[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TERROR INMATES: COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN PRISON AND BEYOND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 28, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-40
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Jerome P. Bjelopera, Specialist in Organized Crime and
Terrorism, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Tony C. Parker, Assistant Commissioner, Department of
Correction, State of Tennessee:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Brian H. Levin, Professor, Department of Criminal Justice,
and Director, Center for Study of Hate and Extremism,
California State University, San Bernardino:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
TERROR INMATES: COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN PRISON AND BEYOND
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Wednesday, October 28, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Barletta, Katko, Hurd,
Higgins, Keating, Vela, and Thompson.
Also present: Representatives Langevin and Jackson Lee.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from
three distinguished experts regarding radicalization in U.S.
prisons. I would like to welcome the Members of the
subcommittee and express my appreciation for the witnesses who
are here today, and I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
The United States is facing a long-term growing threat of
terrorism from ISIS and other radical Islamist terrorist
groups. At least 55 people in the United States have been
arrested for links to ISIS so far this year. Over the past
several years, approximately 200 more have travelled to the
Middle East to join the terror group. Just last week, FBI
Director Comey stated that the FBI had an estimated 900 active
investigations of suspected Islamic State-inspired operatives
and other home-grown violent extremists across the United
States, and as previously noted, that such investigations are
taking place in all 50 States. There can be no doubt that we
have an extremism problem in the United States.
Even more disturbing is that there are an unknown number of
people who are watching terror propaganda and potentially being
radicalized but who are not on law enforcement's radar.
Compelled by this Jihadist propaganda, these individuals could
choose to carry out a small-scale attack with little planning
and no notice.
DHS Secretary Johnson and Director Comey have done an
excellent job over the past year communicating with the public
about this threat, and their agencies are stretched to the
limit in their efforts to investigate, arrest, and prosecute
terrorists walking the streets.
An issue that rarely comes up, however, is how the United
States is preparing to ensure that the 100-plus individuals in
Federal prison for links to terrorism who will be released in
the next 5 years do not pose a continued threat to the
homeland. In the wake of 9/11, our Federal, State, and local
law enforcement did great work in arresting and prosecuting
potential terrorists, but we cannot forget about these
individuals once they are incarcerated because 90 percent will
eventually be released. We have never been faced with such
large numbers of terror inmates before.
When this committee held a hearing in 2011 on prison
radicalization, the primary focus was on the threat of inmates
being radicalized once in prison. There are still a number of
concerns related to how prisoners are monitored, how employees
are trained to watch for possible signs of radicalization, and
how religious service providers are vetted.
We are all familiar with the known cases of individuals who
became radicalized inside prison and then attempted to carry
out attacks within the homeland, cases like Kevin James and
Jose Padilla. Prison radicalization is not unique to the United
States. In France, of course, the Charlie Hebdo attackers were
radicalized in prison. In the United States, the challenge of
prison radicalization, both within prison and once inmates are
released, must be addressed with consistent proactive
information sharing among Federal agencies, including the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and State and local partners, close
cooperation among prison chaplains of all faiths and with law
enforcement, and careful monitoring of former inmates after
they are released into society.
The goal of this hearing is to have a public discussion
about the eventual release of hundreds of individuals serving
time for terrorism and to understand what is being done to
prevent further radicalization within the prison system. We
welcome today our distinguished panel of experts to testify
about the current risk of prison radicalization, for providing
their views in current Government programs, and the lack of
sufficient programs, and provide recommendations to help the
Federal Government and Congress create an effective response to
this situation.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the
gentleman from New York, my good friend, Mr. Higgins, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for
holding this, today's hearing, to explore the detention and
monitoring of radical ideology in prisons, and to ensure that
information is shared between corrections personnel and law
enforcement before the release of inmates, while understanding
the limitations of sharing such information after an inmate's
release from prison.
As we begin today's discussion, I believe it is important
to distinguish between the terms radicalization and terrorism.
Under the First Amendment, an individual's thought and speech
are protected, including radical and extremist thought and
speech. When radicalized individuals move from radicalized
thought to illegal terrorist activity and other crimes, the
criminal activity is not protected.
Based on that distinction, I am hopeful that today's
discussion will focus on how we can prevent former inmates from
becoming a terrorist actor upon release. It is difficult to
predict the behavior of an incarcerated individual upon release
from prison. By its nature, a prison may bring together
disaffected people who might be receptive to antisocial
messages offering intolerant solutions to complex problems of
identity and belonging.
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that some
disaffected prisoners may join extremist groups and engage in
extreme behavior in an attempt to find meaning, establish
bonds, or combat a sense of fear and alienation within prison
walls. Since 9/11, more than 250 people have been convicted for
their involvement in home-grown violent Jihadist plots.
However, an analysis of home-grown violent Jihadist activity
since 9/11 showed that these plots have nearly always featured
people who radicalized outside of prison.
This statistic and similar numbers prove, despite a few
high-profile cases, terrorism plots among prison-radicalized
violent Muslim extremists are rare, but we must remain
vigilant. Radicalization in prisons remains a concern abroad
both in non-Muslim and Muslim-majority countries. Middle
Eastern governments have struggled to contain violent
radicalization in their prisons and have developed innovative
approaches to addressing the issue with varying degrees of
success.
The United States does not have prisoner deradicalization
programs, as many of our Constitutional rights do not permit
aspects of several of these programs conducted abroad. Today, I
hope we can have a robust discussion of the existence of these
programs as we seek to understand whether post-prison
countering violent extremist reentry programs may be helpful in
reducing recidivism and decreasing the allure of committing a
terrorist attack upon release from prison.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
October 28, 2015
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding today's hearing
to explore the detection and monitoring of radical ideology in prisons
and ensure that information is shared between corrections personnel and
law enforcement before the release of inmates, while understanding the
limitations of sharing such information after an inmate's release from
prison.
As we begin today's discussion, I believe it is important to
distinguish the terms ``radicalization'' and ``terrorism.'' Under the
First Amendment, an individual's thought and speech are protected,
including radical and extremist thought and speech. When radicalized
individuals move from radicalized thought to illegal terrorist activity
or other crimes, the criminal activity is not protected.
Based on that distinction, I am hopeful that today's discussion
will focus on how we can prevent former inmates from becoming a
terrorist actor upon release. It is it difficult to predict the
behavior of an incarcerated individual upon release from prison. By its
nature, prison may bring together disaffected people who might be
receptive to anti-social messages offering intolerant solutions to
complex problems of identity and belonging.
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that some disaffected
prisoners may join extreme groups and engage in extreme behavior in an
attempt to find meaning, establish bonds, or combat a sense of fear and
alienation within prison walls.
Since 9/11, more than 250 people have been convicted for their
involvement in home-grown violent jihadist plots. However, an analysis
of home-grown violent jihadist activity since 9/11, showed that these
plots have nearly always featured people who radicalized outside of
prison.
This statistic and similar numbers prove, despite a few high-
profile cases, terrorism plots among prison-radicalized, violent,
Muslim extremists are rare.
But we must remain vigilant. Radicalization in prisons remains a
concern abroad, both in non-Muslim and Muslim-majority countries.
Middle Eastern governments have struggled to contain violent
radicalization in their prisons, and have developed innovative
approaches to addressing the issue, with varying degrees of success.
The United States does not have prisoner deradicalization programs,
as many of our Constitutional rights do not permit aspects of several
of the CVE programs conducted abroad.
Today, I hope we can have a robust discussion of the existence of
these CVE programs as we seek to understand whether post-prison CVE re-
entry programs may be helpful in reducing recidivism and decreasing the
allure of committing a terrorist act upon release from prison.
Mr. King. Thank you, Ranking Member Higgins.
I now recognize the Ranking Member and former Chairman of
the full committee, Mr. Thompson, for a statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and former
Chairman of the full committee. I would like to thank you for
calling this hearing to examine current prison counter-violent
extremism programs and explore the development of such programs
for inmates post-release.
The United States holds an estimated 1.5 million prisoners
in State and Federal custody at the end of 2014. While that
number is down 1 percent from the previous year, the United
States continues to have the highest-documented incarceration
rate in the world.
I am aware that most of today's discussion will likely
focus on a possible radicalization of Muslim inmates; however,
I would like to encourage the committee to remember that
limiting this committee's oversight of radicalization to one
religion ignores threats posed by violent extremists of all
religious and ethnic backgrounds.
Violent gangs organized along racial and ethnic lines exist
throughout United States prisons. The National Gang
Intelligence Center has assessed that major gangs pose a
serious domestic threat, particularly National-level prison
gangs that maintain substantial influence over street gangs. In
some cases, counting incarcerated members as well as affiliated
individuals outside of correctional facilities, prison gangs
can wield influence over thousands of individuals, both
incarcerated and free, throughout the United States.
It is clear that prison gangs often pose a security threat
to prisoners and prison staff, as well as the American public.
Some prison gangs delve into radical or extremist ideologies,
and in a number of instances these ideologies are integral in
fashion to cohesive group identities within prison walls.
Several gangs in America's prisons subscribe to white
supremacist beliefs, views broadly shared by some domestic
extremist groups such as the Aryan Nation, the National
Socialist Party, and the National Alliance.
