[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING OUR PASSENGERS: PERSPECTIVES ON SECURING SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION IN NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-77
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark Walker, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Martha McSally, Arizona Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Kris Carlson, Subcommittee Clerk
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Ms. Sonya Proctor, Director, Surface Division, Office of Security
Policy and Industry Engagement, Transportation Security
Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Thomas Belfiore, Chief Security Officer, The Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Raymond Diaz, Director of Security, Metropolitan Transit
Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Christopher Trucillo, Chief of Police, New Jersey Transit
Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Martin Conway, Deputy Police Chief, National Railroad
Passenger Corporation--Amtrak:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Panel II
Sergeant W. Greg Kierce, Director, Office of Emergency Management
and Homeland Security, City of Jersey City, New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Mr. Richard Sposa, Operations Coordinator, Emergency Medical
Services, Jersey Medical Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 42
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
Mr. Richard D. Gorman, Office of Emergency Management and
Homeland Security, Department of Fire and Emergency Services,
Jersey City, New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 51
Mr. Vincent Glenn, Commander, Emergency Service Unit, Police
Department, Jersey City, New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 53
Prepared Statement............................................. 55
Mr. Mike Mollahan, Trustee, Port Authority Police Benevolent
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 57
Prepared Statement............................................. 59
PROTECTING OUR PASSENGERS: PERSPECTIVES ON SECURING SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION IN NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK
----------
Tuesday, June 21, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Jersey City, NJ.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
Room 202, Hepburn Hall, New Jersey City University, 2039
Kennedy Boulevard, Jersey City, New Jersey, Hon. Daniel M.
Donovan, Jr. (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Donovan, Payne, and Watson
Coleman.
Mr. Donovan. The Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine surface
transportation security. I appreciate the effort taken on
behalf of all those involved to have this important field
hearing.
This is an official Congressional hearing, as opposed to a
town hall meeting, and as such, we must abide by certain rules
of the Committee on Homeland Security and the House of
Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests today that
demonstrations from the audience, including applause and verbal
outbursts, as well as the use of signs or placards, are a
violation of the rules of the House of Representatives. It is
important that we respect the decorum and the rules of this
committee.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Thank you all for being here today. First, I would like to
thank New Jersey City University for hosting us today, as well
as Ranking Member Payne, who has focused a great deal on our
shared priority of security for transportation.
Now, especially with a threat environment that is the
highest since 9/11, it is critically important to examine our
region's surface transportation security. We are here to learn
how Federal partners, transit agencies, and first responders
are working together to protect passengers from the type of
hateful violence that hit Orlando last week.
As that attack tragically reminded us, the threats from
terrorism and their sympathizers--terrorists and their
sympathizers, are not going away. They are evolving and
increasing. Now, more than ever, Congress needs to do
everything it can to assist stakeholders in building and
sustaining their capabilities to prevent, protect against, and,
God forbid, respond to a terrorist attack.
Today, stakeholders from State and local government, the
private sector, and surface transportation networks are giving
their time to share with us their perspectives on achieving our
shared goal of protecting millions of regional commuters. We
will look specifically at the preparedness and response
capabilities of surface transportation systems in New York and
New Jersey, one of the highest threat regions in the world.
Surface transportation networks serve more than 10 billion
riders annually. MTA alone moves more than 8.7 million
residents on their subways, buses, and commuter rails each day.
It is no surprise then that nearly 15 years after the tragedy
in lower Manhattan, our transportation systems remain a top
target for international terror organizations.
This isn't a new threat. We have seen the devastating
impacts of an attack against transportation systems, most
recently a bombing in a metro station in Brussels. Since 2002,
authorities have thwarted 6 terrorist plots against mass
transit systems in the United States. Alarmingly, 5 of those 6
plots were against systems serving the New York metropolitan
region.
As the threat grows, we need to ensure that surface
transportation systems and first responders have the resources
necessary to respond to acts of terrorism and other
emergencies. That is why we convened this hearing today. We
want to hear from the people here on the ground, not hundreds
of miles away in Washington, about what is working and what is
not.
Back in April, this subcommittee held a very informative
roundtable discussion along with the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security regarding this issue. We heard from
multiple transit agencies, many of whom are represented on our
first panel today, about how they have collaborated with
Federal partners like the Transportation Security
Administration to secure their infrastructures. I hope we could
build upon that discussion today.
When I came to Congress and attended my first few hearings,
I asked my staff what happens when these hearings are finished?
Who uses this information that we have obtained, and how do we
use it?
I assure you that the information gathered today will help
form the policies we enact to improve security for our region's
commuters. I am particularly interested in learning about how
our witnesses use the Transit Security Grant Program and other
Homeland Security grants, and if there are needs to change or
enhance these programs that Congress should be addressing.
Also I am interested in hearing more about how security
personnel for mass transit systems coordinate with Federal
Government and local first responders to ensure everyone is
prepared to respond to incidents. How are our witnesses working
together with other transit agencies to share threat
information and best practices?
I want to thank all of our witnesses for testifying today.
We have two very distinguished panels before us, and I look
forward to learning how they are protecting passengers and what
we, as Congress, can do to help mitigate any gaps.
[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel M. Donovan, Jr.
June 21, 2016
Thank you all for being here today.
First, I'd like to thank the New Jersey City University for hosting
us today, as well as Ranking Member Payne, who has focused a great deal
on our shared priority of transportation security.
Now especially, with a threat environment that's the highest since
9/11, it's critically important to examine our region's surface
transportation security.
We're here to learn how Federal partners, transit agencies, and
first responders are working together to protect the passengers from
the type of hate-filled violence that hit Orlando last week.
As that attack tragically reminded us, the threats from terrorist
organizations and their sympathizers are not going away. They're
evolving and increasing.
Now more than ever, Congress needs to do everything it can to
assist stakeholders in building and sustaining their capabilities to
prevent, protect against, and--God forbid--respond to a terrorist
attack.
Today, stakeholders from State and local government, the private
sector, and surface transportation networks are giving their time to
share with us their perspectives on achieving our shared goal of
protecting millions of regional commuters.
We'll look specifically at the preparedness and response
capabilities of surface transportation systems in New York and New
Jersey, one of the highest-threat regions in the world.
Surface transportation networks serve more than 10 billion riders
annually. MTA alone moves more than 8.7 million residents on their
subways, buses, and commuter rail lines each day.
It's no surprise, then, that nearly 15 years after the tragedy in
lower Manhattan, our transportation systems remain a top target for
international terror organizations.
This isn't a new threat. We've seen the devastating impacts of an
attack against transportation systems, most recently a bombing at a
metro station in Brussels. Since 2002, authorities have thwarted 6
terrorist plots against mass transit systems in the United States.
Alarmingly, 5 out of those 6 plots were against systems serving the
New York metropolitan region.
As the threat grows, we need to ensure that surface transportation
systems and first responders have the resources needed to respond to
acts of terrorism and other emergencies.
That's why we convened this hearing today. We wanted to hear from
the people here on the ground--not hundreds of miles away in
Washington--about what's working and what's not.
Back in April, this subcommittee held a very informative roundtable
discussion with the Subcommittee on Transportation Security regarding
this issue.
We heard from multiple transit agencies, many of whom are
represented on our first panel today, about how they're collaborating
with Federal partners, like the Transportation Security Administration,
to secure their infrastructure.
I hope we can build upon that discussion today.
You know, when I came to Congress and attended my first few
hearings, I asked my staff: ``What happens when these hearings are
finished? Who uses this information and how?''
I assure you that the information gathered today will help form the
policies we enact to improve security for our region's commuters.
I'm particularly interested in learning more about how our
witnesses use the Transit Security Grant Program and other Homeland
Security grants, and if there are needed changes or enhancements to
these programs that Congress should address.
Also, I'm interested in hearing more about how security personnel
for mass transit systems coordinate with the Federal Government and
local first responders to ensure everyone is prepared to respond to
incidents.
And how are our witnesses working with other transit agencies to
share threat information and best practices?
I want to thank all of the witnesses for testifying today. We have
two very distinguished panels before us and I look forward to learning
how they're protecting passengers and what we, as Congress, can do to
help mitigate any gaps.
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement he may
have.
Mr. Payne. Good morning. I would first like to thank
Chairman Donovan, my neighbor from Staten Island, for agreeing
to hold today's hearing on securing surface transportation here
in Jersey City.
Our region is a National transportation hub with diverse
assets, from rail to bus to ferries. Our transit operators,
first responders, and workers are uniquely positioned to tell
us what the Federal Government does well to keep our system
secure and what it can do better. In light of the number of
transportation systems running through this area, the people
here are especially qualified to share perspectives on
coordination among transit operators with emergency responders.
Since I joined the Committee on Homeland Security in 2013,
I have focused my efforts on making sure people are safe in the
places they should be safe, whether it is in a school, at a
nightclub, a sporting event, or on a train, or getting to work.
Two years ago, I hosted a hearing in Newark on securing mass
gatherings, using New Jersey's impressive preparations for the
2014 Super Bowl as a case study. New Jersey had important best
practices to share.
I am proud that the rest of the country was able to benefit
from New Jersey's expertise in making a soft target safer.
Nevertheless, there are still people, whatever their
motivations, who want to exploit soft targets in our
communities. The tragic events in Orlando are evidence of that,
and let me again express my deepest condolences to the families
and loved ones of the victims in Orlando.
The terrorist attacks in Belgium earlier this year also
underscore the threats to soft targets. On March 22, the world
was devastated when terrorists carried out 3 coordinated
attacks at transportation facilities in Brussels.
As I was in Washington getting briefed on the attacks, I
could not help but think of my district and my constituents.
Every day, thousands of my constituents board trains to get to
work or visit somewhere along the Northeast Corridor, whether
it is New Jersey Transit, PATH, subway, or Amtrak. When I saw
the footage of the devastation in Brussels, I could not help
but ask myself how do we make sure nothing like that happens
here, and how do we make sure that our first responders are
prepared to respond if it does?
Congress took important steps to prevent attacks on our
surface transportation systems nearly 10 years ago when it
passed the
9/11 Act. It required the Transportation Security
Administration to issue regulations to secure high-risk transit
systems and improve training for front-line employees.
I am troubled the TSA is almost a decade behind in issuing
these regulations and want to know why they have been held up
and when we can expect them. Additionally, I am interested to
learn how TSA coordinates with transit operators to improve
security in the absence of the required regulations.
Today, we also have a distinguished panel of emergency
responders who have spent well over a decade building robust
capabilities to respond to full-spectrum--the full spectrum of
events, from man-made and natural disasters to mass transit
disasters. The 9/11 attacks revealed significant gaps in the
National response capabilities and the need for improved
coordination among first responders and local stakeholders.
The remarkable progress this region has made is due in
large part to the significant--to the significant Federal
Homeland Security grant funding. Today, we will have an
opportunity to learn how grant investments have made us safer
and what more the Federal Government needs to do.
Once again, I would like to thank Chairman Donovan for
holding today's hearing in Jersey City. I would also like to
thank my New Jersey colleague, Congresswoman Bonnie Watson
Coleman, for participating.
Finally, I would like to thank the New Jersey City
University for hosting today's field hearing, and I look
forward to the witnesses' testimony, and I thank them for being
here.
With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
June 21, 2016
Our region is a National transportation hub with diverse assets--
from rail, to bus, to ferries.
And our transit operators, first responders, and workers are
uniquely positioned to tell us what the Federal Government does well to
keep our systems secure and what it can do better.
In light of the number of transportation systems running through
this area, people here are especially qualified to share perspectives
on coordination among transit operators and with emergency responders.
Since I joined the Committee on Homeland Security in 2013, I have
focused my efforts on making sure people are safe in the places they
should be safe--whether it is at a school, a night club, a sporting
event, or on a train, getting to work.
Two years ago, I hosted a hearing in Newark on securing mass
gatherings, using New Jersey's impressive preparations for the 2014
Super Bowl as a case study.
New Jersey had important best practices to share.
I am proud that the rest of the country was able to benefit from
New Jersey's expertise in making a ``soft target'' safer.
Nevertheless, there are still people--whatever their motivations--
who want to exploit soft targets in our communities.
The tragic events in Orlando are evidence of that. I, again, want
to express my deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of the
victims.
The terrorist attacks in Belgium earlier this year also underscore
the threats to soft targets.
On March 22, the world was devastated when terrorists carried out
three coordinated attacks at transportation facilities in Brussels.
As I was in Washington getting briefed on the attacks, I couldn't
help but think of my district, and my constituents.
Every day, thousands of my constituents board trains to get to work
or visit somewhere along the Northeast Corridor, whether it's Jersey
Transit, PATH, the subway, or Amtrak.
When I saw footage of the devastation in Brussels, I couldn't help
but ask myself, ``How do we make sure nothing like that happens here?''
and ``How do we make sure that our first responders are prepared to
respond if it does?''
Congress took important steps to prevent attacks on our surface
transportation systems nearly 10 years ago when it passed the 9/11 Act.
It required the Transportation Security Administration to issue
regulations to secure high-risk transit systems and improve training
for front-line employees.
I am troubled that TSA is almost a decade behind in issuing these
regulations, and want to know why they have been held up and when we
can expect them.
Additionally, I am interested to learn how TSA coordinates with
transit operators to improve security in the absence of the required
regulations.
Today, we also have a distinguished panel of emergency responders
who have spent well over a decade building robust capabilities to
respond to the full spectrum of events--from manmade and natural
disasters to mass transit incidents.
The 9/11 attacks revealed significant gaps in National response
capabilities and the need for improved coordination among first
responders and local stakeholders.
The remarkable progress this region has made is due, in large part,
to significant Federal homeland security grant funding.
Today, we will have the opportunity to learn how grant investments
have made us safer, and what more the Federal Government needs to do.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
We are pleased to have two panels of very distinguished
witnesses before us today on this important topic. I will now
introduce our first panel.
Ms. Sonya Proctor serves as the director for the
Transportation Security Administration's Surface Division,
where she is responsible for developing risk-based security
policies in conjunction with stakeholders in surface
transportation modes. Prior to joining TSA, Ms. Proctor served
as chief of the Amtrak Police Department and served 25 years on
the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police Department.
Welcome.
Ms. Proctor. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Thomas Belfiore serves as the chief
security officer for the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, a position he has held since 2015. Prior to joining the
Port Authority in 2012, Mr. Belfiore held several positions in
law enforcement as well as security management, including
director of security operations for Major League Baseball.
Mr. Raymond Diaz serves as the director of security for the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority. In this capacity, he
oversees the overall security of the MTA, including the
coordination of MTA's security efforts with Federal, State, and
local law enforcement. Prior to joining the MTA, Mr. Diaz was a
member of the New York City Police Department for 41 years and
retired in 2011 as the chief of the Transit Bureau.
Welcome, Chief.
Mr. Christopher Trucillo serves as the chief of New Jersey
Transit, a position he has held since 2010. Prior to joining
New Jersey Transit, Chief Trucillo served as the director of
public safety for John Jay College of Criminal Justice and
spent more than 20 years in the Port Authority Police
Department, where he served as chief of department.
Welcome, Chief.
Chief Trucillo. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Martin Conway serves as the deputy chief
of the Amtrak Police Department, a position he has held since
August 2014. Prior to joining Amtrak, Chief Conway served on
the New York City Police Department for 26 years. While with
the New York City Police Department, he served as an inspector
in the Counterterrorism Division responsible for coordinating
counterterrorism measures within the New York subway system.
The witnesses' full written testimony will appear in the
record. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Proctor for 5 minutes to
testify.
STATEMENT OF SONYA PROCTOR, DIRECTOR, SURFACE DIVISION, OFFICE
OF SECURITY POLICY AND INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Proctor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.
Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and
Representative Watson Coleman. I truly appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's role in transportation
security.
The transportation security network is immense, consisting
of mass transit systems, passenger and freight railroads,
highways, motor carrier operators, pipelines, and maritime
facilities. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
New York MTA, alone transports over 11 million passengers daily
and represents just one of more than 6,800 U.S. public transit
agencies for which TSA has oversight, ranging from very small
bus-only systems in rural areas to very large multi-modal
systems like the one in the New York MTA urban areas.
More than 500 individual freight railroads operate on
nearly 140,000 miles of track, carrying essential goods. Eight
million large-capacity commercial trucks and almost 4,000
commercial bus companies travel on the 4 million miles of
roadway in the United States.
Surface transportation operators carry approximately 750
million intercity bus passengers and provide 10 billion
passenger trips on mass transit each year. The pipeline
industry consists of more than 2.5 million miles of pipelines
owned and operated by approximately 3,000 private companies,
which transport natural gas, refined petroleum products, and
other commercial products throughout the United States.
These thousands of miles of transportation systems and
millions of traveling people remain a target for terrorist
activity, as evidenced by the recent attacks on mass transit
and passenger rail carriers in France and Belgium. These
attacks underscore the importance of building upon our surface
transportation successes through stakeholder communication,
coordination, and collaboration.
Securing such a vast surface transportation network
requires a group effort. TSA's role is focused on security
program oversight, while the direct responsibility to secure
surface-specific transportation systems falls primarily on the
system owners and operators. TSA works with State, local, and
industry partners to assess risk, reduce vulnerabilities, and
improve security through collaborative efforts.
Collaboration between TSA and industry occurs through daily
interaction and engagement, as well as through formal
structures, including the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure
Partnership Advisory Council framework, sector coordinating
councils, and other industry-centric organizations, such as the
Mass Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group.
TSA, security agencies, industry associations, and the
corporate leadership of industry and municipal operator
stakeholders jointly pursue policies to secure surface systems,
including implementation of exercises and training, physical
and cyber protective measures, and operational deterrence
activities. Working with our partners, we develop resources for
security training and exercises, such as TSA-produced training.
For example, our Intermodal Security Training and Exercise
Program, it is called I-STEP, helps surface entities test and
evaluate their security plans and their ability to respond to
threats along with other first responders. We also have the TSA
First Observer Program, which trains highway professionals to
observe, assess, and report potential security and terrorism
incidents.
TSA coordinates with Amtrak and New York MTA to support
rail safe operations in which Amtrak police and law enforcement
officers from Federal, State, local rail and transit agencies
deploy at passenger rail and transit stations and along the
railroad rights-of-way to exercise counterterrorism and
incident response capabilities. The coordinated effort involves
activities such as heightened station and right-of-way patrols,
increased security presence on-board trains, explosives
detection canine sweeps, random passenger bag inspections, and
counter-surveillance.
TSA also plays a role in surface transportation security
through regulatory compliance inspections and voluntary
assessments. We conduct thousands of inspections of freight
railroads each year on rail cars carrying rail security
sensitive materials as well as assessments on the 100 largest
transit and passenger railroad systems, which account for over
95 percent of all users of public transportation. Results of
these assessments translate into resource allocation decisions
to ensure that the higher-risk entities with the greatest need
receive priority consideration for available resources.
TSA remains dedicated to securing the Nation's surface
transportation network from terrorist activities and attacks
through close collaboration with our State, local, and industry
partners. Moving forward, our goal working with our industry is
to continually improve surface transportation security through
the development and implementation of intelligence-driven,
risk-based policies and plans.
We thank you very much this morning for the opportunity to
discuss these important issues and appreciate the committee's
support of TSA's goals.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Proctor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sonya Proctor
June 21, 2016
Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) role in surface transportation security.
The surface transportation network is immense, consisting of mass
transit systems, passenger and freight railroads, highways, motor
carrier operators, pipelines, and maritime facilities. The New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY MTA) alone transports over 11
million passengers daily--and represents just one of the more than
6,800 U.S. public transit agencies for which TSA has oversight, ranging
from very small bus-only systems in rural areas to very large multi-
modal systems like the NY MTA in urban areas. More than 500 individual
freight railroads operate on nearly 140,000 miles of track carrying
essential goods. Eight million large capacity commercial trucks and
almost 4,000 commercial bus companies travel on the 4 million miles of
roadway in the United States and on more than 600,000 highway bridges
over 20 feet in length and through 350 tunnels greater than 300 feet in
length. Surface transportation operators carry approximately 750
million intercity bus passengers and provide 10 billion passenger trips
on mass transit each year. The pipeline industry consists of
approximately 3,000 private companies, which own and operate more than
2.5 million miles of pipelines transporting natural gas, refined
petroleum products, and other commercial products that are critical to
the economy and the security of the United States. Securing such large
surface transportation systems in a society that depends upon the free
movement of people and commerce is a complex undertaking that requires
extensive collaboration with surface transportation operators.
Recent terror attacks on mass transit and passenger rail carriers
in France and Belgium remind us of the need to remain vigilant. While
there is no known specific, credible terrorist threat to the U.S.
passenger rail system at this time, the August 2015 incident in Paris
and the March 2016 attacks in Brussels underscore the need to continue
to build upon our surface transportation successes through stakeholder
communication, coordination, and collaboration. Surface transportation
passenger systems are, by nature, open systems. In the face of a
decentralized, diffuse, complex, and evolving terrorist threat, TSA
responds by employing cooperative and collaborative relationships with
key stakeholders to develop best practices, share information, and
execute security measures to strengthen and enhance the security of
surface transportation networks.
Unlike the aviation mode of transportation, direct responsibility
to secure surface transportation systems falls primarily on the system
owners and operators. TSA's role in surface transportation security is
focused on security program oversight, system assessments, voluntary
operator compliance with industry standards, collaborative law
enforcement and security operations, and regulations. Security and
emergency response planning is not new to our surface stakeholders;
they have been working under Department of Transportation (DOT) and
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) programs and regulations for many years.
Although DOT's regulations relate primarily to safety, many safety
activities and programs also benefit security and help to reduce risk.
In the surface environment, TSA has built upon these standards to
improve security programs with minimal regulations.
TSA's spending on surface transportation realizes a massive return
on its budgetary investment. TSA's resources and personnel directly
support on-going security programs by committed security partners who,
in turn, spend millions of their own funds to secure critical
infrastructure, provide uniformed law enforcement and specialty
security teams, and conduct operational activities and deterrence
efforts. We have invested our resources to help security partners
identify vulnerabilities and risk in their agencies. Surface
transportation entities know their facilities and their operational
challenges, and with their knowledge and our assistance, they are able
to direct accurately their own resources in addition to the hundreds of
millions of dollars in Federal security grant funding to reduce the
risk of a terrorist attack.
federal, state, local, and private coordination
Securing the vast surface transportation network requires a group
effort. TSA oversees the development and implementation of risk-based
security initiatives for surface transportation in coordination with
our security partners.
TSA, on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is a
co-Sector-Specific Agency alongside DOT and USCG for the transportation
sector. DOT and TSA work together to integrate safety and security
priorities. As part of the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council (CIPAC) framework, TSA, DOT, and the USCG co-chair
Government Coordinating Councils to facilitate information sharing and
coordinate on activities including security assessments, training, and
exercises. Additionally, TSA leverages its core competencies in
credentialing, explosives detection, and intermodal security to support
the USCG as lead agency for maritime security.
