[Senate Hearing 113-642]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-642
CRUISE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT: RECENT
INCIDENTS SHOW NEED FOR STRONGER
FOCUS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 24, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK WARNER, Virginia DAN COATS, Indiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TED CRUZ, Texas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts JEFF CHIESA, New Jersey
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 24, 2013.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 24
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 32
Statement of Senator Schatz...................................... 125
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 128
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 131
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 133
Witnesses
Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention
Policy, United States Coast Guard.............................. 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Ross A. Klein, Ph.D., Professor, Memorial University of
Newfoundland in St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada............... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Hon. Mark Rosenker, Former Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board and Member, Cruise Line International
Association's ``Panel of Experts''............................. 92
Prepared statement........................................... 94
Gerald Cahill, President and Chief Executive Officer, Carnival
Cruise Lines................................................... 114
Prepared statement........................................... 114
Adam M. Goldstein, President and Chief Executive Officer, Royal
Caribbean International........................................ 118
Prepared statement........................................... 120
Appendix
Letter dated August 19, 2013 to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV
from Kathy A. Notarianni, Ph.D., P.E., Head, Department of Fire
Protection Engineering; Associate Professor, Fire Protection
Engineering and Associate Professor, Mechanical Engineering and
Chemical Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute.......... 147
Response to written questions submitted to Rear Admiral Joseph
Servidio by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 148
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 150
Response to written questions submitted to Gerald Cahill by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 151
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 154
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 154
Response to written questions submitted to Adam M. Goldstein by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 156
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 158
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV to Ross A. Klein, Ph.D.......................... 159
CRUISE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT: RECENT
INCIDENTS SHOW NEED FOR STRONGER
FOCUS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. I thank all of you for being here. And I will
proceed with an opening statement, followed by Senator Thune,
and then we will go directly to testimony, and then we will
have a lively discussion.
Millions of Americans enjoy taking cruises every year. I
completely understand why. Cruise lines sell people a fun-
filled, once-in-a-lifetime dream vacation. Probably with that
in mind, I guess, two my children have taken cruise line ships.
And sometimes they get that dream. Sometimes they get that
dream. But, as we all know, sometimes cruises hit rough waters
and that dream can turn into a nightmare.
In March 2012, after several very troubling safety
incidents occurred on cruise ships, I held a hearing in this
room to get answers about why passengers sometimes find
themselves in harm's way. It was a serious attempt to get
answers. The leader of the Cruise Industry Trade Association
sat right there and told me, basically, to trust her--that
doesn't come easily in the Senate, right?--to trust that the
industry was engaged in a rigorous review of safety procedures
that would fix everything. I did not entirely believe her at
the time, but I felt like the industry needed a fair chance to
correct their course. It has now been 16 months since that
hearing, and I have not seen much evidence that things have
changed.
Since that hearing, since those empty promises, serious
incidents continue to plague cruise ships. And I'm sorry about
that. This conduct should make us all very angry. If the
industry is seriously working to improve the safety and
security of its ships, why have we witnessed so many serious
incidents in the last 16 months? Is the industry really trying
to adopt a culture of safety or are these safety reviews and
temporary investments a cynical effort to counter bad
publicity? That happens.
I seriously worked to improve the safety and security of
these ships. Why have we witnessed so many serious incidents in
the last 16 months? I believe the culture of safety that
Americans expect, as they should, is clearly not always a
priority for cruise lines. That's not necessarily restricted to
cruise lines, I might say. I can think of a number of American
industries where I might make the same comment.
Cruise ships on fire and drifting at sea tend to make
headlines, and we know how they impact passengers. But, cable
news doesn't cover the many crimes committed against individual
passengers on cruise ships, which are just as concerning to me.
We have been reviewing the industry for a while now, for
quite a long while, and have found some sobering details.
Consumers have the right to know what we have learned before
they book their first or next dream vacation. For instance, if
somebody steals your property or assaults you on a cruise ship,
you cannot, obviously, call 911 and have the police there in a
few minutes; you can only call the ship's security officer,
who, I think, predictably, happens to be an employee of the
cruise line. That's not a criticism, it's just a fact. The
cruise industry has fought to limit when and where passengers
can file lawsuits, so it becomes incredibly difficult, if not
impossible, to right these wrongs.
I have placed, for your reading enjoyment, in front of you,
this. I went to the ophthalmologist, 2 days ago, and, in spite
of my very best efforts last night and this morning, I can't
read a word of this.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. And, at one hearing, we were told that, when
you are sold a ticket, that, after the ticket sale is made,
then you peel off, and then you run into this. What this is are
many pages, in absolutely the smallest type that I have ever
seen in my entire life. It's all about liability limitations.
Not all of it, but a lot of it. It's stunning. And what is most
important to me, I guess, is that it isn't readable. So, if it
isn't readable, is it, in fact, like it's not there and that
they're not being warned?
I don't think people go on cruise ships with the idea of
wanting to sue, but, after some of these incidents recently, it
may be that people do have that in mind.
Anyway, to make things worse, under current law, cruise
ship crime report data is not available to the public. That's
crime data. That means consumers have no way to find out what
their real risks are before they take a cruise. Now, granted,
these are huge ships. I guess the largest one is now, what,
5,000-plus people and 2,000 employees. And I'm not criticizing
that. It's a stunning sight to see, in the Virgin Islands or
the Bahamas or somewhere. But, I'm--I can't criticize that--
but, implicit in 7,000 people on a ship in such tight quarters
over a fairly long period of time, the possibility of predators
and criminal activities, whether it be on persons or on
property, is obviously large.
During the last few months, my staff has been analyzing the
FBI crime report. And that's this. It's the FBI crime report
data that does not get publicly released. And I'm not doing it.
They recently submitted a report to me on cruise ship crimes.
That's that.
I ask unanimous consent to put this staff report in the
record of this hearing.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary
I. The Commerce Committee's Review
II. Background on Cruise Passenger Resources and Recourse Following a
Crime Onboard
A. Calling for Help
B. Onboard Investigation
C. Jurisdictional Issues
D. Ticket Contracts Limit Passenger Rights
E. Impact of Differences
III. The CVSSA Crime Reporting Requirements
IV. Analysis of Cruise Crime Statistics Since CVSSA
V. Conclusion
Appendices
I. Alleged Crime Incident Data for 2011 and 2012
II. Alleged Crime Victim Data for 2012
III. U.S. Coast Guard Publicly Reported Cruise Crime Data for 2010,
2011, and 2012
Executive Summary
For many passengers, a cruise is a dream vacation: a floating city
full of exciting attractions and adventure for the whole family.
However, crime on a cruise ship can turn a dream vacation into a
nightmare. While crimes occur infrequently on cruise ships,\1\ when
crime does occur onboard the victim often lacks the same access to law
enforcement and emergency services--as well as avenues for recourse--
that are available in the United States. Particularly given these
differences, it is important that passengers are informed about crime
on cruises before they travel.
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\1\ Cruise Line I A, CLIA Statement: Congressional Hearing (Mar.
27, 2001) (online at http://www.cruising.org/vacation/node/316).
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To increase transparency regarding crime on cruise vessels,\2\
Congress included in the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010
(CVSSA) public reporting requirements regarding cruise ship crime.
Under the CVSSA, cruise lines must report to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) any allegation of a crime \3\ as soon as possible
and the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)\4\ must maintain and
publicly post on a website a statistical compilation of the alleged
crimes. Unfortunately, the public reporting process established under
this language is not providing consumers a complete view of crimes
reported on cruise vessels.
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\2\ Congress found that ``Passengers on cruise vessels have an
inadequate appreciation of their potential vulnerability to crime while
on ocean voyages, and those who may be victimized lack the information
they need to understand their legal rights or to know whom to contact
for help in the immediate aftermath of the crime.'' Pub. L. No. 111-
207, Sec. 2, (2010).
\3\ CVSSA classifies as crimes required to be reported to the FBI
as all homicide, suspicious death, a missing United States national,
kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which
section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing
or tampering with the vessel, or theft of money or property in excess
of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 111-207.
\4\ CVSSA requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to maintain
and publicly post a statistical compilation of alleged crimes reported
and no longer under investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. These statistics are published on the Coast Guard's
website. Pub. L. No. 111-207.
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Actual Cruise Crime Data is Higher than Publicly Reported
Unlike with crimes reported on land in the United States,\5\ the
public database established pursuant to CVSSA discloses only those
crimes that are no longer under investigation by the FBI. The law also
requires only a subset of the types of crimes reported to the FBI to be
reported publicly.\6\ Data the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation obtained from Coast Guard and the FBI shows that, since
passage of the CVSSA, the number of alleged crimes cruise lines
reported to the FBI--including crimes reported voluntarily by cruise
lines--is 30 times higher than the number of alleged crimes reported
publicly. Since 2011, cruise lines have reported 959 alleged crimes to
the FBI, while the Coast Guard reported only 31 alleged crimes
publicly.
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\5\ Federal Bureau of Investigations, Crime Statistics, Uniform
Crime Reports Web Site (online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
ucr-publications#Crime) (accessed June 10, 2013).
\6\ The owner of a cruise vessel is required to keep logs of all
allegations of crime but is only required to report certain types of
crime incidents to the FBI. The owner of a cruise vessel may voluntary
report other alleged crimes to the FBI. CVSSA provides that only the
crimes that are required to be reported to the FBI must be reported
publicly. These crimes include all homicide, suspicious death, a
missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily
injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or
(c) of title 18 applies, firing or tampering with the vessel, or theft
of money or property in excess of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 111-207. The FBI
records crimes reported to the Bureau, but not required to be reported
or publicly listed by the Coast Guard, as ``Other Crimes.''
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Further, with respect to the categories of crimes for which the
CVSSA specifically requires cruise lines to report alleged incidents to
the FBI, the number of alleged crimes that cruise lines reported is
over four times higher than the number of alleged crimes reported
publicly. Since 2011, cruise lines have reported 130 of such alleged
crimes to the FBI, while only 31 alleged crimes were reported publicly.
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Crimes Committed Against Minors are Unrepresented in Official
Statistics
The Committee's review of cruise crime statistics also identified
that crimes committed against minors are unrepresented in publicly
available statistics. In cases of sexual assault, cruise crime data
that is not publicly reported indicates minors are the victim in a
significant percentage of total alleged sexual assaults.
I. The Commerce Committee's Review
In March 2012, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation held a hearing on the cruise industry and its ability to
protect its passengers. The Committee received testimony raising
concerns that the public was receiving incomplete information regarding
alleged cruise crimes.\7\ At the hearing Ross Klein, a professor at
Memorial University of Newfoundland, testified about his Freedom of
Information (FOIA) request to the FBI for cruise crime data after the
passage of CVSSA:
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\7\ Testimony of Professor Ross Klein, Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Oversight of the Cruise Ship
Industry: Are Current Regulations Sufficient to Protect Passengers and
the Environment?, 112th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2012).
The material returned in response was totally unhelpful. All
useful information was redacted. As well, the FBI says they are
not required to keep track of or report crimes committed on
cruise ships unless they have opened a file of investigation
and subsequently closed the file. That means that allegations
of crime are no longer available for analysis . . . [This
absence of data] is not in the interest of the public or in the
spirit of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010.''
\8\
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\8\ Id. at p. 47.
To further examine these concerns, Committee Chairman John D.
Rockefeller IV requested that the FBI provide the Committee the crime
data that the cruise lines reported to the FBI since passage of CVSSA.
Using the crime data provided by the FBI,\9\ Committee staff then
compared this data to the publicly reported cruise crime data that is
posted on the Coast Guard's website.\10\
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\9\ Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of
Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate
Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (July 16, 2012); Letter from
Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman
Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013).
\10\ The Coast Guard Cruise Crime Website (online at http://
www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/CruiseLine.asp) These statistics can be found
attached to this report as Appendix III.
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II. Background on Cruise Passenger Resources and Recourse Following a
Crime Onboard
According to the cruise industry, a cruise is as safe as ``your
average community in the United States,'' \11\ and ``the incidence of
crime onboard is very small given the large number of guests carried.''
\12\ However, there are significant differences between how crimes that
occur on land in the United States are responded to as compared to
crimes that occur on cruise vessels.
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\11\ Mystery at Sea: Who Polices the Ships?, New York Times (Feb.
26, 2006) (online at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/travel/
26crime.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&).
\12\ Carnival Cruise Line Website (online at https://
secure.carnival.com/cms/fun/cruise_
control/security_safety_act.aspx) (accessed June 10, 2013).
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A. Calling for Help
In the United States, when a crime occurs, a victim or a witness to
the crime generally can call 911 to access police, medical, and other
services.\13\ Often, within minutes, law enforcement trained to
investigate and eventually help prosecute criminals is on the
scene.\14\ Law enforcement called to the scene is an impartial party to
the investigation;\15\ they must protect the scene, take statements,
and collect and preserve evidence in accordance with the law.\16\
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\13\ The National 911 Program (online at http://www.911.gov/
about.html).
\14\ See, e.g., Department of Justice, Crime Scene Investigation: A
Guide for Law Enforcement (Jan. 2000) (online at http://www.nij.gov/
nij/topics/law-enforcement/investigations/crime-scene/guides/
generalscenes/welcome.htm).
\15\ See, e.g., Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Officer
Requirements page (online at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/CJST/
Menu/Officer-Requirements-Main-Page/LE-Ethical-Standardsof-
Conduct.aspx); FBI, Quick Facts (noting FBI core values include
fairness) (online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts) (accessed
June 28, 2013).
\16\ Department of Justice, Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for
Law Enforcement (Jan. 2000), pp.iii, 1, and 10.
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When a crime occurs on a cruise vessel, it can be an entirely
different story for the victim. Victims generally report crimes to
cruise vessel security officers, who are employees of the cruise
company.\17\ These employees do an initial investigation and determine
when and whether to report a crime to law enforcement.\18\ As employees
of the cruise lines, these security officers do not have the same arm's
length relationship with the cruise lines as do local and Federal law
enforcement officials.\19\ Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network
(RAINN) testified before the Commerce Committee about the inherent
difficulties victims face when reporting a crime that occurred onboard
to security officers who work for the cruise company:
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\17\ House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on
Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007),
p. 30.
\18\ Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Cruise Ship Safety:
Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th
Cong. (June 19, 2008), pp. 55-56.
\19\ House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on
Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007),
p. 30.
You won't have any rape crisis personnel onboard to support
you, let alone law enforcement officials to come to your aid.
You might turn to cruise ship employees for help, only to later
find that the cruise line has a vested interest in shielding
themselves against negative publicity or legal jeopardy. And
you might wonder how any security personnel hired by the cruise
line will react if presented with any situation that might give
rise to a potential conflict of interest between their employer
and yourself.\20\
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\20\ Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Cruise Ship Safety: Examining
Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong. (June
19, 2008), p. 13.
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B. Onboard Investigation
Since law enforcement generally is not immediately present when a
crime occurs on a cruise ship, the cruise ship security officers and
sometimes the victims themselves are responsible for preserving the
scene of the crime and any evidence.\21\ According to Congressional
testimony, cruise lines have taken the position that they have no duty
to investigate crimes.\22\ Victims groups and others have raised
concerns that cruise lines have omitted basic steps such as taking
witness statements and have lost, destroyed, or mishandled
evidence.\23\ The International Maritime Organization \24\ (IMO) is
developing draft guidelines to help guide cruise line crew in crime
scene preservation.\25\
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\21\ Id. p. 12.
\22\ See Testimony of International Cruise Victims Association,
Inc. President Kendall Carver, Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential
Steps for Keeping Americans Safe at Sea (June 19, 2008) (discussing
cruise lines' legal position and attaching legal memo by a leading
cruise line taking this position) (online at http://
www.internationalcruisevictims.org/files/Total-testimoney
1a-1-with_titles.pdf) (accessed July 15, 2013).
\23\ See, e.g., The World Today--Brimble inquest hears staff
disturbed crime scene, ABC Online (June 15, 2006) (online at http://
www.abc.net.au/cgibin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/
worldtoday/content/2006/s1663754.htm); Testimony of Professor Ross
Klein, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Oversight of the Cruise Ship Industry: Are Current Regulations
Sufficient to Protect Passengers and the Environment?, 112th Cong.
(Mar. 1, 2012), pp. 39 and 43 (stating that crew training for crime
scenes is inadequate); Testimony of RAINN (Rape, Abuse, and Incest
National Network), Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, of the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Cruise Ship Safety: Examining
Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe at Sea, 110th Cong. (June
19, 2008), p. 12, 18 (discussing issues concerning contaminated
evidence).
\24\ IMO is a United Nations agency that sets international
standards for ship safety, security, and pollution. IMO, See About IMO
page (on line at http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx).
\25\ International Maritime Organization, Collation and
Preservation of Evidence Following an Allegation of a Serious Crime
Having Taken Place on Board a Ship or Following a Report of a Missing
Person from a Ship, and Pastoral and Medical Care of Victims, Legal
Committee 100th session, Agenda item 7 (I:/LEG/100/7.doc) (Feb. 8,
2013).The International Cruise Victims Association has raised concerns
about the adequacy of these draft guidelines. See CDR. Mark Gaouette,
USNR (Ret.), Unpublished paper entitled ICV Discussion on the IMO Legal
Committee Guidelines: ``Collation and Preservation of Evidence
Following an Allegation of a Serious Crime'' 2013; Mark Gaouette,
Campaigners and industry clash over crime guidelines, Fairplay (June 6,
2013).
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C. Jurisdictional Issues
Because of complex jurisdictional rules governing cruise line
activities, in some cases passengers may not have the same legal
protections on cruise vessels as they do in the United States.\26\ U.S.
laws and protections only govern in certain circumstances and there are
instances where U.S. law enforcement has limited jurisdiction over
crimes.\27\ For example, a U.S. citizen can report a cruise crime to
the FBI, but if the ship has left U.S. port the FBI is not typically in
a position to act as an onboard police force immediately after the
crime happens.\28\ Law enforcement may be located thousands of miles
away \29\ and may have to work through a myriad of jurisdictional
issues with other countries that share jurisdiction over the
incident.\30\
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\26\ Myers, Rosie, Cruise Industry Regulation: What Happens on
Vacation Stays on Vacation, A&NZ Mar LJ (2007) (online at http://
heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals
&handle=hein.journals/ausnewma21&div=11&id=&page=), pp. 109 and 114.
\27\ Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Crimes Against Americans on
Cruise Ships, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 1.
\28\ Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Cruise Ship Safety: Examining
Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong. (June
19, 2008), p. 13.
\29\ Rosie Myers, Cruise Industry Regulation: What Happens on
Vacation Stays on Vacation, 21 Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law
Journal (2007), pp. 106-107.
\30\ Id. at pp. 114-117.
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Further, only certain crimes meet the threshold for the FBI to
intervene. Theft of items valued under a certain amount \31\ or lack of
evidence \32\ may result in the FBI declining to investigate an alleged
crime. Even if the FBI does investigate, another country's law
enforcement agency may play the lead role in investigating and
prosecuting the crime.\33\
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\31\ Asia N. Wright, High Seas Ship Crimes, Loyola Maritime Law
Journal 1 (2009), p. 8.
\32\ House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on
Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007),
p. 12.
\33\ House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on
Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007),
pp. 11-12; Asia N. Wright, High Seas Ship Crimes, Loyola Maritime Law
Journal 1 (2009), p. 19.
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D. Ticket Contracts Limit Passenger Rights
Passengers may also find their ability to pursue legal action
limited by clauses in the passenger contract that provides the terms
and conditions of a cruise.\34\ For example, ticket contracts may
require that a passenger has to file a lawsuit in a much shorter period
than if the crime had occurred on land.\35\ Contracts also may include
restrictions on the location of where an aggrieved passenger can file a
lawsuit--typically requiring actions to be brought in Florida, where
the major cruise lines are based.\36\ Further, cruise contracts often
require mandatory arbitration \37\ or limit class action lawsuits.\38\
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\34\ Christopher Elliott, Can you trust the cruise lines' new
passenger ``bill of rights''?, Chicago Tribune (June 18, 2013) and
Princess Cruises, Passage Contract (online at http://www.princess.com/
legal/passage_contract/index.jsp).
\35\ Justice Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passengers' Rights and
Remedies: 2013 (June 10, 2013) pp. 120-123. (online at http://
www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCert_pdfs/Dickerson
_Docs/CRUISEPASSENGERSRIGHTS&REMEDIES2013ONLINE.pdf).
\36\ Michael D. Eriksen, U.S. Maritime Public Policy Versus Ad-hoc
Federal Forum Provisions in Cruise Tickets, The Florida Bar Journal
Volume 80, p.11 (Dec. 2006) (online at http://www.floridabar.org/
DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal
01.nsf/c0d731e03de9828d852574580042ae7a/
78faff425fc6f9e48525723300561ebf!OpenDocument&Highlight=0,*).
\37\ Justice Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passengers' Rights and
Remedies: 2013 (June 10, 2013) (online at http://www.nycourts.gov/
courts/9jd/TacCert_pdfs/Dickerson_Docs/CRUISE
PASSENGERSRIGHTS&REMEDIES2013ONLINE.pdf), pp. 127-128.
\38\ E.g., Princess Cruise Lines Passage Contract, p. 14 (online at
http://www.princess.com/legal/passage_contract/index.jsp) (accessed
July 1, 2013).
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E. Impact of Differences
The vast majority of cruise passengers are not victims of onboard
crime. However, where a crime does occur, the difference between
passenger resources and recourse available on a cruise vessel versus on
land can be the difference between justice and injustice for a crime
victim. A case in point is the account of Laurie Dishman, who testified
to Congress that while she was traveling on a cruise to Mexico, a
janitor who was ``filling in'' for a security guard raped her, leaving
ligature marks on her neck and other physical evidence.\39\ According
to Ms. Dishman's testimony, following this incident, the cruise line
personnel contaminated the scene, mishandled evidence, destroyed or
``re-used'' closed circuit television camera tapes, delayed notifying
the FBI, delayed providing medical treatment, did not immediately seal
the crime scene, and provided limited information to Ms. Dishman.\40\
Further, she stated that the FBI was not able to access the crime scene
for several days. At the time, the FBI indicated they did not have
enough evidence to further investigate the crime. The accused crew
member was not arrested, and he was allowed to return to his home
country.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Crimes
Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007) pp. 158-
159.
\40\ Id.
\41\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stories like this and others provided impetus for Congress to enact
a number of provisions addressing crime on cruise ships in the 2010
CVSSA.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Id.; Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Cruise Ship
Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea,
110th Cong. (June 19, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. The CVSSA Crime Reporting Requirements
In 2007, the FBI, Coast Guard, and the cruise lines agreed that
cruise lines would voluntarily report to the FBI incidents involving
serious violations of U.S. law: homicide, suspicious death, missing
U.S. nationals, kidnapping, assault with bodily injury, sexual
assaults, firing or tampering with vessels, and theft greater than
$10,000.\43\
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\43\ House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
of the Committee on Transportation, Crimes Against Americans on Cruise
Ships (110-21) (Mar. 27, 2007), pp. 2, 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to U.S. Coast Guard testimony, under this agreement, the
FBI would annually compile this data and prepare a comprehensive report
to share with the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA). The
Coast Guard encouraged CLIA to disclose this information to potential
cruise ship passengers.\44\ A victims group indicated it had been able
to obtain these statistics through FOIA requests.\45\ However, this
information was not readily available to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Id.
\45\ Kendall Carver and Jamie Barnett, International Cruise Victims
Challenges Cruise Crime Statistics Provided by FBI (June 10, 2012)
(online at http://internationalcruisevictims.active
board.com/t49559394/icv-update-june-102012/?w_r=1354674534)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the ways Congress sought in the CVSSA to improve the safety
of cruise passengers was to provide for greater transparency in
reporting crimes that occur on cruise ships.\46\ In most major U.S.
localities and foreign countries, the public can view local crime
statistics based on crimes reported.\47\ The FBI views these crime
statistics as an important and helpful tool.\48\ The public can use
information regarding the occurrence of crimes to make more informed
decisions about their travel and actions.\49\
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\46\ Pub. L. No. 111-207.
\47\ The Federal Bureau of Investigations, Uniform Crime Reporting
Program page (online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr); the
State Department, International Travel Page (online at http://
travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_4965.html).
\48\ See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports,
Crime in the United States, Statement of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller
(noting: ``The significant challenge of protecting life and property
requires many different kinds of resources, including data such as the
information found in this report. The highest mission of the FBI's UCR
Program is to provide information to help law enforcement and other
community leaders better understand the issues they face and more
effectively prepare to meet them each day'') (online at http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-
u.s.2010/message-from-the-director).
\49\ For example, numerous travel articles discuss crime as a
factor for consumers considering tourist destinations. See, e.g., Komal
Bakhru, Safest Vacation Destinations in the Caribbean (July 2011)
(online at http://www.buzzle.com/articles/safest-vacation-destinations-
in-the-caribbean.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CVSSA includes language providing for public access to crime
reports for cruise lines similar to reports the public can access
regarding communities across the country. Toward that end, the law
requires cruise lines to report a specific set of crimes to the FBI
that (1) occur on a vessel owned by a U.S. person, (2) involve a U.S.
national, (3) that occur in U.S. waters, or (4) will depart from or
arrive at a U.S. port.\50\ Additionally, the Coast Guard must make
these crime statistics publicly available online.\51\ However, unlike
crime reporting on land in the United States,\52\ the FBI interprets
the CVSSA to require public reporting of only those incidents that are
no longer under investigation by the FBI.\53\
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\50\ The CVSSA requires cruise lines to report to the FBI all
incidents of homicide, suspicious death, a missing United States
national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense
to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18
applies, firing or tampering with the vessel, or theft of money or
property in excess of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 111-207.
\51\ Id.
\52\ Federal Bureau of Investigations, Crime Statistics, Uniform
Crime Reports Web Site (online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
ucr-publications#Crime) (accessed June 10, 2013).
\53\ Under the CVSSA, the incidents of homicide, suspicious death,
a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious
bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or
2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing or tampering with the
vessel, or theft of money or property in excess of $10,000, that are
reported and are no longer under investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation must be maintained on an Internet site that provides a
numerical accounting of each of these incidents. Pub. L. No. 111-207
(2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CVSSA also requires cruise lines to keep logs of all complaints
of crimes committed on any voyage that embarks or disembarks passengers
in the United States.\54\ This requirement covers a broader range of
crimes than those required to be reported to the FBI. Under the CVSSA,
cruise lines may voluntarily report any of the alleged incidents that
do not fall under the category of incidents required to be reported,
and many cruise lines have voluntarily provided this information to the
FBI.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Pub. L. No. 111-207.
\55\ Id.
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While CVSSA attempted to improve public access to reported cruise
crime data, today complete information is still not publicly released.
IV. Analysis of Cruise Crime Statistics Since CVSSA
Cruise crime data reviewed by Commerce Committee staff \56\ shows
that since enactment of CVSSA, the public has not been able to access
complete information regarding reported crimes aboard cruise vessels.
Since passage of the CVSSA, the total number of alleged crimes cruise
lines reported to the FBI--including both incidents reported
voluntarily and those required to be reported to the FBI by cruise
lines--is 30 times higher than the number of alleged crimes reported
publicly. Since 2011, cruise lines have reported 959 alleged crimes to
the FBI, while the Coast Guard reported only 31 alleged crimes
publicly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ To conduct this analysis, Committee staff reviewed publicly
available cruise crime statistics and those requested by the Chairman,
and by victim advocate groups through Freedom of Information Requests
(FOIA). Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of
Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate
Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (July 16, 2012); Letter from
Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman
Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013); Letter from David M. Hardy Section Chief,
Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Mr. Kendall Carver, International
Cruise Victims Association (June 14, 2013) regarding FOIA request for
2012 cruise crime data submitted to the FBI. Appendix I includes the
incident data analyzed to determine total alleged crimes reported to
the FBI versus total alleged crimes reported publicly in 2011 and 2012.
The FBI provided such incident data for 2011 and the incident data for
2012 was drawn from an FBI response to a FOIA request. The FBI also
provided the Committee data for 2012 that tallies victims of alleged
crimes--as opposed to incidents of alleged crimes--and this data is
shown in Appendix II.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure I: Discrepancies Between Publicly and FBI Reported Cruise Crime
Data
There is also a significant discrepancy between the total crimes in
the categories of crime for which CVSSA mandates reporting to the FBI,
and total crimes in these categories that are reported publicly.
According to the FBI, for the years 2011 and 2012, the total alleged
crimes that cruise lines reported to the FBI, in categories where
reporting is required, was 130--over four times the total reported
publicly by the Coast Guard. Figure II shows this difference.
Figure II: Cruise Crime Statistics Reported to the FBI and by the Coast
Guard, Excluding Crimes Voluntarily Reported to the FBI
Figure III provides additional detail, displaying by categories of
crime the difference between the number of alleged crimes reported to
the FBI by cruise lines and the number of alleged crimes reported
publicly.
Figure III: Detailed Cruise Crime Statistics as Reported by the FBI and
Coast Guard \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Id.
In some cases, as with assaults with serious injury reported in
2011, the number of crimes publicly reported matches the number of
crimes reported to the FBI. In most cases, however, the number of
crimes reported to the FBI differs significantly from the number
reported publicly. For example, with respect to alleged sexual assault
crimes, the 13 alleged crimes publicly reported in 2011 represented
only 31 percent of the 42 alleged crimes reported to the FBI, and in
2012 the 11 alleged crimes publicly reported represented only 38
percent of the 28 alleged crimes reported to the FBI. Figure III also
shows that the FBI receives cruise line data on ``other crimes'' that
is not shared publicly.
In addition to the discrepancy between total alleged crimes
reported to the FBI and total alleged crimes reported publicly, the FBI
also receives additional victim detail not reported publicly concerning
the age of victims of reported crimes. According to the FBI, of the 29
alleged reported sexual assault victims in 2012, 10--or 34 percent--
were minors. Figure IV depicts this added detail that the FBI obtains
when gathering cruise crime data with specific regard to alleged sexual
assaults.
Figure IV--2012 Sexual Assault Data as Reported by the FBI \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of
Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate
Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013).
Two recent media accounts of alleged sexual assaults on board
cruise ships, one involving an alleged groping of a 12-year-old girl by
a passenger,\59\ and one involving an alleged groping of an 11-year-old
girl by a crew member,\60\ are reminders that minors as well as adults
can be victims of crimes onboard cruise ships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ KTOO, Ketchikan DA Investigating Alleged Cruise Ship Sexual
Assault (July 12, 2013).
\60\ USA Today, Watchdogs Urge Better Reporting of Cruise Ship
Crime (June 10, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Conclusion
Since the enactment of CVSSA, the number of alleged crimes reported
by cruise lines to the FBI have been substantially higher than the
number reported publicly. Further, the public does not currently have
the ability to assess the extent to which minors are victims of cruise
crime because this information is not currently publicly released.
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The Chairman. Our exhaustive oversight of the cruise
industry and the recent events that have left thousands
stranded at sea make it absolutely clear that more needs to be
done. So, this week I took action. I introduced new legislation
to make the common sense consumer protection improvements the
cruise lines have not been willing to make on their own.
At this point, incidentally, I should thank the Royal
Caribbean CEO for coming. He was the most cooperative. And I
don't know what he's going to say, but he came, and it was his
own decision, and I want to thank him for that.
Consumers deserve to know what rights and protections they
have, and, more importantly, that they do not have, on their
cruise. I have been assured repeatedly by the industry, that
things will get better.
Take a look at the events over the past 16 months and tell
me if this is what you think ``better'' looks like. Cruise
lines are on notice that the safety and protection of
passengers is now their number one priority, whether they like
it or not.
That is the conclusion of my statement, and I turn now to
Senator John Thune, the Ranking Member, whom I'm very fortunate
to be able to work with.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Likewise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing today. And I want to thank our witnesses
for being here to testify.
Ensuring safety across all modes of transportation is one
of this committee's most important functions. And recent
events, in several modes, whether by air, rail, or sea, have
demonstrated how challenging this can be. This task can be made
even more difficult when a vessel like a cruise ship must
travel through several jurisdictions during a single voyage.
For instance, when a cruise ship embarks from a U.S. port,
the cruise line must ensure compliance with safety regulations
through coordination with the industry, the U.S. Coast Guard,
and with foreign governments in countries through which the
cruise ship is passing, either by sailing in foreign
territorial waters or docking at a port within a foreign
government's jurisdiction.
While the cruise ship industry's safety record is generally
good, there have been a few troubling incidents in recent
years. The most tragic of these was the fatal accident
involving the Costa Concordia, which ran aground off the coast
of Italy in 2012. Thankfully, other incidents, other recent
incidents, including those involving ships departing from U.S.
ports, have not resulted in fatalities or significant injuries.
Nevertheless, these particular incidents, which received
significant media attention, did underscore the challenges and
discomfort that passengers can be subjected to, including days
without power or plumbing, and raise questions about the
protections afforded to U.S. passengers.
In the wake of these incidents, the cruise ship industry
has taken several noteworthy steps to further ensure the safety
and comfort of its customers and crews. The industry should be
commended for its adoption of the Cruise Industry Passenger
Bill of Rights, which includes the right to disembark from a
ship if essential provisions cannot be provided; the right to a
refund for a trip canceled due to mechanical failures; and the
right to an emergency power source in the case of a generator
failure. As the Chairman has noted, however, the Committee has
an interest in ensuring that these commitments are translating
into better experiences for passengers.
So, I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about
these and other steps the cruise industry has taken to improve
safety.
Additionally, I am interested in hearing from the Coast
Guard about any recommendations stemming from their
investigations of recent cruise ship incidents and the work
that they're doing at the Cruise Ship National Center of
Expertise, in Everglades, Florida.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing, and
I want to thank our witnesses for being here and for their
willingness to testify.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
I think we should just move right into the witnesses.
That's not pleasing to three distinguished colleagues of mine
over there, but they'll have a lot of time to ask questions and
to engage.
Why don't we just start the way it is here: Rear Admiral
Joseph Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention and
Policy, United States Coast Guard.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO,
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Servidio. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member
Thune, members of the Committee, good afternoon. On behalf of
the Commandant and the men and women of your Coast Guard who
perform our challenging safety, security, and environmental
stewardship missions each day, including our response to the
blowout well going on in the Gulf right now, sir, I thank you
for your continuing strong support of our service. And, Mr.
Chairman, thank you for your oversight.
Today, I look forward to telling you how the Coast Guard
regulates foreign-flagged cruise ships to ensure they are as
safe as possible for the U.S. passengers who embark them. I
want to leave you with three messages, sir: that we have a
robust inspection regime for foreign-flagged cruise ships; I
believe, the strongest port state control program in the world;
that we have trained vessel inspectors and a National Center
for Expertise to provide consistency in identifying risks and
enforcing compliance; and that we have an assertive
investigations process, a feedback loop informing our
inspectors and our inspections, as well as our forward-leaning
standards development process. We're looking to address today's
and tomorrow's potential risks.
Our regulatory oversight of cruise ships starts when they
are still on the drawing board. Coast Guard naval architects
review design drawings with a focus on critical elements, like
fire- and life-safety plans, including structural fire
protection and emergency escape routes. Once the design
drawings are reviewed, we send our inspectors overseas to
conduct onsite inspections and see if the vessels are
constructed as they are designed. Once the ship is complete, it
must pass the rigorous inspection initial exam before we allow
it to embark passengers in U.S. ports. Finally, once in
service, the ship is regularly inspected and will be examined
on a risk-based schedule at least semiannually.
If we have any concerns about a ship's safety, we will not
permit it to embark passengers until our concerns are
addressed. For example, several weeks ago, the Carnival Triumph
was attempting to return to service after suffering an engine-
room fire. Before we would allow it back into service, Triumph
had to pass an initial inspection, which included Coast Guard
inspectors examining fire-detection, firefighting, and
lifesaving systems and observing the crew conduct safety
drills. Triumph did not initially pass, the captain of the port
formally detained the vessel. Triumph eventually did pass, but,
because it was detained, we'll be conducting more frequent
inspections on the vessel.
Inspecting these vessels is difficult, sir. Modern cruise
ships are some of the most sophisticated vessels on the water
today, due to their size and their complexity. To ensure our
Coast Guard inspectors are experts, we leverage our National
Cruise Ship Center of Expertise, in Fort Lauderdale. The NCOE
collects studies and applies lessons learned from inspections
and casualty investigations, and uses them to update our cruise
ship inspection procedures, courses, and job aids.
As an example, the Coast Guard was, and is, actively
involved in a number of investigations. We've learned that our
attention to detail on structural fire protection has worked.
Systems generally performed well; they protected passengers and
they likely saved lives. However, we also learned, in the
Carnival Splendor investigation, that we need to inspect some
areas more closely, like fixed engine-room firefighting
systems, as well as to focus on higher-risk engine-room fires
and drill evaluations. With the NCOE, we have adjusted our
inspection procedures to make these changes.
Because almost all of the cruise ships are foreign flagged,
we are exerting leadership internationally to make cruise ships
safer. Last month, I attended the IMO's Maritime Safety
Committee meeting. At this session, we adopted an amendment
that requires passengers to receive safety instructions prior
to, or immediately after, departure. We also tasked IMO experts
to study how cruise ship designs can be enhanced to increase
survivability.
In summary, the Coast Guard is dedicated to ensuring the
safety and security of every cruise passenger and crew member,
as well as protecting our environment. Our oversight of foreign
cruise ships is comprehensive, but we strive to improve, every
day. We're learning from our casualty investigations and
working on better leading indicators. And, although leadership
at the--and, through leadership at the IMO, we're looking to
mitigate tomorrow's, as well as today's, risks.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Servidio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio, Assistant
Commandant for Prevention Policy, United States Coast Guard
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished
members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss issues related to cruise ship safety. I would
like to provide background into the Coast Guard's oversight of the
cruise industry, highlight what we've learned and implemented from
recent casualties, and discuss the effectiveness of our Port State
Control system in holding cruise industry companies and their vessels
accountable for safe passenger operations.
In my role as the Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Prevention
Policy, I am responsible for setting standards for safety, security,
and environmental stewardship for commercial vessels, facilities, and
mariners, ensuring compliance with those standards, and conducting
investigations of violations and accidents.
Over the past three years we've seen a number of high profile ship
casualties within the cruise industry, fires aboard the Carnival
Splendor, Carnival Triumph and Grandeur of the Seas highlight serious
questions about the design, maintenance and operation of fire safety
equipment on board these vessels, as well as their companies' safety
management cultures. As the United States' lead as a Port State for
holding foreign companies accountable for the safe and secure design
and operation of these vessels, I am very concerned about these
failures. I am working to ensure that the Coast Guard thoroughly
reviews each incident to determine causes and identify corrective
actions and hold the cruise lines accountable for improving safety
aboard vessels through increased examination and oversight.
Additionally we will work through the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) to update the design and operational standards for
cruise ships based on these incidents.
We recently completed our investigation into the Carnival Splendor
engine explosion and debilitating fire. We are treating the
recommendations for Coast Guard action in that report as requirements,
and based on that report, the Coast Guard is changing its examination
program for foreign cruise ships to examine CO2 system
installations and arrangements more closely. Additionally, we have
increased our expectations for successful fire drills. We have also
made recommendations to Carnival Corporation to improve their training
programs. I will cover these recent developments in more detail a bit
later in my testimony.
In late June, I led the U.S. delegation to the 92nd session of the
IMO Maritime Safety Committee. At this session, we adopted new rules
governing cruise ship passenger safety briefings which will become
mandatory in July 2015. These new rules ensure that whenever U.S.
passengers board a Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulated passenger
ship for more than 24 hours, they will receive a detailed safety
briefing either prior to, or immediately after, the vessel gets
underway. This regulatory change elevates the standard globally for
approximately one third of all cruise passengers who don't embark ships
in the U.S.
Further, based in part on our proposals at this June session, IMO
has commenced reviewing design standards in order to make cruise ships
safer, and even more damage-tolerant, through improved survivability
standards.
Modern Standards for Cruise Ships
Over the past decade, the international shipping community, through
the IMO and with Coast Guard leadership, has moved decisively toward a
proactive approach to passenger ship safety. With cruise ships growing
progressively in size and capacity, in May 2000 the IMO agreed to
undertake a holistic examination of safety issues pertaining to
passenger ships, with particular emphasis on large cruise ships. The
outcome of this proactive initiative is an entirely new prevention-and
survivability-based regulatory philosophy for cruise ship design,
construction, and operation.
The U.S., through the efforts of the Coast Guard, has taken a very
active leadership role throughout this initiative, putting forward many
of the recommendations for action taken by the various IMO Sub-
Committees. This effort identified a number of areas of concern related
to cruise ships, and resulted in substantial amendments to major IMO
conventions, including SOLAS, International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL) 73/78, International
Tonnage, Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW)
and Load Line conventions. These amendments address surveys,
structures, stability, machinery, fire safety, lifesaving equipment,
communications, navigation equipment, safety management, maritime
security, pollution prevention, crew competency, watertight integrity,
and safe loading.
Significant improvements under the five main pillars of the IMO
initiative entered into force in July 2010 include:
Prevention: Amendments to the STCW Code and supporting
guidelines focus on navigation safety and resource management;
Improved survivability: New SOLAS requirements for the
``safe return to port'' concept address essential system
redundancy, management of emergencies, and casualty mitigation,
including the new concept of dedicated shipboard safety centers
to manage emergencies;
Regulatory flexibility: Amendments to SOLAS provide a
methodology for the approval of new and innovative safety
technologies and arrangements;
Operations in areas remote from SAR facilities: Guidelines
on external support from SAR authorities, as well as guidance
to assist seafarers taking part in SAR operations have been
developed; and finally; and
Health safety and medical care: Guidelines on establishing
medical safety programs, and a revised Guide on Cold Water
Survival.
Other recent improvements include stability and survivability of
cruise ships through new probabilistic subdivision and damage stability
regulations, and flooding detection systems; improved voyage planning,
particularly in remote and high latitude areas; and voyage data
recorders. As a separate initiative, stemming from the 2006 fire aboard
the Star Princess, significant improvements have been made to the fire
safety features of external areas on cruise ships. Overall, the past
decade has been an enormous leap forward in cruise ship safety measures
and has been largely proactive to casualties. The U.S. Coast Guard's
leadership in the international community with respect to cruise ship
safety measures and our support to foreign casualty investigations
evidences our dedication to the world wide safety of U.S. passengers.
The Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection Net
The IMO conventions form the basis for the international safety,
security, and stewardship net designed to ensure consistent standards
across the world wide fleet of cruise ships. Owners and operators,
vessel crews, classification societies, flag states (or their
recognized organizations when delegated to act on the behalf of the
flag state), and port states each have distinct roles in ensuring
compliance with those standards. Each of these entities performs
specific roles intended to maximize safety, security, and environmental
protection.
Flag states have the primary responsibility to ensure their vessels
meet international and domestic standards. They often achieve this
through recognized third party organizations who certify that vessels
meet design, construction, operating, and manning requirements
throughout the life of the vessel.
Port states verify substantial compliance with international
standards and ensure compliance with applicable domestic requirements
for vessels of all flags calling in their ports. As the port state
authority for the U.S., the Coast Guard has established a robust
control verification program that subjects cruise ships calling in U.S.
ports to a much higher level of scrutiny than other foreign flag
vessels, and much higher than any other port state requires for foreign
flag cruise ships in their ports.
Although we cannot provide total quality control for foreign cruise
ships visiting our ports, we do take prompt action to ensure
deficiencies we find during our examinations are corrected in an
expeditious manner. If a deficiency is serious, we ensure it gets
corrected before the vessel leaves port. When one or more deficiencies
lead us to conclude a ship is substandard, we detain the vessel. A
detention means the vessel cannot leave port until the serious
deficiencies are corrected. We report the detention to IMO and list the
vessel on international forums as a detained vessel, and we will
examine the vessel more frequently for a period of three years.
Most recently, the Coast Guard detained the Carnival Triumph after
it was found to have three serious deficiencies at its first
examination after completing repairs following the February 2013 fire.
As described above, the vessel was held in port until these
deficiencies were corrected, we reported the detention to IMO and
listed the vessel as detained on our website, and the vessel will be
subject to quarterly examinations for three years. This detention
demonstrates the effectiveness of our control verification program, as
well as our willingness to hold substandard vessels accountable.
Coast Guard Control Verification Program for Foreign Flag Cruise Ships
All foreign flag cruise ships arriving in the United States that
embark passengers or make a U.S. port call while carrying U.S. citizens
as passengers must participate in the control verification process.
Cruise ships that return to U.S. service after a prolonged absence are
treated as if they had never been in service in the U.S. and must
undergo the entire process again.
The Coast Guard control verification program includes initial,
annual, and periodic examinations for foreign flag cruise ships calling
in our ports. Further, it includes concept review during the very
earliest stages of design and pre-construction planning by Coast Guard
naval architects and fire protection engineers, mid-construction
inspections at the builder's yard by Coast Guard marine inspectors, an
initial operational inspection of the vessel upon completion of
construction, and at least annual inspections while the vessel is in
service in U.S. ports. This regime allows the Coast Guard to determine
that the vessel is in substantial compliance with all applicable
international and domestic standards.
The engineering review of plans for structural fire protection
arrangements provides an additional level of assurance that shipboard
fire safety arrangements meet international standards. After review,
these same engineers visit the ship to confirm that the arrangements on
the vessel are the same as those shown on the structural fire
protection plans. On the basis of this initial examination, the Coast
Guard issues a certificate of compliance that allows the vessel to
operate in U.S. ports.
The annual examination ensures that foreign cruise ships continue
to maintain the systems the Coast Guard previously examined during the
initial exam in proper operating condition and that the flag
administration has performed annual renewal surveys as required by
SOLAS. Inspectors focus on marine environmental protection,
firefighting, lifesaving, and emergency systems and witness a
comprehensive fire and boat drill by the crew. In addition, inspectors
examine the vessel for modifications that would affect the vessel's
structural fire protection and means of escape. They also check for
modifications completed without the vessel's flag administration
approval. After a satisfactory annual examination, the Coast Guard re-
issues a certificate of compliance.
Periodic examinations are also conducted, typically midway between
the annual examinations. These examinations are more limited in scope
but still compliment the more comprehensive annuals, and they are
intended to ensure vessels are being operated in a safe manner. The
periodic examinations focus on the performance of officers and crew,
with specific attention paid to their training on and knowledge of the
ship's emergency procedures, environmental protection, security,
firefighting, lifesaving systems, and conduct during the drills. To
ensure the overall material condition of the ship has not appreciably
changed since the annual examination, inspectors randomly select sample
items for examination.
Inspectors also vary the scope of the examination depending on such
factors as the material condition of the vessel, recordkeeping, the
maintenance of the vessel, and the professionalism and training of the
crew. At every Coast Guard examination of a foreign cruise ship, the
inspectors will determine whether the vessel is in substantial
compliance with the international convention standards.
Investigations
Foreign vessels operating in U.S. waters are required by U.S. law
to report accidents immediately. Upon accident notification, we
proactively investigate casualties meeting a threshold to determine
causes and issue safety recommendations to prevent recurrences.
This is a continuous improvement process which incorporates lessons
learned from accident investigations to enhance cruise ship safety and
ensure compliance with national and international laws.
After the Costa Concordia incident, and as a ``Substantially
Interested State'' in accordance with IMO Protocols, the Coast Guard
immediately offered technical expertise and support to the Government
of Italy's marine casualty investigation. Similarly, following the
Carnival Triumph fire and the Grandeur of the Seas fire, the Coast
Guard is participating in the investigations with the vessel's flag
state of the Bahamas as a Substantially Interested State. It is long
standing practice to cooperate in all manner of accident investigations
involving different flag and coastal states and the Coast Guard
routinely acts in this accord.
After the Carnival Splendor fire in November 2010, the Coast Guard
reached out to Panama, the vessel's flag state, to offer assistance. In
accordance with international protocols and at the request of Panama,
the Coast Guard took the lead for the investigation into this casualty.
While this incident did not lead to major damage to the vessel, injury
or loss of life, the investigation revealed a number of major safety
concerns. As a result, the Coast Guard immediately issued two safety
alerts to advise the industry of potential CO2 system
problems.
The Coast Guard report of investigation which was released on July
15, 2013, also contains five safety recommendations. Three of the
recommendations are addressed to Carnival and Panama (as the flag
state) to ensure that the conditions which contributed to the fire, are
addressed appropriately. In addition, there are two safety
recommendations which are aimed at exercising and enhancing the Coast
Guard's role as the Port State for this and many other foreign flag
cruise ships. These recommendations will be implemented by my staff and
will ensure that Coast Guard Port State Control Officers are armed with
the information needed to not only evaluate the mechanical systems
onboard these complex vessels, but the human element as well.
Investigations informing the Control Verification Process and other
actions
In its role as a Port State, the Coast Guard employs casualty
investigation lessons learned where practical and appropriate to inform
the Control Verification process.
For example, as a result of the Costa Concordia incident, we
directed Coast Guard field inspectors to witness the passenger muster
required by SOLAS whenever they are aboard a cruise ship conducting an
initial, annual, or periodic examination. Our personnel witness these
musters either immediately before or during vessel departure from port.
In conjunction, the cruise industry associations announced a new
emergency drill policy requiring mandatory muster for embarking
passengers prior to departure from port.
As a result of the Carnival Splendor casualty, we are directing
Coast Guard field inspectors to examine vessel CO2 systems
more closely during examinations. There was evidence that the
CO2 system had not been installed and maintained properly,
and we are looking at sister vessels for similar problems. Any similar
problems will require swift correction. We have also increased our
expectations for the fire drills we witness during our examinations.
Too often, ships perform drills for our inspectors which do not address
a fire in a high-risk area such as an engine room. We will direct ships
to perform an engineroom fire drill during the next examination of all
vessels, and will expect such demonstrations periodically thereafter.
Following the Carnival Triumph fire in the Gulf of Mexico in
February of 2013, we engaged aggressively in Carnival's Safety
Management System (SMS) by requesting them and the vessel's flag state
(the Bahamas) to hold their annual audit early, with which they
complied. We participated in Carnival's company level SMS Document of
Compliance audit conducted by Lloyd's Registry in April, and plan to
observe one of their shipboard SMS audits. Based on the most recent
audit results, we have been generally satisfied with Carnival's SMS
implementation, and will continue to keep a close eye on their
progress.
A more recent casualty to the Grandeur of the Seas yielded several
observations which we are taking immediate action to correct. One
involves a deluge system valve that protected the mooring deck area
that had caught fire. The valve was located in an area made
inaccessible due to the fire. Our inspectors will examine sister ships
for similar problems. Another observation involved un-insulated
aluminum deck hatches which failed and allowed the fire to affect
adjacent spaces. Again, our inspectors will examine sister ships for
similar problems.
Search and Rescue (SAR) and Mass Rescue Operations (MRO)
The Coast Guard has maintained a sound relationship with the cruise
lines regarding search and rescue and medical evacuations. For the
Coast Guard, a Mass Rescue Operation involving a cruise ship casualty
offshore, with potentially thousands of passengers and crew forced to
evacuate into lifeboats and the water, presents our greatest search and
rescue challenge.
Working with cruise line and passenger vessel companies, the Coast
Guard continues to develop and improve SAR and MRO contingency plans.
In addition to internal Coast Guard SAR plans, the Coast Guard holds a
copy of cruise ship SAR plans and is able to incorporate the cruise
ship plans into our overall SAR planning. The Coast Guard also meets
periodically with cruise line medical personnel to discuss plans for
medical emergencies.
Coast Guard passenger vessel safety personnel at each of our
Districts assist in the conduct and coordination of Coast Guard mass
rescue exercises. Over the last five years, the Coast Guard conducted
thirty-six mass rescue exercises involving passenger vessels, three of
which involved a cruise ship.
Mass rescue exercises have been structured around a five-year
cycle. The Coast Guard has directed that, at a minimum, each Coast
Guard District conduct and/or participate in one discussion based
(e.g., seminar, workshop, game, or tabletop) and one operations based
(e.g., drills, functional, full scale) mass rescue exercise over a five
year period.
