[Senate Hearing 113-695]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-695
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OVERSIGHT: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 30, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK BEGICH, Alaska DAN COATS, Indiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN E. WALSH, Montana
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 30, 2014................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 9
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 14
Statement of Senator Scott....................................... 21
Statement of Senator Booker...................................... 23
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 25
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 27
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 29
Statement of Senator Coats....................................... 31
Witnesses
Hon. Mark Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia..................... 1
Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. John S. Pistole
by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 37
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 38
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 39
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 43
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 49
Hon. Roy Blunt............................................... 50
Hon. Marco Rubio............................................. 51
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.
ADMINISTRATION OVERSIGHT: CONFRONTING.
AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION SECURITY CHALLENGES
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. Senator Warner, we welcome you here. And you
had wanted to testify, then not wanted to testify, but there
was something that happened in the Navy which you wanted to
speak of. And Senator Thune kindly has agreed to that. And so,
you proceed.
Now, the first time we talked, before you said you didn't
want to do it, I gave you 3 minutes.
Senator Warner. No, it will be a quick 3 or 4 minutes.
The Chairman. OK.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. And I want to thank the Chairman for the
opportunity to be back before the Commerce Committee. I will
not take it personally that so many of my Republican colleagues
showed up for my statement and none of the Democrats showed up.
[Laughter.]
Senator Warner. So I hope that is not a sign of things to
come.
But I do appreciate you and the Ranking Member's
opportunity to just, frankly, share with you, as I know you
have Mr. Pistole coming up next from TSA, but something that
you may have heard about, but I have a number of concerns that
I wanted to raise. And this is about the TWIC card program.
The Chairman. Can you pull that mike a little closer?
Senator Warner. The TWIC card program.
This chair is really low. I don't know--I feel like I am
kind of, you know----
[Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Is this a Commerce Committee ploy against
the witnesses?
But my interest in the TWIC program was sparked by a tragic
shooting incident at the Norfolk Naval Base on March 24. A
truck driver, who had a valid TWIC card, was cleared onto the
base, passed through two security checkpoints, and got access
to the pier where our U.S. Navy destroyers were docked.
This individual, Jeffrey Savage, then disarmed a ship
security officer, used that weapon to shoot and kill another
sailor, who heroically intervened to try and protect his
shipmate. Other Navy security personnel finally then shot and
killed Mr. Savage. Master-at-Arms Second Class Mark Mayo was
laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery last Friday with
full military honors for his selfless actions.
But since the March 24 shooting, Mr. Chairman, we have
learned that this truck driver had a troubling history of
criminal offenses that were never disclosed to DHS or TSA. He
had been issued a TWIC card despite at least two felony
convictions, including one for voluntary manslaughter. These
convictions occurred beyond the 5-year window used by DHS and
TSA when evaluating this application.
Let me just say that again. Mr. Savage, who clearly had a
checkered past, including voluntary manslaughter, had been
issued a TWIC card that granted him, along with a bill of
lading, access to sensitive U.S. security areas.
This tragedy was obviously deeply felt and still is of
enormous interest in Norfolk and Hampton Roads. And while the
criminal investigation is not completed and it may ultimately
be determined that this shooting had more to do with inadequate
training and procedures at the gate and had less to do
specifically with the shooter's TWIC card, our look into this
tragedy revealed some obvious deficiencies in the TWIC program.
There is a widespread misunderstanding about what exactly a
TWIC card does and does not represent. In fact, DHS officials
have told us that job applicants in the fast-food industry
typically undergo a more robust background check than
applicants for a TWIC card. Harder to get a job at McDonald's
with a security check than to get a TWIC card.
TSA officials revealed they do not have access to criminal
databases beyond the initial applicant screening. That means
that there is no substantial look-back.
And criminal issues that arise after that TWIC card has
been issued--and, again, the period you are looking at is only
for a brief period during the person's life. If the event took
place a long time ago in the background--maybe that should be
the case--it doesn't even get reported. But if once you get the
TWIC card and you create another criminal offense, that doesn't
get into any database.
Now, officially, TSA requires cardholders to self-report on
any crimes. But, Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, listen to this:
out of the more than two million people who have been issued a
TWIC card, only 3 individuals have ever stepped up and self-
reported that they have committed a crime after they have been
issued that card--3 out of two million.
That should send a chill down all of our spines, in terms
of what we are doing on security of these installations. I
think it is fair to say that some security personnel have
placed too much trust in what the TWIC card represents.
Now, since the shooting in Norfolk, the Navy has moved
forward to improve training and enhance procedures at the gate,
and that is appropriate. But multiple GAO investigations over
the years have documented problems with the TWIC program, and
there has been little follow-up.
So as you receive testimony today on the TWIC program, I
would suggest a couple of specific issues deserve your
consideration.
We all have to work together to strike the right balance
between security and daily operations. You can't wait 3 hours
to get onto a base installation, but our challenge is to
provide a system that gives appropriate access to individuals
with legitimate business at our military bases without creating
unmanageable delays.
One area that TSA is specifically asking for help is in
strengthening the background check. TSA also, I believe, needs
the authority to do periodic checkups on cardholders. And that
will require better cooperation from our law enforcement
agencies by providing greater access between those databases
and the TSA database.
Now, we all know there are important issues of security and
privacy that also have to be protected. But as we see these
brave men and women who defend our country, they ought to be
able, especially when they are back home-ported or back in the
country, be able to go to work on a daily basis and feel the
installations they work at are safe.
So, Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate the chance to appear
before the Committee which I was so proud to serve on for 5
years. I know the Committee and you and the Ranking Member and
other members will take up this issue.
But think: it is easier to get a job at a McDonald's in
terms of a security background check than receiving a TWIC
card. And even if you have that card, the failure to have any
subsequent reporting, the record now, with 2 million people
with these cards and only 3 people self-reporting, that just
cannot stand on a going-forward basis.
So, Mr. Chairman, I know you will take appropriate actions,
but you can count on this Senator to work with you in any way
possible to make sure we get a better system in place.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Committee.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warner. And I can't help
but say that you dumped us for the Finance Committee.
[Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, it was a lateral trade at
worst.
The Chairman. Well, a trade it was. All right, I thank you
very much. And thank you for your comments.
Welcome. I enjoyed very much our lengthy conversation
yesterday and look forward to your testimony.
And we have today Barbara Boxer, Chairman Boxer. This only
happens about two or three times a year, so this is obviously
historic.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Pistole. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller and
Ranking Member Thune and distinguished Senators of the
Committee. Thanks for the opportunity to testify today.
As you know, TSA's primary mission is to protect the
nation's transportation systems, including aviation, mass
transit, rail, highway, and pipeline, to ensure freedom of
movement for people and commerce.
Each year, TSA screens over 650 million passengers and 1.5
billion checked and carry-on bags on domestic and international
flights departing the U.S. TSA also strengthens and enhances
the security of an interrelated, multimodal transportation
network that includes millions of bus passengers and billions
of passenger trips on mass transit each year.
To fulfill this vital mission, TSA employs a layered
approach to security through a well-trained frontline
workforce, state-of-the-art technologies, intelligence analysis
and information-sharing, behavior detection, explosive
detection canine teams, Federal air marshals, and regulatory
enforcement.
It is my goal to apply a risk-based approach to all aspects
of TSA's mission so we can provide the most effective security
in the most efficient way. When I last testified before this
committee, TSA was in the initial stages of operationalizing
our first risk-based security, or RBS, initiatives. I am
pleased to report to the Committee that RBS measures have been
broadly implemented across the nation, and I appreciate the
Committee's support on that.
TSA PreCheck was one of the first initiatives in our shift
toward a risk-based, intelligence-driven approach to security,
and I am pleased to report that the TSA PreCheck initiative has
developed into an effective security program at 118 airports
nationwide. As you know, passengers may qualify for the program
through a trusted-traveler program such as TSA PreCheck or
Customs and Border Protection's Global Entry program.
In December, we launched our TSA PreCheck application
program online, and through this initiative passengers can
apply directly to participate in TSA PreCheck and undergo a
background check in order to become a known and trusted
traveler for a period of up to 5 years. To date, more than
200,000 people have applied at over 240-plus application
centers nationwide.
These RBS initiatives have enabled TSA to become more
efficient and have resulted in over $100 million in savings in
our Fiscal Year 2015 budget. I anticipate that expanding RBS
principles throughout TSA will result in a smaller, more
capable workforce focused on our counterterrorism mission.
I would also like to share a number of important steps TSA
has taken to strengthen airport security following the tragic
shooting of Transportation Security Officer Gerardo Hernandez
and two other TSOs at LAX last November.
After working extensively with key stakeholders and
listening to concerns from TSA employees, we issued a report
last month that included a series of actions and
recommendations implemented or in process nationwide.
These include, one, redeploying certain VIPR teams--now,
the VIPR teams are the Visible Intermodal Protection and
Response teams--from surface venues to airports. Second, we are
ensuring airport operators conduct active shooter training at
least twice a year. Third, we issued an operations directive
requiring all airports to conduct mandatory evacuation drills
twice a year. Fourth, we required all TSA employees to undergo
active shooter training and had supervisors brief employees on
evacuation plans and routes.
We also recommended, quote, ``best practice'' standards for
increased law enforcement presence at high-traffic airport
locations, such as peak travel times at checkpoints and ticket
counters, to provide visible deterrence and quicker incident
response times. And, finally, we are procuring and installing
additional duress alarms at airports around the country.
Now, within the surface mode of transportation, TSA is
working to implement a mass transit and passenger rail strategy
that prescribes specific outcome-based risk-reduction
activities. We developed this approach together with mass
transit and passenger rail security stakeholders.
In the surface modes of transportation where TSA does not
conduct frontline screening, our partnership with stakeholders
is key to effective, efficient security. TSA continues to work
with our partners to develop security standards, assess
vulnerabilities, and use metrics to drive risk reduction in a
measurable way.
My vision for TSA as a high-performance counterterrorism
organization begins with a skilled and professional workforce.
Two years ago, we established the TSA Academy at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. This was
part of a necessary first step in a process of moving us
forward as an agency. I am pleased to report that we just
finished training nearly all of our over-4,000 frontline
supervisory transportation security officers, with the next
level of frontline management, our lead transportation security
officers, who have just begun a similar course, while managers
will begin training this fall. I remain committed to creating a
skilled, diverse, well-trained workforce.
In conclusion, I appreciate the support of this committee
and the opportunity to update you on our progress.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
Good morning Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today about the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) on-going efforts to develop and implement a risk-based approach
in securing our Nation's transportation systems.
TSA's primary mission is to protect the Nation's transportation
systems, including aviation, mass transit, rail, highway, and pipeline,
to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. Each year TSA
screens approximately 640 million passengers and 1.5 billion checked
and carry-on bags on domestic and international flights departing from
U.S. airports. TSA also strengthens and enhances the security of an
inter-related, multi-modal transportation network that includes 751
million bus passengers and 10 billion passenger trips on mass transit
each year. To fulfill this vital mission, TSA employs a layered
approach to security through a well-trained frontline workforce, state-
of-the-art technologies, intelligence analysis and information sharing,
behavior detection, explosives detection canine teams, Federal Air
Marshals (FAMS), and regulatory enforcement. This multi-layered
approach helps to ensure the security of the traveling public and the
Nation's transportation systems.
It is my goal to consistently apply a risk-based approach to all
aspects of TSA's mission. Whether it is the deployment of Federal Air
Marshals (FAMs), the allocation of Transit Security Grant resources, or
air cargo screening policies, TSA is working to implement a risk-based
approach that allows us to deliver the most effective security in the
most efficient manner. To this end, TSA continues to examine the
procedures and technologies we use, how specific security procedures
are carried out, and how screening is conducted. When I last testified
before this Committee in 2011, TSA was in the initial stages of
operationalizing our first Risk Based Security (RBS) screening
initiatives. I am pleased to report to the Committee that RBS measures
are now being broadly implemented across the Nation and throughout the
various modes of transportation.
Focusing on risk management is also the most efficient way to use
TSA's limited resources and enhances the value we provide to the
American people. I recently created the position of Chief Risk Officer
to assess and standardize our approach to risk management across our
mission operations and business support operations. This effort allows
TSA to better assess new policies with respect to risk and value
creation. As I have testified previously, it is not possible to
eliminate risk altogether so our efforts must remain focused on
managing and mitigating that risk. This is the most appropriate and
sustainable model for TSA.
Expedited Screening
TSA Pre3TM was one of the first initiatives in TSA's
shift toward a risk-based and intelligence-driven approach to security.
I am pleased to report that the TSA Pre3TM initiative has
developed into an effective security program at 118 airports
nationwide. TSA Pre3TM is a key RBS initiative that allows
us to expedite security screening at aviation checkpoints for low-risk
passengers. As you know, passengers may qualify for the TSA
Pre3TM program through a Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Trusted Traveler program such as TSA's
Pre3TM Enrollment or Customs and Border Protection's Global
Entry program. Last December we extended TSA Pre3TM to
members of the U.S. Armed Forces, and in April of this year extended
eligibility to all civilian employees of the Department of Defense. TSA
is currently working with a number of other Federal departments and
agencies to include other lower risk populations into TSA
Pre3TM.
Another key initiative to expand the TSA Pre3TM eligible
population is the TSA Pre3TM application program that we
started in December 2013. Through this program, U.S. citizens, U.S.
nationals, and U.S. lawful permanent residents can apply directly to
participate in TSA Pre3TM and, undergo a background check in
order to become a known and trusted traveler for a period of 5 years.
This program complements other DHS trusted traveler programs and allows
passengers to access TSA Pre3TM who may not otherwise travel
internationally, or hold a valid passport. To date, more than 180,000
people have submitted applications at the 240-plus application centers
nationwide.
Additionally, TSA uses real-time and intelligence based methods,
such as Managed Inclusion and TSA Pre3TM Risk Assessments to
identify additional passengers eligible for expedited physical
screening on a trip-by-trip basis. Numerous other risk-based changes
are in effect nationwide, including expedited screening procedures for
children 12 and under and adults 75 and older, airline pilots and
flight attendants, and expedited screening at for military personnel.
To accommodate TSA's expansion of program eligibility to a greater
number of low-risk passengers, TSA has taken the following actions:
expanded the number of airports participating in TSA
Pre3TM from the initial 40 to 118 airports; increased the
number of expedited screening lanes from 46 to more than 600, with each
lane providing the capability for doubling hourly throughput; and
increased the number of U.S. airlines participating in TSA
Pre3TM from five to nine in FY 2013, with plans of continued
expansion as airlines are ready. Today, TSA is providing expedited
screening to over 40 percent of the traveling public.
RBS has also enabled TSA to become more efficient and has achieved
$100 million in savings by enabling trusted passengers to more quickly
move through the checkpoint, increasing the efficiency of both standard
and TSA Pre3TM security lanes. TSA anticipates that
incorporating RBS principles throughout our operations will result in a
smaller, more capable workforce focused on our counterterrorism
mission.
Industry Engagement
Our industry and stakeholder partners are key to TSA's ability to
implement risk-based security into every area of transportation
security. These partners were key in the aviation sector as TSA worked
to establish and expand the TSA Pre3TM program. Airlines
worked with us to update their systems to handle new requirements, such
as Pre3TM interconnectivity and boarding pass markings, and
our airport partners worked with us to reconfigure checkpoint space to
accommodate a Pre3TM lane for passengers. To date, TSA has
expanded the program to 9 participating airlines at 118 airports
nationwide, and continues to partner with industry to add additional
partners and innovations to the program.
Our stakeholders were essential in understanding gaps and
implementing important new procedures across our Nation's airports
following last November's tragic shooting at Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX), which resulted in the death of Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) Gerardo Hernandez, and the wounding of Behavior Detection
Officer (BDO) Tony Grigsby, Security Training Instructor (STI) James
Speer, and a passenger. Immediately after the shooting I convened a
series of stakeholder meetings at TSA Headquarters, which included
representatives from law enforcement agencies and associations, labor
groups and industry associations, and other federal, state, and local
agencies. I requested that these stakeholders provide recommendations
on how TSA could improve security and prevent another tragic event.
Thereafter, I again met with stakeholders to present various ideas
under consideration and seek initial feedback.
I also sought the input of TSA employees, through both town hall
meetings and the TSA Idea Factory, our web-based employee engagement
tool. Employees from all levels of the organization contributed ideas,
including Federal Security Directors (FSDs), TSOs, staff from Training
and Coordination Centers, security inspectors, and headquarters
employees. A number of these ideas were incorporated into the final
report TSA produced on March 26, 2014.
The report identifies recommendations adopted by TSA based in part
on ideas and feedback generated by industry and law enforcement
stakeholders as well as the TSA workforce. TSA is implementing these
recommendations nationwide to close gaps identified through our LAX
review. Some of these measures include recommending that airport
operators conduct active shooter training and exercises on a bi-annual
basis, issuing an Operations Directive requiring that all FSDs conduct
mandatory evacuation drills twice a year, and requiring supervisors to
conduct briefings for employees regarding the evacuation routes and
rendezvous points identified in the local mitigation plan. TSA is also
issuing recommended standards for increased law enforcement presence at
high traffic airport locations such as peak travel times at checkpoints
and ticket counters to provide visible deterrence and quicker incident
response times.
TSA also recently extended invitations to 24 industry group and
association members to be part of TSA's Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC), which provides recommendations for improving aviation
security methods, equipment and procedures. The ASAC enhances TSA's
security posture through consultation with key partners concerning
potential risks to infrastructure, passengers and cargo, as well as
gathering input from stakeholders on the effectiveness of TSA's current
security procedures. Members then develop and share recommendations for
possible improvements to make TSA's policies more effective.
Within the surface transportation system, TSA continues to place
emphasis on industry engagement support and partnership as keys to
successfully developing security risk reduction policies. One example
is TSA's effort to implement a mass transit and passenger rail strategy
that prescribes specific, outcome-based risk reduction activities,
developed in concert with mass transit and passenger rail security
stakeholders.
International Engagement
Engaging international partners is also critical to implementing
effective risk-based security. Only with the collaboration and
cooperation of foreign governments and international aviation partners
can we mitigate international aviation threats. Overseas, TSA focuses
on compliance, outreach and engagement, and capacity development. By
conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections at
last points of departure (LPDs) to the United States, TSA is able to
identify, evaluate, and work with our international partners to address
vulnerabilities through outreach and engagement activities and targeted
capacity development. These areas of engagement, informed by
intelligence and combined with the efforts of our international
partners, form a strong foundation for enhancing risk-based security
worldwide.
