[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ISIS: DEFINING THE ENEMY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2015
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Serial No. 114-31
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Robert Ford, Senior Fellow, The Middle East
Institute (former U.S. Ambassador to Syria).................... 6
Ms. Maryam Rajavi, president-elect, National Council of
Resistance of Iran............................................. 23
Walid Phares, Ph.D., co-secretary general, Transatlantic
Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism........................ 43
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Robert Ford: Prepared statement.................... 9
Ms. Maryam Rajavi: Prepared statement............................ 25
Walid Phares, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 47
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 70
Hearing minutes.................................................. 71
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade:
Chart of Middle East Alliances................................. 72
Statement for the Record from the Honorable Tom McClintock, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California...... 73
ISIS: DEFINING THE ENEMY
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record
subject to the length and limitation in the rules.
The Middle East is a complex place. Major players weave an
intricate web of support and opposition. As you can see on the
screen that is on each end of the committee room--and
Ambassador, I think there may be a chart that you have been
furnished as well--it is hard to keep track of who supports
what groups. But one thing is clear. Nobody seems to like ISIS.
Yet, despite everyone being against ISIS, we are not
winning the battle against the war on ISIS. One of the reasons,
I believe, is because it is not clear we understand the group
very well.
It is time we called it like it is. ISIS is a radical
Islamic terrorist group. The White House doesn't really like to
talk about this but we cannot defeat ISIS if we do not
understand who they are.
It is critical that we know what its goals are, how it
seeks to achieve those goals. Even if the White House doesn't
think ISIS is Islamic, ISIS does.
ISIS explains its actions and justifies them through its
interpretation of the Islamic law and Islamic writings. This
philosophy is reflected in its daily actions and its deadly
actions.
ISIS beliefs state that Christians either must renounce
their faith or embrace Islam or die. It is no coincidence then
that we have seen ISIS specifically target Christians not
because Christians are stealing their jobs or fighting against
ISIS but merely because they are Christians.
ISIS attempts to rid Iraq of Christians that have been in
Iraq since the earliest times of Christianity. The 21 Egyptians
beheaded by ISIS in Libya were killed because they were
Christians.
Christian towns across Syria have been destroyed by ISIS.
Last Sunday, ISIS released a new video of them killing
Christians, this time Christians in Ethiopia.
ISIS persecution of Christians is not letting up because
its beliefs have not changed. This evil belief is what attracts
many to join ISIS. Two days ago, six men from Minnesota were
arrested for being recruited to the ISIS cause.
Reports indicate that there is no recruiting mastermind
behind their conversation, just the belief of sharing illicit
beliefs. There are a dozen more examples. Teenagers, women and
fighting-age males all are heeding the call from ISIS.
The main way these recruits hear the call from ISIS is
through social media. I have been raising the issue of
terrorists' use of social media since 2010 when I sent a letter
to YouTube asking them to change the reporting function for
terrorist content.
More recently, the subcommittee held a hearing that
highlighted how Twitter has exploded with ISIS propaganda and
recruitment efforts. ISIS uses Twitter to broadcast its acts to
the world. Twitter can do a better job policing its platform to
stop terrorists from using it.
But I was happy to see that after our hearing Twitter took
down 12,000 ISIS accounts and updated its rules so that even
promoting terrorism is a violation. Time will tell if these new
rules are enforced.
We cannot shut down ISIS' messaging. We must also counter
it. To recognize that ISIS justifies its actions with Islamic
verses does not mean we are at war with Islam. That is too
simplistic and not realistic.
According to ISIS ideals, it also thinks the roughly 200
million Shi'a around the world should also die. Same with the
heads of state of every Muslim country that has elevated man-
made law above Sharia law.
What we need is a deeper understanding of what ISIS
believes and to use this understanding to defeat ISIS and its
philosophy.
For example, if we had a better idea of ISIS philosophy
then we would better understand why people join this group.
This will, in turn, give us ways to stem the flow of foreign
fighters going to this terrorist group.
Another example--if we know ISIS' legitimacy is based upon
establishing a caliphate that must control territory, then
perhaps seizing territory from ISIS becomes a higher priority
by fighting them.
There are many other possible benefits of having a better
understanding of ISIS philosophy.
Finally, we need the voices of Islam who disagree with
ISIS' interpretation of Islam to come and speak out against
ISIS.
We need to find new ways to work with local imams,
prominent well-respected Islamic scholars and like-minded NGOs
here at home and abroad to get their voices heard in the Muslim
world.
I think we should work with our allies to expose ISIS' half
truths and show it for the charlatan that it is. ISIS has used
its ideals to recruit and kill. It is time we now use and find
out what that ideology is and use it against them.
I now yield to the ranking member, the gentleman from
Massachusetts, for his opening statement.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for conducting
today's hearing.
Understanding ISIS, ISIL, Daesh's ideology, how this
ideology informs ISIL's goal and actions and what are the
implications for the United States and its allies in countering
ISIL are issues that merit serious discussion.
As the ranking member on this subcommittee and a member of
the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence, I have engaged on ISIL from two perspectives--on
one hand, from our efforts to counter ISIL abroad in the Middle
East and on the other hand from our work to prevent terrorist
acts and the flow of freedom fighters here at home.
ISIL is a unique threat, and although it rose out of the
group commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, its objectives and
tactics differ significantly from those of al-Qaeda.
Even compared to other terrorist organizations, ISIL's
tactics are especially and deliberately savage. ISIL's
atrocities against its captives and religious minorities living
in the territory controlled by ISIS is horrific.
Even compared to other terrorist organizations, ISIL's
tactics are especially of concern to us. It is brutal,
intolerant toward other faiths, and invokes its ideology to
justify practices including murder, slavery and the destruction
of ancient artifacts in Iraq and Syria.
But ISIL's actions are also hypocritical, for while it
destroys certain pre-Islamic statues and cultural objects in
the name of its ideology, it is also known to traffic in these
sorts of antiquities to finance its terrorist operations.
Indeed, ISIL's members are not exclusively ideologues.
Instead, I see ISIL as being made up at least loosely as three
loose factions--true ideologues with an apocalyptic version of
Islam, old pro-Saddam military and intelligence officers and
foreign fighters from around the world.
Some of these foreign fighters are hardened fighters but
many are just what the uncle of Tamerlin Tsarnaev called his
nephew, one of the Boston Marathon bombers--a loser, misguided
adventure seekers and young men and women who joined ISIL for
some sense of power and purpose they otherwise lack.
To degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL we will have to cut
off its supply of money and manpower. Specifically, we need to
work with our allies to improve our efforts to prevent the flow
of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria.
We also need to do a better job of countering ISIL's
messaging to potential recruits and responding to ISIL's savvy
using social media.
We need to counter their communications smartly and not in
a heavy-handed way that would give them legitimacy that they,
frankly, do not deserve.
Further, we need to assist our allies in the region,
particularly Jordan and Iraq, in containing and rolling back
the territorial gains made by ISIL, for unlike al-Qaeda, ISIL
still needs to control territory in order to survive.
It is my hope that today's hearing will provide some
insights and constructive proposals on how the United States
and its allies can enhance their efforts to counter ISIL.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will now recognize members who wish to
give an opening statement for 1 minute. I would ask members to
keep their statements to 1 minute.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to see you again, Ambassador. Seems like the
only time we meet in safe ground is here. Otherwise, your
career has been in all the places that are at the center of
this discussion today and I appreciate your being here,
certainly, as someone who understands the issues and the people
with a level of detail that is not--even in the Near East--is
not always understood.
And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this
hearing. I certainly think understanding where we must learn
not to tolerate the intolerance that leads to ISIS or for that
matter the intolerance that has led to other terrorist
organizations, which I think you have done a wonderful job of
showing most of them on your diagram that is before us.
So, again, Ambassador, I look forward to a lively debate on
all the steps that could be taken, most of which if they had
been taken have failed and if they haven't been taken the
question today will be why not.
I thank you and yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlemen.
The Chair recognizes the other gentleman from California,
Mr. Sherman, for his opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. I want to commend the chair and the ranking
member for their excellent selection of witnesses. One witness
is particularly controversial and that is because that witness
represents an organization that was formerly on the foreign
terrorist organization list. Formerly.
The Japanese Government in times past carried out horrific
actions, particularly against American POWs. That was then.
Today, we honored the prime minister of Japan.
The prime minister was here today to promote a trade
agreement that includes Vietnam, formerly an enemy of the
United States. The executive branch has treated as terrorists
the IRA, Sinn Fein, the African National Congress at various
times. Formerly is formerly.
Second, the MEK, unlike the vast majority of witnesses,
present company excepted, has actually provided Congress with
startlingly interesting and useful information such as the
existence of the Natanz nuclear facility.
Third, we are told that Ms. Rajavi has greater expertise on
Iran than on ISIS. If we allow--if we had one witness pull out
every time that witness thought that the core expertise of a
fellow witness was in an area on a related issue and not the
explicit subject of the hearing, we would have an awful lot of
empty chairs.
And finally, the press has attacked the inclusion of the
MEK in this hearing because, although the MEK has provided
incredibly useful information, they tend to provide information
that furthers their public policy interest.
I've been here almost 20 years. I've heard about 16,000
witnesses. I have never heard a witness that wasn't providing
information to further their public policy interest.
So I look forward to hearing the witnesses here and commend
you on your selection. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
President Obama declared his intention to defeat ISIS and
developed a plan he believes can achieve his aims. However, I
have serious concerns with the strategy, and I use the term
loosely, especially because the President doesn't seem to have
a clear understanding of our enemy.
In the past year, President Obama has referred to ISIS as
not Islamic and as al-Qaeda's JV team--statements that caused
confusion about the group and may have contributed to
significant strategic errors.
Denying that the U.S. is at war with radical Islam makes it
difficult to engage in a factual honest ideological debate
exposing ISIS' false narrative and to empower moderate Muslim
voices.
Misperceptions and the lack of understanding about ISIS
have consistently led to underestimating this rapidly expanding
terror group.
The reality is that ISIS is very Islamic, even if its
interpretation of Islam differs from the majority of Muslims
around the world, which is exactly why we should identify the
enemy as what it is.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing.
The understanding of ISIS' origins, motivations and
ideology are of critical importance in our bid to defeat this
brutal terrorist group.
ISIS' Salafi jihadist ideology is not unique among
terrorist organizations. However, its brutal exploits,
proficient use of social media, expansive territorial control
and commitment to a pre-modern form of governance constitute a
dangerous evolution that set it apart from its predecessors.
While ISIS' reliance on territorial control and governance
makes it a uniquely serious threat for the United States and
our partners, these attributes also represent serious
vulnerability.
ISIS forces can be targeted more easily and if it continues
to lose territory or its ability to govern it will have lost
much of its legitimacy.
I look forward to the discussion of today's witnesses, and
with that I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the other gentleman from New
York, Mr. Zeldin, for his opening statement.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing.
