[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ISIS IN THE PACIFIC: ASSESSING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE
THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 27, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-65
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
22-758 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
John Dickhaus, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
Witnesses
Mr. John T. Watts, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security, Atlantic Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Patrick M. Skinner, Director of Special Projects, The Soufan
Group:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Ms. Supna Zaidi Peery, Research Analyst, Counter Extremism
Project:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Joseph Chinyong Liow, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center
for East Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John T.
Watts.......................................................... 47
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Patrick M.
Skinner........................................................ 47
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Supna Zaidi
Peery.......................................................... 48
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Joseph
Chinyong Liow.................................................. 48
ISIS IN THE PACIFIC: ASSESSING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE
THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
----------
Wednesday, April 27, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Katko, Higgins, Keating, and
Vela.
Mr. King. The Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting
today to hear testimony from 4 very distinguished experts
regarding Islamist ideology and Southeast Asia.
I would like to welcome the Members of the subcommittee and
express my appreciation to the witnesses who are here today. I
recognize myself for an opening statement.
The spread of Islamist terrorism, around the world, is a
major concern for U.S. Homeland Security. Addressing this
threat requires steadfast monitoring and proactive actions in
every corner where ISIS and al-Qaeda ideology is spreading.
There were indications of ISIS and Islamist ideology spreading
throughout parts of Southeast Asia that are reminiscent of this
violent ideologist expansion in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia,
and elsewhere in Africa.
In recent years, there have been several high-profile
terrorist plots in the region, primarily linked to violent
Islamist extremist networks.
In 2016, there has been a number of attacks and security
concerns throughout the region. In January, ISIS claimed
responsibility for a coordinated attack in Jakarta, Indonesia
that claimed 8 lives and wounded dozens more.
In February, the British and Australian Governments issued
terror warnings for travelers going to Malaysia.
On April 9, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack in
which 18 Filipino soldiers were killed and more than 50
wounded. A few days later, Islamist terror group Abu Sayyaf,
which has been linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS, beheaded 2 Filipino
hostages. In Bangladesh, 5 secular bloggers and a publisher
have been murdered in the past year in attacks that appear to
have been inspired by terrorists ideology.
Just this past Monday, Islamist militants killed Xulhag
Mannan, an editor of Bangladesh's first LGBT magazine. The U.S.
Embassy in Bangladesh confirmed that Mr. Mannan was an embassy
employee and worked with USAID. A group linked to al-Qaeda in
the Indian continent, AQIS, claimed credit for the attack.
Also, on Monday, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau announced
that Abu Sayyaf has killed John Ridsdel, a Canadian citizen,
who had been kidnapped from a resort in the Philippians last
September. Our thoughts and prayers go out to both of their
families.
Estimates of Southeast Asian fighters that have traveled to
Syria to join ISIS range between 800 to more than 1,200. Public
reporting highlights the creation of an ISIS military unit in
Syria comprised of individuals recruited from Malaysia and
Indonesia, known as the Malay Archipelago Combat Unit. Similar
to what we have seen with Australians and Western Europeans,
there are indications that some Southeast Asian recruits from
this unit are trying to direct and inspire pro-ISIS attacks in
the region.
The presence of Islamist terror groups in Southeast Asia is
not a new development. There are historical connections between
the Southeast Asian region and Islamist terror groups.
Al-Qaeda used a number of major cities in the region for
meeting sites, including planning the September 11 attacks.
While many have speculated that while al-Qaeda's influence has
declined, in January 2016, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current
leader of al-Qaeda, released a statement specifically
addressing Southeast Asian Muslims and encouraged sympathizers
in the region to attack U.S. interests. With both al-Qaeda and
ISIS seeking to recruit and radicalize in the region, the
United States must be proactive in working with regional
governments to counter the ideology and identify potential
threats.
Through today's hearing, we will hear from counterterrorism
and regional experts about the current influence of ISIS in the
region, efforts to address the threat, and what more the United
States and allied nations should do to prevent this region from
becoming a bigger source of fighters, funding, and operational
plotting.
Many are skeptical that the violent Islamist groups,
extremist groups of Southeast Asia could present a real threat
to U.S. allies, interests in the U.S. homeland; this is the
same skepticism that ignored the threats from Yemen, Nigeria,
and Libya until they had grown out of hand. While rightfully
focussing on Syria and Iraq in our fight against ISIS, we
should not ignore the growth of extremist activity and ideology
in other parts of the world.
[The statement of Chairman King follows:]
Statement of Chairman Peter T. King
April 27, 2016
The spread of Islamist terrorism around the globe is a major
concern for U.S. homeland security. Addressing this threat requires
steadfast monitoring and proactive actions in every corner where ISIS
and al-Qaeda ideology is spreading.
There are indications of ISIS and Islamist ideology spreading
through parts of Southeast Asia that are reminiscent of the violent
ideology's expansion in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, and elsewhere
in Africa. In recent years, there have been several high-profile
terrorist plots in the region, primarily linked to violent Islamist
extremist networks. In 2016, there have been a number of attacks and
security concerns throughout the region.
In January, ISIS claimed responsibility for a coordinated attack in
Jakarta, Indonesia that claimed 8 lives and wounded dozens more. In
February, the British and Australian governments issued terror warnings
for travelers going to Malaysia. On April 9, ISIS claimed
responsibility for an attack in which 18 Filipino soldiers were killed
and more than 50 wounded. A few days later, Islamist terror group Abu
Sayyaf, which has been linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS, beheaded 2 Filipino
hostages.
In Bangladesh, 5 secular bloggers and a publisher have been
murdered in the past year in attacks that appear to be inspired by
terrorist ideology. On Monday, Islamist militants killed Xulhaz Mannan,
an editor Bangladesh's first LGBT magazine. The U.S. Embassy in
Bangladesh confirmed that Mr. Mannan was an Embassy employee and worked
with USAID. A group linked to al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
(AQIS) claimed credit for the attack.
Also on Monday, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced
that Abu Sayyef had killed John Ridsdel, a Canadian citizen who had
been kidnapped from a resort in the Philippines last September.
Our thoughts and prayers go out to both of their families.
Estimates of Southeast Asian fighters that have traveled to Syria
to join ISIS range between 800 to over 1,200. Public reporting
highlights the creation of an ISIS military unit in Syria comprised of
individuals recruited from Malaysia and Indonesia known as the Malay
Archipelago Combat Unit. Similar to what we have seen with Australians
and Western Europeans, there are indications that some Southeast Asian
recruits from this unit are trying to direct and inspire pro-ISIS
attacks in the region.
The presence of Islamist terror groups in Southeast Asia is not a
new development. There are historical connections between the Southeast
Asian region and Islamist terror groups. Al-Qaeda used a number of
major cities in the region for meeting sites, including planning the
September 11, 2001 attacks.
While many have speculated that al-Qaeda's influence has declined,
in January 2016 Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda,
released a statement specifically addressing Southeast Asian Muslims
and encouraged sympathizers in the region to attack U.S. interests.
With both al-Qaeda and ISIS seeking to recruit and radicalize in the
region, the United States must be proactive in working with regional
governments to counter the ideology and identify potential threats.
Through today's hearing, we will hear from counterterrorism and
regional experts about the current influence of ISIS in the region,
efforts to address the threat, and what more the United States and
allied nations should do to prevent this region from becoming a bigger
source of fighters, funding, and operational plotting.
Many are skeptical that the violent Islamist extremist groups in
Southeast Asia could present a real threat to U.S. allies, interests,
or the U.S. homeland. This is the same skepticism that ignored the
threats from Yemen, Nigeria, and Libya until they had grown out of
hand. While rightfully focusing on Syria and Iraq in our fight against
ISIS, we should not ignore the growth of extremist activity and
ideology in other parts of the world.
I thank all of the witnesses for being here today and I recognize
the Ranking Member for his opening statement.
Mr. King. I thank all the witnesses for being here today. I
will ask if you want to make an opening statement or should we
wait for Brian and have him come in when he does it? Wait for
Brian?
I will go ahead with the witnesses. Okay. We will go ahead
with the witnesses. When the Ranking Member arrives, his
prerogative, he can make an opening statement. Other Members
are reminded that statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 27, 2016
I would also like to thank the witnesses for appearing to testify
to examine terror groups operating in Southeast Asia and their
allegiances to other terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al-
Qaeda. These terrorist groups have a long history of seeking to exploit
this region, which includes the nation with the highest population of
Muslims.
While most countries in Southeast Asia operate secular governments,
terrorist groups continue to make progress at radicalizing and
inspiring attacks.
ISIL has stepped up its efforts to recruit in this area. While
estimates vary, reportedly between 600-1,200 foreign fighters from
Southeast Asia have traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL.
Earlier this year, Islamic militants attacked downtown Jakarta
wounding at least 23 people and leaving 8 dead, including 3 civilians
and 5 militants. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack.
In one of the most horrific attacks in Indonesian history, in 2002,
a bombing in Bali killed over 200 people, most of them Western
tourists.
With assistance from the United States, Southeast Asia continues to
make strides in its counterterrorism efforts. While we must encourage
these countries' efforts to counter the spread of jihadist violence, we
must also be concerned that some countries may use these efforts as a
guise to suppress opposition.
We must continue to promote the expansion of democratic ideals and
principles in Southeast Asia while also weeding out the jihadist
elements in these countries that seek to destroy these freedoms.
The relatively small number of terrorist attacks in recent years is
a testament to the effectiveness of the military and police
counterterrorism efforts in these nations.
Today, I look forward to hearing testimony about the evolving
threat in these nations and how the countries are responding to counter
this threat.
Mr. King. What I would like to do now is introduce our
witnesses. The first witness is Mr. John Watts, who is a
nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Brent
Scowcroft Center on International Security. Prior to joining
the Atlantic Council, Mr. Watts was a staff officer at the
Australian Department of Defense and an officer in the
Australian Army Reserve. Mr. Watts holds a master's degree in
international law from the Australian National University, and
a BA in international studies from the University of Adelaide.
Mr. Watts, you are the kick-off witness, and I recognize
you.
STATEMENT OF JOHN T. WATTS, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, BRENT
SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Watts. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman King, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I
am grateful for this opportunity to talk to you about this
important issue. From the start, Islamic State of Iraq and Al
Sham, otherwise known as IS, ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh, has had a
global ambition. Its long-stated goal is to endure and to
expand. It has sought to find fertile new safe havens and high-
profile targets to attack.
In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is under siege on multiple fronts.
In recent months, it has suffered a number of high-profile
defeats and has given up substantial amounts of land to its
various adversaries. As ISIS is squeezed within its self-
proclaimed caliphate, the importance of finding new safe havens
and new targets increases in order to escape allied bombing
campaigns and to reinforce its narrative of success.
The recent bold attack by ISIS-aligned terrorists in
Jakarta along with indications of additional planning
activities in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, appear
to indicate an increased interest of success by ISIS in
establishing itself there. The calibrating the level of threat
that they pose requires consideration of a number of factors
both encouraging and concerning.
Southeast Asia is an attractive target for ISIS ambitions
due to large Muslim populations, history of terrorist
activities, and a long-standing desire by groups there to
establish a Southeast Asian caliphate. There is a precedent for
this. Darul Islam was an Islamic insurgent movement that grew
during World War II in opposition of Dutch rule. Following the
Declaration of Independence in 1949, it found itself at odds
with the new Indonesian Government and used the political
instability and weak governance at times to grow in influence.
By the late 1950s, it controlled extensive territory in
West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh provinces. Following a
failed assassination attempt on the president, the Indonesian
Government cracked down on the group. By the late 1960s, it had
been effectively destroyed. The remaining elements of the group
scattered across Southeast Asia and went underground.
In the 1990s, remnants of that group developed into another
with similar goals known as Jemaah Islamiyah. JI was formed as
a transnational network across Southeast Asia and sent soldiers
to Afghanistan to train.
Following the forced resignation in 1998 of Indonesia's
second authoritarian President Suharto, JI fighters returned to
Indonesia and used the, again, weak instability, the political
instability and weak government to emerge and to renew
insurgencies across several provinces, and to conduct high-
profile attacks, including the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005,
the Jakarta bombings of the Australian Embassy in 2004, and
several international hotels in 2005 and 2009.
Following the first Bali bombing, the government cracked
down on the group, and after a series of high-profile
operations, many of its leaders were killed or captured with a
group remaining as a degraded form today.
The legacies of these groups are an important element in
examining the terrorism in Southeast Asia today. As with DI,
key leaders or veterans of JI went to ground and are now
emerging as central players in the current evolution of the
militant groups. It is also worth noting that those areas once
controlled by DI harbored lingering Islamic movements seeking
autonomy, which have on occasion broken out into open
insurgency.
ISIS has been targeting Southeast Asia aggressively with
media messaging for some time, and local language has been
styled to appeal to the populations. For some segments of the
population, this has been a clarion call. A number of groups
have sworn allegiance and there have been thousands who
declared their support at public rallies. There are
approximately 3,000 pro-ISIS websites in Southeast Asia with
more than 70 percent coming from Indonesia. As you mentioned
yourself, Chairman, there are approximately 700 Indonesians who
have traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight, which is nearly
doubled that 400 that traveled to Afghanistan in the 1990s.
We need to keep these numbers in context, though. Seven
hundred out of an Indonesian population of 250 million is
minuscule. The numbers of people traveling from Malaysia are
about on par with Australia, despite having much larger Muslim
population. The vast majority of Southeast Asian populations
reject Islamic extremism and groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama,
which have 50 million supporters, preach the inclusive version
of Islam that emphasizes tolerance and rejects ISIS rhetoric.
In fact, some Indonesian jihadist groups have rejected ISIS
because of its brutality and called it un-Islamic.
Globally, the areas and populations ISIS has been
successful in attracting recruits, some face either economic
hardship, weak political governments, authoritative leaders,
and/or persecuted minorities, or a combination thereof. In
Southeast Asia, these conditions are no longer readily
apparent.
Southeast Asian populations live in generally stable, well-
governed, and prosperous nations, and are not as oppressed or
politically disempowered as Muslim populations in other parts
of the world. While some still struggle with poverty, economic
opportunity, corruption, and adequate infrastructure, the
region is broadly prosperous, and most people are experiencing
improving economic conditions.
The final reason for remaining optimistic about the attacks
was that the Jakarta bombings were amateur in nature. The
training and weapons used were poor, and the effect was very
limited with more insurgents dying than victims.
I am out of time. I can continue if you would like wrap-up?
Mr. King. Yes.
Mr. Watts. While Southeast Asian law enforcement is also
highly effective at targeting groups following the Bali
bombings in 2002, the campaign by the Indonesian police killed
over 50 militants and arrested over 500 and the group, Jemaah
Islamiyah, is a shadow of its former self.
That being said, there are some concerns that we still need
to be aware of. Despite the fact that they are broadly
effective, the recent attacks as well as the bombing in
Thailand at the Erawan Shrine, show that terrorist attacks can
and will continue to happen, and no police force is 100 percent
effective at stopping them all.
Moreover, while the groups have sworn allegiance to ISIS,
do not currently have the capability or possibly intent to ban
together and strike on a national level. If ISIS reprioritizes
its strategy and looks at its current situation, it may
reprioritize the effort and the resources it puts into
Southeast Asia, and that threat scenario can change rapidly.
Sources from Syria and Iraq have indicated there is
currently a split between various ISIS leadership factions as
to whether they should prioritize, retain their current
territory at all cost or devolve into a decentralized
international terrorist organization.
If it does the latter, the likelihood of increased
resources flowing to Southeast Asia could raise quickly. As
modern intolerant Muslim majority countries, Malaysia, Burma,
and Indonesia are of great symbolic importance to ISIS, because
they repudiate the extremist rhetoric they espouse by
demonstrating a better alternative to it.
The success of Southeast Asian societies are antithetical
to the apocalyptic and sectarian message ISIS promotes. Muslim
majority countries are an important target--particularly
Indonesia is the Muslim majority country, but their appeal
there has been extremely limited and remains on the absolute
fringe of the already fringed jihadist population.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watts follows:]
Prepared Statement of John T. Watts
April 27, 2016
Chairman King, Subcommittee Ranking Member Higgins, Full Committee
Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I
am grateful for this opportunity to testify today on this important
issue.
From the start, the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham, otherwise
known as IS, ISIS, ISIL, or Dae'sh, has had global ambitions. It has
long stated its goal is to endure and expand. It has sought to find
fertile new safe havens and high-profile targets to attack for a long
period of time and has committed resources to achieving that outcome,
targeting various populations around the world with its powerful
messaging.
In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is under siege on multiple fronts. In
recent months it has suffered a number of high-profile defeats and has
given up substantial amounts of land to its various adversaries.\1\ As
ISIS is squeezed within its self-proclaimed caliphate, the importance
of finding new safe havens and new targets increases, in order to
escape allied bombing campaigns and to reinforce the narrative of
success.
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\1\ Liz Sly, ``In Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State is in retreat
on multiple fronts'' for The Washington Post, March 24, 2016, accessed
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/in-syria-and-iraq-
the-islamic-state-is-in-retreat-on-multiple-fronts/2016/03/24/a0e33774-
f101-11e5-a2a3-d4e9697917d1_story.html.
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South-East Asia (SE Asia) is a tempting prize for ISIS, and the
possibility of them gaining a stronghold there is deeply concerning. SE
Asia is home to large Muslim populations, including the world's largest
Muslim-majority country: Indonesia. The region also has a history of
Islamic-motivated insurgencies, terrorist attacks, and for a time a
declared caliphate.
The recent bold attack by ISIS-aligned terrorists in Jakarta, along
with indications of additional planning activity in the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Thailand, appear to indicate an increase in interest and
success by ISIS in establishing itself there. Calibrating the level of
threat that they pose requires consideration of a number of factors,
both encouraging and concerning. My testimony today is separated into 4
parts: First I will present some broad history and context of the roots
of modern terrorism in SE Asia. Then I will present several reasons for
why the nature of the SE Asian region will limit ISIS' success there,
followed several reasons to be concerned. Finally I will provide an
assessment of how we should balance those opposing factors.
history and context
As stated above, ISIS has been open about its ambition to expand
its reach globally. SE Asia is an attractive target for ISIS ambitions
due to the large Muslim populations, history of terrorist activity and
a long-standing desire by groups in the region to establish a SE Asian
caliphate. Indeed, for a time a caliphate was declared over territory
seized by Islamic militants from the group Darul Islam (DI).
