[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-34
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MATT SALMON, Arizona GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TOM EMMER, Minnesota
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Joseph Humire, Author........................................ 9
Mr. Dardo Lopez-Dolz (former Vice Minister of Interior of Peru).. 26
Mr. Scott Modell, senior advisor, The Rapidan Group.............. 36
Mr. Michael Shifter, president, Inter-American Dialogue.......... 44
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Joseph Humire: Prepared statement............................ 11
Mr. Dardo Lopez-Dolz: Prepared statement......................... 28
Mr. Scott Modell: Prepared statement............................. 39
Mr. Michael Shifter: Prepared statement.......................... 46
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 74
Hearing minutes.................................................. 75
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the
State of South Carolina, and chairman, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere: Material submitted for the record.......... 76
IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
(chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere)
presiding.
Mr. Duncan. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will
come to order.
I will start by asking unanimous consent that two written
testimonies be entered into the congressional record--first,
the testimony of Mr. Leonardo Coutinho, a reporter with Veja
Magazine, and second, the testimony of Mr. William Ross Newland
III, managing director of The Delion Group, a former station
chief in Havana and Buenos Aires. With no objection, so
ordered.
Given this is a joint subcommittee hearing, opening
statements will be limited to the subcommittee chairs and the
ranking members. All other members may submit statements for
the record within 5 business days and I would now like to
recognize myself for an opening statement.
Before I do so, the ranking member is on his way so
hopefully he will be here by the time I conclude my opening
remarks.
At a time when world powers are negotiating with Iran over
its illicit nuclear weapons program to reach a deal by the
March 31st deadline, Iran has not shown a commitment to good
faith negotiations to peace.
For years, Iran has tested the patience of the world with
its defiance of international sanctions and its support for
terrorism. Nowhere is this more concerning for U.S. national
security interests than in our own neighborhood, the Western
Hemisphere.
Today, I want to consider implications for the U.S. and
countries in this region if we continue to ignore Iran and
Hezbollah's activities here in our hemisphere.
Given the significance of the P5+1 negotiations with Iran
and potential effects resulting from a deal or lack thereof, it
is critical that Iran not have an opportunity to exploit
vulnerabilities in our region to cause harm.
Congress has focused extensively on this issue with several
hearings, visits to the region, and legislation which I
authored, entitled the Countering Iran in the Western
Hemisphere Act, which became public law in 2012.
I want to pause and thank Representative Higgins and
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for their assistance in getting that
passed into law. Nevertheless, I am deeply concerned that in
their hope for a nuclear deal with Iran, the Obama
administration and governments in the region are not paying
enough attention to this issue.
In September 2014, the GAO released a report that found
that U.S. State Department had only fully addressed two of the
12 elements required by that public law--Countering the Iranian
Threat in the Western Hemisphere.
As of today, the State Department has not fixed these gaps
or conducted a reassessment of the Iranian threat in the
Western Hemisphere. I believe this negligence is misguided and
dangerous.
Iran and Hezbollah have already demonstrated a willingness
to conduct terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere.
Consider the recent foiled plot by a Hezbollah operative in
Peru in October 2014 and the attempted attack linked to an
Iranian diplomat in Uruguay last month. Or recall the 2011
attempted assignation of the Saudi Ambassador to the United
States in Washington DC and the foiled Iranian plot in 2007 to
blow up the John F. Kennedy Airport in Queens, New York.
These events follow Iran's 1992 attack on the Israeli
Embassy, 23 years ago yesterday, and the 1994 bombing of the
Argentine Israelite Mutual Association, AMIA, in Buenos Aires.
Yet, today in Argentina no one has been brought to justice for
these attacks, even though Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman
determined in 2006 that Iran was responsible--in contrast, the
U.S. State Department's findings in its 2013 report to Congress
that Iran's influence in the region was waning.
Nisman published a report about the same time that provided
evidence of Iran's subversive infiltration of multiple
countries in the Caribbean and in Latin America. Unfortunately,
much of Mr. Nisman's report went unheeded by the U.S. and the
countries named in the report.
Then 2 months ago, Nisman indicted the President of
Argentina, alleging that the Governments of Argentina and Iran
had engaged in a cover-up regarding Iranian officials linked to
the 1994 AMIA terrorist attack in exchange for oil and weapons.
On January 18, Mr. Nisman was mysteriously found dead in
his apartment with a bullet wound to the back of his head right
behind the ear, presumed to be murdered.
This past Friday, Brazilian Veja magazine published another
stunning report. The report found that representatives of the
Argentine Government received large amounts of cash from Iran
in exchange for the AMIA attack to be covered up.
Reportedly, Venezuela even facilitated the transfer of
money directly from Tehran to the tune of about $800,000,
according to the report, to Argentine President Cristina
Kirchner's election campaign.
Significantly, the report alleged that Iran gave this money
in order to obtain nuclear technology and knowledge of
Argentina's nuclear program. I recommend that article for other
members of the committee.
These are very serious findings that demand further
scrutiny by the U.S. and governments within the region.
Although these events seem to be compelling evidence that Iran
and Hezbollah are up to no good in the Western Hemisphere, some
believe that Iran doesn't prioritize Latin America as highly
under President Rouhani as was the case under previous
Presidents, for Rouhani has yet to visit the region.
However, Iran's diplomacy should not be the only indicator
of Iran's activity in the region. According to Mr. Newland's
written testimony that was submitted for the record, the
Iranian logistical and intelligence infrastructure is in place
in Latin America even if their political and economic relations
within the region have waned.
Newland also states that the two most important centers of
the Iranian influence are Cuba and Venezuela, while the Tri-
Border region contains a community with many individuals
providing financial support to Hezbollah.
Similarly, Mr. Coutinho, the same individual who broke the
Veja story this past weekend, submitted written testimony that
was included in the record. His statement outlines Iranian
activity in Brazil and explains that the country plays the role
of a safe haven for Islamic extremist groups.
Coutinho further elaborates that Brazil served as a
planning and operations hub for the Iranian 1992 and 1994
attacks in Argentina and continues to exist today as an
operational base, a weapons cache, a source of revenue for
generation for the financing of terrorist operations and
organizations, most notably Hezbollah.
Coutinho's testimony quotes from numerous Brazilian law
enforcement sources that Hezbollah and Hamas supporters have
been detected in Brazil and that Hezbollah has sold weapons to
Brazilian criminal organizations.
In view of this information, I find it incredible that,
according to Coutinho, Brazil recognizes Hezbollah as a
legitimate political party rather than a foreign terrorist
organization, and Brazil's Parliament has not passed anti-
terrorism legislation which could improve coordination on these
issues.
Yet, Brazil is not alone. The recent situations in Peru,
Uruguay, Argentina and bombing Iran shows clear areas of
vulnerability in the region. Additionally, the Central America
four-border control agreement originally signed in 2006 permits
the free movement of citizens from El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua without any restrictions, similar to
the Schengen agreement in Europe.
This measure, while beneficially portrayed, offers
opportunities for exploitation by drug traffickers, terrorists,
or even foreign fighters. Similarly, the Caribbean is also a
growing place for trans shipments of drugs and other contraband
that Iran and Hezbollah could exploit.
So, in conclusion, Iran and Hezbollah are present in the
Western Hemisphere. Last week, the U.S. Southern Commander,
General John Kelly, testified to the presence of these actors
in the region and also stated the U.S. challenge is our limited
intelligence capabilities.
In view of the fact that Iran is the world's largest state
sponsor of terrorism, it is pursuing nuclear weapons, and
recent events show that Iran has capacity to conduct terrorist
attacks in the Western Hemisphere, I believe the U.S. and other
governments in the region must do more to address this issue.
So with that, I will turn to the ranking member, who just
joined us, for his opening statement.
Albio, welcome to the committee and you are recognized for
as long as it takes.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Chairman, and let me apologize to you
for not being here on time. I had another hearing. I apologize
to you for not being here on time.
Look, I will be very short. I certainly agree with the
chairman's assessment. You know, we have to be on the lookout
on the Iranian influence in the Western Hemisphere. It seems to
me that we are preoccupied with all the events in the world and
yet when it comes to--close to our what we call our back yard
it seems like we don't pay as much attention as we should.
I am concerned about the influence in Venezuela. I am
concerned about the influence and what is going on in
Argentina. We were--last 2 years ago with Chairman Salmon we
were in Argentina and we raised the issue and, basically, they
had no answers for us.
The issue whether we are going to Iran to question some of
the generals, I mean, that never panned out. So it is all a
sham what is going on, and now you have an issue where they
just killed a prosecutor.
So I am very concerned about the issue of the Iranian
influence in the Western Hemisphere. And with that, I will just
turn it over back to the chairman.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman.
I too was in Argentina in 2012 with Chairman Michael
McCaul, the Homeland Security chairman currently. He was
chairman of OME Subcommittee and a lot of the things that the
ranking member mentioned about the dialogue with Argentina were
completely similar.
They just didn't have an answer or tried to sort of
downplay that. So with that, I will recognize a former chairman
of the committee, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Chairman Duncan,
Ranking Member Sires, Ranking Member Deutch. It is a pleasure
to work with all of you and to hold this subcommittee jointly.
I thank all of you for your leadership.
Two years ago, these two subcommittees held a similar joint
hearing to discuss the State Department's reports on Iran's
influence in Latin America that you spearheaded, Mr. Chairman.
Our assessment then, that the report was woefully
inadequate, that State did not follow the law as required, that
our Federal agencies lack a coherent and detailed strategy to
combat Iran in the hemisphere, was confirmed by a GAO report
published last year.
It is simply unacceptable for our administration to ignore
the threats in the region simply because the President wishes
to forge a foreign policy legacy, whether it be with Cuba or
Iran.
State should immediately provide our subcommittees with the
missing information on Iran's activities in the Western
Hemisphere and explain why the information was not included in
the first place.
Despite State's intransigence, its partners at SOUTHCOM
disagreed with its assessment and have been forthcoming, as you
pointed out, Mr. Chairman, about the nature and the risk of the
Iranian threat.
SOUTHCOM has repeatedly stated that its very own limited
intelligence capabilities in the region combined with the lack
of partner capacity has prevented our full awareness of Iran
and Hezbollah's activities and that is where our problem lies.
The Obama administration has failed to allocate the
necessary resources to truly assess the threat of Iran and
Hezbollah not just in our hemisphere but throughout the world.
The intelligence community does not have the resources nor
the political support to properly address the threat because so
much attention is being paid elsewhere. And as General Kelly
stated, Mr. Chairman, and you pointed it out, it isn't just
Iran that is threatening our region. It is ISIL and other
terrorist groups. But we have not given this threat its due
attention.