To meet this exercise requirement the Coast Guard initiated a five-
year mass rescue exercise series known as ``Black Swan.'' The exercise
series commenced in April 2013 with a full scale exercise on a
passenger ship in Freeport, Bahamas, and will continue with a full
scale exercise in Hawaii in 2015 and Norfolk in 2017. The scope of
these exercises provides a valuable opportunity to identify and resolve
the difficulties associated with rescuing hundreds or thousands of
people. Black Swan will continue to focus on the exercise of Coast
Guard mass rescue plans, coordination with other authorities and
industry partners, notification and information processes, personnel
accountability, and unique challenges of embarking thousands of
survivors on rescue ships from the water, lifeboats and rafts, and
rescued passenger and crew support.
Cruise Ship Security and Crime
The events of September 11, 2001, spurred the development of the
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the IMO International
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, both of which are
rigorously enforced by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard examines every
cruise ship that visits the U.S. for compliance with MTSA and ISPS
requirements during the ship's annual and periodic Control Verification
exam, as well as on a random basis throughout the year during
unannounced port security checks.
Despite this security compliance regime, there have been serious
incidents and crimes that have affected U.S. citizens aboard foreign-
flagged cruise ships. This has led to an increased focus on protecting
our citizens both in port and while they are at sea. In 2010, Congress
enacted the Cruise Ship Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA) which
prescribes security and safety requirements for designated cruise
ships.
CVSSA addresses many areas that affect personal safety and
security, including: ship design; better public access to information
about crime aboard cruise ships; improved precautions, response,
medical care, support for victims of sexual assault; preservation of
evidence necessary to prosecute criminals; and more consistent and
complete reports. Some of these requirements went into effect when the
President signed the legislation on July 27, 2010; however, there are
areas that require implementation through the publication of
regulations.
Thus far, the Coast Guard has completed the following actions with
respect to implementing the CVSSA:
The Coast Guard published policy establishing guidelines for
Coast Guard Marine Inspectors examining cruise vessels for
compliance to include physical requirements, such as: rail
heights; door peep-holes (similar to hotel doors), which allow
cabin occupants to see who is outside; and the passenger
security guide.
The Coast Guard established an Internet-based portal
([email protected]) to facilitate electronic submission of crime
reports.
The Coast Guard established a web link to publish cruise
ship sexual assault and criminal activity data received from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in accordance with
the Act: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/.
An Inter-agency workgroup consisting of Coast Guard, FBI,
and the Maritime Administration personnel completed development
of a model course addressing crime scene preservation standards
and curricula.
The Coast Guard published policy promulgating training
standards and curricula for the certification of passenger
vessel security personnel.
Closing
In closing, let me emphasize that the Coast Guard understands and
embraces our lead role in protecting our most precious cargo--people,
who are carried aboard cruise ships in many of the world's most
pristine marine environments. We continue to place the highest priority
on enforcing compliance with safety, security and environmental
regulations on those vessels that embark passengers in the United
States and embark U.S. passengers world-wide.
We have a strong and effective port state control program for
foreign cruise ships and will continue to ensure that vessels calling
on ports in the United States are in substantial compliance with
applicable international and domestic standards.
Through proactive oversight and enforcement, we participate in
casualty investigations, even those taking place overseas, and we lead
efforts at the IMO to improve maritime safety, security, and
environmental protection standards. As those investigation results are
analyzed, the Coast Guard will continue to capture the lessons learned
and incorporate them into our safety regime, and continue to recommend
international requirement updates where necessary. Internally, we are
also changing our examination procedures to address the lessons made
apparent from other recent cruise ship fire casualties and ensure our
port state control examinations target areas of concern.
The Coast Guard looks forward to continued cooperation with this
committee, passenger victims groups, and the passenger vessel industry
to maximize cruise vessel safety, security, and environmental
protection.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I will be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I want to make two announcements at this point. One is that
Senator Nelson--obviously, from Florida--this is a big deal,
this hearing, for him--has left another hearing that he's
chairing and, I think, is going back, and he asked me if he
could make a short statement.
I'm looking at my three esteemed colleagues over there,
praying for sympathetic looks.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. The Ranking Member is sympathetic, so
Senator----
Senator Blumenthal. We're very, very, very sympathetic.
The Chairman. Yes.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. And the other thing is, I would ask Committee
staff to remove these photographs. They've been up, now, and I
want this to be unfettered exchange, as opposed to pictorial
matters.
Please go ahead, Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to my
colleagues, for your indulgence.
As scheduling would have it, the Aging Committee is
meeting, right now, of which I'm chairing. Senator Collins is
taking the gavel while I'm gone, and I must return. But, I did
want to thank you for your consideration that I could make--
Chairman, could make a statement. And I look forward to
reviewing the legislation that you have filed.
All of us here have a responsibility to ensure that cruise
passengers are safe, that ships are well maintained, in top
condition, and the crew members onboard these ships are well
trained and thoroughly prepared to handle any situation that
might arise at sea. So, we, obviously, all of us, have a keen
interest in this, naturally.
The cruise industry is of concern to us, in my state. They
have a major presence in Florida. They employ over 130,000
people. In my state, cruising accounted for $6.7 billion in
total economic impact in Florida, and, last year, nearly 6
million cruise passengers departed from ports in Florida. So, I
can share with the members of this committee that, in my
meetings with the industry, I have stressed that passenger and
crew safety must be the industry's top priority. The industry
has responded to me that it is making a good-faith effort in
prioritizing and improving its safety programs and that it is
ready to work with this committee, and with you, Mr. Chairman,
and they hope to continue this improvement.
And I want to thank you again for your efforts, Mr.
Chairman. I want to thank you, as the Chairman of our overall
committee, on the work that you do to ensure the safety of the
traveling public, not just on the seas, but in all means of
travel.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And, you're right, it's in all means of
travel.
Senator Nelson. It is.
The Chairman. And thank you for coming here.
Senator Nelson. And I--with your permission, I will return
to my chairing duties over at Aging.
The Chairman. Uh-huh.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Dr. Ross Klein is Professor of the School of Social Work,
which resonates with me, at St. Johns College, Memorial
University of Newfoundland.
Please.
STATEMENT OF ROSS A. KLEIN, Ph.D., PROFESSOR,
MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND
IN ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND, CANADA
Dr. Klein. OK, thank you. It is an honor to be asked to
share my knowledge and insights with the U.S. Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
In my brief oral remarks, I will identify some of the key
points in my written submission.
The cruise industry has received considerable attention in
the media in recent years. In 2013 alone, the media has
reported for cruise ships: three running aground; five with
fires; two collisions; 19 mechanical problems, including power
loss, propulsion problems, and generator problems; 10 canceled
port calls and/or changes in itinerary; 16 cruises with delayed
embarkation and/or debarkation; two cruises where passengers
have been bumped; and eight ships that have failed U.S. health
inspection.
In response to the negative publicity from these events and
Senator Schumer's call for greater consumer protection, the
Cruise Lines International Association, in late May, issued its
Passenger Bill of Rights, an obvious public relations
initiative. A systematic evaluation reveals that, while many of
the promises, on their face, are reassuring to cruise
passengers, a deeper look indicates the Passenger Bill of
Rights is filled with empty promises.
Take, for example, number 5, the right to a ship crew that
is properly trained in emergency and evacuation procedures.
There is a huge chasm between being properly trained and those
same crew members demonstrating, through behavior, competence
in executing emergency and evacuation procedures.
Take for example the U.S. Coast Guard's investigation of
the fire and power loss of Carnival Splendor. It indicates a
number of instances of human error.
Also take the cost of Concordia.
I doubt that crew members were not properly trained, but
what assurances does a CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights provide
that training will be reflected in behavior, and what recourse
does a passenger have when this, or any right, is not realized?
Also take for example right number 1, the right to
disembark a docked ship if essential provisions cannot be
adequately provided. What cruise passenger would not be
reassured by this? But, how is this right fulfilled when a ship
is dead in the water for 3 or 4 days, and being towed to port?
And once the ship returns to port, who decides how quickly the
disembarkation will begin, and does the passenger have any
rights if it takes longer than they think is fair? Coming up
with a list of rights is easy. But, as they say, the devil is
in the details.
Perhaps more troubling are contradictions between CLIA's
Passenger Bill of Rights and the typical cruise passenger
contract. There's no indication which takes precedence,
especially given the restrictiveness of the passenger cruise
contract with regard to rights held by a cruise passenger,
particularly in comparison to the rights of the cruise line,
and the extreme limitations on the cruise line's liability for
almost anything that happens on a cruise ship.
My written testimony systematically analyzes CLIA's Bill of
Rights and a typical cruise passenger contract. This analysis
points to the need for better consumer protection of cruise
passengers, much like the protections that are available to
passengers on other modes of commercial transportation,
including air carriers.
My written testimony also provides systematic analysis of
the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. I look at
the implications of differences between the Act, as initially
introduced, and the final Act that was passed. I also look at
issues that are not adequately addressed by the current Act.
One major issue is the reporting of statistics on crime on
cruise ships. The original intent was that the Act would make
available all reported crimes on cruise ships. In practice,
there are many crimes that are neither--that are either not
being reported to the FBI or which the FBI chooses not to make
available to the American public. Take as just one example the
fact that, for a 15-month period, the FBI reports a single case
of sexual assault on Norwegian Cruise Line, but, in the legal
case, in discovery, they disclosed that there were 23 sexual
assaults for that same time period.
Access to comprehensive, reliable data is essential if
we're going to be able to do a proper social epidemiological
analysis of the problems, especially as relates to crimes
against children.
Now, another point worth mention is the nature of security
on a cruise ship. Presently, a crime committed on a cruise ship
is initially investigated by security personnel who are cruise
line employees. They are not independent, as would be the case
for a crime reported on land. The cruise line employee is
clearly in a conflict-of-interest position. This doesn't give
much confidence to a victim of a crime on a cruise ship.
I will stop my oral testimony here. I invite all interested
to read my written testimony for a deeper understanding of my
insights and resulting concerns. I certainly welcome the
Committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Klein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ross A. Klein, Ph.D., Professor, Memorial
University of Newfoundland in St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Oral Testimony
Written Testimony
I. Safety and Security of Cruise Ships
The Nature of the Problem
Lessons to be Learned from These Events
The Relative Absence of Reliable Data
Frequency and Types of Events
Discernable Insights from Data
Learning from Success, Not Just Accidents
Regulation and Oversight of the Cruise Industry
II. Safety and Security of Cruise Passengers
Scope of the Problem
The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010
From Hearings to Legislation
Persons Overboard
Sexual Assaults
Prevention
Intervention
Investigation
Prosecution
Other Crimes
III. Consumer Rights and Cruise Ship Liability
CLIA Bill of Rights
The Right to Disembark a Docked Ship
The Right to a Full Refund
The Right to Medical Care
The Right to Timely Information
The Right to Trained Crew
The Right to an Emergency Power Source
The Right to Transportation
The Right to Lodging
The Right to a Toll-Free Number
The Right to Have Published
CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Contract
What the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights Does Not Include
Passenger Rights
Cruise Line Rights
Issues of Liability
Illness Outbreaks
Independent Contractors
Medical Care
Shore excursions
Sexual Assaults
Limit of Liability
IV. In Closing
V. Summary of Recommendations
Appendix 1: Summary of Cruise Ship Incidents, January 2009-June 2013
Appendix 2: Ships with Two or More Mechanical Incidents, January 2009-
June 2013
Appendix 3: Summary of Persons Overboard, January 1995-June 2013
Appendix 4: Drug Busts, January 2009-June 2013
Appendix 5: Sex at Sea: Sexual Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships
______
Oral Testimony
It is an honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In
my brief oral remarks I will identify some of the key points in my
written submission.
The cruise industry has received considerable attention in the
media in recent years. In 2013 alone the media reports for cruise
ships: 3 running aground; 5 fires; 2 collisions; 19 mechanical problems
including power loss, propulsion problems, and generator problems; 10
canceled port calls and/or changes in itinerary; 16 cruises with
delayed embarkation and/or disembarkation; 2 cruises where passengers
were bumped; and 8 ships that have failed U.S. health inspections.
In response to the negative publicity from these events, and
Senator Schumer's call for greater consumer protection, the Cruise
Lines International Association (CLIA) in late-May issued its Passenger
Bill of Rights--an obvious public relations initiative. Sadly, a
systematic evaluation reveals that while many of the promises on their
face are reassuring to cruise passengers, a deeper look indicates the
Passenger Bill of Rights is filled with empty promises. Take for
example Right #5--The right to a ship crew that is properly trained in
emergency and evacuation procedures. There is a huge chasm between
being properly trained and those same crewmembers demonstrating through
behavior competence in executing emergency and evacuation procedures.
Take for example the U.S. Coast Guard's investigation of the fire and
power loss of Carnival Splendor in 2010. It indicates human error in a
fire alarm being reset, leading to a 15-minute delay in activation of
an automatic fire-suppression system; the crew's lack of familiarity
with the engine room, which hampered their ability to locate and fight
the fire; and the captain ventilating the compartment where the fire
began before it was fully extinguished, allowing the flames to flare
again. I doubt the crewmembers were not properly trained, but what
assurance does CLIA's Passenger Bill of Rights provide that training
will be reflected in action. And what recourse does a passenger have
when this or any Right is not realized?
Also take for example Right #1--The right to disembark a docked
ship if essential provisions cannot adequately be provided onboard.
What cruise passenger would not be reassured by this, but how is this
Right fulfilled when a ship is dead in the water for 3 or 4 days and
being towed to port? And once the ship returns to port, who decides how
quickly disembarkation will begin? Does a passenger have any right to
contest a decision to keep them onboard?
Coming up with a list of ``mom-and-apple-pie'' rights is easy. But
as they say, the devil is in the details.
Perhaps more troubling are contradictions between CLIA's Passenger
Bill of Rights and the typical cruise passenger contract. There is no
indication which takes precedence, especially given the restrictiveness
of the passenger cruise contract with regard to rights held by a cruise
passenger (particularly in comparison to the rights of the cruise line)
and the extreme limitations on the cruise line's liability for almost
anything that happens on a cruise ship. My written testimony
systematically analyses CLIA's Bill of Rights and typical passenger
cruise contracts. This analysis points to the need for better consumer
protection of cruise passengers, much like the protections available to
passengers on other modes of commercial transportation, including air
carriers.
My written testimony also provides systematic analysis of the
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. I look at the
implications of differences between the Act as initially introduced and
the final Act passed. I also look at issues that are not adequately
addressed by the current Act. One major issue is the reporting of
statistics of crime on cruise ships. The original intent was that the
Act would make available all reported crimes on cruise ships. In
practice, there are many crimes that are either not being reported to
the FBI or which the FBI chooses not to make available to the American
public. Take as just one example the fact that for one 15-month period
the FBI reports a single case of sexual assault on Norwegian Cruise
Line; however records disclosed in discovery indicate the number was
actually 23.
Access to reliable data is important for passengers who have a
right to know the relative risk, including between one cruise line and
another and ideally between one cruise ship and another. Through a
Freedom of Information request by International Cruise Victims
Association I was given 12-months of data to analyze. The analysis was
illuminating. It revealed where sexual assaults occur, the identity of
perpetrators and victims, and the conditions surrounding an attack
(including the presence of alcohol and the high rate of victimization
of children). Availability of such data is important for passengers,
and access to data is essential for a proper social epidemiological
analysis of the problem.
I will stop my oral testimony here. I invite all interested to read
my written testimony for a deeper understanding of my insights and
resulting concerns. I welcome the Committee's questions.
______
Written Testimony
It is an extreme honor to be asked to share my knowledge and
insights with the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. My testimony focuses on the parameters I was given when
I was invited to testify:
safety and security issues relating to cruise ships (e.g.,
fires, collisions, and other accidents);
safety and security of cruise ship passengers, including
discussion of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety act of
2010;
consumer rights and issues relating to cruise ship
liability, including discussion of CLIA's Passenger Bill of
Rights.
I. Safety and Security of Cruise Ships
As the luxury liner finally made it to shore . . . [passengers]
expressed disgust at the way they had been treated . . . Conditions
inside the cabins were said to have been ``beyond horrific'' due to the
lack of air conditioning and running water. Lavatories overflowed and
they were fed on little but spam sandwiches. They were forced to sleep
on deck in sweltering temperatures of up to 35C (95F) and said that the
stench in the corridors and cabins was so bad it would remain with them
``for a long time'' . . . ``Sheer luck has disguised the incompetence
from start to finish. Some people are blissfully unaware of how lucky
they are.''
The alarm was first raised at around 1.30 p.m. on Monday when an
electrical fault caused a fire in the engine room and power was lost .
. . All passengers were told to go to their muster stations, at which
point many said they feared they would have to abandon ship . . . It
then took three hours to conduct a roll call amid chaotic scenes and
growing panic. As black smoke billowed from one of the chimneys, it
became immediately clear that a fire had broken out on board.
American Gordon Bradwell, 72, from Georgia, who used to work in the
travel industry, was on the cruise ship with his wife Eleanor when the
engine caught fire. ``It was very tense,'' he said. ``We are just happy
to have got through it. We were very hot and the sewage was very poor.
Right now we're delighted to be off the ship. We are living off
adrenalin right now. We have been eating dried sandwiches for three
days so we are looking forward to eating a proper meal. After the fire
broke out there was nothing to propel the ship along. Things
deteriorated rather quickly. There was no running water so we had go
back to living a primitive existence. The cabin temperature reached
110F so we had to sleep on the deck.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Ward, V. 2012. ``Costa Allegra: Passengers Tell of `Hell' On-
board.'' The Telegraph (March 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One might think this describes the ordeal on Carnival Triumph in
February 2013, but it is about an almost identical incident occurring a
year earlier in February 2012. The Costa Allegra experienced an engine
fire, causing a loss of all power and setting it adrift for three days
in the Indian Ocean. It was finally towed to Port Victoria on the
island of Mahe in the Seychelles where passengers disembarked. The ship
was decommissioned and scrapped after the incident.
A. The Nature of the Problem
The cruise industry would like us to believe incidents such as the
one described above, and the eerily similar incident involving Carnival
Triumph which had an engine fire knocking out all power and setting the
ship adrift for five days \2\--finally arriving in Mobile under tow--
are uncommon. The question isn't whether they are uncommon, but how
common they are. Take for example the following engine fires, all
involving members of the Cruise Lines International Association:\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Brown, R., K. Severson, and B. Meier. 2013. ``Cruise Line's
Woes are Far From Over as Ship Makes Port,'' New York Times, (February
15).
\3\ All of these events are reported at Events at Sea
(www.cruisejunkie.com/events.html)
June 2009--Royal Princess had an engine room fire while
leaving Port Said, Egypt. The ship returned to the port the
next day and after evaluation of damage the cruise was
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
terminated.
November 2010--Carnival Splendor has engine room fire
setting it adrift; the ship was finally towed to San Diego (150
miles north) even though it was 55 miles west of Punta San
Jacinto, Mexico. It was a five day ordeal for passengers.
Initially there was no electricity and toilets did not work,
but toilets were restored by the end of the first day although
there was no air conditioning and no hot food service. The
ship's engine that failed had had five alarms between July 21,
2010 and November 5, 2010, most recently repaired on November
5, 2010; the fire occurred on November 8, 2010.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See United States Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation
into the Fire Onboard the Carnival Splendor which Occurred in the
Pacific Ocean Off the Coast of Mexico on November 8, 2010, which
Resulted in Complete Loss of Power, MISLE Incident Investigation
Activity Number: 3897765 (July 15).
September 2011--Hurtigruten's Nordyls suffered an engine
room fire, killing two crew members and injuring 16. The ship
was evacuated by lifeboat and the cruise was terminated. The
Washington Post reported salvage teams pumped water from the
cruise liner in danger of capsizing, reducing the tilt 21.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
degrees in the morning to 16 degrees in the evening.
October 2011--Cunard Line's Queen Mary 2 suffered an engine
fire causing a loss of power while in a major storm (two other
ships chose to turn back from the storm, but the Queen Mary
decided to battle through). Staff members were given a 90
minute warning in order to prepare to deploy the lifeboats.
Guests had their children dropped off and their animals picked
up from the kennels. Power was restored, but people were
understandably shaken up. Three weeks later the ship twice went
dead in the water on a transAtalantic cruise. And again in
February 2012 the ship had a total power failure and was dead
in the water.
March 2012--Azamara Quest had an engine room fire, injuring
five crew members (one critically), setting the ship adrift
between Manila and Borneo. The ship was able to restore power
and some propulsion after 24 hours and limped to Sandakan,
Malaysia, arriving three days after the fire. The cruise was
terminated and passengers flown home.
April 2012--Adventure of the Seas had an engine room fire
causing section 6 of the ship to be temporarily evacuated. The
ship was adrift for 1-2 hours and then continued on one engine.
November 2012--Adventure of the Seas had an engine room fire
while crossing the Atlantic causing a brief loss of power and
electricity.
February 2013--Carnival Triumph suffers an engine room fire,
setting it adrift for five days without power, air
conditioning, or toilets. Initial plans were to tow the ship to
the closest port, Progresso, Mexico, however a decision was
subsequently made to tow the ship to Mobile. NOTE: The ship was
reported to have technical problems with its propulsion system
affecting its cruising speed and causing a six hour delay in
its return to port two weeks before;
June 2013--Pullmantur's Zenith had a disabling engine fire
and had to be towed to port (Venice, Italy)
There are also ships running aground (19 since 2009) with some
incidents leading to termination of the cruise. Some examples include:
January 2009--Hurtigruten's Richard With ran aground at the
port of Trondheim on the west coast of Norway suffering
propeller damage and taking on water through a leak in a seal.
All 153 passengers were evacuated by the local emergency
services from land.
February 2009--Quark Expeditions' Ocean Nova ran aground off
Antarctica. Passengers were evacuated to other ships.
Unofficial sources report the ship's engines were turned off
for maintenance when the ship was blown aground.
August 2010--Clipper Adventurer ran aground in Canada's
Northwest Passage. Passengers wer transported to Coppermine,
Nunavut to be transported home.
October 2010--Celebrity Cruises' Century damaged its rudder
at Villefranche-sur-Mer. Cruise terminated.
March 2013--Hurtigruten's Kong Harald was forced to wait for
the tide to come in and lift the ship off the underground rock
at the entrance to Trollfjord where it was grounded and the
hull breached. Once the incoming tide freed the ship it carried
on to Svolvaer, where all 258 passengers onboard disembarked
and were flown home today.
March 2013--Coastal and Maritime Voyages' Marco Polo ran
aground just outside Sortland in Vesteralen causing a leak in a
ballast tank.
March 2013--Lindblad Expeditions' National Geographic Sea
Lion hit a rock in the Las Perlas Islands, about 70 nautical
miles from Panama City. The ship sustained damage to its hull
and one propeller during the incident, but after clearance from
the U.S. Coast Guard returned to Panama City on its own power.
The cruise was terminated.
It isn't just engine fires and ships running aground. There are
other problems worth note:
March 2009--P&O Cruises' Aurora experienced propulsion
problems four hours after leaving Sydney. It limped to Auckland
where passengers remained onboard for five days while repairs
were completed. The world cruise itinerary was changed.
April 2009--Passengers were told upon embarkation on Seven
Seas Voyager that most port calls between Dubai and Rome were
canceled because of propulsion problems; the next two cruises
canceled.
November 2009--Norwegian Dawn lost power for hours (and no
air conditioning). Power was restored and the ship sailed to
San Juan from where passengers were flown home. This and the
next cruise were canceled.
February 2010--Costa Europa collided with pier in Sharm-el-
Sheikh, ripping a hole in the side of the ship and flooding
crew cabins. Three crewmembers were killed; four passengers
were injured. The 18-day cruise from Dubai to Savona was
terminated and passengers flown home.
February 2010--P&O Australia's Pacific Dawn was delayed in
port for 18 hours because of propulsion and maintenance
problems; its itinerary is changed. Two months later the ship
lost power and propulsion and narrowly missed collision with a
bridge in Brisbane.
May 2010--P&O Cruises' Artemis notified passengers upon
boarding that engine problems require one port to be dropped
from the itinerary. But once underway on the 20 day cruise,
originally with ten scheduled port calls, passengers were
issued a revised itinerary with four ports calls, only three of
which were on the original itinerary.
June 2010--Celebrity Cruises' Infinity was delayed five or
six hours because of engine problems causing a port call to be
canceled. Five days later an electrical fire caused a power
loss for several hours.
February 2011--P&O Australia's Pacific Sun delayed 24 hours
in its arrival at Newcastle because of engine problems; several
port calls canceled. Propulsion problems in November 2010
caused a 10-hour delayed arrival in Melbourne, engine problems
cause a cruise to be canceled in April 2010, mechanical
problems caused two ports calls to be canceled, and in November
2009 a cruise was canceled to permit repair of the propulsion
system.
March 2011--MSC's Opera twice collided with pier at Buenos
Aires damaging several cabins and delaying departure for 10
hours while repairs completed. September 2011--Toilets in front
and mid-ship cabins were inoperable for a day on Carnival
Imagination. Passengers were told to use public washrooms in
the aft section.
May 2011--MSC's Opera had failure of an electric panel
causing power loss for 8.5 hours. The ship was towed to port
and the cruise canceled.
November 2011--Carnival Splendor collided with pier in
Puerto Vallarta, requiring it to stay an extra day to complete
repairs; the next port call was canceled.
January 2012--Costa Concordia hits a rock off the Italian
coast and capsizes killing 32 people.
February 2012--Enchantment of the Seas left Baltimore 24
hours late after unsuccessful attempts to repair an engine. The
ship started the cruise on one engine, sailing at half speed,
and the itinerary changed. Two weeks later the cruise had
propulsion problems that left it in Port Canaveral for 27 hours
for repairs, again requiring a change to the itinerary.
March 2012--Silversea Cruises' Silver Shadow collided with
container ship in Viet Nam holing the cargo ship; only minor
damage to the cruise ship. Passengers were frightened.
October 2012--Celebrity Cruises' Summit had a tender run
aground with 93 passengers and 2 crew members. The tender
suffered major damage and passengers were rescued by a fishing
boat and whale-watching boat.
November 2012--Saga Ruby had engine problems that required
the current cruise to be canceled.
March 2013--A malfunction of the backup emergency power
diesel generator caused power outages and plumbing issues on
Carnival Dream and led to a cruise being terminated in Saint
Maarten and passengers flown home.
March 2013--Steering problems required Carnival Elation to
have a tugboat escort to port.
March 2013--Carnival Legend was disabled and stuck in Costa
Maya for a day. It finally got underway at reduced speed and
dropped a port call to arrive on time at its port of
disembarkation. The itinerary of the subsequent cruise was
changed because of propulsion problems.
March 2013--Seven Seas Voyager suffered propulsion problems
causing ports to be skipped.
April 2013--Crown Princess began a cruise with 410 cabins
having toilets that would not flush. Until they were fixed,
passengers needed to go to public bathrooms (even during the
middle of the night).
The list can go on. Appendix 2 lists cruise ships having two or
more incidents between January 2009 and June 2013. It shows 353
incidents involving mechanical problems and accidents, approximately 80
incidents per year.
The obvious question is how such events can be so common. A
February 2013 in Newsweek gives the perspective of Jim Hall, head of
the National Transportation Safety Board during the Clinton
administration:
[He] says the industry is watched over by ``paper tigers'' like
the International Maritime Organization and suffers from ``bad
actors'' . . . ``The maritime industry is the oldest
transportation industry around. We're talking centuries. It's a
culture that has never been broken as the aviation industry
was, and you see evidence of that culture in the [Costa
Concordia] accident,'' says Hall.
Ships may seem and feel American but are mostly ``flagged'' in
countries like the Bahamas or Panama in order to operate
outside of what he says are reasonable safety standards. ``It
is, and has been, an outlaw industry,'' says Hall. ``People who
book cruises should be aware of that.'' \5\
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\5\ Conant, E. 2013. ``Carnival from Hell: The Warning Signs Before
the Triumph Disaster,'' Newsweek (February 22).
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B. Lessons to be Learned from These Events
My point is not to muckrake, listing all that goes wrong with
cruise ships. My analysis instead provides insights. By knowing the
problems, we can identify potential solutions. The available data
raises several issues.
1. The Relative Absence of Reliable Data
``No one is systematically collecting data of collisions, fires,
evacuations, groundings, sinkings,'' says Jim Walker, a maritime
lawyer, to the New York Times. The article goes on to say:
``The reason for the lack of data is that cruise lines, while
based in the United States, typically incorporate and register
their ships overseas. Industry experts say the only place
cruise lines are obligated to report anything is to the state
under whose laws the ship operates.'' \6\
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\6\ Rosenbloom, S. 2013. ``How normal are cruise mishaps,'' New
York Times (May 8, 2013).
As the article points out, there remains no comprehensive public
database of events at sea like fires, power failures, and evacuations
except the data available at my website, Cruise Junkie dot Com.
While I take this acknowledgement as a compliment, it identifies a
major gap in available information. My data is based on reports
available in the public media and, on occasion, reports from passengers
and/or crewmembers. There are many incidents occurring that never reach
the public domain. Consequently, there is no way for passengers to know
the track record of an individual cruise line or the ships comprising
the line.
The data I have benefits greatly from the efforts of Senator
Rockefeller who made public a list of casualty investigations by the
U.S. Coast Guard for 2008-2012 and the Sun-Sentinel, which posted
online U.S. Coast Guard data received through a Freedom of Information
request. While the two datasets have considerable overlap, there are
incidents on one list not appearing on the other, and incidents in my
dataset that appear on neither.
Making data available is more important than simply making
passengers aware. It allows a sort of social epidemiology of cruise
ship incidents from which patterns can be discerned and potential
solutions formulated. Rather than seeing each major incident as unique
and unrelated to anything before it, a comprehensive data set permits
early identification of trends or common problems. Unlike the airline
industry, which is governed by the FAA, there is no similar authority
when it comes to the cruise industry.
Recommendation #1: There is need for systematic reporting of all
cruise ship incidents to an independent, central authority charged with
responsibility for data analysis and policy and operational
recommendations.
2. Frequency and Types of Events
There is a range of incidents occurring on cruise ships. Between
January 2009 and June 2013 there were more than 350 incidents involving
mechanical problems or accidents (see Appendix 1). The most frequent
incidents were:
propulsion and engine problems (average 19.59 per year)--7
in which cruise ships were known to go adrift;
fires (average 13.56 per year)--6 known to require
evacuation and 4 with loss of power;
material failure and lifeboat failure (average 13.33 per
year); and
collisions (average 11.56 per year).
These four categories account for 261 incidents--all combined
yielding an average 58 incidents per year. As seen in Appendix 1, less
frequent incidents include loss of power (n=21), running aground
(n=19), maneuverability and steering problems (n=15), experiencing a
severe list (n=11), and technical (n=8) and electrical (n=8) problems.
It needs to be remembered that these accounts rely on public reports,
so the list is largely incomplete and underrepresents the actual
frequency. For example, as relates to fires, a ship officer recently
wrote to me saying:
Every ship, almost weekly, has some type of fire incident. This
could be something as simple as a cigarette butt in a trash can
or a fire in the silo of the incinerator, or a grease fire,
toaster fire, electrical cord fire in the galley. These are
never reported because they are put out quickly, within
minutes. However, there are fires happening on ships every
single week. (Private correspondence)
In part related to these incidents, and in part related to weather-
related factors (not including tropical storms and hurricanes), there
were 104 cruises (average 23 per year) with media-reported canceled
port calls, 69 cruises with media-reported itinerary changes, 25
cruises with media-reported canceled cruises, and 73 cruises with
media-reported delays in embarkation/debarkation. In sum, there are 271
incidents resulting in a cruise itinerary provided passengers when he
or she booked the cruise being different than the itinerary delivered.
The number is undoubtedly considerably higher given that there is no
centralized collection of data on the degree to which cruise ships
approximate their published itinerary, and my data does not include
cruise itinerary changes caused by hurricanes or tropical storms.
Recommendation #2: Similar to data maintained on airlines
documenting ``on time'' performance, there should be a mechanism
whereby cruise ships and cruise lines have reported their adherence to
itineraries and on time performance.
3. Discernable Insights from Data
Based on cursory analysis of the limited data available--
approximately 1,500 incidents in four-and-a-half years (an average 333
per year)--there are two insights that stand out. First is that
Carnival Cruise Lines is disproportionately represented. Appendix 2
shows ships with two or more mechanical incidents from January 2009
through June 2013. Not only does Carnival Cruise Lines have a higher
proportion of its fleet included on the list (19 of 23 (82.6 percent)
versus 10 of 16 (62.5 percent) for Princess Cruises, 10 of 21 (47.6
percent) for Royal Caribbean International, and 4 of 11 (36.3 percent)
for Celebrity Cruises), but it has a higher average rate of incidents
per ship listed (3.89 for Carnival Cruise Lines versus 3.40 for
Princess Cruises, 3.25 for Celebrity Cruises, and 3.20 for Royal
Caribbean International). An obvious question is why the rate of
incidents for Carnival Cruise Lines would be 20 percent higher than for
Royal Caribbean International; 30 percent higher than for Holland
America Line and P&O Cruises, both of which are also owned by Carnival
Corporation.
One factor may be the number and training of staff, but this is
based on conjecture. An inside source in Royal Caribbean Cruises
Limited wrote to me after the Carnival Triumph fire saying:
I've worked at RCCL for many years. Over the last 10 years they
have been steadily decreasing the number of marine employees.
These are the employees that navigate and maintain the engines
and the main employees dealing with life saving. If there is a
fire--it's the marine team suiting up and fighting the fires.
If the ship is listing or sinking--it's the marine team dealing
with technical systems such as water tight doors, moving tank
contents from one area to another, making contact with rescue
services, lowering life boats, etc.
The reason for the decrease in marine manning? It's purely
driven by concern for profit. You can get rid of two marine
employees who do not generate any income (they just play a
major role in saving lives if something goes wrong) and replace
them with a hotel employee such as a marketing and revenue
manager or a maitre `d for income-generating specialty
restaurants, or bar supervisors. Many times employees are cut
in the marine department or doubled up in cabins so the company
can revamp the crew cabins into sellable cruise guest cabins.
Approximately 5 years ago RCCL got rid of the safety officer
position and combined the job with the chief officer position.
There is now talk about changing the marine contracts for 3
stripe officers from 10 weeks/10 weeks off to 4 months on/2
months off so they match the hotel officer positions. The
degree of technical knowledge needed, and the tremendous life
saving responsibility marine officers have, is in no way equal
to the demands placed on hotel officers to sell another drink.
When the ship is sinking--do you want a marine officer that
knows the technical systems or do you want a hotel officer
selling you another beer as you are stepping into a lifeboat?
(Personal correspondence)
While these comments are specific to one corporation, it raises to
the forefront the degree to which this pattern is common to other
cruise lines. Anecdotal accounts indicate changes of the same nature
are taking place within Carnival Cruise Lines. This leads to a question
requiring empirical research using reliable data. The problem is that
such data is not available, largely because systematic independent
oversight of the cruise industry is lacking. It is in stark contrast to
the airline industry where oversight and reporting is the norm.
Recommendation #3: There is need for greater oversight and
monitoring of the cruise industry in order to monitor changing trends
and to determine whether these changes are related to changes in safety
and/or casualties.
A second insight from the data is a preliminary conclusion also
based in part on anecdotal information. It appears there is a pattern
of incidents involving ships built on the Destiny platform (Destiny-
class and Dream-class ships): my understanding is that Carnival
Destiny, Carnival Triumph, Carnival Splendor, Carnival Glory, Carnival
Breeze, Carnival Dream, Carnival Liberty, and Carnival Magic have all
reported electrical and/or propulsion issues, power losses, and some
electrical fires over the last three years or so (not all of these have
been reported in the media and are thus not included in my dataset);
Costa Concordia, Costa Magica, Costa Serena and Costa Pacifica have
also reported similar problems during this timespan--all of these ships
are Destiny platform design ships.
The relevant difference between Destiny platform and the Spirit/
Vista 1/Vista 2/Signature classes is simple. Destiny platform ships
have only been built at Fincantieri shipyards in Italy from a design by
Fincantieri. Spirit & Vista 1 class ships originated in Kvaener Masa
shipyards and were then adapted/enlarged by Fincantieri. The original
blueprints had more than enough redundancy to allow for growth and
design tweaks. There is limited redundancy built into the Destiny
platform ships, which may be why they suffer from systemic failures.
This is illustrated in the report of the Carnival Splendor fire,
leading to the ship losing all power and going dead in the water. The
report observes that ``vessel engineers were unable to restart the
unaffected main generators due to extensive damage to cables in the aft
engine room.'' \7\ It goes on to state, there is ``susceptibility of
the Carnival Splendor and all Dream class vessels to a complete loss of
power resulting from damage to a single area of electrical system
components in either the forward or aft engine room.'' Presumably, with
appropriate redundancy the main generators would have been functional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ United States Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation into
the Fire Onboard the Carnival Splendor which Occurred in the Pacific
Ocean Off the Coast of Mexico on November 8, 2010, which Resulted in
Complete Loss of Power, MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number:
3897765 (July 15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report also observes design flaws that cut across Dream class
(and presumably Destiny platform vessels). These include air cooler
drainage problems, noted as far back as October 2009 and documented
problems with the CO2 system. That these problems were
identified as early as 2009, and may have been factors in the
catastrophic nature of both the Carnival Splendor and Carnival Triumph
fires lends convincing support for increased independent oversight of
the cruise industry.
Carnival Cruise Lines appears to address the shortcoming of
redundancy through its announcement April 17, 2013, of a $300 million
program to enhance operating reliability, an initiative spurred by the
Carnival Triumph fire in February 2013. As stated in the company's
press release, the initiative will add an additional emergency
generator on each vessel and install a second permanent back-up power
system. There will also be increased fire prevention, detection and
suppression systems. As well, there will be modifications to decrease
the likelihood of losing propulsion or primary power.
The modifications will include a reconfiguration of certain
engine-related electrical components. On ships where these
enhancements will be made, the design of specialized components
will require longer lead times for completion.\8\
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\8\ See ``Carnival Cruise Lines announces fleetwide $300 million
program to enhance operating reliability and guest comfort.'' April 17,
2013. Online at: http://carnival-news.com/2013/04/17/carnival-cruise-
lines-announces-fleetwide-300-million-program-to-enhance-operating-
reliability-and-guest-comfort/
While the company deserves recognition of the steps being taken, an
obvious question is how many of these enhancements involve adding
components that were not originally included in the ship's design, but
are normally included in the design of ships operated by other cruise
lines and/or built and designed by other ship yards. An independent
audit is the only reliable means for determining the situation.
More serious is that the company did not appear to maximize
learning from the Carnival Splendor fire in 2010. First, a report about
the incident was not issued until three years later, perhaps because
responsibility rested with Panamanian authorities; this even though
Carnival Cruise Lines had employed a number of experts to provide them
with analysis of causes of the fire. However, a preliminary U.S. Coast
Guard investigation revealed several holes in the ship's fire fighting
methodology, not to mention significant errors in its firefighting
operations manual.
According to a marine advisory issue by the Coast Guard, the
Splendor's firefighting instruction manual was riddled with
problems, including references to ``pulling'' valves that
actually needed to be turned to operate, incorrect descriptions
of system locations, inaccurate graphics and schematics and
confusing instructions such as: ``Once the fire has been
extinguished, make sure that the temperature has decreased
before investigate the area same time is needed to wait
hours.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Wolfe, K.A. 2013. ``Horrific Carnival cruise gets D.C.'s
attention,'' Politico (February 27).
Recommendation #4: Ships operating from U.S. ports should be
obligatorily subject to accident investigations by the National
Transportation Safety Board as a condition of using U.S. ports, and
should be subject to the same fines and other administrative actions
the NTSB is empowered to take with other modes of commercial
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
transportation.
4. Learning from Success, Not Just Accidents
So far I have looked at what might be learned from accidents and
things that go wrong on cruise ships. There is another way to look at
the data; concentrate on those cruise ships and cruise lines that
appear to be under-represented when it comes to incidents. For example,
among the mass market cruise lines Norwegian Cruise Line and MSC
Cruises appear to have much lower incidence of fires, groundings,
engine failures and accidents than others in this class. It would be
interesting to know what those cruise lines are doing differently than
Carnival Cruise Lines and Royal Caribbean International. The problem is
that cruise lines under Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
tend to not effectively differentiate themselves with regard to such
things, and the consuming public lacks reliable data on which to
compare cruise lines. As an authority on the cruise industry I am often
asked what cruise line or cruise ship is the safest. I can give an
anecdotal response, but without adequate data it is difficult to give a
fully informed response.
There are similar contrasts among cruise lines in the premium and
ultra-luxury segments, however they aren't as stark as among the mass
market cruise lines. It appears that Oceania Cruises has a better
record than Celebrity Cruises and both have a better record than
Holland America Line; all have a better record than Princess Cruises.
Similarly, Seabourn Cruises appears to have fewer incidents than
Silverseas Cruises and both less than Regent Seven Seas Cruises.
Seadream Yacht Club has a lower incidence rate than any of the ships in
the ultra-luxury category.
Again, it appears that some companies are doing a far-better job
than others. Research on what they are doing, whether in staffing and
training or in ship design and maintenance, is worth attention. This
would naturally be something undertaken by an industry-based body, but
this is unlikely to happen given the dominance in CLIA of under-
achievers. As well, such research must be done by a wholly-independent
researcher.
Recommendation #5: There needs to be funded research, ideally
provided by the cruise industry to a wholly independent body, to learn
from those cruise lines that appear to be effective in reducing
incidents and accidents.
5. Regulation and Oversight of the Cruise Industry
Unlike the airline industry, the cruise industry is largely self-
regulated. As foreign-registered vessels operated by foreign-located
corporations, cruise ships are not subject to many regulations and laws
in the U.S. However, cruise ships operating from U.S. ports are subject
to regular safety inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard and they
voluntarily participate in the Vessel Sanitation Program of the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) and report illness outbreaks affected 3
percent or more of passengers and/or 2 percent or more of crew members
on ships operating from a U.S. port (ships operating from foreign
ports, but sailing with a majority or U.S. passengers do not have to
file illness reports with the CDC). While reports of CDC activities are
available online, reports of U.S. Coast Guard inspections are not.
I received from a San Francisco-based NBC-affiliate a set of
inspections (Annual Control Verification Exam) done by the U.S. Coast
Guard in San Francisco from 2002 to 2012; they had been acquired
through a Freedom of Information request. These reports spanning 82
pages were illuminating. It was interesting to see the types of
deficiencies identified by inspectors (e.g., fuel leaks, water leaks
from fire pumps, many lifeboat problems, missing or faulty equipment,
faulty fire extinguishers, improper record keeping of required
information, exposed live electric wires, faulty doors, mixing of
segregated garbage streams (including hazardous waste), fire risks,
security deficiencies, and more) and the length of time permitted for
correction of some of the deficiencies. Given these are annual
inspections, it is difficult to know how long deficiencies were
overlooked or ignored. Of greater concern is that these inspections are
not entirely unannounced, so officers and crew often prepare for them
and the most obvious problems are corrected in advance.
In extreme cases, a matter identified in the Annual Control
Verification Exam was referred to the vessel's Classification Society
(e.g., Lloyd's Register, Bureau Veritas, Registro Italiano Navale, Det
Norske Veritas), which certifies the ship's safety and seaworthiness.
While these societies appear to be independent, they earn their income
from cruise lines and may be conflicted when taking action that can
cost the cruise line money or cause a ship to be taken out of service.
For example, there is a fair number of cases where ships have been
judged to have insufficient lifeboat space for the number of
passengers. In some, the Classification Society has instructed the
cruise line to book fewer passengers on the ship until the lifeboat(s)
has/have been repaired. In others, the Classification Society has
permitted the cruise ship to accommodate passengers on inflatable rafts
rather than lifeboats. It is unclear whether this is a reasonable
solution if there were need for emergency evacuation, especially if
like the Costa Concordia half of the lifeboats cannot be deployed.
There is also need for the U.S. Coast Guard to oversee and review
the work of classification societies. For example, the report of the
Carnival Splendor fire indicates:
The firefighting manual available to officers onboard the
Carnival Splendor referred to a CO2 system but not
the one that was installed onboard the vessel. Related system
photographs, images, schematics and diagrams were also found to
be inaccurate.
A review of CO2 system documents revealed a RINA
approved test memoranda dated October 20, 2006, which
established the following procedure for testing the
CO2 system: (1) select the zone or line, (2) observe
the shutdowns of ventilation systems, machinery and other
warning alarms and then (3) move to the gas-release procedure,
which included cylinder selection for the particular zone and
verification of pressurization of the manifold, etc. Another
document that appears to be part of a RINA approval letter
dated December 28, 2008, describes the operational procedure in
exact reverse order.
In this instance, ship's crew opened the cylinder valves first.
As a result, the pressure differential across the zone valve
prevented opening of the ball valve.
This reminds me of publicly-reported findings in 2001 and 2004
respectively, both involving a ship approved by their Classification
Society. The first involves Holland America Line's Zaandam. In May 2001
a crew member noticed a sprinkler head missing from a passenger cabin
and upon investigation found that a branch of the sprinkler system did
not connect to the main water supply. The problem was corrected.\10\
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\10\ Seatrade Insider. 2001. ``Another Ship Sprinkler Problem,''
Seatrade Insider (June 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the second, the British Marine and Coastguard Agency ordered
Cunard Line's Queen Mary 2 in June 2004 to fit extra sprinklers in the
ship's 1,300 passenger cabins. A BBC investigation revealed material
used in the ships' bathroom units did not meet international fire
safety regulations. A short-term remedy was fitting all cabins with an
extra smoke detector, but the ship must also add extra sprinklers in
bathrooms. The ship is estimated to contain 140,000 pounds (63,503
kilograms) of the material causing concern.\11\
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\11\ BBC News. 2004. ``Urgent Safety Work Starts on QM2,'' BBC News
(June 26).
Recommendation #6: Ships should have thorough and exhaustive safety
inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard without advance warning. Full
reports (including all details) of cruise ship inspections by the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coast Guard should be available online.
The importance of an unannounced, surprise inspection is
demonstrated by a recent health inspection of Silversea Cruise's Silver
Shadow. The ship had never had an inspection score of 99 in May 2012
and 95 in September 2012, however following complaints to the CDC from
crewmembers a surprise inspection was done June 17, 2013, and the ship
received a failing score of 84. Crewmembers had alleged that they were
forced to store raw meat, salami, fish, cakes, and every kind of
culinary preparations in their cabins and remote hallways to avoid
inspections by the U.S. Public Health (USPH), and that some spoilable
food items were kept out of the refrigerator in cabins and hallways but
were served the following day to the cruise passengers. Other
complaints included the alleged use of out-of-date ingredients which
were served to the guests. Again, the importance of inspections being
done unannounced and without advance notice cannot be stressed enough.
II. Safety and Security of Cruise Passengers
Previous committee hearings have dealt with safety and security of
cruise passengers.\12\ I won't duplicate that information here, except
to summarize some important points.
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\12\ Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, Hearings on ``Oversight of the Cruise Industry,''
March 1, 2012; Testimony before the Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and
Security, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
June 19, 2008; Testimony before Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Hearings on ``Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships,
March 27, 2007.
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A. Scope of the Problem
It is worth noting that the only comprehensive dataset for crime on
cruise ships is based on data provided by the FBI in response to a
Freedom of Information request by the International Cruise Victims
Association. Between October 1, 2007 and September 30, 2008, the data
reveals there were 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults with serious bodily
injury, 89 thefts less then $10,000, 12 thefts more than $10,000, 154
sex related incidents, 7 people overboard, and 3 drug arrests. A
comprehensive analysis of the data on sexual assaults on cruise ships
is reported in ``Sex at Sea: Sexual Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships,''
published in 2011 in the Journal of Tourism in Marine Environments (see
Appendix 4).
Two areas are worth further mention here because the data is not
reported elsewhere. First, is persons overboard. Since 1995, there have
been 201 reports of persons gone overboard from passenger ships.\13\ As
shown in Appendix 3, 73.8 percent were male, 26.2 percent female. On
average, males are a shade younger than females (38.85 percent vs 42.11
percent). The majority go overboard from cruise ships: 91.4 percent
from a cruise ship, 8.6 percent from a ferry. While data is limited, we
know that the person overboard was rescued alive in 16.7 percent of
cases, 11 percent cases were a confirmed suicide, and all indications
are that 3.3 percent of cases involve murder. Alcohol was a factor in
at least 6.2 percent of cases, a fight with a significant other in 7.1
percent of cases, 2.4 percent followed a significant loss in the
casino, and 9.5 percent were witnessed and confirmed to be a fall.
These numbers will be discussed further later.
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\13\ See www.cruisejunkie.com/Overboard.html
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The second area worth mention is drug arrests. Between January 2009
and June 2013 there were 53 media reports of drug arrests on cruise
ships involving 87 people. Based on cases where data is available, we
know that males are more likely to be arrested than females (83.33
percent vs 16.66 percent); the average age is the same for both
genders. The largest number of individual incidents occur in Bermuda
(n=27) where cruise ships are routinely searched by government
officials using drug-sniffing dogs; the U.S. had 8 incidents involving
the arrest of 27 individuals, in all cases the person was apprehended
by Customs and Border Protection agents. Ships with the largest number
arrests are Norwegian Dawn (9) and Explorer of the Seas (6) (see
Appendix 4). Most frequently, drug arrests are for small amounts of
marijuana, from several grams to less than an ounce.
B. The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA)
The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act was introduced in 2008
following Congressional hearings in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. The
hearings in 2005 were convened in December by two subcommittees of the
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform: the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations chaired by Christopher Shays and the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources chaired by Mark Souder. The
hearings had a twofold purpose. First, given the recent attack of the
Seabourn Spirit by pirates off the coast of Somalia, they sought to
determine the decision-making procedures and processes that were in
place to determine the extent to which the U.S. Government responds to
a ship being attacked by terrorists or pirates. The second purpose of
the hearings was to determine jurisdictional conflicts that occur when
U.S. citizens traveling on a foreign-flagged vessel are involved in a
criminal incident. These incidents included sexual assaults, physical
assaults, robbery, and missing persons. The hearings concluded with an
assurance they would reconvene in March in order to hear directly from
victims.
Hearings were reconvened in March 2006. The Committee heard from
six victims of crime on cruise ships: three victims of a sexual
assault, two families with three persons overboard (one mysterious, one
alcohol-related fall), and one incident involving a theft of $6,700.
The Committee also heard from International Cruise Victims Association
(ICV), which presented 10 recommendations, many of which would be
incorporated in the CVSSA; and from an expert hired by the cruise
industry who claimed the rate of sexual assault on cruise ships was
half the rate on land. The Committee appeared to be sceptical about the
reliability of crime statistics and acknowledged the absence of
reliable data on persons overboard from cruise ships. Subsequent to the
hearing Representative Shays introduced on June 28, 2006 HR 5707,
Cruise Line Accurate Safety Statistics Act. The bill was
straightforward. It required cruise ships that call at a port in the
United States to report all crimes occurring on the ship in which a
U.S. citizen is involved. It also required this information to be made
available to the public on the Internet. The cruise industry didn't
embrace the legislation and with the current session of Congress near-
complete the legislation died in committee.
In March 2007 hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation of the House of Representatives Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure. Two things appear to have
solidified support for the hearings. First, the Los Angeles Times
published an article on January 20, 2007, which based on internal
documents from Royal Caribbean said sex-related onboard incidents was a
larger problem than the cruise industry suggested in March 2006. The
documents revealed 273 reported incidents within a period of thirty-two
months, including 99 cases of sexual harassment, 81 of sexual assault,
52 of inappropriate touching, 28 of sexual battery and 13 cases that
fit into other categories.\14\ When the company-specific numbers were
subjected to the same statistical analysis as done with industry-wide
data in James Fox's 2006 testimony before Congress, the rate of sexual
assault was not half the average rate for rape in the U.S., but 50
percent greater than the U.S. rate.\15\
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\14\ Yoshino, K. 2007. ``Cruise Industry's Dark Waters: What
Happens at Sea Stays There as Crimes on Lineres Go Unresolved,'' Los
Angeles Times (January 20).