DI was an Islamic insurgent movement that grew during World War II
in opposition to Dutch rule in Indonesia. Following the declaration of
Independence in 1949, DI found itself at odds with the new Indonesian
government and used the political instability and weak governance of
the time to grow in influence. By the late 1950's, DI controlled
extensive territory in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh provinces
and declared the establishment of an Islamic State of Indonesia.
Following an attempted assassination attempt on Indonesia's first
president, Sukarno, the Indonesian Government cracked down on the
group. By the late 1960s, the group had been effectively destroyed, but
remaining elements went underground and scattered to other SE Asian
countries. These remnants sought to carry out small terrorist attacks--
often against religious targets--and retained a dream of establishing a
true caliphate across SE Asia.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Fanscisco Galamas, Terrorism in Indonesia: An Overview, for
Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos, Research Paper 04/2015,
accessed at http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_investig/2015/
DIEEEINV04-2015_Terrorismo_en_Indonesia_FcoGalamas_- ENGLISH.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 1990's, remnants of that movement developed into another
group with similar goals, known as Jemaah Islamiyah or JI. JI formed a
transnational network across SE Asia, and sent fighters to camps in
Afghanistan. Following the forced resignation in 1998 of Indonesia's
second authoritarian President, Suharto, JI fighters returned to
Indonesia and renewed insurgencies in several provinces and plotted
major terrorist attacks. JI was responsible for a number of high-
profile terrorist attacks across SE Asia, including the Bali Bombings
in 2002 and 2005, and in Jakarta the bombing of the Australian Embassy
in 2004 and several international hotels in 2005 and 2009. Following
the first Bali Bombing, the Indonesia Government once again cracked
down on the militants, and after a series of high-profile operations,
many of its leaders were killed or captured with little of the group
remaining today.
The legacy of these groups are an important element of an
examination of terrorism in SE Asia today. As with DI, key leaders and
veterans of JI went to ground, and are now reemerging as central
players in the current evolution of militant groups. It is also worth
noting that those areas once controlled by DI harbor lingering Islamic
movements seeking autonomy, which have on occasion broken out into open
insurgency or religious violence.
On the morning of Thursday, 14 January 2016, a suicide bomber
detonated his charge in a Starbucks coffee house in downtown Jakarta.
Gunmen then seized civilians in the street outside and engaged in a
firefight with police, throwing several home-made grenades and firing
assault rifles. The attack ended with 4 civilian deaths, 23 injured and
the killing of 5 terrorist attackers. The style of attack differed from
previous terrorist incidents in Indonesia, which often involved
targeting of buildings frequented by foreigners with sophisticated car
bombs. In the early 2000s, religious buildings and symbols such as
churches were often a focal point of violence, while more recently
attackers have gone after Indonesian police and authorities. This
assault clearly sought to imitate the Paris attacks, but were
ineffective and amateurish. Nonetheless, they were bold and brazen, and
show a degree of sophistication in planning and coordination, and would
have required substantial local support and networks to execute.
With a new terrorist threat emerging at the same time that foreign
fighters are travelling to and returning from an overseas jihadist
battleground, there are worrying echoes of JI's rise in the early
2000s. To understand the implications of this attack, it is necessary
to consider how ISIS has gone about expanding its global reach.
ISIS achieves this goal through several means. In Iraq and Syria,
their forces infiltrated governments and societies, and brought them
down from the inside when the time was right. This approach has been
highly successful in weakly-governed regions, and ISIS has sought to
destabilize some areas in order to create the conditions for their
success. Beyond their immediate area of interest, however, ISIS has
expanded predominately by accepting the allegiance of local groups
seeking to align with the most successful jihadi brand. This approach
can be seen occurring in SE Asia with the likes of the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG) in the Southern Philippines: An Islamic group that has sworn
allegiance to ISIS, but whose fight for autonomy is decades old and the
alignment with the current terrorist super group is likely a pragmatic
move as much as ideological one.
ISIS has been able to directly support terrorist attacks using
returned foreign fighters in areas that can be easily travelled to from
their main area of operations--in particular Europe and North Africa.
Attacks that have been attributed to ISIS in more distant locations,
such as the United States and Australia, have generally been conducted
by ``self-starter'' lone wolves--individuals or small groups inspired
by ISIS rhetoric but lacking in direct support or training.
SE Asia has been an objective for ISIS for some time, aggressively
targeting the region with media and messaging developed in local
languages and style to appeal to SE Asian populations. There are some
segments of the population for whom this has been a clarion call. A
number of groups in the region have sworn allegiance to ISIS and there
have been public rallies where thousands have declared their support
for the terrorist group. There are approximately 3,000 pro-ISIS
websites in SE Asia, with more than 70% coming from Indonesia.
Worryingly there are reportedly 700 Indonesians who have travelled to
Syria and Iraq to fight with ISIS, nearly double the 400 that travelled
to Afghanistan in the 1990s. There are also reportedly around 100
Malaysian and 100 Fillipinos, enough to form a SE Asian battalion
there, known as Katibah Nusantara.\3\ While there are some indications
these numbers may be inflated, there have also been several hundred who
have been detained before they could leave their home country. It can
also be assumed that there are even more individuals and groups with a
broad sympathy to the goal of reestablishing a caliphate in SE Asia,
even if they don't completely agree with ISIS' methods.
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\3\ The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of
the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, December 2015,
accessed at http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.
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reasons for optimism
The parallels with the emergence of JI and signs that ISIS is
gaining some traction amongst local populations are concerning, but
there are several reasons why the situation today is very different to
what it was a few decades ago. First of all it is important to
contextualize the numbers. Seven hundred people out of a population of
250 million is miniscule, and the numbers of people travelling from
Malaysia are about on par with Australia, despite it having a much
larger Muslim population.
The vast majority of SE Asian populations reject Islamic extremism.
Following the January attacks in Jakarta, Indonesians took to twitter,
trending the hashtag #KamiTidakTakut (we are not afraid). Islamic
organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which has 50 million
supporters, preaches an inclusive version of Islam that emphasizes
tolerance and rejects ISIS rhetoric.\4\ Islamic organizations that have
pledged support to ISIS have elicited a backlash from community leaders
and even some fellow jihadist groups have rejected ISIS as un-Islamic
on account of its brutality. This indicates that despite targeted
messaging and a legacy that would seem to align with many of ISIS'
objectives, they are unlikely to attract broad support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Joe Cochrane, ``From Indonesia, a Muslim Challenge to the
Ideology of the Islamic State'' in The New York Times, Nov 26, 2015,
accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/asia/indonesia-
islam-nahdlatul-ulama.html.
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Globally, the areas and populations that ISIS has been successful
in attracting recruits and support from are facing economic hardship,
weak political governance, authoritative leaders, persecuted
minorities, or a combination thereof. In SE Asia, these conditions are
no longer readily present. There are several persecuted Muslim
minorities as well as authoritative governments, such as in Myanmar and
to a lesser degree Thailand. But the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Indonesia are inclusive and tolerant democracies with avenues available
to achieving political aims, particularly in the latter two. Indeed,
Islamic parties have been formed in Indonesia, but have only been able
to achieve very limited support. SE Asian populations live in generally
stable, well-governed, prosperous societies and are not as oppressed or
politically disempowered as Muslim populations in other parts of the
world. And while some areas in SE Asia still struggle with poverty,
economic opportunity, corruption and inadequate infrastructure, the
region broadly prosperous and most people are experiencing improving
economic conditions. ISIS' message therefore has limited appeal to
them.
As an example of how the region has changed, it is worth comparing
the Indonesia of 20 years ago with today. Then it was suffering the
effects of near-economic collapse following the Asian Banking Crisis.
Separatist insurgencies and violence had flared in a number of
provinces, including in Aceh, West Papua, Central Sulawesi and East
Timor, the latter of which would go on to be granted independence. The
forced resignation of Indonesia's second president, Suharto, marked the
end of nearly 50 years of authoritarian rule. Today, the recent
election of President Joko Widodo, commonly known as Jokowi, is a
watershed moment as he represents the first democratically-elected
leader from outside the political establishment. Indonesia's economy
has slowed recently, the poverty rate has fallen from 18% a decade ago
to 11% today, and GDP per capita has more than doubled in the same
period. Inequality and development of rural areas are still problematic
and the benefits are not evenly spread, but the World Bank predicts
5.1% economic growth this year, up from 4.8% last year.\5\ While it
still has areas for improvement, Indonesia is trending in a positive
direction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ World Bank, Indonesia, accessed on April 22, 2016 at http://
data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia#cp_fin.
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Another reason for optimism in the region is the competence and
capability of the police and military forces there. In Indonesia, for
example, during the decade following the first Bali bombings police
operations killed over 50 and arrested over 500 terror suspects,
including key leaders and bomb-makers. Their response to militants is
led by their counter terrorism force, Detachment 88. Set up after the
shock of the Bali bombings, Detachment 88 is a specially-trained
counter-terrorism team that receives support and training from the
United States and Australia. These operations have degraded Jemaah
Islamiyah and prevented any high-profile attacks between 2009 and 2016.
It's important to note, however, that Indonesia's success in countering
terrorism isn't a result of just its offensive law enforcement
capabilities, but also extensive intelligence networks, field craft and
turning militants into informants through rehabilitation and community
outreach programs.
The final reason for remaining optimistic about the current ISIS
threat in SE Asia is that their only known attack was highly
ineffective. On the one hand, a coordinated attack such as that takes
significant support networks and resources to execute. And the brazen
nature of it--attacking downtown in broad daylight--differentiates this
group from others that have sworn allegiance to ISIS, such as Mujahidin
Indonesia Timur (MIT) and Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) who appear to
lack the capacity for similar attacks and are limited to local targets
in regional areas.\6\ Despite the support, planning, and coordination
necessary to stage such a bold attack, the ultimate effect was limited.
The number of injured was substantial, but more attackers died than
victims. The attack was amateurish and the training and weapons appear
to be poor. For the attack to have had such limited impact it can be
assumed that those involved lacked training and resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Thomas Murphy, When IS is not IS: Terrorism in Indonesia,
Australian Institute of International Affairs, March 1, 2016, accessed
at http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/when-is-
is-not-is-terrorism-in-indonesia/.
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reasons for concern
There are nonetheless a number of reasons that the prospect of an
emergent ISIS cell in SE Asia is of concern. While the Jakarta attack
was amateurish and ineffective, ISIS has shown itself to be a learning
organization that can adapt and improve over time. The European cell
behind the devastating attacks in Paris and Belgium had previously
experienced several failures from which it learned and improved. While
the Indonesian police arrested a dozen people following the January
attack, it is likely that there is a still larger network that could
learn from the experience and improve in the future. As foreign
fighters return from Iraq and Syria, they may bring know-how and
experience with them.
While SE Asian law enforcement agencies are broadly effective, the
recent Jakarta attacks and the August 2015 bombing in Thailand at the
Erawan Shrine, which killed 20 people, are reminders that terrorism can
still strike across the region. No police force can stop every attack.
Considering the long history of terrorism in the region, any signs of a
reemerging trend is cause for concern. It remains to be seen if these
incidents were outliers or indicate deeper failures within the
respective forces.
As noted earlier, with a few exceptions SE Asian nations are
relatively prosperous, politically stable with tolerant and moderate
societies. As such, the potential for ISIS to apply the approaches that
have worked for it in the Middle East are unlikely to work in SE Asia.
They are unlikely to be able effectively infiltrate government agencies
en masse, attract large sections of the population, or sufficiently
destabilize governments to create political vacuums. The threat of
large pieces of territory falling to ISIS is very low. But there are
still remote areas, including some with sympathetic local populations,
which could be used to create bases and training camps which would pose
a significant threat to regional security. The likelihood of an
insurgency reemerging is far lower than in the past, but local
outbreaks of violence are possible.
Moreover, while the groups that have sworn allegiance to ISIS do
not currently have the capability, or possibly even the intent, to band
together and strike on a national level, an influx of resources could
quickly change that threat scenario. Groups like Ansharud Daulad
Islamiyah (ADI), which has a presence across several provinces in
Indonesia, and the Ahlus Shura Council in the Philippines, see
themselves as the beginnings of a SE Asian Islamic State, even if they
do not yet control any territory.\7\ Many of the armed groups in the
region are motivated primarily by specific political goals or for
financial gain. There are various other insurgent and secessionist
groups throughout the region of various ethnic and religious
composition. The region comprises numerous different ethno-linguistic
group, and many grievances of individual groups directly relate to
their specific circumstances and political grievances. Nonetheless,
there are sufficient numbers of groups that could align with ISIS'
ideology and in any case we have seen that ISIS can be highly pragmatic
in creating alliances. It is plausible that they could reach a mutually
beneficial arrangement with unaffiliated groups that do not share its
ideology in order to achieve mutually beneficial objectives if the need
arose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Navhat Nuraniyah, ``More than a Fan Club'', for Inside
Indonesia, Oct-Dec 2015, accessed at http://www.insideindonesia.org/
more-than-a-fanclub.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources from Syria and Iraq have indicated that there is currently
a split between various ISIS leadership factions as to whether they
should prioritize retaining their current territory at all costs, or to
devolve into a decentralized international terrorist organization.
Whichever way the group goes, a push into SE Asia could be
reprioritized and become a focal point for their plans: Either as the
target of more attacks or in an attempt to seize territory outside the
Middle East. While ISIS-aligned groups may not currently be
sufficiently resourced to pose a significant threat, if SE Asia became
a high priority for ISIS they may find that they have as many resources
as they want. There are indications that this is already underway, some
analysts believe that ISIS is determined to establish a foothold in SE
Asia this year, most likely in Mindanao in the Philippines or Sulawesi
in Indonesia.\8\
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\8\ Rohan Gunaratna, ``ISIS in Philippines a Threat to Region'' in
The Strait Times, Jan. 12, 2016, accessed at http://
www.straitstimes.com/opinion/isis-in-philippines-a-threat-to-region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As moderate and tolerant Muslim-majority countries, Malaysia,
Brunei, and Indonesia are of great symbolic importance to ISIS because
they repudiate the extremist rhetoric they espouse by demonstrating a
better alternative to it. The success of SE Asian societies are
antithetical to the apocalyptic and sectarian message that ISIS
promotes. Muslim majority countries are an important target, and
Indonesia in particular has special symbolic meaning as the largest
Muslim-majority nation in the world.
The final cause for concern is the size of the population. While we
have seen that there is only a fraction of the population sympathetic
to ISIS' cause, in such a populous region, even a small fraction could
represent a significant number of people. Moreover, while the numbers
of people in the region that are currently suspected to be linked to
ISIS is minuscule, recent history has made it clear that it does not
require a large group of people to create a tragic and far reaching
effect. Those few who have been swayed by ISIS' appeal are likely to be
the most hard-core fringe of the existing fringe elements of society
with jihadist leanings.
assessment
Several recent terrorist attacks have reminded us of the threat the
region has faced from Islamic extremists in the past. That one of them
was clearly connected to ISIS, and with indications that several other
plots were being planned, these fears are justified. The possibility of
an ISIS foothold in one of the most populous and dynamic regions of the
world is deeply concerning. The region's history of insurgency and
political instability and the success of ISIS in expanding its brand
globally give these fears credibility.
However, the moderate and tolerant societies of SE Asia have
broadly rejected the ISIS ideology and its brutal methodology, and have
shown that they are resistant to its messaging. While there remains
some areas of concern, the region is sufficiently tolerant, politically
stable and prosperous that it is unlikely that insurgencies will re-
emerge in a wide-spread manner, even in remote areas. In fact, the
region provides a great case study of how a moderate and inclusive
approach can benefit all groups within a society, and should be held up
as an example for other regions to aspire to. Many of the countries in
the region have done this through quiet competence, empowering their
populations and looking to develop on their own terms in their own way.
The United States and its allies have played a role in supporting the
countries within the region in achieving that, and we should continue
to do so while identifying lessons to apply elsewhere.
As ISIS is pressed within the confines of its self-declared
caliphate, it is having to reconsider its priorities and strategy.
While it is unlikely to be defeated in the near term, the organization
is reacting to this pressure by seeking to open new fronts and strike
at soft targets further afield to maintain their narrative of success.
While ISIS has long sought to generate a presence in SE Asia, its
investment to date has been modest and relatively ineffectual. The
change in its circumstances may change their calculus and see them
increase the resources they commit to their SE Asian affiliates. Among
other setbacks, ISIS no longer has the ability to generate revenue in
the way it has in the past, and there are signs that financial
constraints are impacting their ability to fund their operations. It
would be dangerous, however, to underestimate their capabilities, and
if SE Asia increases in priority it is possible that the embryonic
cells there may receive sufficient resources to become a significant
threat. SE Asia, and in particular Indonesia, is an attractive target
for ISIS, and it likely that they will continue to pursue their
objectives there.
Moreover, one of the greatest threats that ISIS poses is
inspiration to lone wolves and self-starter terrorist groups. While the
currently-identified terror threats in the region may not pose a
significant risk, there is always the possibility of a new one
emerging. We have seen how difficult it is, even in Western nations, to
stop self-motivated lone-wolf attackers.
It is therefore likely that there will be more terrorist attacks in
SE Asia in the future. Whether they are funded by ISIS, inspired by
them, or indeed motivated by a completely separate political
grievances. The regional law enforcement agencies understand the
threats they face and are proactively seeking to diffuse them, but they
will be unlikely to stop them all. At present, few of the extant
militant groups have the capacity to undertake a significant attack,
and there are rifts between the key jihadists. Many jihadist groups in
Indonesia have actually rejected ISIS out of repugnance for their
brutal tactics. But while many of the groups are primarily motivated by
local grievances, those who have aligned themselves with ISIS are true
believers who have been directly inspired by the global movement beyond
any local considerations.\9\ These individuals are highly motivated to
see an ISIS-linked SE Asian Islamic province realized. And while the
percentage of individuals is exceptionally small, even the smallest
fraction of such a large population is cause for concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia, Institute for Policy
Analysis of Conflict, IPAC Report No. 13, September 24, 2014, accessed
at http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/
IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf.
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I would like to thank the committee for holding a hearing on such
an important topic. The threat of an emerging ISIS foothold in SE Asia
is of great concern. But by providing opportunities such as this to
examine the key issues in more depth we will be better placed to
respond to it.
Mr. King. Mr. Watts, thank you. Thank you very much for
that.
