[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSTAYING THEIR WELCOME: NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS POSED BY VISA
OVERSTAYS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-75
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Loretta Sanchez, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Brian Higgins, New York
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Norma J. Torres, California
Will Hurd, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Kris Carlson, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security.............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. John Wagner, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
Mr. Craig C. Healy, Assistant Director for National Security
Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Ms. Kelli Ann Burriesci, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Screening
Coordination Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Mr. Robert P. Burns, Deputy Director, Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Science and Technology Directorate,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
OVERSTAYING THEIR WELCOME: NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS POSED BY VISA
OVERSTAYS
----------
Tuesday, June 14, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McSally, Smith, Duncan, Barletta,
Hurd, Vela, Jackson Lee, and Torres.
Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine DHS's
entry-exit and visa overstay efforts.
Before we begin today, I would ask that we observe a moment
of silence to honor those killed and wounded in the terror
attack in Orlando.
Thank you. Our thoughts and prayers go out to the victims'
families of this terrible tragedy.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Border security naturally evokes images of the hot Arizona
desert, dusty border roads, agents, and green fencing and
camera towers. But a broader view of border security recognizes
that there is more than just security along the Southwest
Border to consider. Time and time again terrorists have
exploited the visa system by legally entering America.
The 9/11 Commission put it this way: ``For a terrorist,
travel documents are as important as weapons.'' The
commission's focus on travel documents is not surprising. Since
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, terrorists have abused the
hospitality of the American people to conduct attacks here at
home.
Mahmud Abouhalima, an Egyptian convicted of the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, worked illegally in the United States as
a cab driver after his tourist visa had expired. At least 4 of
the
9/11 hijackers overstayed their visas or were out of status, a
missed opportunity to disrupt the attacks that killed nearly
3,000 of our fellow Americans.
Among the most important weaknesses the attackers exploited
was the porous outer ring of border security. The hijackers
passed through the U.S. border security a combined total of 68
times without arousing any suspicion. More recently, Amine El
Khalifi attempted to conduct a suicide attack on the U.S.
Capitol in 2012. He had been in the country since 1999 on a
tourist visa but never left.
Another man, arrested in the aftermath in the Boston
Marathon bombing, who helped destroy evidence, was able to
return to the United States despite being out of status on his
student visa.
Clearly visa security is an important element of keeping
the homeland secure. To put the National security risks in
perspective, a widely cited 2006 Pew Hispanic Center Study
indicated that as many as 40 percent of all illegal aliens who
come into our country do not cross the desert in Arizona,
California, or Texas, but come through the front door at our
land, sea, and air ports of entry with permission and then
overstay their welcome.
Earlier this year the Department of Homeland Security
released a visa overstay report demonstrating the visa overstay
problem may be much worse than previously thought. In fiscal
year 2015 fewer people were apprehended by the U.S. Border
Patrol than overstayed their visas and are suspected of still
being in the country, making the estimate closer to 68 percent
of those illegally in the United States.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. McSally. We have a graphic up there, a little bit of
math to--where did it go? It was up there--to show what we are
talking about here. If you think about, again, we have a 54
percent effective rate, you have got to do a little math--for
those who are apprehended, therefore those we think were got-
aways. Then if you look at that, so that is 223,000 got-aways,
but visa overstays in 2015: 482,000.
So the unlawful presence is up to 705,000 just based on
these 2 numbers. So that actually calculates a 68 percent
unlawful presence rate that are visa overstays versus coming
over the border. Again, these are estimates based on got-aways,
so, you know, it is only as good as those assumptions.
But still, the point is we spend a lot of time focusing on
the Southern Border, as we should, but there is also another
problem here. We have unlawful presence in our United States
from the visa overstays, and that is what we are focusing on
today.
I am concerned that there are unidentified National
security and public safety risks in a population that large,
which has historically been the primary means for terrorist
entry to the United States. In order to tackle the challenge,
the Department has to first identify those who overstay their
visa in the first place.
A mandate to electronically track entries and exits from
the country has been in place for more than 20 years, and a
mandate for a biometrically-based entry-exit system has been a
requirement for 12 years. Since 2003, we made substantial
progress adding biometrics to the entry process, and we now
take fingerprints and photographs of most visitors entering on
a visa.
But CBP has made, in fits and starts, only marginal
progress when it comes to biometric exit. There have been a
series of exit pilot projects at Nation's air, land, and sea
ports over the last 10 years, but no plan has ever been
implemented for a biometric exit capability. None of it was
seriously considered by CBP and the Department.
CBP is now engaged in a series of operational experiments,
such as the use of mobile devices with biometric readers
designed to support a future biometric exit system. In fact,
until very recently the political will to make biometric exit a
priority was really missing from the Department and CBP.
Thankfully, it appears the Department has finally turned this
corner.
Secretary Johnson has now committed to a 2018 rollout of an
operational biometric exit system at the Nation's highest-
volume airports, an ambitious time line, but long overdue.
Congress has recently provided a steady funding stream in the
form of new fees that will enable CBP to make investments to
bring this system on-line.
Putting a biometric exit system in place, as the 9/11
Commission noted: ``An essential investment in our National
security,'' because without a viable biometric exit system,
visa holders can overstay their visa and disappear into the
United States, just as 4 of the
9/11 hijackers were able to do.
Once we identify overstays, especially those who present
National security and public safety threats, we must dedicate
resources necessary to properly remove those in the country
illegally; otherwise we put our citizens at risk unnecessarily.
Yet even as we dedicate scarce resources to pursue this small
subset of overstays, up to 25 percent of this group was found
to have already departed the United States after ICE special
agents conducted full field investigations. We are spending too
much time chasing our tails.
Adding a reliable exit system will be an immediate force
multiplier, allows our National security professionals to focus
their efforts on preventing terrorist attacks. Doing so
mitigates the chance that visitors can stay in the country
beyond their period of admission and reduces the terrorist
threat in the process.
The American people need to know answers to these simple
questions. How many more overstays are out there who pose a
serious threat to the security of our homeland? Can
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement quickly identify and
remove these overstays to mitigate substantial National
security risks?
I look forward to receiving answers to these important
questions and to discuss the witnesses' efforts to address the
challenges of visa overstays.
[The statement of Chairwoman McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally
June 14, 2016
Border security naturally evokes images of the hot Arizona desert,
dusty border roads, agents in green, fencing and camera towers. But a
broader view of border security recognizes that there is more than just
security along the Southwest Border to consider.
Time and time again, terrorists have exploited the visa system by
legally entering America. The 9/11 Commission put it this way: ``For
terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.''
The Commission's focus on travel documents is not surprising. Since
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, terrorists have abused the
hospitality of the American people to conduct attacks here at home.
Mahmud Abouhalima, an Egyptian convicted of the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, worked illegally in the United States as a cab driver
after his tourist visa had expired.
At least 4 of the 9/11 hijackers overstayed their visas, or were
out of status--a missed opportunity to disrupt the attacks that killed
nearly 3,000 of our fellow Americans.
And among the most important weaknesses the attackers exploited was
the porous ``outer ring of border security.'' The hijackers passed
through U.S. border security a combined total of 68 times without
arousing suspicion.
More recently, Amine el-Khalifi attempted to conduct a suicide
attack on the U.S. Capitol in 2012. He had been in the country since
1999 on a tourist visa, but never left.
Another man, arrested in the aftermath of Boston Marathon bombing
who helped destroy evidence, was able to return to the United States
despite being out of status on his student visa.
Clearly, visa security is an important element of keeping the
homeland secure.
To put the National security risks in perspective, a widely-cited
2006 Pew Hispanic Center Study, indicated as many as 40% of all illegal
aliens who come into our country do not cross the desert in Arizona,
but come in through the ``front door'' at our land, sea, and air ports
of entry, with permission, and then overstay their welcome.
Earlier this year, the Department of Homeland Security released a
visa overstay report demonstrating the visa overstay problem may be
much worse than previously thought. In fiscal year 2015, fewer people
were apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol, than overstayed their visas
and are suspected of still being in the country, making the estimate
closer to 60% of those illegally in the United States.
I am concerned that there are unidentified National security and
public safety risks in a population that large, which has historically
been the primary means for terrorist entry into the United States.
In order to tackle the challenge, the Department has to first
identify those who overstay their visa in the first place. A mandate to
electronically track entries and exits from the country has been in
place for more than 20 years, and a mandate for a biometrically-based
entry-exit system has been a requirement for 12 years.
Since 2003, we made substantial progress adding biometrics to the
entry process and we now take fingerprints and photographs of most
visitors entering on a visa.
But CBP has made, in fits and starts, only marginal progress when
it comes to biometric exit. There have been a series of exit pilot
projects at the Nation's air, land, and sea ports over the last 10
years, but no plan to ever implement a biometric exit capability was
seriously considered by CBP and the Department.
CBP is now engaged in a series of operational experiments, such as
the use of mobile devices with biometric readers, designed to support a
future biometric exit system. In fact, until very recently, the
political will to make biometric exit a priority was missing from
Department and CBP leadership. Thankfully, it appears that the
Department has finally turned a corner.
Secretary Johnson has now committed to a 2018 roll-out of an
operational biometric exit system at the Nation's highest volume
airports--an ambitious time line, but long overdue. And Congress has
recently provided a steady funding stream, in the form of new fees that
will enable CBP to make investments to bring the system on-line.
Putting a biometric exit system in place is, as the 9/11 Commission
noted, ``an essential investment in our National security,'' because
without a viable biometric exit system, visa holders can overstay their
visa, and disappear into the United States; just as 4 of the 9/11
hijackers were able to do.
And once we identify overstays, especially those who present
National security and public safety threats, we must dedicate the
resources necessary to promptly remove those in the country illegally--
otherwise we put our citizens at risk unnecessarily.
Yet, even as we dedicate scarce resources to pursue this small sub-
set of overstays, up to 25% of this group was found to have already
departed the United States after ICE Special Agents conducted full
field investigations. We are spending too much time chasing our tails.
Adding a reliable exit system will be an immediate force multiplier
that allows National security professionals to focus their efforts on
preventing terrorist attacks. Doing so mitigates the chance that
visitors can stay in the country beyond their period of admission--and
reduces the terrorist threat in the process.
The American people need to know answers to these simple questions:
How many more overstays are out there who pose a serious
threat to the security of the homeland?
Can Immigration and Customs Enforcement quickly identify and
remove visa overstays to mitigate the substantial National
security risks?
I look forward receiving answers to these important questions, and
to discuss their efforts to address of the challenge of visa overstays.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Vela. I thank Chairman McSally for holding today's
hearing on the National security risks posed by visa overstays.
Before we begin, I want to express my sympathies to the
families of those lost in the attack in Orlando this weekend,
and my prayers are with those injured in the tragedy.
I expect to learn more about the National security
implications of this attack at a House-wide briefing with
Secretary Jeh Johnson later today, but hope that the witnesses
before us can touch briefly on the role of the Department and
its components related to this terrible incident.
With respect to the topic before the subcommittee today, I
am pleased we are addressing the overstay issue. While Congress
has in recent years paid a great deal of attention to securing
our Southern Border, and rightfully so, less attention has been
focused on successfully addressing visa overstays. The
approximately 527,000 individuals who overstayed in fiscal year
2015 is a far greater number than the 331,000 individuals who
were apprehended along the U.S.-Mexico border that year,
illustrating the scope of the overstay problem.
As a Member of Congress representing a district along our
Southern Border, I understand the challenges related to
deploying a biometric exit system at ports of entry. Our
Nation's airports and seaports were not built for exit control,
nor were our land borders, certainly.
Overcoming these infrastructure and technology challenges
is an integral part of DHS's task. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses about what progress CBP and DHS S&T have
made toward addressing these challenges as well as what their
plans are for fulfilling the Secretary's commitment to begin
deploying biometric exit at airports by 2018.
I hope to hear about how the Department plans to address
biometric exit at our land borders, particularly with Mexico.
Unlike Canada, Mexico currently does not have the entry
infrastructure, technology, and processes necessary to share
traveler information with the United States. Whatever the
ultimate solution, DHS must ensure it does slow the legitimate
travel and trade that is so important to communities like those
I represent.
I hope to hear from ICE about how it prioritizes
individuals who have overstayed and may pose a National
security or public safety threat. With limited resources, we
must first address those who may do us harm. Deploying
biometric exit at ports of entry and addressing overstays is no
easy task but it is a necessary part of ensuring meaningful
border security.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today and yield back
the balance of my time.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to be joined by 4 distinguished witnesses to
discuss this important topic today. Mr. John Wagner is the
deputy assistant commissioner for CBP's Office of Field
Operations. Mr. Wagner formerly served as executive director of
admissibility and passenger programs, with responsibility for
all traveler admissibility-related policies and programs,
including the Trusted Traveler Program, the Electronic System
for Travel Authorization, the Immigration Advisory Program, and
the Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit.
Mr. Craig Healy is the assistant director for National
security and investigations at ICE's Homeland Security and
Investigations Division. Mr. Healy began his career in public
service with the United States Marine Corps and served as a
U.S. Customs Officer before joining ICE. In 2003, Mr. Healy
served with the first group of U.S. Federal special agents
entering Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has
served at ICE Headquarters since 2010.
Ms. Kelli Ann Burriesci is the deputy assistant secretary
for screening coordination office at the Department of Homeland
Security. In this role, Ms. Burriesci is responsible for
developing and coordinating the Department's screening
policies, including the Visa Waiver Program in the Real ID
Program. Before joining DHS, Ms. Burriesci was working in the
private sector focusing on identity management programs and
Federal personnel identity verification credentials.
Mr. Bob Burns is the deputy director for Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency for DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate. As deputy director, he manages the
resources and technical direction of the APEX Technology Engine
Program and guides business community outreach initiatives.
Mr. Burns was previously the director for Air Entry-Exit
Re-engineering Project from February 2013 until December 2014.
He led S&T in a partnership with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection to enhance both air entry and exit processes by
developing and implementing technologies for use in exiting
airport inspecting and examination operations for travelers
entering the United States.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wagner for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN WAGNER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Wagner. Morning.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today to discuss Customs and Border Protection's
progress in incorporating biometrics into our exit operations,
especially as it pertains to identifying travelers who may have
overstayed their authorized period of admission in the United
States.
Since assuming the responsibility for the DHS entry-exit
policy in 2013, CBP has been actively moving forward on several
initiatives I will discuss today.
I would like to begin by briefly discussing how we collect
current arrival and departure data from foreign visitors. In
the air and sea environments, CBP requires that carriers
provide manifests containing biographic information on all
passengers, which we run against numerous law enforcement and
intelligence databases and automated targeting systems to
identify and, if necessary, address and potential risks as far
advance of travel as possible.
Now, when that traveler arrives in the United States they
present their passport to the CBP Officer, who confirms the
validity of the document, the accuracy of the carrier's
manifest information, and for foreign nationals fingerprints
are collected and a digital photograph is also collected.
