[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE GROWING CRISIS IN SOUTH SUDAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 7, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-236
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina KAREN BASS, California
CURT CLAWSON, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Donald Booth, Special Envoy to Sudan and South
Sudan, U.S. Department of State................................ 7
The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman, senior advisor to the
president, U.S. Institute of Peace............................. 39
Mr. Brian Adeba, associate director of policy, Enough Project.... 45
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Donald Booth: Prepared statement................... 11
The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman: Prepared statement............. 41
Mr. Brian Adeba: Prepared statement.............................. 47
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
Written responses from the Honorable Donald Booth to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs......................... 56
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations: Questions submitted for the record and written
responses from:
The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman............................... 58
Mr. Brian Adeba................................................ 59
THE GROWING CRISIS IN SOUTH SUDAN
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order and good
afternoon, everyone. Thank you for being here.
On April 27 of this year our subcommittee held a hearing on
South Sudan's prospects for peace. An accord that appeared to
have finally ended the civil war that broke out in December
2013 was reluctantly signed by both the Government of South
Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
in August 2015.
We were cautioned by Ambassador Booth at the time and I
remember your testimony on April 27, Mr. Ambassador, when you
said that these are the most significant advancements yet in
implementing the peace agreement.
But you also cautioned and said it is only a first step
toward lasting peace--the most difficult work still lies ahead
and those words were prophetic and certainly very, very true,
especially given what happened in July.
Peace was never fully established in South Sudan as a
result of the August agreement. In fact, as we all know,
fighting spread to areas that had not previously seen armed
conflict.
An estimated 50,000 South Sudanese have been killed since
December 2013. More than 2.5 million have been displaced and
4.8 million face severe hunger.
According to the U.N. Mission in the Republic of South
Sudan, or UNMISS, ``gross violations of human rights and
serious violations of humanitarian law have occurred on a
massive scale.''
South Sudanese women have long reported cases of sexual
assault by armed forces throughout the country, sometimes in
sight of UNMISS bases.
This past July, between 80 to 100 armed soldiers broke into
the Terrain compound which houses aid workers and international
organizations' staff and for several hours they sexually
assaulted women, beat residents, murdered one South Sudanese
journalist, and looted the facility.
UNMISS did not respond to the desperate calls for help from
residents even though their own personnel lived in the Terrain
compound and the U.N. Mission officials say the various
components of UNMISS didn't respond to orders to mobilize from
within the organization.
U.N. peacekeepers were just minutes away but they refused
to intervene despite being asked and having a robust legal
mandate to do so.
A contingent of South Sudanese military ultimately rescued
the victims from other rampaging troops. The investigation by
the South Sudanese Government is scheduled to be completed
within days and just over the weekend our U.N. Ambassador,
Samantha Power, had asked and has asked that there be an
independent panel to look into what happened there.
And there must be consequences for those who are found
guilty. The rapidly deteriorating security and the increasingly
dire humanitarian situation led me to undertake an emergency
mission to South Sudan 2 weeks ago along with staff director
Greg Simpkins.
I have known Salva Kiir since he became First Vice
President in the Government of Sudan in 2005. As a matter of
fact, I met him in Khartoum only weeks after he assumed that
office and I hoped my visit might convey to him the outrage
over the murder, rape, sexual assault, attack on aid workers,
and the precarious situation that his government faces.
South Sudan is at a tipping point. The United Nations will
likely take up a measure to impose an arms embargo if they do
not see implementation of what looks like was an agreement over
the weekend to deploy some 4,000 peacekeepers.
The International Monetary Fund has strongly recommended a
mechanism for financial transparency and that meets next month,
likely expecting a response from South Sudan.
Meanwhile, the House and Senate both have measures that
have an arms embargo embedded in it as well. In Juba, we met
with President Kiir, other members of the cabinet and his
Defense Minister, Kuol Manyang Juuk, and the top members of his
staff including the Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong,
considered by many to be a major power behind the scenes.
I emphasized to them that the widespread rape and sexual
exploitation and abuse by soldiers must stop now and that
perpetrators of these despicable crimes must be prosecuted in a
response both President Kiir and Defense Minister Juuk agreed
to produce a zero tolerance Presidential decree against rape
and sexual exploitation by armed forces.
Such a decree not only informs perpetrators that they will
be punished for their actions but it places the government on
the line to enforce such a decree.
The U.N. High Commission for Human Rights has previously
described the South Sudan's Government to hold perpetrators of
abuses accountable as ``few and inadequate'' and that, of
course, must change.
President Kiir also gave us a copy of a Presidential order
forming a commission to investigate the incident at the Terrain
compound. The results of that are due any day now.
There are, however, four military officers and one civilian
in custody for looting the Terrain compound. But no one has
been arrested for sexual assaults, beatings or the public
murder of a South Sudanese journalist.
One of the victims of sexual assault at Terrain is from my
congressional district. After relating horrible details of the
assault by two soldiers she gave us the name of the soldier who
``rescued her'' and who might be able to provide information
that could be used to prosecute those who attacked her at the
Terrain compound and I conveyed that to Salva Kiir and the
Defense Minister.
As you know, Mr. Ambassador, there are about 20,000
humanitarian aid workers in South Sudan, 2,000 of whom are from
the United States and other foreign countries.
If there is not greater security of these humanitarian
personnel and supplies, vital assistance will diminish at a
time that it is needed most. The exploitation of children as
child soldiers must stop as well. According to UNICEF, 16,000
child soldiers have been recruited by all sides since the civil
war began in December 2013.
Moreover, this year the U.S. State Department Trafficking
in Persons report gave South Sudan a failing grade place it on
Tier 3, in part because of child soldiers.
South Sudan faces the possibility again of a U.N. arms
embargo, again, if they do not implement the deployment of the
4,000 Regional Protection Force.
There is yet time for South Sudan to make its pivot to
peace and good governance by faithfully implementing a
comprehensive peace accord including and especially the
establishment of a hybrid court signed 1 year ago.
But time is running out. It is a very, very fluid and,
unfortunately, volatile situation. The governments of the three
guarantors of South Sudan's peace--the United States, the UK,
and Norway--all have expressed their disgust with the South
Sudanese Government and its armed opposition for not adhering
to the August 2015 peace agreement and providing to the extent
it can for the security and the well-being of its people.
However, expressions of disdain are not enough. This
hearing is not only intended to examine culpability for the
current situation but also to try to find solutions that will
safeguard the future of one of the world's newest nations and
its citizens.
As a guarantor of peace, the United States can and should
do no less.
I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague, Ms.
Bass, the ranking member of the subcommittee.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for your trip
that you and Mr. Simpkins made. I know it was on very short
notice but a very important delegation. So I'm glad that you
did that and also that we are having this hearing so quickly.
I also want to thank Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Lyman
and I'm glad that we will be hearing your testimony today.
I was in South Sudan in November and I went there with a
small delegation to look at the U.N. peacekeeping mission at
the time and that was before Machar returned and the big
concern then was will he return and will the nation hold to the
agreement.
And it was shortly after President Kiir had divided up the
nation and expanded the provinces and we were very concerned
about how you could possibly, since that was done after the
peace agreement, how can you hold to the peace--how can you
hold to the power sharing that had been agreed to in the peace
agreement if you've reconfigured the entire geography of the
nation.
At the time, we were concerned about what was happening
with UNMISS then. But now, what is going on, how the violence
had expanded and encompassed and victimized yet again South
Sudanese citizens and especially the ones that are least able
to protect themselves--women, girls, and youth.
In response to the crisis, I joined several of my
colleagues in a letter to President Obama outlining the
severity of the deteriorating situation in South Sudan and
calling on the U.S. to lead the way in calling for an arms
embargo on South Sudan to stop the needless killing, endless
brutality, and unconscionable impunity.
The UNSC August 12th decision to renew UNMISS, the proposed
revision of its mandate and inclusion of an additional 4,000
strong Regional Protection Force must be applauded.
But there must also be clarification regarding the specific
rules of engagement governing the UNMISS troops.
I understand that the South Sudanese Government agreed to
the additional Regional Protection Force as recently as Sunday.
I look to Ambassador Booth to outline the next steps which
must be taken to bring an end to the nightmare of violence not
only by the long-term suffering citizens of South Sudan but
also by the foreign nationals who, with total disregard for
their personal welfare, seek to assist these citizens.
Several of the questions that I have we'll get into in the
dialogue but I want to propose them in the beginning and,
obviously, the central question is what more can we do.
An arms embargo, will it really be effective? It seems as
though there needs to be a whole international effort that's
beyond UNMISS and I want to know what your thoughts are in
terms of the AU and the AU's capacity.
And also, in terms of UNMISS, what will their role be? Will
they be able to intervene? Will they be able to be aggressive
or are they just going to be in a position where, you know,
they will watch something happening.
I just think that this situation has reached--and we all
know this--has reached dire proportions. I was in Nigeria a
couple of weeks ago and it was a staff member from the State
Department actually had just been evacuated from South Sudan
and sent to Nigeria.
So I really want to be as specific as possible. It's
important to understand the situation but I really want to get
down to the brass tacks of okay, now what--what can we do--what
can we do as a nation and what should the world do because
otherwise I just don't see the situation getting particularly
better.
With that, I yield.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ms. Bass.
The chair recognizes Mr. Donovan.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'm going
to yield my time so we give the witness some more time to
testify. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
and Ranking Member Bass for calling this hearing on the growing
crisis in South Sudan and thank all of our witnesses and
particularly thank Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Lyman for
being here today.
I look forward to hearing from you on the deteriorating
situation in South Sudan and as Congresswoman Bass said what we
can do to be effective in responding.