Our next witness, Mr. Patrick Skinner, is the director of
special projects of the Soufan group. He is a former CIA case
officer, specializing in counterterrorism issues. In addition,
he has law enforcement experience with U.S. Air Marshals and
U.S. Capitol Police as well as search and rescue experience in
the U.S. Coast Guard.
Thank you for your service, and thanks for being here
today. Mr. Skinner.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK M. SKINNER, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL PROJECTS,
THE SOUFAN GROUP
Mr. Skinner. Thank you for having me, Chairman King, other
Members of the subcommittee.
I will try to break it down into 2 threats. There is a long
and well-deserved assumption that Southeast Asia is not fertile
ground for extremism. As pointed out, 99.9 percent, the vast
majority of people, reject that, but that is also true in a lot
of places.
There has been decades of extremism in the area. As you
mentioned, there is a threat of terrorism that has run for
decades, before Afghanistan, before 9/11, but continuing all
the way through it. So when it comes to ISIS, particularly, I
break it down into 2 threats. You have the threat of the
foreign fighters. Again, 700 Indonesians, maybe 1,200 in total,
50 Malaysians, those are wildly--I mean, those are really
positive numbers per capita. I mean, compared to, like, Tunisia
or Saudi Arabia. But as we have seen in Paris, it just takes a
handful of people to come back and destabilize, especially when
there is already political tensions and economic tensions not
as severe but as always an undercurrent.
So the difference between Paris, and the difference between
Jakarta, so one killed 130, one killed 4 plus the attackers
themselves, was training. It is not lack of opportunity. It is
not lack of target. It is training.
So there is a real concern. Now, everything with foreign
fighters can always be either overhyped or downplayed, and so
it is hard to split the difference, because it is such an
unknowable. But it is certainly knowable that the difference
between success and failure, between cartoonishly bad plot,
that are still tragic, but they are not a national security
incident, is training. ISIS has demonstrated the ability to--
though Syria has been a live-fire training ground for 3 years,
for this group, and perhaps longer. As you have seen in the
European Union, and will certainly see in Southeast Asia, the
ability of governments to actually track extremist foreign
fighters is widely overstated. Even in the most
technologically-advanced countries, we are not tracking these
people. You know, we are building this hindsight, after-the-
fact counterterrorism machine. So I think that it is--you
should expect that some of these people who have left, not all
want to come back, you know, to fight. Some just want to come
back, because they are disillusioned, and that is a positive
development, but there will be people that will come back, and
I think that we have to presume that they will be undetected.
Now, these services are really good. So that is one side to
the threat is, not lone wolves, but you can look at them like
that, the little small cells where people come back, and they
know what they are doing, and that is a bad thing.
Another issue, and it is also an unknowable, but we can
begin to assume this might be the case, is that there are
existing sanctuaries that Islamic State would love to plug in.
There is no such thing as a clandestine caliphate. They need
sanctuary. They actually need a place for these people to go to
where they can say, this is where our flag is.
Places like the southern Philippines are a really
attractive option for them, because Abu Sayyaf has proven that
they can be around for decades. They have proven that they can
battle the Philippine police and the military at least to a
standstill. So the danger is that you take these already lethal
groups that are like parasites, that are plugged into the local
economies with kidnapping, you know, for ransom, smuggling,
extortion, and then you add the ISIS notoriety, you add their
funding, perhaps, but you also add that lethality that these
groups have but not on the Islamic State scale.
So the concern is you have returning foreign fighters who
will add a level of professionalism, if you want to use that
word, to attacks. That is the difference between Brussels and
Jakarta. Those are really big differences. One it is a local
crime issue, another is you don't want too many of these
attacks. But then the bigger threat is the instability of the
regions. They are not going to get better immediately, and
these places need help, especially in the Philippines. That is
a military problem.
So ISIS is going to try to plug into that. It is an open
question, but it is likely that they will declare, like at
least a wlilayah, a state there. They haven't done it yet. They
have accepted Abu Sayyef on their, you know, the pledge of
allegiance, but they haven't said, okay. We are going to have a
wlilayah. If they do that, that is a clear sign that they are
going to move hard into the region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skinner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patrick M. Skinner
April 27, 2016
There is no longer any question as to if the Islamic State will
attempt to establish some presence in Southeast Asia; the group has
already done so and intends to do more. The larger and far more
pressing question is how successful will it be applying its motto of
``remaining and expanding'' in the region. Much like the overall issue
of foreign fighters, the issue of the Islamic State's potential power
projection in and from Southeast Asia is one prone to simultaneous and
conflicting exaggeration and downplaying of the threat. Currently the
extremist threat across several countries in the region is limited but
it is growing.
It will take concerted and thoughtful multi-national efforts to
limit the threat to manageable levels. Action and support now will have
significant returns on investment; the longer the problem festers, the
more costly and less effective the corrective measures will be. The
threat can be summed up as such: It is a trend line heading towards a
fault line if not addressed. Failure to counter the threat and ideology
of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia will have severe near-and-long-
term consequences.
In terms of numbers of foreign fighters estimated to have traveled
to Syria for extremist purposes, southeast Asia is a relative success
story. The high end of estimates is that 1,000 people from the region
have made the decision to travel. Other estimates suggest 600 to 700,
with most of those coming from Indonesia. Malaysia and the Philippines
each have seen perhaps 100 of their citizens go to Syria; Singapore
reports just 2. Given the large population of the region, the overall
and per capita numbers of foreign fighters are a positive indication of
a region resistant to the the twisted Islamic extremism espoused by
groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.
The low numbers of people traveling to Syria also means a
relatively low level of returnees, an issue that is a real concern
world-wide and in Southeast Asia, given the damage a handful of trained
fighters can do on a civilian population. The difference between the
November 2015 Paris attacks that killed 130 and the January 2016
Jakarta attack that killed 4 (plus the 4 attackers) was training. The
risk of trained fighters slipping undetected into countries such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, or the Philippines and plugging into existing
extremist groups such as Abu Sayaf and serving as trainers and force
multipliers is a real risk.
The risk is greatest in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines,
with the Philippines having the most severe persistent extremist threat
in the form of Abu Sayaf. The group has pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, a pledge accepted by the Islamic State. As the fortunes of
the Islamic State worsen in Iraq and Syria, it is likely the group
might announce a new state or wlilayah in Southeast Asia. The southern
part of the Philippines, where the central government is unable to
exert consistent control, would make an ideal sanctuary for the Islamic
State.
There have always been pockets of persistent and violent extremism
in the region. Geography works against the central governments in the
expansive island countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
The arc of returning foreign fighters is a long one, with the 1980s and
1990s fighters who returned from Afghanistan still creating problems
with groups such as Abu Sayaf and Jemaah Islamiyah.
The Islamic State has already worked its way into Southeast Asian
criminal terror networks, as al-Qaeda had previously and continues to
do so. Kidnapping, piracy, and smuggling provide much-needed consistent
revenues for terrorist groups in the region. On April 25, 2016, 2 days
ago, Philippine president Benigno Aquino III ordered the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) to immediately conduct operations to reduce 4
hostages taken by Abu Sayaf in September 2015. The order came as the
deadline for ransom had passed. Along with Abu Sayaf, smaller extremist
groups Ansar al-Khilafah, Katibat Marakah al-Ansar, and Katibat Ansar
al-Sharia have also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.
While the region has a well-deserved reputation and reality for
being resistant to religious extremism, that resistance is being
severely tested. Concerns over wahhabist mosques and madrassas
continue, particularly in Malaysia. The long-held assumption that
Southeast Asia isn't ``fertile ground'' for religious extremism is less
true now than ever. Malaysia has begun to crack down on what it calls
extremist mosques, but the scope of the problem is rather large given
the 30-year effort, funded by Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, to
spread wahhabism in the region. Vulnerable communities already
disaffected from the central government can be coated in this
``kerosene of intolerance'' from extremist mosques, needing the
smallest spark to ignite into sustained extremism against anyone
perceived as different or threatening.
Furthermore, the Islamic State has shown it doesn't need ``fertile
ground'' to thrive; like a weed it simply needs to take root anywhere
and then spread. Places outside the government's effective control,
which exist in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, are more than
enough for the group to settle in and then work its way into the major
cities. There will be several indications when this process begins in
earnest.
First, attacks will increase in both frequency and lethality. These
attacks will more resemble Paris than Jakarta, unfortunately, as the
value of combat training and terror sanctuary become evident. The
successes in the region over the last 15 years in combating terrorism
and reducing large terrorist attack were hard-earned and sadly will
have to be re-earned again as the threat level rises to levels not seen
previously due to the size and spread of the Islamic State.
Second, there will be a slow building of pressure and then attacks
against bloggers, authors, newspapers, and other voices that run
counter to the ``us versus them'' ideology of bin-Ladenism. This is
happening now in Bangladesh, where persistent political violence and
gangs have merged with the extreme ideology of the Islamic State to
create a deadly environment for anyone with a different viewpoint.
Silencing other voices is crucial to the Islamic State's monopoly of
message. Intimidating and assassinating people with platforms such as
newspapers or websites is straight out of the extremist playbook. It
will be a sign that governments have failed to adequately counter the
threat if these types of crimes begin to pop up in Kuala Lumpur,
Manila, or Jakarta. Once that begins, it is exceedingly difficult to
break the pattern.
Countering this threat now and for the long-term is a challenge
with which the region will need substantial assistance from the United
States and other countries. There are long-standing ties and liaison
that have proven extremely effective and beneficial in addressing the
threats of the past but that will need to be reassessed and likely
increased to match the new reality. Militarily, the Philippines will
continue to need help combatting Abu Sayaf and other extremist groups
such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Legally and politically,
countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia are trying to balance civil
rights with the increased need to detain people with extremist ties and
intentions. Malaysia has arrested over 100 people on suspicion of ties
to the Islamic State, and has enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA) which increased the length of pre-trial detentions. Indonesia is
considering similar legislation as well. It will be, as it is in every
country, a delicate balance between liberty and security, with
excessive legal persecution likely to lead to more of the behavior it
was intended to prevent. Lastly, each country will need to increase its
respective efforts at countering violent extremism both ideologically
and socially. Singapore has been in the forefront of this, though its
model will be difficult to scale for its much larger neighbors.
Increased assistance from the United States in all 3 facets of the
fight against the Islamic State in Southeast Asia is needed to help
avoid much greater threats.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Skinner.
Our next witness is Ms. Supna Zaidi Peery. Did I get that
okay? You can correct me.
Ms. Zaidi Peery. Zaidi Peery.
Mr. King. Okay.
She is an attorney and a strategic policy analyst at the
Counter Extremist Project, a not-for-profit, nonpartisan,
international policy organization that combats the growing
threats from extremist ideology. Ms. Peery's areas of expertise
include the roots of extremist, foreign policy, human rights,
immigration, and development issues.
She previously worked policy and intelligence analysis for
the banking sector in New York City. Ms. Peery has written
extensively on foreign policy, human rights, and religion for
more than a decade.
We welcome you today, and thank you for appearing. You are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF SUPNA ZAIDI PEERY, RESEARCH ANALYST, COUNTER
EXTREMISM PROJECT
Ms. Zaidi Peery. Thank you. Chairman King, Ranking Member
Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today.
ISIS' position is to increase its threat to the United
States and our allies in Southeast Asia by collaborating with
local militant groups. In response, regional governments should
aggressively seek out preventive policies to combat violent and
nonviolent Islamist activity in the region. These policies
should include an aggressive push against the proliferation of
Islamist propaganda on-line especially on social media.
Concurrently, regional governments must support and amplify
counter messaging spread by modern Muslim organizations like
Sisters in Islam in Malaysia, and Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia,
which Mr. Watts mentioned.
Islamists, especially ISIS, skillfully manipulate regional
and local problems and incorporate them into the Islamist
message of global Muslim victimhood. Currently, there are more
than 3,000 pro-ISIS websites in Southeast Asia. Approximately
70 percent of these websites are hosted on servers in
Indonesia. This is an issue that the Indonesian Government
can't address with working with the private sector. Muslim
youth can easily come into contact with this extremist rhetoric
on-line and become vulnerable through radicalization.
Nonviolent Islamist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamist
televangelist like Zakir Naik empower ISIS by similarly
advocating for a caliphate to replace local governments. In
Southeast Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir events fill football stadiums by
the thousands. Zakir Naik reaches millions through his cable
station, the Peace Network and speaking engagements, which are
later posted on-line.
Earlier this month alone, Zakir Naik spoke at an event in
Indonesia where he stated 9/11 was an inside job, among other
questionable statements. The situation in Southeast Asia can be
compared to the evolution of events in the United Kingdom where
Islamist propagandist Anjem Choudary never reflected the views
of the majority of Muslims in the United Kingdom, but the group
he cofounded, al-Muhajiroun, is blamed by British law
enforcement probably 50 percent terror plots in the United
Kingdom from 1995 to 2015. Choudary's fringe status has not
prevented him from undermining stability and security in Great
Britain.
Equally, extremist activity in Southeast Asia can
dramatically and negatively impact the region in the future if
it is not curbed now.
In the Philippines, for example, militant group Abu Sayyaf
pledge allegiance to ISIS in 2014 despite being considered
primarily a criminal organization. It is possible that the
affiliation benefit Abu Sayyaf by raising its stature, making
its kidnap-for-ransom business a more serious threat to foreign
governments, including the United States.
Abu Sayyaf reportedly beheaded a Canadian hostage, John
Ridsdel, this week who was working on a mining project in the
Philippines and vacationing at the time of his kidnapping. Abu
Sayyaf had demanded ransom, but and apparently did not receive
it by the group's self-imposed deadline. Any support ISIS and
Abu Sayyaf give each other raises a security risk to local
governments in the region as well as to the United States,
which ISIS identifies as a target through its on-line outlets.
Moreover, ISIS affiliated extremists in Bangladesh, which
borders the Southeast Asian country of Burma, killed 2 more
advocates of secularism on April 23 and April 25 of this month,
bringing the death toll of liberal writers in the country to 8
since 2015. These victims do not include the foreigners and
religious minorities that have also been targeted by Islamic
extremist in Bangladesh in the last few years.
Instability in Bangladesh has negative effects in Southeast
Asia since extremists from Bangladesh have allegedly attempted
to recruit from the Muslim Rohingya refugee population along
the Burmese border. ISIS propaganda on various platforms play
the images of starving Rohingya over and over again, striking
deep emotional cord amongst some vulnerable Muslim youth around
the world to do something to help their fellow Muslims.
Jihadist recruitment preys upon these emotions. There are
similarly videos and images played on ISIS platforms of the
Syrian crisis, children, family, family suffering with no
support from the outside.
ISIS has targeted neighboring Malaysia as well. ISIS met
multiple militant groups last fall in the Philippines to plan
attacks to be committed in Malaysia. ISIS also has a presence
in Indonesia where pro-ISIS militants attacked a Starbucks cafe
in Jakarta killing 4 on January 14 of this year.
Bahrun Naim is considered the brains behind the operation,
and he is connected to ISIS propagandist Abu Jandal in Syria,
and pro-ISIS ideologue Aman Abdulrahman. Abdulrahman has
translated pro-ISIS propaganda from Arabic to Bahasa Indonesian
on-line to help recruit jihadists.
It should be important to note that ISIS propaganda
includes multiple languages along multiple platforms to ensure
that his message is, indeed, global.
Thus, the activities of ISIS and local militant groups in
Southeast Asia confirm that extremism is on the rise in the
region. But, yet, it should still be pointed out, as my fellow
witnesses have mentioned, the numbers of actual extremists are
low. But if the United Kingdom is to serve as an example, more
aggressive policies to challenge extremist rhetoric are
critical to prevent extremism from spreading to the same level
as in other parts of the globe in Southeast Asia in the future.
Consequently, we at CEP recommend that regional governments
create policies to work with the private sector to take down
extremist propaganda. Second, local governments should replace
the extremist rhetoric with moderate voices.
Two examples out of many from the region include, Nahdlatul
Ulama, which is an Indonesian clerical body that supports the
indigenous and peaceful interpretation of Islam called
Nusantara Islam. The Ulama represents approximately 40 to 50
million members already. The Ulama has already denounced
extremist rhetoric by ISIS using the hash tag, we are not
afraid, as a social media campaign.
A second moderate voice is the Wahid Institute, founded by
Yenny Wahid, the daughter of former Indonesian president,
Abdurrahman Wahid. She is quoted as saying, we are not just
coming out with a counternarrative. We are coming up with a
counteridentity, and that is what all of this is about. We
believe we are good Muslims, but to be good Muslims, we don't
have to accept the recipes that are handed out by some radicals
from the Middle East.
Raising such pluralist voices will not only challenge ISIS
extremism but also marginalize separatist rhetoric espoused by
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir and individuals like Zakir Naik.
To conclude, Southeast Asia has an opportunity now to
respond properly to the growing extremist threat by addressing
important identity issues and providing alternatives to the
extremist messages turned out daily by ISIS and other Islamist
groups; otherwise, the threat to the region, other countries,
including the United States will only grow.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Zaidi Peery follows:]
Prepared Statement of Supna Zaidi Peery
April 27, 2016
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today
to talk about the threat from ISIS in Southeast Asia. My name is Supna
Zaidi Peery. I am a strategic policy analyst at the Counter Extremism
Project, a not-for-profit, non-partisan, international policy
organization that combats the growing threat from extremist ideology.
ISIS could become a threat to the United States and its allies in
Southeast Asia through its collaboration with local militant groups if
regional governments do not aggressively seek out countervailing and
preventative policies to combat violent and non-violent Islamist
activity in the region. This includes an aggressive push against the
proliferation of Islamist propaganda on-line, and on social media.
Concurrently, regional governments must support and amplify counter
messaging promulgated by moderate Muslim organizations like Sisters in
Islam in Malaysia and Nahdlatul Ulema in Indonesia.
background
Islamist extremism predates the arrival of ISIS in Southeast Asia.
While the number of violent extremists in the region is currently low
compared to the number in the Middle East and South Asia, ISIS, like
other violent militant groups, and non-violent Islamist groups like
Hizb ut-Tahrir, is skilled at manipulating regional and local problems
and incorporating them into its Islamist message of global Muslim
victimhood. This creates an environment where Muslim youth who come
into contact with Islamist messaging on-line or in person become
vulnerable to radicalization.
The most glaring example of this problem in Southeast Asia is the
Rohingya crisis on the Burma-Bangladesh border. The ethnic group's
citizenship has been challenged by the government, which argues that
the Rohingya are historically from Bangladesh, not indigenous to Burma.
