[House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] HEZBOLLAH'S GROWING THREAT AGAINST U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 22, 2016 __________ Serial No. 114-163 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 99-555PDF WASHINGTON : 2016 ________________________________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan LEE M. ZELDIN, New York DANIEL DONOVAN, New York Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan LEE M. ZELDIN, New York C O N T E N T S ---------- Page WITNESSES Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director and Fromer-Wexler fellow, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East Policy................................. 6 Mr. Tony Badran, research fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies.................................................... 23 Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University..................................................... 39 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 9 Mr. Tony Badran: Prepared statement.............................. 25 Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 41 APPENDIX Hearing notice................................................... 58 Hearing minutes.................................................. 59 HEZBOLLAH'S GROWING THREAT AGAINST U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ---------- TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 2016 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros- Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order. After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection, witnesses, your prepared statements will be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days in which to insert statements and questions for the record subject to the length limitations in the rules. Before we begin today, I would just like to say, and I'm sure that I'm speaking on behalf of all of the members, that we condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks in Brussels today and our condolences are with those impacted by this evil and with all of the people of Brussels. We stand ready, willing and able to assist our European allies with whatever they need to root out these terrorists and hold those responsible accountable. I think today's attacks and the subject matter of today's hearing only serve to further underscore the need for all of us--the U.S., our allies, all--to do more to combat and destroy ISIS and other terrorist groups like Hezbollah and it has to start with finding a comprehensive plan for Syria that includes defeating all the terror groups and seeing Assad removed from power. We certainly have trying times ahead but I'm confident that these terrorists will not change our way of life and that freedom and democracy will ultimately triumph over this radical extremism and hatred. The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Israel--the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and the Arab states and Iran--these are all some of the top priorities for U.S. national security interests in the Middle East. And one of the common denominators here, one thing at the center of all of this, is the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization--FTO--Hezbollah. This Shi'ite Islamist group is an Iran proxy group that is known to be one of the world's most dangerous and capable terror organizations trained and equipped and funded by Iran's Quds Force. Hezbollah has been responsible for some of the world's most infamous terror attacks including the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, the 1994 AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires and the bombing of a bus in Bulgaria which targeted Israeli citizens. But this is just a small fraction of the terror activities as Hezbollah is present around the world including an alarming presence right here in our own hemisphere where it is involved in drug trafficking, smuggling networks and terror operations. This U.S.-designated FTO has been responsible for provoking war with Israel most recently in the 34-day conflict in 2006 which saw the militant group launch over 4,000 rockets indiscriminately into northern Israel. Hezbollah is responsible for destabilizing Lebanon's political scene and is growing its influence and presence there, much to the detriment of Lebanon and her people. Hezbollah was found to be responsible for the assassination of the former prime minister in 2005 and, of course, Hezbollah has been used by the Iranian regime as ground forces to protect the regime's interest in Syria. With all of this it is clear that Hezbollah represents a growing threat to our national security interests, especially in the wake of the sanctions relief that the Iranian Government has received as part of this weak and dangerous nuclear agreement. Hezbollah receives financial and materiel support from Iran and now with the regime receiving this financial windfall of over $100 billion, it is not only reasonable to expect that Iran will increase its support for its proxy, it is as near of a guarantee as one can have. With the terror group being such a vital arm of Iran's foreign policy agenda we would be silly and ignorant to expect that it wouldn't use this as an opportunity to strengthen this vital extension of its damaging apparatus. This is likely one of the major driving forces behind the Gulf countries and the Arab League making the decision to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. This designation, regardless of the motivations, was a step in the right direction and we'd like to see more of that from our GCC partners in fighting terror groups like Hezbollah and that includes doing more to combat terror financing in those countries. But it is encouraging and we should seek to work with them in an effort to cut off Hezbollah's support from Iran and eliminate the threat that it poses. Saudi Arabia has cut its military assistance to Lebanon in part because of Hezbollah's undue influence in Beirut and the Lebanese Government. That undue influence led the Lebanese justice minister to resign. This should be sounding alarm bells for the administration. Not only is it allowing Iran and Hezbollah to push us around in Syria but it is allowing Iran to grow its influence in Lebanon and extend its grasp in the region. Now we have Hezbollah on the border with Israel in Lebanon and we have Hezbollah in the Golan Heights, and just because it is preoccupied with the fight in Syria doesn't mean it has turned a blind eye on Israel. Make no mistake about it. The cease fire between Israel and Hezbollah has nothing to do with Hezbollah not wanting to fight Israel. It has everything to do with the terror group restocking and building up its missile and rocket stockpile so that it can once again launch an all-out attack against the Jewish state. In fact, with all the chaos going on in Syria right now, it has helped Iran and the Assad regime in their efforts to smuggle more weapons and more ammunition and more sophisticated weapons systems to the terror group and that includes some advanced Russian-made weapons systems, which could seriously jeopardize Israel's security. Anytime we have Russia, Iran and Hezbollah operating