Like many observers, I was optimistic when South Sudan
emerged in 2011 as an independent country. However, the civil
war that has ravaged South Sudan since 2013 had escalated
alarmingly since the subcommittee's last hearing on South Sudan
in April. The impact is devastating and the potential for even
deeper crisis is greatly disturbing.
Not only does South Sudan face another post-conflict
reconciliation process, massive and chronic humanitarian needs,
high-level corruption and widespread displacement of its
population, but an increase in human rights abuses including
recruiting child soldiers, which is extremely distressing.
U.N. officials have asserted that targeted attacks against
civilians, humanitarians and U.N. personnel in South Sudan
constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, and the U.N.
Mission in South Sudan reports that civilians have been
directly targeted often along ethnic lines.
Forces on both sides have committed widespread violence.
There have been more than 260 attacks on humanitarian workers
in 2016 alone, including an attack on a residence for aid
workers in Juba in July which resulted in assaults on several
Americans and the killing of a local journalist.
The dangers faced by foreign aid workers could have a
devastating effect on relief efforts. This is a critical time
for South Sudan. If the current crisis cannot be brought under
control and the violence halted, the situation will likely
deteriorate further and could spin into complete chaos.
I hope that the South Sudanese Government's decision
earlier this week to allow the Regional Protection Force to
deploy will enable the beginning of real improvement in this
very dire situation.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on what else
we can do to support stability in that part of the world and I
thank our witnesses again for being here and yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. We are joined by full committee
Chairman Ed Royce of California.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I would just start by commending you, Chairman, for your
sustained focus on the crisis in South Sudan.
As all of you know, Chairman Smith just traveled to South
Sudan to engage with our Embassy there and to engage with our
other partners, and this is the fifth, I think, South Sudan-
specific hearing that the committee has held since this crisis
began.
What's unfortunate and, frankly, maddening is the
underlying problems haven't changed in the past 3 years. It is
still a man-made crisis. It is still a crisis political in
nature.
And what does change every day is the number of innocent
South Sudanese killed, the number displaced. Tens of thousands
have been killed, millions have now been displaced.
I very much appreciate the recent senior-level engagement
of the administration, including Secretary Kerry's trip to the
region and Ambassador Samantha Power's leading of a Security
Council delegation to South Sudan. I was on the phone a few
hours ago with Secretary Susan Rice on this issue. It is really
unclear whether this high-level diplomacy can have an impact on
the ground.
One of the oddities here is that the anti-American
sentiment is growing in Juba as of late. There is reporting
today of an incident in which the Presidential guard
deliberately opened fire on a U.S. diplomatic convoy traveling
through the city. I understand command and control of armed
forces in South Sudan is practically nonexistent in this
situation--practically nonexistent. But there should never be
an instance in which American diplomats are specifically
targeted ever.
After lengthy Security Council negotiations, the Security
Council approved of the deployment of a Regional Protection
Force. I met with the Secretary-General recently of the U.N. on
this issue and I shared that we welcome the establishment of a
force. But I know how difficult it is going to be moving this
from concept to reality. It's going to be far from easy.
Special Envoy Booth, in your prepared testimony you explain
that if the Secretary-General reports that the Government of
South Sudan is impeding the new force's deployment, the
administration would be prepared to support an arms embargo.
We've made similar threats in other resolutions and I'm not
sure anyone in South Sudan takes that threat of an embargo
seriously anymore. I hope that we will be serious in terms of
implementation of it.
Interestingly, in your prepared testimony you made no
mention of the existing Executive order that would allow the
sanction of individuals who threaten peace in South Sudan. I
think that is worth contemplating. I look forward to hearing
from you why no one had been added to the U.S. sanctions list
in over a year. There are, surely, people who deserve to be on
that list. If we fail to hold South Sudan's political leaders
on both sides accountable for the atrocities committed we
cannot expect anything to change.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce.
Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you for letting me sit in on your hearing.
Mr. Ambassador, since the signing of the peace agreement in
August 2015 and since the violence in July, the U.N. Security
Council and the U.S. have both failed to implement an arms
embargo, as you know, in South Sudan.
The U.N. and the U.S. have both failed to sanction
additional individuals that we have proof have been involved in
the attacks against civilians and that continue to procure
weapons and military equipment.
Secretary Kerry, in February in the State and Foreign
Operations Subcommittee, which I sit on and as well as
yourself, in April, both told me that the U.S. is committed to
holding senior officials accountable for continued cease-fire
violations and human rights violations that undermine the terms
of the peace agreement in South Sudan.
You both said that the administration would be willing to
implement sanctions on such individuals. But Secretary Kerry
stopped short of endorsing an arms embargo.
Also in August during a trip to Africa, Secretary Kerry
threatened to withhold humanitarian assistance to South Sudan
if leaders there continued to violate the peace agreement.
So I'm curious to hear in your testimony why the U.S. is
threatening to withhold assistance to the people of South Sudan
rather than holding the leaders who perpetuated the violence
accountable through sanctions and arms embargo.
I would also like to know who exactly in the administration
is preventing additional individuals from being sanctioned and
who do not want to implement an arms embargo.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Rooney, thank you very much.
I would like to now welcome Ambassador Booth. Donald Booth
was appointed Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan on August
28, 2013. He previously served as Ambassador to Ethiopia,
Zambia, and Liberia.
Prior to that, he was the director of the Office of
Technical and Specialized Agencies in the Department of State's
Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
Ambassador Booth also has served as director of the Office
of West African Affairs, deputy director of the Office of
Southern African Affairs, economic counselor in Athens, and
division chief for bilateral trade affairs at the State
Department.
Ambassador Booth, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD BOOTH, SPECIAL ENVOY TO SUDAN
AND SOUTH SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Booth. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith,
Ranking Member Bass and the members of the committee and
subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I
want to discuss some of the tragic events that occurred over
the past 2 months.
But without ignoring the bitter reality on the ground, I
also want to focus most of my remarks today on the
possibilities for the way forward.
Chairman Smith, as you know from your visit, South Sudan is
in a dire state. The most recent outbreak of violence in early
July created a perilous security situation in many parts of the
country.
The humanitarian situation, as many of you have noted, is
one of the most extreme in the world, with 4.8 million people,
over 40 percent of the population, facing life-threatening
hunger, 2.5 million displaced and the economy in free fall.
Serious crime is now a part of daily life for South
Sudanese and aid workers and their supplies are targets as
well.
The violence in early July came about because neither
President Salva Kiir nor First Vice President Riek Machar was
willing to work with the other to implement the peace agreement
or to set up the security arrangements that were designed to
prevent a return to fighting Juba.
We saw the moment of greatest optimism since the signing of
the August 2015 peace agreement, the establishment in late
April of the transitional government. We saw it shattered by
the irresponsibility and ruthlessness of South Sudan's leaders.
Both leaders lost control of their forces during a moment
of tremendous political fragility, and government soldiers
engaged in sexual violence against civilians including the
attacks on both South Sudanese and foreigners at Terrain Camp.
Now, I would be remiss not to pause here and praise the
work of Ambassador Molly Phee and her team at Embassy Juba.
They have faced enormous hardships and real danger in doing
their jobs and their work has been, frankly, extraordinary.
They have, against long odds, preserved the engagement
needed to help the people of South Sudan. They have done so
despite two events that I know are on your minds.
First, on the night of July 7th, just a few hours after a
deadly encounter between government and opposition security
forces in the same area, two vehicles carrying several of our
diplomats were fired upon by government soldiers.
Fortunately, because they were both armored vehicles, the
occupants were not injured. Ambassador Phee confronted
President Kiir the following day and received an apology as
well as assurances that there would be a thorough
investigation.
That day, however, was also the same day that major
fighting broke out between the government and opposition. The
second event was much more tragic--the attack by scores of
uniformed government security forces against the Terrain Camp
where 12 Americans and over 30 third country and South Sudanese
nationals were located.
The attack involved hours of looting, beatings, rapes and
the murder of a prominent South Sudanese journalist, John
Gatluak. I would like to express at this point my personal
condolences to John's family and to all of the survivors of the
attack.
That attack occurred toward the end of 2 days of heavy
fighting in Juba which saw government forces drive out Machar's
security contingent.
Even as shooting raged near the U.S. Embassy compounds, as
soon as the Embassy was alerted to the attack, Ambassador Phee
contacted South Sudanese security officials whom she believed
still had command of their forces and the convinced them to
intervene to rescue those under assault at the camp.
I want to stress that Ambassador Phee did everything within
her power and resources in those circumstances to assist those
who were under assault at the Terrain Camp.
In the aftermath of the attack, our priority was the care
and evacuation of the victims and then to protect their privacy
and to demand justice for them.
My written testimony contains a thorough account of what we
know about the awful events at Terrain Camp that day as well as
what we are doing to ensure safety of our personnel.
Now, I would like to focus the rest of my statement on what
I see as the way forward or at least a way forward. First, in
the wake of the fighting in Juba in July, a political
accommodation to avoid further fighting and suffering remains
as important as ever.
But given that neither President Kiir nor former Vice
President Riek Machar could prevent their security entourages
from fighting, we do not believe it would be wise for Machar to
return to his previous position in Juba.
That said, this cannot serve as a justification for
President Kiir to monopolize power. What is most urgently
needed is creation of a secure space in Juba for an inclusive
political process to forestall further violence.
That is why we strongly support the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development's call for deployment of a Regional
Protection Force to Juba to provide for free and safe movement
throughout the capital.