TSA works with State, local, and industry partners to assess risk,
reduce vulnerabilities, and improve security through collaborative
efforts. Collaboration between TSA and industry occurs through daily
interaction and engagement, as well as through formal structures
including the DHS-led CIPAC framework, Sector Coordinating Councils,
and other industry-centric organizations such as the Mass Transit
Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group. TSA, security agencies, and
the corporate leadership of industry and municipal operator
stakeholders jointly pursue policies to secure surface systems,
including implementation of exercises and training, physical and cyber
hardening measures, and operational deterrence activities.
regional alliance including local, state, and federal efforts
(railsafe)
TSA coordinates with Amtrak and NY MTA to support RAILSAFE
operations, in which Amtrak police and law enforcement officers from
Federal, State, local, rail, and transit agencies deploy at passenger
rail and transit stations and along the railroad rights-of-way to
exercise counterterrorism and incident-response capabilities. This
coordinated effort involves activities such as heightened station and
right-of-way patrols, increased security presence on-board trains,
explosives detection canine sweeps, random passenger bag inspections,
and counter-surveillance. RAILSAFE operations are conducted several
times a year to deter terrorist activity through unpredictable security
activities. On average, more than 40 States and Canada, and over 200
agencies participate in RAILSAFE operations. The most recent RAILSAFE
operation was conducted on May 26, 2016, with more than 1,400 officers
across 205 agencies representing 42 States and Canada participating.
exercises and training
TSA has developed multiple training and exercise programs to assist
industry operators in directing their resources and efforts towards
effectively reducing risk. With the support of Congress, TSA developed
the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP). TSA
facilitates I-STEP exercises across all surface modes to help
transportation entities test and evaluate their security plans,
including prevention and preparedness capabilities, ability to respond
to threats, and cooperation with first responders from other entities.
TSA uses a risk-informed process to select the entities that receive I-
STEP exercises and updates I-STEP scenarios as new threats emerge to
ensure industry partners are prepared to exercise the most appropriate
countermeasures. Since fiscal year 2008, TSA has conducted over 105 I-
STEP exercises throughout 40 High-Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs), including
8 conducted so far this fiscal year, such as motorcoach exercises in
Los Angeles, CA and Myrtle Beach, SC; mass transit exercises in Houston
and San Antonio, TX; and maritime exercises in New York City and
Washington, DC. Additionally, TSA conducted an I-STEP exercise in
Philadelphia in August 2015 to help that region prepare for the Papal
visit.
In fiscal year 2015, TSA developed and began utilizing the Exercise
Information System (EXIS) tool, which examines a surface transportation
operator's implementation of security measures in the areas of
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. EXIS helps
transportation operators identify areas of strength in an operator's
security program, as well as those areas that need attention where they
can then focus or redirect resources, such as security grant funding.
TSA also is able to provide operators with several resources that can
improve capability in areas such as training, public awareness
campaigns, and best practices that other systems have implemented to
address security concerns. Since program inception, TSA has facilitated
16 EXIS exercises with stakeholders in HTUAs.
TSA disseminates training materials and information to stakeholders
through several avenues. Through the Security Measures And Resources
Toolbox (SMARToolbox) and other security and public awareness training
materials, TSA provides surface transportation professionals relevant
insights into security practices used by peers throughout the industry
and mode-specific recommendations for enhancing an entity's security
posture. TSA developed the Surface Compliance Analysis Network (SCAN)
to analyze daily incidents reported to the Transportation Security
Operations Center to identify security-related trends or patterns. TSA
disseminates SCAN trend reports to affected entities, as well as to the
broader industry for situational awareness. SCAN reports have been able
to identify incidents that when taken individually may not seem to be
an issue or threat, but when compiled over time and analyzed locally,
regionally, and Nationally, present activities that may be pre-
operational activity aimed at detecting the response methods and/or
capabilities of surface transportation systems. The number of similar
incidents reported in relatively short periods of time may indicate the
intent of a perpetrator to disrupt operations and potentially cause
damage and injuries. These SCAN trend reports provide insight into
those potential threats and operations.
TSA's First ObserverTM security domain awareness program
delivers web-based training to surface transportation professionals,
encouraging front-line workers to ``Observe, Assess, and Report''
suspicious activities. Approximately 100,000 individuals have been
trained on the First ObserverTM Program. Operators have
credited First ObserverTM Program training in their ability
to disrupt a potential Greyhound bus hijacking situation in February
2011. Also in February 2011, a concerned Con-way employee followed
principles he received from the Program's training to alert authorities
about inconsistencies regarding chemicals shipped and their intended
use, which led to the arrest of an individual who was then charged with
attempting to bomb nuclear power plants and dams along the West Coast.
The investigation also revealed that the subject was planning to target
the home of former President George W. Bush as well.
TSA strongly encourages the use of the If You See Something, Say
SomethingTM public awareness campaign--which the NY MTA
created using DHS security grant funding--to make the traveling public
the ``eyes and ears'' of the transportation systems. Similarly, TSA's
Not On My Watch program is directed at the surface transportation
community and designed to make employees of surface transportation
systems part of awareness programs intended to safeguard National
transportation systems against terrorism and other threats. TSA also
works with industry to identify emerging security training needs,
develop new training modules, and refresh existing training.
In September 2014, TSA began a program to provide senior-level
industry transportation security officials with a detailed exposure to
TSA's surface security programs and policies. Once a quarter, a senior
executive from a surface transportation operator or entity is invited
to spend 4 to 6 weeks at TSA to gain first-hand experience in TSA's
counterterrorism and risk reduction efforts and foster beneficial
relationships among TSA and industry stakeholders. Participants in the
program have included Amtrak, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, NY MTA, and the Bay Area Rapid Transit District. Executives
from these agencies were given a broad exposure to TSA operations in
the surface and aviation modes, and left with a better appreciation for
the scope and breadth of the services TSA provides for all modes of
transportation. The program also allows TSA to use the senior
executives as sounding boards for potential security programs and
policies, to ensure that our initiatives not only address their
greatest security concerns, but are feasible from an operational
perspective at the local levels of transportation.
sector-specific programs, assessments, and inspections
TSA performs regulatory inspections on railroad operations, and
voluntary assessments of systems and operations within all of the
surface transportation modes to ensure operator compliance with
security regulations and adoption of voluntary security practices. TSA
deploys 260 Transportation Security Inspectors for Surface (TSI-S) to
assess and inspect the security posture of surface transportation
entities.
TSA and its partners in the freight rail industry have
significantly reduced the vulnerability of rail security-sensitive
materials, including Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials,
transported through populous areas by reducing urban dwell time. The
National rate of regulatory compliance rate is above 99%.
In 2006, TSA established the Baseline Assessment for Security
Enhancement (BASE) program, through which TSA Inspectors conduct a
thorough security program assessment of mass transit and passenger rail
agencies as well as over-the-road bus operators. These inspectors help
local transit systems develop a ``path forward'' to remediate
vulnerabilities identified in the vulnerability assessments, and
identify resources that TSA or other areas of the Federal Government
can provide to help transit systems raise their security baseline. The
results of these assessments are analyzed to influence TSA policy and
development of voluntary guidelines to ensure that our voluntary
policies and programs are addressing the most critical vulnerabilities
from a security perspective. TSA performs these voluntary BASE
assessments with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit and passenger
railroad systems measured by passenger volume, which account for over
95 percent of all users of public transportation. TSA has conducted
over 430 assessments on mass transit and passenger rail systems since
2006. In fiscal year 2015, TSA Inspectors completed 117 BASE
assessments on mass transit and passenger rail agencies, of which 13
resulted in Gold Standard Awards for those entities achieving overall
security program management excellence. In 2012, TSA expanded the BASE
program to the highway and motor carrier mode and has since conducted
over 400 reviews of highway and motor carrier operators, with 98
reviews conducted in fiscal year 2015. On average, approximately 150
reviews are conducted on mass transit and highway and motor carrier
operators each year, with numerous reviews in various stages of
completion for fiscal year 2016.
TSA also regularly engages transit and passenger rail partners
through the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group (PAG),
which represents 26 of the largest public transportation systems in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and through regular
monthly and as-needed industry-wide information-sharing calls, such as
calls conducted after the attacks in Paris and Brussels. Our
participation in forums such as the annual Mass Transit and Passenger
Rail Security and Emergency Management Roundtable, and our continuing
work with the PAG enable us to understand the security needs of our
domestic and international security partners to collaboratively develop
programs and resources to meet critical needs. Through the PAG and the
Roundtables, we have restructured how security grant funds are awarded
to high-risk transportation entities, ensuring that the funding
priorities address the current threat and risks that our surface
transportation operators face. We also developed a list of Nationally
critical infrastructure assets in order to better direct Federal and
local resources to implement security measures to protect those assets.
Since fiscal year 2006, over $565 million in Transit Security Grant
Program funding has been awarded for security projects specifically to
harden these critical assets. We have also been able to enhance and
refine the ways and time frames in which we share threat and
intelligence information, through mechanisms such as Security Awareness
Messages, and regular and as-needed industry information sharing and
intelligence conference calls. TSA also hosts Classified briefings for
cleared industry stakeholders when warranted.
TSA has established a productive public-private partnership with
the pipeline industry to secure the transport of natural gas,
petroleum, and other products. TSA conducts both physical and corporate
security reviews (CSR) within the pipeline sector, with over 400
physical security reviews of critical facilities of the highest-risk
pipeline systems completed since 2008 and over 140 corporate security
reviews of high-risk systems since 2002. TSA completed 6 CSRs in fiscal
year 2015; 4 have been completed in fiscal year 2016 with an additional
4 scheduled for completion by the end of the fiscal year. The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public
Law 110-53) required TSA to develop and implement a plan for inspecting
the critical facilities of the top 100 pipeline systems in the Nation.
TSA conducted these required inspections between 2008 and 2011 through
the Critical Facility Inspection program and is now focused on regular
recurring reviews through TSA's Critical Facility Security Review
(CFSR) program. TSA completed 46 CFSRs in fiscal year 2015; 21 have
been completed in fiscal year 2016 with 16 more expected to be
completed by the end of the fiscal year.
TSA has developed pipeline security guidance with the assistance of
pipeline system owners and operators, pipeline industry trade
association representatives, and Government partners. Wide-spread
implementation of this guidance by the pipeline industry has enhanced
critical infrastructure security throughout the country. TSA is
currently working with stakeholders to update these guidelines. There
has been an increase in the quality of the company corporate security
programs reviewed during CSRs, as the guidance has served as a template
for establishing a corporate security program including a Corporate
Security Plan. For pipeline critical facilities reviewed during CFSRs,
there has been an increase in the number of facilities conducting
security drills and exercises, an increase in coordination with local
law enforcement agencies, and an increase in the number of facilities
conducting security vulnerability assessments, all of which are
recommended practices in the Guidelines.
securing surface through grants
TSA provides the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with
subject-matter expertise to assist in the development of the Notice of
Funding Opportunities for the Transit Security Grant Program. These
FEMA grants support surface transportation risk mitigation by applying
Federal funding to critical security projects with the greatest
security effects. Between fiscal years 2006 and 2015, over $2.3 billion
in Transit Security Grant funding was awarded to freight railroad
carriers and operators, over-the-road bus operators, the trucking
community, and public mass transit owners and operators, including
Amtrak, and their dedicated law enforcement providers. One-hundred
million dollars was appropriated in fiscal year 2016 for mass transit,
passenger rail, and motor coach security grants, which are currently in
the application process. Applications were due April 25, 2016, and DHS
expects to announce final award allocations on June 29, 2016.
TSA reviews the grant program framework and makes recommendations
to FEMA, ensuring funding priorities are based on identified or
potential threats and vulnerabilities identified through TSA assessment
programs such as the BASE program, together with consideration of
potential consequences. For instance, in 2007, TSA's review of the
industry scores in the training category of the BASE assessments
indicated a potential vulnerability, and TSA addressed the
vulnerability by modifying the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) to
prioritize front-line employee training. In fiscal year 2011, TSA's
review of BASE scores and discussions with industry revealed that
vulnerabilities at Nationally critical infrastructure assets were not
being addressed as quickly as they could be. TSA worked with FEMA to
overhaul the TSGP framework to prioritize these assets (``Top Transit
Asset List'') for funding through a wholly competitive process. As a
result over $565 million has been awarded to protect these assets,
resulting in over 80% of them being considered secure from a
preventative standpoint.
As a result of information gained from TSA activities, DHS is able
to direct grant funds to activities that have the highest efficacy in
reducing the greatest risk, such as critical infrastructure
vulnerability remediation, equipment purchases, anti-terrorism teams,
mobile screening teams, explosives detection canine teams, training,
drills and exercises, and public awareness campaigns. For example, the
NY MTA has received $17 million in public awareness funding that helped
create the If You See Something, Say SomethingTM campaign,
which was credited with preventing a potential terrorist event in Times
Square in New York City. Over $276 million in grant funds have been
used to hire over 520 specialty transit law enforcement officers in the
forms of K-9 teams, mobile explosives detection screening teams, and
anti-terrorism teams. Transit systems in major cities including New
York City, Washington, DC, Chicago, and Los Angeles use these grant-
funded teams and patrols not only to conduct regular operations, but
also to provide extra local security and deterrence in response to
attacks across the world, including the recent attack in Brussels.
cybersecurity
TSA supports DHS cybersecurity efforts based on the National
Institute of Standards and Technology cybersecurity framework,
including within surface modes. The cybersecurity framework is designed
to provide a foundation industry can implement to sustain robust
cybersecurity programs, and TSA shares information and resources with
industry to support adoption of the framework. TSA also provides a
cybersecurity toolkit designed to offer the surface transportation
industry an array of available no-cost resources, recommendations, and
practices. Additionally, within the pipeline sector, TSA is
coordinating a voluntary cyber-assessment program with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to conduct cybersecurity assessments of
pipeline entities. TSA works closely with the pipeline industry to
identify and reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including through
Classified briefings to increase awareness of the threat. TSA's efforts
in cybersecurity are critical to securing surface transportation modes
from cyber intrusions.
implementing recommendations of the 9/11 commission act of 2007
TSA has worked diligently to implement the requirements of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public
Law 110-53). Under Administrator Neffenger's leadership, TSA has
prioritized the few remaining outstanding requirements of the Act.
These mandates include the issuance of regulations relating to security
training (Sections 1408, 1517, and 1534) and security planning and
vulnerability assessments (Sections 1405, 1512, 1531), as well as
establishment of a program to complete name-based background and
immigration checks for public transportation and railroad employees
(Sections 1411 and 1520). TSA is making significant progress on all of
these rulemakings, among others, and continues to dedicate substantial
time and resources towards this effort. TSA will continue its
prioritization of these rules notwithstanding the complexity and time-
consuming nature of the rulemaking process.
conclusion
TSA is dedicated to securing the Nation's transportation systems
from terrorist activities and attacks. Through its voluntary programs
and minimal regulations, TSA mitigates security challenges faced by an
open-by-nature surface transportation system in collaboration with our
industry and Government partners. We are focused on improving surface
transportation security through the development and implementation of
intelligence-driven, risk-based policies and plans, and we appreciate
the committee's support of TSA's goals. Thank you for the opportunity
to discuss these important issues.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Ms. Proctor.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Belfiore for 5 minutes of
testimony. Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS BELFIORE, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, THE PORT
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
Mr. Belfiore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Members of the subcommittee. My name is Tom
Belfiore, and I am the chief security officer for the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. I thank you for providing
the opportunity to speak about this critically important topic.
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey conceives,
builds, and operates infrastructure that is critical to the New
York/New Jersey region's transportation and trade network. As
you well know, the assets we protect include 6 airports,
including JFK, Newark, and LaGuardia; 2 tunnels; 4 bridges--3
of them in Staten Island--and the George Washington Bridge, the
busiest bridge in the world; the Port Authority bus terminal in
Manhattan, the busiest bus terminal in America; the PATH rail
system; the Ports of New York and New Jersey; and of course,
the World Trade Center complex.
Brussels, Paris, and Orlando prove to us that we must now,
more than ever, be prepared to address the ever-growing, ever-
evolving, and more lethal threats. To do so, we employ a multi-
layered security approach to protect our critical
infrastructure and those who depend on them.
The layers in the methodology include intelligence-led
policing, measuring risk through a layered assessment process,
police prevention and interdiction methods, operation security
measures and the use of contract security resources, the
deployment of available and developing technologies,
engineered-hardened solutions.
We have our own Office of Emergency Management. We depend
on Federal, State, and regional partnerships like those we have
with my esteemed colleagues at the table today. We measure
effectiveness, we audit effectiveness, and we revise it.
This multi-layered security approach is applied to all of
our facilities. But for today, we will talk about PATH, a rail
system that has 13 stations and 26 miles of track. On any given
business day, the system will carry 265,000 passengers.
Our policing strategy is intelligence led, as the Port
Authority Police Department has a presence in 28 Federal,
State, and local law enforcement task forces that most notably
include the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in both the States
of New York and New Jersey. We are confident that we are
connected to receive important and actionable intelligence and
information.
Our PAPD is a highly competent, professional, and well-
trained police agency that has police commands assigned around
the clock at Port Authority critical infrastructure. Our
policing methods, of course, include routine patrols, high-
visibility Emergency Service Unit deployment, the deployment of
dedicated counterterrorism teams, as well as the assignment of
explosive detection canines and radiation detection
capabilities.
It is important to note that police staffing at the PATH
command has increased by 45 percent since 2002. Our police
presence is supplemented by an unarmed contract security guard
force at PATH of over 100 security officers who are trained in
behavioral recognition techniques and counterterrorism
awareness. These security officers are posted at critical
locations throughout the system and also staff a 24/7 security
operations center.
In addition to these human assets, we have made significant
investments in our capital security projects, as directed by
our periodic program of risk assessments that inform our
investments that further strengthen our facilities. Since 2001,
the Port Authority has spent over $1.2 billion in hardening its
critical infrastructure, and for the coming years, we plan to
spend nearly another $1 billion to protect these assets. The
Federal grant money that this delegation and others have made
is vital to that effort.
For the PATH system, specific measures have been taken to
harden and protect the system from a variety of man-made and
natural hazards that include infrastructure strengthening that
make PATH tunnels more resilient to man-made threats. The use
of technology is paramount to our protection scheme.
In addition to over 800 CCTV cameras, the Port Authority
has invested in a robust card access control system at PATH,
intrusion detection systems that protect tunnel entrances,
detection devices that help protect against chemical,
biological, and radiological threats. We have enhanced the PATH
radio communication system to allow for interoperable and
intraoperable communications for PAPD and our mutual aid
partners such as NYPD, FDNY, and New Jersey first responders
that are so important to our response to emergencies at our
facilities.
The Port Authority has its own Office of Emergency
Management that is very important to this multi-layered
protection approach. They lead our agency-wide business
continuity program. They manage and administer agency-wide
security grant programs.
Another very important role for OEM is to plan and execute
agency-wide training and full-scale exercises. These remarkable
training programs involve both agency personnel and our
regional first responders. To date, over 27,000 Port Authority
staff and regional first responders have been trained on such
topics as incident command, active shooter, PATH rail
emergencies, terror attacks, and other hazards.
In order to maintain a prepared, unified, and accountable
security operation, we regularly measure, audit, and inspect
programs and systems. These internal auditing programs allow us
to proactively identify and mitigate issues and concerns before
our adversaries can exploit them.
Further, in an effort to ensure independent third-party
review, the Port Authority participates in Department of
Homeland Security SAFETY Act program. In 2001, PATH received
SAFETY Act designation for the protective system that is in
place to protect PATH underwater tunnels.
The Port Authority also participates in the TSA Baseline
Assessment and Security Enhancement Program. In 2015, the TSA
awarded the PATH security program the gold standard for best
practices in rail security. We are exceedingly proud of that
achievement.
How the Federal Government can help. First and foremost, I
thank, Chairman, this delegation for your advocacy for all of
the efforts that the Port Authority tries to put forward. We
keep security as a top priority. A critical resource is the
Federal grant funding program. A large source of our funding
comes from the Transit Security Grant Program.
In 2016, a maximum amount of funding through this program
was set at $87 million Nation-wide, an increase, if possible,
of that funding could allow transit operators to pursue larger
capital and operational security projects. Additionally, an
increase in the period of performance from 3 to 5 years would
allow us to plan larger-scale and more effective security
capital projects.
Additionally and last, perhaps DHS science and technology
could publish a guide for review by decision makers relative to
the investment and purchase of proven technologies that will
better aid in the protection of transportation assets.
In closing, I would like to thank the Members of this
subcommittee and our Congressional delegation for their
continuing support that allows us to better serve our
employees, customers, and better protect our regional critical
transportation infrastructure and those that rely on them.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Belfiore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Belfiore
June 21, 2016
about the port authority
The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey conceives, builds,
operates, and maintains infrastructure critical to the New York/New
Jersey region's transportation and trade network. These facilities
include America's busiest airport system, including: John F. Kennedy
International, LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty International airports,
marine terminals and ports, the PATH rail transit system, 6 tunnels and
bridges between New York and New Jersey, the Port Authority Bus
Terminal in Manhattan, and the World Trade Center. For more than 90
years, the Port Authority has worked to improve the quality of life for
the more than 18 million people who live and work in New York and New
Jersey metropolitan region.
the office of the chief security officer
Created in 2012, the Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) is
a department within the Port Authority and is responsible for providing
the highest quality public safety, facility security operations,
security program management, emergency management, and airport rescue
and firefighting training and services. Together, over 2,000 employees
ensure the security and safe movement of the Port Authority's
customers, partners, employees, and stakeholders every day.
I. Port Authority New York and New Jersey Transportation Assets
The Port Authority builds, operates, and maintains critical
transportation and trade assets that fall under our 5 lines of
business:
Aviation
Rail
Tunnels, Bridges, and Terminals
Ports
Commercial Real Estate
Our aviation assets include 6 airports: John F. Kennedy
International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, Newark Liberty International
Airport, Teterboro Airport, and Stewart International Airport. In 2015,
Port Authority airports moved an estimated 124 million passengers.
Our rail and surface transportation assets include the: Trans-
Hudson Rail System (PATH), George Washington Bridge, Bayonne Bridge,
Goethals Bridge, Outerbridge Crossing, the Port Authority Bus Terminal,
George Washington Bridge Bus Station, Journal Square Transportation
Center, Holland Tunnel, and Lincoln Tunnel. Over 115 million vehicles
travel over PA's bridges and tunnels annually.
Port Authority also manages ports that transport vital cargo
throughout the New York and New Jersey region. The Port of New York and
New Jersey is the largest on the East Coast and in 2015 moved over 3.6
million cargo containers.
The Port Authority also owns and manages the 16-acre World Trade
Center site, home to the iconic One World Trade Center.
