russel to Question
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. During your confirmation hearing, I asked you to commit
to advocating for the elimination of trade barriers for soda ash and
other important U.S. industries in the international marketplace.
In response to my question, you explained, ``If confirmed as
Assistant Secretary, I will prioritize the East Asian and Pacific (EAP)
Bureau's promotion of U.S. exports and the facilitation of U.S
industries' participation in international markets.''
In addition, you indicated that you were aware that some countries
have taken actions against the importation of soda ash.
You responded, ``I will also advocate strongly for U.S. firms and
industries, encouraging our trading partners' adherence to their
international trade obligations in providing nondiscriminatory market
access for our exporters, including those in the soda ash industry.''
(1) How have you strongly advocated for market access for
U.S. exporters in the soda ash industry?
(2) What specific actions have you taken to address
Taiwan's 3.5 percent tariff on imported soda ash?
(3) What specific actions have you taken to address China's
reinstituted 9 percent value added tax (VAT) rebate for soda
ash exporters?
(4) What specific actions have you taken to address Japan's
3.3 percent tariff on natural soda ash imports?
Answer. The State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs is working closely with the office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) to help secure important new market
opportunities, including soda ash sales, for U.S. exporters.
On Taiwan, the United States will continue to engage with Taiwan
authorities to support efforts by U.S. exporters and Taiwan importers
to petition Taiwan to reduce its soda ash duties, as appropriate.
Regarding China, we have used bilateral fora--such as the Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade and the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue--to encourage China to open its markets and reduce distorting
practices such as tariffs, advantageous provisions for its state-owned
enterprises, direct export subsidies, and VAT reimbursements for
exporters such as those applied to soda ash exported from China.
In terms of Japan, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will be a
valuable tool in reducing Japan's tariffs on imports such as soda ash.
Japan's participation in the TPP negotiations provides an important
opportunity for many U.S. exporters--including U.S. soda ash
exporters--to expand their access to the Japanese market.
[all]