The RPF should proactively contribute to stability and
thereby allow for the demilitarization of Juba. But we must be
clear that the government will need to allow the RPF to do its
job once it is in Juba.
No political process can take place as long as large
numbers of armed men and heavy weaponry remain in the capital.
Stabilizing the security situation in Juba is only the first
step.
Any political process, to be credible and viable, must be
inclusive. I believe what is needed is for South Sudan's
political and military leaders in and out of government to meet
together to figure out how to jointly shoulder responsibility
for preventing further bloodshed.
However, this can only succeed if those currently in power
are willing to accommodate the legitimate interests of others.
The violence in early July drove out significant factions of
the SPLM-in-Opposition, of the Former Detainees and other
political parties.
These groups must be deterred from supporting any further
violence. Thus, they must see a path for peaceful engagement.
South Sudan's leaders must also look ahead to the creation
of a professional inclusive national army and other security
institutions. They need to be able to articulate an agreed end
state of security sector reform.
As any international support for cantonment, or DDR,
activities will depend among other things on the credibility of
the envisioned security sector end state.
The Transitional Government should then prioritize
legislation, establishing an open consultative process for
drafting and ratifying a new constitution under which elections
will be held at the end of a transitional period.
In addition, the Transitional Government should prioritize
legislation regarding the African Union-led Hybrid Court for
South Sudan.
A recent opinion survey showed that 93 percent of South
Sudanese believe there can be no enduring peace without
accountability. We agree.
What I have described is a sequence of interdependent
events. I'm describing them as a way forward, not because it
will be easy to implement them but because it is difficult to
see any other path that does not lead to a future of oppressive
one-party rule, renewed conflict or, most likely, both.
I am not naive about the chances of these things happening.
Our ability to influence events in South Sudan and steer its
leaders to a more constructive behavior is limited.
The Security Council's permanent representatives just
returned from a trip to South Sudan. We were pleased that the
council was able to come to agreement with the Transitional
Government on several key issues including the government's
consent to deployment of the Regional Protection Force and to
work with the U.N. Mission that's already there.
However, we now need to see those words turned into action.
If the Secretary-General's report finds that the government is
obstructing deployment of the Regional Protection Force or
continuing to prevent UNMISS from fulfilling its mandate we are
prepared to support an arms embargo in the Security Council.
Beyond an arms embargo, we stand prepared to impose visa
restrictions on individuals involved in public corruption, as
official corruption has a long history in South Sudan and has
played a direct role in furtherance of conflict in the country.
Mr. Chairman, I would have liked to come before this
subcommittee today with better news. Unfortunately, we now face
a difficult and uncertain path for South Sudan. It is a
frustrating and disheartening situation, particularly, of
course, for South Sudanese.
It is their future that grows bleaker by the day. With them
in our minds I believe we must continue to press South Sudan's
leaders to give peace a chance.
Thank you for inviting me to speak today and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Booth follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so very much for your
statement and your fine work. Without objection, your full
statement will be made a part of the record.
Just a few opening questions, and I do want to add my
congratulations and thanks to Ambassador--the U.S. Ambassador
to South Sudan, Molly Phee, and her staff who, under
unbelievably trying circumstances, have been working around the
clock to try to secure the peace, provide for access of
humanitarian aid workers, which is one of the biggest
impediments and why so many people are dying of malnutrition
and why so many young people, especially children and babies,
are succumbing to starvation. They are working hard and I want
to thank her for her leadership as well.
Let me ask you about the zero tolerance policy that the
Defense Minister, when I asked him said they would do against
rape and sexual assault.
He made it very clear that he was going to call the
President to try to get him to do it as well. We did meet with
Salva Kiir and I raised it with him and he too said he would do
it.
We have called back since then, a little over a week. It
hasn't been promulgated yet and, of course, the mere issuance
of a statement without implementation is not worth the paper it
is printed on.
So we are hoping that the two will go hand in hand. Good
strong statement--hold these service members, these armed
forces to account, and police, and put them behind bars when
they sexually assault and rape and kill and maim. Your thoughts
on that.
Secondly, Ambassador Lyman, who as you know will be
testifying on the second panel, who performed your job
admirably and with great distinction when he was the Special
Envoy, makes the point in his testimony that the new rapid
protection force should not be under UNMISS, the U.N. Mission
there.
Greg Simpkins and I met with Ellen Loj, who's the head of
the United Nations Mission and she said they tried to get
commanders to make the trip which is only or less than a mile
away to try to save people who were under assault at Terrain
and they wouldn't go, and this isn't the first time.
It's happened several times. They have the right rules of
engagement. This isn't Sarajevo all over again or UNPROFOR in
the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. They have robust rules of
engagement in Chapter 7 powers.
He suggested it be under a separate authority and mission.
Your thoughts on that, whether or not that would be improvement
and provide some additional help.
And then the access issue--it seems to me that if, as I
said, people will die if there is not humanitarian access. The
huge majority of humanitarian workers are South Sudanese who,
in a way are in a special category of risk--your thoughts on
what we could do there.
And then security sector reform--when you testified last
time you put the agreement under four basic baskets which are
mutually inclusive of each other--governance and constitutional
reform, macroeconomic reform and transparency, security sector
reform, and justice and reconciliation.
And I think as you pointed out and as pointed out by
others, the Hybrid Court ought to be set up. It ought to be
done yesterday to hold people to account for acts of impunity
and crimes against humanity. But the security sector reform
seems like the most daunting challenge.
With all the militias and the lack of chain of command that
appears to be the situation there, your thoughts on the
prospects of meaningful systemic reform of the military.
Ambassador Booth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me go through those. First of all, I want to thank you
for being such a strong advocate for the zero tolerance policy
on gender-based violence and for rape other such crimes and for
raising that at the highest levels during your visit in Juba.
It's certainly something that we are following up on.
Unfortunately, like many commitments that are made when we meet
with senior officials in South Sudan, the promises are not
always turned into reality.
But it is something that, certainly, is important and we
will continue to push on that. We will let you know what
success or lack of success we may have in that regard.
Secondly, as regards to the Regional Protection Force,
there are a number of reasons why IGAD proposed and we have
supported putting the Regional Protection Force as part of the
U.N. Mission in South Sudan.
First of all, there is the issue of funding it, and a
separate stand-alone force under an African Union or an IGAD
flag would have faced problems of being funded and would have
severely delayed its ability to be deployed.
Doing it under the U.N. may not be always the fastest but
that's one of the things that I've been engaging on in my many
trips to the region and talking with chiefs of defense and
foreign ministry officials as well as other senior leaders to
ensure that the three countries that have pledged troops to
this Regional Protection Force--Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda--
would be, indeed, prepared to move their forces very quickly
and we would be prepared to help them to move them quickly to
do that.
Also, this force was designed in a way that it would be
under one commander and that commander would report to the
force commander of UNMISS but would have the authority and the
mandate from the troop-contributing countries to use that force
for the very specific tasks of the mandate in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2304, which is to ensure the free movement
of people in Juba, to protect critical infrastructure including
the airport and keeping it open, and in intervening should
anyone be planning or engaging in attacks on the U.N., on
civilians, on IDPs--a very broad mandate.
And, again, in our discussions with the troop-contributing
countries, they have assured us that the troops they would
deploy to do this mission would have the political backing in
their capitals to, indeed, enforce those tasks.
So I understand the skepticism that many may have, having
looked at other U.N. Missions. But this seemed to be the most
practical and expedient way of getting troops on the ground who
could actually provide a security umbrella in Juba.
But as I said in my testimony, just putting those forces on
the ground will not solve the problem. They need the
cooperation of the South Sudanese Government and in the peace
agreement and particularly in the security arrangements that
followed it that were negotiated after the signing of the
agreement in August 2015.
There was a limitation on the number of forces that both
Salva Kiir, the government, and Riek Machar, the opposition,
could have in Juba and all other forces were to be at least 25
kilometers outside of the city.
So that is at least a starting point for taking the heavy
weapons and many of the security forces that are currently in
Juba and getting them out and we would hope that the government
would cooperate in further reducing the military footprint so
that the citizens of Juba can feel more secure and so that
there is the room for the political dialogue that I talked
about.
On humanitarian assistance, this is indeed a terrible
situation. Since the outbreak of this conflict, 59 humanitarian
aid workers have been killed, making South Sudan the most
dangerous place for humanitarian aid workers, more dangerous
than Syria, I am told.
And so this is a serious problem. It is something we have
engaged repeatedly on. In my many visits to Juba I have engaged
with President Kiir, Defense Minister Kuol Manyang and others
on this.
We keep receiving assurances that this issue will be
addressed, that orders are issued, that they simply need to
have a specific example so they can go after individuals who
might have been harassing aid workers or stealing aid.
But, frankly, this has become a systemic problem. Shortly
after the fighting in July, there was looting of many different
stores in Juba. One was the World Food Programme warehouse, and
it was very organized.
A truck came with a crane, not only to loot the food but to
take the generator from the WFP compound.
So this, indeed, does need to investigated and people need
to be held accountable. I think that is the only way that the
message will get out that the government is truly serious that
humanitarian aid workers and their supplies are meant for the
people of South Sudan and should not be interfered with.
But this is going to be a continued engagement and a hard
slog, I am sure, with the government in Juba.
On security sector reform, the peace agreement and in
particular the security arrangements negotiated after it called
for a security and defense sector review board to outline sort
of the end state of the security arrangements of South Sudan--
what the army would look like, the security services, the
police, et cetera.
That board had just begun meeting when things fell apart in
July this year. But even under the peace agreement it was
foreseen that it would not come to conclusions for about 18
months into the transitional period whereas the idea of
cantoning forces and beginning a DDR process was to start prior
to that.