If the traveler has a visa we compare those fingerprints
against what the State Department collected at the embassy to
make sure it is the same person. If they are traveling under
the Visa Waiver Program we collect a set of 10 fingerprints,
and if we have seen them previously we compare them against the
previous visit.
The CPB Officer also reviews all the results of the pre-
arrival biographic and biometric vetting to ensure that there
are no previous violations, active warrants, or any other risk
factors that will determine whether we need a further
inspection. Before admitting the person, we interview the
traveler to determine the purpose and the intent of travel. We
then stamp the passport and write the period of admission into
the passport as well as record that in our automated system.
Now, when that same person leaves the United States we
again receive a biographic manifest information from the
carrier and run this against the same law enforcement and
intelligence databases. This allows us to create a departure
record from the traveler once the airlines confirm that person
has boarded the flight. It is through this exit process that
CBP apprehended the Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, who
was attempting to depart JFK in 2010.
In fact, last year CBP arrested 379 airport passengers with
outstanding NCIC warrants as result of departure manifests
provided by the carriers.
Now, we use this arrival and departure information to
generate overstay lists on a daily basis. It is important to
point out that determining lawful status can be more
complicated than simply matching entry and exit data. For
example, a person may receive a 6-month admission period at a
time of entry but then apply for and receive an extension,
which is relevant to determining if that person is truly an
overstay or not. Therefore, overstay lists need to be carefully
correlated against other DHS systems and organizations.
The overstay lists are run through our automated targeting
system. We apply ICE-defined criteria and prioritize these
records. That information is then provided to ICE for
appropriate action.
Now, the overstay report, along with the comprehensive
entry-exit plan we provided to Congress in April, articulates
the foundation for incorporating biometrics into the exit
aspect of our system. The biographic information we are using
today is actionable, but it can certainly be enhanced with the
addition of a biometric upon departure in order to validate and
confirm the information we are acting upon.
Now, unlike past attempts to deploy a biometric exit
system, the challenge that remains is not so much the
technology as it is the infrastructure, as Mr. Vela pointed
out. Our ports of entry were not designed to have departure-
control processing. Unlike for arrivals, there is no exclusive
and designated space for departure controls. International
departures share gates with domestic traffic.
So where the biometric collection takes place is critical.
Placing the technology too far in advance of the departure
process, such as at a TSA checkpoint or the airline check-in
counter, would not provide assurances that the person who
provided the data actually boarded the plane and left. In this
case, we would end up nearly defaulting to the biographic
manifest data, which is exactly the same system that we have in
place today.
So in preparing for deploying biometric exit we have
launched several pilots, which were mentioned earlier: Did the
facial comparison at JFK and Dulles, and we did a pedestrian
pilot at Otay Mesa in California, and we did the handheld pilot
at 10 airports across the country.
Now, starting yesterday we commenced a pilot in Atlanta,
Georgia at the airport in testing the ability of our
information systems to compare facial images of travelers
departing the United States against previously provided images
by those travelers. This is done in an automoted fashion
without impacting airport operations.
This is our logical next step in building on our previous
pilots that focused on the collection in matching front-end
efforts. This pilot is now integrating this data into our back-
end systems. It is not another layered-on process, and it is
critical to getting the airlines' and airports' cooperation, as
we can incorporate this into their existing business processes.
The analysis of this test will provide the final set of
specifications and requirements for the biometric exit
procurement to be released in early 2017 to provide the best
technologies that meet our mission needs for the biometric exit
system.
So as law enforcement professionals we see that biometric
technology on departure has the potential to provide a critical
layer of data verification and security to our existing
biographic system. We will continue our close collaboration
with the Department and ICE in the development and the
implementation of the biometric exit concepts. We will continue
to work closely with our private industry partners, including
the airlines and airports who are essential to the successful
deployment and development of these solutions.
So thank you again for the opportunity to appear today, and
I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Wagner, Mr. Healy, Ms.
Burriesci, and Mr. Burns follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of John Wagner, Craig C. Healy, Kelli Ann
Burriesci, and Robert P. Burns
June 14, 2016
introduction
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to
discuss the progress the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
making to incorporate biometrics into our comprehensive entry/exit
system and to identify, report, and address overstays in support of our
border security and immigration enforcement missions.
As recently as 13 years ago, the process of matching entry and exit
data was extremely difficult. DHS legacy agencies relied on a mostly
paper-based system to track arrivals and departures to and from the
United States. There was no biometric collection, beyond photographs,
by the Department of State (DOS) for visa applicants, nor for
individuals seeking admission to the United States. Until 2008, myriad
documents were accepted at land borders as evidence of identity and
citizenship for admission or entry, and passenger information was
provided voluntarily by air carriers. There was very limited pre-
departure screening of passengers seeking to fly to the United States.
Overall, these factors provided for only a limited ability to detect
violations of immigration law based on overstaying a lawful admission
period.
Over the last decade, with the support of Congress and our
interagency and international partners, DHS--particularly through the
combined efforts of the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T),
National Protection and Program Directorate's Office of Biometric
Identity Management (OBIM), Office of Policy (PLCY), U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE)--has significantly enhanced its capability to record arrivals and
departures from the United States, detect overstays, and interdict
threats. DHS has dramatically reduced the number of documents that can
be used for entry to the United States, which in turn strengthened
DHS's ability to quickly and accurately collect biographic information
on all admissions to the United States and check that data against
criminal and terrorist watch lists, and other Government sources, such
as immigration databases. This advancement has been particularly
significant at land borders through the implementation of the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative. In the air and sea environments,
individuals undergo rigorous vetting before boarding an air or sea
carrier for travel to the United States. Since 9/11, agencies have
improved information sharing regarding known or suspected terrorists,
including creation of the consolidated Terrorist Watch List through the
Terrorist Screening Database. We have also worked closely with our
foreign partners to deepen bilateral and international information
sharing to enhance the depth and quality of our information holdings.
Presently, we collect biometrics for most nonimmigrant foreign
nationals \1\ and check them against terrorist watch lists prior to the
issuance of a visa or lawful entry to the United States. Furthermore,
we have developed new capabilities and enhanced existing systems, such
as the Automated Targeting System (ATS), to help identify possible
terrorists and others who seek to travel to the United States to do
harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The following categories of aliens currently are expressly
exempt from biometric requirements by DHS regulations: Aliens admitted
on an A-1, A-2, C-3 (except for attendants, servants, or personal
employees of accredited officials), G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO-2,
NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6 visa; Children under the age of 14;
Persons over the age of 79; Taiwan officials admitted on an E-1 visa
and members of their immediate families admitted on E-1 visas. 8 CFR
235.1(f)(1)(iv); and certain Canadian citizens seeking admission as B
nonimmigrants per 8 CFR 235.1(f)(1)(ii). In addition, the Secretary of
State and Secretary of Homeland Security may jointly exempt classes of
aliens from US-VISIT. The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security,
as well as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, also may
exempt any individual from US-VISIT. 8 CFR 235.1(f)(1)(iv)(B).
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Today, DHS manages an entry/exit system in the air and sea
environments that incorporates both biometric and biographic
components. Applying a risk-based approach, the Department is now able,
on a daily basis, to identify and target for enforcement action those
individuals who represent a public safety and/or National security
threat among visitors who have overstayed the validity period of their
admission. Moreover, with the recent support of Congress in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, (Pub. L. No. 114-113), and as
described in the Comprehensive Biometric Entry/Exit Plan provided to
Congress in April 2016, DHS is continuing to move forward in further
developing a biometric exit system that can be integrated in the
current architecture to enhance this capability.
In the past 4 years, substantial improvements to DHS travel and
immigration data systems, coupled with targeted immigration enforcement
efforts, have strengthened the security of our borders and enhanced our
ability to identify, prioritize, and address foreign nationals who
overstay their lawful period of admission. As a result of these
improvements, DHS was able for the first time to publish the Entry/Exit
Overstay Report, for fiscal year 2015, on January 19, 2016. We expect
to expand this report in future years as data and analytic capabilities
continue to improve. Enhanced data analysis and reporting capabilities,
in conjunction with biographic overstay data from CBP, enables ICE to
identify and initiate enforcement actions on overstay violators using a
prioritization framework focused on individuals who may pose National
security or public safety concerns. Both ICE and CBP are taking steps
to further enhance visa overstay enforcement efforts.
existing dhs entry and exit data collection
A biographic-based entry/exit system is one that matches the
personally identifying information on an individual's passport or other
travel document presented when he or she arrives to and departs from
the United States. The biographic data contained in the traveler's
passport includes name, date of birth, document information, and
country of citizenship. By comparison, a biometric entry/exit system
matches a biometric attribute unique to an individual (i.e.,
fingerprints, a facial image, or iris image).
How DHS Collects Arrival Information
For instances in which an individual requires a visa to enter the
United States, biometric and biographic information is captured at the
time his or her visa application is filed with DOS, along with
supporting information developed during an interview with a consular
officer. For certain visa categories, the individual will have already
provided biographic information via a petition filed with U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) as well. For individuals
seeking to travel to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program
(VWP), biographic information is captured from an intending traveler
when they apply for an Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA).\2\ If the individual is authorized for travel with an ESTA
following the required security checks, an individual is able to travel
to the United States under the VWP. Biometric information will be
captured at the U.S. port of entry (POE), where the traveler will also
be interviewed by a CBP Officer.
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\2\ ESTA collects biographic data and screens passengers against
various law enforcement and intelligence databases. ESTA has digitized
the Form I-94 (Arrival/Departure Record) for authorized travelers from
participating VWP countries.
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In the air and sea environment, DHS receives passenger manifests
submitted by commercial and private aircraft operators and commercial
sea carriers, which include every individual who actually boarded the
plane or ship bound for the United States. This information is
collected in DHS's Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and all
non-U.S. citizen data is then sent to the Arrival and Departure
Information System (ADIS), where it is stored for matching against
departure records.
As part of CBP's pre-departure strategy, and throughout the
international travel cycle, CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC)
continuously vets and analyzes passenger information, including visas
and VWP ESTA authorizations. In addition to vetting achieved through
DOS's visa application and adjudication processes, the NTC conducts
continuous vetting of nonimmigrant U.S. visas and ESTA authorizations
that have been issued, revoked, and/or denied. This continuous vetting
ensures new information that impacts a traveler's admissibility is
identified in near-real-time, allowing CBP to immediately determine
whether to provide a ``no board'' recommendation to a carrier,
recommend that DOS revoke the visa, revoke the ESTA authorization, or,
for persons already within the United States, notify law enforcement
agencies or other appropriate entities. CBP devotes its resources to
identifying the highest threats, including those travelers who may not
have been previously identified by law enforcement or the intelligence
community due to the newness of the derogatory information.
When a nonimmigrant arrives at a U.S. POE and applies for admission
to the United States, a CBP Officer interviews the traveler regarding
the purpose and intent of travel, reviews his or her documentation, and
runs law enforcement checks. If applicable,\3\ CBP collects and matches
biometrics against previously collected data and stores this data
within OBIM's Automated Biometric Information System (IDENT). If
admission is granted, the CBP Officer will stamp the traveler's
passport with a date indicating the traveler's authorized period of
admission. Based on electronic information already in DHS's systems,
CBP electronically generates a Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record that
the traveler can print remotely to provide evidence of legal entry or
status in the United States. The form also indicates how long the
individual is authorized to stay in the United States.
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\3\ See Footnote 1.
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How DHS Collects Departure Information
The United States has a fully functioning biographic exit system in
the air and sea environments. Similar to the entry process, DHS also
collects APIS passenger manifests submitted by commercial and private
aircraft operators and commercial sea carriers departing the United
States. Carriers and operators are required to report biographic and
travel document information to DHS for those individuals who are
physically present on the aircraft or sea vessel at the time of
departure from the United States and not simply for those who have made
a reservation or are scheduled to be on board. Since 2005, collection
of this information has been mandatory, and compliance by carriers is
near 100 percent. DHS monitors APIS transmissions to ensure compliance
and, if needed, issues fines for noncompliance on a monthly basis. CBP
transfers this data (excluding data for U.S. citizens) to ADIS, which
matches arrival and departure records to and from the United States.\4\
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\4\ DHS uses this information for a variety of immigration and law
enforcement reasons, including to determine which travelers have
potentially stayed past their authorized period of admission (i.e.,
overstayed) in the United States.
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At the Northern land border, as part of the Beyond the Border
Action Plan,\5\ the United States and Canada are implementing a
biographic exchange of traveler records that constitutes a partial land
border exit system on our shared border. Today, traveler records for
all lawful permanent residents and non-citizens of the United States
and Canada who enter either country through land POEs on the Northern
Border are exchanged in such a manner that land entries into one
country serve as exit records from the other. The current match rate of
Canadian records for travelers leaving the United States for Canada
against U.S. entry records for nonimmigrants is over 98 percent. In
April 2016, Canada reaffirmed its commitment to the United States to
complete the program to include all travelers who cross the Northern
Border. Canada will need to complete passage of additional legislation
to facilitate this, which is expected to happen in late 2016.
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\5\ United States-Canada Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for
Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, Action Plan, Dec.
2011. Accessible at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/us-
canada_btb_action_plan3.pdf.
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Although the Southwest land border does not currently have the same
capabilities and infrastructure as the Northern Border, DHS obtains
exit data along the Southwest Border through ``pulse and surge''
operations,\6\ which provide some outbound departure information on
some travelers departing the United States and entering Mexico. The
Department is seeking to work with Mexico to develop the best methods
of obtaining data from travelers departing the United States through
the Southwest land border.
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\6\ ``Pulse and Surge'' operations are strategies whereby CBP
Officers and agents monitor outbound traffic on the U.S.-Mexico border.
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addressing overstays
This integrated approach to collecting entry and exit data supports
the Nation's ability to identify and address overstays. CBP identifies
two types of overstays--those individuals who appear to have remained
in the United States beyond their period of admission (Suspected In-
Country Overstay), and those individuals whose departure was recorded
after their lawful admission period expired (Out-of-Country Overstay).
The overstay identification process is conducted by consolidating
arrival, departure, and immigration status adjustment information to
generate a complete picture of individuals traveling to the United
States. This process extends beyond our physical borders to include a
number of steps that may occur well before a visitor enters the United
States through a land, air, or sea POE and up to the point at which
that same visitor departs the United States.
CBP's ADIS identifies and transmits potential overstays to CBP's
Automated Targeting System (ATS) on a daily basis, which screens them
against derogatory information, prioritizes them, and sends them to
ICE's lead management system, LeadTrac,\7\ which retains them for
review and vetting by analysts.
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\7\ LeadTrac is an ICE system designed to receive overstay leads to
compare against other DHS systems and Classified datasets to uncover
potential National security or public safety concerns for referral to
ICE field offices for investigation. The system employs a case
management tracking mechanism to assist with analysis, quality control
reviews, lead status, and field tracking.
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Through specific intelligence and the use of sophisticated data
systems, ICE identifies and tracks available information on millions of
international students, tourists, and other nonimmigrant visa holders
who are present in the United States at any given time. Visa overstays
and other forms of nonimmigrant status violations bring together two
critical areas of ICE's mission-National security and immigration
enforcement.