TSA also worked diligently with our domestic and international
stakeholders on the Aircraft Repair Station rule. This regulation
strengthens foreign repair station security as directed by Congress
through The Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L.
108-176). The regulation supplements the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) repair station safety requirements by requiring
security measures to prevent unauthorized operation of aircraft under
repair.
Repair stations that are on or adjacent to a TSA-regulated airport
(or commensurate foreign facility) must adopt security measures to
prevent the unauthorized operation of unattended aircraft capable of
flight. This includes designating a TSA point of contact, securing
large aircraft (those with a maximum certificated take-off weight of
more than 12,500 pounds) capable of flight that are left unattended,
and conducting employee background checks for the point of contact and
any employee who has access to the keys or other means used to prevent
the unauthorized operation of the aircraft.. All repair stations
certificated under part 145 of the FAA rules are required to submit to
TSA inspections and implement any TSA-issued Security Directives. TSA
collaborated with the FAA during this process, and we are pleased that
the final rule enhances security while minimizing the cost to industry.
Surface Transportation
TSA must remain vigilant across all modes of transportation.
Although we know that our adversaries remain intent on targeting air
travel, which is why 97 percent of TSA's budget is focused on aviation,
TSA also has the responsibility for surface transportation security.
Surface transportation modes include mass transit and passenger rail,
pipelines, freight rail, and highway.
In the surface mode of transportation like surface and mass transit
where TSA does not conduct frontline screening, TSA engages with state,
local, and private sector partners to identify ways to reduce
vulnerabilities, assess risk, and improve security through
collaborative efforts. TSA continues to work to develop security
standards, assess vulnerabilities, develop plans to close
vulnerabilities, and use metrics to drive risk reduction in a
measurable way. An integral part of this effort is engaging
stakeholders in developing effective, operational security. For
example, TSA conducts corporate security reviews of Mass Transit
agencies to include Amtrak and over-the-road bus operators through the
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program. This
program is a thorough security assessment of mass transit and passenger
rail systems nationally and over-the-road-bus operations, performed by
our Transportation Security Inspectors-Surface (TSI-S). BASE
assessments are conducted with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit
and passenger railroad systems measured by passenger volume, which
account for over 80 percent of all users of public transportation.
TSA continues to work to develop security standards, assess
vulnerabilities, and use metrics to drive risk reduction in a
measurable way. An integral part of this effort is engaging
stakeholders in developing effective, operational security. As an
example, TSA and AMTRAK have a long-standing security partnership
through programs that aim to deter terrorist activity through expanded
random, unpredictable security activities. Amtrak has also expanded
coordination with rail and transit agencies and local law enforcement
through the Regional Alliance Including Local, State and Federal
Efforts (RAILSAFE) program. Operation RAILSAFE is a coordinated effort
involving counterterrorism activities such as heightened station and
right of way patrols, increased security presence on board trains,
explosive detection K9 sweeps and random passenger bag inspections. On
average more than 40 states and over 200 agencies participate,
including TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)
teams.
TSA also collaborates with industry through our Intermodal Security
Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP) across all modes of surface
transportation. I-STEP tests and evaluates the prevention, preparedness
and ability to respond to threats. As new threats develop, I-STEP
scenarios are updated to ensure that our industry partners are
appropriately prepared.
TSA works collaboratively and proactively with industry partners to
ensure resources are appropriately directed towards reducing risk to
critical pipeline infrastructure. The Implementing the Recommendation
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L 110-53) required TSA to develop
and implement a plan for inspecting the 100 most critical facilities of
the national pipeline system. These inspections were conducted between
2008 and 2011, with regular ongoing reviews through TSA's Critical
Facility Security Review program. I have personally taken the time to
meet with and engage with officials from the pipeline sector and I am
confident that our process of using current threat information and
industry best practices is producing strong, flexible and effective
security measures in a voluntary, rather than regulatory, manner.
TSA also partners with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to allocate transit security grants that assist states and
localities in buying down transportation risk through Federal security
funding. This funding allows for entities to increase mitigation of
terrorism risk through operational deterrence activities, site
hardening, equipment purchases, and other capital security
improvements. Between FY 2006 and FY 2013, approximately $2 billion in
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) funding was awarded to public
mass transit owners and operators, including Amtrak, and their
dedicated law enforcement providers. The FY 2014 grants cycle,
currently in progress, will add another $100M in funding to public mass
transit agencies and Amtrak. These grants provide funding to eligible
recipients to enhance security through critical infrastructure
remediation, equipment purchases, and operational activities such as
counterterrorism teams, mobile screening teams, explosives detection
canine teams, training, drills/exercises, and public awareness
campaigns.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams are a key
layer of security in the deterring transportation threats. VIPR teams
augment the security of any mode of transportation at any location
within the United States and are typically composed of federal, state,
and local law enforcement and security assets and TSA personnel
including FAMs, BDOs, TSOs, Transportation Security Specialists-
Explosives, Transportation Security Inspectors, and TSA-certified
explosives detection canine teams. These teams can be immediately
deployed to local multi-modal security operations nationwide, or
respond to specific requirements and emerging intelligence. While VIPR
teams have predominantly been deployed in surface modes, following
November's shooting at LAX, I directed that VIPR teams be split evenly
between surface and aviation modes. This VIPR deployment strategy has
garnered support among the TSA workforce and we will continue this
shift to enhance VIPR presence at airports, subject to adjustments
based on intelligence or special requirements.
Workforce Training
TSA's mission performance requires a skilled, professional
workforce. Through a variety of current initiatives, TSA has
incorporated professionalism, cultural awareness, and customer service
into our training. Specifically, TSA's new hire training is designed to
strengthen core competencies in teamwork, respect, communication, and
accountability. Further, TSA has expanded its partnership with the DHS
Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETCs) to provide additional
training courses for our screening officer workforce. This dedication
to developing front-line employees recognizes their contributions and
affirms their critical role in our risk-based security approach.
In addition to training for the frontline workforce, TSA offers
programs for all employees that enhance security and leadership skills
through advanced degree curricula and executive training at prestigious
institutions. TSA has also completed leadership training for nearly all
4,331 Supervisory TSOs, and we are implementing similar training for
our 5,500 Lead TSOs and 1,200 Transportation Security Managers. TSA
remains committed to the professional development for employees across
all levels of the organization.
Conclusion
TSA will continue to enhance its layered security approach through
state-of-the-art technologies, better passenger identification
techniques, best practices, and other developments that will continue
to strengthen transportation security across all modes of
transportation. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And I would call now upon the distinguished Ranking Member.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
oversight hearing on the TSA.
This is the first TSA hearing the Committee has held since
November 2011 and the first opportunity to hear from
Administrator Pistole since he provided a classified briefing
on aviation threats to committee members last February.
Last week, a public opinion survey released by Harris Poll
found that only half of respondents thought that TSA security
screening procedures make air travel safer.
Given this measure of public skepticism, which may reflect
the fact that we thankfully haven't experienced another 9/11-
style attack, I hope the Administrator can explain how his
recent efforts to implement a risk-based approach to
transportation security at the agency make it more efficient
and effective at fulfilling its mission of securing the
Nation's transportation systems.
I know Administrator Pistole has made this intelligence-
driven approach a top priority and has brought his former law
enforcement experience to bear in the process. So I look
forward to hearing about TSA's progress in implementing and
expanding the risk-based PreCheck program, which I was pleased
to hear has recently become easier for South Dakotans to
participate in after two PreCheck enrollment centers opened in
Rapid City and Pierre.
At the same time, there have been a number of recent
security breaches in the news that have raised concerns about
TSA's ability to oversee and regulate airport security beyond
the screening of passengers and baggage.
Last November, an individual entered a Los Angeles
International Airport terminal and shot a bystander and three
TSA employees, one of whom, Gerardo Hernandez, tragically died
from his injuries.
And just last week, a teenage stowaway scaled an airport
perimeter fence, climbed into an airplane wheel well, and
somehow survived a flight from San Jose to Maui, Hawaii.
Although TSA and FBI investigators have yet to release further
details on how he evaded detection by the airport's
multilayered security system, I hope the Administrator can
discuss generally the TSA's role in overseeing airport
perimeter security and access controls and how we all might
learn from these two incidents.
Technology is one tool that TSA uses to mitigate threats,
but the Agency's history of technology acquisition is spotty at
best, from the failed deployment of unreliable puffer machines
to the recent removal of those advanced imaging technology
machines that could not be modified to replace detailed images
of passengers with more generic images and automated threat-
detection software.
Industry stakeholders have also criticized TSA for making
it difficult for industry to plan ahead and invest in
innovative research and development.
Legislation to improve transparency and accountability in
technology acquisition spending by TSA cleared the House
unanimously last December. This legislation and a companion
bill introduced by our colleague, Senator Ayotte, and
cosponsored by Senator Blunt have been referred to this
committee, and I hope the Administrator can comment on these
bills and ongoing acquisition challenges.
Mr. Chairman, as we consider TSA's use of its resources, I
also want to note my concerns about recent increases to the
passenger aviation security fee adopted under the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2013. This Act, which was drafted without
authorizing committee input, raises the passenger fee on July 1
to $5.60 per passenger per one-way flight and diverts $12.6
billion of the total fees generated over the next 10 years to
deficit reduction rather than to aviation security.
While I certainly support deficit reduction, I do not think
that the air-traveling public should be singled out to pay for
it. In addition, commercial airlines have expressed concerns
about TSA's implementation of the increased fee, specifically
the elimination of the one-way trip cap and the resulting cost
increases for long, multi-leg, round-trip travel. I look
forward to hearing clarification from the Administrator on
exactly how the TSA will implement this fee change.
I am also looking forwarded to discussing the efforts that
TSA is undertaking in the surface transportation and maritime
sectors.
One TSA program that has come under increased scrutiny
recently is the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential, or TWIC, program that was referenced by Senator
Warner earlier. Recent reports from the Government
Accountability Office have raised serious questions about the
effectiveness of this program, and I would like to hear
Administrator Pistole's suggestions on how the TWIC program can
be improved.
I am also interested in hearing the Administrator's plans
for TSA to carry out its mission as the lead Federal agency for
all transportation security matters regardless of mode. I know
that in response to the recent shooting at LAX, TSA has reduced
the percentage of VIPR teams assigned to surface transportation
security from 70 percent to 50 percent, and I would like to
know whether the Administrator thinks this reduction will have
any negative consequences.
Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you for holding this
hearing. Thank you to Administrator Pistole for being here
today. And I look forward to the opportunity to ask questions.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
I want to make my opening remarks.
Actually, it occurs to me, Senator Barbara Boxer, that you
and I were the only two people on this committee before 9/11.
Senator Boxer. I think that is right.
The Chairman. I think that is right, yes.
Senator Boxer. I think that is accurate. We were together--
--
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Boxer.--that morning.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Remember?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Boxer. You grabbed my hand. We ran down the stairs.
The Chairman. Yes. Yes, I also remember--this is off the
record.
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. No, we are just--talk among yourselves.
The Chairman. I remember John Kerry--I said, come on, John.
Bill Nelson--we were having this Democratic leadership meeting,
before they pitched me out--he is not laughing.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Sort of laughing.
And, you know, we--boom, there was the Pentagon, and we
were looking right at it, because there was one of these huge
windows. And I said--and Bill Nelson and I took off in my car,
and we went a bunch of sort of phony secure places.
Senator Boxer. Oh, so Bill was there?
The Chairman. Yes, Bill was there. But John Kerry was also
there. And he was going down the stairs. I said, John, come
with me, let's get out of here. He said, no, I am going to go
back to my office.
So maybe he was working on the Middle East. I don't know.
Senator Boxer. Who knows?
The Chairman. Yes.
Anyway, in the wake of those attacks on September 11,
Congress worked on several fronts very fronts. The first bill
that we passed embarrasses me to this day. We passed a bill
allowing the CIA and the FBI to talk to each other. You could
not do that before.
You verify that?
Mr. Pistole. A number of limitations, Chairman.
The Chairman. OK. All right.
To secure our transportation system, we created the TSA
administration. That is where it came from. Barbara and Jay and
a few others helped do that. The TSA was given the monumental
task of protecting our aviation system, our ports, our rail
lines, our pipelines, wherever those are, at whatever level,
whatever map, however old, and our transportation system.
Since its inception, this agency has dealt with conflicting
mandates that have left it stuck between two very important
goals: we have asked the TSA to promote speed and efficiency--
fast get-through for passengers, et cetera--while at the same
time prioritizing safety and security. Now, these two don't
necessarily fit very well together. They can, I suppose.
And at the same time, the Agency has had to fulfill this
vast--you have something like, what, 250,000 people?
Mr. Pistole. No, that is the Department of Security writ
large.
The Chairman. That is Homeland Security writ--you are
right.
Mr. Pistole. We are just a portion of that.
The Chairman. You have a bunch. Anyway, you have had to do
all of this with limited resources. And as of our conversation
yesterday, I am going to ask you a lot of questions on limited
resources.
I was Chairman of this committee's Aviation Subcommittee
when the TSA was created, and I have watched it grow but also
struggle at times to meet its mission. However, these ups and
downs are becoming less common. This is partly due to a series
of legislative reforms and, importantly, the strong and steady
and consistent leadership of Administrator Pistole.
Today, I believe our aviation system is safer than it has
ever been. Since the TSA was created, we have had no successful
air attacks on American soil despite several efforts to have
that happen. We are also doing a better job at preempting
dangerous people and goods from getting on aircraft. And better
intelligence has resulted in real policy changes. This has
allowed authorities to act faster than ever to guarantee
travelers' safety.
Now, these are big words to say and hard to do.
Screening at American airports has also evolved and it has
improved. The TSA is harnessing advances in technology while
adequately balancing privacy concerns. And we are going to have
a meeting on that later in the afternoon. As a result, we have
seen shorter waiting times.
And I remind our members that more than 99 percent of
passengers move through security in less than 20 minutes,
including Al Gore. That is a far cry from the days when
security lines were, in fact, several hours long.
A lot of credit for these changes goes to TSA's new risk-
based approach, which you initiated, an approach that is
championed by you. How we refine and how we fund these risk-
based approaches will determine how successful we are in
adapting to our dangerous security concerns.
In the next decade, for example--and I want people to hear
this--air travel is predicted to grow from 700 million a year
to a billion people a year. How is it that we accommodate that
and make that work without spending more money to handle that
sheer volume?
But there is a severe lack of urgency among many in
Congress to invest in the security of other transportation
systems, just in general. Across the board, from our ports to
our rails, we are failing to make sensible investments that
will ultimately make traveling publicly safer and save us money
in the meantime. As a result, we have left vulnerable the
security of our ports and surface transportation systems, which
are all critical components of the TSA's mission and vice
versa.
While there is substantially less public focus on these
areas, these systems have been the target of terrorist plots.
An attack on a major port or in a crowded transit system could
be as devastating as an aviation incident easily.
Even in aviation, where we are focusing the bulk of our
resources, more work must be done. I continue to be concerned
about the gaps in general aviation security.
Now, I am not going to take off, as I would like to do, on
general aviation because they are not doing very much at all,
and they get a free ride, and they ride in huge planes that
could be carrying Semtex and all kinds of other things, but
they won't let anything happen to them. You say that they have
indicated they have made a few improvements, but I am
unimpressed.
Recent incidents have further raised important questions
about the security of our airports themselves. In November,
there was a tragic shooting at Los Angeles International
Airport. One TSA employee was killed, and seven others were
injured. Last week, the famous teenager thing, and we are all
trying to speculate on how he made it 9 hours up in a wheel
casement which I think was 50 degrees below zero. In any event,
he survived, so that is a happy ending. But it is not a happy
story, because he got into the airport, into the airplane, and
nobody noticed.
In the 13 years since TSA was created, we have learned that
transportation issues are not becoming easier to overcome. That
is because our world is becoming much more complex, and you
know what I mean by that. One of the only ways we are going to
meet these challenges is to provide the TSA with the resources
that it needs to get its job done. Nothing in the world is
plainer or truer to me. And, yes, we probably won't do it
unless things change, and then something awful will happen, and
then we will probably do a little bit but not enough.
To improve the overall security of our transportation
system, these resources must be allocated wisely across
aviation and surface transportation programs.
The men and women of the Transportation Security
Administration have done far more than they receive credit for.
And if there are any watching or listening, let them hear that.
They are taking care of us, and it is too often a thankless
task with few good options and too few resources.
So that ends me.
Barbara, are you sure you don't want to make an opening
statement?
Senator Boxer. No, I just have questions.
The Chairman. OK.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, though.
The Chairman. Well, then why don't we start with you on
questions, and then we will go to----
Senator Boxer. Is that OK with everybody?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Boxer. It is OK?
The Chairman. It is OK with me.
Senator Boxer. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. And John comes before I do, so----
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Is it OK if I--thank you.
Well, I just want to thank our Chairman and our Ranking
Member, not only for their leadership on this but also today
raising two issues that happened in California: the tragic
shooting at LAX of a TSA officer--it just happens to be the
entrance that I go to very often when I fly to Washington, and
I see that spot. And I saw it when we had roses all over the
floor there. It is just unbelievable, what happened. And the
second one, which was this terrible breach of security in San
Jose.
So I really want to, before I get into that, just thank you
for two things.
You know, sometimes you come here and you are pummeled, so
I wanted to thank you for the PreCheck system. I want to say,
it means so much to me, because for years I was begging TSA to
do this. Because it means, as we look for the needle in the
haystack, right, we are getting rid of a lot of those needles
that we don't have to look at. And it makes your job really
easier. And it really makes it better for people. People are
thrilled. They really are. And I talk to them all the time. So
thank you for that.
I want to also thank you for this report, ``Enhancing TSA
Officer Safety and Security.'' It came out after this tragedy
at LAX.
So I don't want to ask--we would have to be in a classified
setting. I don't want you to go into how you are changing
things, but let me just get a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer.
Are you working very closely in Los Angeles at LAX with the
other security forces there--the L.A. people, the LAX security
people? Because it is key; you have to be on one page. Are you
coordinating?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Senator. We work very closely with, they
are called LAWA, the police chief, Pat Gannon, and his
officers, to ensure that we have as seamless as possible a
response to another tragedy like this if it may happen.