You can't defeat an enemy that you are not willing to
define accurately. The President, in September 2014, outlined a
strategy to defeat ISIS. That strategy needs to evolve.
In that strategy--that speech he said that he was not going
to have any boots on the ground. It was going to be a different
strategy than past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the same
exact speech he announced that he was sending 495 additional
troops to Iraq.
Here, when Secretary Kerry was before the Foreign Affairs
Committee recently, he said there would be no offensive action,
even though right now we are engaged in kinetic air strikes.
He later clarified we still have unanswered questions as
far as what kind of flexibility and resources are going to be
given to that commander on the ground to actually accomplish
the mission.
We are relying on Iraqi military and law enforcement to
finish the job in destroying ISIS. Many of them don't even show
up to work. Many of the Syrian rebels that we are relying on on
Syria aren't fighting ISIS. They are going after Assad, which
it wouldn't be such a bad thing if they took him out.
The strategy needs to evolve. I look forward to this
hearing today to bring some more accountability not only to
defining the enemy but destroying them.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, all witnesses' prepared
statements will be made part of the record. I ask that the
witnesses keep their presentation to approximately 5 minutes.
I will introduce the first panel. Ambassador Robert Ford
finished his 30-year career with the Peace Corps in the U.S.
Department of State in April 2014 and now is a senior fellow at
the Middle East Institute. Ambassador Ford has served the
United States nobly in a lot of places that have conflict such
as Algeria, Syria and Iraq.
Dr. Walid Phares, who is scheduled to testify here on the
panel, is still on a plane from New York to here. So when he
gets to Dulles we will be notified. But we will proceed with
Ambassador Ford and your testimony at this time.
Thank you, Ambassador. Your statement will be made part of
the record.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT FORD, SENIOR FELLOW, THE
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SYRIA)
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. Thank you for your invitation today. It is an honor
to be here to talk about the Islamic State, which is one of the
biggest foreign challenges that our country and our military
confronts today.
I have laid out in my written testimony some more detailed
thoughts about the ideology of the Islamic State and what an
understanding of that ideology would suggest in terms of our
own strategies.
So in my oral testimony let me just highlight a few key
points. Number one, the Islamic State's ideology comes out of a
Salafi jihadi school, as Congressmen Higgins just noted.
It allows for no compromise on key elements of doctrine and
practice. Let me underline that. It allows for no compromise on
key elements of doctrine and practice.
According to its ideology, compromise in applying divine
instruction is sin and an adherent would not want to die with
that sin weighing against him.
Number two--because ultimately the Islamic State rejects
compromise, it also rejects pluralism and it even rejects
things like borders between states and foreign governments.
Three--in policy terms, this means that the Islamic State
itself thinks that it must fight communities who reject its
rule. It cannot compromise with communities that reject its
rule.
It would be a sin for its leaders and its adherents to make
such a compromise. So what that means is that Iran and the
Shi'a may be the Islamic State's greatest immediate enemy. But
we need to understand that the Islamic State also sees us as an
eventual if not an immediate enemy.
It views us as an enemy to the application of its
literalist interpretation of divine law across the planet. The
Islamic State's ideology also creates some weaknesses that we
should seek to exploit.
First, its severe literalist interpretation of governance
and justice alienates a great many inhabitants of territories
it controls. We have seen this, for example, in Syria and Iraq.
There will be local populations in these countries with
whom we can make common cause against the Islamic State.
Secondly, this is especially true with other armed
opposition groups in Syria. Those opposition groups have fought
the Islamic State on the ground. I want to repeat that.
Those opposition groups have fought the Islamic State on
the ground for the past 16 months. Some of them are also
Salafis. The Islamic State has killed scores of Salafi fighters
from other groups because those other groups refused to
acknowledge the Islamic State's authority.
Remember what I said. It accepts no compromise. What that
also means in practical terms is that if the Assad regime in
Syria were to fall, which is an event that I judge highly
unlikely anytime soon, the Islamic State would not--let me
repeat, the Islamic State would not take control in Damascus.
Rather, other Syrian opposition groups, like antibodies,
would rush to fight against it even harder. We should be
helping anti-extremist Syrian fighters the same way we are
helping the Iraqi army.
Three--we should not fall into the trap, and I have seen
this discussed in some policy circles here in Washington. We
should not fall into the trap of thinking that working with
Iran will help fix our Islamic State problem.
The Islamic State arose in part--not entirely, but in part
from longstanding grievances and fears within Sunni communities
in the Levant and Iraq about growing Persian and Shi'a
influence.
Working with Iran, even indirectly, will feed the Islamic
State narrative and will immediately help its recruiting.
Lastly, the Islamic State's declaration of a caliphate was
quite controversial within Salafi jihadi circles. Its claim to
legitimacy and allegiance depends on its control of land and
its ability to apply its interpretation of Sharia, of Islamic
law.
Were it not to control land, were it not to be able to
govern, its claim to legitimacy within those Salafi jihadi
circles would be undermined, and therefore seizing ground--not
just air strikes but seizing ground--needs to be an important
part of our strategy.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude there and I look forward to a
good discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador, for succinctly outlining
the issue before us.
What is the doctrine of ISIS? You mentioned that there were
two issues. They won't compromise. Compromise is sin. What is
the doctrine?
Mr. Ford. The Islamic State's leadership and its adherents,
the ones that are ideologically driven--and I rush to add here,
Mr. Chairman, that not everyone that fights under the banner of
the Islamic State is probably ideologically driven--I think a
great many, especially in Syria, are driven by more mundane
things like salaries and access to food and war supplies.
But for the ideologically driven among them, their goal is
to apply their interpretation--emphasize that, their
interpretation--of divine law, Sharia, on the planet.
And they--because they do not accept borders, any borders,
they believe that it is to be applied universally to all
mankind and those who resist must, in the end, submit and--
either submit or be killed.
Mr. Poe. Submit or die?
Mr. Ford. Right. Now, can I add one thing on this? I have
seen a great deal of discussion about the Islamic State and
Christians.
The doctrine--the doctrine is that Christians must either
convert or submit, and submit in this case means pay taxes,
which in Islamic law is called jizya, or they face death, too.
So it is convert, pay the tax or they can leave--they can go
somewhere else--or they will be killed.
Mr. Poe. Convert, pay your taxes or die?
Mr. Ford. Or leave, yes.
Mr. Poe. Or leave.
Mr. Ford. So what I saw, for example, people who claimed to
be from the Islamic State in Libya, where they murdered the
Egyptian Coptic Christians and then the Ethiopian Christians, I
think that falls well outside even the Islamic State's
interpretation.
For example, in Syria they allowed Christians to stay but
they insisted that they pay that tax--the jizya.
Mr. Poe. Let me move on to some other comments that you
made. Their leadership--let us use them. And I understand
people are joining ISIS for different reasons. They are not all
united on the reason that they are there.
But it is their interpretation of what they see as divine
law that drives their process of doctrine and then drives their
process of compromise or refusing to compromise.
I want to talk about the compromise part. That means
compromise with anybody else--is that correct--let us say other
Muslim beliefs, other Muslim philosophies about religion or the
Koran.
Mr. Ford. Correct. They believe that their interpretation
is the only valid one and that is why they have murdered scores
and scores of even other Salafis in places like Syria.
They are by far the most extreme, which is why in a place
like Syria, Mr. Chairman, you have some Salafis fighting other
Salafis.
Mr. Poe. A couple more questions with my time remaining.
One thing that you mentioned that makes them different than all
these other terrorist groups that are listed on this chart--and
you need a flow chart to keep up with them--in the whole
world----
Mr. Ford. That is quite a chart, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. Well, you can keep it. There is no pride of
authorship. They control and desire to control land. Unlike al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, who hide in caves and run out and do
mischief and then run back to their caves, ISIS is up front.
They want to control swathes--big areas--and get bigger to
have a caliphate there in Syria, Iraq and move in different
directions. Is that what makes them different than other
terrorist organizations?
Mr. Ford. That is one of the most distinguishing features
of the Islamic State is this drive, this insistence by the
Islamic State, to actually create a governing entity and not
just a terrorist entity but a real live governing organization
with a bureaucracy, with a military, that collects taxes, that
operates court systems openly.
That is what is different, and their declaration of that,
Mr. Chairman, was quite controversial within Salafi jihadi
circles.
A lot of other Salafis said it is not time. It is
premature. Or they said you don't actually control the land and
you won't be able to do it and so you are full of baloney.
Others said your doing so will simply increase divisions among
the Salafis and therefore it is unwise.
So that is a point of vulnerability--that declaration of
the caliphate, this issue of controlling land--is a real
vulnerability within their own school of Salafi jihad Islam.
Mr. Poe. Try to get two quick questions, maybe quick
answers back. How big is ISIS, number wise?
Mr. Ford. In terms of total numbers of people that live
under its control, happily or unhappily, probably a couple of
million.
The big cities in Iraq that are under its control are
Fallujah and Mosul and probably have a population of 1.5 to 2
million. Then on the Syrian side, maybe another million.
Mr. Poe. And ISIS has made it clear by their actions and
their beliefs and their rhetoric that Iran is an enemy of ISIS
because of their different doctrine and philosophies of the
Iranian Government. And you mentioned it would be--would it be
foolish for the United States to try to side with Iran trying
to fight ISIS? Is that what you were saying?
Mr. Ford. Exactly. That plays into their efforts to recruit
by saying there is an American-Iranian conspiracy to put down
the Sunnis and we are the ones fighting it.
Mr. Poe. All right. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I will yield
to the ranking member, Mr. Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. I like that. Makes me sound like some kind of
bodybuilder.
Mr. Poe. I called you something different last week, if you
remember. Go ahead.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Texas.
I just want to deal with the issue, initially, of foreign
fighters and there are some written reports--I will only go
that far in commenting on them--that there might be as many as
22,000 upwards in terms of foreign fighters.
They are the people they are putting on the front line,
many times for suicide attacks and the most vicious attacks in
that regard. So a couple of things.
Number one, Turkey has shown, some initial hesitancy at
least, in working to degrade and defeat ISIL. Foreign fighters
continue to pass through Turkey. What can the United States and
its allies do to further engage Turkey, and what more can
Turkey do to guard its borders so that it can't be used as a
conduit for these foreign fighters as much as it has been?
Mr. Ford. Congressman, the Turks do have a border problem
and it is causing problems for us, too. They need more manpower
along that border because these are--let us be frank--they are
ancient smuggling routes.
There are lots of little goat paths--there are lots of
little donkey paths that have been there for centuries and they
need to be shut down.
There is not a fence along the entire 500-mile Syrian-
Turkish border and there is not a fence along the Iraq-Turkish
border either.
So it is a question of devoting more resources. The Turks
have also asked for greater cooperation in terms of sharing the
names of extremists moving around. I think that will help but
that is not sufficient. There is a strong need for actual
control--physical control of the border.