Enhancing Capabilities
In the past 4 years, DHS has made substantial improvements to
enhance our ability to identify, prioritize, and address confirmed
overstays. DHS system enhancements that have strengthened our
immigration enforcement efforts include:
Improved ADIS and ATS-Passenger (ATS-P) data flow and
processing quality and efficiency, increasing protection of
privacy through secure electronic data transfer.
Extended leverage of existing ATS-P matching algorithms,
improving the accuracy of the overstay list. Additional ADIS
matching improvements are underway to further improve match
confidence.
Developed an operational dashboard for ICE agents that
automatically updates and prioritizes overstay ``Hot
Lists,''\8\ increasing the efficiency of data flow between OBIM
\9\ and ICE.
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\8\ Hot lists are lists of individuals that are prioritized based
on their level of risk.
\9\ OBIM supports DHS components by providing storage and matching
services using its IDENT system and returning any linked information
when a match is made already encountered by DHS to identify known or
suspected terrorists, National security threats, criminals, and those
who have previously violated U.S. immigration laws.
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Implemented an ADIS-to-IDENT interface reducing the number
of records on the overstay list by providing additional and
better quality data to ADIS, closing information gaps between
the 2 systems.
Improved ability of ADIS to match U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services' (USCIS) Computer-Linked Adjudication
Information Management System (CLAIMS 3) data for aliens who
have extended or changed their status lawfully, and therefore
have not overstayed even though their initial period of
authorized admission has expired.
Created a Unified Overstay Case Management process
establishing a data exchange interface between ADIS, ATS-P, and
ICE's LeadTrac system, creating one analyst platform for DHS.
Enhanced ADIS and Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) data exchange to
increase identification, efficiency, and prioritization of TSA
AFSP overstays within the ADIS overstay population.
Enhanced Overstay Hot List, consolidating immigration data
from multiple systems to enable ICE employees to more quickly
and easily identify current and relevant information related to
the overstay subject.
Established User-Defined Rules enabling ICE agents to create
new or update existing rule sets within ATS-P as threats
evolve, so that overstays are prioritized for review and action
based on the most up-to-date threat criteria.
These measures and system enhancements have proven to be valuable
in identifying and addressing overstays. The DHS steps described above
have strengthened data requirements through computer enhancements,
identified National security overstays through increased collaboration
with the intelligence community, and automated manual efforts through
additional data exchange interfaces. DHS is continuing this progress in
fiscal year 2016.
Reporting Overstay Data
On January 19, 2016, DHS released the first Entry/Exit Overstay
Report. This report represents a culmination of the aforementioned
efforts to enhance data collection and address issues precluding
production of the report in prior years. The Entry/Exit Overstay Report
for Fiscal Year 2015 provides data on departures and overstays, by
country, for foreign visitors to the United States who were lawfully
admitted for business (i.e., B-1 and WB classifications) or pleasure
(i.e., B2 and WT classifications) through air or sea POEs, and who were
expected to depart in fiscal year 2015--a population which represents
the vast majority of annual nonimmigrant admissions. In fiscal year
2015, of these nearly 45 million nonimmigrant visitors, DHS calculated
a total overstay rate of 1.17 percent, or 527,127 individuals. In other
words, 98.83 percent of visitors had left the United States on time and
abided by the terms of their admission.
The report breaks the overstay rates down further to provide a
better picture of those overstays, for whom there is no evidence of a
departure or transition to another immigration status. At the end of
fiscal year 2015, there were 482,781 Suspected In-Country Overstays,
resulting in a Suspected In-Country Overstay rate of 1.07 percent.
Due to continuing departures by individuals in this population, by
January 4, 2016, and described in the report, the number of Suspected
In-Country Overstays for fiscal year 2015 had dropped to 416,500,
reducing the Suspected In-Country Overstay rate to 0.9 percent. In
other words, as of January 4, 2016, DHS had been able to confirm the
departures of more than 99 percent of nonimmigrant visitors scheduled
to depart in fiscal year 2015 via air and sea POEs, and that number
continues to grow. Indeed, as of June 6, 2016, the number of Suspected
In-Country Overstays for fiscal year 2015 has further dropped to
355,338, further reducing the Suspected In-Country Overstay rate to
0.79 percent.
For Canada and Mexico, the fiscal year 2015 Suspected In-Country
Overstay rate as of the end of the fiscal year was 1.18 percent of the
7,875,054 expected departures and 1.45 percent of the 2,896,130
expected departures respectively. Consistent with the methodology for
other countries, this represents only travel through air and sea ports
of entry and does not include data on land border crossings.
This report also separates VWP country overstay numbers from non-
VWP country numbers. For VWP countries, the fiscal year 2015 Suspected
In-Country Overstay rate as of the end of the fiscal year was 0.65
percent of the 20,974,390 expected departures. For non-VWP countries,
the fiscal year 2015 Suspected In-Country Overstay rate at the end of
the fiscal year was 1.60 percent of the 13,182,807 expected departures.
DHS is in the process of evaluating whether and to what extent the data
presented in this report will be used to make decisions on the VWP
country designations.
As noted above, these fiscal year 2015 In-Country Overstay rates
continue to decline due to continuing departures by individuals in
these populations.
In partnership with other DHS components, CBP is continuing to
improve ADIS so that additional overstay information can be included in
future reports, including additional visa categories such as the
foreign student and exchange visitor population (F, M, and J
nonimmigrant admission classes) and other nonimmigrant admission
classes (such as H, O, P, Q nonimmigrant admission classes), and
certain land-related overstay populations as determined by our data
exchange with Canada.
Overstay Enforcement in the United States
ICE actively identifies and initiates enforcement action on
overstay violators using a prioritization framework focused on
individuals who may pose National security or public safety concerns,
and consistent with the Department of Homeland Security's November 2014
Civil Enforcement Priorities. ICE's overstay mission is accomplished in
close coordination with CBP, and both agencies are taking steps to
further enhance the visa overstay enforcement efforts described below.
ICE's primary objective is to vet system-generated leads in order
to identify true overstay violators, match any criminal conviction
history or other priority basis, and take appropriate enforcement
actions. Within ICE, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has
dedicated special agents, analysts, and systems in place to address
nonimmigrant overstays. Through investigative efforts, HSI is
responsible for analyzing and determining which overstay leads may be
suitable for further National security and public safety
investigations.
ICE analyzes system-generated leads initially created by, or
matched against the data feed for biographic entry and exit records
stored in CBP's ADIS. ADIS supports the Department's ability to
identify nonimmigrants who have remained in the United States beyond
their authorized periods of admission or have violated the terms and
conditions of their visas. Once the leads are received, ICE conducts
both batch and manual vetting against Government databases, social
media, and public indices. This vetting helps determine if an
individual who overstayed has departed the United States, changed
status or extended a period of stay in the same status, or would be
appropriate for an enforcement action.
As part of a tiered review, HSI prioritizes nonimmigrant overstay
cases through risk-based analysis. HSI's Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) oversees the National program dedicated to
the investigation of nonimmigrant visa violators who may pose a
National security risk. Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records of
hundreds of thousands of potential status violators after preliminary
analysis of data from the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS) and ADIS, along with other information. After this
analysis, CTCEU establishes compliance or departure dates from the
United States and/or determines potential violations that warrant field
investigations.
The CTCEU proactively develops cases for investigation in
furtherance of the overstay mission and monitors the latest threat
reports and proactively addresses emergent issues. This practice, which
is designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting specific risk
factors based on intelligence reporting, travel patterns, and in-depth
criminal research and analysis, has contributed to DHS's
counterterrorism mission by initiating and supporting high-priority
National security initiatives based on specific intelligence.
In order to ensure that those who may pose the greatest threats to
National security are given top priority, ICE uses intelligence-based
criteria developed in close consultation with the intelligence and law
enforcement communities. ICE chairs the Compliance Enforcement Advisory
Panel (CEAP), comprising subject-matter experts from other law
enforcement agencies and members of the intelligence community who
assist the CTCEU in maintaining targeting methods in line with the most
current threat information. The CEAP is convened on a quarterly basis
to discuss recent intelligence developments and update the CTCEU's
targeting framework in order to ensure that the nonimmigrant overstays
and status violators who pose the greatest threats to National security
are targeted.
Another source for overstay and status violation referrals is
CTCEU's Visa Waiver Enforcement Program (VWEP). Visa-free travel to the
United States, especially through the VWP, builds upon our close
bilateral relationships and fosters commercial and individual ties
among tourist and business travelers in the United States and abroad.
VWP participants, the primary source of nonimmigrant visitors from
countries other than Canada and Mexico, currently allows eligible
nationals of 38 countries to travel to the United States without a visa
and, if admitted, to remain in the country for a maximum period of 90
days for tourism or business purposes. Prior to the implementation of
the VWEP in 2008, there was no National program dedicated to addressing
overstays within this population. Today, CTCEU regularly scrutinizes a
refined list of individuals who have been identified as potential
overstays who entered the United States under the VWP. A primary goal
of this program is to identify those subjects who attempt to circumvent
the U.S. immigration system by seeking to exploit VWP travel.
Enforcement Prioritization
Every year, the CTCEU receives approximately 1 million leads on
nonimmigrants that have potentially violated the terms of their
admission, such as overstays and out-of-status non-immigrant students
or exchange visitors. Over half of these leads are closed due to the
vetting conducted by CTCEU analysts, which eliminates false matches and
accounts for departures and pending immigration benefits. As noted
above, to better manage investigative resources, the CTCEU relies on a
prioritization framework established in consultation with interagency
partners within the National intelligence and Federal law enforcement
communities through CEAP. The CTCEU has also aligned its policy on
sending leads to the field with the DHS's civil enforcement priorities,
which focus enforcement and removal policies on individuals convicted
of significant criminal offenses or who otherwise pose a threat to
public safety, border security, or National security.
The CTCEU's prioritization framework is divided into 10 CTCEU
priority levels to identify possible immigration violators who pose the
greatest risks to our National security. The CTCEU Priority Level 1 is
based on special projects and initiatives to address National security
concerns, public safety, and apply certain targeting rules. These
projects and initiatives include: The Recurrent Student Vetting
Program; DHS's Overstay Projects; Absent Without Leave (AWOL) Program;
INTERPOL Leads; and individuals who have been watchlisted.
In fiscal year 2015, CTCEU reviewed 971,305 compliance leads.
Numerous leads that were referred to CTCEU were closed through an
automated vetting process. The most common reasons for closure were
subsequent departure from the United States or pending immigration
benefits. A total of 9,968 leads were sent to HSI field offices for
investigation--an average of 40 leads per working day. From the 9,968
leads sent to the field, 3,083 have been determined to be viable and
are currently under investigation, 4,148 were closed as being in
compliance (pending immigration benefit, granted asylum, approved
adjustment of status application, or have departed the United States)
and the remaining leads were returned to CTCEU for continuous
monitoring and further investigation as appropriate. HSI Special Agents
made 1,910 arrests, and secured 86 indictments and 80 convictions in
fiscal year 2015 from overstay leads.
ICE is taking steps to further enhance enforcement efforts with
respect to non-immigrant visa overstays and violators, in conjunction
with CBP.
enhancing the department's comprehensive entry/exit system
Since fiscal year 2013, CBP has led the entry/exit mission,
including research and development of biometric exit programs. A
comprehensive entry/exit system that leverages both biographic and
biometric data is key to supporting DHS's mission. As previously
described. Biographic information is, and will continue to be, the
foundation of our comprehensive entry/exit system, because it
constitutes the vast majority of our intelligence, law enforcement, and
background information that informs CBP decisions regarding the
admission of individuals into our country. CBP will continue to further
these biographic capabilities, while also redoubling efforts to
incorporate biometrics into the exit aspect of our system and to
develop and deploy a biometric entry/exit system, as mandated by
statute. CBP's plan for expanding implementation of a biometric entry/
exit system, based on technological and operational lessons derived
from past, on-going, and planned pilots, and utilizing currently
authorized funding, is described in the Comprehensive Biometric Entry/
Exit Plan provided to Congress in April 2016. This plan includes
Secretary Johnson's direction to begin implementing biometric exit
solutions, starting at the highest volume airports, in 2018.
DHS continues to strengthen systems and processes in order to
improve the accuracy of data provided to ADIS. These improvements will
enable ADIS to more accurately match entry and exit records to
determine overstay status, and whether that individual presents a
National security or public safety concern. Data that is entered into
ADIS comes from a variety of sources in the Department including USCIS,
CBP, and ICE. Additionally, DHS has identified mechanisms to ensure ICE
investigators receive priority high-risk overstay cases for resolution
in a timely fashion and to ensure other ADIS stakeholders (such as CBP,
USCIS, and DOS) receive the best possible information with which to
make immigration decisions. Furthermore, the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2015 (Pub. L. No. 114-4) provided $9
million for a new reporting environment for ADIS, enhancing DHS's
ability to record and analyze the entry/exit data.
Incorporating Biometrics into the Exit System
In pursuing a biometric exit system, DHS is cognizant of
limitations posed by existing infrastructure. The United States did not
build its land border, aviation, and immigration infrastructure with
exit processing in mind. In the land environment, there are often
geographical features that prevent expansion of exit lanes to
accommodate adding lanes or CBP-manned booths. Furthermore, U.S.
airports do not have designated and secure exit areas for out-going
passengers to wait prior to departure, nor do they have specific
checkpoints for these passengers to go through where their departure is
recorded by an immigration officer. Instead, foreign nationals depart
the United States without Government exit immigration inspection and
intermingle with domestic travelers. This challenge is further
compounded at many airports where international and domestic flights
share gate space for operations. Ultimately, CBP must develop a
solution for this environment that ensures a passenger ticketed for a
particular flight actually departed the United States in order for a
biometric exit program to be credible and effective. Additionally, this
solution must address airline carriers' and airports' concerns that a
biometric exit process not create an environment in which an airport
cannot afford to support an international flight because that space is
so highly restricted.
Currently, Federal law requires airports serving flights with
arriving foreign nationals to provide space, at no cost, to DHS for
processing of travelers entering the United States; however, there is
no corresponding provision that requires airports to provide space for
processing of departing foreign nationals.
In meeting these challenges, CBP has concluded that a viable
biometric exit solution depends on leveraging emerging technologies to
innovate ways of processing passengers biometrically. In reaching this
conclusion, CBP considered and rejected broad non-cost effective
options involving recapitalizing the infrastructure at land borders and
airports, or the hiring of additional officers to manually verify all
departing travelers. Recapitalization of all U.S. international
airports and land borders would allow CBP to establish sterile physical
areas, which, once entered, a foreign national cannot leave without
inspection by an immigration officer. This recapitalization would
require significant limitations in the number of gates that airlines
could use for international departures, and result in overall direct
and indirect costs of billions of dollars. CBP does not consider this
option viable.