\15\ Klein, R. A. 2007. ``Crime Against Americans on Cruise
Ships,'' Testimony Before the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, March 27.
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The second factor that pushed for a new round of hearings was that
Representative Doris Matsui from California had a constituent, Laurie
Dishman, appeal for help following non-prosecution of a rape by a
security officer on a Royal Caribbean International's Vision of the
Seas. Matsui was not only concerned about the way Laurie had been
treated and her case handled, but also with discrepancies in crime
statistics.
These hearings opened with the FBI and Coast Guard announcing that
an agreement had just been reached with the cruise industry whereby
cruise line members of the Cruise Line International Association (CLIA)
agreed to report to the FBI (either a field office in the U.S. or the
FBI Legal Attache at an embassy or consulate closest to the vessel's
location at the time of the incident) all crimes against Americans on
their ships. To many the timing of the announcement was suspicious. As
well, the agreement appeared to be a rehash of the ``zero tolerance''
policy announced by the International Council of Cruise Lines in 1999
and it was redundant to reporting requirements already in place. The
key difference was the agreement provided a standardized form for
reporting crimes that the FBI could use to establish a data set from
which reports could be drawn for Congress and other government
authorities. The data would not to be available to the public. The
hearings also heard from ICV, Laurie Dishman, a sociologist who
reported on analysis of the crime statistics presented in the Los
Angeles Times, an attorney who represents cruise victims, and
representatives of the cruise industry. At the end of the hearings the
subcommittee chair, Elijah Cummings, called on CLIA and ICV to get
together and to attempt to find some common ground and solutions. He
said he'd prefer a solution that did not require legislation, but also
said that legislation was always an option. He gave the two sides six
months and said the hearings would reconvene in September.
With no solution from collaboration between ICV and CLIA, hearings
were reconvened in September 2007. The day before the Congressional
subcommittee reconvened September 19, 2007, Representatives Matsui and
Shays with twenty-three co-sponsors introduced a House Resolution to
call attention to the growing level of crime on cruise ships and the
lack of Federal regulations overseeing the cruise industry. The purpose
of the reconvened hearings was to receive an update on the status of
discussions between ICV and CLIA and to examine whether the security
practices and procedures aboard cruise ships are adequate to ensure the
safety of all passengers. As before, it received testimony from the FBI
and Coast Guard, which discussed the implementation of the reporting
framework announced at the previous hearings; from ICV and several of
its members (parents of a 21-year-old who fell overboard while throwing
up over a railing, two sexual assault victims, a surviving family
member whose father died in a cruise ship fire); and from the cruise
industry. Not surprisingly the cruise industry painted a picture that
said everything was under control, that it is working diligently to
improve situations raised as sources of concern by its critics, and
that cruises continue to be safe.\16\ The claim of safety was based in
large part on the FBI receiving from cruise ships only forty-one
reports of sexual assault and twenty-eight cases of sexual contact
between April 1 and August 23, 2007. Together, these numbers give an
annualized rate for sexual abuse on CLIA member cruise lines of 172
incidents; a rate of 56.9 per 100,000 passengers--several fold higher
than the rate claimed in the 2006 hearings. The industry also used the
hearings to announce formation of its survivors' working group, a group
that ostensibly attempted to supplant ICV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Dale, T. 2007. ``Cruise Ship Security Practices and
Procedures,'' Testimony Before the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, September 19.
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Less than a week after the hearings, the House Committee on
Homeland Security approved by voice vote inclusion of language in the
Coast Guard Authorization Act requiring cruise lines to notify the
Department of Homeland Security Secretary of security-related incidents
involving U.S. persons when it advises its next port of call of its
arrival. Incidents required to be reported under the legislation
include any act that results in death, serious bodily injury, sexual
assault, a missing person, or that poses a significant threat to the
cruise ship, any cruise ship passenger, any port facility, or any
person in or near the port. Unlike Representative Shays' Cruise Line
Accurate Safety Statistics Act, the reports would not be made public.
At the same time there was a move involving Senator John Kerry and
Representatives Matsui, Shays, and Maloney to write legislation that
would require cruise ships to immediately notify the FBI about crimes,
suicides, and disappearances. The legislation would also provide
protocols for collecting evidence. The legislation in many ways is like
the agreement announced in March 2007 between CLIA and the FBI would be
mandatory. A key requirement of any legislation or regulation, if it is
to be useful to the public, is public disclosure. Passengers should
know the history of problems and incidents on a cruise ship, much the
same as they can view reports of sanitation inspections conducted on
cruise ships by the Centers for Disease Control.
The Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation held hearings in June 2008. The
hearings heard from ICV; CLIA; the Rape, Abuse, Incest and Neglect
Network (RAINN); and a sociologist reporting on analysis of sexual
assault data and on persons overboard. The information presented was
similar to previous hearings in the House of Representatives, however
RAINN discussed the need and methods for providing support to victims
of sexual assault on cruise ships. The CVSSA was introduced shortly
after the hearings.
1. From Hearings to Legislation
A key advocate for legislation was the International Cruise Victims
Association, formed when its founders (Ken Carver whose 40 year old
daughter mysteriously went missing in 2004 from Mercury, a Celebrity
ship; Bree Smith whose 26 year old brother mysteriously went missing in
on his honeymoon in 2005 from Brilliance of the Seas, a Royal Caribbean
ship; Son Michael Pham whose parents aged 67 and 71 mysteriously went
missing in 2005 from Carnival Destiny; the parents of 23 year old Amy
Bradley who mysteriously went missing in 1998 from Rhapsody of the
Seas, a Royal Caribbean ship; and the parents of 22 year old James
Scavone who mysteriously went missing in 1999 from Carnival Destiny)
met at the 2005 hearings. The sponsor of the CVSSA in 2008 in the U.S.
House of Representatives was Doris Matsui (HR 6408); in the U.S. Senate
John Kerry (S 3204). The legislation was reintroduced in 2009 as HR
3360 and S 588 and subsequently passed, becoming Public Law 111-207.
The initial version of the CVSSA reflected concerns raised in
hearings and contained solutions to identified problems. However, a
number of provisions of the Act when it was first introduced in 2008
and in March 2009 were changed when introduced in the Senate in June
2009, presumably partially in response to lobbying by the cruise
industry or others. These changes and other elements of the legislation
will guide this discussion.
2. Persons Overboard
The number of people going overboard from cruise ships is
significant: between 20 and 25 a year since 2009. It is known that in
9.5 percent of cases the person fell overboard, however if we trust
cruise industry claims--they often say a passenger has fallen or jumped
even if the assertion cannot be independently corroborated--then the
percentage is much higher. With that in mind, it is curious that the
original version of the CVSSA stated, ``The vessel shall be equipped
with ship rails that are located not less than 4\1/2\ feet above the
deck'' (Sec. 3507 (a)(1)(A)). However the legislation passed set the
height one foot lower at 42 inches. In retrospect, it would appear the
original provision of 54 inches (4\1/2\ feet) may be more reasonable as
an impediment to passengers falling overboard.
A second change is seen in Sec. 3507(a)(1)(D). The original
proposed legislation stated, ``The vessel shall integrate technology
that can be used for detecting passengers who have fallen overboard, to
the extent that such technology is available.'' Such technology is
available, but there are cost implications.
The revised legislation states, ``The vessel shall integrate
technology that can be used for capturing images of passengers or
detecting passengers who have fallen overboard, to the extent that such
technology is available.'' While close-circuit television (CCTV)
technology (used to capture images of persons going overboard) may be
effective if it were monitored in real-time, it is of little use when
tapes are reviewed only after it is known a person has disappeared. In
addition, there are issues with whether CCTV cameras cover all relevant
areas where a person may go overboard, and whether images are readily
made available when requested. In a recent case in which I was retained
as an expert witness we found that the CCTV images were recorded using
old technology (not in a format easily viewed) and when converted the
images were of limited probative value. Again, it would appear that the
original legislation proposed in 2007 was more effective in identifying
when a person goes overboard and in causing a response that is more
likely to lead to a live rescue. Many of the 16.7 percent of cases
where a person is rescued alive is when their disappearance is observed
and reported to officers who immediately execute rescue procedures.
Data also indicates there is sufficient number of cases of persons
going overboard when they are intoxicated. In two known cases the
person was bending over the railing while throwing-up over the side of
the ship. This is further reason for raising railing height, but also
reinforces the need for stringent rules for the responsible service of
alcohol; not just training, but practice.
One other concern is the way the FBI interprets the CVSSA.
International Cruise Victims Association reports they have been told by
the FBI that a person overboard is not necessarily a crime and thus
will not be investigated and not included in the FBI's official
statistics. It is difficult to understand how a determination can be
made about whether a case of a person overboard is not a crime without
a proper investigation. Even if CCTV videotapes show a person falling
overboard, an investigation may be warranted to determine the
conditions surrounding the incident, for example whether intoxication
is an issue and whether the cruise ship was responsible in serving
alcohol. Current wording of the CVSSA does not classify a person
overboard as a crime.
Recommendation #7: Original provisions of the CVSSA regarding
railing height and technology to detect passengers who have fallen
overboard be reconsidered.
3. Sexual Assaults
Contrary to cruise industry claims, sexual assaults are an ongoing
problem on cruise ships. Just in the past couple of months there have
been media reports of a 12-year-old girl groped on Celebrity Century by
a 30-year-old male passenger, and an 11-year-old girl molested by a
crew member on Disney Dream. In neither case was the perpetrator
arrested or prosecuted; in the latter, the crewmember was offloaded by
the cruise line in the Bahamas and flown home to India at the cruise
line's expense. Data from the FBI for October 2007 through September
2008 reveals that at least 18 percent of sexual assault victims are
younger than age 18. The data was secured through a freedom of
information request.
Unfortunately, reliable data is hard to come by. No comprehensive
FBI data has been available since 2008. The only other data available
for analysis was provided in the discovery phase of lawsuits, yielding
incident reports from 1998 through 2002 for one cruise line; 1998
through 2005 for another. In a recent lawsuit involving the sexual
assault of a minor a cruise line was ordered by the judge to disclose
to the plaintiff's attorney all reported cases of sexual assault for
the previous five years. The cruise line settled the case out of court
in order to avoid complying with the court order.
There is much to be learned from incident reports of sexual
assault. We know that the most frequent perpetrator among crewmembers
(between 50 percent and 77 percent of sexual assaults on passengers are
perpetrated by a crew member) is a room steward (34.8 percent) followed
by dining room waiter (25 percent) and bar worker (13.2 percent). We
also know that the most frequent location for the assault is a
passenger cabin (36.4 percent) and that alcohol is a factor in 36
percent of incidents involving minors. Having detailed data permits
identification of risk and of potential solutions or means for
ameliorating the problem. However, changes to the CVSSA between the
first versions to the version passed make this data much more difficult
to access and thus more difficult for proper prevention and
intervention. The following discussion will be organized around
prevention, intervention, investigation, and prosecution.
Prevention
The best way to deal with sexual assault is to have methods of
primary prevention. One of the most effective methods is for passengers
to know the risk. That is why the initial version of the CVSSA not only
required all sexual assaults to be reported to the FBI but that ``The
Secretary shall maintain, on an Internet site of the department in
which the Coast Guard is operating, a numerical accounting of the
missing persons and alleged crimes . . .'' (Sec. 3507(c)(4)(A)). But
the section was changed in the final version to read, ``The Secretary
shall maintain a statistical compilation of all incidents described in
paragraph (3)(A)(i) on an Internet site that provides a numerical
accounting of the missing persons and alleged crimes recorded in each
report filed under paragraph (3)(A)(i) that are no longer under
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation''
(Sec. 3507(e)(4)(A)0.
The result is that the FBI only publicly discloses those cases
where they have opened a case and they have subsequently closed the
case. Those incidents judged to be he said-she said, or where
sufficient evidence is not available, do not have an investigation so
appear to be not reported. Unlike crimes on land that are included in
Uniform Crime Statistics and that reflect all complaints of a crime,
crimes on cruise ships are only publicly recorded when the FBI has
decided first that an investigation is warranted and second when the
investigation is closed. The result is that the number of publicly
reported sexual assaults on cruise ships is grossly under-reported. The
one-year data for 2007-08 reported 154 sex-related incidents. In stark
contrast, the FBI dataset on the U.S. Coast Guard website (which is
difficult to find) reports 11 incidents in 2012 (data for 2010 and 2011
was not accessible). More illuminating is a recent case I was involved
with. The FBI indicated that the cruise line (NCL) had one case of
sexual assault in 15 months, but records disclosed in discovery
indicated the cruise line had received (and we assume reported to the
FBI in compliance with the CVSSA) 23 complaints. The change in the
language of the Act effectively makes invisible the true scale of the
problem of sexual assault and undermines passenger awareness of the
need to protect themselves and their children.
Recommendation #8: The CVSSA should require reported cases of
sexual assault committed on a cruise ship be displayed online and
broken down by cruise line and cruise ship. In addition, the raw data
of cases should be made available upon request for statistical/
sociological analysis in order to permit a social epidemiology of the
problem.
A provision that was not changed, but that may need to be revisited
relates to crew access to passenger cabins. Sec. 3507(f)(1) states that
a cruise ship shall ``establish and implement procedures and
restrictions concerning--(A) which crewmembers have access to passenger
staterooms; and (B) the periods during which they have access; and (2)
ensure that the procedures and restrictions are fully and properly
implemented and periodically reviewed.'' While this provision is clear
in its intent, it may not be specific enough in its statement. I am not
sure if it effectively addresses certain incidents of sexual assault.
Take for example the teenage daughter left in her parent's cabin who is
walked in upon and sexually assaulted by a crew member gaining access
with a room key; or the adult woman who returns to her room in the
middle of the afternoon and when she walks out of the shower finds a
crew member in her room and is raped; or a woman who wakes in the
middle of the night and finds a crew member standing over her and is
assaulted. These cases are not anomalies, but even if they were they
demonstrate why there is clear need for strict restrictions on
crewmember access to passenger cabins. As it stands, restrictions on
access to passenger cabins by room stewards, maintenance people,
minibar stockers, and others are unclear. This may be addressed in
legislation that more clearly identifies parameters for when crew
members have access to passenger cabins (e.g., between 9:00 AM and
11:59 AM, and between 6:00 PM and 9:00 PM). At the very least,
passengers should be told what hours of the day a crewmember may have
access to their cabin.
Recommendation #9: The CVSSA should require passengers to be
advised of the hours during which crewmembers may access their cabin
without specific permission from the passenger.
Another strategy for prevention, as well as useful for
investigation, is CCTV cameras. There are two issues. One is that
cruise ships often have real cameras and dummy cameras around the ship.
Consequently, a crewmember may take a passenger to an area with no
camera or a dummy camera and then assault them. This was the case when
an 8-year-old girl was molested on a cruise ship: a cleaner led her
down a hallway with the promise he would help her find her way back to
her family's cabin. He knew where there were active cameras and where
there were dummy cameras.
A second related issue is where live cameras are located. In a
recent case in which I served as an expert witness I raised concern
about where cameras were and were not located, pointing out that
cameras were not directed toward areas that I believed were high risk.
The cruise line's attorney countered that the CVSSA only requires that
``The owner of a vessel . . . shall maintain a video surveillance
system to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel and in providing
evidence for the prosecution of such crimes'' (Sec. 3507(b)(1). In this
case the area not being covered was the entrance to public washrooms
even though one data set indicates that 4.4 percent (n=14) of sexual
assaults occur in public washrooms. While it shouldn't be necessary for
an act to clearly specify where CCTV surveillance should take place,
the current language of the Act is so vague that it can be effectively
used to counter and/or undermine victim claims when an assault occurs.
As has already been mentioned, the videotapes that were provided by the
cruise line in this case were of such poor quality that they had no
probative value.
Recommendation #10: The CVSSA more clearly and specifically state
requirements for CCTV surveillance and the quality and format of tape
recordings.
A final method of prevention is making passengers aware of the risk
of crime on cruise ships. I have already discussed the quality of
information reported on the website maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard,
however the website is difficult to find and for most passengers does
not alert them to the risk. Perhaps a better way to alert passengers of
onboard risk is through the ``Security Guide'' required under
Sec. 3507(c)(1)(A) of the Act. Presently the Act requires the guide to
be available for each passenger, but doesn't specify how availability
is achieved. The Act requires the guide to ``provide a description of
medical and security personnel designated on board to prevent and
respond to criminal and medical situations with 24 hour contact
instructions'' and to describe the jurisdictional authority applicable
and the law enforcement process available with respect to reporting a
crime. However there is no requirement for the guide to include a clear
statement of what crimes occur on cruise ships, nor for it to educate
passengers in methods and/or strategies for reducing vulnerability to
crime. The guide could be an effective method for forewarning
passengers of known dangers.
Ironically, passengers are often advised in port lectures of things
they can do to reduce the likelihood of becoming a victim to crime
ashore, but there is no parallel information for how to reduce the
likelihood of crime onboard the ship. It is reasonable to expect a
cruise ship to alert parents to the need to supervise their children
and to be aware of the risk of child sexual assault onboard, to advise
adult passengers of the risk of sexual assault and the most common
places and scenarios where these occur--this may include advice to keep
track of one's drink to be sure it is not drugged or otherwise tampered
with. The data on sexual assaults provides considerable insight into
where and when sexual assaults occur; information that passengers would
benefit from knowing.
Recommendation #11: The CVSSA explicitly require the ``Security
Guide'' be placed in plain sight in every passenger cabin and that the
content of the guide include information about the types of crimes on
cruise ships, where they commonly occur, and steps a passenger can take
to decrease the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime.
Intervention
Despite best efforts, it is likely some sexual assaults will occur
on cruise ships. The issue then is how victims will be treated. Again,
there was a critical change from early drafts of the CVSSA and the Act
that subsequently passed into law. Sec. 3507(e)(3) stated,
. . . make available on the vessel at all times an individual
licensed to practice as a medical doctor in the United States
to promptly perform such an examination upon request and to
provide proper medical treatment of a victim, including
antiretroviral medications and other medications that may
prevent the transmission of human immunodeficiency virus and
other sexually transmitted diseases.
This was replaced with Sec. 3507(d)(3) that reads:
(3) make available on the vessel at all times medical staff who
have undergoe a credentialing process to verify that he or
she--(A) possesses a current physician's or registered nurse's
license and--(i) has at least 3 years of post-graduate or
postregistration clinical practice in general and emergency
medicine; or (ii) holds board certification in emergency
medicine, family practice medicine, or internal medicine;. .
.and (C) meets guidelines established by the American College
of Emergency Physicians relating to the treatment and care of
victims of sexual assault.
The most significant change is the required qualifications of the
person providing medical care to a sexual assault victim. The original
draft clearly required a physician who is licensed to practice in the
United States; the change permits either a doctor or a nurse and makes
no reference to where that person was trained or where they are
licensed. This change is significant.
There are several reasons why this change may be of concern. First,
some may believe a physician would be better able to deal with a
medical issue. But more importantly is where that doctor was trained
and is licensed. There has traditionally been a wide variation in
medical care on cruise ships. Some cruise lines have chosen only
physicians trained and licensed in the U.S., Canada, or U.K.; others
have drawn physicians from a variety of countries because they are able
to pay significantly less. This is not to impugn the competence of all
foreign-trained physicians, but there may be issues around language
(competence in English, which is important given the nuances and
emotions at play in a sexual assault), issues around culture and
different views about women and sexuality, and differences in knowledge
of clinical guidelines common in the U.S. Perhaps more important is
that when there is malpractice a physician in the U.S., Canada, or the
U.K. may be easy to find, but a physician from a developing country or
a non-English speaking country may be exceedingly difficult for a
patient to track down.
The reference in the CVSSA to guidelines established by the
American College of Emergency Physicians may be seen as a way of
dealing with some of these concerns. However a review of the Policy
Compendium (2013 Edition) of the American College of Emergency
Physicians (ACEP) brings other issues to the forefront. The Compendium
reads:
The sexually assaulted patient, who may be an adult or child of
either sex, presents special medical, psychological, and legal
needs. ACEP believes that all patients who report a sexual
assault are entitled to prompt access to emergency medical care
and competent collection of evidence that will assist in the
investigation and prosecution of the incident. ACEP has
therefore developed the following guidelines:
With the cooperative efforts of local governments, law
enforcement agencies, hospitals, courts, and other relevant
organizations, each county, state or other geographic area
should establish a community plan to deal with the sexually
assaulted patient. The plan should ensure that capable,
trained personnel and appropriate equipment are available
for treating sexual assault patients.
Each community plan should address the medical,
psychological, safety, and legal needs of the sexually
assaulted patient. The plan should provide for counseling,
and should specifically address pregnancy and testing for
and treatment of sexually transmissible diseases, including
HIV.
Each hospital should provide for access to appropriate
medical, technical, and psychological support for the
patient. A community may elect to establish, under the
supervision of a physician, an alternative medical site,
which specializes in the care of the sexually assaulted
patient and provides medical and psychological support
capabilities when no other injuries are evident.
A victim of sexual assault should be offered prophylaxis
for pregnancy and for sexually transmitted diseases,
subject to informed consent and consistent with current
treatment guidelines. Physicians and allied health
practitioners who find this practice morally objectionable
or who practice at hospitals that prohibit prophylaxis or
contraception should offer to refer victims of sexual
assault to another provider who can provide these services
in a timely fashion.
Specially trained, nonphysician medical personnel should
be allowed to perform evidentiary examinations in
jurisdictions in which evidence collected in such a manner
is admissible in criminal cases.
Physicians and trained medical staff who collect evidence,
perform in good faith, and follow protocols should be
immune from civil or criminal penalties related to evidence
collection, documentation of findings, and recording of the
patient's subjective complaints.
For the special diagnostic and therapeutic needs of the
pediatric patient, a community plan should provide for
primary referral centers with expertise and ancillary
social services that support a multidisciplinary approach.
As part of its ongoing quality management activities, the
hospital should establish patient care criteria for the
management of the sexually assaulted patient and monitor
staff performance.
ED staff should have ongoing training and education in the
management of the sexually assaulted patient.
ACEP supports appropriate measures to prevent sexual
assault in the community.
First, and perhaps most important, is the guidelines place the
emergency care physician as the primary care provider to a victim of
sexual assault. Nonphyscian medical personnel may be allowed to perform
evidentiary examinations, however the guidelines do not contemplate a
nurse being responsible for the care received by a sexual assault
victim. The CVSSA contradicts this by permitting it.
Second, the guidelines set expectations on the community, including
ongoing quality management activities, however these do not appear to
be part of what a cruise ship does, especially with physicians
typically working a four-month (or less) contract. The infirmary on a
cruise ship is not comparable to a land-based hospital and it is
difficult for it to comply with the guidelines.
One guideline that is of particular note is that the ACEP expects
the physician to support appropriate measures to prevent sexual assault
in the community. As has already been discussed, there is much more a
cruise ship can do to prevent sexual assault and to, in turn, comply
with this guideline. One has to wonder whether an under-contract
physician who is considered an independent contractor is in a position
to effectively advocate on such a matter.
Finally, the guidelines are explicit that the psychological and
safety needs of a sexual assault victim be addressed. It also has very
specific expectations for how the pediatric patient will be treated,
including referral centers and ancillary social services. These ``best
practices'' are not available on a cruise ship. There are no
psychological services available onboard, and cruise ships do not
typically take responsibility for referring the sexual assault victim
(especially a child) to appropriate therapeutic and support services.
As well, a victim of sexual assault will often see their perpetrator
wandering freely on the cruise ship, which seriously questions the
commitment to the victim's need for feeling safe. In both cases
discussed above, of the 11-year-old and 12-year-old girls recently
sexually assaulted, the perpetrator was not apprehended in a timely
manner (in one case the perpetrator was not apprehended at all).
While the intent of the CVSSA in referencing the ACEP guideline is
laudable, it is an empty gesture when the guidelines do not fit with
the setting. More appropriate would be language that addresses: (1) the
qualifications of the physician charged with treating sexual assault
victims; (2) the appropriate role played by nonphysician medical
personnel; and (3) the provision of psychological and therapeutic
services both onboard and appropriate referrals for when the victim
returns home from the ship. These latter requirements may be met
through a partnership with land-based organizations such as RAINN or
with land-based service providers. Interestingly, based on the
landscape of onboard sexual assaults I advocated in my 2002 book,
Cruise Ship Blues: The Underside of the Cruise Industry, that cruise
ships invest in having a counselor onboard a ship, both for passengers
and crew. I write:
The counselor would be someone competent in dealing with cases
of sexual assault, who could serve as an ombudsperson in
matters arising between passengers and staff or between
shipboard employees. If a counselor is to be effective and seen
as someone to turn to, it is essential that he or she be
independent of the ship's hierarchical structure--a status
similar to the ship's physician who on medical matters
essentially answers to no one onboard, not even the captain.
Counselors would need to be independent, and independently
available. The simple fact is that abuses are known to occur on
ships, but the information is kept within the shipboard
community. The only way that information gets out is by having
an outsider brought in (p. 161).
I know this was read by cruise industry executives and their
lawyers, but it had no apparent effect.
Recommendation #12: The CVSSA should require onboard physicians to
be board certified in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or
internal medicine in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, France, or
Germany. Further, there should be clear statements about how cruise
ships will treat the psychological and safety needs of sexual assault
victims, especially victims who are minors.
Investigation
Proper investigation of cruise ship crimes and preservation of
evidence is critical, especially in a case of sexual assault. In
addition, there needs to be proper procedures for ensuring chain of
evidence requirements. Though beyond my expertise, I have to wonder
whether evidence collected and secured by a shipboard safety officer
will stand up in a shore side court of law. I suspect a critical issue
will also be whether the safety officer is available to testify in a
criminal prosecution or a civil case, especially if the case is against
his/her employer.
This raises a critical issue with regard to the independence and
impartiality of onboard security officers. On land when there is a
sexual assault the victim can talk to their local law enforcement
office, which is totally independent of the perpetrator, and they
receive medical care and support services from professionals who are
also independent of the perpetrator. On a cruise ship, a victim's case
is investigated by an employee of the cruise line, a relationship that
becomes particularly thorny when the perpetrator is also a cruise line
employee--the most recent comprehensive data of sexual assaults on
cruise ships indicates that the majority are perpetrated by a cruise
ship employee; and then their medical care is provided by another
employee of the cruise line. This situation does not engender the same
level of trust a victim is likely to have when dealing with the same
issue on land.
Recommendation #13: Cruise ships should be required to have a
private, independent law enforcement agent for purposes of crime
investigation. These would be similar to the wholly-independent Ocean
Rangers placed on cruise ships by the State of Alaska to monitor
discharge of waste streams while the ship is in Alaska state waters.
Notwithstanding the above, Sec. 3508(a) of the CVSSA states that
the Secretary ``shall develop training standards and curricula to allow
for the certification of passenger vessel security personnel,
crewmembers, and law enforcement officials on the appropriate methods
for prevention, detection, evidence preservation, and reporting of
criminal activities in the international maritime environment.'' The
intent of this provision is clear, however the execution appears to be
problematic. Compliance is ostensibly effected by Model Course CVSSA
11-01: Crime Prevention, Detection, Evidence Preservation and
Reporting. This is an on-line course that takes eight hours (one day)
to complete. Aside from there being no direct contact between an
instructor and a student, there is a total of three hours devoted to
``Crime Scene Actions,'' which includes techniques used by law
enforcement, action required to preserve different crime scenes, and
access control. There is extremely limited content on collection and
preservation of evidence. The stated measure of competence for this
three-hour module is that ``requirements related to reporting and
recording of serious crimes are correctly identified and
demonstrated.'' It is unclear from the manual how students are tested
(although it appears that the most likely method is multiple choice and
other closed-choice exams) and whether the student can learn in three
hours the skills and knowledge commonly possessed by crime scene
investigators on shore. While the course may be useful for training
support personnel to a professionally trained investigator, it appears
inadequate preparation if the concern is with gathering evidence that
will withstand the requirements of land-based law enforcement and a
court of law.
Recommendation #14: In the absence of a professionally qualified
crime scene investigator, a cruise ship should be required to have
onboard a staff person with more than adequate training in all facets
of crime scene preservation, collection of evidence, and methods to
ensure proper chain of evidence.
Prosecution
The final area to consider regarding sexual assault is prosecution
of the perpetrator. I have already addressed the need for evidence to
facilitate prosecution. Another critical issue is to detain the
offender. This may be more easily done when the perpetrator is a
crewmember, however when a passenger perpetrates a sexual assault he or
she should also be detained for law enforcement personnel at the next
U.S. port. It is unfortunate when a crewmember is flown to his home
country from a foreign port rather than having to face prosecution,
especially when the crime is irrefutably caught on videotape, as was
the case of the 11-year-old girl molested on Disney Dream in May 2013.
It is equally sad that a 30-year-old man who groped a 12 year old girl
can wander freely on the ship while the girl and her family are
reminded of the ordeal every time they see him.
Recommendation #15: Cruise ship personnel should take more
seriously their responsibility to detain perpetrators of sexual assault
until the ship arrives at its next U.S. port. Further, Congress should
contemplate whether there needs to be a legislated requirement to
ensure perpetrators are isolated from the general public onboard the
ship and held for delivery to land-based law enforcement personnel.
4. Other Crimes
There are two crimes for which the FBI collected data in 2007-08,
but that are not required to be reported under the CVSSA. One is a
theft of less than $10,000--there were 89 in the one year period 2007-
08. The other is simple assault--there were 115 in the same one year
period. It doesn't seem right that these crimes are not recorded and
that victim rights are apparently truncated.
As regards theft, there is the obvious fact that crew members know
that a theft of less than $10,000 will not only not be prosecuted, but
will not be recorded. This seems like an open door for a permissible
level of crime. Why $10,000 rather than $9,800? The amount appears
arbitrary. However, more importantly, by not collecting data there is
no ability for analysis to discern patterns or trends that might inform
interdiction or prevention. As well, there is no way to know whether
the problem is increasing or decreasing, and whether the problem on
cruise ships is greater or lesser than on land.
Judge Thomas A. Dickerson of the New York State 9th Judicial
District makes the same point, but more eloquently:
[The Act does not] . . . require the reporting of thefts which
are between $1,000 and $9,999 in value. These problems may be
resolved as follows. First, requiring owners to report thefts
less than $10,000 would allow local law enforcement to
investigate and deter future crimes. Second, mandating owners
to include the recorded thefts of property valued between
$1,000 and $9,999 on the USCG website would allow prospective
cruise passengers to better appreciate the risks associated
with cruises. An even more effective method would be to
breakdown the USCG online reporting by individual cruise ships,
rather than by cruise lines, as is currently required.\17\
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\17\ Dickerson, T.A. and S. L. Sgroi. 2012. ``Recent Developments
in Maritime Law,'' Presented at the Joint Judicial Seminar Program for
the Appellate Divisions for the First and Second Judicial Departments,
April 25. Available at:
There are similar concerns with regard to simple assault. What if
the assault is a case of domestic violence (a fair proportion of which
do fall within this category)--why would this not be reported and
considered for prosecution, especially if the victim decides to press
charges. Also, what is the fine line between a simple assault and an
assault with serious bodily injury? Are cruise ship personnel expert in
making this determination? I think not. But most importantly is the
fact that having this data is useful both to determine changes over
time as well as to compare the situation between different cruise ships
and between cruise ships and incidence on land. It would seem it is in
the interest of the cruise industry to have this data collected, unless
they are concerned that the rate onboard their ships is higher than the
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rate onshore.
Recommendation #16: The CVSSA should require reporting to the FBI
of all onboard crime, including thefts less than $10,000 and simple
assaults.
III. Consumer Rights and Cruise Ship Liability
The issue of consumer rights was directly addressed by CLIA's
recent announcement of its Passenger Bill of Bights. This will be
discussed first. I will then shift to the broader issue of liability as
it applies to cruise ships and cruise lines.
A. CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights
The CLIA Bill of Rights is as interesting for what it includes as
for what it does not include. It was announced May 22, 2013 just five
days before a fire on Grandeur of the Sea; probably motivated in large
part by a series of problems before and following the media-focused
fire on the Carnival Triumph and by Senator Schumer's stated intent to
develop a passenger bill of rights. In the month before the Carnival
Triumph fire, five ships experienced propulsion problems causing delay
and/or requiring itinerary changes: Carnival Splendor, Carnival
Destiny, Carnival Legend, Carnival Triumph, and P&O Cruises' Aurora
(all ships operated by Carnival Corporation). In the several months
following the Carnival Triumph fire there were the following:
Seabourn Odyssey had a power failure and was towed to port
in New Zealand;
Cunard Line's Queen Elizabeth had a collision with a tug
boat packed with pleasure seekers in New Zealand;
Hurtigruten's Kong Herald ran aground and the cruise was
canceled;
Coastal and Maritime Voyage's Marco Polo was holed and
canceled its cruise;
Carnival Dream had generator problems and ended a cruise
early, flying passengers home from Saint Maarten;
Carnival Legend had propulsion problems and was stuck for a
day in Costa Maya; the ship altered the itinerary on this
cruise and the next because of continuing problems;
Carnival Elation had steering problems and required
assistance of a tug to navigate to New Orleans;
P&O's Ventura had propulsion problems transatlantic and
changed its itinerary;
Regent Seven Seas' Voyager had propulsion problems causing
significant delays;
Carnival Sunshine canceled two cruises because of longer-
than-anticipated time in dry dock; when the ship finally left
dry dock passengers complained that work was still being done
and some ship services are unavailable;
Celebrity Millennium had propulsion problems that caused
itinerary changes, at one point being dead in the water for
three hours in the South China Sea;
Carnival Ecstasy experienced a power failure;
Coral Princess experienced a fire;
And then comes the Passenger Bill of Rights--no doubt a public
relations initiative to counter the wave of bad publicity (notably, all
but three of the problems occurred on ships operated by Carnival
Corporation). In announcing the Bill of Rights CLIA stated that they
detail CLIA members' ``commitment to the safety, comfort and care of
guests.'' CLIA also stated the Bill of Rights ``codifies many
longstanding practices of CLIA members and goes beyond these to further
inform cruise guests of the industry's commitment to their comfort and
care.'' The obvious question then is what is new about the Bill of
Rights. I will address this and then consider what isn't contained in
the Bill of Rights.
1. The right to disembark a docked ship if essential provisions
such as food, water, restroom facilities and access to medical care
cannot adequately be provided onboard, subject only to the Master's
concern for passenger safety and security and customs and immigration
requirements of the port.
This Right makes perfect sense if a ship is alongside a pier,
however it does not consider the issue of passengers who are stranded
on ships without electrical power, propulsion, toilets, air
conditioning and adequate food for three to five days. What are the
rights of those passengers? Getting off a ship when it is docked is an
easy Right to guarantee. However there are still questions. As Senator
Schumer observes in his May 21, 2013 letter to CLIA, who determines
that essential provisions cannot be adequately provided? If someone on
the ship or the cruise line is the decision maker, how can passengers
appeal that decision? But there is also the issue of disembarking in a
port that requires clearance by customs and immigration officials. A
cruise ship can prevent disembarkation if local port authorities do not
cooperate. What are the rights of passengers then?
The issue of landing and needing clearance from immigration
officials was raised as a potential concern when Carnival Triumph had
its fire and the company decided to tow the ship to a U.S. port rather
than to a closer Mexican port. The explanation given was that many
passengers didn't have passports, so disembarking in Mexico and
repatriating to the U.S. could be problematic. Does the location of a
ship truncate one's rights? On surface the Right sounds reasonable, but
in the concrete situation with a range of conditions it isn't as
straightforward.
2. The right to a full refund for a trip that is canceled due to
mechanical failures, or a partial refund for voyages that are
terminated early due to those failures.
Again, the Right is straightforward and sounds reasonable. If a
product paid for is not delivered there will be a refund. But the Right
does not indicate whether the refund is in cash and how long it will
take for the refund to be processed--the passenger paid for their
cruise 60-90 days in advance of the cruise so shouldn't they be
entitled to the income generated by the cruise line for the period of
time it held the money on deposit? As well, how is a partial refund
calculated and what mechanism is in place for a passenger to challenge
the entitlement offered by the cruise line.
But there is a larger issue. What is a passenger's Right when they
fly to a distant port and learn upon arrival that their ship will not
depart? Will the cruise line reimburse their travel costs to the port
on top of refunding the cruise fare? This is not clear from the
Passenger Bill of Rights. The Passenger Bill of Rights is also not
clear about a passenger's rights if a cruise line leaves port with a
cruise ship that it is known will not be able to fulfill the published
itinerary, as was the case on a couple of cruises listed in Appendix 2.
A related issue is how the Passenger Bill of Rights applies to a
missed port and/or changed itinerary. There is a significant number of
these as noted in Appendix 2 (see for example Aurora (March 2009),
Seven Seas Voyager (April 2009), Pacific Dawn (February 2010), Artemis
(May 2010), Infinity (June 2010), Pacific Sun (February 2011),
Enchantment of the Seas (February 2012), Carnival Legend (March 2013),
Seven Seas Voyager (March 2013), Crown Princess (April 2013)). Do
passengers have the right to be refunded port fees, taxes, and port
related services for which they have already paid when a port call
skipped, and is this payment in cash rather than the typical practice
of an onboard credit? Are they entitled to an additional payment for
failure to deliver the published itinerary, especially when the change
is due to a mechanical problem or failure? And should passengers have a
right to be reimbursed for costs associated with an independently
arranged shore excursion in a port call that is skipped or canceled?
Finally, how are these refunds computed and by what means does a
passenger have a right to dispute that computation? As the saying goes,
the devil is in the details.
While the Passenger Bill of Rights appears to address canceled
cruises, albeit without sufficient clarity, it does not address the
much more common occurrence of port calls that are canceled. What
rights do passengers have in these cases?
3. The right to have available on board ships operating beyond
rivers or coastal waters full-time, professional emergency medical
attention, as needed until shore side medical care becomes available.
Having on board professional emergency medical attention has been a
long-standing practice on cruise ships--in fact it is required by
International Labor Organization Convention 164, entitled ``Health
Protection and Medical Care for Seafarers,'' requiring that ships
``:engaged in international voyages of more than three days' duration
shall carry a medical doctor as a member of crew responsible for
providing medical care.'' However the qualifications of medical
personnel has varied widely. In most cases a physician and/or a nurse
provide medical services. Some cruise lines have a policy of only using
medical professionals trained and board certified in the U.S., Canada,
or U.K. Other cruise lines, in part because the fee paid is less, draw
medical professionals from a range of countries. In all cases, medical
professionals are considered independent contractors--they are paid a
fee by the cruise line and receive a commission based on charges for
medical services and prescriptions/supplies. Though the physician wears
a senior officer's uniform and is considered a member of the crew, she
or he is not a cruise line employee and the cruise line claims no
liability for his or her medical practice.
While the Right states a standard practice, and reiterates a
requirement of the CVSSA, it does not indicate a substantial fee is
charged for emergency medical attention. The Passenger Bill of Rights
should have greater transparency, clearly indicating that medical
services on board a ship are fee-for-service. In addition, passengers
have the Right to know the limitations on medical services on board a
ship. One issue is the scope of practice of the individual physician.
An equally, if not more important issue, is the limited nature of a
ship's infirmary. There may be limited diagnostic facility (e.g., no X-
rays or complex blood tests) and there is no surgical theatre. As an
experienced emergency physician on board a cruise ship told me, ``my
greatest fear is an ectopic pregnancy that needs emergency surgery--
there is very little I can do in the middle of the ocean.''
What this suggests is that the Passenger Bill of Rights should
include useful information about the limits of medical care on a cruise
ship so a passenger can make an informed decision and not go onboard
expecting services that will not be available. In the absence of such
information, the obvious question is whether a cruise ship, by the
Passenger Bill of Rights, is accepting liability for cases where
emergency medical attention may be inadequate or otherwise lacking in
an emergency medical situation. What recourse is available to a
passenger in such a case?
4. The right to timely information updates as to any adjustments in
the itinerary of the ship in the event of a mechanical failure or
emergency, as well as timely updates of the status of efforts to
address mechanical failures.
On surface this right sounds ideal--what else could a passenger
expect? However the term ``timely'' is subjective. I have been on
cruises where timely was measured in hours (sometimes many hours)
whereas I as a passenger measure timely in quarter hours. It would be
helpful to a passenger in understanding the Right to know what is meant
by timely. Aside from that, how will these information updates be
provided--via public announcements on board or by written
notifications? And what recourse does a passenger have if information
updates are not timely? Are they entitled to compensation or some other
consideration? In many ways the Right can easily become an empty
promise.
Another term requiring definition is ``mechanical failure or
emergency.'' This presumably includes a situation where a ship is dead
in the water or has an extended power loss. But does it also apply to a
ship that has a propulsion problem causing it to sail at reduced
speeds, or a medical emergency that delays a ship and causes a change
in itinerary. It would seem that what the industry should be stating is
that a passenger has a Right ``to timely information updates as to any
adjustments in the itinerary of the ship''--full stop.
The Right leaves unstated what compensation, if any, is available
to passengers when a port call is dropped or an itinerary is changed.
Will they be refunded all port fees, taxes and other port use expenses
associated with that port? This was addressed above. In any case, the
Passenger Bill of Rights should be explicit about the parameters for
what their rights are and what their rights are not.
5. The right to a ship crew that is properly trained in emergency
and evacuation procedures.
This is certainly a fair expectation on the part of passengers.
However, there is a huge chasm between being properly trained in
emergency and evacuation procedures--there may not be basis to argue
that crewmembers aren't trained--and those same crewmembers
demonstrating through behavior competence in executing emergency and
evacuation procedures.
Unfortunately, there is a track record of crewmembers not
demonstrating this competence, not only in emergency situations but in
periodic inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard and in annual U.S. Coast
Guard Control Verification exams. The report of the Carnival Splendor
fire is a good example of the point I am making. Officers were likely
properly trained, however the reports says that one reason for the
catastrophic nature of the fire was human error--when the fire alarm
first went off on the ship's bridge, a crew member reset it, leading to
a 15-minute delay in the activation of an automatic fire-suppression
system. The report also faults the crew's ``lack of familiarity with
the engine room,'' which hampered their ability to locate and fight the
fire, and the captain's decision to ``ventilate'' the compartment where
the fire began before it was fully extinguished, allowing the flames to
flare again.\18\
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\18\ Dolan, J. 2013. ``Crew Error Cited in Carnival Ship Fire that
Led to Nightmare Tow,'' Los Angeles Times (July 16).
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Two questions derive from these points. First, what will the cruise
industry require to ensure that all crewmembers are properly trained--
will current regimes of training be augmented or bolstered? How will
proper training in emergency and evacuation procedures be verified?
Second, what recourse does a passenger have when crewmembers do not
demonstrate competence in emergency and evacuation procedures? Will the
cruise line waive damage limits contained in the Passenger Contract
and/or permit a passenger to file a lawsuit (including for emotional
distress, mental suffering/anguish or psychological injury, presently
excluded from the cruise line's liability) for demonstrated failure of
competence in emergency and evacuation procedures? These should be
explicitly laid out in the Passenger Bill of Rights.
6. The right to an emergency power source in the case of a main
generator failure.
Like other items in the Passenger Bill of Rights, the obvious
question is what is included under ``main generator failure'' and what
is excluded? We can point to Carnival Splendor, which had six diesel
engines--a fire in one engine caused extensive damage to cables in the
aft engine room that meant vessel engineers were unable to restart the
unaffected main generator.\19\ How can CLIA guarantee that a similar or
more catastrophic event wouldn't happen on another ship? In the case of
the Carnival Splendor it wasn't that the main generator failed, but
that the cables carrying power from the generator had been destroyed.
Also on the Carnival Splendor the emergency generator apparently
continued to work, but only provided power to emergency services. Does
this technically comply with the right stipulated?
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\19\ U.S. Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation into the Fire
Onboard the Carnival Splendor which Occurred in the Pacific Ocean off
the Coast of Mexico on November 8, 2010, which Resulted in Complete
Loss of Power. MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number 3897765.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case of Carnival Dream in March 2013, news reports indicate
the main power generator had not failed, but the backup emergency
diesel generator had failed, thus causing the cruise to be terminated
when the ship was in Saint Maarten. This illustrates the confusion in
the language in the Right--what is it actually telling a passenger and
whether what is being promised can actually be delivered? And if the
Right is not fulfilled, what recourse does a passenger have?
This issue is made even more confusing when considering the number
of cruise ships that have lost power and gone adrift--some for short
periods of time; others for longer periods of time. How does this Right
apply to a passenger in this situation? Does this Right apply to all
power outages or only power outages of a certain duration and/or only
power outages caused by failure of the main generator? Assuming a
passenger has a Right to an emergency power source, what happens if it
isn't provided; what recourse or compensation is available to them?
There are many questions raised by this Right, which on surface is
intended to reinforce a sense of security, but upon reflection is
potentially an empty promise.
7. The right to transportation to the ship's scheduled port of
disembarkation or the passenger's home city in the event a cruise is
terminated early due to mechanical failures.
This Right is already a common practice of the cruise industry,
however the Passenger Bill of Rights doesn't address two situations.
First, what Right does a passenger have when a cruise ends early and
passengers are returned to the port of embarkation--does the cruise
line assume responsibility for the additional travel costs (and change
fees on airline tickets) associated with getting from the port of
disembarkation, does the cruise line assume responsibility for lodging
and food expenses incurred by the passenger in getting home, and does
the cruise line provide compensation for a passenger who arrives home
later than scheduled thereby losing salary from missed work and having
expenses for childcare etcetera? The Right to transportation doesn't
appear to extend to these issues. Related to this is whether a
passenger is accommodated in the same class of service on airlines and
the same class of hotel that they normally choose. How long will a
passenger wait for reimbursement of these costs and what mechanism is
in place if there is a dispute between a cruise line and the passenger
about the amount due to the passenger? Does the cruise line waive the
Passenger Contract so the passenger can pursue a case in a court of law
of their choosing (for example, if they live outside the U.S. or in a
location remote from the court specified in the Passenger Contract's
forum selection clause)?
Second, the Passenger Bill of Rights does not address the Right a
passenger has when a ship arrives late in a port of disembarkation and
the passenger has arranged his/her own transportation. Does a passenger
in this case have the Right to have the cruise line assume
responsibility for all additional travel costs (in the class of service
originally booked) as well as lodging and food expenses incurred in
getting home, and does the cruise line provide compensation for a
passenger who arrives home later than scheduled thereby losing salary
from missed work and having expenses for childcare etcetera? This is an
area of rights that is not addressed at all in the Passenger Bill of
Rights.
8. The right to lodging if disembarkation and an overnight stay in
an unscheduled port are required when a cruise is terminated early due
to mechanical failures.
Does this Right only apply to a cruise terminated due to a
mechanical failure, or to any cruise terminated early? CLIA's choice of
more restrictive language suggests there are many situations when a
cruise may be terminated in an unscheduled port of call and lodging
would not be provided. How does this Right interface with the Passenger
Bill of Rights' #1?
This Right also says nothing about the quality of the lodging
provided. Does a cot in a high school gymnasium qualify as ``lodging''?
Does lodging include a private bathroom? Based on past events, it is
possible to imagine a range of scenarios. What Right to lodging,
precisely, does a passenger have and will the cruise line assume all
costs associated with that lodging? What recourse does a passenger have
when the lodging provided is unacceptable.
9. The right to have included on each cruise line's website a toll-
free phone line that can be used for questions or information
concerning any aspect of shipboard operations.
Cruise lines already have toll-free numbers accessible from
telephones in the U.S. Will access to these numbers extend to all ports
of call on the cruise line's itinerary and to all countries from which
passengers are drawn? More importantly, what will be done to ensure
that the information provided by an operator at a toll-free number has
accurate and correct information? Take for example the following
correspondence I received from the parent of a passenger on Carnival
Legend March 14, 2013:
The ship is disabled and stuck in Costa Maya on March 13, 2013.
I spoke with Carnival last night about how this might effect
the itinerary because my daughter is on the ship. They told me
they did not know anything about an alteration in the cruise
schedule and would only tell me the ship was moving. I called
the ship to try to speak with my daughter today and while I did
not reach her, the ship officer confirmed to me that they were
in Costa Maya and not Belize yesterday. Her boyfriend called
Carnival this morning as well and they denied the ship was in
Costa Maya and called it a rumor. I can understand a mechanical
issue that needs to be addressed although this seems to be a
big problem with this company. I cannot tolerate flat out lying
and misinformation that they are providing about the Legend.
What changes or initiatives are being undertaken by CLIA and its
member lines in order to avoid a similar situation? What recourse does
a passenger and/or his/her family have when misinformation is provided
or information is withheld?
10. The right to have this Cruise Line Passenger Bill of Rights
published on each line's website.
This seems like the easiest Right to realize, however a quick
survey of CLIA-member cruise line websites on July 15, 2013, found that
the Passenger Bill of Rights was apparently not published on 13 of the
26 member lines' website. CLIA's May 22, 2013, Press Release (Cruise
Industry Adopts Passenger Bill of Rights) states that publishing the
Passenger Bill of Rights on a cruise line's website is a condition of
membership in CLIA. Are these 13 members no longer members of CLIA?
What right or recourse does a passenger have if they have purchased a
ticket from one of these lines in the past eight weeks--does the
Passenger Bill of Rights apply to them?
CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Contract
There is one additional issue with the Passenger Bill of Rights.
CLIA promised that the Passenger Bill of Rights would be added to
Cruise Passenger Contracts. This is laudable, but this is not apparent
from Passenger Contracts displayed on cruise line websites, but more
importantly there is no mention of how conflicts and contradictions
between the Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Passenger Contract
are resolved. Which has precedence? According to the standard passenger
contract the cruise line has the right to alter a cruise itinerary for
any reason and the passenger has no recourse. As Carnival Cruise Lines
states in its hard-to-find ``Cruise Cancellation and Itinerary Change
Policy'' states:
In the event an itinerary change becomes necessary while the
ship is at sea or when notice prior to sailing is not feasible,
Carnival and/or the Master will attempt to substitute an
alternative port. Carnival and/or the Master may, in their
discretion and for any purpose, deviate in any direction or for
any purpose from the direct or usual course, and omit or change
any or all ports of calls, arrival or departure times, with or
without notice, for any reason whatsoever, all such deviations
being considered as forming part of and included in the
proposed voyage. Carnival shall have no liability for any
refund or other damages in such circumstances.\20\
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\20\ See http://www.carnival.com/about-carnival/legal-notice/port-
cancellation-policy.aspx
In terms of itinerary changes before a ship leaves port, the policy
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states:
Due to the nature of a cruise vacation, itinerary changes
sometimes become necessary for safety, weather or other reasons
beyond the control of Carnival. If the itinerary change is for
reasons beyond Carnival's exclusive control, including but not
limited to safety, security, weather, strikes, tides,
hostilities, civil unrest, port closings, emergency
debarkations of guests or crew, late air, sea, car or motor
coach departures or arrivals, mechanical breakdowns or problems
not known to Carnival, itinerary changes consistent with U.S.
State Department travel warnings/advisories or other applicable
U.S. or foreign governmental advisories, guests will not be
provided any compensation. Guests electing to cancel will be
subject to the standard cancellation terms.
And in terms of passenger costs resulting from cruise cancellations
or itinerary changes the policy states:
Carnival shall not be liable to guests for any charges, fees or
expenses paid or owed to third parties by guests (such as air
travel booked by a guest directly with an airline) in
connection with a cancelled cruise or an itinerary change for
any reason.
