[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-31]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING
ON
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S READINESS POSTURE
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 26, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
94-233 WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Ryan Crumpler, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness............................ 1
WITNESSES
Allyn, GEN Daniel B., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army........ 6
Howard, ADM Michelle, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S.
Navy........................................................... 7
Paxton, Gen John, USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.. 8
Spencer, Gen Larry O., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Allyn, GEN Daniel B.......................................... 42
Howard, ADM Michelle......................................... 63
Paxton, Gen John............................................. 76
Spencer, Gen Larry O......................................... 92
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 103
Mr. Nugent................................................... 103
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 104
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S READINESS POSTURE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 26, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 7:59 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wittman. We call to order the Subcommittee on Readiness
of the House Armed Services Committee. Mr. Crumpler said he
will blow reveille for us this morning.
I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us this
morning. I would like to thank our committee members. I want to
thank all of our witnesses again for taking time to join us
today. This is an important hearing determining where we are
currently with the state of readiness and the challenges that
we have before us.
This morning we have with us General Daniel Allyn, Vice
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Michelle Howard, Vice Chief
of Naval Operations; General Larry Spencer, Vice Chief of the
United States Air Force, Vice Chief of Staff; General John
Paxton, Assistant Commandant, United States Marine Corps.
Folks, thank you so much for being here with us this morning.
Thanks for your perspective and for your service to our Nation.
As we know, for the past 3 years the Readiness Subcommittee
has held a number of briefings and hearings on the state of
readiness in our Armed Forces. Without exception, we have heard
time and time again of our witnesses, both here with us this
morning and from others that our readiness is in peril. We are
also challenged in our ability to meet combatant commander
demands and to restore readiness to any level that any of us
believe is acceptable.
We have also heard about the self-inflicted damage that we
have placed upon this Nation's capacity to deal with potential
adversaries done by the sequester.
Chairman Dempsey characterized our situation at our Armed
Services Committee retreat as being on the ragged edge. And he
even stated that the President's budget still puts us just at
that ragged edge. He warned that we are moving toward a
military that is challenged to execute the most basic strategic
requirement of the U.S. military, defeating an enemy in a
single major theater operation. And this, to all of us, is
unacceptable.
I believe, as I am sure you do, that we are critically
challenged today in our ability to perform steady-state
missions and simultaneously respond to an unforeseen
contingency.
I also remain concerned that, even at the President's
budget levels of funding, we accept too much risk. I believe
that there is a lack of understanding of what risk entails,
being able to bring to bear too little, too late, and with
increased casualties and possibly even the inability to
accomplish the mission. That is a place where we do not want to
be. We have seen ourselves in that place at other times in this
Nation's history. And by any measure, it is unacceptable.
I do look forward to this morning's briefing in learning
where we are today, in terms of overall readiness. And I hope
that our witnesses can touch on the risk inherent in the fiscal
year 2016 budget and provide some specific examples of
challenges in matching ready and available forces to what the
Department referred to in the budget materials as ``severe
deployment demands.''
I would like now to turn to our ranking member, Ms.
Madeleine Bordallo, for her opening comments. Madeleine, thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and I thank the witnesses, too. And we were briefed in our
offices. And I appreciate your coming to see me and, of course,
the chairman as well.
We all appreciate the great sacrifices that every service
member makes when joining the Armed Forces. At today's hearing,
we are making sure that Congress is providing the right
resources to support our service members, especially in regard
to their overall readiness. However, we hold this hearing on
the day after we voted for a budget resolution that undermines
defense and uses gimmicks to act like we are truly--have
boasted defense spending.
The budget resolution that this House passed effectively
continues sequestration. The budget resolution will inhibit the
Department of Defense's ability to effectively plan and program
for future years, a shortcoming that numerous defense officials
have lambasted before the committee these past years.
We have neglected to do our very basic job of providing
adequate funding for our military. We convene this hearing at a
time when the world and this country face seemingly countless
challenges to our very way of life. We face challenges in the
Asia-Pacific, with an erratic dictator in North Korea, whose
every move seems to challenge our status quo and has been quite
provocative at times.
The Chinese continue to foster instability in the South
China seas, with development of manmade islands and continue to
challenge Japan's sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Russia
continues to foster instability in Ukraine and may be trying to
provoke problems in other Baltic and Scandinavian nations. Most
visible are the atrocities of the ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant] and their barbaric actions against all people,
including fellow Moslems.
And I mention all this, knowing there are also challenges
in Africa and other regions of the world. Although we ramp down
from more than a decade of war, we find ourselves in a world
that remains dynamic and challenging. U.S. leadership is needed
across the globe and we cannot neglect our obligation and
commitments to our allies.
Unfortunately, I fear that the budget resolution this House
passed yesterday undermines our ability to project power and
maintain commitments to our allies. We all know that when
sequestration hit in 2013, most of the cuts were taken from the
operation and maintenance accounts. The effect of these cuts is
still being felt today. And in the fiscal year 2016 budget
request, we know that only about 50 percent of the Air Force's
fighter squadrons are ready to meet their operational
requirements.
General Odierno has indicated that the Army's readiness is
at its lowest level in 20 years. That is just a small sampling
of the very real readiness challenges that we face today, due,
in great part, to sequestration and the lack of predictable
budgets that would allow the Department to plan and program for
the rest of the years.
And I hope that our witnesses today can comment on the
impact of having a sequestration-level base budget with
increases in the OCO [overseas contingency operations] account.
What impact will this have on the readiness of our forces? Will
we be able to executive that funding within the constraints
that exist on the obligation of funds in that account? How does
cementing sequestration levels in the base budget impact
planning for the future years?
Further, I hope that our witnesses can speak out on what
would happen to future budgets' additional OCO funding--were
not provided to offset a sequestration-based budget. What
impact would this have on the readiness of our forces and can
you provide specific examples of where we would take
significant risk and what capabilities would we simply lose?
Today's hearing is an important opportunity to educate this
subcommittee, but more importantly, our colleagues on other
committees, about the very real readiness challenges that we
face. And I hope that our witnesses will help us understand the
problems that we have created in funding the base budget at
sequestration levels and providing additional funds in OCO.
Unfortunately, I fear this testimony will fall on deaf
ears, and we will continue to allow ideology to drive our
military's funding and undermine our military's readiness.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. I am going to go now
to Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I will pass. I didn't realize I had an opening statement.
Mr. Wittman. Oh, no. Well, we are going to go right into
questions.
Ms. Stefanik. We are going to questions. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. And pass by my questions. I am going to defer
to the committee members and I will go ahead and ask last, just
so that we can make sure we get to our committee members.
Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
Ms. Stefanik. Thanks for clarification.
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you to all of the witnesses who are
here today. Thank you for your service. I wanted to ask about
the long-term impacts of severe deployment demands. I represent
the 10th Mountain Division, based at Fort Drum. And especially
as we continue to draw down end strength, what are we doing to
enable units more time to train and regain full-spectrum
readiness, and how does the fiscal year 2016 budget support
that effort?
General Allyn. ``Climb to Glory,'' ma'am. General Allyn
here. And I will speak partly to the 10th Mountain Division
that I know you know very well from your visits there at Fort
Drum, but more broadly to the United States Army as a whole.
Quite frankly, as we reduce our end strength on the current
ramp toward 450,000, it does increase the demands on our
trained and ready forces.
And so, our goal is to get to a point where we are at a
dwell-to-deployment ratio of 1:2. Right now, if you do not
factor in our Pacific-based forces that we have protected from
global deployments, by and large, so that they can stay focused
in that critical region of the world, our dwell-to-deployment
ratio for the rest of our brigade combat teams, like the 10th
Mountain Division, is at 1:1.6.
And so, we are well below the--what we consider to be the
sustainable level. And you highlighted exactly why it is so
important. We need time to restore full-spectrum readiness as
we come back from these important missions that we are
supporting for the Nation around the globe.
And I know that you are aware that we have about 140,000
U.S. Army soldiers forward deployed, forward stationed and
performing missions in about 140 countries, as we speak this
morning. And so, I hope that addresses your specific question
in terms of why it is so important that we fund the budget, at
a minimum, to the President's budget, because it is absolutely
the minimum that we can continue to meet the current demands.
And quite frankly, we are consuming readiness as fast as we
are generating it today. And so, we are not building surge
capacity, we are not building a continuous response capability
like you spoke to.
Ms. Stefanik. Admiral Howard.
Admiral Howard. Thank you, Congresswoman.
For the Navy, the core piece to our readiness is our
capital ships. And we have had extended deployments over the
last 15 years. We are trying to go back to a normalized
deployment of 7 months. But for the last 15 years, they have
been 8, 9, 10 months. So we have to reset those ships. We had
to stretch out and sometimes not do the maintenance avails
[availabilities], which is the very first phase of getting a
capital ship ready to bring--upload the crew or to bring
onboard the Marines.
With this particular budget, we are still in reset, taking
those ships through drydocking, through overhauls, all the way
up through fiscal year 2018 for our carrier strike groups. And
then we don't reset and recover the maintenance on our
amphibious ships until fiscal year 2020.
So for us, these platforms are the way we project power and
they have got to be--go through overhaul and to recover from
the high OPTEMPO [operations tempo] that we placed them under
during the last 15 years.
Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. General Paxton.
General Paxton. Thank you, Congresswoman.
And for the Marine Corps, this story is almost identical.
We are consuming readiness faster than we can generate it. To
your specific question, ma'am, we--in the Marine Corps, we
believe we are the Nation's 911 force, the crisis response
force. We have every expectation that we will be forward
deployed. But right now our dep-to-dwell [deployment-to-dwell]
is less than 1:2. It is at 1:2, overall. That is the way we
advertise, that is the way we testify.
We have certain critical communities, right now some of our
infantry battalions, our refueling squadrons, some of our
fixed-wing squadrons, that are less than a 1:2, as General
Allyn just mentioned.
In an optimal world, we would like to get to 1:3. The
challenge with being at a 1:2 over a sustained period is
exactly what you said. We will be ready for the crisis. You
will have ready Marine units on ships with aircraft ready to go
into harm's way to fight tonight to do exactly what the Nation
needs.
The challenge is that the next to deploy will be in a
degraded state of readiness. Right now we have over 50 percent
of our home station units in what we call degraded readiness,
C3 or C4. They don't have their proper equipment, they don't
have the right skilled leadership at the small unit level, they
don't have the right training opportunities. And this is
dependent on O&M [operations and maintenance] dollars, on TOA
[total obligation authority], on fixed allocation of resources.
Right now under a BCA [Budget Control Act] cap that will
continue to get worse. It has been bad since 2013. We are still
feeling the effects of our fixed-wing depot maintenance and our
flight rehab [rehabilitation] facilities, and in our shipyards,
in our Federal shipyards, where the artisans left, the people
were furloughed, the equipment was not being maintained, and we
are still in the downward spiral from that, from 2013 right
now.
So if the BCA caps continue, you can expect that to get
exacerbated.
Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Stefanik. General Spencer.
General Spencer. Good morning, Congresswoman.
Yes, this--so the crux of your question is really a good
one, and that is, what are we doing to reduce our dwell so that
our folks can come back and become full-spectrum trained? The
problem is we are not and because the OPSTEMPO has not dropped.
And like the other services, the reason that really puts us in
such a bind is because if you think about the capacity we have
and the age of the systems that we have, that is really where
all the stress is.
To give you some specifics, you know, during Operation
Desert Storm, in the Air Force we had 134 combat fighter
squadrons. Today we have 55. We are on our way to 49. To give
you some additional perspective, and during Desert Storm when
we had that 134 fighter squadrons, we deployed 33 of those to
Desert Storm. So think about now, we have--today we have 54, if
we had Desert Storm today what the impact would be.
We have--our tankers are 52 years old, bombers 50 years
old. Our fourth-generation fighters are on average 25 years
old.