II. Our Multi-Layered Approach to Securing Our Assets and Protecting
the Public
We utilize a robust multi-layered security approach to protect the
Port Authority's customers, the general public, employees, and critical
infrastructure by developing, implementing, and managing programs that
preserve life and property, increase safety and security, and support
the agency's business objectives by strengthening our resilience and
continuity of operations. With these measures in place--there is no
single point of failure. Our multi-layered approach is explained in
detail below.
Intelligence-Led
The Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) implements
intelligence-led policing to ensure our resources are effectively
deployed to prevent potential threats to our customers, employees, and
facilities. The PAPD has presence in 28 Federal, State, and local law
enforcement task forces, to include: The Federal Bureau of
Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI JTTF) in New York and New
Jersey which allows for shared intelligence across many agencies; The
New York and New Jersey High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)
taskforce and the New Jersey State Police Regional Operations
Intelligence Center (ROIC) that allows for the immediate exchange of
important, timely, and actionable intelligence for both sides of the
Hudson.
Additionally, we have a stakeholder representative assigned full-
time to the New York Police Department's Lower Manhattan Security
Initiative. This unit is a key provider of day-to-day actionable
intelligence relative to routine conditions like large events and
demonstrations to current and emerging threats.
These combined resources result in the agile, flexible, effective,
and efficient deployment of security and law enforcement resources that
are responsive to current and developing threats and conditions.
Risk Assessments
The protection of critical infrastructure is driven by all-hazards
risk assessments which are performed on a regular basis to better
understand changes in threats and vulnerabilities related to our
facilities. Our periodic multi-hazard assessments look across all
agency assets and prioritize our risk so we can guide our security
investments accordingly.
Police Interdiction Activities
The PAPD is comprised of over 1,800 uniformed police officers
operating across 13 Port Authority facilities. The department also
includes a Criminal Investigations Bureau, Special Operations Division,
which includes an Emergency Services Unit and a Canine Unit (K-9), and
an Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting component at the Port Authority
airports.
Through visible uniformed police presence and in partnership with
other law enforcement agencies, the PAPD suppresses crime and utilizes
counterterrorism measures to thwart potential adversaries seeking to
cause harm or disruption by way of an attack. PAPD also deploys high-
visibility patrols and specialized services to enhance basic patrol
functions utilizing intelligence-led policing concepts.
Operational Security Measures and Security Agents
The Port Authority implements civilian security programs to
supplement our police department activities and increase the levels of
protection at our facilities. These programs safeguard Port Authority
facilities from threats to physical infrastructure, unauthorized access
to restricted areas, cybersecurity attacks, and breaches of protected
security information.
Additionally, the Port Authority employs over 1,000 unarmed
Uniformed Contract Security Agents to guard our facilities and keep our
employees and customers safe.
Technology
A critical element of a robust multi-layered approach is the
development and maintenance of advanced technology systems to support
both security and resiliency. Significant investments have been made in
the areas of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), access control systems,
and our perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS).
In addition, we have created a new Cyber Security program to better
monitor and respond to suspicious activities occurring on our network,
therefore strengthening our capability to protect our critical
information and industrial control systems. The Port Authority operates
a 24/7 cybersecurity operations center that can receive and respond to
threats to our network and equipment.
Engineered Hardening Solutions
Since September 11, 2001, we have made over $1 billion in asset-
hardening investments. Although faced with the challenge of
retrofitting security features into existing facilities, we have
implemented a multitude of hardening solutions such as bollard
placement, fencing installation, tunnel and guard post hardening,
floating barriers, facade glazing, flood mitigation systems and no
trespassing signage. Prospectively, these protective measures are built
into new developments or the renovations of existing assets.
Office of Emergency Management
The Port Authority enhances resiliency, response, and recovery
through our Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The OEM champions
programs that provide the Port Authority with the resources, support,
and capabilities to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate
against all-hazards. The OEM is organized into 3 core mission areas:
Emergency Management.--Supports the Incident Command
response structure at Port Authority during events or
incidents. Additionally, responsible for all-hazard planning
and training for agency personnel and regional partners who
will support our response activities to emergencies at our
facilities located in New York and New Jersey. Through the use
of table-top and full-scale exercise, over 27,000 Port
Authority staff and regional partners have been trained on such
topics as Active-Shooter response, PATH rail emergencies,
terror attacks, and other hazards.
Grant Management.--Administers and manages all Federal and
State Homeland Security Grants that allows us to harden our
assets, invest in technology, initiate new programs, and
provide for enhanced police protective services.
Risk Management and Resiliency.--Responsible for
coordinating and implementing the agency-wide all-hazard risk
assessment and oversees the Port Authority Business Continuity
program.
These programs are regularly adapted to meet the needs of the Port
Authority with an impact range that stretches from individual employee
preparedness to agency-wide, corporate-level resiliency.
Federal, State, and Regional Partnerships
The Port Authority understands the importance of maintaining strong
relationships with our Federal, State, and local partners. These
cooperative partnerships are integral to our intelligence,
counterterrorism, cybersecurity, technology, and training efforts. The
support received through these partnerships helps us better secure our
assets and the information exchange is mutually beneficial to all
partners.
Measuring Effectiveness and Performance Assurance
In order to maintain a prepared, unified, and accountable security
operation, the Port Authority regularly measures, audits, and inspects
programs and systems. This practice instills a culture of evaluating
the effectiveness and integrity of our systems and program performance.
The OCSO also maintains its own Quality Assurance Inspections program
that evaluates the physical protection strategies employed at the Port
Authority. These internal auditing programs allow us to proactively
identify and mitigate issues and concerns before our adversaries
exploit them.
Furthermore, in an effort to ensure independent third-party review
of our security programs, the Port Authority actively participates in
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Safety Act program. To
date, Port Authority received 6 awards for designation and 1 for
certification at various facilities.
III. The Application of the Multi-Layered Security Approach to PATH
In 2015, the PATH system carried over 76.5 million passengers; an
average of 265,000 passengers per day. The security of those passengers
is paramount.
Human Assets
We have a police command dedicated to patrolling the 13 stations
and 26 miles of track. The PATH police command has grown by 45% since
January 2002. Policing methods include: Routine uniformed patrols,
high-visibility emergency service unit random anti-terrorism patrols,
the deployment of dedicated counterterrorism teams, as well as the
assignment of explosive detection canine (K-9) units. Police officers
assigned to these teams and patrols are trained and equipped in the use
of tactical weapons and equipment to include radiation detection
capabilities.
PAPD efforts to secure the PATH system are further supplemented by
a contract security guard force of over 100 security officers who are
trained in behavioral recognition techniques and counterterrorism
awareness. These security officers are posted at critical locations
throughout the system. They also staff a 24/7 Security Operations
Center whose core function is to monitor a multitude of CCTV cameras
and access control and intrusion alarms that span the entire rail
system. Suspicious activity or other emergency conditions are
immediately dispatched to PAPD for response.
Physical Security
As previously discussed, the Port Authority has made significant
investments in capital security projects. Specific measures have been
taken to harden and protect the PATH system from a variety of man-made
and natural hazards. These projects include right-of-way fencing and
perimeter protection through the use of bollards, as well as
infrastructure strengthening to make the PATH tunnels more resilient to
man-made threats. Redundancy is also a critical part of our
methodology, and as such we have constructed a new train control
center. The existing train control center serves as a redundant back-up
facility and is also used for training personnel.
Technology
In addition to CCTV, the Port Authority has invested in other
security technology such as:
A laser intrusion detection system that helps protect
against trespassers entering tunnels from the track.
An extensive and robust card access control system, which
restricts access to critical areas to authorized personnel
only.
The deployment of sensor and detection devices to help
protect against chemical, biological, and radiological threats.
The use of detailed background and criminal history checks
as part of a personnel assurance program to include outside
contractors and service providers.
The enhancement of public safety communication systems at
PATH stations and underground portions of the system. PAPD's
intra-operable 800MHz radio system has been installed
throughout, enabling PAPD officers responding to an incident
from a neighboring command (e.g. Holland Tunnel, Newark
Airport, etc.) to talk seamlessly to other PAPD officers
assigned to the PATH command. Further, we have deployed antenna
networks carrying National Mutual Aid channels in both the UHF
and 800MHz bands (``UTAC and 8TAC'') into the PATH underground
to assure radio inter-operability with our mutual aid partners,
such as NYPD, FDNY, and the city of Jersey City first-responder
agencies.
Quality Assurance and Independent Review
In addition to our internal Quality Assurance Inspection program,
the Port Authority participates in the Baseline Assessment and Security
Enhancement (BASE) program, which is a voluntary program implemented by
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The BASE program
assessment is composed of more than 200 questions that review a transit
system's security and emergency preparedness posture regarding 17
Security and Emergency Preparedness Action Items. The TSA awards its
``Gold Standard'' to transit agencies and passenger railroads that
achieve the highest rating on the BASE assessment and for building a
strong security program.
For 2015, TSA has awarded the PATH Security program its Gold
Standard for best practices in rail security.
Furthermore, in 2011, DHS awarded SAFETY ACT designation status to
a protective system put in place to protect PATH underwater tunnels.
IV. How the Federal Government Can Help?
Grant Funding
The Port Authority keeps security as a top priority as evidenced by
the investments in resources it makes to that purpose. Currently,
agency-wide, 24% of personnel and 22% of the operating budget is
allocated to security. Since 2002, $1.2 billion dollars has been spent
in capital security projects and another $900 million in capital
security projects have been identified for the coming years. A critical
resource is the Federal grant funding program. This funding source is
essential to help us continue to protect our facilities from evolving
threats.
A large source of funds for our capital security projects comes
from the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). In 2016, the maximum
amount of Federal funding through this program was set at $87 million
Nation-wide for all transit operators. This amount, when distributed,
can only fund smaller capital security projects. An increase in TSGP
funding would allow transit operators to pursue larger capital security
projects that would better reduce the risk to those who use our
facilities. Additionally, the period of performance for grant funding
is limited to 3 years, which hinders our ability to plan, design, and
construct larger-scale projects. An increase in the period of
performance from 3 years to 5 years would allow us to plan larger-scale
and more effective capital security projects.
DHS Science and Technology
It would be valuable if the DHS Office of Science and Technology
would publish a guide for review by decision makers that will aid in
their selection of effective and proven technologies and equipment that
would better protect the public and the infrastructure they depend
upon.
V. Closing Remarks
In closing, I would like to thank the members of the Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications subcommittee for inviting me
to testify on behalf of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
regarding this critical topic of protecting our passengers.
The Port Authority operates the busiest and most important
transportation facilities in the region, as such, we take on the
tremendous responsibility of maintaining safety and security. The Port
Authority will continue to make enhancements to its policing and
security programs and systems in an effort to stay current and adapt to
the ever-changing threat landscape. I would like to thank our
Congressional delegation for their continuing support that allows us to
better serve our employees and customers and better protect our
regional critical transportation infrastructure.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, sir.
The Chair now recognizes Chief Diaz for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND DIAZ, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, METROPOLITAN
TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Mr. Diaz. Good morning, Chairman Donovan and Ranking
Members Payne and Coleman and other Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for holding this hearing today.
I want to also thank the entire committee for its continued
support to surface transportation security and the opportunity
to discuss security and preparedness at New York's Metropolitan
Transportation Authority.
Joining me today is Michael Coan, the chief of department
of the MTA Police Department.
I want to begin today by acknowledging the horrific attack
in Orlando about a week ago. Speaking on behalf of the entire
MTA, our thoughts and prayers go out to the entire Orlando
community and everyone affected by the attacks.
There have been no specific threats to our system related
to the attack, but we have nevertheless significantly stepped
up our security efforts, increasing patrols and surveillance in
order to provide heightened protection across all our agencies.
The incident serves as a stark reminder that we must continue
to be vigilant, continue to be alert to the possibility of a
terrorist attack on our system.
It also reminds us that it is more important than ever for
all of us to work together to keep each other safe. The idea is
a central component of our ``See something, say something''
campaign, which we relaunched this year in February.
Our new campaign incorporates real stories from real New
Yorkers who have reported suspicious packages or activities,
and we have added a tagline, ``New Yorkers keep New York
safe.'' That resonates with me because it is so true. We all
have a crucial role to play in keeping New York safe.
I am here representing MTA chairman Tom Prendergast. But
before I get into some of the topics he suggested I discuss, I
want to provide some context with some background information
on my job and the MTA's operation.
As the MTA director for security, I am responsible for the
security of the MTA, including coordinating MTA efforts with
the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, the National Guard,
the NYPD, and the New York and Connecticut State Police. I
oversee the MTA Police Department, which has jurisdiction in 14
counties in New York and Connecticut and patrols a 5,000 square
mile rail network.
I am responsible for the implementation and execution of a
security strategy that offers maximum protection to the public,
MTA employees, and MTA property. It is a big responsibility.
Every day, the MTA moves more than 8.7 million people on our
subway, buses, and commuter rail lines. We are one of the few
transit systems in the world that operates 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, 365 days a year.
Our 7 bridges and tunnels carry nearly 300 million vehicles
a year. If we were to build our network today, including about
9,000 rail cars, 5,000 buses, and millions of other assets, it
would cost almost $1 trillion.
Protecting millions of people a day and a trillion-dollar
asset is an enormous task, and I could tell you this. The MTA's
priority is crystal clear, ensuring the safety and security of
our customers and employees.
To protect our customers and assets, the MTA employs a
multi-layered security strategy. Some strategies, like
policing, are highly visible. Others are less visible, like
structural hardening, advances in technology, and improved
communications.
The hallmark of our policing strategy is collaboration. Let
me explain. The NYPD is responsible for patrolling most of our
heavily-used portion of our network, the New York City subways
and buses. We work closely with the NYPD to ensure that capital
investments are consistent with the latest security and
policing strategies.
The MTAPD polices our commuter rail system, including Metro
North Railroad, Long Island Railroad, the two busiest commuter
rails in the country. We are also responsible for policing the
Staten Island Railway in Chairman Donovan's district.
Over the past 15 years, the MTAPD has grown from 494
uniformed officers to 722 today. In addition, the MTA chairman
and board have approved the hiring of an additional 46 new
officers for our counterterrorism deployments. We have 691
bridge and tunnel officers that patrol our 7 bridges and
tunnels.
Fifty explosive canine teams are now deployed throughout
our system, and we have significantly increased our presence on
trains and at stations. In support of the canine program, the
MTA recently opened up a State-of-the-art canine training
facility. This facility will enhance the canine program and
allow for training of canines from other law enforcement
agencies as well.
In response to the growing threat of active-shooter
attacks, every single MTA officer receives Transit Security
Grant Program-funded active-shooter training. In addition, more
than 60 officers have received on-going heavy weapons training.
As mentioned previously, we have a robust ``See something,
say something'' campaign, coupled with security and awareness
training for our civilians and front-line employees. These
initiatives encourage vigilance and teach people what to do if
they see a suspicious package or activity.
To date, the MTA has trained more than 35,000 front-line
employees. Recent active-shooter incidents clearly illustrate
the importance of these awareness initiatives and training.
Transit Security Grant Program grants also support our ``See
something, say something'' campaign and also the civil employee
training.
Behind the scenes, one critical layer to our security is
the structural and technological hardening of our
infrastructure. Since 9/11, the MTA has invested close to $1.4
billion of local funds toward an aggressive campaign to harden
our subway and commuter rail systems, as well as our bridges,
tunnels, and other infrastructure.
Critical stations in vulnerable areas have been secured
with electronic security systems consisting of CCTV, intrusion
detection, access control devices. In addition, we have
deployed chemical, biological, and radiological detection
technology at these locations.
Since 2003, we have benefited from more than $470 million
from DHS in support of our security program. TSA and FEMA have
helped us immeasurably with grant allocations and
reallocations. We are grateful for the support and pleased that
the initial period of performance for transit security grants
has been extended to 36 months, which affords us more time
needed to complete these capital security projects.
Another layer of our MTA security strategy is communication
and intelligence sharing. At the Federal level, we have
excellent working relationship with our DHS partners,
represented by FEMA and TSA. We regularly attend meetings,
conference calls, and continually exchange information. When
potential threats are identified, they are communicated
immediately.
We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies on
a daily basis through our Interagency Counterterrorism Task
Force. We also conduct joint patrol initiatives, tabletop
exercises, and drills with other regional transportation
services, including Amtrak, the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, the New York and Connecticut
State Police, and the New York National Guard--State National
Guard, and the NYPD.
MTA detectives represent MTA on a number of high-profile
anti-crime and anti-terrorism groups, including the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Force, the FBI's Cyber Crimes Unit, the High-
Intensity Drug Traffic Area Program, and the Counterterrorism
Intelligence Division Units. In addition, when activated, the
MTAPD is represented at emergency operation centers at the city
and local level and State level.
I am proud to oversee this system and its proactive and
accomplished security personnel and look forward to continue to
work with my colleagues in law enforcement and you in the House
to keep our customers safe and our system secure.
Once again, thank you for inviting me to testify today, and
I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Diaz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond Diaz
June 21, 2016
Good morning, Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member Payne,
and other Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding
this field hearing today. I want to also thank the entire
committee for its continued support to surface transportation
security and the opportunity to discuss security and
preparedness at New York's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority. Joining me today is Michael Coan, chief of
department of the MTA Police.
I want to begin today by acknowledging the horrific attack
in Orlando about a week ago. Speaking on behalf of the entire
MTA, our thoughts and prayers go out to the entire Orlando
community and everyone affected by the attacks.
There have been no specific threats to our system related
to the attack, but we've nonetheless significantly stepped up
our security efforts--increasing patrols and surveillance in
order to provide heightened protection across all our agencies.
The incident serves as a stark reminder that we must continue
to be vigilant . . . continue to be alert to the possibility of
a terrorist attack on our system. It also reminds us that it's
more important than ever for all of us to work together to keep
each other safe.
This idea is a central component of our ``See Something,
Say Something'' campaign, which we relaunched this year in
February. Our new campaign incorporates real stories from real
New Yorkers who have reported suspicious packages or
activities, and we've added a tagline--``New Yorkers Keep New
Yorkers Safe.'' That resonates with me, because it's so true--
we all have a crucial role to play in keeping New York safe.
I'm here today representing MTA chairman Tom Prendergast,
but before I get into some of the topics he suggested I
discuss, I want to provide some context, with background
information on my job and the MTA's operation.
As the MTA's director of security, I'm responsible for the
security of the MTA, including coordinating MTA efforts with
the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the National
Guard, the NYPD, and the New York and Connecticut State Police.
I oversee the MTA Police Department, which has jurisdiction in
14 counties in New York and Connecticut, and patrols a 5,000-
square mile rail network. I'm responsible for the
implementation and execution of a security strategy that offers
maximum protection to the public, MTA employees, and MTA
property.
It's a big responsibility. Every day, the MTA moves more
than 8.7 million people on our subways, buses, and commuter
rail lines. We're one of the few transit systems in the world
that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
Our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels carry nearly 300 million vehicles a
year. And if we were to build our network today--including
about 9,000 railcars, 5,000 buses, and millions of other
assets--it would cost nearly $1 trillion.
Protecting millions of people a day and a trillion-dollar
asset is an enormous task, but I can tell you this: The MTA's
top priority is crystal clear--ensuring the safety and security
of our customers and employees. To protect our customers and
assets, the MTA employs a multi-layered security strategy. Some
strategies, like policing, are highly visible. Others are less
visible, like structural hardening, advances in technology, and
improved communications.
The hallmark of our policing strategy is collaboration. Let
me explain. The NYPD is responsible for patrolling the most
heavily-used portion of our network: New York City subways and
buses. We work closely with the NYPD to ensure that capital
investments are consistent with the latest security and
policing strategies.
The MTA PD polices our commuter rail system, including
Metro-North Railroad and Long Island Rail Road--the two busiest
commuter rail agencies in the country. We're also responsible
for policing the Staten Island Railway--in Chairman Donovan's
district. Over the past 15 years, the MTA PD has grown from 494
uniformed officers to 722 today. In addition, the MTA chairman
and board have approved the hiring of 46 new officers for
counterterrorism deployment, and 691 Bridge and Tunnel officers
patrol our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels.
Fifty explosive detection K-9 teams are now deployed
throughout the system, and we've significantly increased our
presence on trains and at stations. In support of the K-9
program, the MTA recently opened a state-of-the-art canine
training facility. This facility will enhance the K-9 program
and allow for training of canines from other law enforcement
agencies.
In response to the growing threat of active-shooter
attacks, every single MTA PD officer receives Transit Security
Grant Program-funded Active-Shooter Training. Additionally,
more than 60 officers have received our on-going heavy weapons
training.
As mentioned previously, we have a robust ``See Something,
Say Something'' campaign, coupled with security awareness
training for civilian front-line employees. These initiatives
encourage vigilance, and teach people what to do if they see a
suspicious package or activity. To date, the MTA has trained
more than 35,000 front-line employees. Recent active-shooter
incidents clearly illustrate the importance of these awareness
initiatives and training. TSGP grants also support our ``See
Something, Say Something'' campaign and civilian employee
training.
Behind the scenes, one critical layer to our security is
the structural and technological hardening of our
infrastructure. Since 9/11, the MTA has invested close to $1.4
billion of local funds toward an aggressive campaign to harden
our subway and commuter rail systems, as well as bridges,
tunnels, and other infrastructure. Critical stations and
vulnerable areas have been secured with electronic security
systems consisting of CCTV, intrusion detection, and access
control devices. We've also deployed chemical, biological, and
radiological detection technology at these locations.
Since 2003, we've benefitted from more than $470 million
from DHS in support of our security program. TSA and FEMA have
helped us immeasurably with grant allocations and
reallocations. We're grateful for this support, and are pleased
that the initial ``period of performance'' for transit security
grants has been extended to 36 months, which affords us the
time needed to complete TSGP-funded capital security projects.
Another layer of the MTA's security strategy is
communication and intelligence sharing. At the Federal level,
we have an excellent working relationship with our DHS
partners, represented by FEMA and TSA. We attend regular
meetings and conference calls, and continually exchange
information. When potential threats are identified, they are
communicated immediately.
We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies on
a daily basis through our Inter-Agency Counterterrorism Task
Force. We also conduct joint patrol initiatives, table-top
exercises, and drills with other regional transportation
agencies including Amtrak, the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, the New York and Connecticut
State Police, the New York State National Guard, and the NYPD.
MTA PD detectives represent the MTA on a number of high-
profile anti-crime and anti-terrorism groups, including the
FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI Cyber Crimes Unit,
the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, and the NYPD
Counter Terrorism and Intelligence units. In addition, when
activated, the MTA PD is represented at Emergency Operations
Centers at the city and State level.
I'm proud to oversee this system and its proactive and
accomplished security personnel, and look forward to continuing
to work with my colleagues in law enforcement and you in the
House to keep our customers safe and our system secure. Once
again, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I'm happy to
answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief.
The Chair now recognizes Chief Trucillo for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER TRUCILLO, CHIEF OF POLICE, NEW JERSEY
TRANSIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Trucillo. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Representative
Payne, Representative Watson Coleman. I welcome the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the challenges of
securing passengers utilizing surface transportation in New
York and New Jersey.