We are currently not able to track national security
threats in the region including potential instability, the
influence of Iran and other actors like Russia and China, and
the collaboration between criminal and terrorist networks.
The administration continually underestimates the threat in
the region that pose a grave risk to our own national security
as well as that of our partners.
What we do know is that Iran and its proxy Hezbollah want
to circumvent sanctions to counter U.S. influence and to make
use of growing networks of transnational organized crime in
order to finance its own terror activities.
Iran has opened up more than 80 cultural centers in Latin
America in order to export its toxic brand of political
influence and serve its interest, focusing on partnering with
nations well known for their anti-American rhetoric including
Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.
The Treasury Department has sanctioned multiple Venezuelan
banks and Venezuelan regime operatives including the former
Minister of Interior and Justice. The State Department has
designated Venezuela's state-owned oil company, PDVSA, and
CAVIM, the Venezuelan weapons company, for their role in
helping Iran circumvent sanctions.
Yet, the Obama administration continues to buy oil from the
same entity that it sanctioned in 2011 for shipping two cargoes
of gasoline to Iran. And we are seeing terrorist groups forge
connections to drug cartels in the region, forging a deepening
narcoterror connection that is funding so many of the terror
groups and their activities.
Drug trafficking funds terrorism. It is that simple. So our
comprehensive strategy must also address this fundamental cause
of the problem.
Recent reports of the connections between Hezbollah and the
FARC, the murder of the special prosecutor of Argentina,
Alberto Nisman, and the alleged conspiracy between the
Argentine Government, Venezuela and Iran to cover up
Hezbollah's activities and involvement in the AMIA bombing do
nothing to quell doubts about Iran's activities in Latin
America.
Alberto Nisman was a courageous and strong leader who was
dedicated to pursuing the truth behind the AMIA terrorist
attacks wherever they may have led. His murder must be
investigated in a comprehensive and transparent manner to
search for the truth and his work on AMIA must continue
forward.
The AMIA attack wasn't the first time we saw Iran's deadly
activities in Argentina. Yesterday was the 23rd anniversary of
the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires which killed
29 and injured hundreds more.
I stand in solidarity with the people of Argentina in
mourning this horrific attack, the AMIA bombing, and the tragic
loss of Alberto. We must ensure that Nisman's memory and his
life work carry on.
So the question is why is this administration so intent on
downplaying the Iranian threat? It now appears that the
administration has even scrubbed its most recent worldwide
threat assessment report of all Iranian connections to
terrorism or Hezbollah in order to make it easier to eventually
lift sanctions on Iran.
The parallels between the administration's misguided Iran
policy and its Cuba policy are clear. The President has been
using Cuba as a test case for normalizing relations with Iran.
So it should come as no surprise that the Iranian threat in
our own hemisphere is also downplayed by the administration. It
is time for the President to stop trying to burnish his foreign
policy legacy and stop putting politics ahead of national
security.
The White House must let the truth about Iranian
involvement in the Western Hemisphere be exposed, put the
necessary intelligence capabilities in place to monitor Iran
and its activities, and develop a serious strategy to counter
what can only be called a threat.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentlelady for her leadership and
the chairman of the Middle East and North Africa.
I now turn to the ranking member of that Subcommittee on
the Middle East and North Africa, Mr. Deutch from Florida, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires
and Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for holding this hearing.
As the international spotlight is focused on Iran's illicit
nuclear weapons program we can't be distracted from Iran's
other dangerous and subversive acts around the world.
This is our subcommittee's second hearing on Iran's efforts
to expand its network of influence into the Western Hemisphere
since Congress passed the Countering Iran in the Western
Hemisphere Act championed by Chairman Duncan and Congressman
Higgins in 2012.
That legislation made clear that Congress would not turn a
blind eye to Iran's work in the hemisphere done both in a
public way and in any clandestine way and that there must be a
viable strategy to counter the manipulative tactics and
deplorable goals of the regime.
We knew then that the Iranian regime has and will resort to
almost any illicit activity that furthers its ambitions of
being a global force against the United States and our allies.
Iran's fingerprints have been found in numerous instances
of illegal arms shipments from West Africa to Yemen and its
notorious network of terror proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, and other groups.
Since a growing and more unified international coalition
began exerting crippling political and economic pressure on
Iran, it started seeking out countries that were inclined to
align with it against the United States and would be willing to
help it evade international sanctions and that were in need of
economic support and trade deals.
In Latin America, Iran found several partners that were
open to collaborating with a pariah state and were willing to
accept the risks of violating international sanctions to do so.
Alberto Nisman witnessed this. The Argentine investigator
knew that Iran and its proxies were active in Argentina. He
knew that Iran was behind the bombing of the Buenos Aires
Jewish Community Center and how Iran used its proxy Hezbollah
to carry it out.
Clearly, Iran wasn't and still isn't afraid of committing
brazen and public attacks on Jews around the world, and aside
from small and ineffective punitive measures Iran has yet to be
deterred from financing terrorist groups and encouraging
attacks on innocent civilians.
But Nisman also knew that Iran's presence wasn't restricted
to Hezbollah's cells around the region. Rather, traces of
Iranian influence could be found in high levels of leadership
in the region.
According to recent press reports, there is evidence of
considerable collaboration between Hugo Chavez, former
President Ahmadinejad, and Argentina's current President,
Cristina Kirchner, with guarantees of energy deals, cash
transfers, and assistance in clearing Iran's name from its
involvement in the AMIA bombing.
Tragically, Nisman's voice was silenced when he was found
shot in his home in January. We must honor him by continuing to
push for justice not only for his work but for his death.
Some have wondered if events of late might have changed the
calculation of Iran and its friends in the Western Hemisphere.
With Chavez's death in March 2013, Latin America lost its most
outspoken critic of the United States and leader of the anti-
American alliance with Iran.
A few months later, President Ahmadinejad left office and
was replaced by President Rouhani. So within the course of a
few months, Iran in Western Hemisphere countries lost two of
its most vocal leaders who enjoyed a close personal
relationship, calling into question the sustainability of the
union without them.
The State Department's country reports on terrorism for
2013 noted that Iran has been unable to expand its economic and
political ties in Latin America and I think there are many who
would question that declaration.
Regardless, we can't afford to shift our attention away and
let Iran's influence grow under the radar. President Rouhani
has made it very clear that he has no intention of letting his
country's ties with the region weaken.
There have been a number of visits and exchanges between
leaders and lawmakers from Latin American countries and Iran in
the past few years. And just as our hopes for a more moderate
Iran have been crushed as we witnessed no drop--no drop in
support for terrorist groups or in the number of human rights
violations against the Iranian people, we should not be
surprised that President Rouhani has not stepped back from the
foundation laid by President Ahmadinejad.
So there remains work for the United States to do to
counter the Iranian influence and stem the infiltration of
terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere.
Last September, the GAO released a report on the
government's efforts to meet the obligations included in the
2012 Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act.
In its assessment there are considerable numbers the
chairman referred to earlier--there are a considerable number
of elements that have yet to be addressed or were not addressed
sufficiently.
We should double down on our commitments to identify and
designate terrorists and Iranian proxies that intend to
destabilize the region and harm innocent civilians.
We have to ensure that Iran cannot use other countries to
circumvent sanctions and that other countries recognize the
real risk of violating U.S. and international sanctions.
And we must work with our allies in the region to bolster
counter terrorism capabilities and prevent Iranian proxies from
targeting and terrorizing communities and Jewish populations.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
what they view as the most immediate and significant concerns
posed by Iran in the hemisphere, where the United States and
the international community can take action to counter and
deter this influence, and we are grateful for your presence
here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman for his comments. I think
you are spot on. Before I recognize you to provide testimony,
let me explain the lighting system before you.
Each of you have 5 minutes to present your oral statement.
That light will be green until you are getting close to the
end. With 1 minute left it will go to yellow. So when you see
the yellow, again, wrapping up. So if you see it turn yellow
wrap up your statement and anyway so I will give a little
leeway if you are--if you are making a point.
But when we get to the end we will wrap it up, and that
goes for the members as well. With a large--four panelists and
a lot of questions we will try to stay on the 5-minute time
frame.
So the first--the biographies are in your notebook. I am
not going to do the biographies. We are going to recognize in
essence of time.
Mr. Humire, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH HUMIRE, AUTHOR
Mr. Humire. Thank you. Chairman Duncan, Chairwoman Ros-
Lehtinen, Ranking Members Sires and Deutch, distinguished
members of both subcommittees, good morning. It is a privilege
to appear before you today.
The death of Dr. Alberto Nisman on January 18th shocked us
all. I remember receiving the news on a late Sunday afternoon
in quite disbelief, hoping that these were just Internet
rumors. Unfortunately, several hours later his death was
confirmed.
Aside from the shock, at the time my initial reaction was
that Iran was involved. Of course, this is not proven and most
likely we will never know all the circumstances surrounding his
mysterious death.
But as time goes by and more evidence is revealed, what we
do know is more about the extent to which Iran has infiltrated
Argentina.
Just last week--Chairman Duncan, you referred to this--the
highly respected Brazilian weekly Veja reported that the
Argentine President, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, had
received Iranian financial support for her Presidential
campaign all the way back in 2007.
This means that that highly controversial memorandum of
understanding between Iran and Argentina signed in 2013 was a
campaign promise made by Argentine President 6 years earlier.
Moreover, through the wiretaps related to Dr. Nisman's most
recent investigation, we are realizing that the mastermind of
the AMIA attack--Iranian intelligence operative Mohsen Rabbani,
who the Brazilians call the terrorist professor--is still
active in Argentina, sending money, making orders, and
interfering in Argentine diplomatic affairs.
But the most interesting revelation from the Veja piece is
not who Iran has bought in Latin America but why. According to
the Venezuelan military defector who was the source for this
report, whitewashing Iran's accused from the AMIA attack was
only a secondary objective for Iran's controversial outreach to
Argentina.
The primary objective was to gain access to Argentina's
nuclear technology and her materials, a goal the Islamic
Republic has had for over 20 years--the same goal that,
according to Dr. Nisman, is partially the reason why Argentina
was targeted in the first place back in the early 1990s.
In this Veja piece, there is a recount of private meeting
between former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the
late Hugo Chavez in which Ahmadinejad told Chavez, and I quote,
``This is a matter of life or death. I need you''--referring to
Chavez--``to be an intermediary with Argentina to get help for
my country's nuclear program. We need Argentina to share its
nuclear technology with us. It will be impossible to advance
our program without Argentina's cooperation.''
Impossible is a strong word. This suggests that Iran needs
Latin America to complete its highly ambitious nuclear program.