My colleagues here sometimes accuse me of being a pilot
back during the B-17, but the reason they do that is because of
this statement, which is true, and think about this, though. In
1999, if we had used the B-17 bomber to strike targets in
Baghdad during the first Gulf War, it would have been younger
than the B-52, the KC-135, and the U-2 are today.
So that is--if you couple the stress of deployments, the
stress--the OPSTEMPO, deploy-to-dwell, with the reduced
capacity and the age of our fleets, that in essence is where we
are.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you very much. I am over my time.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for the flexibility.
Mr. Wittman. No problem. Thank you. I want to remind our
witnesses that your full statements are going to be entered
into the record, and if you would like at this time you can
make a brief opening statement in the summary of that, and then
we will go to Ms. Bordallo.
General Allyn.
General Allyn. We are very flexible, Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Yes, indeed.
STATEMENT OF GEN DANIEL B. ALLYN, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Allyn. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the readiness of your United States
Army.
On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh, and
our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, I thank you for your
support and demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army
civilians, families, and veterans. There are over 140,000
soldiers committed around the globe, partnered with our allies
in response to increasing instability across Europe, the Middle
East, Africa, and the Pacific, continuing the mission in
Afghanistan, and reacting to humanitarian crises.
The velocity of instability is increasing, and now is not
the time to drastically reduce our capability and capacity. The
Army needs Congress to provide adequate, consistent, and
predictable funding.
Today only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our
sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent. The
fiscal year 2015 enacted funding for our Army is $5.1 billion
less than last year's budget and challenges our commanders and
leaders across our Army to sustain our hard-fought gains in
readiness.
We are funded to achieve just enough readiness for
immediate consumption and are unable to generate the readiness
required to respond to an emerging contingency.
While the fiscal year 2015 budget constrains training, we
remain committed to our combat training center rotations to
develop leaders and build unit readiness. We accept risk in
home station training to conserve resources for the combat
training centers. The result of this approach is that units
arrive at our combat training centers not fully trained and
ready for these complex training scenarios, and therefore
unable to derive the full benefit of the training that is
provided.
Under the President's budget in fiscal year 2016, our goal
is to increase regular Army brigade combat team readiness to 70
percent, allowing us to balance force requirements while
maintaining some surge capacity. But we need consistent
resources to get there.
Sequestration will undermine readiness, ultimately putting
soldiers' lives at risk and will increase significantly the
involuntary separation of officer and noncommissioned officer
leaders who have steadfastly served their country through the
last 13 years of war.
Sequestration will also severely impact our ability to
maintain our installation readiness and protect the industrial
base, both key components to maintaining a ready force. It will
cut essential funds from military construction, sustainment,
restoration, and modernization on our installations.
Sequestration will degrade the industrial base's ability to
sustain the lifecycle readiness of warfighting equipment, while
also maintaining the capability to surge to meet future
demands.
To achieve our required readiness level in fiscal year
2016, we need Congress to support all of the cost-saving
measures the Army has proposed. These include compensation
reform, a new round of base realignment and closure, and the
aviation restructure initiative [ARI].
Aviation restructure eliminates 700 aircraft from the
Active Component and 111 from the Guard and Reserve, but
increases readiness and saves $12 billion. If the Army does not
execute ARI, we will incur additional costs buying aircraft and
performing maintenance at the expense of modernizing our
systems and maintaining readiness for a heroic total force
aviators.
The Army remains committed to protecting our most important
resource, our soldiers, civilians, and families. We build
leaders of character and trusted professionals who provide an
environment where every member of our great Army is treated
with dignity and respect, supported by essential soldier and
family programs. We will protect our most vital programs, but
sequestration-driven budget cuts affect every facet of our
Army.
I thank you again for your steadfast support of the
outstanding men and women of the United States Army and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Allyn can be found in
the Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Allyn.
Admiral Howard.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHELLE HOWARD, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Howard. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. It is my honor to represent the
Navy's Active and Reserve sailors and civilians, and
particularly the 41,000 sailors who are underway and deployed
around the world today. They are standing the watch right now
and ready to meet today's security challenges.
The citizens of this Nation can take great pride in the
daily contributions of their sons and daughters who fulfill our
Navy's longstanding mandate to be where it matters when it
matters. And recent events exemplify the benefit of forward
presence. Last August, the George Herbert Walker Bush Carrier
Strike Group relocated 750 nautical miles from the Arabian Sea
to the Arabian Gulf in less than 30 hours to respond to ISIL
attacks in Iraq. They executed 20 to 30 combat sorties per day,
and for 54 days they were the only coalition strike option to
project power against ISIL.
I want to make it clear, the fiscal year budget--the fiscal
year 2016 budget is the minimum funding required to execute the
Nation's defense strategy. In other words, if we return to a
sequestered budget, we will not be able to execute the Defense
Strategic Guidance.
Past budget shortfalls have forced us to accept significant
risk in two important mission areas. The first mission at risk
is deter and defeat aggression, which means to win a war in one
theater, while deterring another adversary in a different
theater. Assuming risk in this mission leads to a loss of
credibility in the ability to assure our allies of our support.
The second mission at risk is to project power despite
anti-access/area denial challenges. This brings risk in our
ability to win in war. Some of our people and platforms will
arrive late to the fight and inadequately prepared. They will
arrive with insufficient ordnance and without the modern combat
system sensors and networks required to win. Ultimately this
means more ships and aircraft out of action, more sailors,
marines, and merchant marines killed.
Our Navy will continue to ensure the security of the
maritime domain by sustaining its forward presence, warfighting
focus, and readiness preparations to continue operating where
it matters and when it matters. Since there is no foreseeable
reduction to global maritime requirements, we have focused our
fiscal year 2016 Navy budget to address the challenges to
achieving the necessary readiness to execute our missions. Any
funding below this submission requires a revision of the
defense strategy.
So to put it simply, sequestration will gravely damage the
national security of our country.
Despite these challenges, we are fortunate to have the
highest quality, most diverse force in my Navy history. These
outstanding men and women who serve our Nation at sea make us
the finest navy in the world. So on behalf of all those Active
and Reserve sailors, and our civilians and their families, I
extend our appreciation to this committee for your efforts and
your continued support to keep our Navy ready to defend this
Nation.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Howard can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Howard, thank you.
General Paxton.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN PAXTON, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT, U.S.
MARINE CORPS
General Paxton. Good morning and thank you, Chairman
Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee. I appreciate having the opportunity to appear
before you today and to report on the readiness of your United
States Marine Corps.
Today, as always, your Marine Corps is committed to
remaining our Nation's ready force, a force that is truly
capable of responding to a crisis anywhere around the globe, at
a moment's notice.
I know that this committee and the American people have
high expectations of your marines. You expect your marines to
operate forward, to stay engaged with our partners, to deter
potential adversaries, and to respond to crises. And when we
fight, you always expect us to win. You expect a lot of your
marines, and you should.
As we gather today, more than 31,000 marines are forward-
deployed and forward-engaged. They are doing just what you and
we expect them to be doing. Our role as our Nation's ready
force continues to inform how we man, train, and equip the
Marine Corps. It also prioritizes the allocation of the
resources that we receive from Congress. And I can assure you
that your forward-deployed marines are indeed well-trained,
well-led, and well-equipped.
In fact, our readiness was proven last year as your Marine
Corps supported recent evacuations of American citizens in
South Sudan, in Libya, and in Yemen. Those ready forces are
also currently engaged in the Middle East in conducting strike
operations against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, through training the
Iraqi Army units, and through protecting our embassy compound
in Baghdad.
They also routinely deploy and exercise across the Asia-
Pacific region where over 21,000 are currently west of the
International Date Line. All of these events demonstrate the
reality and the necessity of maintaining a combat ready force
that is capable of handling today's crisis today. Such an
investment is essential to maintaining our Nation's security
and our prosperity for the future.
While we work hard with you, in order to maintain the
readiness of all our forward-deployed forces, we have not
sufficiently invested in our home station readiness and our
next-to-deploy forces. We have also underfunded or delayed full
funding for modernization, for infrastructure sustainment, and
for some of our quality-of-life programs.
As a result, approximately half of our non-deployed units
are suffering personnel, equipment, or training shortfalls.
Ultimately, this has created an imbalance in our overall
institutional readiness.
At the foundation of our readiness, we will emphasize and
we do emphasize that all marines and all units are physically
and mentally ready, are fully equipped, and have sufficient
time to train at home station with quality small-unit leaders
at the helm. They are, thus, ready to go anywhere when they are
called.
As we continue to face the possibility of full
implementation of the Budget Control Act, our future capacity
for crisis response, as well as major contingency response is
likely to be significantly reduced. Quite simply, if our home
station units are not ready, due to a lack of training,
manning, or equipment, it could mean a delayed response to
resolve that contingency or to execute an operational plan.
Both of which would consider and create unacceptable risks for
our national defense strategy, as well as risks to the limits
of mission accomplishment or perhaps physical risk to the force
itself.
The readiness challenges we already see today provide
context for our messages this morning. Your United States
Marine Corps can, indeed, meet the requirements of the Defense
Strategic Guidance with the President's budget [PB]. But there
is no margin.
As the Chairman stated, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
several weeks ago, even under PB16 [2016], we are already at
the ragged lower edge for overall readiness. I thank each of
you for your faithfulness to our Nation, your support for the
Department and our services. I request that the written
statement be submitted for the record and I look forward to
your questions. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Paxton can be found in
the Appendix on page 76.]
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, General Paxton.
General Spencer.
STATEMENT OF GEN LARRY O. SPENCER, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. AIR FORCE
General Spencer. Good morning, Chairman Wittman and Ranking
Member Bordallo and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for your continued support of America's airmen and
their families and for the opportunity to share the Air Force's
current readiness posture.
The United States Air Force is the most globally engaged
air force on the planet, and our airmen are defending the
Nation through a wide spectrum of activities, from dropping
bombs and flying space assets, to delivering humanitarian
relief and protecting the homeland. We remain the best air
force in the world. But with recent budget cuts, coupled with
24 years of combat operations, it has taken its toll.
Our airmen have always been and will always be the
cornerstone of the Air Force and the combatant commanders tell
us that our airmen continue to perform exceptionally well
across the entire globe. However, we are the smallest and
oldest Air Force we have ever been, while the demand for
airpower continues to climb. This is not a complaint. We are
happy that what we bring to the table is recognized as
indispensable, when it comes to meeting the Nation's
objectives.
But, I am concerned. I am more concerned today than I was
at my last testimony. We have to modernize to maintain our
technological advantage and this is something we have set aside
over the last few years. Our potential enemies or adversaries
have been watching us and now know what it takes to create the
best air force in the world.
They are investing in technologies and doing everything
they can to reduce our current airpower advantage. Because we
have the smallest and oldest Air Force in history, we need all
of our airmen to be proficient in every aspect of their
mission. Unfortunately our high operations tempo has caused our
airmen to only be proficient in the jobs they do when they
deploy. We simply do not have the time and resources to train
airmen across the full spectrum of Air Force missions.
I am confident that, with your help, we can reverse this
trend and regain our readiness. But, we will have to make some
difficult choices to balance capacity, capability, and
readiness, all of which have been already cut to the bone.
Our fiscal year 2016 President's budget submission aims to
balance critical operational training and modernization
commitments. But even at this level, it will take years to
recover lost readiness. We have already delayed major
modernization efforts, cut manpower, and reduced training
dollars.
One final point, the capability gap that separates us from
the other air forces is narrowing. That gap will close even
faster under BCA levels of funding. When sequestration first
hit in 2013, we saw the domino effect it had on our pilots,
maintainers, weapons loaders, air traffic controllers, and our
fighter and bomber squadrons. Readiness levels of those central
combat operations plummeted. In short, we were not fully ready,
and we cannot afford to let that happen again.
To quote a young C-17 instructor pilot, ``I am committed to
defending this Nation any time and any place. But I need the
training and equipment to be ready to perform at my best.''
This is critical to answering the Nation's call to fly, fight,
and win.
I would like to thank all of you for the opportunity to be
here today and your continued support of your Air Force. I am
now happy to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Spencer can be found in
the Appendix on page 92.]