As you mentioned, before joining the Transit Police in July
2010, I served and had the honor of being the chief of
department for the Port Authority in New York and New Jersey.
During my tenure with them, I served as the commanding officer
of the bus terminal in midtown Manhattan, as well as the
commanding officer of Newark Liberty International Airport.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify at this
hearing, which is aptly entitled Protecting Our Passengers:
Perspectives on Securing Surface Transportation in New Jersey
and New York. We appreciate the important role of this
committee in matters related to transportation security, and we
look forward to working with you on these issues.
New Jersey Transit is the third-largest transit system in
the country and also the Nation's largest State-wide public
transit system. Servicing an area of over 5,000 square miles,
we provide almost 1 million weekday trips on 257 different bus
routes. We have 3 light rail systems across the State, 11 heavy
commuter rail lines, and our Access Link program, which serves
our paratransit community.
We serve 166 different rail stations across the State of
New Jersey, 62 light rail stations. We have got more than
19,000 bus stops linking major points in New Jersey, New York,
and Philadelphia.
Mr. Chairman, the transportation services provided by New
Jersey Transit are vital to the economic well-being of our
State and this region. We provide an essential service to the
nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey commuters who use and
depend on the New Jersey Transit system.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, transit agencies have unique
security challenges, due to the large numbers of people we
serve in publicly accessible facilities traveling on
advertised, predictable schedules. Just over a week ago, we saw
the carnage inflicted in Orlando by a radicalized extremist on
a crowd of people in a nightclub, and earlier this year, the
attacks in Brussels reminded us once again how mass transit
systems world-wide continue to be the preferred targets of
terrorists.
Our most important priority is keeping our customers and
employees safe as we continue to provide our essential
transportation services. Safety and security are the top
priority for all of us at New Jersey Transit and within the New
Jersey Transit Police Department.
Counterterrorism is our department's No. 1 primary mission,
and Mr. Chairman, we take that mission very seriously. New
Jersey Transit uses a risk-based approach to maximizing our
security efforts to protect our trains, buses, and light rail
vehicles, and stations from all hazards and threats.
The police department's intelligence section provides the
agency with strategic-level risk management tools in support of
our counterterrorism efforts and coordinates all of our
intelligence collection, analysis, and production efforts,
including the reporting and monitoring of suspicious activity
and individuals. We do this in collaboration with the FBI's
Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the New
Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, our
partners at the NYPD and my partners at this table, and the New
Jersey State Police Fusion Center run by the New Jersey State
Police and other partners.
Mr. Chairman, almost all of our 11,000 employees have
received security awareness training. From conductors to bus
operators to office staff, our employees are force multipliers.
Extra eyes and ears, if you will, for our police department.
We also work in cooperation with the thousands of
businesses that are located near all our train stations to know
what suspicious activity is and to report it. In addition, we
continue to work closely with first responding agencies at the
municipal, county, and State levels.
To give you just an example, several times per year,
members of New Jersey Transit's police operations and
administrative staff partner with local police, fire, and EMS
agencies in advanced incident command training at Texas A&M
University. To date, more than 500 Transit employees from
across all business lines and an equal number of our partners
have participated in these joint exercises.
In fact, right now this week, we have 65 people at Texas
A&M and training for the entire week in advanced incident
command. We are partnering with New Brunswick, New Jersey,
first responders this week.
New Jersey Transit also promotes a campaign urging
customers who see suspicious activity or unattended packages at
stations, aboard trains or buses, or near facilities to call
the New Jersey Transit security hotline or to text us at our
NJTPD text line.
The New Jersey Transit mobile app for smartphones includes
convenient one-touch access to call or text the New Jersey
Transit Police Department directly. So not only can customers
purchase digital tickets on-line, but with that same app, they
can also report suspicious activity.
We investigate all calls. We get back to those who alert
us, and all information is kept confidential.
Mr. Chairman, while we do not release details about police
deployments or specific countermeasures, our uniformed patrol
officers remain vigilant in monitoring our system, and they are
supported by plainclothes detectives, anti-crime officers
throughout the New Jersey Transit system. Our Special
Operations Division provides enhanced capability to protect and
respond to terrorism on our system.
We perform random baggage screening. We also have the
capability to detect and respond to incidents involving
chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive materials.
Our Emergency Service Unit, along with our train patrol units
and conditions unit, also provides specialized tactical
response capability and have unique training and capabilities
specific to the mass transit environment.
Our canine unit officers, along with their explosive
detection dogs, perform perhaps some of our most important
functions. These officers, along with their canine partners, do
not just work to detect explosives throughout our system, but
their presence, as we have come to learn, provides an
effective, visible deterrent against our adversaries.
To ensure that we are prepared and are able to respond
adequately to a terrorism incident, the police Office of
Emergency Management conducts regular drills and exercises that
ensures that our response to terrorism incidents is both
effective and well-coordinated with our local, State, regional,
and our Federal partners. Every member of the department is
equipped with radiation pagers, and Mr. Chairman, we have
tripled the number of officers trained in the use of long guns.
We continue to work closely with TSA's Office of Science and
Technology as a testbed to test the next generation of
technology that may be utilized to secure surface
transportation.
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security
needs, we believe that the increased Federal investment in
public transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical.
New Jersey Transit has made great strides in transit security
improvements in recent years, but much more needs to be done.
We look forward to building on our cooperative working
relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and
Congress to further address these needs.
On behalf of New Jersey Transit and the New Jersey Transit
Police Department, I again thank you and the committee for
allowing me to submit testimony on these critical issues, and I
look forward to working with you on safety and security issues.
[The prepared statement of Chief Trucillo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Trucillo
June 21, 2016
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I
welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
challenges of securing passengers utilizing surface transportation in
New Jersey and New York.
Before joining New Jersey Transit in July of 2010 as the chief of
police for the New Jersey Transit Police Department, I served for 5
years as the chief of department for the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey Police Department. During my 23 year career with the Port
Authority I served as the commanding officer of internal affairs and
special investigations, the commanding officer of the Port Authority
Bus Terminal in midtown Manhattan, as well as the commanding officer of
Newark Liberty International Airport.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing,
which has been aptly entitled ``Protecting our Passengers: Perspectives
on Securing Surface Transportation in New Jersey and New York''. We
appreciate the important role of this committee in matters relating to
transportation security, and we look forward to working with you on
these issues.
about nj transit
NJ TRANSIT is the third largest transit system in the country and
also the Nation's largest State-wide public transportation system
serving an area encompassing 5,325 square miles. We provide more than
938,500 weekday trips on 257 bus routes, 3 light rail lines, 11
commuter rail lines and through Access Link, our paratransit service.
We serve 166 rail stations, 62 light rail stations, and more than
19,000 bus stops linking major points in New Jersey, New York, and
Philadelphia.
Mr. Chairman, the transportation services provided by NJ TRANSIT
are vital to the economic well-being of our State and the region. We
provide an essential service to the nearly 10 percent of all New Jersey
commuters who use and depend on the NJ TRANSIT system.
overview
Mr. Chairman, as you know, public transit agencies have unique
security challenges due to the large numbers of people we serve in
publicly accessible facilities, traveling on advertised predictable
schedules. Just a few days ago we saw the carnage inflicted in Orlando
by a radicalized extremist on a crowd of people in a publicly
accessible space, and earlier this year the attacks in Brussels
reminded us once again how mass transit systems world-wide continue to
be preferred targets of terrorists.
Our most important priority is keeping our customers and employees
safe as we continue to provide our essential transportation services.
Safety and security are the top priority for all of NJ TRANSIT and
within the New Jersey Transit Police Department--counterterrorism is
our primary mission, and we take that mission very seriously.
NJ TRANSIT utilizes a risk-based approach to maximizing our
security efforts to protect our trains, buses, light rail vehicles, and
stations from all hazards and threats. The Police Department's
Intelligence Section provides the agency with strategic level risk
management tools in support of our counterterrorism efforts and
coordinates intelligence collection, analysis, and production efforts,
including the reporting and monitoring of suspicious activity and
individuals, with the FBI's Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
and the TSA, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness, the NYPD, the New Jersey State fusion center, and other
partners.
Almost all of our 11,000 employees have received security awareness
training. From conductors to bus operators to office staff, our
employees are ``force multipliers''--extra eyes and ears for our
police. We also work in cooperation with the thousands of businesses
located near train stations to report suspicious activity.
In addition, we continue to work closely with first responding
agencies at the municipal, county, and State levels. To give you just
an example, several times per year members of New Jersey Transit's
police, operations, and administrative staff partner with local police,
fire, and EMS agencies in Incident Command Training at Texas A&M
University. To date, more than 500 transit employees and an equal
number of our partners have participated in these joint exercises.
NJ TRANSIT also promotes a campaign urging customers who see
suspicious activity or unattended packages at stations, aboard trains
or buses, or near transit facilities to call the NJ TRANSIT security
hotline at 1-888-TIPS-NJT, text us at NJTPD or notify a New Jersey
Transit Police officer. The NJ TRANSIT mobile app for smartphones
includes convenient one-touch access to call or text the New Jersey
Transit Police Department directly. So, not only can customers purchase
digital tickets by using the app, they can also easily say something if
they see something. All calls are investigated, and all information is
confidential.
Mr. Chairman, while we do not release details about police
deployments or specific countermeasures, our uniformed police patrol
officers remain vigilant in monitoring our system and they are
supported by plainclothes detectives and anti-crime officers throughout
the NJ TRANSIT system.
Our Special Operations Division provides enhanced capabilities to
protect and respond to terrorism on our system. Random baggage
screening performed by our Emergency Services Units provides us with
the capability to detect and respond to incidents involving chemical,
biological, radiological, and explosive materials. ESU along with our
Train Patrol Units and Conditions Tactical Unit also provide a
specialized tactical response capability with unique training and
capabilities specific to the mass transit environment.
Our canine unit officers along with their explosive detection dogs
perform perhaps some of our most important functions. These officers
along with their canine partners do not just detect explosives
throughout the NJ TRANSIT system but their presence provides an
effective visible deterrent against our adversaries.
And to ensure that we are prepared for and are able to respond
adequately to a terrorism incident, the NJTPD Office of Emergency
Management conducts regular drills and exercises that ensures that our
response to terrorism incidents is both effective and well-coordinated
with our local, State, regional, and Federal partners.
Every member of the department is equipped with radiation pagers
and we have tripled the number of officers trained in the use of long
guns. We continue to work closely with the TSA's Office of Science and
Technology to test the next generation of technology that will be
utilized to secure surface transit.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs,
we believe that increased Federal investment in public transportation
security by Congress and DHS is critical. NJ TRANSIT has made great
strides in transit security improvements in recent years, but much more
needs to be done. We look forward to building on our cooperative
working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and
Congress to further address these needs. On behalf of NJ TRANSIT and
the New Jersey Transit Police Department, I again thank you and the
committee for allowing us to submit testimony on these critical issues,
and look forward to working with you on safety and security issues.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief.
The chair now recognizes Chief Conway for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN CONWAY, DEPUTY POLICE CHIEF, NATIONAL
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION--AMTRAK
Mr. Conway. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
Payne, and Members of the committee.
I am Deputy Chief Martin Conway, and it is an honor to
appear before you today to discuss our region's coordinated
preparations to secure vital transportation systems.
Amtrak is America's railroad, serving more than 500
communities in 46 States, carrying over 30 million travelers a
year. The Amtrak Police Department was created to protect
employees, passengers, stations, rolling stock, and critical
infrastructure.
Uniformed patrol is our most visible presence, and they
perform traditional policing. Our special operations unit
performs station searches, performs counter surveillance,
conducts random passenger bag screening, patrols the rights-of-
way, and provides dignitary protection. Our canine program,
which consists of both conventional and vapor-wake detection
dogs, average over 1,000 train rides a month.
We coordinate with numerous local, State, and Federal
agencies. Members from APD's intelligence unit are assigned to
the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force, as well as
regional joint terrorism task forces, including the New York
JTTF.
Major stations like Newark Penn Station and New York Penn
Station connect with buses, subways, and commuter rail. The
porous environment, meaning easy access, is an advantage for
travelers, but a vulnerability from a security point of view.
It is, therefore, of critical importance that we work closely
with our transportation partners and their police forces to
ensure that our information sharing and quick reaction
capabilities are sufficient to keep us ahead of any threat.
While small stations are frequently unstaffed, they provide
access to major cities, and we must work closely with local
police to ensure the same type of cooperation. This is a
particularly important function here in the Northeast, where 5
of Amtrak's 10 busiest stations are located. The Northeast
Corridor carries more than 220 million riders a year.
Many railroad stations are a part of the urban fabric of
city centers, with a tremendous volume of pedestrian traffic.
New York Penn Station, for example, hosts more passengers than
LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark airports combined.
To ensure the necessary level of coordination and
information sharing, Amtrak has partnered with the NYPD and TSA
to form Operation Rail Safe, a regional and now National
alliance that includes Federal, State, local railroad and
transit police agencies. Operation Rail Safe, started in May
2010, functions at several levels, the most visible being
tactical deployments at stations and along the right-of-way to
exercise our incident response and counterterrorism
capabilities.
Operation Rail Safe has significantly improved cooperation
among participating agencies, and that relationship has, in
turn, provided a foundation for training opportunities that
have so far been extended to over 250 public safety agencies.
Screening every passenger prior to boarding a train, as the
airports do, would require resources and technologies that rail
properties don't possess and probably could not afford. We do,
however, employ a multi-layered approach while retaining robust
capability to surge our resources and leverage our
partnerships.
We coordinate with other law enforcement agencies and the
intelligence community to respond to threats and adapt tactics
in anticipation of potential new threats. We have also trained
Amtrak employees and passengers to spot and report suspicious
behaviors via phone or text.
The ability to leverage our skilled work force contributes
significantly to our safety and security. Our chief often says
aviation gets billions and rail gets millions. Over the years,
Amtrak has received varied levels of funding from Congress.
Prior to 2012, Amtrak received over $20 million a year from the
Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program. But in the past several
cycles, that has been reduced to about $10 million a year.
Amtrak security would benefit from a restoration of these
funds to the $20 million level and a discussion on future
investment and eligibility for other programs. I look forward
to answering any questions you might have regarding rail
transportation security.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Conway follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martin Conway
June 21, 2016
Good morning Chairman Daniel Donovan, Ranking Member Donald Payne,
Jr., and Members of the committee. Thank you very much for the
invitation to speak today. Amtrak takes its responsibility to protect
its riders seriously, and on behalf of Mr. Boardman, and the men and
women of the Amtrak Police Department (APD), I'm Martin Conway, deputy
of chief of police for Amtrak and it's an honor to appear before you
today on behalf of the men and women of Amtrak to discuss our region's
coordinated preparations to secure vital transportation systems. I've
been with Amtrak for 5 years and prior to that, I was with the NYPD for
26 years. While with NYPD, I served as commanding officer of several
commands within the bureaus, including the Transit Bureau; my last
assignment was a 5-year stint as an inspector in the Counterterrorism
Division, where I was responsible for coordinating all counterterrorism
measures within the city subway system.
Amtrak is America's Railroad, serving more than 500 communities in
46 States, carrying over 30 million travelers a year. APD was created
to protect employees, passengers, stations, rolling stock, and critical
infrastructure. Uniformed officers are the most visible presence, but a
Special Operations capability performs station surges and counter
surveillance, conducts random passenger bag screening, patrols rights-
of-way and protects dignitaries. Our K-9 program which consists of both
conventional and vapor-wake detection dogs averages 1,000 train rides a
month. We coordinate with numerous other local, State, and Federal
agencies, and officers from Amtrak's Intelligence Unit are assigned to
the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force at the National Counter-
Terrorism Center, as well as regional Joint Terrorism Task forces and
the police and security organizations for connecting transit modes.
A high level of cooperation and coordination is particularly
important, because more than half of all Amtrak stations feature some
form of connecting transportation service, and major stations like
Newark Penn or New York Penn Station are multi-modal, hosting busses,
subways, and commuter rail. Passenger rail security differs
fundamentally from aviation security. The nodal aspect of our stations,
combined with offices, food courts, and retail establishments, makes a
major urban station into a high-traffic location. Daily commuting
cycles require a fundamentally different security solution than
airports, because urban terrain is different, and rail journeys are an
organic part of our travelers' daily schedule. The very high degree of
connectivity between our modes is an advantage for travelers, but a
vulnerability from the security point of view, and it is therefore of
critical importance that we work closely with our modal connections and
their police forces, to ensure that our information-sharing and quick
reaction capabilities are sufficient to keep us ahead of any threat.
While small stations (both rural and outlying commuter stops) are
frequently unstaffed, they provide access and connectivity to major
cities, and we must also work closely with local police to ensure the
same type of cooperation. This is a particularly important function
here in the Northeast, where 5 of Amtrak's 10 busiest stations are
located; the NEC carries more than 220 million riders a year. Amtrak
serves more than 520 stations in 46 States, about a hundred more than
the total count of airports that host scheduled domestic air service in
the 48 contiguous States. Many railroad stations are a part of the
urban fabric of city centers, with a tremendous volume of traffic. New
York Penn Station, for example, hosts more rail travelers annually than
the La Guardia, JFK, and Newark Airports together, a combination of
Amtrak and commuter rail passengers--and that total doesn't include all
of the subway and bus riders who pass through the station without
taking a train.
To ensure the necessary level of coordination and information
sharing, Amtrak has partnered with NYPD and the TSA to form ``Operation
RAILSAFE,'' a regional alliance that includes Federal, State, local,
railroad, and transit police organizations. RAILSAFE functions at
several levels, the most visible being tactical deployments at stations
and along the right of way to exercise our incident response and
counterterrorism capabilities, and we also conduct coordinated efforts
such as heightened station patrols, increased security presence on
trains, K-9 explosive sweeps, random bag inspections, and
countersurveillance in an effort to reassure the public, display our
capabilities, and make it more difficult for a would-be attacker to
what the environment will look like at any particular time or place.
RAILSAFE has significantly improved cooperation among participating
agencies, and that relationship has in turn provided the foundation for
training opportunities that have so far been extended to 56 separate
agencies.
Terrorist tactics continue to evolve, and we must keep pace. U.S.-
based extremists will continue to pose the most frequent threat to the
U.S. homeland. As the tragic attacks in Boston, Garland, Texas, and in
New York have shown over the last several years, the new terrorist
threats are already here. Either alone or in small groups, with the
ability to mask the extent of their radicalization, these individuals
represent the most lethal of threats. U.S.-based jihadist terror cases
increased more in 2015 than in any full year since 2001. From ``lone-
wolf'' attackers to ISIL radicals, we see a greater likelihood of
attack than we have in years. The internet and cyber space have become
the new recruiting ground and the new battle-space. Aided by the
internet and social media, ISIL has featured plans to kill U.S.
soldiers or law enforcement personnel and the recent attacks in France
and against tourists in Tunisia demonstrate the threat is increasing.
Screening every passenger prior to boarding a train, as the
airports do would require resources and technology that rail properties
don't possess and probably couldn't afford. We do however, employ a
variety of tactics to surveil key infrastructure and stations, while
retaining robust capability to surge our resources and leverage our
partnerships in unpredictable ways to complicate the task for a would-
be attacker. We coordinate with other law enforcement agencies and the
intelligence community to respond to threats and adapt tactics in
anticipation of potential new threats. We have also trained Amtrak's
employees and passengers to spot and report suspicious behaviors via
phone or text. The ability to leverage our skilled workforce
contributes significantly to our safety and security.
Our chief often says `` . . . aviation gets billions and rail gets
millions'' and the New York Times, recently noted that TSA's $7.55
billion annual budget translates into a cost of about $10 per
passenger-trip; that's almost twice Amtrak's total annual budget last
year. Over the years Amtrak has received varied levels of funding from
Congress. Prior to 2012 Amtrak received over $20 million from the
Intercity Passenger Rail grant program but in the past several cycles
that has been appropriated at $10 million level. Amtrak security would
benefit from a restoration of these funds and a discussion on further
future investment and eligibility for other programs.
I look forward to answering any question you might have regarding
rail transportation security.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief.
Let me thank all of you not only for your testimony, but
for the vital service that you provide for all of our
commuters.
I remember one time when being on time was the No. 1
concern for a transportation system. Now it is the protection
of their commuters, and I thank each of you.
I recognize myself for questions now, and I throw this out
to the panel. When I gave my opening statement, I talked about
how when I first got to Congress I didn't know if we utilized
the information that we received at hearings from experts like
yourselves and assured you that your testimony today would be
brought back to Washington, and myself and other committee
Members would put it to good use.
One example of that is Chief Diaz spoke about how we
expanded the time frame in which you could utilize the moneys
that you are granted through the Federal grants. Used to be a
2-year program. Through testimony, through hearing from the
people on the ground, witnesses, we expanded that to 3 years.
Now, Chief, I understand that an expansion of up to 5 years
would be even more beneficial. This way, you could plan for
long-term projects, and we will bring that back as well.
Is there anything in the grant program that we could do to
better it, to enhance it, to make your jobs easier besides more
resources? Because we could all use more resources, and we
understand that. But are there things in the program that
hinder you? Is the program flexible enough for you to utilize
the moneys to your specific needs, or is it too stringent, too
structured, that what may be good for the MTA might not apply
for the Port Authority Police?
I would like to ask the entire panel this because each of
you have a different agency that you are trying to get these
grant moneys for. Sonya, is there?
Ms. Proctor. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would defer
because I think the grantees might have a better perspective at
the moment.
Mr. Donovan. Then we will let you respond.
Mr. Proctor. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Mr. Belfiore. So I think the Port Authority is finding the
flexibility that it needs, thank you, other than the items that
we talked about. We are able to leverage those available funds
for operational measures in supporting PAPD counterterrorism
measures, as well as asset hardening. So, so I have no
additional recommendation.
Mr. Donovan. The expansion of time, though, would be very
helpful?
Mr. Belfiore. It would. You know, the Port Authority has
its own process for moving large-scale capital projects
through, which, you know, would help us accommodate that. But
it would allow us to take on, you know, larger-scale and
longer, more forward-looking capital projects if possible.
Mr. Donovan. I always thought that the people who set the
time frame never went through a procurement process with the
city of New York.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. Chief, is there anything other than the time
frame that would be helpful to you?
Mr. Diaz. The time frame was it for us, and if it could be
expanded it would be great because by the time you do design
and then you build the project, it takes a lot of time. So
sometimes in some grant periods, we will just put in for
design, and then, hopefully, for the next grant period, we can
then put in for construction. So if that time frame is
expanded, that would be helpful.
The other thing is we have a great relationship with our
DHS partners, FEMA and TSA. So we have a lot of conversations
we put in for our grant applications, and they are very, very
good at giving us guidance and where we should put our moneys.
Mr. Donovan. The definition of the grants is flexible
enough that you are not trying to squeeze something in that
wouldn't be your preference? The grant definitions are flexible
enough that you could utilize it for different projects?