Senator Boxer. And if there are any problems in that
regard, in terms of the cooperation, will you let me know?
Because, to me, that is the key.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, there----
Senator Boxer. You have to mobilize all the resources. That
was a mess. People were just not around. Passengers were just
running, didn't know in which direction. No one was in charge.
It was really a very bad situation.
So this requires your attention. And I am assuming it has
gotten your attention.
Mr. Pistole. It very much has. I have been to Los Angeles,
including the day after the shooting, November 2----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Pistole.--and then a number of times since then.
Senator Boxer. Good.
Mr. Pistole. Gina Marie Lindsey, the Airport Director, met
with the Mayor, a number of people, to ensure that we are doing
everything we can to address situations like that.
Senator Boxer. OK.
And my last question has to do with that incident that was
raised by my friends here. San Jose Airport, the early hours of
April 20, a 15-year-old boy was able to breach the perimeter
fence, climb unnoticed into the wheel well of a parked
aircraft.
And we are all thankful that this child survived the 5-hour
flight, but this situation, we can just use our imaginations.
If a 15-year-old kid can do this, who else can do this? I don't
have to go into detail. So this layered defense is critical.
Obviously didn't work.
And let me tell you what really, really concerns me. Three
weeks before this security breach, the TSA completed a
comprehensive, 3-month inspection of San Jose Airport. And what
did you find?
And I would ask unanimous consent to put this in the
record.
The Chairman. It is done.
Senator Boxer. You found that they were in compliance on
all counts, including a review of the perimeter security
through physical barriers and electronic access control
systems. They passed this.
Now, it is an 82-hour inspection. And, in your own words,
``San Jose Airport was found to be in compliance with its
security requirements for perimeter systems and measures,
including the fence line.'' And then you go into everything
that was done.
What happened here? What are people telling--I am sure you
called them in and said, huh? Are you kidding? This is a
nightmare. What did they say?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, so we are obviously following up on that,
Senator. As I think you and everyone----
Senator Boxer. Why are you just now following up on it? Why
didn't you follow up on it the next morning?
Mr. Pistole. Oh, no, we did. We did that night. Well, as
soon as we learned that there had been a stowaway. We have been
working that almost nonstop since then to find out exactly what
happened, what the airport authority who has the responsibility
for perimeter security--we, of course, work with them in terms
of the airport security plan to say----
Senator Boxer. No. You are not----
Mr. Pistole.--here is what----
Senator Boxer.--answering me. I am sorry. You found them in
compliance 3 weeks before this happened.
Mr. Pistole. So there----
Senator Boxer. And it is not about a stowaway. It is
about--it is not about a stowaway. It is about the fact that
someone leaped over that fence and got onto a plane. What if it
was someone else?
So I don't understand. I just think you are too calm about
this. I don't understand. I want to know, what are you doing
about this?
Mr. Pistole. So we are working with the airport, obviously,
in our regulatory capability. We have the ability to fine the
airport for allowing this to happen, because it is an egregious
violation of the airport's perimeter.
Senator Boxer. So you think it was a failure of their
personnel, not their fencing or everything that you checked.
Mr. Pistole. So, as you know, with 450 airports, there is
no one-size-fits-all for each airport, so we inspect each one
to assess, for that location, is the perimeter fencing--along
with a number of other things. We actually did have two
findings unrelated to the perimeter security.
Their fencing was in fine shape, but as at least one prior
Secretary of Homeland Security said, ``show me a 15-foot fence
and I will show you a 16-foot ladder.'' So there is no perfect
solution, so what we do is try to buy down risk in a measured
fashion that allows us to make sure that we are doing
everything possible.
The fact is there was no CCTV coverage showing where he
actually went over. We know what he said, where he went over
the fence, and then what he did, as you described.
Senator Boxer. OK. Are you concerned that your organization
cleared this airport just 3 weeks before and said they were in
compliance, including physical barriers and electronic access
control systems?
Mr. Pistole. So I would like to draw a distinction between
what our regulatory compliance work is to say, they have the
systems in place; the question is, do they work at every
instance? And there is no 100 percent solution here, Senator,
as you know. So we can build fortresses around airports for
access----
Senator Boxer. But where is the layered defense? What is
the layered defense here?
Mr. Pistole. So there are a number of opportunities. There
could be armed officers or with canines out patrolling. There
could be better CCTV coverage. There could be a second fence in
some situations. You can look at Ben Gurion Airport to see what
they do. That is----
Senator Boxer. Well, let's do it.
I don't want to take any more time. I just wanted to say
this. You cleared them, and that is troubling to me. Why didn't
you know that they didn't have the dogs? Is something wrong
here?
I am very worried about this, because it isn't enough to
fill out a piece of paper and say, ``Check.'' This is really
serious business--really serious business. What if it was
someone else with an explosive----
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Senator Boxer.--that got on that plane?
Hey, this is bad news. And I just would like not to
continue this conversation now, A, because of my colleagues'
getting probably very annoyed with me because I have gone over,
but, B, I think we need to meet in a different type of
setting----
Mr. Pistole. I would be glad to do that.
Senator Boxer.--to find out what the heck is going on here.
Because I don't want this happening at anybody else's airports.
And I just don't feel the sense of urgency in your voice that I
would like to hear.
Mr. Pistole. So, thank you for that comment, Senator. I try
not to be too over-the-top. I try to be measured in what I do.
And I think that what we do is measured in terms of--we
could require airports to do much, much more. The question is,
who pays for that? And if Congress doesn't fund us to fund the
airports, then that is an unfunded mandate for the airports.
So we try to work in partnership as best we can to buy down
risk and to do what we can to try to prevent risk, but not try
to eliminate risk.
Senator Boxer. OK. I get it. Don't throw it away from the
fact that you cleared these people and that is wrong. And there
ought to be----
Mr. Pistole. I respectfully disagree, Senator----
Senator Boxer.--an explanation.
Mr. Pistole.--because I think if you go into detail as to
what we are doing in terms of clearing, I think you are drawing
the wrong conclusion from why we are, as you say, clearing.
We are assessing the airport security program. If it is
done to our standards, then we will say, yes, you are doing it
to our standards. It is not a guarantee that nothing bad will
ever happen. So if that is what you are getting to, if you are
looking for a 100 percent guarantee, that is not going to
happen.
Senator Boxer. I am looking for a layered defense----
Mr. Pistole. Which we have. Which the airports have.
Senator Boxer. Well, no. Did not----
Mr. Pistole. It is not a guarantee 100 percent, ma'am.
Senator Boxer. Did not happen. This is serious business.
Mr. Pistole. I agree.
Senator Boxer. I don't think you are taking it that
seriously.
Mr. Pistole. I disagree.
Senator Boxer. That is fair enough.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Senator Boxer. I still like you.
Mr. Pistole. I like you, too. We disagree.
The Chairman. Thank you, Chairperson Boxer.
I call now upon Chairman Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I like you and
Senator Boxer and Mr. Pistole.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Pistole. Senator.
Senator Thune. I have a TWIC question. You heard Senator
Warner's statement about the problems with TWIC, specifically
whether the background checks are robust enough and are
refreshed often enough to identify those who represent a threat
to our transportation infrastructure. And I am just wondering
how you would respond to that critique.
Mr. Pistole. No, I agree with Senator Warner that the
tragedy at the Norfolk Navy Yard was very unfortunate.
I think there is still some uncertainty as to the facts,
whether the shooter actually displayed the TWIC card to gain
access, which we know a TWIC card does not grant access to a
naval base; it grants access to ports. And I would defer to the
Navy, in terms of their investigation, as to whether he
actually displayed that card.
That being said, in terms of the background, we have been
working on some of the legal aspects of what we are authorized
to consider, both from a policy standpoint but also from a
statutory standpoint. So I would look forward to working with
the Committee in trying to tighten up some of those gaps which
I believe were identified as a result of this tragic shooting.
Senator Thune. Are we routinely checking TWIC holders
against relevant criminal and counterterrorism databases to
mitigate the risk that these people are getting access to
sensitive locations?
Mr. Pistole. We do as to the terrorism database. So if
somebody is a TWIC card holder and they are placed on the
terrorism watchlist by another agency, then that information is
pushed to us and we are made aware of that, and then we take
steps to revoke that TWIC card, for example.
If it is a criminal arrest or something, as Senator Warner
testified, that is not pushed to us. And that is one of those
gaps.
So we know that about a third of all the TWIC card holders
do have criminal histories, but that is acceptable under the
statute. And so that is something--I mean, these are dock
workers, these are port workers, in large part.
But that criminal information is not, or that updated
information, not pushed to us. So it is only done at the
issuance of the card and then on a reissuance, say, 5 years
later.
So that is something that would be beneficial, in terms of
buying down risk, to say if somebody had been not necessarily
arrested but at least convicted, particularly of a felony,
particularly of a violent felony, that we should get that
information so we can take appropriate action, similar to the
terrorist watchlist.
Senator Thune. OK.
As I noted in my opening statement, the Bipartisan Budget
Agreement of 2013, which, again, I would add, was drafted
without authorizing committee input, increased the TSA
passenger security fee from $2.50 per enplanement with a cap of
$5 per one-way trip to a flat $5.60 per one-way trip beginning
July 1 of this year.
And we, of course, hear general complaints about the
increased cost of travel, but we have been hearing concerns
regarding TSA's implementation of the act and specifically that
a multi-leg, roundtrip itinerary could be subject to much
higher fees than even the statutory increase would seem to
indicate.
And it is my understanding, and correct me if I am wrong,
that in response to industry inquiries, TSA suggested that a
single roundtrip with five or six legs could be treated as five
or six one-way trips. And so you could generate roughly $30 in
fees even though the previous $5 cap per one-way trip would
have limited those total fees to $10. And I am just curious if
that is accurate.
Mr. Pistole. That is not my understanding. Obviously, our
lawyers have been working on this. My understanding is it is
$5.60 per one-way, and as long as that one-way trip is not
interrupted by more than 4 hours in a transiting airport, then
it is still considered one-way. So let's say you flew from
Dulles to O'Hare to LAX, as long as O'Hare is less than 4
hours, Dulles to LAX is still one-way and that is $5.60.
Now, the roundtrip portion, if--did you want to go into
that?
Senator Thune. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. On the roundtrip, we have not taken the
position that that existing $10 cap applies because that is not
what the Bipartisan Budget Act said. It doesn't address the
cap. And so we are just reading the statute and saying it is
$5.60 one way, so it is $5.60 the other way, so that is $11.20
rather than $10.
Senator Thune. So there is no departure from the precedent
as to what constitutes a one-way trip today?
Mr. Pistole. There is a different--the statute is
different. The existing talks about enplanement, and I think
there has been some discussion about that. But as I outlined,
that is my understanding. And I will take that back with our
lawyers to make sure that is consistent.
Senator Thune. If you would, that would be great. Because
it sounds like what TSA is proposing is to treat each
enplanement as a one-way trip, whereas previously it was
recognized that a one-way trip could include several
enplanements.
Mr. Pistole. That is correct.
Senator Thune. OK. Well, you could read that new law, then,
as simply replacing the $5 cap per one-way trip----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Thune.--with a $5.60 cap per one-way trip, which
would still be a significant increase for people who have only
been paying $2.50 for a one-way trip with a single enplanement.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Thune. I would appreciate if you could get some
clarification to us on exactly how you intend to implement
that. Because we are hearing, obviously, some concerns about
that.
Mr. Pistole. OK.
Senator Thune. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman, so
I will turn it over back to you and let some other people ask
questions.
The Chairman. Good. I don't mean ``good.'' I should just
say ``thank you.''
When we talked yesterday, Administrator Pistole, I told you
that I am overwhelmed with the lack of possibilities in the
future for our safety and for all kinds of inventiveness and
STEM and research and everything because of the lack of
revenue. And there are people here who will do anything other
than raise revenue.
I remember going to a hearing at Chicago airport with Dick
Durbin and Mayor Daley--Mayor Daley at that time--because they
had eight runways, but two of them crossed, and they have to
take out some public housing to build in room for another
runway. And so the point is it is in the middle of the city, so
to speak, and there it is with no more space whatsoever.
Now, I go from the 700 million to 1 billion passengers and
I try to contemplate, what in heaven's name is O'Hare going to
do? Or Santa Fe, New Mexico, or Albuquerque, you know, much
less Charleston, West Virginia.
At some point, if you don't have resources, you can't
testify that things are safer. You can say you are doing your
best. And you are. And I think you are the perfect guy for this
job, and I have told you that, because you are very
workmanlike. You don't do it in a flashy sense, but you get it
done.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
The Chairman. But do you believe that we have resource
problems?
Mr. Pistole. Clearly, with the expanding passenger growth,
we will be challenged to keep up with those passenger loads at
the same throughputs and same level of security and efficiency.
So, clearly, that is an issue for us.
I believe, that being said, that through our risk-based
security initiatives, we are making significant strides in both
buying down risk and being more efficient. But when you are
talking about those multiples, going from 700 million to a
billion----
The Chairman. That is what I am talking about.
Mr. Pistole.--that makes it a challenge, as it does for
each airport, as you described, in terms of their physical
infrastructure and their ability to process people through.
For example, LAX, on busy days in the summer, they will
have over 100,000 people go through their 9 terminals. That is
a lot of people, and it creates a lot of challenges for
everybody.
The Chairman. Second part of my question. We discussed this
yesterday. Could you please tell us where you could
immeasurably improve security on your watch if you did have
more resources?
Mr. Pistole. So I think there are two parts to that,
Chairman. And thank you.
I think the one is expanding the risk-based security
initiatives. And so we were at 40 airports last year, 118 now,
and up to 600 TSA PreCheck lanes, either full-time or part-
time. I see the future of TSA being the majority of passengers
going through expedited screening, either TSA PreCheck or one
of our other programs. We have 75 and older, 12 and under,
things like that.
I also see that same thing being applied to checked bags
and carry-on bags. I mentioned the 1.5 billion, you know, that
we screen every year. So that is something that I see.
The challenge becomes, what is the point of--the return on
investment. So at what point does the number of passengers
overload the system for our efficient handling with the best
security? The more prescreening we can do of passengers, cargo,
and baggage, the better job we can do of buying down risk in a
measured way to say, yes, we have high confidence that this is
not an underwear bomber or there is not a toner cartridge bomb
in this package.
The bottom line is the threats are real. I provided a
classified briefing for some of your colleagues in the House
yesterday going over some of the latest intelligence. And it
concerns me greatly, about what terrorists are continuing to do
in terms of focusing on aviation, particularly Western
aviation.
So, given all that, yes, we have to work together with
airlines, airports, industry, passengers, and particularly with
the Congress to make sure we have the resources to do the job,
to make sure there is not another 9/11 or some other type of
attack.
The Chairman. And, you know, a problem that we all have--
and I would just say this to my friend, Senator Thune. I say it
all the time, but it is just so inbred that it is pointless.
You can't give your own views, as director of TSA, when you
testify. It has to be approved by the Office of Management and
Budget. And if they think you are going out too far this way or
too far that way or you are extending yourself to some point of
vulnerability, then you can't say it.
I really resent that. I don't resent you; I resent that.
For heaven's sake, if we have these hearings and we are trying
to find out what we need to do, you have to be able to say
where you are hurting and where you are not. And if OMB doesn't
like it, that is too bad. What you will get is much more
support from those of us on this committee because we will know
that you are talking to us straight.
Now, you have edged into some subjects, and I congratulate
you for that. But, you know, then you talked about all the
PreCheck and, you know, expedited screening procedures. The
more you do that, in order to cut down on time, the more you
put at risk certain security measures, potentially. Somewhere,
there is a cross-line there. And I don't know where it is, but
I worry about that.
And my time is up. So, Senator Scott?
STATEMENT OF HON. TIM SCOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much
for holding this very important hearing on our security through
our transportation area.
Administrator Pistole, thank you for your dedication to a
very difficult task, as we listen to the folks on both sides
cross-examine you, in many ways. I am going to provide more of
that in a second here, but we do appreciate your public service
to our Nation.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Scott. Yes, sir.
We have heard the Chairman and others talk about the need
for speed and efficiency, safety and security, and the use of
technology. And the final point that he was talking about is
the lack of revenues or the limited resources that we have.
My question really comes down to, what is your takeaway
from some of the challenges of using technology that was either
unproven or just inconsistent with the environment that it
would be put into?
I think specifically about the puffer machines, $160,000
each, now probably sitting in a warehouse somewhere. I am not
sure what the return on the investment is on that. I think
about the full-body scanners, 800 of them now sitting
somewhere, as well, perhaps not being used as effectively as
possible. Or the SPOT program that, of course, well-intentioned
as it was, had a $200 million rollout cost, perhaps not
performing and getting accomplished what we would like to see
accomplished.
My question to you, Administrator Pistole, is, as you look
at those rollouts or those uses of technology, some untested,
just some didn't work out well, what is your takeaway for how
we look at the limited resources, a lack of revenues, and yet
we have spent a lot of money doing things that just haven't
worked very well?
And part of the challenge that I see is that some of these
things came out without any cost-benefit analysis being
performed before we used the very limited resources in a fairly
ineffective way.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. And thank you, Senator. And I wish I had
a nickel for every time the puffer machines have been brought
up with me, because that was an inartful, ineffective rollout
of an unproven technology in the actual airport environment. It
preceded my time, but I am responsible for it now.
But I think one of the lessons learned from there, for
example, was we did not have a testing facility to really test
equipment before deployed. And so we created the Transportation
Security Integration Facility just south of Reagan Airport,
which I invite all Senators to come out and visit anytime,
where we test with the latest technology before we deploy. So
that is one of the lessons learned.
Two is on the acquisition process that a couple Senators
have mentioned. We have learned a lot over the 12 years since
TSA was created on how to do acquisition on a more timely
basis, a more informed basis, more transparent basis, and I
think we have made great progress in that.
And so we are working with industry to acquire technology
that, one, helps buy down risk, but, two, does it in a cost-
effective way, and not only here in the U.S. but working
internationally, because we are trying to harmonize
international standards. And we realize that as other countries
acquire the latest technology that is commensurate with ours,
that buys us down risk across the board. Because we know that
since 9/11 all the threats to aviation have emanated from
overseas. So we want to make sure our overseas partners are as
well-equipped to buy down risk as we are.
