[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LIBYA'S TERRORIST DESCENT:
CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-225
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Federica Saini Fasanotti, Ph.D., non-resident fellow, Center for
21st Century Security and Intelligence, Foreign Policy Program,
The Brookings Institution...................................... 5
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior editor, Long War Journal, Foundation
for Defense of Democracies..................................... 12
Mr. Benjamin Fishman (former Director for North Africa, National
Security Council).............................................. 27
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Federica Saini Fasanotti, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.............. 8
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn: Prepared statement.......................... 14
Mr. Benjamin Fishman: Prepared statement......................... 27
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 46
Hearing minutes.................................................. 47
LIBYA'S TERRORIST DESCENT:
CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Cook
presiding.
Mr. Cook. Subcommittee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions and extraneous materials for the record subject to
the length limitation in the rules.
Since the U.S.-led NATO intervention in 2011, Libya has
completely spiraled out of control and has become a regional
and international security threat.
Five years ago, the regime of Libyan dictator Muammar
Gaddafi helped us fight against international terrorism. This
is not to say that Gaddafi was a good guy. He was a ruthless
dictator who sponsored terrorism in the 1980s.
But Gaddafi eventually realized that he was the target of
terrorists himself and he changed course to side with us
against the cancer of terrorism.
By 2008, U.S. military leaders were calling Libya a top
U.S. ally in combating transnational terrorism. Fast forward to
today, and Libya is a virtual incubator of terrorist groups,
hosting all stripes of jihadi organizations including ISIS and
al-Qaeda.
Unfortunately, it was U.S. policy that transformed Libya
into the complete failure that it is today. 2011 we decided to
intervene in Libya and establish no-fly zones to aid Libyan
rebels plotting against Gaddafi.
Under the safety of the no-fly zone we imposed, Islamic
terrorist groups long subdued under Gaddafi's regime sprung up,
amassed weapons, training and military experience.
Gaddafi was ultimately killed in October 2011. Within days,
NATO and U.S. forces packed up and left Libya to its own
devices.
It appears that our own Libyan policy at the time was to
remove Gaddafi. There was little planning regarding what to do
the day after.
Gaddafi's ouster unleashed chaos in the country. Long-
simmering political, regional and ethnic divisions suddenly
emerged and set Libya on a path toward disaster.
The country has never recovered. Even the administration
says that Libya failed due to our lack of forward thinking.
Earlier this year, the President admitted that his
administration did not have a plan for post-Gaddafi Libya and
he said this was his biggest regret as President.
Dangerous terrorist groups popped up almost immediately to
fill the power vacuum created by NATO's intervention. Ansar al-
Sharia, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Libya, emerged shortly after
Gaddafi's ouster began, deeply entrenching itself in Libya's
society by providing social services.
But this did not--this organization did not stop with
building schools. They recruited, they armed and trained
terrorist fighters intent on carrying out the group's ultimate
goal--imposing Islamic law on the country.
These fighters were among those who attacked the U.S.
diplomatic compound in Benghazi in 2012, killing Ambassador
Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues.
By 2014, the security situation in Libya had gotten even
worse. It became apparent that the country's warring factions
were not going to unite anytime soon.
Sensing an opportunity, ISIS announced the establishment of
a Libyan affiliate at the end of 2014 and soon began
consolidating power around the coast city of Sirte.
From there, ISIS quickly expanded east, west, and south.
Terrorists set up checkpoints along the coast and within over a
year ISIS managed to hold over 200 kilometers of territory
along the Libyan coast.
By the beginning of 2016 reports indicated that ISIS was
redirecting recruits and even senior leaders to Libya. It
appeared that ISIS was creating what many called a fallback
caliphate where it could retreat to in case it was pushed out
of Syria and Iraq.
Pentagon estimates suggest the group's ranks in the country
quickly swelled to nearly 7,000 fighters. It became apparent
that the U.S. needed to target ISIS in Libya as well as in
Syria and Iraq.
In August 2016, the U.S. expanded what was until then a
very limited air strike campaign with the intention of
dislodging the terrorists from their stronghold of Sirte.
By September, the U.S.-backed operation pushed into the
last ISIS-held areas of Sirte and freed the city from the reign
of terror. But this by no means defeated ISIS in Libya.
Libya remains an ideal foothold for terrorist groups of all
kinds and ISIS' removal from Sirte will not be the end of the
group. Until we can devise a truly comprehensive long-term
strategy to stabilize Libya and defeat the terrorists hiding
there, Libya will continue to threaten regional and
international security.
Treating the symptoms while ignoring the underlying disease
will not solve our problems. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and others will
continue to operate at Europe's doorstep and menace the free
world. The time has come for America to lead again. Until we
do, the world will remain at risk.
I will now turn to the ranking member, Congressman Keating
from Massachusetts, for his opening statement.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Colonel. I'd like to thank Chairman
Poe for calling this hearing and we share a concern for the
situation on the ground in Libya and I appreciate the attention
we are affording the issue.
I'd also like to thank my colleague, Colonel Cook, for
joining us as chair today as well as our panel for joining us
to discuss the topic at hand.
The situation in Libya remains very fluid and complex.
While the topic of this hearing will focus on the risk or
growth of terrorist organizations in the country, I think it's
important that we examine the challenges of the interim Libyan
government and the lack of a clear strategy from international
partners, which contributes to the continued instability.
Since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has witnessed
pervading and varying levels of instability and civil war
resulting from the lack of a strong united government. Libyans
and the international community have witnessed a number of
interim governments from the General National Congress to the
House of Representatives and now, since December of last year,
the Government of National Accord--the GNA.
However, the GNA is struggling to build legitimacy and
public support in August. The Libyan House of Representatives
conducted a vote of no confidence on the new interim government
and according to political agreement that created the GNA their
House must approve the GNA cabinet before assuming office.
Additionally, the GNA has so far been unable to provide
basic services and address long-term issues in Libya such as
chronic power and water outages, inflation, a liquidity crisis
and a lack of security.