The other thing I would just say, and I think this is
really important, I was in Turkey recently at the end of
January and beginning of February.
The Turks have real doubts about the utility of a policy
that focuses on combatting the Islamic State without also
dealing with and removing the Bashar al-Assad government, which
they believe fuels the recruitment to the Islamic State.
Their argument would be something like this. You can bomb
and kill 50 of them and they will recruit 45, 48 or 50 the next
day because they want to fight Bashar al-Assad. So the strategy
that the American administration has laid out, in the Turkish
view, is inadequate.
Mr. Keating. I see. Also, just looking at our European
allies in this regard, what can they do that they are not doing
now to help stem the flow of foreign fighters?
Mr. Ford. Couple of comments on that. First, I think many
of our European friends are genuinely concerned about the size
of the foreign fighter flow. You mentioned a 22,000 number. I
have seen numbers like that.
I know, for example, that the French and the Belgians are
exceptionally concerned about the numbers of their citizens
that are going. And so, in a sense, you have to deal with it on
two levels.
One is just a pure intelligence and security effort to
block movements, whether they be out of Europe or coming back
into Europe. And then the second is, they need people within
the Muslim communities of those countries themselves to be
explaining to potential recruits why joining the Islamic State
is not only wrong morally, but will also land them in serious
trouble.
Mr. Keating. Other groups, including affiliates in
Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya as well as Boko Haram in
Nigeria, have significantly pledged to ISIL as well. What are
the operational and financial relationships between these
organizations, and do ISIL leaders exert command and control in
any way over these groups?
Mr. Ford. There have been lots of little Salafi splinter
groups that have announced their allegiance to the Islamic
State, although some others have pointedly declined to do so in
places like Algeria.
The two big ones that have pledged allegiance are Libya and
in the Sinai Peninsula. Those are the two most serious.
On the Libya side, I am not aware that there is much
command and control. I rather doubt that. But there certainly
has been some sharing of information in terms of how to use
social media and how to do filming.
If you saw, for example, that terrible film where the
Egyptian Christians were marched onto the beach and then
murdered, that bore a very frightening resemblance to videos
that have come out of places like Iraq and Syria, and the same
in Sinai.
So there certainly are some kinds of links but I don't know
if it extends to command and control. With respect to
financial, Congressman, I just can't say one way or the other.
I don't know.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Ambassador. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, bios are a wonderful thing, especially when
they link us back to the early days of the Afghan initiative
after 9/11. At that time, the then Bush administration was
focused on Afghanistan and the Taliban-supporting al-Qaeda.
We have certainly morphed a long way during the second half
of your career and my entire career in Congress together.
Today, that complex chart that I will hold up one more time and
say it isn't nearly complex enough for the problem----
Mr. Ford. I hope there is not a test on that chart later.
Mr. Issa. Well, if--there are a whole bunch of lines that
should go both ways for opposed, too. But before we modify
that, Ambassador, we were overly simplistic in 2001 when we
viewed the Middle East.
At that point you were halfway through your career. You
were an expert in Near East, Middle East, and a little bit of
Africa. Now, today, we are a little more aware of the
complexity.
We understand the real struggles between various power
groups--the former Ottoman Empire in Turkey and their not
wanting to acquiesce to other powers--obviously, Persian
expansion to regain their historic position, and Saudi Arabia's
control of Mecca and Medina.
I am not trying to give a lecture here. I will bring this
to a close. These odd alliances that often--you explained
caliphates--but, of course, the idea that an Alawite minority
in Syria, somewhat Shi'a in its nature, could dominate the area
and in fact support both Shi'a and Sunni operations against
Israel is longstanding and has been ignored.
So what I want to do in the limited time after this little
diatribe of history is ask you specifically, Syria seems to be
one of our most complex areas.
We know that everybody in Syria either is or could be on
the wrong side because we, obviously, know that Assad is
aligned with Iran. We know that many of the Sunnis are involved
with ISIS and, as you said, there is a real question about what
after Assad.
So let me just go through two or three quick points and you
can take as much time as the chairman will give you afterwards.
The potential outcome if Assad falls is one area, because
although he has shown a resilience it is not a forever
situation in any of these countries.
Secondly, the effects of a no-fly zone both on the long-
term strategy of, if you will, bringing peace of some sort to
Syria with or without Assad leaving and its effect on refugees.
And then the last one, which is the one I alluded to in
this long question--how would you suggest we find and define
and be comfortable in what the administration calls the, if you
will, the moderate Free Syrian Army forces?
How do you find those groups when there seem to be more
people in the two other groups that we say we oppose? And
thanks for taking notes on that. If there is time left, we will
go to Yemen.
Mr. Ford. I think Syria is just the hardest nut. It is just
the hardest nut to crack, very tough. With respect to your
questions, I think it is very unlikely, as I said, that Assad's
regime is going to collapse tomorrow or the next day.
It is getting weaker but I don't think it is about to
collapse. But if we think--if we stretch out this--where it is
going in this long horrible war of attrition, were the regime
to finally be worn down what you would have is you would just
have more groups fighting for control of the capital and you
might end up with a situation where different opposition groups
control different neighborhoods of Damascus. The Islamic State
might control some but they wouldn't control it all.
Mr. Issa. Right. And in that vein, what would be the
effects on Christians, a rather large minority in the region,
since Assad is effectively the protectorate of Christians?
Mr. Ford. Well, I don't--I wouldn't call Bashar al-Assad
the protector of the Christians. He likes to call himself that
but his forces have bombed plenty of churches, too.
Mr. Issa. Sure.
Mr. Ford. So the effect on Christians, like the effect on
all Syrians, would be really bad because the fighting would
just get worse. We will have a huge surge of refugees out of
Damascus so----
Mr. Issa. Which brings us to the other two points, the no-
fly zone, and where do you find moderates?
Mr. Ford. Yes. With respect to the no-fly zone, this is a
tough one. Where I am on this now, Congressman, is a no-fly
zone could help but not just without thought and a strategy.
The no-fly zone--we had a no-fly zone in Iraq and it lasted
12 years and it only ended when U.S. troops went into Baghdad.
So I don't think we want to do another 12-year no-fly zone over
Syria.
So the real question is, can you use a no-fly zone to get
to the political settlement that we want? And that requires
then that in return for our doing a no-fly zone, the
opposition--the Syrian opposition--is going to reach out to
elements that now support the Assad regime and say, hey, there
is a third choice.
It doesn't have to be the Islamic State or Assad. There is
a moderate third choice. Work with us on that.
I have to be honest. I don't think the Syrian opposition
has done a very good job of that. And the other part of that is
if we are going to do it the quid pro quo really needs to be
from the Turks--you will put the resources on that border and
shut it down so that we don't have Islamic State and al-Qaeda
elements moving back and forth over the order to get food, to
get medical care, to travel, whatever it is.
So if we are going to do a no-fly zone, Congressman, we
need to leverage that to get things that we need out of the
other side.
With respect to your question about how do you find
moderates in the Syrian armed opposition, that is a----
Mr. Poe. If you would, Ambassador, try to keep it brief.
Mr. Ford. Yes. The main thing is, Congressman, there are
moderates. There always have been moderates. They need support.
There is a competition for recruits between moderates and
extremists. We need to empower the moderates to be able to
recruit better.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, ISIS seeks death and destruction to anyone who
does not believe as they do. They have a presence in Syria.
They have a presence in Iraq. They are expanding to North
Africa and they appear to be on the move.
What is the historical relationship between ISIS and al-
Qaeda? ISIS is an outgrowth of al-Qaeda--a radical outgrowth of
al-Qaeda, I presume, but I need your clarification on that.
Mr. Ford. The Islamic State is actually the offspring of
al-Qaeda and in particular the al-Qaeda in Iraq organization.
But originally al-Qaeda in Iraq was not thinking about setting
up a state.
Over a period of years, really, between 2006 and 2013, al-
Qaeda in Iraq more and more took on the idea of creating a
state, of creating a caliphate. But originally it was loyal to
bin Laden and Zawahiri and the real split that now exists
between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda is mainly over this
issue of a state.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. The--in the Middle East or in the
continent of Africa is there--are there instances of al-Qaeda
and ISIS in open conflict?
Mr. Ford. I am not aware of al-Qaeda and Islamic State
elements fighting each other in North Africa or in sub-Saharan
Africa. I have not seen that. But there has certainly been
evidence of that in abundance in Lebanon and in Syria.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. So there is, clearly, the potential for
more of that open conflict between those two groups. ISIS is--
wants to be ever present. ISIS wants to control territory and
expand its control of that territory yet they don't appear at
the moment to pose an existential threat to the United States.
Al-Qaeda has been more explicit about that. Is that an accurate
statement?
Mr. Ford. The Islamic State has said plenty of blood-
curdling things against the United States and it has threatened
the United States on any number of social media messages.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
Mr. Ford. I wouldn't call it an existential threat but it
is certainly a terrorist threat, absolutely, and I think we
have to take them at their word, Congressman, that if they
could reach out and strike us they would.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. Would you--would you agree that ISIS is
a product of decades of failed governance in the Arab world and
of the hijacking of Arab Islam--kind of a toxic mix?
Mr. Ford. Absolutely, that is part of it. For example,
there was a really good article in November of last year in the
New York Times about Tunisians who were going to the Islamic
State-held territories in Syria.
Tunisia has a really good middle class. It has suffered but
it is still a strong middle class with Mediterranean
influences. And yet thousands of Tunisians have gone over to
the Islamic State, and why is that?
And the main reason is there are frustrations among many
young Tunisians about corruption, lack of opportunity, bad
economic opportunities. And so one element of the Islamic State
appeal--not the only element but one element of the appeal--is
its claim to good governance.
Mr. Higgins. Yes. You said in your opening statement that
ISIS adopts a policy through their ideology of no compromise--
compromise is sin. It rejects pluralism and it has a presence
in an area of the world that is highly pluralistic and it
rejects borders.
How do you combat ISIS and their expansion in this part of
the world?
Mr. Ford. It is really important to seize territory because
it defines itself as a state with a bureaucracy and an
organization. Therefore ground forces, and I would strongly
argue not for American ground forces but for indigenous ground
forces in Iraq and Syria, elsewhere, Lebanon. I think that is
the way to combat it ultimately.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, but I suppose my point is this. Without
compromise, there is no negotiated settlement to this thing
anywhere, anytime, and therefore they have to be destroyed.
Mr. Ford. Exactly.
Mr. Higgins. So, you know, the strategy is then, and we
discuss a lot about where these recruits are coming from. I
don't think there is enough emphasis on why they are coming and
I suppose it is a more complicated question with a complicated
response to it. But it seems like there is one objective here,
and I suppose the question becomes how best you accomplish
that.
Mr. Ford. You want to strangle it on a variety of different
levels, Congressman, whether that be recruitment, financing,
access to the media, which ties into recruitment and financing,
and control of territory.