Mr. Diaz. Yes, they are. Yes, sir.
Mr. Donovan. Chief, do you have anything?
Chief Trucillo. I concur with my colleague from the Port
Authority that in capital investment, the increase from 3 to 5
years would make a significant difference and enable us to look
at more capital infrastructure protection than we presently do.
I also would be remiss if I didn't commend TSA for not
treating our region as a cookie cutter the same as across the
entire Nation. They have been very good about allowing us to
look at where our needs are operationally and to utilize our
specific grants to help us cover operational costs that would
otherwise be very problematic within our individual agencies.
The only other thing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention
is that we have done a tremendous job in our individual
agencies with the grant program to buy down risk. We--I know I
could speak for my agency--have seen a tremendous drop in risk
based on what we have been able to accomplish and only
accomplish through the grant program.
I will give you an example. Cameras. But those cameras,
over 4,000 of them, which we have across our system, have a
lifespan. So the ability to replace, sustain, maintain becomes
very critical. So to be able to do that with the grant program,
for my purposes, would be very significant and helpful.
Mr. Donovan. Be able to replace perishable items?
Chief Trucillo. Correct.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief.
Chief, is there anything?
Mr. Conway. Probably nothing to add that hasn't already
been said. But I do know from attending meetings that time
constraint for people who write these grants, as we know,
things don't happen as quickly as we would like them,
especially when it comes to capital improvements, cameras,
bollard systems. And as you said, in New York City and Penn
Station, it is time-consuming. So I think that would help all
of us.
Mr. Donovan. All right. Great. Thank you.
Many of you mentioned the ``See Something, Say Something.''
Is the program successful? Do people report things? I was just
very curious about it, and I have all of you here. Do we have
any success stories?
Mr. Diaz. Well, Congressman, just this past weekend, one of
our MTA employees saw somebody suspicious on a platform wearing
an MTA Metro North vest, called the police, and it turned out
it was somebody that shouldn't have been where he was, and we
challenged them. He wound up being arrested. So people
definitely see things, call us, and we take action on it.
Mr. Donovan. That is great. Thank you.
My time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
Member of this committee, my good friend from New Jersey, the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Proctor, as we discussed yesterday in my office, I am
really concerned about the delay in the TSA's implementing
surface transportation security regulations under the 9/11 Act,
and you were able to explain where we are and what is in. Just
for the committee and testimony, could you just explain where
we are in the time line and the anticipated completion,
whatever the challenges have stalled this process?
Ms. Proctor. Yes, sir, Representative Payne.
We recognize, obviously, the delay that you are addressing,
and the completion of those requirements in the 9/11 Act are a
high priority for Administrator Neffenger. As we discussed
yesterday, we have under way now the effort to complete the
remaining portions of those requirements.
I think it is important to note that the 9/11 Act included
42 requirements, some which had more than one section. Of the
42, we have completed 91 percent of those requirements, and we
are working on the remaining 3 at this point.
The administrative rulemaking process in the Federal
Government is a lengthy, complex process, and it doesn't just
apply to TSA. It applies to all Federal agencies. But it is a
very--it is a very cumbersome process, and we are working
through that process now. The standards for rulemaking are very
high. So we are working to meet those standards.
We recognize that implementing standards will have an
economic impact as well. So we have to take all of that into
consideration, but we are working diligently to complete the
requirements in the 9/11 Act.
But in the interim, while we are working on those, we also
have in many ways met the spirit of the 9/11 Act with the
agreement that we have with our industry partners on the
security action items, which have heightened the level of
security in all of our transit systems. Those 17 security
action items form the basis of the assessments that have been
referenced here, the base assessments.
Those 17 security action items have helped to raise the
security bar across mass transit Nation-wide. So while we work
to complete those requirements of the 9/11 Act, it is important
to note--we would certainly like to note for everyone that we
have been working hard to raise the security bar, and we
believe that we have done that with the security action items
while we continue to work to complete the 9/11 Act
requirements.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
You know, as I think about this, our transit employees are
on the front lines identifying and responding to incidents on
our systems. What kind of security training do you provide for
your employees, and how do you leverage them in your plans to
prevent and respond to transit incidents? Mr. Conway.
Mr. Conway. Well, I know Amtrak, all of our employees
receive a daily bulletin. We send out daily tips, what things
to look for. That is sent out email. So in crew rooms, for
example, at New York Penn Station, those would be posted before
crews take their assignments on a train.
Over the last 2 years now or so, we have started active-
shooter training for our employees, both train crews and office
workers. That was in response to, obviously, things that we are
seeing in the terrorism world and workplace violence type-of
situations.
Can we do more? I think we need to do more. Funding,
obviously, would help something like that. Because even when we
provide free training, we need--we have got to backfill people.
A training crew comes off a train to go to training, somebody
has got to take their place. So even free training costs. So,
again, funding--I know we are probably all looking for
additional funding, and everyone is always asking for it. But
there is a legitimate reason for that.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Trucillo.
Chief Trucillo. Congressman, as I had mentioned, New Jersey
Transit has over 11,000 employees. To date, we have trained
close to 10,000 of our employees in behavioral detection.
Again, this is not looking at who a person is, but this is
about what a person is doing. Is their behavior suspicious?
We also, after the events in Orlando, will get our
intelligence unit to put a relevant bulletin out, and that goes
out to all 11,000 employees to make them aware of the
circumstances, to remind them in this case about their
training, which they have all received about active shooter--
run, hide, fight--and reminding them what they need to look for
and what their protocols are, God forbid they find themselves
in that situation.
I think we need to continually engage. Last week, we were
involved with the rail side of New Jersey Transit in gaming out
an incident, an active-shooter incident on one of our trains.
As you know, Congressman, our trains, on a typical rush hour,
move upwards up to 1,200 to 1,300 people on a train on the
Northeast Corridor that moves into and out of Penn Station in
New York.
So those are the kind of things that we are continually
working on. We are continually trying to look at what our
response would be in those situations.
I mentioned to you that we have a group down at TEEX now,
and that is the exact scenario, Congressman, that they are
working on now as we sit here today.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz. Congressman, we look at our employees and our
ridership as a force multiplier. We have a limited number of
law enforcement personnel, but we have large numbers of
ridership, large numbers of employees that see things out
there.
So we have an aggressive training program. We have trained
over 35,000 of our front-line employees to identify suspicious
behaviors and how to report those suspicious behaviors. We keep
refreshing our ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign for
our ridership, which is effective.
For our office employees, we have our workplace violence
instructions on what they should do--the run, hide, and fight
procedure and other things that we put in place for our office
employees.
Mr. Belfiore. So our facility operators and employees are
trained through our exercises and drills in response. But
taking a page from Chief Trucillo and Chief Diaz is in post-
Brussels environment, we are going to go forward and train our
employees in 3 components of a training.
One will be what to see, what to say, who to say it to, and
how to say it so that we have more effective kind of force
multipliers that are looking--you know, who truly understand
what to look for and what to report. To provide each employee
with what to do in an active-shooter situation. So the run,
hide, fight curriculum that DHS has put forward.
Then finally, an OEM component that would be how to take
care of yourself and your family in the event of a natural
weather emergency so that you can, you know, respond to take
care of others. That is grant-funded, by the way. We have the
approval to spend grant funding to support that effort.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you for your
graciousness in allowing me the extra time.
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
New Jersey, Representative Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Proctor, you are--your agency is responsible for
surface transportation. So that not only includes commuter
transportation, but that is, you know, the freight that goes on
the rails, right?
Ms. Proctor. Yes, ma'am. That is correct.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Buses?
Ms. Proctor. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. What about trucks on the highways?
Ms. Proctor. Commercial trucks, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So what is the point, what is the
touch point for coordination in overseeing possible problems
and risk associated particularly with the commercial trucks?
Because I will tell you, coming here, I was in traffic, and all
around me was trucks.
I am thinking this is a great opportunity for some
nefarious activities if someone had that in mind. What is the
coordinating element with that part of the surface
transportation network?
Ms. Proctor. In Surface Division, one of the areas that I
am responsible for, it is a highway motor carrier office, which
comes under Surface Division, and we work with the Federal
highway motor carrier unit to coordinate our efforts. Their
primary function is safety. So they design the safety
regulations, hours of work and the safety-focused regulations.
We have security-focused regulations. So we work very
closely with the trucking associations, American Trucking
Association, for example, the Operators of Independent--OIDA,
Operation of Independent Drivers Association.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Let me ask you a question. How do you
know who is driving these trucks?
Ms. Proctor. The drivers of those trucks are required to
have commercial driver's licenses and their CDL licenses. So
there is a process that they have to go through, a testing
process to acquire that. Every State regulates that.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Do you know whether or not they have
got background checks that would give us any indication of, you
know, sort-of associations, affiliations of that nature that
could be harmful or dangerous?
Ms. Proctor. There are some truck drivers that are required
to have Transportation Worker Identification Credentials, TWIC,
cards if they serve a maritime facility, a port facility. Other
than those that are required to have the TWIC card, they would
not have a required vetting process, but many do have that TWIC
card.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So another interesting thing I read is
that you also have responsibility for oversight of the
transporting of natural gas through pipelines.
Ms. Proctor. Yes, ma'am. That is correct.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So how do we do that?
Ms. Proctor. We have a pipeline office as well, and we work
very closely with the pipeline associations. We recently had a
hearing in Washington on the pipeline transportation issue. But
we work very closely with the pipeline associations, and
through our work with them, voluntary guidelines have been
developed. So they have agreed to follow guidelines that were
developed in conjunction with the pipeline operators, and those
guidelines function as essentially standards.
We conduct assessments with them. We conduct assessments at
critical facilities, and we conduct corporate security reviews.
So we have both corporate security reviews and critical
facility security reviews with the pipeline community.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you.
I have a question for New Jersey Transit and Amtrak. I
represent the 12th Congressional District. So I have the
Princeton station, train station. I also have the large capital
station in Trenton, and Trenton is a station that has New
Jersey Transit, Amtrak, and it has SEPTA. But we don't get the
kind of grants and support in that part of the State as we do
in the northern part of the State.
So my question to Amtrak and to New Jersey Transit is to
what extent are resources being utilized to protect those
stations and the riders of those stations, particularly the
Trenton train station?
Chief Trucillo. All of the training that we give to the
agency is given to the cadre of officers and civilian employees
who work in Trenton as well, and we are able, we being New
Jersey Transit, to participate in the grant program for the
greater Philadelphia region. So we get that opportunity.
Congresswoman, we also train with SEPTA and our greater
Philadelphia partners, to include Amtrak in Trenton, in drills
and exercises in that region. So what we are doing in the north
part of the State, we are mirroring in the Trenton area as well
for that key transportation facility in our State's capital.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Mr. Conway.
Mr. Conway. Yes, from Amtrak, we are pretty limited in our
responsibilities at Trenton. Our police officers will take
train rides and pretty much turn around at Trenton. The
policing of the station itself is left to New Jersey Transit
police. In return, what happens in New York Penn Station,
although we serve thousands of New Jersey Transit commuters,
the Amtrak polices the New Jersey Transit side of Penn Station.
So you won't--unless there is a special event or something
special going on, you will not see New Jersey Transit police in
Penn Station. They come over for special events--the Pope,
Super Bowl, New Year's Eve, St. Patrick's Day, events like
that.
So, again, New York Penn Station, New Jersey Transit side
policed by Amtrak. The opposite is true for the most part at
Trenton.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. OK. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentlewoman yields back.
I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. Beside
your testimony, though, I want to thank you for the efforts
that you perform every day on behalf of our commuters and our
families, and I want you to bring back, on behalf of this
Congress, our thanks for the men and women who work for you,
the members of the service. Tell them to continue to do the
great job they are doing, to do it safely.
This panel is dismissed. The clerk will prepare the witness
table for our second panel.
Thank you.
[Pause.]
Mr. Donovan. I would like to welcome our second panel to
today's hearing and thank them for their participation.
Mr. Greg Kierce serves as director of Jersey City--excuse
me. Serves as the director of the Jersey City, New Jersey,
Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security. In this
capacity, he is responsible for the city's response to
disasters and manages the city's homeland security grant funds.
Sergeant Kierce previously served in the New Jersey State
Police--excuse me, Jersey City's police department, and I also
want to note that this is his third appearance before our
subcommittee, actually the second in this Congress.
Welcome again, Sergeant.
Mr. Kierce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Rick Sposa oversees emergency medical
service operations at the Jersey City Medical Center. In this
capacity, he is responsible for the dispatch center and the
hospital's emergency preparedness program.
Additionally, Mr. Sposa is an adjunct professor at the
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Services and a member of the
National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. He previously served
in the Borough of Norwood Office of Emergency Management.
Welcome, sir.
Mr. Donovan. Lieutenant Vincent Glenn serves as commander
of the Jersey City Police Department's Emergency Services Unit.
He is also a member of the New Jersey State Render Safe Task
Force, the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Stabilization Team,
and the Jersey City Medical Center Paramedic Education Advisory
Board.
Welcome.
Mr. Glenn. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Richard Gorman serves as a captain in the
Jersey City Department of Fire and Emergency Services. In this
capacity, he is responsible for the Jersey City Metropolitan
Medical Response System and New Jersey Task Force One Urban
Search and Rescue Team.
Welcome, sir.
Mr. Gorman. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Mike Mollahan serves as trustee and
legislative director on the board of the Port Authority Police
Benevolent Association. Mr. Mollahan joined the Port Authority
Police Department in 2002. He began his law enforcement career
with the NYPD in 1998.
Welcome, sir.
Mr. Mollahan. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. The witnesses' full written testimony will
appear on the record. The Chair now recognizes Sergeant Kierce
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF SERGEANT W. GREG KIERCE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY, CITY OF JERSEY
CITY, NEW JERSEY
Mr. Kierce. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Members
of the subcommittee, Representative Bonnie Watson Coleman,
thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before you
this morning.
After every major terrorist attack in any part of the
world, security officials and the American public alike turn to
the question of what can be done to deter, prevent a similar
attack from occurring here? Unfortunately, it requires a major
disaster to arouse concern sufficiently to mobilize the
political will to take needed action.
Useful things are often accomplished in the shadow of
tragedy. It is not because those charged with security are
unable to imagine what terrorists might do. It is rather that
people seldom support costly and potentially disruptive
measures to protect them against things that haven't occurred.
The reality is because terrorists can attack anything,
anywhere, anytime, while we cannot protect everything,
everywhere, all the time, security tends to be reactive.
Certainly, we must try to protect the targets that terrorists
show a proclivity to attack.
Terrorist attacks on public transportation are nothing new.
Since the early 1990's, those concerned with security of public
surface transportation have been increasingly worried that
trains and buses were becoming highly-attractive targets for
terrorists bent on body counts. For those determined to kill in
quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, trains, subways,
and buses are ideal targets. They offer terrorists easy access
and escape, and congregations of strangers guarantee anonymity.
Approximately one-third of terrorist attacks world-wide
target transportation systems, with public transit the most
frequent. An analysis of more than 22,000 terrorist incidents
from 1968 through 2014 indicated that assaults on land-based
transportation targets, including mass transit, had the highest
casualty rates of any type.
Although major terrorist attacks like those on transit
systems in other parts of the world have not occurred in the
United States, chances prove exceedingly high. Heavily-
populated systems that operate on predictable schedules with
passengers having little or no chance to escape crowded
stations, buses, trains, and other conveyances make public
transportation susceptible to acts of terrorism.
Moreover, many systems are expanding and ridership has
generally increased, raising more policing concerns. Vehicular
gridlock, air pollution, expensive parking, and higher gasoline
prices have made mass transit an attractive option for urban
dwellers in metropolitan areas.
Numerous individuals have chosen to leave their vehicles at
home and subsequently have logged millions of more daily rides
on mass transit and regional rail. Terrorists and criminals
continue to think of new schemes in attempts to adjust their
tactics to thwart law enforcement officials, who, in turn, must
remain relentless when developing and integrating strategies to
safeguard the public.
Surface transportation cannot be protected in the ways that
commercial aviation is protected. Trains, subways, and buses
must remain readily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive.
The deployment of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive
sniffers, and armed guards, which have become features of the
landscape at airports, cannot be transferred easily to subway
stations or bus stops. The delays would be enormous and the
cost-prohibitive. Public transportation would effectively shut
down.
Transportation facilities are open public places. Other
public places that offer terrorists similar body counts--
shopping malls, crowded streets, or the lines of people just
waiting to get through security measures--are just as
vulnerable.
This does not mean that nothing can be done to increase
surface transportation security. Security officials in
countries that have been subjected to terrorist attacks have
developed some effective countermeasures. Good security can
make terrorist attacks more difficult, can increase their
likelihood of being detected, can minimize casualties and
disruption, can reduce panic and reassure passengers.
Visible security patrols and staff have a deterrent effect.
Closed-circuit television coverage has been used extensively in
Europe with good results. Enlisting employees and the public in
surveillance could also be very effective.
Much can be done through the design of vehicles and
facilities to eliminate hiding places, facilitate surveillance,
and reduce casualties by removing materials that explosions may
turn into shrapnel or burn with toxic fumes. Adequate
ventilation to remove deadly smoke, a leading killer in
tunnels, must be ensured. Safe areas can be created to protect
passengers during bomb threats.
Transportation operators, either public commissions or
private companies, have the front-line responsibility for
implementing security measures and responding to threats,
crisis planning, and restoration operations. We must all do
what we can to enhance the ability of our intelligence efforts
and law enforcement officials to uncover and thwart terrorist
plots, increase security around vulnerable targets, and improve
our ability to respond to attacks when they occur.
At the same time, we must be realistic about the acceptance
of risk. We cannot allow fear to become the framework of
American governance. Ensuring the security of this country's
critical infrastructure has become even more a priority since
September 11, 2001.
To that end, public transportation systems must
continuously develop and implement programs to protect
passengers, employees, and property from those individuals who
wish to do harm. We should be wary of slouching toward a
security State in which protected perimeters, gates, and guards
dominate the landscape and irrevocably alter everyday life.
On behalf of Mayor Steven M. Fulop and the citizens of
Jersey City, I once again thank you for inviting me here today
and look forward to working with you in providing a safe and
secure environment for the citizens which we serve.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kierce follows:]
Prepared Statement of W. Greg Kierce
Tuesday, June 21, 2014
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear
before you this morning.
After every major terrorist attack in any part of the world,
security officials and the American public alike turn to the question
of what can be done to deter or prevent a similar attack from occurring
here.
Unfortunately, it often requires a major disaster to arouse concern
sufficiently to mobilize the political will to take needed action.
Useful things are often accomplished in the shadow of tragedy.
It is not because those charged with security are unable to imagine
what terrorists might do. It is rather that people seldom support
costly and potentially disruptive measures to protect them against
things that haven't occurred.
The reality is that because terrorists can attack anything,
anywhere, any time, while we cannot protect everything, everywhere, all
the time, security, tends to be reactive. Certainly we must try to
protect targets that terrorists show a proclivity to attack.
Terrorist attacks on public transportation are nothing new. Since
the early 1990s, those concerned with the security of public surface
transportation have been increasingly worried that trains and buses
were becoming highly attractive targets for terrorists bent upon body
counts.
For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill
indiscriminately, trains, subways, and buses are ideal targets. They
offer terrorists easy access and escape. Congregations of strangers
guarantee anonymity.
Approximately one-third of terrorist attacks world-wide target
transportation systems, with public transit the most frequent. Analysis
of more than 22,000 terrorist incidents from 1968 through 2014
indicated that assaults on land-based transportation targets, including
mass transit, have the highest casualty rates of any type.
Although major terrorist attacks like those on transit systems in
other parts of the world have not occurred in the United States,
chances prove exceedingly high.
Heavily-populated systems that operate on predictable schedules,
with passengers having little or no chance to escape crowded stations,
buses, trains, and other conveyances, make public transportation
susceptible to acts of terrorism.
Moreover, many systems are expanding and ridership has generally
increased, raising more policing concerns. Vehicular gridlock, air
pollution, expensive parking fees, and higher gasoline prices have made
mass transit an attractive option for urban dwellers in the
metropolitan.
Numerous individuals have chosen to leave their vehicles at home
and, subsequently, have logged millions of more daily rides on mass
transit and regional rail.
Terrorists and criminals continue to think of new schemes and
attempt to adjust their tactics to thwart law enforcement officials
who, in turn, must remain relentless when developing and integrating
strategies to safeguard the public.
Surface transportation cannot be protected in the same way
commercial aviation is protected. Trains, subways, and buses must
remain readily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive.
The deployment of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive
sniffers, and armed guards, which have become features of the landscape
at airports, cannot be transferred easily to subway stations or bus
stops.
The delays would be enormous and the costs prohibitive--public
transportation would effectively be shut down.
Transportation facilities are public places. Other public places
that offer terrorists similar body counts--shopping malls, crowded
streets, or the lines of people waiting to get through security
measures--are just as vulnerable.
This does not mean that nothing can be done to increase surface
transportation security.
Security officials in countries that have been subjected to
terrorist attacks have developed some effective countermeasures.
Good security can make terrorist attacks more difficult, can
increase their likelihood of being detected, can minimize casualties
and disruption, can reduce panic, and can reassure passengers.
Visible security patrols and staff have a deterrent effect. Closed-
circuit television coverage has been used extensively in Europe with
good results. And enlisting employees and the public in surveillance
can also be very effective.
Much can be done through the design of vehicles and facilities to
eliminate hiding places, facilitate surveillance, and reduce casualties
by removing materials that explosions may turn into shrapnel or that
burn with toxic fumes.
Adequate ventilation to remove deadly smoke, a leading killer in
tunnels, must be ensured. Safe areas can be created to protect
passengers during bomb threats
Transportation operators, either public commissions or private
companies, have the front-line responsibility for implementing security
measures, responding to threats, crisis planning, and restoring
operations.
We must do all we can to enhance the ability of our intelligence
efforts and law enforcement officials to uncover and thwart terrorist
plots, increase security around vulnerable targets, and improve our
ability to respond to attacks when they occur.
At the same time, we must be realistic about the acceptance of
risk. We cannot allow fear to become the framework of American
governance.
Ensuring the security of this country's critical infrastructure has
become even more of a priority since September 11, 2001.
To that end, public transportation systems must continuously
develop and implement programs to protect passengers, employees, and
property from those individuals who wish to do harm.
We should be wary of slouching toward a ``security state'' in which
protected perimeters, gates, and guards dominate the landscape and
irrevocably alter everyday life.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Sergeant.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sposa for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD SPOSA, OPERATIONS COORDINATOR, EMERGENCY
MEDICAL SERVICES, JERSEY MEDICAL CENTER
Mr. Sposa. Chairman Donovan, Members of the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, on behalf
of Barry Ostrowsky, president and chief executive officer of
RWJ Barnabas Health, I would like to thank you for the
opportunity to come before you today to discuss first
responders and their role in supporting the efforts to secure
transportation in the region.