If this is the case, then I believe we have all underestimated
Latin America's importance to the Islamic Republic and by
extension can no longer afford to divorce the ongoing nuclear
negotiations with the P5+1 and Iran's activities in the region.
And as these negotiations come to a critical juncture, it
is more important than ever to understand to what degree does
Latin America benefit Iran. Venezuela, Argentina is just the
tip of the iceberg.
In my written testimony, I describe a conceptual model for
how Iran has infiltrated and gained an inordinate amount of
influence in just about every country in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Of course, there is varying levels of success. In some
countries, namely the Bolivarian Alliance Nations, Iran has
embedded themselves completely into the highest levels of those
governments. In other countries, they are still operating at a
covert level, perhaps through their proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah.
But in all cases, it is safe to say that Iran has a
footprint in every country throughout the region. In my book, I
call this--I call this pattern of infiltration the pattern of
penetration which is why we called the book ``Iran's Strategic
Penetration of Latin America,'' which is co-authored with
several prominent Latin American scholars, officials, military
officers, and policymakers, all who themselves describe how
Iran and Hezbollah is operating in their respective countries.
We uses the term ``strategic penetration'' in the title on
purpose because the word strategic implies that Iran has a
plan. The word ``penetration'' means that they are executing
this plan through covert methods.
So as we examine the issue in today's hearing, I ask that
you keep in mind that there is a degree of difference between
what Iran and Latin American allies say they are doing and what
they are actually doing behind the scenes, because it is the
work behinds the scenes, their covert work, that is driving
their influence in the region--an influence that extends to the
United States through Latin American politicians.
And to pay special attention to the Organization of
American States. The Argentine Ambassador, Nilda Garre, is
proven to have a close relationship to Venezuela as becoming
the former Argentine Ambassador to Venezuela and also a close
relationship to Iran by being the former Minister of Defense of
Argentina.
Also today there is a vote on the Organization of American
States for a new general secretary. The most likely candidate,
Luis Almagro, also had a close relationship to Iran, being an
Ambassador to that country many years ago.
For a long time, Iran and Hezbollah's presence in Latin
America was viewed as a defensive posture in case of conflict
with Israel or the West erupts in the Middle East.
But as the Iranian nuclear negotiations heat up, the
question we must all ask and answer is at what point does a
good offense become your best defense.
And with that, I yield my time. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Humire follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman for his testimony. There
will be an opportunity for us to delve more into that during
the question and answer time.
So I will recognize Mr. Lopez-Dolz.
STATEMENT OF MR. DARDO LOPEZ-DOLZ (FORMER VICE MINISTER OF
INTERIOR OF PERU)
Mr. Lopez-Dolz. Thank you. Ranking Member, Chairman and
members of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, I very
much appreciate the invitation sent by Committee Chairman Royce
permitting me the opportunity to appear before you today.
My testimony began with the case of Muhamad Amadar, a
presumed Lebanese terrorist and confessed Hezbollah member, who
was arrested by the Peruvian National Police in October 2014
for possession of explosives that have distant similarities
with explosives usually employed by Hezbollah. The intended
target of these explosives was not identified. Photos were
found on his iPad by the Peruvian-North American Cultural
Institute and the Lima International Airport.
But since clear is that Amadar is not--is an explosives
manufacturer but not an operator. He was not going to be the
engineer who would carry out the attack that was presumably
being prepared.
His network will continue to be around and should be
assumed to be intact. Therefore, its operational regional
capability can continue to build and intensify without
difficulty.
In my testimony, I describe Hezbollah recruitment in Peru.
Since at least the end of the 1990s, Iran had recruited native-
born Latin Americans into training, where they use faith with
military and political indoctrination and a key precept is that
Iran's mission--indeed, its obligation--is ostensibly expressed
as a movement to liberate the oppressors of the world.
This purported goal is one also embraced by the violent
radical movements in South America that almost all have clear
anti-Western and anti-Reagan inspiration.
Hezbollah recruitment activity has been focused in southern
Andes, the poorest region of Peru, an area of rampant and
flagrant trafficking in drugs, weapons, and human trafficking--
without any real possibility of detecting what or who enters or
leaves the area that has many conditions that are a clear
advantage for the expansionist plans of Iran.
The southern border with Bolivia and Chile is highly porous
and permeable in the jungle regions as well as the highland and
mountain ranges. Consider the great interest of Iran in Bolivia
and the apparent closeness of the two governments, the dangers
stemming from their presence in the area expands geometrically.
Another significant concern is that Peruvian national
intelligence source speak of more than 120 military reservists,
meaning former active duty soldiers, who were recruited and
sent to Iran via Quito in Ecuador for political indoctrination
and possible advanced military training.
In terms of risk, the Hezbollah reserves in Bolivia could
be easily used as a support element or an attack element
against entities perceived as U.S. or Israeli interests.
In fact, they are already acting to undermine democratic
institutions and the political capacity of the Peruvian economy
in coordination with their obvious allies, receiving
inspiration from Chavista or Bolivarian movements.
It is important to stress that fundamental characteristics
of Andean culture. It's considered a fertile breeding ground
for totalitarian ideological proposition or fundamentalist
theocratic concepts.
The cultural similarity between the Shi'ite worldwide and
the southern Andean world could, given funding and sufficient
education, generate a rapid expansion of Hezbollah cells.
Finally, there is a dangerous proximity between these
cells, the Governments of Cuba and Venezuela, and Latin
American terrorist organizations that joined to direct the so-
called Fronts for the Defense of the Environment, positions to
which no one has elected them, in titles that they themselves
have appropriated.
Using this cover, they systematically and flagrantly oppose
all major investments and development projects, leaving illegal
mining and illegal narcotics production as the only de facto
industries in these poverty-stricken areas.
I will say it is imperative to reinforce ties with the
Peruvian police force, its legal system, Peruvian intelligence,
and the Peruvian armed forces to combat these new enemies to
democratic stability, freedom, and economic growth, which is in
the common interest of my country and the U.S.
This new focus, if backed by your country, would support
not only security in the U.S. and Peru, but also freedom and
free markets in the Western Hemisphere, all of which are
undermined by narcotics trade and extremists in the region.
Human intelligence networks are also needed in a broad area
and electronic communication to ensure that Hezbollah and their
partners cannot expand their influence and ultimately cannot
threaten the common interest as well as the internal security
of both Peru and the United States.
Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lopez-Dolz follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. I thank you.
Mr. Modell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MODELL, SENIOR ADVISOR, THE RAPIDAN
GROUP
Mr. Modell. Chairman Duncan, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen,
Ranking Member Sires and Deutch, thank you, members of the
committee, fellow panelists. Good morning.
I was planning on spending the first part of my statement
going over what I thought was the Iran Action Network, a
combination of the ministry of intelligence and the IRGC and
all the things that they have done over the years in the
region.
But I think that has been adequately--more than adequately
covered. I would like to spend the little time that I have to
discuss some of the things that I think we should do going
forward as far as solutions as a government looking at this
region, particularly given the inadequacies that have been
pointed out as far as the lack of attention and resources
toward this region.
In my opinion, even if sanctions and diplomacy lead to a
nuclear agreement with Iran, the activities of both Iran and
Hezbollah will continue to post significant challenges to any
long-term relationship or rapprochement with the West.
To address the threats that are likely to live on long
after any deal is reached, in my opinion we should consider the
following recommendations.
First, we need to take more of network approach to
countering Iran. I think it was pointed out here that the State
Department is woefully inadequate in the attention that it
gives toward the Iranian threat in Latin America. There is a
government-wide lack of attention.
I think when you look at the agency or look at DEA and
others who have very specific mission sets, I would argue that
they actually are adequately focused on, whether it is
narcotrafficking or Iran or other hard targets in the region,
but there is not a combined whole of government counter network
approach that I think we really need to start looking at.
In particular, when you are looking at Hezbollah, which I
think is arguably even more dangerous than Iran as a whole
across the region, there is a real need to identify the
external security organization--Hezbollah's armed wing overseas
that has been responsible for all of the terrorism.
All of the failed attempts, all the successful attempts
most of its criminality tend--really, tend to go back to the
ESO, also known as the IJO.
There is broad disagreement within the U.S. Government as
to what that organization does, what it is, who is affiliated
with it. We need to all be on the same page and there needs to
be a networked plan for figuring out how to better go after
that.
Anti-illicit finance measures--Hezbollah activity in
Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil has been linked
directly to several drug related trade-based money laundering
schemes, which I think we are all familiar with. All of these
were--the key point to take away in this is all roads generally
lead back to Lebanon.
One of the things I would recommend is enhancing the role
of Treasury not only in designations but resume the overseas
presence of the Treasury where they can kind of roll up their
sleeves and be involved in financial investigations, building
that Treasury attache for us but as long--but with the idea of
having a more of a systematic approach to financial targeting
and criminal disruption.
Hezbollah's finances within the Lebanese banking system
have been widely exposed. Lebanese-Canadian banking--the
Canadian bank case was a very good example of it. The degree of
vulnerability, I think, is underestimated.
We need to give Treasury more latitude to actually put
pressure on that banking system in order to change Lebanon--
Lebanese Hezbollah's behavior.
Software initiatives--one of the things I mentioned the
Supreme Leader and senior Iranians conservatives in their
government consistently refer to the software from the United
States as being the single biggest threat to the Islamic
Republic.
One of the things that I think we need to do is a much
better job of exposing and trying to neutralize its nonofficial
cover organizations, its religious, cultural and charitable
organizations, and the businesses that effectively blur the
lines between its official and its unofficial activities.
I would also focus on transnational organized crime. Again,
Hezbollah has become a global criminal enterprise. It is a
shadow of its former self. Mughniyah and the others, some of
the key founding members of the ESO, had this in mind 25 years
ago.
It has blossomed into a global commercial network that
leads back to the Jihad Council and the decision-making
apparatus in Lebanon is responsible for the worst attacks and
the kinetic activities that we are all concerned about,
particularly in this hemisphere.
Finally, I think that the U.S. needs to find creative
incentives for working with our liaison partners across the
region, whether it is Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil. I don't think
that our good old fashioned military-to-military or intel-to-
intel relationships are enough.
I think that we need to do better to incentivize our
foreign liaison partners to go after Iran. I served across the
region and what I saw was a willingness to do that, but without
properly incentivizing our partners to actually take the risks
of engaging in higher impact operations against these types of
threats, which are higher priority to us than they are to them,
there is a limit to what we can do down there.
One of the things that I have always focused on and I have
always talked about is the Rewards for Justice program.
Generally, in my experience people do things--corruption is
rampant almost everywhere in Latin America from what we saw.