For sure undermining its ability to recruit is extremely
important which is why I talked about not playing into the Iran
idea.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. I yield back. My time is expired.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentlemen from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Ford, good to see you again. The last time we
spoke was regarding the red line in Syria prior to Assad
crossing the red line and if you recall my questioning was what
our range of options might be.
And so that kind of colors the context of my thinking
regarding the administration in my opening statement, et
cetera.
With that in mind, I think that you may have alluded to the
fact that the administration is right to understand that we
have to confront the Islamic State and that this is an
organization wholly different from al-Qaeda. I think throughout
the course of the discussion you have kind of buttressed that
claim.
As an individual who has worked in the current
administration and maybe understands better than some of us on
the outside that are casual spectators and frustrated
spectators, why do you think, if you would proffer an opinion,
the administration, the President in particular, it doesn't
seem like he understands the threat that ISIS poses or at least
his actions don't reflect that. Would you comment on that?
Mr. Ford. I think the administration actually is doing not
so bad on Iraq in fighting the Islamic State in Iraq. It is
going to be a slow effort but ground has been taken back, and
although it is not an easy battle, I think there is progress.
On the Syria side, Congressman, I think the strategy of
simply trying to arm one element of Syrian fighters and sending
them into the Islamic State without looking at the broader
conflict in the end will not be adequate.
There is this--Congress voted for it--$500 million program
to train the new Syrian force--5,000, 10,000, maybe 15,000 if
they are lucky--to go in over the next couple of years and
fight the Islamic State.
I personally doubt very much that that will be an effective
way to do it because it won't address the recruitment problem.
Mr. Perry. So let me clarify because maybe I wasn't clear.
I am not talking about the borders of Iraq and Syria and what
is occurring there so much as the ideology, as I see it, that
is not only pervasive to the region but pervasive around the
globe.
And when I see that we have leaders come to the White House
to have a summit and a discussion of what comes out of it is
some kind of view that the terror movement is not embedded in
an ideology but in socio-economic disparities I wonder if I am,
and the rest of the world, are completely wholly off base--or
the administration is missing the mark because one of us must
be.
I mean, when you think that--you know, would you say that
Osama bin Laden had economic issues that drove him? I mean, he
was a wealthy man, and Ayman al-Zawahiri is--I think he is an
eye surgeon, right?
I mean, these are not people without means. So why would we
focus on the--I understand from a recruitment standpoint it
might have a component to it. But we are talking about leaving
your home as a teenager to go cut people's heads off and live a
life of great hardship.
Mr. Ford. I put it like this, Congressman. For every one
Osama bin Laden or every one Ayman al-Zawahiri there are
probably 50 young Tunisians, young Syrians, young Iraqis who
are not necessarily joining because they are ideologically
driven but because they are angry at the world.
They don't have economic opportunity. They have been
disenfranchised. They are sick of corruption and so the Islamic
State is----
Mr. Perry. There is a lot of Americans that feel that way
that have nothing to do with it but----
Mr. Ford. Well----
Mr. Perry [continuing]. But we don't go doing things like
the Islamic State does.
Mr. Ford. The good news is, Congressman, we have a much
more responsive political system than most Arab countries do.
So those grievances are real and they drive a lot of the very
broad Islamist movement in the region including the Salafi
jihadi element among them, and my experience in the
administration is that they focus on that broader problem----
Mr. Perry. But we are not--we can find jobs in this country
for people.
Mr. Ford [continuing]. Which the Islamists----
Mr. Perry. We are talking about getting jobs in those
countries for people as a solution set to the spread of this
scourge. It is so counterintuitive and seems, quite honestly,
it seems imbecilic.
Mr. Ford. Actually, Congressman, I don't agree. I think
that were socioeconomic conditions better in many Arab
countries the----
Mr. Perry. So how do you explain the foreign fighters from
America going there?
Mr. Ford. The foreign fighters from America are a tiny
minority.
Mr. Perry. Regardless----
Mr. Poe. Excuse me. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess just picking right where Mr. Perry is leaving off,
Ambassador Ford, if you were sitting in the Oval Office and
President Obama was asking you for advice as to how to evolve
the strategy to better defeat the threat, what would you tell
him?
Mr. Ford. Find indigenous groups that will take the lead in
combatting the Islamic State in North Africa, in Syria, in
Lebanon, in Iraq--indigenous. The American role should be
supportive but they need, A, to find indigenous fighters and B,
they need to address root causes. Let me give you an example.
Mr. Zeldin. What if you can't find indigenous forces?
Mr. Ford. Well, but I think you can and I think, frankly,
if you put the resources out there you can develop the moderate
forces.
Can I give you an example of what I am talking about? This
is a widely known story in Syria, frankly, is where the capital
of the Islamic State is now in Raqqa. So there is a soccer
player named Abdul Baset al-Sarout.
He is a soccer player, well known in Syria. He joined the
Islamic State after he had been fighting off the outside regime
for 2 years at home and saw people bombed, et cetera, starved
because of the regime's brutality. He ended up joining the
Islamic State.
Syrian activists I know talked to him in January--the
families know each other--and said, ``Why would you join an
awful organization like the Islamic State?''
What he said was, ``How dare you talk to me about human
rights and democracy when you people in the West did nothing to
help us when we were being bombed and ravaged by the brutal
Assad regime--how dare you lecture me.''
That is what I mean, Congressman. We have to deal with the
root causes of the conflict in a place like Syria or a place
like Iraq.
Mr. Zeldin. Well, you know, Ambassador, the--I don't know
if we really have enough--if there is enough patience where
eventually we are going to be able to turn the tide on ISIS. I
think that we all need to be much more on our game and when I
say ``we'' I mean, obviously, not just the United States of
America.
Now, President Obama doesn't have the military experience
that his two-star general on the ground has. You know, no
disrespect to him. President Bush before him, President Clinton
before him, you know, they don't have six, seven tours under
their belt of commanding troops on the ground.
Right now, we have thousands of American service members on
the ground in Iraq. We had generals before our Foreign Affairs
Committee hearing last week and we were asking what kind of
flexibility does that two-star have on the ground. We asked if
he knows where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is and if he can send a
Navy SEAL team to execute a well-planned mission at night under
the cover of darkness to take out the leader of ISIS; or if
there was great actionable intelligence where we knew where
there was, you know, a boatload of computers, for example. We
asked what kind of flexibility does this two-star general have,
and the general's answer back to me was reading a paragraph
essentially saying that the two-star general can make a
recommendation.
Now, when I am at events around my district and elsewhere
and I say who is in charge of the surge in Iraq at the
beginning of 2007, everyone says Petraeus, Petraeus, Petraeus.
How many of you know who the two-star general is who is in
charge of our forces on the ground today?
I have asked that question to Members of Congress and they
don't know the answer to that, and that two-star general
doesn't have the flexibility that they need to accomplish their
mission to defeat the threat.
Now, everything is being micromanaged in the White House.
They send an authorization for the use of military force to
Congress. We are expected to sign off on it to send our service
members overseas.
Right now, the 82nd Airborne Division is preparing to go to
Iraq. We want to know that we are sending them off to succeed
and not fail and to actually defeat the threat.
So what may be happening right now, you know, you might
have examples in Iraq, for example, of where we are degrading a
threat, taking out some of their command and control, and
killing some of their bad guys.
We need to kill ISIS. We need to destroy them. The whole
degrading thing--if we measure success whether or not we kill a
few of the bad guys but meanwhile their ranks continue to
grow--they become billions of dollars richer.
Meanwhile, we are negotiating a nuclear arms race--a
nuclear deal with Iran--that might trigger a nuclear arms race
in the Middle East.
I am concerned that this President's strategy is not
evolving quick enough to actually defeat the threat and the
people on the ground don't have the ability that they need to
take the action that will actually take out leadership when the
opportunity presents itself.
I asked that general to clarify. I was asking him a
different question and, again, he was reading the same exact
paragraph that all he could do was make a recommendation.
So here we are--we are facing a real threat that if we
don't defeat them overseas--we will be facing them here at
home. We are literally--over the course of the last few weeks
we have gone after people who are now becoming self-radicalized
U.S. citizens who consider themselves to be citizens of the
Islamic State.
I believe that the President's strategy needs to evolve. We
know what the threat is. Now we need to take it out.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from New York.
I want to thank Ambassador Ford, and Dr. Phares, glad to
see that your flight finally made it. We are in the middle of a
vote on the House floor. It is one vote and members have left
and I assume they will come back.
But we will start--we will have your testimony, Dr. Phares,
and Madam Rajavi's testimony when that vote is over with.
Ambassador Ford, you do not need to stay. I don't want to
hold you up. Probably that is not a good word to use. As a
former judge, I shouldn't use the word hold up, and you are
welcome to stay or leave, whichever you prefer.
But we will be in recess until the vote is over with--5
minutes after the vote is over--and then we will have the
testimony from our other two witnesses. So the subcommittee is
in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
We have two other witnesses to testify. Ms. Maryam Rajavi
is the president-elect of the National Council of Resistance of
Iran.
Ms. Rajavi has appeared before many national parliaments in
Europe and has published a book entitled ``Women Against
Islamic Fundamentalism.''
We also have Dr. Phares. Once again, thank you for getting
here no matter what it took. Dr. Phares is the co-secretary
general of the Transatlantic Legislative Group on
Counterterrorism.
Dr. Phares is also a professor of global strategies in
Washington and has been an advisor to the U.S. House of
Representatives Caucus on Counterterrorism since 2007. And
before our next witness testifies, I would ask that all
spectators be seated in the courtroom or in--sorry, that was a
slip from the old days--in the committee room--I used to be a
judge--in the committee room. So spectators be seated, please,
or leave the court--or leave the room. Thank you.
I think we have the electronics working, and Madam Rajavi,
we welcome you to the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade.
I don't know if you heard that or not but welcome to the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and the
subcommittee is ready to hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARYAM RAJAVI, PRESIDENT-ELECT, NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN
[The following testimony was delivered via teleconference.]
Ms. Rajavi. Mr. Chairman, ranking member, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for giving me this
opportunity to talk about this issue.
Today, Islamic fundamentalism and extremism under the name
of ISIS or Shi'ite paramilitary groups have turned into a
global threat.
Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a threat to peace and
security when Khomeini stole the leadership of a popular
revolution in 1979 and established a religious dictatorship.
The Iranian regime has served as the main source of this
ominous phenomenon in the region and across the world. The
primary objective of Islamic fundamentalists, including ISIS,
is to establish an Islamic caliphate and enforce Sharia law.
They recognize no borders. Aggressiveness and violence are
two common features of Sunni and Shi'ite extremists. As such,
searching for moderates among them is an illusion.
In 1993, we published a book, ``Islamic Fundamentalism: The
New Global Threat,'' warning about this threat and identifying
its epicenter in Tehran. We said the mullahs sought to obtain
nuclear weapons, to export fundamentalism and guarantee their
own existence.