I would like to thank the subcommittee for its dedication
to seeking input from a wide range of stakeholders, including
first responders, on this critical issue. I hope to show how
your financial commitment to emergency preparedness have better
prepared the region and how continued appropriations will
continue to support the medical surge needs and prepare health
care systems for any disaster we could face, including a
transit disaster or attack on its infrastructure.
Today, I will speak both from the perspective of the pre-
hospital EMS provider, as well as the emergency preparedness
role in front-line acute care hospitals, and I would not think
of a more fitting setting to discuss the topic than the city of
Jersey City, New Jersey.
It has been nearly 15 years since the deadliest terrorist
attack on American soil, which occurred a mere 4 miles from
this spot. I can tell you that we are most certainly better
prepared today than we were in 2001 because of the development,
funding, and implementation of Federal programs and local
initiatives to bolster response capabilities.
But I would be remiss if I told you there wasn't more work
to do, more goals to accomplish, and more loops to close. To
begin, I would like to give you a snapshot of programs that
exist within the health care community today because of the
Federal Government's commitment to better preparing the
community to protect the residents, visitors, and workers in
New Jersey.
Since 2003, the Federal Government has invested more than
$33 million in bolstering health care preparedness in the North
Jersey UASI region, which includes Jersey City. This money has
built new programs and provided the basis for some of the most
unique and forward-thinking solutions to deal with medical
surge and mass casualty incidents that exist in the country
today.
I would like to highlight some significant accomplishments,
both in the hospital and EMS worlds that indeed make this
region safer and more resilient in the face of an attack or
large-scale incident. These programs enhance the ability of EMS
and hospitals to respond to mass casualty events, pandemic
events, and acts of terrorism and would have not been possible
without the funding that was supplied by these important UASI
grants.
Hospitals are, by their very nature, considered to be a
soft target for a number of reasons. The mission of all
hospitals is to be available to their community 24/7/365.
Because those in need of aid must have immediate access to
life-saving care, entry to these facilities can't be hampered
or restricted.
Our lights are always on, our doors unlocked, and our
prominent role in the surrounding community unquestioned. This
could easily be exploited, and therefore, the need to protect
an open campus is paramount and a necessary first step to
providing excellent patient care.
The trauma centers in the UASI region have been able to
harden their structures and better protect themselves from
unwanted attacks through the trauma center target hardening
grants. These improvements include increased closed-circuit
television capabilities, the creation of blast buffer zones
around the structures, the installation of radiation detection,
and the placement of better access control systems to aid in
that mission.
Our hospitals are also better prepared for medical surge
events as a result of the receipt of the UASI grants. For
example, each of the 34 hospitals in the New Jersey UASI region
has been provided with a medical surge trailer designed to
provide the necessary supplies, tools, and protective equipment
that would be needed in the face of a medical surge event. The
coordination and uniform outfitting to each facility would not
have been possible without an overarching mission directive
like that from the UASI grant stream.
In any medical surge event, communication systems and
modalities will play a crucial role. If you read any after-
action report from an incident or exercise, you will almost
certainly find multiple references to communication gaps that
occurred during the event, and UASI has allowed the hospitals
to bolster their communications capabilities. The
implementation of a mass notification system that allows
hospitals to communicate and recall their staff was a key to
building more resilient hospitals.
Another major step forward for interoperability and
communications that was undertaken was the Mutualink system
that allows for cross-platform, multi-discipline communication
in real time. This tool will assist with the overall response
coordination by allowing multiple disciplines' radios, phones,
and even video feeds to be shared in real time and increase
capabilities of communications instantly.
As you can see through these examples, the health-care
community in the New Jersey UASI region has dramatically
improved its response capabilities and resiliency since the
inception of the UASI grant process, and these initiatives
directly support securing the infrastructure of mass transit in
the region. Through regular interfaces and exercises with the
transit community, relationships are built and responses
refined. The UASI program has directly impacted and improved
these relationships through mutual training and cross-
discipline planning.
Turning specifically to our role in protecting and
responding to emergencies within the transit systems, I want to
focus on two collaborative endeavors. Our efforts in the
creation of the passenger rail security plan, as well as our
work through UASI grants to furnish our partners with
specialized equipment geared toward transit events.
First, the passenger rail security plan, which represents
the most comprehensive initiative undertaken by EMS in New
Jersey related to the transit system. The plan was developed by
the New Jersey EMS Task Force, which is a stakeholder group of
specialized resources, of which Jersey City Medical Center's
EMS is a charter member.
The creation of the plan began with a kick-off meeting in
October 2009 and included nearly 80 representatives from local
EMS agencies and the State Office of Emergency Management, as
well as State, Federal, and private planning partners. The task
force reviewed and analyzed response guidelines, best
practices, and lessons learned from authorities such as
Madrid's Emergency Services, the London Ambulance Service,
District of Columbia Fire and EMS, the Los Angeles Fire
Department, Jersey City Medical Center EMS, and the Hudson
County Office of Emergency Management.
Completed in March 2011, the plan is an unprecedented
1,238-page detailed document, and as I have mentioned, it
represents the largest EMS planning project in New Jersey's
history. Its authors invested more than 10,000 hours of work,
and more than 70 agencies collaborated between its inception
and completion. This plan incorporates more than 300 stations
throughout the State overall.
The most vulnerable stations, of which there are 38,
spanning 10 counties, have either ridership of at least 500,000
per year or attached to critical infrastructure, such as an
airport, sporting event, or entertainment venue. This plan made
unprecedented strides in terms of EMS coordination and
integration with our transit partners.
Next, we have equipped our partners with specialty
equipment designed to enable remote access to patients, support
mass casualty events, and aid in the mass transportation of
patients. This is critically important, as one of the largest
challenges that EMS face during mass transit events is the
availability of access to remote locations.
When an event occurs away from a station, it can be
incredibly difficult--it can be incredibly difficult to access
the incident location. To address this issue in New Jersey, we
have amassed a fleet of off-road ambulances built specifically
to access remote locations and remove patients to central
locations for further treatment and transport.
These assets allow for the quick extraction of patients
from remote locations and in time/life critical circumstances
will mean the different between life and death. New Jersey EMS
has assembled the largest known fleet of medical ambulance
buses, which are designed to meet the needs of mass casualty
events and are capable of transporting up to 22 patients with
one trip.
These assets would not have been obtainable without the
support of UASI dollars coming through the region, and these
assets have been proven time and time again in the region and
continue to be a valued resource. Regularly assisting with
nursing home evacuations and large-scale incidents throughout
the State, these assets have been put into action on countless
occasions and transported thousands of patients, allowing for
quick evacuation and relocation with much less manpower during
a disaster response. This fleet has become an indispensable
asset in the region and a model for other locations to emulate.
Based on some of the examples I provided with you today,
you can see that hospitals, emergency medical providers, and
other partners in the region are better prepared to handle
adverse surge events, such as those that could be created by
large-scale transit attacks or accidents, as a direct result of
Federal dollars supplied. But there is more work to do in order
to continue to ensure we are exceptionally prepared for any
emergency response.
This is particularly important as we see our terror threats
evolving, such as the recent tragedy in Orlando. Our focus must
be given to new threats, and training and equipment must change
to meet those new threats.
We are prepared for the all-hazards approach and have
already refined our mission to include the latest trends
throughout the EMS and hospital community by bolstering our
bleeding control equipment and training and working with our
partners in law enforcement and fire. To date, the New Jersey
UASI has already invested nearly $4 million in the rescue task
force concept and getting the right equipment into the hands of
those who need it. This is another successful example of how
these dollars prepare us for these events.
We are cognizant of the limited resources available and the
difficult decisions that you must make in Congress on how to
allocate resources. However, because of the changing landscape,
we are hopeful that the recent trend to reduce homeland
security grants is reversed.
In closing, I would like to once again offer my sincere
appreciation for the opportunity to speak with you today. The
region is most certainly prepared for an emergency of any kind
than it was 15 years ago, but the job is not done. The threat
is not gone, and the realities are continually changing.
I urge you to work with the vast group of stakeholders here
today and others to begin planning how to make and continue us
to make safer, more resilient, and more ready to face what
seems to be a never-ending threat stream.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sposa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Sposa
June 21, 2016
Chairman Donovan and Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications, on behalf of Barry
Ostrowsky, president and chief executive officer of RWJBarnabas Health,
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to come before you today
to discuss first responders and their role in supporting efforts to
secure surface transportation in the region.
RWJBarnabas Health is the largest not-for-profit integrated health
care delivery system in New Jersey. The system includes 11 acute care
hospitals, 3 children's hospitals, a pediatric rehabilitation hospital,
a freestanding behavioral health center, ambulatory care centers,
geriatric centers, the State's largest behavioral health network,
comprehensive home care and hospice programs, and several accountable
care organizations. As the second-largest private employer in New
Jersey, RWJBarnabas Health includes more than 32,000 employees and over
9,000 physicians and we train more than 1,000 residents.
Jersey City Medical Center's Emergency Medical Service (EMS) has
served the city of Jersey City uninterrupted as its ambulance and
emergency service provider for more than 130 years. In fact, April 2016
marked our 133rd year of providing
24/7/365 Basic and Advanced Life Support ambulance service to this
great city. JCMC EMS has utilized many Nationally-recognized best
processes and practices and has found that this has been instrumental
in our system's success.
I would like to thank this subcommittee for its dedication to
seeking input from a wide range of stakeholders, including first
responders, on this critical issue. I hope to show how your financial
commitment to emergency preparedness have better prepared the region
and how continued appropriations will continue to support the medical
surge needs, and prepare health care systems for any disaster we could
face, including a transit disaster or attack on its infrastructure.
Today I will speak from both the perspective of the pre-hospital
EMS provider as well as the emergency preparedness role of front-line
acute care facilities. And I could not think of a more fitting setting
to discuss this topic than the city of Jersey City, New Jersey. It has
been nearly 15 years since the deadliest terrorist attack on American
soil, which occurred a mere 4 miles from this spot. I can tell you that
we are most certainly better prepared today then we were in 2001
because of the development, funding, and implementation of Federal
programs and local initiatives to bolster response capabilities. But I
would be remiss if I told you there wasn't more work to do, more goals
to accomplish, and more loops to close.
To begin, I would like to give you a snapshot of programs that
exist within the health care community today because of the Federal
Government's commitment to better preparing the community to protect
the residents, visitors, and workers in New Jersey. Since 2003, the
Federal Government has invested more than $33 million in bolstering the
health care preparedness in the North Jersey UASI region, which
includes Jersey City. This money has built new programs and provided
the basis for some of the most unique and forward thinking solutions to
deal with medical surge and mass casualty incidents that exist in the
country today.
I would like to highlight some significant accomplishments both in
the hospital and EMS worlds that indeed make this region safer and more
resilient in the face of attack or large-scale incident. These programs
enhance the ability of EMS and hospitals to respond to Mass Casualty
Events, Pandemic Events, and Acts of Terrorism and would not have been
possible without the funding that was supplied by these important UASI
grants.
Hospitals are, by their very nature, considered to be a soft target
for a number of reasons. The mission of all hospitals is to be
available to their community 24/7/365 and because those in need of aid
must have immediate access to life-saving care, entry to these
facilities can't be hampered or restricted. Our lights are always on,
our doors unlocked, and our prominent role in the surrounding community
unquestioned. This could easily be exploited and therefore the need to
protect an open campus is paramount and a necessary first step in
providing excellent patient care. The trauma centers in the UASI region
have been able to harden their structures and better protect themselves
from unwanted attacks through the Trauma Center Target Hardening
grants. These improvements include increased closed circuit television
capabilities, the creation of blast buffer zones around the structures,
the installation of radiation detection and the placement of better
access control systems to aid in that mission.
Our hospitals have also become better prepared for a medical surge
event as a result of the receipt of UASI grants. For example, each of
the 34 hospitals in the NJ UASI region has been provided with a medical
surge trailer, designed to provide the necessary supplies, tools, and
personal protective equipment that would be needed in the face of a
medical surge event. The coordination and uniform outfitting to each
facility would not have been possible without an overarching mission
directive like that of the UASI grant stream. These trailers have been
utilized for many events, such as during Hurricane Sandy, and are
easily shared within the hospital community for more isolated incidents
that don't involve all the hospitals.
In any medical surge event, communication systems and modalities
will play a crucial role. If you read any after-action report from an
incident or exercise you will almost certainly find multiple references
to communication gaps that occurred during the event. And UASI has
allowed the hospitals to bolster their communications capabilities. The
implementation of a mass notification system that allows hospitals to
communicate and recall their staff was a key to building more resilient
hospitals. The other major step forward for interoperability and
communications that was undertaken is the MutualLink system that allows
for cross-platform, multi-discipline communication in real time. This
tool will assist with the overall response coordination by allowing
multiple disciplines, radios, phones, and even video feeds to be shared
in real time and increase capabilities communications instantly.
As you can see through these examples, the Emergency Medical
Services community in the NJ UASI has dramatically improved its
response capabilities and resiliency since the inception of UASI grant
process. And these initiatives directly support securing the
infrastructure of mass transit in the region. Through regular
interfaces and exercises with the transit community, relationships are
built and responses refined. The UASI program has directly impacted and
improved these relationships through mutual training and cross
discipline planning.
Turning specifically to our role in protecting and responding to
emergencies within transit systems, I want to focus on two
collaborative endeavors--our efforts in the creation of the Passenger
Rail Security Plan as well as our work, through UASI grants, to furnish
our partners with specialized equipment geared toward transit events.
First, the Passenger Rail Security Plan, which represents the most
comprehensive initiative undertaken by EMS in New Jersey related to the
transit system. The Plan was developed by the New Jersey EMS Taskforce,
which is a stakeholder group of specialized resources of which Jersey
City Medical Center's EMS is a charter member. The creation of the Plan
began with a kickoff meeting in October 2009 and included nearly 80
representatives from local EMS agencies and the State OEM, as well as
State, Federal and private planning partners. The Task Force reviewed
and analyzed response guidelines, best practices, and lessons learned
from authorities such as Madrid's emergency services, the London
Ambulance Service, District of Columbia Fire and EMS, the Los Angeles
Fire Department, Jersey City Medical Center EMS, the Hudson County
Office of Emergency Management. Completed in March 2011, the Plan is an
unprecedented 1,238-page detailed document and, as I mentioned, it
represents the largest EMS planning project in New Jersey's history.
Its authors invested more than 10,000 hours of work, and more than 70
agencies collaborated between its inception and completion.
The Plan incorporates more than 300 stations throughout the State
overall. The most vulnerable stations, of which there are 38 spanning
10 counties, have either a ridership of at least 500,000 per year or
are attached to critical infrastructure such an airport, sporting arena
or entertainment venue. This Plan made unprecedented strides in terms
of EMS coordination and integration with our transit partners.
Next, we have equipped our partners with specialty equipment
designed to enable remote access to patients, support mass casualty
events, and aid in the mass transportation of patients. This is
critically important as one of the largest challenges that EMS faces
during mass transit events is the availability of access to remote
locations. When an event occurs away from a station it can be
incredibly difficult to access the incident location. To address this
issue, in New Jersey we have amassed a fleet of off-road ambulances
built specifically to access remote locations and remove patients to
central locations for further treatment and transport. These assets
allow for the quick extraction of patients from remote locations and,
in time life critical circumstances, will mean the difference between
life and death.
New Jersey EMS has assembled the largest known fleet of Medical
Ambulance Buses, which are designed to meet the needs of mass casualty
events and are capable of transporting up to 22 patients with one trip.
These assets would not have been obtainable without the support of the
UASI dollars coming to the region, and these assets have been proven
time and time again in the region and continue to be a valued resource,
regularly assisting with nursing home evacuations and large-scale
incidents throughout the State. These assets have been put into action
on countless occasions and transported thousands of patients allowing
for quick evacuation and relocation with much less manpower during a
disaster response. This fleet has become an indispensable asset in the
region and a model for other locations to emulate.
NJ also has a large fleet of mass care response units (known as
``MCRUs''), spread throughout the State to meet the ever-evolving
threat profile and these units will play a critical role in providing
the much-needed supplies, equipment, and transport devices at an event.
There are 5 large-scale MCRU's capable of treating 100 patients each
and an additional 7 smaller units that can each treat 50 patients.
Should a large-scale transit event occur, these assets would be a
critical asset that will be mobilized quickly and allow for adequate
supplies to be delivered to the scene.
Based on some of the examples I've provided you with today, you can
see that hospitals emergency medical providers and other partners in
the region are better prepared to handle adverse surge events, such as
those that could be created by large-scale transit attacks or
accidents, as a direct result of Federal dollars supplied. But there is
more work to do in order to continue to ensure we are exceptionally
prepared for any emergency response necessary. This is particularly
important as we see terror threats evolving.
As the challenges we are facing change, our needs to meet those
challenges will change as well. We are talking about protecting our
transit systems and how different aspects of the health care continuum
support that. What we see unfolding is a new disturbing trend of
active-shooter and mass-shooting events, such as seen in Orlando last
weekend. Of course we need to be prepared for the next threat, but
there is a benefit to the tasks already undertaken. We are prepared for
the ``all hazards'' approach and are already refining that mission to
include the latest trends in EMS and Hospital care by bolstering our
bleeding control equipment and training and working with our partners
in Law Enforcement and Fire. To date the NJ UASI has already invested
nearly $4,000,000 in the rescue task force concept and getting the
right equipment into the hands of those who need it this is another
successful example of how these dollars prepare us for these events.
We are cognizant of the limited resources available and the
difficult decisions that you must make in Congress on how to allocate
resources; however, because of the changing landscape, we are hopeful
that the recent trend to reduce homeland security grants, is reversed.
In closing, I would like to once again offer my sincere
appreciation for the opportunity to speak with you today. The region is
most certainly more prepared for an emergency of any kind than it was
15 years ago. But the job is not done, the threat is not gone, and the
realities are continually changing. I urge you to work with the vast
group of stakeholders here today, and others, to begin planning how to
continue make us safer, more resilient, and more ready to face what
seems to be a never-ending threat stream.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Captain Gorman for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. GORMAN, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AND HOMELAND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND EMERGENCY
SERVICES, JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY
Mr. Gorman. Thank you, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
Honorable Donald Payne, and respective Members of the
subcommittee.
On behalf of the Jersey City Fire Department and the
Emergency Response Partnership of the Northern New Jersey
Region, please accept my deepest gratitude to appear and
present testimony regarding the protection of our passengers on
surface transportation.
On February 9, 1996, at 8:40 a.m., the emergency response
community of Jersey City, Hudson County, and New Jersey State
and Federal agencies converged to a remote section of the
Jersey City-Secaucus border. I was--as a young firefighter/EMT,
I was one of the first responders, and I was presented with a
horrific crash of two commuter trains.
Our society was beginning to worry about terrorist events
with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which was right in
our neighborhood, Jersey City. First thing you ask yourself,
was this a terrorist event?
As highlighted in the articles that I have submitted, you
could review that for your future reference, as the police,
fire, rescue, and EMS crews began to triage and treat the
injured, we were quickly exhausted of our resources we had on
hand. We were already beyond our capabilities, and we hadn't
even transported a single patient to the hospital. In order to
accomplish that, command and control had to be established, and
multi-discipline mutual aid to be summoned on an unprecedented
scale for our area.
Unfortunately, we measure our response by stating our
losses, and that day, 3 people lost their lives, the 2
engineers and 1 passenger. But 162 passengers were injured, 16
severely, and we should begin to realize that we were
successful in that every passenger that we treated on that day
did survive, largely due to the rapid response, on-scene
operations, due to the extensive training and superior
knowledge, skill, and ability of many emergency response
personnel, both on scene and in the hospitals.
That day ended for us, and we were proud to say that we
saved many from death and further injury, but the lessons
learned continued to evolve. The executives of many agencies
gathered and conducted very comprehensive evaluations and post-
incident analysis of many aspects of this incident. There were
models presented to many committees, which included natural and
man-made disasters related to rail and surface mass
transportation.
Different target locations were introduced to include
transportation hubs and terminals, as well as hard-to-access
remote locations that is described in this incident. The State
of New Jersey and Jersey City has come a long way since that
day.
As Director Kierce has testified to the attraction of
attacks on our infrastructure, we in the emergency management
and response community are well aware that any place is a
potential target, and we respond to each and every one of them
to protect the lives of the citizens we are sworn to protect.
Many programs have been developed to support our response
to terrorism and enhance our ability to operate in these large-
scale events. To highlight a few, the Metropolitan Medical
Strike Team; the Urban Area Security Initiative funding, or the
UASI; SAFER grants, which is Staffing to Adequate Fire and
Emergency Response; AFG, which is the Assistance to Firefighter
Grant; the Port Security Grant Program.
These work to enhance communications, develop threat
analysis groups and fusion centers, form specialized teams,
enhance training and exercise to include our working with FEMA
for National exercise pilot programs, and the most recent
exercise was the Bakken crude oil transport within Hudson
County. Special trained law enforcement teams and rapid
deployment forces and information-sharing committees were
formed.
MMRS was developed and was one of the first National grant
programs to support emergency response agencies to address gaps
in equipment and training. This funding has been discontinued.
However, many other programs, such as UASI, has replaced it and
has a more detailed, focused structure to provide a better-
defined overall system.
The on-going interagency communication of radio, data, and
live-streaming to enhance situational awareness from on-scene
operation to senior commanders and executive decision-making
officials continues to evolve. Secure radio communications have
become better and will continue to grow with the demand.
Systems like NJ NET and Mutualink are becoming common.
Local, county, and State emergency operation centers, fusion
centers, and coordination centers are in virtually every city
and township, which are used for planned events and natural and
man-made disasters. These systems and locations are extremely
useful. However, they do have a price tag in the new and
evolving technical support that they require.
Additionally, challenges in permissions of being able to
share frequencies with other agencies is becoming or has been a
problem, and we seem to be overcoming that. The inception of
dual and tri-band radios and the complicated user training that
we will need to use them is going to be apparent.
Specially-trained units, such as the New Jersey Task Force
One Urban Search and Rescue Team, due to the large commitment
of manpower and equipment, we were recently the latest to be
accepted into the National Urban Search and Rescue Response
System. This team began its journey in 1998. From that unit, a
new concept was introduced in this region called the Metro
Urban Strike Team.
Based on a gap analysis from a first responder operating on
a collapse to the time that the task force could arrive on
scene, it was estimated to be a 1- to 6-hour window. The MUST
team, or the Metro Urban Strike Team, fills that gap, and these
teams are lined throughout the UASI region. Their capabilities
are structural collapse, trench rescue, technical rescue, and
we seek to train and respond in new disciplines as that
committee unfolds.
As Mr. Sposa stated, the New Jersey EMS Task Force is also
a system born from this UASI subcommittee, and it has proven
itself to be invaluable. New Jersey Transit provides also
evacuation transport in stricken localities, such as Jersey
City, to self-shelter areas.