Consequently, without status it is difficult for the Rohingya to find
work in Burma. Many attempt to flee, with some creating new lives in
nearby countries like Malaysia. Other families, in the hundreds of
thousands, fester at refugee camps on the border between Bangladesh and
Burma.
Pro-ISIS militants from Bangladesh have allegedly attempted to
recruit men from these refugee camps. It is unclear if these recruiting
attempts were part of a new strategy to expand extremist activity to
Burma.
ISIS has increased its profile and presence in Bangladesh as well
in the last year, where increasingly aggressive domestic Islamist
militant groups have killed foreigners, religious minorities, and
secular bloggers.
Technology enables extremist messaging that fuels radicalization,
recruitment, and incitement to violence. There are more than 3,000 pro-
ISIS websites in Southeast Asia, and 70 percent of these websites are
hosted on servers in Indonesia. These websites feature translations of
ISIS ideology as well as YouTube channels, Twitter, and other platforms
exploited by extremists.
ISIS propaganda is strengthened by purported non-violent Islamist
groups in Southeast Asia as well. Islamist messaging encourages a
separatist and supremacist attitude among otherwise moderate Muslims.
Thus, as the Hudson Institute states, purported non-violent Islamist
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir spread a mindset that jihadi recruiters can
exploit to encourage militancy.
Hizb ut-Tahrir is an Islamist movement founded in the Middle East
that has chapters in more than 40 countries, including Malaysia and
Indonesia. The group advocates an identical message to that of ISIS--
regime change in favor of a caliphate. Rather, than support
indiscriminate violence to realize their vision, HT hopes to convert
key figures in society--like the military--so a coup can bring about a
peaceful change in government. HT events in Indonesia regularly attract
more than 5,000 men, women, and children.
Separately, so-called peaceful Islamist events host religious
televangelists like Zakir Naik, who teaches a supremacist
interpretation of Islam alien to Southeast Asia. His on-line presence,
including YouTube channels, satellite, and cable television, has grown
his network called ``Peace TV.'' The station and its 24/7 Islamic
programming reach hundreds of millions of men and women around the
world in numerous languages.
On April 13, 2016, Naik spoke at an event in Indonesia attended by
hundreds where a young woman asked how ``brothers'' could be killing
each other. She was referring to the conspiracy that the majority of 9/
11 victims were Christian and the perpetrators were Muslim. Naik\1\
responded by stating that 9/11 was an inside job by perpetrated by the
White House. His evidence included a documentary called ``Loose
Change,'' a conspiracy-theory-inspired series produced between 2005 and
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://video.wapgrab.com/watch?v=p_iT0S_r_Ak.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naik also spoke in Malaysia. His topic of choice was a speech on
why Islam is better than Hinduism. Fearing communal tensions, Naik's
invitation was rescinded. The ban was lifted when he agreed to adjust
his speech to ``Islam and Hinduism.''
The propaganda spread by organizations like HT and individuals like
Naik lays the effective groundwork for groups like ISIS and is just as
dangerous. It chips away at the tolerant and pluralist societies that
currently exist in Southeast Asia. Worse, once individuals are softened
to a worldview setting Muslims apart and above all others, the
radicalization of Muslim youth towards violence becomes more likely.
The situation in Southeast Asia can be compared to the evolution of
events in the United Kingdom. Propagandist Anjem Choudary by no means
reflects the majority of Muslims in the United Kingdom. Yet, he is
finally on trial now for his alleged support for ISIS in the United
Kingdom, and has spent decades advocating for sharia law. Choudary is
responsible for founding al-Muhajiroun \2\--which British law
enforcement blames for at least 50 percent of terror plots in the
United Kingdom from 1995 to 2015. Apparently, Choudary's fringe status
did not prevent him from doing major harm in the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3007180/The-terror-
group-UK-s-terror-plots.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Worse, the separatist ideology of Choudary, and his mentor, Omar
Bakri Mohammad, who founded the London-based chapter of Hizb ut-Tahrir,
may be responsible for the lack of integration in some Muslim
communities in the United Kingdom.
the current landscape in southeast asia
Presently in Southeast Asia, militant Islamist groups are localized
for now mainly in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In these
locations, extremists have traditionally targeted their attacks on law
enforcement and government, rarely attacking public spaces.
However, ISIS' propaganda in the region increases the future risk
for more indiscriminate acts of terrorism, as well as the targeting of
foreigners, religious minorities, and U.S. interests. The Bali bombing,
for example, was committed by the Indonesian militant group Jemaah
Islamiyah, with the help of al-Qaeda, in retaliation for the U.S.-led
Global War on Terror.
In the past year, there have been indications of growing support in
general for sharia among some Muslim communities in Southeast Asia, as
well as growing support for ISIS. For example, the monarchy of Brunei
instituted sharia law in 2013. Brunei is physically nestled on a small
corner of a much larger Malaysian island. Cross-border influence is
very possible.
In 2015, a retailer in Malaysia selling pro-ISIS merchandise was
finally shuttered, despite local law enforcement having knowledge of
the items in the store, including ISIS flags, T-shirts marked with
statements like ``Mujahideen cyberspace,'' and images of Kalashnikovs.
The merchandise was produced in Indonesia.
In December 2015, the BBC published photos of HT members protesting
in front of American Mining Company Freeport, in central Jakarta. HT
propaganda argues that allowing Western firms to extract Indonesian
minerals is un-Islamic.
Further anecdotal evidence indicates the influence of ISIS is
growing in Indonesia. In February 2015, the BBC reported that students
outside Jakarta declared their allegiance to ISIS. This was not an
isolated incident, as other ISIS supporters have organized parades and
demonstrations advocating ISIS' message in Indonesia as well.
indonesia
A very small minority of Indonesians have sought an Islamic state
since 1949, when the Darul Islam movement was formed.
A new wave of radicalization emerged in the 1980s, with al-Qaeda
spreading its extremist message, like ISIS today, to near and far-flung
Muslim communities from its headquarters in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda
has funded militancy, including training camps in Southeast Asia since.
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) \3\ made international headlines with
bombings targeting tourists in Bali in 2002 and 2005, killing more than
200 in each incident, but the group has a long and violent history
spanning decades. JI is also known for its ties to the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, as well as the 1995 failed ``Bojinka'' plot, an attempt
to bomb 12 U.S. commercial airliners in the span of 2 days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ http://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jemaah-islamiyah-ji.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Founded by Abu Bakar Bashir \4\ and Abdullah Sungkar to overthrow
the secular Indonesian state through political disruption and violence,
JI seeks to establish a regional caliphate that would encompass
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mindanao (southern Philippines), southern
Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei. Bashir pledged loyalty to ISIS in July
2014, but the group also has links to al-Qaeda \5\ and the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), a Philippines-based terrorist organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abu-bakar-bashir.
\5\ http://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS propaganda and networking between Southeast Asian militants
serving in Syria and those at home in Malaysia and Indonesia has
created a nascent but powerful network supporting extremism from the
Middle East to South Asia.
This was best illustrated on January 14, 2016, when pro-ISIS
militants attacked a Starbucks cafe in Jakarta, killing 4 innocent
people. The pro-ISIS militant responsible for the attack is Bahrun
Naim. He is believed to be connected to ISIS propagandist Abu Jandal in
Syria and pro-ISIS ideologue Aman Abdulrahman, who is currently behind
bars in a maximum security prison in Java, Indonesia.
Abu Jandal is one of many Twitter propagandists CEP monitors and
has repeatedly tried to force Twitter to take down. Jandal uses Twitter
as a platform to advocate for ISIS as well as promote other extremist
accounts. Via Twitter, Abu Jandal has condoned violence against
civilians, including the victims of Paris's January 2015 Charlie Hebdo
attacks.
Aman Abdulrahman is believed to be responsible for the extensive
translation of pro-ISIS propaganda from Arabic to Indonesian. His
materials are available on a website called al-Mustaliq.com. He is also
the ideologue behind at least 9 other local Islamist groups,
including:\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rQbqNl_lacg&ebc=ANyPxKp3MFwU2bBA6eexRCPM-
jrun_w8LCmzzJWGttu4HycGzDSHpmItLQWhxfwH1Mwa-QeT-wisO1IfjE-
lA44nZoNW8hfekg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tawhid wal Jihad group
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
Mujahedin East Indonesia
Mujahedin West Indonesia (MIB)
the Bima group
NII Banten also known as Ring Banten
Laskar Jundullah
the Islamic Sharia Activists Forum or Forum Aktivis Syariat
Islam (FAKSI)
and the Student Movement for Islamic Sharia or Gerakan
Mahasiswa Untuk Syariat Islam (Gema Salam).
the philippines
In the Philippines, the Muslims of the southern-most islands of
Mindanao have for centuries sought independence--first from Spain, then
from the United States, and now from secular Philippine rule. The most
recent vehicle for this pursuit of independence is the militancy of the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an Islamist terrorist organization that seeks
to establish an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines.
ASG was founded by and named after Abdurajak Janjalani, who took the
nom de guerre Abu Sayyaf, ``Father of Swordsmen.''
ASG is known for kidnapping innocents, including Westerners, for
ransom and beheading captives if their demands are not met. ASG's
brutal decapitations date back to 2001, predating the notorious
beheadings by al-Qaeda and ISIS. ASG's relationship with al-Qaeda
brought extra attention to the Philippines as a battleground in the
U.S.-led Global War on Terror. In the summer of 2014, ASG leaders
pledged allegiance to ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,\7\
drawing focus back to ASG's presence in the southern Philippines and
its potential threat to other areas of Southeast Asia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abu-bakr-al-
baghdadi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
malaysia
In Malaysia, as Brookings \8\ reported last December, ISIS
conspires to initiate new attacks in major cities like Kuala Lumpur, as
highlighted in a memo released by Malaysian police in December 2015.
The memo stated that on November 15, 2015, representatives of Abu
Sayyaf, ISIS, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) met in
person in the Philippines and conspired to commit terrorist attacks in
Malaysia. The police memo added that there were allegedly Abu Sayyaf
and ISIS militants already present in a number of cities, including
Kuala Lumpur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/12/16-malaysia-
danger-from-islamic-state-chin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is troubling, not only because it puts Malaysia on the radar
of terrorist targets, but because it indicates possible increased
extremist recruitment in the country. Malaysians are already vulnerable
to extremism because of Islamization programs that the government began
in the 1980s. These efforts were made to appease and integrate
extremist elements already existing in the country at the time.
Instead, they normalized extremist rhetoric. In 2014, for example,
current Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak ``hailed'' the courage of
ISIS fighters. Another former prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, is also
known for repeating extremist rhetoric-including, ironically, blaming
Israel for the growth of ISIS.
Thus, ties are already present between ISIS and local militant
groups in Southeast Asia. Consequently, it is imperative that the
regional governments go beyond law enforcement initiatives and create
proactive policies to deter further growth in ISIS' influence. The
United States should continue to provide support for measures that work
to prevent violent extremism.
recommendations
1. Remove Extremist Content On-line and on Social Media
The first step is to assist regional governments in their effort to
remove extremist propaganda from the internet and social media in the
region. First, Southeast Asian governments must create policies and
work with the private sector to take down extremist propaganda on-line.
Indonesia is of particular importance, given its role as the host to
approximately 70 percent of the pro-ISIS websites in the region.
2. Counter Violent and Non-Violent Islamist Messaging
Regional governments should consider the separatist messaging of
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir and televangelists like Zakir Naik in the
same category as ISIS propaganda. All 3 encourage a separatist identity
among otherwise pluralist Southeast Asian communities. It is an alien
interpretation of Islam in the region that can easily be fought off
with a stronger spotlight on moderate Muslim organizations. Otherwise,
even the non-violent Islamist messaging feeds radicalized youth
straight towards jihadist recruiters.
3. Improve Criminal Laws in Indonesia
First, encourage the Indonesian government to criminalize
membership in militant groups like ISIS, fundraising for extremist
groups and activities, and leaving the country to train at jihadist
camps. Unlike Malaysia, it is not illegal to support ISIS in Indonesia.
To date, law enforcement in Indonesia has had to fall back on more
generic charges related to terrorism.
Address prisoner radicalization. Prison activity is not monitored
as closely as it should be in Indonesia. This leaves petty criminals
vulnerable to radicalization in prison. A report by the U.S. Agency for
International Development found that ``Due to overcrowding and limited
resources, Indonesian prison officials struggle to isolate jihadist
inmates from the general jail population.'' Moreover, pro-ISIS
prisoners are able to proselytize to inmates openly.
Encourage regional governments to support moderate Islamic groups
to boost the role of aggressive, preventative messaging. De-
radicalization programs initiated after the Bali bombings were limited
to those involving law enforcement and the judiciary. Instead, public
messaging, engagement by the media and in schools are all necessary
ingredients for success.
4. Support the Moderate Islam Indigenous to Southeast Asia
In Indonesia, for example, the indigenous and peaceful
interpretation of Islam is called Nusanatara Islam. The clerical body
that supports this interpretation is called Nahdatul Ulema. Nusanatara
Islam has approximately 40-50 million followers. On social media,
Indonesian Muslims denounce ISIS using the hashtag #WeAreNotAfraid.
Yenny Wahid, the daughter of former Indonesian President
Abdurrahman Wahid, founded a research center in Jakarta focusing on
religion and pluralism called the Wahid Institute. The motto listed on
the organization's website says, ``Seeding Plural and Peaceful Islam.''
Ms. Wahid is quoted as saying, ``We're not just coming up with a
counter narrative, we are coming up with a counter identity, and that's
what all this is about. We believe we're good Muslims but to be a good
Muslim we don't have to accept the recipes that are handed out by some
radicals from the Middle East.''
Sisters in Islam (SIS) \9\ is a Malaysian organization focused on
promoting universal human rights, including advocacy for women through
an Islamic lens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/page.php?54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SIS has challenged the legality of child marriage, polygamy, and
hudood laws (sharia laws governing adultery and other personal
matters). SIS drafts original Islamic legal theory and jurisprudence as
well, including the defense of free speech, protections for apostates
against prosecution, and other human rights issues.
conclusion
The governments of Southeast Asia can look to Europe and the United
Kingdom as an example of what not to do. Islamist activity, when it
appeared decades ago, was treated as something innocuous. But
unchallenged, it grew as an ideology that has become not only a real
security threat to the West, but a de-stabilizing and stigmatizing
force for innocent Muslim citizens as well.
Southeast Asia has an opportunity now to respond properly to the
growing extremist threat by addressing important identity issues and
providing alternatives to the extremist messages daily churned out by
ISIS and other Islamist groups. Otherwise, the threat to other
countries like the United States will only grow over time.
Mr. King. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Our next witness is Dr. Joseph C. Liow. He is a senior
fellow in the Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He
is concurrently a professor and dean at the Rajaratnam School
of International Studies in Singapore. He is the author and
editor of 11 books or monographs. Dr. Liow holds a doctorate in
international relations for the London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Dr. Liow, you are recognized. Thank you very much for being
here today.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CHINYONG LIOW, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN
POLICY, CENTER FOR EAST ASIA POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
Mr. Liow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for this
honor and privilege to be here today. Let me start by saying
that any assessment of the ISIS threat in Southeast Asia must
begin with the observation that terrorism is not a new
phenomenon in the region. It goes as far back as the era of
anticolonial struggle, but gathered pace after 9/11 with a
series of attacks perpetrated mostly by the al-Qaeda-linked
Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization.
Against this backdrop, recent ISIS-inspired attacks in
Jakarta and the southern Philippines serve as a timely reminder
of the threat that terrorism continues to pose to Southeast
Asian societies.
Related to ISIS, the threat takes 3 forms. First, the
danger of attacks perpetrated by local groups or individuals
inspired by ISIS. These groups or individuals might not have
direct links to ISIS central. Rather, they possess local
grievances for which the extraction that is ISIS provides
impetus and inspiration, usually via internet. Jakarta was an
example of this.
Second, the threat pulls by returnees from Syria and Iraq.
In particular, the possibility that hardened militants would
return with battlefield experience and operational knowledge to
either plan or mount attacks back in the region. Thankfully,
this has not yet happened.
Thus far, the returnees in custody are deportees, who
failed in their attempt to get to Syria and Iraq in the first
place.
Third, the threat posed by militants who will soon be
released from prison. At issue here is the weak prison system,
particularly in Indonesia and the radicalization that occurs
within prisons. We should bear in mind, though, that not all of
these soon-to-be-released militants are ISIS supporters or
sympathizers. In fact, the vast majority are members of
militant groups known to be anti-ISIS. There will be about 100
or so released from Indonesia at the end of the year.
So how serious is the threat posed by ISIS? The threat is
certainly real and warrants our attention for reasons I already
mentioned. By the same time, we must take care not to
exaggerate it. Let me make 3 points in that regard.
No. 1, when we speak of ISIS in Southeast Asia, we have to
be mindful of the fact that at present, there is no such thing
as an ISIS Southeast Asia, nor has ISIS central formally
declared an interest in any Southeast Asian country. For the
most part, we are dealing with radical groups and individuals
who have on their own taken oaths of allegiance to ISIS.
No. 2, the number of Southeast Asians fighting in Iraq and
Syria remains comparatively small. We are talking of, at most,
700 mostly from Indonesia. By way of comparison, thousands are
coming from Europe. In addition to this, a large proportion of
Southeast Asians' death, I would say around 40 percent,
comprise women and children under the age of 15.
No. 3, in our anxiety over ISIS, we must be careful not to
miss the forest for the trees. There are multiple militant
groups operating in Southeast Asia. Many are at odds with each
other. Not all seek affiliation to or are enamored of ISIS.
In fact, I would argue that the greater long-term threat
comes from a rejuvenated Jemaah Islamiyah, which has a larger
network and is better funded than the pro-ISIS groups in the
region currently.
What about terrorism in Southeast Asia more generally?
Here, too, it is imperative that we keep things in perspective.
Yes, for Southeast Asia today, the question of terrorist
attacks is, unfortunately, no longer a matter of if but when.
Even if the influence of ISIS diminishes over time, and it
will, terrorism is part of the lay of the land and will not be
eradicated any time soon. But terrorism, whether perpetrated by
ISIS or Jemaah Islamiyah is not an existential threat to
Southeast Asian societies.
All indicators are that from an operational perspective,
the threat remains at a low level. Of course, given the
resilience and evolutionary nature of terrorism, this situation
might well change. As I alluded to earlier, one possible factor
that could prompt a change is a deliberate shift of attention
on ISIS central to Southeast Asia.