Unfortunately, little if anything was done to prevent the
export of fundamentalism. Experience shows that in the absence
of a firm policy vis-a-vis Tehran regime, there will be
destructive consequences.
Unfortunately, failure to stop the Iranian regime's post-
2003 meddling in Iraq which led to occupy that country and
further spreading fundamentalism.
Similarly, crimes committed by Bashar al-Assad in Syria and
the massacre and exclusion of Sunnis in Iraq by Maliki coupled
with Western silence empowered ISIS. I emphasize that the
mullahs' regime is not part of any solution to current crisis.
It is, indeed, the heart of the problem.
The people of Iran, indeed, call the mullahs' regime
godfather of ISIS and other fundamentalist groups. The ultimate
solution to this problem is regime change by the Iranian people
and resistance.
This regime is extremely fragile. As evident during the
2009 uprising, the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people
demanded regime change. The regime's show of force is hollow
and a result of weak Western policy.
Owing to the pivotal role of the People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran as a democratic Muslim movement, the
Iranian resistance has established itself the antithesis to
Islamic fundamentalism. We believe in separation of religion
and state, gender equality, respect for rights of religious and
ethnic minorities, a democratic and non-nuclear Iran. The
following practical steps are necessary to achieve this goal.
One, expel the Quds Force from Iraq and end the Iranian
regime's influence in that country.
Two, enable full participation of Sunnis in power sharing
and arm Sunni tribes to provide security for their communities.
Three, assist Syria's moderate opposition and people to end
Assad's regime and establish democracy in that country. Four,
recognize the Iranian people's aspirations to overthrow the
mullahs and ending inaction vis-a-vis the gross human rights
violations in Iran.
Five, provide protection for and uphold the rights of
members of Iran's organized opposition, the PMOI, in Camp
Liberty in Iraq.
Six, empower the true democratic and tolerant Islam to
counter fundamentalist interpretations of this religion.
And seven, block all pathways for the mullahs' regime to
acquire nuclear weapons.
But let me finish by a quote from America's first
President, George Washington: ``The harder the conflict, the
greater the triumph.''
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rajavi follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Madam Rajavi.
We will have questions for you momentarily. But first, we
will hear from Dr. Phares, and for the record both your
testimony and Ms. Rajavi's testimony will be made a part of the
record and you can summarize your testimony, Dr. Phares.
STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., CO-SECRETARY GENERAL,
TRANSATLANTIC PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON COUNTERTERRORISM
Mr. Phares. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
invitation. I would like to thank also the ranking member and
the members of the committee for organizing this very important
strategic seminar hearing on ISIS--defining the enemy.
My testimony has the title ``Identifying the Jihadi
Ideology and Providing Alternative Strategies to Defeat ISIS,''
which I believe is the heart of the discussion on this panel.
For the sake of summary, I would like to go over the major
principles I began with, the four points I would like to raise.
Point number one is about the ideology displayed by the
Islamic State, its roots, its evolution and ultimately its
final goals, and the question I raise: Are we dealing with a
new ideology?
Is ISIS producing a new ideology, or is it an ideology that
has been around through various organizations, various
movements and now has reached a mutation that is allowing ISIS
to win and win further?
Point two I am going to raise is about what happens if ISIS
is unchecked. If the current situation of status quo, which I
call a moving status quo--take a few villages, they take back a
few villages despite the destruction of their military
machine--if that situation continues, what should we be
expecting in Iraq--in Iraq and Syria, in the region and beyond?
And maybe beyond is in our homelands, including the United
States and across the Atlantic.
Three--there is a current geopolitical problem or a series
of problems in the confrontation with ISIS nowadays as we
speak. I would like to offer a very short identification of
what these two problems are--why we are obstructed, why we are
not ending ISIS, as many in this House and the Senate and
European Parliament have been asking.
And last, what can the United States and its allies do or
actually, I would say, should do, to defeat ISIS and the
movements behind ISIS--because ISIS is just a stage in a
movement that began before and will continue later.
In my past 30 years of research, in six books focusing on
future jihad and the evolution of this war of ideas, I have
made the case that what we are dealing with, particularly since
9/11--and the 9/11 Commission has been very clear on this--we
are dealing with an ideology that is producing a movement, not
a movement that is producing the ideology.
Hence, I have recommended that the United States, to the
past administration and this administration and future
administrations, actually engage in a battle that we have not
engaged in, which is to respond to the ideology, to actually
mobilize those forces and civil societies that can respond to
this ideology.
And after doing this we can encourage the societies that
could be and would be freed from ISIS to form an intellectual
resistance to stop the return of ISIS. Remember, dear members,
that we were in Iraq. We left Iraq.
There was an Iraqi army. That Iraqi army was in the Sunni
areas. So the maximum that our hopes would be right now would
be for the same forces to go into the same regions, to defeat
ISIS.
We have defeated al-Qaeda before. So there is a constant
phenomenon that keeps bringing the jihadists back, not just to
Iraq this time, but to Syria and as far as Libya and Yemen and
north Nigeria.
I have suggested in my research that, number one, we need
to identify the ideology but, number two, we need to have a
coalition with forces that are willing to push back against the
ideology.
One cannot win a war of ideas from an American perspective
against the whole world. We need to have allies, and the most
important ally should be in the region. The problem has been,
in the past, that we have ignored them.
We have partnered with many forces, but I assume and I will
make the case that we have partnered with the wrong persons,
with the wrong forces.
Partnering, for example, with the Muslim Brotherhood. Even
though this is based on the notion that moderate Islamists can
be a wall against extremist Islamists--that is what we have
heard from Washington over the past years--we forget one thing:
That we do not control what happens.
If we support the moderate Islamists without making sure
that they are vetted, that they will move against the
jihadists, what will happen? And it already happened in Syria;
when we supported moderate Islamists, they became al-Nusra and
from al-Nusra they ended up becoming ISIS.
So we need to have a better, not just vetting system, but a
better system of ideas upon which we can develop the strategy.
Last but not least, in my last book, ``The Lost Spring,'' I
urged the administration and, of course, Congress to act faster
before the catastrophes hit--that was last March--before ISIS
takes over half of Syria and one-third of Iraq, before ISIS
lands in Benghazi and Derna, before the Houthi pro-Iranian
militias expand. All of this happened since last June.
If you look at the map--the historical map of these events,
most of the explosions that we are dealing with happened over
the past 9 months.
On the ideological level, it is clear that this group,
ISIS, has not invented new ideas. The success of ISIS is that
it has made into reality all the dreams of the previous
ideologies and previous jihadists.
What is ISIS in Iraq and Syria? It is the dream of bin
Laden. He spoke about it--killing infidels: Every single
jihadist since the '20s has been talking about it.
The major difference is that this Daesh, ISIS or ISIL has
been able to do it because of their strength, because of the
chaos in the region but, I would add, because of our policies,
which were not preemptive enough nor formed the right
coalitions at the right time.
Second, if not checked, ISIS is projected to increase its
control of the Sunni areas where they are. But that control is
not going to be only military.
My concern and the concern of many of my colleagues who
have been looking at what this organization is doing, number
one: They are drafting.
So we are not just talking about individuals who have been
in al-Qaeda and other places and now adhering to ISIS. They are
going into cities and towns and drafting. So their numbers are
supposed to grow.
My greater concern, dear members, is that they are now
schooling. They are doing in Iraq and in Syria what the Taliban
did two decades ago in parts of Afghanistan and in Pakistan.
They are creating already the next generation, and this is
not something secret. We don't even need intelligence to know
that. It is on YouTube.
We see those kids aged between eight and 12 being schooled
into ideological madrassas and hence my first conclusion. Even
if we take back Mosul, if we take back Tikrit, if we take back
Raqqa in Syria or others would do, my concern is that the next
generation is being worked on right now. So we need to have a
strategy with regard the ideological confrontation.
Third, on the geopolitical problems that we are facing in
fighting ISIS today I would identify two major obstructions.
One, definitely, and it responds to my concern: We don't have a
war of ideas.
I have reviewed every single piece of what we call in
Washington a strategic communications campaign, a de-
radicalization campaign. I will be more than happy to expand on
that when and if needed.
We are not winning on the ideological level. An argument
such the one discussed earlier that a jihadi becomes jihadi
because there is no job--and I am not talking about the
politics of it, I am talking about the academic dimension of
it--that argument is not true.
It has been debunked in the Middle East. When you talk to
intellectuals in Egypt and Libya and Tunisia and other parts of
the Middle East, they do not adopt this argument.
A jihadi becomes a jihadi simply because of indoctrination,
and the evidence is if you have 1 million individuals in any
country in the Middle East that are jobless, why would 500 of
these 1 million choose to become jihadi? What is the
difference?
Why wouldn't the 1 million become jihadists? It is the same
frustration. The others would choose to become revolutionaries,
reformers, do demonstrations, find a job. They would choose
many other options.
Science and research have told us those who have shifted to
become jihadists, even if they are under duress sociologically,
have been indoctrinated before.
There is a chip that was put in their mind by different
ways that allowed them to take the argumentation of we are now
jihadists. And, by the way, dear members, the jihadists
themselves never use the socioeconomic element.
They would never say, ``I didn't find a job or I was
frustrated, therefore I became.'' They didn't even use the norm
of, ``We are against the richer people.''
Their concern is caliphate or no caliphate. Their concern
is to win that battle on the ground or not.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Phares follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Phares. I let you go a little
longer. I need time for the members to ask questions as well to
both of the witnesses. But I thank you for your testimony--Ms.
Rajavi, your testimony as well.
I will recognize myself for questions. How is ISIS
philosophy different from Sunnis', say, in Saudi Arabia or
Shi'ites' in Iran? First you, Dr. Phares, briefly.
Mr. Phares. Well, a first difference between all Sunni
Salafis on one hand and then the Shi'ite jihadists, those that
Madam Rajavi has mentioned, meaning the Iranian regime and the
path they are on, they both want the establishment of an
international universal Islamic empire with different names.
While the Salafis in general choose the caliphate, the
Khomeinis use the imamate for historical reasons that we don't
probably have the time to go over.
But between ISIS and between the Saudis, the Saudis accept
they are Salafi in their essence but do accept the
international system. They have Ambassadors.
They accept the United Nations, they accept a minimum of
consensus while ISIS doesn't accept borders, doesn't accept the
existence of the international system and their acts are a
result of that.
Mr. Poe. Ms. Rajavi, same question. How does ISIS
philosophy differ from the Sunnis in Saudi Arabia or Shi'ites
in Iran?
[The following testimony was delivered through an
interpreter.]
Ms. Rajavi. So far as the formation of ISIS is concerned,
it was also the mullahs' regime which helped the creation of
ISIS. The crimes committed by the Iranian regime and Assad and
the killing of the Sunnis in Iraq helped the emergence of ISIS.