So I think we have learned several lessons and we have
tried to be good stewards in these last 3 years. So, for
example, our budget from Fiscal Year 2012 to 2015 has gone down
by over $500 million. So we have had to become more efficient,
we have had to buy down risk in a way that recognizes there are
limited resources, so let's make sure we make wise investments.
Senator Scott. I know you have answered this question in
part previously, with Senator Warner's comments, Senator
Boxer's comments on the TWIC program, or it may have been
Senator Thune's comments on the TWIC program.
Looking into the future of the TWIC program, what real
changes, substantial changes, do you see?
And I will say that, speaking from a South Carolinian's
perspective, residing in the Charleston area and thinking about
the beauty of our coastlines and the economic contributions of
our ports and the vigilence that it will take for us to make
sure that we secure ourselves from the ports perspective, what
do you see happening?
Mr. Pistole. So I think the TWIC card is a good idea in the
sense of identifying people who have access to sensitive areas
of ports, so we are doing a security threat assessment to know
we are not allowing terrorists to get access to a port. And
that is the bottom-line purpose of TWIC.
That being said, the deployment of card-readers in high-
risk ports has been slow for a number of reasons. We work very
closely with Coast Guard, which has that responsibility. I
understand they will have a TWIC card-reader rule out sometime
early next year.
So we work very closely in partnership with the Coast Guard
to say, how can we buy down risk jointly? Because, obviously,
TSA is not at the port, we are not reading the cards, we are
not providing access to the ports and all the things; we just
do the security assessment on the front end.
Senator Scott. And I know I am out of time. I may contact
your office later on an additional question that I have on TSA
PreCheck and the application by different airlines.
Mr. Pistole. OK. Look forward to it, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Come on, big guy. It is your turn.
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY BOOKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Booker. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
And the thoroughness of my colleagues, many of the
questions I had have been addressed, maybe not as sufficiently
as I would like.
And I would enjoy to have a conversation in a more
confidential environment, given a lot of the threats that we
obviously see there, when you see things that happen like they
did in California. And, obviously, someone stowing away in a
wheel, I know that it rises to your level of concern.
Mr. Pistole. It does.
Senator Booker. You guys have been doing a better and
better job and a good job. But if better is possible, even good
is not enough. And so we constantly have to see us getting
better.
Questions were asked, which I appreciate, about the
increased funding that you have already gotten and how that
might be being applied. I am happy to hear that there are some
caps that our residents who often have to take multiple--like
some of my colleagues, in fact, when they fly, have to take
multiple links, and that those will, if I understand it, never
be more than that $5.60 and $5.60, depending on if a roundtrip.
Is that correct?
Mr. Pistole. That is generally correct. I mentioned that
one 4-hour exception, so if you are in a transiting airport for
more than 4 hours, then it would be considered----
Senator Booker. That is on a scheduled flight. So if I have
a layover that ends up because of weather being 5, 6, 7 hours?
Mr. Pistole. I am not sure about that, Senator. I will have
to look into that.
Senator Booker. I would love to know that.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Booker. And so, since a lot of the areas I wanted
to discuss have been discussed, I would like to just pin down
on the surface transportation security, which is something that
deeply concerns me.
Because in New Jersey we have a lot, with such a dense
area, we have a lot of vulnerabilities. We house many chemical
manufacturing sites and facilities in our state, and I worry
about a breach in security there. It may not end up just being
a person stowing away but could end up causing extreme havoc
and untold damage on life and property.
And so, this increased funding that you get, you know, what
are you doing, what additional steps are you taking now to
secure transportation sectors?
Mr. Pistole. So, of course, because we don't have the
frontline responsibility for surface transportation--for
example, Amtrak Police does, and we work in concert with them--
or pipelines or the rail, either passenger or freight, what we
try to do is be a force multiplier for either those state or
the local authorities that have that responsibility.
For example, Port Authority of New York/New Jersey, we work
very closely with them to ensure that targets have been
hardened. For example, if we went into a classified setting, I
could tell you exactly what we have done over the years to
harden particular vulnerable targets in your state.
Then, how can we do things that would enhance, for example,
training; providing our VIPR teams to high-profile events, such
as the Super Bowl that was just held. So we have VIPR teams
there that helped, we believe, buy down risk as a visible show
of force.
So there are a number of things we do to supplement those
frontline efforts.
And recognizing that only about 3 percent of our budget is
dedicated to surface transportation. Ninety-seven percent is on
aviation because that is the way we are funded. So----
Senator Booker. And, Administrator, just given that, if you
had more funding, what more would you do?
Mr. Pistole. Well, there are a number of things we could
do, in terms of provide more LEO-reimbursable funds to state
and local police and Amtrak and others, either for additional
training or for overtime for officers who may want to have a
more visible presence, like at Penn Station, Newark, or
whatever.
We could do more training. We could do more infrastructure
hardening of targets. There are a number of things we could do.
But that is not where we are right now, so we do what we can,
again, as supplement to those frontline resources.
Senator Booker. And, Mr. Chairman, I am going to stop
there. I am grateful for the Administrator. He has a very, very
difficult job. I know----
The Chairman. You have plenty of time.
Senator Booker. I know I do, but I want to stop there, but
just encourage us to perhaps get into a confidential setting,
because some of my questions about specific areas are
important. Or maybe that is something we can do individually.
The Chairman. A secure setting.
Senator Booker. A secure setting, a location to be--a
secure location.
The Chairman. We are all going to meet in Kelly Ayotte's
office.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. And you are next.
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. Chairman, we might need a little more space
than my office. But I think we should meet in your office. That
would be even better.
Thank you for being here.
Mr. Pistole. Senator.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate you have a challenging
position but very important leadership position for the
country.
And I wanted to ask you about a bill. We have seen some
examples in the past of some challenging--and I won't just pick
on TSA for this, but one of the challenges I think that has
been across the government is acquisition challenges. And some
of those acquisition challenges, and particularly in the IT
area, where we have invested but we haven't really been able to
get the outcome that we want or the system that has been
effective for us.
So I have introduced a bill that actually passed the House
416 to zero. Now, that is a rare moment, in and of itself. The
bill is called the ``Transportation Security Acquisition Reform
Act.'' The legislation would just essentially implement a
number of good-government reforms to help streamline TSA's
acquisition process, have greater transparency, and
accountability to the public.
So some of the things it would do is develop and share with
the public, for the first time, a strategic multiyear
technology investment plan; share key information with Congress
on technology acquisitions, including cost overruns, delays, or
technical failures, within 30 days of identifying the problem
so we can work with you; better manage and utilize the
inventory; and report goals for contracting with small
businesses.
Have you had a chance to look at the legislation?
Mr. Pistole. I have, Senator, and----
Senator Ayotte. What do you think of it?
Mr. Pistole.--yes, I think it is generally good. We have
worked with Senator Richard Hudson and his staff in the House,
one of the sponsors there. And I think, one, it does a couple
things. It recognizes that we have made some progress over the
last few years to improve the process, which was in many ways
broken. And so we are taking those steps.
There may be some technical language that we would want to
work with the Committee on to make sure that we are achieving
the outcomes that are intended and that there aren't some
unintended consequences, in terms of some reporting
requirements.
But, overall, I applaud the bill and support it, in terms
of what I have seen. So----
Senator Ayotte. Fantastic. I appreciate that. And, you
know, I look forward to us addressing that bill in the
Committee, especially since it had unanimous support in the
House. I am glad to hear your endorsement of it and look
forward to working with you on this important issue.
I also wanted to ask you about the issue of exit-lane
staffing, because there have been some concerns raised to me
that TSA may be walking away from staffing exit lanes at
certain airports, in reliance on a provision that was included
in last year's budget agreement that requires the agency to
continue to perform those services. So, in other words, that
this may be contradicting that, and that one of the arguments
that is being made is that if an airport makes any changes to
an existing exit lane, including infrastructure, then TSA won't
continue to man that exit-lane position.
So can you just help me understand the Agency's position on
this and what is happening with regard to exit lanes?
And, obviously, if an airport is willing to make
investments in infrastructure that could actually improve the
airport, I wouldn't imagine that would be or should be a factor
as long as they meet your standards in terms of what kind of
staffing would be present.
So if you could help me with that----
Mr. Pistole. Right. Thank you, Senator, because that is
something--because of our reduced budget, we were looking for
ways to save taxpayer money. And not staffing exit lanes, which
we see as access points as opposed to security screening
functions--we only do exit-lane staffing in about a third of
the 450 airports currently.
So, as we tried to get out of that business to save about
$100 million a year, so a billion dollars over 10 years, what
we found is there was a lot of opposition to that from those
150, 160 airports that we do staff, because it would be
basically an unfunded mandate on them.
So what I see as the long-term solution, and I think others
generally would agree, is that technology is, in most
instances, the long-term solution to get both airports and TSA
out of the business of humanly staffing those exit lanes.
Senator Ayotte. Using, like, surveillance and technology
or----
Mr. Pistole. There are dozens of different technologies,
including that, including doors, ``mantraps'' they call them,
and different things, any number of things. But to work in a
collaborative fashion to look at long-term, not just year by
year.
And so your specific question relates to the Bipartisan
Budget Act, which had an effective date of December 1, which
said if we were providing security staffing or exit-lane
staffing as of December 1, then we are required to continue
that.
So if we weren't doing it December 1, then the question
becomes--and this is what the lawyers are discussing. If it is
a new exit lane or----
Senator Ayotte. The lawyers are always involved.
Mr. Pistole. Being a recovering lawyer, I can appreciate
what they are doing. So it is----
Senator Ayotte. I am, as well.
Mr. Pistole. I appreciate that, and Senator Coats and
others.
So I think they are just trying to work out what is the
best way forward as airports reconfigure. And is it collocated
with a security checkpoint, or is it over there, where there
are no TSA people? And so do we put somebody over there by
themselves or two people?
So I think, look, I want to find a solution to it that
makes sense not just now but for long-term, and I think
technology is the key to that.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that. And, obviously, I think
it makes sense that your agency is really communicating with
the airports and coming up with a mutually acceptable solution.
That would make a lot of sense.
Mr. Pistole. We are communicating, but we might not always
agree. But, yes, we are communicating, I think, effectively.
Senator Ayotte. Great. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal?
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for holding this hearing.
Thank you for being here today.
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
program. In your testimony before this committee back in 2011,
you were asked, on a scale of 1 to 10, how you would rate the
progress that has been made, or had been made by then, on the
TWIC program. You put it at 3. What would be your grade today?
Mr. Pistole. I would put it at probably a 6 or so, maybe 7,
because it is achieving the purpose of buying down risk so we
don't let terrorists have a credential that authorizes them
access to a secure-area port. So that is continuing, and that
is a good thing.
I think where it still is lacking is the deployment of the
card readers in high-risk ports around the country that allow
those cards to be used as intended to verify the identity, so
if it is you coming with your TWIC card, that Coast Guard and
the port authorities who provide that staffing can look at that
and say, yes, that is you, that is not a stolen card, it is not
an outdated card. Because a flash pass doesn't do much,
frankly.
Senator Blumenthal. Is the obstacle to the remaining
progress, whether it is from 6 or 7 to 10, one of resources or
management? How would you characterize it?
Mr. Pistole. It is a complex issue, as I am sure you know,
Senator. So I would say resources, management, cooperation with
ports, port workers, having a rule that people can buy into and
accept, which the Coast Guard is working on. And, again, I
think that is due to be published in the first of next year or
something.
Senator Blumenthal. On surface transportation security
generally, where would you say we are most vulnerable right
now? What keeps you awake at night on surface transportation?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, so I am concerned about all the attacks
that have taken place overseas in surface, whether it is the
Madrid bombings, whether it is the London Tube bombings,
whether it is the Moscow subway, whether it is trains in India
and Pakistan. You know, we have had more killed in those
surface attacks since 9/11 than we have in aviation on 9/11, so
the nearly 3,000.
So my concern is that one or more of those attacks,
including perhaps a situation like in Mumbai, the active
shooter scenario, could take place here. And we have good
defenses in many ways, and I won't go into detail where I think
those are, just for obvious reasons. But there is clearly, to
the Chairman's point, with additional resources, additional
things could be done to buy down that risk.
So, given where we are today, I think we are as well-
positioned as we could be, recognizing, as you saw in your
state, that a shooter can do something tragic in a very short
amount of time and there is just no 100 percent guarantee. So,
given what we have, where we are, I believe we are as well-
poised as we can be.
Senator Blumenthal. And in order to achieve what you would
regard as an acceptable level of security in surface
transportation, do you have a ballpark figure and a length of
time?
Mr. Pistole. No, I don't, Senator. I would have to give
that some thought. Because if you start with the major
metropolitan areas and look at what is being done--for example,
you know, between Connecticut and New York and New Jersey,
there is a lot of great work being done to buy down risk on
Metro-North or on the New York City Subway system or the MARC
train, different--or, I mean, the PATH train and things.
So there is a lot that is being done. If there were
additional resources, could more be done? Sure. That is a
question of, what is that return on investment for something
that hasn't happened here? And so that is part of that public
policy question of, what do we invest in something that may or
may not happen?
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you a question about the
PreCheck program on air transportation. There are two separate
lines in most airports.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Blumenthal. Is there any procedure for shutting
down the PreCheck line and making everybody go through the
regular check? Is that a----
Mr. Pistole. We could do that. I am trying to envision a
scenario where we would do that.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, let me just tell you why I am
asking. I encountered this situation myself, and I had reports
of people telling me that the PreCheck line was, in effect,
eliminated and everybody was going through just one line. And I
don't know whether that is a situation that has come to your
attention.
Mr. Pistole. So, out of the 600-plus TSA PreCheck lanes we
have around the country, out of 2,200 lanes around the country
all together, about 300 of those are full-time, meaning they
are open whenever the checkpoint is open. So about half of
those are only open during the morning rush, afternoon rush,
whenever that may be.
It may be that you encountered a situation where, because
of staffing levels and things, resources, we can't staff those
full-time because there are only a few people, perhaps, going
through. That may be what happened, but I would have to look
into it specifically and would like to follow up on that with
staff to figure out if that is what it was.
Senator Blumenthal. Great. Thank you very much.
My time has expired. Thanks for your testimony.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Klobuchar, to be followed by Senator Coats.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Administrator, for your good work. I think you
have some great people in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport. You
know----
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar.--it is one of our stellar airports, and
we are proud of the work they do. And I know what hard jobs
they have and what a hard job you have.
You were just talking with Senator Blumenthal about the TSA
PreCheck. And I support the expansion of PreCheck, but I am
concerned that making the expansion without preparation could
negatively impact the expedited screening process that you are
supposed to get. And as your prepared testimony says, more than
180,000 people have submitted applications at the 240-plus
application centers nationwide.
What is the screening process now, and how long does it
take for the average application to be processed?
Mr. Pistole. And just to update that, we have actually had
now slightly over 200,000. And so it takes around 30 days or
less, typically, to process that and then to issue a known-
traveler number, which that person then takes and enters into
their passenger profile. So that is what we are looking at.
And as more and more people sign up, either for TSA
PreCheck or for Global Entry, then what we see as the expansion
of either more lanes or more hours, to Senator Blumenthal's
issue I believe, to expand the hours of operation that those
TSA PreCheck lanes would be open.
And I think the analogy to a supermarket checkout lane
where, if you have 10 items or less, you go through that lane,
and there may be 3 or 4 or 5 people in that lane, so it looks
like a long line because there is only 1 person over in this
lane, checkout lane, but if that checkout lane has a month's
worth of groceries in 2 full grocery baskets, that is still
going to take a lot longer than going through the 4 or 5 people
ahead.
So we have had some challenges in some airports at certain
times, but the goal is to have TSA PreCheck lanes move quickly
and efficiently with the best security and to try to get people
through in, frankly, 5 minutes or less in the TSA PreCheck
lanes.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And let me make clear, I have never
been in a longer line than the Safeway in Penn Quarter, so none
of your lines are longer than that. So thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Good to hear, Senator.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. So maybe not an analogy you want to
keep using.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Pistole. OK. I will come up with a new one.
Senator Klobuchar. Well, for some places.
So the staffing levels at airports--and, I mean, again, the
expansion is good, but we just continue to be concerned if it
doesn't work.
And for passengers, there is something going on at
Minneapolis-St. Paul. I don't know if you heard about this. An
advisory was issued for passengers to arrive two and a half
hours early for domestic flights during peak hours. I had never
heard of this before. And fewer security personnel was a reason
cited for the need for them to arrive earlier.
And there are people--I talked to the airport director--
there are people that have been missing their planes that had
gotten there 2 hours earlier. And I understand this isn't
strictly a TSA problem.
Can you explain what you are doing to ensure there is
sufficient TSA personnel?
Part of it is that the flights are all leaving--suddenly we
are a hub--in a certain time period, and literally they have to
have people there two and a half hours early.
Mr. Pistole. And I think you have identified the issue, hit
it on the head. TSA obviously has some role in that, and we
have addressed it with our Federal Security Director there, in
terms of those times. I think if you found, many times, wait
times at TSA PreCheck--or TSA lanes writ large of more than 20
minutes, there have been a few, but that two and a half hours
is exactly what you are talking about in terms of other issues.
So, actually, Richard Anderson, the CEO of Delta, and I
have spoken about this and looking at ways that we can both do
things that will improve the efficacy, if you will, of that
whole process. So there is a lot of----
Senator Klobuchar. They need to space out their flights a
little, as well, yes.
Mr. Pistole. I would defer to them----
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Mr. Pistole.--defer to them on that.
Senator Klobuchar. That might be helpful.
So, OK, TSA has been mandated to ensure that Transportation
Worker Identification Credential enrollment, which is, as we
know, a TWIC, activation, issuance, and renewals require no
more than one in-person visit to an enrollment center within
270 days. TSA has indicated that the reforms are under way but
that full implementation of the one-trip requirement would not
occur until the third quarter of 2014, which would be a year
late.
In November of last year, Senator Ayotte and I wrote you
with a concern regarding the timeline for the implementation.
You said that TSA is transitioning the TWIC database and card
production system to the new TIM system. Can you give us an
update? And what are you doing to accelerate the timeline?
Mr. Pistole. So we have initiated the pilot programs for
the one visit of TWIC. In Alaska, we have 9 or 10 locations
where, because of the geographic, obviously, the size of
Alaska, where TWIC enrollees can go in and just go in once, and
then the card can be mailed or provided. And so that is
working. We have been doing that for close to a year now, I
believe.