Mr. Wittman. General Spencer, thank you. And thank the
members of the panel here. Before I go to Ms. Bordallo, I do
want to make a comment. Obviously, yesterday's budget that
passed does put money back into the Nation's military. Much of
it in the overseas contingency operation funds. The good new is
that it does allow the HASC [House Armed Services Committee] to
authorize to $613 billion. And it allows the appropriators to
appropriate to that number. It puts no restrictions on how the
OCO dollars are then used to do that.
Now there are internal OMB [Office of Management and
Budget] restrictions that we are going to have to address, I
believe, in that particular effort. It is not the best way to
run the military, to do funding that is base mission through
contingency funding. The definition of contingency is something
that is unusual or unexpected. Obviously, funding this Nation's
military is not unusual or unexpected. So it does create,
again, a gap next year.
I think, though, if used properly, it can be a forcing
mechanism to make Congress come to grips with the tough
decisions it has to make and it is not just there in the
spending on the military side. It is the most immediate. The
Congress has to address all the different parts of the budget.
And if it doesn't address the biggest ticket items, the
autopilot spending programs in an adult way, without thrashing
each other here, and I am talking about Members of Congress
thrashing each other about what it does or does not do to the
individuals involved, instead, making sure that it is viable,
then we can get this fixed.
But our immediate challenge is to make sure the dollars are
there for the military today. The budget that passed yesterday,
while not the most desirable mechanism, does allow the
appropriators and the authorizers to get to the $613 billion
number. So it does allow at least some relief. But as with
everything else, you want to be able to look in the window past
this year, too, to determine the long-term needs. That is where
our effort has to come in.
So with that, I will go to Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
thank the witnesses for their very frank opening statements and
the real challenges that you have to face in the future. I
appreciate your being very forward in that.
I have two questions, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to ask
of each. So if you could kind of put your answers together in a
quick way, because we do have quite a few members that I know
want to ask questions. I will start with General Allyn. How
does OCO funding affect execution of your current baseline
funding?
General Allyn. Yes. Congresswoman Bordallo, the OCO
funding, while it is better than not receiving the increased
funding that is essential to achieve the outcomes that the
President's budget set forth, the restrictions that are
inherent in OCO funding, as the chairman highlighted, with
regard to OMB's current rules, do not allow us to have the
flexibility required to get at home station readiness for units
that are not deploying in support of a contingency operation.
It also does not allow multiyear funding, which means we cannot
use it for critical modernization programs in acquisition and
procurement.
And so, the restrictions truly create challenges and hard
decisions under the current rule set. So as we discussed
yesterday with the Senate committee, we would need
significantly greater flexibility. What is built into the
current President's budget is a $3 billion to $6 billion OCO-
to-base transfer requirement per year. And so what we are doing
is increasing that through funding base requirements through
OCO funding. And this is a year-to-year drill and we need
predictable, consistent funding to get at the readiness that we
are talking about here today, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Admiral.
Admiral Howard. Ma'am, very similar to the Army, it is the
multiyear constraints that is toughest for the Navy,
particularly when you look at shipbuilding and ship
contracting. And then for--and then in the past there have been
restraints on OCO where it could not be used to buy individual
platforms such as aircraft.
And so when you look at procurement and you look at our
ability to modernize, OCO, the way it is currently set up, is
not available for us. And clearly for a capital ship intensive
force, multiyear funding is essential for us to continue to
grow the Navy. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
General.
General Paxton. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo.
Same thing my two counterparts said. The other issue is--to
remind is that all the services probably spend well over 50
percent of their TOA dollar on people. They are our most
important resource, our most important weapon. But in order to
recruit, retain, PCS [permanent change of station] move, we
spend most of the money on people.
The largest chunk for most of the rest of us is in
operations and maintenance. So the things that we need and the
reason our readiness is degraded is because of inability to put
sufficient money into modernization, inability to put
sufficient money into sustainment. Modernization in the Marine
Corps is only 9 percent of our dollar right now.
And the OCO money addresses the O&M and the direct linkages
to the current place we are in--it doesn't give us the help we
need to continue to modernize and to buy those big platforms we
need.
So thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Next?
General Spencer. Again, ma'am, similar story. A couple of
things--the Air Force is very capital-intensive, so as General
Allyn mentioned, the ability to plan to buy weapon systems, you
know, F-35 bomber, tanker that we are trying to procure, C-130,
multiyear contracts, that multiyear allows us to have a really
good deal, funding-wise. Those type of things, it is hard to
really plan for if you get one year's worth of money.
The other thing is there are some issues with OCO. For
example, one of the OCO rules allows us to buy replacement
munitions that we have expended in the war. So we can buy smart
munitions that can get pretty expensive, that we expended last
year. We can't budget for projected weapons that we are going
to use. So it puts us behind by a year. So that is something
that would concern me.
I haven't read the details, but I don't know what the
timing of the OCO budget would be. Would it be simultaneous or
would it come later? If it came later, like it does in a lot of
cases, again, there are problems inherent with that. What is
the total going to be, finally? How are we going to know how
much we are going to get? What is in there between O&M and
procurement?
There are rules, for example, you have to execute 80
percent of your O&M by July. If we get a late OCO, is that
going to be a problem?
OCO to base has been touched on. That is something we are
all worried about. If we wake up one day and OCO is gone, what
do we do? And you know, in the Air Force's case, we have got
several bases in the Middle East that were stood up and are
paid for today with OCO funding that we are told will probably
endure, will probably stay for the long term. That is fine. But
then we will have to figure out where does that money come from
that is now in OCO that we will have to put into the base.
As my colleagues already mentioned, that is now
exacerbating this sort of OCO-to-base transfer, at some point.
It just further mixes and blurs the lines between the base and
emergency contingency, essentially.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you.
Now I have one quick question here, also, if you could
answer. Current defense planning guidance says the United
States military should be prepared to do three things: one, win
a big war; two, prevail in a smaller contingency; and three,
protect the homeland, all at the same time. Can your service do
that now? And how will the fiscal year 2016 budget request
change all of that?
General.
General Allyn. Yes, Congresswoman. I think we have touched
on this already and the fact of the matter is that we are on
the lower ragged edge of our capacity to do that with the
President's budget.
And the highlight that I made about our consuming readiness
as rapidly as we are generating it means that our ability to
respond to the unknown contingencies, to reinforce either the
major fight or the deterrence fight is significantly strained.
And we know what that--it is very easy to say constrain. That
sounds clean. It is not clean.
It means we are late to the fight in one or both locations
with sufficient capacity and we either fail in our mission or
we increase the loss of life to those committed forward from
the joint force, as well as innocent civilians that we are
charged to protect in accordance with our national security
interests.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Howard. Ma'am, so within those major missions you
talked about, the Navy has some very specific responsibilities.
One is strategic deterrence. And no matter what happens, we
will maintain zero risk in strategic deterrence.
But when you talk about projecting power despite anti-
access/area-denial circumstances and then this deterring and
defeating an aggressor, winning the war, with the PB16 budget,
those are still at risk. But if you talk BCA, then we will not
be able to project power and we would not be able to deter and
defeat aggression.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
General.
General Paxton. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Your Marine Corps, of course, is--we consider ourselves to
be the 911 force, the crisis response force. And that is our
focus. So as I said in the opening statement, we guarantee that
we will have ready forces for the fight-tonight mission. But to
your question, ma'am, the contingency mission or the deliberate
operations plan, that is when we have to go to our home station
units who are already at lower than 50 percent readiness and
are degraded.
So the answer, then, would be yes, but. They are coming.
Yes, they will be there, but they will be later, but they will
not have the right leaders in the right positions, but they
won't be fully trained. So we are going to accept risk in our
ability to respond and to win in a contingency and in a war.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
General.
General Spencer. Yes, ma'am. To answer your question
directly, could we meet the Defense Strategic Guidance at the
President's budget level? Yes. Just barely. Could we execute
the Defense Strategic Guidance under sequestration? No.
One of the ways we describe the Air Force sometimes, and I
think all my colleagues could probably describe their services
similar, it is almost like a light switch. I mean, you cut on a
light switch and if we go into a contingency, we expect air
superiority to just happen. We expect if someone launches a
weapon, a GPS [Global Positioning System] will just guide it to
where it needs to go. You know, we expect our nuclear deterrent
to work so we don't get a nuclear attack.
We expect those things to happen. That is what the American
people expect of us, and that is what we want to provide. I get
concerned in sequestration that we are going to cut that light
switch on and some things are not going to work.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. We will now go to Mr.
Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess most of my questions will be for you, General
Spencer. I want to talk a little bit about the civilian
workforce, but I would ask a favor of you, all of you, and that
maybe you go back and review some of the testimony from a few
years ago when the reductions in your force were being referred
to as rightsizing by your own leadership and it was the Armed
Services Committee that was trying to stop those reductions in
force size. And quite honestly the leadership at the Pentagon
was supporting the President's position in reducing them.
I would just ask that you go back and read the testimony of
your leaders from just a few years ago when they felt like
those cuts were acceptable and we were trying to stop some of
them.
But I represent Robins Air Force Base, a tremendous
civilian workforce, crucial role in generating readiness for
our Air Force. And one of my concerns is that there continue to
be proposals to cut the civilian defense workforce. They go
well beyond any of the Department proposals. Existing law
already mandates cuts in the civilian workforce similar to
those of uniformed personnel.
And my concern is in two forms. It would have a direct
impact on the ability to deliver weapon systems on time and on
budget for our depots, or from our depots, I should say. And
secondly, if you arbitrarily reduce the civilian workforce,
would that not add stress to the uniformed personnel and
soldiers and airmen, who would be forced to spend less time
training for the missions and more time performing non-mission-
related tasks?
So General Spencer, could you speak to the arbitrary cuts
to the civilian workforce and what impact they have on Air
Force readiness?
General Spencer. Congressman, first of all, maybe--we are
in violent agreement. I agree with everything you said. As you
know, I was stationed at Robins, I have been stationed at all
the Air Force depots. I love it. Robins is a great community,
great workforce, great work ethic. If you could clarify for me
the arbitrary reductions you are talking about. We have had
some headquarters reductions, 20 percent headquarters reduction
that was mandated by the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense].
I am sorry.
Mr. Scott. I am sorry, General. These are legislative
proposals from other Members of Congress.
General Spencer. Okay, okay, I am sorry. Yes, no, that
would not work for us. It would not work. I am not sure if
everyone has the sort of right perspective on civilian
employees. You know, first of all, 96 percent of our civilian
employees don't work in the National Capital Region. They are
out in the field, getting our mission done, turning wrenches,
making--launching airplanes, launching satellites. These are
critical to the mission of the Air Force, no doubt about it.
And so any--we cannot afford to impact our civilian
workforce with an arbitrary cut. Period, dot.
Mr. Scott. They are extremely skilled and when we break
faith with them we run the risk of losing some of the most
talented people with regard to rebuilding our airplanes and the
weapon systems that our warfighters need. And I am extremely
concerned about the lack of knowledge with regard to their
value to national security with some of our members. Not with
you or with the people at the Department of Defense, but with
some of my colleagues.
And just one other thing with regard to that, the trends
and the costs of weapons and the system sustainment, the
increases there. Can you give any assessment of what the
drivers of that and what we can do to help reverse that trend?
General Spencer. Yes, Congressman. One of the primary
drivers of weapon systems sustainment cost increase is the
aging of our systems. So as our systems get older or the parts
break faster, a lot of the manufacturers go out of business, we
have to manufacture the parts, it just becomes an expensive
proposition to maintain old weapon systems.
So we could certainly use your help not only to sustain the
weapon systems costs that we have now, but to help us with our
modernization so we can get new systems into our inventory.
Mr. Scott. Thank you for that.
And one of the things that you mentioned that I caught on
was when manufacturers go out of business. And that is where I
think it is extremely important for national security for us to
maintain organic capabilities. And while we can, through 50/50
and other things, share that workload with the private sector,
from a national security standpoint, we have to have the
ability as a country to deliver those weapons systems to the
men and women in the fight.