What I'm proposing, and I've said in my testimony, is that
we really need to have an idea of what the end state is. South
Sudan has suffered for too long as a heavily militarized state,
probably understandable in that it was the product of a long
liberation struggle--Anyanya I and Anyanya II against the
government in Khartoum--so almost 50 years of struggle.
But it is time that South Sudan, in order to be able to be
at peace and to prosper needs to be a less demilitarized state.
So can we get South Sudanese to agree on what the end state is
and if we agree that that's a sustainable and reasonable end
state that's something that then we can look to support.
So, really, our leverage on getting a meaningful security
sector reform is that we will not fund things if it isn't a
reasonable outcome that we are driving toward.
And then on the Hybrid Court, again, we share frustration
that this is moving more slowly than we would like. I have
engaged numerous times and we had our legal experts engage with
the African Union.
We are at the verge of giving them $3.3 million to actually
begin some of the work. We have encouraged them to move forward
on at least establishing an office for the prosecutor so that
testimonies and evidence can begin to be collected even before
the court is established and judges can decide on who would be
indicted or who would be looked at by the court.
So that's something we want to push forward. I discussed
that also with the African Union High Representative for South
Sudan, the Honorable President Konare, former President of
Mali, who has been deeply engaged for the past year as well in
trying to sort out the problems of South Sudan.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass.
Ms. Bass. Thank you again, Mr. Ambassador.
I wanted to know if you could tell me the status of the
former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, and if you could,
one, review the role he is playing and then the status of that.
We've talked about humanitarian aid and I know no one wants
to see that end, but how can humanitarian aid get to the
population?
You mentioned the World Food Programme and the theft--the
organized theft that took place and I wanted to know if that
was the government or the opposition.
We have talked about an arms embargo and I mentioned that
in my opening and I wanted to know, one, what is the position
of the administration on an arms embargo and where are the
South Sudanese getting their arms from now?
I also wanted to mention a couple other items.
Ambassador Booth. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Let me start with question about the Joint Monitoring and
Evaluation Commission, which is headed by Botswana former
President, Festus Mogae.
He was appointed by IGAD to fulfill the role as chair of
JMEC. Now, JMEC is a committee that is made up of South
Sudanese parties as well as of the members of IGAD Plus, who
are both guarantors and in our case a witness of the peace
agreement.
We're not a guarantor of the peace agreement. And he chairs
monthly meetings of that group, and his function is to oversee
the implementation of the agreement and where the parties get
stuck in implementing he is to recommend ways forward. And if
the parties are blocking implementation his recourse is to
report to IGAD, to the African Union Peace and Security Council
and to the U.N. Security Council, and he had done a number of
reports to those various bodies.
He has tackled issues such as the problem of the 28 states,
the impasse in the seating of members of the transitional
legislature and other elements of the agreement that the
parties were unable to actually find a way to implement because
they were not working in good faith with each other.
After the events of July 8 to 11, JMEC temporarily moved
its operations to Addis Ababa. They have now gone back to Juba,
and one of the tasks that the Security Council asked JMEC to
undertake is to hold a security workshop to determine the level
and arming of forces that should remain in Juba, and I
understand that President Mogae has convened a meeting which
will be held on the 22nd and 23rd of this month to look at
that.
So those are the types of activities that JMEC is doing. We
are one of the major supporters of JMEC. We have contributed
over $3 million to the operation of the JMEC and we believe it
is a critical component for successful implementation of any
part of the peace agreement.
It has been criticized by the government in particular for
usurping government authorities.
We do not see it that way at all. We see it as the
neutral--President Mogae in particular as the chairman, as the
neutral arbiter of implementation of the agreement.
On humanitarian access, I just really would like to clarify
one thing on what Secretary Kerry was expressing in the press
conference in Nairobi.
I really think what he was expressing there was not a plan
to cut off humanitarian assistance from the United States but,
rather, a frustration with the continued interference with the
humanitarian assistance that we are providing and really trying
to put South Sudan's leaders on notice that they have to get
serious about dealing with this. That was the message----
Ms. Bass. I wasn't referencing Secretary Kerry, really. I
know that there is concern about that here.
Ambassador Booth. Yes. So, again, how do we get the
humanitarian assistance delivered? It is a systemic problem and
it is partly related to the criminality.
The WFP warehouse incident, for example, occurred after
opposition forces were driven from the capital so it would have
to have been government forces that were doing that looting.
And, again, that is the type of thing that needs to be
investigated and some examples need to be made of people who
were involved in that type of activity.
Of the people that the government claims it has arrested
for looting in the aftermath of the fighting in July it is not
clear to us that any individuals--of those individuals
particularly involved are being looked at for involvement in
this attack.
And then the arms embargo--what we have tried to do with
the arms embargo, as it is a major tool, is to achieve progress
toward peace by threatening it and we have used that on a
number of occasions and we think it is one of the reasons that
the government is seriously looking at allowing the deployment
of the Regional Protection Force because they know that if
there is impediments to that--that the United States and I know
that many other members of the Security Council are already on
record of supporting the arms embargo.
But I think most importantly what they heard when the
Security Council permanent representatives went to Juba this
past weekend was a unanimous Security Council that was saying
when we pass a resolution, even though some may have abstained
on it, it is the Security Council that is speaking and so you
have to take that seriously.
And as I mentioned in my testimony, if the Secretary-
General reports that there is continued obstruction of this
force we are prepared to move ahead and, as we said in Security
Council Resolution 2304, which we have the pen on, that there
is an appended resolution to be voted on, which is an arms
embargo resolution, and we are also prepared to look at other
tools such as sanctions.
I must say, though, our record in getting additional people
sanctioned in the Security Council has not been good. We had
what we thought was a very good case back about a year ago when
fighting flared up in the Malakal area right after the signing
of the peace agreement and the two generals who were
responsible for this--Paul Malong on the government side and
Johnson Olony on the opposition side--we put their names
forward for sanctioning and the Council--several members of the
Council blocked that effort.
So it is not--even when you think you have a very clear
case it is not easy to get the Council to agree on that and it
is--to be effective travel and financial sanctions really do
need to have the backing of a broader community than just the
United States.
Ms. Bass. Did you mention who's the primary or where's the
primary place that they get their arms from? Who is selling
them the arms?
Ambassador Booth. They seem to have mainly come from the
former Soviet Union area but I think most of them come in
through the gray or black market arms market.
I don't have specific countries that I can attach to
specific arms platforms because obviously, the government goes
to some lengths to keep that information to itself.
But, clearly, it has access still to arms and----
Ms. Bass. Which is why I wonder about the effectiveness of
an arms embargo. But anyway----
Ambassador Booth. Well, that's why if an arms embargo is
voted it has to be something that is done by the Security
Council so that it will have the imprimatur of that body and
the weight of the international community behind it.
Ms. Bass. So, Mr. Chair, before I yield I just wanted to
bring attention to someone who's in the audience who was a
former intern with me, David Acuoth, who was part of the Lost
Boys and Lost Girls that have been living very successfully in
the United States and is leading an effort with other Lost Boys
and Lost Girls--I should say Lost Men and Lost Women because
they are all grown.
But we actually plan to next week introduce legislation
calling for a program that would be run by us, by the State
Department, to allow some of the former Lost Boys and Lost
Girls to return to South Sudan.
Those individuals who have come here, who have gotten their
education, who have been successful and want to go back and
give back to their country, obviously, no one would suggest
that they go back right now.
But given the length of time it takes to do legislation we
certainly would hope if a program like that is instituted it
was one that had been suggested before many years ago by one of
your former colleagues that it is something that we might
consider.
So I just want to mention that and I will save my other
questions for the next witness.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Donovan.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ambassador,
thank you for your service to our country. Many of the things
that you spoke about are troubling.
Two things I would like for you to address, if you could
for us, is one, is the recruitment of children to fight in
these battles and the other is the U.N. Mission and South
Sudan's inability to protect the workers that are going there
on humanitarian missions.
And the last thing, if you have a moment, is you spoke
about the path of peaceful engagement. I was just curious about
how you think we get there.
Ambassador Booth. Thank you, Congressman.
On child soldiers, I think the number was already read out
of about 16,000 supposedly have been recruited during the
course of this conflict since December 2013.
Child soldiers had been a problem in South Sudan before
this current conflict. It's something that we had actually
engaged very robustly with the Ministry of Defense prior to
December 2013 on and which we were making actually some real
progress in getting child soldiers out of the SPLA and even
addressing those who were in many of the militias throughout
the country.
Mr. Donovan. Ambassador, what ages are we speaking about,
if you know?
Ambassador Booth. I have heard of children as young as 10
and 12 being involved. It could be even younger, in some cases.
But this is something that we have been constantly engaging
them on.
Now, during the height of the conflict they were recruiting
both sides, opposition and government, and they were utilizing
militias and many of these militias are traditional youth
organizations that go on traditional cattle raids and there is
sort of no distinction there in terms of age of majority, if
you will.
And so they ended up being, I think, swept into the
fighting. So that's part of the problem.
But, clearly, as we look--and I talked about a security
sector end state. Clearly, we would want to see a security
sector end state that the government would support. They would
have no place at all for child soldiers and we will continue to
engage on that.
The State Department last week, I think, issued a very
direct statement condemning the use of child soldiers in South
Sudan and the continued practice of that there.
On UNMISS and its problems in protecting humanitarian
workers, I would just like to give a little bit of context. The
U.N. Mission in South Sudan on December 14, 2013, the day after
the trouble started in Juba, they had camps in Juba and in
other towns.