The Rewards for Justice program could be something that
could be effectively used in a positive way to further
incentivize policemen, intelligence officers, the foreign
governments that are working closely with us against these
threats.
In conclusion, I would just say with or without a nuclear
deal I don't think this regime is going to change. The
conservative establishment that has been there since the
beginning is still in power.
You are starting to see more maneuvering behind the scenes
with regard to the Supreme Leader and his upcoming succession
transition. He has been given 18 to 24 months to live. Cancer--
his prostate cancer has apparently metastasized.
So the assembly of experts, the body responsible for
choosing the next Supreme Leader, has already--he has already
started to make--he has already started to position people in
that body that are going to ensure that the succession goes
toward--leans toward the hardliners.
So a number of things that are being done inside the
apparatus are only going to verify that this externalization of
the Islamic regime is going to go on.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:]
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----------
Mr. Duncan. I appreciate those questions and we can get
into that a little bit more going forward.
I will recognize Mr. Shifter for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SHIFTER, PRESIDENT, INTER-AMERICAN
DIALOGUE
Mr. Shifter. Thank you very much, Chairman Duncan, Chairman
Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Sires. It is a pleasure to be here
this morning and I appreciate the opportunity to share some of
my views about Iran's agenda in the Western Hemisphere.
Let me start by saying that this is an issue that needs to
be taken seriously. No one has any illusions about the nature
of the Iranian regime and its history in flouting international
law, supporting terrorist groups, threatening Israel and
violating U.N. resolutions in its nuclear program.
When it comes to Iran's role and influence in the Western
Hemisphere, we need to keep our eyes wide open and be vigilant.
Some of Iran's allies--some of Iran's ties in the region are of
concern including its relationship with Venezuela, the
allegations in the Nisman case in Argentina, and Brazil's
previous support for Iran's nuclear program.
But in my judgment, these do not amount to very much and,
if anything, since I last appeared before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs over 3 years ago, the situation has
improved.
The good news in the region in this regard is overwhelming.
Iran has little real influence in the region today and what
influence it had has declined in the recent period.
There is no evidence that Latin America has an interest in
aligning itself strategically with Iran. That would be
irrational and counter-productive for a region that over the
last decade has moved forward in many respects.
If we consider Iran's main entry point in Latin America
Venezuela, while the geopolitical alliance between the two
countries remains, the relationship today is weaker than it was
a few years ago when Chavez and Ahmadinejad were in charge.
Many of the development projects announced between Iran and
Venezuela along with Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador have
simply not materialized. Although Brazil is Iran's largest
trading partner in Latin America, the political relationship
has cooled.
To be sure, the Brazilian Government took a stand
supporting Iran's position on the nuclear program in 2008. But
today, 7 years later, there is a distance between the two
governments and President Rousseff has criticized Iran's human
rights record.
There have been reports and allegations in the past about
Iranian agents sponsoring training camps for terrorists in
Latin America and Iranian support for prospecting uranium in
Venezuela and Ecuador. But these remain unsubstantiated.
In Argentina, prosecutor Alberto Nisman accused President
Kirchner of trying to shield Iran in the investigation of
involvement in the bombing of the Israeli Embassy. I was in
Argentina in Buenos Aires when that Embassy was bombed, just a
few blocks from the Embassy back then, and in AMIA in 1994 that
killed 85 people.
Nisman was found dead right before he was set to testify
before the Argentine Congress. But even if one accepts Nisman's
troubling report that Argentina and Iran were negotiating an
exoneration of Iran in the 1994 attack in exchange for
increased trade relations, this does not necessarily show a
growing influence of Iran in Argentina or the wider region.
The circumstances of Nisman's death remain mysterious but
so far there is nothing to indicate that Iran was involved in
any way.
There have also been more plausible allegations of money
laundering through the region's banks to finance Hezbollah
activity. But this is a fundamental problem not just related to
Iran's role and influence in Latin America but is much broader.
In my judgement, the time, effort, and resources that are
being spent on the subject of Iranian intervention in the
Western Hemisphere should, rather, be devoted to proactive
engagement and support around the very real security issues
that Latin America is confronting today--a robust drug trade
and other illicit commerce, an epidemic of violence and crime,
a deteriorating political, economic, and human rights situation
in Venezuela, and widespread corruption and state weakness.
These are critical questions that risk being neglected when
we focus all of our attention on Iran. Indeed, the best way for
Washington to address concern about Iran's role in the
hemisphere is to help improve the capacity and effectiveness of
Latin American governance to protect their citizens against
varied sources of insecurity and instability.
That is where we should place our policy priority. Issues
of organized crime and governance challenge need greater
attention and enhanced cooperation from Washington.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the--all four of the panelists
for great testimony and I will begin with the question period.
First off, let me say, Mr. Humire, your written testimony
is chock full of information. Thank you for your longstanding
work into this issue and you provide me a lot of information. I
will come back to you in just a second with some questions.
But as I was reading and listening to Mr. Lopez-Dolz's
testimony, I was in Peru in November and I understand the
vastness of the country and the different--jungle, mountains,
desert--all the elements. And thank you for your service there.
But it is interesting. You were the Minister of Interior in
2006. Were you aware of Iran's activity at that point in time?
Mr. Lopez-Dolz. When I was Vice Minister of Interior, I
didn't have a sign of Iran at the beginning. After a few months
and a few weeks in the position, I started to see some relation
but not something to pay too much attention.
We were more concerned about other houses--more about the
Venezuelan Government's involvement in these organizations.
Iran's presence was not clear at this time.
Mr. Duncan. Do some of the cultural centers that General
Kelly talks about, the general commander of SOUTHCOM, are they
located in Peru? Are you aware of any of that? I am just
curious.
Mr. Lopez-Dolz. At least one that I know. The name is
Inkarri Islam. It is a mix between Islam and Inkarri. Inkarri
is a myth of Southern Andes culture about an Incan will be
reborn and free the people from any kind of oppressor. Similar
to another myth from the followers of Ali, one of the sons of
Muhammad, and they mix both and use it to recruit people in the
center.
Mr. Duncan. Not putting you on the spot but in 2012-2013
are you aware that--of any conversations elements of the
Department of State had with Peruvian officials about the
Iranian threat as part of their application of the law to
counter the Iranian threat and do an assessment? Do you know if
they have contacted any Peruvian officials?
Mr. Lopez-Dolz. I don't know if in 2012 or 2013. But right
now, there is some contact between the American Embassy and the
special task--small special task force to Interpol in the case
of international terrorists.
Actually, now, clearly, they are in contact.
Mr. Duncan. Right. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Humire, given the recent events with attempted attacks
in Peru but also Uruguay, the Iranian-Argentine scandal this
last week, do you agree with the State Department's assessment
that Iranian influence is waning in the hemisphere?
Mr. Humire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
No, I don't agree. I think the State Department's
assessment when it came out--at least the public portion that
came out the annex--lacked the depth and the seriousness to
really examine this issue and offer some type of insight.
The work I have done there is plenty that you can get on
the granular level to look at anecdotal evidence of this. But
if you look at the strategic level on pretty much every
indicator, even if you look at the indicators of what is out
there in the public, the agreements in the trade and
everything, there is an increase.
There is a marked increase. But those aren't the indicators
that I think are particularly worrisome. The most worrisome
indicators is what they are not telling you that they are
doing.
So when they create a factory, say, in Venezuela or they
create a cement plant in Bolivia and those factories don't
produce anything or don't create cement, what are they doing?
Some wisdom--conventional wisdom might say okay, they are
just politically posturing. But my evidence suggests that they
serve a dual function, a dual purpose, and it is that other
function that we need to examine.
So I think that has been the focus of my research and what
you are seeing Iran's influence today as it was yesterday when
Ahmadinejad was in power is that it is expanding beyond the
ALBA nations. The ALBA bloc as a political power project is
weakened.
But the sentiments that brought the ALBA to power in Latin
America--the anti-U.S. sentiments, the--specifically the anti-
Israel sentiments--are stronger than ever throughout the
region.
And Cuba and Venezuela have a new political soapbox now to
project this influence called the CELAC and Iran, under
Rouhani, has made a concerted effort to align himself closer to
that kind of narrative, moving into countries like Peru,
countries like Chile, and even countries like Mexico and El
Salvador, which are not typically ALBA-associated nations.
Mr. Duncan. I mean, you can understand the sympathy with
especially Chavez in power with ALBA countries and the ties
there that possibly Chavez opened some doors in the ALBA
countries for Iran as he furthered that relationship.
But let me delve into the Veja report for just a minute,
which I thought was fascinating. I don't know--I am still
reading it and chewing on whether, you know, it is factual. I
want to go a little bit further on that.
But in that Veja report--article it talks about Iran trying
to procure some nuclear capability, intelligence research
components, whatever. I just find that hard to believe in that
Iran seems to me like they are further down the road than that
and why would they not go to Pakistan or somewhere like that to
get that versus a relationship with Argentina.
So is there anything else that Iran may have been going--
interested in that Argentina could provide?
Mr. Humire. Well, there is two major strategic programs
that you have to look at when you examine Iran. One is the one
that is the most paid attention to here in Washington which is
the nuclear program.
The other is their ballistic missile program. These aren't
mutually exclusive, of course. But raw materials that are
perhaps needed for the ballistic missile program sometimes
aren't always needed for their nuclear program and Latin
America has an abundance of these raw materials. Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil--all these countries have an abundance of
minerals that have dual-use functions. They have commercial
applications----
Mr. Duncan. Would you say Argentina has long-range missile
technology or expertise in any way for a payload delivery
system?
Mr. Humire. They have medium range missile technology. From
my understanding they don't have an intercontinental ballistic
missile or any of that kind of know-how.
Mr. Duncan. Right. Okay. Lord, there is just so much to
ask. Let me ask this of Mr. Lopez-Dolz. Do you have any
additional information surrounding the recent incidents in
Uruguay and what does this event show about Iran's activities?
Because that is probably the most recent. Assuming that
Iran wasn't involved in Alberto Nisman's demise, Uruguay was
one of the most recent incidents. Do you have anything to point
to--Iranian activity, Hezbollah's activity--with relation to
that?
Mr. Lopez-Dolz. We don't have information about--I don't
have information if there is a connection or there is not a
connection with the cells. We are not sure yet because he was
captured very soon and the information was released to the
press pretty soon. So when information was public, if there
wasn't something that they were hiding, there is no single
piece of information to know who is with him.
But what is important to remark is he was manipulating
explosives. Not weapons, not ammunition, something that you
could expect to wait for some time to use it all or sending it
across the border.