This, however, seems unlikely for now, as ISIS is
preoccupied with its immediate priority of holding ground in
Iraq and Syria and expanding its fight in Libya, Yemen, and
Europe.
A final observation, without being complacent, we should
also recognize that regional governments are, today, better
equipped and prepared to deal with the threat compared to a
decade-and-a-half ago, although capacity can and should be
further improved with cooperation among themselves and with
help from the United States. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Liow follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Chinyong Liow
April 27, 2016
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the
subject of the threat of ISIS in Southeast Asia. It is a pleasure and
privilege to appear before you today.
My name is Joseph Chinyong Liow. I hold the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in
Southeast Asia Studies at the Brookings Institution, where I am also
senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Program. I am, concurrently, dean
and professor of Comparative and International Politics at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, in Singapore. I am a citizen of the Republic of Singapore.
The views expressed here in this testimony are my own, and should not
be construed as those of the Brookings Institution, the S. Rajaratnam
School, or indeed, the government of Singapore.
I have been asked to offer my assessment of terrorism in Southeast
Asia especially in relation to ISIS. Let me begin by saying that any
assessment of the threat posed by ISIS in Southeast Asia must begin
with the observation that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the
region. During the era of anti-colonial struggle, terrorism and
political violence were tactics used frequently by various groups.
Since 9/11, Southeast Asia has witnessed several terrorist incidents
perpetrated mostly by the al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist
organization and its splinter groups. These incidents include the
October 2002 Bali bombings, the August 2003 J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing
in Jakarta, the bombing of Super Ferry 14 in the southern Philippines
in February 2004, the September 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in
Jakarta, further bombings in Bali in October 2005, and further bombings
at the J.W. Marriott (again) and the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Jakarta in
2009. From this last series of attacks to the Jakarta attacks earlier
this year, there has not been a major urban terrorist incident,
although sporadic violence had continued in the form of clashes between
security forces and militant groups, especially in the southern
Philippines and also in Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia.\1\ In 2010,
Indonesian security forces discovered a major militant training camp in
Aceh which involved a number of jihadi groups. Several reasons can be
cited to explain this hiatus: Improved counterterrorism capabilities of
regional security forces, disagreements within the jihadi community
over the indiscriminate killing of Muslims, and rivalry and
factionalism among jihadi groups that have reduced their capabilities
and operational effectiveness.
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\1\ There were bomb attacks in Bangkok during this time but these
were not linked to ISIS or any other Muslim terrorist groups. There
were also bombings in Myanmar in 2013, but the identity of the
perpetrators remains unknown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Against this backdrop, the ISIS-inspired attacks in Jakarta on
January 14, 2016, the April 9, 2016 attack on Philippine security
forces in the southern island of Basilan conducted by groups claiming
allegiance to ISIS, and a recent spat of kidnappings in southern
Philippines serve as a timely reminder of the persistent threat that
terrorism continues to pose to Southeast Asian societies. ISIS has
emerged as the signal expression of this threat, in part, because of
the speed with which it has gained popularity in the region. When Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi announced on June 28, 2014 (the first day of Ramadhan)
that a caliphate had been formed by ISIS, the announcement captured the
imagination of the radical fringes across Southeast Asia. The
announcement was followed by a comprehensive and effective propaganda
campaign that conveyed the impression of ISIS' invincibility and
validation from god. July and August that year witnessed a series of
bay'at (pledge of allegiance) to ISIS taken by radical groups and
clerics from Indonesia and the Philippines. It was the audacity of its
announcement of the caliphate and forcefulness of its communications
strategy that set ISIS apart from other groups. In September, the
Southeast Asian dimension of ISIS was given something of a formal
expression with the formation of Katibah Nusantara, a Southeast Asian
wing of ISIS formed by Malay and Indonesian speaking fighters in Syria.
Katibah fulfills several functions: It provides a social network to
help Southeast Asian recruits settle in, training for those among them
who would eventually take up arms, and communications with the network
of pro-ISIS groups operating in Syria. By dint of these developments,
the threat posed by ISIS in Southeast Asia is real, and it has been
growing since mid-2014. Nevertheless, the extent of the threat should
also not be exaggerated.
the isis threat in perspective
On present evidence, no ISIS-aligned group has developed the
capability to mount catastrophic, mass casualty attacks in the region.
Four civilians were killed in the Jakarta attacks. By comparison, 130
were killed in the Paris attacks, on which the Jakarta attacks were
purportedly modelled. Because of improved legislation and operational
capabilities that have gradually developed over the years since the
October 2002 Bali bombings, Southeast Asian governments have managed
for the most part to contain the threat posed by terrorist and jihadi
groups.
An accurate assessment of the number of Southeast Asians currently
in Iraq and Syria is difficult to make. Most reasonable estimates place
the number at 700-800. The majority are Indonesians, with an estimated
100 Malaysians as well, and a few from Singapore and possibly, the
Philippines. In both real and proportionate terms, these figures are a
mere fraction of the recruits coming from Europe and Australia.\2\ Nor
do they all carry arms. A significant number (about 40%) are women and
children below the age of 15. These women and children have followed
the men to Syria in support of their efforts to fight in a holy war,
and also to live in a pristine ``Islamic State''. Of the Southeast
Asians who carry arms, some have already been killed in the conflict
zones, especially in battles with Kurdish forces. Finally, not all
Southeast Asians fighting in the conflict zones are fighting for ISIS.
There are some known to be fighting with other rebel groups as well as
the al-Nusra Front.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Edward Delman, ``ISIS in the World's Largest Muslim Country:
Why are there so few Indonesians joining the Islamic state?'' The
Atlantic, January 3, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In keeping with the need for proper perspective, we should also
bear in mind that despite the hype, there is at present no ``ISIS
Southeast Asia,'' nor has ISIS central formally declared an interest in
any Southeast Asian country. For the most part, the presence of ISIS in
Southeast Asia is expressed in the form of radical groups and
individuals who have taken oaths of allegiance to ISIS. In other words,
the ISIS phenomenon is imbricated with indigenous jihadi agendas and
movements. This should prompt a further consideration: The appeal of
ISIS in Southeast Asia differs depending on the country. In Malaysia
and Singapore, it has mostly been the eschatological ideology and
theology of ISIS that has attracted a following. In Indonesia, while
ISIS does have religious appeal, other reasons have also been cited to
explain its attraction. These include kinship networks and loyalties,
group/personal rivalries, and personal and pragmatic interests. As a
consequence, the jihadi landscape in Indonesia is considerably more
complex and variegated compared to other Southeast Asian countries. In
the southern Philippines, groups that have long engaged in violence for
political and criminal reasons are now claiming allegiance to ISIS. It
is also worth noting that while Khatibah Nusantara was established in
Syria as the Southeast Asian wing of ISIS, not all foreign fighters
from the region have joined it. For instance, rather than aligning
themselves with the Indonesian-led Khatibah, some Malaysians are known
to be fighting alongside French, Algerian, and Tunisian foreign
fighters instead. A likely reason for this is rivalry and disagreement
with the Indonesian leadership.
A final observation is in order, regarding the pressing matter of
foreign fighters returning to Southeast Asia. Given how terrorism in
Southeast Asia was previously catalyzed by returnees from the Afghan
jihad against the Soviet Union, it should hardly be surprising that the
scenario of hardened militants returning from Syria with ideology,
operational knowledge, and front-line experience to mount attacks in
the region is one that exercises security planners. This is a potential
threat that cannot be taken lightly. But it should also be viewed in
context. Three points are instructive in this regard:
First, the returnees known to regional governments and currently in
custody are essentially deportees who failed in their efforts to gain
entry into Syria. They are not fighters who have returned of their own
accord or were sent back by ISIS central for purposes of launching
attacks in the region;
Second, in the 1980s, the primary objective of Indonesian radicals
and jihadis in Afghanistan was not so much the defeat of Soviet forces,
but to obtain training and experience in order to return to fight the
repressive regime of President Suharto as revenge for its hardline
position against Muslim groups. With the democratization of post-
Suharto Indonesia, this situation no longer holds;
Third, given the currency of ISIS' eschatology at least among
certain segments of its Southeast Asian support, it stands to reason
that many among them could well decide to stay the course in Syria to
fight the great end-times battle.\3\ This is more likely now that ISIS
has been losing considerable swathes of its ``Islamic State''
territory--approximately 40% in Iraq and 10% in Syria, and has called
for a new front to be established in Libya. In other words, while the
threat of returnees wrecking havoc is certainly real, there are equally
compelling reasons why many foreign fighters might in fact not return
to Southeast Asia. In this respect, the greater threat may well be that
the idea and phenomenon of ISIS would provide greater inspiration for
local jihadis to continue waging what are essentially localized
struggles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Narrated by Ibn 'Umar that the Messenger of Allah said: ``O
Allah bless us in our Sham! O Allah bless us in our Yemen.'' They said:
``And in our Najd'' He said: ``O Allah bless us in our Sham! O Allah
bless us in our Yemen.'' They said: ``And in our Najd'' He said:
``Earthquakes are there, and tribulations are there.'' Or he said:
``The horn of Shaitan comes from there.''--Jami` al-Tirmidhi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the nature of the problem in indonesia
Indonesia was the victim of the first ISIS-inspired attack in
Southeast Asia. This occurred on January 14, 2016, when self-proclaimed
followers of ISIS set off bombs at a Starbucks outside the Sarinah mall
and at a nearby police outpost, and gunfire broke out on the streets at
Jalan Tamrin in the heart of Jakarta.\4\ While the casualty toll was
limited, it could have been higher had the militants succeeded in
conducting the attack on a much larger and more popular shopping mall,
as was the original intent (but they were discouraged by the tight
security at that mall).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Sidney Jones, ``Battling ISIS in Indonesia,'' New York Times,
January 18, 2016.
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The fact is that while Indonesia is often touted for its
``moderation'' in Islamic thought and practice, a radical Islamic
fringe has been part of the Indonesian social and political landscape
for a long time. During the Second World War the Dutch East Indies (as
Indonesia was then known) was occupied by imperial Japan. Towards the
end of the occupation, the Japanese military administration
deliberately adopted a policy of politicizing the Muslim population and
encouraging the assertion of Islamic identity. While the intent was to
stoke indigenous ill-will against the Dutch, it effectively created,
radicalized, and empowered an entire generation of youth, many of whom
eventually took up arms not only against returning British and Dutch
forces, but later also against the Republican Indonesian government
that was subsequently established. Their rallying cry was jihad; and
their objective was the implementation of Islamic law as a fundamental
organising principle for post-independence Indonesian society. Led by
charismatic self-proclaimed religious leaders such as Kartosuwirjo,
radicalized youth established the Darul Islam Indonesia movement
(Islamic State of Indonesia) and waged armed struggle against the
Dutch. This armed struggle continued after transfer of power in 1949,
this time against the Republican government in Jakarta. The Darul Islam
movement presented an alternative vision of Islamic society to
Indonesians, a vision they were prepared to usher into reality through
the use of political violence. While generations of Darul Islam
leadership have since been eliminated, the vision itself, and many of
the networks built on it, remained intact and informs much of present-
day radicalism and jihadism in Indonesia, including the forms that are
aligned with ISIS.
Meanwhile, the mainstream of Indonesian society was itself in the
throes of an Islamisation process triggered as much by internal factors
as it was by the widely-discussed phenomenon of the ``global Islamic
resurgence.'' Since the constitutional debates in 1945, a segment of
the Indonesian political class has agitated for the implementation of
shari'a in the country. These efforts were defeated by due process in
1945, 1959, and 2001, but have never been entirely eliminated. Many
chose to read this as indicative of the unpopularity of Islamic
strictures as a formal principle of governance. Yet, other segments of
the Muslim leadership saw this as evidence of an urgent need for
greater Islamic proselytization--da'wa--in Indonesia.
For the first three-quarters of President Suharto's 32-year New
Order rule, Muslim activism was depoliticized and circumscribed. This
had the effect of catalyzing a vibrant Islamic intellectual milieu as
Islamic social movements moved underground and into the campuses. Among
other things, it found expression in the rise of a number of da'wa
groups and Muslim student associations in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Their activities flourished with funding from Saudi Arabia.
Similar to what happened in neighbouring Malaysia, before long
graduates of these groups and associations would come to control the
levers of power as they entered the buraucracy and positions of
leadership.
Fast-forward to the fall of Suharto in the late 1990s, this vibrant
``apoliticized'' milieu quickly morphed and surfaced as a dynamic
terrain of Islamic activism comprising groups with multiple shades of
doctrinal affiliations. Many of these were reformist and liberal groups
that embraced democracy and human rights as wholeheartedly as they did
Islamic culture and tradition. But another less appealing side also
emerged, comprising groups that drank from the wells of Darul Islam
radicalism. The most vivid, but by no means only, expression of this
phenomenon was the Jemaah Islamiyah, created by the late Abdullah
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, two Indonesian Islamic clerics of Arab
origin with deep roots in Darul Islam as well as the da'wa movement.
What is significant about Jemaah Islamiyah is the fact that it was
built not only around Afghan veterans, but more importantly, kin
networks of Darul Islam supporters and their disaffected descendents.
Jemaah Islamiyah, as we know, masterminded a number of terrorist
attacks in Indonesia through the 2000s, the most devastating being the
Bali bombings. Less visible to the world--but no less bloody--was the
violence perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah and other jihadi groups in the
Eastern Indonesian islands of Sulawesi, Maluku, and North Maluku. Since
the 2009 attacks on the J.W. Marriott and the Ritz Carlton hotels in
Jakarta, Indonesian jihadi activity has moved away from targeting
foreigners and has focused on the Indonesian police. This pattern held
until the ISIS-inspired attacks in Jakarta in January 2016 in which
civilians were also killed.
After a frustrating initial period of denial, the Indonesian
government eventually managed to circumscribe the activities of Jemaah
Islamiyah and killed and/or captured a considerable number of its
leadership and membership. Yet, Jemaah Islamiyah still exists. More
disconcertingly, it has consolidated, and has not disavowed violence in
pursuit of its objective of the creation of an Islamic state. Likewise,
notwithstanding 2 peace accords, residual grievances and the threat of
violence continues to cast a long shadow over places like Poso in
Central Sulawesi, which remains a hothouse for jihadi activity
including those of self-proclaimed ISIS militants. The fact that
Uighurs were found in the training camp of Santoso's pro-ISIS group,
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur or the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia, in
Poso further attests to a new phenomenon--foreign fighters who are
using Poso for purposes of training and, possibly, transit to Syria.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Two Chinese Uighurs Killed in Poso Terrorist Shootout,''
Jakarta Globe, March 16, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to mention that in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah are
at odds with ISIS for reasons of theological and personality
differences. Ironically, because of their anti-ISIS position, Jemaah
Islamiyah has been granted a public platform from which they have
readily denounced ISIS. An example is how Abu Tholut (Imron), a
convicted terrorist serving a prison sentence in Indonesia, has been
given airtime to criticize ISIS. While any denunciation of ISIS is
understandably welcome, the fact that the Indonesian government is
enlisting Jemaah Islamiyah, which has been designated a terrorist
organization by the United States and the United Nations and whose
membership includes hardline militants, to do this cannot but give
pause. As mentioned earlier, Jemaah Islamiyah, which has a following
that is far larger than ISIS in Indonesia, has never renounced the use
of violence to achieve its ends. In fact, Jemaah Islamiyah has over the
years managed to regroup, consolidate, and recruit.\6\ Finally, a
significant number of Jemaah Islamiyah members currently imprisoned are
expected to be released towards the end of the year when their
sentences run out. Indonesia does not as yet have any strategy to deal
with released terrorists in terms of rehabilitation. Simply put, the
arid reality is that while ISIS is commanding attention today, it may
well be Jemaah Islamiyah--with its organizational strength, funding,
and more established support base--that will pose a graver terrorist
threat in Indonesia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Extremist group Jemaah Islamiyah active again, recruiting and
collecting funds,'' Straits Times, February 15, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the nature of the problem in malaysia
There are an estimated 100 Malaysians in Syria and Iraq, of which
more than 10 are women. More than 10 are also known to have already
been killed on the battlefield, mostly in Syria (one known casualty in
Iraq as of 2015). Although there has not been a successful terrorist
attack in Malaysia, police raids in recent months have uncovered
efforts to mount such operations in the country, including an alleged
attempt to kidnap the country's political leadership. In 2015 alone,
more than a hundred alleged ISIS-sympathizers were arrested in the
country.
Any attempt to understand the context and nature of the terror
threat posed by ISIS in Malaysia must begin with an examination of the
climate of religious convervatism and intolerance in the country, to
which the UMNO-led ``moderate'' government has contributed by way of
its institutions, affiliates, and policies. This climate of religious
conservatism and intolerance has created fertile conditions for ISIS
ideology to gain popularity, to wit, the reality is a far cry from the
``moderate'' image of Malaysia that the government of Prime Minister
Najib Tun Razak has tried to portray.
Islam has unfortunately become heavily politicized in Malaysia.
Malaysia's dominant political party, UMNO, is a Malay-Muslim party that
was created with the main objective of, at least in theory, promoting
and defending Malay-Muslim supremacy. According to the party's
narrative, this supremacy is coming under siege from various cultural
(read: non-Malay) and religious (read: non-Muslim) quarters and hence
has to be staunchly defended. Given that Malaysia has a Malay-Muslim
majority population, it should come as no surprise that UMNO's chief
political opponents are also Malay-Muslim parties who equally brandish
religious credentials as a source of legitimacy. The consequence of
this is a condition whereby the political parties try to ``out-Islam''
each other, leaving non-Muslims and minority Muslim sects and movements
marginalized in their wake. But the politics merely expresses the
perpetuation of an exclusivist brand of Islam that is divorced from the
religion's historically enlightened traditions, and which has no
intention to encourage pluralism or compromise. Because politics in
Malaysia is now a zero sum game as UMNO struggles to cling on to power
by focusing on its religious credentials, religion has also become a
zero sum game.
Related to this is the fact that this politicization of Islam is
taking place against a backdrop of a state which has taken upon itself
to police Islam and curtail any expression of faith that departs from
the mainstream Shafi'i tradition. Yes, the ummah may be universal and
Islamic confessional traditions may be diverse, but in Malaysia there
is very little room for compromise beyond the ``Islam'' sanctioned by
the state. The Shi'a are legally proscribed, and several smaller
Islamic sects are deemed deviant and hence, banned. All this happens
despite the existence of constitutional provisions for freedom of
worship. Needless to say, attempts by various fringe quarters in Muslim
society to move discourse away from an overly exclusivist register have
run up against the considerable weight of the state, who appoint and
empower religious authorities that define and police ``right'' and
``wrong'' Islam.