Carnival Cruise Lines' Passenger Contract is even more restrictive:
(c) If the performance of the proposed voyage is hindered or
prevented (or in the opinion of Carnival or the Master is
likely to be hindered or prevented) by war, hostilities,
blockage, ice, labor conflicts, strikes on board or ashore,
restraint of Princes, Rulers or People, seizure under legal
process, breakdown of the Vessel, congestion, docking
difficulties or any other cause whatsoever or if Carnival or
the Master considers that for any reason whatsoever, proceeding
to, attempting to enter, or entering or remaining at the port
of Guest's destination may expose the Vessel to risk or loss or
damage or be likely to delay her, the Guest and his baggage may
be landed at the port of embarkation or at any port or place at
which the Vessel may call, at which time the responsibility of
Carnival shall cease and this contract shall be deemed to have
been fully performed, or if the Guest has not embarked,
Carnival may cancel the proposed voyage without liability to
refund passage money or fares paid in advance. (emphasis added)
These statements appear at variance with a number of items in the
Passenger Bill of Rights. It appears disingenuous to promote a
Passenger Bill of Rights without also clarifying how conflicts between
those rights and the cruise passenger contract are to be resolved.
A common theme across all elements in the Passenger Bill of Rights
is how a passenger deals with a Right that has not been fulfilled or
has been directly violated. Are these rights ultimately governed by the
cruise passenger contract that sets clear terms about when and how
complaints and legal action must filed, and where law suits must be
filed? Forum selection clauses effectively truncate a passengers rights
under the Passenger Bill of Rights given the requirement that legal
action can only be taken in a court located in the state where the
cruise line's corporate headquarters is located (most frequently
Florida). The cruise passenger contract also includes a ``class action
waiver,'' prohibiting a passenger from taking any legal action as a
member of a class or as a participant in a class action. For many
passengers these are impediments to taking any action and they often
resign to accepting whatever the cruise line offers, if anything.
B. What the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights Does Not Include
1. Passenger Rights
There are a number of things obviously missing from the CLIA
Passenger Bill of Rights. Some of these have already been mentioned:
There is no mention of the recourse a passenger has if one
of the Rights is not fulfilled or realized.
There is no indication of how a partial refund will be
computed and whether that refund is provided in cash or, as
common in the industry, as a discount on a future cruise or an
onboard credit.
There is no mention of whether the cruise line is
responsible for ancillary costs when a cruise is cancelled,
including change fees for airline tickets and for the costs of
the tickets themselves, the cost of lodging required in travel
to the passenger's home city, and support for food and
incidentals associated with delays in getting from the ship to
the passenger's home city.
There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a
port of call is canceled. Some cruise lines refund ``port fees
and taxes,'' however these are given as an onboard credit
rather than as a cash refund. As well, there is no transparency
with regard to the amount refunded. Some cruise lines average
the cost of port fees and taxes so a refund for one port is the
same as the other even though actual fees can vary widely from
one port to another. Also, it isn't transparent whether costs
other than port taxes and fees that are not paid by the cruise
line because of the canceled port call are also refunded to the
passenger. There is considerable need for greater clarity and
transparency around passenger rights when a port call is
canceled.
There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a
cruise itinerary is changed, such as a cruise sailing the
Eastern Caribbean instead of the Western Caribbean because of
propulsion problems, or a cruise going to Canada instead of the
Caribbean because of weather. The Passenger Cruise Contract is
clear that the cruise line has no obligation or responsibility
to provide compensation in these situations. This absence of
rights should be clearly articulated in the Passenger Bill of
Rights.
There is no mention of the rights a passenger has when
embarkation is delayed. Does a passenger have a Right to meal
vouchers or compensation for meals purchased (as is common in
airline travel)? Also, after how many hours of waiting in a
cruise terminal is the cruise line obligated to provide either
lodging or a comfortable setting to wait? A comprehensive
Passenger Bill of Rights would address these situations given
the frequency of delayed embarkations.
There is no mention of a passenger's rights when a cruise
arrives late in its port of disembarkation, causing the
passenger to miss transportation arrangements for their trip to
their home city.
In addition there are some rights that should be directly
addressed.
The Passenger Bill of Rights should clearly articulate the rights
of a passenger who is ``bumped'' from a cruise because of overbooking
or other issues. The most recent cases involve Carnival Sunshine, which
bumped passengers on its June 7, 2013, cruise because a number of
cabins were needed for contractors completing work that was not
completed while the ship was in dry dock. Similarly, passengers in 78
cabins on Grandeur of the Seas were bumped from the July 12, 2013 (and
perhaps the July 19th), sailing because cabins were needed for workers
who were still making repairs following the fire earlier in the year.
Some of these bumped passengers had their cruise canceled because the
ship had been out of service for repairs, and here they were bumped
from their replacement cruise.\21\
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\21\ It is worth mention that Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited, in
anticipation of these hearings and concern that the facts might paint
an unkind picture, sent an e-mail to all employees asking them to write
their Senator with the following text: Dear Senator, As one of your
constituents and an employee of _______________, one of the major
cruise lines serving North America, I am contacting you today out of
concern regarding the July 24 Senate Commerce Committee hearing
regarding the cruise industry. As an individual who is intimately
familiar with cruising, it is apparent to me that there has been a
great deal of misinformation and distortion regarding the industry in
recent months. As one of your constituents, I am concerned that the
industry will be unfairly portrayed at this hearing. As someone that
works in the cruise line industry, I know firsthand that cruising is
extremely safe and well regulated at the national level, by the U.S.
Coast Guard, and by international authorities. Additionally, the cruise
industry directly benefits businesses in all 50 states, generating over
355,000 jobs and over $42 billion in economic impact. It provides $17.4
billion in wages to American workers each year. I would greatly
appreciate your support to ensure that the cruise industry receives a
fair and balanced hearing. Thank you for your time and attention to
this matter and your service to our Nation. Sincerely, Your Name
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Similarly, the Passenger Bill of Rights should discuss a
passenger's rights when they are expelled from a cruise ship, often for
questionable reasons and the result is loss of cruise fare and their
having responsibility for transportation from the port where they are
left. Between January 2009 and June 30, 2013, there are eight cases
list on my website where a passenger has been evicted or expelled
(these are only ones reported in the media). These passengers have no
right to appeal or recourse. The cruise line Cruise Passenger Contract
gives them this unilateral, uncontestable Right to evict or expel,
without liability.
The Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passenger's rights
when they miss the ship because of flight delays or because of weather
conditions (such as Hurricane Sandy in the fall of 2013 when passengers
lost their cruise fare because they couldn't get to the ship). The
cruise lines generally take the position that this type of situation is
not their problem. A passenger without trip insurance is responsible
for lost cruise fares and/or additional travel costs to join the ship
at a later point. Further, it there are reports that some benefits
under trip insurance policies offered by the cruise line are more
restrictive in the benefits they provide than insurance policies
offered independent of the cruise line.
The Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passenger's rights
to have safety concerns taken seriously. Though not the first time I
have received this sort of information, on June 21, 2013, I received
the following from a cruise passenger:
We have just disembarked after a 7-day Alaskan cruise aboard
Celebrity Solstice. We frequented the quasar dance club each
night. On night two I noticed at 2300 (11pm), when the club
only allows 18 and over, a crew member used a small rope to tie
the handles of one of the two exits closed to prevent access.
Not must looped but tied in a fashion that untying would be
impossible is a smoke filled environment or panic. This room is
required to have two emergency exits and this exit was clearly
marked ``emergency exit''. This happened three nights in a row.
I brought my concerns to the attention of guest services
requesting to speak to the ships Safety Officer. I was told
that another passenger had requested to speak with him also but
he stated that he was ``too busy with paperwork to speak to
anyone''. The guest services person apologized and drafted an
e-mail to him explaining my concerns and that I am a 28 year
firefighter. That night in quasar the doors were once again
tied closed. As of this writing no staff or crew has contacted
me. I would encourage that all passengers be aware of their
surroundings. It appears Celebrity is not concerned with safety
and if this blatant example of reckless disregard for its
passengers and crew in a public space is allowed to exist, then
I am wondering what other safety issues exist that we did not
see.
It would seem this passenger's expectations were realistic, but
they were ignored. Did he have any rights? And what rights were
available for this disregard of concern for fire safety?
Finally, the Passenger Bill of Rights does not address the Right to
be free of sexual assault by crewmembers or cruise ship employees, or
the Right to be free of other types of crime. This type of assurance
seems only natural given the rate of sexual assault on cruise ships,
but it is obviously one that would be difficult to fulfill (although no
less difficult than some of the other rights included in the Passenger
Bill of Rights). In this line of thought, the Passenger Bill of Rights
should also contain a Right to contact the FBI directly from the ship
when a victim of a crime. This Right is accorded by the CVSSA, so it
should be provided, however most victims will be unaware of what is
available to them without it explicitly being stated in something like
a Passenger Bill of Rights. Alternatively, a cruise ship may be
required to provide a crime victim with an information sheet outlining
the rights and the options available to them, including the telephone
numbers for relevant law enforcement agencies, and agencies that
provide direct services or referral to services that are likely to be
needed by the victim.
In sum, it appears the Passenger Bill of Rights is a public
relations initiative that on its face accords more rights and
protection to a passenger than is realistically the case. One problem
is the many empty or nonspecific promises contained in the Passenger
Bill of Rights, but a larger problem is there is no clear recourse for
a passenger who believes the rights promised have not been provided.
This is all based essentially based on a matter of trust, however as
was observed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) in 2003, trust (or voluntary approaches) does not
substantively change the status quo of the way things are done.
Focusing specifically on environmental policy, the OECD notes few cases
where voluntary approaches have improved the environment beyond a
business as usual baseline.\22\
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\22\ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2003.
Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Policy: Effectiveness,
Efficiency, and Usage in Policy Mixes, Paris:OECD.
Recommendation #17: Given the imprecise nature of the CLIA
Passenger Bill of Rights, there is an obvious need for a legislated
solution. Passenger rights can only be achieved by legislation that
puts into place clear and specific measures for consumer protection,
similar to those available to passengers of other modes of commercial
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
transportation.
This recommendation for greater consumer protection may help level
the field between the rights of cruise passengers in the U.K. versus in
the U.S. Unlike the U.S., there have been a number of successful
lawsuits in the U.K. for ``cruises from hell,'' with problems ranging
from illness outbreaks, lapses in service, and ships having facilities
that are not in proper repair or that remain under construction
following time in dry dock.
2. Cruise Line Rights
While the typical Passenger Cruise Contract accords few rights to
the cruise passenger, it gives many rights to the cruise line.
Unfortunately, the cruise passenger contract is rarely given to the
passenger when they make their booking and put down a deposit. Further,
they are not usually given a copy of the passenger contract before
making full payment for their cruise 60-90 days before the cruise. Most
frequently a copy of the cruise passenger contract is provided in small
print on the back of the tickets sent to a passenger to be used for
boarding. By accepting the ticket the passenger acknowledges receipt of
applicable brochures and agrees to abide by the terms and conditions of
the cruise line's brochures and website, including but not limited to
the information contained in the ``Frequently Asked Questions'' and
``Embarkation Information'' sections.\23\ At this point the passenger's
rights have already been compromised--he or she cannot cancel the
cruise without losing all monies paid. A cruise line would likely say
that the passenger could have downloaded the passenger contract from
the company's website, however a more proactive approach by the cruise
line would make sense. When I buy an airline ticket I receive the
passenger contract when I print or receive the ticket and I have 24
hours to cancel that ticket without loss of funds. It only seems
reasonable that a cruise passenger should receive a copy of the cruise
passenger contract before his or her Right to a refund passes.
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\23\ See section 2(d) of Carnival Cruise Lines' passenger contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As regards rights, there is an asymmetric power relationship
between a passenger and a cruise ship. As already seen, the cruise line
holds all of the power when it comes to itinerary changes and canceled
cruises, and when it comes to crime. The cruise line similarly has full
control over how to resolve customer service issues--not just evictions
and expulsions, but lapses in providing the services and care a
passenger is led to believe will be provided by advertising and
promotional materials. The cruise contract either truncates a
passenger's rights in most situations, or reinforces the cruise line's
Right at the detriment of the passenger.
Some of the cruise line's rights appear unreasonable. For example,
Carnival Cruise Line's contract states:
Carnival reserves the right to increase published fares and air
fare supplements without prior notice. However, fully paid or
deposited guests will be protected, except for fares listed,
quoted, advertised or booked in error, fuel supplements,
government taxes, other surcharges and changes to deposit,
payment and cancellation terms/conditions, which are subject to
change without notice. In the event that a cruise fare listed,
quoted or advertised through any website, Carnival sales
person, travel agent or any other source is booked but is
incorrect due to an electronic error, typographical error,
human error or any other error causing the fare to be listed,
quoted or advertised for an amount not intended by Carnival,
Carnival reserves the right to correct the erroneous fare by
requesting the Guest to pay the correct fare intended, or by
canceling the cruise in exchange for a full refund, but in no
event shall Carnival be obligated to honor any such booking
resulting from the error or otherwise be liable in such
circumstances.
Thus, a passenger can book a cruise only to be told later that they
owe additional funds for a fuel supplement, surcharge, or government
taxes. As well, if the company makes an error in booking a cruise at a
fare it didn't mean to, the passenger has no right to receive the fare
advertised and under which the cruise ticket was issued. This is
another stark contrast with the airline industry.
The passenger contract also gives the cruise line the right to
cancel the cruise contract at its discretion (and without the
passengers consent)--the passenger has no reciprocal right. The cruise
line also has no obligation to provide a passenger the cabin reserved
when a reservation was made. As Carnival Cruise Lines' contract states,
``Carnival reserves the right to move Guests to a comparable stateroom
for any reason, including but not limited to, instances in which a
stateroom is booked with fewer than the maximum number of Guests the
stateroom can accommodate.'' Again, the passenger has no recourse.
Finally, the cruise line retains an exclusive right to use
photographs and videotapes of a passenger onboard a ship with no
limitation (including in advertising and publicity) and without the
passenger's consent. Imagine taking a cruise and some time later seeing
an advertisement or video with your image in a photograph or videotape
(including when doing something silly or foolish). To some of us, this
would be construed as a violation of privacy. Rightfully, consent
should be required for use of anyone's image in a public forum.
3. Issues of Liability
In addition to issue of the cruise line's rights is the extreme
limits placed on the company's liability. For claims not involving
personal injury, illness, or death a passenger must give notice of
claim within 30 days of disembarkation from the vessel. Claims
involving personal injury, illness or death must be filed with the
company within 6 months of the injury, event, illness or death and a
lawsuit must be filed within a year. In all cases that legal action is
taken, it must be filed in the U.S. District Court or state court where
the cruise line's headquarters is located (referred to as a forum
selection clause). As already mentioned, this severely limits the
option available to many passengers.
Baggage and Personal Effects
Even when legal action may be initiated, there are other limits.
Many passenger cruise contracts limit the liability of the cruise line
for lost or damaged luggage and personal effects. For example, Carnival
Cruise Lines' passenger contract states ``. . . that the aggregate
value of Guest's property does not exceed $50 USD per guest or bag with
a maximum value of $100 USD per stateroom regardless of the number of
occupants or bags.'' Consequently, a family of four whose luggage is
lost by the cruise line is due only $100--this doesn't even cover the
cost of the luggage, much less the contents. A passenger can increase
these limits by declaring a higher value and paying 5 percent of the
declared value to the cruise line. In contrast, the passenger contract
for an air carrier limits liability to approximately $1,500 per
passenger.\24\ A family of four on a cruise would have to pay $280 to
the cruise line for the same level of coverage provided automatically
by an air carrier.
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\24\ Coverage under the Warsaw Convention is approximately
US$1,663; under the Montreal Convention US$20 per kg for loss of or
damage or delay to checked baggage, and US$400 for unchecked package.
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Illness Outbreaks
Cruise lines operating out of U.S. ports and serving U.S. ports
have successfully avoided liability for illness outbreaks. This has not
consistently been the case in the U.K. where there are stronger
consumer protection laws. Part of the cruise industry's defense is
their mantra that ``passengers bring the illness with them,'' thereby
coloring itself as an unwilling victim. As Rose Abello, vice president
of Public Relations of Holland America Line stated, ``The ship is not
sick. There are sick people getting on the ship.'' \25\ This mantra was
first used in late-2002 when there was a wave of very visible norovirus
outbreaks on cruise ships, and it proved effective. Interestingly, The
International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) laid out its strategy at
the 2003 World Cruise Tourism Summit on March 3, 2003. An almost-
inspirational video was shown about the situation in which the industry
found itself and the way that it successfully responded on the public
relations front.
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\25\ LaMendola B. and T. Steighorst. 2002. ``Cruise Lines Blame
Passengers for 3rd Viral Outbreak on Ship,'' Sun--Sentinel (November
12).
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At the start of the video, the industry was depicted as receiving
an inordinate amount of attention for a series of norovirus outbreaks
on cruise ships. Illness on cruise ships had been the topic of stories
on mainstream television: Inside Edition, CNN, NBC, and many others.
The industry had even become the brunt of jokes on late night
television--Jay Leno and David Letterman among others. Evening news
with increasing frequency showed people who had become sick on board
ships.
The video described the industry's media strategy had three
elements: provide talking points to cruise executives and others in a
position to present the industry's position, arrange as many media
interviews as possible, and flood the media with positive information
about the cruise industry. It proactively distributed pictures and
video footage showing ships being disinfected, and engaged in positive
messaging. Carnival Cruise Lines' president, Bob Dickinson, framed the
problem as part of a national epidemic and said there was no cause-and-
effect with regard to norovirus on cruise ships. Colin Veitch, NCL's
CEO, pointed to the incidence of norovirus in the general population to
minimize the problem as unique to cruise ships. The industry also
enlisted the help of third parties in its campaign, most significantly
the Centers for Disease Control. It helped promote the idea that people
get sick on airplanes too, but they don't experience symptoms until
they get home so they don't associate it with air travel.
ICCL's video concluded with ``Smooth Seas Ahead.'' The industry
successfully fought off the negative media attention and reframed the
issue. Its message was two pronged: cruises are a great vacation at a
good price, and why worry about norovirus--it is as common as the
common cold. You can't argue with that. The media became desensitized
to the issue and most of the 79 outbreaks affecting 6,630 people in
2003 and 2004 went unnoticed. The problem continues: in 2012 the were
were 34 known outbreaks affecting 5,542 passengers.
When an outbreak does happen ill passengers often are quarantined
in their cabin for days; whether they receive any compensation is
wholly at the cruise line's discretion. However, cruise lines are not
as innocent or defenseless as they would like to appear. In 2005 and
again in 2008 I argued in my books, in response to claims by the
industry that the low incidence among prove that norovirus is largely a
passenger problem, that there are systemic disadvantages for
crewmembers to report when they are ill. This position appears to be
supported by recent CDC health inspections that have identified cases
where crewmembers have continued to report to work despite being ill,
including in positions of food handling and food service.
The problem for passengers is that cruise lines have effectively
escaped liability for illness among passengers. To my knowledge there
have been no successful lawsuits in the U.S. for these outbreaks even
though similar lawsuits have been successful under consumer protection
laws in the U.K.
Independent Contractors
A cruise ship is populated with many independent contractors whose
behavior and practice the cruise line assumes no liability. Most
visibly these include medical services (physician(s) and nurse(s)), but
spa and personal care services (including health and beauty staff),
photographers and video diary staff, retail shop personnel, casino
workers, art auctioneers, and all other concessionaires. Even though
many of these people wear clothing with the cruise line's logo, and in
the case of medical personnel officer uniforms, they are not considered
cruise line employees. Unbeknownst to most passengers, the cruise ship
has no liability for services provided and billed to the passenger's
onboard account. The status of these groups as independent service
providers over whom the cruise line has no authority, control, or
responsibility (even though tacitly endorsed by the cruise line) needs
to be more clearly visible to passengers. At the very least, there
should be signage or formal notification to passengers of this fact.
Medical Care
Medical services are a bit different. In an emergency situation,
the passenger has no choice but to accept the service of medical
personal who the cruise line has judged to be appropriate for medical
care on its ship. But the cruise ship has no liability for their
practice. It is a hard concept to get one's head around given the
service is offered by the cruise line and the cruise ship collects the
fees. But the nature of this arrangement was supported by the Florida
Supreme Court in February 2007 and by the U.S. Supreme Court in October
2007.
The case began ten years before in March 1997. Fourteen-year-old
Elizabeth Carlisle was on a Caribbean cruise on Carnival Destiny with
her family. On the second night out of Miami she developed severe
abdominal pain. She consulted the ship's physician, Dr. Mauro Neri, who
had finished medical school in his native Italy in 1981 and had held
nine medical jobs in Italy, Africa and England in the fifteen years
before joining Carnival Cruise Lines. His salary was $1,057 a month.
Dr. Neri advised that Elizabeth was suffering from the flu and sent her
on her way. But her pain became worse. On the third visit to the
infirmary, after Elizabeth's parents specifically asked whether the
problem could be appendicitis, Dr. Neri conducted his first physical
exam. He responded that he was sure the problem was not the girl's
appendix.
When the pain continued to grow worse Elizabeth's parents called
their family physician in Michigan, who advised they return home. The
family took the advice, and shortly after arriving home Elizabeth
underwent emergency surgery to remove her ruptured appendix. The
infection had rendered the fourteen year old sterile and caused
lifelong medical problems. Elizabeth sued Carnival Cruise Lines in
Florida state court, a case she lost on Carnival's motion for summary
judgement. The cruise line claimed it was not responsible for the
medical negligence of the doctor on board and pointed to the fine print
in the passenger cruise contract to support its position.
The family appealed the Circuit Court's decision to Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal, where the parents argued the cruise line was
vicariously liable for the doctor's negligence. Judge Joseph Nesbitt
agreed and reversed the lower court's decision. The judge held that the
cruise line had control over the doctor's medical services for agency
law purposes; the doctor was to provide medical services to passengers
and crew in accordance with the cruise line's guidelines. And as it was
foreseeable that some passengers at sea would develop medical problems
(and that the only realistic alternative for such a passenger was
treatment by the ship's doctor) the cruise line had an element of
control over the doctor-patient relationship. As such, the cruise
line's duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
extended to the actions of a ship's doctor placed onboard by the cruise
line. The doctor was an agent of the cruise line and his negligence was
imputed to the cruise line. This invalidated the cruise ticket's
purported limitation of the cruise line's liability for the negligence
of its agents.
Judge Nesbitt's decision was groundbreaking. It was likely the very
first case where a cruise line was held responsible for the care
provided by a ship's physician. Not surprisingly, Carnival appealed the
case to the Florida Supreme Court. While the court almost agreed with
the lower court's assertion that times had changed and that a doctor's
negligence at sea also shows negligence by the cruise line, it
ultimately found in favour of Carnival. Justice Peggy Quince wrote in
her opinion:
We find merit in the plaintiff 's argument and the reasoning of
the district court. However, because this is a maritime case,
this Court and the Florida district courts of appeal must
adhere to the Federal principles of harmony and uniformity when
applying Federal maritime law.\26\
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\26\ Supreme Court of Florida. 2007. Carnival Corporation vs. Darce
Carlisle, Case No. SC 04-393, February 15.
The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the court
refused to hear it. The Florida Supreme Court's decision was the final
word. If the Carlisle family wanted to pursue the case they would have
to sue the physician directly. But this would be difficult in their
case, and in most involving medical malpractice on cruise ships, given
that they'd first have to locate the physician in his present home.
Cruise lines historically have not provided assistance with locating
former staff members. In addition, malpractice cases involving
treatment in international waters must be filed in the courts of the
physician's country of origin, which is both difficult and
expensive.\27\
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\27\ Chen, S. 2007. ``Trouble at Sea: Free-Agent Doctors,'' Wall
Street Journal (October 24).
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Shore Excursions
Shore excursions are a major source of income for a cruise ship--
the cruise ship retains 50--70 percent or more of what a passenger pays
for the tour. These tours are sold onboard at a Shore Excursion Desk by
staff members wearing the cruise line's uniform. But when something
goes wrong on a shore excursion, the cruise line is quick to remind the
passenger that they are not liable; shore excursions are provided by
independent contractors. Appendix 1 indicates 14 known deaths on shore
excursions (these are only incidents that have been reported in the
media; there are many more than this) and five robberies ashore (some
at knife or gun point) on shore excursions affecting dozens of
passengers--these again are only those that have been reported in the
media so they underrepresent the true number.
If there is an injury or death on a shore excursion, the cruise
passenger's options are limited in U.S. courts. Their options in a
court in the country where the shore excursion was offered may also
offer few options. The problem is that shore excursions are largely
unregulated, except by the cruise line itself, and some can be quite
dangerous.
While the cruise line has no liability for shore excursions, they
tend to dissuade passengers from taking tours that are independently
available. They may talk about safety concerns for a tour that is not
approved, and will often warn passengers that the advantage of the
ship-sponsored tour is that if they are delayed the ship will wait for
them. In contrast, the ship will not wait for a passenger delayed on an
independent tour. While more and more passengers are choosing to make
private arrangements for land-based tours, those who make advance plans
may find they are out money when a ship alters its itinerary or cancels
a port call.
Sexual Assaults
The issue of liability for sexual assaults reached public attention
in the mid-1990s. A tort reform measure attached to the Coast Guard
Reauthorization bill had passed on May 9, 1995. The amendment, for the
most part written by the ICCL, was introduced by Representative Don
Young. He referred to it as a ``noncontroversial manager's amendment.''
\28\ It passed the House by a vote of 406 to 12. Only afterwards did
people read the final print.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Glass, J. 1996. ``Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort,'' Lloyd's
List (October 1), p. 1.
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One provision, directed at mounting claims from injuries and sexual
assaults, limited liability to passengers and crew for ``infliction of
emotional distress, mental suffering or psychological injury'' unless
negligence or an intentional act can be proven. The American Trial
Lawyers Association characterized the amendments as ``dangerous
legislation'' that ``jeopardized the safety of women on cruise ships.''
Opposition also came from the Women's Defense Fund, the National
Organization for Women's Legal Defense Fund, the Maritime Committee of
the AFL-CIO, and rape treatment centers.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Fox, L. and B. R. Fox. 1995. ``Anchored in the Docks,
Washington Post (October 8), p. E4.
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The amendment languished for more than a year waiting to go to a
House-Senate conference where lawmakers would resolve the House and
Senate versions of the Coast Guard Reauthorization Bill. Lobbying by
the industry continued, including a delegation of cruise line
executives led by Micky Arison in March 1996. He and Celebrity Cruise's
president Richard Sasso met with Senator Larry Pressler and separately
with other members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. Pressler chaired the Committee and would serve on the
conference committee charged with reconciling the House and Senate
versions.\30\ By October 1, 1996, a compromise had been negotiated.
Ernest Hollings, from the Senate's Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, observed before the Conference Committee that
no one knew if the cruise ship people had enough votes to push the
amendments through, but the cruise industry figured they were 50
percent there and didn't have much to lose.\31\ When the Conference
Committee convened, Senator Hollings threatened to kill the entire
reauthorization bill if ICCL's amendments remained. In the end he
capitulated after amended language was adopted for the two provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Rowe, S. 1996. ``There Oughta Be a Law,'' Miami New Times
(March 21).
\31\ Ibid.
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In the final version, ship owners were prohibited from limiting
their liability in cases involving sexual harassment, sexual
misbehavior, assault, or rape in cases where the victim is physically
injured. Limitations were allowed in all other situations.\32\ Current
passenger cruise contracts read, as does Carnival Cruise Line's, the
cruise line shall not be liable to the passenger for damages for
emotional distress, mental suffering/anguish or psychological injury of
any kind under any circumstances, except when such damages were caused
by the negligence of Carnival and resulted from the same passenger
sustaining actual physical injury, or having been at risk of actual
physical injury, or when such damages are held to be intentionally
inflicted by the cruise line. Consequently, unless a cruise line can be
found negligent, a victim of a sexual assault, whether be a crew member
or a fellow passenger, has no claim for emotional distress, mental
suffering/anguish or psychological injury. This position appears
insensitive, especially to those (including children) victimized by a
cruise ship employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Glass, J. 1996. ``Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort,'' Lloyd's
List (October 1), p. 1.
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Limit of Liability
In addition to the issues already discussed, there is one other
limitation on a cruise line's liability that is worth mention;
specifically that the cruise line is not liable for the intentional or
negligent acts of any persons not employed by the cruise line
(including independent contractors and other passengers) nor for any
intentional or negligent acts of cruise ship employees committed while
off duty or outside the course and scope of their employment. This last
exclusion is a huge loophole given the cruise line has no
responsibility when a crewmember commits a sexual assault when off
duty. As well, they are not responsible when the sexual assault is not
part of the scope of their employment--by its very nature, an assault
would be outside the scope on one's employment. While there are a large
number of lawsuits filed against cruise lines for sexual assaults, the
vast majority of these are settled out of court, presumably because the
cruise line wishes to avoid negative publicity. However, in how many of
these cases can the cruise line effectively use the disclaimer in the
passenger cruise contract?
Recommendation #18: Given the many limits on cruise line liability,
there should be a requirement that cruise lines provide passengers, in
advance of when penalties accrue for cancelation, a clear statement in
plain, clear English (and French or Spanish as required) of all limits
on liability and laying out all rights that can be freely exercised,
without limitation, by the passenger.
Recommendation #19: That consumer protection legislation be
promulgated that extends to cruise passenger common rights and
opportunities for complaint or other action similar to those available
to consumers of other services, especially transportation services such
as train, airlines, and other commercial carriers.
IV. In Closing
Thank you again for the opportunity to share my observations and
insights generated from my 17 years as an academic whose research has
focused on the cruise industry. I welcome your questions.
V. Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation #1: There is need for systematic reporting of all
cruise ship incidents to an independent, central authority charged with
responsibility for data analysis and policy and operational
recommendations.
Recommendation #2: Similar to data maintained on airlines
documenting ``on time'' performance, there should be a mechanism
whereby cruise ships and cruise lines have reported their adherence to
itineraries and on time performance.
Recommendation #3: There is need for greater oversight and
monitoring of the cruise industry in order to monitor changing trends
and to determine whether these changes are related to changes in safety
and/or casualties.
Recommendation #4: Ships operating from U.S. ports should be
obligatorily subject to accident investigations by the National
Transportation Safety Board as a condition of using U.S. ports, and
should be subject to fines and other administrative actions the NTSB is
empowered to take with other modes of commercial transportation.
Recommendation #5: There needs to be funded research, ideally
provided by the cruise industry to a wholly independent body, to learn
from those cruise lines that appear to be effective in reducing
incidents and accidents.
Recommendation #6: Ships should have thorough and exhaustive safety
inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard without advance warning. Full
reports (including all details) of cruise ship inspections by the U.S.
Coast Guard should be available online.
Recommendation #7: Original provisions of the CVSSA regarding
railing height and technology to detect passengers who have fallen
overboard be reconsidered.
Recommendation #8: The CVSSA should require reported cases of
sexual assault committed on a cruise ship be displayed online and
broken down by cruise line and cruise ship. In addition, the raw data
of cases should be made available upon request for statistical/
sociological analysis in order to permit a social epidemiology of the
problem.
Recommendation #9: The CVSSA should require passengers to be
advised of the hours during which crewmembers may access their cabin
without specific permission from the passenger.
Recommendation #10: The CVSSA more clearly and specifically state
requirements for CCTV surveillance and the quality and format of tape
recordings.
Recommendation #11: The CVSSA explicitly require the ``Security
Guide'' be placed in plain sight in every passenger cabin and that the
content of the guide include information about the types of crimes on
cruise ships, where they commonly occur, and steps a passenger can take
to decrease the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime.
Recommendation #12: The CVSSA should require onboard physicians to
be board certified in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or
internal medicine in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, France, or
Germany. Further, there should be clear statements about how cruise
ships will treat the psychological and safety needs of sexual assault
victims, especially victims who are minors.
Recommendation #13: Cruise ships should be required to have a
private, independent law enforcement agent for purposes of crime
investigation. These would be similar to the wholly-independent Ocean
Rangers placed on cruise ships by the State of Alaska to monitor
discharge of waste streams while the ship is in Alaska state waters.
Recommendation #14: In the absence of a professionally qualified
crime scene investigator, a cruise ship should be required to have
onboard a staff person with more than adequate training in all facets
of crime scene preservation, collection of evidence, and methods to
ensure proper chain of evidence.
Recommendation #15: Cruise ship personnel should take more
seriously their responsibility to detain perpetrators of sexual assault
until the ship arrives at its next U.S. port. Further, Congress should
contemplate whether there needs to be a legislated requirement to
ensure perpetrators are isolated from the general public onboard the
ship and held for delivery to land-based law enforcement personnel.
Recommendation #16: The CVSSA should require reporting to the FBI
of all onboard crime, including thefts less than $10,000 and simple
assaults.
Recommendation #17: Given the imprecise nature of the CLIA
Passenger Bill of Rights, there is an obvious need for a legislated
solution. Passenger rights can only be achieved by legislation that
puts into place clear and specific measures for consumer protection.
Recommendation #18: Given the many limits on cruise line liability,
there should be a requirement that cruise lines provide passengers, in
advance of when penalties accrue for cancelation, a clear statement in
plain, clear English (and French or Spanish as required) of all limits
on liability and laying out all rights that can be freely exercised,
without limitation, by the passenger.
Recommendation #19: That consumer protection legislation be
promulgated that extends to cruise passenger common rights and
opportunities for complaint or other action similar to those available
to consumers of other services, especially transportation services such
as train, airlines, and other commercial carriers.
______
Appendix 1: Summary of Cruise Ship Incidents, January 2009-June 2013
\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data based on media and other reports as recorded at Cruise
Junkie dot Com
Cancelations, Itinerary Changes, Missed Port Calls (N=271) *
Cruise with Media-Reported Canceled Port Calls 104
Cruise with Media-Reported Itinerary Changes 69
Cruise with Media-Reported Canceled Cruises 25
Cruise with Media-Reported Delayed Embarkation and/or debarkation: 73
*Does not include changes caused by a hurricane or tropical storm
Mechanical Problems (N=353)
Aground 19
Collision 37
Collision with Pier 15
Damage in Storm 5
Detained for Safety 5
Electrical Problems 8
Engine Problems 26
Fire (6 evacuation; 4 power loss) 61
Generator Problems 5
Lifeboat Failure 7
Maneuverability/Steering Problems 15
Material Failure 53
Power Loss (7 adrift, 1 towed) 21
Propulsion Problems (7 adrift) 62
Severe List 11
Technical Problems 8
Deaths on Shore (N=37)
Dive/Scuba (1 on Shore Excursion) 4
Jet Ski 1
Parasailing (3 on Shore Excursion) 3
Snorkeling (3 on Shore Excursion) 8
Swimming (7 on Shore Excursion) 13
Other 8
Miscellaneous (N=269)
Accidents Ashore (8 on Shore Excursion) 10
Bomb Threats: 14
Child Pornography Seized 8
Illness Outbreaks 189
Injuries on Shorex (n=52) 5
Passengers expelled/evicted 11
Robberies Ashore (5 on Shore Excursion) 13
Onboard Falls (3 deaths) 9
Thefts > $10K 10
______
Appendix 2: Ships with Two or More Mechanical Incidents, January 2009-
June 2013
A. Carnival Corporation (7 companies, 45 ships, 145 incidents)
Carnival Cruise Lines (19 ships, 74 incidents)
Carnival Destiny (n=6)
11/18/2009 Primary motor unit 1 tripped due to malfunction
1/26/2010 Propulsion problems; itinerary changed, cruises canceled
10/22/2010 Propulsion problems; primary motor two faulty
9/10/2011 Lifeboat damaged--removed for repair
1/7/2012 Material failure
1/24/2013 Problem with stern thrusters; itinerary changed
Carnival Dream (n=3)
7/6/2011 Propulsion problems; change from Western Caribbean to Eastern Caribbean itinerary
10/7/2012 Fire
3/14/2013 Malfunction of backup emergency diesel generator, power outages and plumbing
issues; cruise canceled in St. Maarten
Ecstasy (n=5)
1/19/2009 Propulsion problems; operating on half power
2/13/2009 Fire
1/28/2010 Collision with gangway
4/22/2010 Severe list to avoid buoy; damage and 60 injuries
4/18/2013 Power failure; some onboard attribute it to a fire
Elation (n=3)
10/20/2009 Propulsion problems as a result of failure with electronic control system
1/13/2011 Technical problem with propulsion system; port call skipped
3/14/2013 Steering problems; tugboat escort required
Fantasy (n=4)
1/29/2009 Equipment failure in steering system
1/5/2010 Lifeboat failure/material failure
7/27/2011 Collision with Imagination; minor damage
10/17/2011 Vessel maneuverability problem; arrives in port late
Fascination (n=3)
7/1/2010 Loss of power for several hours, adrift; late arrival
2/27/2011 Material failure
1/19/2013 Late return from dry dock; 7 hour delay
Carnival Freedom (n=3)
2/6/2010 Fire in crew cabin
6/27/2011 Blackout due to generator failure; fuel oil filters cleaned, fuel oil purifiers
started and chemical treatment added to the both service tanks.
8/21/2011 Material failure
Carnival Glory (n=3)
5/15/2011 Vessel maneuverability
11/14/2012 Material failure
12/2/2012 Propulsion problems
Holiday (transferred to Iberocruises in 2010) (n=4)
1/20/2009 Material failure
2/6/2009 Technical problem causing reduced speeds; dropped port call on this and next
cruise
3/9/2009 Material failure
4/11/2009 Material failure
Imagination (n=3)
7/13/2010 Fire in the elevator machinery room leaving two passenger elevators and one crew
elevator inoperable
7/27/2011 Collision with Fantasy
9/28/2011 Toilets in front and midship inoperable for day
Carnival Legend (n=10)
3/21/2009 Smoke and fire system on Deck B-A-1 in fault and not operating properly
6/21/2009 Unpalatable water in cabins
9/30/2009 Collision with Enchantment of the Seas; minor damage
2/7/2010 Maneuverability problems given malfunctioning azipod
2/14/2010 Mechanical problems cause seven-hour delay leaving Tampa, itinerary changed;
vessel pitched when leaving Roatan, maybe caused by touching channel wall
7/11/2010 Loss of propulsion on port azipod while entering port; faulty circuit breaker
tripped
1/17/2012 Material failure
1/29/2012 Technical problem with starboard azipod causes late arrival (5 hours) and delayed
embarkation (2 hours)
3/14/2013 Disabled and stuck in Costa Maya; a day later underway with reduced speed and
changed itinerary
3/16/2013 Propulsion problems; changed itinerary
Carnival Liberty (n=4)
4/26/2010 Problems with palatable water in cabin
11/5/2010 Two diesel generators shutdown because of malfunction
1/15/2012 Technical problem, severe list
11/25/2012 Loss of electrical power
Carnival Miracle (n=3)
1/10/2010 Lifeboat material failure
1/28/2010 Collision with pier at Port Zante (St. Kitts); stay overnight for repairs and
arrive late for disembarkation
1/18/2011 Lifeboat material failure
Carnival Paradise (n=2)
8/31/2012 Material failure
10/1/2012 Partial loss of propulsion; power loss
Carnival Pride (n=2)
5/16/2009 Fire in battery room
3/31/2011 Blown from mooring at Port Canaveral; delayed departure
Sensation (n=2)
2/9/2012 Burst pipe floods 10-20 cabins; departure delayed 4-5 hours
5/22/2012 Fire
Carnival Splendor (n=7)
11/8/2009 Delay in Long Beach (7 hours) to repair fire door
11/25/2009 Collision with Radiance of the Seas in Puerto Vallarta
12/17/2009 Collision with pier in Puerto Vallarta, stayed until 3:30PM next day for repairs;
next port call canceled
2/18/2010 Sharp turn (radar missed some small yachts in path) causes flooding onboard
11/8/2010 Fire lasting several hours knocks out all power, ship towed back to San Diego;
this and next 8-10 cruise canceled
1/6/2013 Itinerary changed to permit two days in Puerto Valllarta for repair of damage to
propulsion system
1/13/2013 Cruise delayed one day given repair of propulsion system; itinerary changed
Carnival Triumph (n=4)
3/14/2010 Vessel maneuverability
11/18/2010 Oil leak from shaft seal of forward bow thruster; disabled until repairs made
1/27/2013 Technical problem with propulsion system affecting cruising speed; 6 hour delay in
return to port
2/10/2013 Disabling fire, adrift for days with no power/electricity, towed to port; cruise
canceled
Carnival Victory (n=2)
1/17/2010 Failure of UPS battery charger
1/20/2013 Propulsion problem; leaves port almost 24 hours late, itinerary change
Costa Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Costa Europa (n=2)
3/5/2009 Propulsion problems lead to passenger revolt; ports missed
2/26/2010 Collision with pier in Sharm-el-Sheikh killing three crew and injuring four
passengers; cruise canceled
Cunard Line (1 ship, 6 incidents)
Queen Mary 2 (n=6)
7/22/2009 Broke from mooring lines; damage to stern, four hour delayed departure
9/23/2010 Loss of electric and all power for an hour after explosion in electric panel
10/5/2011 Fire causes power loss in major storm, damage onboard; arrive in NYC 2 hours late
10/17/2011 Went ``dead in the water'' twice during transatlantic cruise
2/4/2012 Total power failure, ``dead in the water''
10/23/2012 Material failure
Holland America Line (7 ships, 21 incidents)
Maasdam (n=4)
3/17/2009 Fire in crew galley
5/22/2009 Severe list caused by pilot error
8/8/2012 Sewage and refuse from ship washes up on shore at Nahant, MA
6/13/2013 Port forward propulsion system malfunctioning; 2.5 hour delayed departure and
sailing at reduced speed
Prinsendam (n=2)
9/11/2010 Major damage from storm--50 windows blown out (with flooding) and dent in prow of
ship
12/17/2010 Lifeboat failure
Ryndam (n=2)
11/18/2012 Material failure
6/8/2013 Fire--40 minute wait for all clear after initial alarm
Statendam (n=2)
12/21/2009 Engine problems, changed itinerary
9/22/2012 Fuel pump explosion causes two hour power outage
Westerdam (n=2)
5/11/2011 Collision with ice; damage 15 feet below water line
10/28/2011 Fire
Zaandam (n=6)
1/13/2009 Alternator of #5 generator exploded causing switchboard to ground out; emergency
generator started 43 second later
7/13/2010 Fire
7/28/2010 Loss of electrical power
8/11/2010 Material failure
6/7/2011 Material failure
10/19/2012 Mechanical problems and/or flooding onboard
Zuiderdam (n=3)
7/8/2010 Material failure
2/9/2012 Fire in engine room
9/25/2012 Material failure
P&O Cruises (4 ships, 12 incidents)
Artemis (n=2)
4/7/2010 Engine problems, skipped St. Barts
5/8/2010 Engine problems, itinerary changed from 10 ports to 4 ports (Pax advised when
boarding that there were engine problems and 1 port would be skipped)
Aurora (n=4)
3/3/2009 Propulsion problems--Broke down 4 hours after leaving Sydney. Stuck in Auckland
(with passengers aboard) for five days for repairs. Itinerary changed
9/18/2009 Mechanical problems and loss of bow thruster; changed itinerary
9/30/2011 Electrical problems delay for three hours departure from Portland, ME
2/8/2013 Fault with port propeller shaft. Delayed in Auckland, dropped two port calls
Oriana (n=4)
8/5/2010 Delayed four hours in Dubrovnik; computers crash causing loss of steering system
8/7/2010 Fire on tender
11/30/2010 Engine breakdowns; missed port call
6/2/2011 Collision with pier
Ventura (n=2)
10/18/2012 60 mm crack on full width of deck 14; passengers advised to not use balconies
3/17/2013 Propulsion problems cause missed ports and itinerary changes
P&O Australia (3 ships, 10 incidents)
Pacific Dawn (n=3)
1/8/2009 Engine problems; arrival in Sydney 10 hours late
2/15/2010 Propulsion and maintenance problems cause 18 hour delayed departure; itinerary
changed
4/10/2010 Loss of power and propulsion; near miss collision with bridge
Pacific Pearl (n=2)
2/2/2011 Three-meter-across chandelier falls three storeys into cafe area in atrium
2/3/2011 Lack of running water and working toilets
Pacific Sun (Left fleet in 2012) (n=5)
11/10/2009 Cruise canceled to permit repair of propulsion system
3/13/2010 Mechanical problems cause canceled port calls at Suva and Denarau
4/21/2010 Engine problems; cruise canceled
11/2/2010 Propulsion problem; 10 hour delayed arrival at Melbourne
2/28/2011 Engine problems, 24 hour delayed arrival at Newcastle; several ports canceled
Princess Cruises (10 ships, 34 incidents)
Caribbean Princess (n=9)
10/16/2009 Severe list, storm damage
4/5/2010 Severe list, steering malfunction
5/9/2010 Collision with gangway; departure delayed several hours
8/8/2010 Material failure
2/4/2012 Engine problems--delays
2/25/2012 Material failure
3/12/2012 Engine problems--next two cruises canceled
6/8/21012 Technical fault; remain in port overnight, itinerary changed
12/15/2012 Loss of electrical power
Coral Princess (n=3)
3/19/2009 Propulsion problems; missed port
8/19/2011 Turbine oil system failure; switch to diesel electric power
5/2/2013 Fire
Crown Princess (n=3)
6/20/2009 Fire in passenger cabin
7/17/2012 Electrical fire in passenger cabin
4/13/2013 Toilets in 410 cabins not operational
Dawn Princess (n=3)
6/15/2010 Propulsion breakdown, adrift for 2.25 hours; restored and sailing at reduced speed
7/16/2010 Engine problems; missed port call
10/27/2011 Mechanical problem; missed port call
Emerald Princess (n=2)
7/26/2010 Electrical failure leads to propulsion problems; no A/C; repaired in 6 hours
5/17/2011 Collision with fuel barge damages several lifeboats
Golden Princess (n=3)
1/22/2009 Near-collision with fishing vessel
3/22/2009 Fire in engine room
3/28/2012 Vessel maneuverability
Royal Princess (n=2)
6/18/2009 Fire in engine room as leaving Port Said, passengers called to muster stations;
cruise and next cruise canceled
4/9/2010 Break in fire hose fitting causes extensive damage to restaurants; water leaked
all the way down to crew decks
Sapphire Princess (n=4)
7/12/2010 Severe list to avoid collision with whale
2/4/2011 Loss of electrical power
2/26/2011 Material failure
9/7/2011 2 pleasure boats swamped and float dock damaged by ship's wake when maneuvering in
Ketchikan Harbour
Star Princess (n=3)
3/21/2011 Material failure
7/1/2012 Material failure
8/2/2012 Material failure
Sun Princess (n=2)
7/25/2012 Material failure
8/27/2012 Transformer blown leading to loss of power adrift for 3.5 hours
B. Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited
Celebrity Cruises (4 ships, 13 incidents)
Century (n=4)
10/15/2010 Rudder damaged, stranded in Villefranche-sur-Mer; cruise canceled
10/22/2011 Vessel maneuverability problems
3/25/2012 Engine problems, late departure and late arrival
10/28/2012 Fire
Infinity (n=3)
6/22/2010 Material failure
6/26/2010 5-6 hour delayed departure because of engine problems, canceled port call; five
days later an electrical fire causes power loss for several hours
8/23/2012 Material failure
Millennium (n=2)
3/9/2009 Cruise canceled to allow repair of problem with bearing on propeller shaft
4/9/2013 Electrical problem adversely affects propulsion, dead in water for 3 hours; port
call at Hanoi canceled
Summit (n=4)
1/10/2009 Electrical problem causes cruise to be shortened by one day and itinerary changed
2/27/2010 Material failure
4/9/2011 Loss of electrical power
10/5/2012 Tender runs aground with 93 passengers and 2 crew, sustains major damage
Pullmantur (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Zenith (n=2)
8/18/2009 Fire while docked in Stockholm, evacuated; departed one day late, itinerary
changes
6/25/2013 Fire in engine room disables ship; towed to port
Royal Caribbean International (10 ships, 32 incidents)
Allure of the Seas (n=2)
1/29/2012 Fire in incinerator area
4/12/2012 Fire in engine room, section 6 of ship evacuated; drift 1-2 hours and then
operated on 1 engine
Brilliance of the Seas (n=2)
10/13/2009 Windows broken out in storm and 35 passenger cabins flooded, delayed departure
from Barcelona
12/12/2010 Severe list while entering Alexandria, Egypt; 30 passengers injured
Enchantment of the Seas (n=5)
7/21/2009 Material failure
3/23/2010 Load sharing problem shuts down engine 4
7/27/2011 Steering gear pump failure on pump #4
2/20/2012 Propulsion problems--one propeller broken; delayed departure by 24 hours, changed
itinerary, sailing at half speed
3/10/2012 Propulsion problems; spent 27 hours in Port Canaveral to accommodate repairs,
itinerary changed
Explorer of the Seas (n=7)
2/5/2009 Propeller damaged causes change in itinerary on this cruise and next
4/14/2009 Changes in itinerary for several upcoming cruises; too late to cancel, no
explanation
9/30/2009 Collision with Carnival Legend; minor damage
1/13/2010 Delayed departure because delayed arrival from drydock
3/14/2010 Severe list due to human error; injuries and considerable damage
9/14/2012 Collision with Norwegian Star when mooring line breaks; minimal damage
10/29/2012 Sailed into Hurricane Sandy
Grandeur of the Seas (n=3)
2/26/2009 Loss of two engines; material failure
7/30/2009 Loss of power due to malfunctioning power inverter; loss of electrical power
5/27/2013 Fire; cruise canceled
Jewel of the Seas (n=3)
8/3/2010 One hydraulic motor not working forcing reduced speeds; itinerary changes
12/7/2010 Collision with 500 meter long 2 foot wide flexible plastic pipe, becoming wrapped
around front of ship
9/6/2012 4.5 hour delay leaving Cape Liberty; no reason given
Legend of the Seas (n=2)
2/9/2009 Pulled into Key West for unscheduled stop because of faulty azipod and leaking oil
(needed boom around ship); repaired by day's end
1/30/2012 Fire in bar (Cafe Promenade)
Majesty of the Sea (n=4)
8/13/2010 Lifeboat malfunction when lowered; damaged and release of oil
9/30/2011 Vessel maneuverability
11/2/2011 Material failure
11/7/2011 Material failure
Oasis of the Seas (n=2)
5/7/2010 Emergency generator damaged; given three months to repair
11/16/2012 Vessel maneuverability
Radiance of the Seas (n=2)
11/25/2009 Collision with Carnival Splendor in Puerto Vallarta; minor damage
1/27/2011 Ship is operating under USCG COTP due to one of two main propulsion azipods not
working; repairs anticipated in fall 2011
C. Prestige Cruise Holdings (3 companies, 5 ships, 14 incidents)
Norwegian Cruise Line (2 ships, 4 incidents)
Norwegian Dawn (n=2)
11/27/2009 Loss of power for hours (no A/C), ship disembarks in San Juan instead of Miami;
this and next cruise canceled
8/27/2010 Leaves Bermuda 11 hours early because engine problems cause slower speeds; want to
arrive in NYC on time
Norwegian Star (n=2)
4/28/2012 Collision while docking
9/14/2012 Collision with Explorer of the Seas when mooring line breaks; minimal damage
Oceania Cruise (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Regatta (n=3)
6/20/2011 Material failure
7/24/2011 Material failure
10/19/2012 Electrical outage; delayed return to port (NYC) by several hours
Regent Seven Seas Cruises (2 ships, 7 incidents)
Seven Seas Navigator (n=2)
10/25/2011 Material failure; one day delayed departure from Charleston, itinerary change
11/9/2011 Material failure
Seven Seas Voyager (n=5)
3/22/2009 Propulsion problems (fishing net caught in azipod), reduced speed; many ports
canceled
4/1/2009 Passengers told upon embarkation that most port calls canceled from Dubai to Rome
because of propulsion problems; following two cruises canceled
12/14/2009 One azipod fails so sailing at reduced speed; port call canceled
10/4/2010 Podded propulsion system fails; passengers flown home from Athens, 2 cruises
canceled
3/17/2013 Propulsion problem; skipped ports and itinerary changes
D. Independent Cruise Lines
Avalon Waterways (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Avalon Tranquility (n=3)
7/23/2009 Collision with the tall ship Schoenbrunn, a 1912-built paddlesteamer
9/5/2011 Collision with cargo ship--holed, cruise ended
12/13/2011 Fire in generator room
Celebration Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Bahamas Celebration (n=2)
2/1/2012 Maneuverability problems
3/30/2012 Maneuverability problems
Fred Olsen Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Black Watch (n=2)
10/21/2009 Severe list--navigational error while entering La Coruna Harbour (Spain)
8/12/2010 Collision with iceberg--damage superficial
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) (2 ships, 5 incidents)
Opera (n=3)
3/30/2011 Collision with pier (twice), damage to several cabins; delayed 10 hours for
repairs
5/15/2011 Failure of an electric panel causes power loss for 8.5 hours; towed to port and
cruise canceled
5/27/2011 Detained by UK authorities for noncompliance with safety regulations
Poesia (n=2)
1/7/2012 Ran aground in Bahamas; waited for high tide to refloat
1/10/2012 Collision with pier while leaving Jamaican port
Saga Cruises (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Saga Ruby (n=3)
10/12/2009 Collision with pier, emergency repairs to bow; itinerary changes
11/11/2012 Engine problems; remainder of cruise canceled
1/7/2013 Mechanical problems with crankshaft; current world cruise delayed ten days
Silversea Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Silver Shadow (n=2)
3/19/12 Collision with container ship off Vietnam; major damage to container ship, minor
damage to cruise ship
9/9/2012 Material failure
Thomson Cruises (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Thomson Dream (n=3)
7/25/2010 Plumbing/sewage problems
1/17/2011 Starboard engine fire
5/20/2012 Severe list following two maneuvers caused by ``slip of the hand''; major damage
Travel Dynamics International (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Clelia II (n=3)
12/26/2009 Propeller damaged, loss of power; escorted to port, next cruise canceled
9/1/2010 Loss of electrical power (human error)
12/9/2010 Wave in storm breaks bridge window; damage to electronics, affecting engine
performance
Voyages of Discovery/Coastal and Maritime Voyages (1 ship, 4 incidents)
Discovery (n=4)
10/15/2009 Engine problems; port missed
12/05/2009 Delayed return from drydock; itinerary changed
3/4/2013 Ship detained in UK for safety issues; cruise canceled
5/7/2013 Deep cleaning after illness outbreak delays departure; itinerary change
______
Appendix 3: Summary of Persons Overboard, January 1995-June 2013
(n=210)*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ The data contained in this table is based on available
information. Details were not consistently available for each incident.