When you manipulate explosives in a big city, as Lima, with
millions of inhabitants, it means will they use it or somebody
else. We don't know who. We don't know the target and they
have--I think they have this explosives ready to use. We don't
know when and we don't--and we don't know against what.
Mr. Duncan. Yes. I was asking about Uruguay, though, if you
knew of anything about Uruguay and the recent bombing attempt
there or on the Israeli Embassy, in Uruguay.
Mr. Lopez-Dolz. No, I don't have more information about it.
I read it in the press.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Thank you.
So I will just stop and hopefully we will have a second
round of questioning and I will recognize the ranking member,
Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. You know, one of the hearings that we had here,
some of the people that came and spoke before this committee,
mentioned that Iran had a number of flights into Venezuela per
week, and they were delivering crates and so forth.
I was just wondering if you have any information as of late
whether those flights are still going in and out of Venezuela,
whoever--I guess you don't.
Mr. Humire. No. The flights, from my knowledge, Mr. Sires,
stopped in the end of 2010, beginning of 2011. But it should be
noted that the President of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, in his
last trip to Iran late last year asked President Rouhani if
they could resume that flight.
It is not clear whether he agreed or what his response was.
But that flight that existed for about 3 years nobody knows as
to what exactly was in the contents. There is rumors of drugs,
explosives, terrorists and other.
But I can tell you that the flight, which was a commercial
flight, lost more than $30 million in those 3 years and those
$30 million were subsidized by the Venezuelan Ministry of
Mines, which you have no--which doesn't make sense. It would
have been subsidized by the transportation ministry. But there
was something very nefarious going on with that flight.
Mr. Sires. Anybody else?
Mr. Modell. Mr. Sires, the only thing I would add to that
is a meeting in the Iranian Supreme Council on national
security where they discussed the use of Mahan and other--and
Iran Air and other airlines for the purpose of transporting
lethal supplies and other forms of aid to Syria and to Iraq,
and have considered the use of it in non-geostrategic areas
like Latin America and Africa.
Mr. Sires. Anybody else? Mr. Shifter?
Mr. Shifter. Thank you.
The only thing I would say is that, you know, if one reads
all the press reports and media accounts there was a lot of
attention paid to this a few years ago and, I mean, I follow it
pretty closely.
I haven't seen anything on these flights. Doesn't mean it
doesn't exist but, you know, that does suggest that there were
a lot of people that were following this and writing about it
that no longer is out there.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Shifter, I just wonder if you know anything
about the relation between Hezbollah with the Colombian
guerillas and the Mexican drug traffickers' organization.
Mr. Shifter. I think there have been--as I said in my
testimony, I think--Mr. Sires, I think that the main connection
there is through--is through money laundering for support of--
these are groups, obviously, that are very wealthy through the
drug trade and what concerns me is their connections through
money laundering--they are supporting some of the groups in the
Middle East.
I think that is the main connection and I think, you know,
that is something that we are aware of and we need to address
and I think the governments in Colombia and Mexico that are
concerned about--we haven't talked about the government--the
regional governments.
But they are, obviously, worried about their own security
and are also focusing on this effort. So I think that is the
connection that concerns me and I think we need to do more.
Mr. Sires. Anybody?
Mr. Modell. Congressman, I would just suggest that you have
a series of briefings with DEA if you haven't already to
discuss the links between several senior Hezbollah members who
are currently residing in Lebanon because they have to reside
in Lebanon who were previously based in Mexico and Venezuela
and places like Colombia where the cartels operate.
There have been a number of high-profile cocaine busts,
drug stoppages, investigations that have led back to Hezbollah.
The only question is to what extent was Hezbollah
institutionalizing--was there an institutional program on the
part of the Hezbollah leadership council with regard to its
involvement in drug trafficking.
But DEA can give you a long list of Hezbollah affiliation
with drug-related activities in Latin America that will
actually pertain to trade-based money laundering that not only
expands into Latin America but goes into--deep into West Africa
as well.
Mr. Humire. Mr. Sires, I agree with Mr. Shifter. There is a
huge laundering component. But the question you have to ask is
who is the one doing the laundering.
One of the connections to the FARC and Hezbollah resides in
Venezuela. The current governor of a very important state in
the northern Caribbean coast called Aragua is a gentleman named
Tareck El Aissami.
He is connected through Hezbollah to the former
intelligence director, Hugo Carvajal, that was detained through
the U.S. authorities in Aruba and he is connected to Hezbollah
through his--through his financial network. This is a clear
connection with the Venezuelan Government that links the FARC
with Hezbollah.
There is probably more connections but that is one that has
been relatively looked at publicly that I know our law
enforcement and intelligence officials are examining very
closely.
Mr. Sires. And I was just wondering if you know where the
investigation is to the prosecutor in Argentina today. Is it
done? It just went by the wayside or is there any effort? Does
anybody--where is that at?
Mr. Humire. The investigation on his death?
Mr. Sires. Yes, the circumstances of his death.
Mr. Humire. It is still ongoing. My understanding is that
they asked for a second autopsy and they are proceeding the
investigation on the circumstances around his death.
Mr. Sires. Okay. Thank you. My time is up.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen had to leave. Just for the committee
members, there was a terrorist attack in Tunis, Tunisia. I know
of 12, I believe, people killed, 17 wounded, and I am sure that
is part of why she had to leave. But I just wanted to let you
be aware of that.
I will now recognize Mr. Weber from Texas for 5 minutes.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Modell--is that how you pronounce your name? You said
earlier that there seems to be a government-wide lack of
attention to this connection in South America. Can you
elaborate on that?
Mr. Modell. Are you referring to the governmen- wide lack
of attention to Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America?
Mr. Weber. Correct.
Mr. Modell. When you look at most of the government--let me
just reiterate--when you look at most of the government
agencies and what they are doing based out of Embassies and
other activities throughout Latin America, I would say that
most of them recognize that Iran is an important thing to be
looking at.
But there are some exceptions. I think it was mentioned
that the State Department has neglected Iran. I mean, if you
worked at an average Embassy and you watch what the Embassy--
political officers are doing, what the Ambassador is doing, for
the last 10 years for the most part they avoid Iran at all
costs.
So that is not necessarily true in the intelligence
business and the defense business. But the point I wanted to
make wasn't necessarily that it was being totally neglected but
that there wasn't a very well thought out networked plan and
approach to figuring out what the true threats of Iran and
Hezbollah are across the region and how do--and whatever
residual elements have been left behind over the years by their
attempts to build infrastructure----
Mr. Weber. You are talking about the United States
government-wide?
Mr. Modell. Exactly right. Yes. I am talking about the U.S.
Government agencies who are operating outside the United States
in Latin America who are trying to address threats posed by
Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.
Mr. Weber. That is not very encouraging.
Mr. Modell. I would agree. Let me make one--let me make one
other point. I would agree with Mr. Shifter in one sense.
In terms of a geostrategic alliance--I mean, people are
wondering. You know, while Iran has pulled off some, you know,
obviously, some bombings and they have done some horrible
things and we have foiled a lot of their plots across the
Western Hemisphere, is there a geostrategic alliance that has
formed between Latin American governments and Iran?
I would say with the exception of maybe Venezuela and a few
of the ALBA countries that Joseph mentioned I would say no.
They have very little in common.
But what is more striking to me is when you have--we have
an Iranian Ambassador, for instance, in 2005 who shows up on a
country like Mexico and he tells the Mexican Government that
his main priorities in that country during his tenure are to
proselytize and spread Twelver Shi'a Islam in a country that
is--it is 99.9 percent Catholic.
Nevertheless, they are headstrong and they are going to
push their form of Islam in that country. And the other
objective that they had, according to this Ambassador, was to
break the relationship between Mexico and the United States.
So, obviously, incredibly unrealistic.
No foundation for geostrategic alliance but the point isn't
necessarily that he was--that Iran is on the verge to actually
succeeding in that. It is that they are headstrong and they are
willing to push and----
Mr. Weber. Hold that thought. I appreciate you going there,
and I am going to go to Mr. Shifter next.
Having heard that, Mr. Shifter, you know, you made the
statement earlier that you didn't see that overall alliance,
basically. But let us talk about fraudulent documents.
It has been reported that several countries in Latin
America have provided fraudulent documents for Islamic
radicals--passports, national ID cards, birth certificates, et
cetera. Are you aware of those reports?
Mr. Shifter. To those reports, yes.
Mr. Weber. Do you have--is it--are they true? Do you have
any information, any background?
Mr. Shifter. I can't verify those reports but if--you know,
I wouldn't be shocked if they were true. I think that--you
know, the reports of fraudulent passports of that for lots of
governments and they need to be investigated and I think they
need to be seen what is the significance of that, what are----
Mr. Weber. So you don't seem to think it is a concern,
this--apparently, as Mr. Modell just described, a growing
alliance with no other--if no other purpose with the intent to
divide America or United States and Mexico. You don't seem to
be concerned about that kind of alliance.
Mr. Shifter. I don't think strategically it is of concern.
I think these incidents of the passports and the other
fraudulent documents are of concern. They are always of concern
for any government.
But I don't think that one should exaggerate the threat
that that poses to----
Mr. Weber. Well, what I think when there is Islamic
militants who have created a kind of mayhem that they have, I
mean, how do you exaggerate those who are intent on killing
men, women and children, in some instances with suicide
bombers? That is a pretty heavy threat. I mean, how do you
exaggerate that?
Mr. Shifter. Well, I think that--I think that if you look
at from country to country there have been mentioned--leaving
aside Venezuela but if you look at Mexico and Peru and Colombia
these are all countries with governments that are committed to
trying to improve the security situation.
Mr. Weber. Well, they are but----
Mr. Shifter. They are more concerned than we should be.
Mr. Weber [continuing]. Well, we happen to have less than--
someone called it a porous border between--I was--in the Texas
legislature I was the vice chairman of the borders committee.
I can tell you how porous the border is in many instances.
So the fact that we have Islamic militants that are getting
forged documents and coming up into the country just to the
south of us how would you mitigate that?
Mr. Shifter. I think there must--has to be a much stronger
pressure and more cooperation to try to guard against that. I
agree that that is a concern. I share that. But I don't think
that we should--I don't think it poses a major threat to the
United States.
I think these are specific questions that need to be
addressed that should be addressed, and I wanted to make that
point in my testimony that there are things that are troubling
and this troubles me.
But I don't think it means--I don't think we should--we
should take it beyond what the evidence suggests.
Mr. Weber. You don't think it is a major threat? So if nine
people--I think, Mr. Chairman, was it Tunisia--were killed or
12, whatever the total is--if nine or 12 were killed in the
United States then that is not a major threat?
Mr. Shifter. If they were killed in the United States it
would be a very, very significant and troubling event.