Their own bases had become the sanctuary of tens of
thousands of South Sudanese who were fleeing ethnically-based
killing and this was a new move, if you will, for the U.N. to
actually let people onto their bases in such numbers. But we
think it was the right thing to do at the time and that it
saved thousands of lives to have that happen.
But what has resulted is the U.N. is now saddled with
somewhere between 150,000 or so people that are actually now
in, if you will, their own facilities--their own camps--that
they have to provide static protection to and in many instances
they don't control much of a perimeter around where their camps
were and so it takes a fair number of troops to be able to
provide that static protection.
So this means that there are fewer troops available for
moving out into the city and to the countryside. But we have
had numerous successes.
For example, back in April of this year Ambassador Phee
worked very diligently with the government in Juba, the
regional governor in then Unity State and the U.N. Mission to
put in a forward base in Leer, which is in Unity State.
So it was a hot spot for humanitarian needs and the
humanitarian community was demanding protection there.
And so the U.N. did go and establish a forward base there
and that enabled humanitarians to access an area that they had
not been able to get to for almost 2 years of the conflict.
So we have had successes like that in some specific cases.
But the ability of the U.N. to be able to move about the
country as well as in Juba has been restricted by the
government.
UNMISS has had two helicopters shot down by government
forces over the years--one before the conflict and one since--
and when they need to fly they need to get government
permission to fly to make sure that it is safe and the
government does not always give that.
So, again, I would go back to the problem is perhaps partly
UNMISS but it is also mainly the government which has not
allowed UNMISS to do all that it could do to facilitate
humanitarian assistance delivery and that function--
humanitarian assistance delivery and supporting that--is one of
the four key functions that the Security Council has given to
UNMISS. So they, clearly, understand that as part of their
mandate.
Mr. Donovan. And if you could just spend a moment, because
my time had expired, just about your vision on how we get to
this path of peaceful engagement.
Ambassador Booth. Well, I think the first step is, as I
said, getting Juba secured so that there is some space for a
political engagement.
Now, why would those that are sitting in Juba now who feel
that they can implement the agreement where they are--why would
they go forward on that.
I think the answer to that is that they have to ensure that
these people that have been driven out over the past 2 months
and others that felt already excluded from the peace process,
if they are not given a peaceful path forward, a political path
forward, it is going to result in more widespread fighting
throughout the country.
And can this government afford that? Is that what it wants
its legacy to be, a South Sudan that goes down with more and
more fighting in more and more parts of the country?
So there is going to have to be pressure on the leaders for
sure. But, frankly, it is the only way forward that's going to
lead to peace, is to have this open up some political space and
have this discussion with others.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, let me come back to a question that my
colleague, Ms. Bass, asked you, because your response was a
little troubling with regards to arms and where they're coming
from and where they are not coming from.
Are you suggesting in your testimony that we don't know?
Because you said it was a gray market. But we have unbelievable
intelligence even in that region. So are you suggesting we
don't know or that you can't say?
Ambassador Booth. Congressman, what we do know I would have
to address in a different setting than this.
Mr. Meadows. All right. That's fair enough. I just wanted
to make sure we clarified because here's my concern,
Ambassador.
I have followed Sudan and South Sudan before there was a
South Sudan and it has been a passion for my family from a
humanitarian standpoint.
The true stories that have been told will break anyone's
heart on what so much has not only been done but has not been
done.
And so I appreciate you being the Special Envoy and your
work there in a very complex and difficult situation. But what
I've also come to find out is that from both sides--those who
would be supportive of Sudan and those who would be supportive
of South Sudan in a particular position--they believe that the
United States has failed to live up to the promises that we've
made and that we make threats that we don't follow through on.
And even some of your testimony here today would seem to
underscore that, that when we talk about arms embargo or
sanctions does it not have a chilling effect if we ask for
sanctions and they don't get passed by the U.N. that there is
no consequences--that life is going to be like it always has
been?
Ambassador Booth. Well, first of all, on the threats and
particularly the example that I gave of the two generals, even
then, while we were trying to get them on the list we were
using that as leverage to get them to stop the fighting and
they were both told directly that we were going to sanction
them.
We were proceeding in New York to do so and the only way
they could get out of this would be if they stopped the
fighting.
Well, while the sanctions committee did not approve that
into the list, it also did have the beneficial effect of the
fighting dying down in the same time frame.
So cause or effect, I can't prove it. But I think it----
Mr. Meadows. I think the results speak for themselves. But
here's the concern I have. If we make too many idle threats
that are not backed up by action then ultimately what happens
is the threat becomes irrelevant and, Ambassador, do you
believe that our country, indeed, the State Department is using
all its leverage points to accomplish the task at hand on
dealing with the issue in South Sudan? Are we using every
leverage point that we have?
Ambassador Booth. Congressman, I think--I think we are
using all the leverage points that we have. Some take some time
to develop. Sanctions cannot be imposed even bilaterally under
U.S. law without a rather extensive package that could hold up
in a court of law.
Mr. Meadows. Right. Right.
Ambassador Booth. And so sometimes, you know, when you
think you need to move against someone you find that the actual
evidentiary requirements are not there.
This is, as you mentioned, the idea of idle threats. This
is one reason we don't just take names up to the Security
Council if we don't think we can get them through.
It is also why, for example, we often, as we have done with
the arms embargo, we will say this will--we will move on this
and we will put the full weight of the United States behind
trying to achieve this if you don't do X or Y.
Mr. Meadows. Well, the reason I ask is because it sounds
like you walked back a little bit Secretary Kerry's comments
here today and I guess why would you walk those back?
Ambassador Booth. Well, I'm certainly not trying to walk
back what the Secretary said. But our humanitarian assistance--
--
Mr. Meadows. That is what it sounded but anyway, you go
ahead and clarify. That's why I am asking.
Ambassador Booth. Humanitarian assistance is something that
we provide on the basis of need. It's not something we provide
on the basis of political----
Mr. Meadows. But it is something that we must prioritize.
And so if some groups are using it inappropriately there is
more need than there is ability, even for a very prosperous
nation like the United States.
And so do they understand that there is a priority for
humanitarian relief?
Ambassador Booth. That is something that I think----
Mr. Meadows. But if they don't understand it please let
them understand it based on this hearing.
Ambassador Booth. I think it came across from what the
Secretary said. It certainly is something that I've made very
directly to them, that they are not the only place in the world
that needs humanitarian assistance, that there are many other--
--
Mr. Meadows. And this comes from someone who is--my kids
collected money in tennis cans to give to them to support. So,
I mean, it is not out of a noncompassionate heart.
Let me ask you one other question. I think there is a new
law about NGOs and 80 percent of those NGOs have been having to
be South Sudanese citizens in order--is that correct? Are my
notes correct on that?
Ambassador Booth. Yes.
Mr. Meadows. So tell me about the implications. If that is
indeed correct would that not have a chilling effect on some of
the work that the NGOs have done and could do in the future?
Ambassador Booth. This NGO law has been something that's
been in the making for a long time, something that I've engaged
on several occasions directly with President Kiir on.
Yes, there is a provision that says the percentage of
workers of NGOs need to be South Sudanese. This is something
that many countries do to try to ensure that aid workers or aid
organizations are also hiring local staff.
There are a number of problems with the bill that we've
pointed out. A lot of them have to do, frankly, with things
like excessive registration requirements and also very vague
references to what is allowed and what is not allowed that
allows the government to interpret whether an NGO is doing the
right thing or not.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So let me ask, and be specific
then--this new law do you see it having the potential of
providing less humanitarian relief to some of the most needy in
the country--the potential?
Ambassador Booth. We certainly see this law as having a
potential impact on the ability of NGOs, both international and
local, to operate.
Mr. Meadows. So does the President--their President not see
that?
Ambassador Booth. Well, I'm sure that they do see that.
Mr. Meadows. But they think that we are just going to go
ahead and just go along and fund it and create a jobs program?
Ambassador Booth. Well, I wouldn't see this as a jobs
program. I think most NGOs probably do hire more than 80
percent of their staff being local. I don't think that's----
Mr. Meadows. So why the need for the law then?
Ambassador Booth. Well, that's a good question and these
are some of the issues that we have raised repeatedly over 3
years when this has been under consideration.
Mr. Meadows. Well, if you could----
Ambassador Booth. It is a problematic law and we have made
that very clear.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. If you could, as the Special Envoy, take
to their very highest government officials a sincere concern
from Members of Congress on this new law that potentially the
humanitarian relief that needs to get to needy families and
citizens could be stopped because of the unintended
consequences of a new law and that we would ask them to
reconsider.
And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, you paint a very bleak picture and what we have
talked about here today and the testimony you've given--we talk
about a government that has lost control of its military from
time to time, an opposition that's gone--a government that has
raided humanitarian and food aid from this country of which I
sit on the committee which helps appropriate that money, which
is why it is concerning to me.
But as a Catholic, it is also concerning to me that this
would happen in this day and age that we, as Americans,
wouldn't be able to do anything about it.
And the only thing it seems like you've said that we have
leverage to use is this arms embargo and we keep threatening to
use it but we never really get there.
And then I just noticed that maybe it might be a political
thing to say if we use an arms embargo then we are admitting
some kind of failure as a government.
I hope that is not the case. I hope that it is a sincere
ploy or a sincere intention of this government to use an arms
embargo because guess what? What can it hurt if we actually do
it?
If this guy controls the government there is no opposition.
He's used the term over-militarization--you used that term. If
that is true, then the only thing that we can control is how
much militarization is in that country. Then what can it hurt
if the United States does take the lead to say that enough is
enough?