in the same theater with the same objectives, it cannot be good for the security and the stability of the region. It is an imminent threat to our friend and ally, the democratic Jewish state of Israel, and it is a great threat to our national security interests in the region as the proxy war between Iran and some of our GCC allies threatens to escalate. The Obama administration needs to do more to counter Hezbollah and Iran in Syria, which means delivering a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS and the Assad-Hezbollah- Iran nexus. It needs to do more to take action to combat the weapons transfers from Russia to Iran and to Hezbollah in Syria. The President needs to use the tools at his disposal to sanction Hezbollah and cut off its network, and the President needs to realize that foregoing old alliances in the region to legitimize relations with and legitimize itself, the Iranian regime, is a strategic calamity that will have terrible consequences for the region and for our national security interests for years to come. With that, I'm pleased to recognize the ranking member, my friend, Mr. Deutch of Florida. Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman. I'd also like to just take a moment to say that we stand with the people of Brussels, the people of Belgium and all those who are resolute in battling ISIS and the terrorist groups that cowardly launch attacks on innocent civilians. It will not win, not in Belgium, not in Turkey, not in Cote d'Ivoire, not in Israel, nowhere, and our thoughts and prayers go out to the victims--today's victims and to their families. Thank you to our witnesses. It's a pleasure to welcome you all back to our subcommittee and I thank the chairman for convening today's hearing to examining the terrorist organization Hezbollah whose dangerous behavior poses a threat in nearly every corner of the globe. Hezbollah was founded as a resistance group against Israel, a group dedicated to the destruction of the state of Israel. Today, its activities are broad and they are wide. Hezbollah has become Iran's proxy terrorist using Iranian dollars to launch attacks around the world just as they use Iranian weapons to kill Syrians. Hezbollah is responsible for the 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing in Argentina which killed 29 people, the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish center that killed 85 people. It attacked a bus of tourists in Bulgaria in 2012. Since 2008, attacks plotted by Hezbollah have been foiled in Cyprus, in Azerbaijan, in Georgia and in Turkey. And in 2012 a Hezbollah plot to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia right here in Washington was uncovered. This attack, had it gone forward, would have resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians here in our nation's capital. And while Hezbollah has been a designated U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997, it still operates freely around the world as a so-called political group--a political group. The distinction between Hezbollah's political and military wings allows the group to fundraise throughout Europe and Latin America. The Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, which I was proud to introduce with Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel and my friend, Mr. Meadows, has been signed into law and would help crack down on Hezbollah's use of the banking system as well as its other funding sources from narco-trafficking to money laundering. Now, today's hearing comes on the heels of two surprising announcements--the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization by the Gulf Cooperation Council followed by the same designation by the Arab League. These actions are a clear indication of just how dangerous Hezbollah has become as it does Iran's dirty work throughout the Middle East. Iran has a long history of meddling in neighboring countries with hopes of destabilizing governments and inciting unrest among Shi'ite populations. After the conclusion of the nuclear agreement, there is increasing concern about the kind of damage an Iran with access to billions of dollars in sanctions relief could do. But Hezbollah is not just a threat to Israel and to Arab states. This murderous group has a history of attacking American citizens and American interests. Since its inception in 1982, Hezbollah has attacked American citizens in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983, killing 63 including 17 Americans, the U.S. Marine barracks bombing in October 1983 which killed 241 American and 58 French servicemen, the bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984 which killed 24, the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985 in which a Navy diver was shot in the head and his body dumped on the Tarmac, and the Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia in 1996 that killed 19 U.S. airmen. Desperate to hang on to its best friend, Bashar al-Assad, Iran dispatched Hezbollah mercenaries to Syria nearly 5 years ago. Hezbollah has sustained the regime's grip on power and aided in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians by providing Assad with somewhere between 6,000 and 8,000 fighters. Just this week, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed that his fighters would press on in Syria even as Assad loses his support from the Russian air force. The conflict in Syria has delivered an influx of new weapons into the region, increasing the chances that dangerous chemical or advanced precision weapons had fallen into Hezbollah's hands. Already Hezbollah is reportedly in possession of Russian- designed surface-to-air shoulder-mounted missile systems and with an arsenal of well over 100,000 missiles, which are, according to Nasrallah, capable of reaching every corner of Israel, it is troubling to imagine these rockets with precision capabilities or Hezbollah with a stockpile of chemical weapons that could one day be used against Israel. The U.S. must lead the efforts to interdict Iranian weapons as they make their way to Hezbollah for use in Syria and against Israel. We have tremendous cooperation with Israel in these efforts but the international community under the mandate of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the de-arming of Hezbollah, must step up these efforts. The Security Council must do more to ensure that Security Council resolutions are implemented. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon does not have the ability to de-arm Hezbollah. There is no enforcement mechanism. Hezbollah has a stranglehold on Lebanon, the country is paralyzed because Hezbollah essentially functions as a state within a state. The political stalemate has persisted for nearly 2 years with the government unable to select a President. Moreover, the Lebanese Armed Forces must be the sole security apparatus in the country. I was pleased to see the Security Council reaffirm this last week reiterating their strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon and underscoring the crucial role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces in extending and sustaining the authority of the state in supporting the country's stability. As long as Hezbollah remains in Syria, a threat to Lebanon remains. Retaliatory bombings have struck Beirut, the country is buckling under the weight of over 1 million refugees and Hezbollah is desperate to see its lifeline to Iran preserved. This makes a political solution that removes Bashar al- Assad from power all the more important for regional international security. Without Assad, the Hezbollah-Iran nexus is inherently weakened. Madam Chairman, it is time for the world to call Hezbollah what it is--a terrorist organization that murders innocent civilians at the behest of Iran. I hope today will give us new insight into how we can beat Iranian support for Hezbollah and curb the menacing group's activities in the Middle East and around the world, and I yield back. Thank you. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. And seeing no member request for time, we are so pleased to get to our witnesses and I thank the witnesses and the audience for their patience, as we had a series of votes. We are pleased to welcome back Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Previously, Dr. Levitt has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, a branch chief under the Director of National Intelligence and a Counterterrorism Advisor to the State Department's Special Envoy to the Middle East. Welcome, Dr. Levitt. We would also like to welcome back Dr. Tony Badran, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Dr. Badran focuses on Lebanon, Syria and Hezbollah. As an expert on U.S. foreign policy toward Syria and nonstate actors and terrorist groups, Dr. Badran has--well, I made you a doctor, that's not bad--has written extensively--my arm hurts, maybe you could take a look at it--extensively in Hezbollah. And lastly but not least, we would like to welcome back Dr. Daniel Byman, who is a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and the research director for the Saban Center for the Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Byman previously served as a professional staff member for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States and the joint 9/11 inquiry staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Thank you, gentlemen. Your prepared remarks will be made a part of the record and please feel free to summarize. Dr. Levitt, we will begin with you. STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND FROMER-WEXLER FELLOW, STEIN PROGRAM ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY Mr. Levitt. Thank you very much, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee. It's a pleasure to be here. I, too, would like to just make a comment about Brussels. I was in Brussels last week meeting with counterterrorism officials including with officials as they were planning the first raid last Tuesday. But I also had the opportunity while there to talk to them about Hezbollah and there is some silver lining here, because due to Hezbollah's tremendous investment in international organized crime, going up to the highest levels of Hezbollah, we now have an opportunity to work with Europeans, even within the context of a European Union designation of Hezbollah that is partial, just the military and terrorist wings, as if such a distinction exists. Hezbollah will be the first to tell you it does not, and so maybe this is something we should push on again. But even where things are, we are seeing tremendous cooperation with them on these cases. The fact is that Hezbollah has branched out and experienced a regional transformation. We see the designation by the GCC and Arab League and it's because of an increased amount of Hezbollah activity in the region, not just the long history of Hezbollah in the Gulf, and to be clear, for example, just 2 months after the finalization day of JCPOA we had the arrest of Mughassil who was one of the masterminds of the Khobar Towers bombing that you both mentioned. Hezbollah's transformation has, clearly, taken it to Syria. It has taken it to Iraq in small numbers. But, for example, the Treasury Department designated al-Inmaa Group, a Beirut-based engineering company which has been opening up basically fronts to finance and support Hezbollah activities, a small footprint in Yemen, which is most noticeable for the very high ranking Hezbollah operatives that they have sent there. When Hezbollah sends a special operations commander like Abu Ali Tabatabai to Yemen, that means that Yemen means something to them, even if they're not sending large numbers of people. Hezbollah's global criminal networks are on the increase and it's important to note that they rely sometimes on what we call these criminal super facilitators who can move and launder tremendous amounts of money in and out of Europe, in and out of the United States. It's important to note that the Department of Justice, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, has been targeting a whole host of these actors. To be clear, we don't actually know what this unit within Hezbollah calls itself. But U.S. law enforcement, for lack of a better term, came up with a name called the Business Affairs Component--the BAC--which to be clear is not operating on behalf of Hezbollah's political wing, for its social welfare wing, but it is specifically under and providing facilitation and finance for the terrorist wing, the Islamic Jihad organization, the external security organization, and was founded, according to the GOA, by Imad Mughniyah himself before he was killed in 2008. That's how far back this organization goes. In terms of the Western Hemisphere, the BAC has established working relationships according to DOJ with South American drug cartels that supply cocaine to drug markets in both the U.S. and Europe. The BAC then launders these drugs through well-known black market peso exchange and other vehicles. This has come close to the United States as well. One of the most important arrests we've made was of an individual who we lured to Atlanta, Imam Kubaisi, in October 2015, just 3 weeks after the end of the 60- day congressional review period for JCPOA. She was arrested in Atlanta. She was arraigned on money laundering conspiracy charges, unlicensed firearms dealing, conspiracy for laundering funds she believed to be drug money and for arranging for the sale of thousands of firearms including military assault rifles, machine guns and sniper rifles to criminal groups in Iran and Lebanon, including Hezbollah. She also was trying to procure airplane parts for Iran. And meanwhile, as associate of hers, Joseph Asmar, was arrested in Paris--again, underscoring the tremendous law enforcement cooperation we're seeing with key European allies. According to the Department of Justice, Kubaisi and Asmar explained that they could arrange for places from South America--planes, that is, from South America laden with multi- ton shipments of cocaine to land safely in Africa as a transit point before the drugs were smuggled to the United States and to Europe. DEA recording of the conversation of these two individuals with a DEA undercover discussing their money laundering network and the services they provided to drug traffickers, terrorist organizations and other criminal groups including places--in places like