Finally, rather than extol the virtues and conciliatory features of
Islam's rich tradition, many Malay-Muslim political leaders have
instead chosen to use religion to amplify difference, to reinforce
extreme interpretations of Malay-Muslim denizen rights, and to condemn
the ``other'' (non-Muslims) as a threat to these rights. For fear of
further erosion of legitimacy and political support, the Malay-Muslim
leadership of the country have circled the wagons, allowing vocal
right-wing ethnonationalist and religious groups to preach incendiary
messages against Christians and Hindus with impunity. In extreme cases,
they have even flippantly referred to fellow Malaysians who are
adherents to other religious faiths openly as ``enemies of Islam.''
Until recently even state-sanctioned Friday sermons have on some
occasions blatantly taken to referring to non-Muslim Malaysians as
``enemies of Islam.''
Granted, Malaysia is now a member of the anti-ISIS coalition, and
its leaders have finally started to act against inflammatory rhetoric
targeted at non-Muslim and minority Muslim sects. Yet, given the
reality that is the religio-political climate in Malaysia today, it
should hardly be a surprise that Malaysia is now struggling to deal
with the appeal of extremist ideas of a group such as ISIS. Such is the
potential depth of this appeal, ISIS sympathizers have been found even
within the security forces (although some news reports have exaggerated
their numbers). A particular concern for Malaysian authorities is the
proliferation of Malay-language radical websites and chat groups that
are pro-ISIS in orientation. This indicates that there is clearly a
Malaysian audience for ISIS-related propaganda. It also renders the
dangers of self-radicalisation more acute, and the prospects of ``lone-
wolf'' terrorism more likely.
assessing counterterrorism efforts in southeast asia
Unlike the 1990s, when they were caught offguard by the return of
Jihadis from Afghanistan, regional security forces have been alert to
the threat that potential returnees from Syria and Iraq might pose. In
part, this is because counterterrorism has already been a matter of
policy priority since the 9/11 attacks (when investigations revealed
that some of the planning took place in Southeast Asia) and the Bali
bombings in October 2002. The declaration of the caliphate in mid-2014,
and revelations that Southeast Asians were fighting in Syria, have
further hastened counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore.
In Indonesia, counterterrorism operations mounted by both
Detachment-88 (Densus-88 or National Police Counterterrorism Squad) and
the BNPT (National Counterterrorism Agency) have pinned down militant
ISIS sympathizers in Poso, Central Sulawesi. In Malaysia and Singapore,
security agencies have used internal security legislation to curtail
ISIS-inpired activity and arrest suspected ISIS sympathizers. In the
Philippines, while several militant groups have sworn allegiance to
ISIS, their activities remain confined to the southern regions of the
archipelago, in Sulu, Basilan, and Mindanao. That being said,
authorities in Philippines are worried that an attack may happen in
Manila.
In response to the Jakarta attacks earlier this year, Indonesia is
currently in the process of tabling significant amendments to existing
laws pertaining to terrorism (Law No. 15/2003 on Terrorism). The
general objective behind these revisions appears to be to allow
security forces to pre-empt acts of terrorism rather than merely react
to them after they have occurred. A series of recommendations for legal
reform have been submitted to the parliament to that effect, and await
parliamentary debate. These recommendations include, among other
things, introduction of some form of detention without trial for
purposes of investigation, a redefinition of terrorism (to include not
just physical acts but also hate speech, symbols, etc), swifter
approval of electronic surveillance, and the arrest of individuals
involved in military training overseas and the revoking of their
citizenship (this is a direct response to the problem of Indonesian
foreign fighters in Syria).
There has also been considerable pushback against the ideoogy of
ISIS, although more can certainly be done. Indonesia is home to 2 of
the largest Muslim mass movements in the world--Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
and Muhammadiyah. NU and Muhammadiyah claim memberships of 40 million
and 30 million respectively. Both are considered mainstream Muslim
organizations widely accepted and popular among Indonesians (hence
their large memberships). Their leaders and clerics are respected
internationally as Islamic scholars of considerable repute. Noteworthy
too, is the fact that both have launched their own programs to counter
the narrative of ISIS, and indeed, of other radical groups. Similar
efforts at countering the ISIS narrative can be observed in Malaysia
and Singapore, albeit on a smaller scale. Nevertheless, such efforts
could perhaps be further enhanced by greater cooperation and
collaboration among them, especially given that the threat posed by
ISIS is transnational in nature.
The situation in their prison system poses a major problem for
Indonesian counterterrorism efforts. Pro-ISIS and pro-Jemaah Islamiyah
Jihadi ideologues have been recruiting easily in Indonesia's prisons.
At issue is how these radical clerics, such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and
Aman Abdurrahman, the chief ISIS ideologue in Indonesia, are allowed to
mingle with ``gen pop'' on a regular basis (in fact, Aman Abdurrahman
and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were in constant communication over text
messaging while both were in different prisons--Ba'asyir in Pasir Putih
and Aman in Kembang Kuning--and it is likely that Aman eventually
persuaded Ba'asyir to swear allegiance to ISIS, which he did on July 8,
2014 only to rescind it later).\7\ This being the case, their radical
ideas and sermons have enjoyed easy access to a ready, disaffected
audience. In addition to this, corruption, incompetence, poor
monitoring, and poor supervision of visits have all contributed to the
ease with which radical ideas propounded by jihadi ideologues and
recruiters are allowed proliferate among ``gen pop''. Hence, reform of
the prison system is urgent, if not an absolute priority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Yuliasri Perdani and Ina Parlina, ``Govt to tighten prison
security following Ba'asyir's `baiat,'' Jakarta Post, July 7, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps the greatest challenge for the region as a whole is the
policing and governance of the triborder waters encompassing the Sulu
Sea (Philippines), waters off Sabah (Malaysia), and the Celebes/
Sulawesi Sea (Indonesia). This porous and ungoverned region has
presented, and will continue to present, a major problem by virtue of
the ease of movement for militants and terorrists across borders (see
attached picture). This region has developed their own political
economy over many decades, which involves not just the movement of
militants and terrorists, but also human and arms trafficking. Local
authorities are often either unable to curtail such activities or,
indeed, complicit in them. The challenge posed by the ungoverned space
in this triborder area will require multi-national cooperation to
surmount. None of the regional states can do it alone. They do not
possess the capabilities required to police this vast and complex
space, nor the authority to do so given that such efforts will
necessarily involve cross-border operations. Moreover, as evident from
the difficulties faced by regional security forces to apprehend
militants from Jemaah Islamiyah and other groups ensconced in the Sulu
archipelago, this region has already emerged as a safe haven for
terrorists. With the ``Pivot'' strategy in place, the United States
should consider exploring how to facilitate cooperation among regional
states on this matter. There is also a definitive U.S. interest in
this, given that American citizens have been kidnapped before by groups
operating in this region.
At present, there is on-going conversation and exchange of
intelligence and information in various forms between Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. But cooperation needs to be
taken a step or two further, to involve joint patrols and where
necessary, joint operations. Of course, such efforts could run up
against rigid mindsets, obsolete paradigms, and the perennial
reluctance to compromise sovereignty, but the harsh reality, as
mentioned earlier, is that none of the regional states are capable of
doing this on their own. Much in the same vein, cooperation between
agencies within the various Southeast Asian governments--specifically,
between the military, police, and intelligence--can also be improved.
These 2 areas are where the United States can perhaps make a
contribution by way of training programmes and transfer of operational
knowledge.
conclusion
The emergence of the phenomenon of ISIS in Southeast Asia and the
traction it appears to have garnered is illustrative of how resilient
but also evolutionary the threat of terrorism has become. Because of
this, regional governments must remain vigilant to ISIS-related
developments, particularly in terms monitoring both returnees as well
as communications between militants in Syria and their counterparts and
followers back home. They must equally be prepared to evolve with the
threat in terms of counterterrorism strategies, narratives, and
cooperation.
At the same time, in our anxiety over ISIS, we must be careful not
to miss the forest for the trees. There are multiple groups operating
in Southeast Asia that are intent on using some form of political
violence to further their ends. Many are at odds with each other; not
all are seeking affiliation to, or enamored of, ISIS. Indeed, while
ISIS appears an immediate concern, a case can be made that the longer
term, possibly more resilient, terrorist threat to the region may not
come from ISIS but from Jemaah Islamiyah, for reasons explained
earlier. It is also imperative that the threat of terrorism in
Southeast Asia be kept in perspective. Whether from ISIS or Jemaah
Islamiyah, the threat of terrorism is not an existential one for
Southeast Asia. Though eliminating terrorism altogether would be a tall
order, the threat is certainly manageable if the correct balance of
perpective and policies are taken, and cooperation among regional
states is enhanced.
The operational capabilities of Southeast Asian militant and
terorrist groups, including those aligned to ISIS, remains limited.
There is little evidence that groups have developed the sophistication
and know-how to mount mass casualty attacks. However, we must be
mindful that given the resilient and evolutionary nature of terrorism
in Southeast Asia, this situation could well change. One possible
factor that could prompt this change is a deliberate shift of attention
of ISIS central to Southeast Asia, leading to the dispatch of hardened
fighters to the region. This however, seems unlikely for the present as
ISIS is preoccupied with its immediate priority of holding ground in
Iraq and Syria, and possibly expanding its fight to Libya and Europe.
ISIS-related activity in Southeast Asia poses no immediate threat
to the American homeland. Thus far, there has also not been any
indication of any specific desire on the part of ISIS-inspired
militants to target offshore American interests such as embassies and/
or commercial enterprises. This does not mean however, that there is no
need for vigilance. The Jakarta attacks could be indicative of a return
to the targeting of foreigners. Meanwhile, U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition
successes in Syria and Iraq might elicit a call from ISIS central to
its sympathizers and supporters world-wide to strike at the United
States. On this score, it would serve U.S. interests to cooperate even
more closely with regional partners in the fight against ISIS, and more
generally, terrorism, in Southeast Asia.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. King. Let me thank all the witnesses for their
testimony. We have been joined by the Ranking Member.
Brian, do you want to make an opening statement or submit
for the record?
Mr. Higgins. I will submit for the record.
Mr. King. Okay. The Ranking Member will submit his
statement for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
April 27, 2016
Violent extremists in Southeast Asia are not a new phenomenon. For
decades, Separatist movements have committed bombings, kidnappings, and
assassinations in the region.
With the emergence of ISIL and al-Qaeda the intensity of these
attacks has only gotten more devastating.
Over the past 2 years, in Malaysia alone, there has been a spike in
terrorism-related arrests and detainments totaling nearly 160 Malaysian
citizens.
In 2002, a militant group tied to al-Qaeda bombed a nightclub in
Bali, Indonesia killing 200 mostly Western tourists and injuring
countless more.
There have also been numerous suicide bombings targeting U.S.
interests in the region, which have resulted in countless deaths.
Earlier this year in January, militants attacked a busy shopping
and tourist district in downtown Jakarta resulting in 8 deaths and
numerous injuries.
ISIL has taken responsibility for the January attack, which
employed similar techniques used in the Paris, and Belgium attacks.
Counterterrorism efforts in the region have had some success. The
capabilities of the militant group, Jemaah Islamiyah or JI which has
ties to al-Qaeda have been significantly degraded by the region's
efforts.
Unfortunately, terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL seemed
poised to fill the void left by this and other groups.
ISIL has targeted its extremist propaganda to the region in Malay
and Pilipino languages.
ISIL's aggressive recruitment efforts in the region must be matched
by equally aggressive security efforts to contain supporters and limit
their influence.
While we cannot overstate the reach of al-Qaeda and ISIL's
terrorist networks, we must not encourage the countries of Southeast
Asia to respond to threats where there are none.
While it is important to remain vigilant and respond to credible
threats, it is also important to acknowledge that experts predict the
threat from Southeast Asia will remain relatively low.
Against this backdrop, we should encourage the governments of
Southeast Asia to respect the rights and liberties of their citizens
and discourage officials from using their counterterrorism efforts to
restrict civil liberties and freedoms.
I look forward to a robust discussion with our witnesses today
about terrorist threats in Southeast Asia, and how we can shape U.S.
policy to counter their efforts.
Mr. King. At the outside, I want to thank Ranking Member
Higgins for his support on this hearing and all the hearings
prior to this.
My question is, sort-of, broad-based and it will be to all
of you, and it follows up on the conclusion of Dr. Liow's
testimony. One thing that the European nations seem to realize
since the attacks in Paris and Brussels, that there should be
more cooperation among countries in Europe.
I would ask you, do the countries in Southeast Asia, do
they consider this a regional threat? Is there a level of
cooperation among them? Also, considering the outstanding work
that is done by Australia, are they involved in any of this
sharing of information? Is their information shared and other
regional plans?
I will start with Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. Thank you, Chairman. Good question. I will leave
some of the details about the coordination between some of the
other governments in the region to the other speakers. I can't
say specifically, because I haven't had first-hand knowledge,
and I wouldn't. You know, it would be Classified if it was, of
the degree to which the Australian Government shares
information with Indonesia and other governments in the region.
I can tell you, there is close cooperation.
One of the key elements that we didn't bring us with
Detachment 88 in Indonesia, which is a counterterrorism unit
that was stood up after the Bali bombings and was funded and
had trained support from both the Australians and the United
States, FBI, and others in terms of building capacity. That
group is a spearhead. Their approach to counterterrorism is
something that we can learn lessons from. It is not just about
offensive capabilities. It is about understanding through
intelligence networks the lay of the land. It is about our
running rehabilitation programs and getting a message through
to, you know, potential jihadists or actual jihadists and
turning them away, and that has had around about a 50 percent
success rate at rehabilitating insurgents.
One of the things that is going to come through a lot of
the discussions here has been many of the problems here are
hyper-local. ISIS or al-Qaeda or whatever is just the current
brand that they are attaching to. The actual discontent or the
political motivations from many of these groups go back many,
many years. Abu Sayyaf is a good example. They have been
fighting for decades. The degree to which they are actually
interested in ISIS' ideology, is very questionable. It is
probably a pragmatic move, as was stated, in order to raise
their profile and get more funding.
If ISIS goes away, if al-Qaeda goes away, those problems
don't go away, those political discontents. So what that means
is most of the groups are focused on their issues within their
own territory. There is a handful of ideologues, who have a
broader intent to, you know, kind-of, ban the groups together,
but it seems to be a very, very small portion of the jihadists
who actually want to do that. So the majority of the
counterterrorism action needs to be hyper-local, focused inward
by the governments themselves onto the local conditions. Even
within Indonesia, you know, across the 6,000 inhabited islands,
you know, the provinces themselves need to focus on the issues
within their provinces as much as across the country as well.
So I believe there would be sharing. I can't tell you to
what degree that sharing happens, but I will say that United
States, and Australia, is already providing a lot of support,
particularly to Indonesia, and that's been a large part of
success in combating Jamar Islamir in the early 2000s.
Mr. King. As I said, I am aware, certainly, with our
country, the tremendous amount of intelligence sharing with
Australia. Thank you.
Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Skinner. Yes. As I said, Detachment 88 is a really good
success story that can be modeled, you know, in Malaysia and in
the Philippines. You have the ASEAN level of--where they--it is
not threat information, but it is the policies and
capabilities. Then you go down to the global counterterrorism
forum, the JCPF, which all of the countries in the region are--
they are very active and have a really good hub and is anchored
by Australia.
The capacities differ and also the threats differ. The
Philippines, they have a big problem in the south, and that is
almost beyond a CT effort. That is a military effort, and the
United States is providing a lot of support. We have been for
years, and we are increasing it again.
Malaysia has less of an organized group threat than they
do--they just have a lot of people that have extremist
tendencies. They are pretty good at arresting them. They have a
very good day intelligence service, and they have a really good
counterterrorism police.
Indonesia, their problem is the resurgent Jemaah Islamiyah.
I agree that the depth and the history and the network of a JI
in Indonesia just dwarfs Islamic State. Now, Islamic State
might make a push. They are sympathizers. I know that Singapore
and Malaysia obviously where they are border crossings, they
have relatively day-to-day intelligence sharing. The same with
Indonesia a little bit between Singapore.
It is just the threat. It is so different in all these
places. So it is hyper-local. But I haven't seen that--or
having talked to these people, I haven't heard that lack of
intelligence sharing is an issue. I mean, if the threat grows
more broadly, then, yeah, of course, it will be, because even
in the best functioning governments or bureaucracies, things
get through the cracks. But I think that they are probably
doing well. What they need is, you know, local solutions which
are in their hands which we can empower.
But I really believe that rule of law, counterterrorism
specialties like Detachment 88 are something that is very hard
to overstate how much positive work they did after Bali. So if
that could be replicated, and it is in varying degrees, that is
a really low-cost approach with a huge payoff.
Mr. King. Ms. Peery.
Ms. Zaidi Peery. While I agree that the issues are very
local and engagement with communities will require specific
policies between governments and their respective provinces, I
do think the region has an opportunity as a region to meet and
at least discuss certain macro issues from immigration to at
least having unified laws with regard to banning travel to join
a militant group or going to training camp. This, for example,
varies greatly between Malaysia and Indonesia.
Malaysia had out loud--excuse me--outlawed travel for
training in militant groups long before Indonesia addressed the
issue. I believe as of last year, even in Indonesia, it was not
illegal to join ISIS, but it had been in Malaysia for some time
prior.
Immigration, and traveling between the region and going to,
you know, Europe and other parts of the world, these are
opportunities to have better security measures and potentially
even unify them in a way, at least travel can be tracked.
So there are opportunities for these countries in the
region to compare and contrast what is going on and how they
are being affected by each other. For example, as I mentioned,
if ISIS can meet different militant groups in the Philippians
last fall to talk about attacking Malaysia, there is a reason
for Malaysia and the Philippines to talk to each other. I
assume that intelligence sharing is happening, but as Mr. Watts
mentioned, I am sure a lot of it is because it is happening
now. These are Classified details that we are not privy to. But
the details and community issues, whether it is Mindanao or
Aceh, that is local.
Mr. King. Thank you, Ms. Peery.
Dr. Liow.