For example, the Aryan Brotherhood is a particularly
dangerous National-level gang with approximately 15,000 members
in and out of prison. In June 1998, James Byrd, a particularly
disabled black man, was dragged to his death by 3 ex-convicts,
2 of whom were members of the Aryan Brotherhood and the other
was seeking membership with that group. The presence of these
types of intact and operational gang organizations, coupled
with the ability of their leaders to control and direct
operations outside of the prison from within the prison's walls
should not be ignored.
The willingness of these groups to use violence, undermine
order, and commit mayhem is not dependent on religious belief
or political ideology, nor do these groups limit their
terrorist acts to prison walls. The use of a prison as a
platform for collaboration between both criminal and extremist
gangs and groups, pose a real and present threat to our
homeland. With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
October 28, 2015
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing to
examine current prison countering violent extremism programs and
explore the development of such programs for inmates post-release. The
United States held an estimated 1.5 million prisoners in State and
Federal custody at the end of 2014.
While that number was down 1% from the previous year, the United
States continues to have the highest documented incarceration rate in
the world. I am aware that most of today's discussion will likely focus
on the possible radicalization of Muslim inmates. However, I would
encourage the committee to remember that limiting this committee's
oversight of radicalization to one religion ignores threats posed by
violent extremists of all religious and ethnic backgrounds.
Violent gangs organized along racial and ethnic lines exist
throughout U.S. prisons. The National Gang Intelligence Center has
assessed that major prison gangs pose a serious domestic threat,
particularly National-level prison gangs that maintain substantial
influence over street gangs.''
In some cases, counting incarcerated members as well as affiliated
individuals outside of correctional facilities, prison gangs can wield
influence over thousands of individuals, both incarcerated and free,
throughout the United States. It is clear that prison gangs often pose
a security threat to prisoners and prison staff as well as the American
public.
Some prison gangs delve into radical or extremist ideologies, and
in a number of instances, these ideologies are integral to fashioning
cohesive group identities within prison walls. Several gangs in
America's prisons subscribe to white supremacist beliefs, views broadly
shared by some domestic extremist groups such as the Aryan Nation, the
National Socialist Party, and the National Alliance.
For example, the Aryan Brotherhood is a particularly dangerous,
National-level gang with approximately 15,000 members in and out of
prison. In June 1998, James Byrd, a partially-disabled black man, was
dragged to his death by 3 ex-convicts, 2 of whom were members of the
Aryan Brotherhood and the other who was seeking membership with this
group.
The presence of these types of intact and operational gang
organizations coupled with the ability of their leaders to control and
direct operations outside of prison from within the prison walls should
not be ignored. The willingness of these groups to use violence,
undermine order, and commit mayhem is not dependent on religious belief
or political ideology nor do these groups limit their terrorist acts to
prison walls.
The use of prison as a platform for collaboration between both
criminal and extremist gangs and groups poses a real and present threat
to our homeland.
Mr. King. I thank the full committee Ranking Member.
Bennie, I just want you to know that even though the emphasis--
my emphasis today is on Islamist radicalization in prison, I
agree with every word you said. We are in full agreement
underneath, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. King. Has to be done in prisons.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic.
Our first witness is a person who often does a lot of the
work for us and doesn't get the credit for it. I am glad to
give you the credit today, Mr. Jerry Bjelopera, as a specialist
in organized crime and terrorism with the Congressional
Research Service. He has authored or coauthored more than 35
reports for Congress on homeland security and intelligence
issues.
Jerry has been a valued asset to the committee on Homeland
Security and has assisted in a number of oversight and
investigative projects, including prison radicalization, the
DHS intelligence enterprise, and the Boston Marathon bombing
investigation. Jerry, I do want to thank for your service and
especially for what you do, you know, for this committee and
have done for us over the years. With that, Jerry, you are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF JEROME P. BJELOPERA, SPECIALIST IN ORGANIZED CRIME
AND TERRORISM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS
Mr. Bjelopera. Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins,
Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of subcommittee, my name
is Jerry Bjelopera. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on behalf of the Congressional Research Service. My
testimony attempts to frame the issue of violent jihadist
radicalization in U.S. prisons.
Since 9/11, the vast majority of home-grown violent
jihadists have not radicalized behind bars. Far more often the
shift from law-abiding citizen to terrorist has involved other
social environments and contexts. In fact, most home-grown
violent jihadists radicalize via virtual or in-person
interactions that can depend on powerful relationships such as
face-to-face or on-line friendship networks or family ties.
CRS has identified more than 120 post-9/11 home-grown
violent jihadist conspiracies. Only one of these plots included
participants who had clearly radicalized while serving time
behind bars in the United States. This suggests that domestic
prisons are not fertile grounds for the nurturing of future
jihadist terrorists. However, two important caveats likely
limit this observation.
These two points suggest that U.S. correctional
institutions cannot be dismissed as potential radicalization
arenas. The first caveat. We don't know the actual extent of
jihadist influence in U.S. prisons. No solid publicly-available
estimates exist either of the number of people imparting
violent jihadist messages in U.S. prisons or their followers.
Social interaction in prison might offer opportunities for
convicts unfamiliar with terrorist world views to learn about
them and to radicalize.
Violent jihadists embrace intolerant interpretations of
Islam, the fastest-growing faith in U.S. prisons. Some
disaffected prisoners adopt versions of the religion that stray
far from broadly-accepted sects and schools of thought. Some
espouse forms of Islam that may incorporate radical viewpoints
and violent rhetoric.
Other extremist viewpoints such as white supremacy have
taken root behind bars, suggesting that it may be possible for
violent jihadists to circulate their messages in similar
settings. A number of gangs in U.S. prisons recruit and
organize around extremist but not jihadist ideologies. The
beliefs that such gangs have adopted helped them to
indoctrinate new members. However, these gangs tend not to use
their idealogical systems to justify terrorist acts. Rather,
groups like white supremacist gangs focus on maintaining their
own cohesion and profiting from crimes like drug trafficking
while incarcerated.
The second caveat. It is unclear whether incarceration in
U.S. prisons fosters deeper commitment to radical violence
among people already jailed on terrorist charges. We will
likely learn more about this in coming years. In the next 2
decades, scores of convicted and incarcerated home-grown
violent jihadists are to be released from U.S. prisons,
potentially making this issue especially salient.
Until recently, relatively few home-grown jihadists have
been released from U.S. correctional facilities, offering us
little insight into the effect of prison on such persons.
Though, of this small pool of released convicts, none has
returned to terrorist plotting, according to open sources. This
suggests at least several questions. How successfully will
convicts due for release after 2015 reintegrate into life
outside of prison? How might they influence the home-grown
threat landscape? Will any of these ex-convicts foster new
plots? Will any serve as role models for future terrorists?
Based on CRS research, since 9/11 more than 250 people have
been convicted for their involvement in home-grown violent
jihadist plots. CRS was able to find information regarding the
sentences of 151 home-grown violent jihadists. Of the 151, 132
had identifiable release dates, and just over 100 will be
released after 2015.
To summarize, only 1 post-9/11 home-grown jihadist
terrorist plot has involved people who clearly radicalized
behind bars. This may imply that jihadist extremism is not a
problem in U.S. correctional facilities; however, arguably, we
cannot dismiss this issue.
We haven't determined the extent of jihadist influence in
U.S. prisons. We also need to better understand whether
confinement in U.S. jails fosters deeper commitment to radical
violence among convicted terrorists. Further work on these
issues will help us to better understand the security
challenges that radicalization in U.S. prisons may pose. I
thank the subcommittee again for this opportunity to testify
and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bjelopera follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jerome P. Bjelopera
October 28, 2015
overview
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the
committee, my name is Jerry Bjelopera. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on behalf of the Congressional Research Service. My
testimony attempts to frame the issue of violent jihadist
radicalization in U.S. prisons and briefly examines whether Federal
efforts to counter violent extremism extend to U.S. prisoners.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the vast majority
of home-grown violent jihadists have not radicalized in U.S. prisons.
Far more often, the shift from law-abiding citizen to terrorist has
involved other social environments and contexts--both virtual and real.
Domestic prisons do not appear to create many violent extremists out of
non-terrorist criminals, according to open-source information.
Two important caveats temper this point and suggest that U.S.
correctional institutions cannot be completely dismissed as potential
radicalization arenas.
We do not know the actual extent of jihadist influence in
U.S. prisons.--No solid estimates exist either of the number of
people preaching violent jihadist messages in State and Federal
prisons or their followers. Non-jihadist extremist movements
such as white supremacy have taken root behind bars, suggesting
that it may be possible for violent jihadists to propagate
their messages in the same settings.
Whether incarceration in U.S. prisons fosters deeper
commitment to radical violence among convicted terrorists
remains unclear.\1\--In the next 2 decades, scores of convicted
and incarcerated home-grown violent jihadists are to be
released from U.S. prisons potentially making this issue
especially salient.
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\1\ Since 9/11, more than 250 people have been convicted for their
involvement in home-grown violent jihadist plots.
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Key Terms
Radicalization.--The process of acquiring and holding radical,
extremist, or jihadist beliefs. A radicalized individual becomes a
terrorist when he or she commits a crime on the basis of such beliefs.
Home-grown.--Terrorist activity perpetrated within the United
States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or
visitors radicalized largely within the United States.