Alternatively, CBP could pursue a solution within the constraints
of existing infrastructure through the hiring of thousands of new
officers that would be necessary to biometrically verify departing
passengers. There are currently thousands of international departure
gates at the top 30 airports in the United States, which handle over 97
percent of the departing international passengers. Based on current and
previous pilot programs, CBP estimates that it would need 7-9 officers
to collect biometrics on departing foreign visitors for a large
aircraft, which accounts for many international departing flights. CBP
estimates that in order to inspect 95 percent of all ``in-scope''
travelers departing by air, a manual solution at the top 30 airports
would require approximately 3,400 more officers at an average annual
cost of $790 million, independent of any other costs, including
considerable infrastructure costs, and cause significant delays.
For the land environment, such an approach to biometric exit would
require building and staffing of hundreds of outbound lanes at land
ports of entry, many of them operational 24 hours a day. It is
estimated that the land solution would require CBP to dramatically
increase the current Office of Field Operations workforce and budget,
and those costs would recur annually.
Instead, DHS believes the most efficient and cost-effective
solution to a viable biometric exit program is to leverage emerging
technology, in addition to process transformation. CBP is collaborating
with S&T and is also partnering with private industry to develop the
tools needed. CBP has already deployed several pilot programs in order
to operationally test different technologies and operational processes,
provide input to the cost-benefit analysis of a comprehensive biometric
exit solution, and to inform decisions regarding the next steps in
deploying a biometric exit program. These include:
1-to-1 Facial Comparison Project.--From March to June 2015,
CBP conducted a 1-to-1 Facial Comparison project. This
biometric experiment at Washington Dulles Airport (Dulles) used
facial comparison on some returning U.S. citizens to confirm
the identity and determine the viability of using facial
recognition technology during entry inspections. Facial images
of arriving travelers were compared to images stored in the
U.S. ePassport chips. This project tested the viability of the
technology in matching a traveler to their travel document and
assessed the extent to which it may further strengthen our
entry screening abilities. The success of this program led to
deploying the project at JFK airport in New York in January and
back to Dulles in February 2016. Lessons learned from this
deployment are informing the use of facial biometric matching
during departure.
Biometric Exit Mobile Air Test (BE-Mobile).--Since July
2015, CBP has been experimenting with the collection of
biometric exit data using mobile fingerprint collection devices
on a random group of in-scope non-U.S. citizen travelers on
selected flights departing from 10 U.S. international airports.
BE-Mobile confirms traveler departures with certainty and
identifies threats in real time using biometric technology.
This test has provided a small amount of biometric departure
data, supported on-going auditing of biographic data provided
through airline manifests, and provided a significant law
enforcement benefit for existing outbound operations. The
technology is currently being used in the Top 10 airports:
Chicago/O'Hare, Atlanta/Hartsfield, New York/JFK, Newark, Los
Angeles/LAX, San Francisco, Miami, Dallas/Ft. Worth,
Washington/Dulles, and Houston/George Bush. While evaluating
the data collected, CBP will continue to operate BE-Mobile at
these airports and expand BE-Mobile to a number of small
airports to see if BE-Mobile can fully support the biometric
exit requirements of small ports.
Pedestrian Field Test.--From early December 2015 through
early May 2016, CBP deployed a Pedestrian Field Test at the
Otay Mesa POE in California, which involved the collection of
biographic and biometric data from pedestrian travelers
departing the United States. Biographic data was collected on
all outbound travelers, including U.S. citizens, and biometric
data (face and iris image capture) was collected on all inbound
and outbound non-exempt, non-U.S. citizens. The field test
explored the viability of this technology in an outdoor land
environment. While the evaluation of this test is on-going,
this initiative enhanced CBP's ability to identify departures
and successfully match biometric entry and exit records at the
land border for the first time.
Departure Information System Test.--Starting June 13, 2016,
CBP has begun to implement a test of how the integration of
data sources and re-architecture of information systems can
process new departure data at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport. CBP is testing the ability of its
information systems to compare images of travelers departing
the United States in real time against images previously
provided to determine if they are in scope for biometric
collection in an automated fashion. This effort builds upon
previous CBP biometric efforts at Dulles International Airport
and John F. Kennedy International Airport and will advance the
innovation and transformation of the entry and exit process.
This test has been designed to conform with airlines' existing
standard operating procedures such that the incorporation of
biometrics is agnostic to current boarding processes and will
have minimal impact on airlines, airports, and the traveling
public.
The results from these pilots will inform the future biometric exit
solution by identifying how best to leverage our existing biographic
capabilities, determining the overall accuracy of the biographic exit
data that CBP receives today, and testing new business processes and
emerging technologies. The Department and CBP will continue to apprise
Congress of the results of these projects and their implication for the
deployment of the biometric entry/exit system.
Fee Collections for Exit Activities
In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Pub. L. No. 114-113),
Congress provided CBP with a fee-funded account for biometric entry/
exit activities, which may collect up to $1 billion by fiscal year
2025.
CBP's plan for expanding implementation of a biometric entry/exit
system, based on technological and operational lessons derived from
past, on-going, and planned pilots, and utilizing these authorized
funds, in described in the Comprehensive Biometric Entry/Exit Plan
submitted to Congress in April. CBP is further developing its
expenditure plan for these funds, which could cover the initial
biometric air exit engineering efforts, biometric scanning technology,
data system integration, infrastructure upgrades, and CBP officer
support that would be necessary to deploy to the top gateway airports.
CBP is also preparing an acquisition plan which will address how and
when CBP will partner with private industry in order to achieve our
goal of development of a biometric exit system. Of note, while the
funds provided through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 will
enable CBP to take the next major step in development of a biometric
entry/exit system at the highest volume airports, full Nation-wide
deployment of a comprehensive entry-exit system at system at all ports
of entry will require additional resources not available from the
authorized surcharges.
conclusion
While implementation of a robust and efficient biometric exit
solution will take time, and significant challenges remain, DHS is
aggressively evaluating emerging biometric technologies in existing
operational environments and redoubling efforts to incorporate
biometric exit capabilities into our comprehensive entry/exit system.
We are working closely with our domestic and international stakeholders
to find solutions that protect the integrity of our visa system,
minimize disruptions to travel, prove to be cost-effective, and provide
sufficient flexibility to address both current and future requirements.
Through these and related efforts, we will continue to build on the
progress we have made in our ability to identify, report, and take
appropriate action against those who overstay or violate the terms of
their admission to the United States.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today on
this important issue. We look forward to answering your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Wagner.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Healy.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG C. HEALY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Healy. Good morning Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
Vela, and distinguished Members. Thank you for the opportunity
to discuss ICE's role in overstay enforcement and how we would
benefit from the implementation of a biometric exit system.
For nearly 30 years I have spent my career in Federal law
enforcement, and I recognize that visa overstay enforcement is
an important issue for this subcommittee. I would to briefly
outline my agency's involvement as a recipient of information
collected by my DHS colleagues represented here today and how
we use that information.
ICE Homeland Security Investigations, or HSI, through our
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit, is dedicated
to identifying and initiating enforcement action on priority
overstay violators. Our overstay mission is accomplished in
close coordination with CBP, and our primary objective is to
vet the system-generated leads we receive in order to identify
true overstay violators for appropriate enforcement action.
ICE uses dedicated special agents, analysts, and systems to
specifically address nonimmigrant overstays who may pose a
National security and public safety concern. In fiscal year
2015 our agents and analysts devoted approximately 650,000
investigative hours on overstay enforcement. In fiscal year
2015 the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
received approximately 971,000 system-generated potential
overstay leads received from entry-exit international student
databases and other Government systems.
The system-generated leads are created using biographical
and travel data stored in CBP's arrival and departure
information system. This system allows DHS to identify
nonimmigrants who have remained in the United States beyond
their authorized periods of admission or have violated their
visas.
Once the leads are received, ICE conducts both automated
and manual searches against additional Government databases,
social media, public records to determine if a potential
overstay has departed the United States, has adjusted to a
lawful status, or requires further review, in which case a lead
will be sent out to a field office.
Additionally, ICE prioritizes nonimmigrant overstay leads
through risk-based analysis. A targeting framework consisting
of 10 tiers was developed in close consultation with the
intelligence and law enforcement communities to ensure that our
National security and public safety concerns are prioritized.
To accomplish this, we meet regularly with interagency
partners to ensure that our targeting methodologies are aligned
with current and existing U.S. Government threat information,
trends, and priorities.
To better manage investigative resources, the
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit not only relies
on the previously-discussed prioritization framework, but also
incorporates focused enforcement and removal operations on
individuals who are threats to National security, border
security, public safety, or who are convicted of significant
criminal offenses.
Of the leads analyzed in fiscal year 2015, approximately 1
percent, or roughly 10,000 leads, were determined to
potentially pose a National security or public safety concern.
Fortunately, with further investigation ICE was able to
determine that even many of these leads were not, in fact,
high-risk. However, all of these leads were sent to HSI field
offices for further-up investigation.
Of the 10,000 field referrals or 10,000 investigations that
were sent out to the field, our offices have approximately
3,000 of those investigations that are still on-going, and
roughly 4,000 of those investigations have been closed, because
even after our initial vetting it was determined that those
individuals were, in fact, in compliance.
The remaining leads are in continuous monitoring for
further investigation. More importantly, as a result of those
10,000 investigations we made over 1,900 arrests, of which 139
were criminal arrests, and secured 86 indictments and 80
convictions.
In conclusion, ICE will continue to work alongside our
partners within DHS in pursuing visa overstays who violate the
terms of their admission. The implementation of the biometric
exit system will facilitate enhanced information sharing while
improving the quality of the data, thereby improving our
efficiency and effectiveness in identifying and removing visa
overstay violators.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and I
look forward to taking your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Healy.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Burriesci for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KELLI ANN BURRIESCI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
SCREENING COORDINATION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Ms. Burriesci. Before I begin I would also like to express
my sincere condolences for the people of Orlando who lost a
family member or a friend this past weekend, and I appreciate
the moment of silence earlier.
Thank you, Chairman--Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
Vela, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, for the
opportunity to appear here today to discuss DHS's progress to
support border security and immigration enforcement missions.
I am the deputy assistant secretary of the Screening
Coordination Office, part of the DHS Office of Policy. The
Screening Coordination Office is charged with developing cross-
departmental policy for the screening and vetting of people and
with advising the assistant security of policy.
The Screening Coordination Office also collaborates with
its interagency partners to inform and develop screening
policies that involve multiple departments. This whole-of-
Government approach to screening involves decisions about how
we share information and interact with one another across the
Government.
I am here with my DHS colleagues today to discuss overstays
and biometric exit.
On January 19, 2016, DHS released the entry-exit overstay
report for fiscal year 2015, the first such report in a
generation. This report provides information on the number of
individuals in this country who have overstayed their period of
admission and is presented by country. The report covers 87
percent of all nonimmigrant travelers coming to United States
by air and sea. It reflects that 99 percent of these travelers,
these nonimmigrant travelers, depart within their period of
admission.
At the time the report was issued, 416,000 of these
individuals were suspected of remaining in the United States as
an overstay. Since the report was issued, the number has
dropped to below 355,000 individuals.
While the report represents a tremendous step forward, DHS
recognizes that it does not answer all of the questions. As you
have heard DHS officials brief in the past, DHS has identified
quality errors in historic data that, while now fixed, prevents
us from being able to retroactively produce reports for prior
fiscal years.
That said, and for transparency, DHS provided fiscal year
2014 numbers in the appendix of the fiscal year 2015 report. As
the report states, the ability to accurately and reliably
estimate overstay rates is dependent upon the completeness and
accuracy of arrival and departure records.
During the generation of the fiscal year 2014 overstay
data, DHS identified significant discrepancies regarding the
data received from certain air carriers, which resulted in
artificially elevated overstay rates. These data quality issues
have since been resolved for business and tourism travelers,
and the fiscal year 2015 overstay report tables are an accurate
depiction of country-by-country overstay numbers for these
categories.
Over the past 2 years DHS has made significant progress in
terms of its ability to accurately report data on overstays,
and we will continue to make progress. DHS anticipates that we
will broaden the scope of data for future reports, with a
particular emphasis on student visa categories.
Relatedly, DHS recently submitted the comprehensive
biometric entry-exit plan to Congress April 20, 2016. Over the
last decade, with the support of Congress, DHS, through the
combined efforts of DHS S&T, CBP, ICE, and NPPD's Office of
Biometric Identity Management, has enhanced its capability to
record arrivals and departures within the United States.
CBP is the DHS-designated executive agent for
operationalizing a comprehensive entry-exit system with
biometrics, building off of our current biographic system that
exists today.
Secretary Johnson directed CBP to redouble its efforts to
achieve a biometric entry-exit system and to begin implementing
biometric exit starting at the highest-volume airports in 2018.
While it will take time, effort, and innovation, DHS believes
it has put forward a responsible and thoughtful approach to
achieve a sustainable solution.
This solution recognizes that one technology may not be
suitable for each air, land, and sea environment and that one
process may not be appropriate for all environments. Our
overarching goal is a fully integrated, scalable, and
sustainable entry-exit enterprise that includes biometrics.
With the on-going support of Congress, most recently
demonstrated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016,
DHS will continue to advance a biometric exit system that can
be integrated into the current traveler screening architecture.
We thank you for the support and we will continue to provide
updates on our progress to Congress well past this hearing.
Thank you.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Ms. Burriesci.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Burns for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT BURNS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Burns. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
Vela, and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for
this opportunity to testify along with my colleagues today from
the Office of Policy, Customs and Border Protection, and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, with whom we work closely.
The mission of the Science and Technology Directorate, or
S&T, is to deliver effective, innovative insight, methods, and
solutions for the critical needs of the homeland security
enterprise. We work closely with our operating components, such
as ICE, CBP, and our oversight offices, including the Office of
Policy, to address the gaps in operational capabilities and
invest in efforts that will result in knowledge or products
aimed at closing these gaps.
In 2012 CBP asked for our assistance in their efforts to
enhance air entry and air exit operations. In response, S&T
created the Apex AEER Entry-Exit Re-Engineering Project, known
as AEER, or AEER, which is composed of several vital parts:
Technology forging and testing, operations and technology cost
analysis, and stakeholder engagement.
Apex projects are key S&T activities carried out in close
collaboration with operational components to achieve increased
or improved capabilities.
With respect to air entry and exit, our goal has been to
help CBP evaluate technologies and concepts of operations to
biometrically verify the arrival and departure of foreign
nationals from U.S. airports.
To determine candidate technologies, AEER conducted a
comprehensive market survey of commercially-available,
standards-based fingerprint, iris, and facial recognition
technologies. We work closely with biometric experts from the
National Institutes for Standards and Technology to solicit
their assistance and develop robust testing protocols and
objectively analyze results.
Additionally, we leveraged headquarters, interagency, and
international expertise from the DHS Office of Biometric
Identity Management, the Department of Defense, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and foreign
government partners.