Lebanon, Iran, France, Belgium, again, Bulgaria, Benin, the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, Cyprus and, yes, across the United States. We see Hezbollah not only engaging in facilitation but also operational activity, the latest plot to be thwarted in Cyprus with Hussein Bassam Abdallah, a dual Lebanese-Canadian citizen involved in the stockpiling of over eight tons of ammonia nitrate, and according to intelligence officials that was intended not just for Cyprus but for further operations in Europe. The fact is that there are activities here in the Western Hemisphere we need to be extremely cognizant of. The most recent plot to be thwarted was in Peru. The individual who was arrested, Mohamad Amadar, had married a dual Peruvian-American citizen who was a resident in Miami. But perhaps the most--the thing we need to be most concerned about and which perhaps you haven't heard is that the person who was the handler for Mohamad Amadar, who met with him personally in Turkey, was Salman Al-Redda. Salman Al-Redda has been indicted for his role in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA attacks. He came and went throughout South America in the years followed, never arrested, and he has become one of the absolute top--perhaps the top three or four Islamic jihad organization Hezbollah terrorist wing operatives personally in charge of operations in South America, and those operations continue. My time is over, but I'd like--if you're interested I'm happy to tell you about some of the other things that Treasury, the State Department and the Department of Justice are doing. There's good things happening from the United States regarding Hezbollah. But my time is over. I want to thank you for having me once more. [The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We'll make sure that we ask you that. Thank you. Mr. Badran. STATEMENT OF MR. TONY BADRAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES Mr. Badran. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Ranking Member Deutch and for the members of the committee for allowing me to testify today. I'm going to just briefly talk about, as Matt has talked about, Hezbollah's global operations. I want to talk specifically more about how that relates to their position in Lebanon and Syria specifically. On the one hand, the Syrian uprising 5 years ago posed a significant challenge to Iran and Hezbollah by--as you noted, by threatening to sever their bridge to Lebanon and thereby denying Hezbollah their strategic depth as well as their logistical pipeline. Unfortunately, 5 years on the trend is moving in the opposite direction. Hezbollah and Iran have secured their core interests in Syria, albeit at significant cost. They have managed to secure contiguity between Lebanon and the regime-controlled areas in western Syria, thereby securing the ability to continue to move weapons from Damascus to Lebanon. A key partner in this effort has been the Lebanese Armed Forces. In fact, one of the interesting things to note and troubling things to note over the past 5 years has been the growing partnership between Hezbollah and the LAF, which has allowed Hezbollah to protect its domestic flank when it was facing some backlash for its involvement in Syria. The partnership between Hezbollah and the LAF, however, is not the only point of Hezbollah control and domination of the Lebanese state. It has placed its members or sympathizers in key government positions which like, for instance, the Lebanese customs office as well as its financial auditor which allows it all this activity that we're hearing about globally to be processed domestically with little oversight or backlash. In fact, Lebanon has become a critical hub in Hezbollah's criminal activities. Hezbollah has made Lebanon complicit both financially and economically as well as militarily because of all the weapons that it's moving from Syria that it's getting from Iran and is storing the majority of it in civilian areas. Hezbollah has essentially painted a big target on the back of all of Lebanon and this is, unfortunately, has not been countered by U.S. policy over the last 5 years. What this threatens to do is to--in addition to all these strategic weapons that are being moved to Lebanon as well as the Hezbollah's entrenchment in Syria and its expansion into the Golan along with the IRGC and the building of new infrastructure on Syrian soil, it creates a situation for Israel that will, I think, accelerate an upcoming future conflict which, as the IDF has been saying to anybody who will listen for the last few years, is going to be far bloodier than anything that we've ever seen on both sides. You talked about the 4,000 rockets that they launched in the previous war. Now they have the capacity to launch anywhere between 1,000 to 1,500 a day. So the IDF is very clear that there's going to be a lot of dead civilians both in Israel but also in Lebanon. The problem also has been that Hezbollah has gained operational expertise in Syria, working alongside the Russian military in combined weapons operations and in different urban and rural settings. So it's actually be able to offset its losses with this experience. All of this creates a situation on the border of Israel in the northern border that now combines the Syrian front as well as the Lebanese front and soon to be not just swimming in Iranian cash but also potentially soon with an Iranian nuclear umbrella. This creates an unacceptable position for Israel. But it's not only Israel's security that has been challenged by this development. It's also the Arab states and we've seen the Saudis leading the charge in this regard in designating Hezbollah but also in pulling the $3 billion aid that they gave to the Lebanese Armed Forces, citing the fact that the Lebanese Armed Forces have become an ``auxiliary'' of Hezbollah and I think this is an accurate assessment. And although the--there's a tendency on the part of the administration at least to kind of pressure the Saudis to go back on that decision, I think actually we should stop and take and pause and reassess what exactly U.S. materiel support to the LAF and intelligence sharing--how that can actually go to sustain and help Hezbollah entrench its grip on Lebanon. In addition, we should not--because of--the nature of Hezbollah's control over Lebanon--think about it in the way that the IRGC is in Iran. It's tentacles are everywhere in the economy and security apparatus. So when pushing for the implementation of H.R. 2297, I think we should be very, very clear about not being taken hostage by the prospect that this is going to somehow collapse Lebanon's economy or the assistance to the LAF is going to collapse Lebanon's security, we have to also be cognizant of the fact that any nook and cranny and any safe haven that's provided in the Lebanese system ultimately is going to benefit Hezbollah because of its dominant position in the state, both in the security sector as well as in the economic sector. So I'll stop right here and I'll be happy to flesh this out in the conversation. [The prepared statement of Mr. Badran follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, sir. Dr. Byman. STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Mr. Byman. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee, thank you very much for having me here today. Hezbollah is in a time of transition and this is in large part because of the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah forces have been involved in several of the most important battles in the war and they have proven a vital ally to the Syrian regime due to their skill and their discipline, which are often much greater than those of the Syrian army forces. Hezbollah has had to expand the overall size of its military wing, and although it was cautious about entering the fray, many Lebanese Shi'a now see it as a defender of their community. They look at the atrocities that the Islamic State is perpetrating against their co-religionists and believe that a strong Hezbollah is necessary to protect their community. We see extreme voices within the Lebanese Sunni community including jihadists tied to the Islamic State or al-Nusra, al- Qaeda's affiliate. They see Hezbollah as the leading or top foe they face and they've conducted terrorist attacks on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and Iranian targets there as well. Perhaps the biggest negative consequence for Hezbollah though has been the collapse of its regional reputation and the associated prestige it's had in the Arab world. Almost 10 years ago in 2006, Hassan Nasrallah was one of the most popular men in the Arab world for Hezbollah's military efforts against Israel. Today, he's widely hated. Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war has largely made it more cautious about taking on Israel. It's taken close to 1,000 causalities and that's a huge number for a relative small group, and this is putting a strain on the organization. In addition, the organization's Lebanese constituents have little appetite for yet another confrontation, yet another draining conflict. This could change, though, for several reasons. One is that if there are setbacks in Lebanon or elsewhere the group would have an incentive to restore its past reputation, and fighting Israel might be one way to do so. Also, Israel regularly attacks Hezbollah targets in Syria and Lebanon to stop the transfer of advanced weapons, as Tony mentioned, and these strikes have at times killed senior Hezbollah officials and even a senior Iranian official. This has the potential to escalate though, fortunately, we haven't seen that happen yet. And finally, Hezbollah is loyal to Iran and if there were a collapse in the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal or another source of tension, Hezbollah would be seen as part of the Iranian response. In my judgement, the close relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is not likely to change with the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal. It is possible that Iran might step up support to Hezbollah, taking advantage of the sanctions relief. But at the same time we must recognize that Iran is diplomatically over stretched. It's deploying considerable forces in Syria to prop up the Assad regime. It maintains a large and clandestine force in Iraq and it's even established limited ties to the Houthis in Yemen. These are considerable financial commitments. You couple that at home with the collapse in oil prices and add to that decades of economic mismanagement and this has all come at the same time when ordinary Iranians are expecting an increase in economic prosperity due to the deal. So those sanctions relief will put more money into Iran's coffers. Iran has many, many demands on these scarce funds and in my judgement the level of support for Hezbollah is not likely to change significantly barring a significant change in the regional situation. For the United States we face a dilemma. Washington, of course, doesn't want Hezbollah's influence to grow. But at the same time, Hezbollah is one of the most formidable foes of the Islamic State and it is fighting the group effectively in Syria. A standard recommendation is to build up the Lebanese Armed Forces and to otherwise strengthen the Lebanese state to help it counter Hezbollah and I've argued that for quite some time. For the most part, though, I think we need to recognize that U.S. efforts to do this have failed. In part, this is linked to some general problems with U.S. training programs. But the bigger problem is that Lebanese leaders don't want to exacerbate tension with Hezbollah right now and as a result they're hesitant to go for any efforts to try to push them in that direction. Part of this is due to fear but Lebanon's situation right now is quite precarious and the country is, I would say, on edge because of the neighboring unrest in Syria. The million plus Syrian refugees in Lebanon are a potential destabilizing force and I think U.S. aid for the refugees in Lebanon is vital. We really don't need another failed state in the Middle East and Lebanon, unfortunately, is a fairly strong candidate to be the next one should things get worse. And finally, as the United States steps up its intervention in Syria and Iraq, continues its efforts to fight Hezbollah, coordination with Israel is going to be essential. The two countries work well together on this and we need to redouble cooperation to make the most of everything. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to all of you. I'll start the questions. When the Lebanese justice minister resigned he stated that Hezbollah's undue influence was ruining Lebanon's relations with Arab nations. Saudi cut its military aid to Lebanon. Hezbollah still wields considerable clout in the Lebanese Government. How can the U.S. ensure that Iran and Hezbollah do not gain even more influence in Lebanon and given Hezbollah's relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces should the United States reassess the President's budget request for $105 million in foreign military financing for Lebanon? Dr. Levitt. Mr. Levitt. I think one of the significant steps that U.S. agencies have taken recently is an effort to take the financial fight to Beirut where Hezbollah until recently has been banking with impunity. The Treasury Department has been targeting designations that go right back to the heart of Beirut and we know that that's having an impact because Hassan Nasrallah is telling us so. So in several of his last speeches including in particular in December in that speech he used I think 23 out of 55 minutes to deny that Hezbollah has any businesses whatsoever which, of course, it does. They're just not listed as Hezbollah, Incorporated. Now, armed with the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, U.S. agencies are really truly empowered to, in the administration's words, thwart the group's network at every turn by imposing sanctions on financial institutions that deal with Hezbollah or key elements. Tony hit the nail on the head. The ability of Hezbollah to use Beirut as the core, as the hub of its literally international organized criminal activities threatens Lebanon's financial system, which is the backbone of its economy. We can help Lebanon protect that financial system, not undermine it--to the contrary protect it, and when you speak to Lebanese officials who are outside of Hezbollah they beg for that assistance. Mr. Badran. I would just add just a