Violent Jihadists.--Radicalized individuals using Islam as an
ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the
establishment of a caliphate--a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil
and religious leader known as a caliph--via violent means.
Plots.--Schemes by home-grown individuals or groups to either join
terrorist organizations abroad or to commit violent attacks at home or
abroad.
american prisons have produced almost no post-9/11 jihadist terrorists
According to CRS analysis of home-grown violent jihadist activity
since 9/11, such plots have nearly always featured people who
radicalized outside of prison. Out of approximately 120 conspiracies,
CRS has found 1 that included participants who had clearly radicalized
while incarcerated in the United States.
Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad
Samana were arrested in August 2005 for plotting to attack
targets in the Los Angeles, CA area, including synagogues, the
Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX),
U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases. In 1997,
James founded a violent jihadist movement he named Jamiyyat Ul-
Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS or the ``Authentic Assembly of God'') in
the California State prison system. James met Washington behind
bars in 2004 and recruited him into JIS. After his release,
Washington enlisted Patterson, an employee at LAX, and Samana
at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, CA, where they
all worshipped.\2\
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\2\ Department of Justice, ``Man Who Formed Terrorist Group that
Plotted Attacks on Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 16 Years
in Federal Prison,'' March 6, 2009, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/
dojpressrel/pressrel09/la030609ausa.htm; Department of Justice, ``Man
Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting Military and Jewish
Facilities Sentenced to 22 Years,'' July 23, 2008, http://
losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/la062308usa.htm; Department
of Justice, ``Second Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting
Military, Jewish Facilities Sentenced to Prison,'' July 21, 2008,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-nsd-634.html; Department of
Justice, ``Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges,'' August 31, 2005,
http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/IGInformationReleases/
fourmen_090105.pdf.
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Most home-grown violent jihadists radicalize via virtual or in-
person interactions that can depend on powerful contexts such as real
or on-line friendship networks and family relationships. These usually
do not involve the levels of scrutiny or supervision by authority
figures as do interpersonal dealings in prison.
In 2013 and 2014, Asher Abid Khan conspired with a friend to
travel to Syria and join the terrorist organization known as
the Islamic State (IS).\3\ Khan, a 20-year-old Houston, TX
resident, and his friend radicalized together. For example,
they watched violent jihadist videos on-line. The duo exchanged
IS-inspired messages and imagery via social media platforms
such as Facebook and Instagram. They also used Facebook to
contact an IS foreign terrorist fighter facilitator based in
Turkey. Khan's friend eventually made it to Syria and joined
the Islamic State.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The group has also been known as the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic
State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), and Daesh among other names.
\4\ Adam Goldman, ``An American Family Saved Their Son from Joining
the Islamic State. Now He Might Go to Prison,'' Washington Post,
September 6, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/an-american-family-saved-their-son-from-joining-the-islamic-
state-now-he-might-go-to-prison/2015/09/06/2d3d0f48-44ef-11e5-8ab4-
c73967a143d3_story.html; United States v. Asher Abid Khan, Criminal
Complaint, United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, May 25, 2015.
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In 2014, Heather Elizabeth Coffman, a 29-year-old Glen
Allen, VA resident, attempted to assist others to join the
Islamic State. Coffman relied on Facebook postings as she
radicalized and attempted to help a man she described as her
husband travel to Syria to link up with the terrorist group.\5\
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\5\ Department of Justice Press Release, ``Glen Allen Woman Pleads
Guilty to Making a False Statement Involving International Terrorism,''
February 2, 2015; Danielle Haynes, ``Virginia Woman Arrested for
Allegedly Offering to Help Islamic State,'' United Press International,
November 17, 2014. United States v. Heather Elizabeth Coffman, Criminal
Complaint, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, November 14, 2014.
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yet, concerns about jailhouse jihadism persist
The extent of violent jihadist radicalization behind bars is
unknown. American prisons might offer venues for such activity, where
neophytes can be radicalized or recruited, even though only a small
percentage of such individuals may eventually turn to terrorism.\6\
Also, we do not fully understand the effect of prison time on convicted
terrorists who came to prison already radicalized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See Mark S. Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization
and the Evolving Terrorist Threat (New York: New York University Press,
2013), Hereafter: Hamm, The Spectacular Few. See also Mark S. Hamm,
``Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An
Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups,'' December 2007, p.
112, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220957.pdf. Hereafter:
Hamm, ``Terrorist Recruitment.'' See also ``U.S. Congress, House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Written Statement of Janice
Fedarcyk, fmr. Special Agent in Charge, Counterterrorism Division, Los
Angeles Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, `Radicalization,
Information Sharing, and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland
from Homegrown Terror,' '' 110th Cong., 1st sess., April 5, 2007, p.
18; George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute
(HSPI) and The University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group
(CIAG), ``Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner
Radicalization,'' HSPI and CIAG, Washington, DC, September 2006, http:/
/www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/
out_of_the_shadows.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its many peaceful mainstream forms, Islam is the fastest-growing
faith behind bars in the United States. However, some disaffected
prisoners adopt versions of the religion that stray far from broadly-
accepted sects and schools of thought, versions that may incorporate
radical viewpoints and violent rhetoric. One such non-traditional
jailhouse variant is commonly known as ``prison Islam.'' Prison Islam
selectively uses the Quran and other Islamic texts in a ``cut-and-
paste'' ideological approach to reinforce gang values and may encourage
violence.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Hamm, The Spectacular Few; Peter R. Neumann, Prisons and
Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries,
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political
Violence, London, 2010, p. 2, http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/
1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countr
ies.pdf. Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin,
Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the Challenges of
Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners, RAND Europe, Cambridge, United
Kingdom, 2008, p. 10, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/
RAND_TR571.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Islam and Conversion Behind Bars
Islam has been described as the fastest-growing religion among
North American prisoners, with one estimate suggesting that ``30,000 or
perhaps as many as 40,000'' prisoners convert every year.\8\ Prison
converts do not necessarily adopt the tenets of mainstream major
religions. Some consider non-traditional, potentially radical, quasi-
religious outlooks instead. At least two broad motivations influence
potential converts--a search for meaning/identity (which can translate
into defiance of prison authorities) and a need for physical protection
from other inmates. Religious conversion plays a varied part in prison
life. Cynical prisoners may use conversion to demonstrate good behavior
to prison officials, thereby potentially improving their conditions.
For others, religious conversion can offer a powerful alternative to
harmful or destructive behavior behind bars and may reduce the
likelihood that they will commit future offenses in jail or once
released.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Hamm, The Spectacular Few, pp. 43-44. According to one study,
just State and Federal institutions held ``an estimated 1,574,700
prisoners on December 31, 2013, an increase of 4,300 prisoners from
year-end 2012.'' This figure peaked in 2009 at 1,615,500. When
factoring in local jails as well, the number of inmates for 2012 was
2,231,400 and 2,220,300 for 2013. See E. Ann Carson, ``Prisoners in
2013,'' U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, (September 30, 2014); Lauren E. Glaze and
Danielle Kaeble, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, ``Correctional Populations in
the United States, 2013'' (December 2014).
\9\ Hamm, ``Terrorist Recruitment,'' pp. 112, 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Radicals in Prison
While the scope of jihadist radicalization in U.S. correctional
facilities is unclear, a number of large gangs in U.S. prisons recruit
and organize around other extremist ideologies. The existence of such
gangs suggests that extremist ideologies can find root in American
prisons. The beliefs that some prison gangs have adopted help them to
radicalize new members. However, these gangs tend not to use their
ideological systems to justify terrorist acts. Rather, they focus on
profitable criminal enterprises such as drug trafficking.\10\ White
supremacist prison gangs illustrate this.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, and David Caspi,
``Critical Events in the Life Trajectories of Domestic Extremist White
Supremacist Groups,'' Criminology and Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 3
(August 2009), p. 508; David Holthouse, ``Smashing the Shamrock,''
Intelligence Report, Southern Poverty Law Center, Issue 119, (Fall
2005), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/
browse-all-issues/2005/fall/smashing-the-shamrock?page=0,1. Hereafter:
Holthouse, ``Smashing.'' Camille Jackson, ``Nazi Low Riders,''
Intelligence Report, Southern Poverty Law Center, Issue 114, (Summer
2004), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/
browse-all-issues/2004/summer/nazi-low-riders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
White supremacist beliefs form the key tenets binding several gangs
in U.S. prisons. Extremists of this persuasion hold that whites: (1)
Are superior to all other racial groups, (2) have experienced decline
at the hands of other races, and (3) require extreme measures to return
them to social and political preeminence.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Such views are broadly shared by domestic extremist groups
such as the National Socialist Party and racist skinheads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Aryan Brotherhood, a National-level prison gang with
approximately 15,000 members in and out of custody, has
factions within facilities managed by the California Department
of Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Department of Justice, ``Prison Gangs and Photos,'' May 11,
2015, http://www.justice.gov/criminal-ocgs/gallery/prison-gangs;
``Member of Aryan Brotherhood Booked in Slidell,'' Associated Press
State and Local Wire, October 6, 2009; Holthouse, ``Smashing.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nazi Low Riders, a regional-level gang with a membership
estimated between 800 and 1,000, exists in correctional
facilities on the West Coast and in the Southwest.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ibid. See also National Drug Intelligence Center. Attorney
General's Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in
Suburban Areas, (April 2008), Appendix B. Pete Simi, Lowell Smith, and
Ann M.S. Reeser, ``From Punk Kids to Public Enemy Number One,'' Deviant
Behavior, vol. 29, no. 8 (2008), pp. 753-774.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How Have Incarcerated Jihadists Fared in Prison?