Mr. Weber. Okay. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman.
I think if you talk to Paraguayans they would tell you that
there are a lot of false documents that are transferred between
Lebanese that are traveling in other Tri-Border region.
I think it is very prolific there. The question, I think,
the gentleman was trying to get to is Venezuela's role--what
Chavez may have provided to the Iranians on the flights that
went from Caracas to Tehran and where terrorists or other
Iranian operatives may have been able to travel on Venezuelan
documents and other things. I think that is something to delve
into. I think that is what the gentleman was getting to.
So with that, I will recognize Mr. Deutch from Florida for
5 minutes.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Humire--is that right? You spoke as the chairman did of
the Brazilian newspaper article that alleged Iran and Venezuela
were part of a scheme aimed at restarting nuclear cooperation
between Iran and Argentina.
The report is based on three high-ranking former officials
of the government of Hugo Chavez, all of whom are now in the
United States and requested asylum in this country.
According to three officials, on January 13th, 2007,
Iranian President Ahmadinejad asked Venezuelan President Chavez
for assistance in securing nuclear cooperation from Argentina
and in dissuading Argentina from pursuing Interpol Red Notices,
which are akin to arrest warrants in connection with the
bombing of the AMIA Jewish Center, Buenos Aires.
I just got a few questions based on that article. First of
all, what is your assessment of Prosecutor Nisman's complaint
that Argentina was seeking to absolve Iran of responsibility in
the AMIA attack?
Mr. Humire. I think Dr. Nisman is probably the most
credible Latin American governing official that has worked on
the portfolio of Iran in Latin America. Not just in Argentina,
in general. His report in 2013 provided a lot of details about
seven countries that had the same kind of activity.
Dr. Nisman's most recent report was--unfortunately, was not
surprising because our independent investigation came to very
similar conclusions. Argentina's economic deficits puts them in
a very vulnerable position. Even if they say they don't want to
align themselves with Iran, they may have to out of necessity.
Argentina did align themselves with Venezuela because they
needed energy, because they needed help financially. We know
that the former President, Hugo Chavez, authorized the purchase
of almost $10 billion worth of Argentine debt. That gives him
an inordinate amount of influence and that could be
triangulated toward Iran.
Mr. Deutch. So you don't have any--you don't have any
reason to believe that Prosecutor Nisman was operating at the
request of interested parties and not simply following the
evidence?
Mr. Humire. The only interested party that I know that he
had in his mind was the AMIA victims and he spoke about them
quite frequently and he sought justice and truth for the case
in Argentina.
Mr. Deutch. Interpol said that no official requests have
been made to cancel the Red Notices. So on what basis then
would Nisman have said that Iran sought to lift them?
Mr. Humire. Well, I mean, one thing is what the Argentine
Government can do and another thing is what they promise Iran.
You know, they might make promises that they can't actually
deliver but they will make those promises to get whatever
benefits that they can receive.
I am not--I can't tell you if they actually made the
request but Nisman didn't say that they actually were going to
go through it.
What he said was that they told Iran that that is what they
were going to do and that is based on wiretaps so there is
audio recording evidence and that is also based on eyewitness
accounts. So he had the evidence to make those statements.
Mr. Deutch. And the Foreign Minister Timerman said that
Argentina's refineries wouldn't be able to process the high
sulfuric content of Iran's crude oil and therefore, he has
claimed, that Nisman's allegations on that front couldn't be
true. How do you respond to his rebuttal?
Mr. Humire. Again, this is--these are not the purpose of
what Nisman--he wasn't trying to make a sophisticated case as
to what Argentina could actually get.
He is only telling you what they told them. Argentina has
energy agreements with other countries--Brazil, Bolivia,
Venezuela--where they perhaps could get the refineries they
need to get the crude.
I couldn't tell you if that is what they actually are going
to do. But there was triangulation with a lot of their
activities with Iran, not just with Venezuela. Perhaps with
Bolivia as well.
Mr. Deutch. And do you know how Argentina would be able to
share nuclear information or material with Iran, considering
the sanctions that are in place on Iran?
Mr. Humire. I would say it would be a third-party country,
most importantly through Venezuela. At the same time that
Argentina started to become more active with Iran they became
more active with Venezuela, especially on the financial level
and also through social projects--projects that actually never
were completed but yet the money was still being moved between
two countries.
They would have to shield this through other activities,
through other projects that perhaps wouldn't get the scrutiny
that would a military project or something else.
Mr. Deutch. And, finally, what has to happen in order for
us to ensure that the work that Nisman did is not lost and that
it is seen through?
Mr. Humire. I think one of the things that Dr. Nisman was
really focused on was how to take the AMIA case and
particularly the Iranian accused to be focused on the
international level.
The Red Notices for him just didn't work because in order
for that to happen the Iranian Government would have to arrest
their own accused and send them for custody. He knew that was
never going to happen.
However, if he was able to move the case to a third party
court international--on an international level, perhaps the
United Nations, they can maybe obligate not as--perhaps as a--I
am sorry, not as a accused but as a witness to another crime,
perhaps a criminal conspiracy.
So in my opinion, Dr. Nisman knew that in order for the
AMIA case--in order for the conspiracy in Argentina to be paid
attention to, he had to take it to a higher level to the
international community.
Mr. Deutch. Great. I really appreciate your insight. Thanks
for being here and thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Weber. I thank the gentleman.
The gentlelady from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you and Ranking
Member Sires and Deutch and the witnesses here today.
The State Department has maintained for a number of years,
as you know, in its annual terrorism report that there are no
operational cells of al-Qaeda or Hezbollah in the hemisphere
but that ideological sympathizers in the region provide
financial support to these and other terrorist groups in the
Middle East and South Asia.
In contrast, as we have talked about a little bit, General
John Kelly has maintained in the SOUTHCOM's 2014 posture
statement that he remains concerned that Hezbollah maintains an
operational presence in the region.
In your opinion, what accounts for the apparent discord
between the State Department's terrorism report and SOUTHCOM'S
2104 posture? Why is there a difference of opinion? Anyone who
dares.
Mr. Modell. Based on my own experience in the region, I can
tell you that people focus on different things. Going back to
the issue of false documentation in the region, one of the
things that Hezbollah has developed a very, very good skill in
is counterfeiting--counterfeiting false documentation and they
have long relied on Latin America not necessarily as a base of
terrorist operations but as a fund-raising center.
So whether you are talking about the Tri-Border area or the
free trade zones where they have been reportedly active, there
are certain things that they do very well down there.
And the U.S.--let me just mention something--the U.S.
Government needs to get on the same page with the regard to the
extent of those activities and the extent to which there is a
very formally approved process between the chain of command in
Beirut and what goes on in places like the Tri-Border area, the
extent to which people are actually doing Hezbollah-specific or
Hezbollah-supported activities.
But to address the idea that there is a discrepancy between
the two, again, in my experience in the region, while we were
very focused on Iran or on Russia and other what we call hard
targets, State Department wasn't focused on them at all and
there was a different--there was a fundamental difference in
their approach and the way they view the problems and the tools
they had and the resources they had for dealing with it. And
that--for me, that is the only explanation.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
Mr. Shifter. Thank you. I would only add that I think there
is no question--again, I think we have to distinguish between--
in the Tri-Border area there is contraband, there is smuggling,
there is money laundering, there is illicit commerce, and there
are Muslim communities there as well.
Whether there is an operational cell there, I think some of
it is--you know, one has to have--apply very high standards of
evidence and make sure that that is confirmed.
And there may be information that--different kinds of
information that get to different parts of the U.S. Government
and they reached different conclusions and I think the State
Department said, we really want very, very hard
incontrovertible evidence that there is an operational cell
before we include it in our report, and whereas perhaps other
parts of the government say there is a lot of information that
we are getting that lead us to this conclusion. So there are
different emphases that happen.
My own sense and just consulted a lot of people who are
very familiar with that area say that, you know, there is no
question that there is enormous, you know, contraband and
illicit trafficking and there is a big Muslim community. But
whether there is an operational cell there is still not yet
substantiated.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
Beyond Hezbollah, is there evidence to suggest that there
is other extra-hemisphere foreign terrorist organizations that
maintain operational presence in Latin America and the
Caribbean--and/or the Caribbean?
Mr. Shifter. Terrorist organizations?
Ms. Kelly. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Shifter. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Humire. Ms. Kelly, yes. To answer your question, there
is operational intelligence--operational presence of other
foreign terrorist organizations even though they are Islamic
terrorist organizations.
The case in 2007 that was a thwarted plot against the John
F. Kennedy International Airport--that is a very interesting
case to study because here you have a Sunni Islamic terrorist
group, Jamaat al-Muslimeen, in Trinidad cooperating with the
Shi'a imam and political figure in Guyana to coordinate an
attack against a U.S. target.
The Caribbean has a lot of this type of activity that is
not particularly always Iranian funded or supported that is
supported by other elements and other groups that are looking
also at different type of terrorist operations.
But I also want to make a quick point on your earlier
question. There is also a legal distinction that needs to be
understood and it creates a big vacuum in the region that could
be a vulnerability for the United States.
If you are the State Department and you were to call Brazil
and say, you know, is there a Hezbollah-operated presence in
your country, they will say no and they would be legally
correct because they don't distinguish legally Hezbollah as a
foreign terrorist organization.
Until Hezbollah commits a crime or a member of Hezbollah
commits a crime--narcotrafficking, extortion or other--they are
not considered a terrorist in their country, and that legal
distinction is, I think, what causes some of the confusion.
When people on the ground like, perhaps, people in Southern
Command or special operations commander or other, are seeing
some of the same individuals that they see are on watch lists
in other parts of the world operating in those countries they
don't make those legal distinctions and so they understand that
there is a Hezbollah presence.
But there is a vacuum in Latin America with anti-terror
legislation. They don't look at Islamic extremism the way we
look at it and so that causes some of that confusion.
Ms. Kelly. My time is up.
Mr. Duncan. The gentlelady's time has expired. Thank you--a
great question. The chair will--okay. The chair will recognize
Mr. Weber. Mr. Yoho--I am sorry. Mr. Yoho from Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here and your testimony,
and this is something that I think we are all very well
concerned with what is going on in our Western Hemisphere and I
think it is something that has been overlooked.
I want to reference--go back to the State Department
request for the report on the Western Hemisphere, and they
finally reported in 2012--they gave a report and it says--it
found that Iran's influence in the Western Hemisphere was
waning.
And if so, if that was--do you feel that was true back then
in 2012 when the report came out from the State Department
about the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in the Western
Hemisphere? Was it waning?
Mr. Modell. I thank you for your question.