We are also doing that in Michigan, a similar area in terms
of toward the Upper Peninsula, to look at some, again, remote
areas and things to keep people from having to go in for that
second visit. So those are working.
The plan is to have it rolled out nationwide later this
year. Yes, it was delayed from what we had hoped, but there
were a number of challenges that I believe we have worked
through, and so I am hopeful and confident that we will be able
to roll that out later this year for one visit for those who
choose to.
Now, what we are finding is, even Alaska and the U.P., not
everybody is taking advantage of that for whatever reason. They
may live close to an enrollment center and so it is not
inconvenient for them. But that is a personal choice they have.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Coats?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Coats. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Speaking of lawyers, the Administrator and I are graduates
of the same law school.
The Chairman. No kidding.
Mr. Pistole. Hear ye.
Senator Coats. Does that disqualify me from asking tough
questions or----
The Chairman. Not if you root for the Pacers.
Mr. Pistole. Ooh.
Senator Coats. We do root for the Pacers, but we are in a
perilous situation right now, as you know. As a former
basketball player, you follow that.
The Chairman. You were number one in your class and he was
number two?
Senator Coats. I think I went through school a little bit
earlier than he did. And I was not number one in my class. I
don't know about----
Mr. Pistole. And I was not number two, so----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Pistole. Or number one.
Senator Coats. Well, I just have two questions here,
Administrator. Well, first of all, thank you for your service,
first as Deputy FBI Director----
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Coats.--with your outstanding record there, as well
as your service here. And, gosh, you must have to get all kinds
of questions and complaints every day about a certain line at a
certain airport being backed up beyond a certain point, et
cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So it is not an easy job, that is
for sure.
I wanted to ask you about exit alane monitoring, but
Senator Ayotte asked that. I would just do a follow-up here.
You did a pilot study, from what I understand, and did it
identify a timeline or a solution, a list of possible
solutions? And where do we stand on actually implementing this?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Senator. And so it really
comes down to, again, each airport being unique and different
airports seeking different solutions. So some are way forward-
leaning in terms of acquiring technology that could serve as a
long-term solution, as opposed to staffing either by TSA or
airport employees. And so we are trying to work with them as
closely as we can, recognizing we don't have separate funding
to either acquire the technology or to install it.
And so I think the longer-term plan is working with each
airport and to find a solution that makes sense that allows us
to get out of the exit lane business, which is, again, an
access control point, which airports have the responsibility
for dozens of places around any size airport, including
Indianapolis, beyond the exit lanes, so those are all access
control issues, and allow us to focus on the core mission of
TSA, that being the security.
So, as we work with each airport, what I could envision is,
with this committee's support, OMB's support, everybody, is to
take the savings we glean from getting out of the staffing of
those positions and to try to reinvest that in the technology
and the installation of those long-term solutions.
So that is something that the House Homeland Security
subcommittee is interested in, I know, and working toward that,
I think, with industry. So that is what I would see as a good
longer-term solution, airport by airport.
Senator Coats. Thank you.
And, second, speaking of budget, as you know, the Murray-
Ryan budget deal gave us all an increase in the passenger
security fee. But the administration has now asked for an
additional increase, I think, from, what is it, $5.60 to $6,
one-way trip.
That is unlikely to be authorized. I am not always a
prophet here in terms of what the Senate ends up doing, but
what I hear from my colleagues is, hey, the first one isn't
even implemented yet, and now they are asking for more? I have
talked to some members on the authorizing committee and so
forth; I am not sure that is going to be authorized.
I am told that leaves about a $615 million hole in your
budget. How do you address that, or what is the response to
that?
Mr. Pistole. So we are hoping, obviously, that there would
be passage. The passenger fee you are referring to is about
$195 million of that, and then there is a $420 million airline
fee that was rescinded by the Bipartisan Budget Act, and so
that is what has created that significant gap.
And so, obviously, we are hopeful that the Congress will
enact those, but if not, then we will go back and figure out
how we--and I don't think it is just TSA. It would be within
the Department of Homeland Security writ large to figure out
how we can manage our security operations, to the chairman's
point, with what might be an even more reduced budget.
Senator Coats. Well, that is going to be an interesting
task. Obviously, we want to work together. Providing the
security is the number-one priority, but finding the funds to
do so--maybe the chairman has a better idea of whether or not
that fee can be implemented or not on the back of the other
one.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Coats. But I am sort of--I guess what you need is a
plan B just in case.
Mr. Pistole. We are looking at a number of different
options. This has been a recurring issue, as you know, Senator,
other than the $420 million airline fee which has been
collected every year and now this year for the first time not.
So that is our biggest challenge.
Senator Coats. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coats.
I have one more, and Senator Thune may also.
We are going to have--some of us are going to have a
meeting on cybersecurity. And this is a very sad, sad tale, in
talking about the Congress. I started work on that in 2008 and
have watched as each year it has been derailed, with very close
votes, pretty much party-line, with the United States Chamber
of Commerce squashing any effort to do anything even though the
entire suggested program was entirely voluntary, which is what
everybody sought to have as a beginning, as a program.
So what I want to ask you is, how do you stay alert to
people hacking into your various functions?
It seems to me that because lots of them are huge in size
but small in resources and personnel attending to them that it
would be quite an opportunity.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Chairman.
So, obviously, we start off every day with a classified
intel brief that looks at across-the-board vulnerabilities,
physical security, cyber, where those issues have come up from
intel. And I would be glad to go into detail in a classified
setting.
But generally we look and are focused on the onboard
avionics, how they may be compromised on commercial aircraft,
and then working with FAA, the air traffic control system, in
case hackers or a cyber-terrorist were able to somehow affect
that system. Again, I would be glad to go into more detail in a
classified setting, but those are two of our areas.
And working with both industry, manufacturers, and then of
course the intel community, law enforcement community to say
what are the threats that are out there and what are the
capabilities and then what are the defenses, the layered
defenses, which obviously implicate a number of different
agencies.
The Chairman. I guess the other thing I worry about, in
closing, from my point of view, is this rush of people using
your services, both on air, in barges and containers and ships,
all kinds of things, ports, that you concentrate more and more
on let's get it done as quickly as we possibly can, in other
words, a low risk, and get as many people out of the way as
possible, and what does that then, being noticed, do to those
who would wish us harm? I worry about that.
Mr. Pistole. And thank you, Chairman, for that, because
that is a concern I share also.
But just to clarify, the whole purpose is to improve
security by, as Senator Boxer mentioned, reducing the size of
the haystack from those known and unknowns. And so it is a risk
calculation, though, that if you are a United States Senator or
Member of Congress that you are lower-risk, so let's expedite
your physical screening because we have prescreened you.
And if all we know about you is name, date of birth, and
gender, which is required by Secure Flight, required by the
statute, then let's apply some other layers, potentially, of
security to help buy down that risk.
So the notion is not simply to try to speed things up. It
is to apply some common sense policies and protocols that allow
us to focus on higher risk because they are unknown or,
clearly, the highest risk because they are people on the
terrorist watchlist.
I think the Known Crewmember program that we have worked
out with industry and pilots and flight attendants is a good
example of how we buy down risk but achieve efficiencies. And
so over 90 percent of the pilots and flight attendants every
week in the Nation's busiest airports go through an identity-
based screening that has been enabled by the airlines and the
pilots association that allows us to verify in real-time that a
pilot or flight attendant is in good standing, they didn't get
fired last night, they are not disgruntled or something. And
then we allow them to go through identity-based screening,
because I don't, frankly, want to spend time patting down a
pilot or flight attendant for what may be a small prohibited
item when what is in their mind and what is in their hands--the
yoke of the aircraft, for the pilots--is what could be
catastrophic to that aircraft.
So it is a risk-based decision, but it is not a guarantee.
As we know, there have been pilots or copilots in the last 10
years who have crashed planes because of bad intent, not
necessarily because of terrorism but for whatever reason.
So it is something that we have to work in a way that makes
sense. Always try to be flexible and adaptable so we can modify
on a moment's notice. If there is new intel that there is
somebody trying to exploit that, then we can modify it in a
moment's notice.
The Chairman. I thank you and call upon Ranking Member
Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
last question, too.
And I would, Mr. Pistole, ask you, as--we have talked a lot
about this today, but, as administrator, you have championed
programs like PreCheck and other risk-based security
initiatives. And as I mentioned in my opening statement, I am
pleased to see the agency move forward with these initiatives
that are designed to reduce hassle for the flying public.
One of the ancillary benefits to that is the potentially
significant cost savings to the agency for personnel,
especially in light of TSA's workforce growth over the past
decade.
The question has to do with resource issues, budget issues,
et cetera. How has the establishment and expansion of some of
these programs impacted your staffing model at airport
checkpoints?
And as you continue to expand the proportion of the flying
public that is using these screening lanes through PreCheck and
other initiatives, do you anticipate that the staffing needs
might become more streamlined?
I think the most visible thing that people see of TSA is
people, obviously, personnel at the airports. And if these
risk-based mechanisms and things that are being done at these
various checkpoints actually are being effective, the
assumption would be that it would give you an ability to
streamline some of the staffing needs.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, that is exactly right, Senator. And that
is why we were able to give back $100 million in savings this
year in our 2015 budget, because of those efficiencies we have
achieved.
And so, for example, because of sequestration last year and
then the government shutdown, we have been attriting of people
at a higher rate than we have been replacing them. So, in the
past, if we had 100 people leave, we would probably hire 100
people. Because of those issues and our declining budget, we
are a smaller agency today than we were a year ago. And so, for
example, we have approximately 3,000 people less than we had a
year ago, and so our budget has gone down in that regard
because we are more efficient.
So at a TSA PreCheck lane, it may be literally twice--we
can process perhaps as many as twice as many people than a
standard lane. A standard lane may have 120 to 150 people an
hour; a TSA PreCheck lane, 240, perhaps as high as 300 people
an hour. So we don't need as many people to staff those lanes,
so our staffing models, as you say, for each airport has gone
down.
We have also streamlined our oversight of those. For
example, a year ago, we had 120 what we call Federal security
directors in a hub-and-spoke alignment around the country. We
are down to 82 Federal security directors now.
And we have also downsized headquarters to reflect that
smaller field presence. Federal Air Marshals we have downsized.
We are closing 6 out of our 26 offices because of airline
mergers and realignments and things.
And so we are trying to make sure that we are providing the
most effective security but doing it in the most efficient way.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
And I would just close by thanking you, Administrator
Pistole. I have not a single example I can think of in the last
4 or 5 years where I have seen a TSA personnel being rude,
curt, nasty, or whatever to harried passengers trying to get
on.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
The Chairman. They know their work. They do their work.
They probably mutter things under their breath sometimes, but
they put their best face forward, and you should be proud of
them.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman.
There was a good article in The New York Times yesterday
about one of our TSOs at LaGuardia who had just sung the
national anthem at Citi Field with the Mets and engaged a New
York Times reporter. And I think what you just stated was
demonstrated in that engagement with that reporter. And, again,
a good article in The New York Times about TSA.
Senator Thune. And I would echo that, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service, Mr. Pistole. And you have a
very, very tough job under always-difficult circumstances and a
public that is very demanding. And I know all of us get
frustrated flying, as those of us that are members of the
traveling public. But you have a lot of people who are trying
their best and doing it in a very professional way. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Thanks, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. What are TSA's biggest obstacles to improving the
acquisition process for security technology, and do any current
legislative proposals address those obstacles? Does TSA's strategy for
the allocation of security identification display area badges to
employees of airport concessionaires ensure that small businesses are
able to compete for concessionaire contracts? What are TSA's biggest
obstacles to putting better security technology tools in the hands of
security professionals, and how well does the TSA Acquisition Reform
bill help to overcome them?
Answer. The biggest obstacle to improving the acquisition process
for security technology and putting better security technology tools in
the hands of security professionals is the availability of mature
technology that meets the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) requirements. Over the past several years, TSA and industry have
partnered to create a number of processes to advance technology and
reduce the testing timeline. TSA spends a significant amount of its
Test and Evaluation budget on having to retest technologies because
they fail to meet TSA's requirements and would not stand up to the
rigor of the field. Enhancements are ongoing to better validate
requirements, communicate testing needs, and streamline processes to
more quickly obtain mission critical security technology.
Current legislative proposals outline sound acquisition principles,
processes and best practices which TSA embraces. A majority of these
principles have already been implemented by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and by TSA in response to past Government Accountability
Office (GAO) findings, as well as a result of the natural maturation
that this agency has undergone.
In April 2013, TSA issued a national amendment to airport operators
as Airport Security Plan (ASP) Change 13-02, which provided additional
options for compliance along with the measure in Security Directive
1542-04-10. The other options provided in the amendment included: 1)
utilizing a system to limit access by ID media based on specific
operational need that requires routine unescorted access to the
Security Identification Display Area (SIDA); or 2) implementing
physical improvements to the airport infrastructure that limit, or
eliminate the need for sterile area concessionaire employees working in
the sterile area to have unescorted access to the SIDA. Each airport
operator will work with their respective Federal Security Director to
amend the Airport Security Plan as necessary. TSA remains dedicated to
working with airport operators to lessen the burden of outdated
security measures by updating them for present day security challenges
while using a risk and outcome-based approach.
Question 2. As a component of TSA assuming responsibility for
United States transportation security, at many airports, TSA took
control of securing exit lanes to ensure that individuals do not access
secure parts of the airport without passing through the proper
screening.
According to the Department of Homeland Security, there have been
3,000 security breaches nationwide over the past 10 years involving
unscreened individuals gaining unauthorized access via exit lanes and
security checkpoints. There have been specific incidents at Newark
Airport and other major hubs, where individuals have gained access to
secure areas through exit lanes. This threatens everyone's security. In
the New Jersey-New York metro area, at Newark, LaGuardia, and JFK
airports, TSA has controlled exit lane security over the past decade.
Maintaining strong security at airport exit lanes is essential.
Given the number of breaches over the years, do you believe that our
airport exit lanes are vulnerable? Can you provide further details on
what TSA has done at airports in which TSA controls exit lanes, such as
Newark, to strengthen security and prevent unscreened and unauthorized
entry through exit lanes?
I am also concerned about proposals to remove TSA responsibility
from securing the exit lanes. Last year, TSA proposed an amendment that
would remove TSA's responsibility over exit lanes at certain airports
and give that responsibility to the airports. While the budget deal of
December 2013 maintained funding for TSA exit lane security at airports
such as Newark, I am concerned about TSA's position on this issue. Is
there any existing effort or plans to implement a rule that would
transfer TSA exit lane funding and responsibility to the airports?
Answer. Currently, two thirds of airport operators control access
at exit lanes. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) staffs
approximately 350 exit lanes at 145 airports, or 32 percent of the
Nation's approximately 450 airports at which TSA provides screening
resources. The majority of exit lanes staffed by TSA are co-located
with a TSA screening checkpoint. At federalized airports across the
Nation, the TSA has closely examined exit lane security procedures. TSA
has worked with airports to improve lines of sight and domain awareness
for exit lane monitors. At those airports where TSA is directly
responsible for staffing exit lanes, additional measures have been
developed. Examples of such measures include local written guidance,
and local training and frequent reinforcement, tailored to specific
checkpoints and terminals. At Newark Liberty International Airport
(EWR), for instance, TSA has increased staffing at those exit lane
corridors most vulnerable according to past breaches. Additionally, TSA
EWR has posted detailed guidance on standing, positioning, facing
forward while engaging with passengers, the need for unimpeded domain
awareness, and still further specific guidance, tailored to the unique
exit lane configurations within each terminal at EWR.
Section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-
67, 127 Stat. 1188 (2013) (Budget Act) requires TSA to monitor
passenger exit points from the sterile area of airports at which TSA
provided such monitoring as of December l, 2013. TSA has interpreted
this to mean if TSA was responsible for an exit lane on December 1,
2013, TSA will continue to be responsible for the EWR exit lane.
Question 3. The Airline Pilots Association, Federal Law Enforcement
Officers Association, and others have recommended the use of
``secondary barriers'' on aircraft as a mechanism for delaying
attempted breaches of the cockpit while in flight. Proponents of this
extra protection maintain the fortified cockpit doors on aircraft are
only effective when the doors are closed, but there are times during
flight when the doors need to be open for various reasons, leaving the
cockpit vulnerable to an intruder. This is a serious security threat
that may require a policy change.
In your opinion, what more can be done by Congress, industry, the
Administration and other stakeholders to increase in-flight passenger
safety? Do you have an opinion on measures such as installing secondary
barriers to increase passenger safety?
Do you agree it is critical to not only employ effective airport
and screening security, but also to maintain equally stringent in-
flight security precautions, in order to achieve the maximum security
to airline passengers?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to evaluate what
can be done to improve passenger safety while in-flight, and more has
already been done in the specific area of flight deck access.
Procedures that provide additional security while the flight deck door
is open, such as blocking access with a catering cart, have been
incorporated into airline operating procedures. The FAA adopted a rule
requiring Flight Deck Door Monitoring and Crew Discrete Alerting
Systems. While this rule requires additional measures for protection of
the flight deck, it does not require installation of secondary
barriers, because according to the FAA this would require an expensive
reconfiguration of each airplane affected.
Airlines have the option to install secondary barriers, or adopt
other security-enhancing practices. TSA's only concern is that any
secondary barrier installed should not impede the ability of a Federal
Air Marshal to observe and defend the cockpit door.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. I am very concerned about the incident at San Jose
International Airport in the early hours of April 20th, when a 15-year-
old boy was able to breach the perimeter fence and climb unnoticed into
the wheel well of a parked aircraft. We are all thankful that this
child survived the five-hour flight to Hawaii, but this situation could
have been a tragedy if terrorists were involved. Situations like this
remind us that we must have a layered defense when it comes to
protecting our Nation's transportation systems.
I understand that the Transportation Security Administration issues
regulations to guard against unauthorized access to aircraft and
approves and inspects compliance with airport security plans, which
includes airport perimeter areas.
Only three weeks before this security breach, the TSA completed a
comprehensive three-month inspection of San Jose Airport and found it
to be in compliance. In the wake of this incident do you agree that
current regulations are in need of an update? Are you considering
additional regulations to improve airport perimeter safety?