Until recently few home-grown violent jihadists have been released
from U.S. correctional facilities, offering little insight into the
effect of prison time on such persons. Though, of this small pool of
released convicts, none have returned to terrorist plotting, according
to open sources. In the next 20 years, the United States is to release
scores of similar individuals. It is unknown how such people will
handle their exits from penal institutions. How successfully they
reintegrate into life outside of prison might influence the home-grown
violent jihadist threat landscape. Will a significant portion of these
released jihadists foster new plots? Will any serve as role models for
future terrorists? Since 9/11, more than 250 people have been convicted
for their involvement in home-grown violent jihadist plots. Approximate
release dates for 132 people imprisoned for such activity are publicly
available and depicted in Figure 1 below. CRS was able to find
information regarding the sentences of 151 home-grown violent jihadists
arrested for either their involvement in terrorist attacks for plotting
such attacks. Of the 151 home-grown violent jihadists:
132 had identifiable release dates. (The earliest possible
release date was considered, where appropriate.)
Of the 132 with identifiable release dates, 5 were
incarcerated at the State level. The rest (127) were held in
Federal (non-military) correctional facilities.
16 received life sentences.
3 received death sentences. Two of these individuals were
tried as U.S. soldiers in military courts and await their
executions in military custody.
11 are housed in the U.S. Bureau of Prisons Administrative
Maximum Security (ADX) facility, in Florence, CO. Commonly
referred to as ADX Florence, Florence ADMAX, or the Alcatraz of
the Rockies, this prison is reputedly the most secure prison
facility in the United States.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ For example, see Mark Binelli, ``Inside America's Toughest
Federal Prison,'' New York Times Magazine, March 26, 2015.
to what degree do federal efforts to counter violent extremism extend
to u.s. prisoners?
Based on public sources, it is difficult to determine how much of
the Obama administration's program to thwart terrorist radicalization
focuses on Federal, State, or local prisons.\15\ The plan, dubbed
``countering violent extremism'' (CVE), was announced in 2011. When
describing existing CVE efforts in 2011, the administration noted that
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) had collaborated to evaluate how State-
level prisons identified radicalization among inmates and shared such
information with law enforcement partners.\16\ The administration's
program for further work on CVE included almost 50 ``future activities
and efforts'' for numerous Federal agencies.\17\ One of these focused
on prison radicalization, suggesting that DHS, FBI, BOP, and NCTC
continue existing collaboration to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the
United States, August 2011, p. 1. Hereinafter: Empowering Local
Partners.
\16\ Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, December 2011, p. 13.
\17\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improve awareness of the risk of violent extremism in
correctional systems;
Enhance screening of new inmates to detect individuals
associated with violent extremist organizations;
Improve detection of recruitment efforts within the
correctional environment; and
Increase information sharing, as appropriate, with Federal,
State, and local law enforcement about inmates who may have
adopted violent extremist beliefs and are being released.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Ibid., p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is unclear what progress has been made in these efforts.
I thank the subcommittee again for this opportunity to testify and
look forward to your questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Bjelopera, for your testimony.
Our next witness, Mr. Tony Parker, is the assistant
commissioner of prisons with the Tennessee Department of
Corrections. Commissioner Parker has a 32-year record in the
corrections field, and is currently responsible for overseeing
the day-to-day operations of the correctional institutions in
Tennessee.
In addition, in 2013, Commissioner Parker completed the
Naval post-graduate school in Monterey, California, and wrote a
thesis entitled, ``Establishing a Deradicalization/
Disengagement Model for America's Correctional Facilities:
Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization.'' Now,
the staff was not able to come up with simultaneous translators
for today, so Mr. Parker and I have agreed not to comment on
each other's accents and try to understand our dialects as
closely as possible. Thank you, Commissioner. You're
recognized.
STATEMENT OF TONY C. PARKER, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTION, STATE OF TENNESSEE
Mr. Parker. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman King, Ranking
Members Thompson and Higgins, and Members of this subcommittee,
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today.
I would also like to express my appreciation to the men and
women who work inside America's jails and prisons. It is truly
an honor to testify at this hearing and to share my experiences
about the correctional environment as well as my prison
radicalization research.
My name is Tony Parker, and I serve as the assistant
commissioner of prisons for the Tennessee Department of
Correction. Prison radicalization has been identified as a
significant threat to America's homeland security. Currently,
the United States has no prison deradicalization program. When
considering the inmate population within the Federal Bureau of
Prison who have a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent
of America's inmate population will return to our communities,
it is evident we need to do something proactively to address
prison radicalization.
In 2011, I had the opportunity to participate in the
master's degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Center for Homeland Defense and Security in Monterey,
California. I would like to thank Congress and FEMA for funding
a program grounded in providing future homeland security
leaders with the analytical tools to establish future policy.
My research examined the literature about environmental
factors within prisons that promote radicalization. I also
conducted a comparative analysis of deradicalization programs
used in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. That research provides the
basis for my recommendations regarding a U.S. prison
deradicalization model, a model that addresses both prison
environmental factors as well as providing recommendations for
a rehabilitative initiative targeted toward reentry.
Prison radicalization has left its footprint on society
through the actions of individuals like Kevin James, Jose
Padilla, and Michael Finton. The American prison system has
many of the characteristics that promote radicalization.
Prisons are isolated environments. In such an environment,
inmates become easy targets for radical extremists searching
for individuals to join their cause.
The most effective correctional system incorporates
productive rehabilitative programs with sound security
policies. Corrections' long-term strategy, security, is the
foundation of sound correctional policy, although that strategy
may have become a liability. We have failed to recognize the
need to change the strategy to an approach that includes both
security and a robust rehabilitative initiative. I would argue
you cannot have one without the other.
Effective monitoring and control of prison groups,
especially security threat groups, are essential to reducing
the vulnerability of prison radicalization. The radicalization
message can enter the correctional environment through numerous
avenues such as radicalized inmates, unvetted radical
chaplains, extremist propaganda labeled as religious material,
illegal cell phones, and social media sites. Rigorous vetting
and monitoring of prison chaplains and religious volunteers
must be a standard.
Understanding the complexities of a captive society like
prison populations is complicated. My 32 years of correctional
experience has helped me recognize how fragile this environment
can be, but additional social science research would be
beneficial in expanding the knowledge base regarding prison
radicalization. Providing adequate staff training and
developing intelligence-sharing networks with criminal justice
partners are critical in fighting prison radicalization.
The correctional intelligence initiative developed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Joint
Terrorism Task Force provides a good framework that promotes
intelligence gathering related to terrorism and prison
radicalization from United States correctional agencies. I
argue that although the framework is structurally sound, there
remains a significant training element that must be
accomplished.
The prison deradicalization programs of Singapore and Saudi
Arabia were based on the applicable laws and cultural
considerations of both countries. I recognize the profound
differences in both of these countries, especially when
compared to our Nation's civil liberties and due process
protections. Even so, the value of learning from successful
deradicalization programs of other countries should not be
minimized.
Although the deradicalization programs of Singapore and
Saudi Arabia were designed to counter radicalization within
their respective borders, unique elements of these programs
offer possible solutions to prison radicalization in the United
States that should be evaluated through a filter that maintains
the Constitutional protections afforded to U.S. prisoners.
The 9/11 Commission report identified failure of
imagination as America's most glaring failure leading to the
attacks of September 11. According to the report, we failed to
understand and consider the gravity of the threat. May we never
underestimate the threat of prison radicalization and the
importance of reentry protocols for the convicted terrorist.
Without a multi-disciplinary approach that targets prison
radicalization and understands the reentry issues that surround
the inmates with a terrorism nexus, America will always be
reacting to prison radicalization. Our policy and our strategy
must be proactive. Correctional policymakers must be cognizant
of the environmental factors that promote prison radicalization
and promote policy to mitigate the threat. Failing to provide
aggressive treatment and program options to counter prison
radicalization leads to the prison gates open to releasing
potentially radicalized individuals back into our communities.
I would ask the subcommittee to support this model and
support additional social science research designed to mitigate
the factors of contributing to prison radicalization. Again, I
thank you for allowing me to address this distinguished
committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tony C. Parker
October 28, 2015
Chairman King, Ranking Members Thompson and Higgins, and Members of
this subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today. I would also like to express my appreciation
to the men and women who work inside America's jails and prisons. It is
truly an honor to testify at this hearing and share my experiences
about the correctional environment as well as my prison radicalization
research.
My name is Tony Parker and I serve as the assistant commissioner of
prisons for the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC).
Prison radicalization has been identified as a significant threat
to America's homeland security. Currently, the United States has no
prison deradicalization program. When considering the inmate population
housed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons who have a terrorism nexus,
and the fact that 95 percent of America's inmate population will return
to our communities, it is evident we need to do something proactively
to address prison radicalization.