We identified over 100 devices and 15 matching algorithms
from a wide range of vendors for testing in our Maryland test
facility, which many Congressional staff members have visited
over the past 2 years. We first evaluated these device
performance on factors including accuracy, cost, speed, and
operational footprint.
Those that performed well were selected for scenario-based
testing of their human interface and suitability in various
concept of operations. Since June 2014, AEER has utilized a
diverse group of over 1,700 volunteers from 50 countries of
origin for our testing and we have simulated actual
environmental conditions in which the technology would operate.
To inform concepts of operation and scenario-based testing
and to collect data in support of subsequent CBP cost analysis,
we sent teams into the field to observe and analyze current
airport operations. This entailed close cooperation with CBP
headquarters and field staff, as well as airport and airline
stakeholders. AEER facilitated working sessions with front-line
CBP Officers to solicit their operational insights and inform
their project's technical roadmap.
Externally, we engaged industry groups, including Airlines
for America, Airports Council International North America, the
International Air Transport Association, or IATA, and the
Association of American Airport Executives, to gain an
understanding of the direct and indirect economic impacts of
various biometric exit concepts of operation in the airport
environment.
We proactively and regularly invited airline, airport, and
biometric industry groups to the Maryland test facility and
hosted webinars to keep stakeholders updated and to solicit
their feedback. We even co-chaired IATA biometrics working
groups with Lufthansa.
Through the Apex AEER Project, we have gained a robust
understanding of the state-of-the-art of biometric technologies
and how these technologies interact with passengers and might
fit into various concepts of operation. With simulated testing
of the biometric exit technology complete, CBP has taken
responsibility for the airport-based pilots of biometric air
exit. Apex AEER's products will inform CBP's path forward to a
Nation-wide deployment for the biometric exit program.
As we move into 2017, S&T will continue to assist CBP in
data analysis for the upcoming pilot phases needed, and we
stand ready to invest in additional R&D work should the need
arise as results of the pilot. With this transition of S&T's
air exit work to CBP, the Apex AEER Project will end this year.
We are developing out-briefs to share our high-level
results and lessons learned with industry and Government
partners, including, most recently, the Transportation Security
Administration. S&T will continue to work with CBP's Office of
Field Operations to re-engineer the air-entry process. This
work is important not only to implementing a full biometric
entry-exit process, but to helping CBP manage growth in
international travel.
Leveraging emerging biometric and mobile technologies, we
will explore innovative ways to build upon and further secure
valuable programs like Mobile Passport Control, Global Entry,
and Countering and Measuring. Technology is undoubtedly an
essential ingredient of effective border security. S&T will
continue to collaborate with our components and partners to
bring technology to operational use and help enhance border
security.
I thank the committee for giving me the opportunity to
testify on this very important subject and I look forward to
your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Burns.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
I want to first make sure we understand the scope of the
challenge and the numbers. Your visa overstay report for fiscal
year 2015, which we very much appreciate, indicated 482,000
overstays, has since been whittled down over time to, I think
to 355,000. But just, I know you all understand this, but for
the record, that was just for air and sea arrivers, and also
just in B1 and B2 categories. So what we are missing is the
rest of the categories arriving by air and sea, and all
overland arrivals in departures.
Is that correct, Mr. Wagner?
Mr. Wagner. Yes, that is correct.
Ms. McSally. So if we were to extrapolate about the 1
percent rate of overstays to those other categories, like what
would that number estimate to be if we would say 1 percent of
the additional people that were not measured? What are we
talking about here?
Mr. Wagner. We will have the numbers on the Canadian border
on the next report. It is kind of tough to estimate because it
is a different type of traffic, crossing a land----
Ms. McSally. Well, I am just trying to understand, like, we
measured how many visitors total--4 million, or what was the
number that we measured?
Mr. Wagner. Oh, it is 382 million passengers last year
total; 250 million came across the land border----
Ms. McSally. Okay.
Mr. Wagner [continuing]. One hundred twelve million came
land and sea, but that is total. That----
Ms. McSally. Okay. I will follow up for the record. I am
just saying if we can extrapolate the same rate to total
visitors, I am just trying to understand what we think the
magnitude of the overstay might be. Does that make sense if we
extrapolate a 1 percent rate?
Mr. Wagner. Yes. Let us get those numbers for you.
Ms. McSally. Okay, great.
Mr. Healy, I am concerned about--these numbers are pretty
large. So we have, you know, known, 482,000 but probably more,
and you have gone through the process of how you sort of
whittle that down with your resources to identify who are high-
risk. I have a couple of questions on--you mentioned you test
that against several databases.
In your testimony it talks about viewing social media and
other means. Are these not tests that are done prior to issuing
someone a visa? Are the things that you are finding to identify
somebody high-risk--they are here for 90 days, so they have
committed a crime just in those 90 days? Like, can you just
walk me through that process?
I am particularly interested in social media. This
committee has been very concerned about use of social media for
vetting people prior to issuing a visa. So I want to know what
we are doing with social media after the fact to identify high-
risk overstayers.
Mr. Healy. Well, ma'am, as you are aware, Secretary Johnson
did direct that a social media task force be created within the
Department. The Department is about to transition into a DHS
Social Media Center of Excellence, which will be housed and
hosted by CBP, which we will be a part of.
In answer to your question, the first part of the question
ma'am, on a limited basis we do utilize social media in a visa
security program for individuals coming into the United States.
We do not utilize social media to review every application.
Ms. McSally. Yes, I am familiar with that. I am just
talking about you whittling down the 480,000----
Mr. Healy. Okay. Yes, yes ma'am. Now, getting to the
overstay population, my numbers are actually a little larger
than the 480,000 because my numbers include everything received
coming out of ADIS. So that includes students, and it includes
all visa categories.
The first thing that we do, ma'am, is we check to confirm
whether or not those individuals have departed again, we will
go back to ADIS. We will also check with CIS to see if they
have tried to attempt to obtain any benefits.
We will also reach out to the intelligence community. We
are more than happy in a detailed briefing, ma'am, in an
appropriate setting to give you more background, but we reach
out to the intelligence community and they provide information
that we make decisions upon.
After those decisions are made, we continue our vetting
process by prioritizing the names. We have a criteria that we
use in coordination with the intelligence community on law
enforcement. We will put those names within certain categories
and then we will rely on analysts to manually vet those names.
If we are able to establish some type of derogatory
information, if we are able to establish the location, then we
will continue to prioritize as we go down the line.
When we get to the point, ma'am, where the leads are ready
to be sent out to the field, we in turn--sometimes we will use
social media. If we haven't had an opportunity to fully locate
the individual and we want to enhance our ability to find that
person, then those leads will go out to the field.
Once out in the field, again, 40 percent of the leads that
we sent out of that 10,000, ma'am, it was determined that
individuals were in compliance. They had already either
departed or they had applied for and received CIS benefits.
The remaining individuals, we will proceed, whether it be a
criminal-type investigation or whether it just be an
administrative removal.
Ms. McSally. What is the time frame--the average time frame
for this process that you just mentioned? Somebody is here for
90 days, they have overstayed their visa, and now you are
whittling down these numbers. What are we talking about? Are we
talking about days, weeks, months?
Mr. Healy. It could be a month, a couple of months, ma'am.
Because once the information--I mean, the manual vetting
process to go through all of these--forget about the automated
batch reviews that we do. Analysts have to go through this
information because from our perspective it can't go out into
the field unless we know that it is a real individual and we
know where that individual is located. So it can take a little
bit of time because again, ma'am, these aren't all just B1s,
B2s; we got students involved, we have other categories that
are involved as well.
Ms. McSally. Great. It was previously reported to me that
about 3 percent of your resources are used on these types of
investigations on visa overstays. Is that still an accurate
image?
Mr. Healy. I have to get back to you, ma'am, but last year
total within the entire program we spent 650,000 hours on visa
overstay enforcement. I have a unit, the Counterterrorism and
Criminal Exploitation Unit, this is all that they do in
coordination with contractors, in coordination with----
Ms. McSally. How many people are in that unit?
Mr. Healy. I would have to get back to you on the exact,
ma'am, but I would probably say well over 100.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great, thanks.
My time is expired.
The Chairwoman will now recognize Ms. Torres, from
California.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
For Commissioner--or Deputy Commissioner Wagner, what are
the different challenges of implementing a biometric entry and
exit system on our Northern Border versus implementing that
similar technology on our Southern Border?
Then a follow-up from that for Ms. Burriesci, can you--once
he answers, will you please follow up and discuss the training
process of how we intend to bring up-to-date the agents working
at both borders?
Mr. Wagner. Thank you for the question.
At the land borders, unlike on the inbound traffic, we do
not have facilities in ports of entry constructed to be able to
stop traffic and confirm somebody's departure. That is common
on both borders. Places where they collect a toll to cross a
bridge, there is some natural stop-and-go, which we can conduct
some out-bound operations in, but if it is just a highway that
goes across, they don't stop until they hit the Canadian or
Mexican in-bound facility.
Now, the big difference with the Northern Border is the
Canadian government does record the arrival biographically of
everyone into Canada, so we have worked out an arrangement
where we exchange the out-bound and in-bound data--our in-bound
data and their in-bound data--to service as that out-bound
departure record on all non-U.S., non-Canadian citizens.
On the Mexican border, the Mexican government does not
collect that type of information. So some of the discussions we
have with them is is there a possibility to help them build the
infrastructure to be able to do that and have a similar type of
exchange.
When we focus on the biometrics, none of the countries have
the ability to collect the biometrics from passengers in a
vehicle that is moving by or even stopping, so there is the
extra challenge of finding technology that can work and look
inside of a passenger vehicle or a bus with 50 people aboard to
be able to retrieve those biometrics short of getting everyone
out and lining up in front of some type of equipment to collect
it.
I think looking at the numbers of non-U.S., non-Mexican,
non-Canadian citizens crossing the land borders, the numbers
are very, very low. If we look at the number of, say, visa
waiver travelers, they are very low that are crossing the land
borders.
So we are looking at efforts and what programs can we build
to start with those populations first and start to move out on
being--doing this. But it will be a bit of a manual-type
process until the technology really emerges to do that.
Mrs. Torres. Okay. Can you talk about the training process
of bringing the agents up-to-date on training on biometrics--
time line, time frame as to what that will take? Can you also
touch on this infrastructure that the Canadian has versus what
we have and how the two compare?
Ms. Burriesci. Well, the Office of Policy does not direct
training for officers so I will defer those questions to CBP.
Mr. Wagner. This was on the training of the biometrics? I
am sorry.
So our officers go through a 19-week academy when they get
hired, then there is on-going training efforts on current
trends with----
Mrs. Torres. I am not talking about new hires; I am talking
about the people that are already there and then we have a new
system coming up.
Mr. Wagner. Right. So we will embark on a training regimen
to teach them how to use the new systems, what the policies
are, the technical requirements on how to operate the systems,
and then what the trends are with what we are seeing and what
we are trying to accomplish as far as fraudulent documents,
counterfeit documents----
Mrs. Torres. Is that an 8-hour program? Is that a 2-week
program? Is that a 3-week program?
Mr. Wagner. It all depends----
Mrs. Torres. Is that a 6-month program? What does that look
like?
Mr. Wagner. It all depends on the type of technology we are
delivering and how complicated or complex or new it is to the
office. If it is just building on a current capacity, it might
be as simple as a 4-hour training. If it is something brand new
and a whole different approach with new policy implications it
may be a full day, 2 days, or a week. It all depends.
Mrs. Torres. So what are you looking at planning-wise for
personnel that would be taken out of the field to do that type
of training?
Mr. Wagner. For which----
Mrs. Torres. I mean, we are talking about implementing a
biometric program, but you are telling me that we have no
answers as to how we plan to implement and train the folks that
will be utilizing this program----
Mr. Wagner. Okay. So----
Mrs. Torres [continuing]. Budgets that you will need in
order to implement it?
Mr. Wagner. Right. So when we make the final determination
on how the technology will operate, there will be a personnel
cost on getting officers to work the equipment and then respond
to the information that equipment is going to provide. So if we
have a mismatch on a biometric on someone departing the United
States, an officer has to respond. If we have a case where it
is a law enforcement action, an officer will have to respond.
But it is too soon to calculate what those personnel costs will
be.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you. I am out of time. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
It is the understanding of the Chair that the gentlemen
from Pennsylvania, Mr. Barletta, has a limited amount of time
to spend with us this morning. Without objection, Mr. Barletta
is recognized out of order for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
What happened this weekend in Orlando was tragic. My
prayers, as all of ours, are with the victims and their
families and with our brave law enforcement officers on the
front lines in this fight. This attack is at the very least
inspired by radical Islamic terrorism and once again
demonstrates that radical Islam and ISIS are at war with us and
want to attack our Western values.
One way that they will do this is through our visas
programs, which can be easily exploited. This threat is not
new. Congress first mandated the establishment of the fully
functional entry-exit system in the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996.
The 9/11 Commission taught us that to terrorists, travel
documents are just as important as weapons. That is the
preferred method of entry into our country for terrorists: Come
here legally and they just stay, disappear into the heartland.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, a biometric exit
capability could have assisted law enforcement and intelligence
officials in August and September 2001 in conducting a search
for two of the 9/11 hijackers who were in the United States on
expired visas. Mohamed Atta overstayed a tourist visa and Ziad
Jarrah violated his student visa.
This is a point that I have consistently raised since
joining this committee. For example, one of the terrorists for
the 1993 World Trade Center bombings was Mahmud Abouhalima. He
overstayed a tourist visa and received amnesty when
comprehensive immigration reform passed in 1986. He was a cab
driver, but he claimed to be a seasonal agricultural worker.
The only thing he planted in America was a bomb.
In 2004 Congress followed the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission and required the use of biometric technology in the
entry-exit system by passing the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act. Yet our Government still has not
implemented the exit component of this National security
system.
I believe it should be a priority for Congress to address
this gaping loophole. We should know in real time when a
foreign national has left our country.
Why? Because when I first came on this committee we were
talking about roughly 40 percent of illegal aliens being
present in our country because of their overstayed visas, yet
the Department's own incomplete--very incomplete--data shows
that in the fiscal year 2015, 483,000 individuals overstayed
their visas while 337,000 were caught by the Southern Border.
More people overstayed their visa than were caught
illegally crossing the Southern Border.
Mr. Wagner and Mr. Healy, we have always assumed that about
40 percent of the people here in the United States illegally
overstayed their visas. Can we now say that is a gross
understatement of the visa overstay problem? Mr. Wagner and Mr.
Healy, can we follow up here? Were you surprised to find that
more individuals overstayed their visas than were apprehended
crossing the Southwest Border?
Mr. Wagner. Well, I think if we look at the visa
population, it is less than 1--about 1 percent overstay their
visa of all the visa travelers that are entering the United
States. As you extrapolate over time----
Mr. Barletta. But you are counting people who come in
multiple times, right? If I am going back and forth, you are
counting----
Mr. Wagner. No, these are individuals that overstayed their
period of admission on a visa. We had calculated it at--for the
B1, B2s, which is the majority of them, 1.74 overstayed. As you
extrapolate that over time of course that number does decrease
because people do leave, but later on. But I don't think you
can draw a comparison to the people crossing the land border in
between the ports of entry.