See www.cruisejunkie.com/Overboard.html for details.
A. Gender
Male 73.8%
Female 26.2%
B. Age by Gender
Total Male Female
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range
39.82 14-90 38.85 14-90 42.11 15-79
C. Vessel
Cruise 91.4%
Ferry 8.6%
D. Passenger vs Crew
Passenger 75%
Crew 25%
E. Rescued 16.7%
F. Alcohol 6.2%
G. Suicide 11.0%
H. Murder 3.3%
I. Fall 9.5%
J. Casino loss 2.4%
K. Fight 7.1%
______
Appendix 4: Drug Busts, January 2009-June 2013 \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data based on media and other reports as recorded at Cruise
Junkie dot Com
A. Gender
Male 83.33%
Female 16.66%
B. Age by Gender
Total Male Female
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range
38.5 19-74 38.6 19-74 38.25 20-54
C. Drug Busts by Country (N=53)
Bermuda 27
U.S. 8 (27 persons)
Belize: 6
UK 6
St. Kitts-Nevis 2
Jamaica 1
Cayman Islands 1
Australia 1
Spain 1 (9 persons)
D. Drug Busts by U.S. State/City
Florida 3 (17 persons)
Baltimore 2
Alaska 1
U.S. Virgin Islands 1
Puerto Rico 1
E. Ships with 2 or More Drug Busts
Norwegian Dawn 9
Explorer of the Seas 6
Black Watch 3
Enchantment of the Seas 3
Summit 3
Allure of the Seas 2
Bahamas Celebration 2
Grandeur of the Seas 2
Grand Princess 2
Norwegian Gem 2
Poesia 2
______
Appendix 5: Klein, R.A. and J. Poulston. 2011. ``Sex at Sea: Sexual
Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships,'' Journal of Tourism in Marine
Environments, 7:2, pp. 67-80.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
And now we will go to The Honorable Mark Rosenker, who's
the former Chairman of the NTSB--that is, the National
Transportation Safety Board--and member of the Cruise Line
International Association's ``Panel of Experts.''
Please.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK ROSENKER, FORMER CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AND MEMBER OF THE CRUISE LINE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION'S ``PANEL OF EXPERTS''
Mr. Rosenker. Thank you--having trouble getting this--there
it goes.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. Rosenker. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking
Member Thune, distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you
very much for inviting me to testify today.
Until August of 2009, I served as the 11th Chairman of the
NTSB. I'm also a retired Major General in the United States Air
Force Reserve. Prior to being appointed and confirmed to the
NTSB, I served as Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of the White House Military Office for President
George W. Bush, with responsibility for all DOD support to the
President and Vice President. As part of my responsibilities, I
was traveling with the President on September 11, 2001.
I welcome the opportunity to once again testify before this
important committee and applaud its focus, not only on cruise
ship safety, but safety in all modes of transportation in our
Nation.
I'm testifying today in my capacity as a member of the
Independent Panel of Experts established by the Cruise Lines
International Association. The panel was put in place as part
of the Global Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review,
launched in January 2012, following the Concordia accident. The
review was focused on the critical human factors and
operational aspects of maritime safety, and was introduced to
identify best practices and develop new policies that could be
implemented to rapidly further enhance crew passenger and crew
safety. The review was led by senior industry executives
responsible for maritime safety.
Ultimately, the review resulted in the industry's adoption
of 10 policies that were submitted to, and accepted by, the
IMO. The IMO is an independent international maritime
regulatory body, with 170 member states, including the United
States, which mandates global standards for the safety and
operation of all ships, including cruise ships.
The Independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in
April 2012 to provide an impartial assessment of the review's
recommendations. I took this panel's efforts extremely
seriously and approached it with the same unwavering commitment
that I had as NTSB Chair, to raise the bar of safety even
higher on this already safe industry.
The Chairman. The Committee was appointed by whom?
Mr. Rosenker. CLIA. Oh, which committee are you talking
about, sir?
The Chairman. The one you--that you----
Mr. Rosenker. CLIA. CLIA created this Independent Panel of
Experts.
The Chairman. That's the association, then.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
Each member of the panel has extensive experience in the
maritime regulatory and/or accident investigation fields. The
other members are Stephen Mayer, a retired Rear Admiral in the
Royal Navy and led the U.K. Marine Accident Investigation
Branch, the equivalent of their NTSB for marine; Willem de
Ruiter--he led the European Maritime Safety Agency; and Dr.
Jack Spencer, who led the Office of Maritime Safety at the NTSB
when I was there and is also a retired Coast Guard Officer.
The panel deeply examines the issues and policies
considered by the industry. We are a deliberative body that is
independent of CLIA's technical and regulatory advisory
committees. Our advice, counsel, and recommendations cover a
wide range of topics and are delivered to CLIA's board of
directors, executive committee, and other advisory committees,
as appropriate.
We find our views to be well received, and candor is a
hallmark of our confidential deliberations. At times, the
deliberations among the panel members, themselves, have been
very spirited. This has further assisted CLIA in highlighting
for its members the various thoughtful perspectives of complex
safety issues and the related policy implications.
Every aspect of the cruise industry is heavily regulated
and monitored by the United States, EU, and international
maritime law to protect the safety of passengers and crew
members. The panel has helped to strengthen and improve the
wide-ranging policies that were put forth by the industry as
part of the review. But, we also provided many new and
innovative ideas and recommendations that were incorporated
into the final policies as well as other initiatives.
When I was Chairman of the NTSB, I closely monitored trends
in safety across every sector of transportation. I applied my
experiences and knowledge of transportation safety to the panel
as we evaluated and suggested policies and best-practice
improvements. I can say, unequivocally, that the cruise
industry has been very receptive to our input. I've been
impressed with the level of collaboration of this industry with
its regulators and other stakeholders. Panel members have been
extremely impressed with the speed with which the industry
adopted the 10 policies developed by review, all of which
exceed current international regulatory requirements.
As an avid cruiser, I also know that cruise vacations are
not only quite enjoyable, but, most importantly, extremely
safe. The panel's work continues as we are advising and
assisting the cruise industry in providing ideas, guidance, and
impartial analysis as it reviews and seeks improvements to
shipboard operations and safety.
Thank you again, sir, and I look forward to the questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark Rosenker, Former Chairman, National
Transportation Safety Board; and Member, Cruise Line International
Association's ``Panel of Experts''
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune and distinguished
members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today.
My name is Mark Rosenker and I am a former Chairman of the United
States National Transportation Safety Board and a retired United States
Air Force Reserve Major General. I also served as Deputy Assistant to
President George W. Bush and Director of the White House Military
Office. I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee,
which served as my authorizing committee during my tenure as Chairman
of the National Transportation Safety Board.
I am testifying today in my capacity as a member of the independent
Panel of Experts established by the Cruise Lines International
Association, or CLIA. The independent Panel of Experts was put in place
as part of the Global Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, which
was launched in January 2012 by the industry in the wake of the
Concordia incident. The Review was introduced as part of the cruise
line industry's efforts to execute on their stated commitment to
continuous improvement and innovation in shipboard operations and
safety. It focused on the critical human factors and operational
aspects of maritime safety.
The Review was introduced to identify best practices and develop
new policies that could be implemented rapidly on an industry-wide
basis to further enhance the safety of passengers and crew. It took the
lead in identifying additional best practices for industry-wide
implementation and ultimately, formal submission to the International
Maritime Organization, as appropriate, that could strengthen the cruise
industry's safety record. [See appendix] The International Maritime
Organization is an international maritime regulatory body with 170
Member States including the United States, which mandates global
standards for the safety and operation of cruise ships. The Review was
guided by a task force consisting of senior industry executives from
CLIA member lines with responsibility for maritime safety. To commence
the Review, CLIA's member lines took a detailed look at existing safety
procedures and practices. Senior cruise line executives undertook
internal reviews of their own operational safety practices and
procedures concerning issues of navigation, evacuation, emergency
training, and related practices and procedures.
The independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in April
2012 to provide an impartial assessment of the recommendations
developed by the Review. Collectively, those of us on the Panel of
Experts bring well over a century of experience in transportation and
safety to the table. Our backgrounds include senior positions with a
diverse mix of organizations. Each Panel member has deep experience in
the maritime, regulatory and accident investigation fields and the
Panel is balanced geographically with equal representation from the
United States and Europe. The three other members of the panel are Rear
Admiral (Ret.) Stephen Meyer, Dr. Jack Spencer, and Willem de Ruiter.
Stephen Meyer is a retired Rear Admiral in the Royal Navy. He is a
former commander of a number of Royal Navy Ships and was the former
head of the United Kingdom Marine Accident Investigation Branch.
Dr. Jack Spencer is the former Director of the Office of Marine
Safety at the National Transportation Safety Board. Dr. Spencer has
more than 40 years of experience with the U.S. Coast Guard, American
Bureau of Shipping, and National Transportation Safety Board. For 30
years, he has been on United States delegations to the International
Maritime Organization.
Willem de Ruiter is former head of the European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA). In 2003, Mr. de Ruiter was appointed as the first
executive director of EMSA and charged with building up the
organization. He joined EMSA after a distinguished career in the Dutch
government and at the European Commission.
The independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in April
2012 to provide an impartial assessment of the Review's
recommendations. I took this panel extremely seriously and approached
it with the same unwavering commitment that I had as NTSB Chair to
raise the bar of safety even higher for this safe sector.
The Panel takes a very active view of the issues being discussed
and policies being developed by CLIA that relate to all aspects of
maritime safety. We are a deliberative body that is independent of
CLIA's technical and regulatory advisory committees. Our advice,
counsel and recommendations have covered a wide range of topics and are
delivered to CLIA's Board of Directors, Executive Committee, and other
advisory committees as appropriate. We are all experienced
professionals and we find our views to be well-received and that candor
is a hallmark of our confidential deliberations. We are a group of
highly critical and deeply committed experts and we are never bashful
about sharing what we are thinking either as individuals or as a Panel.
At times our deliberations between the Panel members have been very
spirited. This has further assisted CLIA in highlighting for their
members the various thoughtful perspectives of complex safety issues
and the related policy implications.
As someone with four decades of experience in the transportation
and technology industries, I've always known that the cruise industry
is governed by an extremely extensive framework of safety regulations.
Every aspect of the cruise industry is heavily regulated and monitored
under United States, European Union, and international maritime law to
protect the safety of passengers and crewmembers. Regulations start
with the design and construction of the ship and extend to the
operation of the vessel, the emergency equipment on board, and
scenarios for emergency situations, including the evacuation of a ship.
Cruise ships are also subject to multiple layers of enforcement at the
international, flag State and port State level.
The Panel played an active role and provided many new and
innovative ideas and recommendations that were incorporated into the
final policies and other initiatives, in addition to providing
independent, expert analysis of proposed policies. As the Panel gained
more experience working together, our commitment to the process grew
and the value of our role became even clearer over time, as our
engagement in the issues and policy development began to produce
tangible results. It is without question that we are working with a
talented and deeply committed group of cruise industry professionals
that share the Panel's values toward maritime safety. If I did not
believe this to be the case, I would most certainly not be associated
with these efforts, nor would any of my colleagues that serve on the
Panel.
During the course of the Review, my fellow panelists and I examined
safety-related shipboard systems and observed safety drills aboard one
of the world's largest cruise ships. We visited the state-of-the-art
full bridge simulator at the Resolve Maritime Academy to see how
technology can strengthen safety and supplement training on cruise
ships. We held a session with officials at Airbus to draw from their
efforts related to Crew Resource Management, Simulation Training, and
Safety Culture. We met with leaders of the Review multiple times to
review, analyze, and discuss recommended changes to cruise industry
safety practices and offered our own ideas based on our individual and
collective experiences.
As a member of the Panel of Experts during last year's Review, my
role was to provide an impartial assessment of the recommendations
developed by the established Task Force of cruise line experts, before
they were ultimately implemented and then submitted for formal
consideration to the IMO. Additionally, as Panel members we shared
numerous, wide-ranging recommendations and suggestions that were
incorporated into the industry's policies, as well as into other
important ongoing efforts that have not specifically resulted in
published industry-wide policies.
All ten policies that resulted from the Review were incorporated
into IMO standards. Those ten policies, in the order in which they were
introduced, are as follows:
The Passenger Muster Policy requires musters for embarking
passengers prior to departure from port and was launched with immediate
effect on February 9, 2012. On occasions when guests arrive after the
muster has been completed, the policy dictates that they are promptly
provided with individual or group safety briefings. This practice
exceeds existing legal requirements--which require that musters occur
within 24 hours of passenger embarkation.
Under the Passage Planning Policy, each passage plan is to be
thoroughly briefed to all bridge team members who will be involved in
execution of the plan well in advance of its implementation. The
passage plan will be drafted by the designated officer and approved by
the master. This policy was effective upon its announcement on April
24, 2012.
To minimize unnecessary disruptions and distractions on the bridge,
the Bridge Access Policy requires bridge access be limited to those
with operationally related functions during any period of restricted
maneuvering or when increased vigilance is required such as arrival/
departure from port, heavy traffic, or poor visibility. Further, member
lines are to take steps to prevent distractions to watchkeeping during
these periods. This policy was effective upon its announcement on April
24, 2012.
The Excess Lifejackets Policy ensures that the number of
lifejackets carried is far in excess of the number of persons actually
onboard a ship. In addition to the statutory requirements of carriage
of lifejackets for each person onboard and certain specified extras,
the cruise industry adopted a policy of carrying additional adult
lifejackets onboard each cruise ship in excess of current legal
requirements. As a result, the number of additional adult lifejackets
provided must not be less than the total number of persons berthed
within the ship's most populated main vertical fire zone.
All of the additional lifejackets addressed in this policy are to
be stored in public spaces, at the muster stations, on deck or in
lifeboats, and in such a manner as to be readily accessible to
crewmembers for distribution as may be necessary in the event of an
emergency. This policy was effective upon its announcement on April 24,
2012.
The Nationality of Passengers Policy was developed in response to
the request of governments at the May 2012 meeting of the IMO Maritime
Safety Committee meeting. This policy prescribes that the nationality
of each passenger onboard is to be recorded, kept ashore and made
readily available to search and rescue personnel as appropriate. This
policy was effective upon its announcement on June 26, 2012.
Under the Common Elements of Musters and Emergency Instructions
Policy, member cruise lines have specified 12 common elements that are
to be communicated to passengers in musters and emergency instructions.
In addition to current legal requirements, this policy specifically
requires that musters and emergency instructions are to include the
following common elements:
1. When and how to don a lifejacket
2. Description of emergency signals and appropriate responses in
the event of an emergency
3. Location of lifejackets
4. Where to muster when the emergency signal is sounded
5. Method of accounting for passenger attendance at musters both
for training and in the event of an actual emergency
6. How information will be provided in an emergency
7. What to expect if the Master orders an evacuation of the ship
8. What additional safety information is available
9. Instructions on whether passengers should return to cabins prior
to mustering, including specifics regarding medications,
clothing, and lifejackets
10. Description of key safety systems and features
11. Emergency routing systems and recognizing emergency exits
12. Who to seek out for additional information
This policy was effective upon its announcement on June 26, 2012.
To facilitate training for lifeboat operations, the Lifeboat
Loading for Training Purposes Policy requires that at least one
lifeboat on each ship is to be filled with crewmembers equal in number
to its certified number of occupants at least every six months. Under
this policy, for safety considerations, the loading of lifeboats for
training purposes is to be performed only while the boat is waterborne
and the boat should be lowered and raised with only the lifeboat crew
onboard essential for safe operation. All lifeboat crew and
embarkation/boarding station crew are to be required to attend the
lifeboat loading drill. If not participating inside the lifeboat, crew
members are to observe the loading of the lifeboat to its certified
number of people and its operation. Taking into account safety
consideration, the policy also includes specific provisions for ships
with crew sizes less than three hundred. This policy was effective upon
its announcement on September 20, 2012.
Operational safety can be enhanced by achieving substantive
consistency in bridge operating procedures among commonly owned ships,
for example by providing that bridge personnel who may rotate among
such ships can be familiarized with a common set of procedures. The
Harmonization of Bridge Procedures Policy requires that bridge
operating procedures are to be harmonized as much as possible, both
within individual companies and among brands within a commonly owned
and operated fleet. Under this policy, each member operating multiple
ships and each cruise line brand that is commonly owned and operated
with another brand is to harmonize their respective procedures for
bridge operations. This policy was announced on November 15, 2012 and
its implementation has been completed.
The Location of Lifejacket Stowage Policy complements the Excess
Lifejackets policy under which oceangoing cruise ships carry additional
adult lifejackets onboard far exceeding the number of persons actually
onboard the ship. Under this new policy lifejackets equal to or greater
than the number required by international regulations and the ship's
flag State are to be stowed in close proximity to either muster
stations or lifeboat embarkations points on newly-constructed ships.
Consequently, lifejackets will be readily accessible by crewmembers for
distribution to passengers in the event of an emergency. This policy
further enhances shipboard safety as passengers will have even greater
access to lifejackets in the event of an emergency. This policy was
announced on November 15, 2012 and goes into effect with newly-
constructed cruise ships for which the building contract is placed on
or after July 1, 2013.
The Securing Heavy Objects policy requires that oceangoing members
include procedures in their Safety Management Systems to secure heavy
objects either permanently, when not in use, or during severe weather.
This policy was announced on November 15, 2012 and its implementation
is now complete.
When I was Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, I
closely monitored trends in safety across every sector of
transportation. I've been able to apply my experiences and knowledge of
transportation safety to the panel as we evaluated the suggested policy
and best practice improvements. Each of the individual Panel members
brings unique and in-depth strengths to the Panel as a whole; one of my
greatest strengths is a broad view of transportation safety that
includes but reaches far beyond the maritime sector.
I can say unequivocally that the cruise industry has been very
receptive to our input. I've also been impressed with the level of
collaboration of this industry with its regulators and other key
stakeholders to enhance safety practices and procedures. The cruise
industry works continually with the IMO, other global maritime
authorities, classification societies, and shipbuilders to implement
and enhance what are already stringent safety standards. My involvement
on this panel has given me confidence that the industry is engaged in
proactive and responsible relationships with regulators across the
globe.
Along with the other members of the Panel of Experts, I've been
extremely impressed with the speed with which the industry adopted the
ten policies developed by the Review, all of which exceed current
regulatory requirements. Further, I believe that CLIA's initiative to
combine these ten policies related to the Review with an additional ten
new and existing industry-wide policies is a very positive and
aggressive step for a trade association to take. We specifically
advised CLIA as they considered this initiative, including with
relation to developing a comprehensive Compendium of Policies; their
methods of CEO-level verification of policy implementation; and their
use of Safety Management Systems to ensure the sixteen policies related
to safety and environmental protection were subject to a regulatory
internal and external auditing scheme. These are exactly the types of
proactive and innovative actions that I, and my fellow Panel members,
have encouraged this industry to take. As an avid cruiser, I also feel
it is important that consumers understand that cruise vacations are
extremely safe. This industry is highly regulated that is continuously
subjected to tremendous oversight, wherever they operate.
As members of the Panel of Experts, our work isn't done because the
Operational Safety Review is completed. We continue to advise and
assist the cruise industry in providing ideas, guidance and impartial
analysis as it continues to review and seek improvements to shipboard
operations and safety. We remain actively engaged by providing our
advice through CLIA's Board of Directors, Executive Committee and other
Advisory Committees. This has ensured that while the formal structure
of the Operational Safety Review wound down, the cruise industry could
still benefit from our active input and expertise.
So thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and I look
forward to your questions.
______
Appendix Table of Contents
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 90/27/1)
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 90/27/2)
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 90/27/11)
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 90/27/12)
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 91/7/1)
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 92/6/1)
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 92/6/9)
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 92/6/10)
__________
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC/90/27/1
90TH Session February 29, 2012
Agenda Item 27 Original: English
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Executive summary: This document describes the work undertaken
immediately following the Concordia incident,
under the leadership of the Cruise Lines
International Association, to address
operational safety. This work will continue
and recommendations will be provided to the
industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing
basis.
Strategic direction: 5.1
High-level action: 5.1.1
Planned output: None
Action to be taken: Paragraph 16
Related document: MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the
industry's continuous efforts to review and improve safety measures,
the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf
of the global cruise lines industry, announced the launch of a Cruise
Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had
begun prior to that date.
2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be
shared on an ongoing basis among CLIA members and any appropriate
recommendations will be shared with the IMO.
Support for the Secretary-General's Efforts
3. In expressing his condolences to the families of those lost in
the Concordia incident, the Secretary-General stated his determination
to work with others to ensure that such an accident could be prevented
in the future and has pledged that the Organization will consider
seriously the lessons to be learned and will take action, as
appropriate, in the light of those findings.
4. CLIA specifically supports the views expressed by the Secretary-
General in his 30 January 2012 press statement on this subject.
5. The Secretary-General indicated in that statement that he had
opened a channel of communication with passenger ship operators--
through the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)--and that he
welcomed the response to his request to hold meetings with him to
discuss the safety of cruise passenger ships in general and, in
particular, any findings and recommendations from their own internal
review of current--practices and safety procedures in the operation of
passenger ships.
6. This Review is intended to complement the efforts and goals of
the Organization and to also be completely consistent with the
Secretary-General's description of the on-going communications and
operational safety initiatives of the global cruise industry.
Description of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
7. The Review will include a comprehensive assessment of the
critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety.
8. Key components of the Review include:
.1 An internal review by CLIA members of their own operational
safety practices and procedures concerning issues of
navigation, evacuation, emergency training, and related
practices and procedures.
.2 Consultation with independent external experts.
.3 Identification and sharing of industry best practices and
policies, as well as possible recommendations to the IMO for
substantive regulatory changes to further improve the
industry's operational safety.
.4 Collaboration with the IMO, governments and regulatory
bodies to implement any necessary regulatory changes.
9. More specifically, an example of how one major cruise line
intends to proceed with their internal review in three distinct phases
might be useful for the Committee:
First Phase: Bridge operating procedures; Emergency response
procedures; and Abandon ship
Second Phase: Lessons learned; Communications shoreside and
with local authorities; Remote monitoring of voyages and status
of ship; and Newbuild implications
Third Phase: Emergency responses to fire, flooding,
collision, and grounding; Damage control equipment; Training;
Safety Management System; Audit procedures; and Corporate
emergency response
10. Each cruise line will conduct their internal review in
accordance with their own Safety Management System.
Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
11. The first output of the Review was the cruise industry's
Passenger Muster Policy, announced on 9 February 2012 and made
immediately effective, serves as an example of the type of best
practices and procedures that may be expected as outputs from the
Review.
12. That Passenger Muster Policy is offered to this Committee for
them to consider and reads as follows:
``Current legal requirements for conducting a muster of
passengers are found in the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and mandate that a muster for
embarking passengers occur within 24 hours of their
embarkation. Notwithstanding the legal requirement, CLIA's
member cruise lines have identified a best practice effective
immediately that calls for conducting the mandatory muster for
embarking passengers prior to departure from port. On occasions
when guests arrive after the muster has been completed, CLIA's
policy is that they be promptly provided with individual or
group safety briefings that meet the requirements for musters
applicable under SOLAS. This practice exceeds existing legal
requirements and has been adopted by CLIA's membership as a
formal policy to help ensure that any mandatory musters or
briefings are conducted for the benefit of all newly embarked
passengers at the earliest practical opportunity.''
13. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as
appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-
committees.
Conclusion
14. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that
contributed to the Concordia incident and is proactively responding to
all maritime safety issues.
15. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the
industry to do so in a meaningful and expedited manner.
Action requested of the Committee
16. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided
in this submission and take action as appropriate.
______
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC 90/27/2
90th session 13 March 2012
Agenda item 27 Original: ENGLISH
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Executive summary: This document describes certain specific
initial outputs from the Cruise Industry
Operational Safety Review, which was
undertaken immediately following the Concordia
incident, under the leadership of the Cruise
Lines International Association, to address
operational safety. This work will continue
and recommendations will be provided to the
industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing
basis.
Strategic direction: 5.1
High-level action: 5.1.1
Planned output: None
Action to be taken: Paragraph 9
Related document: MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; MSC-
MEPC.3/Circ.3; and Res. MSC255(84)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the
industry's continuous efforts to review and improve safety measures,
the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf
of the global cruise lines industry, announced the launch of a Cruise
Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had
begun prior to that date.
2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be
shared on an ongoing basis among CLIA members and any appropriate
recommendations will be shared with the IMO.
3. In CLIA's previous submission, MSC 90/27/1 we described the
basic framework for the Review and reported on the first output, which
was our Passenger Muster Policy.
Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
4. The first output of the Review was the cruise industry's
Passenger Muster Policy, announced on 9 February 2012 and made
immediately effective, serves as an example of the type of best
practices and procedures that may be expected as outputs from the
Review.
5. In the interim, the cruise industry has developed three
additional outputs which CLIA wishes to share with this Committee:
i. The cruise industry is of the view that we, along with the rest
of the maritime community, would benefit from increased
reliability and transparency with regard to marine casualty
information. Specifically, we believed the relevant information
contained in the IMO database would benefit from some
additional verification. Accordingly, CLIA recently undertook
an effort with the IMO Secretariat to harmonize the information
in Annex I of the GISIS Marine Casualties and Incidents module
to ensure that no recent and known ``very serious casualties,''
alternatively referred to as ``very serious marine
casualties,'' involving one or more fatalities on a cruise
passenger ship were inadvertently omitted. This action resulted
in adding and verifying basic information on a total of fifteen
marine casualties in the database, but did not result in the
removal of any existing marine casualties or associated data.
ii. Consistent with the above actions regarding Annex I of the
GISIS Marine Casualties and Incidents module, CLIA is of the
view that a mandatory obligation to provide information on the
occurrence of very serious casualties is beneficial to Member
States, the maritime industry, and the public at large. As we
worked through reconciling existing IMO casualty data with the
best data presently available to our industry, we found
substantial inconsistency in reporting. Thus, to assist Member
States in their ongoing efforts to consider improvements to
maritime safety through examination of casualties, we
respectfully wish to draw attention to the existing provisions
in the mandatory IMO Casualty Investigation Code (Res.
MSC.255(84)) and those in MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3.
iii. Thus, recognizing that it is not procedurally appropriate for
CLIA to propose an amendment to a mandatory instrument, we
request that Member States consider revising SOLAS Chapter XI-
1, Regulation 6 to expressly and more clearly emphasize the
mandatory reporting requirements regarding ``very serious
casualties.'' We believe that Member States would find this to
improve the breadth and depth of reporting, providing them a
better foundation for prevention of future casualties.
6. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as
appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-
committees.
Conclusion
7. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that
contributed to the Concordia incident and is proactively responding to
all maritime safety issues.
8. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the
industry to do so in a meaningful and expedited manner.
Action requested of the Committee
9. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided in
this submission and take action as appropriate.
______
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC 90/27/11
90th session 10 April 2012
Agenda item 27 Original: ENGLISH
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Executive summary: This document describes a specific additional
output from the Cruise Industry Operational
Safety Review, which was undertaken
immediately following the Concordia incident,
under the leadership of the Cruise Lines
International Association, to address
operational safety. This particular output
relates to the subject of Carriage of
Additional Lifejackets onboard. This work will
continue and recommendations will be provided
to the industry, IMO, and governments on an
ongoing basis.
Strategic direction: 5.1
High-level action: 5.1.1
Planned output: None
Action to be taken: Paragraph 10
Related document: MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/
27/2; and MSC 90/27/12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the
industry's continuous efforts to review and improve safety measures,
the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf
of the global cruise lines industry, announced the launch of a Cruise
Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had
begun prior to that date.
2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be
shared on an on-going basis among CLIA members and any appropriate
recommendations will be shared with the IMO.
3. In the first of CLIA's previous submissions, MSC 90/27/1, we
described the basic framework for the Review and reported on the first
output, which was our Passenger Muster Policy.
4. In MSC 90/27/2 and 90/27/XX, CLIA reported upon a series of
additional outputs of the Review.
Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
5. The first outputs of the Review, as mentioned above, were
reported in MSC 90/27/1, 90/27/2, and 90/27/12.
6. The cruise industry has developed an additional output of the
Review, applicable to all of the oceangoing ships we represent, which
CLIA wishes to share with this Committee:
Carriage of Additional Lifejackets Onboard:
.1 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), as well as flag State regulations, require that
passenger ships on international voyages carry an approved
lifejacket (Personal Flotation Device-PFD) for every person
onboard the ship.
.2 SOLAS requires that lifejackets suitable for children must
also be carried in a number equal to 10 percent of the number
of passengers onboard, provided that the number of children's
lifejackets carried must not be less than the number of
children onboard.
.3 Lifejackets must also be carried for the persons on watch
and must be stored on the bridge, in the engine control room
and at any other manned watch station.
.4 An additional number of lifejackets equal to 5 percent of
the persons onboard must also be carried and stored in
conspicuous places on deck or at muster stations.
.5 Under certain circumstances, additional lifejackets must
also be carried, and stored at muster stations or in public
spaces, when it is likely that persons may not be able to
return to their staterooms to retrieve the lifejacket stored
there.
.6 Some flag states have similar requirements for domestic or
non-international voyages.
.7 CLIA's members have adopted a policy of carrying additional
adult lifejackets onboard each cruise ship in excess of these
legal requirements.
.8 Under this policy the number of additional adult lifejackets
to be provided must not be less than the total number of
persons berthed within the ship's most populated main vertical
fire zone.
.9 Implementation of this policy ensures should result in spare
lifejackets being carried are far in excess of the number
required by SOLAS.
.10 Some smaller cruise ships may be constructed with only one
main vertical fire zone that is utilized for accommodation
spaces.
.11 For these vessels, CLIA's policy is that the maximum number
of excess lifejackets provided need not exceed fifty percent of
the total number of persons carried by the vessel.
.12 Extra lifejackets for children in excess of legal
requirements, in a number equal to 10 percent of the number of
passengers berthed within the most populated main vertical
zone, must also be carried on international voyages under this
policy.
.13 All of the additional lifejackets addressed in this policy
are to be stored in public spaces, at the muster stations, on
deck or in lifeboats, and in such a manner as to be readily
accessible to crewmembers for distribution as may be necessary
in the event of an emergency.
.14 Lifejackets carried for persons on watch, and at remotely
located survival craft stations, are to be carried in
accordance with SOLAS and other applicable flag State
regulations.
7. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as
appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-
committees.
Conclusion
8. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that
contributed to the Concordia incident and is proactively responding to
all maritime safety issues.
9. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the
industry to do so in a meaningful and expedited manner.
Action requested of the Committee
10. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided
in this submission and take action as appropriate.
______
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC 90/27/12
90th session 10 April 2012
Agenda item 27 Original: ENGLISH
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Executive summary: This document describes certain specific
additional outputs from the Cruise Industry
Operational Safety Review, which was
undertaken immediately following the Concordia
incident, under the leadership of the Cruise
Lines International Association, to address
operational safety. These particular outputs
relate to the subjects of Passage Planning and
Personnel Access to the Bridge. This work will
continue and recommendations will be provided
to the industry, IMO, and governments on an
ongoing basis.
Strategic direction: 5.1
High-level action: 5.1.1
Planned output: None
Action to be taken: Paragraph 10
Related document: MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; and MSC
90/27/2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the
industry's continuous efforts to review and improve safety measures,
the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf
of the global cruise lines industry, announced the launch of a Cruise
Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had
begun prior to that date.
2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be
shared on an ongoing basis among CLIA members and any appropriate
recommendations will be shared with the IMO.
3. In the first of CLIA's previous submissions, MSC 90/27/1, we
described the basic framework for the Review and reported on the first
output, which was our Passenger Muster Policy.
4. In MSC 90/27/2, CLIA reported upon a series of additional
outputs of the Review, which were all related to reporting of marine
casualties.
Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
5. The first outputs of the Review, as mentioned above, were
reported in MSC 90/27/1 and 90/27/2.
6. The cruise industry has developed two additional outputs of the
Review, applicable to all of the oceangoing ships we represent, which
CLIA wishes to share with this Committee:
Passage Planning:
.1 Since 1999, CLIA's member lines have been subject to
international guidance concerning passage planning in
accordance with IMO Resolution A.893(21), Guidelines for Voyage
Planning, adopted on 25 November 1999.
.2 CLIA has adopted a policy that the guidance elements set
forth in this resolution are deemed to be the mandatory minimum
requirements in the development of passage plans by all member
lines.
.3 In addition, CLIA's policy recognizes the Bridge Procedures
Guide published by the International Chamber of Shipping as a
compilation of best practices valuable resource that should are
to be utilized by all ship operators, either as a component of
their Safety Management Systems or Bridge Resource Management
procedures.
.4 Under this policy each passage plan is to be thoroughly
briefed to all bridge team members who will be involved in
execution of the plan well in advance of its implementation.
.5 The passage plan will be drafted by the designated officer
and approved by the master.
.6 CLIA's policy is that all members are to take steps to help
ensure bridge team members are asked and encouraged to raise
any operational concerns without fear of retribution or
retaliation.
Personnel Access to the Bridge:
.7 To minimize unnecessary disruptions and distractions to
bridge team members in accomplishing their direct and indirect
duties during any period of restricted maneuvering, or while
maneuvering in conditions that the master or company bridge
procedures/policy deems to require increased vigilance (e.g.,
arrival/departure from port, heavy traffic, poor visibility),
CLIA's members have adopted a policy that bridge access is to
be strictly limited to those with operational functions only
during these periods.
.8 Further, member lines are to take steps to prevent
distractions to watchkeeping during these periods.
.9 Any deviation from this policy requires prior approval of
senior management ashore.
7. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as
appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-
committees.
Conclusion
8. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that
contributed to the Concordia incident and is proactively responding to
all maritime safety issues.
9. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the
industry to do so in a meaningful and expedited manner.
Action requested of the Committee
10. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided
in this submission and take action as appropriate.
______
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC 91/7/1
91st session 24 September 2012
Agenda item 7 Original: ENGLISH
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Executive summary: This document provides additional outputs from
the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
and proposes a revision to include these
additional outputs in the annex to MSC.1/
Circ.1446.
Strategic direction: 5.1
High-level action: 5.1.1
Planned output: None.
Action to be taken: Paragraph 14
Related documents: MSC 90/27
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
1 In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the
industry's ongoing efforts to review and improve safety measures, the
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf of
the global cruise lines industry, announced the launch of a Cruise
Industry Operational Safety Review (hereinafter ``Review'') on 27
January 2012, although it had begun prior to that date. As best
practices are identified via this Review, they will be shared on an on-
going basis among CLIA members and as appropriate to the Organization.
2 In the first paper on this subject (MSC 90/27/1), CLIA provided
the Committee with an overview of the basic framework of the Review and
also reported on the first output, a CLIA policy on passenger muster
prior to departure from port. Since then, we have provided the
Committee with additional outputs, including:
.1 The need for consistent reporting and additional verifying
of marine casualties and incidents, in particular very serious
casualties, with a concomitant recommendation that Member
States consider revising SOLAS regulation XI-1/6 to emphasize
the mandatory reporting requirements of very serious casualties
(MSC 90/27/2);
.2 CLIA policies on passage planning and personnel access to
the bridge (MSC 90/27/12); and
.3 CLIA policy on carriage of additional lifejackets on board
(MSC 90/27/11).
3 The Committee, having considered the information provided in the
Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, invited Member Governments
to recommend that passenger ship companies conduct a review of
operational safety measures with the aim to enhance the safety of
passenger ships, taking into consideration the recommended interim
measures of an operational character listed in the Recommended interim
measures for passenger ship companies to enhance the safety of
passenger ships (MSC.1/Circ.1446), on ships flying their flag, on a
voluntary basis and with all possible urgency and efficiency
(Resolution MSC.336(90)).
Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
4 As part of the ongoing Review, the cruise industry has developed
three additional outputs as laid out below in paragraphs 5-9.
Common Elements of Musters and Emergency Instructions
5 Regulations 8 and 19 of SOLAS Chapter III require musters and
emergency instructions to be provided for passengers. In addition to
the legal requirements, CLIA oceangoing members have adopted a policy
that musters and emergency instructions are to include the following
common elements:
.1 When and how to don a lifejacket.
.2 Description of emergency signals and appropriate responses
in the event of an emergency.
.3 Location of lifejackets.
.4 Where to muster * when the emergency signal is
sounded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ The terms ``muster'' and ``assembly'' are used interchangeably
and therefore are synonymous for this purpose.
.5 Method of accounting for passenger attendance at musters
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
both for training and in the event of an actual emergency.
.6 How information will be provided in an emergency.
.7 What to expect if the Master orders an evacuation of the
ship.
.8 What additional safety information is available.
.9 Instructions on whether passengers should return to cabins
prior to mustering, including specifics regarding medications,
clothing, and lifejackets.
.10 Description of key safety systems and features.
.11 Emergency routing systems and recognizing emergency exits.
.12 Who to seek out for additional information.
Recording the Nationality of Passengers
6 Regulation 27 of SOLAS Chapter III requires that all persons on
board be counted prior to departure; details of those who have declared
a need for special care or assistance in an emergency be recorded and
communicated to the Master prior to departure; names and gender of all
persons on board, distinguishing between adults, children and infants
be recorded for search and rescue purposes; and that all of this
information be kept ashore and made readily available to search and
rescue services when needed.
7 To further facilitate the effective and immediate availability
of key information in the event of an emergency situation, CLIA
oceangoing members have adopted a policy that, in addition to the
information required by SOLAS, the nationality of each passenger
onboard is also to be recorded, kept ashore and made readily available
to search and rescue services when needed.
Life Boat Loading for Training Purposes
8 To facilitate training for lifeboat operations, CLIA oceangoing
members have adopted a policy that at least one lifeboat on each ship
is to be filled with crewmembers equal in number to its certified
number of occupants at least every six months. Under this policy:
.1 for safety considerations, the loading of lifeboats for
training purposes is to be performed only while the boat is
waterborne and the boat should be lowered and raised with only
the lifeboat crew onboard;
.2 lifejackets should be worn;
.3 all lifeboat crew and embarkation/boarding station crew are
to be required to attend the lifeboat loading drill; and
.4 if not placed inside the lifeboat, those crew members are to
observe the filling of the lifeboat to its certified number of
people.
9 This policy applies to ships with crew sizes of three hundred or
greater, with lifeboats installed. Ships with crew sizes of less than
three hundred are to conduct similar and equivalent training
evolutions, at appropriate intervals, that are consistent with
operational and safety considerations.
Proposed revision to MSC.1/Circ.1446
10 CLIA recommends the Committee consider revising MSC.1/Circ.1446
such that these three additional outputs (paragraphs 5-9) would be
included among the other recommended interim measures contained in the
annex to that circular.
Conclusion
11 CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that
contributed to the Concordia incident and is proactively responding to
all maritime safety issues. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety
Review has enabled the industry to do so in a meaningful and expedited
manner.
12 Since the Review began, CLIA has provided the Committee with
several outputs, including 7 new policies regarding passenger muster
prior to departure from port; passage planning; personnel access to the
bridge; carriage of additional lifejackets on board; common elements of
musters and emergency instructions; recording the nationality of
passengers; and life boat loading for training purposes. In addition,
CLIA has provided the Committee with an output of the Review regarding
marine casualty reporting.
13 Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as
appropriate to the Organization via relevant Committees and Sub-
Committees.
Action requested of the Committee
14 The Committee is invited to:
.1 consider the information provided in this document;
.2 consider revising the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1446 (paragraph
10); and
.3 take action as appropriate.
______
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC 92/6/1
92nd session 13 February 2013
Agenda item 6 Original: ENGLISH
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Executive summary: This document provides additional outputs from
the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
and proposes a further revision to include
these additional outputs in the annex to MSC.1/
Circ.1446/Rev.1.
Strategic direction: 5.1
High-level action: 5.1.1
Planned output: None.
Action to be taken: Paragraph 17
Related documents: None.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
15 In response to the Concordia incident, the global cruise
industry launched a comprehensive Cruise Industry Operational Safety
Review (hereinafter ``Review'') and identified a number of best
practices, which have been shared among CLIA members and with the
Organization.
16 In the first paper on this subject (MSC 90/27/1), CLIA provided
the Committee with an overview of the basic framework of the Review and
also reported on the first output, a CLIA policy on passenger muster
prior to departure from port. Since then, we have provided the
Committee with additional outputs, including:
.1 The need for consistent reporting and additional verifying
of marine casualties and incidents, in particular very serious
casualties, with a concomitant recommendation that Member
States consider revising SOLAS regulation XI-1/6 to emphasize
the mandatory reporting requirements of very serious casualties
(MSC 90/27/2);
.2 CLIA policies on passage planning and personnel access to
the bridge (MSC 90/27/12);
.3 CLIA policy on carriage of additional lifejackets on board
(MSC 90/27/11);
.4 CLIA policies on musters and emergency instructions (MSC 91/
7/1);
.5 CLIA policy on recording the nationality of passengers (MSC
91/7/1); and
.6 CLIA policy on life boat loading for training purposes (MSC
91/7/1).
17 The Committee, having considered the information provided,
invited Member Governments to recommend that passenger ship companies
conduct a review of operational safety measures with the aim to enhance
the safety of passenger ships, taking into consideration the
recommended interim measures of an operational character listed in the
Recommended interim measures for passenger ship companies to enhance
the safety of passenger ships (MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1), on ships flying
their flag, on a voluntary basis and with all possible urgency and
efficiency (Resolution MSC.[. . .](91)).
Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
18 As part of the Review, the cruise industry has developed three
additional outputs as laid out below in paragraphs 5-13.
Securing Heavy Objects
19 CLIA's oceangoing members have adopted a policy to incorporate
procedures into their Safety Management Systems (SMS) to help ensure
the securing of heavy objects either permanently, when not in use, or
during heavy/severe weather, as appropriate. Under this policy, a
person or persons are to oversee a deck by deck inspection to identify
unsecured and potentially hazardous heavy objects. Integral to the
procedures is a list of identified objects which have a significant
potential to cause injury.
20 Shipboard personnel should apply good seamanship in identifying
additional items to be secured. Attention should be given to muster
* stations, evacuation routes, and lifeboat embarkation
stations as a ship emergency could give rise to conditions that differ
from ship motions caused by heavy/severe weather.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ The terms ``muster'' and ``assembly'' are used interchangeably
and therefore are synonymous for this purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 Consideration should also be given to development of a guidance
document to assist in the identification of heavy objects and the most
adequate methods for securing them. An example of this guidance
document is attached in the annex. This annex is only intended to
provide an example for one method of implementing this policy.
22 Practices and procedures for securing heavy objects should be
monitored by each Head of Department and/or as otherwise specified by
the ship's command structure, and during routine shipboard inspections
and audits.
23 Heavy/severe weather should be clearly defined under the
company policy taking into account the size of the ship, operational
profiles, and other information. In defining heavy/severe weather,
appropriate deference should be given to the judgment of the Captain.
Harmonization of Bridge Procedures
24 Operational safety can be enhanced by achieving substantive
consistency in bridge operating procedures among commonly owned ships,
for example by providing that bridge personnel who may rotate among
such ships can be familiarized with a common set of procedures.
25 CLIA's oceangoing members have adopted a policy that bridge
operating procedures are to be harmonized as much as possible, both
within individual companies and among brands within a commonly owned
and operated fleet. Under this policy and best practice, each CLIA
member operating multiple ships and each cruise line brand that is
commonly owned and operated with another brand is to harmonize their
respective procedures for bridge operations, taking into account any
unique operating characteristics of specialty ships (e.g., expedition
ships; sail powered ships; etc.) *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ And giving due regard to any relevant flag State requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Location of Lifejacket Stowage
26 In addition to CLIA's policy on excess lifejackets (MSC 90/27/
11), CLIA's oceangoing members have adopted an additional policy to
reflect best practices for the stowage of lifejackets onboard newly-
constructed cruise ships (e.g., cruise ships for which the building
contract is placed on or after 1 July 2013). Under this policy, a
number of lifejackets equal to or greater than the number required
onboard under the relevant international and flag State regulations,
are to be stowed in close proximity to either muster
stations or lifeboat embarkation points, and be
readily available for use in case of emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\\ The terms ``muster'' and ``assembly'' are used
interchangeably and therefore are synonymous for this purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27 Implementation of this policy will continue to result in spare
lifejackets being carried in excess of the number required by the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
Proposed revision to MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1
28 CLIA recommends the Committee consider revising MSC.1/
Circ.1446/Rev.1 such that these three additional outputs (paragraphs 5-
13, annex) would be included among the other recommended interim
measures contained in the annex to that circular.
Conclusion
29 Since the Review began, CLIA has provided the Committee with
several outputs, including 10 new policies regarding various
operational safety matters. In addition, CLIA has provided the
Committee with an output of the Review regarding marine casualty
reporting.
30 CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that
contributed to the Concordia incident. Ongoing innovation in safety has
been a hallmark of our industry for decades and we are fully committed
to continuous improvement of shipboard operations and safety. The
global cruise industry continuously reviews operational safety and
works closely with the Organization as well as flag States, Recognized
Organizations and others to enhance maritime safety.
Action requested of the Committee
31 The Committee is invited to:
.1 consider the information provided in this document;
.2 consider revising the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1
(paragraph 14); and
.3 take action as appropriate.
______
ANNEX
SAMPLE STRUCTURE OF A GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
TO ASSIST IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF HEAVY OBJECTS
AND THE MOST ADEQUATE METHOD FOR SECURING THEM
Guidance document(s) should consider the following three elements,
in addition to any other relevant information.
1 Heavy Objects. The following list is an example of some heavy
objects that may be identified and secured in accordance with company
policy. In this sample listing, the objects are grouped by those that
should be permanently secured, always secured when not in use, and
those to be secured in heavy weather. Heavy objects that have been
identified include, but are not limited to, the following:
1.1 Heavy objects that should be permanently secured.
1.1.1 Heavy plant pots, sculptures, TVs, cash machines,
laundromat equipment, slot machines, and game machines
such as in teen recreation areas.
1.1.2 Display stands and racks.
1.1.3 Treatment tables, heavy standalone product
displays, treadmills, exercise weight racks, and weight
lifting machines.
1.1.4 Pianos, lounge speakers, and back-stage scenery
equipment.
1.2 Heavy objects that should be secured at all times when not
in use.
1.2.1 Trolleys and forklift trucks.
1.2.2 Paint rafts, gangways, and deck trash containers.
1.2.3 X-ray scanners.
1.2.4 Cylinder heads, pistons, charge air coolers,
heavy chemical containers, and heavy fan impellers.
1.2.5 Gas bottles (refrigerant, oxygen, acetylene,
CO2, etc.)
1.3 Heavy objects not otherwise secured that should be secured
for heavy weather.
1.3.1 Loose objects on display.
1.3.2 Temporary decorations.
1.3.3 Items brought aboard temporarily as part of
shows.
1.3.4 Materials/equipment onboard as part of repairs/
refurbishment.
2 Securing Methods.
2.1 Consideration should be given to the strength and
appropriateness of each point of attachment to which the heavy
objects are secured.
2.2 Consideration should be given to the following list of
securing methods. Additional securing methods appropriate to
the objects to be secured should be identified and used as
necessary. Examples are as follows; however, additional methods
should be identified and included as appropriate.
A--Latch type gate hook and eye bracket mounted on
bulkhead or vertical surface.
B--Ratchet strap and eye brackets mounted on bulkhead
or vertical surface.
C--Rope secured to object and adjacent suitable
securing surface.
D--Contained in metal rack-type shelving system.
E--Suction cup and bracket, ratchet strap, chain, etc.
F--Permanent securing such as bolting to bulkhead or
deck.
3 Various. A list of specific heavy objects that have been
identified by the company during surveys and inspections and that
require particular attention.
______
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC 92/6/9
92nd session 24 May 2013
Agenda item 6 Original: ENGLISH
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Comments relating to the Costa Concordia incident:
The importance of shoreside management to maintaining shipboard safety
Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Executive summary: This document provides comments relating to the
Costa Concordia incident.
Strategic direction: 5.1, 5.2, 5.4
High-level action: 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.1
Planned output: None
Action to be taken: Paragraph 25
Related documents: MSC 92/6/1; MSC 92/6/3; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/
1; MSC 90/27/2; MSC 90/27/11; MSC 90/27/12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
1 This document is submitted in accordance with paragraph 6.14 of
the Guidelines on the organization and method of work of the Maritime
Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee and
their subsidiary bodies (MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.2), and provides
comments relating to the Concordia incident and in particular the
importance of shoreside management to maintaining shipboard safety.
2 Comments related to Italy's report on the safety technical
investigation regarding the Concordia marine casualty investigation are
in document MSC 92/6/10.
Discussion
3 The role of shoreside management is critical to the proper
development and function of an effective Safety Management System. An
integrated approach is used by the cruise industry to maintain
shipboard safety; one that recognizes an essential connection with
senior shoreside officials.
4 Notwithstanding substantive progress made to date, the cruise
industry continues to establish and implement operational and
management measures that are robust enough to minimize the potential
for a recurrence of the type of navigational incident recounted in
document MSC 92/6/3. For example, the cruise industry takes very
seriously its responsibility to address issues surrounding the
authority of the Master with regard to maneuvering a large cruise ship
and the naturally related responsibility in management of the company
to ensure safety. These efforts are ongoing and take the form of both
industry-wide cooperation and company-specific actions.