This brings me to the concern today--the rise of ISIL
inside the country. As we have seen, since its formation in
2014, ISIL is able to metastasize in places which lack a strong
civil society or central government and in Libya the group has
managed to establish itself wherever rival militias have not
already carved out territories for themselves.
The group has proven capable of launching domestic attacks
and Libya's proximity to states such as Tunisia, which struggle
with the flow of foreign fighters, make the country an easy
destination for extremists.
Fortunately, there has been some success against ISIL by
GNA, which has been aided by U.S. air support. In Sirte, for
example, anti-ISIL forces have been largely effective in
driving out militants from the city.
However, Sirte is just one area and there are still large
swaths of land in the south and the west in which ISIL is
afforded freedom of movement.
Operation Odyssey Lightning and ISIL's defeat will only
succeed as long as GNA is able to capitalize on these security
gains and the government's gains.
The question remains what should our role be, that of the
United Nations in helping the situation in Libya. I hope during
the course of this hearing we examine what can be done both
militarily and diplomatically to combat ISIL but also improve
their fragile government in Libya.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Congressman Keating.
I now recognize Representative Zeldin from New York for 1
minute.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Chairman, and I thank all the
witnesses who are here for this important hearing. I was
recently in Iraq and I had a chance to meet with some of our
commanders on the ground.
One interesting observation that was made is that here in
the United States we often talk about Iraq, Syria, Libya in
that order. The observation that was shared to me is that in
many respects we should be talking about Libya, Syria, Iraq, in
that order, and the commanders were explaining why--that right
now in Iraq we have a strategy to win.
It's tenuous. It can turn. In Syria, my own personal
observation--not to put any words into those commanders' mouths
is that we seem like maybe we have a strategy to run in place
at best as far as Syria goes.
But if we eliminated ISIS from Iraq and even eliminated
ISIS from Syria, what I am concerned about is that Libya right
now can easily pop up as a new command and control node. So
thank you for holding this hearing. It's really important for
us to talk about the situation on the ground in Libya.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Congressman Zeldin.
Congressman Wilson from South Carolina, 1 minute.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Chairman
Ted Poe for convening this timely and important hearing. It is
sad that since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 a dangerous
vacuum has emerged in Libya with numerous, regional and
ideological actors competing for power.
Perhaps more dangerously, the past 5 years has given the
Islamic State the opportunity to dramatically increase its
presence and influence.
I am grateful that recently in August the United States
began operation Odyssey Lightning, which is aimed at destroying
ISIS along the Libyan coast.
As we have seen throughout its existence, ISIS is a cancer
and when it has presence in a country or region there is only
oppression and violence. The only way to have a free Libya is
the removal of ISIS.
It's important that we have a free and stable government
for the people of Libya. I urge promotion of the General
National Congress, a foundation for a democratic transition.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses. I yield back.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
By the way, I just got a flash message from Judge Poe. He
says Cook, you talk too much, and make sure--by the way, I was
going to let you talk for 15 minutes each but he said only keep
it 1 minute.
So just to let you know that was not my call. I am only
kidding on that, by the way.
Without objection, all of the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made part of the record. I ask that each
witness please keep your presentation to more--no more than 5
minutes, and I will introduce each witness and then give them
time for opening statements.
Dr. Federica Fasanotti--I hope I got that correct--is a
non-resident fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and
Intelligence of the foreign policy program of the Brookings
Institute.
Her field of work and research have focused on Libya,
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Thank you for joining us.
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies and senior editor of the Long War
Journal, which focuses on counter terrorism and related issues.
Mr. Benjamin Fishman is an adjunct fellow with RAND
Corporation's International Security and Defense Policy Center.
Previously he served as the Director for North Africa at the
National Security Council.
Doctor, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF FEDERICA SAINI FASANOTTI, PH.D., NON-RESIDENT
FELLOW, CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE,
FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ms. Fasanotti. Okay. Chairman Cook and distinguished
members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. It's an honor for me to be before you and I'm
happy to answer to any question you may have for me after.
Libya's persistent fragmentation is what is most worrying
today. Internal divisions are the product of decades of
Gaddafi's reckless governing. He played his citizens off of
each other and kept them isolated from the rest of the world
and also deprived them of any political institution that could
keep the country united and stable after he was gone.
Libyan history shows that Libyans have long been divided
regionally and locally. Tribes have a long history of fighting
one another.
Today, the Libyan state remains immature and those ancient
divisions have only gotten worse. At the end of Gaddafi's time
in power there were from 100 to 300 armed militia groups. Now
there are, according to a European study, about 1,600 militias,
gangs and criminal groups.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1917 put an arms embargo
on Libya but today there are more than 20 million weapons
circulating in the country of only 6 million people. External
powers who have intervened in Libya have actually worsened the
polarization and made reconciliation less likely.
It is well known that countries such as Egypt and Emirates
have been supporting the toppled government and on the other
side Qatar and Turkey did the same with the GNC in Tripoli.
The state of affairs is still going on. Even now that
thanks to the UNSMIL mediation in Tripoli, it's been
established a Government on National Accord, presumably
recognized by most of international actors.
After the 2011 revolution and international intervention,
there were few sustainable political options. Social frictions
increased in the aftermath of the Gaddafi overthrow and the
country's economic fabric eroded.
All these only radicalized the insurgency. The situation in
Libya is so compromised that it can be difficult to provide
meaningful policy prescriptions.
But I must emphasize that Libya's dramatic downward slide
is extremely dangerous for the West and the West should do
everything it can to ensure improvement of the situation. In a
territory stretching like Alaska are active various shades of
Islamic terrorism from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda,
Ansar al-Sharia, ISIS.
The absence of any state structure has turned the country
into an incubator of terrorism ready to act as a trigger for
the whole continent.
In the nomadic tradition and experience gained during the
Italian domination, handed down from generation to generation,
has provided to the Libyans the ability to survive and recover
strength even after the heaviest defeats.