How often does TSA review and update Airport Security Plans? If an
airport's perimeter security is found to be non-compliant, how does TSA
work with the airport operator to address and correct that?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regulates
airport security under multiple authorities, including 49 U.S.C. 114
and implementing regulations at 49 CFR parts 1503 and 1542. TSA has not
recently proposed any new regulations regarding perimeter security;
however, TSA conducts regular inspections of security measures at
airports under existing authorities to make sure that airports are in
compliance with the requirements described in the Airport Security
Program. For any instance of non-compliance, the regulatory enforcement
team responsible for covering the airport at which the noncompliance
was discovered discusses the finding with the airport operator to
determine the airport's corrective measures and how they will be
implemented. TSA Inspectors conduct follow-up inspections to ensure the
finding was addressed and corrected. If airports do not satisfactorily
implement corrective measures and are found to be in violation, they
may be subject to civil penalty under the provisions of 49 CFR Part
1503. The Federal Security Director, Assistant Federal Security
Director for Inspections, and the Transportation Security Inspector
staff work directly with the airport operator to put corrective
measures into place. All investigations and recommendations for
administrative action or civil penalty are completed within a 90 day
time frame from the time of the finding of non-compliance.
Question 2. In a May 2011 TSA report titled ``Recommended Security
Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design, and Construction,'' there was
mention of a successful pilot project which used existing FAA Airport
Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE) radar to provide perimeter and
airport surface surveillance at a major airport. This technology
successfully identified intruders, tracked them across the airfield and
alerted the security operations center. Have any airports across the
country been working to implement this technology? Can you tell me
whether TSA has been testing other technologies designed to protect
airport perimeters?
Answer. The Airport Surface Detection Equipment radar modification
was done at John F. Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia Airport,
T.F. Green Airport, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport and San
Francisco International Airport. Operational use reported by installers
is that the radar has limitations for use and is not totally capable of
detecting small targets in high clutter areas.
Currently, the Transportation Security Administration is not funded
to test other technologies, but is working with airport operators who
are selecting technology solutions as layers of security in perimeter
security risk mitigation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. Mr. Pistole, as your agency continues to work to find
ways to maximize your resources while improving safety, members of the
flying public and the aviation industry as a whole have been glad to
see the TSA moving away from a one size fits all approach, and toward a
risk-based system. How are your Risk-Based Security Initiatives
continuing to drive more common-sense, effective screening measures at
our airports to keep traffic moving safely and efficiently?
Answer. Through the implementation of risk-based security
initiatives focused on passenger screening, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has demonstrated that it can improve the passenger
experience and maintain effective security. Since TSA began the initial
pilot in 2011 of what is now TSA Pre3TM, more than 200
million travelers have experienced expedited screening. Today, TSA is
providing expedited screening to more than 5 million travelers each
week, and over 40 percent of passengers each day. Recent expansion of
the Known Crew Member (KCM) program, which provides expedited screening
for pilots and flight crew, to 56 airports has increased participation
in that program by nearly 30 percent, with nearly 300,000 flight crew
each week processing through dedicated KCM portals.
TSA continues to work with additional airlines to expand TSA
Pre3TM participation to more travelers, while expanding the
population of passengers enrolled in the program. Since the April 30
hearing, TSA has added two airlines, Sun Country Airlines and Air
Canada (the first non-U.S. airline), opened 20 more TSA
Pre3TM enrollment centers, and added nearly 90,000 new
travelers to the program. These efforts have improved operational
efficiency and reduced passenger wait times, and allowed TSA to reduce
overall staffing in the FY 2015 Request.
Additionally, TSA continues to expand its risk-based approach to
our regulatory compliance programs, including vetting of regulated
party personnel through the National Targeting Center, Cargo Risk-Based
Inspection Techniques (CRBITs), national testing focused on specific
areas of threat or concern, vulnerability assessments, and risk-driven
exercises for industry. In the area of current airport Security
Directives, TSA is working collaboratively with Industry where possible
to review current requirements and look to update requirements to 2014
standards for risk, efficiency, layered approaches, and technology
improvements. Through these efforts, TSA will continue its goal to
maintain effective aviation security while facilitating the movement of
travelers and commerce through the Nation's airports.
Question 2. Mr. Pistole, perhaps the most visible example of Risk
Based Security is TSA Pre-check, which allows travelers who have been
accepted into the program to move more quickly and easily through
designated screening checkpoints. I understand that you have committed
to open a TSA Pre-check Enrollment Center at Spokane International
Airport in June, which is particularly important to that community
since there are currently no Enrollment Centers in eastern Washington.
Is that Enrollment Center still on track to open as planned in June?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recognizes
the importance of offering TSA Pre3TM enrollment centers to
Spokane and the broader eastern Washington community. TSA, through its
enrollment vendor, has been actively engaging with Spokane
International Airport to determine the terms and agreements necessary
to open an enrollment center in the airport. The agreement was recently
finalized and the anticipated launch date is targeted for August 2014
following construction and build out of this site. On May 12, TSA
opened an enrollment center in Spokane Valley to begin offering TSA
Pre3TM to the community while the airport enrollment site
activities are underway. Individuals may go online and make an
appointment and/or visit the off-airport enrollment center in-person
located at:
12510 E Sprague Ave # 7
Spokane Valley, WA 99216-0755
Question 3. Mr. Pistole, in 2013, Congress passed the Bipartisan
Budget Act that directed TSA to continue to staff airport exit lanes
and increased funding in part to pay for that monitoring. This action
was in response to TSA's plan to direct 155 airports across the country
to assume responsibility for exit lane monitoring. It has come to my
attention that TSA is now informing airports that are making
renovations to security checkpoints that if any change is made that
alters the location of exit lanes, the TSA will not staff those exit
lanes because they were not in place on December 1, 2013. Can you
explain TSA's actions and why they appear to be contradictory to
Congressional direction and the intent of the legislation we passed?
What long-term technology solutions exist to address this function, and
how are you working with airports to explore this equipment?
Answer. Section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L.
No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1188 (2013) (Budget Act) requires the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to monitor passenger exit
points from the sterile area of airports at which TSA provided such
monitoring as of December l, 2013. TSA has interpreted this to mean if
TSA was responsible for an exit lane on December 1, 2013, then after
remodeling, TSA will continue to be responsible for that exit lane.
Remodeling an existing exit lane at which TSA provided monitoring on
December 1, 2013, is distinct from opening a new exit lane or moving an
existing exit lane to a new location. In determining whether an exit
lane project is a remodeling or relocation effort, TSA would consider
whether the post-project physical location of the lane would require
noteworthy additional effort by TSA for supervision, safety checks, and
supervisor response for a checkpoint breach and/or incident.
Technology solutions to address this function cover a wide range.
Baseline solutions for small airports can be as simple as locked doors
or inexpensive Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems. Baseline
solutions for more complex environments, or supplementary capabilities
beyond a baseline capability, can range from a CCTV system with simple
video analytic capabilities all the way to highly sophisticated, multi-
layered custom solutions costing millions of dollars. Examples of
highly sophisticated systems are automated interlocking doors with
video; custom multi-layer systems with video (including analytics),
infrared and optical sensors, automatic doors, and half height
turnstiles; technology enhanced security force solutions including
video (with analytics), magnetic closure doors, motion sensor double
glass doors, steel doors with one-way automatic locks, and smart one-
way doors. TSA developed and made available on-line guidance
documentation (``guidelines'') and web-based, self-guided, self-
assessment and decision aid tools that provide airport operators and
Federal Security Directors (FSD) capability to assess their technology
needs and choose which technologies will most effectively meet their
needs and resources. Proper use of the ``toolbox'' will produce outputs
which, TSA can certify as effective security technology options.
Question 4. Mr. Pistole, last year the House passed legislation
(H.R. 1204--Rep. Thompson) to permanently charter TSA's Aviation
Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) in the hope of avoiding lapses in
the Committee's charter, as has been the case recently. Do you think
this legislation, which now has a Senate companion (S. 1804--Sen
Tester), is the best approach? More broadly, I know that you have just
taken action on the ASAC, but do you have any suggestions for improving
it to be a more useful and productive resource for TSA and ensure
stakeholder involvement in TSA's decision making?
Answer. The Federal Advisory Committee Act exemption contained in
the proposed bill could help avoid possible lapses in the charter due
to the Committee re-approval process. However, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has been working with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) on improving this process, and currently has an
active Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC).
Most importantly, TSA wants to avoid any implication that all
aviation security matters--including developing and implementing
policies, programs, rulemaking and security directives--must go through
the ASAC. TSA continues to work with the ASAC on these actions as
appropriate, but there may be times when it is not possible to do so.
For example, in exigent situations, TSA may not have time to fully
coordinate security directives mandating additional security measures
in response to a specific threat against civil aviation.
Concerning the proposed subcommittees, the language is too
prescriptive. The proposed subcommittees cover important topics where
TSA expects ASAC will do work, but mandating these subcommittees could
limit the Committee's flexibility to set its own priorities. ASAC
members, selected from the private sector, choose a Chairperson and
Vice-Chairperson to lead the group and establish priorities and
subcommittees for each term. The committee should have the flexibility
to create the subcommittees it deems critical to meet the pressing
needs during each term.
Question 5. Mr. Pistole, the incident at San Jose Airport last week
has highlighted the issue of perimeter security at airports. I
recognize that TSA does not implement and manage the airport security
plans that it approves, but any conversation about security threats to
our aviation system must address who has access to aircraft and
runways, and whether we are in full control of that access, which we
clearly are not. What has TSA learned from your internal reports and
analysis of this incident, and what improvements can be made to prevent
this, or a more catastrophic version of this, from happening in the
future?
Answer. Since the incident, Norman Mineta San Jose International
Airport (SJC) Airport Operations, San Jose Police Department and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) conducted a physical
examination of the airport's perimeter security measures to identify
and address potential vulnerabilities. SJC staff has increased the
number of perimeter inspections per day, discussed perimeter and
individual security with staff and tenants, reconfirmed training
programs, and notified tenants of the importance of challenging and
reporting suspicious people and items. SJC is also working with the
National Safe Skies Alliance Inc. to coordinate research into
additional technologies related to perimeter deterrence and detection.
TSA continues to actively engage and meet with the SJC to provide
guidance and assistance as needed, through direct engagement from the
Federal Security Director at SJC and from TSA headquarters Office of
Security Operations (OSO) Compliance Programs Division.
TSA partners with the Nation's airports to manage risk, within the
scope of TSA's regulatory oversight capacity and within the funding
available. TSA also collaborates with industry to identify new
approaches to secure the Nation's airports.
Question 6. Mr. Pistole, serious concerns have been raised by GAO
and others about TSA's Behavior Detection and Analysis Program and
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program,
including lack of effectiveness or scientific basis. What is your
response to those criticisms?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
share the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) assessment of the
effectiveness of the TSA Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT) program as outlined in their Report to Congressional
Requesters (GAO-14-159) of November 2013.
Behavior detection techniques have been an accepted practice for
many years within law enforcement, customs and border enforcement, and
security communities, both in the United States and internationally.
TSA's SPOT protocol and the Behavior Detection and Analysis (BDA)
program are important elements of the TSA multi-layered security
approach. TSA's Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) also play a key role
in carrying out TSA's risk-based screening (RBS) initiatives. RBS
initiatives are intended to provide a more common sense, less-invasive
screening experience for low-risk passengers.
TSA's overall security posture is composed of interrelated parts;
to disrupt one piece of the multi-layered approach will have a far
reaching adverse impact on other pieces, thereby negatively affecting
TSA's overall mission performance.
In April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security Science and
Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) completed a comprehensive study that
examined the validity of using behavior indicators in order to identify
high-risk passengers. The study found that the SPOT program provided a
number of screening benefits and is more effective than random
selection at identifying high-risk passengers. While S&T and GAO both
noted some deficiencies in the methodology used as a part of the study,
limitations are present in every study and we do not feel that these
limitations were great enough to discredit the overall findings. While
future studies will mitigate the concerns that were noted, we believe
the study itself was an important first step in assessing behavior
detection in an operational environment.
Since the publication of the 2011 Study, TSA has taken steps to
improve the entirety of the behavior detection program and the process
by which it is validated. In early 2012, TSA began another round of
research aimed at further substantiating the behavioral indicators by
providing specific scientific research support for the indicators
included and improving the detection protocols. This effort evolved
into what is now known as the Behavior Detection Optimization effort.
Optimization encompasses four pillars of behavior detection: (1)
Improving recruiting processes, (2) Enhancing training content to
further enhance BDO skillsets, (3) Instituting greater management and
quality control systems, and (4) Revising its Behavioral Detection
Reference Guide (BDRG) and corresponding Operational Handbook for the
BDOs as well as designing a new referral methodology. Beginning in the
Fall of 2014, a subset of airports will receive training for the
optimized protocol and this training will continue into 2015. After the
BDOs at these airports have demonstrated proficiency with the new
protocol, data collection and record testing will begin to further
validate the new methodology.
Integral to the optimization project is a comprehensive operational
test designed to collect the operational performance data to validate
behavior detection over and above what was seen during the original
2011 SPOT Validation Study. Scenario-driven testing will be used in
addition to the outcome-based protocols used in the prior study.
Utilization of both methods will allow TSA to replicate the type of
testing used in the 2011 study with the new optimized program while
also gathering additional data and employing additional testing
methodologies that are better suited for determining the efficiency and
effectiveness of the program (e.g., threat inject-type methodologies).
Each of the GAO limitations discussed in their report will be mitigated
to the maximum extent possible given the constraints of testing within
an operational environment as well as the extremely low base rate of
actual operational terrorists transiting U.S. airports. Initial testing
will begin in fall 2014, and full data collection is planned for late
winter 2015.
Question 7. Mr. Pistole, there has been a lot of discussion of the
safety of crude-by-rail--with new tank car standards, operating
procedures, and proper testing and labeling of shipments. But I would
like to talk with you about the security of crude-by-rail shipments.
Like much of the West, Washington's cities grew up around--and because
of--railroads. This means that there is a lot of rail freight moving
through the centers of our population centers. What kind of security
threats do crude-by-rail shipments (and other explosive shipments)
pose?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
issued any security alerts related to shipments of crude-by-rail in the
United States. However, TSA is aware of some plots and discussions of
attacks against crude-by-rail internationally. For example, in January
2014, Indian authorities arrested an Indian Mujahideen leader on
terrorist-related charges. During debriefings, he revealed Indian
Mujahideen intentions to use magnetic improvised explosive devices
against freight rail tank cars in India. He further stated the
intention was to use such a device to detonate one tank car, in hopes
that the explosion would cause a chain reaction and subsequently engulf
the remaining freight cars. Extremist media outlets and social network
sites have also provided technical training documents and explicit
encouragement to individuals seeking to replicate devices of this kind.
Question 8. Mr. Pistole, as communities across Washington--and our
country--grapple with the rapid increase in highly explosive crude oil
moving through their downtowns, many have requested detailed
information about how crude trains are being routed, and how many there
are. They'd like to be able to prepare better accident response plans
for first responders. Some of that routing information isn't fully
available, though--and security concerns have been cited as one of the
explanations. Are you worried that the release of detailed routing and
train information of crude-by-rail shipments could pose a threat to the
public?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is always
concerned that information, which could reveal a security
vulnerability, or aid an adversary planning an attack, is protected in
accordance with all applicable laws and regulations. When information
or data is so specific as to reveal potential vulnerabilities, then
that information must be protected to ensure that only those with a
legitimate need to know have access to the information. TSA also
recognizes the need to provide certain information about rail shipments
of hazardous materials to emergency planners and responders so that
they may adequately prepare for emergencies involving railroads and the
transportation by rail of hazardous materials such as crude oil. TSA
will continue to work with its Federal partners to ensure the proper
balance of protection and accessibility of transportation-related data
and information.
TSA supports the issuance on May 7, 2014, of an Emergency Order by
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to require railroad
carriers operating trains containing large amounts of Bakken crude oil
to notify State Emergency Response Commissions about the operation of
these trains through their states. TSA also supports DOT's approach to
limit distribution of this information to authorized entities within
each state, which includes emergency planning and first responder
organizations.
Question 9. How does the Transportation Security Administration
work with rail operators to identify risks related to routing of
hazardous shipments--both those that are Rail Security Sensitive
Materials, and those that are not?
Answer. Since 2005, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) has worked with the Nation's railroads to identify threats,
vulnerabilities, and potential consequences associated with the
transportation of hazardous materials. The focus of this effort has
been on the locations and routes with the highest population density
and routes containing the greatest volumes of rail security-sensitive
materials. In most cases, assessments of these areas have been used to
provide the railroads with options for consideration to reduce
vulnerabilities and minimize potential consequences.
In 2008, the Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Administration promulgated a regulation that requires
railroads to analyze the routes used for the transportation of certain
hazardous materials to determine the safest and most secure route. This
regulation (49 CFR 172.820) requires freight railroad carriers to
submit the results of their analysis to the Federal Railroad
Administration for evaluation. In February 2014, the Association of
American Railroads, on behalf of its members, agreed to voluntarily use
the same route analysis methodology (Rail Corridor Risk Management
System) for routes used for trains with 20 or more cars of crude oil.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon John S. Pistole
Question 1. Transportation Worker Identification Credentials
(TWICs) are required to access ports and other secure facilities in the
maritime sector. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued
two reports harshly critical of the TWIC program. And earlier this
year, Congress required the Department of Homeland Security to conduct
an effectiveness assessment of the program prior to promulgating a rule
on automated card readers for TWIC cards at selected ports. Has the
Department begun this assessment? If so, are there any results that you
can share with the Committee at this time?
Answer. At the direction of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committee, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
United States Coast Guard (USCG) have conducted a security assessment
addressing the benefits of the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) program. The draft security assessment report is
currently under review by USCG and TSA leadership.
Question 2. In conducting its 2011 report, GAO investigators were
successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs, authentic TWICs
acquired through fraudulent means, and by fabricating phony business
cases for accessing secure areas. What steps has your agency taken over
the past three years to address these concerns?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has worked
with the United States Coast Guard to identify port access
vulnerabilities when Transportation Worker Identification Credentials
(TWICs) are used as ``flash passes,'' to include updates to training,
access control policies, and business processes.
Ports establish the requirements for access to their secure
facilities. Possession of a TWIC, while a necessary element for access,
does not guarantee its holder the right of access. The TWIC is not a
substitute for access control policy or trained and attentive security
personnel. The Coast Guard works with the ports to ensure the
enforcement of security practices for access to secure facilities,
including unscheduled inspections using portable TWIC readers.