couple of points. First, more broadly, we have to understand--I mean, it's hard to say this but we have to understand that there is a big level of complicity, unfortunately, with Hezbollah's criminal acts. So corruption is widespread and it has affected every corner of the Lebanese economy down to the micro level. Think of Florida with the cartels, right, and the drug money that went through. It corrupts and it infiltrates segments--banks and other parts of the economy. It's a similar situation, unfortunately, and they have key positions and they're very keen on guarding these key positions that enable them to do this in the government. I mentioned the customs office, financial auditor, general security, et cetera, et cetera. So dealing with Lebanon as though there's a separation between Lebanon and Hezbollah becomes increasingly difficult. So we cannot have kid gloves sort of when we're dealing with this situation. The Lebanese have to be placed--you know, facing a tough choice or else this is going to continue indefinitely. With the LAF, similar things. Why--the Saudi recognition that ultimately the LAF is acting as an auxiliary as opposed to sort of a challenge to Hezbollah has made them reach the conclusion we cannot continue to fund this uncritically. There has to be an assessment as to how to separate operationally Hezbollah from the LAF and also to put the LAF in front of its own responsibilities in safeguarding the United Nations' Security Council Resolution 1701 or simply in the way it's rounding up Sunni young men and just putting them in jail and exacerbating tensions in the country when they're supposed to be a national institution. So just a couple of thoughts. I think that an assessment is certainly due in this case. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Byman. One concern I have is that by the Saudi withdrawal of aid if the U.S. were to reduce support for the Lebanese Armed Forces that the winner would be Hezbollah--that these institutions and Saudi funding that goes to various places in Lebanon have tremendous flaws--overwhelming flaws. But they're better than the alternative, which is an unfettered Hezbollah. And so I would agree strongly that assessing this regularly is necessary but we should encourage the Saudis to resume their aid. We want countervailing forces to Hezbollah in Lebanon and I think U.S. ties to Lebanese Armed Forces are also necessary even though we need to recognize that the Lebanese army is going to be limited and that's a very polite way of saying that they're not going to be able to accomplish what we want. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And my last question is Russia's role. Hezbollah may have advanced Russian weapon systems. Iran is believed to have transferred some of these to Hezbollah. Russia is also working with Iran and Hezbollah to support the Assad regime in Syria and protect its own interests. What can you tell us about the Russian-Hezbollah relationship and what that might mean for the U.S. and for Israel? Mr. Levitt. If you want to be polite there's just a de facto relationship between Russia and Hezbollah in their cooperative support together with Iran for the Assad regime. I'd argue it's much more than that. You effectively have Russian air cover for the entire pro-Assad axis which very much includes Hezbollah, as Dan mentioned. But it goes much farther than that. It's not just the obvious things we can see when we're paying attention to the news and to what Russia is doing in the region, and while they may have removed some assets from the region they haven't removed as many as they said they had and Putin himself has been quite blunt to the fact that they can put them back very quickly. I'm no less concerned about some of the illicit procurement efforts that I alluded to earlier in Europe in particular that are happening including in places like the former Soviet Union. Consider the case of Ali Fayyad who, at our request, was arrested by the Czechs, a dual Lebanese-Ukrainian citizen who was procuring all kinds of former Soviet Union arms for Hezbollah. Hezbollah took notice because Ali Fayyad is important to them and they kidnapped five people in Lebanon and eventually those people were released. Ali Fayyad was released. We still have fingers into this investigation because Ali Fayyad was arrested together with two Ivorians, dual Lebanese Ivorian citizens who are still in custody in the Czech Republic, and while it remains to be seen if anything will really happen with it, last week the Lebanese Government announced that they are actually intending to prosecute Ali Fayyad, who was sent from the Czech Republic back to Lebanon on arms procurement weapons trafficking charges, not mentioning the T word, terrorism, the H word, Hezbollah, of course. But this would be a step forward in demonstrating there might be some elements of the Lebanese Government with which we can partner with more than others. Mr. Badran. I mentioned earlier the Israeli concern regarding Hezbollah operational experience by working side to side with the Russians in Syrian. Because they have gained experience in combined arms operations and working with new weapons systems that the Russians introduced to the Syrian theater Russian trainers that are working with the Syrian military and Hezbollah sitting there and watching they have also with the Iranians started a joint operations room in Iraq last year to exchange intelligence. So we hear about the Russian communication with the Israelis on one hand to deconflict in Syria but there's also a parallel sort of relationship that the Russians are maintaining with the Iranians who are really the ground troops of the Russian air force in Syria. So the Russians, you know, when they're providing close air support in Aleppo it's--none of the IRGC and Hezbollah were on the ground checking around. Now, if this situation transfers--the fear was that this situation would transfer to the south of Syria in the Golan. Now, thankfully, it hasn't happened yet. Maybe it will not happen. Maybe the Russians will balance out their relationship with the Israelis and that with the Iranians. But nevertheless it's a risk that should the Russians say we are going to combat terrorist groups in southern Syria near Jordan, near Israel, who are going to be the ground troops for such an operation? It's going to be the IRGC and Hezbollah. So, clearly, the coast is not yet clear for Israel. For now, the Russian announcement that they're going to kind of freeze their operations for a while or reorient them elsewhere it doesn't seem to include the south of Syria yet. But it's by no means, I don't think, sort of gone--should be stricken out of our calculation that something like that is going to happen in the future. Mr. Byman. I'll only briefly add that I'm very skeptical about the degree to which Russia is going to cease its operations. I think there will be still considerable support and the number of assets that have been redeployed so far have been quite limited. I will also add, however, that Russia has a visceral distrust and dislike of anything that smacks of Islamic extremism and the Russians are if anything pragmatic but at the same time they see that broader community as quite hostile and they are quite concerned. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr. Deutch of Florida. Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madame Chairman. Dr. Byman, you had said--you described Nasrallah's current position as one who's widely hated. You also pointed out that Hezbollah is a formidable foe of Islamic State. Do those two things--is it likely that because they are a formidable foe of ISIS that that will have some impact on the way Nasrallah is viewed? How do those interrelate and on the ground, more broadly, how does the population view Hezbollah, given the role they've played in fighting ISIS? Mr. Byman. For most people in the Middle East the primary fight is not between the Islamic State and the United States but rather between the Syrian regime and what we would call the moderate opposition. It's not a term I love because it means 100 different things. But that said, Hezbollah has been an arm of the Syrian regime, killing its own people including a range of groups supported by the United States which whom we have, I think, reasonable relations and Hezbollah is widely hated in the Sunni Arab world because it is seen as on the side of an oppressive minority regime that has killed several hundred thousand of its own people. It's a staggering number. Hezbollah's operations against the Islamic State for most people in the region are a footnote to this, right, where some would say that's bad, some would say that's good. But they would focus on their killing of people they regard as much more mainstream and much more heroic figures and much more representative. So that, to me, is the primary reason for its unpopularity and that's, to me, why so many Arab states that are backing the moderate opposition are against Hezbollah is they see it really as an enemy and a tool of Iran. Mr. Deutch. And does--the decision by GCC and the Arab League to designate Hezbollah a terrorist organization what's the impact of that in the region and do you expect another--are there retaliatory attacks to come from the designation? What happens next? Mr. Byman. I think at this point the designation is really a reflection of the political reality on the ground rather than a major shift. These states have been tremendously against Hezbollah for a while. The designation helps, though, right. It enables us to garner diplomatic support. A number of things that Matt has mentioned, for example, are helped diplomatically by being able to point to a GCC or an Arab League designation to kind of push along agendas we want. So I think it's a relatively small impact but nevertheless symbolic of a bigger shift. Mr. Deutch. And does the failure--I'll throw this open to anyone on the panel--does the failure on the part of Europe to designate Hezbollah--I mean, what does it actually mean? What are they able to do from a fund-raising standpoint? What are they able to do from an operational standpoint that could potentially be stopped if Europe actually does the right thing and designates them a terrorist organization? Dr. Levitt. Mr. Levitt. Yes. Everything. Right now for an EU designation of Hezbollah you have to make a definitive link to the terrorist and military wing. But Hezbollah's no fool. In fact, they're quite good at layering and obfuscation. So they engage in all kinds of activities. They just don't put a Hezbollah shingle out there. The only case we've had since the designation was not an EU action but a German action against the Orphan Welfare Foundation, which was a Hamas front organization and was caught making the mistake of openly providing some of its donations to the Martyrs Foundation, which can be tied, though some Europeans would even disagree with this, directly to militancy. So designation wise, the EU can't really do very much. It does provide an umbrella so that if member states want to do something they can say well, Hezbollah is at least partially designated--if you can find that they're doing arms procurement, arms procurement, for example, is by definition probably not for social welfare or political activity. So you can feel more comfortable doing that. I would argue they should feel comfortable doing it anyway since it's black and white criminal activity. Quietly on law enforcement issues we've seen great cooperation. But the designation as such doesn't actually empower them to do a whole lot. Mr. Deutch. But what would the full designation empower them to do? Mr. Levitt. If they found someone or something that was doing anything for Hezbollah and all you'd have to prove was Hezbollah that entity could be designated. Mr. Deutch. And what would that mean to---- Mr. Levitt. Asset freezes, travel bans. Mr. Deutch. Right. And in terms of--in terms of impacting their operations, what would the impact be? Mr. Levitt. Given the huge increase in Hezbollah operations in Europe including a whole bunch of entities that we have designated, that the DOJ has indicted there's very good reason to think that a designation in the EU would empower European nations to target those activities in Europe. Let me put it to you another way. Since the July 2013 partial designation of Hezbollah, Hezbollah activities in Europe have increased. I'm writing a study on it right now. So that suggests that maybe Hezbollah has kind of called that bluff and by activities I don't only mean fund raising, logistics and procurement but operations as well as evidenced from the--not just the first Cyprus operation which was predesignation but the second one with over eight tons of explosive materiel which we believe was going to be sent farther into Europe. Mr. Deutch. And Mr. Badran--last question, Madam Chairman. Is there any--can you foresee anything that would prompt or what would--that would prompt the Europeans to take the necessary step, given what Dr. Levitt just laid out, to make this a full designation? Mr. Badran. I remain a little--I mean, Matt has expressed more optimism and I hope--and he would know, certainly, better than me on this--I hope it actually goes in this direction. But one of the things, for instance, let's take what the GCC has done, right, and let's actually help them enforce it and provide also reassurances for these very vulnerable nations that the United States will stand with them as they push against any Iranian and Hezbollah retaliation. But one of the things, for instance, that they're looking to do and that could be transferred into the European context just as easily because it's not just front organizations that are involved here. The Saudis leaked, when they made their decision--the Saudis leaked through the Lebanese media that one of the things they might consider is actually going after not just Shi'ite businessmen that may have ties to Hezbollah's financial operations but also Christian businessmen who have interests in the Gulf states and those are a lot and they're big interests, including--they even went so far as to leak that this includes sitting ministers in the Lebanese cabinet, okay--that they're willing to go that far I think they waved it as a threat. We should encourage them to follow through on all of this because there's a huge amount, especially in the United Arab Emirates, of financial interests for people who are on the face of it legitimate businessmen, both Shi'ite and Christian and Sunni even. In Kuwait especially there are Sunni Kuwaiti businessmen especially with tremendous ties to Hezbollah's financial empire. This is an opportunity to take to squeeze and then to transfer the same template to the Europeans if they're willing to go along with it. Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania. Mr. Boyle. Thank you. I just have a few questions. When I was in Israel last August--well, actually, a few years ago and then again last August, folks I talked to including Israeli generals talked--they said not if there's a third Lebanon war but when there's a third Lebanon war, and that really struck me. So my question was about the rockets because there's been quite a change even since I was there 7 months ago. The Israeli military that was briefing us had used the figure about 85,000 rockets. Then it was revised upwards after that to 100,000 and now I read upwards of 150,000. So I guess two questions. First, where exactly do things stand now in terms of the amount of rockets and their sophistication. As I recall from 2006, the rockets that they had were not exactly precise. So that's the number one, and then number two is what is our best intelligence that would be the event to trigger a third Lebanon war? So I decided to ask all my questions at once and then leave it to each of you to figure it out which ones you'll want to take. Mr. Levitt. Thanks for those questions. I don't know any Israeli security or military official who doesn't talk that way, not because they're looking to invite a third Lebanon war but because you don't stockpile--the numbers I hear are 130,000 to 150,000 rockets--to keep them as paperweights. I don't think that they want to initiate. I had an opportunity to speak to a senior Israeli official this week. He said, we will not initiate but we will not allow Nasrallah to threaten the entire country, as he puts it, not just the north with all of these weapons. And what we're dealing with now are more sophisticated weapons than we saw in 2006, both an increase in the number of actual guided systems and also maybe even more significantly because not all rockets are equal and the majority of their arsenal is not this longer--medium and longer range guided missiles but the GPS kits that they are reportedly getting from Iran which you can put on something like which they had in the past and you can make a dumb rocket smarter. They're trying to cope with a situation where hundreds of rockets are fired at specific buildings in Tel Aviv and one can understand why they won't tolerate that type of a situation and as Tony said why they've made it very clear from a deterrent perspective that if it happens their response will be much more severe than it has been in the past. Mr. Badran. So Matt covered the issue of the long range rockets that they've upgraded them--they're now precision guided. They're no longer dumb rockets. Now they can hit strategic installations. They've added also the Russian-made anti-ship--the cruise missile. Now, those are very, very dangerous. They can hit strategic installations offshore, installation gas rigs, et cetera. So the Israelis have now taken this in such that it's part of their doctrine, that they're emphasizing defense of the interior, which is a departure from what it used to be in the past. It used to be much more offensive minded. Now they take into consideration that the population is going to have to suffer and there's going to be prioritization as to what has to be guarded by the Iron Dome missile defense system because of the high density of the weapons--of the rockets that Hezbollah can fire on a daily basis, basically about 1,000 a day. Now, not all of these are long range--okay, a lot of them are actually the shorter range. But there's 1 million other issues now. All of this stuff that they're learning in Syria is going to be translated kinetically in the next war in maybe offensive operations into the Galilee because now they're on the Golan Heights, not just in Lebanon. So you ask what would trigger such a war. See, this is where the failure of U.S. policy in Syria becomes something about much more than just Syria. The Israelis are now warning that any solution to the Syrian crisis cannot leave Iran in a position of dominance in Syria and in a position on the Golan Heights. Unfortunately, the United States--the U.S. President has said that any solution in Syria has to take into consideration respecting Iranian equities in Syria. So you can see where now our policy in Syria and Israel's position in Syria are directly at odds. Any position, any movement in the Golan, any movement of rockets or strategic weapons across the border into Lebanon has the potential for triggering such a conflict and the more they entrench themselves in Syria the shorter this time period becomes of when Israel--of how long Israel can tolerate this buildup before having to take action. So the situation in Syria, I think, is critical to the security. Of course, I mean, it affects Turkey, it affects Jordan just the same, but very critical as far as Israeli security is concerned. Mr. Boyle. My time has expired so I thank the chair and the ranking member. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. And Dr. Levitt, you wanted to say something and you had run out of time. So this is a great opportunity right now. Grab it. Mr. Levitt. Thank you so much. I don't want to take much time because I've actually managed to sneak most of it in. But I did want to just add just as an example of some of the things that are being done creatively and some of the European cooperation we're getting, under the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, the State Department together with DOJ and others have been able to put together a series--an international initiative to raise awareness about Iran and Hezbollah's broad range of terrorist and criminal activities around the world, engaging with partners around the world, not only informing them and teaching them but then teaching them how to use tools at their disposal and we're seeing actual cases come out of these including, for example, the U.S. co-led law enforcement coordination group, which we co-lead with EUROPOL, getting EUROPOL to focus on Hezbollah activities. There are EUROPOL cases now. This is not a small achievement. Clearly, there is much, much more to be done but I see an interest in the part of Europeans because of Hezbollah's increased activities there, because of Hezbollah's regional growth and in particular in Syria and figuring out what they can do within their system, within their designation partial regime to work with us on this target. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And gentlemen, are there any parting thoughts that you would like to leave us with? Mr. Deutch? Mr. Deutch. No, thank you, ma'am. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you very much. This subcommittee is very concerned about doing everything that we can to cut off the funding to this terrorist organization. We're going to keep on in that track. Thank you. And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you to everyone. [Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]