In my opinion, there are three key challenges we have to
address--the security situation, the severe economic downturn,
and deeply fractured politics. These factors are all
intertwined and you cannot tackle one if you have not invested
in the other.
First, security--Libya is a country at war today. Criminals
and their networks are increasingly organized. The state police
are powerless even when they exist and the armed forces no
longer exists as a coherent entity.
The problem of criminals and militias is connected to the
huge amount of weapons. So the first thing to do is try to
diminish them.
One policy could be to consider a weapons buyback program
which has actually been implemented in Afghanistan in recent
years even though in Libya the situations presents many, many
different differences.
In the medium term, it is essential that the Libyan armed
forces and national security forces and the local police be
fundamentally revered.
Second, the economy--before the revolution, Libya's oil-
based economy was functional and pretty stable. Today, it is in
shambles. The country's gross domestic product fell from $74.76
billions of dollars in 2010 to $29.15 billions in 2015 in part
because Libya exported 1.6 million barrels of oil per day in
2010 and only exported 240,000 barrels of oil per day in August
2016.
The inflation is at almost 30 percent. Youth unemployment
is at 48 percent and the banking system is on the brink of
collapse. In the short term, Libya must manage fiscal spending
pressures while restoring and improving basic public services.
In the long term, Libya needs to develop a more diversified
market-based economy that goes beyond the oil and gas sector.
But in the limited term, Libya should invest in new management
of oil and gas revenues to ensure they are using the best
interest of the whole country.
The private sector will only be able to reenter the Libya
market once the security situation is stabilized. But then it
can help create sustainable jobs and wealth.
For the unemployed, targeted intervention should seek
advanced skills development, vocational training and
apprenticeship and entrepreneurship programs, something that
Gaddafi never did but which Libya need in order to have a
competitive workforce.
Third, Libya's fractured politics--although there has been
some progress in forming national unity government in Libya,
unity is today a rather inapplicable word for the country.
Friction between various political actors remain high. One
approach to consider is helping Libyans build a confederal
state divided into three large regions, for example--
Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.
While a united Libya is preferable, of course, it might be
not possible after years of civil war and entrenched hatreds.
So I propose something seemingly paradoxical--
deconstructing to construct, which may have the best chance of
providing Libyans with a deeper stability. Regional governments
could better protect local interests in security, economic
reconstruction, and governance.
The international community should have the Libyans start
from the bottom, emphasizing local solutions, supporting local
actors. The system does not exclude the role of the central
government.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fasanotti follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
Our next witness, Mr. Joscelyn.
STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR EDITOR, LONG WAR
JOURNAL, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, Congressman, thank you for having me
here today to testify before you. Last time I testified on
Libya specifically was before Homeland Security in April 2011
and I testified then that we should be wary the jihadis will
take advantage of the political vacuum and the uprisings and
expand their presence.
Little did I know that within just days before I testified
actually Osama bin Laden had received a memo in his compound in
Abbottabad, Pakistan that specifically outlined how they were
going to send operatives who had been freed from custody in
Iran and elsewhere to Libya to take advantage of the uprisings
and they were going to establish their beachhead in Libya.
So al-Qaeda actually very much saw what was going on in
Libya as an opportunity to expand their operations and they did
so. I am going to start by talking about the Islamic State,
which is sort of the hot brand of the moment but then I am
going to come back to al-Qaeda.
As you said, Congressman Zeldin, Libya is crucially
important for the Islamic State. Earlier this year in May, Abu
Muhammad al Adnani, who was the Islamic State spokesman, was
killed in August, actually mentioned Sirte as one of the top
three cities on the Islamic State's priority list.
He mentioned it alongside Raqqa and Mosul as sort of key
areas under the organization's control. The good news today is
that Sirte is on the verge of falling, that basically local
Libyan forces backed by American air strikes in our Operation
Odyssey Lightning have absolutely dislodged the Islamic State
from much of the city and the surrounding areas.
The bad news is we don't really know, or at least I don't
know, how many forces the Islamic State has throughout Libya in
its entirety. There is others that mentioned there are other
areas in the south, in Benghazi and elsewhere, the Islamic
State continues to operate.
My suspicion is that they've basically redeployed some of
their forces from Sirte, which they are on the verge of losing
entirely, to other areas in Libya.
So the key question in Libya is the key question that comes
in Iraq and Syria as well--what comes next after they lose
their safe haven. We know that the Islamic State is still able
to maintain a prolific insurgency, conduct massive terrorist
attacks within the country and will be able to sort of continue
to facilitate sort of the movement of its operatives.
The Islamic State--something I call ISIS fever has sort of
infected our coverage of jihadi groups. There is no about that
ISIS has grown substantially and is a big problem. I am not
discounting that. But it also obscures in some ways what's
going on in the other side of the jihadi coin with al-Qaeda.
And I saw a documentary, for example, earlier this year on PBS
Frontline, which was excellent in many ways, which focused on
ISIS in Benghazi.
And if you'd watched this documentary you would have
thought that the only jihadi game in Benghazi was the Islamic
State when in fact by our count the Islamic State is probably
less than 10 percent of jihadi operations in Benghazi
currently.
And al-Qaeda has in fact established front groups in Libya
through which they are operating to this day. Going back to
2011-2012, remember the rise of Ansar al-Sharia.
Well, the big meme on Ansar al-Sharia is it really isn't
al-Qaeda, right. Well, that was all theater. It was all false.
In fact, when the head of Ansar al-Sharia, Muhammad al-
Zawahi, was killed, al-Qaeda came out with a statement saying
in fact he had met with Osama bin Laden personally in the 1990s
and adopted al-Qaeda's methodology then and in fact he was
personally eulogized by Ayman al-Zawahiri.
And there are now designations by the U.N. and just
voluminous material on the fact that Ansar al-Sharia was, in
fact, and is a front group for al-Qaeda and their operations,
in particular, al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb.