So if we had a shelter in Jersey City and we were in a
danger zone, New Jersey Transit would mobilize buses, and we
would move then to another section of the State which is safe.
I would like to thank you for your support and commitment and
our elected officials at many levels of government for that.
Training and exercise programs in basic to advanced
operations from initial arrival to advanced command-and-control
have also been developed. These programs are world class,
delivered by the very best instructors in the field. Many are
sponsored by the National Office of Domestic Preparedness in
similar agencies.
These are invaluable. However, they are scaled down by
departments due to operating at minimum staffing levels and
budgetary concerns to pay for the venues and the expensive cost
of replacing personnel.
Additionally, the allocation or allowance of Federally-
funded training centers and staff should be seriously
reconsidered. Hudson County does not have a fully-functional,
fully-staffed, multi-disciplined training academy and training
ground, and this area, being as compressed as it is, severely
lacks that. The personnel must be placed off-duty and often
replaced to attend training academies in other counties,
leading to delays in response should they have to be recalled
for an emergency within Hudson County.
Other programs were the rapid deployment force and
information-sharing component, such as the JTTF, which will be
addressed by other capable persons here. But the most important
thing that we have today, which we didn't have, is the
relationships with the mutual aid partnerships, the police
departments, the EMS. Imagine a cop and a fireman getting along
and getting things done.
The Port Authority Police, the Port Authority OEM, New
Jersey Transit Police, their special operations group, their
OEM group, New Jersey State Police, Amtrak, Conrail, and
Norfolk Southern, we work with many different partners to do
training and district familiarizations.
In closing, on behalf of the Director of Public Safety Shea
and the Chief of Department Darren Rivers, the men and the
women of the Jersey City Fire Department, the men and women of
the New Jersey Task Force One, and of course, the Jersey City
Mayor Steven M. Fulop, I thank you again for your interest in
the most important aspect of our business, keeping the citizens
of the United States and her visitors safe and secure.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gorman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard D. Gorman
June 21, 2016
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Honorable Donald M. Payne Jr., and
the respected Members of this subcommittee, On behalf of the Jersey
City Fire Dept and Emergency Response partnership of the North New
Jersey Region, please accept my deepest gratitude to appear and present
testimony regarding the protection of our passengers on surface
transportation.
On February 9, 1996 at 8:40 a.m., the emergency response community
of Jersey City, Hudson County and N.J. State, and Federal agencies
converged to a remote section of Jersey City and Secaucus Border. As a
young firefighter/EMT and one of the first due responders, I was
presented with a horrific crash of 2 commuter trains.
Our society was beginning to worry about terrorist events after the
1993 WTC Bombing.
Was this a terrorist event?
As highlighted in the New York Times article provided, there were
many obstacles to overcome.
As the police, fire rescue and EMS crews began to triage and treat
the injured, we quickly exhausted the resources we had on hand. We were
already beyond our capabilities, and we haven't even transported a
single patient to a hospital yet. In order to accomplish that, Command
and Control had to be established, and multi-discipline mutual aid had
to be summoned in an unprecedented scale for our city.
Unfortunately we measure our response by stating our loses. Three
people lost their lives, the 2 engineers and 1 passenger, 162
passengers were injured (16 severely). We should begin to realize that
we were successful in that all the passengers treated survived largely
due to the rapid response, on-scene operations due to extensive
training and superior knowledge skill and ability of many emergency
response personnel both on scene and in hospitals.
That day ended for us, and we were proud to say that we saved many
from death and further injury that day. But the lessons learned
continue to evolve.
The executives of many agencies gathered and conducted very
comprehensive evaluation (Post-Incident Analysis) of many aspects of
this accident.
There were models presented to many committees, which included
natural and man-made disasters related to rail and surface mass
transportation. Different target locations were introduced, to include
transportation hubs and terminals, as well as hard-to-access remote
locations as described.
The State of New Jersey and Jersey City has come a long way from
that day.
As Director Kierce has testified to the attraction of attacks on
our infrastructure, we in the emergency management and response
community are well aware that any place is a potential target. And we
respond to each and everyone of them to protect the lives of the
citizens we are sworn to protect.
Many programs have been developed to support our response to
terrorism, and enhance our ability to operate in these large-scale
events.
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMRS)
Urban Area Security Initiative Funding (UASI) on a regional
basis
Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER)
Grants
Assistance to Firefighter Grant (AFG)
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)
Enhancement in the Communications
Threat Analysis Groups, Fusion Centers
Specially Trained Teams and Groups (NJ-TF 1, MUST, NJEMSTF,
NJ Transit Police Special Operations)
Training and Exercise
Command and Control
Special Trained Law Enforcement Teams (RDF)
Information-Gathering Sharing committees
MMRS was developed and was one to the first National Grant programs
to support the emergency response agencies to address gaps in equipment
and training. This funding has been discontinued, however many other
programs such as the UASI has replaced it and has a more detailed,
focused structure to provide a better-defined overall system.
The on-going inter agency communication of radio, data, and live-
streaming to enhance situational awareness from on-scene operation to
senior commanders and executive decision-making officials continues to
evolve. Secure radio communication have become better and will continue
to grow with the demand.
Systems like NJ NET and Mutual Link are becoming common. Local,
county, and State Emergency Operations Centers, Fusion Centers,
Coordination Centers are in virtually every city and township, which
are used for planned events, and natural and man-made disasters.
These systems and locations are extremely useful, however they do
have a price tag in the new and evolving technical support they
require.
Specially-Trained units such the NJ-TF 1 USAR team. Due to a large
commitment of manpower and equipment was recently the latest to be
accepted into the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System.
This team began it's journey in 1998. From that unit, a new concept was
introduced in NJ. The Metro Urban Strike Team (MUST), Funded by the
UASI program, local departments have received equipment and training to
fulfill the first response operational period of the first 4-6 hours in
structural collapse, trench rescue, technical rescue, and seek to train
and respond in enhanced disciplines. The NJ EMFS Task Force is also a
system born of the continued UASI subcommittees.
I would like to thank you for your support and commitment and that
of our elected officials from many levels of government.
Training and Exercise Programs in basic to advanced operations.
From initial arrival to advanced Command and Control have also been
developed. These programs are world-class, delivered by the very best
instructors in the their field. Many are sponsored by the National
Office of Domestic Preparedness and similar agencies.
These are invaluable, however often are scaled down due to
departments operating at minimum staffing levels and or budgetary
concerns to pay for venues and cost of replacing personnel.
The allocation or allowance of Federally-funded training centers
and staff should be seriously reconsidered. Hudson County does not have
a fully functional, fully-staffed multi-discipline training academy
training ground. The personnel must be placed off duty and often
replaced to attend training academies in other counties leading to
delays in response should they be recalled.
RDF and Information Sharing Components (JTTF) have or will be
addressed by other capable persons here.
In closing, on behalf of Director of Public Safety Shea and Chief
of Department Datten Rivers and the men and women of the Jersey City
Fire Department, The men and women of the NJ Task Force 1, and of
course Jersey City, City Mayor Steven M. Fulop, I thank you again for
your interest in the most important aspect of our business, keeping the
citizens of the United States and her visitors safe and secure.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Captain.
The Chair now recognizes Lieutenant Glenn for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF VINCENT GLENN, COMMANDER, EMERGENCY SERVICE UNIT,
POLICE DEPARTMENT, JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY
Mr. Glenn. Good morning. I am Lieutenant Vincent Glenn from
the Jersey City Police Department, and I appreciate the
opportunity to speak before you today.
I am currently the commander of the Emergency Service Unit.
The Emergency Service Unit, ESU, oversees the bomb squad, the
scuba team, maritime operations, and the CBRNE response unit,
CBRNE meaning chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosives.
Our specially-trained and equipped personnel are
responsible for prevention and response to terrorism events,
including those in our local port areas, industrial facilities,
transit hubs, and commuter corridors. Officers who are assigned
to ESU include FBI-certified bomb technicians, Coast Guard
credentialed boat operators, hazardous materials technicians,
and fully-certified scuba divers.
ESU officers are capable of responding with a full
complement of CBRNE equipment to assist in the response and
recovery of criminal incidents, terrorism events, and other
emergencies.
Please let me share some relevant details of our city.
Jersey City is situated on a peninsula, with the Hackensack
River and Newark Bay on its western shore and the Hudson River
and New York Bay on its eastern shore. The city's population is
nearly 270,000 residents, and it is estimated that daytime
commuters more than double that number.
Our officers continually collaborate with emergency
management officials, law enforcement partners, and first
responders throughout the New York/New Jersey metropolitan
region in a whole community approach to carefully manage
resources and response activities. Some of our partnerships
include participation in the New Jersey State Render Safe Task
Force, Urban Area Security Initiative, Securing the Cities
Program, WMD Stabilization Team, and FBI Electronic
Countermeasures Task Force.
Some of the critical infrastructure, buffer zones, and soft
targets that fall within our area of responsibility include the
Jersey City waterfront, financial district, the Holland Tunnel,
5 separate commuter ferry terminals, the Port Jersey shipping
terminal, and various railways.
Additionally, ESU's incident prevention and response
equipment is utilized along Newark Bay and the Hackensack River
for security risk mitigation of the numerous bridge crossings
for inter-State highways and railways running in and out of the
New York/New Jersey region.
My fellow officers and I take pride in our training and
preparedness. One of the most fundamental aspects of responding
to an emergency incident is interoperability. On a daily basis,
the Jersey City Police Department, particularly ESU, is
constantly working to foster partnerships and improve
interagency communications.
Training courses, multi-jurisdictional drills, and
interdisciplinary exercises prepare us to be ready to respond
to every perceived threat to public safety, regardless of
whether that threat is predictable or emerging. Because the
skill set to meet an all-hazards approach is perishable,
training and education must be on-going and repeated for new
and seasoned responders alike. As complex threats intensify, it
is our duty to lead, coach, and direct our first responders.
ESU officers dedicate a significant number of hours to
specialized training. For example, bomb technicians attend 6
weeks of training at the FBI's Hazardous Devices School. They
then continue their education with monthly in-service classes
and periodic multi-jurisdictional drills.
Our scuba divers spend hundreds of hours in initial
training to attain skills such as advanced open water diving,
rescue diving, and evidence recovery. Their training continues
as they perform practical exercises in hazardous environments
such as the Hudson River and Newark Bay.
Boat operators are fully credentialed by the National
Maritime Service, as they learn to pilot our 37-foot CBRNE
rescue patrol boat. This credential mandates that operators
maintain hundreds of hours on the water per year to ensure
proficiency.
Our emergency responders prepare and experience tremendous
local support during drills conducted at public locations in
sensitive areas. These drills, which are frequently covered by
the media, give first responders an invaluable opportunity to
work with stakeholders and other officials in demonstrating the
interoperability that is so essential to managing a crisis.
Within Jersey City, these drills have recently been carried out
at the Holland Tunnel, the JP Morgan Chase building, and even
right here at NJCU.
It is not only emergency response agencies that need the
ability to work cohesively, but it is important that the public
be empowered to unite with first responders in achieving
coordination and preparedness. For example, the police
department's bomb squad conducts community outreach to our
partners in the public and private sector with lectures and
demonstrations in such topics as IED awareness, evacuation
procedures, response to bomb threats, and active-shooter
safety.
Our scuba team visits junior police academies to
demonstrate water safety, and our canine officers provide
question-and-answer sessions at local schools. It is because of
the skills afforded to us by advanced training that we as
professionals can continue to raise standards, improve
planning, and build partnerships.
Another important component to consider is equipment. Not
only is training and education perishable, but the tools to
meet emerging threats are perishable as well. Ordering
specialized equipment often takes many steps and incurs
considerable expense over time.
Equipment and tools often require everything from
rudimentary maintenance and repair to advanced technological
upgrades. Some of these tools include radiation detectors, X-
ray systems, air monitors, and bomb disposal robots. The
specialized equipment that I just mentioned, among many other
tools, demonstrate the multiple defenses that are needed to
improve our approach to pervasive threats and targets of
interest.
With pride, let me relate a few noteworthy incidents that
occurred within the last year and concluded with positive
outcomes. I responded to a report of a suspicious package on
the PATH train in Jersey City during prime commuter hours. Upon
assessing the situation, the item, a pressure cooker, was
remotely dismantled with minimal disruption to the public.
On another occasion, a radiological source was detected
near the Hoboken waterfront and deemed to be nonhazardous by
using an advanced isotope identifier.
Recently, police divers retrieved a piece of sensitive
homeland security equipment from the waters surrounding the
Port Jersey marine terminal. It was through the cooperation of
a variety of agencies that these incidents were quickly
resolved.
In summation, we need not be reminded that our area has
been labeled as a target-rich environment, perhaps even the
most high-risk urban area in the country. It is because of the
constant vigilance of public safety professionals who operate
in challenging environments all day, every day that allow for a
robust response to disruptions and emergency events of all
types.
On behalf of the quarter-million residents of Jersey City,
my professional partners, and our government officials, I thank
you for affording me the opportunity to testify before you on
these important matters.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Glenn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vincent Glenn
June 21, 2016
introduction
I am Lieutenant Vincent Glenn from the Jersey City Police
Department and I appreciate the opportunity to speak before you today.
I am currently the commander of the Emergency Service Unit. The
Emergency Service Unit (ESU) oversees the Bomb Squad, SCUBA team,
maritime operations, and the CBRNE response unit (CBRNE meaning
response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
incidents).
Our specially-trained and equipped personnel are responsible for
prevention and response to terrorism events, including those in our
local port areas, industrial facilities, transit hubs, commuter
corridors, and residential neighborhoods. Officers who are assigned to
ESU include FBI-certified Bomb Technicians, Coast Guard-credentialed
boat operators, State-certified hazardous material technicians, and
fully certified SCUBA divers. ESU officers are capable of responding
with a full complement of portable CBRNE equipment to withstand and
assist in the response and recovery of criminal incidents, terrorism
events, and emergencies due to natural disasters.
background
The city of Jersey City is situated on a peninsula with the
Hackensack River and Newark Bay on its western shore and the Hudson
River and New York Bay on its eastern shore. The city's residential
population is nearly 270,000 residents and it is estimated that daytime
commuters raises the populace to approximately half-a-million people.
Jersey City's 21 square miles and population density of nearly 17,000
people per square mile makes it the third most-densely-populated large
city in America and it is ranked as one of the top 120 cities
vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
Our officers continually collaborate with emergency management
officials, law enforcement partners, and first responders, through the
New York/New Jersey metropolitan region, in a whole-community-approach,
to carefully manage resources and response activities. Some of our
partnerships include participation in the NJ State Detect and Render
Safe Task Force, Urban Area Security Initiative, Securing the Cities
program, and FBI Level III WMD Stabilization Team, and FBI Electronic
Countermeasures Task Force.
We, as first responders are dedicated to enhancing emergency
preparedness and enabling rapid recovery from terrorist events, natural
disasters, and other emergencies. Some of the critical infrastructure,
soft targets, and buffer zone responsibilities include the Jersey City
waterfront financial district, the Holland Tunnel, 5 separate commuter
ferry terminals, 3 separate public marinas, Cape Liberty Cruise Port,
Port Jersey Shipping Terminal, Global Container Terminal, Claremont
Terminal, Public Service Electric Hudson Generating Station, Liberty
State Park, and Ellis Island. Additionally, ESU incident prevention and
response equipment is utilized along Newark Bay and the Hackensack
River for security risk mitigation of the numerous bridge crossings and
support stanchions for inter-State highways and State thoroughfares
running in and out of the New York/New Jersey metropolitan area. The
JCPD Emergency Service Unit has existing MOU's with UASI and the USCG
to respond with personnel and CBRNE equipment to areas along the Hudson
River, Hackensack River, New York Bay, Raritan Bay, Kill Van Kull, Port
Elizabeth, and Port Newark.
training/preparation
One of the most fundamental aspects of responding to any emergency
incident is interoperability. On a daily basis, Jersey City Police
Department, particularly ESU, relies on partnerships with all local
agencies to ensure the safety of everyone. We are constantly working to
foster these partnerships and improve our interagency communications.
Training courses, multi-jurisdictional drills, and inter-disciplinary
exercises, prepare us to be ready to respond to every perceived threat
to public safety, regardless of whether that threat is predictable or
emerging. And because the skill set to meet an all-hazards approach is
perishable, training and education must be on-going and repeated--for
new and seasoned responders alike. As complex threats intensify it is
our duty to lead, coach, and direct our first responders.
Members of ESU dedicate a significant number of hours to
specialized training. Bomb Technicians earn certification after an
initial 6 weeks of training at the FBI's Hazardous Devices School, the
only school in the country certified to train Bomb Technicians. They
then continue their education with monthly in-service classes, periodic
multijurisdictional exercises and drills, and continuing professional
development at HDS. Our SCUBA divers spend hundreds of hours in initial
training to attain skills such as advanced open-water diving, rescue
diving, and evidence recovery. Their training continues as they perform
practical exercises in hazardous environments such as the Hudson River,
Hackensack River, Newark Bay, and New York Bay. Boat operators are
fully credentialed by the National Maritime Service as they learn to
pilot our 37-foot CBRNE rescue and patrol boat, which is also equipped
with radiation detection equipment. This credential mandates that
operators maintain hundreds of hours, on the water, per-year to ensure
proficiency. Their skills are particularly necessary when operating
under harsh conditions, which is likely to occur when responding to
those in need of assistance. All of these disciplines practice response
to, and recovery from, criminal incidents, terrorism events, and
disruptions due to emergencies. However, just as important is the
prevention and mitigation of security threats that these officers
accomplish by routinely conducting critical infrastructure surveys and
safety checks.
Emergency response preparation has experienced tremendous local
support during drills conducted at public locations and sensitive
areas. These drills, which are frequently covered in the media, give
first responders an invaluable opportunity to work with stakeholders
and other officials in demonstrating interoperability that is so
essential to managing a crisis. Within Jersey City, these drills have
recently been carried out at the Holland Tunnel, the JP Morgan Chase
building, St. Peter's University and New Jersey City University. An
upcoming drill is scheduled to test emergency response to the Newport
Mall. In addition, on-going radiological training exercises are
conducted at maritime chokepoints in the area of the Verrazano Bridge,
George Washington Bridge, and Bayonne Bridge.
It is not only emergency response agencies that need the ability to
work cohesively, but it is important for the public to be educated and
empowered to unite with first responders to achieve coordination and
preparedness. For example, the Police Department's Bomb Squad conducts
community outreach to our partners in the public and private sector
with lectures and demonstrations in such topics as IED awareness,
evacuation procedures, response to bomb threats, and active-shooter
safety. Our SCUBA team visits junior police academies to demonstrate
water safety, and our K-9 officers provide question & answer sessions
at local schools. It is because of special skills afforded by advanced
training that we as a profession can continue to raise standards,
improve preparedness planning, and build partnerships between local
government and the public.
equipment
Not only is training and education perishable, but the tools and
equipment to meet emerging threats and mitigate disruptions due to
emergencies are perishable as well. Not only does ordering specialized
equipment take many steps, it more-often-than-not incurs reoccurring
expenses over time. Many of the tools to which I refer, require
everything from rudimentary maintenance and repair, to advanced
technological upgrades and expansion--this, in addition to running day-
to-day operations. Some of the highly special tools needed to perform
the task of protecting the public and enhancing emergency preparedness
include radiation detectors, counter-IED X-ray systems, suspicious
powder test-kits, chemical air monitors, interoperable communications
gear, and bomb disposal robots. The specialized equipment that I just
mentioned, among many other tools, demonstrate the multiple defenses
that are needed to improve our approach to pervasive threats, targets
of interest, critical infrastructure.
realization
With pride, I can relate a few incidents that occurred within the
past year that concluded with a positive outcome. We responded to a
report of a suspicious package on the PATH train in Jersey City, during
prime commuter hours. Upon assessing the situation, the item, a
pressure cooker, was remotely dismantled with minimal disruption to the
public. On another occasion, a radiological source was detected by
police near the Hoboken waterfront and ruled out as hazardous by the
Jersey City Emergency Service Unit with the use of advanced isotope
identification equipment. Recently, a piece of sensitive Homeland
Security equipment was safely retrieved by Jersey City Police divers in
the area of the Port Jersey Marine Terminal. It is through the
cooperation of a variety of agencies and the public, that these
incidents were quickly resolved without incident.
summary
In summation, we need not be reminded that the New York/New Jersey
metropolitan area has been labeled as a target-rich environment,
perhaps even the most high-risk urban area in the country. It is the
constant vigilance of public safety professionals who operate in a
challenging environment, all day every day, that allow for a robust
response to disruptions and emergency events of all types. On behalf of
the quarter-million Jersey City residents, my professional partners,
and our government officials, I thank you for affording me the
opportunity to testify before you on these important matters.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Lieutenant.
The Chair now recognizes Officer Mollahan for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MIKE MOLLAHAN, TRUSTEE, PORT AUTHORITY POLICE
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Mollahan. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne,
Representative Watson Coleman, thank you for convening this
important hearing and giving me the opportunity to appear
before you today.
My name is Mike Mollahan. I am the legislative director and
a trustee of the Port Authority PBA.
Our police officers patrol some of the most terrorist-
targeted infrastructure and landmarks in the world, including
the 6 bridges and tunnels between New Jersey and New York; the
world's busiest airport system of JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark;
marine terminals and ports, including Port Newark, Elizabeth,
and Brooklyn Piers; the largest and busiest bus terminal in the
Nation, the Port Authority bus terminal in Manhattan; the
sacred ground of the World Trade Center; and most relevant to
this hearing, the PATH trains.
The PATH heavy rail, rapid transit system serves as the
primary transit link between Manhattan and neighboring New
Jersey urban communities and suburban commuter railroads. PATH
carries approximately 244,000 passengers each week day and is
growing.
In 2015, PATH carried approximately 76.6 million
passengers. I have worked the PATH system for the last 12
years, and during this time, passenger loads have increased,
trains have become more crowded, and threat incidents have
risen.
For today's hearing, I would like to highlight two areas
that are important to fortifying the security of PATH trains,
training and resources for police officers and coordination
with other agencies. Over the past 3 years, biannual training,
which involves active-shooter and tactical weapons training,
pistol requalification, legal updates, and a host of other
important refresher training has gone down from 5 days of
training to 2, which directly impacts officers' readiness.
In particular, active-shooter and tactical weapons training
previously entailed a full day of training but has been cut to
only a few hours. Tactical training involves using specialized
weapons and equipment to breach doors in our ``tac house''
structures that are built to simulate rooms within buildings or
train cars and mimic active-shooter and mass shooting
situations.
This type of training is more important now than ever in
the aftermath of assault weapons attacks in Newtown,
Connecticut; Aurora, Colorado; as well as the recent shootings
in Orlando, Florida, and San Bernardino, California, which have
now become all too frequent. To this end, heavy weapons and
heavy weapons-trained officers need to be increased throughout
the Port Authority facilities, along with the number of
vehicles that can properly secure these weapons.