5 Some specific elements that have already been addressed and will
continue to be evaluated on an ongoing basis via the cruise industry's
efforts include:
.1 senior management level of engagement in safety-related
matters;
.2 senior management commitment to a company-wide culture of
safety;
.3 integration of shoreside management responsibilities into
the company's Safety Management System; and
.4 CEO-level direct engagement in CLIA's Member Policy
Verification Program.
6 Recall the prior CLIA submissions to the Committee on various
outputs from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review.\5\ As part
of the cruise industry's ongoing efforts to continually improve
operational safety, a wide range of additional items were also
considered but have not to this point resulted in industry-wide
policies. Instead, with regard to these items, information and best
practices have been shared among our members and incorporated into
their own relevant policies and procedures as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See MSC 92/6/1; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/2; MSC 90/
27/11; and MSC 90/27/12 (CLIA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Efforts to evaluate and improve in these areas remain ongoing
within our standing committee structure and other appropriate
mechanisms within our industry. Examples of areas, closely related to
the role of shoreside management, that continue to be under
consideration include:
.1 discretion of the Master with regard to non-safety related
voyage modifications;
.2 bridge procedures during maneuvering and shipboard
emergencies;
.3 voyage plan change and general bridge procedure review
practices and policies;
.4 hiring, evaluation, and training practices for Masters; and
.5 expectations and policies on when a Master may personally
abandon their ship.
8 It is the cruise industry's approach that these types of issues
are very much the responsibility of shoreside management to develop and
successfully implement via effective shipboard practices and
procedures. For a Safety Management System to be genuinely effective
and within the true spirit of the ISM Code, it must carefully integrate
the roles carried out by both professional shipboard staff and the
shoreside management that both lead and support them. The cruise
industry continues to fully embrace such an approach and commits to
continuous improvement in this regard.
Conclusion
9 The cruise industry looks forward to working with all engaged
stakeholders to identify and prioritize areas where additional
improvements can be made and to develop any necessary standards that
will further the shared goal of continuous improvement of maritime
safety.
Action requested of the Committee
10 The Committee is invited to consider the comments provided in
this document and take action as appropriate.
______
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE MSC 92/6/10
92nd session 24 May 2013
Agenda item 6 Original: ENGLISH
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
Comments relating to the Costa Concordia incident:
Specific comments on Italy's recommendations
Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Executive summary: This document provides comments relating to the
Costa Concordia incident.
Strategic direction: 5.1, 5.2, 5.4
High-level action: 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.1
Planned output: None
Action to be taken: Paragraph 25
Related documents: MSC 92/6/1; MSC 92/6/3; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/
1; MSC 90/27/2; MSC 90/27/11; MSC 90/27/12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
1 This document is submitted in accordance with paragraph 6.14 of
the Guidelines on the organization and method of work of the Maritime
Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee and
their subsidiary bodies (MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.2), and provides
comments relating to the Concordia incident and in particular Italy's
Report on the safety technical investigation regarding the Concordia
marine casualty investigation, as presented in the Marine Casualty and
Incident Module of GISIS under Incident Reference No. C0008482
(hereafter ``the Report'').
2 Comments related to the importance of shoreside management to
maintaining shipboard safety are in document MSC 92/6/9 (CLIA).
Discussion
3 The Report contains 20 recommendations grouped into 6 functional
areas covering stability; vital equipment & electrical distribution;
emergency power generation; operational matters; evacuation analysis;
and search and rescue. Seven are for new ships only, while 11 are for
both new and existing ships. The two SAR recommendations, which are
external to the ship, will not be discussed in this document. CLIA
welcomes the opportunity to discuss the Report, consider the
recommendations made by Italy, and develop a comprehensive way forward
to further improve safety.
4 Below is a summary of CLIA's preliminary comments regarding
Italy's recommendations as contained in the Report.
Stability (Section 6.2.1.)
5 Double skin. Future discussions regarding the need for double
skin to protect compartments containing equipment vital for the
propulsion and electrical propulsion should also take into
consideration requirements and guidance relating to SOLAS Safe Return
to Port and Probabilistic Damage Stability, as appropriate.
6 Limiting down flooding points. If this recommendation is aimed
at mitigating progressive flooding, CLIA is of the view that it may
need to be clarified. CLIA notes that the Report indicates the water
reached the bulkhead deck in the aft area after about 40 minutes
following the incident.
7 Computerized stability.
.1 In the discussion of computerized stability support for the
master in case of flooding, it is important to distinguish
between systems having static inputs (manual, by crew) from
those having dynamic inputs (automated, in near real time).
.2 Many cruise ships currently have computerized stability
support systems on board that are based primarily on static
inputs. Such systems require manual intervention and input by
ship's crew in order to display damage stability information.
.3 Dynamic simulation would likely entail inter alia fitting
and interfacing of flooding sensors on existing ships. CLIA
believes that such a proposal needs an in-depth discussion
among subject matter experts. To our knowledge, such systems
are currently not available to handle dynamic inputs, in near
real time, displaying predictive dynamic damage simulation.
8 Interface between flooding detection and stability computer. See
paragraph 7.
Vital equipment and electrical distribution (Section 6.2.2.)
9 Discontinuity between compartments. This recommendation relates
to new ships. In addition, CLIA members have initiated a preparedness
risk assessment to inter alia identify ways to preserve functional
integrity of essential systems for existing ships.
10 Bilge pumps. The recommendation regarding bilge pumps is far
too vague e.g., ``huge quantities of water'' cannot be defined. Also,
there may be additional aspects to consider when discussing this
proposal such as power source and requirements to feed additional
pumps.
11 Relocation of main switchboard. CLIA notes that there are
existing regulatory constraints regarding location of main switchboards
in relation to other spaces/equipment. Such requirements may affect
aspects of this recommendation regarding relocation of main
switchboards. Any future development of new/revised requirements would
need to be discussed by experts and carefully considered.
12 Relocation of UHF radio switchboard. CLIA agrees in principle
that the preservation adequate communications in an emergency is
required. CLIA is of the view that the basis of the Italy proposal to
relocate the UHF switchboard above the bulkhead deck is not clear.
Therefore, CLIA believes that other more effective and efficient
options may exist to accomplish the intended goal. A number of
different solutions should be discussed and evaluated by experts.
Emergency power generation (Section 6.2.3.)
13 Increasing EDG capacity. It should be clarified whether
increasing EDG capacity would apply to existing certified emergency
diesel generators or to the ``second emergency diesel generators''
mentioned in paragraph 14.
14 Second EDG. CLIA agrees in principle with providing increased
emergency power supply to support additional selected services.
However, the recommendation regarding a second EDG is not clear whether
the intent is to apply existing regulations (statutory EDG) to the
second EDG or to allow for flexibility in the requirements applicable
to the second EDG. When establishing new requirements for the ``second
emergency diesel generator,'' this proposal should be carefully
considered in relation to the multiple technical and operational
aspects involved. Therefore, CLIA recommends that any further
consideration of this item be made by the relevant technical sub-
committee(s).
15 EDG functional tests. Italy proposes that both emergency diesel
generators be tested weekly for at least two hours under a load of at
least 50 percent. While generally in favor of enhancing functional
testing aimed at improving reliability of EDGs during emergencies, the
basis for Italy's proposal is not clear and therefore further
consideration is needed in the relevant technical sub-committee(s),
including input from engine manufacturer(s).
16 Emergency light in cabins. Italy's proposal regarding emergency
light in cabins suggests that these lights should be fed by both UPS
and emergency power. Although cruise ships are provided with such
emergency lights in cabins, CLIA would like to inform the Committee
that not all of the lights are fed by the emergency source of power. In
some installations, a light is powered by stand-alone battery. CLIA is
of the view that as long as the goal is achieved (e.g., lighting the
exit) and that a process is in place to ensure that lights work in an
emergency, that a requirement for feeding from emergency power is not
necessary.
Operational matters (Section 6.3.4.)
17 Bridge management. CLIA supports consideration of development
of training requirements that reflect established principles such as
function-based bridge management and collective decision making. CLIA
is looking forward to considering this matter, perhaps in the STW sub-
committee.
18 Bridge team management certification. Italy's recommendation
regarding bridge team management certification is unclear.
19 Principles of minimum safety manning. CLIA notes there is a
lack of details in Italy's recommendation. Nevertheless, CLIA agrees
that the current principles of Minimum Safe Manning do not adequately
reflect reality on passenger ships and therefore supports in principle
the need for further consideration on this matter.
20 Muster list. CLIA does not support the Italy proposal to show
certification requirements in muster lists. CLIA notes that under the
ISM Code, the Company is already required to ensure crewmembers are
duly certified according to the duties and responsibilities assigned
onboard. Cruise ships already have procedures/processes in place that
ensure compliance with such requirements. In addition, robust systems
are in place to ensure that those responsible for assigning emergency
duties to the crew can easily verify the certifications required to
cover such duties. CLIA believes that this proposal could result in the
addition of unnecessary and redundant information to an already ``over-
populated'' document.
21 Inclusion of inclinometer data in VDR. CLIA agrees in principle
with the Italy proposal to include inclinometer data in the VDR.
Evacuation analysis (Section 6.3.4.)
22 Evacuation analysis at early stage of project. CLIA notes that
evacuation analysis is currently not on any sub-committee agenda, and
that MSC 92 may consider whether to send a new work item to FP. CLIA
looks forward to participating in the discussion at the relevant sub-
committee, should the Committee decide to place this on the work
programme.
23 Embarkation ladders. CLIA supports in principle consideration
for additional embarkation ladders. However, CLIA believes that in this
regard careful consideration should be given to a number of important
aspects, such as:
.1 the positioning of additional ladders that could impact
other LSA;
.2 the difficulties for un-trained persons to utilize the
ladders in conditions other than Concordia high-side, etc.; and
.3 ``blanket'' requirements may be difficult to meet.
CLIA suggests that other individual means of evacuation should also
be included in the discussion on how to achieve the goal, with the
focus of identifying improvement in their design and functions, if
needed.
Conclusion
24 The cruise industry looks forward to working with all engaged
stakeholders to identify and prioritize areas where additional
improvements can be made and to develop any necessary standards that
will further the shared goal of continuous improvement of maritime
safety.
Action requested of the Committee
25 The Committee is invited to consider the comments provided in
this document and take action as appropriate.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And we will now turn to Gerald Cahill, who is the President
and Chief Executive Officer of Carnival Cruise Lines.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF GERALD CAHILL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES
Mr. Cahill. Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller and
Ranking Member Thune and members of the Committee.
My name is Gerry Cahill, and I am President and Chief
Executive Officer of Carnival Cruise Lines. I have been with
Carnival Cruise Lines and its parent corporation, Carnival
Corporation, in various roles for almost 19 years; the last 6
years, I've been with Carnival Cruise Lines in my current
capacity.
I have submitted written testimony, for the record, which
includes information on the various initiatives and investments
that Carnival Cruise Lines has undertaken in the area of safety
and passenger comfort. I will, therefore, keep my remarks today
very brief.
Carnival Cruise Lines has a fleet of 24 ships, and we
operate approximately 1,500 cruises per year, carrying nearly
four and a half million guests per year. Our business is built
on offering a safe, comfortable, and affordable cruising
experience to middle--to millions of middle-class American
families each year. The safety and security of our guests is
not only important to us, but our very success relies upon it.
In our over forty-one history, we've provided over 60
million vacations and maintained an excellent safety record. We
are proud of our record of providing our guests with safe and
memorable vacation experiences, and we appreciate the continued
confidence that our guests have shown in us. We will continue
to strive to exceed the regulatory requirements of our industry
and ensure that our guests enjoy their cruise vacations.
I welcome the opportunity to participate in this hearing,
and I look forward to discussing with you ways in which we can
further improve and deliver an even better experience to the
millions of middle-class American families who sail with us
each year.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cahill follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald Cahill, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Carnival Cruise Lines
Good afternoon Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and
Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
the Committee to discuss Carnival Cruise Lines' (``Carnival'')
commitment to the safety and security of our guests. It is Carnival's
number one priority.
Carnival operates 1500 cruises per year, carrying nearly 4.5
million guests. Our parent company Carnival Corp & plc serves nearly 10
million guests annually. Our business is built on being able to offer a
safe, enjoyable, and affordable cruising experience to millions of
middle-class American families each year. Safety, security, and guest
satisfaction not only is important to us, but our success relies upon
it.
Over our forty-one year history, Carnival has an excellent safety
record. We work hard to provide our guests with safe and memorable
vacation experiences. Our goal is to exceed the regulatory requirements
of our industry to ensure that our guests are confident that they will
enjoy a fun cruise vacation. To that end, I will focus my testimony on
some of the steps that we take with respect to safety and security.
Regulation of the Cruise Industry
Because of the international nature of the cruise industry, there
are several layers of oversight and regulation designed to insure the
safe and reliable operation of cruise ships around the world. At the
global level, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is
part of the UN, is responsible for creating standards for all ships
operating around the world.
IMO has adopted several conventions that address and regulate
various areas of vessel operations, which in turn, are ratified and
enforced by Flag and Port States. These conventions address, among
other things: all aspects of safety; ship design and equipment; fire
protection, training and watch keeping; communications; search and
rescue; navigation; and, environmental protection.
The Flag State of each vessel is primarily responsible for
enforcing international requirements, as well as additional regulations
imposed by the Flag State. All Port States the vessel calls upon also
ensure the vessel is in compliance, which further strengthens what the
IMO and Flag State provide. Cruise ships, like other vessels, are
subject to regular inspections and audits from both the Flag and Port
States.
In the U.S, the Coast Guard is both the primary regulator and the
principal enforcement agency of the laws, regulations, and
international treaties applicable to cruise ships. The U.S. is a party
to IMO and has adopted the conventions described above. The Coast Guard
conducts announced and unannounced inspections of cruise ships that
operate out of U.S. ports in order to ensure compliance by ships
operating in U.S. waters. Therefore, cruise ships operating in the U.S.
are subject to numerous local, state, and Federal laws and regulations,
including those related to safety.
Safety and Security
Carnival takes our compliance with all laws and regulations very
seriously. Carnival has safety management systems in place that meet or
exceed all regulatory requirements. Further, our parent company in 2006
established at the Board-level, a Health, Environmental, Safety &
Security (``HESS'') Committee to assist the Board in fulfilling their
responsibility to supervise and monitor HESS policies, programs,
initiatives at sea and onshore, and compliance with HESS legal and
regulatory requirements. In addition, the HESS Committee oversees
audits of each of our ships annually to ensure compliance. Our HESS
policy includes our commitments to:
Protecting the health, safety and security of our
passengers, guests, employees and all others working on behalf
of Carnival;
Protecting the environment, including the marine environment
in which our vessels sail and the communities in which we
operate;
Fully complying with or exceeding all legal and statutory
requirements related to health, environment, safety and
security throughout our business activities; and
Assigning health, environment, safety and security matters
the same priority as other critical business matters.
Carnival engages in regular training to ensure compliance as well.
As an example, all officers and crewmembers on Carnival's ships undergo
regular safety and emergency training, which meets or exceeds all
regulatory requirements. Carnival Corporation and Carnival plc also
operate their own Center for Simulator Maritime Training (CSMART), in
Almere, Netherlands, which features a broad portfolio of maritime
training courses, including courses dedicated to bridge resource
management, in which Carnival participates. The facility is one of the
most advanced of its kind in the maritime industry and has been praised
by the U.S. Coast Guard.
Carnival has a professional Shoreside Security Department that
provides training and support to shipboard security staff on each
vessel. The Security Department consists of former law enforcement
professionals. Training includes week-long annual shoreside training
sessions for all shipboard Senior Security Officers, with curriculum
based on the CVSSA model course 11-01 designed by the FBI and U.S.
Coast Guard. Support includes pre-employment evaluation and incident
response assistance and guidance. In addition, the Security Department
serves as liaison to the FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, and local law
enforcement agencies for reporting and investigation of incidents.
Global Operational Safety Review Implementation
The cruise industry, through the Cruise Lines International
Association (``CLIA''), initiated a comprehensive Global Operations
Safety Review with the purpose of identifying additional practices that
could strengthen the cruise industry's already exceptional safety
record. CLIA received input and guidance from an independent panel of
experts with extensive experience in the maritime, regulatory and
accident investigation fields. As a result, ten new industry-wide
policies that exceed current international regulatory requirements were
developed. Carnival has approved and has implemented these policies,
which have also been submitted to IMO for consideration.
The new policy recommendations that exceed current international
regulatory standards are:
Passenger Muster policy;
Passage Planning policy;
Personnel Access to the Bridge policy;
Excess Lifejackets policy
Recording the Nationality of Passengers policy;
Lifeboat Loading for Training Purposes policy;
Harmonization of Bridge Procedures policy;
Location of Lifejacket Stowage policy; and
Securing Heavy Objects policy.
Operating Reliability and Guest Comfort Enhancements
Immediately after the Carnival Triumph incident, Carnival announced
a comprehensive review of its entire fleet, which was overseen by our
parent company. While no one was injured as a result of the incident,
our guests clearly went through an uncomfortable experience. As part of
that review, Carnival is implementing a $300 million program to
significantly enhance emergency power capabilities, take advantage of
new fire safety technology, and improve the level of operating
redundancies across its entire fleet. Carnival's ships have been and
are safe. The changes made as a result of the review are primarily to
improve comfort and guest convenience.
All of Carnival's ships have strong systems in place to respond to
emergency situations. We meet or exceed all regulatory requirements.
However, as we do on an on-going basis, we are applying lessons learned
through our operational review after the Triumph fire, and by taking
advantage of new technologies, we identified multiple areas for
enhancement across our operations. These enhancements reinforce our
commitment to safe and reliable operations and to provide an enjoyable
cruise experience for the nearly 4.5 million guests who sail with us
each year.
The actions by Carnival will expand the availability of hotel
services for the comfort of our guests in the rare instance of a
shipboard event that involves the loss of main power. In addition, the
plan will reinforce key shipboard operating systems to further prevent
a potential loss of primary power.
Increased Emergency Generator Power
The initial increase in emergency generator power across Carnival's
fleet of 24 ships is projected to be completed by November. An
additional emergency generator will be installed on each vessel to
provide for 100 percent of stateroom and public toilets, fresh water
and elevators in the unlikely event of a loss of main power. Upon
completion of the initial phase, the line will install a second
permanent back-up power system on each ship to provide an even greater
level of hotel and guest services if main power is lost. These
additional services will include expanded cooking facilities and cold
food storage, as well as Internet and telephone communications.
Increased Fire Prevention, Detection and Suppression Systems
The company will also make additional investments in the newest and
most technically advanced fire prevention, detection and suppression
systems. This includes upgrading the existing water mist fire
suppression systems already in place on Carnival vessels to the newest
generation. When triggered, this high-pressure water mist system
instantly creates a larger and thicker blanket of water droplets than
the present system. As the water droplets evaporate, the system also
rapidly cools any hot areas to prevent the possibility of a fire
restarting.
Enhanced Operating Redundancies
All of Carnival's ships have two separate, redundant engine rooms.
The company's operational review has identified modifications to
further decrease the likelihood of losing propulsion or primary power,
as happened on Carnival Triumph in February. The modifications will
include a reconfiguration of certain engine-related electrical
components to improve and enhance operational redundancies.
New Safety & Reliability Review Board
Carnival also announced the formation of a Safety & Reliability
Review Board comprised of outside experts with significant expertise in
marine and occupational safety, reliability and maintenance, marine
regulatory compliance and quality control/assurance. The company
already receives oversight and input from outside regulatory
authorities and industry experts, as well as the HESS Committee. The
new Review Board will provide an additional, independent third-party
perspective, drawing from deep experience across a number of relevant
fields and organizations.
Carnival's review board will include five external members with
specific expertise in the areas of marine and occupational safety,
reliability and maintenance, marine regulatory compliance and quality
control/assurance. Four highly esteemed maritime and transportation
industry experts, including two former U.S. Navy Flag Officers, already
have been appointed. These experts will help us drive continuous
improvement and further ensure the safe and reliable operation of our
fleet.
Passenger Bill of Rights
Carnival, along with 25 other CLIA North American member cruise
lines, has formally adopted the Cruise Industry Passenger Bill of
Rights, which details our industry's commitment to the safety, comfort
and care of our guests. The voluntary implementation of the Bill of
Rights formalizes many longstanding industry practices and is currently
in effect for all U.S. passengers who purchase their cruise in North
America, regardless of itinerary.
We expect the impact of the Bill to be a positive one for Carnival
because we have already taken great strides to deliver across all areas
described in the Bill throughout our fleet. The Bill serves to
underscore our already-existing commitment to our guests.
The Bill covers the following set of passenger rights:
The right to disembark a docked ship if essential provisions
such as food, water, restroom facilities and access to medical
care cannot adequately be provided onboard, subject only to the
Master's concern for passenger safety and security and customs
and immigration requirements of the port.
The right to a full refund for a trip that is canceled due
to mechanical failures, or a partial refund for voyages that
are terminated early due to those failures.
The right to have available on board ships operating beyond
rivers or coastal waters full-time, professional emergency
medical attention, as needed until shore side medical care
becomes available.
The right to timely information updates as to any
adjustments in the itinerary of the ship in the event of a
mechanical failure or emergency, as well as timely updates of
the status of efforts to address mechanical failures.
The right to a ship crew that is properly trained in
emergency and evacuation procedures.
The right to an emergency power source in the case of a main
generator failure.
The right to transportation to the ship's scheduled port of
disembarkation or the passenger's home city in the event a
cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures.
The right to lodging if disembarkation and an overnight stay
in an unscheduled port are required when a cruise is terminated
early due to mechanical failures.
The right to have included on each cruise line's website a
toll-free phone line that can be used for questions or
information concerning any aspect of shipboard operations.
The right to have this Cruise Line Passenger Bill of Rights
published on each line's website.
Conclusion
Nothing is more important than the safety and comfort of our
guests, and we will devote the full resources of our company to meet
that commitment. As I have said, our continued success depends on our
ability to offer a safe, comfortable, and affordable cruising
experience to millions of middle-class American families each year. We
strive every day to improve our performance in all areas so that our
guests have confidence in their choice of Carnival, and we will
continue to do so.
The Chairman. All right, I thank you for that very brief
statement.
Mr. Adam Goldstein, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Royal Caribbean International.
Welcome to you, sir.
STATEMENT OF ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ROYAL CARIBBEAN INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Goldstein. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thune, distinguished members of the Committee.
My name is Adam Goldstein, and I am President and Chief
Executive Officer of Royal Caribbean International, which
operates 21 cruise ships around the world, with four new ships
on order. Royal Caribbean International is one of six brands
owned by Royal Caribbean Cruises, Limited, the world's second-
largest cruise company. Our company operates a total of 41
ships, globally. Last year, we carried nearly 5 million guests,
visiting approximately 425 different destinations throughout
the world.
Last week, members of this committee's staff visited one of
our ships, Grandeur of the Seas, for which I thank all of you
who were there. The ship was docked in Baltimore, Maryland,
while the staff toured the engine rooms, the bridge, the
medical facility, and observed firsthand some of the important
safety features, such as backup power generation and fire-
suppression systems. They were also briefed by the U.S. Coast
Guard on the agency's role in inspecting cruise ships to
further ensure the safety of all guests and crew.
In addition, the staff were briefed on our extensive
environmental programs and observed our advanced wastewater
purification system, or AWP, in which we have invested about
$150 million. As a result of the AWP systems, the wastewater
that we discharge into the ocean is purified to a standard that
exceeds leading municipal, Federal, and international
standards.
With regard to air emissions, Royal Caribbean began working
with manufacturers several years ago to develop advanced
emissions purification, or AEP, systems to clean or scrub the
sulfur from fuel emissions before they are emitted from the
ship. While we have had some success with the two scrubbers in
which we have invested, we are now pleased to be expanding this
research project to additional vendors and to additional ships
within our fleet, including Grandeur of the Seas.
A new initiative, which I'm sure we'll be discussing today,
is the decision of Royal Caribbean, together with our industry
colleagues from Carnival and Norwegian, to post on our websites
a compilation of allegations of crime that occur onboard our
ships around the world on all itineraries by all guests and
crew.
In 2010, Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Security and
Safety Act, or CVSSA, which required the U.S. Coast Guard to
maintain a public website disclosing the allegations of crime
onboard U.S.-based cruises, provided those allegations were the
subject of a closed FBI investigation. As this committee is
aware, there are those who have taken issue with this
limitation. So, in the spirit of transparency, the three
largest cruise companies, making up over 85 percent of the
cruise industry, have voluntarily agreed to expand that
reporting by posting all allegations in each of the CVSSA
categories on our websites, regardless of whether an
investigation was opened or closed. We will have this reporting
posted on our websites by August 1, and it will date back to
the last quarter of 2010, when the CVSSA was passed.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, there was a recent fire onboard
Royal Caribbean's Grandeur of the Seas. Grandeur of the Seas
set sail from Baltimore, Maryland, on Friday, May 24, for a 7-
night Bahamas cruise. Unfortunately, just before 3 o'clock in
the morning on Monday, May 27, the ship experienced a fire,
requiring us to cancel the remainder of the cruise as well as
six subsequent sailings. The cause of that fire remains under
investigation.
This incident was the first to occur subsequent to the
cruise industry's adoption of a Passenger Bill of Rights. As I
believe the Committee knows, your colleague, Senator Charles
Schumer, recommended that the industry adopt a 6-point Bill of
Rights to protect those guests whose vacations are disrupted by
mechanical issues on a cruise ship. Our industry trade
association, CLIA, welcomed this recommendation, expanded the
Bill of Rights to 10 points, and its member cruise lines
adopted it within a number of weeks.
In the wake of the fire aboard Grandeur of the Seas, Royal
Caribbean exceeded our obligations under that Bill of Rights,
in terms of both compensating and accommodating our guests.
While compensating our guests for the stress and
inconvenience caused by such a serious incident is important,
clearly our immediate onboard response is of far greater
importance. First and foremost, we must address and
successfully resolve any immediate threat, such as the fire
itself. As required by international regulations, our crew
members conduct extensive training and drills to address
emergency situations, and are well prepared to act quickly and
decisively in the event of a real emergency. Once the threat is
eliminated, crew members can and should ensure the comfort of
the guests. In the case of Grandeur, fortunately, none of the
guests or crew members were seriously injured, and the ship
never lost power.
In addition to the emergency response drills and
predeparture muster drill, each ship in our fleet is equipped
with emergency backup systems that activate in the event there
is an interruption in the main power systems. Each ship in our
fleet is equipped with multiple high-capacity pumps that are
capable of removing large amounts of water that may enter the
ship. Each ship in our fleet has two or more propellers, each
operated by a separate propulsion motor. Each ship in our fleet
has three or more generators, and each generator has its own
separate power cable.
At Royal Caribbean, we recognize that there is no such
thing as perfect safety. But, there is perfect commitment to
safety, and that is our goal every minute of every day.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the
Committee this afternoon, and look forward to working with you
and your staff, now and in the future. I'm happy to respond to
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Adam M. Goldstein, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Royal Caribbean International
Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune and Members of the
Committee. My name is Adam Goldstein and I am President and Chief
Executive Officer of Royal Caribbean International which operates 21
cruise ships around the world with four new ships on order.
Royal Caribbean International is one of six brands owned by Royal
Caribbean Cruises Ltd., (``Royal Caribbean'') the world's second
largest cruise company. Our company operates a total of 41 ships
globally. Last year, our brands carried nearly 5 million guests,
visiting approximately 425 different destinations throughout the world.
Approximately 50 percent of our worldwide revenue is currently
generated by cruises in and out of the United States--down from 76
percent in 2006. We believe that this trend will continue as rapidly
growing foreign markets offer significant growth and profitability.
Last week, members of this Committee's staff visited one of our
ships, Grandeur of the Seas, while she was docked in Baltimore,
Maryland. The staff toured the engine rooms, the bridge, the medical
facility, and observed firsthand some of the important safety features
such as back-up power generation and fire suppression systems. At the
Committee's request, the U.S. Coast Guard also participated in the ship
tour and explained its role in inspecting cruise ships to further
ensure the safety of all guests and crew.
The Committee staff were also briefed on our extensive
environmental programs and observed our Advanced Wastewater
Purification, or AWP, system. Royal Caribbean has invested over $150
million in our AWP systems. As a result, the wastewater that we
discharge into the ocean is purified to a standard that exceeds leading
municipal, Federal and international standards.
With regard to air emissions, Royal Caribbean began working with
manufacturers several years ago to develop Advanced Emissions
Purification, or AEP, systems to clean or ``scrub'' the sulfur from
fuel emissions before they are emitted from the ship. While we have had
some success with the two scrubbers in which we have invested, we are
now pleased to be expanding this research project to additional vendors
and to additional ships within our fleet, including Grandeur of the
Seas.
With the extraordinary support and cooperation of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Coast Guard, as
well as the Canadian Government, Royal Caribbean has been able to
develop an approach designed to benefit the broader maritime industry.
We anticipate that successful development of this AEP technology will
allow marine engines to achieve sulfur reductions below that required
by regulatory standards.
Mr. Chairman, the cruise industry has been at the forefront of not
only maritime wastewater treatment and emissions reduction technology,
but other environmentally responsible initiatives. Royal Caribbean, and
the cruise industry as a whole, has adopted practices and procedures
that are substantially more protective of the environment than are
required by regulation. On our website, we post our annual Stewardship
Report which provides the public with updates on our performance in
nine key areas of stewardship, including safety and security, energy
and air emissions, water and wastewater, and medical operations.
Also on our website--and on those of my colleagues from Carnival
and Norwegian--the public will find a compilation of allegations of
crime that occur onboard our ships around the world, on all
itineraries, by all guests and crew. In 2010, Congress passed the
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, or CVSSA, which required the
U.S. Coast Guard to maintain a public website disclosing the
allegations of crime onboard U.S.-based cruises, provided those
allegations were the subject of a closed FBI investigation.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, there are those who have taken issue
with this limitation so, in the spirit of transparency, the three
largest cruise lines--making up over 85 percent of the cruise
industry--voluntarily agreed to expand that reporting by posting all
allegations in each of the CVSSA categories on our websites, regardless
of whether an investigation was opened or closed. We will have this
reporting posted on our websites by August 1st and it will date back to
the last quarter of 2010 when the CVSSA was passed.
We are proud of this initiative and believe that it addresses many
of the concerns raised with the limited public reporting required by
the CVSSA. By providing these statistics, as well as the land-based
rates of crime, consumers will be able to see for themselves that
cruise ships are among the safest venues when compared to any landside
communities or destinations.
At Royal Caribbean, we recognize that there is no such thing as
perfect safety--but there is perfect commitment to safety and that is
our goal every minute of every day. While we are proud of our safety
record and of our high rate of guest satisfaction, we understand that
incidents do happen, such as the recent fire onboard Royal Caribbean
International's Grandeur of the Seas.
Grandeur of the Seas set sail from Baltimore, Maryland on Friday,
May 24 of this year for a 7-night Bahamas cruise. On Sunday morning,
May 26, the ship made its scheduled port call in Port Canaveral,
Florida then set sail again that evening, bound for the Bahamas.
Unfortunately, just before 3 o'clock in the morning on Monday, May 27,
the ship experienced a fire, requiring us to cancel the remainder of
the cruise as well as six subsequent sailings. The cause of the fire
remains under investigation.
This incident was the first to occur subsequent to the cruise
industry's adoption of a ``Passenger Bill of Rights.'' As the Committee
may know, your colleague Senator Charles Schumer recommended that the
industry adopt a 6-point Bill of Rights to protect those guests whose
vacations are disrupted by mechanical issues on a cruise ship. Our
industry trade association, the Cruise Lines International Association,
or CLIA, welcomed this recommendation, expanded the Bill of Rights to
10-points, and its member cruise lines adopted it within weeks. In the
wake of the fire onboard Grandeur of the Seas, Royal Caribbean exceeded
our obligations under the Bill of Rights in terms of compensating and
accommodating our guests.
While compensating our guests for the stress and inconvenience
caused by such an incident is important, clearly, our immediate onboard
response is of far greater importance. First and foremost, we must
address and successfully resolve any immediate threat such as a fire.
As required by international regulations, our crew members conduct
extensive training and drills to address emergency situations and are
well-prepared to act quickly and decisively in the event of a real
emergency. Once the threat is eliminated, crew members can and should
ensure the comfort of the guests. In the case of Grandeur, none of the
guests or crew members were seriously injured and the ship never lost
power. While I am certain the fire caused stress and fear among guests,
I am pleased that many guests took the time to write to Royal Caribbean
to commend the crew's response to both the fire and the comfort and
care of the guests.
In addition to the emergency response drills and the pre-departure
muster drill, each ship in our fleet is equipped with emergency backup
systems that activate in the event there is an interruption in the main
power systems. Each ship in our fleet is equipped with multiple high
capacity pumps that are capable of removing large amounts of water that
may enter the ship. Each ship in our fleet has two or more propellers,
each operated by a separate propulsion motor. Each ship in our fleet
has three or more generators and each generator has its own separate
power cable.
I believe it is important to note that, in addition to what our
individual companies are doing, many of these ``best practices'' have
been set forth by the industry's trade association, CLIA, for adoption
by its diverse and global membership. As the second largest cruise
company, Royal Caribbean plays a significant role in CLIA and I would
like to briefly advise the Committee of recent developments at CLIA.
CLIA represents the interests of 26 cruise lines, as well as 16,000
travel agencies, and hundreds of port authorities, destinations, and
various industry business partners. Over the course of the past year,
CLIA has successfully globalized its membership so that the policies
developed for its members operating in North America will extend to
CLIA members operating worldwide. CLIA now provides the single platform
for a unified approach to industry policy and advocacy with
representation in North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and
Australia. Prior to December 2012, nine separate trade associations
represented the global cruise industry.
As a result of CLIA's aggressive efforts, our industry around the
world is more focused on higher standards of safety and security than
ever before. Last year, CLIA directed an industry-wide Operational
Safety Review, a comprehensive assessment of the critical human factors
and operational aspects of maritime safety. As a result of that review,
the global cruise industry introduced ten new safety policies--each of
which exceeded current international regulatory requirements upon their
announcement and each of which have now been included in formal
standards for Passenger Ship Safety promulgated by the International
Maritime Organization, or IMO.
For example, passenger ships were required to conduct muster drills
within 24 hours of guests embarking on a ship; CLIA identified as a
`best practice' conducting the muster drills prior to departure from
port. CLIA's membership adopted this as a formal policy and IMO has now
adopted it as an international regulation.
Royal Caribbean is proud to play a leadership role in CLIA and has
been supportive of its relentless efforts towards continuous
improvement for the global industry. CLIA's commitment to Safety,
Security, Environmental Stewardship, Medical Care, and Public Heath
makes for a stronger, more consistent and more unified cruise industry
in these critical areas of our operations. I am sure my colleagues from
Carnival and from other member cruise lines will join me in saying that
we are proud of all that CLIA has accomplished and we will continue to
support its efforts to develop global policies, to address
international issues, and to provide strategic communications for its
worldwide audience.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee this
afternoon and look forward to working with you and your staff in the
future.
I am happy to respond to any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I'll start off. And this would be to the Coast Guard
Admiral Servidio.
The Carnival Triumph is now a household name--probably
doesn't welcome that--and not in a good way. The ship became
famous in February, when it drifted for 4 days in the Gulf of
Mexico after an engine knocked out the ship's power and
propulsion. Four months later, the Coast Guard boarded the
Triumph, in Galveston, Texas, to conduct a safety inspection,
and found a number of problems. As a result, the Coast Guard
detained the Triumph in port and prohibited passengers from
boarding the ship.
Admiral, the Coast Guard only uses its, quote, ``detention
authority'' in serious cases. Can you please explain why the
Coast Guard detained the Triumph in Galveston last month?
Admiral Servidio. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
We inspected the vessel. We look at the firefighting
systems, we look at the lifesaving systems, and we examine the
drills. Onboard the Triumph, there were problems with the
drills, specifically with regard to the lifeboats, sir, and we
also found problems with the fire detection system. Basically,
just like you have in your house, there are fire detectors
around the vessel. In some segments of the vessel, there were a
number of the fire detectors that weren't working the way they
should have been working. And there were also some problems
with the fire sprinkler system in certain parts of the vessel.
Again, it's the sprinkler system that's designed, if there is a
fire, to automatically activate to put out that fire. Those are
significant problems. And, as such, we detained the vessel
until they were rectified. And they were rectified the next
day, sir.
The Chairman. And you found, as I understand it, 28
deficiencies.
Admiral Servidio. Yes, sir. The--there were a number of
minor deficiencies, but those were the substantial
deficiencies, sir, that caused us to take the actions to not
allow the vessel to embark passengers until they were
corrected.
The Chairman. Understood.
Mr. Cahill, after the Carnival Splendor engine room fire
left the ship disabled and stranded, in November of 2010, you
told the media that this was, ``a very surprising incident.''
You later said Carnival spent millions of dollars on, quote,
``lessons learned from the Splendor fire.''
After the Carnival Triumph engine-room fire left the ship
disabled and stranded, in February 2013, you told the media
that, ``Something like this is a very rare incident.'' Carnival
also has said that it was spending millions of dollars on ships
in the aftermath of the incident.
And on June 12, 2013, while the Triumph was being detained
by the Coast Guard in Galveston for failing a safety
inspection, Carnival posted a video, claiming that the ship
was--before it had been cleared, that--you said, in the video,
the ship was repaired, enhanced, and back in service.
Mr. Cahill, you've been--you have a speaking role,
yourself, in this video, in which you say that Carnival has
completed it--an operational review of the ship, and that it
was ready to go.
In light of this record, why should the American public now
believe that Carnival has a meaningful commitment to promoting
its ships? It's easy to say things happen infrequently, but,
when they happen, they affect an awful lot of people, and
they're happening, even to the extent that the public knows
about it, more frequently than necessary. How would you answer,
sir?
Mr. Cahill. Mr. Chairman, first off, I take it very
seriously, myself. After the Carnival Splendor fire, we did
form a Safety--a Fire Safety Task Force, and that Fire Safety
Task Force consisted of 15 people who came up with 25
recommendations, at a very significant cost. They were all--I
approved them all, they were all implemented. And, in fact,
they were very helpful in extinguishing the fire on the
Carnival Triumph. The Coast Guard noted that the crew performed
very well in extinguish the fire, containing the fire, and
putting it out quickly.
What happened with respect to the Triumph was that the
cabling that ran over the engine room was damaged, and we lost
propulsion in the main--in the forward engine room. We were
able to put the fire out. No one was injured. In either case,
no one was injured. We were able to fulfill our obligation of
keeping everyone safe.
What we did do, very unfortunately, was, we really,
seriously put our guests in an uncomfortable position. And that
bothers us a great deal. And, as a result of that, we then
performed an operational review. We announced, in--we consulted
with the Coast Guard, actually, before we announced it. We came
out and announced that we were going to invest over $300
million across our fleet, concentrating first that--this
problem, where we lost both engine rooms, which is not supposed
to happen, to rewire the engine rooms so that that would not
happen in the future. We're also investing in additional
auxiliary diesel generators, so, in the rare case you do lose
main propulsion power, we have backup power to provide better
hotel facilities. And then, lastly, we are also investing in an
upgraded fire safety and detection system, a higher-quality,
more--I guess, more advanced technology has come out in recent
years--water mist system.
So, we take our obligations very seriously, Mr. Chairman,
and we are working very hard. We've also just recently
announced that we've formed an External Safety and Reliability
Review Board. There are two former Navy admirals who are on
that board, as well as people who are--one gentleman from the
NTSB and another person who comes with a very significant
airline maintenance background.
So, we take all of these things--we consider them very
important, and we are working to improve.
The Chairman. I'm beyond my time, already, but I was
fascinated by your opening statement. It couldn't have been
more than a minute and a half to 2 minutes, and it had no
content whatsoever. I don't ask you to answer that or pass
judgment on it, but I was kind of stunned. Everybody else was
talking substance, and you were kind of walking away from
things, was my impression.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. I'd like to--oh, sorry--I'd like to direct
this to Admiral Servidio. Could you explain to the Committee
how the Coast Guard coordinates with industry and with
enforcement agencies in other countries to enforce vessel
safety regulations?
Admiral Servidio. Yes, Ranking Member.
Basically, the way the oversight of a foreign-flagged
vessel works is that the crew, the owner, and the operator are
responsible, primarily, for ensuring that the vessel complies
with all the international requirements. That's sort of the
first rung of the safety net.
The next rung is the flag state, which is the flag that the
vessel flies, be it Bahamas, Panama, Malta. And the flag state
has a requirement to ensure that, again, vessels that fly their
flag comply with this.
The next rung in that safety net is the class societies,
who perform an oversight function, for insurance purposes.
And the last rung is the Coast Guard, which does port state
control, sir. So, when a foreign-flagged vessel comes to the
U.S., we enforce both U.S. laws and the international laws on
that vessel.
So, that's the way--there's an international set of
requirements. Each flag has their own set of requirements, sir.
Class society has rules that also need to be implemented. And
then, here in the U.S., sir, when the vessel comes in, if it's
foreign-flagged, we conduct oversight to ensure the vessel is
in compliance.
Senator Thune. So, just to be specific on that, it's
accurate to say that, even if a vessel is foreign-flagged, it
is responsible for complying with all relevant U.S. safety
standards.
Admiral Servidio. Yes, sir. The vessel is required to
comply with the international standards; and, likewise, they're
required to comply with the U.S. standards that are in addition
on cruise ships that we have, sir.
Senator Thune. OK.
Mr. Cahill, as you know, the Coast Guard, last week, issued
its final report on the 2010 Carnival Splendor incident
involving the engine fire and the complete loss of power.
You've talked about some of the steps that Carnival is taking--
it sounds like, sort of, proactively--to correspond with some
of the recommendations made in that report. I'm wondering if
there are recommendations that were made that Carnival
disagrees with.
Mr. Cahill. In thinking, no--no, Senator, I think we agree
with their recommendations. Most of the recommendations that
the Coast Guard came up with, we had already implemented. We
had our own fire safety experts who came in. We had four or
five independent experts that we hired who worked at the same
time as the Coast Guard. They primarily noticed the same
things. We went right ahead and implemented them. So----
And, basically, as I mentioned before, those things were
very helpful. They were effective in putting out the fire on
the Carnival Triumph.
Senator Thune. Mr. Rosenker, you serve on CLIA's Panel of
Experts that makes safety recommendations to the cruise ship
industry. Can you tell me what major recommendations you've
made recently, and what the reaction has been of the cruise
lines to those recommendations?
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
We took a look, after the operational safety review that
was going on, at a number of recommendations that we believe
would go a long way to raise the bar of safety within this
industry. And what we did was make these recommendations back
to the industry; and they questioned a few of them, but
immediately said, ``This is the right thing to do.'' And I
found, having had experience in making recommendations to
industries beyond the cruise industry--the rail, aviation,
highway, pipeline--that, many times when I made
recommendations, it took a while for those industries either to
act or to finally implement what we had asked. This one was
done very quickly.
The 10 policies, which I submitted in my testimony,
ultimately were put forth to the IMO, and they, too, had been
accepted for implementation.
So, I was--and along with my colleagues at the Independent
Panel of Experts--we were impressed with the expeditious manner
in which the industry accepted our advice and adopted the
policies.
Senator Thune. We have other members who want to ask
questions, Mr. Chairman, so I'd--my time's expired, so I'll
pass and allow them to do so. Thanks.
The Chairman. Well, you gave them an extra second.
Senator Schatz.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member.
I have a question for the Admiral.
First of all, thank you, Admiral, for appearing before the
Committee. And let me say how grateful we all are, to you and
your colleagues in the United States Coast Guard, for your
service and providing a first-responder service to ensure that
Americans at sea enjoy the same level of safety and security
that they do on land.
As we've heard today and in previous hearings, the Coast
Guard plays a critical role in the safety and security of
cruise ship passengers, from ensuring that cruise ships make--
that make a port of call in the United States are in compliance
with safety and environmental regulations to responding to
accidents at sea. And I know you have 11 statutory missions,
and you're having to balance, as all Federal agencies are, all
of those missions under the constraints of the sequester.
So, my question is, Can you speak to the resource
constraints that you have, in terms of your emergency response
capability and also your inspection regime?
Admiral Servidio. Thank you, Mr.--thank you, Senator.
We believe--we conduct our marine safety missions, risk-
based; so, we put the most resources we have to those vessels
that pose the greatest risk. We do believe we have the
resources, at present, that we need to continue to conduct our
oversight of what other flags are doing, what the class
societies are doing, as part of our port state control, as well
as with our U.S. vessels.
Senator Schatz. Could you just divide your answer to the
emergency response side, as well as the, sort of, inspection
regime? You believe that you have the resources on, sort of,
both sides of that equation?
Admiral Servidio. Well, sir, I think the Commandant has
gone on record as saying there is great concern with the age
and the numbers of some of our fleet. So, I obviously agree
with everything our Commandant has said, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Schatz. Of course you do.
I have a question for Mr. Goldstein.
We've heard, today, about the so-called Passengers Bill of
Rights. I think it's an important first step. But, bills of
rights are generally enforceable and there is an accountability
mechanism. So, I'm wondering if you could articulate what kinds
of metrics you're going to be putting forward to hold
yourselves accountable to consumers and to the Committee, to
the Coast Guard, to all of the various constituencies to which
you are responsible. I think it's an important first step, to
articulate what you want to accomplish on behalf of passengers,
but we sort of need to know how you're going to measure your
success and hold ourselves accountable, collectively.
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Senator.
The first thing I would say, because the question was
raised about this earlier on in the comments, to the extent
that there was a question as to, ``What is the relationship
between the passenger ticket contract and the Passenger Bill of
Rights?''--we would not, as an industry, have agreed to issue
the Passenger Bill of Rights if we didn't expect that it would
apply in all the relevant situations that the 10 points call
for.
We wanted to be fast in getting it out, and we didn't want
to wait until however many cruise lines who choose to do this
would go through whatever process they might need to go through
to harmonize the passenger ticket contract with the Bill of
Rights.
I am aware that, for at least a good number of cruise
lines, they're now in the process of trying to eliminate any
perceived inconsistencies.
The point is that it's supposed to apply. It creates a
contractual right, between the customers and the cruise lines,
on which they can take legal action if they feel they've been
denied any of those rights.
Senator Schatz. And, in plain language, and up front, in a
sufficiently large font, in a----
Mr. Goldstein. In----
Senator Schatz. No, it's a serious question, because----
Mr. Goldstein. Yes. In whatever font is required for the
purpose. And in the case of all 26 cruise lines, on their
websites, adjacent to the passenger ticket contract so that the
two are there, side by side, to be viewed, the 10 rights are
stated publicly at all times.
And it's a good question about the metrics. This is very
new. The main metric, I would say, is, Do the passengers
actually have the right, and are they able to exercise the
right, to take action? Are they actually able to receive the
refunds that are meant to be automatically due to them under
the Passenger Bill of Rights? Whereas, in the past, they would
have only had the remedy of suing under the passenger ticket
contract provisions. Are these things actually happening? Is
there real relief involved as different incidents occur?
As I mentioned, with respect to Grandeur of the Seas and
the fire there, our goal was to go far enough beyond all of the
relevant provisions of the Passenger Bill of Rights so that
nobody would seek action.
Senator Schatz. Mr. Cahill, anything to add? Mr. Cahill?
Mr. Cahill. Yes, Senator?
Senator Schatz. Do you have anything to add? I have 9
seconds.
[Laughter.]
Senator Schatz. If not, I'll yield back.
Thank you very much.
Dr. Klein. May I make a comment to what he just said?
The Chairman. Mr. Begich is not yet seated.
I'm sorry?
Dr. Klein. May I make a comment in relation to the last
question?
The Chairman. Of course.
Dr. Klein. Just--I'll just make it very brief. I mean, I
guess, in my written testimony, I go in detail with regard to
either inconsistencies or problems, and I'm not going to take
the time to do that, since you can read it. But, I do want to
point out two things:
The Bill of Rights says there's a right to a refund. The
practice of the industry is, those refunds are onboard credits.
I don't think an onboard credit is a refund. It doesn't say how
refunds are--onboard credits are computed. There's no way in
which that can be audited.
Finally, the Passenger Bill of Rights is--states, is that
it's obligatory on all members of CLIA, and if they don't do
it, it's--they can't be members of CLIA. When I went through
websites last week, preparing my testimony--I went to 26 cruise
lines' websites--I found that 13 of them do not have obviously
displayed anywhere on their website the Passenger of Rights. I
could not find it. So, 50 percent of the members of CLIA are
out of compliance in the Bill of Rights, which is obligatory
for membership in the association.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Begich.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
apologize, I had to leave here for about a half hour. I was
chairing a meeting upstairs with veterans folks.
Let me--I want to follow that up to the industry folks, and
maybe Mr. Goldstein, or whoever would like to answer this.
What is the follow-up for members to ensure that they are
adhering to the Bill of Rights? What--how do you process that?
I don't know who would like to answer that, but----
Either one.
Mr. Goldstein. I'm sorry, Senator. By ``members''----
Senator Begich. CLIA's members.
Mr. Goldstein. OK.
Senator Begich. Like, if you didn't----
Mr. Goldstein. Yes.
Senator Begich.--adhere to the Bill of Rights, what--how
does that work?
Mr. Goldstein. Right. So, every CEO of a member line needed
to attest, in writing, to the fact that the Passenger Bill of
Rights was in effect, that it was displayed on all 26 websites.
And it is a condition of membership now. So, if we are found to
be out of compliance with the Passenger Bill of Rights, we
would have to relinquish our membership in the organization.
Senator Begich. Let me--in your--the Bill of Rights you've
put into place in the last 6 months, 8 months--is that a fair
statement? Do you think, in order to really understand its
effectiveness or its use by the different cruise lines--how
much time do you think you need that--is--I mean, you've gone
through it--from Alaska's perspective, you're in a season right
now. But, I know, in Florida, the season starts later. I mean,
everyone has a different season. So, how would you measure your
success--or, when would you be able to measure your success, I
guess is a better way to put it?
Mr. Goldstein. Sure. So, while fully admitting that there
have been more incidents in the cruise industry this year than
any of us would like to have seen, they are rare, as a matter
of historical record, and I would think it would take more
than--it's actually been only 2 months----
Senator Begich. Two months.
Mr. Goldstein.--almost to the day----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Goldstein.--since the Passenger Bill of Rights went
into effect. So, it will take--I don't know; I'm making up a
number--1 or 2 years, probably, to see exactly what that means,
in practice.
Senator Begich. OK.
Mr. Goldstein. And, hopefully, it will show that the
passengers are well protected.
Senator Begich. How many--just so I know. From Alaska's
perspective, we had 3.5-or-so-million passenger visits.
Approximately 65 percent of our port-of-call cruise passengers
visit U.S. ports. Direct expenditure, in our economy, is about
a billion dollars and 22,000-plus employees. So, a lot of
impact to our state. You know, not like--maybe Hawaii, to a
certain extent, but--not, clearly, like Florida, but, you know,
a lot.
And tell me, in the overall industry of U.S. port touch,
how many visits does the industry have--or, how many
passengers, over a year, would they have? How big is it? And
either one could answer this. I'm----
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, I'll just start. With the worldwide
industry, there will be about 21 million cruises taken this
year. North Americans will take approximately 11- or 12
million. The great majority of those, plus some taken by
others, will occur in and out of U.S. ports. So, the number of
cruises being taken in or out of the U.S. is somewhere in the
10- to 12-million-person range.
Senator Begich. OK.
And, Mr. Chairman, I was quickly trying to grab the report
and look through it. Like you, I'm having to my put glasses on,
because I'm looking at the data points. But, I'm----
If I read this right--this is the FBI report, and it
talks--January 1, 2011, through December 31, 2011, Cruise Line
Incident Reporting Statistics Incidents Report; it includes
``Other,'' which some industry folks don't have to report it,
but they do--a lot of them do. The number is 655.
And I guess--and I don't know what the total incident
numbers are, because there's, like, three or four different
charts in there, so I didn't have time to go through it, but
let me just put that aside for a second.
We don't--and I'm sure you are of the same view--``no
incidents'' is great. Right? That's the goal. Right? Is that a
fair statement?