Again, I want to thank all of you for being here, and, you
know, just hope again that you will take time to go back and
look at the testimony from just a couple of years ago, where
members of the Armed Services Committee were trying to stop the
reductions. And it is hard for us to keep you fully funded if
the leadership of the DOD [Department of Defense] isn't
standing with us.
General Paxton. Congressman Scott, if I may, sir--and this
is the third I have been--had the honor and the privilege to
testify before this subcommittee. And we will certainly take
your guidance there and go back and review testimony. But I
would just like to be clear for the record that when the
leadership comes over to testify, we talk about the POM
[Program Objective Memorandum] as submitted. And we talk about
the ability to execute the defense guidance with the POM as
submitted. When we get the marks, and then particularly, when
we are very clear for 3 or 4 years in a row about the
devastating effects of the Budget Control Act, we are now 4
years into POMs that have been adjusted, and 2 years after a
BCA.
I think we are all pretty clear that we are at the lower
ragged edge. And we are in hopes that through the good offices
of this committee and subcommittee back to the larger House, we
can send the message that this is devastating to the ability of
the Department of Defense to safeguard the Nation.
Mr. Scott. General, I didn't support those cuts. And I was
concerned when I first heard about the reductions in personnel
that it was taking this away from a primary goal of 1:3 in
dwell time for Active Duty and 1:5 for Guard and Reserve.
So, with that, I am past my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For General Allyn, I would like to get your thoughts on a
recent decision made to keep us at near 10,000 in Afghanistan
through the rest of this year, first. And then along the same
line, I would like you to discuss the Army's preparations for
potentially having to use ground forces in Iraq and Syria.
I know nobody wants to do that, and it is not part of the
President's request for this authorization for use of military
force. But I think it is within reason to assume that if we
want to achieve the President's stated goals, with the current
forces that are on the ground, we have to seriously consider
this.
I am assuming you have planned for that. And what I want to
know is, within this budget, do we have the resources to meet
our commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to every
other potential threat that has been outlined earlier.
General Allyn. Thank you, Congressman O'Rourke. I
appreciate both of your questions. And to Afghanistan first--I
believe this is a very good outcome for accomplishing the
mission that was established in what we were set forth to do
with our Resolute Support mission.
I was fortunate to be in Afghanistan in early February. And
I was able to get out and meet with all of our leaders, and
particularly with our two divisions that are deployed over
there providing both essential mission command and advise and
assist support to our Afghan security forces, from the 1st
Calvary Division in Texas and from the 3rd Infantry Division in
Georgia.
And both of these missions were being accomplished with
great leadership, with great focus, with great precision, but
with significant risk, as we were drawing down the forces while
still trying to maintain touch with the capabilities when the
Afghan security forces that needed to be finished. So, I----
Mr. O'Rourke. And I don't want to interrupt you, but I have
got limited time.
General Allyn. Okay.
Mr. O'Rourke. The two scenarios I just described are new
over the course of this year. We weren't necessarily
anticipating them a year ago. How has that changed how we are
prepared to fund those in this budget?
General Allyn. Yes. Well, we do appreciate the increase in
OCO because the increased numbers in Afghanistan are greater
than what was programmed. We did, however, program to train the
forces to backfill the forces that are there now, and to
continue that in case it was required. So, we will be trained
and ready to continue this mission. And I believe the OCO
funding increase will enable us to meet that to include the
increase in ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] that is above what was originally programmed
for this year. And we will meet that.
In terms of our ability to meet the response that may be
required in Iraq--just as we were capable of deploying the 3rd
Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne Division in response
to the initial advise and assist increase, we will have forces
prepared when called.
Now, clearly----
Mr. O'Rourke. And those forces are funded within this
budget?
General Allyn. Yes. The President's budget fully funds our
combat training center rotations, where we prepare all of our
units for full-spectrum mission readiness.
Sequestration will put that at risk because units will not
arrive at the combat training centers as ready as they should
be. And that will potentially put us at risk. So, the
President's budget does enable us to do that.
Mr. O'Rourke. If I am reading this correctly, the Army's
total O&M, which funds our readiness, is down a little from
last year. Is that reflecting the reduction in force size, and
will that continue to track if we stay under current caps to
2020, when the total force size is down to 420,000?
General Allyn. Well, first of all, all of our current end
strength above 490,000 is funded in OCO. So, it is not a
reflection for this year of a drawdown in our force. It is
really a reflection of we got 5 billion less dollars this year,
and we had to take some cuts. And, as General Spencer
highlighted, we really only have two places to draw it from. We
are going to pay for our people, because that is a sacred trust
and we are going to meet that requirement. So it either comes
out of O&M or modernization. And we have had to make very hard
choices in both of those. We reduced our modernization 25
percent, even in the President's budget submission. And so, we
are facing a very tough balancing act. And the reflection of
the reduced O&M reflects that--those hard choices.
Mr. O'Rourke. In conclusion, you know, couldn't agree more
with General Paxton that our people are going to be our
greatest resource and our greatest weapon. And with your
conclusion that unless we do some difficult things, make some
tough decisions like a BRAC [base realignment and closure],
like rethinking compensation, pension, and health--you
mentioned restructuring aviation--then we are going to have cut
people. And for me, that is not acceptable.
So, I appreciate your testimony today.
I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate, once
again, other comments that were made in regards to your candor.
You know, I am obviously concerned about how we move forward.
You know, we have been struggling as a Congress to figure out
what do we do about sequestration. And that is not your
problem. That is our problem. But I do--or I am concerned,
though, as we move forward. I think that--I think we have
learned some things about our withdrawal from Iraq that put us
in the position that we are today, with trying to figure out,
``Now, what do we do with the downfall, what is going on within
Iraq?'' And so, you know, I was happy to see the President
didn't draw down more troops in Afghanistan. I worry about what
he wants to do next year, obviously, at the end of 2016, to
draw out all of our forces. I think that we put ourselves in
the same predicament that we are today in Iraq, where we are
not quite ready. And I think that President Ghani made that
pretty clear.
While he wants to do as much as he can, that country,
obviously, is in a tough spot. Because of their ability to
raise money, to, you know, get employment within their own
country. So, I worry that if we were to actually follow what
the President wants to do, and withdraw our forces at the end
of 2016, we would be in a comparable situation that we find
ourselves in today in Iraq, figuring out, what do we do? And I
agree with Mr. O'Rourke that, you know, I don't want my sons
going back to Iraq and Afghanistan in the fight. But I also
believe that without Americans leading from the front, that we
will not get to the end state that we want to see ourselves in
for those countries in question.
So, my question is on--is obviously on readiness. And,
General Allyn, I worry that when we hear the Army is at 33
percent readiness, that should cause a lot of pause amongst all
of our colleagues within the House of Representatives.
And, you know, our constitutional requirement is to defend
this Nation, number one--is the number one constitutional
requirement. We kind of forgot that in the myriad of all the
other requests and wants, and nice to have things that, you
know, are good to have. But we forgot that we need to actually
worry about you all in regards to providing for the common
defense.
I do worry when we start talking about balancing a budget
on the backs of the men and women that are out there, that
are--that have volunteered to serve this country. And I get
really upset and worried that the Pentagon is--and I understand
where you are coming from--but the Pentagon is willing to
sacrifice some of that, you know, to meet the mission, while
instead of saying, You know what? We need to start talking
about keeping compensation. Now for future compensation, that
is not an issue, I think, but you can talk about that. But I
worry that, you know, we want to balance a budget on the backs
of these men and women that have given everything, and are
willing to give everything in the defense of this country.
So, General Allyn, how do we actually--how do we keep the
people that we are talking about, that we don't want to lose;
those great NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and officers that
are at risk? How do we actually keep them in service of their
country, if we start cutting compensation?
General Allyn. Well, thank you, Congressman Nugent. I will
say, first and foremost, our great soldiers and leaders are
meeting the demands that are placed before them, and are
volunteering to stay. Our retention rate remains very, very
high--over 113 percent last year of the goal.
Mr. Nugent. Great.
General Allyn. So, our leaders want to serve on this
great----
Mr. Nugent. I know they do. I know they do, but----
General Allyn [continuing]. Army--and I believe that the
most important thing that we must do is sustain their trust.
And their trust is sustained through predictable funding that
is consistently delivered, and enables us to have them trained
and ready for the missions that are required of them. That is
the first and foremost responsibility that we have.
Because as you said, defending our Nation is job one. And
they are committed to that and we must be committed to them. I
will highlight that the cost of a soldier has doubled since
2001. Okay.
So it is important to keep that in mind and, you know, we
believe that some of the compensation reform that we are
proposing is reasonable, without putting the balancing the
budget on the back of the soldier. We would never put forth
something that puts the burden on the soldier who has
volunteered to serve his country.
Mr. Nugent. Well, I just know that, you know, from a family
perspective, when--typically it is the wife who does the
budget, who does the checks, makes sure everything gets paid.
And when they see a reduction in their BAH [basic allowance for
housing], that creates a stress.
And I know we haven't actually had to deal with that yet,
but that will create a stress on the force that may not be
apparent today, but, you know, when you have got the wife back
home nipping at your heels because she is the one that is doing
the budget and writing the checks, that is a big issue. And I
think that is one of those things that compounds in the future
and it is not in your face today.
And so I just--I worry from that standpoint. We need--and
you talk about it, families are so important in keeping our
soldiers and airmen and marines and sailors out there in the
fight. So I appreciate all your comments.
Anything else that anybody would like to ask?
General Paxton. Thanks, Congressman. We are keenly aware
that your soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines represent
somewhere between one-half and one percent of the American
population. I mean, one-half of one percent, right. So our goal
is to make sure, as General Allyn said, when they go into a
fight, (a) we never want them to go into a fair fight. They
ought to have all the tools at their behest to win. And we want
them to have confidence. We want to have confidence in their
gear, confidence in their training, and confidence in their
leadership.
So every time we submit the budget, every time we
articulate the budget, every time we defend the budget, it is
with that in mind--to take care of that one-half of one percent
to accomplish the difficult missions our Nation gives us and to
ensure that every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine has that
confidence.
And as you said a minute ago, we may enlist a soldier,
sailor, airman, and marine, but we are going to reenlist a
family.
General Spencer. And Congressman, I certainly appreciate
your comments. I am actually--I am prior enlisted. I spent 7
years enlisted. Back then, I know what it was like to live from
paycheck to paycheck. And my wife was nipping at my heels.
Actually she still does. But that is a different----
Mr. Nugent. I have been married 40 years. I understand.
General Spencer. That is for a different hearing. But the--
what we wrestle with, I think, is balance. And so clearly we
need to provide, I think, General Allyn used the term
reasonable amount of compensation. But we all owe our men and
women in uniform the equipment and the training they need if we
have to send them in harm's way.
And so as budgets draw down, particularly if you get into a
sequestration environment, yes, you have to focus on
compensation, but we have to send our folks forward in harm's
way with the right equipment and the right training. And so,
that is what we are wrestling with--finding out what the
reasonable amount of compensation is in the context of
balancing the other things that they need.
Admiral Howard. I would like to add, their compensation for
what we ask them to do is extremely important. But there are
immediate impacts to the quality of their service when we
sequester. I was the Deputy for Fleet Forces Commander when we
sequestered in 2013.
It is a bad day for a commander when you have to go down to
the waterfront, go on a cruiser and tell those folks they are
not deploying, they are not getting underway. The commanding
officer, the chiefs, the sailors, that is how they qualify.
That is their core profession. And they are going to be tied up
next to a pier.
We will lose people because they will not have satisfaction
because they will not be able to do their jobs, as well as if
we have to impact compensation.
Mr. Nugent. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Nugent.
We will go now to Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
panelists here today. Thank you for your service, achievements,
and sacrifices, and for the sacrifices of your families.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, put significant emphasis on
restoring deterrence principles of peace through strength by
reasserting the ability of the Global Response Force. I
acknowledge the comments here this morning with regard to
sequester and the need for steady and consistent funding. And
that is really a point for my colleagues here. We have to work
together on that and have the temperament to solve these
problems.