Mr. Barletta. So you disagree that more people overstayed
their visa than crossed the----
Mr. Wagner. No, I didn't say that. I don't understand the
comparison that is being made between those 2 numbers. Yes,
there is about 1 to 2 percent of people overstay their visas,
but I am not sure I understand the correlation with the
Southwest Border numbers.
Mr. Barletta. Are you surprised that more people overstay
their visas than cross the border illegally?
Mr. Wagner. I was not surprised by these numbers, no.
Mr. Barletta. Okay.
Mr. Healy.
Mr. Healy. I am not surprised by the numbers either, sir.
But from my perspective, we receive the information and I just
wanted to let you know that we are as committed to trying to
track down and trying to vet these numbers for National
security and public safety purposes. So the way we would look
at it, sir, is numbers come to us, we follow them to where they
take us.
Mr. Barletta. I have an important--I know my time is
running out, but this is an important point I am going to make.
I have begun to introduce legislation that makes a simple tweak
to our laws.
As we all know, if someone illegally crosses the Southern
Border they are unlawfully present in the United States. That
is the term you use. If someone crosses--comes in on a visa and
overstays their visa, the term is that they are unlawfully
present in the United States.
It is the same term for both individuals, yet the penalty
is very different even though both people in this situation
have the same legal status: Unlawfully present. Their status is
the same: Unlawfully present. But unlawful border crossing is a
crime while overstaying a visa is a civil offense.
Does it make sense, Mr. Wagner and Mr. Healy, does it makes
sense that the penalty is different? Why doesn't it make sense
for the same penalty--be the same penalty for both?
Ms. McSally. We can take that for the record since the
gentlemen's time has expired.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Smith, from Texas for 5
minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I didn't know if
you were giving him more time or not.
Mr. Healy, let me direct my first questions to you, but on
the way to doing so admit that I have a particular interest in
the subject of entry-exit and overstayers. In 1996 I introduced
a bill that became law that has still not been fully
implemented, and if that law had been implemented I think we
would have done a lot to address the problem of visa
overstayers.
Last year I think the administration deported about 2,500
visa overstayers. Is that accurate?
Is that the fewest number of any year under this
administration?
Mr. Healy. I would have to check and get back to you on
that, sir. I am not sure.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Let me tell you what the figures are and
ask you the question again.
This administration removed 12,500 in 2009; 11,200 in 2010;
10,400 in 2011; 6,800 in 2012; 4,200 in 2013; 3,500 in 2014;
2,500 in 2015. This is, in fact, the fewest number ever
deported by this administration in 1 year.
I would like to go to the overall figure. We have heard
estimates as to the percentage of people in the country who are
here illegally being visa overstayers. Percentages range from
40 percent to 68 percent; let's take 58 percent.
So let's take 10 million people in the country illegally.
Half are here because they are visa overstayers and are in
illegal status.
So you have got 5 million people now in illegal status
because they are visa overstayers. The administration deported
2,500 of those. That is 1/20th of 1 percent.
That sounds to me like an extension of the administration's
amnesty program. Why are you not prioritizing these
individuals? Why are you not sending more home? Two thousand,
five hundred, the fewest of any year under this administration,
1/20th of 1 percent.
I know the administration favors amnesty. Is this, like I
say, just part of their amnesty efforts?
Mr. Healy. Sir, from my perspective, when you took a look
at the removals process, when we look at the cases that we have
worked and individuals who have gone into proceedings and then
you look at the actual removals for that year, the removals
process can be quite lengthy, as you are aware, sir. If we grab
someone today, they are not necessarily going to be removed any
time soon because it could take a while for them to go through
the process.
Mr. Smith. But the----
Mr. Healy. In terms of our prioritization, sir, we utilize
our prioritization scheme along with the resources that we
have----
Mr. Smith. I understand that. But the administration
remains convicted by their own actions, by the facts. Why
haven't they requested more money in their budget if they want
to send more individuals home? They have not requested the
money sufficiently to do so.
Let me get at this point another way. How many
investigations were conducted last year?
Mr. Healy. Within this area, sir, specific to 2015, we sent
out 10,000.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Those are 10,000 individuals whose
identity you knew, whose location you knew, but you did not
consider a priority because they had not been convicted of
serious crimes. Is that correct?
Mr. Healy. No, that is not true sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Mr. Healy. Those investigations were sent out for the field
investigators to locate and to try to remove these individuals.
But can I add one other point, sir?
Mr. Smith. Sure.
Mr. Healy. If we send a lead out to the field, or if we
don't have the location of an individual, or if we have say a
teenager who might not necessarily be of age but we are aware
they are in our pool, if we have a situation where we know
somebody has applied for a benefit, however they have yet to
receive the benefit, all of that plus the individuals we cannot
locate out in the field get continuously monitored.
Last year, sir, 95,000 people were continuously monitored,
and we periodically recheck those against the intelligence
community, against CIS, against ADIS, to make a determination
as to whether or not we have the information to send them back
to the field.
Mr. Smith. Had you chosen to do so, many thousands of those
individuals could have been deported. You picked 2,500 of the
many, many thousand. You mentioned if they have applied for a
benefit; there is an immense amount of fraud there where
individuals know how to game the system, apply for a benefit,
then they know they are not going to be deported.
My concern with the administration's actions is that by
sending so few home, by deporting such a small percentage of
the visa overstayers, the message they are sending wide and far
is just get into the country. If you are not convicted of a
serious crime, you are going to be allowed to stay. You are
going to pass go. You are going to get the money. That is the
wrong message to send because it increases more illegal
immigration, it sends a message that the administration is just
trying to implement amnesty by another means, and, as I say, it
is the wrong message to send if you are really serious about
trying to address illegal immigration in America.
Thank you, Madam Chair, and I will yield back.
Ms. McSally. Gentleman yields back.
Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan, from South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks for this
hearing. Thanks for the information provided about visa
overstays.
We talk a lot about it back in the district. I talked about
visa overstays with some students that were in my office this
morning. The number I used then was 49 percent of all visa
overstays, of all illegals in this country, were people that
overstayed their visa--people that we gave a permission slip to
to enter this country. They had a interview or went on-line
with a Visa Waiver Program, but the bottom line is they came to
this country with a permission slip, known as a visa, and
decided to stay, for whatever reasons.
The numbers you have here are 68 percent. It is an alarming
number.
We have entrusted these people with access to our country
and they chose to violate that trust. Now I think that is low-
hanging fruit for enforcement.
We are not chasing a footprint in the desert. We know who
these people are. They had an interview. They had a name,
probably a correct spelling, some biometrics, according to Mr.
Wagner.
We know where a lot of them were headed--either a work visa
or a student visa. But too many times they overstay. This
student visa, then why not contact the university if their visa
has expired and find out what their status is? Are they still
enrolled? Maybe they are in a master's program. Maybe they need
to have their visa extended. Maybe we get them into legal
status and out of illegal status by extending their visa.
Then we start reducing this number from 68 percent to a
lower number, and then we can focus on the real problem in this
country and that is our porous Southern Border that is being
infiltrated by elements that have nefarious ideals, whether
that is drug trafficking, human trafficking, or intent on doing
harm to this Nation through acts of terror.
ISIS has said they will infiltrate and exploit our porous
Southern Border. They will infiltrate the Syrian refugee issue.
Take them at their word.
We send a lot of requests to Government agencies. I just
sent a letter--actually several letters--to the Department of
State asking about a memo, a white paper that was used to
justify them circumventing the will of Congress in the Visa
Waiver Program that we passed back in December in ways to try
to get foreign nationals that have visited Iran or visited
Syria or visited Sudan to circumvent our processes and the will
of Congress, negotiated with the White House even, to allow
those people to travel the United States.
So they wrote a memo to justify that. We have asked for
that, and asked for that, and asked for that, and I am asking
for it again from the Department of State, to provide what we
requested to Congress.
Mr. Wagner, April 20, Chairman Perry asked Mr. Kolowski
about the lost body armor and the 150 firearms that were
unaccounted for by the CBP. Can you respond to why we haven't
gotten a response from CBP on this?
Mr. Wagner. No, sir. I was unaware you did not receive a
response yet.
Mr. Duncan. How about Government agencies be responsible to
the United States Congress and respect our request for
information?
Okay. Entry-exit visas. When I think about--let's go back
to just one thing in just a minute on the visa overstays.
I will give you an example. Boston bombing happened. Had
original person of interest that was apprehended and taken to
the hospital. Turns out he was an F1 student visa overstay.
He actually was supposed to go to Ohio University and was
over in Massachusetts as a student at another university. Why
didn't Ohio let the Department know, the U.S. Government know,
that this gentleman who came to their university on a student
visa was no longer enrolled there?
These are common-sense things that American people expect
us to do to start dealing with the number of illegals in this
country. That gentleman is not in the country any more, by the
way.
So talk with me about an exit system. Right now we are
checking airline manifest, but if I go to Japan, I am going to
scan my thumb when I am leaving. They are going to know I left
the country.
What are we doing about that? Because Congress has actually
mandated that system. What are we doing?
Mr. Wagner. I am not aware that Japan is doing biometrics
on departure. I know that they are doing it on entry, like
several other countries around the world. I am not aware of
many countries that do a 100 percent biometric exit on
departure.
Some countries have put automated gates in to speed their
own citizens and others' departure from that country, so there
are some automated gates that they do allow people to use, but
they also have officers and departure control systems set up in
departure terminals exclusively for that, so it is easy just to
put up a gauntlet of machines to help get everybody going
through there.
Now, we are working to deploy the biometric capability on
departure. We launched a pilot yesterday----
Mr. Duncan. We have been working for several years now.
When do we expect the Federal Government to finish this
project?
Mr. Wagner. We will have this deployed and operational by
fall of--by 2018. The Secretary has committed to 2018 to be
doing this and we intend to do this. There are several steps we
have to take before we get there, including launching this
pilot, which we did yesterday, which will give us really the
final requirements for what this solution will look like.
Mr. Duncan. I appreciate the pilot and I appreciate you
saying 2018. I look forward to you coming back to this
committee and telling us, ``This is done. We will know when
people have exited the country that have entered from a foreign
country.''
I yield back. Thank you, Madam.
Ms. McSally. Gentleman's time is expired.
Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, from
Texas, 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me pass for Mr. Hurd and I will go
after him.
Ms. McSally. Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Hurd, from Texas
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hurd. I would like to thank my colleague from the great
State of Texas, want to thank the panelists for being here.
Y'all have a difficult job, and I recognize that.
Mr. Healy, I have a set of questions for you. It has been
argued that an accurate entry-exit system would enhance ISIS
enforcement efforts by reducing DHS's need to review potential
overstay leads that turn out to be false positives. For
example, about one-quarter of the leads HSI investigated
between 2004 and 2012 were individuals who had already departed
the country.
Could you explain to the committee how leads are generated
and sent to the field offices? I know you addressed that a
little bit in your answer to my colleague from Texas.
Mr. Healy. Yes, I can, sir. So the information, the
referral, is received from ADIS, Arrival Departure Information
System. From there it is plugged into the automated targeting
system CBP belongs to.
It starts to work with my organization. This is all
basically automated, sir. First thing we are going to do is we
are bouncing it up to the intelligence community a batch
request. We are going to send it next over to CIS to see how
many are basically in compliance or have applied for benefits,
and then we are going to send it back, sir, to ADIS to see how
many have departed in that window between receipt and when we
are processing.
Just that alone out of that 971,000 number that I provided
you, we have already eliminated now 141,000 records in that
quick exchange between us and CBP.
The next thing, sir, we are going to wait for the response
from the intelligence community, and we will take appropriate
action depending on how we prioritize something depending on
the response.
Now we meet, sir, with the--a group of interagency
intelligence community and law enforcement partners. They have
given us a tiered system, a way to prioritize individuals in
terms of U.S. security interests. I am more than happy, sir,
to--in a closed setting to give you much greater detail on how
we do that.
Once that information comes to us and it is bucketed and
prioritized, now I have to have analysts who have to manually
vet all of that information. When they vet it, sir, we are
looking for any type of derogatory information across 22
Government systems that will enable us to turn around and
validate what we are doing and locate the individual.
It will continue to work its way through the chain, sir.
Once we get to that determination, now it is going to be sent
out to the field office.
The referral goes out as a collateral lead investigation.
The field office is provided with a jacket, all the information
that we have, and the field office is requested to go proceed.
It can go down a criminal road; it can go down an
administrative road. But that, in a nutshell, sir, gives you an
overview of the process.
Mr. Hurd. That is helpful, and that is helpful for the
American people to understand the process and what you all go
through to identify these leads that you have to follow. So
would a biometric exit capability reduce that amount of time
because it allows you to focus on people that are actually
still in the country?
Mr. Healy. Well, the example I would use, sir, and the
Chairwoman cited it before, as those investigations get sent
out to the field, out of that 10,000, 40 percent of those, they
are deemed to be in compliance. So it is not an efficient use
of resources.
If we have the appropriate system as it evolves and gets to
it, we will be able to better apply those resources toward a
legitimate enforcement use instead of somebody who has already
left the country or has accrued CIS benefits and we can't take
action on them.
So, yes, sir. The answer is yes.
Mr. Hurd. Good copy.
Is there currently a backlog of unmatched overstay records
for terrorism and public safety threats?
Mr. Healy. In what way, sir?
Mr. Hurd. As you have vetted the potential leads through
the intelligence community, those 22 agencies that you said you
are reviewing, and there was derogatory information, is there a
number that you all haven't been able to begin investigation
on?
Mr. Healy. Well, some of it, sir, would be the information
that is received. We might have a name; we might have a name
and a date of birth; we might have John Smith who is staying
down at a hotel in Disney World.
Depends on the individual. Depends on the information. But
I can tell you that this group--we call it the Compliance
Enforcement Advisory Panel, and they are very supportive of
assisting us to get the information that we need quickly so
that we are able to follow up on these leads. I hope that
answers your question.
Mr. Hurd. Yes. Do you have a percentage of those folks that
have been identified by one way or another as having an
overstay--that have derogatory, whether it is an SAO advisory
or--they have derogatory information and you have a limited
amount of information to conduct an investigation?
Mr. Healy. Yes, sir. What we will do is, as I referenced
the continuous monitoring process before, if--even if a lead
goes out to the field and it is exhausted, meaning that the
agents can't locate the individual, it circles right back
around and it goes back into our tank. That would be inclusive
of our intelligence community engagements as well.
If we can't identify and we don't have enough to move
forward, we will hold it in our tank. If ADIS provides
information or CIS or the I.C., we will repeatedly batch those
requests and bounce them on a quarterly basis off other systems
to kind-of update and refresh the record. Does that make sense,
sir?
Mr. Hurd. It does. Thank you.
Mr. Healy. Okay.