You know, in 2012--between 2012 and today, budgets at the
Iranian Government as for any types of activities whether you
are talking about in their own immediate back yard in Iraq and
Syria, intelligence activities further afield in Africa and
Latin America, have gone drastically down.
So has their influence gone down? I would point out there
was mentioned earlier today Mr. Rabbani, the guy who was the
Iranian cultural attache at the time in the bombing in 1994 who
has since remained in Iran and reportedly left a few times here
and there--that he is still doing--but he is in charge of a
network of people that the Iranian Government relies on,
whether they are people who have gone--who are running mosques,
cultural centers and so forth, throughout Iran. So--go ahead.
Mr. Yoho. Well, that is what I wanted to ask you. I mean,
if they are waning but they are building mosques at the time
and they are donating $800,000 to the Argentinian President--
Presidential race, it seems like their influence was pretty
strong and we know that.
So to say it was waning I think was a mischaracterization,
and they had a report and it says in this here that they can
only submit five pages back to Congress, which is very
limiting.
It would be like, you know, having a cake recipe and you
only can do three pages of it or, you know, three sentences of
how to make that and then the rest is on your own.
It just seems very limiting. So I feel like they have been
growing and it just wasn't a correct conclusion. Mr. Humire?
Mr. Humire. Correct, Mr. Yoho.
The--you know, there was some evidence to say that perhaps
they were maintaining. But I will give you a point that
supports the evidence that they are growing. This was mentioned
just a minute ago.
The commander, Southern Command General John Kelly, just
testified before Congress saying that there is 70 culture
centers or 80 culture centers----
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Humire [continuing]. In Latin America. In 2012, the
former commander of Southern Command, Doug Fraser, testified
that there was 36. That is a 55-percent increase, and those
culture centers are what is linked to those influence
operations.
The gentleman that Mr. Modell mentioned, Mohsen Rabbani,
has a network of disciples in Latin America that are in charge
of those operations.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Humire. That number has multiplied. So if you talk
about terms of influence, there is more agents of influence.
There is more access of influence and these individuals are the
ones that make contacts with the host governments.
Mr. Yoho. Is there a Muslim-practicing population
sufficient enough to warrant 80 mosques in Latin America?
Mr. Modell. I would point out one thing with regard to the
80 mosques and the cultural centers, and I agree with Joseph
that they have expanded those efforts.
Mr. Rabbani invites people from all over Latin America to
come in and do training courses and learn about Islam, and then
he has this leave behind--this sort of operational force or
influence force around Latin America.
I would say no. In most cases, they would be happy to take
any person who walks through the door who expresses even the
smallest willingness to learn about Islam.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Modell. And then they are happy to say hey, go run our
cultural center or our mosque. And I am not suggesting that
that is not influential or dangerous or maybe something needs
to be monitored. But it is very tenuous and to call it an
operational cell in a lot of cases is an overstatement.
Mr. Yoho. I would agree with that, and then I have got a
minute left here, roughly, and I don't know if you guys have
touched on that structure in Bolivia that is built by Iran,
supposedly, and heavily guarded.
Do you have a feel for what that is or has that already
been discussed? And if so, I apologize.
Mr. Humire. I have looked at the facility in great detail.
I could tell you this. The facility doesn't function the way it
is supposed to function. It is a military academy of some sort
for asymmetric warfare but is an academy that doesn't receive
students, that doesn't have operational presence as far as,
like, logistics and others.
Mr. Yoho. How large is that compound or structure?
Mr. Humire. It is not entirely large. There are more
administrative buildings--about four buildings. I couldn't tell
you the exact geographic dimension but it is about four
administrative.
Mr. Yoho. I have heard all kinds of theories and rumors
about it--you know, launch sites and all that. You know, I just
wanted to make sure it has been looked at well.
Mr. Humire. Okay.
Mr. Yoho. Anybody else have an opinion on that?
I am out of time and I appreciate your testimony. I yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman.
One thing I think that is interesting to note is the amount
of student travel from South American countries to Tehran, and
based on those cultural centers.
So Mr. Castro from Texas is recognized.
Mr. Castro. Well, thank you, Chairman, and thank you to
each of the witnesses. Thank you for your testimony and for
your scholarship and work on these issues.
I think our nation should, of course, be vigilant about any
kind of growing influence that Iran may have whether it is in
Latin America, Europe or anywhere else.
But I guess let me ask you a baseline question. How many
people have been radicalized in Latin America and gone over to
fight for, say, in ISIS or in al-Qaeda? Has anybody been
radicalized that you all know of?
Mr. Humire. I think there has been individuals in Venezuela
and several countries in the Caribbean that have gone over to
Syria to fight. But the numbers aren't significant. They are
relatively small.
Mr. Castro. Do we know their names or what impact they have
had? I know you gave the example of the Guyanese man, of
course, who has been convicted here for his actions.
Mr. Humire. Correct.
Mr. Castro. Is there anybody else that we know of by name?
Mr. Humire. To that level of such a high profile I don't
know a specific name but I can tell you that there is a
criminal terrorist pipeline that has developed through
Venezuela that sends funds and drugs from Latin America to the
Middle East and, in turn, sends foreign fighters from the
Middle East back to Latin America. That pipeline is still
active today.
Mr. Castro. Is it safer to say that there have been more
folks radicalized both in the United States and Europe than
they have in Latin America?
Mr. Humire. Correct.
Mr. Castro. Okay. What would be the advantage to a Latin
American country? I guess--or let me preface my question by
reiterating some of the points that have been made.
Iranian--the Iranian budget is drastically down for some of
these outreach efforts. Their economy right now is--I don't
want to say quite in shambles but is going through a very rough
time. So what is the advantage of a Latin American to cozy up
to Iran, at least in the period that we find ourselves now?
Mr. Shifter. Well, Congressman Castro, I don't think there
is much of an incentive. That is why--precisely why I am trying
to make the case that although there are concerns and we should
watch closely, Latin America, you know, wants to be prosperous.
They want investment. They want democracy. I mean, this is
a region that is in a very different state and I think that
this--they are not going to find what Iran has to offer very,
very attractive, either economically or in any other way.
So I don't think there are great incentives. There are,
obviously, a few--a handful of countries we know--they have
already been mentioned that have more of an anti-U.S. agenda
and so they will find common cause with Iran because they share
that to sort of--to curtail the influence of the United States.
And so the geopolitical--they are joined in sort of a
geopolitical alliance. Some of that exists. But beyond a few
countries and beyond that issue, I see very little.
Mr. Castro. Sure. Yes, sir?
Mr. Lopez-Dolz. In the case of my country, Peru, the
advancements that were obtained by radical movements is money
because in general terms the violent movements in my country
don't have the money. They obtain some money from drug
trafficking but any kind of money they receive will be well
received.
What I want to remark is the same people that is--they are
acting--are heads of every single violent movement against any
kind of legal production or whatever in the deep country, in
order to preserve the drug trafficking and illegal money is
that all activity that could be done in this area is the same
people connected with Iran activity.
So we will find people who are chiefs of a party or an
organization leading to FARC, leading to Venezuela, and the
same are pretty close to those Iranian activities in the area.
Mr. Castro. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the gentleman.
We are going to enter in a second round, if the gentlemen
would like to stay. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Last Congress, the House passed the Hezbollah International
Financing Prevention Act, which died over in the Senate. It
targets foreign banks and requires that the administration to
determine whether Hezbollah is a transnational organized
criminal significant narcotic trafficker.
So I would ask this of Mr. Modell, do you believe that this
legislation could effectively enhance our ability to target
Hezbollah in Latin America?
Mr. Modell. I do think it could make a difference. I was--I
am aware that legislation, and we had some meetings to discuss
that legislation as it was being formed.
I think that any time you can put additional pressure on
the Lebanese banking system to--for them to crack down on
Hezbollah within Lebanon is going to help and it is going to
reverberate out.
I think--I think as far as the U.S. Government that we can
do in addition to passing legislation anything that enables
Treasury to have more latitude in pursuing banks, particularly
with banks that we have already identified, but people are
concerned that it is going to destabilize the Lebanese banking
system and they don't want to--they don't want to do anything
about it, recognizing that, well, it is too bad because we see
so much IRGC Quds Force or we see so much Syrian money
illegally going through there. We even see Lebanese bulk cash
shipments coming from West Africa going right into these banks.
But yet, it is part of a major banking center within the
region. We don't want to destabilize it. So if that led--to the
extent that that legislation can lead to more latitude and
better tools at our disposal for putting pressure on that
financially I am entirely in favor of it. I think it could have
an impact, yes.
Mr. Duncan. I mean, we have focused on Latin America here
but the 2012 law was Iran's presence in the Western Hemisphere.
So we are talking about financial transactions. We can't ignore
the Canadian Bank and the fact that there is very clearly
transactions that were going, whether it was money laundering
and other things.
And as we mentioned Paraguay earlier, you know, anybody in
Ciudad del Este, whether it is Paraguayans or others, will tell
you Hezbollah's activity there, which is financial transactions
to fund Hezbollah.
Now, whether it is skimming rents or whether it is, you
know, contraband that is being sold and I have seen it with my
own eyes. And so I think you are right. I think that is just--
this would be just another tool and I am going to talk with the
author about possibly reintroducing that.
In your written testimony, you make several specific policy
recommendations for the--Mr. Modell, for the U.S. to consider.
Of these recommendations, which do you believe has the highest
priority?
If you had to rank them, give me the first one or two.
Mr. Modell. First one or two is the first thing that I
mentioned today and I would say first--if we are really serious
and, again, I don't want to overstate the threat.
I mean, I think that when you have somebody like Rabbani
or, you know, and other Iranians who have made a consistent
effort to build networks of influence in Latin America, I don't
deny that that is going on.
I don't want to inflate that, though, to a geostrategic
problem in the region. That said, if I was going to do one
thing--if I could make one recommendation, distill all of this
down to one thing, that would be getting everybody on the same
page.
I hear a lot of talk about whole of government solutions
within DoD, and DoD says well, wait a minute--we have got to
enable whole of government solutions where we are going to work
with State and we are going to work with the agency and
everybody else, and rarely does that happen.
Everybody is pursuing different aspects of the problem set
and there are working groups that get together--counter threat
mitigation working groups that get together and they talk about
problems like Hezbollah and they say, here are our
transnational criminal organizational problems and nobody
agrees and nobody is forced to work together, to take it to the
next level and actually implement steps that are coming to a
common set of platforms that can last the test of time in a
place like Latin America.
And, again, I don't see the hordes coming over the gates,
you know, coming across the wall. I think that Iran is a
problem we need to be looking at.
But it is the leave behind--the residual leave behind
force--the influence networks that they have that need to be
better identified and rooted out. But that will require a
counter network strategy and I don't think we have that.