We had an opportunity in 2012 with the bipartisan budget
that was inspired by Simpson-Bowles; it only got 38 votes.
Whatever it is, if we are going to do something big like that
or if we are going to do something like Ryan-Murray, now is the
time. We have got to start assembling the coalition to get that
done.
That being said, Mr. Chairman, what I think our committee
should do is document the risk as it relates to the Global
Response Force. So I have a specific question here today,
recognizing we are in an unclassified setting, so you may not
be able to specifically respond to it. You can maybe generally
respond to it, but for the record, if you could specifically to
respond to it, and the staff will assemble.
And it has to do with the war plans now with regard to the
Global Response Force, your specific requirements and where you
stand today in terms of readiness to meet those requirements.
And you use two categories, please, the President's budget and
sequester. So we can document that here in the committee and
that will allow us, as myself, I will own this, and then
perhaps the committee, that we communicate with our colleagues
that we can address this.
So I would like to begin actually with the Air Force and
then work our way on the panel.
General Spencer. Yes, Congressman. Again, to answer your
question directly, with the President's budget we could respond
just barely. On sequestration, we could not. Probably any
deeper than that getting into war plans I would like to come
back and brief you in a classified session, if we could.
[On 15 April, General Welsh gave a classified readiness
briefing to the House Armed Services Committee in which
Congressman Gibson was in attendance.]
General Paxton. Yes, thank you, Congressman. And I can in
the unclassified setting give you two fairly good illustrative
examples. And the subject for us is amphibious ships. And we
work very closely with my counterpart, VCNO [Vice Chief of
Naval Operations], and with the Navy. We have probably one of
the best working relationships we have had in years.
But we have a problem with amphibious ships. And we have a
problem with inventory. And we have a problem with
availability. And there are two different metrics for doing
this. One is the steady state, when all the combatant commands
would like to have sailors and marines forward-deployed around
the world to be there when it most matters and to respond at a
crisis tonight.
The CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and the Commandant are
on record as saying we need somewhere north of 50 ships to be
able to answer all the current crisis and contingency combat
and command requirements.
To your specific question about war plans and contingency
response, we know that under the two most stressing war plans,
we would need 38 amphibious ships. That is a matter of record.
That is a matter before Congress.
We have agreed under our budget-constrained environment the
better part of two decades ago that we would do it with 33. But
that 33 was predicated on having 33 available, having the money
for the 33, or being willing to put them in the yard for a
required maintenance with the expectation that 90 percent of
them will be operationally available and be able to get
underway within the timelines to meet the war plans.
Right now we don't have 33 ships. We don't even have 30 on
the waterfront. We are not going to get to 33 for another year,
and we are not going to get the right 33 until 2024, until the
end of the decade. So we have an inventory problem.
And then because of furlough and sequestration in the
shipyards, we have an availability problem where we can't get
them out and get them on their way.
So the Navy-Marine team, in general, and the Marine Corps
in specific, we think amphibious ships are very, very
challenged under the current budget, let alone sequestration.
Thank you, sir.
Admiral Howard. Thank you, Congressman.
As we consumed readiness and as I have mentioned earlier,
we are in the process of resetting--doing the maintenance on a
lot of these ships. Today we can--we keep deployed two carrier
striker groups. So that is a carrier with a cruiser and
associated destroyers. And we have enough readiness to have one
that we can surge.
And then for an Amphibious Readiness Group [ARG], which is
normally a large amphib with two smallers, an LSD [Dock Landing
Ship] and LPD [Landing Platform Dock], we are keeping two
deployed with a third that we can surge. This is the lowest we
have been probably since I have been in the Navy. And we, as
General Paxton pointed out, we are on a path, with this budget,
to reset and get us back to having two carriers deployed and
three in surge capacity, and having two ARGs deployed with
three in a standby capacity.
For the carrier strike groups, that is about fiscal year
2018, and then for the Amphibious Ready Groups that is about
fiscal year 2020. But that presumes we have a budget, we have
multiyear, we can continue to buy the ships we are buying and
that we can continue to do the money to do the maintenance, and
then the money to do the training for our people. Thank you.
General Allyn. Thank you, Congressman Gibson. And it is
appropriate for you to ask this question from a joint force
perspective because, as you know, and thank God I have never
deployed to war with anything less than a joint force, in our
Army contingent of the Global Response Force is a relatively
small component that is capable of forced entry, early entry
operations, but absolutely dependent upon the readiness of
follow-on forces to accomplish the missions that are likely to
be required of it.
And that depends upon all of us having the forces ready. As
you know from your time in the 82nd Airborne Division, we don't
get anywhere without the Air Force, all right. They put the air
in airborne and the capacity to get the global reach. And we
depend upon the forces of the Marine Corps and the Navy to
enable us to have the joint capabilities that are required.
So we require that. It is at risk, for sure, with
sequestration. And we have prioritized the Army contingent, but
we have done so by going to tier readiness and sequestration.
So we will have a Global Response Force capability, but the
follow-on forces will have insufficient training and
insufficient readiness to reinforce, if required.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you. I thank the panelists for their
responses.
And Mr. Chairman, as I yield back, I reiterate, I think we
should take this on. We have--we generally have one slide that
shows top line numbers and I think that has been effective in
talking to our colleagues. But I think if we had a finer point,
if we had fidelity, as it would, relates to this, and even if
it has to go at the classified level, I think it would be
something that very resonates among our colleagues.
Pat, I would ask you to take this on, Pat McGuigan, with
the staff that we can pull this together, because we are going
to get this for the record.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Gibson. I couldn't agree with
you more. What we have tried to do is to make sure that these
types of bundles of information are available to everyone, but
specifically non-HASC members to be able to sit down in a
secure setting, because you have to be able to talk about these
things at the top-secret level. So we will work with the staff
to make sure that those are available. We have done those in
the past.
And Mr. Gibson, we will work with you and the vice chiefs
and the chiefs and make sure we have that information
available. And we will schedule another round of briefings for
members to come in, so they can get the details on this.
At this point, I ask unanimous consent that non-
subcommittee members be allowed to participate in today's
hearing, after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity
to ask questions. Is there objections? Without objection, non-
subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time
for 5 minutes.
With that, Mr. Russell.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me join
the committee this morning. I guess, the big concern that I
see, and General Allyn, you pointed it out in your testimony,
about in terms of brigades, 36 brigades will be reduced to
individual and crew-level training. The last time that we saw
any combination of effort among our services in--you know, with
formations of vehicles, paratroopers, air strikes, in
combination with all of the service forces and the harder
things that we do, was in 2003.
The company commanders at that time with 4 to 6 years
service would now be battalion commanders. The battalion
commanders at the time if they are still around, would be major
generals. And so, we have seen a migration of leadership at
both the NCO level and the officer level where, even knowing
how to do these things is being lost, our core capabilities.
And then we see a foreign policy shift with statements from the
White House, talking about a shift to the Pacific with all of
the difficulties that jungle warfare and long logistic lines
would create for our armed services.
I have to say, I can't think of a time in our history,
except maybe 1940, where we stand a greater risk. And at that
time, we saw 160,000 Americans surrender because we couldn't
get to them in the Philippines. It wasn't for lack of fighting
spirit. It wasn't for lack of training. It was just for lack of
resources to be able to get to them. And so, with that, we all
know that we can fight with whatever insufficient implements we
have, if we have good, strong leaders.
As I look at the training base and see some of that, the
focus now is being reduced as you had mentioned, General Allyn,
it reduced to individual and crew level with our combat
brigades. I am sure this can be extended to fleets, airframes,
all kinds of things. How do we survive that?
General Allyn. Thanks, Congressman Russell. And as you
know, the Chief of Staff of the Army's top priority for our
Army for the last 2 years has been developing the leaders that
will thrive in the uncertain and ambiguous world that we live
in today. That commitment has remained and concurrent with our
demand to restore our full-spectrum capability, the kind of
force you talked about that fought and marched to Baghdad, that
fought so effectively in Iraq and Afghanistan, is under way at
our combat training centers.
So our combat training centers deliver both the leaders
required for the future, with the skills required to dominate
in this uncertain world that we live in, and the agility to
respond to the unexpected and to thrive under adversity. That
is happening each and every day, each and every rotation at our
combat training centers.
We will do 14 decisive action rotations at the National
Training Center. Fourteen brigade combat teams will receive
that training this year, building to 17 over the course of the
next 3 years. And so, we are getting after that, but it depends
upon predictable funding. And it really depends upon enabling
us to increase the funding for our home station training so we
arrive at those training centers ready to fully take advantage
of the complexity of the training environment we deliver and
the challenges that occur there. And frankly, as some of our
members have seen, our leaders respond with amazing, amazing
results. And you can be very, very proud of how committed they
are to being ready for the next conflict.
Mr. Russell. Thank you.
Admiral Howard. Thank you, Congressman. In terms of the
rebalance to the Pacific, there may be a different perspective
for those of us in the maritime domain. When you look at the
countries that live in the Pacific or the Pacific Rim, they are
investing in their militaries and they are investing in their
navies. This is a different perspective than the countries of
the Western nations which, some of them are struggling to meet
2 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product] despite
commitments.
And in addition, I think sometimes we forget the Pacific
not only holds countries with significant capability, like
China, but Russia is in the Pacific. And our relationship with
Russia, clearly, is changing. In addition, there are many
countries that either have nuclear weapons or are attempting to
get nuclear weapons and they, too, are in the Pacific.
So from our perspective, when you look at who is investing
in their navies, where there are potential fault lines of
conflict, there is a potential it could be in the maritime
domain. And it is our responsibility to be ready for that.
That said, with this budget, even with the President's
budget, we have had to slow down a modernization for both
ballistic missile defense and then to be able to fight in an
anti-access/area denial. And so, then under sequestration, we
would probably lose all of our modernization. And it has
generally been our technological edge as a Navy that has
allowed us to maintain maritime superiority. Thank you.
General Paxton. Thank you, Congressman Russell, nice to see
you again. Appreciate your time.
Mr. Russell. Good to see you, General.
General Paxton. A little bit from both what General Allyn
just offered and what Admiral Howard just offered. We, as a
ground-centric force, if you will, in the Marine Corps, and as
a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, we have aviation assets, so not
to be confused.
But when we look at a protracted ground campaign, we need
to have leaders who are ready at home station, so we suffer
from the same sacrifices we have had to make through budgetary
constraints at home station ranges and training areas. So we
have qualified leaders, we have qualified training. And we are
going to guarantee--and this testimony was before you came
today. Well, we will guarantee that the crisis response force,
the fight-tonight force is ready to go. The issue is who is
back at home station and have we crimped our modernization and
our sustainment costs where we are unable to train them at home
station.
The second piece--back to both what Admiral Howard said
about the Asia-Pacific region and to an earlier comment from
General Allyn--it is a joint force. We depend on the
capabilities of other services. If we can't train with ISR and
get the feeds that we need, the intel [intelligence] feeds,
which come from--a lot of them from other services, then our
training is reduced.
For our aviation arm and we can have all the best pilots in
the world and we can work hard to get our aircraft through the
maintenance pipeline, but if the ships aren't out there, then
we don't get deck bounces, and we don't get night-vision
qualifications. And then consequently, the unit that goes will
get them and the unit at home station will go into the fight
having untrained pilots. So we are at risk for that, certainly.
General Spencer. And thank you also for your question,
Congressman. I think the example you used in--with the
Philippines was a good one because not much keeps me up at
night. But the fact--I mean, the Air Force was born and it has
its foundation in innovation and technology. And I am really
concerned that the gap--and we have enjoyed a technological
edge--I am really concerned that that is closing and it is
closing pretty fast.
And you know, we have always been in a position where our
potential adversaries would wake up and say, where in the world
did they get that technology from, how did they do that? I am
afraid we are going to wake up and say, where in the world did
they get that from and now what are we going to do about it?