Mr. Liow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, there is a bit of information sharing and intelligence
sharing amongst these security services of, say, Singapore,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines. One of the problems, though,
is that they are so--within individual countries, there are so
many intelligence services or branches involved that it gets
complicated. The information you get from agency A as compared
from agency B is--could be different. So that poses a problem.
That speaks to the issue of within these individual countries,
interagency cooperation needs to be improved. But over and
above that, from a regional perspective, I think the challenge
now is for these regional states to go beyond information
sharing, to actually consider, if I may say so, joint
operations. I think it is about time they look into that.
We think that--well, I think that it is very important to
consider that simply because of the problems in the tri-border
area that a number of my fellow panelists alluded to. This is
between the Sulu Sea, the Celebes Sea, in Indonesia, and the
waters off the coast of Sabah. These are really ungoverned
areas, ungoverned waters, and these form very effective
communications and networks for militant groups and terrorist
groups, and it has been the case for decades. Regional states
have not been able to mount any sort of joint operations to
deal with this threat.
Part of the problem is because they have their own baggage.
Right? For example, the Filipinos and the Malaysians are
concerned that if you push cooperation too far, this issue of
the Philippine--the dominant Philippine claim to Sabah, for
example, will surface. So it does run into these issues, but at
least as far as trying to cope with the threat of militancy and
terrorism is concerned, I think that some serious thought
should be given to joint operations or even having some sort of
joint security presence in that tri-water area in the form of a
base or center or something to that effect.
Mr. King. Okay. What exact area are you talking about now?
Mr. Liow. It is the waters that border southern
Philippines----
Mr. King. Right.
Mr. Liow [continuing]. Which is the Sulu Sea, northern
Sulawesi, which is the Celebes, that is C-e-l-e-b-e-s, and the
waters off the coast of Sabah in Borneo.
So I have a map in my testimony where it shows exactly what
this area is.
Mr. King. Great. Thank you.
Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just--Ms. Peery,
you indicated in your testimony that the largest population,
Muslim population, in the world is in Indonesia, and 70 percent
of those supporting websites are from Indonesians. But
Southeast Asia has been pretty effective in suppressing ISIS.
So could you just reiterate the reasons as to why that is?
Ms. Zaidi Peery. Certainly. Can you hear me?
Mr. Higgins. Yes.
Ms. Zaidi Peery. Okay. Sorry.
So the point I was trying to make was, in part of being
proactive about moving extremist rhetoric away from the
populations that are vulnerable to radicalization, one of the
biggest issues is the fact that there is approximately 2,000
websites, pro-ISIS websites, in the region. The fact that 70
percent of the servers that host these websites come from
Indonesia actually give Indonesia a wonderful opportunity to be
a proactive and aggressive. Very quickly change the dynamic of
ISIS' communications, because the vast majority of the hosting
is coming from companies within Indonesia.
I agree with you that in absolute numbers, we are not
looking at a huge extremist problem. We have over 140 million
Muslims in Indonesia and approximately 300 that have gone to
become foreign fighters. But what I am concerned about on a
broader level is the ideology and the attitude of separatism,
that the ISIS message is spreading in these societies where
prior to this extremist rhetoric, Indonesia has and continues
to maintain overall a much more pluralist interpretation state.
So in preventing a future change, which is why I mentioned
what is happening in the United Kingdom as kind-of a case study
of what you don't want to become if you are not proactive now.
Mr. Higgins. So Indonesia is effective in integrating the
Muslim population?
Ms. Zaidi Peery. I am sorry?
Mr. Higgins. Indonesia is relatively effective in
integrating----
Ms. Zaidi Peery. Well, not even just that. It is Islam that
has been practiced for centuries have always been different.
One of the issues with extremist rhetoric is that it is
foreign-born, and it has come to the region from funding or
extremist groups and then it is proliferated through their
proselytizing. So for Indonesians who don't have the identity
issues that is prevalent in places like Pakistan or the
relatively new Nation State of the Middle East, they know who
they are; they know what their culture is.
Mr. Higgins. Is there an estimate as to how many
Indonesians are in Iraq and Syria as ISIS fighters?
Ms. Zaidi Peery. The numbers, depending on the source, vary
as low as 300-something and go upwards of 800.
Mr. Higgins. Is there an ISIS presence in India?
Ms. Zaidi Peery. At a speculative level right now. There
isn't enough information coming in yet to show that there is.
But there is--excuse me. There is AQIS, al-Qaeda, and the
Islamic subcontinent, and with that umbrella branch trying to
unite Islamist groups between Afghanistan and Bangladesh
including India, there is increased pro-ISIS activity from
Pakistan and Bangladesh and with India sitting right at the
center of it and being a specific target.
It is, again, low numbers right now, but the activity is
legitimate. So these are--the conversations we are having today
it is so important to keep on discussing the roles that
extremist rhetoric is playing in these societies and trying to
balance how we can practically push back without being
alarmists or without being unnecessarily aggressive.
Mr. Higgins. As Iraq and Syria continue to retake territory
previously held by ISIS, what is the impact of that phenomenon
on ISIS activity in Indonesia?
Ms. Zaidi Peery. To be fair, I think that would be
speculation on all our parts. But in my opinion, it would be an
opportunity for them to focus on other regions where they have
cells or have individuals that are sympathetic to their world
view. If they are going to lose territory in one place, they
are going to try to get more elsewhere, because for them their
mission statement is global.
Mr. Higgins. But doesn't ISIS lose a very important
component to its recruiting tool if it is perceived to be
retreating as opposed to expanding?
Ms. Zaidi Peery. Possibly, but there are enough
organizations that are like-minded from al-Qaeda to Hizb ut-
Tahrir to not remove the risk of radicalization from the
communities.
Mr. Higgins. The point I am trying to make is this: That if
our strategy by sending more U.S. troop personnel to Syria and
Iraq to combat the ISIS expansion, and if that is successful,
aren't we, in effect, undermining ISIS's ability to grow in
other regions?
Ms. Zaidi Peery. Not necessarily.
Mr. Higgins. Everybody agree with that?
Mr. Watts. Again, it is speculative to decide. There is
going to be 2 sides to it. The one is for every action there is
a counter reaction. So as we squeeze them in one area, they are
going to look to survive. Again, endure and expand has been a
key motto for them.
So there is currently a debate amongst some of the senior
leaders in Syria and Iraq as to whether they should maintain
their territory, because that is the central message of why
they differentiate from other terrorist groups, that they have
actually established the caliphate that many others talk about
and aspire to. They have actually done it. If they lose that
talking point, their narrative is undermined.
However, the group has been squashed before, almost within
an inch of its life, and it's come back. It's done that because
it knows how to go to ground and disperse. So if the pressure
on them becomes such that they make a decision that they can no
longer hold the territory, they will make the pragmatic
decisions. As much as they are idealists, they are a very
pragmatic organization, and they will look for ways to spread
that.
Going to your earlier question about why has there not been
a larger attraction in Indonesia. I agree with everything that
Ms. Zaidi said, but it also goes to the fact that those areas
are politically empowered. The Muslims in those countries have
actual political processes to achieve their ends. There are
fundamentalist Islamic parties in Indonesia that have tried to
go through the Democratic process, and have been rejected by
the majority of voters.
The difference between Indonesia and, say, Yemen or Egypt
or any of the other countries, perhaps, in the Middle East is
that the economic situation is better there. The political
system is stable. They have political mechanisms to pursue
their objectives and, therefore, they don't have to resort to
the more violent extremes. It also has to do with culture and
messaging and many, many other things, religious traditions,
but at a very simple level, that is a really important
differentiator between countries in Southeast Asia and
countries in the Middle East, and that is why it is hard to
compare the 2.
Mr. Liow. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. Just to add on to some of
the points that my colleagues have raised. In other--let me
start with the issue of why there are so few Indonesians. I
think we have to bear in mind 2 things.
No. 1 is that you have in Indonesia an increasing need
conservative Muslim society. So I am not entirely sure about--
or I am not entirely persuaded by this--the orthodox view that
you know, Indonesian, Islam has always been--I mean, for the
most part, but they have always had a radical fringe since the
18th Century.
So the question is, where does it get from conservative
society to pro-ISIS? I think that is a very big jump. That
leads me to my second point.
In Indonesia, in the radical Muslim intellectual community,
there is a very intense debate going on now about this issue of
whether Muslims are legitimate target of terrorist acts. This
is where a lot of the militant groups defer. This is where
Jemaah Islamiyah has major differences with the pro-ISIS
groups, because they are of the view that we should be
minimizing Muslim casualties; in fact, from Bali 2002, they
have been having this debate already.
So this, I think, explains why on the one hand, you see a
very conservative trend in Indonesians, slightly, but on the
other hand, it doesn't quite translate to pro-ISIS support.
Also, just very quickly, there is also the issue of why
Indonesians and Malaysians are going to fight in Syria and Iraq
in the first place. Speaking to a number of Malaysian
detainees, it is very interesting. For them, they buy into the
eschatological logic of ISIS, that they are fighting the end-
time battle in Syria. So if that is the case, it stands to
reason that they won't want to come back. They want to fight
the end times in Syria as they are called to.
In the case of Indonesia, on the other hand, a number of
the people who have joined pro-ISIS groups have done so not so
much because of doctrine of theology but because of personal
allegiances to individual ideologues and leaders, which also
means they can shift. Indeed, if we manage to push back ISIS,
you might actually see that. You know, because a lot of them
came from the Jemaah Islamiyah background. They could very well
move back.
I will end with an example of Abu Bakar Bashir, who we all
know is the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, who made an
oath of allegiance to ISIS but has since retracted that oath of
allegiance saying that now he understands better what ISIS is
about, and he doesn't quite agree with them today. So that
phenomenon can happen as well.
Mr. Skinner. Just real quickly. I think whatever--so the
effort that we are putting into Iraq and Syria, whatever threat
that might come from squashing them there and like the ink blot
where it goes somewhere else, and in particular here, Southeast
Asia, I think that is a manageable risk.
Now, it is a real risk, and it needs to be addressed, but I
think it pales in comparison to the damage that if they lose
that self-proclaimed caliphate in Raqqa, the damage that does
to their global brand, because a lot of their world-wide
allegiance is superficial bandwagoneer. It appeals to a certain
criminal mind set and a lot of disaffected people.
So the damage to do to that group, No. 1, it is
categorically imperative to help Syria and Iraq to get rid of
this, because for them it is an existential threat. So applying
pressure there and toppling them there, yeah, it might lead
them to look for other places. Libya is proving harder than
they ever thought, because they don't have that secretarian
wedge. I mean, they don't have that wedge in Southeast Asia
either. They have maybe ethnicity, but it is going to be hard
for them to play that card. So they are going to try to tap in
to preexisting networks that have a sanctuary, which is a
couple of places, but I think that the risks are managable.
But, yeah, it is a real--you know, you would be foolish not
to think that if they get pushed out of there, they need a
physical place. Foreign fighters have to go somewhere. They
have to have a place to put the black flag. It is not all
propaganda. They need some kind of on-the-ground reality.
Mr. King. Mr. Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a couple of questions. I just want to follow up on
what you said with respect to the importance of having a
caliphate in Syria and Iraq.
First of all, Syria and Iraq are probably more unstable
than most places in the world, and that was easier for them to
establish it there. But also one thing we haven't mentioned, it
is fair to say that the money flow is also important in Syria
and Iraq?
They have oil, and they have resources they can tap into
there that they may not have access to elsewhere. Without
money, they are going to be less effective. Is that fair to say
as well?
Mr. Skinner. Yes. I mean, foreign fighters like to be paid.
You know, their logistics like to be paid. They are able to buy
weapons at--you know, they are not hurting for weapons in Iraq
and Syria. So cutting their money, there isn't a downside to
that. So if they move--if they splinter and some of them go to
establish or rely or even a caliphate in Southeast Asia, it is
going to be a shell of the organization.
Syria and Iraq are the perfect place for them to thrive.
They will not have that type of--they will have to revert back
down to a terrorist group instead of a proto-state.
Mr. Katko. All right. Thank you.
In my other capacity, in my other subcommittee I am on in
Homeland Security, I was put in charge of what is called the
Foreign Fighter Task Force, so I am interested in the flow of
foreign fighters. I know from Western Europe that there is
thousands upon thousands of people that they believe went, and
they think there are hundreds in the United States. I think
both of those numbers are probably dramatically lower, because
we only know what we know. We don't know what we don't know as
far as some who may have gone there.
So I want to kind-of probe you as to Southeast Asia. I know
these numbers sound very low, but how much confidence do you
have in the numbers about the foreign fighter flow from
Southeast Asia to Iraq and Syria? Anybody can take that.
Mr. Skinner. Yeah, it is probably low, but maybe not as
dramatic as--the thing is, foreign fighters, especially--it is
so weird. They were radicalized in open source. They were
basically social media announcing the radicalization. Then the
government--you could count this up, and we did a lot of that,
and the numbers would come close to what the U.S. Government,
with all their information, would come up. Because these people
weren't trying to hide. But these were really lagging
indicators.
By the time you count these things that is a year or 2 ago,
I think that we dramatically underestimated what was happening
in 2013 and 2014, and that we are probably now trying to catch
up. We think, oh, no, the flows are still that. So basically,
that is why the estimates were all over the map.
In 2014, we completely underestimated the size of the
group, but also the size of--I mean, there were a lot of people
going there. Now we have got to understand that--I think the
United States and Department of Defense put out a number
yesterday that it's really dropped. It took several years for
that to happen. It wasn't just closing a border. It was
everybody stopped--and most of these people are stopped at the
airport. I would say, again, we constantly overestimate our
ability to track foreign fighter extremist travel. I mean, even
here, I--there are people that have gone that we don't know. So
it would be foolish to think that in Indonesia, that that
number is exactly 600. Because it could literally be between
like 500 to 700, but that is that we know of, and that is what
they announced. Some of it is open source, some of it is not
open source.
So I really think that--in my old job, I was always
optimistic. The problems were never as bad as they seemed. We
haven't proven the ability to monitor this, and we are way
behind the curve.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. Thank you, sir. Excellent question. I haven't
studied this in detail, so I can't say with any confidence in
numbers, specifically, but I will say that the--what I had seen
when I read in the research, there is some very, very specific
information where they have spoken to the individuals involved,
and they can actually track specifically, you know, person No.
1 went to his friend and asked how to get to wherever, and he
got knocked back and went to friend No. 2. He got in touch with
friend No. 3. They had some very specific information.
As mentioned before, the counterterrorism efforts in
Indonesia in particular are very sophisticated. They rely on
heavy intelligence and human sources. They have informants
within some of these groups. They know where they are, even if
they can't affect them, they know where they are. They know
where the networks are. They know who the key personnel are.
So I absolutely would agree. We can't say specifically how
many the numbers are, and we can't really be sure, but I think
that we can have some confidence they are not radically
different to what they are, because, you know, there would be
some sign-up within these networks. The informants would have
picked it up. You know, these groups are quite tight-knit.
There is literally a handful of key personnel who everyone
knows and speaks to and interacts with. So I think we have some
confidence that while they might not be exactly what we see,
they are not going to be radically different to the numbers
that have been quoted.
I just point out with the foreign fighters. As much as the
foreign fighters coming back, I would like to reinforce the
comment that was made earlier, those that are going over
predominantly want to be there because they want to be there,
not because they want to come back and bring the skills back.
It is a very different mentality.
But even if ISIS went away or even if al-Qaeda went away,
the terrorist threat in Indonesia will not, necessarily, or
Southeast Asia will not necessarily be less, because, again,
those motivations for those groups, the political grievances,
are local as much as they are in the broader ideological state.
It doesn't necessarily shift the threat analysis.
Mr. Katko. That is a perfect segue to my question for Dr.
Liow, or more of an observation, really.
You have indicated, I think, in your testimony that you
must take care not to exaggerate the threat of ISIS in
Southeast Asia, and that ISIS right now isn't the biggest
threat there. I think that is consistent with what Mr. Skinner
is saying in his testimony as well. That is understood. I mean,
it is not the biggest problem right now.
But I think it is probably different in Western Europe than
it is for Southeast Asia right now. But despite that, can any
of you tell me if there is any particular area of Southeast
Asia where you are most concerned about the possible rise of
ISIS-related activity?
Mr. Liow. Maybe I will start.
A specific area, I think, would be the Sulu Archipelago
Basilan, the island of Basilan, because again, as I mentioned
earlier, it is ungoverned space. The Philippine military--I
mean, I have friends in the Philippine military, but if you
look at--the Chairman mentioned the operations on the 9th of--
on April 9. I think that was quite an embarrassment for the
Philippines special forces, and it is not an isolated incident
either.
So the capability, the capacity that the Philippines has to
manage--to deal with the threat in that area is very low. It is
very low, which is why I--my view is that we have to really
look beyond just joint information sharing. You have got the
information. You have got the data. They still cannot do
anything with it. We need to really look at operations.
The United States to some extent is already present there.
The Australians I think would take an interest as well as a
number of Southeast, Malaysia, Singapore, as well. But you know
it runs into issues of sovereignty and things like that. But
that area, in terms of a specific geographical area that would
be a source of concern, that would be it. Whether it is ISIS,
whether it is Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, et cetera, it is
all happening there.
If I could just react very quickly to your earlier point?
Mr. Katko. Sure.
Mr. Liow. About the numbers. I agree with my colleagues. It
is not a precise science. I think that at least the figures I
have seen are about 700 in total of Southeast Asians, by far
the majority from Indonesia, a handful from Singapore, and
there are suspicions of a handful from Philippines as well but
not confirmed. I think we have to bear in mind two things.
The first thing, as I mentioned in my testimony that
certainly, in the case of Indonesia, we have noticed a large
number of the men and children who are going there because they
are relocating; they are doing the hijrah. Right? The families
are relocating to the pristine Islamic State. They are going to
stay there. They are going to grow up there for better or for
worse.
The second point is there is quite a significant casualty
count as well. As far as the Malaysians are concerned, if they
work on the premise that there are about 100 there, figures I
have seen--and you can actually get it off YouTube, where there
is a number of clips where militants talk about--they actually
talk and film information about operations that they have
conducted a few years--a few days prior, and there are at least
about 12, 13 Malaysians that have already been killed in Syria
and Iraq. Mostly in Syria, one in Iraq.
In the same manner, Indonesians as well, we are talking
about 40 or 50 of them. So this is about roughly about 15
percent, 20 percent of the figures that we are talking about.