But what I'd say to that--an additional point of that is
there are other organizations in Libya today that are connected
to al-Qaeda. What we do in Long War Journal is what I call nerd
analysis where we track operatives and what they are saying and
propaganda--those sorts of things--to try and detect sort of
the hints of al-Qaeda's presence--that they are very keen to
hide, I would say.
And as we have this hearing today, keep in mind that the
Islamic State declared its presence in Sirte as a new sort of
one of its trio of capitals for its operations. Al-Qaeda has
not done the same thing in Libya or elsewhere. This is by
deliberate design.
Al-Qaeda looks at what the Islamic State is doing and it
said well before even the Islamic State's rise and say if you
prematurely declare an Islamic State and then you can't hold it
you have discredited this idea not only amongst jihadis but
also amongst the Muslim population and therefore al-Qaeda is
basically looking at the loss of Sirte and is looking at the
loss of territory in Syria and Iraq and then saying, we told
you so.
This is the message we see because we track in Arabic and
other languages on a day to day basis that's going out right
now and they are saying it in Libya itself as well.
And so as that warning was expressed by Ayman al-Zawahiri
and other al-Qaeda leaders, I have no doubt that they are
looking to take advantage of the fact the Islamic State is
losing ground in Libya as well.
Now, this doesn't mean that al-Qaeda is this sort of 10-
foot ogre in Libya. They are not. But they have taken their
lumps as well and they've lost quite a bit of personnel in the
war in Libya.
But as we move forward in this hearing I just wanted to
keep in mind that just because group doesn't call itself al-
Qaeda doesn't mean it isn't al-Qaeda and that al-Qaeda is still
very present in Libya to this day.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
Mr. Fishman.
STATEMENT OF MR. BENJAMIN FISHMAN (FORMER DIRECTOR FOR NORTH
AFRICA, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL)
Mr. Fishman. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you
this afternoon. I appreciate this committee's attention to
Libya because I believe it remains an important issue for U.S.
policy and often it is poorly understood.
My written testimony goes into further details about this
but I'd like to highlight just one common misrepresentation.
That is if we had left well enough alone, Gaddafi would have
returned to his reformed, albeit peculiar, personality.
For those on this committee on terrorism who have not been,
I urge you to visit the Pan Am 103 Memorial Cairn at Arlington
National Cemetery or participate in the annual memorial there
on December 21.
Among other moving tributes, you will see students at
Syracuse University--current students--reading out the names of
the victims including 35 Syracuse students who were returning
home for Christmas.
When I imagine Gaddafi left in power after facing down an
uprising in Benghazi, together with his refusal to negotiate
anything, I see the man capable of ordering the Pan Am 103
attack, not some humbled strawman--strongman.
Instead of the fragile state that Libya has become, Libya
most likely would resemble Syria today and most sides of the
conflict could be strongly anti-Western.
I acknowledge that the U.S. and our allies made some errors
in handling the post-conflict environment in Libya. There
should have been greater involvement with our Libyan partners
from day one to help them establish a basic form of governance
and security after the 2011 revolution.
But the truth is Libya's leaders didn't want or know how to
accept international assistance despite our efforts to help
before the security breakdown started emerging and the civil
war broke out on 2014 when delivering assistance became less
viable.
Now we face a situation where Libya is divided among many
factions. The good news is that a unity government, the
Government of National Accord, has been formed and there are
ongoing efforts to help strengthen that government's legitimacy
and credibility.
There is also a dialogue in place to solidify agreement for
the unity government, and as my old boss, Ambassador Dennis
Ross, says about the Middle East, when the parties are talking
directly it strongly reduces the probability of violence.
The process won't be easy but at least it's underway and
the GNA has strong international backing from the West and the
region.
ISIS and terrorism emanating from Libya remains a current
serious concern--the primary reason for holding this hearing.
But here, there is actually good news to report.
After ISIS built a so-called government--governate in Libya
in the city of Sirte, establishing their Islamic police and
executing clerics and other dissidents, local Libyan forces
began an offensive against Sirte this summer.
With the support of U.S. air power, Sirte has been
virtually liberated from ISIS and we have proven repeatedly
through air strikes and capture operations in Libya that the
U.S. is capable of doing--capable and interested in sustaining
these sorts operations.
The militias from Misrata suffered heavy casualties but
they took on the mission themselves. Now, instead of ISIS
directing its fighters to Libya, there's no such governate to
fall back to in North Africa.
This is not to say that the threat has been vanquished.
Terrorism from Libya will evolve and cells will likely be
established in Libya's southern desert or, more worrisome, the
foreign fighters who made up the bulk of the Sirte contingent
may repatriate, posing an especially serious threat to Tunisia.
That is why we need to continue to expand our support to the
region's only democracy to emerge from the Arab Spring.
In sum, Libya faces many serious challenges. But I must
emphasize it is not Syria. It hasn't seen nearly the scale of
the violence in Aleppo alone. Nor is it Yemen. Both countries
pose far greater threats to regional security and to U.S.
interests in the homeland and overseas.
I still believe Libya has a chance to realize the vision of
the 2011 revolution and we should do whatever we can together
with our allies to assist the Libyans to achieve this goal.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fishman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
My first question I want to ask is--and I know that you're
all experts on Libya but I want to get your feelings about
Egypt because, obviously, Egypt has had problems in the Sinai.
They've had a history in the past going back quite a few
years now where they almost went to war or were at war with
Libya in the past.
But Islamic extremists in Libya would that cause a military
or at least a diplomatic reaction from el-Sisi, in your
opinion? Anybody? Doctor?
Ms. Fasanotti. Yes. I think that it's possible that, for
example, Egypt intervene in Libya and not so late. So at the
moment, I think Egypt is acting any way in Libya--giving arms,
weapons, money--and General Haftar has been many times in Cairo
to have meetings with not only el-Sisi but all of the most
important politicians of Egypt.
And so I think that it's very--Libya, it's one of the--it's
the interest of Egypt at the moment and, yes, I think it's
possible that they can intervene, even in an open way, not just
like nowadays.