Therefore, gaining state power, and it was the Iranian
regime when there was a state in Iran, created the terrorism as
a major threat for security.
But from a philosophical respect, the most fundamental
element in all fundamentalist groups, whether Sunni or Shi'a,
they are common on the following.
They want to force their religion or school of thought,
establish a religious dictatorship whether under the name of
caliphate or the absolute rule of the clergy; they do not
believe in any borders and going after expansion and capturing
other territories and also believe that those who do not accept
the Sharia law must be eliminated.
And I want to stress that there is an antithesis to this
philosophy and that is a tolerant and democratic interpretation
of Islam. There is a conflict between ISIS and the mullahs in
Iran but that is an internal power struggle.
But despite any differences, the continuation of other
fundamentalist groups very much hinges on the Iranian regime
being in power, remaining in power. Terrorism and
fundamentalism under the name of Islam came to the world scene
by the mullahs' regime in Iran and when this regime is
overthrown that will be limited or destroyed.
And it is interesting that after the emergence of ISIS the
people of Iran called the Iran regime, the godfather of ISIS.
Regarding Saudi Arabia, I want to add that ISIS, contrary to
Saudi Arabia, they do not believe in borders. Therefore, the
question is not being Sunni or Salafi or whatever.
The problem is those characteristics which I just
identified and that is where you will see that despite all the
differences ISIS is very close to the fundamentalist ruling in
Iran. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. Ms. Rajavi, may I ask you a question that you made
a comment about? How do you see the mullahs in Iran having
facilitated and helped the ISIS movement?
How has ISIS been able to expand its influence, its
philosophy because of the mullahs in Iran? Make that clear, if
you would, on how there is that connection.
Ms. Rajavi. As I said, there is a power struggle between
ISIS and the regime. But at the same time, on occasions they
have cooperated.
For example, Zarqawi, the original founder and leader of
ISIS, received enormous logistic support from the Iranian
regime and had his bases even in Iran. And I think it was in
2005 that intelligence security services in Germany exposed
this connection between Zarqawi and the Iranian regime.
And also there has been many reports even in the media that
Bashar al-Assad released many of the ISIS members from prison
in order to join ISIS. While in their air attacks they have
never attacked ISIS but the focus is on the moderate opposition
in Syria.
So I want to conclude that so far as the mullah's regime in
Iran is concerned, they are 100 percent supporting Bashar al-
Assad in Syria and therefore all the crimes that are committed
by the help and support of the mullah's regime has created a
fertile ground for ISIS to emerge.
And on the other hand, crimes committed by Maliki at the
behest of the Iranian regime in Iraq and in particular the
absolute suppression of the Sunnis has led to empowering ISIS
to expand itself both in Iraq and Syria.
Mr. Poe. I will yield 5 minutes to the ranking member from
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on Ambassador Ford's testimony in terms
of Dr. Phares. I really want to see if we can get to the root
of some things, as short as this time is.
Your main thought was that the ideology is the controlling
factor--absolute controlling factor that happens. Is that
correct? I think I got that.
Mr. Phares. The ideology is what produces them but it is
not the only element that controls their action. But without
the ideology they cannot be produced. So the movement can use
this pool only if it exists.
Mr. Keating. So the leaders would be pure to that ideology?
Mr. Phares. Yes. The leaders who are produced by this
movement, if they are eliminated, that would slow down the
activity of the movement.
Mr. Keating. Then here is where I have the problem trying
to put everything--it is nice to put everything in one box. I
wish we could in this instance.
But if it was absolutely controlling, how do you explain
then that ISIL will then take cultural artifacts and it will
destroy them because they are uncompromising, as Ambassador
Ford said?
And they are ideologically centered, so they are destroying
those cultural artifacts that aren't inconsistent with their
ideological beliefs. But if they are so pure why are they
taking these things then and selling them, preserving them to
get money?
Isn't that more the actions of a criminal enterprise too? I
mean, it is not as simple. It is complex and I think that is
part of it.
If we focus on one narrow box we are going to miss the
whole picture. But there is an element of that, isn't there,
with ISIL?
Mr. Phares. Mr. Congressman, I think it is the other way
around. If I may not disagree but readjust the argument. In
past similar situations with totalitarian armies that were
supposed to go only by ideology, and I am talking about World
War II, should it be the Nazi armies or the Soviet armies, you
can't get more totalitarian and disciplined, they have done the
same.
Rank and file could go against the ideology and the
instructions that are----
Mr. Keating. These are the leaders that are making these
decisions.
Mr. Phares. The leaders of the ISIS movement can also be
corrupt. There is no doubt about it, and there were leaders in
the Communist movement in the past during the Cold War and
guerilla forces that were corrupt.
My point is, we have to give what to Caesar is to Caesar
and, of course, what the corrupt are doing is their natural
behavior. I am not claiming that the ideology will only produce
a perfect behavior.
But what I am claiming is that without the ideology you
cannot have jihadists. Then another argument would win.
Mr. Keating. But there is--they are related and they can't,
I don't think, be ignored. Ambassador Ford--I am sorry you
weren't here and thank you for coming and making the trouble
with plane flights and all--but Ambassador Ford, upon being
pressed in questioning, became clear there are other social
factors that are a part of this and to me, the chairman's
experience in law enforcement as a judge, mine as a prosecutor,
there are social issues that breed criminal activity.
It is not--there are people in the same social settings
with the same challenges. They don't become criminals. But
there are some that are.
Mr. Phares. That is true.
Mr. Keating. And more so than not and you can't say that
that is not a factor even. So I think the social conditions--
and I am sorry you weren't here to see--hear Ambassador Ford's
testimony--but they are a factor as well. It is not pure
ideology.
And I don't deny there is ideology. That is a given.
Mr. Phares. I hear you, Congressman. There is a point, of
course, in socioeconomics for everything else, not just for the
jihadists but for every ultra nationalist movement.
Let me draw your attention to the fact that Egypt in 2013,
while the argument was that people were adhering to the Muslim
Brotherhood because they were not finding jobs or because of
the social conditions, when on June 30th, 2013, 33 million
Egyptians, 80 percent of whom are under the level of poverty,
marched against the Muslim Brotherhood, that defeats the logic
that it is only socioeconomic. But I do agree with you that
socioeconomics are part of it.
Mr. Keating. That is important because I think if we are
going to fight them we have to fight them in so many different
levels.
And one of the things you brought up that I thought was
very important was our messaging and how we can do a better job
messaging, and I think we have to incorporate the Muslim
community back home and have their voices be trusted voices in
opposition.
But if you could comment just briefly on what we could do
not only in the U.S. but in Europe and Turkey, you know, in
approaching this problem. I gave you a lot in a short time so I
am sorry.
Mr. Phares. Absolutely. Thank you again.
I did 5 years of research on our messaging, both
administrations, the bureaucracy in general. The problem is,
first of all, we have to vet who we are working with in terms
of message, meaning we need to work with NGOs who have had an
experience on the ground in the region and have an experience
here and can be diverse as much as possible.
Even within our own communities when we are dealing with
organizations, we cannot say this one organization represents
the entire community unless we have referendums in this
country, which I don't think under the Constitution we do.
So I agree fully with you the next stage to push back
against radicalization is from within these communities to have
NGOs that are vetted and that they are willing to push back
against the doctrine.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I am over my time but I think this
is a crucial issue that we have to address. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating was just asking about the socioeconomics. My
question--I just want to get to the heart, Doctor, of what is
the most effective way to get inside the head of ISIS and
demoralize them?
Mr. Phares. Well, that is a different battle, Mr.
Congressman, from the interception I suggested but I will
answer both.
Pushing back against an individual who has already been
radicalized is a much bigger mission. It would need a much
larger mobilization.
It needs for ISIS elements to feel that the people are
against them and that the international community in the region
are against them, so in response to what the congressman has
mentioned about strategic communication, we need to do a better
job.
Our Arab broadcast, our Persian broadcast, that the
Congress funds here, has not been doing, in my own view, enough
to push back against these organizations.
But I do propose that before these individuals are
radicalized, this is where we need to interfere. When kids are
10 and 12 and 13, in a short 10 years, as in Afghanistan or as
in Iraq and in Syria, they are the new ISIS.
So we need to add and supply strategies that would help
first women, their mothers and teachers, and the NGOs to be
part of this enterprise, not just on the military level, not
just on the economic level, but on the educational level.
Mr. Zeldin. What is the most effective way, though, for
those who are currently part of ISIS who are beheading
individuals in their region--what is the best way to get into
the head of ISIS and demoralize them?
Mr. Phares. Congressman, it is only a massive military
defeat of large areas controlled by ISIS.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you. I mean, I totally agree with you. I
mean, we could spend a lot of time here, you know, talking
about other elements of what we are up against and we can
spend--we can have a hearing dedicated to talking about social
economics.
We can all admit that maybe there is something to do with
the economy. That might have something to do with it. But the
best way to get into the head of a member of ISIS is to put a
round in it--is with lead.
Honestly, they have to be defeated. That is what we are up
against. And we can have a tremendous amount of patience
waiting for someone else to fill this vacuum and step up in the
region.
But listen, when you want to be the leader of the free
world, you know, American exceptionalism isn't about figuring
out a way to get everyone a job. You know, King Abdul of
Jordan, you know, when one of their pilots is executed isn't
filming a video to ISIS and the rest of the world on how we
need to get them more jobs.
You know, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, when
he is giving a speech about, you know, what we do with our
enemies around the world it is not that we need to give them
more wealth.
I mean, we have to confront this threat and, honestly, if
you want to--if you want to demoralize them, if you want to
defeat ISIS--it is not going to be done through social programs
of giving people jobs and more wealth.
The world needs America to lead. Now, it is our
responsibility here to ensure that we are never setting our
services members up to defeat. I do not support occupations,
enduring ground operations.
But there is a big difference when you are talking about
Navy SEALS, Delta Force, Green Berets, Marines, Army Rangers
who in the middle of the night under the cover of darkness they
are going to show up at areas where ISIS is operating, where
ISIS is sleeping, and they are going to execute well-planned
missions that is going to take out high-value targets and
capture actionable intelligence.
Our enemies do not respect weakness. They only respect
strength, and strength cannot be shown just by finding jobs for
more people who are members of ISIS. It is--it is divorced from
reality to spend time here talking about social economics as if
that is the root of what we are up against and that is the way
to turn the tide.
You know, we are all saying it is all part of it. That
might be why some people are getting involved in ISIS. It might
have something to do with economics. That is not going to
eliminate the threat.
Now, Madam Rajavi, listening to you speak and mentioning
the Green Revolution back in 2009, and we think about the
undemocratic elections that took place in Iran, at that point
when the economy was doing better and oil was $100 a barrel,
and millions of Iranians were rising up to take control of
their country, and our President was saying that that was none
of our problem.
Fast forward today when the economy is worse and oil is $50
a barrel and people like you are showing a leadership, willing
to take control of your own destiny.