That bothers me. And I just see that walking away from us, and
I don't--I am concerned I don't see a hue and cry as to what
do--we need to stop this.
And so, I couldn't agree with you more. I mean, we need the
resources. This is not about just getting more money. I mean,
we want to--I think the American people--I mean, this is not,
you know, a Super Bowl game where if you lose, you come back
and play next year. The expectation of us is we go in and we
win and we win every time and we win decisively. And I get
worried about that, as we continue to draw down the DOD budget,
are we going to be to deliver that?
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Russell. We will now go to Ms.
Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
just a simple question and maybe a statement. General Allyn, I
was well-pleased to hear that recruitment is up to par. And you
were the one that commented on that, were you not, the
recruitment?
General Allyn. Ma'am, I actually commented on retention.
Ms. Bordallo. Retention, yes.
General Allyn. But the recruitment this year is okay, as
well.
Ms. Bordallo. Good.
General Allyn. In the future year, it is at risk.
Ms. Bordallo. Let me--yes, let me say I am looking to the
future. And if we continue to draw down on funding, certainly,
we are putting our young men and women at risk. How anxious
will they be to join the military and how will their families
feel about this? So I think this is another situation that we
have got to look at.
I mean, certainly if--you know, and this is widely known,
if sequestration continues, we have to continue to draw down on
funding. They know that our military may weaken them, that you
are putting their young men and women in harm's way when they
are out there, you know, trying to win a war. So I think that
the recruitment numbers will be probably going down as well.
That is just a statement, and I was just thinking about it.
But I do have a question for you, General Allyn. What is
the status of the Army Sustainable Readiness Model? What
assumptions are being made in the development of the model and
how is the National Guard being incorporated into the model?
General Allyn. Well, thank you, ma'am.
First of all, let me hit the recruiting, because it is
important to highlight the fact that, of our 17- to 24-year-old
young Americans, about 360,000 of them across all of America
meet the prerequisites to become a member of the Armed Forces.
Okay. That is the starting point. But they are also the same
population that the colleges are attracting and that businesses
are attracting. And so, we are all competing for that--what I--
we like to refer to as the top 1 percent or less of America.
The Army requires 120,000 of that 360,000 just to sustain
our current force level, okay. So we are absolutely laser-
focused on the challenges of recruiting going forward. We are
putting additional resources at it in terms of people and
money. But at the end of the day, we believe that our young
Americans still want to serve on this championship Armed Forces
team that we field.
And sustaining trust with our people is absolutely
essential in accomplishing that.
To the Sustainable Readiness Model question, it is a total
force model. Everything that we do is about the total force. We
fight as a total force. We train as a total force. We recruit
as a total force. We retain as a total force. And so it is
absolutely a component of our effort.
And specifically what we are working with the National
Guard Bureau on is how can we better sustain the readiness that
we generate when we send our two National Guard brigades to our
annual combat training center rotations? Because what the
Active Force is able to do is within weeks of returning from a
combat training center rotation, they are back in the field
fixing the shortfalls that were identified to get at that peak
level of readiness.
For the Guard, as you know, they don't have that ability to
do so. So we are working with them on how do we sustain that
readiness longer, which ultimately is what we owe the American
people? Once we train and develop readiness, we want to sustain
it as long as we can so that we have increased surge capacity.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much.
And just one quick question, Mr. Chairman, to General
Spencer. The Air Force today is responding to greater
operational demands from--with the 35 percent fewer forces and
aging aircraft. If smaller and more ready are mutually
exclusive, what are the consequences--if smaller and more ready
are mutually exclusive, what are the consequences of this?
And in particular, how does the shortage of maintenance
affect the Air Force's ability to generate requested forces?
General Spencer. Yes, ma'am. Well, first, you have to--I
would ask myself ready for what? So if we--to be--we are right
now as small as we can get to support what the country has
asked us to do. We really--in terms of our overall ceiling for
manpower and our equipment, we are at the bottom right now. We
can't go any lower, or we will have to rewrite the strategy and
do something different.
So getting smaller than we are now and, ``more ready,''
again is going to--capacity has the capability in all of it--in
and of itself. So you have to have enough stuff to move around,
you can't get so small and say, well, I am smaller but I am
more ready. Ready to go do what? If you have a wide variety of
demands and you don't have enough to go around, that formula
won't work.
In terms of maintenance, we are short. One of the reasons
we drew a red line this year on drawing down the force was a
lot of our maintenance folks, we have drawn them down too far.
So we have got--we aren't able to generate the sorties that we
need at our bases to make sure our pilots are trained, to make
sure our airplanes are ready to go.
So we have not only drawn down but we are starting to
reallocate, if you will, folks that we have more out into our
flight line maintenance areas.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back but I do have a few more
questions that I would like to enter into the record.
Mr. Wittman. Sure, yes. Yes, we will make sure those
questions get entered into the record and get the service
branches to provide answers for you.
I would like to thank the members of the panel for joining
us today. I do have a couple of questions as we end, and want
to get your direction. As you know, readiness includes not just
training and equipping, but also the modernization element. And
you all talked in brief about that.
But I think it is one of the more important things that we
have to speak about. And you all alluded to the fact that our
adversaries are pursuing technology upgrades at light speed.
And when we mark time and they are traveling at light speed,
even though we have an advantage, when we are static and they
are traveling at light speed, it doesn't take long for them to
catch up.
And I think by any measure, we are looking at in a fairly
short window to be looking at their tailpipe when it comes to
technology and maintaining that overwhelming superiority that
General Paxton spoke about. And I think that is an obligation
this Nation has to every man and woman that serves in the
military.
And that is to make sure that when they sign up, when we
attract the best and brightest, that we also tell them we are
going to be committed to making sure that you are properly
compensated, but also that you have the tools necessary to be
successful in the job that you do. And that is, we are going to
give you overwhelming superiority so when we ask you to go into
harm's way, you are going to have the highest probability of
fighting to victory and coming home safe.
We all know it is a dangerous business, but we owe it to
our men and women to do that. If we don't commit to modernizing
our forces, or we are stagnant in keeping up, then we do our
men and women in the military a disservice. And we can do great
things on the compensation side and make sure that compensation
and benefits stay where it is.
But as you said, the young men and women that come to the
military come there for a variety of different purposes.
Obviously we need to properly compensate them and to provide
them benefits, but they come there for the challenge and they
come there knowing that they are there to serve their country
and they want to defend this Nation when we ask them to go into
harm's way.
But they also want to go there knowing that they have the
best of what is available to do that. And doing anything less
than that, I think is an abdication of our responsibility as
Members of Congress under Article I, Section A of the
Constitution, and we have to make sure that that happens.
With that being said, we also have an obligation under this
new budget scenario of--with a lot of what is happening being
pursued under OCO, to make sure that we are directive in the
budget languages. We know the way things have existed up to
this point is OCO has been used, again, for a fairly specific
and limited sets of operational aspects of the military.
This budget opens it up and says we are going to allow the
authorizers and the appropriators to appropriate and authorize
to $613 billion. But there are still the internal OMB controls
on what OCO is. And if the House Armed Services Committee and
the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense are
not directive in the language to say this is what you will do
with those OCO dollars, then the default position is for OMB to
say, here are the limits and this is what you can and cannot
spend it on.
So I think it is incumbent upon us and I say us, both
appropriators and authorizers, to get that right. The branches
have told us where the needs are from the standpoint of
training and equipping. But one of those areas that I think has
to be emphasized in this and becomes a forcing mechanism for
Congress next year to make sure we continue with this effort to
modernize is to get your direction on the most pressing needs
on modernization. And I would like for all of you to just give
us your overview about where you believe your most pressing
needs are in modernization, so that we have some perspective as
authorization and appropriations take place, to understand what
do we need to do not just on the training side and the
equipping side--you all have given us a good perspective on
that about where we need to go with our national training
centers, where we need to go with getting our pilots sea time,
to make sure that our sailors are at sea, to make sure our
marines are also there, with the ARG to use, understanding how
they are trained up, ready to go.
But the place I think we haven't given the attention that
needs to be given is on the side of modernization.
So General Allyn, I give you the opportunity to start and
we will move to each of the other members from there.
General Allyn. Thanks, Chairman Wittman.
First of all, I appreciate the highlight of the tough
balancing act and the hard choices that we have had to make
even with the President's budget submission. And that
President's budget submission reflects a 25 percent cut to our
modernization program because of the hard choices that we have
had to make to sustain readiness, even to deliver 33 percent of
our brigade combat teams ready to deploy globally as they are
today.
There are--basically a snowplow effect has gone into our
modernization program across every program. Now we are underway
with a critical effort in divestiture to ensure that every
resource dollar that we put into our modernization program
delivers the best effect to offer the best possible equipment
to our deploying soldiers, which as you highlight, is what we
owe to our soldiers.
No adversary deserves a fair fight. And if we fail to
increase our modernization efforts, as has been highlighted by
each of my teammates, that gap is closing and we cannot allow
that to happen.
So for the Army, there are at least a dozen priority
programs that require more funding, but I will highlight just a
couple. I highlighted in my opening statement that our aviation
restructure initiative was a budget-driven effort to increase
readiness, increase modernization, and increase the capacity
and capability of our aviation across the total force.
It accelerates the UH-60M modernization for our National
Guard by 3 to 5 years, which is really, really important for
defense of the homeland. It is the most critical capability
that our governors need in response to crises in the homeland.
We have to modernize for cyber. As we have talked about
previously, we are vulnerable to cyber attack and right now we
are on a path for a multiyear plan to address those
vulnerabilities. We ought not be forced to take a multiyear
approach. We ought to be modernizing our network as rapidly as
we possibly can, recognizing that there are always going to be
budget constraints.
Under sequestration, our network modernization would take a
$400 million cut. And so, a multiyear plan would become, you
know, exceeding beyond the POM. And that is absolutely
unacceptable.
The other area that we require--really a more accelerated
approach is ensuring the installation readiness, which is a
critical component of our training and readiness as we have
previously talked, and specifically protecting against insider
threat attacks.
Right now, because of budget constraints, we have put
soldiers at many missions, which means they are not training
and preparing for their core combat mission. We need increased
funding to enable us to address the insider threat to ensure
that our installations are ready and ensure our soldiers are in
the units training to deploy to war.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Allyn.
Admiral Howard.
Admiral Howard. So when we talk about modernization, you
can see from our fiscal year 2015 budget submission to fiscal
year 2016 where we took risk. And we took some risks by slowing
down or deferring modernization specifically at that future
fight in anti-access/area denial. Specifically, we took risk in
munitions, we took risk in electronic warfare, particularly
associated with our surface ships, and we took risk in
ballistic missile defense.
And then in another area where we could actually use some
assistance, we appreciate the work we have done with Congress
on the cruiser modification. And if we could re-look at that
SMOSF [Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund]
fund and then lift restrictions, that would also help us get to
a better modernization package. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thanks, Admiral Howard.
General Paxton.
General Paxton. Thank you, Chairman. Sir, we had discussed
several times before, all of the services, when we talk about
fiscal predictability in that top line, all of the services
make very deliberate, very conscious, very thoughtful decisions
about the way we are going to modernize. And when the budget
gets sequestered, those decisions are imperiled.
So for the Marine Corps right now, we are in the midst of
an aviation bathtub. We made a decision several years ago that
at least three of our fixed-wing platforms were at age limits,
had high maintenance costs and, indeed, were not comparable to
the cutting-edge technology and the unfair fight that we want
to have. So we bought into the B-22 on the rotary wing and,
more importantly today, the F-35 JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] on
the fixed wing.
We are in the bathtub, where we are having to retire old
aircraft or because of other issues on sequestration, they are
not ready basic aircraft. It takes too much to maintain them
and get them off the line. An example with our V-22 was almost
as soon as that rotary-wing aircraft went IOC [initial
operational capability], it had to go FOC [full operational
capability] and we put it in the fight in Iraq. And we are
delighted we did it because it proved the technology, twice the
lift, twice the payload, twice the range.