Mr. Cook. Well, I want to switch gears a little bit because
we have a NATO conference coming up and some of us, both
Democrats and Republicans, are part of that NATO Parliament.
And in the past, the Mediterranean members of NATO have
been very, very nervous about what went on, obviously, in
Tunisia and then Libya.
Now, I know that subject is going to come up. Do you have
any advice on how we can handle that in terms of NATO being
involved in this since they're very, very concerned about the
refugee situation but also different terrorist groups just to
the south of them?
Ms. Fasanotti. Well, it's difficult to answer to this
question because it's--the situation is so articulated and so
complex that every answer would be not enough.
But if you analyze--I think that we should start analyzing
the situation right now in Cyrenaica, for example, which is
strictly connected to Egypt, and in many months--not so many,
Cyrenaica has now a kind of military government very similar to
the el-Sisi one so which is, at the same time, different from
the Tripolitania one--the GNA.
Mr. Cook. Let me jump around a little bit more because, you
know, I, for one, and I think a lot of the members of the
committee are very, very nervous about what's going to happen
about al-Qaeda and I think it's going to be a huge target
because it's oil-rich and I just--looking at a map and reading
some of Churchill's commentaries on World War II at El Alamein,
which is Egypt.
But the geography seems to be against the terrorists, if
you will, in terms of outside allies and what have you. Can you
comment on that as to how al-Qaeda, anybody, could develop
there because they've obviously had a setback there, whether
this will continue. Yes, sir.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I think the fact of the matter is,
going back to 2011 we've documented both al-Qaeda and then ISIS
using Libya facilitation networks to influence the situation
all the way through Egypt into the Sinai--in fact, arms
shipments, that kind of thing, where they've actually been able
to get through, even though the Egyptian government has cracked
down on a number of occasions and I will give you one stunning
example.
There's a guy named Hisham al-Ashmawy who is actually a
former Egyptian special forces officer who is actually one of
the biggest al-Qaeda operatives in North Africa. If you meet
with the Egyptians, they know, certainly, very well who Ashmawy
is because he's actually targeted for assassination some senior
Egyptian officials including the chief prosecutor for the
Egyptian state was killed by him.
This is a very dangerous guy. He operates in Libya all the
way into Egypt and, in fact, the Islamic State blames him for
kicking them out of Derna because Ashmawy actually organized
the jihadi resistance in Derna to the Islamic State and
actually, the Islamic State put out a most wanted poster for
him because they want him dead. That's how much--how dangerous
he is.
So here's a guy and his network, who is both dangerous to
both the Egyptian state and the Islamic State and is in fact an
al-Qaeda operative. So I think that tells you quite a bit about
what he's doing.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
If you'd be so kind, if you have any background literature
on that you could provide to the committee----
Mr. Joscelyn. Sure. Absolutely.
Mr. Cook [continuing]. And we can distribute to the
members.
Mr. Joscelyn. Egyptians will know very well who he is.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
All right. I'm going to turn to the ranking member,
Congressman Keating, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Earlier, this month General Haftar seized three oil
fields--oil terminals--major oil terminals and they're just
about 50 miles east of Sirte.
Now, what do you suppose--maybe Mr. Fishman could lead
this--what do you suppose this might mean in terms of the peace
process?
What about the signed deal to resume oil exports, in
particular, in terms of these actions and do you think
there's--I was in the--I was in Tunisia just a few months ago
discussing things with our Libyan team and I'm just curious
about what your feelings are about General Haftar, just going
on--you know, going along on his own or any option about him
working with us instead of independently.
I know there's a lot of questions but basically his action
this month--the oil terminals--what it means in terms of the
deal to resume oil exports and how does it affect the peace
process and do we ever get him to somehow cooperate?
Mr. Fishman. Thank you. And it also relates to the--Mr.
Cook's questions about Egypt because Egypt has a prominent role
in influencing General Haftar.
To summarize and perhaps to simply--the greatest--the
greatest asset to ridding Libya of terrorism, ISIS, al-Qaeda,
whatever the threat may be, is to form a stable and unified
government and that's what our administration has been trying
to do for the last 3 years--plus years.
That's what the U.N.-backed process has been trying to do
and that's what our major European and regional allies have
been trying to do with this GNA.
The problem is with Haftar and some of his allies he's
been, shall we say, the main opponent of forming a unity
government because he's holding out for some high-ranking post
or some regional position within that government and,
obviously, the oil and the seizures of the oil fields give him
more leverage to hold out further.
So in summary, Haftar is an obstacle. It's very hard to
influence him. That's especially since he's made recent
military progress. The problem is the Western factions--and we
can go into this in more detail--are adamantly opposed to any
of his contributions and the rubber meets the road where Egypt
continues to support him.
And so in brief, I just--we need to find a formula through
our Egyptian allies to help negotiate some kind of----
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Mr. Joscelyn.
Mr. Joscelyn. The question you asked, Congressman, is the
one that I knew was going to be asked at this hearing and the
one that I think is the trickiest one to answer for these
reasons.
I actually agree with a lot of what Mr. Fishman said. I
think the simple fact of the matter is that Haftar is in fact
one of the key guys who has taken the fight to the jihadis in
Benghazi and Derna and elsewhere.
They complain about him all the time so I know he's doing a
good job with killing them, you know. Unfortunately, I think
his bombing campaigns also are indiscriminate at times, you
know, and you can see areas of Benghazi and elsewhere that are
sort of levelled.
You know, we do see reports, too. For example, there was a
helicopter that was down in Benghazi earlier this year. There
were conflicting reports about whether or not it was actually
shot down by the jihadis or crashed on its own accord.
Be that as it may, it confirmed that French special forces
and Western special forces are also involved with him. It's not
just the Egyptians but there are other Western forces that are
there and so this becomes very tricky.
But by the same token, on the other side of the coin, what
Mr. Fishman has outlined I think is right--that he's the
political wild card and if you want a stable Libya in the
future and you want to actually try and figure out a way to
basically tamp down this and provide a long-term political
solution for the jihadi insurgency, then he provides down side
risks in that regard as well.