I honestly do not know whether or not my President is on
the same exact team that I am because there are individuals
like you who are willing to rise up and take control of your
country's future and destiny with a vision, whether it is Iran
or Syria or elsewhere, to bring stability to the Middle East.
I commend you for being here and for leading your effort. I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for 5
minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the last
gentleman and point out that on the issue of socioeconomics not
being the driving force, keep in mind 19 of the 20 hijackers on
9/11 were from a rich oil-rich country and were middle class in
their background. They did not take over those planes because
they couldn't support their families.
This hearing is about defining the enemy and the President
is attacked by some because he doesn't have the courage to give
ISIS the ideological victory that ISIS wants. ISIS wants to be
called the Islamic State.
They want to be regarded as Islamic. They want to be
regarded as a state. I think they are heretic terrorists, not
Islamic scholar statesmen, and so I do not think the President
should be criticized for not calling them Islamic when they are
heretics, and not calling them a state when they are
terrorists.
Also, the topic of this hearing is defining the enemy and I
think the greatest enemy is the Shi'ite alliance. I have said
that before in this room, the alliance of Iran, Assad,
Hezbollah, now the Houthi, has killed more Muslims, killed more
Americans and poses a greater threat of mass destruction than
does ISIS.
I am glad to have Ms. Rajavi here. I want to thank the MEK
for revealing to the world the Natanz nuclear plant. There may
have been a few members of the intel committee who knew that
before the MEK told us.
But speaking on behalf of roughly 400 Members of Congress,
thank you for telling Congress as well.
Now, you personally promote a very tolerant moderate view
of Islam. You are an advocate of the separation of religion and
state, and you have been an advocate for human rights and
women's rights.
Of course, your country is ruled by very rigid laws that
call for stoning people and chopping off limbs. ISIS does the
same thing supposedly in support of a different version of
Islam--Iran being Shi'ite, ISIS being Sunni.
Why is their understanding of Islam the same, or at least
similar to our eyes, and why do both the rulers of Iran and
ISIS enforce their beliefs through these gruesome measures? If
you could respond.
I am sorry. We are unable to hear you. I don't know if
our----
Mr. Poe. Technical difficulty here.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Technical people can help that.
Ms. Rajavi. Thank you very much, Congressman Sherman. You
touched upon a very important issue. You said that Islamic
fundamentalism of the kind of the Shi'ite is even more
dangerous than the Sunni one before anything else.
The reason is that there is a state empowered in the
dimension of the mullahs' regime in a country--in a vast
country with so many resources--financial resources--and it is
supporting these Shi'ite fundamentalist groups financially,
ideologically and logistically in every field.
Therefore, they are much more dangerous. I agree with you.
Regarding your question as to why they resort to so much
violence to pursue their objectives I should tell you that the
reason is they can only survive through absolute terror and
fear, and this has been the trend of over 30 years of ruling
fundamentalists in Iran that now has expanded to Iraq, Syria,
Yemen, Lebanon and other countries, and other fundamentalists
take lessons from the Godfather.
Let us not forget that the mullahs in Iran are implementing
more than 70 kind of different tortures--cutting off limbs or
gauging eyes, executing pregnant women and all the heinous
crimes that one might imagine--and now ISIS and other
fundamentalists are really imitating from the mullahs in Iran.
Therefore, I reiterate once again that the ultimate
solution is, one, evict, dislodge the Iranian regime from Syria
and Iraq and Yemen and, even more important, regime change in
Iran.
The fundamentalist regime in Iran must be changed because
this regime has created a political umbrella and a source of
ideology and logistical and financial support for the
fundamentalists and terrorists in today's world.
If it were not due to the destructive influence of the
Iranian regime, we would not face the situation today in Iraq,
Yemen and Syria and they would have stability.
Let us not forget that by regime change in Iran, those
militia under the command of the Quds Force, like the Hezbollah
in Lebanon or Ansar Allah of the Houthis in Yemen, and other
various groups in Iraq, would be eliminated without having
their support and they would not have the vital environment to
survive.
Mr. Poe. Does the gentleman yield back his time?
Mr. Sherman. I would love to ask another question but I
have gone over. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Doctor, you had--we got called out for votes--but you were
making three points when I came in, and number two was you made
reference to ideological confrontation I presume toward the
goal to delegitimize ISIS. Could you elaborate further?
Mr. Phares. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
The first goal is to delegitimize them but there is a more
important goal. It is to encourage and mobilize civil societies
where ISIS controls so eventually, when ISIS control is
eliminated by military means, there will be no new ISIS.
My whole point to the panel is that ISIS is a new al-Qaeda,
al-Qaeda a new Ansar al-Sharia. These are organizations. Every
time there is a problem and a suppression, they come back.
So the ideological battle is not just to deter them. It is
to create a resistance inside these societies to make it
impossible for a new ISIS to emerge.
Mr. Higgins. So you have to confront the ideology in order
to stop the evolution of these groups from proliferating. So
how is that done?
Mr. Phares. It is done in the field where it has been
fought. The message that ISIS and the jihadists are producing
and, of course, sending through Internet and--the problem is
not Internet and Facebook--the problem is who is responding to
them. We need to partner with and work with leaders and
ideologues such as the spiritual leader of Sunni Islam. I just
came back from Egypt a few weeks ago.
I met with Sheikh Azhar, the equivalent of the Sunni Pope.
We had a long conversation. He is ready to mobilize against
this way of thinking.
There are many clerics around the Muslim world. They are
ready to move. Their problem--there is no coordination among
themselves and us.
Mr. Higgins. With all due respect, we hear this all the
time but it never happens. You know, the United States, whether
you agreed with our involvement in Iraq, you know, the best
that we could hope for was taking out a bad guy and creating a
breathing space within which Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds could
develop some kind of social contract and live peacefully
amongst one another.
Obviously, that didn't happen. You know, some would say
that ISIS is just trying to get their country back in Iraq
because the origins of ISIS, clearly, are de-Baathification and
the dissolution of the Iraq army under Saddam Hussein, who were
Sunnis.
And maybe it is second generation, but as you talk about
the continuum of this kind of extremist activity, their roots
are somewhere. I suppose the question is, you know, where is
the end and how do you achieve that?
You also said that jihadis become jihadis by indoctrination
and I know there was some discussion here about whether or not
socioeconomic factors contribute to that.
I suppose they do to a degree. That is certainly not the
only vulnerability to radicalization. But I would suggest--I
would argue that some of it is.
You know, I think the American people become very
frustrated because we, as the indispensable nation, are called
upon to try to intervene to resolve these problems. But yet at
its core, these problems have to be resolved internally, and
the Middle East is a very pluralistic society.
There is a very pluralistic society. But there is a zero
sum game mentality and in order for somebody to win somebody
has to lose. And that is why Bashar al-Assad in Syria enjoys
partnerships with people he has no interest in.
Just because they are minorities, the Sunnis take over,
they feel as though they will get slaughtered and therefore
they align themselves with Bashar al-Assad so that they don't
get slaughtered.
There is no recognition of minority rights. You know, in
game theory there is also what is referred to as a variable sum
game and that means that there can be multiple winners. But in
order to promote a peaceful path toward an existence of
peaceful coexistence there has to be pretty profound
compromises.
You know, I referenced before in Northern Ireland they had
a history--a horrible history of Protestants and Catholics
killing each other. No troops were deployed by the United
States in Northern Ireland.
But both sides, in order to participate in the Good Friday
Agreement of 1998, had to denounce violence publicly--
paramilitaries on both sides--the Irish Republican Army and the
Protestant paramilitaries--and they actually had to participate
in the destruction of their arms with an international
tribunal.
And, you know, my point is you are either going to get
democracy through peaceful means or, in the absence of that,
civil war. And the United States fought a civil war where
650,000 to 700,000 people were killed at a time where our
country's population was about 30 million people.
I mean, that is very, very significant. But that is the
consequence of not being able to resolve your problems
peacefully. So as we, you know, look for solutions with these
very clear maps of delineation as to who is responsible, but
this is--you know, this is probably pretty accurate. There is a
lot of duplicity going on there.
You know, Tom Friedman, the author and New York Times
columnist, once said, ``Is Iraq the way it is because Saddam is
the way he is, or is Saddam the way he is because Iraq is the
way it is?''
And I think unless and until these Middle Eastern countries
recognize, you know, that there is something beyond the horizon
than hating one another and killing each other in the name of
God then we are just going to be at this table and these panels
for years and years to come.
There has got to be some enlightenment and that is going to
require leadership, and it is going to require leadership in
the Arab Muslim world.
Mr. Poe. And you yield back your time. And without
objection, this chart that was hastily made by the Chair, will
be made part of the record and with--I ask unanimous consent
that Mr. Davis, who is not a member of this committee, be
allowed to ask questions and if there is no objection then the
Chair recognizes Mr. Davis from Illinois.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank you for your indulgence. Indeed, I am not a member of
this subcommittee but I do have interest in the subject matter,
and I want to thank you and I thank both of our witnesses for
being here.
Ms. Rajavi, over the past 30 years the United States has
been drawn into some serious diplomatic and military dead ends
in the Mideast by mistakenly backing individuals and
organizations claiming popular support which turned out to be
largely exaggerated and somewhat manufactured.
Would you please tell us about the role of the National
Council of Resistance in Iranian civil life and its place in
current Iranian political life, and how do you measure your
popular support in Iran?
Ms. Rajavi. With absolute repression it is not possible to
go to the vote of people and see what the people really think,
and the mullahs will never accept a free election.
Therefore, the yardstick or the gage for the popularity of
this movement, one, is its persistent continuation of its
principles despite the absolute repression and having lost
120,000 of its members and sympathizers who were executed by
the regime.
I show you now this book, which includes the names of some
20,000 members of the resistance movement from different strata
of the Iranian society. So you can imagine that collecting such
information during repression is very difficult.
But another indication is the fear of the regime and its
engagement in demonizing the Iranian resistance as another
indication of the strength of the resistance and its
popularity.
As you may know, in all the diplomatic correspondence that
they have their main demands from their interlocutors is to
restrict the activities of our movement and any affiliation
with our movement in Iran is equal to execution.
In the 2009 uprising, the regime's officials acknowledged
publicly that those demonstrations were organized by a
Mujahideen network, the MEK network in Iran, and this popular
support has enabled this movement also to have access to most
secret information of the Iranian regime--on nuclear, on
missile and what the Quds Force is doing in the region as well
as the human rights violations in Iran.
We have always said to the mullahs' regime that if you
really claim that our movement has no popular support, let us
have a free election under the auspices of the international
community and let us see who has the popular support of the
Iranian people. But let us not forget that a free election for
the mullahs is a red line.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Dr. Phares, do you believe that the United States should be
cooperating militarily with Iran in combating ISIS in Iraq and
Syria, and if yes, how and to what extent? Is it direct
cooperation or indirect cooperation through the Iraqi
Government and if no, why not?