Mr. Goldstein. That would be a fair statement.
Senator Begich. In proportional to other industries, when I
look at the millions of passengers and the incidents, then,
compared to it--and ``no incident'' is a good incident--I mean,
we don't want any incidences--but, in comparison, it's a small
number. Am I missing that? And again, I know there are lots of
other data points in here. I'm just quickly grabbing what I was
able to pull out of this report, here. I don't know if you've
seen the report at all.
Mr. Goldstein. We haven't had a lot of time, but the
Chairman wrote letters to three cruise lines, about two and a
half months ago. We answered in late May and provided a good
amount of data, as I'm sure the other two cruise companies did,
as well. As we move forward and as we begin to report out, as
of August 1 on our website, all allegations of crime,
irrespective of whether----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Goldstein.--cases have been opened or closed or some of
the issues that have been prevalent up until now, we will be
able to compare to the uniform crime reporting that applies
nationally in the country----
Senator Begich. For the FBI crime reporting statistics----
Mr. Goldstein. Right.
Senator Begich. Yup.
Mr. Goldstein.--there will be, for the first time, the
ability to compare, on an apples-to-apples basis, what the
crime rates are for the principal CVSSA categories to what
happens on land. And we are very confident that the comparative
will be beneficial for the cruise industry, because crime is
relatively rare on our ships.
Senator Begich. Very good.
I know my time's up, but I--just a quick answer from either
one of you on regards to--I know, in Alaska, you guys are
called on, off and on, by the Coast Guard to assist in
situations. Is that just an Alaska incident type of situation,
or--maybe both of you could respond to that.
Mr. Cahill. Thanks, Senator.
It's a time-honored tradition that, in the maritime
industry, we all respond to help another vessel that's in need.
And the Coast Guard will often call on us in the--since March,
the Coast Guard called on Carnival ships at least three times
to assist in distressed vessels. Two times, they were
relatively small vessels, and the people--we actually took the
people onboard our ships--that is, to assist the Coast Guard.
And then, the last time was to assist--to stand by for another
cruise ship that was in distress. So, we do appreciate Coast
Guard helping so much, and we try to return the same thing.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
I'll end there with--I don't know if we'll have a second
round, but I thank the Chairman for the opportunity.
Dr. Klein. If we can--if I can offer just a couple of quick
comments.
I think one is that, in comparing the Cruise Vessel
Security and Safety Act, when it was initially proposed and
what was passed, there were two crime categories that were
dropped off. And I think it's dangerous for them to be left
off. That is: simple assaults and thefts below $10,000. As
Judge Thomas Dickerson, in New York, said--suggested in what--
in a lecture he gave to a seminar of judges, that he felt the
issue of thefts, dropping those off, was a serious problem,
because it basically gives permission for those kinds of crimes
to go on.
I think the other issue--and I'm not too sure what the--
what's going to be reported, but--I don't want to get into
rates. What I'd like to identify is----
Senator Begich. Can I--I hate to interrupt you, and I----
Dr. Klein. That's OK.
Senator Begich.--my time is expired, but--you're saying,
because it's not reported, that then says to everyone, ``Go and
commit crimes under $10,000''?
Dr. Klein. Well, the understanding that I have is, a crime
of value of less than $10,000 is known that it will not be
prosecuted, and it doesn't get reported. That--you know, and
I'm not too sure how they're handled, but it doesn't go to the
FBI. So, you know, the--I guess it's handled internally, if
it's handled.
Senator Begich. I don't know if the industry folks want to
respond----
Dr. Klein. Yes. Let me just make my other one comment. And
that is, the data we--last comprehensive data we have was--
through a Freedom of Information Request, was dated for 2007-
2008. And what that data demonstrated, which is similar to data
from discovery in legal cases between 2003 and 2005--this is in
an appendix in my testimony--found that close to 18 percent of
the victims of sexual assault on cruise ships are children.
I don't want to get tied up in debates. I don't want to get
tied up into the incidents. My concern is that, when people--
when families bring their children on a cruise, and they're
told that it's a safe vacation, I think any number of children
who are being victimized is unacceptable.
We have two children, an 11-year-old girl and a 12-year-old
girl, both of whom were--one was molested--or, one was sexually
assaulted, the other was groped on cruise ships within the past
4 to 6 weeks. To me, I don't care about the total numbers, I
care about that those young children are going to live with
that for the rest of their lives.
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Senator.
With respect to the latter comment, obviously none of us
accept anything of that sort, and we all want to work together
to prevent any allegations or crimes of that nature from taking
place.
With regard to crime reporting, since 1996 it has been a
legal requirement for us in the United States to report all
felonies. That remains in place, irrespective of the CVSSA
categories or what have you. So, we report thefts, for example,
of $1,000 or more, which are felonies, to the FBI. It doesn't
matter that the CVSSA did not address that. So, in terms of
categories of crime, we report much more to the FBI than the
CVSSA required of us.
Also, the CVSSA is written with respect to ships going in
and out of the United States. On our websites, as of August 1,
we will report all allegations of crime, wherever they may
occur on any of our ships anywhere in the world, and to any
citizen of any country, not restricted to U.S.
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.
The Chairman. Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you for this hearing,
Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to the members of the panel who are here today.
All of you have an expertise and knowledge in this area that's
very valuable to this committee.
And I want to thank, particularly, Mr. Cahill and Mr.
Goldstein, for being here. I know that this is not one of the
great treats or glamorous occasions of your professional lives,
so----
We have tough questions, which we have an obligation to
ask, in my view, because the information coming to me--I think,
to many of us--is that there is inadequate protection for
travelers on cruise ships. The issues and problems may be more
exceptional than the rule, but my impression is that consumers
and travelers deserve to know better what the rights and
protections are. And, in some cases, with many cruise ship
lines, they are more illusory than real. And that's why I've
become a cosponsor of Senator Rockefeller's bill, the Cruise
Passenger Protection Act, which would address many of these
concerns in the areas of enforceability and disclosure,
transparency, accountability.
For example, Professor Klein mentioned--and I think it's
true--that the Bill of Rights that CLIA has issued are
essentially unenforceable, as a matter of contractual law,
unless I'm mistaken. Correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Cahill and
Mr. Goldstein. Are those guarantees, every one of them, that
you regard as a contractual right of a cruise ship traveler?
Mr. Cahill. Senator, yes, we do. We would never have
published it on our website as a list of passenger rights
unless we intended it to be enforceable. I have been advised by
our counsel that it is, in fact, enforceable. Now we are in the
process of going through and changing our contract so that it
corresponds to the Passenger Bill of Rights. So, we----
Senator Blumenthal. And clearly you would not contest
jurisdiction in any United States District Court, or oppose
provisions that would grant jurisdiction in District Courts of
the passenger's choosing.
Mr. Cahill. I'm not a lawyer, Senator, but we would not
contest the Bill of Rights. In fact, for all----
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I'm asking about the forum where
it's enforced, because a right without a forum, without a
court, without an enforcer, is illusory. So, they're not--you--
I would be more than happy to give you the benefit of
consulting with your attorney before you ask. I'm not trying to
put you on the spot, here. But, may I simply suggest--and you
can answer at greater length in writing--that you can do
consumers and travelers a great service by allowing them to
take action as a matter of contract against you in the forum of
their choosing. Would you agree to do so?
Mr. Cahill. I think it's pretty normal practice for a
company to specify the forum on which it can be sued. In our
case, it's Miami courts.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, it may be the normal practice in
your industry, but not necessarily in all industries. And----
Let's move on, because I have a number of other points to
make about the reality of these rights. Let's talk, for
example, about CLIA right number 3--talks about medical
attention. In fact, it guarantees--and I'm quoting--``full-time
professional emergency medical attention, as needed, until
shoreside medical care becomes available.'' Do your lines
charge for that medical care? Are passengers charged?
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Senator.
So, in the normal course, yes, there are charges for using
the medical center, depending on what the situation is. And
then there are incidents and accidents, depending on what the
situation is, where we may waive charges.
Senator Blumenthal. You may waive, but there are fees and
charges, which----
Mr. Goldstein. There are normally fees----
Senator Blumenthal.--which are not indicated----
Mr. Goldstein.--and charges--which are normally subjected
to insurance.
Senator Blumenthal. And with respect to your line, Mr.
Cahill?
Mr. Cahill. Senator, it would be the same.
Senator Blumenthal. I might cite from Carnival's ticket
language--and I'm quoting--``Carnival, in arranging for the
services called for by the physician or nurse, does so only as
a convenience for the guest. Guest agrees that Carnival assumes
no responsibility, does not guarantee performance, and in no
event shall be liable for any negligent or intentional acts of
omissions, loss, damage, injury, or delay to guests. Guests use
the services of all independent contractors as the guest's sole
risk.''
My time is rapidly coming to an end, but would you agree
with me that, in effect, your cruise lines are disclaiming any
and all legal responsibility for the quality of care that's
provided?
Mr. Cahill. Senator, we have an obligation to research and
hire qualified physicians. We are not a hospital, but we are
required to make sure that the physicians that we hire are
properly accredited, properly trained. And we do that. So, we
are legally liable to do that.
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Goldstein?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, we are in the same position.
Senator Blumenthal. So, you would not dispute legal
liability for medical malpractice by one of those doctors
performing services during one of your trips.
Mr. Goldstein. My understanding is that--to the point that
Mr. Cahill was just making--if we make a poor choice, if we
choose somebody who is unqualified to provide that medical
service, we are liable and subject to a lawsuit for failure to
do so.
Senator Blumenthal. But, apart from the credentials----
Mr. Goldstein. Apart from the----
Senator Blumenthal.--you would disclaim any responsibility.
Your--the limits----
Mr. Goldstein. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal.--of your acceptance of liability is--if
there--if that person has a diploma or a credential, that's
where your liability ends. Is that correct?
Mr. Goldstein. The appropriate diploma or credential, yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Same with you, Mr. Cahill?
Mr. Cahill. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time has expired. I apologize for running over, and I'll
follow up in second round of inquiry.
Dr. Klein. One quick----
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Klein. Just want to mention, real quickly, that the--
this issue of liability was handled both by the Florida State
Supreme Court and by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was the case
Carnival Corporation versus Darce Carlisle. And that would have
been in 2007. The legal opinion in that case with the--which
the cruise industry argued for and was able to get--was that
they are not liable for the behavior of a physician conducting
malpractice on one of their cruise ships.
The Chairman. I'll absorb that as best as I can.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Did you want me to make a speech welcoming
you once again to the Committee?
[Laughter.]
Senator Markey. I feel welcomed. And I'm glad that you've
introduced legislation in this area. And I would like to, as
one of the first things I do, is to ask to be added as a
cosponsor to your legislation. So----
The Chairman. With pleasure.
Senator Markey. And I thank you. This hearing has been
highly illuminating.
May I ask you, Admiral Servidio--I know there has been some
reference to this accident off the coast of Louisiana, and
there is, right now, from the Coast Guard, an update saying
that there is significant risk of losing the blowout preventer.
Could you tell us what are the consequences of losing the
blowout preventer in a situation like this? What would the
impact be upon the Gulf of Mexico?
Admiral Servidio. Thank you, Senator.
From what I understand, the Hercules 265, which is the--an
oil rig that was drilling--I believe it's about 40 miles off
the Louisiana coast--suffered a well kickback; and, as such,
gas came up, and there was an explosion last night. And, as a
result of that explosion and the fire, the cantilever, which is
pretty much the derrick--the floor of--on which the derrick was
drilling, has collapsed. And, with that--I understand that the
crew was interviewed before they evacuated; everyone evacuated
safely from the mobile offshore drilling unit--that they said
they actuated the blowout preventer, but, for whatever reason,
it seems like it did not work. I don't know, at this point in
time, sir, on why that might have happened or whether the rams
actually, which are, basically, two hydraulic presses that
squeeze together--I don't know whether they actually actuated
or whether they didn't, sir.
If there is no blowout preventer, then there might be a
number of options that I know the Unified Command is looking
at. I don't know whether capping, in a capping stack, would be
a potential. The--due to the sand that might be in the
formation, it might plug itself. There are a number of
different things that could happen, sir. We're working with
BSEE, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and
the Unified Command is looking at what those potential options
are and what might be. I can't----
Senator Markey. Is there----
Admiral Servidio.--speculate, sir.
Senator Markey. Is there a chance that the rig could sink
if they cannot get close enough to fight the fire?
Admiral Servidio. There is a chance, sir, that, if the--if
we can't fight the fire and it continues to burn, that there
will be metal fatigue, and that will infect the vessel, sir.
Senator Markey. And what would that mean for the Coast
Guard or for the industry, in terms of capping the well, if the
rig actually sank?
Admiral Servidio. Again, sir, I don't know specifically on
what that would do. I think a lot would depend upon what
happens with the rig and how it would end up--if it does have a
failure, how it would end up failing. And I don't know the
pressures of the formation or anything else, sir, so I really
can't speculate, Senator.
Senator Markey. But, it could take upwards of 20 or 25 days
to have a relief well that is actually drilled, if this rig
sinks, if there is an inability to deal with it.
Admiral Servidio. Senator, I believe both the Coast Guard
and BSEE issued, or are issuing, a joint order to start the
process of drilling a relief well. I'm not sure whether there
are other contingencies, but I think they're starting to get
that process in place, should that happen.
Senator Markey. Yes. You know, there was another event like
this, just 2 weeks ago, where there was a loss of well control.
And this is just a second incident in 2 weeks. So, again, it's
just something that we have to learn, that when we don't put in
the proper policies that ensure that these events are
preventable, that they become inevitable, and they recur. And
we're seeing it, now, twice in just 2 weeks.
Admiral Servidio. As you're aware, Senator, the Coast Guard
has responsibility for the safety systems onboard that mobile
drilling unit. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement looks at the drilling systems, the BOP and other
types.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Admiral Servidio. But, we share. We work together.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Thank you, sir. Thank you for
your service, and thank you for the Coast Guard's work in this
instance.
Mr. Chairman, for the past three Congresses, I have
actually introduced the Travelers International Bill of Rights
in the House of Representatives. And this relates to a similar,
but not identical, issue, here, that we're talking about, which
is a consumer who purchases international vacation travel
online. My bill would require travel website operators to
prominently post information regarding the health and safety
conditions at overseas travel destinations, such as the
availability of lifeguards, medical personnel, as well as
information from the Department of State on crime statistics
and travel warnings related to their destination. So, this
would actually relate to passengers on ships that disembark
when they go into these vacation destinations.
So, I'll tell you why. Maureen Webster, she was a
constituent of mine in Woburn, Massachusetts--she educated me
about the potentially deadly consequences that can result from
lower safety standards and medical response capabilities at
some overseas travel destinations. Her son, Nolan, died at a
resort in Mexico, when he did not receive the medical treatment
that may have been able to safe his life.
So, I'm planning on introducing that legislation in the
Senate, as well, because, by having easy access to health and
safety information, Americans can actually make more informed
decisions about where to travel and where to stay when they are
overseas.
We've recently heard a number of serious incidents that
compromised the safety of cruise ship passengers, including
serious mechanical failures that left thousands of passengers
stranded for days, navigational mistakes that led to passenger
deaths, et cetera, violent crimes that were committed onboard.
But, the same thing happens when passengers disembark in
individual countries. And that information, in my opinion, as
well, should be made available.
So, Dr. Klein, what do you think about that, in terms of
that next step in giving protection to consumers?
Dr. Klein. Well, I very much agree with what you're saying
and the need for that for international travelers, but also for
cruise passengers. For example, there are cases--I mean, not
frequent, but there are enough--of people going on shore
excursions and being robbed, or going on shore excursions and
dying. In my testimony, I give a list of the number of deaths
onshore for people who have taken a cruise.
And I think, as long as your legislation would extend to
including what happens ashore to cruise passengers, not just
people who have flown to stay in that location, I think it
would be a wonderful and a very positive move.
Senator Markey. Mr. Cahill, what would you think about
that--giving that information to passengers on cruise ships or
to anyone just going into a country, flying in, as well?
Mr. Cahill. Senator, we actually try to do that now when we
have concerns about a particular area. We have a security
group. We review ports before we go. We have actually canceled
calls in a number of ports--we've stopped going to ports--when
we've had concerns about it. But, our security team reviews
for--is there potential with terrorism in that particular part
of the world? We look to see, Is there civil unrest? If there's
civil unrest, we're probably going to pass on that port.
But, we also look at local crime. We work with local
authorities. And we will give notices to our guests. I mean, to
some extent, it's common sense, just like when I'm home, there
are certain parts of town you may not want to go to at night.
We will tell the same things to our guests there. So, we try
and do that, today, Senator.
Senator Markey. But, would you support requirements that
travel website operators who sell cruise vacations must
prominently post this information for consumers shopping for a
cruise so that they can understand what the dangers, what the
health conditions might be in these individual ports? Would you
support that being posted, as well, on the websites of the
travel----
Mr. Cahill. I think I have to look at it, first, Senator.
Senator Markey. Mr. Goldstein, what would you think about
that?
Mr. Goldstein. That sounds like something that the industry
would be definitely open to dialogue about. We want our guests
to be informed. Both our companies and, I think, other cruise
companies have very experienced people. In our case, our head
of Security, Safety and Environment was a very senior long-term
ranking official at the FBI. I believe Carnival's person had a
long and distinguished career at the Coast Guard.
So, we are constantly evaluating. And it seems like an
eminently sensible idea. But, I just want to stress that things
change all the time. So, for example, with the recent unrest in
Turkey, cruise ships are obviously going in and out of Turkey,
land-stay vacationers are going in and out of Turkey. We're
monitoring that situation literally hour by hour to make sure
that--it is still okay for the ships to go there, and so forth.
So, it's a very important subject for us.
Senator Markey. I appreciate that. But, it turns out that
Maureen Webster, in talking to me about her son, basically
learned, as I learned in helping her, that all of this
information was knowable, that she learned so much about where
her son was going after the fact that, if there had been a
conversation beforehand, might have prevented him ever going
there. So, that was a destination in Mexico, but it could have
been in many other countries in the world. So, I would like to
work with you on that, just so that information is made public.
So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey, thank you very much. That was
a substantial input of 10 minutes and 13 seconds.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. But, of course, very interesting.
Senator Markey. I was playing under American League rules.
I'm over here in the National League. So, I'm just learning the
rules----
[Laughter.]
Senator Markey.--you know, designated hitter, you know----
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman----
Senator Markey.--proxies, all different rules over here.
So, I'm----
[Laughter.]
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr.----
Senator Thune. Having served with the Senator from
Massachusetts in the House, I know there's a real pent-up
demand to talk for long periods of time when you get to the
Senate.
[Laughter.]
Senator Markey. When you move from a 1-minute rule----
[Laughter.]
Senator Markey.--right, it's liberating.
Senator Blumenthal. And maybe in the Grapefruit League.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Let me make a comment and read something
controversial.
My impression of this hearing is that there's a bit of a
Kabuki dance. I mean, my mind is not neutral on this. And I
come from a state where we have a lot of coal mines. And
although it may be very odd to compare coal mines to cruise
ships, the psychology focused within the management of coal
mines and what we're talking about here seems to be somewhat
parallel.
There is danger every day in the coal mines. People
understand that. But, since coal mines, like cruise ships are
located beyond the borders of 3 miles, nobody really knows
what's going on. There's no 911 reporting system. And so, you
have to depend on whatever the rules are of management on that
cruise ship.
In the coal mines, that can be very deadly. When we do have
accidents, they sort of stop the world, at least the coal-
mining part of the world, and parts of the Congress. And
Republicans and Democrats come together, and they pass mine
safety legislation, because there's a shock factor, where, in
fact, there should not have been a shock factor, because the
elements leading up to that were there all the time for those
of us who've dealt with coal mines and miners for years and
years--and coal operators, in particular.
I have a feeling that those who operate here are showing
the good side, emphasizing how infrequent these matters are. I
think I've heard it mentioned a couple of times, of passengers,
but not very much. And I think there are some people who want
to see good done. And that, after all, is the purpose of an
oversight committee. We take that extremely seriously.
So, Mr. Rosenker, I will just highlight in my statement,
yes, you're the former chairman of the National Transportation
Safety Board, and yes, you are also the CLIA-appointed Panel of
Experts--you belong to that. But, you see, that doesn't make
you a free actor. That makes you a part of the system. You can
answer, at the proper time.
Mr. Rosenker. Thank you, Chairman----
The Chairman. I--at the proper time.
Mr. Rosenker. Oh, I'm sorry.
The Chairman. I want to read to you--a predecessor of
yours, Jim Hall, who I've known for 30 years, and who had some
part of, in fact, saving my life, at one point, in Tennessee,
which doesn't bias me toward him, because this is a different
subject. But, this is what he had to say. And I didn't see this
until last night, until--we just got it last night. As you
know, he was head of NTSB from 1994 to 2001. He recently made
some comments about the cruise industry that I will share with
you.
He said that the IMO--in other words, the International
Maritime Organization--and other cruise regulators are ``paper
tigers''--his words--that haven't been able to get, quote,
``bad actors out of the industry.'' He said that the maritime
industry is, quote, ``a culture that has never been broken, as
the aviation industry was''--and you see evidence of that in
the Costa Concordia accident--by which I mean we had a lot of
trouble with getting aviation to take seriously the problems of
the amount of sleep that their pilots got, and the propeller
people, who had to travel over the country and could get hardly
any sleep, as opposed to those who flew international flights
pretty much on automatic control and made a lot more money. And
he even said that, though cruise ships may seem and feel
American, they flag in countries like the Bahamas and operate
outside of reasonable and safety standards.
I think there was a discussion earlier which I felt I
disagreed with, and that is that if it was--that, you know,
safety standards applied, no matter where you were. I think
that's not true. American standards of safety apply within the
3 miles. Outside of that, it's your world, your ball game.
And he said that people who book cruises should be aware of
all of this, operating outside of reasonable safety standards.
And he says that the industry is, and has been, an outlaw
industry. Those are strong words from a moderate Southern
person, who I greatly respect.
Frankly, that introduces the kind of controversy that I
want in this hearing. You, on the one hand; him, on the other
hand. What they say, I expect. What you say, I don't expect,
except as I understand not breaking the culture.
So, what are your comments on Jim Hall's statement?
Mr. Rosenker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I, too, along with you, respect former Chairman Hall.
He was an excellent head of this board that I had the privilege
to chair for 6 and a half years.
Let me put a little perspective in. And I think you will
appreciate this, sir, because of being Chairman of--this
oversight committee goes across all modes of transportation.
When I served and got confirmed by this committee, in March
of 2003, until I left, in August of 2009, 2000--and this is
approximate--210,000 people died on our Nation's highways; 36
million accidents, 18 million injuries. During that same
period, 210 commercial airline accidents and incidents,
resulting in 10 fatal accidents, for 138 fatalities. In the
rail, without including the 180 people that committed suicide
during that six and a half years, 317 people died in
operational fatalities. In that same period, in the cruise ship
area--and this is according to G.P. Wilde, who is the
authoritative statistician that covers this industry--18 people
died, three of which were passengers and 15 were crew.
None of those are acceptable fatalities, but I'm just
asking for a perspective to understand where we need to be
really looking to raise the bar of safety, not just in our
cruise ship area, but clearly in others, as well.
The Chairman. Sir, you do this committee an injustice, and
one which offends me, because we do that--you're unaware of it,
but----
Mr. Rosenker. Oh, no, sir, I'm quite aware of it.
The Chairman.--we do it on a constant basis.
Mr. Rosenker. I do--I know that----
The Chairman. We do not accept----
Mr. Rosenker.--and I applaud the work that you're--been
doing. But----
The Chairman.--in any----
Mr. Rosenker.--I just wanted to put it----
The Chairman.--in any way, shape----
Mr. Rosenker.--in perspective.
The Chairman.--or form----
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
The Chairman.--a comparison between the number of deaths in
one industry, as compared to the number of deaths in another
industry. In that case, the coal industry might look quite
good. That's not my view, generally, of the coal industry. And,
in fact, I even worked it out so that they had to pay--anytime
they had to--an accident of any sort, they had to post it on
the SEC website. And I did the same with--since we do some
cybersecurity, with hacking. That now is law. If you're hacked
into, you have to post it on the website. Now, that's aimed at
the shareholder, not the passenger.
But, I'm--I think I'm--I think we're talking past each
other. I'm not sure what we're accomplishing here. I think it's
helpful, in that it sort of sets up who's on what side of
which, and therefore, ``How can you measure what they say?''
But, it has not been as successful, from my point of view, a
hearing as I would like.
And I will leave it there and turn to Senator Blumenthal.
Dr. Klein. May I make a comment?
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Klein. If I may, just want to make a very quick
comment.
We had a variation of this conversation at the last
hearing, 16 months ago. And I had asserted that I think one of
the problems with the industry is an issue of--they listen to
the insiders, but they don't listen to the outsiders. And
anybody who's not part of the industry who has an opinion is,
basically, ignored, somehow marginalized.
And I recall--to Senator Rockefeller's comment--that the
CEO of CLIA suggested that perhaps CLIA should have a
conversation with me. Now, I don't take this personally. And
the CEO turned to me and says, ``Oh, yes, we will be talking to
him, because he may have some valuable insights.'' That's 16
months ago, and I've received no call. Again, I'm not hurt.
This is--it's not an ego. But, I think it reflects that, ``If
you're not one of us, you have nothing to offer to us that can
help us.''
The Chairman. Point taken.
Actually, Senator Begich----
Senator Blumenthal. I'm--with apologies, Mr. Chairman, I
will have to leave to preside----
Senator Begich. Let him do that, then.
Senator Blumenthal.--but----
The Chairman. Can you put in one final question?
Senator Begich. No, go ahead. I'll follow him. I'll follow
him.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you----
The Chairman. You mean to preside over the Senate? What a
miserable task.
[Laughter.]
Senator Blumenthal. No comment.
[Laughter.]
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein, we were
talking, a little bit earlier, about limits on liability,
limits on where remedies can be enforced--with those limits,
I've looked and read carefully at CLIA, and I don't see any
indication of what those limits on liability are. Wouldn't you
agree?
Mr. Goldstein. I'm sorry, I didn't follow.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, for example, the limits on what
standards are enforced when the guarantee--and it's a
guarantee, in CLIA, that medical care would be provided--
nowhere is there any indication that fees are going to be
charged. That's correct?
Mr. Goldstein. Right. As you noted, the Passenger Bill of
Rights does not comment on that aspect of the requirement to
provide the necessary medical care.
Senator Blumenthal. And there's no indication as to the
limits on what passengers can seek, by way of recourse, if
there's negligence in the provision of medical care. You simply
guarantee that a doctor has a diploma; you don't guarantee the
doctor's going to provide adequate medical care. That's--is
that correct?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes. But, I will note----
Senator Blumenthal. And there's no indication, in CLIA, of
that limitation on your obligation. Is that correct?
Mr. Goldstein. That is correct. But, I--if I may----
Senator Blumenthal. Wouldn't it be clearer if--and more
transparent--if, as to that right--and, by the way, many other
rights--and I'm going to be following, with the Chairman's
permission, with some more detailed questions in writing, not
only about what your lines guarantee, but what others do, as
well, because you may be the leaders in the industry; you may
be the good guys. But, wouldn't it be preferable if more of
those limits, more of the nontransparent restrictions or fees
or charges were provided in CLIA instead of in the fine print
of contractual disclaimers of obligations?
Mr. Goldstein. It may be, Senator. I just would emphasize
two things.
First, we wanted to be able to issue a Passenger Bill of
Rights faster rather than slower. And----
Senator Blumenthal. But, a Passenger Bill of Rights can be
misleading.
Mr. Goldstein. Our intention was----
Senator Blumenthal. To put it very bluntly, it can do more
harm than good.
Mr. Goldstein. It certainly----
Senator Blumenthal. It would seem to a guarantee a right
that, in fact, is illusory.
Mr. Goldstein. OK. I can tell you that we do not believe,
nor does our counsel, who has advised us, believe, that any of
those rights are illusory. We believe that it has gone beyond
the standard ticket contract, over time, in meaningful ways.
And then, the second thing is that we're trying----
Senator Blumenthal. Well, that may be part of the problem,
that the standard ticket contract limits your obligations and
CLIA seems to expand them, but, when the rubber meets the road,
you go back to the contract and insist on what I'm calling
``the fine print'' in the contract, that, in effect, narrowly
constricts and limits the rights of the passenger.
And when I say ``you,'' I'm not necessarily talking about
your line; I'm talking----
Mr. Goldstein. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal.--about ``you,'' other lines, as well.
I'm not here to sort of cross-examine you or put you on the
spot. This is not about your line or Mr. Cahill's; it's really
about the industry.
Mr. Goldstein. No, I understand. I just want to emphasize--
I believe Mr. Cahill noted this, in passing, earlier--for at
least a good number of cruise lines--I can't say for the whole
industry, but for at least a good number of cruise lines right
now--there is a process in place where the ticket contract is
being modified and harmonized to accord with the intent of the
Passenger Bill of Rights so that this potential dilemma doesn't
exist.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, that is a welcome development. I
hope it will be accelerated and enhanced, and enlarged by
proposed legislation like the Chairman's, which Senator Markey
and I have joined, and that the good guys in the industry will
join in educating us as to how the potential abuses can be
reduced, and the whole industry made more transparent and
accountable.
And I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for taking more than 3
minutes, here.
And, to my colleague, Senator Begich, thank you for letting
me have this additional time.
And really appreciate all of you being here.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you.
And, Senator Blumenthal, it's okay, because you get to
preside and I don't have to.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. So, that's a plus.
Let me--you know, I was listening to the Chairman's
comment. And, all due respect, I think it's important to know
the data comparison--I think that's what you were trying to
do--not to question the Committee's--because we have done a lot
on airlines, I'll tell you that. And, you know, we've clamped
down, based on some disasters. But, I'm going to give you a
whole different data point that I want to make sure is part of
the record, and I want to submit this for the record. It's
crime-rate calculations for the three top cruise ship industry
folks which accumulate 90 percent of the traffic, basically.
[The information referred to is retained in Senator
Begich's files.]
Senator Begich. And when you take rates, like assaults with
serious bodily injury, it's 3.8 per 100,000. But, when you
compare it to cities--and I was a mayor, so I can legitimately
say this--it's 27.1 per 100,000. It's nine times worse in a
city.
Now, again, we believe, as a mayor--former mayor--and, I'm
sure, you also--zero is the goal. No one questions that. Am I
correct on that? That is the target. But, when you look at
others--and, you know, the horrendous crime of rape on cruise
ships, so the 90 percent, the three top, is 5.9 per 100,000;
but, when you compare it, again, around 27 percent per--for the
cities. Sexual assaults, 8.7 per 100,000, 97.2 per 100,000 in
cities. I just want to, you know--data is data. We can argue
over data. But, it's data.
But, here, I guess I have a question. Is there any data--
you know, I just took a ferry from the Cape over to Cape Cod--
or, over to Martha's Vineyard. I didn't get any Bill of Rights.
I didn't get a ticket. I got a little piece of stub. It didn't
tell me anything of my rights. And I can guarantee there have
been incidences on ferries--theft, other incidences--crashes,
disabled--I can go through the list. I don't use a lot of them,
because, on the East Coast, they're more apparent, because of
the way they move through the islands. We have some in the--
southeast Alaska, run by the State of Alaska. But, I'm not
familiar with--when I went and paid my $8, that I got some long
explanation of all the issues.
The other thing I'll put on the record, because, I think,
Mr. Chairman, you're right, there is some differences. You
know, I come from a state that understands the cruise ship
industry. We've hammered on you on certain areas around--
especially our environmental. We have folks that--Ocean Rangers
that are on your ships, when you come into our waters, to make
sure you provide the environmental safety standard we require.
We have onshore requirements of waste disposal, for example,
that is very unique to our state.
But, at the same time, there's a balance. For example, I--
you know, Senator Markey, in all due respect, I'd be interested
in his legislation, to look at it, but are we now going to do
hotel packages, airline packages? I can tell you, on limited
liability that Senator Blumenthal brought up, every federally-
funded healthcare clinic has limited liability set up by the
Federal Government so the Federal Government doesn't have to--
responsible for those doctors. It's very interesting that we
have tort reform for us, so we don't get sued--because these
clinics are all out there, and we're not sure--but, they're
contractors, and we assume, because they are diploma'd they've
done internships, and other things, that they have the
experience. I'm assuming that's the same way you do it. I may
be wrong about that. But, I'm assuming you're not just getting
a ``doc in a box'' with a certificate and hope to God they work
out okay. I'm guessing that.
And, you know, honestly, Dr. Klein, your comment that
onshore crime occurs--is somehow the cruise ship's fault--now,
you didn't say that, that exact way, but you implied it. Does
that mean, when I fly to a community that I get mugged or my
money is taken, the airline is at fault? No. Absolutely not.
So, I'm all for--because you all remember last year on the
Coast Guard reauthorization, that we worked, and I made sure
some new rules were put in play on safety standards and other
things that you were required to do. So, I'm all for it.
Guaranteed. But, we have to be careful of how far we expand the
government regulation component when we need to have safety on
these ships--there's no question about it--and, you know,
again, you remember the conversations we had last year, and
continue to have these conversations. But, I want to be careful
of the broad statements that are made, at times.
And, Mr. Chairman, I have not looked at your bill, but I
have one major concern, I will tell you. DOT is not--I
understand the reason why, but DOT, to write standards and to
manage an issue like this would make me very nervous. Consumer
Protection, I think, is an important agency. DOT has a hard
enough time figuring out which roads they're building, what
bridges they should do, what airports they should manage. I get
very nervous about DOT. I'm caught talking as a mayor who had
to deal with DOT on a national and a local level. But, I think,
if there is an agency--I don't know if the Consumer Protection
Agency is the right one, but I just want to give my two bits.
I have not reviewed your bill in detail, other than that
piece of it, and I--I just know my headache with DOT is large,
and increasing on an annual basis. I thought I'd ended when I
was done being mayor, to be frank with you, but coming here and
listening to the Federal DOT is even worse. But, I would give
that cautionary note as a bill is being put together.
But, I just--you know, in all due respect, I think it's
important that we look at this and--the incidents that have
occurred have been very visible. No question about it. And the
families and individuals that have been harmed have had
impact--not only to us in our policy decisions and discussion,
but to them, personally, obviously. But, let's be careful and
cautious of how we approach this.
And I'll leave it on this one note. I didn't realize we
were going to talk about oil and gas industry when Senator
Markey was here, but let me give you an example. When we were
drilling, this last--Arctic--last summer in the Arctic--Shell
was drilling in the Arctic Ocean. But, their incident that
occurred was not in the Arctic Ocean, it was 800 miles away,
because of a transportation issue. We heard about it all over,
everywhere. They never spilled a drop of oil, no incident and
injury.
Now, saying that, we've had a fishing vessel spewing oil
out for some period, here. Most in this room have no idea that
has occurred, because it didn't have an oil company name
attached to it.
We had a military ship run aground, probably 2 years ago--
you may remember this, as a Coast Guard--run aground because it
was trying to help a village move because of a climate-change
issue--ran aground, spilled tons of diesel. We never heard
about that, because it didn't have the word, you know, X Oil
Company on there.
So, we've got to be careful, here. We--you know, if we're
going to look at cruise ships, then we'd better add ferries in
this, because they have more passenger movement, and some of
those ferries are held together by duct tape. And I didn't--you
know, I like getting on them, because they're fun, they're
enjoyable. But, you know, I've got to question, sometimes, how
they're operated, because they're usually operated by local
governments or State governments that have no money to maintain
them.
The Chairman. Senator, is it your view, therefore, that we
should not proceed in looking at the cruise line industry until
we've properly done ferries?
Senator Begich. No. I--what I'm saying is, as I did last
year, in the Coast Guard reauthorization bill, we absolutely
looked at them, and made some adjustments in there. But, at the
same time, I would say, 2 months on the Bill of Rights--you
know, we can barely--I mean, DOT--it will take them 2 years to
write the regulations, and then they'll get stuck, as you know,
on some OMB sanitation department.
So, I would say that I think we have an obligation, as a
committee, as whatever that seasons are done, that this
industry do report to us on what is happening with their Bill
of Rights, and are they employing them correctly? Is there
penalties if someone does not respond to them?
But, 2 months on a new rule that they jumped on--and I give
them credit. Now, it's not perfect, and I think you guys have
acknowledged that, and there's some more room, here. But, we
should spend the time to allow some improvement to occur,
rather than, 2 months after it, suddenly decide we have new
rules. Because I guarantee you, DOT will take--it will take us
a--it--you know, 3 years from now, we will have new rules, if
we started today and had a bill, just based on the way this
place operates and DOT operates, in the sense of regulation-
writing.
So, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that I would aggressively
work with them on these Bill of Rights, see how--and if there
are some--like Mr. Blumenthal brought up, if there are some
issues of disconnect between the rules that are on the ticket,
the detail of it, and what they're claiming to give to the
public, then we should help make those aligned, because we
don't want false advertising; we want correct advertising. So,
if someone sees this Bill of Rights, they know the detail is
wherever it is. That's kind of my view on it.
But, 2 months is not enough time, I will tell you that,
just from my own experience. But, no, we should continue to
work everywhere we can to increase safety, but I would include,
you know--I'm just telling you, Mr. Chairman, I--after riding a
couple of ferries, you know, we love duct tape in Alaska, but
I'm not sure I'd wrap a boat in it. That's all.
I'll end there. There was my question, which--you really
had no question. More of a commentary.
Dr. Klein. Can I respond to the----
Senator Begich. I guess it was a question, then.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Klein. I just want to respond to two points.
First of all, in terms of the issue of crime onshore, I
would distinguish between general crime and crime when they
occur on a shore excursion. And what I was referring to in the
larger part is that, when one goes on a shore excursion and
they are robbed, when there's an accident that results in
physical injury or death, I think the cruise line does have
responsibility. But, if you read the cruise contract, they have
no liability for that, because those are independent
contractors.
So, I think there are two issues there. One is liability,
one is--it is something that they are selling to passengers and
endorsing as an activity.
The other issue is--I can't argue with the statistics you
gave. However, as an academic, when I give numbers, I've got to
be transparent about the methodology. And my work has to be
subject to peer review. So, without my knowing the methodology
of where--what those numbers--how they're constructed, the data
from which they're drawn, the definitions that are used for
those categories, it's hard for me to make any comment, other
than----
Senator Begich. That's fair.
Dr. Klein.--they're numbers. OK?
So, it's just--you know, again, I'm not judging, I'm not
asking----
Senator Begich. Understood.
Dr. Klein.--questioning the integrity; just that, without
that information, without peer review, it's difficult to make
any statement.
Senator Begich. Fair.
The Chairman. I want to--we're going to start voting in
about 5 minutes--make a closing statement, here.
One issue that we have not spent time talking about today,
but we've spent a lot of time talking about it as a committee,
or committee staff, is how the cruise industry uses a loophole
in our tax code to avoid paying its fair share of corporate
income taxes.
Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein, my staff reviewed your 10k
financial reports for the past 7 years. They found that, in
this period, your company--your two companies have made over
$17 billion in profit, while managing to pay only $218 million
in corporate income taxes. Your collective corporate income tax
rate, therefore, comes to about 1.3 percent.
I'm not asking for your comment, I'm just saying what I'm
saying.
Your companies are headquartered in the United States. Most
of your passengers are U.S. citizens. You use our ports, our
courts, and the services of the Coast Guard and many other
government agencies, but, because you flag your ships in other
countries and maintain the fiction that you earn most of your
income outside of U.S. territory, you do not pay your fair
share of taxes in this country.
I would just like you to know that I'm working on
legislation to close this loophole. My staff has been working
with the Finance Committee and with the Joint Committee on
Taxation to develop legislation that would require your
industry to pay your fair share of taxes. I will be introducing
this legislation later this week.
I thank you all for your attendance, and I thank you for
your patience.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Worcester, MA, August 19, 2013
Senator John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Dear Senator Rockefeller,
I am writing to provide you and the Committee with my thoughts on
the U.S. Coast Guard post-accident investigation report on the Carnival
Splendor fire which occurred in the Pacific Ocean on November 8, 2010.
I was asked to read this report and to provide my thoughts to the
Committee on ``your insight on the incident, the quality of the
investigative report, and how anything in your research could help add
value to the report.'' I note here two important facts: Firstly, this
was a short turn around request (2 days), therefore, my comments are at
the 20,000 foot level and are based solely on reading the report, i.e.,
no further investigation was conducted and Secondly, the content of
this letter represents my own professional opinion and has not been
endorsed by WPI.
I find the investigation and report on this incident to be very
thorough, professional, and comprehensive. As a result of reading the
full report, I have some thoughts on the incident and in this letter I
point out some areas where further probing would be beneficial. I also
suggest some additional recommendations that I deem of value. I have
organized my thoughts and recommendations into six important areas:
alarm culture; fireproofing and protection of cable trays; maintenance
of the emergency diesel generator/system maintenance philosophy; an
engineering cascade analysis of CO2 systems, recommendations
for more comprehensive and effective fire-fighter training, and
important areas of fire research and development.
Probing of the Alarm Culture on the Ship
Two of the major factors resulting in the negative outcomes of this
incident were the significant delay in agent delivery caused by the
manual alarm reset and the subsequent ignition of the cable trays. The
report states that suppression agent delivery was delayed 15 minutes
and that ``this delay was the result of a bridge watchstander resetting
the fire alarm panel on the bridge.'' The report goes on to acknowledge
that ``this was a critical error which allowed the fire to spread to
the overhead cables and eventually caused the loss of power.'' What we
don't know is why this alarm was reset. I recommend probing the alarm
culture on the ship. What operational and maintenance issues may be
uncovered that would explain why the operator's first reaction was to
reset the alarm? How often do they have false alarms? What's causing
these and what changes to the installation, operation, and maintenance
of the fire alarms would result in less false alarms? While there is an
alarm log given in the report, there is no analysis or further probing
associated with it. Recommendation 1. Calls for the removal of the 40-
second time delay in the automatic activation sequence for the Hi-Fog
system. This recommendation correctly notes that ``the seconds and
minutes following the ignition of a fire are crucial to the
firefighting response. As such, failure to take quick and prompt action
to extinguish a fire can lead to major, negative downstream effects.''
I agree with this recommendation, however, I feel the delay caused by
the alarm reset and the fact that alarms are reset is even more
significant.
Fireproofing of Cable Trays
To ensure safety and prevent casualties such as fire, loss of a
prime system, etc, ship design focuses on both the hardening of
critical systems and on providing redundancy in those systems. It
appears that in this installation, the electrical cable trays represent
a single-point failure mode, if the cables cannot deliver electricity,
most major ships systems are rendered inoperable, yet there was neither
redundancy nor hardening of the cable trays. I would recommend
fireproofing and/or other modes of protection for these trays. The
optimum way to provide this would need to be evaluated but may take the
form of passive protection such as wrappings or coatings, or may take
the form of active protection such as a suppression system. The
potential to re-route the cable trays so they do not pass directly
overhead of major hazard should also be evaluated. This is already
common practice in very similar land-based facilities. Recommendation
2f does call for addressing the susceptibility of all Dream class
vessels to a complete loss of power; however, it falls short of making
a recommendation for cable tray protection.
Maintenance philosophy and Maintenance of Emergency Generators
The emergency diesel generator (EDG) stopped running several times
during this incident but we don't know why. I would probe both the
maintenance philosophy for the ship and the actual maintenance logs for
specific essential equipment. Maintenance philosophies range from
fixing something when it breaks down to performing routine maintenance/
testing at scheduled intervals. There are also predictive maintenance
philosophies and reliability-centered maintenance philosophies. What is
the maintenance philosophy employed on this ship? How was maintenance
for the EDG conducted? Was it tested under load? Was it periodically
exercised?
Engineering cascade analysis of CO2 systems
The report recognizes that ``The CO2 system is a crucial
line of defense in extinguishing an engine room fire, and must be
installed and maintained properly so that it operates when needed.'' I
would suggest broadening this to a full engineering cascade analysis of
the CO2 system. A cascade analysis would start with system
design. What standards were the system designed to? Is the design
adequate? The CO2 system on this ship exhibited multiple
system failures and leaky valves. Thus, the cascade analysis should
continue from design to installation, maintenance and testing.
Firefighting Procedures and Firefighter Training
The report states that ``approximately five hours into the
firefighting effort, the Captain evacuated the engine room and
attempted to activate the installed CO2 system.'' The report
also states that it took approximately two hours to locate the fire in
the cable runs. The math suggests that fire teams attempted to
extinguish the fire with portable extinguishers for three hours. These
point again to a need for reliable, location specific detection and
better defined and practice firefighting tactics.
Fire Research and Development
In any fire event, quick reliable detection and automatic
suppression are key. A study of new detection and suppression options
for cruise ships should be conducted. Two hours to locate the fire
along the cable tray is not acceptable, and options beyond
CO2 should be evaluated.
Respectfully submitted,
Kathy A. Notarianni, Ph.D., P.E.,
Head, Department of Fire Protection Engineering,
Associate Professor, Fire Protection Engineering and
Associate Professor, Mechanical Engineering and Chemical
Engineering,
Worcester Polytechnic Institute.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio
Question 1. During the week of July 15, 2013, the Coast Guard
released its investigative report on the November 2010 engine room fire
that disabled the Carnival Splendor. The report found that the Splendor
fire-fighting crew did not appear to be familiar with the engine room,
and the fire-fighting team made errors in decisions critical to
preventing the spread of fire. Would you say it is important for
firefighting crews on cruise ships to conduct drills in the engine room
space so they can move quickly and effectively in the event of a real
fire?
Answer. Yes, this is important. As a result of this event, the
Coast Guard published policy in July 2013, directing Coast Guard vessel
inspectors to witness a fire drill in the engine room space on all
foreign cruise ships at the next scheduled examination, and
subsequently, at least once during a foreign cruise ship's annual
examination cycle.
Question 2. Admiral Servidio, the Coast Guard report recommends
that Carnival address firefighting training deficiencies by revising
its safety management system. Please explain why the report asks
Carnival to implement this recommendation not just for the Splendor,
but across the entire fleet.
Answer. An effective means to ensure consistency within a fleet of
vessels is through the company's Safety Management System (SMS) since
an SMS applies to each vessel in the company's fleet, vice just to one
vessel.
For instance, changes made to Carnival Cruise Lines SMS, to improve
firefighting training, would therefore apply to each Carnival Cruise
Line vessel. This will ensure that ensure that fire fighting training
improvements will be implemented company-wide, fleet-wide, and to all
crew operating throughout the cruise line's fleet of vessels.
Question 3. The Coast Guard report on the Splendor fire found that
the ship's CO2 firefighting equipment was not installed
properly and had other flaws that prevented it from working properly
during the fire. The report also said these flaws should have been
spotted by multiple parties including the shipbuilder, Carnival, and
the flag country of Panama, or the classification society operating on
behalf of the flag country.
Clearly there are multiple parties involved with review of ship
equipment installation and inspection. But at the end of the day,
doesn't the ship owner bear the primary responsibility for making sure
equipment on the ship doesn't present safety risks?
Answer. Ultimately, yes. The owner/operator of the vessel has
primary responsibility for the operation of the vessel's equipment,
while the Flag State, Class Societies and Port States verify compliance
with established regulations and standards.
Question 4. After the Carnival Triumph engine room fire left that
ship disabled and stranded in February 2013, Mr. Cahill emphasized to
the press that ``everyone was safe,'' and ``what we're talking about is
the convenience of the guests.''
I am concerned that such comments minimize the potential dangers of
onboard fires and other cruise accidents.
The Triumph was stranded in the Gulf of Mexico for four days before
rescue was complete. If that event had occurred during hurricane
season, could we have seen different results?
Answer. It is difficult to speculate what could have happened had
this event occurred during hurricane season. The wide range of possible
outcomes would likely have been influenced by alternate actions/
decisions that could have been taken by the U.S. Government or the
TRIUMPH's owner/operator, and any number of other variables which might
arise had heavy weather threatened.
That being said, the Coast Guard recognizes this incident's
potential for much more catastrophic consequences, and as one that
needs to be closely examined and learned from by all stakeholders so
that risks of future occurrences can be reduced.
Question 5. While no passengers were harmed by the recent fire
aboard the Royal Caribbean's Grandeur of the Seas, if the fire occurred
further out to sea and required passengers to be evacuated, could we
have seen different results?
Answer. The investigation into this casualty is ongoing. From
publically available information, the vessel's structural fire
protection appeared to ultimately largely contain the fire; this result
would likely not have changed had the fire occurred further out to sea.
A different scenario requiring an at-sea passenger evacuation or
abandon ship would be complex but the Coast Guard cannot speculate on
whether that would have occurred based on the vessel's distance out to
sea.
Question 6. As part of the lessons learned analysis, do you think
it is important for cruise lines to examine potential risks highlighted
by accidents in addition to reviewing what actually happened?
Answer. Yes. It is important for any operator/owner of a vessel to
examine risks identified as causal factors in marine casualties and
where possible incorporate lessons learned as a part of their Safety
Management System (SMS).
Question 7. The Coast Guard has the authority to charge user fees
for the inspection and other marine safety services it provides for
vessels and mariners. As originally conceived in the 1980s, the user
fees were expected to pay for the costs to the Coast Guard and the
Federal Government of providing the services. Do the user fees the
Coast Guard charges under section 2110 of title 46 pay the full cost of
the services for which they are charged?
Answer. No. The Coast Guard estimates that user fees currently
cover only 40 percent of the cost of providing the services.
Question 8. Almost two decades ago, Congress enacted the Coast
Guard Authorization Act of 1996. That law removed language that
prevented the Coast Guard from charging user fees for safety
examination services provided to foreign cruise ships in U.S. ports.
Does the Coast Guard charge user fees for the examinations it performs
on foreign cruise ships in U.S. ports? If not, are there any plans to
do so?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not currently charge user fees for
examinations conducted on foreign cruise ships in U.S. ports. The Coast
Guard is studying the feasibility of updating all user fees and as part
of that effort, a user fee for foreign cruise ships is being
considered.
Question 9. Does the U.S. Coast Guard inspect Passenger Ferry
Vessels, including state run ferries?
Answer. All ferries, including state run ferries, carrying more
than six passengers on a navigable waterway in the U.S. are inspected
by the Coast Guard. Specifically, in 2006, the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2006 amended Title 46 United States Code Chapters
21 and 33 by defining ``ferry,'' ``passenger,'' and ``small passenger
vessel'' such that some previously uninspected ferry vessels, including
state owned ferries that did not carry `passengers for hire', became
subject to Coast Guard Inspection for Certification.
Prior to this legislation, ferry vessels were not subject to
Inspection for Certification if they did not carry passengers for hire
(charged a fee for carriage). The new definitions of ``passenger'' and
``small passenger vessel'' include ferries that carry at least one
passenger for a vessel of 100 gross tons and over and that carry more
than six passengers for vessels of less than 100 gross tons, regardless
if a fee is paid by the passenger.
If a vessel meets the definition of ``ferry,'' the fee is no longer
a determining factor in the application of marine inspection laws and
regulations.
The total number of ferry vessels affected by this change was
estimated to be 71, which brought the total number of Coast Guard
inspected ferry vessels up from approximately 384 to 455.
Question 10. What is the scope of the Coast Guard's inspection for
a Passenger Ferry Vessel and how often are these inspections/exams
required?
Answer. Ferry Vessel inspections are regulated by 46 CFR
Subchapters T & K for vessels less than 100 gross tons; and regulated
under 46 CFR Subchapter H for vessels over 100 gross tons. Inspections
are required at least annually on vessels inspected under Subchapters T
& K, and annually with periodic re-inspections for vessels inspected
under Subchapter H.
The scope of an inspection includes but is not limited to the Hull,
Firefighting, Electrical, Pollution Prevention, Lifesaving, Navigation,
and Machinery equipment. Additionally, inspections include witnessing
drills and assessing crew proficiency in handling shipboard
emergencies, as well as witnessing the operation of a vessel's
machinery and other equipment including underway tests such as man-
overboard drills. Ferry Vessels are also required to undergo periodic
dry-dock examinations
Of the 455 ferries inspected by the Coast Guard:
109 are over 100 gross tons and are inspected under 46 CFR
Subchapter H.