In 2011, I had the opportunity to participate in a Master's Degree
Program at the Naval Postgraduate School--Center for Homeland Defense
and Security in Monterey, California. I would like to thank Congress
and FEMA for funding a program grounded in providing future homeland
security leaders with the analytical tools to establish future policy.
My research examined the literature about environmental factors
within prisons that promote radicalization. I also conducted a
comparative analysis of deradicalization programs used in Singapore and
Saudi Arabia. That research provides the basis for my recommendations
about a U.S. prison deradicalization model. A model that addresses both
prison environmental factors as well as providing recommendations for a
rehabilitative initiative targeted toward reentry.
Prison radicalization has left its footprint on society through the
actions of individuals like Kevin James, Jose Padilla, and Michael
Finton.\1\ The American prison system has many of the characteristics
that promote radicalization. Prisons are isolated environments. In such
an environment, inmates become easy targets for radical extremists
searching for individuals to join their cause.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House Committee on Homeland Security, Background Information on
Prominent Post-9/11 U.S. Prison Radicalization Cases (Washington, DC:
Committee on Oversight and Government Affairs, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most effective correctional system incorporates productive
rehabilitative programs with sound security policies. Correction's
long-term strategy--security--is the foundation of sound correctional
policy, although; that strategy may have become a ``liability.'' We
have failed to recognize the need to change the strategy to an approach
that includes both security and a robust rehabilitative initiative. You
cannot have one without the other.
Effective monitoring and control of prison groups, especially
security threat groups, are essential to reducing the vulnerability for
prison radicalization.
The radicalization message can enter the correctional environment
through numerous avenues such as radicalized inmates, unvetted radical
chaplains, extremist propaganda labeled as religious material, illegal
cell phones, and social media sites. Rigorous vetting and monitoring of
prison chaplains and religious volunteers must be a standard.
Understanding the complexities of a captive society like prison
populations is complicated. My 32 years of correctional experience have
helped me recognize how fragile this environment can be, but additional
social science research would be beneficial in expanding the knowledge
base regarding prison radicalization.
Providing adequate staff training and developing intelligence-
sharing networks with criminal justice partners are critical in
fighting prison radicalization. The Correctional Intelligence
Initiative, developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), provides a good
framework that promotes intelligence gathering, related to terrorism
and prisoner radicalization, from United States correctional agencies.
I argue that although the framework is structurally sound, there
remains a significant training element that must be accomplished.
The prison deradicalization programs of Singapore and Saudi Arabia
were based on the applicable laws and cultural considerations of both
countries. I recognize the profound differences of both of those
countries, especially when compared to our Nation's civil liberties and
due process protections.
Even so, the value of learning from the successful deradicalization
programs of other countries should not be minimized. Although the
deradicalization programs of Singapore and Saudi Arabia were designed
to counter radicalization within their respective borders, unique
elements of these programs offer possible solutions to prison
radicalization in the United States that should be evaluated through a
filter that maintains the constitutional protections afforded to U.S.
prisoners.
The 9/11 Commission Report identified ``Failure of Imagination'' as
America's most glaring failure leading to the attacks of September 11.
According to the Report, we failed to understand and consider the
gravity of the threat. May we never underestimate the threat of prison
radicalization and the importance of reentry protocols for convicted
terrorist.
Without a multidisciplinary approach that targets prison
radicalization and understands the reentry issues that surround the
inmate with a terrorism nexus, America will always be reacting to
prison radicalization. Our policy and our strategy must be proactive.
Correctional policymakers must be cognizant of the environmental
factors that promote prison radicalization and promote policy to
mitigate the threat. Failing to provide aggressive treatment and
program options to counteract prison radicalization leaves the prison
gates open to releasing potentially radicalized individuals back into
our neighborhoods.
I would ask the subcommittee to support this model and support
additional social science research designed to mitigate the factors
contributing to prison radicalization.
Again, I thank you for allowing me to address this distinguished
committee.
Attachment.--Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for
America's Correctional Facilities: Recommendations for Countering
Prison Radicalization
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A U.S. PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Suggested Proactive Measures for the Suggested Proactive Measures
Correctional Environment Aimed at That Provide Individual
Reducing the Vulnerability of Prison Treatment Options for the
Radicalization Radicalized Inmate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Productive Rehabilitation and 1. The establishment of a
Effective Security: The Dual Strategy voluntary cognitive-based
(effective rehabilitation enhances counseling program for inmates
security). who are incarcerated for
terrorism-related crimes or
inmates who exhibit violent
ideological expressions.
2. Effective Monitoring and Control of 2. Inmates who participate in
Prison Groups. voluntary deradicalization
programs should be afforded
the same incentives related to
sentence credit reductions,\1\
vocational/educational
opportunities as well as
aftercare programs that
support their chances for
successful reentry and reduce
the chances of further
extremist activity.
3. Rigorous Vetting and Monitoring of 3. U.S. Corrections should
Prison Chaplains and Religious invest in an intensive effort
Volunteers. to recruit properly-vetted and
trained volunteers, chaplains,
and psychological
professionals that would be
utilized in an established
counseling program as
recommended in recommendation
1.
4. Encourage Positive Inmate/Family 4. Develop and implement a
Social Interaction and Communication. vigorous aftercare initiative
that ensures post-
incarceration monitoring/
supervision, counseling and
social service assistance upon
successful completion of the
deradicalization program.
5. Correctional Policy Should Encourage ...............................
Social Research Within Prisons.
6. Provide Adequate Staff Training and ...............................
Develop Intelligence-Sharing Networks.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sentence credit reductions would be considered the reduction of days
from the offender's total sentence for satisfactorily participating in
a program or job as well as the reduction of days from the sentence
for good behavior.
Mr. King. Thank you, Commissioner Parker.
Our next witness, Mr. Brian Levin, is a professor within
the Department of Criminal Justice and the director of the
Center for the Study of Hate & Extremism at California State
University in San Bernardino. Professor Levin is the author,
coauthor, and editor of a number of books, articles, and
studies on extremism and hate crime. He has testified
previously before Congress and has appeared on multiple
National news outlets.
Prior to joining academia, Professor Levin earned a law
degree from Stanford, and I must say I am particularly proud of
the fact that you served as a New York City police officer and
is then third generation NYPD.
So thank you for your service and thank you for your
testimony today, Professor. I just wish you were back on Long
island. That is all. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN H. LEVIN, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR STUDY OF HATE AND EXTREMISM,
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SAN BERNARDINO
Mr. Levin. Good morning, Chairman King. Mets in 6. Ranking
Member----
Mr. King. We can end the hearing right there. I am with
you. Here we go.
Mr. Levin. The last time I went to a World Series was 1986.
Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Members Thompson and
Higgins, and Members of the committee. Thank you so very much
for the privilege of speaking before you, and my son Gabriel, a
Boy Scout, today, on behalf of the nonpartisan Center for the
Study of Hate & Extremism at California State University, San
Bernardino.
My name is Professor Brian Levin, and for over 15 years I
have served as director of our center where, as you have heard,
I teach in the criminal justice department and in our
interdisciplinary National security studies program. I also
write front-page analysis in National security for the
Huffington Post, including today, and like you, I am very proud
to be part of an NYPD family--in my case, three generations. I
think that is what I am most honored to be associated with.
My testimony today, however, will address three basic
subjects. First, I will address the overall homeland terrorist
threat, with particular emphasis on the two most prominent ones
coming from violent Salafist jihadists and far-right-wing
extremists. Second, I will discuss issues relating to these
movements in the context of prisons and post-release
activities. Lastly, I will address issues relating to
countering violent extremism, CVE, programs in the contents of
efficacy, as well as civil rights and civil liberties concerns.
The United States faces multiple severe risk factors and a
diverse set of emerging contemporary actors in the area of mass
terrorism, with shots on goal increasingly coming from across
both the idealogical and competency spectrum. According to the
global terrorism database, GTD, at the University of Maryland's
START program, total terror attacks in the United States have
increased from 9 in 2011 to 19 in 2014, and from no fatalities
in 2011, to 18 last year.
The GTD data indicates that since 9/11, at least 66 attacks
came from right-wing extremists versus about 25 from Muslim
ones. The next deadly mass attack, assassination, or crippling
infrastructure sabotage may not necessarily come from extremist
movements that have had more terrorist attacks or plots before,
or even more or better-trained adherence. Rather, the next
terrorist attack will simply come from whoever is proximate,
operational, and undetected tomorrow, and we cannot
mechanistically presume from the totality of these threats,
solely revolve around any single movement alone, including the
two most prominent ones, violent Salafist jihadists and far-
right extremists.
In today's splintered socio-political landscape,
increasingly sophisticated organized groups also share the
stage with angry, unstable, or disenchanted loners along with
smaller informal groups. My counsel to the House Judiciary
Committee almost 20 years ago is even more valid today.
Leaderless resistance calls for small autonomous bands of
terrorists to further the overall goals of their movement by
committing random acts of terror against public institutions,
infrastructure targets, and innocent citizens will continue.
While there are significant qualitative and quantitative
factors that plausibly skew our center's current overall mass
terror threat assessment toward violent Salafist Jihadists,
available data does not yet indicate that their potency outside
of prisons has sparked significant internal activity or wave of
recidivism. While there have been two known Salafist jihadist
prison-related plots at different ends of the operational
landscape over the last decade and some really disturbing
incidents involving bigoted literature and poorly-vetted
clerics, far-right extremists, often operating as criminal
syndicates, along with other ethnic-based prison gangs have
been far more prominent and violent within correctional
settings.