Mr. Phares. Well, I will begin by the answer no, and
certainly no, Mr. Congressman. I will give the argument that
unless there is a change in the government and in the
direction, at least, of Iranian policy in the region,
cooperating with the regime that is waging a campaign in Iraq,
in Syria, in Lebanon and now in Yemen against five or seven of
our own allies and probably soon to be trying to destabilize
Bahrain, it would be a strategic mistake.
So I am not against the principle that the United States
would cooperate with anybody to defeat the terrorists. But if
we cooperate with the Iranians as they are engaged militarily
against our own allies, and there is something even more
important--every inch of land taken away from ISIS, which is
the good thing, all depends on who is taking away that inch
from the organization.
If the Iranian-controlled militias or Iranians with
different aspects in Iraq are taking over, we would be
replacing one problem with another problem.
So my answer is, clearly, no to that cooperation unless we
see a change or a reform and, clearly, we have not seen yet a
Gorbachev-like perestroika or glasnost inside Iran for the time
being.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much and, Mr. Chairman, again, I
thank you for your indulgence and I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. Without objection,
unanimous consent the Chair will allow another individual who
is not a member of this committee to ask questions. Ms. Chu
from California is recognized.
Ms. Chu. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I would like to address these questions to Ms. Rajavi. I
would like to ask about Camp Liberty. Camp Liberty is a
military base that has become a permanent home for over 3,000
Iranian refugees.
But the conditions there are poor and freedom is very
severely restricted. Worse, there are reports that the Iraqi
Government is blockading the base, preventing food, water and
medicine from arriving.
Combined with the restriction on travel, this blockade has
led to at least 25 deaths, the most recent being Mr. Jalal
Abedini on April 17th.
Can you give us a sense of living conditions in Camp
Liberty in regard to food, medicine and decent housing?
Ms. Rajavi. Our prime concern about the residents in Camp
Liberty is their safety and security. That is the main problem
that they are facing in Camp Liberty now to the extent that
since the protection of the residents was transferred from the
United States to Iraq 116 have been killed, seven have been
taken hostage and the residents are denied timely access to
medical care.
And for this reason, as you have just mentioned, 25 people
have lost their lives while there was the possibility to save
their life.
I think it was 116 who have been killed during these
attacks by Iraqi forces; they have no freedom of movement and
enormous restrictions have been imposed on them.
Just to give you one example, Camp Liberty's electricity is
not connected to the city grid and since the Abadi government
took office there has been no changes in the condition and
there is still a prison-like situation for the residents.
And I think the new government must recognize Camp Liberty
as a refugee camp and remove all the inhumane restrictions
which have been imposed on the camp and put an end to the daily
harassment of the residents.
In particular, it is very important that the camp
management be changed because they are the same people--the
people who are the camp management are the same people who were
engaged in the massacre and the killing of the residents in the
past attacks.
And as you know, the United States Government had made a
written commitment to provide safety and security for these
people but that obligation has been violated and I think Camp
Liberty should be really put under the protection of the United
States or at least their personal weapons to be given so that
if they are attacked by the militias or paramilitary groups
that they could defend themselves.
And I expect that the United States upholds its commitment
to regular monitoring of Camp Liberty.
Ms. Chu. Let me ask now about--do you have any confidence
in the current government to improve conditions and what is the
future for the people at Camp Liberty? Is there a U.S. role?
Ms. Rajavi. I think the U.S. Government can really demand
and urge the Iraqi Government to uphold its obligations.
So far, the government has not done anything that we could
really trust that they will do the right thing, and as I said
that the people are still living in a prison-like situation in
Camp Liberty as prisoners.
That is why I said that the new government should recognize
Liberty as a refugee camp and remove all the restriction
imposed on the camp and end the harassment of the residents.
And I want to reiterate that it is very vital to change the
camp management and do not allow the mullahs' regime to send
its agents for psychological torture of the residents and
laying the ground for another massacre in Camp Liberty. These
are actions that they can take and I believe that the United
States Government is in a position to really call on and demand
from the Iraqi Government to uphold this obligation.
Ms. Chu. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady.
We have also been joined on the dais by the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, and without objection and unanimous
consent that she will be allowed to question the witnesses. You
have 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
kindness and let me add my appreciation to both you and Ranking
Member Sherman and all the members on this panel for their
courtesies extended and to indicate that this is a very
historic hearing because as far as my memory can recollect, Mr.
Chairman, this is one of the few times that the voice of the
opposition of the Government of Iran has been part of an
official discussion.
And that is very important for the American people and for
us to formulate the right kinds of policies. Many of us worked
for long years to ensure that this great leader, who happens to
be a woman, would be able to speak and would be able to lead
the MEK and be removed from the terrorist list.
There were many machinations and court decisions and we
have moved to a decision which I think reflects the fairness of
this nation. Might I also say that the importance of hearing
both views in this backdrop of ISIS and the backdrop of the
merging of the caliphate--it is from Syria to Iraq to Iran is
very important.
As we watch Yemen, and we watch Libya, we know that we have
to come together around a full understanding of the influence
and impact of ISIS.
So let me say to Ms. Rajavi, who has been a continuing
leader and someone who has opened her information cycle, if I
will, to ensure that information be given. She doesn't hide
information. She has been open and forthright.
So I would like to pose these questions. We are trying to
discern ISIS the enemy and I would just make the comment that
any organization that beheads and uses the kind of horrific
video to intimidate certainly is a defined enemy, from my
perspective, and all those who contribute to the growth and
continuation of ISIS, using them as a front for the dastardly
deeds they want to do, we have to review.
We have to look at Syria. We have to look at what is
happening in Iraq and we certainly must look at what is
happening in Iran.
But I do want to say as well in the nuclear
nonproliferation agreement framework, which we don't have, I
still believe that we should look at that in a way that we look
and analyze first before we condemn and we take the input that
Members of Congress will hopefully be able to give and we look
forthright to ensure that Iraq knows--that Iraq knows we mean
business but, more importantly, this agreement that may come
about with Iran is to enhance the security of the United States
of America.
To Ms. Rajavi, I would like to ask the question that you
promote a very tolerant and moderate view of Islam. You are an
advocate of separation of religion and state and you also favor
women's rights and human rights.
Is it true that Iran is upholding laws that call for the
stoning to death of people and the chopping off of limbs?
Can she hear that I was directing that question?
Mr. Poe. There is a satellite involved in this
communication and it takes a while, plus the translation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Rajavi. Yes, precisely. I should say that what the
mullahs really want under the pretext of Islam are doing--they
are doing it under the pretext of Islam, but it has nothing to
do with Islam.
They stone people, amputate limbs and they rape people and
so far, as I said, 120,000 of the best children of the Iranian
people have been executed under the name of religion and Islam.
But I should make it clear that Islam is a religion of
compassion and freedom and rejects fanaticism, dogmatism and
dictatorship. Congresswoman Jackson Lee as you mentioned, we
believe in separation of religion and state. We advocate a
tolerant and democratic interpretation of Islam, which is the
genuine Islam, and we believe that it is the vote of the people
that will count.
In our view, there is gender equality between men and
women. While, you know that fundamentalists are misogynists and
whatever is based on compulsion is contrary to Islamic
teaching.
There is no compulsion in religion, in what you wear and
how you think, and as the Koran said, there is no compulsion in
religion. Sovereignty and the vote of people is the treatment--
please, go ahead.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I am going to make these very
brief because I know our time has ended. I just simply know
that in the 1979 revolution the Iranian intellectuals called
for democracy and human rights.
You just mentioned Islamic fundamentalism, which Iran seems
to be the epicenter of and therefore promoting terrorism. You
might want to comment how you think this happened to Iran and
then maybe the top challenges that we must face.
If we identify ISIL as an enemy, what are the challenges
that relate to freedom, democracy, peace and security that we
all want to see? Let me finish by saying that if you have any
comments about Camp Liberty and those continued attacks if you
want to include that as to how we can work to better stop that,
and I would appreciate the chairman's indulgence and I thank
you very much for your answers to these questions.
Ms. Rajavi. You are absolutely right. The people of Iran
wanted freedom and democracy from the revolution and they
continue to yearn for freedom and democracy. But,
unfortunately, Khomeini stole the leadership of the revolution
which was for freedom and democracy and imposed a
fundamentalist regime which by eliminating all freedom and
eliminating all political forces from the Iranian society,
particularly women and the youth, and established its rule.
And for the past 37 years a fundamentalist government has
been in power in Tehran. This regime is based on two pillars--
export of terrorism and fundamentalism outside and domestic
repression, and at the same time trying to acquire nuclear
weapons in order to take hostage the international community
for doing nothing against these atrocities.
These are the basis or the pillars of this regime. In the
month of April, just in this month, nearly 150 executions have
been announced in Iran. Only by absolute repression they are
maintaining their power.
But on the other hand, there is--an organized resistance,
which has been resisting this fundamentalist regime for the
past 37 years and has been able to expose the fundamentalism
and terrorism of this regime and to show the world who is the
epicenter of fundamentalism in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen
and other parts of the world and to show that where are the
secret sites, nuclear secret sites of the mullahs are operating
and they have been operating and also to inform the world about
the human rights violations in Iran.
But I am absolutely confident that the people of Iran and
the Iranian resistance will bring an end and overthrow this
mullahs' regime and bring freedom and democracy for the people
of Iran and for the people of the whole region.
And just very briefly about Liberty, as I said, we expect
that the United States Government upholds its obligations which
has been violated by now and the U.S. Government must really
put Camp Liberty under its own protection soon and to put an
end to the blockade and to demand from the Iraqi Government to
lift the blockade and to recognize their rights as a protected
person under the Geneva Conventions. I thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The gentlelady yields back her time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentlelady yields back the time. Thank
you.
Mr. Poe. I want to thank all of the members of the
committee and guests of the committee for being here today.
This has been a very insightful hearing and the witnesses
have presented three different perspectives of the problem of
ISIS, starting with Ambassador Ford succinctly analyzing that
they are driven by doctrine and they are driven by the
philosophy that compromise is a sin.
And Dr. Phares, you brought in your expertise to say and
show that this isn't just a philosophy that is against
Christians and Jews but it is a philosophy that also attacks
Muslims to a great deal--maybe more Muslims than other groups.
And Ms. Rajavi, I want to thank you as well, bringing a
perspective from an Iranian point of view that is not the
official mullah point of view of the Government of Iran, having
your expertise and seeing firsthand the results of oppression
in Iran and the oppression of ISIS, and thank you as well,
especially this late time in the evening. I guess it is about
11:30 or 11:45 wherever, somewhere in there.
But I do also want to thank all of the people in the
audience that have shown a great interest in this hearing.
So this subcommittee is adjourned and there will be follow-
up questions by--that can be submitted by members of the
subcommittee to all of the witnesses that have testified.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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