Mr. Duncan. Let me--let me ask you on that point. After 9/
11, we saw that stove piping of information was a big factor in
allowing a terrorist attack to happen on the United States.
So do you think--I agree with you. DIA, DoD, elements of
DIA and others--NCTC, CIA, all these elements--should be
talking with our neighbors, our allies in the hemisphere about
this real threat. And so I gather from what you said they are
not, or at least we are not forcing them to come up with a
comprehensive approach.
You know, this committee has jurisdiction over State. We
don't have jurisdiction over DoD, over intel. But I think there
needs to be an effort to try to make sure there is no stove
piping of that information because we are going to miss
something if we do.
And it may not be an attack on the United States but it may
be something in our hemisphere that, for our involvement, may
be able to thwart. Would you agree with that assessment?
Mr. Modell. I would agree with that assessment, and when
you look at the people--the men and women in the United States
Government who are working out of our Embassies around--
throughout the hemisphere, the Ambassador obviously is the
Chief of Mission and he is the one who gets, you know, the
country team together and finds out what everybody is working
on and he tries to drive everyone toward the larger objectives
of the United States Government in that particular country.
But one thing I would comment on is yes, I agree with you.
The State Department needs to have--there needs to be a
different dynamic and part of it would be a new series of
incentives that would have to be created at the Embassy level.
Everybody, at the end of the day, even post 9/11, goes
about their good old traditional missions and you can create a
DNI. You can create an NCTC. It has very, very limited impact
on how we do business overseas. The agency continues to do what
it has always done and so does State, and so does DIA, and so
does DoD and everybody else.
So if you really decide that you want a networked approach
to figuring out how to better go against Hezbollah, which is a
complex undertaking, particularly because it is a criminal
issue more than anyone else for the most part until they are
called on to do terrorism, you really need to have everybody
working together.
Mr. Duncan. Yes, I agree. Look, I think NCTC, CIA--I think
all of these organizations alphabet soup of them do a great
job, and if you look at all the worldwide activity whether it
is what happened in Tunisia today, what is going on with ISIS
across North Africa and the Middle East, whether it is Iran and
nuclear weapons, whether it is even terrorist attacks in
Indonesia and India and others that are directly tied to Iran,
this is our hemisphere. This is our neighborhood. These are our
allies, our neighbors, our friends, and I will remind the
committee that the largest loss of life from a terrorist attack
prior to 9/11 happened in Buenos Aires in the 1994 attack--the
largest loss of life from a terrorist attack.
And many believe that Iran or Hezbollah, its proxy, was
directly involved in that. We can't take our eye off that ball
and it hits to home when it is here. I don't want to see it
happen again here to anyone, most importantly, not to the
United States or our assets or elements.
And so this has been a great hearing. I am going to
recognize the former chairman of the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee and now the chairman of the Asia-Pacific
Subcommittee, my friend, Mr. Salmon, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Salmon. Thanks a lot, Mr. Chairman.
My question is to anybody who has a great answer, or even
if it is a not so great answer go ahead and take a stab. But as
we are looking at the Nisman allegations and his subsequent
murder, logic dictates he must have had something beyond what
he revealed before his death to have driven somebody to have
murdered him.
Have any of you looked closely at Argentina's missile
program, formerly known as Condor II but reconstituted by
President Kirchner as Gradicom?
Is there any indication beyond conjecture that Kirchner
transferred missile technology indirectly to Iran via
Venezuela? As you all know, missile technology is really the
missing piece should Iran be seeking to militarize its nuclear
capability.
So could this sort of technology transfer have been that
grave finding that Nisman wanted to take to the U.N. Security
Council but was murdered before he could reveal it?
Mr. Humire. Mr. Salmon, the missile technology that was
given to Venezuela from Argentina, the important component of
that transfer is who received it in Venezuela.
The recipient in Venezuela was the Venezuelan military
industry known as CAVIM. CAVIM has been littered with Iranian
agents as well as Iranian projects--joint projects that have
several dual-use capacities.
The missile transfer was just one of them. There were
several other projects that were also done with CAVIM. CAVIM
was sanctioned for this very purpose.
I think it is highly probable that something nefarious was
in that transfer because on the face of it the missile program
that Argentina was building didn't have a real endogenous
production.
It wasn't something that they necessarily needed or the
Latin Americans needed that much. They don't have those kind of
conflicts right but--but it is something that perhaps Iran
could have benefitted from.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
As an aside, I was in Buenos Aires back in April in 2013
right around the time that the intercepts revealed that D'Elia
and his Iranian interlocutor were discussing Foreign Minister
Timerman's role in the alleged plan to whitewash Iran's role in
the AMIA bombing.
While I was there along with Ranking Member Sires, I met
with Timerman and asked him about the Truth Commission his
government signed with Tehran. I remember Timerman flying off
the handle at the very question--very much an overreaction.
I remember I walked out of my meeting, turned to my staffer
and I asked, what is wrong with this guy--he seemed like a
really extreme and overreaction to a--you know, a reasonable
question.
Now I know. Nisman's allegations show that Timerman was
being asked to help cover up Iran's role in the largest attack
against Jews since World War II.
So that was just an aside I would like to share with the
chairman, the committee and the panelists. There is a lot of
stuff going on over there that we need some answers on and I
don't--this administration, dealing with the current President,
the current Foreign Minister is not very forthcoming. In fact,
they put up brick walls every time we try to get close to
something and people end up dead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman. I thank him for his
leadership on that.
We have got one last member, Mr. Yoho, for a final round of
questions.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me, and
gentlemen, I will make this hopefully quick.
Hezbollah, the Party of God, is a Shi'ite Islamist militia.
It was founded in 1982 in response to the first Israeli-
Lebanese War and its stated goal include wiping Israel off the
map.
Has that goal changed, in your opinions?
Mr. Modell. I think it--I think it hasn't changed at all
and I think that both Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah officials
have restated it.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Shifter?
Mr. Shifter. The goal--that goal remains.
Mr. Yoho. All right. Are we pretty much in agreement that
that goal has not changed? And then it is disturbing to me that
the U.S. national intel report that came out has removed Iran
and Hezbollah off the terrorist threat list.
Do you see that as just a--what do they call it? A
graphical drop when they reformat at a graphical format error?
Knowing what we know, and we also know that Fidel Castro went
to Iran I think it was approximately 10 years ago and met with
the Ayatollah, and they said their common goal was to bring
America to its knees.
Has that changed with the Cubans and the Iranians working
together? Has that goal changed, in your opinions? Mr. Shifter,
we will start with you.
Mr. Shifter. I think the goal of Cuba has changed. I think
the latest change in U.S.-Cuban relations suggests to me that
that is not what the goal of the Cubans is, that they realize
that they can't do that. They need the United States and that
is why they are pursuing this opening with the United States.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. So you feel that way. Does anybody else
feel that way or is there a counterpoint--somebody feel
different? That the Cuban----
Mr. Humire. No. I believe, Mr. Yoho, that--the Iranians
entered, by extension also as well, Hezbollah into a global
campaign for international legitimacy.
Latin America is a big component of that. The nuclear--the
conversations and the negotiations over their nuclear program
that began in 2013 paralleled the negotiations that were
happening in Argentina to whitewash themselves from the AMIA
attack.
I mean, there was even some of the same negotiators. The
former Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, was also the
negotiator for the nuclear program and we are talking about the
same individuals that are looking to do the same things.
Cuba's role in Latin America, aside from what they are
telling the United States, is also a role of an intelligence
function. They have restructured and enhanced the intelligence
apparatus of many countries in Latin America to the benefit of
Iran.
This immigration scheme, which I want to--I want to clarify
one thing. It is not--they are not fraudulent documents. These
are state issued documents that are not doctored. They are
actually given by the government to a Hezbollah member.
The research at my center, we have a list of 173
individuals that have gotten this type of service. That is
evidence we have submitted to law enforcement. I would be happy
to submit it to the----
Mr. Yoho. No, I have seen that and that is the thing that
disturbs me about this whole thing. In 2013, the State
Department report stated that Iran and Hezbollah terrorist
activity has reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s, and that
is with sanctions on Iran.
So I think this is something we need to really pay
attention to and I think it is a misstep by our State
Department and this administration to negotiate with Iran and
open up that negotiation without giving anything.
I mean, they still have four of our hostages. They have
four Americans still sitting over there. To even open up those
negotiations in good faith I would have asked for those to
return.
And so you kind of wonder why we even entered into this,
and then you look at the relaxation of the foreign policy with
Cuba that we got nothing out of, and then we sat here a week
ago or 2 weeks ago and we asked the experts, did we get
anything out of this and did the Cuban people--did they get
more freedoms and liberties with the proposed change through
the Obama administration.
All four of them said no, and they all four said that this
negotiation, along with what we are doing with Iran, has
weakened the Western Hemisphere and has weakened America. And,
you know, I can only take that as expert opinion and if that is
true I just--I just think this is the wrong way and that we
need to heed the warning.
We had a professor in vet school that said if it walks like
a duck, quacks like a duck, smells like a duck, it is a duck.
What we are seeing is not good, I feel, for the direction of
America and America's security and I think we need to pay
strong attention to this.
Mr. Shifter, do you have anything you want to add?
Mr. Shifter. Just one final comment, if I could.
Mr. Yoho. Sure.
Mr. Shifter. I think you are right. But I also think that
in terms of the role of Iran and Hezbollah I would also consult
with the Israeli Government.
They are--of all the governments besides ours would be
concerned. I have talked to them a lot and at least what I
have----
Mr. Yoho. I think that is a wise--a wise decision.
Mr. Shifter. I think they follow it closely.
Mr. Yoho. Yes, sir. Thank you for your time. Mr. Chairman,
thank you for the second round.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman from Florida, and there
being no other committee members we will wrap up.
I will say that I agree with Mr. Humire that these aren't
fraudulent travel documents. They are issued by a government.
They are just carried by the wrong person or they are
exchanged, as we see down in Paraguay, with a lot of Lebanese
coming over, and this has been pointed out to me by the
Paraguayan intelligence. So I think you are right.
Well, pursuant to Committee Rule 7, the members of the
subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements to
be included in the official record. As an addition, they may
have additional questions that could be put in.
So we are going to leave the hearing record open for 5 days
to allow statements, questions, extraneous materials for the
record subject to the length of limitations.
And so there being no further business for the
subcommittee, we will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan, a
Representative in Congress from the State of South Carolina, and
chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
[Note: A statement by William Ross Newland III, submitted for the
record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan, is not reprinted here but the link
is available on the Internet at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/
Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103177]
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