We've got diplomatic envoys being shot at. We have got all
kinds of crimes that we have talked about against its own
citizenry. We have got humanitarian aid and food being seized
upon. We have got the opposition has fled.
We have got a government that has lost control of its own
military and we keep threatening to use this arms embargo as if
it is something that well, maybe if we say this one more time
we will put this security force in there of 4,000 people, which
I got to be quite honest with you--I don't think they are going
to do anything.
I think that this is just going to keep going on and on and
we are going to be right back here again at the next hearing
talking about how this has failed but we might use an arms
embargo again.
I just want to know what will it hurt if we do it. Is it an
admission by the administration that we failed in South Sudan?
Is that the problem?
Ambassador Booth. Well, Congressman, as I've said the--it
is a major tool and to be effective it has to be done
multilaterally, not by----
Mr. Rooney. Why? Just do it. Just use the United States as
the leader of the free world and do it and other people will
follow.
Who cares if it is unilateral? That doesn't make any sense.
We build coalitions all the time and people follow us because
we are the number-one country in the world. We are the sole
superpower.
Ambassador Booth. Right. And because it is such an
important tool we have used it effectively and we think we are
using it effectively now to leverage a way forward for South
Sudan to get it back to a path of peace and political dialogue.
Mr. Rooney. Do you believe that? Do you believe that we are
going to create this space in Juba like you say and there is
going to be elections and a political process and a
constitution and all that? Do you believe that--unless we do
something affirmative?
Ambassador Booth. Well, something affirmative we are trying
to do is we are trying to get this force on the ground and get
Juba to be demilitarized and this is the leverage we are using
to try to get there.
Now, the South Sudanese may very well not cooperate with
this, in which case, as I have said, we are prepared to move
forward on that as well as potentially other sanctions. So----
Mr. Rooney. Okay. I hope you do.
Ambassador Booth [continuing]. Our frustration level is--we
share it.
Mr. Rooney. Yes. Hey, you are on the front lines so, I
mean, I appreciate your service. I just don't believe that any
of this stuff is going to work anymore. I don't think that the
security force is going to work.
I think that we need to move forward with an arms embargo
now and stop as much bloodshed and killing as we can and
protect the food and humanitarian aid that Mr. Meadows talked
about getting in there by however means we need to figure out
how to do that because I think that's the only thing that's
left to do is to help the people that are starving and being
oppressed.
But, trying to talk about elections and that kind of stuff,
I don't buy it.
I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador.
Mr. Ambassador, what is your best assessment of the
anticipated timeline for the Regional Protection Forces, both
troop generation and deployment, and how long do you expect
that negotiations with the government will continue on the
composition of the RPF?
How long will that delay the deployment? Have any countries
outside the immediate subregion besides Rwanda indicated that
they might consider providing troops to the RPF?
Ambassador Booth. Okay. On the time line--what I have been
told by the military leaders in the region is that they are
prepared to deploy the troops very quickly, within a matter of
weeks, after there is permission from the government to go in.
They have made it clear they are not fighting their way
into Juba. The U.N. does not send missions to fight their way
into countries.
But if the government in Juba accepts this force and
provides land for it to be bivouacked on, what I have been told
is they are prepared to move the troops very quickly.
Moving the equipment will take a little bit longer and that
is something that they have indicated that they might need some
help with.
Mr. Cicilline. Maybe I wasn't clear, because I recognize
that the troops are prepared to--I guess my question is what's
the length of time the government is likely to engage in
negotiations. That is really the unknown piece of it.
Ambassador Booth. Well, yes. I mean, there's also questions
about how fast sometimes countries can actually mobilize their
troops.
Mr. Cicilline. Right.
Ambassador Booth. In terms of that--this is what the
Secretary-General's report, which should come out and will be
discussed next week in the Council and will be about is the
government really moving forward to accept this force and the
message that was given by the Security Council visit, that
Secretary Kerry gave with regional leaders including to the
South Sudanese when we met in Nairobi on the 22nd of August,
was a very clear message that we expect that this force is
going to be deployed.
It is going to be deployed as envisioned by IGAD, which is
with the troops from those three countries who are committed to
this mission of actually ensuring freedom of movement around
Juba, protecting the critical infrastructure including the
airport and preventing violent actions. So protecting civilians
in a more robust, not a static, manner.
Those troop-contributing countries have agreed to that
mission. So we don't want to enter into a negotiation with
South Sudan on who the troop contributors will be, what arms
they will need, how many of them can deploy. That is foreseen
and what their mission will be--that is all in the resolution.
And so that is where we get to this idea of using the
threat of the moving on an arms embargo and potentially other
sanctions if, indeed, the government tries to delay this.
So far their actions have been on the one day to say yes,
the next day to say maybe, the next day to say no and then to
say well, probably yes again. So this is something that we are
not going to have patience with to drag on.
Mr. Cicilline. So that leads to my second question, Mr.
Ambassador. What influence does the United States have with the
Government of South Sudan to encourage them to develop a more
inclusive, transparent, and accountable approach to governance
and what other things might we do to accelerate that process?
Ambassador Booth. When I was here in April and we were
actually looking at trying to help a Transitional Government to
succeed, one of the pillars of the peace agreement that I
mentioned was this idea of the economic reform and in
particular strengthening the transparency of public financial
management and that's something that we believe needs to happen
in South Sudan.
The kleptocracy of the past must end. As I mentioned in my
testimony, we are continuing to look and utilize information to
utilize sanctions that are available, particularly travel
sanctions, for corrupt practices--to send the signal that being
in charge in South Sudan it's not about just enriching
yourself--trying to change a little bit of the mentality of
those who might lead the country going forward.
So a very important component--how do we get them to do
it--again, I think our main leverage is, you know, what is it
they want from us.
At that point, they were clearly looking for support for
their budget, for their economy, and they have recently come
out again and said to the international community we need $300
million from you this year. That's not going to be forthcoming
unless these types of reforms occur.
Mr. Cicilline. And my final question, Mr. Ambassador, is
the director of the African Center for Strategic Studies has
suggested that it may be time to put South Sudan on life
support by establishing executive mandate for the U.N. and the
AU to administer the country until institutions exist to manage
politics nonviolently and to break up patronage networks
underlying the conflict.
If such an initiative were to be considered how do you
think it would be executed given the sensitivity of the current
government to foreign intervention and parent reticence of some
of the Security Council toward U.N. actions perceived to
threaten South Sudan's sovereignty?
It seems like that would be a very difficult initiative to
move forward on. But I would love your assessment of it.
Ambassador Booth. I have seen that proposal. We have looked
at that idea. Frankly, the U.N. cannot impose this on a member
state.
The African Union I think certainly has absolutely no
appetite for putting one of its member countries under an
international trusteeship or guardianship, whatever you want to
dress it up and call it.
That is something that I don't see that we would have any
support for--impractical--and I don't see how the South
Sudanese would ever accept it.
The visceral reaction they have had even to this--to the
role of JMEC in overseeing implementation of the agreement as
an extra sovereign force, the reaction that they've had, where
the initial reaction to the joint--the Regional Protection
Force was not one more foreign soldier--we will fight them--
this is a matter of sovereignty.
I think you get the idea of how that would be received in
South Sudan.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Before we go to our next panel, I
would like to just say, I make it a point to always meet with
the bishops, the faith community, the Protestants, whatever the
denominations might be in every country.
Greg Simpkins and I met with Archbishop Paulino Lukudu
Loro, had a very, very good exchange on the reconciliation
aspects of what the church can provide and also the
humanitarian assistance. Are we fully utilizing the faith
community in South Sudan?
Secondly, there is a Foreign Policy article, September
6th--very disturbing. I was briefed on it when I was in South
Sudan about the gunning and the bullets that were sent into two
of our vehicles as they passed by Salva Kiir's compound by his
troops.
Thank God nobody was hurt but the State Department says we
do not believe our vehicles and personnel were especially
targeted.
But the article's author, Colum Lynch, points out that 50
to 100 rounds were pumped into those two vehicles. The SUV--
armored SUVs held laminated cards with the American flag on it
and also the diplomatic plate number 11.
Are we investigating this? Do we believe it was by design
or by mistake? Even by mistake is bad enough but it was by
design?
And finally, on the sanctions, we have had sanctions for 2
years--OFAC sanctions--the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
They are well laid out--child soldering sanctions against
persons contributing to the conflict in South Sudan. There are
only six people on it and I wonder if you are looking at that
to expand it and make it more robust in terms of those who meet
the criteria so well laid out 2 years ago in this sanctions
regime.
Ambassador Booth. Well, Mr. Chairman, on your question
about engaging with the faith-based community, yes, we do
engage with them both within South Sudan and also the Vatican.
We have been in touch with them on numerous occasions and
comparing notes on South Sudan and they have also engaged.
I think one of the senior cardinals recently went there as
an emissary for the Pope and a number of the religious leaders
spoke out during the visit of the U.N. Security Council
permanent representatives this past weekend in favor of the
Regional Protection Force being deployed and moving forward on
a political process.
So I think the faith-based community is finding its voice.
We have also, through USAID, given a $6 million grant to the
South Sudan Council of Churches to work on community-based
reconciliation efforts. So we are engaging the faith-based
community.
I think in the many meetings that I have had with religious
leaders in South Sudan after the outbreak of fighting in
December 2013 they showed a lot of frustration and that the
leaders seemed to have turned a deaf ear to them.
I think they are beginning now to, as I say, find their
voice in unison and it may become harder going forward.