We are convinced that the F-35 at IOC will be better than
the AV-8 or the F-18 team at FOC or as it is today. But we are
in the middle of that bathtub. Sequestration puts constraints
on us with the number of aircraft we can buy. It is a joint
service program. It is an international program. It imperils
the issues of cost benefits and the value of quantity. So that
is point number one, sir, on modernization.
Point number two is you can become a hollow force, as you
well know, sir. You can become a hollow force in many ways. You
can become a hollow force because of insufficient people. You
can be a hollow force because of aged equipment. So we need to
strike a balance, all of the services, between our people, our
equipment, and our modernization.
The one thing we don't want to have is--in the Marine
Corps, for example, is we don't want to have now with the V-22
and the F-35, we don't have to have a 21st century aviation
capability and then we don't have our ACVs [Armored Command
Vehicles] in our ship-to-shore. We can't work with the Army on
the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] and we have a 20th
century ground capability. And then because we have done all of
those, the maintainers are not there and we have a 19th century
logistics capability. We have to modernize all of them
together. And the predictability of the budget is essential for
that, sir.
Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thanks, General Paxton.
General Spencer.
General Spencer. Mr. Chairman, I will start off answering
your question with a statement. We have 12 fleets of aircraft
in the Air Force that qualify for an antique license plate in
the State of Virginia.
[Laughter.]
General Spencer. That is a fact.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Spencer. So for us, specifically, we are--as you
know, we are trying to field the F-35. That is crucial to
both--many of here at the table. And some folks will say, well,
why. Well, the majority of our fleet are fourth generation. And
our adversaries are rolling what they could call or some would
call a 4.5 generation.
Now training, you know, we have the best trained pilots in
the world. But if you put them in an airplane that has less
capabilities than another, I mean, that is a real issue. So we
have got to get to that fifth-generation fighter.
We then need a long-range strike bomber, which is--will
help us penetrate into anti-access/anti-denial areas around the
globe. And then third--our third priority is a tanker. You
know, I was going to say our tanker is as old as General
Paxton, but it is not quite that old.
[Laughter.]
General Spencer. But it is, but they are, on average, about
52 years old. And we have got to get those tankers in and
rolling. As you know, we don't go very far without tankers to
get folks across the globe. So those are our top three not to
mention, I mean, JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System], AWACs [airborne warning and control system], our ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] fleet is going to have to
be upgraded. I mean, I could go on and on--space. I could go on
and on, but those are our top three.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thanks, General Spencer.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
indulgence. I regret that I wasn't able to be here earlier, but
you all know how sometimes many commitments at the same time. I
just wanted to follow up quickly, because I think we all know
that we have to translate all of this for not just our
colleagues, but certainly for our constituents. And you have
just talked about modernization and cited a few examples. And
we know that these are funding requirements that are not part
of OCO. They need to be sustaining over some time.
And people sometimes think that, well, you are putting all
this money in OCO, well, surely, you will be able to do
everything that you need to do. And I think you have made the
case very well this morning, I am sure. And I appreciate the
question, particularly, that the chairman just asked.
But could you--and you may have already done this. I am
thinking about skill sets, I am thinking about the risks that
we have to the men and women who serve our country.
What is it about those skill sets, about the needs that we
have--whether, you know, mental health to cyber, what have
you--that puts our men and women at such risk that we need to
really sound the alarm on this and exclaim that that is not
something covered by OCO? How would you do that? And it is an
elevator speech, obviously. You got about, you know, two
sentences' worth.
General Paxton. Congresswoman Davis, great to see you
again, ma'am. Thanks.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, General. Good to see all of you.
General Paxton. One of the things we did not discuss
earlier, so this is really a topical question is we talk about
the cohesion of a unit and the leader-to-led ratio. And both of
those are critically important. The world is a much faster
place than it has been, and it is a much more complex place
than it has been. And I think all of us have in other
testimonies talked about the skill sets that our small unit
leaders indeed.
And consequently, not only the skill sets that those
leaders need, but the stability that the unit and the other
soldier, sailor, airmen, marine deserves from having a skilled,
trained leader at the helm. So with the OCO dollars, when we
are paying for the current fight, the current reset, as opposed
to reconstituting new gear, we mortgage the modernization and
we also mortgage--when we talk about home station, training and
we talk about modernized equipment, we reduce the capability to
take that skilled leader and to train him or her on the
equipment that we need in the conditions that we need with a
number of what we call sets and reps we need, so that that
leader is confident in his or her capabilities. And so that
unit is confident in that leader.
So I think in the future what we may see is services that
are already kind of high-demand, low-density. But you may see a
continued need to better train our leaders and perhaps age our
force a little bit because you have to get those skills sets.
Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
General Allyn. Yes, ma'am. I will highlight another
approach to this that we are working and that is, in order for
us to ensure that the modernization programs that we have
underway are better delivering the capability that our soldiers
need, we are better linking our users with our developers and
with our requirement's writers, so that we get the reps with
that equipment and, more importantly, we get the feedback on
what that equipment can do and cannot do. And what it shows us
is that some of our new equipment is very complex. And it does
require increased training for our incredibly bright and
energetic young soldiers.
And we require a--I would say a--just enough technological
edge. We don't have to make it so hard to train that the
limited training time that we get creates challenges for our
ability to integrate new capabilities. So we are trying to
tighten that linkage. Because at the end of the day, a soldier
that is confident and competent with the equipment that they
would provide them, because of the decisive edge of our
leadership, they will dominate on the future battlefield. But
we have got to give them the right equipment and the time to
train on it to master.
Admiral Howard. With the budget with OCO, you still have
not removed the threat of sequestration. We have people who
have lived through sequestration and it is a dissatisfying
experience. And there are a couple of cohorts that are very
important to readiness.
One, we don't often talk about them, but we have got these
wonderful public servants who are repair workers, shipyard
workers, aviation depot artisans, engineers, IT [information
technology] people. They are intrinsic to us maintaining
readiness. And when we sequestered before, we furloughed those
great public workers. And then when you--and so some of them
retire early. You lose those skill sets. It could take years to
go to for someone to go from apprentice to journeyman in order
to be able to fix our ships or our aircraft.
And then when we want to hire them back, they are deeply
suspicious. These folks have to be able to earn a living and
know that they can take care of their families and pay their
mortgages, just like anybody else. And for some of our
engineers, it is their patriotism that lets them serve. They
could have much greater rewards in the outside world. So there
is that cohort. So if you don't take away the suspicion that we
might sequester again, we create angst in that workforce, that
civilian workforce.
Then the impact of that sequester, we are still dealing
with an aviation depot backlog. That impacts the aircraft that
we need to operate, but also for our officers to--our pilots to
be able to train in.
So our folks have knowledge of what it is like to
sequester. So OCO will help us in the immediate, but it won't
take away the threat and the angst that comes with that law
looming over our head.
Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Yes, thank you.
General Spencer. And Congresswoman, I guess, if I was in an
elevator and I only had a few seconds, I would probably make it
personal. And so, I would describe it this way. I mean, I used
to coach Little League football. And so, our job is to
organize, train and equip, to provide forces to combatant
commanders.
So, as a football coach, I trained the kids how to play. I
would not send anyone into the game without a helmet or
shoulder pads or knowing how to tackle or how to protect
themselves. That is what we do. But if you look at that sort of
in the military, that is not--OCO doesn't fund any of that. It
is--that is part of our base budget. If we have to get into the
game, or we have to go to war, that is when OCO kicks in,
because we have extra over-and-above expenses to our base.
I think it is important to keep that difference--the
differentiation, so we understand what the differences are, and
make sure we don't mix what goes into base and what OCO is for.
I just get worried when we do that.
Mrs. Davis. Yes.
General Spencer. How do we--and then what happens when OCO
goes away? And what happens to predictability and all the other
things you have heard about here? I really worry about that.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that time.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mrs. Davis.
We will go to Mr. O'Rourke. And knowing that we have votes
have been called at 9:48. So, you go ahead and ask your
questions. We will try to do it as quickly as we can so we can
wrap up.
Mr. O'Rourke. Sure. Let me just start by thanking each of
you for your testimony today. I think you made an excellent
case for the folly of our current budget trajectory and how
that is going to impact readiness. And I think you have given
us some facts that we need to help our colleagues make the
right decision to ensure that we don't cut any further, and
that we support our greatest asset. And our greatest weapon,
again, as General Paxton said, are the men and women who serve
this country in uniform.
General Allyn, you mentioned a 25 percent cut--I think that
you said that--to modernization in the fiscal year 2016 budget.
Tell me what kind of impact that is going to have to, say, the
Brigade Modernization Command at Fort Bliss under General
Charlton, the NIE--the Network Integration Evaluation exercises
and the upcoming Army Warfighting Assessment that will take
place there. Will we be able to continue to do those things? Or
will we have to change those schedules and push those further
out?
General Allyn. Thanks, Congressman O'Rourke. We will--we
have fully funded our Army Warfighting Assessment and our
Network Integration exercise program. They are vital to us
testing new capabilities. And, more importantly, getting it
into the hands of our brigade combat team that trains out
there.
And, as you know, those are joint exercises and those are
multinational exercises. We have had a battalion of the Marines
participate in the last two exercises. We have had our
teammates from Canada, from Australia, from the United Kingdom
train with us there, and they will train with us there in the
future.
So, not only do we work on developing the modern
capabilities we need, but we work on the concepts that will
enable us to fight as a ``Force 2025 and Beyond'' force that
the future will require of us. And we are able to get a lot of
interoperability work with our most critical allies.
So, it is fully funded. And General Charlton's leadership
will remain critical to us achieving the objectives of that
program.
Mr. O'Rourke. So, just a quick follow-up question; 25
percent cut--what does that affect?
General Allyn. It primarily delays the procurement and
acquisition of virtually every program that we have. So, you
know, we won't achieve balance under the President's budget
until fiscal year 2023. If sequestration comes back, it will be
3 to 5 years longer than that. And that balance is people,
modernization, and readiness.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
I just want to close by thanking all of our witnesses
today. Thank you so much.
I do want to end with a question. Just a simple yes or no
answer.
Obviously, where we are today with the budget that passed--
we have 96 billion additional dollars in OCO. In your
perspective, understanding the long-term perspectives and the
challenges that that creates in funding that way--none us like
to do it that way. But if you put that in perspective of having
that number now at $613 billion to authorize to and appropriate
to, versus the BCA levels, which of those is more preferable to
each of you?
General Allyn.
General Allyn. Well, clearly, Congressman Wittman,
increased money delivers increased capability and provides
better training, readiness, and modernization. So, you know,
give us a choice of increased OCO or BCA, it is a simple
answer.
Mr. Wittman. Gotcha.
Admiral Howard.
Admiral Howard. A bird in the hand is always worth more
than the bush, Congressman.
Mr. Wittman. Yes, that is right.
Admiral Howard. But it is--for the long term, it is not a
good solution.
Mr. Wittman. Correct. Yes.
General Paxton.
General Paxton. Yes, absolutely. So, the OCO dollars help
in the short term. I continue to worry about the long term, our
modernization, our training, and our exercises. We want to
fight and win tonight and tomorrow, but we also want to make
sure we don't do that at the expense of not being able to do it
the day after tomorrow.
Mr. Wittman. Exactly.
General Paxton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. General Spencer.
General Spencer. Same answer, Mr. Chairman. It is a
patchwork.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Spencer. And would hope going forward, we could
come up with a better solution, but the same.
Mr. Wittman. Absolutely.
Well, thank you all so much. Thanks for your service.
Thanks for coming in today. Thanks for your candidness. We have
our work cut out for us to not only look at what we are doing
with the short-term budget perspective, but I agree with you
all. We have to create some long-term certainty here. And that
is up to all of us here to make sure that we are working
together to get that done.
Thank you for what you do. Please thank your soldiers,
sailors, marines, and airmen for the spectacular job they do
for our Nation. And thank their families, too, for the
sacrifice that they have made.
Thank you so much.