TSA has also implemented a variety of enrollment safeguards, such
as Federal training for trusted agents and the use of document
authentication technology. Additionally, the Homeland Security Studies
and Analysis Institute's (HSSAI) Counterfeit Deterrence group conducted
an evaluation of TWIC in November 2012 and provided input to the
program for consideration in strengthening TWIC security. TSA is
developing a Next Generation TWIC under TSA's Technology Infrastructure
Modernization Program, which incorporates the HSSAI recommendations and
includes additional security features to further reduce the use of
counterfeit TWICs. Considerations for the Next Generation TWIC are: (1)
card durability, appearance, and new security features; and (2) use of
facial, iris, and other biometrics.
Question 3. What role will TSA have in the rulemaking that the
Coast Guard is conducting related to TWIC card readers? What are your
thoughts on the Coast Guard's decision to require card readers only at
certain ports and on certain vessels?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
United States Coast Guard (USCG) jointly administer the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. TSA is responsible for
enrollments, security threat assessments, credential production, and
systems operations. The USCG is responsible for establishing and
enforcing access control requirements for Maritime Transportation
Security Act -regulated vessels and facilities. Regulations are
developed through a thorough, coordinated process that involves all of
DHS including TSA and USCG, enabling TSA to contribute information to
USCG to help inform all aspects of the USCG's rulemaking, including but
not limited to TWIC card reader technical specifications, qualified
reader technology, and reader testing.
Question 4. At the hearing, I asked about TSA's implementation of
the increased passenger security fee scheduled to take effect July 1st
under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. Senate and House Budget
Committee Chairmen Murray and Ryan recently provided insight into their
intentions in a letter to you on the subject, stating that their intent
in drafting the legislation was that passengers would pay no more than
twice the maximum fee on a round trip, no matter how many stopovers may
occur during that round trip. It appears TSA intends to implement the
fee increase in a manner that is inconsistent with the stated intent,
even though the agency could implement the fee increase as requested by
the authors. As you pledged to follow up with me on this question
during the hearing, please provide a copy of the legal analysis and
justification used by TSA in drafting the new security fee rule under
the Bipartisan Budget Act. If none was provided to the Office of
Management and Budget for consideration, please indicate as much and
provide an analysis and justification for this hearing record.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
completed a rulemaking action to amend its regulations to implement
restructuring of the September 11th Security Fee, enacted as part of
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA). In developing this rulemaking,
TSA has carefully considered the text of 49 U.S.C. 44940, the statutory
language amending 44940 under the BBA, and available legislative
history. In the interim final rule published on June 20, 2014, which
can be found in the Federal Register (https://www.federalregister.gov/
articles/2014/06/20/2014-14488/adjustment-of-passenger-civil-aviation-
security-service-fee), TSA provided the following explanation for
removal of the round trip cap:
TSA is removing language that effectively applied a cap to the
amount of the fee that could be imposed per ``round trip.''
Under current Sec. 1510.5(a), ``passengers may not be charged
for more than two enplanements per one-way trip or four
enplanements per round trip.'' This provision effectively
created a $10 cap on round-trip travel--in other words, it set
a $10 cap on any itinerary that ended at its origin point, even
if the itinerary included more than four $2.50 enplanements
with lengthy stopovers.
Thus, for instance, if a passenger purchased a round trip for
an itinerary involving ten enplanements, each separated by a
three-day stopover, but ultimately ending at the origin point,
a $10 fee would be imposed because the regulation caps a round
trip at 4 enplanements. At the same time, a different passenger
travelling on the same exact flights (same days, same planes,
same stopovers and destinations) who does not purchase the
travel as a single round trip itinerary could potentially be
charged up to $25.00 ($2.50 x 10 enplanements). Thus, as a
result of the distinction between round-trip and other
itineraries, similarly situated passengers could be charged
different fees.\1\ TSA received comments on the 2001 IFR
questioning the round trip cap on the basis that it was not
specifically stipulated in the statute and had the effect of
decreasing revenue. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In other words, under the current regulations, if Passenger A
were to book such an itinerary beginning and ending at New York's John
F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), and Passenger B were to book
the same exact itinerary, except that Passenger B planned to return to
Boston, Passenger A would owe $10, and Passenger B would owe $25.00.
Similarly, Passengers C and D could both fly on the same days, flights,
stopovers, and destinations, but pay different fees based on how the
air transportation was purchased (for example, Passenger C purchases
air transportation as a single five-stopover round trip itinerary but
Passenger D purchases the same air transportation in separate
transactions, creating multiple itineraries).
\2\ See Letter from Air Transport Association to Docket TSA-2001-
11120 (dated March 1, 2002) available at www.regulations.gov under
Docket No. TSA-2001-11120-0032.
As enacted by ATSA in 2001, section 44940(a) required
imposition of a ``uniform fee'' on passengers, but specifically
imposed a one-way cap on the fee amount in 44940(c). As
discussed above, prior to the Budget Act amendments, section
44940(c) provided that the fee ``may not exceed $2.50 per
enplanement in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation that originates at an airport in the United
States, except that the total amount of such fees may not
exceed $5.00 per one-way trip.'' This language provided TSA
with clear discretion to limit the amount of fee charged per
enplanement and, therefore, to provide a cap on the amount
charged per round trip. Amending section 44940(c) by mandating
a fee of $5.60 per one-way trip, as well as eliminating the cap
language that was in the statute as enacted in 2001, is
consistent with the authorizing language of section 44940(a)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and the requirement to impose a ``uniform fee.''
Accordingly, in the absence of statutory language authorizing
such a cap, and in light of the fact that a round-trip cap
under the revised fee structure would have the effect of the
fee being far less for some passengers than the mandatory $5.60
per one-way trip, this IFR does not include a limit on the
number of one-way trips--trips that can be charged per
itinerary. TSA notes that by eliminating the round-trip cap,
the restructured fee mitigates the likelihood of disparate
treatment for substantially similar travel--some booked as
round trips on one itinerary, and some not.
Question 5. Given TSA's interest in reducing or eliminating the
need to remove shoes, laptops and liquids under its risk-based
approach, how will TSA's new technology acquisitions and upgrades help
facilitate this goal? Additionally, could TSA's technology acquisition
plan aim to achieve risk-based screening on a passenger-by-passenger
basis?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) new
technology acquisitions and upgrades are designed to support TSA
Pre3TM expansion and facilitate specific goals to minimize
divestiture requirements for passengers while enhancing security
effectiveness. TSA has invested in, and began the testing of, enhanced
algorithms on Advanced Technology systems that allow large electronics
to remain in passengers' carry-on luggage. Additionally, further
planned enhancements are aimed at easing current liquid restrictions.
To ensure alignment between industry partners and TSA in meeting agency
goals, TSA has released the TSA Security Capability Investment Plan
aimed toward providing industry stakeholders insight into the
capability investment areas. TSA continues to work closely with the
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology and interagency
partners in the Departments of Defense and Justice to develop advanced
technology in support of TSA's risk-based security needs.
In addition, TSA is investing in Credential Authentication
Technology (CAT). This technology enables TSA to automatically
authenticate identity documents that are presented to TSA by passengers
during the security checkpoint screening process, further enhancing
travel safety. In the future, CAT systems will integrate with the
Secure Flight system through the Security Technology Integrated Program
(IT program that automates exchange of information with various
screening equipment, including the capability to dynamically transfer
information between Transportation Security Equipment and vetting and
security operations) in order to provide a passenger's risk status to
the Travel Document Checker at the airport checkpoint. Additionally,
TSA would like to develop an integrated system whereby a passenger's
risk status would be correlated with appropriate screening
technologies. By linking risk information with a more tailored approach
to screening, TSA will be able to provide greater situational
awareness, as well as the ability to rapidly adjust risk mitigation
based on emerging threats and evolving environmental risk.
Question 6. After 9/11, the U.S. Congress mandated that TSA deploy
Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) to screen 100 percent of checked
baggage at all U.S. airports, and TSA deployed EDS with computer
tomography (CT) technology in fulfilling this mandate. This technology
is now available for security checkpoints as well, and we're seeing the
application of such technology at airports overseas. Such systems could
potentially address the need for improved screening while improving
traveler experience by largely eliminating the need to remove liquids/
laptops and increasing throughput. Does TSA plan to bring this type of
technology to the checkpoint?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in
collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science
and Technology Directorate (S&T) has been monitoring the progression of
computed tomography (CT) but is not planning on using this technology
for checkpoint purposes. Historically, the issues with operationalizing
CT for the checkpoint have been cost and size related. CT systems for
the checkpoint have been roughly 50 percent more expensive than
traditional projection X-ray systems, and the footprint is larger than
currently deployed technologies.
However, TSA's Passenger Screening Program has hosted over six
different companies who discussed their CT for checkpoint solutions and
TSA collaborates with its international partners who utilize CT to
exchange lessons learned. TSA will continue to actively monitor the
technological developments of CT and its feasibility within the
checkpoint environment. At this time, TSA does not have any plans to
procure CT for use at the checkpoint to screen carry-on bags.
Question 7. I have heard concerns from those representing smaller
concessionaires at airports that TSA, under Security Directive 1542-04-
10, allows only 25 percent of an airport concessionaire's employees to
hold security identification display area--or SIDA--badges. For small
businesses with few employees, the limited number of employees allowed
to hold SIDA badges may be problematic. This requirement could make it
difficult for these small businesses to compete effectively for
concessionaire contracts. For example, because certain contracts may
require long continuous service hours during which a concessionaire's
employees would need to access secure areas like the tarmac for various
servicing, delivery, and trash disposal needs, the limited proportion
of employees who would be allowed to hold a SIDA badge may disadvantage
concessionaires with a relatively small number of employees. Would you
revisit TSA's current ``one-size-fits-all'' approach to SIDA badge
issuance procedures and look at changes that may be necessary to
facilitate and help small businesses compete on an equal playing field,
while still providing the necessary security measures for airport
facilities?
Answer. Strong access controls to the sterile areas of our Nation's
airports are a crucial layer in our aviation security system. One way
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) manages access control
is through limiting the number of secure identification display area
(SIDA) badges issued at each airport, as these badges give individuals
unfettered access to the sterile area. However, recognizing that this
limitation was creating some hardships at larger airports, TSA worked
with industry to develop options for addressing this issue.
In April 2013, TSA amended the national Airport Security Plan (ASP)
(Change 13-02), to create flexibility by providing options in addition
to the 25 percent measure in Security Directive 1542-04-10. The other
options provided in the amendment included: (1) technology that, in
lieu of general access, enables limited access to individuals to
certain areas of the airport based on their specific job requirements;
or (2) implementing physical improvements to the airport infrastructure
that limit or eliminate the need for sterile area concessionaire
employees working in the sterile area to have unescorted access to the
SIDA. An example of this would be providing storage areas for
consumable goods in the SIDA, thus negating frequent trips. Each
airport operator must work with its respective Federal Security
Director to amend the airport-specific, Airport Security Plan, as
necessary. TSA remains dedicated to working with airport operators to
lessen the burden of outdated security measures by updating them to
meet present day security challenges, while using a risk and outcome-
based approach.
Question 8. Your written testimony for this hearing stated: ``It is
my goal to consistently apply a risk-based approach to all aspects of
TSA's mission. Whether it is the deployment of Federal Air Marshalls
(FAMs), the allocation of Transit Security Grant resources, or air
cargo screening policies, TSA is working to implement a risk-based
approach that allows us to deliver the most effective security in the
most efficient manner.'' With respect to TSA's air cargo screening
policies, how are you implementing a risk-based approach and how far
along are you are in that implementation process?
Answer. The ``Trusted Shipper'' concept is an essential element in
enabling passenger carriers to apply principles of risk to the
screening of inbound cargo without disruption to the global air cargo
supply chain. The concept, currently implemented as standards in the
Transportation Security Administration security programs requiring air
carrier determinations, may in the future be implemented through the
Air Cargo Advanced Screening program to provide an automated, data-
driven, neutral platform for the determination of ``trusted'' shipper/
shipment status. Automated segmentation of these shipments will more
readily enable industry to apply appropriate tiered screening
protocols, assisting both passenger carriers, and all-cargo carriers in
processing ``non-trusted'' shipments for additional screening measures
outlined in the appropriate security program.
Question 9. In your written testimony, you also referenced seeking
employee feedback via the TSA Idea Factory, your web-based employee
engagement tool, and receiving contributions from all levels of the
organization. In contrast, however, the Partnership for Public Service
(PPS) recently ranked TSA last out of all Federal agencies in its
annual innovation score based on a survey of Federal employees. This
ranking suggests TSA employees are not being encouraged and motivated
to be creative and develop new ideas in their job. How would you
describe TSA's current culture for promoting innovation and new ideas,
and how do you reconcile TSA's low ranking in the PPS survey with your
description of TSA's efforts to solicit employee feedback in your
testimony?
Answer. Innovation and promoting new ideas is an integral part of
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) current culture.
Innovation has been one of TSA's core values since its formation in
2002. TSA defines innovation as embracing and standing ready for
change; being courageous and willing to take on new challenges; and
having an enterprising spirit and accepting risk-taking that comes
along with innovation. In 2007, TSA launched the IdeaFactory, a web-
based social media tool that allows all employees to submit, rate and
comment on ideas to improve the organization. This gives the frontline
workforce the ability to submit ideas and gain a voice in how the
agency evolves. The IdeaFactory has changed the way TSA interacts with
a large, geographically dispersed frontline workforce and has led the
way in how the Federal government uses employee ideation tools to
engage employees. The IdeaFactory was featured in the White House
Innovation Gallery in 2009, and in 2011, it was honored with a Harvard
Kennedy School Ash Center Bright Idea Award. TSA has implemented
hundreds of employee suggestions over the last seven years improving
areas such as communications, customer service, training, procedures
and human resource policies.
Yet, technology cannot be the only solution for encouraging and
motivating employees to be creative and develop new ideas in their
jobs. Currently, the IdeaFactory is accessible only via TSA's network
and many of the 46,000 frontline employees do not have ready access to
computers. Additionally, because of TSA's critical security mission,
the frontline workforce is expected to follow Standard Operating
Procedures in their daily operations. Consistent application of
security measures is critical to carrying out the mission and this may
make employees feel as though new ideas are not consistently
encouraged.
Future plans include making the tool more accessible to the
workforce; training supervisors and managers to be responsive to new
ideas and initiatives; and using senior leadership-sponsored
IdeaFactory challenges to ask the workforce for input on specific ideas
and programs.
Question 10. In your March 25, 2014 testimony to the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, you stated that TSA
is letting private contractors know how much Screening Partnership
Program (SPP) airports cost the government. But in testimony before the
House Committee on Government Reform in January 2014, Assistant
Administrator Kelly Hoggan stated that TSA does not consider some
costs, such as Federal employee benefits, in its Federal cost estimate.
Since these and other costs associated with TSA screening that are
incurred in accounts other than Screening Operations are not being
considered, how do private contractors and the general public know
whether the TSA's Federal cost estimate provided to the private sector
truly represents the entire cost paid by the taxpayer?
Answer. When calculating the Federal Cost Estimate (FCE) that is
included in the Request for Proposals (RFP) for privatized screening
contracts, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) includes
all costs directly attributed to screening operations, which include
indirect costs such as headquarters overhead, airport administrative
staff and supplies, hiring and recruitment costs, information
technology support and other cost items.
TSA excludes costs that fall outside annual appropriations,
including future unfunded retirement liabilities, corporate tax
adjustments, and general liability insurance. The FCE reflects those
costs directly borne by the agency.
Question 11. You also stated in your House testimony that the SPP
drives up the TSA's administrative costs, because the agency must
employ more contract administration staff. While increased SPP
participation may necessarily increase TSA's contract oversight staff,
wouldn't the TSA's overall administrative cost actually be reduced,
because the SPP shifts some of TSA's significant human resources
administrative responsibility to the private sector?
Answer. Administrative costs for the Screening Partnership Program
(SPP) are dependent on factors such as the number of airports in the
program, the size and operational complexity of these airports, and the
number of companies involved in providing services. For example,
implementing or negotiating multiple changes at several airports with
multiple contract providers may present greater challenges than
managing these matters with fewer contract providers or airports.
Similarly, multiple and overlapping contracting competitions may
require more Transportation Security Administration Headquarters
administrative resources to manage efficiently.
The SPP workforce currently represents less than 5 percent of total
screeners in the field. The human resources administrative
responsibility relieved by such a small number of workers moving to the
private sector does not relieve enough workload for TSA personnel to
result in meaningful staffing reductions.
Question 12. At the hearing, I asked about the impact of risk-based
security initiatives on staffing models at airport checkpoints. Please
provide additional, specific forecasted long term cost savings and
staffing efficiencies that you expect TSA to achieve as a result of all
risk-based security measures taken or planned at the agency.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began
implementing a series of risk-based initiatives in 2011. TSA continues
to expand risk-based security (RBS) efforts by adding new programs and
populations selected for expedited screening by using intelligence and
risk-based information. Staffing efficiencies are now being realized
due to TSA meeting and surpassing its calendar year 2013 goal of
providing expedited screening to 25 percent of the traveling public,
and as a result, TSA included $120 million in budget savings related to
RBS efforts in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Request.
TSA's general underlying assumption at this time is that TSA will
be able to achieve an approximate 50 percent expedited screening rate
by the end of calendar year 2014. However, this general assumption
cannot be applied universally across all airports. Realized
efficiencies are unique to each airport, based on the size of the
checkpoints, the peak travel times, the number of participating air
carriers, airport infrastructure configurations and other factors.
TSA's Enhanced Staffing Model (ESM), which determines the workload for
each checkpoint, will need to be run for each location to determine
actual savings.
The ESM is updated for each airport in the summer preceding the
upcoming Fiscal Year and reviewed on a regular basis. Although future
system-wide staffing efficiencies, due to RBS efforts, are anticipated
in FY 2016 and beyond, the specific impact at each airport and
checkpoint in these out years has not been determined at this time.