The remaining 346 are less than 100 GRT, and inspected under 46
CFR Subchapter T (235) and 46 CFR Subchapter K (111).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio
Question 1. The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) currently requires muster drills to be performed within 24
hours of a cruise ship's departure. However, last month the
International Maritime Organization's (IMO's) Maritime Safety Committee
adopted an amendment to SOLAS that would require muster drills to
happen ``prior to or immediately upon departure.'' These rules will go
into effect in January 2015. Can you please clarify the phrase
``immediately upon departure?''
Answer. Additional guidance has not been developed at IMO on the
text updates, including ``immediately upon departure,'' related to
amendments to regulation 19.2.2 of chapter III of the SOLAS Annex. The
Coast Guard will work as necessary to provide clarification of this
language prior to implementation.
In February 2012, the Coast Guard published policy to its field
units that requires inspectors to observe completion of passenger
muster drills aboard cruise ships during the course of required cruise
ship examinations in U.S. ports where passengers have embarked the
vessel. Under this policy, passenger muster drills must occur before
the Coast Guard will consider the examination complete.
In the course of these examinations, the expectation is and the
Coast Guard's experience has been that passenger muster drills are
overwhelmingly conducted prior to vessel's departure. Additionally, the
industries voluntarily adopted standard outlines that a cruise ship's
passenger muster drill should occur prior to vessel's departure after
embarking passengers.
Question 2. While much of the cruise industry changed its policies
in February 2012 to require muster drills upon departure, I understand
that the IMO rule will not go into effect until January 2015. Why is
the effective date of the policy January 2015, which is nearly a year
and a half from now?
Answer. While it may seem a very slow process, in fact this new
mandatory requirement for muster drills ``prior to or immediately upon
departure'' will formally enter into force as quickly as can
practicably be done under the amendment process timelines specified in
Article VIII of the SOLAS Convention. The Contracting Governments to
SOLAS adopted the amendments at IMO by means of Resolution MSC.350 (92)
on June 21, 2013. After adoption, Article VIII provides that the
amendment must be accepted by Contracting Governments, which is
facilitated through a process whereby acceptance is deemed to occur on
a certain date if a critical mass of Contracting Governments has not
objected by that time. This acceptance period, two years by default,
was reduced to essentially the minimum of one year permitted by Article
VIII (until July 1, 2014). Finally, as specified in Article VIII, the
amendments enter into force six months after they are deemed to have
been accepted, which would mean entry into force on January 1, 2015. In
the interim, the recommendatory guidance developed at IMO and
promulgated in MSC.1/Circ. 1446 (as revised) remains in effect.
Although the new IMO requirements for passenger musters will not
formally enter into force until January 2015, the Coast Guard is
already witnessing passenger musters as part of its foreign cruise ship
examination program. The Coast Guard began doing this as a matter of
policy beginning in February 2012.
Question 3. What is the Coast Guard's timeline for adopting the new
muster drill standard? Will the Coast Guard wait until 2015 to adopt
these new standards, despite the fact that the Cruise Line Industry
Association has already adopted such standards? If the Coast Guard
plans to wait until 2015, why?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not waited to adopt this standard.
Prior to the action at IMO action with respect to passenger musters,
the Coast Guard adopted this muster drill standard as a matter of a
policy change that was promulgated in February 2012. Coast Guard field
personnel are already witnessing this muster during cruise vessel
examinations conducted in U.S. ports where passengers have embarked the
vessel.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Gerald Cahill
Fire Safety
Question 1. Based on your company's review of the Splendor
incident, what explains the failure of multiple inspections to uncover
CO2 System flaws?
Answer. Before any ships are delivered, the CO2 system
is inspected, tested and approved by the shipyard and the ship's
classification society. RINA, the classification society responsible
during shipbuilding, conducted the initial testing and approved the
CO2 system prior to the Splendor's delivery.
Ship engineers do not have the specialized training and experience
needed to properly maintain or uncover defects in these critical
systems, so vessel operators hire industry specialists to service and
maintain CO2 systems. Carnival hired Wilhelmsen Ship Service
to perform the annual inspection and testing of the CO2
system, and all system maintenance as the service provider approved by
both the Flag state and Classification Society. Since Wilhelmsen had
more than 40 years of experience in the provision of inspection,
reporting, maintenance and repair for fire and safety systems and
equipment for the maritime industry, Carnival relied on Wilhelmsen to
have the expertise to perform this service properly.
After the Splendor incident, Carnival's investigation revealed
problems with the CO2 system that should have been
identified by specialists earlier, including a significant design fault
in the CO2 system release sequence that increased the
likelihood that a valve might not operate properly. Carnival remedied
that flaw with a major redesign of the CO2 systems on
several ships to change the sequence and achieve improved system
reliability. Carnival has revised the test procedure to ensure that
system operation is tested at full pressure. We have also replaced our
service provider.
While Carnival will need to continue to rely on the expertise of
the maintenance service providers, these changes to the system
operation sequence will enhance reliability and full pressure testing
should identify any future defects in the system.
Question 2. Can you explain why Splendor fire-fighting crews did
not train in the engine room?
Answer. Carnival conducts firefighting training in the engineering
spaces, which includes the engine rooms, incinerator room, and other
spaces. Fire drills were conducted in various locations around the
ship, including similar machinery areas to the engine room where fires
might occur. Although we kept records of the fire drills, we did not
keep specific records of the locations of the fire drills.
While more emphasis will be placed on training to fight engine room
fires, including secondary fires that spread to the overhead cable
runs, we do not agree with the U.S. Coast Guard's conclusion that a
lack of familiarization with the engine room itself hampered efforts to
locate and extinguish the fire, or allowed for further spread of fire
and smoke. (U.S. Coast Guard Report at p. 44). The Splendor's
firefighting crews were fully familiar with the engine room layout and
equipment. The firefighting timeline included in the U.S. Coast Guard
report reveals that the engine crew, who are intimately familiar with
the engine room, were either part of, or accompanied the fire teams
during firefighting operations. For instance, the Staff Chief Engineer
and the Second Engineer accompanied Fire Team Charlie into the engine
room and helped identify the location of the secondary fire in the
cables above DG5.
It was not a lack of familiarity with the engine room layout, but
rather the nature of the secondary fire in the overhead cable runs,
that made firefighting difficult on the Splendor. For most of the time,
no flames were visible in the hot, smoke-filled engine room without any
lighting or power. The smoldering cable runs were located high above
the firefighters. Even the ship's engineers were challenged by these
difficult circumstances.
Crime Reporting
Question 3. While the Chairman understands some alleged crimes
might not be prosecuted, do you support publicly reporting the number
of all crimes on cruise ships that are reported to the FBI?
Answer. To our knowledge, no land-based vacation options have any
duty to report crimes to law enforcement, let alone to publicly report
crime allegations as statistics. At the same time the incidents of
alleged crimes in the cruise industry are far below those which are
reported on land in the general population. Furthermore, it is
difficult to prevent the media from publishing this information out of
context, which becomes even more misleading to the consumer and
unfairly damaging to the cruise industry. Consequently, we do not
support publicly reporting the number of all alleged crimes on cruise
ships--nonetheless, Carnival has voluntarily posted on its website a
listing of all the alleged crimes reported to the FBI for our North
American lines (Carnival Cruise Lines, Princess Cruises, Holland
America Line and Seabourn).
Question 4. Given that many parents and children take vacations on
your cruise ships, do you support publicly reporting the number of
alleged crimes that occur against minors?
Answer. We believe the numbers show that cruising is a very safe
vacation alternative especially when compared to the crin1e statistics
on land. Those land statistics are reported in the Uniform Crime
Reporting system (``UCR'') published by the FBI. The statistics do not
separately categorize or track alleged crimes against minors.
Therefore, the UCR will not offer any context or perspective to a
consumer who is provided cruise lines statistics regarding alleged
crimes against minors. We believe providing information on alleged
crimes without such context would be misleading and will merely confuse
the consumer. The information would also be skewed by the fact that
different companies have different passenger demographics and
correlations would therefore be unfair.
Question 5. The crime data appears to be compiled by the
overarching Carnival parent company rather than by individual line.
What is the rationale for posting the crime data in this manner? Please
provide the Committee with this information broken down by individual
line in the same format that you posted the information on your
website.
Answer. Carnival believes that the statistics viewed as presented
provide more insight into cruise safety than when the data is broken
out into individual lines. Specifically, one can compare the total
number of passengers and crew we carry to the number of crimes which
occur for that population and then compare it to the land based
statistics in the UCR. This comparison clearly and easily shows that
crime statistics on cruise ships are much lower than on land for
similar size populations.
Furthermore, even if all the incidents were allocated to just one
of our lines, the number would still be below UCR crime reporting for
similar populations on land. We feel strongly that providing data at a
brand level would encourage meaningless and misleading comparisons,
providing the potential for users to take the information out of
context. The fact is that our incidents of crime are very low.
Question 6. Many crimes that occur on cruise ships are classified
as ``other'' meaning they don't meet the threshold categories required
under current law. What types of crimes are included in the ``other''
category?
Answer. The ``other'' category includes alleged unlawful acts that
are not designated in the CVSSA but are otherwise reported, such as
thefts under $10,000.00 and crimes against our passengers which take
place in countries outside the U.S. or for crimes not covered by the
CVSSA.
Question 7. Current law requires that only thefts greater than
$10,000 be reported publicly. How many thefts of $1,000-$10,000 were
reported for each of the last three years?
Answer. During the relevant period, the North American lines
carried approximately 25,876,189 guests and the following thefts of
$1,000-$10,000 were alleged:
July-December 2010: 58
2011: 82
2012: 91
January-May 2013: 52
Question 8. The posted crime data details the number of missing
U.S. nationals. How many additional non-US nationals went missing for
each of the last three years? Please indicate whether they were
passengers or crew.
Answer. The total number of non-US nationals missing from the North
American lines is:
2011: 1 (non-US crewmember)
2013: 2 (passengers onboard the Carnival Spirit while in
Australia)
Bill of Rights
Question 9. According to Professor Klein's written testimony,
cruise line contracts include ``extreme limits'' on the company's
liability, including requirements about where a passenger must file a
suit and how quickly they must bring the suit. Explain to me why this
makes sense for a consumer. Does this seem fair to you?
Answer. Our cruise ships call on thousands of destinations, as well
as carry passengers from all fifty states and from countries all over
the world. Without the contract provisions that specify where, when and
how a passenger should bring an action, cruise lines would be forced to
defend litigation all over the country and the world and possibly many
years after a cruise when evidence and witnesses are no longer
available. The courts have agreed that cruise lines, like a myriad of
other businesses, should have some measure of predictability regarding
the forum, the timing of claims, and exposure to damages. This
predictability is achieved through the ticket contract provisions
governing the forum and manner of claims (including forum selection,
choice of law, time limitations, arbitration and class action waiver
provisions). Such ticket provisions have been found to be legal if
reasonably communicated to the passengers and these provisions do not
limit the substantive rights afforded under the passenger ticket
contract or the Bill of Rights in any way.
Arbitration provisions, class action waivers and forum selection
clauses are common in not only other transportation industries but
other consumer industries (Disney World, Water-Zoo Indoor Water Park,
Hilton HHonors loyalty programs, Starwood Preferred Guest Programs,
AT&T service agreements, Four Seasons Private Jet Tours and Southwest
Airlines). We believe the fact that these provisions have been
routinely adopted by other industries and supported by the courts,
evidences the fair balancing by these provisions of the interests of
businesses and consumers.
Question 10. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to
passengers when one of these rights is violated? Please provide
specific examples of how a passenger could enforce the rights.
Answer. The Bill of Rights is a legally enforceable promise and
thus a contractual obligation which forms part of the agreement between
cruise lines and their guests who now have a private right of action to
enforce the rights. The contractual recourse to enforce the passenger
rights is in addition to remedies available under state consumer
protection laws available in virtually every port state where cruise
lines base their businesses or ships, including Florida, California,
Hawaii, New York, Texas, Alaska and Washington. These laws typically
provide for recovery of damages, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees,
and in some cases, double or treble damages for misleading or false
advertising.
Well established law protects the right of passengers to assert
legal claims against cruise lines arising out of the maritime contract
of passage, such as the Bill of Rights. For example, a cruise line is
prohibited from abrogating the right to a trial in court for any claims
involving injury or death or providing less than one year to commence
suit based on such claims. The general maritime law of the U.S. will
typically apply although state law can sometimes supplement the
remedies afforded under U.S. maritime law where not inconsistent. Many
claims arising out of the Bill of Rights (e.g., over costs of
transportation, lodging, and reimbursement), will qualify for small
claims court jurisdiction which provides the passenger with a cost
effective method to enforce their rights without having to hire an
attorney.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Gerald Cahill
Question. A recent report was issued by the U.S. Coast Guard
regarding the Carnival Splendor incident in November 2010. The report
made a series of recommendations to Carnival to improve safety in the
future. What specific steps has Carnival taken to address the concerns
and recommendations in the U.S. Coast Guard's report?
Answer. We have implemented actions to address and improve in the
areas of maintenance log management, additional firefighting training,
as well as increased fire prevention, detection and suppression
systems. We have implemented new procedures for logging of technical
parameters, checking the condition of the plant, precautionary measures
before startup of engines, and new robust engine watch handover
policies.
Additionally, we have taken steps to strengthen the depth and
frequency of all critical system inspections and formed a new
Department of Marine Safety staffed with technical experts in the areas
of fire prevention, detection, and suppression.
During the last two years the shoreside technical management has
been expanded and strengthened with dedicated diesel engine and
maintenance and repair experts. This team includes more than 140
members and has grown significantly in the past couple of years as we
continue to invest in talent across our company.
Following the Splendor fire, several new operational management
personnel have been hired at Carnival including a new SVP of Marine
Operations. Earlier this month Carnival announced the first 4 members
of its new Safety & Reliability Review Board including Rear Admiral
Mark H. Buzby, Rear Admiral Joseph F. Campbell, Ray Valeika and Dr.
John K. Lauber who have collectively very deep experience in the marine
and air transportation and maintenance fields.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Gerald Cahill
Natural Gas Vessels
Question 1. As I'm sure you're aware, advances in technology,
reduced emissions, and high oil prices have led the transportation
industry to look to natural gas as an alternative source of fuel.
Natural gas trucking has increased in current years, and the Energy
Information Agency (EIA) recently projected that for the heavy-duty
industry ``Natural gas, as compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied
natural gas (LNG), is the fastest-growing fuel in the transportation
sector, with an average annual growth rate of 11.9 percent from 2011 to
2040.'' And a company based in my home state has ordered the LNG
conversion of two diesel ships currently in use for Alaska trade, as
well as the construction of two new first-of-their-kind LNG-powered
containerships for use on the Puerto Rico-Florida trade route. The fuel
is also being evaluated for use on our public Washington State Ferry
system.
Do you believe natural gas-fueled vessels have a future within the
cruise ship industry? To that end, to what extent has your company
evaluated using natural gas as a fuel source for either converted/
renovated or new vessels?
Answer. Carnival has three projects related to LNG use on cruise
ships.
a. Carnival is installing a dual fuel engine on one ship
currently under construction, so that LNG can be used in port
as well as conventional liquid fuel.
b. Carnival is developing a power barge supplied with LNG that
could connect directly to a ship in port, substituting LNG-
generated electricity for utility shorepower (Cold-Ironing).
c. Carnival is examining the feasibility of installing limited
LNG tank capacity on one ship that would supply one dual-fuel
engine that could operate on LNG while the vessel is at sea or
in port, as an alternative to shorepower.
Question 1a. What challenges or barriers exist to deploying natural
gas technology safely within the cruise ship industry? Do you believe
that any of the challenges or barriers is unique to your industry?
Answer. LNG is not available in numerous ports in which our ships
currently bunker fuel, even where a natural gas supply is available
near the pier. Infrastructure for storage and delivery of LNG would
need to be developed to ensure reliable supply. Storage of LNG onboard
requires greater tank capacity than liquid fuel. This is not a
significant challenge for some cargo ships, with ample space both above
and below deck. Cruise ships have very little available space either
above deck or in engine spaces below deck.
Safety issues related to switching from liquid fuel oil to LNG are
a consideration, but can be managed. U.S. Coast Guard policy guidance
for refueling passenger ships with LNG is being developed now and the
resultant controls and operational restrictions could have a major
impact on the potential future use by the cruise industry.
Also, in the past public perception in North America has often been
that LNG is not as safe as liquid fuel or natural gas. This is not
scientifically valid, but it has been a significant issue with
development of LNG facilities in many ports and coastal areas. Today,
the environmental advantages of LNG may override such concerns, but
cruising is a discretionary leisure activity and concern over the
safety of LNG-powered cruise ships may need to be addressed.
Question 1b. Can you speak to your company's long-term strategy
with regards to natural gas vessels?
Answer. LNG may be an option over the mid to long term if the
challenges described above can be resolved. This could be accomplished
by adding limited LNG tank capacity, or by supplying LNG to the ship
while at berth from trucks or a barge.
Cold-Ironing
Question 2. As you know, Cold-Ironing is the practice of providing
cruise, container, and other vessels with shore-side electrical power
for the operation of equipment while in port, thereby allowing main and
auxiliary engines to be shut down. This can reduce or eliminate many
airborne emissions and improve nearby air quality. How many of your
vessels are equipped to use Cold-Ironing infrastructure/equipment while
in port?
Answer. Carnival Corporation has 24 ships that are equipped to
connect in seven West Coast Ports, including Juneau, AK; Vancouver, BC;
Seattle, WA; San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Long Beach, CA; and
San Diego, CA. East Coast Ports pending development in include Brooklyn
Red Hook, NY, Halifax, NS, and Quebec City.
Ships currently equipped to connect to shorepower by Operating
Company are:
Princess Cruises 14
Holland America Line 6 (plus 2 partially converted)
Carnival Cruise Lines 3
Cunard Line 1
Question 2a. Does Cold-Ironing have any negative impacts on cruise
ship operation?
Answer. There is no negative impact on the technical operations of
the ship, if the shoreside system is properly installed, and if the
supply of electricity is adequate and reliable. Shorepower
installations have been very well received in port communities.
Question 2b. What are the barriers to further deployment of Cold-
Ironing infrastructure/equipment on your vessels? Are certain ports
more/less feasible for Cold-Ironing?
Answer. The primary barriers are the cost to the utility company to
make the necessary improvements to deploy Cold-Ironing, the cost to the
cruise industry to convert its ships to tie into the electricity and
the availability of electricity. Some utilities do not have excess
capacity, or rates for interruptible service. As a result, ports with
limited cruise ship activity may not be able to economically justify
the investment in shoreside infrastructure.
Question 2c. Please describe your company's long-term strategy with
regards to Cold-Ironing.
Answer. Shorepower will be part of the mix of technology to address
air emissions from cruise ships. This will include use of scrubbers or
other technology, low sulfur fuel, now required in all U.S. Ports under
the Emission Control Area regulations of IMO MARPOL Annex VI and
potential use of LNG in Ports.
Carnival has been the leader in developing shorepower for the
cruise industry and plans to utilize shorepower for a significant
number of vessels calling regularly in Ports on the Pacific Coast of
North America, as well as select Ports in the North Atlantic.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Adam M. Goldstein
Crime Reporting
Question 1. At the hearing, Chairman Rockefeller entered into the
record a Commerce Committee staff report showing that the number of
crimes onboard cruise ships reported to the FBI is much higher than the
number that is publicly reported. It also shows that in a significant
percentage of sexual assaults reported to the FBI, children are the
alleged victims.
The Chairman also introduced legislation that would require public
reporting of all alleged crimes on cruise ships, including those
against children.
While the Chairman understands some alleged crimes might not be
prosecuted, do you support publicly reporting the number of all crimes
on cruise ships that are reported to the FBI?
Answer. As the Committee is aware, just over three years ago,
Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) of
2010. In that legislation, Congress set forth the categories of serious
crimes that cruise lines were required to report to the FBI. The
legislation also required the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain a public
website that lists, by cruise line, a quarterly accounting of every
crime and missing person case that has been reported to law enforcement
in any of the listed CVSSA categories where the matter is ``no longer
under investigation by the FBI.''
While we had long been reporting all crime allegations to Federal
authorities, this legislation was the first of its kind to single out a
commercial industry and require public disclosure of its allegations of
crime. Although crime statistics on land are published under the FBI's
longstanding Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system for states, cities
and municipalities, they are not aggregated by type of venue (hotels,
resorts, theme parks), let alone by individual company.
Even so, we supported the legislation as we believed that publicly
reporting crime allegations would enable consumers to see for
themselves that cruise ships are among the safest venues when compared
to any landside community or destination. We were unaware until the
legislation was passed that Congress was limiting the public disclosure
of the crime data to only those allegations ``no longer under
investigation by the FBI.''
Because of this provision in the new law, the numbers provided to
the public by the Federal Government did not reflect the actual number
of allegations we were reporting to the FBI. Royal Caribbean, and our
colleagues at Carnival Corporation and Norwegian Cruise Lines, took it
upon ourselves--well in advance of any announced Congressional
hearing--to rectify the limitation imposed by Congress by agreeing to
voluntarily disclose on our websites all allegations of crime in the
CVSSA categories, on all itineraries worldwide, committed by passengers
or crew members, regardless of whether an FBI investigation had been
opened or closed.
We believe that the current reporting protocol--providing the
number of all allegations in each of the CVSSA categories--allows the
consumer to compare the minimal number of allegations of serious crimes
onboard cruise ships with those reported for land-based communities and
make informed vacation decisions. We do not believe that any further
expansion of this reporting is warranted or reasonable.
Question 2. Given that many parents and children take vacations on
your cruise ships, do you support publicly reporting the number of
alleged crimes that occur against children?
Answer. As explained above, we believe the value of publicly
reporting allegations of crimes is in providing consumers with an
opportunity to compare/contrast crime on land with crime at sea. Crime
against minors is not a category reported by the UCR for land-based
communities and, thus, such disclosures by the cruise lines would not
allow consumers to draw meaningful comparisons.
Question 3. Royal Caribbean, along with the other major cruise
lines, agreed to voluntarily post crime data on its website.
The crime data appears to be compiled by the overarching Royal
Caribbean parent company rather than by individual line. What is the
rational for posting the crime data in this manner? Please provide the
Committee with this information broken down by individual line in the
same format that you posted the information on your website.
Answer. The premise of this question is incorrect. As of August 1,
2013, Royal Caribbean posted its crime data by individual cruise line,
not by parent company. The data may be found here:
For Royal Caribbean International:
http://www.royalcaribbean.com/
contentPage.do?pagename=royal_caribbean_
cruise_ship_crime_allegation_statistics
For Celebrity Cruises:
http://celebritycruises.com/
genericHtmlTemplate.do?icid=spe_bt_twdybr_
1306_dtbe_lk_921032&pagename=celebrity_crime_allegation_statisti
cs
For Azamara Club Cruises:
http://www.azamaraclubcruises.com/azamara-club-cruises-crime-
allegation-statistics
Question 4. Many crimes that occur on cruise ships are classified
as ``other'' meaning they don't meet the threshold categories required
under current law. What types of crimes are included in the ``other''
category?
Answer. The CVSSA identified eight categories of serious crimes
that cruise lines are required to report to the FBI. The ``other''
category is used to capture allegations not designated by the CVSSA,
such as thefts between $1,000 and $10,000.
Question 5. Current law requires that only thefts greater than
$10,000 be reported publicly. How many thefts of $1,000-$10,000 were
reported for each of the last three years?
Answer. For the three-year period, 2010 through 2012, Royal
Caribbean International, Celebrity Cruises and Azamara Club Cruises
carried more than 13 million guests. During this time period, the
reports of alleged property thefts valued between $1,000 and $10,000
were as follows:
2010--84 reports
2011--103 reports
2012--116 reports
Additionally, during this three-year period, RCL received a total
of 97 reports alleging the theft of property valued between $1,000 and
$10,000 from luggage. These alleged thefts from luggage, however, may
have occurred prior to the luggage arriving at the ship (e.g., airline,
hotel, taxi, bus).
Question 6. The posted crime data details the number of missing
U.S. nationals. How many additional non-U.S. nationals went missing for
each of the last three years? Please indicate whether they were
passengers or crew.
Answer. For the three-year period, 2010 through 2012, the reports
of missing non-US nationals were as follows:
2010--3 missing non-US nationals (all crew members)
2011--4 missing non-US nationals (all crew members)
2012--4 missing non-US nationals (1 guest, 3 crew
members)
Bill of Rights
Question 7. According to Professor Klein's written testimony,
cruise line contracts include ``extreme limits'' on the company's
liability, including requirements about where a passenger must file a
suit and how quickly they must bring the suit. Explain to me why this
makes sense for a consumer. Does this seem fair to you?
Answer. With regard to virtually every sailing of ships operated by
cruise lines based in the U.S.--regardless of itinerary and regardless
of whether it embarks or debarks in the U.S.--passengers have access to
a U.S. forum if they wish to file a claim.
Because the travel industry accommodates customers from around the
world, forum selection clauses are commonly used across many sectors of
the industry. These clauses allow hotels, resorts, cruise lines and
countless other sellers of goods and services to have some level of
legal predictability while providing guests with the opportunity to
have their claims heard.
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 1991 opinion, found that
forum selection clauses benefit passengers in two important ways: (1)
the clauses eliminate confusion about where claims can be filed, saving
litigants the time and expense of determining the correct forum; and
(2) the passengers benefit from lower fares that travel providers can
offer as a result of the legal certainty established by forum selection
clauses.
With regard to the time period for filing claims, Title 46 U.S.C.
Sec. 30508, specifically permits a time limit of no less than one year
for suits involving claims of personal injury (including emotional
distress) or death. Courts have routinely enforced a six-month deadline
for contract claims. These limits are not considered ``extreme.'' To
the contrary, for any cruise that even touches a U.S. port, Sec. 30509
specifically prohibits it from including any provision in a passage
contract that either limits ``the liability of the owner, master, or
agent for personal injury or death caused by the negligence or fault of
the owner or the owner's employees or agents; or [. . .] the right of a
claimant for personal injury or death to a trial by court of competent
jurisdiction.''
Question 8. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to
passengers when one of these rights is violated? Please provide
specific examples of how a passenger could enforce the rights.
Answer. The Bill of Rights is a legally enforceable contract. It
forms part of the contract between cruise lines and our guests who now
have a private right of action to enforce the rights.
In addition, state consumer protection laws available in virtually
every port state where cruise lines base their businesses or ships,
including Florida, California, Hawaii, New York, Texas, Alaska and
Washington, still apply. Thus, the contractual recourse to enforce the
passenger Bill of Rights is in addition to these state laws which
typically provide for recovery of damages, injunctive relief,
attorneys' fees, and in some cases, double or treble damages for
misleading or false advertising.
Passengers can generally bring a legal action against cruise lines
for any claims arising out of the maritime contract of passage, such as
the Bill of Rights. The general maritime law of the U.S. will typically
apply although state law can sometimes supplement the remedies afforded
under U.S. maritime law where not inconsistent.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Adam M. Goldstein
Natural Gas Vessels
As I'm sure you're aware, advances in technology, reduced
emissions, and high oil prices have led the transportation industry to
look to natural gas as an alternative source of fuel. Natural gas
trucking has increased in current years, and the Energy Information
Agency (EIA) recently projected that for the heavy-duty industry
``Natural gas, as compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural
gas (LNG), is the fastest-growing fuel in the transportation sector,
with an average annual growth rate of 11.9 percent from 2011 to 2040.''
And a company based in my home state has ordered the LNG conversion of
two diesel ships currently in use for Alaska trade, as well as the
construction of two new first-of-their-kind LNG-powered containerships
for use on the Puerto Rico-Florida trade route. The fuel is also being
evaluated for use on our public Washington State Ferry system.
Question 1. Do you believe natural gas-fueled vessels have a future
within the cruise ship industry? To that end, to what extent has your
company evaluated using natural gas as a fuel source for either
converted/renovated or new vessels?
Answer. We believe there is a future for LNG as a major marine
fuel, although there are a number of challenges that will need to be
addressed, as outlined below. We have done extensive studies into the
current and future feasibility from a technical, operational/safety,
and supply availability perspective. We have involved engine
manufacturers, shipyards, existing LNG suppliers, and maritime
classification societies in these reviews.
We do not believe that CNG will ever be a realistic option given
the very low energy density of CNG (i.e., we could not carry enough
fuel to get the ship to port).
Question 1a. What challenges or barriers exist to deploying natural
gas technology safely within the cruise ship industry? Do you believe
that any of the challenges or barriers is unique to your industry?
Answer. There are a number of technical and operational issues with
LNG compared to traditional fuels, all of which stem from the physical
properties of LNG, including:
We would have to carry twice as much volume of LNG to
achieve the equivalent amount of energy of traditional fuels
LNG must be maintained at cryogenic temperatures (i.e., -160
degrees F)
Because of these physical properties, LNG requires specialized
storage tanks, piping systems, safety systems and design limitations,
loading systems, and engine modifications. We do not think there is a
high likelihood that existing cruise ships could be retrofitted with
significant LNG capacity, but believe it is more feasible in the
context of newbuilds.
Another major obstacle is the minimal supply infrastructure
available. Because of the physical properties of LNG, it is very
expensive and time consuming to develop and build the necessary supply
infrastructure. While this issue exists for all ships, it is a much
larger issue for cruise ships given the amount of LNG required and the
time frame in which it would have to be loaded (e.g., 25 to 50 truck
loads per week). The other ``unique'' issue is that cruise ships tend
to travel around the world, so a single point supply solution is not
sufficient; our vessels would need access to reliable supplies around
the world.
Question 1b. Can you speak to your company's long-term strategy
with regards to natural gas vessels?
Answer. Our long term strategy is to continue monitoring the
regional and global supply development to determine if and when it
would be prudent to commit to an LNG fueled vessel. We routinely re-
evaluate our position when committing to newbuild orders.
Cold Ironing
Question 2. As you know, cold ironing is the practice of providing
cruise, container, and other vessels with shore-side electrical power
for the operation of equipment while in port, thereby allowing main and
auxiliary engines to be shut down. This can reduce or eliminate many
airborne emissions and improve nearby air quality. How many of your
vessels are equipped to use cold-ironing infrastructure/equipment while
in port?
Answer. We have seven vessels in our fleet that have reserved space
in the electrical switchboards for equipment to connect to shore power
and all future newbuilds will have the space reservation as well. We
are also in the process of equipping one vessel with shore power
capability in order that it may make frequent calls on California
ports.
Question 2a. Does cold ironing have any negative impacts on cruise
ship operations?
Answer. There are always challenges when introducing a new
technology to marine operations and, of course, we always take handling
extremely high voltage equipment and connections seriously. The biggest
challenges relate to handling the switch over from ship power to shore
power and back again.
Question 2b. What are the barriers to further deployment of cold-
ironing infrastructure/equipment on your vessels? Are certain ports
more/less feasible for cold ironing?
Answer. Cold-ironing is very much a port-by-port evaluation;
furthermore, it is a day-by-day issue within an existing port. We have
found that the availability of cold-ironing infrastructure varies by
port and even by berths within a port. In addition, the ability of
local utilities to scale up to meet one or more large ship's power
demand is also an important factor. Of course, the reliability, cost,
and environmental benefits of shore power vary by port as well.
Question 2c. Please describe your company's long-term strategy with
regards to coldironing.
Answer. Although the majority of our energy consumption occurs when
we are not in port, we continue to evaluate cold-ironing as a component
of our energy/environmental strategies.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Ross A. Klein, Ph.D.
Crime
When a crime happens on a cruise ship, passengers can be in for a
rude awakening--they can't just call 911 to get the police to come
investigate the crime, they can't go to a U.S. hospital for treatment,
and they can't always just get off the ship. To make things more
difficult, U.S. laws may not govern if the crime occurs in
international waters or at a foreign port.
Question 1. Given the stark differences in the level of support
available to crime victims on land versus on cruises, how important is
it that passengers have an understanding of the number and types of
alleged crimes that occur on cruise ships?
Answer. The cruise industry promotes itself as ``the safest mode of
commercial transportation''--a claim based on a 1996 study done by the
U.S. Coast Guard.\1\ But this study only considered three issues of
safety: fatalities, injuries requiring treatment beyond first aid, and
accidents such as trips and falls. Based on these criteria, a cruise
ship is safer than U.S. air carriers and motor vehicles; however, the
study did not look at simple assaults, thefts, sexual assaults or at
disappearances under mysterious circumstances. The claim by the cruise
industry to be the safest mode of transportation misleads consumers
into a false sense of security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The claim to be the safest mode of commercial transportation
has long appeared at the website of Cruise Lines International
Association, and before that at the International Council of Cruise
Lines website. It was recently removed because of intense lobbying by
the International Cruise Victims Association (ICV), which called on the
Coast Guard and members of Congress to force the cruise industry to
remove the misleading claim. The study to which the industry refers was
secured by ICV through a freedom of information request; the data was
based on National Transportation Statistics 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the face of this claim, and in the frequency of certain types of
crime, it is important that cruise passengers have access to
independently-verified and reliable crime statistics for cruise lines
and for cruise ships. Particularly relevant are sex-related crimes
(sexual assaults and forcible rapes), which on some cruise ships/cruise
lines may be higher than on land, but also property crimes (i.e.,
thefts), crimes against persons (simple assaults and assault with
serious bodily injury), and persons overboard.
The importance and value of by-ship data is demonstrated in TABLE
1: RCI ``Reported Sex Related Incidents'' 2003-2005 Number of Reported
Incidents and Annualized Rate per 100,000 by Ship of my testimony
before the Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearings on ``Cruise Ship
Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe at Sea,''
Thursday, June 19, 2008. As seen in that table the rate of sexual
harassment/sexual assault when viewed by ship ranged from 10.75 per
100,000 to 208.33 per 100,000 across a fleet of 19; the fleet average
was 111.97 per 100,000. This level of detailed information is helpful
to passengers--both in gaining awareness that there are certain
problems or risks on cruise ships (as there are on land), and that
choices can apparently be made that minimize risk. The transparency may
also benefit cruise ships and cruise lines in that it will ideally
motivate a higher degree of vigilance in preventing and effectively
dealing with onboard crime in order to avoid being ``the worst.''
Having valid and reliable rates of crime is important for the
purpose of comparison: comparison between cruise lines/ships and
comparison of crime at sea versus crime on land. There is a simple
illustration that makes this point. Disney Cruise Line reports on its
website 6 sexual assaults in 2012. This sounds like a small number.
However, when converted to a standardized rate it is 32.6 per 100,000--
almost four times higher than claimed for the industry as a whole in
its written testimony before the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee. It is
tempting to interpret this as indicating that Disney Cruise Line is
worse than the rest, but the more likely interpretation is that Disney
Cruise Line is being more transparent than the others. After all, the
numbers reported by Royal Caribbean and Carnival for 2010-2013 are so
different than what are independently confirmed as numbers for 2007-08,
that it makes suspect the more recent reports (see
www.cruisejunkie.com/crimedat.pdf).
Crime Data
Royal Caribbean, Carnival, Norwegian, and Disney recently posted
cruise crime data on their websites. Some questions have been raised
about what data is included and whether it paints a clear picture of
the crime onboard vessels.
Question 2. Professor Klein, what did your review of the crime data
show?
Answer. On surface, the crime statistics appear to be a positive
step, however upon reflection one has to wonder precisely what are
being provided:
1. What ``crimes'' are included in the category ``other''? There is
a significant number that can undoubtedly be categorized and
reported (e.g., inappropriate touch, sexual harassment, simple
assault, thefts of less than $10,000).
2. What incidents are included as ``sexual assaults'' and ``rape''
and who decides that an incidents falls into one or another (or
neither) category. If it is the cruise line, is it in an
objective position from which to judge the nature of the
incident and crime? When considering the category ``other,''
what is the number and types of sex-related incidents that do
not fall under sexual assault and rape.
Aside from the problem of data kept invisible through the category
``other,'' and confusion caused by lack of clarity on who makes the
determination of a category of crime (e.g., simple assault, assault
with serious bodily injury, sexual assault and rape), the data
displayed at the Carnival and Royal Caribbean websites are misleading.
Both companies combine cruise lines, which dilutes the rate of crime on
Carnival Cruise Lines'. For example, Carnival combines four cruise
lines in its report--Carnival Cruise Lines, Holland America Line,
Princess Cruises, Seabourn Cruises--and then computes the crime rate.
This produces misleading statistics. Carnival Cruise Lines accounts for
46 percent of the passenger population on ships belonging to these four
brands, however in 2007-08 Carnival Cruise Lines accounted for 87
percent of the sexual assaults and 96 percent of the thefts. The rate
of crime is significantly lower on the other cruise lines than on
Carnival Cruise Lines; by averaging across the lines it gives the
appearance that Carnival is safer than it actually is. The same is the
case with Royal Caribbean International, Celebrity Cruises, and Azamara
Cruises.
Review of the data also raised some direct questions. The FBI told
the Commerce Committee that it had received 40 reports of sexual
assault on Carnival ships, but Carnival reports on its website a total
of 17 for the same period. Similarly, data presented by NCL on its
website and to the FBI is numerically different than data provided in
the discovery phase of a lawsuit.
So, while the idea of publishing the data is excellent, the
underlying problem is the reliability and integrity of the data being
presented. By being done in-house, with no independent oversight
produces numbers that aren't particularly informative. The public needs
to be protected from erroneous claims.
Question 3. How will the provisions in the Cruise Passenger
Protection Act help ensure that all crime data is being reported
publicly?
Answer. The CPPA will improve the reporting of crime data by
requiring reporting of all reported crimes, however it doesn't go as
far as I'd like it to go. There are crimes that will not be reported
(thefts less than $10K, simple assault), and crime reports will be
amalgamated by cruise line (maybe by cruise corporation?), which allows
problem ships/lines to remain invisible.
In an ideal world, all reports to security on a cruise ship would
be sent to the FBI. The FBI would filter out cases it wishes to pursue,
though all cases would go to an independent third party for entry into
a crime database (including properly assigning complaints to a crime
category). This database, showing crime by cruise ship and cruise line,
would then be available online.
Question 4. In your written testimony, you highlighted that
additional crime beyond what's required by law should be reported
publicly. What type of crimes are these and how will making this
information public help passengers?
When consumers have complaints about cruise ships--whether it's
unexpected fees, lost baggage, or conditions on the vessel--what
recourse do they currently have beyond lodging a complaint with the
company?
Answer. This question is actually two questions. The types of
crimes that should be included in reporting include simple assault and
theft less than $10,000. There might also be consideration to include
under sex-related incidents cases involving ``inappropriate touch'' and
``sexual harassment''. These categories were well populated in reports
in 2003-2005. That data, when combined with data for sexual assaults
and forcible rapes, is illuminating.
My view is that passengers have a right to know what crimes are
being committed on different cruise ships belonging to different cruise
lines. They should be equipped to make informed shopping decisions when
buying a cruise. And they should approach a cruise taking the usual
precautions families take when traveling to a ``strange'' or new city.
The second question relates to complaints when something goes
wrong. Aside from attempting to persuade the cruise line that they owe
you something, a passenger has very little recourse. They can file a
complaint with the Maritime Administration, but that is unlikely to
have any impact. Alternatively, a passenger might be able to file a
claim in a small claims court--this may or may not survive a forum
selection clause challenge, or in the odd case hire an admiralty lawyer
in Miami. In the United Kingdom, where there is stronger consumer
rights legislation, legal cases have a higher chance for success on
cases that would be non-starters in the U.S. There are cases in both
the U.S. and U.K. (more so the latter) where passengers have
successfully used the Internet and/or social media to extract
settlements for complaints against a cruise line, but these are
relatively infrequent.
Consumer Complaints
When consumers have complaints about cruise ships--whether it's
unexpected fees, lost baggage, or conditions on the vessel--what
recourse do they currently have beyond lodging a complaint with the
company?
Question 5. How would giving a Federal agency, such as the
Department of Transportation authority to investigate passenger
complaints, as it does for the aviation, auto, and other industries,
help passengers when something goes wrong?
Answer. I think the issue is one of oversight. The cruise industry
operates out of U.S. ports, serving largely U.S. passengers, yet unlike
the aviation or other transportation industries, has no active
oversight by the U.S. Government. There is some oversight relating to
cruise ship safety (U.S. Coast Guard) and sanitary conditions (Centers
for Disease Control), however there is absolutely no oversight with
regard to consumer rights and proper treatment of passengers (not to
mention proper treatment of workers). An aggrieved passenger lacks a
venue (other than a lawsuit) for dealing with a serious complaint
against a cruise line (other than the cruise line itself). As well,
because there is no central agency where passengers can file reports,
there is no knowledge base about complaints common on cruise ships
(even specific cruise ships or cruise lines). Such an agency would also
be a venue for a passenger to express a safety concern that was ignored
while onboard a ship.
Given the size of the cruise industry, and its reliance on
passengers in and from the U.S., it makes infinite sense to treat the
cruise industry like other modes of commercial transportation
(airlines, trains, buses) and for this oversight to rest in the
Department of Transportation. At present the industry is largely self-
regulating. With market domination of three corporations (comprising
more than 90 percent of the North American market), self-regulation is
not in the best interests of the consumer.
Bill of Rights
The cruise industry has actively promoted their Cruise Passenger
Bill of Rights, which includes the right to professional emergency
medical attention, the right to properly trained crew, the right to
timely updates for itinerary changes, etc.
Question 6. Professor Klein, you reviewed the Bill of Rights in
your written testimony, what new rights were passengers provided?
Answer. In my opinion, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights
does not provide anything that the cruise industry wouldn't argue was
already being done before the bill of rights. What is different is that
there is now, they would say, a binding pledge that these things will
absolutely be done. However CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does
not say what a passenger is due when a right is not fulfilled (e.g.,
having a trained crew, receiving timely information).
The Bill of Rights is a restatement of industry practices and is
used largely as a marketing scheme at a time that the industry was
attempting to repair its image.
Question 7. Were there any major areas that were not addressed?
Answer. There are a number of things not covered in CLIA Cruise
Passenger Bill of Rights:
(1) What rights does a passenger have when essential provisions such
as food, water, restroom facilities, etc cannot be provided and
the ship is not docked? What rights does a passenger have when
a ship is ``dead in the water?''
(2) A passenger's right to have refunded by the cruise line the cost
of airfare to get to a cruise when a cruise is canceled because
of mechanical or other failure.
And the following copied from my written testimony:
There is no mention of the recourse a passenger has if one
of the Rights is not fulfilled or realized.
There is no indication of how a partial refund will be
computed and whether that refund is provided in cash or, as
common in the industry, as a discount on a future cruise or an
onboard credit.
There is no mention of whether the cruise line is
responsible for ancillary costs when a cruise is cancelled,
including change fees for airline tickets and for the costs of
the tickets themselves, the cost of lodging required in travel
to the passenger's home city, and support for food and
incidentals associated with delays in getting from the ship to
the passenger's home city.
There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a
port of call is canceled. Some cruise lines refund ``port fees
and taxes,'' however these are given as an onboard credit
rather than as a cash refund. As well, there is no transparency
with regard to the amount refunded. Some cruise lines average
the cost of port fees and taxes so a refund for one port is the
same as the other even though actual fees can vary widely from
one port to another. Also, it isn't transparent whether costs
other than port taxes and fees that are not paid by the cruise
line because of the canceled port call are also refunded to the
passenger. There is considerable need for greater clarity and
transparency around passenger rights when a port call is
canceled.
There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a
cruise itinerary is changed, such as a cruise sailing the
Eastern Caribbean instead of the Western Caribbean because of
propulsion problems, or a cruise going to Canada instead of the
Caribbean because of weather. The Passenger Cruise Contract is
clear that the cruise line has no obligation or responsibility
to provide compensation in these situations. This absence of
rights should be clearly articulated in the Passenger Bill of
Rights.
There is no mention of the rights a passenger has when
embarkation is delayed. Does a passenger have a Right to meal
vouchers or compensation for meals purchased (as is common in
airline travel)? Also, after how many hours of waiting in a
cruise terminal is the cruise line obligated to provide either
lodging or a comfortable setting to wait? A comprehensive
Passenger Bill of Rights would address these situations given
the frequency of delayed embarkations.
There is no mention of a passenger's rights when a cruise
arrives late in its port of disembarkation, causing the
passenger to miss transportation arrangements for their trip to
their home city.
In addition there are some rights that should be directly
addressed.
CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights should clearly articulate the
rights of a passenger who is ``bumped'' from a cruise because of
overbooking or other issues. The most recent cases involve Carnival
Sunshine, which bumped passengers on its June 7, 2013, cruise because a
number of cabins were needed for contractors completing work that was
not completed while the ship was in dry dock. Similarly, passengers in
78 cabins on Grandeur of the Seas were bumped from the July 12, 2013
(and perhaps the July 19th), sailing because cabins were needed for
workers who were still making repairs following the fire earlier in the
year. Some of these bumped passengers had their cruise canceled because
the ship had been out of service for repairs, and here they were bumped
from their replacement cruise.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ It is worth mention that Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited, in
anticipation of these hearings and concern that the facts might paint
an unkind picture, sent an e-mail to all employees asking them to write
their Senator with the following text: Dear Senator, As one of your
constituents and an employee of ______________________, one of the
major cruise lines serving North America, I am contacting you today out
of concern regarding the July 24 Senate Commerce Committee hearing
regarding the cruise industry. As an individual who is intimately
familiar with cruising, it is apparent to me that there has been a
great deal of misinformation and distortion regarding the industry in
recent months. As one of your constituents, I am concerned that the
industry will be unfairly portrayed at this hearing. As someone that
works in the cruise line industry, I know firsthand that cruising is
extremely safe and well regulated at the national level, by the U.S.
Coast Guard, and by international authorities. Additionally, the cruise
industry directly benefits businesses in all 50 states, generating over
355,000 jobs and over $42 billion in economic impact. It provides $17.4
billion in wages to American workers each year. I would greatly
appreciate your support to ensure that the cruise industry receives a
fair and balanced hearing. Thank you for your time and attention to
this matter and your service to our Nation. Sincerely, Your Name
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Similarly, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights should discuss
a passenger's rights when they are expelled from a cruise ship, often
for questionable reasons and the result is loss of cruise fare and
their having responsibility for transportation from the port where they
are left. Between January 2009 and June 30, 2013, there are eight cases
list on my website where a passenger has been evicted or expelled
(these are only ones reported in the media). These passengers have no
right to appeal or recourse. The cruise line Cruise Passenger Contract
gives them this unilateral, uncontestable Right to evict or expel,
without liability.
The CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a
passenger's rights when they miss the ship because of flight delays or
because of weather conditions (such as Hurricane Sandy in the fall of
2013 when passengers lost their cruise fare because they couldn't get
to the ship). The cruise lines generally take the position that this
type of situation is not their problem. A passenger without trip
insurance is responsible for lost cruise fares and/or additional travel
costs to join the ship at a later point. Further, it there are reports
that some benefits under trip insurance policies offered by the cruise
line are more restrictive in the benefits they provide than insurance
policies offered independent of the cruise line.
The CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a
passenger's rights to have safety concerns taken seriously. Though not
the first time I have received this sort of information, on June 21,
2013, I received the following from a cruise passenger:
We have just disembarked after a 7-day Alaskan cruise aboard
Celebrity Solstice. We frequented the quasar dance club each
night. On night two I noticed at 2300 (11pm), when the club
only allows 18 and over, a crew member used a small rope to tie
the handles of one of the two exits closed to prevent access.
Not must looped but tied in a fashion that untying would be
impossible is a smoke filled environment or panic. This room is
required to have two emergency exits and this exit was clearly
marked '' emergency exit''. This happened three nights in a
row. I brought my concerns to the attention of guest services
requesting to speak to the ships Safety Officer. I was told
that another passenger had requested to speak with him also but
he stated that he was ``too busy with paperwork to speak to
anyone''. The guest services person apologized and drafted an
e-mail to him explaining my concerns and that I am a 28 year
firefighter. That night in quasar the doors were once again
tied closed. As of this writing no staff or crew has contacted
me. I would encourage that all passengers be aware of their
surroundings. It appears Celebrity is not concerned with safety
and if this blatant example of reckless disregard for its
passengers and crew in a public space is allowed to exist, then
I am wondering what other safety issues exist that we did not
see.
It would seem this passenger's expectations were realistic, but
they were ignored. Did he have any rights? And what rights were
available for this disregard of concern for fire safety?
Finally, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address
the Right to be free of sexual assault by crewmembers or cruise ship
employees, or the Right to be free of other types of crime. This type
of assurance seems only natural given the rate of sexual assault on
cruise ships, but it is obviously one that would be difficult to
fulfill (although no less difficult than some of the other rights
included in the Passenger Bill of Rights). In this line of thought, the
Passenger Bill of Rights should also contain a Right to contact the FBI
directly from the ship when a victim of a crime. This Right is accorded
by the CVSSA, so it should be provided, however most victims will be
unaware of what is available to them without it explicitly being stated
in something like a Passenger Bill of Rights. Alternatively, a cruise
ship may be required to provide a crime victim with an information
sheet outlining the rights and the options available to them, including
the telephone numbers for relevant law enforcement agencies, and
agencies that provide direct services or referral to services that are
likely to be needed by the victim.
Question 8. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to
passengers have when one of these rights is violated?
Answer. A common theme across all elements in the Passenger Bill of
Rights is how a passenger deals with a Right that has not been
fulfilled or has been directly violated. Are these rights ultimately
governed by the cruise passenger contract that sets clear terms about
when and how complaints and legal action must be filed, and where law
suits must be filed? Forum selection clauses effectively limit a
passenger's rights under the Passenger Bill of Rights given the
requirement that legal action can only be taken in a court located in
the state where the cruise line's corporate headquarters is located
(most frequently Florida). The cruise passenger contract also includes
a ``class action waiver,'' prohibiting a passenger from taking any
legal action as a member of a class or as a participant in a class
action. For many passengers these are impediments to taking any action
and they often resign to accepting whatever the cruise line offers, if
anything.
The cruise industry's representatives claimed at the hearings that
the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights is not superseded by the passenger
contract, however what this actually means remains unclear. It is
unclear what recourse a passenger has when a right has not been
fulfilled, and it is unclear through what forum this recourse is
sought. Cruise passenger contracts have not yet changed.
Contract Limitations
According to your written testimony, cruise line contracts include
``extreme limits'' on the company's liability, including requirements
about where a passenger must file a suit and how quickly they must
bring the suit.
Question 9. These ticket contracts generally require that all law
suits be filed in Florida. Does this mean that even though a passenger
might buy a ticket in West Virginia and leave from a port in Maryland,
they have to go all the way to Florida to pursue a lawsuit?
Answer. Based on the forum selection clause in the passenger cruise
contract any lawsuit must be filed in the court where the cruise line
is headquartered--for Princess Cruises it is Los Angeles, for Holland
America Line Seattle, and for many others Miami. This is a huge
disadvantage, if not impediment, to a passenger from out of state of
the cruise line's headquarters (e.g., West Virginia, Arizona, Vermont).
Many will initially contract with a local attorney who needs in turn to
be represented by an attorney in Florida. Alternatively, the passenger
may contract directly with a Florida-based attorney, but there is a
challenge locating and getting to know one. In any case, access to
court of law is quite difficult (if not costly) for the average cruise
ship passenger.
Question 10. What impact do these provisions have on a passenger's
ability to pursue legal recourse?
Answer. This lack of recourse means that many problems, complaints,
and justified claims against cruise lines are never pursued. If legal
recourse were more readily available, then cruise passengers feeling
wronged may feel like their concerns can be heard. Another option
(perhaps complimentary) is for an agency within the Department of
Transportation to deal with consumer complaints regarding the cruise
industry.
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