While violent Salafist jihadists have achieved extensive
notoriety over recent years, they are but a tiny sliver of the
estimated 2.7 million law-abiding American Muslims. Recent
statements by FBI officials tentatively suggest violent
Salafist jihadists are possibly plateauing at the top of an
evolving terrorism threat matrix, with 900 open investigations,
and 6 foreign-fighter Middle East forays a month, down from a
previous sustained level of 9 monthly departures.
The catalytic civil wars in Syria and Iraq, a well-
organized overseas ISIS presence, and the most sophisticated
use of the internet ever for terrorist recruitment and training
is indeed the most profound, though hardly the only, threat to
our National security.
One of the things that we are seeing is that context is
critical. With respect to prison and post-release issues, we
may very well be in the eye of a small incarceration storm with
only about 200 internal security and terrorism Federal
prosecutions last year, compared to over 1,200 in 2002. The
2014 figures show a one-third decline in cases from 5 years ago
and a 75 percent decline from the previous 10 years, according
to the Syracuse University-based Transactional Record Access
Clearinghouse.
As Mr. Bjelopera points out, many of those convicted during
the height of the Federal prosecution efforts over the last
decade have been or will be released soon, while new offenders
may be ensnared in the foreseeable future, as Federal
authorities ramp up counterterrorism investigations related to
recruitment efforts of ISIS and related entities. These
numbers, however, represent a mere fraction of the 1.5 million
prisoners incarcerated Nationally and of the 211,000
incarcerated in the Federal system.
Just because my time is running over, I am just going to
close with a couple of observations. Far-right-wing extremists,
for instance, groups like Aryan Brotherhood, 15,000 to 20,000;
Nazi Low Riders, maybe 1,000 or so; Public Enemy Number 1, 800
to 1,200, these are all significant prison presence relating to
radicalism on another end of the spectrum. They, however, often
operate as criminal syndicates.
Interestingly enough, the first post-9/11 operational
jihadist Salafist plot came from a prison. So simply, while we
have not seen prisons be a fertile breeding ground yet, that
does not mean in the future that won't change because we are in
a very fluid environment, and I would be more than happy to
answer questions related to that in the Q and A section.
However, what I must say, though, we must be very careful with
respect to civil rights and civil liberties concerns.
As the Supreme Court has stated, the Constitution does not
stop at prison walls. While we very well may have to engage in
a variety of rehabilitative and monitoring programs, it is
crucial that they apply across the board to the vast threat
because we don't want to focus just on one section of the ice,
when the shot on goal tomorrow might come from another. I again
want to thank you so much for the privilege of testifying here
before you and am honored to do so.
Let me just say, I am so moved by the bipartisanship that
your committee has shown, and I think the words of Senator
Robert Kennedy speak well here. ``Let us work together towards
this noble effort against terrorism to dedicate ourselves to
what the Greeks wrote so many years ago, `to tame the savages
of man and make gentle the life of this world.' Let us dedicate
ourselves to that and say a prayer for our country and for our
people,'' and if I may, for this wonderful committee. Thank you
so much for inviting me today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian H. Levin
October 28, 2015
introduction
Good morning Chairman King, Ranking Members Thompson and Higgins,
and Members of the committee. Thank you so very much for the privilege
of speaking before you, and my son Gabriel, today on behalf of the
nonpartisan Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, at California
State University, San Bernardino.
My name is Professor Brian Levin and for over 15 years I have
served as director of our Center at the University, where I teach in
the Department of Criminal Justice, and in our interdisciplinary
National Security Studies Program. I also write front-page analysis on
National security for the Huffington Post, and am 1 of 3 generations of
officers in my family who have had the honor of serving in the NYPD. I
am also a graduate of Stanford Law School, where I was co-recipient of
the Block Civil Liberties Award, and of the University of Pennsylvania.
My testimony today will address 3 basic subjects. First, I will
address the overall homeland terrorist threat, with particular emphasis
on the 2 most prominent ones coming from violent Salafist Jihadists and
far-right-wing extremists. Second, I will discuss issues relating to
these movements in the context of prisons and post-release activities.
Lastly, I will address issues relating to Countering Violent Extremism
(CVE) programs in both the context of efficacy, as well as civil rights
and civil liberties concerns.
the contemporary terror threat to the american homeland
The United States faces multiple severe risk factors and a diverse
set of emerging contemporary actors in the area of mass terrorism with
shots on goal increasingly coming from across both the ideological and
competency spectrum. According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
at the University of Maryland's START Program, total terror attacks in
the United States have increased from 9 in 2011 to 19 in 2014, and from
no fatalities in 2011, to 18 last year. The GTD data indicated that
since 9/11 at least 66 attacks came from right-wing extremists, versus
about 25 from Muslim ones. Other estimates put the number of home-grown
Islamic plots far higher from 63 to 188 according to one of our
Criminal Justice Masters' recipients, Cynthia Quintero.
The next deadly mass attack, assassination, or crippling
infrastructure sabotage may not necessarily come from extremist
movements that have had more terrorist attacks or plots before, or even
more or better-trained adherents. Rather, the next terrorist attack
will simply come from whoever is proximate, operational, and undetected
tomorrow, and we can not mechanistically presume that the totality of
these threats solely revolve around any single movement alone,
including the two most prominent ones: Violent Salafist Jihadists and
far-right-wing extremists. In today's splintered socio-political
landscape, increasingly sophisticated organized groups also share the
stage with angry, unstable, or disenchanted loners; and with smaller
informal groups. These latter actors may sculpt idiosyncratic hatreds
on-line, become operational, and even recruit with little external
backing. My counsel to the House Judiciary Committee almost exactly 20
years ago is even more valid today:
``Leaderless resistance calls for small autonomous bands of terrorists
to further the overall goals of the movement by committing random acts
of terror against public institutions, infrastructure targets, and
innocent citizens. Information on how to commit such violence is widely
available, and an underground market for the tools of destruction
exists.''
Former FBI supervisor, Dr. Carl Jensen III, writing in this month's
American Behavioral Scientist, that I co-edited, forecasts that over
the next 5 years terrorists will make increasing use of technology,
forge new alliances and hybrid structures, and morph between politics,
criminal enterprises, and even gangs.
diverging assessments of the overall terror threat
While there are significant qualitative and quantitative factors
that plausibly skew our Center's current overall mass terror threat
assessment toward violent Salafist Jihadists, available data does not
yet indicate that their potency outside of prisons has sparked
significant internal activity or a wave of recidivism. While there have
been 2 known Salafist Jihadist prison-related plots at differing ends
of the operational landscape over the last decade, and some really
disturbing incidents involving bigoted literature and poorly-vetted
clerics, far-right extremists, often operating as criminal syndicates,
along with other ethnic-based prison gangs have been far more prominent
and violent within correctional settings.
While violent Salafist Jihadists have achieved extensive notoriety
over recent years, they are but a tiny sliver of the estimated 2.7
million law-abiding American Muslims. Recent statements by FBI
officials tentatively suggest violent Salafist Jihadists are possibly
plateauing at the top of an evolving contemporary terrorism threat
matrix, with 900 open investigations and 6 foreign fighter Middle East
forays a month, down from a previous sustained level of 9 monthly
departures. The catalytic civil wars in Syria and Iraq, a well-
organized overseas ISIS presence, and the most sophisticated use of the
internet ever for terrorist recruitment and training, is indeed the
most profound, though hardly the only, threat to our National security.
Moreover, while our Center's threat assessment currently leans
somewhat more towards violent Salafist Jihadist extremists due to ISIS,
al-Qaeda, al-Shaabab and others, it is a close call. For instance, in
the post-9/11 era 48 Americans have been killed in far-right-wing
attacks, compared to 31 fatalities in Salafist Jihadist incidents.
However, when all casualties, included the wounded are factored in, it
is the Salafists who become more prominent. Although the Boston
Marathon bombing killed only 3 civilians, it injured 264 others, with
well over 1 dozen amputees. The subsequent lock-down of Boston and
surrounding areas during the manhunt for the suspects also had
significant economic costs to the region, not to mention the fear from
the assailants being on the loose. Either of these metrics would have
skewed substantially more toward radical Salafist Jihadists. A recent
study by the Anti-Defamation League's Dr. Mark Pitcavage, also in this
month's American Behavioral Scientist, however, shows that lone attacks
by active shooters appear more prevalent among right-wing extremists.
Moreover, a 2014 law enforcement agency survey, by the Police Executive
Research Forum found that 74% regarded anti-Government extremism as
being among the top threats, while only 39% listed extremist Muslim
organizations, but the survey was concluded before ISIS ramped up
external recruitment operations. Today's threat scenario is fluid not
only by the background of would-be actors, but also by the breadth of
attack types, and the potential casualties are wide-ranging too, from
moderate to devastatingly severe.
prison extremist risks vary
CVE programs, particularly those in the correctional and post-
release settings, must be flexible and responsive not only to the
diversity of extremist adherents by ideology, but to the civil rights
and civil liberties issues that these responses necessarily impact.