On the July 7th firing on two U.S. vehicles that contained
several U.S. diplomats, this occurred, as I mentioned, very
shortly after similar looking vehicles that were driven by the
opposition forces who had come into town on some mission and
they were going back to Riek Machar's compound area and they
were driving in this--it is always a tense area because it's
right by the President's compound and they tried to stop that
vehicle. The opposition people refused to get out of the
vehicles and they sped off and the soldiers fired at those
vehicles.
The opposition security officials in the vehicles fired
back and killed, I believe, five government soldiers right in
that very vicinity.
So it was a very tense environment. There were a lot more
soldiers out on the street after that incident and our cars
came along and they were--it wasn't a formal checkpoint.
It was a lot of soldiers on the street waving them down. It
was very dark and our vehicles have tinted glass.
So even though for the brief time that they stopped and
tried to show identification it is not at all clear that these
soldiers would have been able to see it or, frankly, even
understand the license plates.
You are dealing, don't forget, with an army that is
primarily illiterate and so when our vehicles--according to
standard operating procedures when they tried to open the doors
of our cars--also sped off the soldiers opened fire, just as
they had when it had happened with opposition vehicles and,
again, shortly, again, in the same area shortly after that
incident the country representative for UNESCO, an Egyptian
national, was driving in the area and encountered a similar
problem and because he was not in an armored vehicle he was
actually seriously wounded.
So, again, to say this was targeting Americans, we did not
deduce that from the circumstances and the regional security
officer working with diplomatic security back here in
Washington conducted an internal investigation of the events
and the review of that report is still ongoing and we were very
thankful, of course, that our people had the resources, that we
had the fully armored vehicles there for them to ride around
Juba.
That is why our security protocols call for them to be
riding in armored vehicles in most parts of town and
particularly after dark. And in response to that incident the
Embassy's emergency action committee met the next morning and
changed the curfew to a dawn to dusk so took appropriate
actions to try to mitigate that.
In terms of sanctions, let me just say yes, we share the
frustration. I mentioned some of the difficulties of actually
putting together packages that meet all the legal criteria. But
we certainly will look at taking actions against those who
continue to impede the peace process or hindering humanitarian
delivery and the like.
Ms. Bass. Yes. I just wanted to take a moment to
acknowledge that there are several people here from Gabon who
are expressing their concern about the elections that took
place.
I just want you to know that we see you. We read your
posters. I know you were asked to put them down but we did see
what they said and we also are concerned and I just wanted to
acknowledge that your presence has not gone unnoticed.
Mr. Smith. And I fully concur with the ranking member and
thank you for being here.
I would like to now yield to Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Meadows. Ambassador, let me come back with two very
quick points. I mentioned the NGOs and technology is a great
thing so I got some information that would suggest that even
within the last few hours or few days that there has been
potentially the shutdown of 40 NGOs and the threat, if not the
reality, of seizing their assets. Are you aware of that report?
Ambassador Booth. We have received reports over the past
several hours of harassment of a number of NGOs, civil society
organizations.
Mr. Meadows. So you would say that that report could be
accurate? You're getting the same----
Ambassador Booth. It could be. We have to look into that
and try to verify it.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So will you get back to this
subcommittee right away on whether that is accurate or not? And
I guess the second follow-up question to that is if it is
accurate will you be resolute in your condemnation of saying
and that we will not tolerate that kind of behavior if our
humanitarian aid is going to continue?
Ambassador Booth. I can assure you, Congressman, that we
will be very direct and very strong in a condemnation of any
harassment of----
Mr. Meadows. But seizing of assets and it is more than just
harassment and so that's my concern. And so will you commit to
get back to this subcommittee within the next 7 business days
to let us know what is happening on that?
Ambassador Booth. Well, let me say that we will get back to
you as soon as we can confirm----
Mr. Meadows. All right. Well, what is a reasonable time? If
7 days is not reasonable what is a reasonable time?
Ambassador Booth. Again----
Mr. Meadows. 14 days?
Ambassador Booth. I am not on the ground.
Mr. Meadows. I mean--I mean, it----
Ambassador Booth. 14 days--give us 14 days, yes.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Donald Booth to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Mark Meadows
update on harassment of civil society in south sudan
There has been an uptick in reported harassment, threats, and
violence toward South Sudanese civil society organizations (CSOs) in
recent weeks and specifically following the September 3 meeting in Juba
between CSOs and the UN Security Council (UNSC). The U.S. government is
deeply concerned and U.S. Embassy officials have met with multiple
activists to discuss this trend, and continue to follow up.
Both before the UNSC arrived and immediately after they departed
Juba, several CSOs reported receiving anonymous phone calls ordering
them to shut down and saying their assets would be seized because of
the ``anti-government'' messages they had been spreading. On the night
of September 4, one activist received text messages from an unknown
number asking for her present location. The following day, while she
was at work, her home was visited by unidentified armed men who asked
after her whereabouts and told neighbors that they wanted to talk to
her because she had ``talked ill of the government'' in the September 3
UNSC-CSO meeting. Some CSOs believe that the Sudan People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) Military Intelligence is responsible for the harassment,
while others have blamed the National Security Service (NSS). Activists
have reported that the government has made considerable effort to
infiltrate civil society, including the placement of NSS officers into
CSOs, which has severely undermined the trust networks activists rely
upon to function in South Sudan.
Some activists who were in the September 3 meeting have fled South
Sudan out of fear for their safety. One civil society actor who
participated in the September 3 meeting was detained and interrogated
by NSS when, on September 5, he attempted to depart Juba International
Airport en route to Uganda; he was eventually allowed to leave.
One activist, who did not take part in the September 3 meeting,
reported that another, who also seems not to have taken part, was
killed by NSS officers after a political argument at a cafe later on
September 3. This is an unverified report from a single source who
claims second- or third-hand knowledge of the incident. The individual
who was allegedly killed was not known to the U.S. Embassy or to its
contacts in Juba. It has not been possible to verify this report, as
many details, including the location of the body, remain unknown or
unconfirmed. The State Department continues to seek information about
this case.
Particularly concerning is the government's use of the Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act and the Relief and Rehabilitation
Commission (RRC) Act as tools to close down CSOs. Some groups were
warned verbally that they would have to ``answer'' for ``pro-West,
anti-government'' views, which they were told constituted banned
political activity under the Acts, and as a result, the RRC would
suspend their registrations.
There have been reports of threats by the Government of South Sudan
(GOSS) to freeze CSO bank assets following the September 3 meeting,
although no CSO has reported any assets actually being frozen or seized
since then. The CSO actors who reported harassment before and after the
September 3 meeting work in advocacy areas, not in humanitarian
assistance. However, humanitarian actors face numerous physical
obstructions to access those in need of assistance, as well as taxes,
fees, and other bureaucratic impediments imposed at multiple levels by
the GOSS. While the reported harassment since September 3 has affected
CSOs engaged in advocacy work, some humanitarian organizations have
reported harassment by the RRC based on the language of the NGO and RRC
Acts.
Some CSOs report that they are working ``within their own
networks'' in an effort to persuade the GOSS to relax its harassment
and refrain from de-registration, and some fear that intervention on
their behalf by the U.S. government or other foreign countries could
make their security situation more precarious. Other CSOs have
requested U.S. government engagement with the GOSS on opening the
political space.
Unfortunately, the closing of political space in South Sudan is a
long-term trend. The State Department has registered its concern on
multiple occasions in public, most recently in a press statement on
September 10. Ambassador Samantha Power expressed her concerns in an
official statement issued the same day. State Department officials at
the highest levels previously raised concerns about the closing
political space directly with the GOSS, including with President Kiir,
and will continue to do so in light of this recent and troubling trend.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. All right. Fourteen days--we will do
that. And the last thing is this is you talked about a
political environment which is open and inclusive and yet we
are hearing reports that potentially someone took a letter to
the U.N. Security Council and might have been murdered after
that. Would you care to comment on what's happening since the
U.N. Security Council's visit?
Ambassador Booth. Well, some of this harassment of civil
society that----
Mr. Meadows. Well, murder is more than harassment.
Ambassador Booth [continuing]. That we have been hearing
about has been subsequent to the visit by the Security Council.
But is something that has gone on in the past as well. We have
long been----
Mr. Meadows. So how much of that are we going to tolerate--
--
Ambassador Booth [continuing]. Press freedom and freedom of
movement for NGOs and the like.
Mr. Meadows. So how much of that are we going to tolerate?
Ambassador Booth. Well, it's a matter what can we actually
do to affect that behavior.
Mr. Meadows. I will yield back. We have many leverage
points. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your flexibility.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ambassador Booth, for your leadership
and for spending your time today with us at the subcommittee.
Thank you.
I would like to now invite to the witness table Ambassador
Princeton Lyman, who is senior advisor to the President of the
United States Institute for Peace. Ambassador Lyman served as
U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan from March 2011 to
March 2013.
As Special Envoy, he led U.S. policy in helping in the
implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Ambassador Lyman's career in government included assignments as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, U.S.
Ambassador to both Nigeria and South Africa and Assistant
Secretary of State for international organizations. He also was
a member of the African Advisory Committee to the U.S. Trade
Representative. He began his career with USAID and served as
its director in Ethiopia.
We will then hear from Mr. Brian Adeba, who is a journalist
by training and was previously an associate of the Security
Governance Group, a think tank that focused on security sector
reform in fragile countries.
Over the last 3 years, his research interests have focused
on inter linkages of media, conflict, human rights, and
security.
He supervised the coverage of the conflict zones in Darfur,
South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and eastern Sudan for the Boston-
based Education Development Center's Sudan Radio Service
Project in Nairobi, Kenya.