Furthermore, the support services provided to our patrol
units, including the Emergency Service Unit and canine unit,
have been diminished. The ESU provides SWAP, sniper, and
specialized response capabilities to issues that arise at all
Port Authority facilities. ESU staffing levels have been cut
for budget savings, and current ESU officers need better
refresher training. The Port Authority canine unit, which
covers PATH, the bus terminal, and the World Trade Center has
also suffered.
Last, while the camera systems at PATH have been updated,
they lack enhancement capability, which can make identifying
and apprehending suspects difficult. The cameras at Port
Authority bridges, tunnels, and bus terminals are also outdated
when compared to readily available and common technology on the
market.
With today's technological advancements, the Port Authority
police should have been able to have a photo of a suspect
within minutes to be able to broadcast to all PAPD, NYPD, and
MTAPD in proximity to the bus terminal. It is worth noting that
the Port Authority has installed State-of-the-art cameras on
the JFK Air Train and should deploy this camera technology to
the rest of its facilities.
We are still unsure if these incidents were pranks or tests
of vulnerability by terrorists. Either way, it is unacceptable.
The Port Authority Police attend New Jersey Transit Police
training tools and tactics training, which is a step in the
right direction. However, the Port Authority needs to expand
this training to more officers or similar training with other
departments to ensure a seamless, multi-agency response.
Further, when we train in multi-agency drills, the Port
Authority staffs these drills at significantly higher levels
than we staff on a daily basis, making the drills less
realistic. Thus, multi-agency drills should be conducted with
the regular number of officers assigned during the shift for
the time of the drill.
With regards to interagency communication, the PBA, along
with Jersey City Office of Emergency Management, has made
numerous requests to the Port Authority to install a Mutualink
radio system, which allows multi-agency communications during
emergencies. While the system has been installed at the PATH
police desk, our officers are not trained how to use this
capability.
Training on this system should be made available to
officers immediately so that in the event of a multi-agency
response, our officers are able to relay information to mutual
aid forces in order for a seamless and unified response. The
Mutualink is a good communication system that needs to be
placed at all Port Authority facilities, and we need to be
trained in how to use it.
Those seeking to disrupt travel and inflict harm are
constantly working to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in
our system. So we must remain vigilant and aggressive in our
posture. Our officers also patrol the World Trade Center, where
we witnessed the worst terrorist attack in American history,
and I know that men and women who patrol and secure this area
never want to let another tragedy like this happen on our
watch.
In this regard, the most important actions that can be
taken to help secure PATH are to increase officer training and
resources and to continue to enhance interagency coordination
among the various first responder entities within our region.
I would request that Members of this committee join me on a
visit to the PATH facilities and other important Port Authority
infrastructure to inspect these issues first-hand and see what
needs to be done immediately to address these concerns and
properly protect the public.
Thank you again for inviting me to appear before your
subcommittee, and I look forward to answering any questions you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mollahan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Mollahan
June 21, 2016
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for convening this important hearing and giving
me the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Mike Mollahan and I am legislative director and a
trustee of the Port Authority Police Benevolent Association (PBA). Our
police officers patrol some of the most terrorist-targeted
infrastructure and landmarks in the world, including the 6 bridges and
tunnels between New Jersey and New York; the world's busiest airport
system of JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark airports; marine terminals and
ports including Port Newark/Elizabeth and Brooklyn Piers; the largest
and busiest bus terminal in the Nation, the Port Authority Bus Terminal
in Manhattan; the sacred ground of the World Trade Center; and most
relevant to this hearing, the PATH trains.
The PATH heavy rail rapid transit system serves as the primary
transit link between Manhattan and neighboring New Jersey urban
communities and suburban commuter railroads. PATH carries approximately
244,000 passengers each weekday and is growing; In 2015, PATH carried
approximately 76.6 million passengers. I have worked the PATH system
for the last 12 years and during this time, passenger loads have
increased, trains have become more crowded and threat incidents have
risen.
For today's hearing, I would like to highlight two areas that are
important to fortifying the security of PATH trains: Training and
resources for police officers and coordination with other agencies.
training and resources
Over the past 3 years, biannual training, which involves active-
shooter and tactical weapons training, pistol re-qualification, legal
updates, and a host of other important refresher training, has gone
down from 5 days of training to 2 days of training which directly
impacts officer readiness.
In particular, active-shooter and tactical weapons training
previously entailed a full day of training but has been cut to only a
few hours. Tactical training involves using specialized weapons and
equipment to breach doors and ``tac house'' structures that are built
to simulate rooms within buildings or train cars and mimic active-
shooter and mass-shooting situations. This type of training is more
important than ever in the aftermath of assault weapons attacks in
Newtown, CT and Aurora, CO, as well as the recent shootings in Orlando,
FL, and San Bernadino, CA, which have now become all too frequent.
To this end, ``heavy weapons'' and ``heavy weapons trained''
officers need to be increased throughout the Port Authority facilities,
along with the number of vehicles that can properly secure these
weapons.
Furthermore, the support services provided to our patrol units,
including the Emergency Service Unit (ESU) and K-9 Unit, have been
diminished. The ESU provides SWAT, sniper, and specialized response
capabilities to issues that arise at all Port Authority facilities. ESU
staffing levels have been cut for budget savings and current ESU
officers need better refresher training. The Port Authority K-9 unit,
which covers PATH, the Bus Terminal and the World Trade Center, has
also suffered.
Lastly, while the camera systems at PATH have been updated, they
lack enhancement capability, which can make identifying and
apprehending suspects difficult. The cameras at the Port Authority
bridges, tunnels, and Bus Terminal are also outdated when compared to
readily-available and common technology on the market. With today's
technological advancements, the Port Authority Police should have been
able to have a photo of the suspect within minutes to be able to
broadcast it to all PAPD, NYPD, and MTA PD in proximity to the bus
terminal. It is worth nothing that the Port Authority has installed
state-of-the-art cameras on the JFK Air Train and should deploy this
camera technology to the rest of its facilities. We are still unsure if
these incidents were pranks or tests of vulnerability by terrorists.
Either way this is unacceptable.
interagency coordination
The Port Authority Police attend New Jersey Transit Police Transit
Tools and Tactics Training which is a step in the right direction.
However, the Port Authority needs to expand this training to more
officers, or similar training with other departments, to ensure a
seamless multiagency response to incidents. Further, when we train in
multiagency drills, the Port Authority staffs the drills at
significantly higher levels than we staff on a daily basis, making the
drills less realistic. Thus, multiagency drills should be conducted
with the regular number of officers assigned during the shift time for
the drill.
With regards to interagency communication, the PBA, along with the
Jersey City Office of Emergency Management, has made numerous requests
to the Port Authority to install a Mutualink Radio System which allows
multiagency communications during emergencies. While the system has
been installed at the PATH Police Desk, our officers are not trained on
how to use this capability. Training on this system should be made
available to officers immediately so that in the event of a multi-
agency response, our officers are able to relay information to mutual
aid forces in order for a seamless and unified response. Mutualink is a
good communication system that needs to be placed at all Port Authority
facilities and we need to be trained in how to use it.
Those seeking to disrupt travel and inflict harm are constantly
working to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in our system, so we
must remain vigilant and aggressive in our posture. Our officers also
patrol the World Trade Center where we witnessed the worst terrorist
attack in American history, and I know that the men and women who
patrol and secure this area never want to let another tragedy like this
happen on our watch. In this regard, the most important actions that
can be taken to help secure PATH are to increase officer training and
resources and to continue and enhance interagency coordination among
the various first responder entities within our region.
I would request that Members of this committee join me on a visit
to the PATH facilities, and other important Port Authority
infrastructure, to inspect these issues first-hand and see what needs
to be done immediately to address these concerns and properly protect
the public.
Thank you again for inviting me to appear before your subcommittee
and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you for your testimony, Officer.
Not that we need a reminder of the dangerous times we are
living in, but as we were all sitting here, two men and a woman
carrying multiple loaded weapons have just been arrested at the
New Jersey entrance to the Holland Tunnel.
So the men and women who work for you are out there
protecting us as we are sitting here right now. We don't have
any further detail on it, but thank you for that.
I would like to, before I ask my questions--and I wanted to
note that our colleague Congresswoman Watson Coleman had
another engagement, but she didn't want to leave before your
testimony was over. It was that important to her.
Before I ask my questions, I just want to comment, first of
all, our committee is known as the Committee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications, and so many times,
the communication part of that gets lost. Many of you spoke
about how important the communication is.
Captain, you did. Mr. Sposa, you did about how important in
your efforts in communicating now compared to where they were
back in 1993, 1998 are so much more better. So I was certainly
glad to hear that.
Also I was very glad to hear that many of your successes
you share with other agencies. So we are learning from best
practices of our colleagues. So that was refreshing, too.
I had two quick questions, and then I am going to yield to
my friend from New Jersey. One is what can Congress do to help
you and the members of your various services to do your job
better? The second thing I want to know is, are you getting
sufficient information and readily getting the information
about threats to our rail system?
So let me open that up to the panel. No. 1, what can we do
to help you, and No. 2, are you getting the information that
you need to do your job?
Mr. Kierce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Two things. I think, you know, the UASI grant program, I
know how hard you have fought to keep the dollars coming at the
current funding levels. I think one thing that would benefit us
all is a little more flexibility as far as the use of those
dollars for backfill when it comes to training.
As Captain Gorman had alluded to, many of the specialized
training events out there necessitate replacing of on-line
firefighters and on-line police officers to attend these
events. Unfortunately, on the budget restrictions today, that
has greatly been diminished.
I think many times we have seen that there have been a
significant amount of UASI dollars remaining at the end of the
funding cycle, which many times folks like yourself question,
well, if the money isn't being spent, why do we, you know, keep
throwing money into the system?
I think if there was more flexibility as far as allowing
agencies to utilize some of that funds specific for backfill,
that would greatly enhance the training capabilities of all the
first responders in the area.
As far as the information sharing, I have to say there has
been great improvements. In Jersey City's case, we have
representatives assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force. I
coordinate any terrorist events impacting Jersey City, and I
have to say over the last couple of years, the flow from the
Federal level down to the local level has greatly increased.
Mr. Sposa. Chairman, I would echo a lot of the comments of
Director Kierce. The flexibility assigned to the grant dollars
that come down would certainly assist in procuring the needed
things and getting the backfill that is just so important. When
it comes to----
Mr. Donovan. May I ask, is like the directive that comes
down with the grant money is so stringent that you are only
permitted to use it for certain purposes, and if that was
expanded and made more flexible, we would get better use out of
our dollars?
Mr. Sposa. I think we would, Chairman. Not only if it was
more flexible, but to allow for the backfill as well, it would
help. One of the other things that----
Mr. Donovan. That is not permitted now?
Mr. Sposa. Correct.
Mr. Donovan. OK.
Mr. Sposa. One of the other things that would assist us
greatly would be breaking down a few of the silos. You know,
the partners here in Jersey City, we don't have silos. We are
all a forward-thinking agency, even though we are multiple
agencies.
But certainly amongst even the different grant streams
within UASI, I think there are still silos that exist, whether
it is firefighters talking to hospitals or hospitals talking to
public health and different things. So I think a few of those
silos, breaking them down would be a great help in the region.
As far as communication with our transit partners, I will
speak for myself and my agency. We work closely with our
partners at Port Authority, closely with our partners at New
Jersey Transit, certainly through the Jersey City Office of
Management, we have representation with the Joint Terrorism
Task Force as well with our Federal partners.
So getting the information that we need is not--is not a
problem right now. Getting it down to the troops could probably
be done in a more efficient fashion.
Mr. Donovan. That is not a problem of classification
because we have heard from other witnesses at other hearings
that if you don't have somebody who has clearances, it is hard
to pass that down. We have to scrub down that information so
that people with proper clearances can receive that
information. That is not what you are talking about?
Mr. Sposa. I think that does play into a little bit.
Speaking for myself, I have clearances. So I can get
information that I don't necessarily know what I can release,
where I sort of err on the side of caution of not releasing
Classified information versus getting the information to the
masses. So I will ``dumb it down'' or smooth it out and get out
a general awareness about a problem rather than say the problem
is here.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Mr. Gorman. Sir, the only thing I would--two things I would
like to add to my colleagues would be the current grant system
does not allow for a brick-and-mortar kind of allocation. So
using grant money, we cannot build a new facility, and we
believe that that should be reconsidered.
To have a state-of-the-art--Lieutenant Glenn, my
department, the EMS department, Jersey City Fire Department has
a double-wide trailer for our training facility. I don't want
to say it is an embarrassment because good work comes out of
that, but we can do better. We go to any place in the State of
New Jersey and around the country, and they have state-of-the-
art amphitheaters, extrication equipment, trench rescue
equipment.
In Task Force One on Lakehurst, we have what is called the
``rubble pile'' that was built, and that is an incredible
facility, if you have ever been there. But in Jersey City or in
something that we can share with Essex County, we should look
to allocate that money to a brick-and-mortar facility.
Mr. Donovan. Good recommendation. Thank you. Lieutenant,
yes?
Mr. Glenn. Sir, we have had a lot of success being able to
assign personnel out to the Department of Justice, the
Department of Homeland Security, Emergency Management. To be
able to speak to them on a peer-to-peer basis enhances
information sharing, and that has only come about within the
past few years, I am happy to say.
So, but there is a limitation to that, that, of course,
when you lose personnel to another area, you have to backfill
those people, which takes time and money.
Mr. Donovan. Officer.
Mr. Mollahan. I think speaking about grants is a little
outside my scope, but the one thing I have noticed is that
everything always comes down to budget when it comes to
training. Even if the money is there to budget for the
training, like my colleagues have said, backfilling those
people is the reservations that the agency always seems to
have.
Mr. Donovan. I mean, you were saying before like if the
training could be free, but it is costing you manpower, it is
costing you resources----
Mr. Mollahan. Because you pulled them for the training.
Mr. Donovan. Right. To pull them for the training. Grant
money, as far as any of you know, is not permitted to use for
that?
Mr. Kierce. It is specific to a program, Mr. Chairman. For
instance, if it is an initiative that is coming out through the
Department of Homeland Security, sometimes they will permit it.
But the day-to-day training that is required, as Lieutenant
Glenn and Rick and Captain Gorman had alluded to, it is not
available.
For instance, we have one officer in particular was--paid
for his own way to go to bomb school, and you know, we since
were able to compensate that and get it done. But I think you
can have all the equipment in the world, but unless you have
qualified people to operate that equipment and sustain that
equipment, it is for naught.
Mr. Donovan. I yield whatever time I don't have remaining
to my colleague, Representative Payne.
Mr. Payne. I thank the Chairman.
I will ask each of you this question. You know, as I
stated, mentioned in my opening statement, the attacks in
Brussels earlier this year really had an impact on me and
reminded me, reminded all of us--me and all of us the
vulnerabilities inherent in our surface systems.
Can you talk about how you had to adjust your operations
and the communication in the days following those attacks?
Mr. Kierce. Well, Congressman, in Jersey City, and this
would come out of Lieutenant Glenn's house, we would do an
uptick of high uniform presence, particularly members of the
Emergency Services Unit. There again, it goes back. We still
have a huge city to police. Our day-time population is over
500,000 people.
So there, again, you know, when you have these type of
events, you really haven't got time to look at the budget and
deal with it, you know, the effects of the additional manpower.
You just have to do it.
I think the public, the perception of the public requires
it. They have to have a feeling of safety and security, and it
is incumbent upon us to be able to deliver that service.
Mr. Sposa. Congressman, I would speak actually prior to the
Brussels attacks. The attacks in Boston, the bombings in Boston
is where we really saw an uptick and a change in our response
modalities on a day-to-day basis. Since then, I have deployed
nerve agent antidote kits on the bodies of our EMTs and
paramedics here in Jersey City 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Since the more recent attacks, we have deployed body armor
to our emergency medical personnel and issue it to them on a
daily basis. We are in the process right now of deploying
bleeding control kits to face those type attacks and
tourniquets and things like that to stop the bleeding to save
lives in a mass attack or mass shooting or mass bombing event
or transit event.
Our roles are changing. The EMS role in particular is
changing where we were on the sidelines for a while in these
events, and that is just not the case anymore. The public's
perception and, quite frankly, what is needed is for us to be
on the front lines and in that second wave of responders inside
of a potentially dangerous situation.
So we went from being on the sidelines to being in the
front lines, and the equipment needed to do so is much
different. A stethoscope won't protect you inside an active-
shooter event, but a bulletproof vest will. So we are changing
every day. In fact, we are in the process right now of working
with our partners to go to the next level and become part of
that wave.
Mr. Payne. Captain Gorman.
Mr. Gorman. I think you wanted to see the communication.
Our situational awareness comes from many, many things.
Director Kierce and I, we share an office, and we monitor all
the radios. We have become what you would call a news junkie,
and we listen to everything.
Even an inflection in a voice. Now I know Lieutenant Glenn
very well. We grew up together. If I hear stress in his voice
on the radio, I know something is not right, and we respond to
that.
That is the interpersonal relationships that we have, and
then we have phone calls. New Jersey Transit OEM, they call me
all the time with Hudson light rail problems, and we start to
say what do you have on your camera? What if we look at our
camera system?
In fact, New Jersey Transit is in our office as often as
they are in their own, getting video surveillance for crime
follow-ups. So that is what we get. But the cell phones. The
cell phones and the media, that is where we get a lot of our
information.
But I have that in the office. The guys responding don't
have the luxury of having information. They have to go in
harm's way. As Rick said, they are no longer watching. They no
longer have the ability to wait for police and ESU to secure a
scene before we have to go in.
By virtue of our job, we have to go in and investigate. We
have run active-shooter drills in Jersey City, and a lot of the
scenarios have brought down first responding EMS and fire
crews. Once you lose that command-and-control at a local level
on a single unit, it complicates your problem.
I would think that trying to get something as a computer-
aided dispatch out to the guys to get updated information, to
get response, better response information prior to arrival, I
think that would help with our interoperability and our
communications.
Moving forward, how do we respond to this? Even tomorrow,
we are going up to Morris County to deal with a Fire
subcommittee on how to deal with active shooters. Now that also
is going to take a lot of the groundwork that we have learned
in looking for secondary devices when we respond to surface
incidents. So a lot of the different trainings that we have
over the last 20 years is really starting to coalesce.
Then it goes back to the training. We have to release the
people to get the training, but we can't afford to do it. So
there are some changes that need to be made.
Mr. Payne. To your point, I know that you are familiar with
my work around interoperability.
Mr. Gorman. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Payne. The whole question of that communication, and we
continue to try to strive to give you the resources and the
equipment you need in order to do this quickly and safely for
the community and yourselves as well. I have even been
approached in terms of trying to help Hudson County get a
frequency that all of you can use to that end, and I am still
working on it.
So, but most of my work has been around interoperability
question and understand what it means to you in these times of
response. So, Lieutenant Glenn.
Mr. Glenn. Sir, I would just like to add that we have been
very proactive on the police side of the service in deploying
those interoperable radios, using the frequencies given to us
in the spectrum, and we are very privileged to have that
opportunity.
Mr. Mollahan. As far as the Port Authority, specifically
PATH, anytime there is an attack or after the attack, response
is usually pretty strong. We deploy a lot of our SOD units, you
know, ESU, canine, commercial vehicle inspection unit. The
issue is in between attacks, we tend to get very lackadaisical.
So you have mentioned, you know, how we react after an
attack such as Brussels. Our response after the attack is
usually pretty good. It is in between attacks where we are most
vulnerable.
Mr. Payne. You know, since we are on the--it seems like it
has come up a couple of times and, naturally, because of the,
you know, the incident that we had last weekend in Orlando, you
know, guns can be used to breach security at soft targets to
inflict great harm to innocent Americans. So it is critical
that we are able to thwart naturally those kind of events and
respond to them.
I am not sure, but your agencies have been dealing with
scenarios involving active shooters. I believe you have
mentioned you are doing one tomorrow.
Mr. Gorman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Payne. So how much has that grown over the last year or
2 in light of what we have seen in South Carolina and San
Bernardino and the myriad of issues that we----
Mr. Kierce. Well, Congressman, I sit on the UASI executive
board for Newark and Jersey City, which also oversees the seven
contiguous counties, which in our case represent approximately
4.3 million people, almost, if not more than half of the
population of the State of New Jersey. It is a severe target-
rich environment.
For fiscal year 2015, we dedicated specific funding to
training and equipping our various first responders in active-
shooter operations. In Jersey City, we have undertaken a
significant--conducted a significant amount of training both in
the public and private sector.
As Lieutenant Glenn alluded to, we recently conducted an
active-shooter drill here on campus, and to say the least, it
is an eye-opening experience. I think the days--in my
experience, 30 years as a Jersey City police officer, the days
of responding to a call like that and waiting for the
specialized units to arrive is long gone. You know, the mindset
is now is to engage the actor and neutralize him and then, you
know, work on getting the injured and sick and, unfortunately,
killed out of there.
I hope that more money will be coming through the system.
We had recently just purchased all of the IFAK kits for our
police officers. We will be training them, and they will be
issued and carried. We are working with Rick to buy them the
bulletproof vests that they need.
Then after that, we are moving toward our fire service.
What we are looking to do here is to engage all of our first
responders in an active-shooter situation. The years of them
and us is no longer here. It is one operation to combat these
types of events.
Mr. Sposa. Congressman, I would echo Director Kierce's
statements in that it is a partnership unlike any I have ever
seen, and it is a necessary partnership. The recent events just
underline that need.
These events aren't going away, and we need to be prepared
for them, and the way to save lives is to work together to have
the right equipment in the right hands at the right time. We
are doing that in this region.
Mr. Gorman. Yes, I would concur with my colleagues. It is
an eye-opening experience. When I was hired, I didn't suspect I
would be fitted for a bulletproof vest to put fires out, but
this world has changed, and so do we. Our tactics have to
change as well.
We will work on this committee tomorrow, and we will come
up with a solution to keep our members safe in the fire
service, our brothers and sisters in other agencies, and our
citizens. So we will--we have a lot of work to do tomorrow.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Vinny.
Mr. Glenn. Sir, I could say first-hand that not only has
the frequency of our active-shooter drills increased maybe even
three-fold from just 10 years ago, but perhaps even more
importantly, there has been a large increase in the
participants and the partners that we work with at these
drills.
Mr. Mollahan. Our drills shifted a little bit. We used to
do a lot of active-shooter within the department. That has
decreased. We now do more interagency drills. So to say if our
drilling has gone up or gone down, it has probably stayed about
the same. It has just kind-of shifted in how we do it.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Well, I appreciate all the witnesses'
testimony and answers today. We really appreciate it.
Mr. Donovan. Absolutely. I would like to also thank our
witnesses not only for their testimony, but for your service to
our communities particularly because the purpose of this
committee are commuters, and I would also like to thank our
members of the panel for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for each of you, and we ask that you respond to those
in writing. The hearing record will remain open for 10 days.
This subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]