Context is critical. With respect to prison and post-release issues, we
may very well be in the eye of a small incarceration storm with only
about 200 Internal Security and Terrorism Federal prosecutions last
year, compared to over 1,200 in 2002. The 2014 figures show a one-third
decline in cases from 5 years ago and a 75% decline from the previous
10 years, according to the Syracuse University-based Transactional
Record Access Clearinghouse.
As Mr. Bjelopera points out, many of those convicted during the
height of Federal prosecution efforts over the last decade have been or
will be released soon, while new offenders may be ensnared in the
foreseeable future as Federal authorities ramp up counter-terrorism
investigations related to the recruitment efforts of ISIS and related
entities. These numbers however, represent a mere fraction of the 1.5
million prisoners incarcerated nationally, and of the 211,000
incarcerated in the Federal system, which accounts for 13% of all
prisoners Nationally, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Moreover, researchers urge prudence in our analysis. As Dr. Mark
Hamm noted in a National Institute of Justice Study entitled Prisoner
Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions:
``[E]xtensive literature review revealed that moving from
radicalization to actual recruitment for terrorism is a rare event.
Only a small percentage of converts to white supremacy groups and to
Islam--primarily, fresh converts, the newly pious, with an abundance of
emotion and feeling--turn radical beliefs into terrorist action.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that it is not the sheer
number of prisoners following extremist interpretations of religious
doctrines that poses a threat; rather, it is the potential for small
groups of radicals to form support networks for terrorist goals upon
release.''
the jis case: outlier or bellwether?
Fortunately, to the present time violent activity exhibited by
these extremists in the prison and post-release context has been
significantly less pronounced than in other contexts, with only 1
identifiable independently operational prison-related terror plot in
2005 in Southern California, out of well over 120 post-9/11 cases
involving violent Salafist Jihadists. The Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh,
or JIS, terror plot, however, was the first operational home-grown
Salafist Jihadist plot in the post-
9/11 era.
The JIS cell and plot formed inside a California State Prison from
a small group founded in 1997 by convict Kevin James. Torrance,
California police, aided by a regional law enforcement consortium,
unraveled a local conspiracy to attack military, Jewish, and Israeli
targets that was to be financed through a series of armed robberies.
The plotters included three American-born converts along with a
Pakistani-born man, and with the exception of extremist literature was
completely home-grown. Dr. Hamm observed in his NIJ report that,
``James, however, was the first gang member to radicalize inmates into
joining a prison gang with a terrorist agenda.'' Attempted airplane
shoe bomber Richard Reid converted to Islam while incarcerated in
Britain, while another terror convict Jose Padilla was a violent gang
member with a criminal record before his conversion.
Interestingly, violent Salafist Jihadists, who apparently are
classified as international in orientation by authorities, irrespective
of their birthplace, citizenship, or gang affiliations, do not appear
to have yet developed an imposing prison infrastructure or demonstrated
a pattern of recidivism, though the exact extent of their prison
radicalism is largely unknown and could very well accelerate as their
representation and infrastructure evolves. Muslims, and converts in
particular, appear to be among the fastest-growing segments of the
prison population.
The apparent relative lull in violent Salafist extremism in the
correctional and post-release setting, while possibly temporary, is
probably due to a variety of factors. First, because of a post-9/11
pivot to terrorism interdiction, many Federal prosecutions come at
earlier stages of criminality than was previously the case. Thus, some
of those ensnared are less competent, motivated, and operationally
advanced than was previously the case. Moreover, these defendants,
often convicted on lesser charges, lack the structural and
communicative connections to organized gang or terror groups compared
to other extremists, or even fellow travelers on the outside. The
Center on Law and Security at New York University, School of Law found
that in the decade following 9/11 the five most charged offenses in
terrorism cases were:
1. 18 U.S.C. 371; Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States,
2. 18 U.S.C. 2339A; Providing material support to terrorists,
3. 18 U.S.C 2339B; Providing material support or resources to
designated foreign terrorist organizations,
4. 18 U.S.C. 1001; (False) Statements or entries generally, and
5. 18 U.S.C. 1956; Laundering of monetary instruments
Lastly, with the exception of individuals like Egyptian clerics
``Blind Sheikh'' Omar Abdel-Rahman and hook-handed cleric Abu Hamza al-
Masri nearly all of the convicted Salafist Jihadists were not part of
the hierarchy of the movement or considered theologically
authoritative. The lack of accessible incarcerated charismatic leaders
may have been a factor in stunting the spread of certain types of
radicalism.
far-right-wing extremists
Another prominent terrorist threat comes from adherents to an array
of extreme far-right-wing ideologies. These far-right-wing extremists,
who are properly distinguished from peaceful politically-active
Conservative citizens, are steeped in deep-seated bigotry, an array of
increasingly mainstreamed conspiracy theories, and exhibit a profound
distrust of pluralistic democratic governance. Distressingly, it should
be noted that trust in Government and other institutions including
religion, media, academia, finance, and health care have declined
precipitously in recent decades across the general population as well.
The FBI reportedly lists 7 current domestic extremist categories,
with 4 arguably falling under the extreme right-wing umbrella:
White Supremacists
Anti-government Militias
Abortion Extremists
``Sovereign Citizen'' Nationalists.
Some like white supremacists and neo-Nazis have a significant
prison presence Nationally because they belong to more structured hate
groups or racial criminal syndicates, like Aryan Brotherhood, Nazi Low
Riders and California's Public Enemy Number 1, a racist gang that
exists both inside and outside of prisons. In the racist neo-Nazi and
white supremacist subculture there is significant approbation for
violence, with imprisonment serving as a mark of distinction. These
bigots, like Animal Liberation adherents, Jewish radicals, Black
Separatists and violent Anti-Abortion extremists regard many of their
incarcerated ideologues as political prisoners who took a selfless
stand against a corrupt powerful Government and immoral society. In the
neo-Nazi and white supremacist sub-culture some prisoners are hailed as
folk heroes and political prisoners of the ``Zionist Occupation
Government.''
For example, prisoner and Federal felon David Lane was a co-founder
of the violent domestic terrorist group, The Order, which took its name
from fictional anti-Government terrorists in the racist Turner Diaries
novel. Before his death behind bars in 2007, Lane became a folk hero
and ``political prisoner'' whose written works were widely circulated
throughout the white supremacy world, while his ``14 words'' became a
mantra for violent racists, including the mass killer of African-
American Charleston church members earlier this year. Upon his death
memorials for him were held around the world.
AT Think Progress Online Magazine recently observed:
``White supremacist prison gangs are the only formal subculture in the
American racialist movement that is thriving, and yet, ironically,
their ideology is also the most superficial and least consequential to
their day-to-day operations . . . The Aryan Brotherhood is widely
considered the oldest and most notorious racialist prison gang in the
United States.''
cve responses in the correctional and post-release context
In the correctional context, both pragmatism and civil rights
protections can be coextensive. As President Obama counseled, ``As for
our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety
and our ideals.'' It is one thing to discuss terror threats in general,
but prisons ensnare and release individuals first, rather than
ideologies.
As seen below extremists are individuals with differing influences,
so there is simply no one-size-fits-all solution, nor one that is fool-
proof. Extremists like Holocaust Museum shooter James Von Brunn, served
6 years in prison for an armed plot against Federal Reserve members
before his murderous attack decades later. In France Amedy Coulibaly
was radicalized in prison by ``segregated'' al-Qaeda supporter Djamel
Beghal, before his homicidal rampage this past January, years after his
release. Alleged Army of God member Shelley Shannon firebombed clinics
and shot a physician. She nonetheless, still communicated with
``Reverend'' Paul Hill during her incarceration, before he murdered two
people outside a Pensacola, Florida clinic.
Extremists come in three general types:
Ideologically Motivated
Religious
Political
Hybrid
Psychologically Dangerous
Cognitively Impaired OR
Sociopath
Personal Benefit or Revenge
(Most can be ``mixed and matched,'' but one is dominant.)
Randy Borum defines radicalization as the ``process of developing
extremist ideologies and beliefs.'' As Pete Simi and Bryan Bubolz point
out the transition from nonviolent to violent ideology can include a
variety of catalytic influences including:
internet propaganda,
social networks and personal connections to existing
extremists,
religious and political leaders,
and intergroup conflicts.
Governmental programs promoting deradicalization, that is the
social and psychological desistence from violent extremism, occurs
internationally, where laws, state authority, societal norms, and
religious roles vary significantly. Horgan and Braddock observed that
internationally, these programs involve education, occupational
assistance, mentoring, psychological assistance, and encouraging a
shift to positive social networks. In the United States, where large
numbers of prisoners are dispersed across Federal and State
institutions, deradicalization programs are not as focused or
sophisticated as some of our smaller allies, but are sometimes modeled
from those used in the gang and cult disengagement process.
Cilluffo, Cardash, and Khor detail an intensive, culturally unique,
Saudi program that nonetheless still has a failure rate of 10-20%:
``Since 2004 Saudi Arabia has operated one of the most high-profile
terrorist deradicalization and disengagement programs in the world. The
Saudi approach blends coercion with an appeal to family/clan honor by
integrating detainees' family members into the deradicalization and
disengagement effort, in part by holding a close male relative
responsible for keeping the released prisoner out of trouble following
release. Significant financial resources are likewise invested in the
case of each detainee in order to provide the individual with the tools
necessary (such as a car and a job) to succeed outside of prison and
the realm of violent extremist groups. Regarding the counseling
component, Muslim clerics meet with detainees and prisoners as part of
the Saudi program. To facilitate reintegration back into society and
after-care, both governmental and non-governmental agencies are
involved.''