So there is a casualty count as well. I just wanted to put that
up.
Mr. Katko. I thank you.
Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Skinner. Yes, I agree. There are 2 ways to look at it.
The south Philippines would be the perfect large-scale ISIS
presence, because that area is not going to be controlled any
time soon, hasn't been for decades. That provides them a
sanctuary, a place to literally stay and to recoup or to
rebuild and also to plant. I mean, that is what they do. That
is why we tried to deny sanctuary.
So if they got there, I would probably say that is the No.
1 spot.
Another concern is what we are seeing in Bangladesh is
truly horrifying, because we are watching in slow motion, but
real time, how this extremism works. It is not that they have
the best message, they just need to be the monopoly of the
message. To do that, it is not a metaphor. They literally kill
the messengers. So we always talk about credible voices and
these people need to stand up, well, they are, and they are
getting slaughtered.
In Bangladesh, that would be a night--I mean, I focus on
counterterrorism, and that would be a nightmare scenario.
Bangladesh is, for all their--all its problems, a relatively
stable society. They have a lot of good politics, but so do we.
I think what we are watching there is this slow motion
slaughtering of other voices and they are targeting--these are
not randoms. They are going at, you know, certain alternative
voices and mainstream, even. So if you start seeing that in
Jakarta, you start--every now and then you see a blogger killed
in Jakarta, or new--you know, weird newspaper killed in Kuala
Lumpur. You see that a couple of times, that is a real sign of
a society that there are not just gangs and criminal gangs,
which ISIS is basically a criminal gang, but they are making a
push to frighten. All they want is people not to speak up. They
don't really care if they believe them or not, they just want
them to be scared. Hacking people to death with machetes, it
doesn't cost anything and the pay-off is huge.
I think that southern Philippines would be a territorial
gain for ISIS, and they might try to go there and they might
not. I mean, if I were them, I would. There is no cost, why
not, because it is so uncontrolled. But if you start seeing in
the cities attacks on media, news, bloggers, radio
personalities, that is a real, real bad sign.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. Thank you, sir. I just want to point out a few
other areas. As I mentioned in my testimony, some of these
areas have grievances going back 50, 60 years, back to the
independence of Indonesia. Any of those areas that, you know,
have links way back to Darul Islam are areas of potential hot
spots, again, in Indonesia, specifically and Poso in central
Sulawesi, there is known cells there. Some of the groups are
operating out of there. Again, the Indonesian Government and
police forces know this. They are watching it. They are
conducting operations as we speak to try and eliminate that.
There is a local sympathy for the broader cause if not the
methodologies.
The area that I think is of great concern is Aceh. Aceh is
for a long time been an area of insurgency with Indonesia. It
has sought autonomy for a long time. It has been very quiet in
recent years, but that is mostly due to tsunami from, you know,
about a decade ago. There was a huge amount of piracy in that
region. There was a huge amount of insurgency in that region.
Quite literally the pirate boats got wiped out by the tsunami.
The impact it had on the region saw that the insurgence and the
government forces come to together to try and repair.
We are now seeing the effects of that wear off, and we are
seeing all the animosity start to grow out again. There has
already been some training camps identified in Aceh. It is an
area with, again, long-standing discontent, political
grievances. There is a deep sense of needing autonomy for the
region, and whether or not, it is Islamic as well and they want
to see Sharia law imposed, but it is autonomy as much as
anything.
Again, whether ISIS is there, whether Jemaah Islamiyah is
there, that area is going to continue to be a hot spot where
insurgent groups and terrorist groups are going to want to
operate out of.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Katko.
Again, I would ask all 4 panelists, if ISIS did decide to
officially designate or associate itself with one of the
organizations in the region, what impact would that have? Also,
is ISIS considered a competitor to al-Qaeda in that region or
the two as being the same?
Yes, Ms. Zaidi Peery.
Ms. Zaidi Peery. A specific answer to your question, there
is the possibility that if ISIS did become affiliated with a
specific group in southeast Indonesia, there is a view that to
now, these localized groups have questionable levels of
training and sophistication, and capability, that that
capability would increase with the influence and help of ISIS
militants from the Middle East. I think that is a concern
country to country, because as has been previously mentioned,
there are hubs. There are already certain training camps
present. If there is increased collaboration, there is a
potential for greater sophistications. There is one example
that I have, in early April a Moroccan bomb maker named
Mohammad Khattab was killed in the Philippines. This was the
incident in early April where reports had mentioned 18 law
enforcement soldiers that were killed in a skirmish.
So again, right now, we are limited to specific incidences
here and there, and--but increased collaboration is going to
raise these questions in terms of scenario-building and trend-
watching that what was before specific militant groups with
specific issues in their region fighting with their local or
federal governments that the expansion of targets would become
more indiscriminate, because that is ISIS' preference. They
wanted to create chaos.
So what was something that was happening in--excuse me.
What was, let's say, serious skirmishes in Mindanao might be
called on for or larger cities across the region, because that
is what ISIS needs to make the next video.
Mr. King. Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Skinner. Yes, that is a really good point. We are
having--it is not a debate, but in the United States we are
sending additional Special Forces or Special Operation Forces
to train and advise. As you know, these people are very
skilled, and you only need a couple of them to act as a force
multiplier. I think that if--and they are probably trying to do
it now, ISIS, to send them to wherever their home countries
are. But if they make it official, which they have been pretty
hesitant to do. They have declared or relied in Southeast Asia,
yeah, they might try to send some of their best trainers. Just
as we believe in train and advise, so do they. I mean, talent
goes to talent.
So if they sent a couple of trainers, it will do two
things. It will increase the legality of these groups. It will
also--it might cause some kind of bandwagon thing where a lot
of rival groups that aren't ideologically--you know, they are
just more like rival small gangs kind-of join up, and that
increases the manpower of that pretty existing group.
ISIS isn't replacing these groups. It is not like they are
moving an army from Raqqa to Mindanao or something. You know,
they are just plugging into these preexisting groups. So if
they go all out and make a big media push and they put
caliphate on the line and say, there is a new allied here, they
might get more capability, maybe a little funding. It is hard
to know in how much they can go, you know, we are trying to
decide in Boko Haram too if that is happening. But it certainly
would increase some kind of support for the young kids.
But there is no love lost between JI, which is still the
major threat there. They are the mafia there. They have been
there forever. The best ISIS could try to do is try to do what
they doing in the Taliban and try to splinter some stuff off.
But the most important part is, they are going to broaden. If
ISIS goes there, they are going to go from attacking a police
station for a real reason to attacking anybody anywhere. I
mean, that is their motto. If they do that, you will see just
an indiscriminate campaign.
Mr. King. Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. Just two points. It was mentioned earlier, I
think, by Dr. Liow, there is debate within the groups within
Indonesia, the jihadist community, within the conservative
community, about whether or not they really appreciate or agree
with ISIS' methods. There is a huge amount of jihadist groups
who reject them for that very reason. So the question: Would
there be competition? Absolutely there would.
The split between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in Syria caused
huge rifts within some of the key members within the jihadist
community in Indonesia, as some back the al-Qaeda-backed groups
and some went with ISIS, so there would be tensions and
problems between them as to who would align with the other, and
there would be problems with ISIS' methodology and ideology for
some of those groups.
Having said that, to focus purely on Islamic groups or
jihadist groups I think would be short-sighted. Again, ISIS has
shown itself to be extremely pragmatic in the way that it
creates alliances. The very alignment between the Baathists and
ISIS in the early days of their expansion is a perfect example
of that. If groups within Indonesia who may not have an
ideological alignment with ISIS see that there is some benefit
to jumping on board, getting funding, if there is something
they are going to gain from it, they may band with them, even
if they don't buy into the ideology, so I think there are two
aspects of that that needs to be considered.
Mr. King. Dr. Liow.
Mr. Liow. Thank you.
I think that the threat, the concern, really, will be about
the groups in the southern Philippines. Some Philippines you
have a whole of, you know, proliferation of militant groups,
and they are always looking for an ideology, and they will go
with the flow. I mean, Abu Sayyaf is a prime example, you know,
align themselves with al-Qaeda, and now they are aligning
themselves with--align themselves with ISIS. You know, very
conveniently disregarding the kind of differences that al-Qaeda
has with ISIS. Right? So I think the manageability of the
ideology of southern Philippines groups, I think, would be a
cause of concern as far as ISIS looking to work with groups in
the region is the issue.
In the case of Indonesia, again, there is rivalry between
pro- and anti-ISIS groups. The danger there is that the
Indonesian government is starting to give publicity and a
platform for anti-ISIS elements who are from the jihadi
community. So they are giving Jemaah Islamiyah leaders a
platform from which they can discredit ISIS. But there is a
problem there, quite obviously, because these people have a
jihadi agenda as well. They will very quickly be able to use
the visibility and publicity that they have been given to
advance the agenda. So I think there is an issue there.
Last point I would raise is I think a big concern, which we
didn't talk about, is the case of Malaysia. Because unlike
Philippines and unlike Indonesia, Malaysia, you are looking at
the individual radicalization. The nature of this sort of
radicalization is that it is much more difficult to monitor and
much more difficult to deal with as opposed to looking at
groups.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Liow.
Any further questions? Ranking Member? Mr. Katko? Okay.
It is my job now to thank you for your testimony. I want to
tell you how sincerely I mean it. This was as enlightening as
any testimony we have had before this subcommittee, and quite
frankly, before the entire committee. This has been extremely
helpful. You put it in terms that all of us could understand,
which is somewhat of an achievement. I want to thank you for
that.
Now, the Members of the subcommittee may have some
additional questions of witnesses. We ask you to respond to
those in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, the record will
be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
Again, thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John T. Watts
Question 1. In recent months, there have been a number of attacks
targeting activists and bloggers, as well as violence toward non-Muslim
individuals in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and other countries in the
region. The cruel murder of a locally-hired employee of USAID and the
founding editor of Bangladesh's only LGBT magazine, Xulhaz Mannan, this
past weekend only serves to further highlight the growing tolerance for
violent discrimination. These attacks have understandably caused
writers and journalists to become hesitant in publishing work that
would attract attention from potential assailants.
How is the United States assisting in protecting freedoms of speech
and assembly in Bangladesh and neighboring countries?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. As with so many other states, Bangladesh's current
political climate and increasing human rights restrictions have pushed
many in the public to seek violent solutions, including extremist
ideologies.
How is the United States addressing the root causes of this
violence and working with Bangladesh to bring warring political
factions together to negotiate a peaceful settlement, allowing it to
successfully counter external extremist organizations, such as ISIL,
from gaining a foothold in the country?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. In many cases in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle
East, the cruel and harsh treatment within prisons has essentially
acted as an incubator for radicalization among inmates. Some countries,
such as France, have sought to address this issue by isolating
prisoners suspected of being radicalized; however, many experts believe
this does not effectively address the issue of radicalization.
What methods should countries employ to reduce the possibility of
radicalization inside prisons? Are countries in Southeast Asia making
efforts to restructure their prisons or address the potential for
radicalization within prisons?
Question 3b. Are there any case studies in which countries can use
as a template for success to reduce radicalization through
rehabilitation and educational activities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Patrick M. Skinner
Question 1. In recent months, there have been a number of attacks
targeting activists and bloggers, as well as violence toward non-Muslim
individuals in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and other countries in the
region. The cruel murder of a locally-hired employee of USAID and the
founding editor of Bangladesh's only LGBT magazine, Xulhaz Mannan, this
past weekend only serves to further highlight the growing tolerance for
violent discrimination. These attacks have understandably caused
writers and journalists to become hesitant in publishing work that
would attract attention from potential assailants.
How is the United States assisting in protecting freedoms of speech
and assembly in Bangladesh and neighboring countries?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. As with so many other states, Bangladesh's current
political climate and increasing human rights restrictions have pushed
many in the public to seek violent solutions, including extremist
ideologies.
How is the United States addressing the root causes of this
violence and working with Bangladesh to bring warring political
factions together to negotiate a peaceful settlement, allowing it to
successfully counter external extremist organizations, such as ISIL,
from gaining a foothold in the country?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. In many cases in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle
East, the cruel and harsh treatment within prisons has essentially
acted as an incubator for radicalization among inmates. Some countries,
such as France, have sought to address this issue by isolating
prisoners suspected of being radicalized; however, many experts believe
this does not effectively address the issue of radicalization.
What methods should countries employ to reduce the possibility of
radicalization inside prisons? Are countries in Southeast Asia making
efforts to restructure their prisons or address the potential for
radicalization within prisons?
Question 3b. Are there any case studies in which countries can use
as a template for success to reduce radicalization through
rehabilitation and educational activities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Supna Zaidi Peery
Question 1. In recent months, there have been a number of attacks
targeting activists and bloggers, as well as violence toward non-Muslim
individuals in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and other countries in the
region. The cruel murder of a locally-hired employee of USAID and the
founding editor of Bangladesh's only LGBT magazine, Xulhaz Mannan, this
past weekend only serves to further highlight the growing tolerance for
violent discrimination. These attacks have understandably caused
writers and journalists to become hesitant in publishing work that
would attract attention from potential assailants.
How is the United States assisting in protecting freedoms of speech
and assembly in Bangladesh and neighboring countries?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. As with so many other states, Bangladesh's current
political climate and increasing human rights restrictions have pushed
many in the public to seek violent solutions, including extremist
ideologies.
How is the United States addressing the root causes of this
violence and working with Bangladesh to bring warring political
factions together to negotiate a peaceful settlement, allowing it to
successfully counter external extremist organizations, such as ISIL,
from gaining a foothold in the country?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. In many cases in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle
East, the cruel and harsh treatment within prisons has essentially
acted as an incubator for radicalization among inmates. Some countries,
such as France, have sought to address this issue by isolating
prisoners suspected of being radicalized; however, many experts believe
this does not effectively address the issue of radicalization.
What methods should countries employ to reduce the possibility of
radicalization inside prisons? Are countries in Southeast Asia making
efforts to restructure their prisons or address the potential for
radicalization within prisons?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. Are there any case studies in which countries can use
as a template for success to reduce radicalization through
rehabilitation and educational activities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Joseph Chinyong
Liow
Question 1. In recent months, there have been a number of attacks
targeting activists and bloggers, as well as violence toward non-Muslim
individuals in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and other countries in the
region. The cruel murder of a locally-hired employee of USAID and the
founding editor of Bangladesh's only LGBT magazine, Xulhaz Mannan, this
past weekend only serves to further highlight the growing tolerance for
violent discrimination. These attacks have understandably caused
writers and journalists to become hesitant in publishing work that
would attract attention from potential assailants.
How is the United States assisting in protecting freedoms of speech
and assembly in Bangladesh and neighboring countries?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. As with so many other states, Bangladesh's current
political climate and increasing human rights restrictions have pushed
many in the public to seek violent solutions, including extremist
ideologies.
How is the United States addressing the root causes of this
violence and working with Bangladesh to bring warring political
factions together to negotiate a peaceful settlement, allowing it to
successfully counter external extremist organizations, such as ISIL,
from gaining a foothold in the country?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. In many cases in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle
East, the cruel and harsh treatment within prisons has essentially
acted as an incubator for radicalization among inmates. Some countries,
such as France, have sought to address this issue by isolating
prisoners suspected of being radicalized; however, many experts believe
this does not effectively address the issue of radicalization.
What methods should countries employ to reduce the possibility of
radicalization inside prisons? Are countries in Southeast Asia making
efforts to restructure their prisons or address the potential for
radicalization within prisons?
Answer. In the case of Southeast Asia, the problem is not so much
harsh treatment of prisoners as it is the ease with which radical
clerics have been allowed to mix with ``gen pop.'' Radicals are not
separated from common criminals, and because of the availability of
free time and the religious stature of some of these clerics, they are
allowed not only to mingle but to preach to ``gen pop.'' This creates
conditions for recruitment. Another problem is the lack of training for
wardens and prison officers. What we have is a situation where prison
officers are not checking visitors carefully. This means that
struggling radical material as well as cellphones (which allows
prisoners access to internet and various sources of radical propaganda)
into prisons is very easy. Finally, corruption is a perennial problem.
The United States should consider playing a more active role in
providing professional training for prison officers, and funding for
the creation of more separate facilities for radicals (there already
are some, but Indonesia in particular needs more).
Question 3b. Are there any case studies in which countries can use
as a template for success to reduce radicalization through
rehabilitation and educational activities?
Answer. Singapore is widely seen as one of the success stories of
deradicalisation and religious rehabilitation, where the recidivism
rate is low. However, we should be mindful of the special circumstances
in Singapore, namely, a strong state apparatus and a smaller
geographical space which makes it more difficult for radicals to sneak
beneath the radar.
Question 4a. A major hindrance to U.S. assistance in Southeast Asia
can be attributed to lack of anti-terrorist and anti-corruption
legislation. Malaysia is enacting legislation for The Prevention of
Terrorism Act.
Can you expand upon the logistics of this act, and its
effectiveness?
Answer. The Prevention of Terrorism Act or POTA was proposed to
eliminate potential threats of violence through any acts relating to
terrorism. More specifically, due to the alarming threat of Malaysians
joining ISIS. Any persons who fall under suspicion of terrorist
activities can be detained, without warrant, up to a maximum time of 60
days by the police. Under the approval of Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King)
appointed 5-to-8-member Prevention of Terrorism board this can be
extended for up to 2 years at a time. Any person who is arrested shall
be presented to the magistrate within 24 hours unless released earlier.
The previous Internal Security Act or ISA allowed initial detention
of 60 days with unlimited renewals based solely on the will of the Home
Minister. POTA has the same 60-day initial detention period as the ISA
but with possible extensions of up to 2 years at a time relying on the
executive power of the Prevention of Terrorism Board. There is also the
inclusion of an electronic monitoring device that will be used to keep
track of a suspect's location. The fact that under POTA executive
powers of detention rest on the appointed board rather than police has
led the Malaysian government to claim that POTA is different from the
ISA. But it does herald a return of detention without trial in
Malaysia, an issue of particular sensitivity given how such legislation
can be, and has been, used against political opposition in the past.
The major concern over POTA, like the ISA, is that it gives police and
the appointed board the power to detain suspects without warrant or
judicial review for an extended period of time. Though both POTA and
SOSMA state ``No person shall be arrested and detained solely for his
political belief or political activity'', this only refers to parties
registered under the Societies Act. Some people therefore believe that
POTA could be used more widely than at first anticipated.
Question 4b. Does this act give way to an increase in U.S.
assistance?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]