Mr. Keating. Okay. I just had a quick question, having just
been there.
Tunisia is extremely fragile. Could you tell me why you
think, from a pro rata basis or per population member basis,
that it has the highest participation in foreign terrorist
fighters?
Is it economic? I've heard on the ground different theories
as to why that country of all, the last remaining democratic
country there, why that's so involved and so high a proportion
of foreign terrorist fighters.
Mr. Joscelyn. It's going back to the height of Iraq war.
Both Tunisia and Libya on a per capita basis contributed more
foreign fighters to the fight--jihadis--than basically anybody
and it's a complicated story as to why.
I think radicalization, of course involves many different
factors. But the bottom line is--and I wouldn't underestimate
this--there is a facilitation network in Tunisia that they were
able to use to send these fighters at different various
facilities and, you know, some of the mosques have been
radicalized and have given in to this sort of ideology, and
that was a--played a major role in this.
Now, you know, just to go back to my original opening
statement. Here in Tunisia is a great example of how AQIM, al-
Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaeda play the Tunisian game.
They had group called the Uqba bin Nafi battalion, which
was in fact an al-Qaeda front group--AQIM front group--that
fights there.
They had some losses when it comes to the Islamic State
but, again, this is another time when an organization didn't
use the al-Qaeda brand name, was actually answering up the
chain of authority to al-Qaeda and, you know, initially was
misidentified as just a local group.
And the reason why I say that's important is because we
shouldn't let them play the local game. Don't allow al-Qaeda
jihadis or any jihadis to pretend that they represent Tunisian
or they represent Libyans or any of them.
That's why it's important to expose them because their game
is to say no, no, we represent the locals here and our--big
part of our strategy has to be say, no, you don't.
Mr. Keating. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Cook. Congressman Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the many reasons why we have the greatest military
in the world is our use of the after action report where we
will very specifically give three sustains and three improves.
As we look back on these last few years of U.S foreign
policy in Libya, whether it is tactically, operationally,
strategically, if you can share what's working--specifically
what's working that we need to continue and/or specifically
what are we not doing that we should be or maybe what we are
doing but not doing it well.
So I want to turn over my 4\1/2\ minutes to you to talk
specifically about what we are doing that's working and what we
are--what we need to improve upon.
Mr. Joscelyn. Okay, I will start.
You know, I don't know if I can give you three and three
but I'd say, you know, we do--we should find some encouragement
in the recent military efforts in Sirte, for example. I mean, I
think that that coalition that came is relying primarily on
Libyan local forces from the Sirte and militiamen to take the
fight to Islamic State that has worked to a large degree.
I would say there that although the local Libyan forces are
doing the bulk of the fighting on the ground, I'd point you to
a Washington Post article that came out recently that said, for
example, the American special forces are in fact there helping
them and if you look at the press reporting very carefully this
is sort of the secret of Libya that I don't think is really
emphasized enough.
There are probably four Western nations that have special
forces footprints inside Libya today fighting. That's the U.S.,
the U.K., Italy, and France. And so this is very much a sort of
special forces war and once you started thinking about it that
way it becomes a little bit different.
I think that we've been very good at sort of, you know,
recently combatting Islamic State but my big concern is in the
long run how do we have something--you know, if you go back to
counter insurgency in Iraq and Syria, Congressman, where you
just visited in Iraq, it's clearing and then holding.
And, you know, this gain over the long run, you know,
clearing is a lot easier sometimes than is holding, you know,
and this is where building long-term, you know, established
political institutions becomes the key thing and I don't know
at this point--we've made some progress with the GNA--the
Government National Accord--and others and they deserve more
support. But I'm skeptical about what the long-term holds in
that regard.
Mr. Zeldin. Anybody else like to add?
Mr. Fishman. I think I agree with Thomas about the CT
effort that has been made recently and I point back to the
targeted capture operations against Abu Anas al-Libi and Abu
Qatada who is responsible for the--one of the men responsible
for the attack on our diplomatic facilities.
That brings up a sensitive issue because I think where
we've been less successful in interacting across the region
in--particularly in conflict zones is gaining access to the
right people to do the right political reporting and
implementing programs that these fragile governments need and
that, unfortunately, has played into the politics back here but
also more--there are people in the government whose careers are
built in serving in conflict zones and we visited them in the
military and civilian roles.
And one of our deficits in Libya particularly--you just
mentioned that you visited our Libya team in Tunis. Well,
they're in Tunis and they don't have access to--they have phone
access to Libyans. They have access to Libyan expats. But
they're not on the ground.
They're not--they're not feeling the heartbeat of Tripoli,
and until we can solve this issue, I think, of getting our
diplomats to find the right balance between serving in hardship
and moving effectively, we are not going to be able to, I
think, serve as effective interlocutors as we could.
Our European counterparts do a better job of it because
they're more low profile. But, certainly, they don't have the
political clout that needs to be happening.
Mr. Zeldin. Doctor, we only have a few seconds left. Was
there anything, very quickly, you wanted to add before we ran
out of time?
Ms. Fasanotti. Yes. I think we should try to understand
much, much better the tribes and the internal divisions of
Libya because--can I--can I go?
Mr. Zeldin. Finish your sentence. Go ahead.
Ms. Fasanotti. Even though it's perfectly right, the idea
of controlling the terrain with military operations and so on,
the problem still exists and it's a problem that exists since
centuries. And now without any kind of government it's
impossible to solve otherwise. So I think this.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you. Thank you for the extra time,
Chairman.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
Congressman Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Well, a country of 6.5 million people, about
160 tribes, 1,600 militias, about 90 percent of the economy is
oil--plummeting oil prices, no central government. What a mess.
I mean, really, what--and then you have the Islamic State there
as well.
These militias are made up, presumably, of--and it's a
majority Sunni Muslim country. So they're probably al-Qaeda
affiliates? Enlighten me.