With that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 9:53 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 26, 2015
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 26, 2015
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 26, 2015
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. Describe the series of events that led to the backlog
in maintenance for legacy F-18 Hornet aircraft and the steps the Navy
is taking to alleviate this backlog which is leading to a higher T-
rating, and therefore lower readiness, in the FY16 budget.
Admiral Howard. The Department's legacy F/A-18A-D depot throughput
challenge is attributed to a series of events beginning with delays in
JSF procurement, which has translated to unplanned maintenance to
extend the service life of legacy Hornet aircraft beyond the 6,000 hour
design life. Additionally, COCOM-driven operations and Fleet Response
Training Plan (FRTP) training and readiness requirements are driving an
increased strike fighter utilization rate thereby adding to the current
depot workload. In an effort to meet strike fighter inventory
requirements, depot throughput of planned service life extension work
has been complicated by the discovery of unexpected corrosion induced
work, leading to longer repair times for inducted airframes.
Furthermore, the constraints of sequestration, and multiple
continuing resolutions, have limited the Navy's ability to replenish
artisans and engineers to keep pace with personnel attrition and the
increased breadth and depth of depot repair requirements associated
with extending the service life of legacy Hornets. As a result of the
2013 Budget Control Act, the Department imposed a nine month hiring
freeze, which prevented the replenishment of some 400 artisans who
voluntarily left the workforce. Additionally, budget reductions imposed
as a result of sequestration limited the hiring capacity for engineers
who support depot planning and inspection and repair disposition.
Furthermore, the depots experienced an increased requirement for
personnel to address new requirements, an increase in depot facility
repair events, and an increase in scope of current work associated with
aging legacy airframes. This increase in workload coupled with a
decreased workforce has created a complex challenge at the organic
depot facilities.
To improve F/A-18 depot capacity, the Department is attacking the
major barriers to production--manpower and material. This includes an
aggressive hiring and training plan for artisans and engineers, and
improved parts availability and staging for high flight hour (HFH)
maintenance events based on common repair requirements. Additionally,
the Navy has collaborated with Boeing in identifying several areas to
improve overall depot throughput, such as employing Boeing Engineering
Support and incorporating Super Hornet modifications at its Cecil Field
facility. The strategy is proving successful as depot production levels
are improving, but requires time to fully mature. With the requested
funding, and under this plan, the Department anticipates continued
improvement in depot throughput to meet annual production requirements
by FY17 and full recovery by FY19.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT
Mr. Nugent. In this year's NDAA I will be submitting language
asking the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) for a
plan to reform the Defense Personal Property System (DPS). As you know,
this is a system that thousands of military families use each year to
organize and facilitate service member change of stations. In 2013, the
Army entered into a contract to improve the functionality and ease of
use for the system.
Would you mind identifying the progress towards improving this
system? Is the build out of the DPS system moving as scheduled or has
it fallen behind?
General Allyn. In 2013, USTRANSCOM entered into a 5-year contract
to implement Increment III of DPS. Increment III's primary goal is to
develop and implement for DPS the remaining three major capabilities,
Non-Temporary Storage, Intra-country Moves, and Direct Procurement
Moves, so that the legacy Transportation Operational Personal Property
Standard System (TOPS) can be retired in 2018. In Fiscal Year (FY)
2014, DPS supported over 550,000 shipments for military families
worldwide and implemented eight maintenance releases, most of which
remediated software defects from the previous developer or enhanced
system security. The DPS Program Management Office also completed
several major requirements refinement efforts with the Services, which
allowed the developer to begin the requirements analysis phase for
several Increment III capabilities. Website improvements were
accelerated to meet the needs of our service members in 2015, which
required a reprioritization of other tasks on contract. These
improvements include customer ease-of-use updates for the Self-
counseling, Claims, and move.mil web pages and are scheduled to be
completed in FY15. Additional improvements on contract for FY16-18
include support for document management and imaging and digital
signature capability, as well as server and software modernization to
improve performance and stability. The implementation timeline has
slipped approximately 4 months.
Mr. Nugent. After more than a decade in Afghanistan, there have
been a number of lessons learned not least of which have been in the
functionality and reliability of our communications networks and
equipment. Millions of Americans carry cell phones that are extremely
user friendly and capable of texting, searching the Web and geo-
locating while soldiers on the battlefield have cumbersome and
difficult to use systems.
Currently, the Army is working towards improving the network under
the Simplified Tactical Army Reliable Network (STARNet) program.
Would you mind discussing the milestone progress of that plan?
General Allyn. As our adversaries continue to invest in network and
cyber capabilities, we must do so as well to keep our decisive edge.
The Simplified Tactical Army Reliable Network (STARNet) is an
overarching strategy to provide incremental network enhancements
between 2016 and 2021; it is not a formal acquisition program. The Army
is resourcing individual existing programs that align with the
enhancements to simplify and harden the network. The endstate goals of
the roadmap include: fielding modernized network capabilities across
formations from Infantry, Stryker and Armored brigades to Aviation and
enabling forces; delivering the Common Operating Environment to give
Soldiers a familiar look and feel for their mission command
applications from garrison to foxhole; simplifying and protecting the
network to increase commanders' operational agility; improving tactical
communications with joint, interagency, intergovernmental and
multinational partners; creating smaller, lighter command posts for
rapid deployment; and improving home station training and readiness to
deliver uninterrupted mission command.
Some examples of promising capability include small expeditionary
satellite terminals, en route airborne mission command planning tools,
air/ground radios, implementation of the Command Post and Mounted
Computing Environment applications and hardware, and network monitoring
tools. By inserting these capabilities into the current network, we
achieve faster, economic benefits to military operations. We will see
these improvements in the network as they are integrated between FY16-
21.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. Pennsylvania has the third largest National Guard in
the nation, and in the 4 counties of the Pennsylvania 6th district,
there are about 5,947 Guard members. The experience of all forces in
combat and the high up-tempo of the post 9/11 military is an important
and perishable capability. When Active Component members separate from
service, DOD should work to keep those capabilities and experiences
through the Guard or Reserves Components. How do you plan to
incentivize our separating Active Component soldiers to join the Guard
or Reserves?
General Allyn. So far in FY 2015, we are exceeding established
transition retention goals for active duty Soldiers to Army Reserve and
National Guard Service. Both the Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National
Guard (ARNG) offer incentives for transitioning Active Duty Soldiers to
join the Selected Reserve.
Among those incentives are the Officers Affiliation Bonus (OAB) and
the Enlisted Affiliation Bonus (EAB), both of which may not exceed
$20,000. Soldiers can apply for the OAB/EAB through a Reserve Component
Career Counselor and/or an Active Component Career Counselor only while
on Active Duty. Soldiers may execute the OAB/EAB addendum up to 180
days prior to their scheduled Expiration of Term in Service date.
In order to be eligible, Soldiers must: be serving on active duty
or have served on active duty and are discharged under honorable
conditions; have less than 20 years of total military service; have
completed any term of service or period of obligated service; meet the
re-entry and separation program designer code requirements for
affiliation; affiliate as Duty Military Occupational Specialty
Qualified directly into a USAR or ARNG critical skill vacancy from the
Active Army; and agree to serve a minimum of three years in the
Selected Reserve.
Other incentives for service in units of the ARNG and USAR for both
officers and enlisted include Drill/Battle Assembly pay; promotion and
advanced training opportunities; life, health and dental insurance at
very competitive rates; two-year deferment from mobilization in the
USAR; and Reserve and veterans benefits authorized and administered by
each state Government.
Both components also offer educational benefits such as Federal
Tuition Assistance, Student Loan Repayment, and GI Bill under certain
conditions.
Mr. Shuster. Pennsylvania has the third largest National Guard in
the nation, and in the 4 counties of the Pennsylvania 6th district,
there are about 5,947 Guard members. The experience of all forces in
combat and the high up-tempo of the post 9/11 military is an important
and perishable capability. When Active Component members separate from
service, DOD should work to keep those capabilities and experiences
through the Guard or Reserves Components. How do you plan to
incentivize our separating Active Component soldiers to join the Guard
or Reserves?
Admiral Howard. There are 1,929 Navy Reserve Sailors who are based
in Pennsylvania. They are supported by five Navy Operational Support
Centers (Avoca, Lehigh Valley, Erie, Pittsburgh, Ebensburg, and
Harrisonburg).
In the Navy, we use a Continuum of Service (CoS) approach that
provides opportunities for seamless transition between active and
reserve components, and service status categories, to meet mission
requirements and encourage a lifetime of service. Through our Navy
Personnel Command Career Transition Office, monetary and non-monetary
incentives, and options for continued service, are discussed with
officer and enlisted Sailors prior to leaving active duty, to present
options best suited to each individual transitioning Sailor.
Affiliation bonuses may be used to attract transitioning Sailors
with certain desired skill sets into the Navy Reserve. Non-monetary
benefits of transitioning from active duty directly into the Selected
Reserve include a 2-year involuntary mobilization deferment, continued
access to TRICARE healthcare coverage and long-term care and life
insurance, transferability of Post-9/11 GI-Bill benefits and other
education opportunities, and the prospect for eventual non-regular
retirement.
Mr. Shuster. Pennsylvania has the third largest National Guard in
the nation, and in the 4 counties of the Pennsylvania 6th district,
there are about 5,947 Guard members. The experience of all forces in
combat and the high up-tempo of the post 9/11 military is an important
and perishable capability. When Active Component members separate from
service, DOD should work to keep those capabilities and experiences
through the Guard or Reserves Components. How do you plan to
incentivize our separating Active Component soldiers to join the Guard
or Reserves?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps has multiple incentives to help
retain talented Marines in the Reserve Component. First, the direct
affiliation program (DAP) affords highly qualified active component
(AC) Marines the opportunity to affiliate with a Selected Marine Corps
Reserve (SMCR) unit following their end of active service (EAS). The
DAP provides transitioning AC Marines a seamless transition into the
SMCR with a guaranteed reserve billet prior to reaching their EAS. It
also provides Marines with a no-cost six month extension of their
existing Tricare benefits.
Second, affiliation bonuses are also available for Marine officers,
noncommissioned officers with critical skills and staff sergeants. The
Marine Corps also offers inactive duty for training (IDT) travel
reimbursement for staff noncommissioned officers and officers. This
incentive pays up to $300 per month to more senior Marines who live
greater than 300 miles from their reserve unit. This program has been
very successful. In fact, the Center for Naval Analyses found that the
IDT travel reimbursement program is associated with an estimated 10-
percentage point increase in manpower levels and a 24-percentage-point
increase in regular drill attendance.
Finally, most Marines leaving the active component are eligible to
retrain to another military occupational specialty (MOS) if their local
reserve unit does not have a requirement for the current MOS. This
program has been critical to keeping the Marine Corps Reserve ready and
relevant. Overall, the Marine Corps Reserve retrains approximately 400
Marines per year.
Mr. Shuster. Pennsylvania has the third largest National Guard in
the nation, and in the 4 counties of the Pennsylvania 6th district,
there are about 5,947 Guard members. The experience of all forces in
combat and the high up-tempo of the post 9/11 military is an important
and perishable capability. When Active Component members separate from
service, DOD should work to keep those capabilities and experiences
through the Guard or Reserves Components. How do you plan to
incentivize our separating Active Component soldiers to join the Guard
or Reserves?
General Spencer. The Air Reserve Components are employing a number
of tools, initiatives, and educational benefits to attract prior
service members. Both the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard
leverage the access provided by In-Service Recruiters to capture
departing service members. These Recruiters track separating Airmen and
contact each one of them to ensure they are aware of the opportunities
in the reserve component. They employ affiliation bonuses and
incentives to attract members with critical skills and specialties.
We are working on a Total Force awareness initiative sponsored by
the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force which aims to educate Airmen
of the opportunities within the reserve components at the earliest
stages and throughout their Air Force service commitment. The
initiative involves an awareness campaign as well as a cultural change
via socialization of reserve component opportunities throughout
leadership and supervisory channels.
[all]