Prior to this he served as project and publications
coordinator at the think tank the Center for International
Governance Innovation in Waterloo, Canada. Again, he is
representing the Enough Project.
Ambassador, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON N. LYMAN, SENIOR ADVISOR
TO THE PRESIDENT, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
let me begin by thanking you personally for all the support you
and the committee provided when I was Special Envoy, and you
and Congresswoman Bass and the members of the committee
continue to focus attention on this set of issues. It is very
important and it is very much appreciated.
I am not going to go over the background of the situation.
I want to address some of the key questions that you have
raised and have been raised in the previous exchange.
Let me start with the peace plan itself around which all
the various activities are organized. The IGAD peace plan,
which was signed in 2015, on paper is a very comprehensive
agreement.
But it has a fatal flaw to it and that is it rests very
largely on the willingness, ability, and commitment of the very
antagonists who brought the country into civil war to carry out
a fundamental political transformation. It is not in their
interest to do so and what we have seen over the last year or
so is that instead of carrying that forward they fell back into
conflict. Now Riek Machar has been driven out of the country.
Without a strong international oversight and administrative
oversight of this program, it was not likely to succeed.
The second problem that we now face is that it would be a
mistake to assume that, with the accession of Taban Deng Gai to
the Vice Presidency, we have a government of national unity.
Taban Deng does not command the loyalty of all the various
forces that were fighting this government and to assume that it
is capable of carrying out a comprehensive and being inclusive
would be wrong. It is not.
Now we have the humanitarian crisis which the people have
addressed. It is an outrageous situation that the international
community, and the United States alone is spending over $1
billion a year--that over 60 aid workers have been killed
trying to carry out a humanitarian program--that they have been
attacked and, again, most recently in the Terrain hotel.
And both sides have impeded this activity--that the
international community seems to care more for the people of
South Sudan than the leaders on both sides. That is an
outrageous situation. And what it does is call into question
whether the government has the--can claim to the rights and
responsibility of sovereignty which goes with the claim of
sovereignty.
Recently Kate Almquist, as Congressman Cicilline mentioned,
and myself, did an op-ed saying that there should be an
international oversight administration of South Sudan. Without
that, we did not see how this peace plan could go forward.
Ambassador Booth has described the role of JMEC under the peace
plan and the role of Festus Mogae. The fact is that that
mechanism has no real authority over the parties and Festus
Mogae himself has, on several reports, said that almost no
progress has been made on implementing the peace process.
Now, the proposal we made, of course, it would be
extraordinarily difficult to do and Ambassador Booth indicated
that. But here is the fundamental question and the fundamental
challenge.
The peace process is in the hands of IGAD and the African
Union, primarily, and if they are not prepared to amend the
current peace process and create a true oversight authority,
which they will back up politically, back up by enforcing an
arms embargo, by taking other measures, then that peace plan
won't work.
Now, if they are prepared to do that, then no one needs
trusteeship or anything else. But the problem is that IGAD is
badly divided. They are not in agreement. They have threatened
an arms embargo many times but never followed through.
And as for the U.N. Security Council, we have an adage that
guides, you know, practicality. When the Africans are divided,
the Security Council is divided. You are not going to get
sanctions past Russia and China unless the Africans are united
and say this is what they want. But the Africans are divided.
IGAD is divided.
So even if the U.N. Security Council wanted to pass an arms
embargo, those surrounding countries would have to implement it
and make sure that arms weren't sneaking through.
So the primary attention and effort seems to me, for the
African Union and for IGAD to decide exactly if they are in
control of this process, how to strengthen it.
Now, let me address this question of the 4,000 troops that
are being added. As you pointed out, it is a question of
putting these under UNMISS and whether they will act
differently.
It is very difficult to contemplate a U.N. peacekeeping
force confronting in an armed way the forces of the host
government. I do not think very many U.N. peacekeeping forces
are prepared for that. I am not sure the Security Council is
even prepared for it.
So the question is, is this force really going to have the
mandate to confront not just outliers but an attack like the
Terrain hotel complex and go up against government forces?
That is a very difficult thing to do and it has to be
backed solidly by the troop-contributing countries, and by
IGAD, and by the U.N. and if they are not prepared for that,
then this force may secure the airport but they won't be able
to protect civilians.
Now, the other question is the political context. Putting
more forces into Juba without changing the nature of the peace
process and the way it is enforced seems to me is going to have
a continuation of the situation we now have.
So I think it is critical that the U.S., the international
community, and the United Nations call upon the African Union
and IGAD to strengthen that process so there is real oversight
and enforcement of the peace process with sanctions and
punishment for those who get in the way of it. Otherwise, we
won't get the transformation we need and I think that is the
great dilemma that we now face in South Sudan.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lyman follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Ambassador Lyman, thank you so very much and,
again, thank you for your prior service as Special Envoy.
Mr. Adeba.
STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN ADEBA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF POLICY,
ENOUGH PROJECT
Mr. Adeba. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members of
the subcommittee, I want to thank you for your continued focus
on South Sudan and for inviting me to testify.
Impunity is entrenched in the system of rule in South
Sudan. The horrific Terrain hotel incident is an example of
that impunity.
The country's leaders commit horrific crimes and treat
state resources like their personal property. The country's
money is captured by a few and used to wage war.
With financial leverage on these leaders and your continued
leadership and support it is possible to counter this system
and the perverse inclinations of its leaders.
It is possible to disrupt access to the proceeds of
corruption that fund war and to shift the incentives of South
Sudan's leaders toward peace.
Congress can do the following four things to have an
immediate impact on the perpetrators of the crisis in South
Sudan.
First, Congress can make sure that the U.S. Treasury
Department has the staff and the funds it needs to use more
anti-money laundering measures. The measures can be used to
target and freeze the assets of elite politicians and leaders
in South Sudan who perpetuate violence, loot public coffers,
and use the international financial system, including U.S.
institutions, to launder deposits of their ill-gotten wealth.
Second, you can ensure the administration imposes targeted
sanctions and asset freezes on top leaders and support others
who take these measures.
We have had discussion about how the threat of sanctions
alone is not inducing the change that is needed in South Sudan.
So when we look at the recommendation, this is a call to
action.
Third, you can push for stronger enforcement of existing
sanctions and asset freezes in the United States and
internationally on the South Sudanese political elite.
Fourth, you can pass the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act. This act authorizes the U.S. President to
impose sanctions on government officials like those in South
Sudan who misappropriate state assets and attack anti-
corruption crusaders.
I believe these four steps can strike directly at the
wallets of the people responsible for the suffering in South
Sudan, the people who commit crimes and enrich themselves
because they believe they will not face consequences for their
actions.
These leaders are more likely to support peace when they
pay a price for war. The institutional challenges in South
Sudan require your long-term support as well.
I travelled to Juba this past April to analyse this very
issue. April was a month full of hope and the past Vice
President and main opposition leader, Riek Machar, had returned
to town.
People believed that the fighting would stop and the two
leaders would work together to govern. There was hope that the
critical governance institutions could begin to function
properly as well.
I focused my research on three key institutions--the Anti-
Corruption Commission, the National Audit Chamber, and the
Public Accounts Committee in the National Legislative Assembly.
I found that all three were severely undercut
intentionally. Top-level politicians deprived them of the money
they need to function. Conflicting laws prevent prosecutions of
officials that have been investigated. And cronyism undermines
the effort to fight graft.
The mechanisms and institutions that could promote
accountability do not have what they need to be effective. But
there are several things Congress can do to help South Sudanese
people address their institutional and systemic challenges.
First, continue to support the people in South Sudan who
fight for transparency and accountability. Listen to them.
Stand with them and help them raise their voices.
Second, ensure there is strict budget oversight for
assistance to South Sudan. Those who command or commit
atrocities and seek personal enrichment should not be able to
misappropriate public funds, especially those given by
Americans to support the South Sudanese people.
Third, support and strengthen the institutions in South
Sudan that can build an open and accountable government. These
institutions could work much more effectively than they do
today. But they need political, technical, and financial
support.
Most of all, they need the space to operate without undue
political interference.
A fourth institution that needs these same things is the
Hybrid Court of South Sudan that was established in the August
2015 peace agreement to ensure accountability for war crimes.
Next week, on September 12, the Sentry, an initiative of
the Enough Project, will publicly present the results of a 2-
year investigation into corruption in South Sudan.
The Sentry has documented the connection between high-level
grand corruption and violence in South Sudan and we encourage
U.S. policymakers to take immediate action on the findings we
release.
Your support is critical. The stakes are very high in South
Sudan. If South Sudanese leaders face no price, no deterrent
for their crimes from anyone, South Sudan will disintegrate.
With your help, that can be prevented. Thank you very much
for your efforts on South Sudan and for your tireless
commitment to the South Sudanese people.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Adeba follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Mr. Adeba, thank you very much for your personal
work, your trip, which really uncovered--and you got to see
those three institutions in particular.
Thank you for relaying that to us. Without objection, your
full statements will be made a part of the record.
And, unfortunately, we do have a series of votes--well over
an hour we expect of voting. So we will conclude here but I
want you to know how deeply appreciative we all are on the
subcommittee for your leadership, for your guidance and we will
stay in touch going forward.
In a week I look forward or so to that new report which the
committee will digest and, I'm sure, utilize as we have in the
past with those from the Enough Project.
And Ambassador Lyman, thank you, because you did
extraordinary service under very difficult situations. So thank
you for that leadership all those years and your entire Foreign
Service career.
The hearing is adjourned and, again, I would have liked to
have asked some questions. I will submit a few for the record.
If you could get back to us in a timely fashion that would be
greatly appreciated.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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