Mr. Joscelyn. I mean, the--the al-Qaeda groups are--you can
distinguish them from the vast majority of the militias. The
militias a lot of times--and this is where I objected to some
of the al-Qaeda groups being called militias back in 2011 and
2012 because they weren't.
You know, they were--they were very insidious. No, there
are a lot of militias that do local security work, which is
what you're talking about, which are a much more local power
base and this is where Libya is a fractured society, as the
doctor said.
Mr. Higgins. Wait a minute. How do you--how do you
distinguish between what militias do in Syria, for example, and
militias that are a local security group?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, no. This is--this is part of the
challenge, absolutely. But I would say this. What I'd say is of
the--I think 1,600 is the number you used, something along
those lines.
Mr. Higgins. That's what----
Mr. Joscelyn. Right. Somewhere along those lines. We--I
mean, obviously, we don't have perfect information on Libya.
I'm not claiming I do.
But we track it very carefully and I can tell you that, you
know, we don't see--you know, the vast majority of those
militias as far as we can tell from open source information
appear to be sort of local security groups. They're not
involved in sort of the jihadi insurgency activities.
Now, Congressman, to your point, however, you know, going
back through time, some of the militias did get entangled with
Ansar al-Sharia and others and that's where it became complex
in Benghazi and elsewhere.
But, you know, I think if you'd taken that 1,600 number, my
guess is, and it's an informed guess, most of those are local
security forces.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. But it's still a country of only 6.5
million people so it's relatively small. It is--you don't have
a Shi'a-Sunni divide as you have in Syria, as you have in Iraq,
because 97 percent are Sunni Muslims.
What are the dividing lines? These tribes or----
Ms. Fasanotti. It's--can I? It's a question of history and
ancient times, and of course, the tribes are still--if you--if
we analyze the tribes one century ago, we can see that they are
still in the same place of the 1926, for example, and the
frictions of those tribes are still the same because, for
example, Misrata, which is a tribe of the Tripolitania, and
Zintan, which everyone knows because Zintan militias, they are
still fighting. So nothing has changed in this way.
Mr. Higgins. Who finances the militias?
Ms. Fasanotti. Sorry?
Mr. Higgins. Who finances the militias?
Ms. Fasanotti. Some--many, in many ways. They can finance--
--
Mr. Higgins. They, presumably, tax the people over which
they are providing security for?
Ms. Fasanotti. Maybe. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. So that's a source of revenue?
Ms. Fasanotti. Yes.
Mr. Fishman. Actually, I don't mean to interrupt but----
Mr. Higgins. Jump in.
Mr. Fishman [continuing]. Many of them are financed from
the state itself and that's the paradox of how to solve this
problem because after the----
Mr. Higgins. Solve the problem to what end?
Mr. Fishman. Getting the militias to form up in a coherent
security service that answer to a state authority and instead
this is called DDR, Defense, Deconstruction--or Demobilization,
Disarmament, and Reconstruction--sorry--and it's a common
process in counter insurgency and it just hasn't taken off in
Libya in part because there were poor decisions early on by the
Libyan government to incorporate the militias as, basically,
state actors, and all the while they are earning their salaries
effectively holding the state hostage to persist in this--the
civil war.
And so you're--I just want to make one more point about
your Islamist association with the militias. The civil war was
initiated by a large faction that's pro-Islamist and a large
faction that's anti-Islamist.
It's implying things but in general and so I don't know
whether the percentage is 50/50, 60/40, 70/30, whatever. But a
lot of those militias reject the premise of Islamists and those
primarily are the ones who helped kick out ISIS from Sirte.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cook. Thank you. Congressman Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fishman, you're--are you with RAND now?
Mr. Fishman. I'm an adjunct there so I'm not officially
part of the organization. I just help them with various
projects.
Mr. Perry. Okay. And before doing that, you were at--were
you at State?
Mr. Fishman. I was at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
Mr. Perry. Okay. And before that State?
Mr. Fishman. The NSC at the White House, then at State.
Mr. Perry. Okay. And before that?
Mr. Fishman. State.
Mr. Perry. What's that?
Mr. Fishman. State Department.
Mr. Perry. Before that State Department.
Mr. Fishman. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Perry. How--when did you start at the State?
Mr. Fishman. 2009.
Mr. Perry. 2009. Before that?
Mr. Fishman. I was in graduate school at Washington
Institute for Near East Policy.
Mr. Perry. Okay. So I'm looking through your submission
here and it says misrepresentation one--we should never have
gone into Libya in the first place. The threat was not
significant to the U.S. or the Libyan population. Gaddafi could
have been placated. That's misrepresentation one, right?
Mr. Fishman. That's what I submitted.
Mr. Perry. And then misrepresentation two--NATO and the
U.S. abandoned Libya after the intervention. There should have
been a stabilization force assembled to restore security.
That's two, correct?
Mr. Fishman. Correct.
Mr. Perry. Makes it easier. So just out of curiosity, what
was your position regarding the United States intervention, if
you want to call it that, in Iraq?
Mr. Fishman. In Iraq?
Mr. Perry. Yes.
Mr. Fishman. You mean in 2003?
Mr. Perry. Yes.
Mr. Fishman. I was--contemporaneously I was supportive of
the intervention in Iraq.
Mr. Perry. I'm sorry. I didn't--you what?
Mr. Fishman. I supported it as a college student.
Mr. Perry. You supported the intervention in Iraq?
Mr. Fishman. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Okay. And so you're supporting the intervention
in Libya because you're saying that there's a
misrepresentation. We should have never gone into Libya in the
first place.
But I'm wondering if there was a plan post-Gaddafi--if
there was a plan for governance at State, at the National
Security Council for the follow-on operation in Libya once
Gaddafi was gone.
Mr. Fishman. There were many, many discussions at both an
agency level, interagency level, international level about how
to help stabilize the Libyans.
Mr. Perry. But was there a plan? Not just a discussion but
was there a plan? This is, what, 2000--this--essentially the
overthrow of Gaddafi occurred fall of 2011, right?