Ms. McSally. Gentleman yields back.
Chair now recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee, from Texas for 5
minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady and I thank the
Chairwoman. I thank the Ranking Member as well.
Let me acknowledge the representatives here from the
Department of Homeland Security and add my personal
appreciation to your service. We are having this hearing and it
was scheduled before the heinous and horrific terrorist act of
this past weekend.
We know every day that you are on the front lines and many
of you I have engaged with on a number of issues. We recognize
that we also live in a Nation that deals with the issues of
civil liberties and civil rights, and we understand that
security has to be responsive to that.
Let me before I ask my question, make a few comments. Madam
Chairwoman, just to set the record straight, as I look at the
Pew Research Center we note that there are about 93,000
overstays coming out of Canada, 123,000 out of Europe, and
about 42,000 out of Mexico. There have arrived Central America,
17,000, and then we go down further with South America that has
93,000.
So this overstay issue is not predominant to any one area.
I think that is very important. I believe that the President's
approach of focusing on those who would do us harm is the most
important approach.
Let me also add to the record that this is, the DHS found
that there were a total of 44.9 million nonimmigrant visitor
admissions in the United States, air or sea, who were expected
to depart fiscal year 2015. Of this number, an estimated
527,127 individuals overstayed. That is 1.17 percent.
So today I am really going to say that the Congress has
some higher responsibilities right now. I think we need to pass
a no-fly, no-buy; that if you are a terrorist on a terrorist
list most Americans will not realize that the Department of
Homeland Security can only abide by the law. The FBI can only
abide by the law. Frankly, they cannot stop terrorists or
individuals who have been investigated from buying for
terrorism activities a gun. I hope we can pass that today or
this week in regular order, that we can have that legislation
passed.
The banning of the assault weapons is something that the
Secretary of Homeland Security has offered to provide security
to the American people. That bill is ready to be passed right
now.
So I believe we will find that the alleged perpetrator, now
dead, that did the heinous attack on the gay community, heinous
attack on Americans, heinous attack on Latinos--dominant
numbers of these individuals were from the Hispanic community--
he was not an overstay.
Why don't I just ask the question? Mr. Wagner, was--to your
knowledge, was the individual that perpetrated the heinous act,
do you have any facts that he was an overstay?
Mr. Wagner. I believe he was a U.S. citizen born in New
York.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, sir. I wanted to clarify that
from the record from Mr. Wagner. He was a U.S. citizen born in
New York.
So, we are here confronting an issue that is important. The
American people believe that there should be regular order in
the immigration process.
I believe in comprehensive immigration reform, which would
allow Department of Homeland Security to see more people, vet
more people, and reject more people, because in fact you would
have a process for admission, or you would have a process for
the overstays to engage in regular order. I think that is
important.
I do want to raise one question about technology. I have
supported pilot programs, Mr. Burns, dealing with the
technology, the biometric technology of overstays. That is what
you need. You are much better at overstay situations in the
airports or aviation than you are at the land areas, as I
understand it.
But would you share with me what you are doing in Science
and Technology--if you do it quickly; I have one last
question--on dealing with this technology that you need to
better refine the issues of overstays? For all overstays, of
course, you have a visa or you come in legally, and then it
expires and you don't leave. Thank you.
Mr. Burns. Thank you for the question. To follow up, it
is--as Mr. Wagner said, it is an application issue. Biometric
technology and the field of biometrics is rapidly evolving. It
is, how do we take the actual pieces of technology and build
them in to the operational process?
The border situation, as Mr. Wagner stated, looking at
people in vehicles, buses, is very different than the
operations of an airport. So we are continuing to evolve and
support looking at all biometric technology, actively working
with the biometric industry, both large and small business, to
make sure that we can bring the proper technology to the table,
linking it to the operational process.
In deference, I will stop. You said you wanted more time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I do. Thank you very much. I am gratified
for that.
Let me ask----
Ms. McSally. The gentlelady's time is expired.
We are going to do another round, though, if you wouldn't
mind deferring.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Could I just get this last question out on
the record?
Ms. McSally. I cut everybody off at a little after 5, so if
you want to submit it for the record or wait for a second
round?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will do that for the record, then.
Mr. Craig Healy--and I may be able to stay--and Ms. Kelli
Ann Burriesci, if you would, I would be interested particularly
in student overstays, which is somewhat difficult, and whether
or not we include--incorporate the institution that they are
supposed to be going to as an assist or a partner in
determining. Is there a reporting feature that students--that
universities have to utilize with respect to students?
I would add employment, as well, because a lot of those
visas, those H-1B visas, individuals have their families here,
they have rooted here, and then they are without employment,
looking for employment, and they may be considered an overstay.
Ms. McSally. Okay. The gentlelady's time is expired.
Actually, I was going to ask about student visas in my next
round, so I will ask the panelists to answer concerns about the
student visa process. Those are not in this report, just so we
know.
Also I want to note, Mr. Healy, in the testimony you said
for CTCEU's priority No. 1 list you listed a series of projects
and initiatives, and one of them is called the Recurrent
Student Vetting Program. So let's talk about the student visa
process and compliance with universities, information flow, and
how this all works.
Mr. Healy. Yes. Yes, ma'am.
So in terms of the SEVP program, the Student Exchange and
Visitors Program, we do have on several fronts in terms of
overstays. We would not treat them any differently than we
would any other overstay category.
So in the numbers that I referenced earlier, ma'am, those
are not only being fed into terms of SEVP submissions coming in
from SEVIS. In other words, if a school determines that a
student is no longer within a program and they terminate the
student, the school will report that to SEVIS. That will come
in to us.
There is also----
Ms. McSally. Could you talk about the compliance rate? I
noticed you talk about the airlines--there are fines and nearly
100 percent compliance rate for passing information to you.
What about educational institutions' compliance rate, and are
there any fines for noncompliance?
Mr. Healy. Well, there could be, ma'am. I will speak a
little bit in generalities about it. I will have to get you
specifics in terms of the actual program.
But from our perspective, yes, we do have a robust
compliance program. We do site visits--unannounced site visits.
We are able to turn around and do out-of-cycle reviews. As you
are aware, every school is mandated that they be certified
every 2 years.
So we have a robust engagement with the schools through
SEVP. It is required that the schools--their designated school
officials report the information. If an individual stop
attending class or if there is a problem with the student, they
are required to report that within I believe a 30-day period.
We have also started a new program, ma'am, in terms of our
field representatives. We now have 60 individuals that are
geographically placed around the country. Their job is to be
that in-between. They visit schools daily to make sure that the
information flow is continuing.
In terms of your question about recurrent vetting, what
that basically means for us, as a part of our prioritization
process every student that is legitimately in the United States
attending school, when derogatory information comes in it is
vetted against every individual student. So it is just another
opportunity to make sure that we are being as expansive as we
can be in our vetting processes.
In terms of specific compliance rates, ma'am, I would have
to get back to you on that.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. Thank you.
Will next year's report include visa overstay information
on students as well?
Mr. Wagner. Yes. We plan to include the student visas, some
of the worker visas, as well as the U.S.-Canada land border
non-U.S., non-Canadian travelers.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great, thanks.
I want to follow up on the report. This is the entry-exit
overstay report, and I ask unanimous consent that it be entered
into the record for fiscal year 2015, the one that has been
referenced several times today.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files and is
available at https://www.dhs.FY%gov/sites/default/files/publications/
FY%2015%20DHS%20Entry%20and%20- Exit%20Overstay%20Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. McSally. Table one gives a review of Visa Waiver
Program countries. Several of them are over 2 percent: Chile,
Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovakia.
In your testimony you indicated that there is consideration
to potentially using these overstay numbers to impact future
inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program. Ms. Burriesci, can you
clarify what is being looked at related to that?
Ms. Burriesci. Overstay rates is part of something larger
called the disqualification rate, and that is one of the
requirements for a potential country to become a member
country. So we do look at those overstay rates.
Ms. McSally. Okay. It is just in the testimony it says we
are looking at future--I can find the exact page that that is
on--looking at future use of this information related to visa
waiver countries, so I was just wondering what that meant in
the testimony.
Ms. Burriesci. Oh. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that question.
As we have testified, we have been working on the
reliability and accuracy of that data. So as that data
improves, we would use that information for making
determinations on whether a country's status remains and
whether their designation in the program remains or we need to
take an additional action.
Ms. McSally. So is that currently being utilized to make a
determination? It is on page 7 in the top paragraph.
Ms. Burriesci. There is not a Visa Waiver Program country
that is currently over the 3 percent requirement.
Ms. McSally. Okay.
Then for the non-visa waiver countries we have got
Afghanistan at 10 percent; Burkina Faso, 18 percent; Bhutan,
24.89 percent; Chad, 17 percent; Djibouti, 27 percent; Eritrea,
19 percent. I mean, these are huge numbers.
So what is the information in this now? What is going on
with this? Are you using it to decide whether countries should
continue to have a certain number of visas or trying to address
the issues of noncompliance with that country?
Ms. Burriesci. The Department of Homeland Security assists
in the vetting of the visas and the State Department issues the
visas. So I am not sure if that answered your question or not.
Ms. McSally. So is there any feedback loop from this report
to DHS and the State Department? I mean, are we just continuing
to issue visas to these countries that have 20 to 30 percent
overstay rates, or is there any sort of punishment or
accountability?
Ms. Burriesci. That might be a question better referred to
the Department of State.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Is there any coordination that any of
you can speak about from this information to the Department of
State? Are they aware of it?
Ms. Burriesci. The Department of State has the numbers that
you have referenced, has the report information, yes.
Ms. McSally. Okay. We will follow up on that.
I will now recognize Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee for another 5
minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, very much.
I want to pursue my line of questioning, but I am going to
pointedly ask for a more explicit response from Mr. Wagner, Mr.
Healy on the job-related visas, the H-1Bs in particular, if
there are others, in terms of any precise numbers that you may
have of those.
The numbers that we have--and I just want to recite these
numbers again because I think it is worthy of including in the
record--44.9 million nonimmigrant visitor admissions, and the
record shows a estimated 527,127 individuals overstayed their
visas, 1.17 percent. The report goes on to stay, in other
words, 98.8 percent of nonimmigrant visas complied with their
terms of admission and departed on time in fiscal year 2015.
But do we have any sort of isolation of the numbers dealing
with those who are overstays that relates to work? To Mr.
Wagner and Mr. Healy.
Mr. Wagner. No, we have not broken those out yet, but we
will include those in next year's report. Now, this year's
report included about 85 percent of all travelers, so all the
other visa classifications covers about 15 percent of
commercial air passengers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you will do that for us next year? I
think that will be very helpful.
Mr. Wagner. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But let me get to the bottom line of what
my concern is. This should all be about, as we look at how we
help you do your job, and I have already said a metric of new
laws under the title that we have been speaking about, many of
us for a very long period of time, comprehensive immigration
reform, which again refines and defines probably even in a more
detailed manner what happens to overstays, maybe based on the
level of threat.
I am not arguing for overstays. They are persons who are in
the United States unauthorized. But I think the question for
the American people is the issue of security and the level of
threat that these individuals represent.
Mr. Wagner has reinforced the public information that the
deceased actor and terrorist for the event in Orlando was not
an overstay, was not an immigrant. The individual was a citizen
of the United States born in New York. So I am concerned that
Department of Homeland Security, which last part of its name is
security, is taken away from major responsibilities dealing
with the level of threat.
So to Mr. Wagner, Mr. Healy, you are in Homeland Security
Investigations. Have you all been able to assess overall, say,
the 500,000 individuals that have overstayed? Can we include in
the report an assessment of the threat that they represent,
which I believe is what the American people would be concerned
with? Mr. Wagner, Mr. Healy.
Mr. Wagner. Let us take that back and look at that for
inclusion in next year's report, some analysis of what the
overstay population encompasses.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that would be extremely important.
Mr. Healy.
Mr. Healy. No, I would agree, ma'am. That is something that
we are going to have to take back and consider and provide you
that information at a future date.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me continue that line of questioning.
In your recollection--and help me. Obviously, I have served
on Homeland Security. I am trying to just monitor mass
shootings. San Bernardino. Maybe you can recollect because it
would have come to your attention, were any of those
individuals--the--as I remember, the Virginia Tech was an
individual from the Asian community. The Connecticut and
Newtown, Auburn--excuse me--Colorado, in the theater--you can
just--does any overstays come to mind in any of those mass
shootings? I may not have calculated all of them.
Mr. Wagner. I can't think of any off-hand, no.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, we all want to do our research, make
sure we are giving accurate questions, but to your--coming to
your mind at this time--and I believe that if one was it would
probably remain very viable, enough for you to remember an
individual because it would have come to your attention as to
what kind of person perpetrated those particular incidences or
mass incidences.
Mother Emmanuel was not; Colorado was not, to my
recollection; Columbine was not; Virginia Tech was not; Newtown
was not; San Bernardino were individuals who were statused,
though they were immigrants, if I recall. Certainly going back
to as far as 9/11, let me say that I am not ignoring that. That
is 9/11--I used the term mass shootings--9/11 did have
overstays.
So my question would be, after 9/11 the Department of
Homeland Security was created. Do you feel that you have enough
structure in place that you would have caught or would have
been drawn to the attention of the overstays that were part of
the acts of 9/11 where there were overstays that were engaged
in that?
Mr. Wagner. I believe we would have identified them, yes.
With the systems that are in place now and the measures that
are in place now, I believe so.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Can you just expand on those
systems without breaching confidentially?
Mr. Wagner. I think, you know, well, one of the things we
do is we take the visa database that State Department provides
us and we run recurrent checks every day on that information,
and if someone appears on a watch list that has a current visa,
one of the things we do is look to say are they in the country
or have they left the country. Regardless of whether they are
an overstay or not, are they still here?
We will provide that information to ICE, we will provide
that information to the FBI, we will provide that to the
intelligence community. But we have ways to identify those in
real time when those things happen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I am going to yield back.
Mr. Healy, did you want to comment on the investigation
part of it?
Mr. Healy. I was just going to add, ma'am, that we rely
heavily upon the intelligence community and our law enforcement
partners to help us prioritize. So I am comfortable that they
are providing us with good guidance for the individuals that we
should be targeting and focusing on for National security
purposes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That are coming into the United States.
Let me thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I think I want to leave
my time at the microphone with the ultimate question of the
threat to the people of the United States and our
responsibility of securing them. I think any hearing that we
have here in this committee needs to be in that context, and
thank the men and women who are on the front lines for doing
so.
I end by saying I know, Madam Chairwoman, this is not your
jurisdiction, but I cannot help saying that this week we must
pass no-fly no-buy. If you are in any way had discussions about
terrorist activities or threatening comments toward the
American people you cannot buy an assault weapon or any guns of
any kind.
I thank the gentlelady for being kind enough, and I yield
back.
Ms. McSally. Gentlelady's time is expired.
I am going to go through another round. Again, I appreciate
the patience of our panelists here.