Question 13. As the TSA has acquired Reveal Imaging Technologies
(CT-80) x-ray machines, airports across the country have spent
significant funds designing and building checked baggage systems laid
out to accommodate these machines. I understand the agency is now in
the process of upgrading and removing some of the machines to allow for
better throughput on a per machine basis. However, with fewer machines,
overall capacity in the event of an outage may be temporarily
diminished even with the upgraded machines, and the full costs of
accommodating the new machines are not clear. These potential capacity
and cost problems would be particularly difficult for small airports.
Please provide a full inventory of the machines, including a list of
airports using the CT-80 machines and those machines that may be in
storage. Please also provide a list of airports where the agency is
proposing changes, and a description of what TSA intends to do with the
existing machines, including a description of the agency's plan for how
costs associated with the agency's moves will be borne. In your
response, please be sure to detail any plans that may affect any of the
South Dakota airports, including Sioux Falls, regarding checked baggage
screening capacity and costs.
Please provide a full inventory of the machines, including a list
of airports using the CT-80 machines and those machines that may be in
storage.
Answer. As this information is designated For Official Use Only,
the Transportation Security Administration is providing this
information under a separate cover.
Question 14. Please also provide a list of airports where the
agency is proposing changes, and a description of what TSA intends to
do with the existing machines, including a description of the agency's
plan for how costs associated with the agency's moves will be borne.
Answer. As this information is designated For Official Use Only,
the Transportation Security Administration is providing this
information under a separate cover.
Question 15. Explanation of costs:
Answer. TSA will fully fund the design and facility modification
costs for both stand-alone and integrated Explosives Detection System
(EDS) recapitalization projects, provided all costs are within current
Planning Guidelines and Design Standards. For integrated EDS
recapitalization projects, the infrastructure changes required to
accommodate growth through the date of beneficial use plus five years
are the responsibility of the airport.
In instances where airports have requested funding for integrated
screening solutions where none existed before, TSA will enter into a
cost share agreement with an airport to facilitate the design and
construction of a Checked Baggage Inspection System. If funds are
available, TSA will provide up to 90 percent (for large and medium hub
airports) or 95 percent (for small and non-hub airports) of allowable/
allocable costs associated with the project if the cost effectiveness
analysis predicts a 10 year positive return on investment.
In instances where TSA has identified a requirement for a new or
upgraded stand-alone EDS unit, TSA will fully fund the removal,
upgrade, deployment and installation of the EDS.
Question 16. In your response, please be sure to detail any plans
that may affect any of the South Dakota airports, including Sioux
Falls, regarding checked baggage screening capacity and costs.
Answer. One of the airports that the TSA has identified for CT-80
EDS upgrades is Sioux Falls Regional Airport (FSD) which currently has
two baggage zones supported by two CT-80 EDS units in each zone. All
CT-80 units in the field must be upgraded to meet enhanced detection
standards. TSA will fully fund all costs associated with this upgrade
project. TSA has completed one phase of the project by removing two CT-
80 units that need to be upgraded by the vendor, Reveal, to the CT-80DR
model. Current demand at FSD does not warrant two EDS in each zone;
therefore, the two underutilized EDS units will be removed, upgraded to
CT-80DRs, and reallocated in order to satisfy an existing operational
need at another airport.
Should demand for baggage screening resources change, TSA will work
with local airport authorities to accommodate new requirements.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. It has come to my attention that the TSA has planned to
replace the seven CT-80 Reveal machines with only five upgraded
machines at Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport. The airport has recently
made significant investments in its ticket lobby and baggage handling
area under the assumption that it would maintain seven baggage
screening machines. These machines are routinely used and are
instrumental to the airport's attempt to attract additional carriers
and increase the economic development opportunities throughout the
region. Can you please justify for me the reasoning for the TSA's
decision to reduce the number of machines? During the decision making
process, did the TSA consider the additional impacts to the airport
including the affects to customer service, exclusive lease areas,
operational, marketing and space constraint issues?
Answer. Prior to making the decision to remove two CT-80 Reveal
explosives detection system (EDS) units from Gulfport-Biloxi Regional
Airport, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) confirmed no
airlines have used ticket counters 2 and 3 for over a year. The two EDS
units at those ticket counters have accommodated overflow from Delta
Airlines and occasional unscheduled charter flights. TSA has
recommended the use of gravity rollers in place of the EDS units to
support transferring bags for screening when these ticket counters are
utilized. TSA also advised the airport authority that should an airline
decide to move into those spaces, TSA would work with the airport in
meeting its requirements for baggage screening.
Question 2. It has also come to my attention that despite the clear
legislative guidance regarding the need for TSA to continue to monitor
airport exit lanes, this does not seem to be the case when it comes to
Raleigh-Durham International Airport. TSA recently informed Raleigh
Durham Airport that because of its recent renovations it is no longer
responsible for monitoring the new exit lanes. Memphis International
Airport is about to embark on a Terminal Modernization Program and is
concerned that it will be in a similar situation. Does TSA have an
obligation to monitor airport exit lanes? Can I have your assurances
that TSA will continue to monitor the exit lanes at Memphis
International Airport both during and after the renovations are
complete?
Answer. Section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L.
No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1188 (2013) (Budget Act) requires the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to monitor passenger exit
points from the sterile area of airports at which TSA provided such
monitoring as of December l, 2013. TSA interprets this to mean if TSA
was responsible for an exit point on December 1, 2013, then after
remodeling, TSA will continue to be responsible for that exit point.
Remodeling an existing exit point at which TSA provided monitoring on
December 1, 2013, differs from opening a new exit point or moving an
existing exit point to a new location. In determining whether an exit
point project is a remodeling or relocation effort, TSA would consider
whether the post-project physical location of the point would require
significant additional manpower or FTE allocation by TSA for
supervision, safety checks, and supervisor response for a checkpoint
breach and/or incident. TSA does have an obligation to monitor exit
points at Memphis International Airport. Based on current modernization
plans, this obligation is expected to continue during and after the
recently announced airport modernization effort.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question. TSA has historically maintained that it is 3 to 9 percent
more cost efficient than its private sector Screening Partnership
Program (SPP) partners at providing airport security screening at
airports across country. I have always found it difficult to accept
this position. Surely, when factoring in how much it costs for TSA
screeners to receive government benefits and other costs born
``government wide'' (not just specifically by the TSA), your cost
comparison cannot be accurate. Multiple GAO studies have also been
critical of the methodology used by TSA to calculate this cost
comparison. DHS has also acknowledged that TSA does not include
government-wide costs when making cost comparisons to SPP contractors.
In the FY14 Omnibus, Congress directed TSA to contract with an
independent entity to analyze this cost issue and hopefully once and
for all get to the bottom of it.
But for now I want to ask for more elaboration on TSA's continued
position that it is more efficient than private contractors,
specifically in relation to the cost estimate TSA uses as a maximum
allowable price bid for solicitations. For example, TSA in February
awarded a SPP contract at the Kansas City Airport. The cost associated
with the contract is 20 percent below TSA's cost estimate of its own
costs were it to perform the screening services. Without getting into
the specifics of the contract, I have concerns that this huge
inconsistency, albeit one that cuts in the private applicants favor, is
symptomatic of these problems with TSA's cost analysis. Can you explain
how TSA might award a contract award at a price so far below its
operating costs (20 percent) while at the same time maintain that its
operating costs are generally 3-9 percent more cost efficient than
private contractors? Do you anticipate the study directed by the FY14
Omnibus will include a ``government-wide'' cost accounting?
Answer. The 3 to 9 percent reference is from a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report update in 2011 (GAO-11-375R), which
included alternative approaches to formulating estimates. As reflected
in the report, this range was for a point in time and was a composite
average for all participants in the program. Cost estimates vary from
airport to airport and are dependent on security requirements, which
may change based on variables such as the configuration of the airport,
passenger throughput and equipment requirements.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) awards contracts
under the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) that provide the best
value to the Government and do not compromise security or detrimentally
affect the cost-efficiency or effectiveness of screening passengers or
property, as required by the Federal Aviation Administration
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95). TSA's solicitations
are based on cost estimates reflecting the actual resources used to
conduct screening operations at the airport. Upon conclusion of the
evaluation process, the award is made to the responsible offerer whose
proposal, conforming to the solicitation, will be most advantageous to
the Government. A low price does not necessarily reflect an
insufficiency of technical approach (to ensuring security
effectiveness). In the case of Kansas City International Airport, the
winning proposal was found to be the most advantageous offer for the
Government, meaning it provided the best technical proposal for the
price.
Per the request of Congress, TSA has awarded a contract for an
independent study to be conducted on the cost and performance of SPP
airports as compared to non-SPP airports. Because TSA's cost estimating
methodology is the focus of the study, TSA structured the solicitation
so that companies may propose their own approaches for providing the
most robust cost and performance comparisons. The independent
contractor does intend to assess costs external to TSA's budget per
recent GAO recommendations. The contractor's report will be due to TSA
in November for review and TSA is required to provide that report to
GAO for its review within one year of enactment of the FY 2014
Appropriations Act.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Marco Rubio to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. My understanding is that the TSA, as part of its
responsibility for transportation security, must provide certain
transportation workers with a security threat assessment that may
include a fingerprint-based criminal history records check. These
workers may include those with certain aviation jobs, maritime jobs
which require a ``transportation worker identification credential'' and
commercial drivers who seek ``hazardous materials endorsements.'' It is
also my understanding that there are variations in the criteria for a
criminal history records check that may disqualify an applicant for one
position but would not disqualify an applicant for another position. Is
there an opportunity to harmonize the criteria? And if so, what
benefits could stem from harmonization?
Answer. Yes, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
supports and intends to harmonize programs to the extent it can within
existing legislation such as harmonization of enrollment procedures and
customer interaction. TSA was able to align the Hazardous Materials
Endorsement (HME) criminal disqualifying criteria to be the same as
required for the maritime workers requiring a Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC). For these two populations, TSA is
able to provide a common enrollment, security threat assessment and
associated reduced fees to lower the burden to applicants.
A legislative change is required to harmonize criminal
disqualifying criteria between aviation and the surface and maritime
credentialing programs. Under the current statutory regime, the list of
crimes, period of time for which a conviction remains disqualifying
(``look-back'' period); and redress process for aviation differs
substantially from the surface and maritime programs.
Amendments to existing statutes are required to make the aviation
criminal history records check (CHRC) requirements the same as the
statutory requirements governing the TWIC program, which TSA also
applies to HME applicants.
If the CHRC statutory requirements were made identical across all
modes of transportation, TSA anticipates that it would reduce the need
for multiple background checks for workers who access a variety of
transportation facilities.
Question 2. Congress directed TSA to reform the TWIC process to
enable applicants to obtain a TWIC with a single visit to an enrollment
center. It's my understanding that TSA's plans for the national
implementation of the OneVisit program calls for rollout in May and
completion in August. Can you confirm that time-frame for the
Committee? Based on the OneVisit pilot programs that have been
completed, do you anticipate any problems that would prevent you from
meeting objective? I would appreciate regular reports from you and your
staff on the status of national implementation after the rollout begins
in May.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began
national implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) OneVisit in May 2014, and completed the national
OneVisit rollout in July 2014. All Universal Enrollment Services (UES)
sites offer the OneVisit enrollment option. TSA revised the information
collection associated with the TWIC program to reflect the OneVisit
option. This revised collection was approved earlier this summer.
Question 3. Tourism is an important part of Florida's economy, and
my home state is a destination for millions of international travelers.
One key part of their trip is the experience they encounter when
travelling through our airports. Does TSA work with tourism officials
when developing screening procedures or training agents, particularly
at airports with a high percentage of international travelers?
Answer. In 2012, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
created the Passenger Support Specialist program. This workforce
initiative is comprised of Transportation Security Officers who have
received special training to resolve the concerns of, and provide
assistance to, travelers including those traveling to and from
international destinations. More than 3,500 officers volunteered to
represent TSA in this role, receiving specialized training from
stakeholder organizations representing various facets of the traveling
public, including those representing multicultural communities.
Question 4. It seems that the TSA PreCheck program has benefited
both TSA and the traveling public, and that those benefits would
continue if more people signed up for the program. In looking at the
PreCheck program, however, it seems that TSA has neither the resources
nor the expertise to conduct an effective marketing campaign to expand
PreCheck and help the program realize its potential. As a result, it
seems to me that some sort of collaboration with the travel community
to have marketing experts promote the program would be smart and
effective. Is TSA partnering with the travel community on this program,
and what are your thoughts on such an effort?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
partnered with the travel industry since the inception of TSA
Pre3TM in October 2011. Initial marketing and communication
efforts involved the airlines participating in TSA
Pre3TM program and promoting enrollment via the U.S. Custom
and Border Protection's (CBP) Global Entry program. During 2012, TSA
expanded outreach and communications more broadly to the larger travel
industry community, including:
Dedicated TSA Pre3TM web pages on the Internet
sites for all 11 participating airlines.
TSA Pre3TM-related articles in several in-flight
magazines and employee newsletters.
Direct airline messaging about TSA Pre3TM to
passengers via e-mail, signs posted at ticket counters and in
airline lounges, and pop-up messages on check-in kiosks.
TSA Pre3TM-specific signage provided by airports
to include directional signs as well as `call to action'
banners regarding the TSA Pre3TM enrollment process.
Co-marketing agreements with American Express Card Services
and Sabre Travel Network to promote TSA
Pre3TMenrollment direct to customers and through
travel managers.
After TSA launched the TSA Pre3TM application program in
December 2013, marketing shifted to promoting direct enrollment in this
program. TSA has opened 304 application centers across the country. On
average, TSA receives 3,500 applications per day, more than double the
initial projections that were based on CBP Global Entry enrollments. As
of September 3, 2014, more than 524,000 travelers will have enrolled in
TSA Pre3TM.
TSA recognizes that a strong partnership with the travel industry
and other organizations remains critical to the success of TSA
Pre3TM. TSA recently established a marketing advisory group
consisting of the TSA Office of the Chief Risk Officer's Chief
Marketing Officer and the Division Director of Marketing and Branding,
and the Aviation Stakeholder of the TSA Office of Security Policy and
Industry Engagement. The marketing and advisory group is actively
working with a number of industry trade groups including Global
Business Travel Association, U.S. Travel Association, Airports Council
International, American Society of Travel Agents, U.S. Tour Operators
Association, and several large travel management firms. TSA also works
with other entities which include Marriott Hotels, Loews Hotels, Brand
USA, and Visa Card Services to market TSA Pre3TM. A contract
with a small business marketing firm to assist with branding and
creative content development is close to being finalized.
Question 5. I sent you a letter in 2011 following a much publicized
incident with the screening of an elderly passenger in a Florida
airport. In your response, you noted on the letter that TSA is
``actively exploring options for screening the elderly using more of a
risk based approach.'' This is of particular interest to my state given
the elderly population in Florida. Can you describe what options you
have explored and implemented to ensure that elderly passengers are
treated with dignity and respect?
Answer. It has always been the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) policy to treat all passengers, especially the
elderly, with dignity and respect. As part of TSA's movement away from
a one-size-fits-all approach to security and the implementation of
risk-based protocols, TSA has modified screening procedures for the
elderly to better focus resources on passengers who may be more likely
to pose a greater risk to security, and to further ensure elderly
passengers are treated with dignity and respect as they undergo
screening. Under the modified procedures, passengers appearing 75 and
older do not have to remove shoes and light jackets when going through
security checkpoints and are allowed an additional pass through
Advanced Imaging Technology to clear any anomalies detected. However,
elderly passengers may be required to remove their shoes or undergo a
pat-down if anomalies are detected during security screening that
cannot be resolved through other means. Additionally, passengers
appearing 75 and older who are unable to stand for screening may remain
seated and will receive a comparable level of screening, including
explosives trace detection.
Question 6. As you look to increasingly enhance the performance of
TSA's front line workforce--the Transportation Security Officers,
specifically--what are the critical success factors you and your
management team consider need to be addressed? Additionally, in looking
at the job of a TSO, there is clearly a security component to it;
however, there is also an important customer service aspect that I am
guessing is often overlooked. How customers are treated when in line,
how long they have to wait, and how TSOs interact with passengers at
the checkpoint are among the items I'd consider critical to customer
service. So, can you tell me how you measure the level of customer
service provided at the checkpoint, and how that factors into the
overall evaluation of a TSO?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
committed to enhancing the performance of its front line workforce and
has implemented various programs to that end. Factors deemed critical
to success not only include technical proficiency in screening
operations, but those factors that contribute to deterrence, passenger
experience, and workplace atmosphere. Passengers have multiple vehicles
for providing feedback to TSA, such as the TSA Contact Center via
telephone or e-mail; comment cards that are available at the checkpoint
upon request; and through local Customer Service and Quality
Improvement Managers at the airport. If passenger feedback cannot be
addressed at the local level, it is elevated to TSA Headquarters for
review and appropriate action.
The passenger experience (sometimes referred to as customer
service) is important to TSA as is demonstrated by the implementation
of the Presence Advisements, Communication, and Execution (PACE)
program, which was launched in 2011. The PACE program deploys
evaluation teams to six geographical regions. Teams of evaluators
travel in pairs to covertly assess checkpoints at Category X, I, and II
airports by posing as inexperienced travelers.
A PACE assessment evaluates how a checkpoint is adhering to
standards derived from TSA management directives and the checkpoint
screening Standard Operating Procedure.
TSA measures many other elements related to passenger experience
through the PACE program. Elements include TSO command presence,
whether they proactively direct and prepare passengers for the next
stage of screening, and how they communicate with each other and with
passengers.
The TSOs are evaluated in the Transportation Officers Performance
System (TOPS). The performance goal by which they are evaluated is
``Demonstrates professionalism and commitment to TSA's mission in order
to promote public trust and confidence.'' The measures for the
performance standards include: ``fosters public trust and credibility
by providing responsive service to internal/external customers and in
accordance with TSA directives; maintains a positive demeanor and
awareness while conducting assigned screening functions and operations,
as observed by supervision; diffuses potentially disruptive situations
promptly and tactfully.'' This goal is part of the 4-tier performance
plan that also includes an assessment of competencies, i.e., oral
communication and interpersonal skills.
All of these elements factor into overall performance. While TSO
names are not recorded (unless an egregious situation is observed),
immediate feedback is provided to the Federal Security Director (FSD)
following an assessment so that corrections can be made. Detailed
written reports are provided to FSDs on the performance of each
checkpoint so they may target specific deficiencies discovered. Each
year, Category X, I, and II airports receive two PACE assessments for
approximately 75 percent of the airport's checkpoints.
[all]