Mr. Fishman. Yes.
Mr. Perry. So it had been going on----
Mr. Fishman. Yes.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. It had been leading up to that for
some time but was there a--and we were involved and----
Mr. Fishman. We had stabilization planning documents and
the nature of the fall of the regime led to the fact that those
plans had to change on the fly.
Mr. Perry. Were you--were you privy to those plans?
Mr. Fishman. Some, but not all of them.
Mr. Perry. So are you familiar with Presidential Study
Directive 11?
Mr. Fishman. You have to remind me.
Mr. Perry. Okay. So it's a classified document. You can
find some open source information. I'm happy to provide what we
know for you.
But it's essentially changing decades of United States
policy in favour of authoritarian rulers such as Gaddafi for
the sake of stability in the region in North Africa and the
Middle East and partnering with the--with the local population
in overthrowing those governments in--for the sake of democracy
and partnering specifically with the Muslim Brotherhood in that
effort.
Are you familiar with that? Did that play into your----
Mr. Fishman. I don't recall any such directive and I recall
a similar study about supporting reform in the region. But it
was certainly----
Mr. Perry. Well, what drove who you partnered with or who
you worked with? What determined that effort? How was that
defined for you?
Mr. Fishman. In the Libya circumstance?
Mr. Perry. Sure. Libya is one of--by the way, one of the
target countries in Presidential Study Directive 11--Libya,
Syria, Yemen, Egypt. All the failed ones are delineated and
specifically named, according to open source.
Mr. Fishman. I think that your--if I recall correctly, and
it was several years ago, that document referred to how we can
support gradual change for institutional reform in countries
that you named who we thought assessed to be long-term threats
to stability if you--if the authoritarian regimes continued as
they were.
And you saw as a result we didn't push--we didn't push
Tunisia to rid themselves with Ben Ali. The Ben Ali regime
portrayed it that those offenses----
Mr. Perry. I'm sorry, sir. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
Congresswoman Kelly.
Ms. Kelly. Doctor, in your statement you discuss
restructuring the Libyan armed forces, national security forces
and local police.
How do you envision countries like the United States or
other outside actors assisting in this effort without--I know
there was a comment we do have special forces there without
committing more and more and more troops. What military ideas
do you have?
Ms. Fasanotti. Well, I--still, I don't have any clear idea
of this. Mine is just a suggestion, knowing the country, and so
of course, in my opinion we should intervene in a more
systematic way because you cannot--I think that security, like
economy and politics, are profoundly restricted to the other.
So I think that we have to invest, first of all, as I was
telling before, in the security, of course, because if you
don't have security you cannot work.
But on the other side, we have to invest even in all these
incredible divisions that Libya has because Libya is not only
what we talk right now about or we said about Islamist, non-
Islamist, militias, different militias, militias in Tripoli,
militias in Benghazi, in Derna and so on. But there are the
tribes and then there are diversity at an ethnic level.
So Arabs--because we talk about Shi'a and Sunni but here we
have atavistic divisions in terms of ethnicities. So Arabs were
the Bedouins and Berbers, Tuareg, Amazigh, and Toubou.
So in this way, I think, yes, of course we should invest in
the disarming, for example, because we cannot have, frankly, 6
million people and almost at minimum 20 million weapons.
Ms. Kelly. Do you think outside forces, depending on who it
is, would further divide Libya? Because you talk about all the
tribes and the different groups already. Do you think it's the
United States that should intervene or----
Ms. Fasanotti. This is a very difficult answer because
Libyans are really particular, even in this way, because they
do not want to be touched by anyone.
They want, of course, to decide for themselves and I can
understand them, of course. And so all--what I see is that all
this continues in interventions open or--not opened by the
international community. At the moment, did not obtain
anything. So----
Ms. Kelly. Welcome to jump in.
Mr. Joscelyn. Oh, geez. This is a very complex question. I
don't know--I don't have all the answers. I will just say this.
The--on the other side of the coin, when you talk about
Western intervention or assistance, I will tell you what the
al-Qaeda jihadis are doing, which is that they're organizing
themselves against that.
And so what they in their propaganda, and we've seen this
as a major theme, they're holding up Omar Al-Mukhtar, who was--
in the first half of the 20th century resisted Italian, you
know, forces in Italy.
Ms. Fasanotti. Yes, a hero.
Mr. Joscelyn. Yes, hero. What's happening now is, and I see
this in the videos--I see this in the magazines that they put
out in Arabic and in different languages--al-Qaeda is trying to
portray him as sort of this ancestor of theirs in Libya and
they're trying to rally forces around his image to say that
they're also resisting sort of Western interference.
So, for example, when this French--this helicopter carrying
three French special forces officers went down in Benghazi
earlier this year, immediately that became a flashpoint where
the so-called Grand Mufti of Libya--he's not really but that's
how he--what he's called--immediately comes out and says this
proves that France and the West is intervening here in Libya
and we need to rally our forces on the jihadi and Islamist side
against any outside interference.
And so it's a complex dynamic. That's only one factor, of
course, in all of this. But I can tell you that there are
people on the other side thinking about that and never to
forget that.
Mr. Fishman. Just in 2 seconds--that's why our planning, as
well as it was done, ran into easy or specific opposition by
the interim leaders, as I noted at the beginning, whether it
was on security issues or economic issues, and legally you
can't deploy troops for security reasons.
You can't deploy technical assistance if the government
doesn't sign an agreement and much like the Iraq issue with the
withdrawal of our troops, we didn't have agreement from the
Libyans.
Ms. Kelly. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
What I want to do is thank the panellists for being here
today. I want to thank the members and just want to also second
my prayers and thoughts are with Judge Poe, the chairman, and
hope that he gets better.
And I want to thank the member from Buffalo and the one
from Massachusetts for being civil today toward each other,
knowing that there's a big game at stake. Counsellors are
standing by and I've given them a copy of Kumbaya, which they
will memorize before the next hearing.
But I do want to thank everybody, and right now this
subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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