Mr. Healy, you mentioned in your testimony you had 10,000
leads last year, 1,910 arrests, 86 indictments, and 80
convictions. Is that number of arrests to convictions--that
seems like a small percentage of arrests. Is that pretty
typical or could you kind of speak about those that were
arrested who, for whatever reason, have not been convicted?
Mr. Healy. The arrests, ma'am, include not only criminal
arrests but also administrative arrests. So in a situation
where there might be a criminal prosecution following as part
of an investigation, or there might be nothing much--might just
be virtue of the fact of an administrative arrest because an
individual is an overstay.
Ms. McSally. So of the 1,910, do you know how many were
criminal arrests and how many were administrative arrests?
Mr. Healy. I believe----
Ms. McSally. Can you just walk me through the process of an
administrative arrest? Like what does that mean, and what
happens after the arrest?
Mr. Healy. What will happen is an individual will be
encountered and they will be issued a notice to appear. It
could be broken down into a couple different categories. If
there is derogatory information, then it may be a custodial-
type detention or the individual might just receive the notice
to appear and then they are required to appear before an
immigration judge.
If it is a Visa Waiver Program they are not required to
appear before an immigration judge because that is waived by
virtue of the fact that a person came in through the Visa
Waiver Program. But it would basically not go down the criminal
route, would not go through the U.S. attorney's office; it
would be an internal administrative protocol that is run by ICE
and enforcement and removal operations.
Ms. McSally. Okay. So of the 1,910, do you know how many
were administrative? If you don't we can----
Mr. Healy. I have it, ma'am. I will get it for you.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Do you also know--and this may be just
for the record, and I wasn't planning on going down this road,
but since you brought it up--of those that have been given
notices to appear, are you tracking those that do not appear
and do they kind of go back into the system here?
Mr. Healy. That is correct, ma'am, yes. Yes. We can get you
those numbers and break them down for you.
Ms. McSally. So are they then included in the, you know,
355,000 remaining, because they maybe sort-of left your numbers
and came back to the numbers?
Mr. Healy. Well, they would come back to us, ma'am, and
they would actually wind back up in our continuous monitoring.
Ms. McSally. Yes, okay. Okay. Great.
Mr. Burns, can you talk about the Apex program and what we
learned from the program and how that is going to inform our
implementation of, you know, future--the future biometric exit
program?
Mr. Burns. Certainly. Thank you.
The Apex AEER program I think was indicative of the
Department's commitment to try and answer the question. So
instead of it being the typical ``let's go develop something,''
it was really a collaboration between CBP and S&T to look at
the biometric entry and exit issue.
In addition, we brought in all of the stakeholders that
would have to deal or be impacted by what we were doing. So it
was very important to bring in the biometric industry, the
airline industry, and everybody that would be part.
So the first couple of months was actually getting
everybody to identify the problem, both from a DHS operational
perspective but also from an airline and an operation
perspective as well. So the team was broad. The team was
inclusive.
Then we went and worked with industry, both small and large
business, to identify the technologies--finger, face, and
iris--which were the 3 that we deemed would fit in this
operational construct, to bring them across the border and
start the process.
Biometric technology is evolving. Biometric technology is
here to stay and I think will help answer the question. The
issue is its application within the environment.
Fingerprint technology that works well in one location does
not work in another; the same with facial and same with iris.
The simple thing is lighting or the environmental conditions of
humidity will impact how we work it.
So we ran a series of operational simulations within the
Maryland test facility to see how well all those pieces would
come together. All of that information has been provided to CBP
so they can build into their longer acquisition program.
We started from the get-go knowing that whatever the
technical solution or products that we were going to bring out
had to fit into their acquisition program. So operational
requirements, cost-benefit analysis, all those things that
would help them make a successful decision as they moved
forward was provided to them.
We also made sure that we looked at it from an entry and an
exit holistic perspective. So whatever you do, as Mr. Wagner
has said, on the exit side impacts entry. So we worked to see
what could we do to speed up entry as we brought things forward
for exit.
We knew we had to deal with seconds. Five seconds added to
an entry process is a huge amount of time. So we were down to
looking at technology and operational processes that were 3
seconds differential from something else, and we brought all of
that together.
Working with the general public was also incredibly
important. As I stated, we had 1,700 people from 18 to 81. We
looked at all ethnicities, 50 different countries of origin.
Because once again, it has to work for everyone that is in the
traveling public.
Ms. McSally. Great. My understanding is there is an AEER
report that you have that is going to be delivered to us, or
can you give us a time frame of when we might----
Mr. Burns. We are in the process of completing the high-
level report of our findings. It is not as detailed as we would
like because many of the companies that brought their
technology did it under the agreement that their intellectual
property and some other aspects would be protected. But the
high-level report is in process, should be ready this summer. I
can get back to you with a specific date.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Wagner, in the testimony--your joint testimony that
already put together, said the compliance for--I know whether
you guys call is APIS or A-P-I-S--is near 100 percent. I think
in 2015 the number was 92 percent. Can we talk about what steps
are being made to bring that to as close to 100 percent as
possible? What are the reasons why it is not 100 percent?
Mr. Wagner. Correct. So when the airline transmits the
information to us we do all of our pre-arrival vetting and
database checks on that. So when the person actually arrives
and we read the document that is presented now, we compare it
in the data fields against what the airline transmitted, and
then we keep a log of any type of discrepancies.
If there is data missing or inaccurate, the airlines are
subject to a fine for that. We issue very few fines these days.
I think we issued maybe about a dozen last year total.
Generally I think they are for like missing crew data or a
late transmission of the information. But we can certainly get
you a breakdown of that.
Where we see some of just the technical issues of a date of
birth where they put the month and the day instead of the day
and the month, some formatting issues like that, especially
when it is keystroked in overseas by airline personnel and not
through the machine-readable zone of the document, which is
what we try to encourage.
But by and large, the data is accurate both inbound--and
what we have found with outbounds, even though on the departure
manifest we are not there to validate each and every single
transmission, what we are finding with the mobile technology
that we deployed--one of the things we did is let's confirm the
accuracy of what the airlines are providing.
We are finding that it also was in the high-90 percentile
of accuracy. When we conclude our report on the mobile
technology, we will include those figures in there.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
I want to follow up, Mr. Wagner, on--I understand the
differences between what we can do with Canada with information
exchange and the challenge that we don't have a similar
exchange with Mexico. Is there anything we can do with Mexico
to address providing some better information for land ports of
entry on the Mexican border in the short term? What are the
ideas for the longer term?
Mr. Wagner. Well, we continue to hold discussions with them
about the databases that they do have and what types of
information are potentially to share, what kind of information
are we sharing already. You know, at the land border they just
do not have a system or the technology or the infrastructure to
collect the passenger-level information.
They collect license plates, and we have talked about
sharing them or exchanging that. But at the traveler level,
they just don't have a system. So it is a case of we can build
it on our side for departure and record it, or maybe we could--
this opportunity to work with Mexico to build the
infrastructure to collect it and then both of us use it.
That is, you know, the ideas and the concepts that are
being kicked around, but we haven't really solidified an
approach that would work.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
So a lot of what we have talked about so far and really the
focus of the hearing is tracking people who are overstaying and
using biographical and biometric information in order to know,
you know, who has left and who is in compliance and who is not.
You mentioned in testimony, and we are interested in this
committee, about the pilot program of identifying to make sure
the person is the person who owns the passport, right? So they
could have a fraudulent passport, a stolen passport, and that
may--you can match their fingerprints to them in and out but it
still may be that there is fraud involved and that is not the
person who it is supposed to be.
The pilot project that we had to match the facial
recognition--I am interested in the outcome of that. I think
Mr. Hurd has legislation to make that permanent for all
passengers.
Can you just comment on the fraud piece and how we can make
sure that bad guys are not using the system to their advantage?
I mean, you may match their biometrics to their passport, but
if it is not the right person then we have a whole other
program.
Mr. Wagner. Correct. So as travel documents' physical
security has gotten a lot better over the years, we have seen
the amount of altered or counterfeit-type documents decrease
tremendously, especially in the commercial air environment.
Where the risk remains, though, is a person with a
legitimate document that does not belong to them--a lost
document, a stolen document, a borrowed document. That is
really where the risk is because it is a good physical
document. You have to compare the person against it.
Most of the countries issue now electronic passports that
at least at the minimum have a photograph on there, including
U.S. travel documents. So what we are able to do with the
facial comparison technology is read that chip, open it up,
take a picture of the traveler, compare the two using an
algorithm, and tell us with some certainty or probability that
it does belong to that person.
So what we are seeing--we have caught a couple of
impostors, what we call them--a person using the--a legitimate
document that doesn't belong to them. Just a couple of weeks
ago at JFK we had a woman arrive on a flight from Ghana, I
believe, that presented a U.S. passport. The officer looked at
it; didn't quite think the picture matched up to the traveler,
put her in front of the camera, recorded it, and it turned out
that no, she was not the document-holder. She turned out to be
a person from Liberia that had been denied a visa previously
last year.
But knowing that she had a U.S. passport wouldn't routinely
subject her to fingerprints upon entry. But using this
comparison to the picture on the photograph of the document she
presented, we could confirm she is an impostor. We then can
fingerprint her, found out what her real identity was and the
fact that she was denied a visa.
So it is incredibly helpful technology for our office to be
able to help make that determination of who the true document-
holder is.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
Mr. Healy, if you were in charge of--with unlimited
resources, in order to be able to do you job, to whittle down
those who have overstayed and quickly be able to locate them
and take appropriate action, what else would you need? We heard
the biometric exit would help whittle down those false
positives. What else would you need?
I am also interested in local law enforcement are often
maybe the first people that are encountering individuals, the
information flow between the Federal and the local officials,
and what access they may have. But what is your wish list in
order to address this issue?
Mr. Healy. I think we are going in the right direction,
ma'am, in terms of the work that we are doing, from where we
have come from to where we are now. The system is not perfect.
No system is perfect.
But all the players that need to be engaged are engaged.
CBP is in the process of pulling it together in terms of the
automation process, which is making it a lot easier for us.
In terms of our local engagement, through our field
offices, through our task forces we are tied at the hip with
our local States and local partners. So they also can be a part
of this process, as well.
So in terms of what I would hope for, I would just hope
that we would just continue to move in the direction that we
are moving. I think that we will get there soon.
Ms. McSally. Thanks.
I do want to follow up on Mr. Barletta's question--I had
thought about that myself in preparing for this hearing--is
right now if somebody overstays less than--what is it? They
can't come in for 2 years if it was a short overstay, and they
can't come in for 10 years if it was a long overstay? Yes,
okay, 3 and 10. Those are really the only disincentives or
accountability items.
Would it be valuable to provide some other accountability
to these overstayers--to make it a crime, to have some fines,
to have maybe a little bit of a harsher penalties of not being
able to reenter? Are there any disincentives that we should
consider--thoughtful disincentives?
Mr. Wagner. Well, what we do see is people that overstay,
as time goes on, you know, those numbers do get whittled down,
like you mentioned. You know, a lot of people do leave at some
point, just late or later.
They are subject to that 3-year bar or 10-year bar of
getting a visa then to come back. They certainly cannot use the
Visa Waiver Program again. You know, their Estas are
invalidated; that information goes to State, and then they have
to go to State and apply and really state their case as to what
why they overstayed.
So once they do depart the United States or are removed
from the United States, it is going to be very difficult to
come back in and get a visa unless they overcome with a waiver,
and there are procedures to do that, or wait out the bar of
inadmissibility.
I don't know if fining them or making it a criminal act
would change the behavior of the people that are going to stay
here and not leave.
Ms. McSally. Are individuals who left, say, 60 days late
considered the same as individuals you caught 60 days later and
put out? Like, basically it is the same punishment that they
left voluntarily or you caught them and deported them? Because
that is different behavior.
Mr. Wagner. I believe it would be the same.
Ms. McSally. Okay.
Mr. Wagner. I will have to think about it.
Ms. McSally. Do all of you--I mean, do you feel that those
disincentives are adequate?
Mr. Wagner. I think people that are going to stay here
permanently are--will try to stay here permanently. It will be
difficult to come back in once a person leaves that has been
identified as an overstay, so it is going be difficult to get a
travel document, to get on board a plane to come back.
Ms. McSally. Okay.
I think we have exhausted a lot of items here. Let me give
the opportunity for any of the members of the panel to share
any other perspectives you weren't asked about that weren't in
your testimony that you feel are important, even with some of
the lines of questioning that came from the entire group of
Members here. Is there anything else you want to leave with us
that we haven't considered on this issue?
Mr. Healy. Ma'am, just for the record, I wanted to clarify
I have that number. Out of the 1,900 that you asked about----
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Mr. Healy [continuing]. One hundred thirty of those were
criminal.
Ms. McSally. Got it. So it is 80 of 130, not 80 of 1,910,
right? You know, 80 convictions of 130----
Mr. Healy. That is correct.
Ms. McSally [continuing]. Criminal arrests.
Mr. Healy. That is correct, ma'am.
Ms. McSally. That is a little bit of a higher rate of
conviction there.
Mr. Healy. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. McSally. Okay, great. Anything else?
Mr. Wagner. I would just like to add that, you know, just
to follow up on what we discussed about the--our plan is to
deploy the solution in fall 2018. The Secretary has charged us
with doing that. We have put together a strategy to get there.
It is contingent on the Government procurement process to
spend the fees that Congress has made available to us to do
this as a reference of $1 billion over the 10 years to do that.
So there is a quite extensive procurement process, several
steps that we will be engaging the industry and doing request
for proposals over the next, you know, 18 months to be able to
get there.
So there are some tight deadlines to do this, but we will
be going through that structured procurement process to be able
to take that money and then put it onto a contract and be able
to spend it to deploy the solution. So that is all.
Ms. McSally. Great.
Any other--Mr. Burns. Ms. Burriesci. Anything else to add?
Ms. Burriesci. No.
Mr. Burns. No.
Ms. McSally. Great, thanks.
I appreciate the hard job that you all have. There is
obviously some differing perspectives about what is more
important, you know, 1 percent or, you know, 480,000. I think
at some point, you know, quantity has a quality all of its own
when you are talking about the magnitude of individuals, and it
only takes one person with bad intentions, you know, to be a
risk to public safety and National security.
So we don't need a hyperbolize it, but we need to be
vigilant about doing everything we can to make sure that those
that are trying to use our system and our processes that are
trying to do us harm are very quickly identified and the public
remains safe. So I appreciate all the efforts that are being
made related to that.
I think we do have a lot of--a lot of work has been done,
but we do have a lot of work left to do, and we look forward to
partnering with you to make sure that we are able to close some
these gaps that are still there in technology and procedures
and whatever else is required.
So I appreciate your testimony today and appreciate all the
work that you all do.
I also want to thank the Members for their questions. The
Members of the committee may have some additional questions for
the witnesses, and I think we have already had some for the
record, so please get back. We would ask you to respond to
additional questions in writing. Pursuant to committee rule
VII(e), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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