While domestic programs are still being developed, some key final
points are worth noting. Correctional and post-release programs, by
their very nature restrict liberties. (See e.g. Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517 (1984)). However, in 1987, the United States Supreme Court
held that prison walls ``do not form a barrier separating prison
inmates from the protections of the Constitution.'' (Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 84). The high court further held that prison regulations
impinging on Constitutional rights must be ``reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.'' Still, the Court granted deference
to prison officials by instructing judges to exercise a ``policy of
judicial restraint'' in cases of Constitutional claims by prisoners.
Outside of prison, in many instances, depending on individualized
threat assessments and conditions of release, it may be necessary to
monitor or restrict contacts, travel, weapon possession, drug use,
technology, and employment, among other things. However, whatever
restrictions or aftercare measures are implemented, they must be
applied based on objective individualized criteria and not
discriminatory stereotypes that not only violate civil rights, but
damage offender disengagement from extremists, as well as trust from
the mainstream communities that are essential to our partnerships.
It is key that CVE responses in this context should take into
account the following:
The reestablishment of moderating influences from offender's
family and community may be key, as they provide an alternative
during disengagement form anti-social associations.
Individualized, and culturally-specific programs and
aftercare, which may include emotional counseling, substance
rehabilitation and vocational training should be considered.
Flexible monitoring and counseling by trained professionals
should be individually tailored to promote disengagement and
prevent reinfection.
When indicated and legal, monitoring may include
associations, technology access, financial reporting,
employment, location, and long-distance travel.
CVE programs should be more open to legitimate academic
research as restrictions make objective micro research on
individuals as well as trend analysis difficult.
CVE programs addressing extremism should always be
implemented to consider all religious backgrounds and all parts
of the political spectrum in a manner that does not infringe on
Constitutional rights.
In the words of Senator Robert Kennedy, let us work together toward
this noble effort to: ``[D]edicate ourselves to what the Greeks wrote
so many years ago: to tame the savageness of man and make gentle the
life of this world. Let us dedicate ourselves to that, and say a prayer
for our country and for our people.''
Thank you. I will address any question the committee may have.
appendix
Definition of Terrorism
The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a
group or individuals; to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political
or social objectives. (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Counterterrorism Division, 2007).
FBI National Domestic Threat Assessment
White Supremacist Extremists
Black Separatist Extremists
Anti-Government Militias
Abortion Extremists
Violent Animal Rights
Environmental Extremists
``Sovereign Citizen'' Nationalists
Anarchists
Terrorist Incidents Directed Towards Americans by U.S. Deaths
1. 9/11 Attacks, Incendiary Bombing by Aircraft, NY, DC, PA 2,975
killed, 9/11/2001 Al-Qaeda
2. U.S. Marine Barracks, Truck Bombing, Beirut, Leb., 241 killed
(US) 10/23/1983 Hizbollah precursor
3. Pan Am Fl. 103, Aircraft Bombing, Lockerbie, Scotland, 270
killed (189 US), 12/21/1988 Libyan Agent
4. Murrah Fed. Bldg., Truck Bombing, Oklahoma City, OK, 168 killed
4/19/1995 Anti-gov't extremists
5. Bath, MI School Bombings, Bombing, 44 killed, 5/18/1927
Disgruntled taxpayer
6. Wall Street Bombing, Horse Cart Bomb, NY, 35 killed, 9/16/1920
Socialists/Anarchists Suspected
7. Los Angeles Times Bldg., Bombing, Los Angeles, CA, 21 killed,
10/01/1910, Union militants
Source: Center for the Study of Hate & Extremism.
Extremists by Organizational Structure
Lone Offender
Ted Kaczynski, Unabomber (1978-1995)
James Vonn Brunn, Holocaust Museum Shooter (2009)
Richard Poplawski, Pittsburgh Police Killer (2009)
Kevin Harpham, WA MLK Parade Bomb Plot (2011)
Duo (Leader & Follower)
John Allen Muhammed & Lee Boyd Malvo, DC Sniper (2002)
Timothy McVeigh & Terry Nichols, Oklahoma City Bombings
(1995)
Autonomous Cell
The Order (Neo Nazi, 1980s)
JIS (CA--1st operational Jihadist Cell)
Command Cell/Large Group
9/11
Symbionese Liberation Army
Weather Underground
Traditional Ku Klux Klan
Terrorism by Method
Explosives
Arson
Active Shooting
Targeted Assassination
Multiple Simultaneous Targeting
WMD
Sabotage
Chem/Bio
Radiological Nuclear
Disabling Infrastructure: Cyber, Transport, Communication,
Energy
Potential Targets by Type
Symbolic
Government
Religious
Cultural
Political
Financial Center
Military/Police
Aviation & Transit
Other Infrastructure: Power Grids
Cyber
Special Events/Anniversaries
Assassination
Idiosyncratic
High Density
Events
Entertainment
Schools
Hotels
Mr. King. Thank you very much, Professor Levin.
I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
Let me begin on the point that Professor Levin raised at
the end about the Constitutional guarantees, and obviously,
there is a line we have to be very concerned about. I really
ask all three of the witnesses. Commissioner Parker, you
mentioned about the experiences of Singapore and Saudi Arabia.
I would like to ask the witnesses if they are aware of any
other deradicalization programs in other countries, and to what
extent do you think we can use the methods used in a non-
democratic society such as Saudi Arabia or Singapore here in
the United States without violating civil rights and civil
liberties? I guess we will just go across the board. Mr.
Bjelopera.
Mr. Parker. Sure.
Mr. King. Okay. Mr. Parker.
Mr. Parker. My research at the time of my research, I found
a couple of other programs, but they were all very similar in
nature. All of them basically dealt with a--were framed around
a counseling program where they basically targeted the
ideological perspective of the inmate based on a
misinterpretation of a religious text. All of them were pretty
much the same, a 3- or 4-step process where they had
counselors, people who come in and talk to the inmates with an
attempt to try to change their mindset, basically, before they
were released. So all of the programs that I found were pretty
much the same.
Mr. King. In what way can they be adapted to the United
States, do you believe?
Mr. Parker. Well, I think there is an open door there.
Currently, we have to look at what are we doing now. What are
we doing now in BOP when we house these offenders. I have had
the opportunity to talk to Director Samuels and with some other
people with the BOP. We basically take a containment model, a
total security model where we house these individuals in a
segregation unit, and we may provide them some type of
vocational training at some point, but the point is, we are not
doing anything to try to address the ideological motives that
make them the way they are.
The point is, if we train people to be welders, a
vocational program, a terrorist, a convicted terrorist, and we
turn them out with only that training, then all we have done is
put a welder in society that is still a terrorist.
Mr. King. Professor Levin.
Mr. Levin. Yes, if I may. Cilluffo, Cardash, and Khor
detailed an intensive culturally-unique Saudi program that
nonetheless still had a failure rate of 10 to 20 percent.
``Since 2004, Saudi Arabia has operated one of the most high-
profile terrorist deradicalization and disengagement programs
in the world. The Saudi approach blends coercion with an appeal
to family, clan, honor, by integrating the detainee's family
members into the deradicalization and disengagement effort, in
part, by holding a close male relative responsible for keeping
the released prisoner out of trouble following release.''
Significant financial resources are likewise invested in
the case of each detainee in order to provide the individual
with the tools necessary, such as a car or a job to succeed
outside of prison, and the reality of violent extremist groups.
Regarding the counseling component, Muslim clerics meet with
detainees and prisoners as part of the Saudi program to
facilitate reintegration back into society as well as after-
care, both governmental and non-governmental agencies involved.
But the Saudi model, and I think this is interesting, they
put a lot of money into it, it is very culturally-specific, and
there, where clerics have a direct connection to the
Government, there is a type of, I think, authority and gravitas
that those religious leaders would have that we couldn't have
in a more secularized society such as ours. To be sure, we have
seen some disturbing cases that have been outlined in various
testimonies before this committee before.
I would say, though, if we look at a lot of the surveys
that are out there, including the Pew surveys and others, the
overwhelming majority of American Muslims are quite concerned
about extremism as well. One of the reasons that they so love
this country, and I think this is very important, is because,
that there is not an orthodoxy of acceptable religious
expression here. But I think, basically, common sense prevails.
As President Obama said, we don't have to check our ideals
and our pragmatism with respect to terrorism. The same rules
can apply. We had a shooter and an arsonist of medical clinics
go to prison and was counseling a reverend who then shot an
abortion provider to death. So common sense prevails, but I do
think that one of the things that we have to understand, and I
put this in my testimony, is that there are different types of
extremists that do not rely upon necessarily one aspect.
So in other words, some theological-based extremists might
very well have sociopathic or cognitive impairments. They may
also be seeking personal benefit or revenge. So if we step away
from stereotypes and approach each prisoner and the situation
uniquely, it says something. I think just, if I may, Mr.
Bjelopera made an excellent point, and that is, a lot of times
it is attachment to social networks or some kind of connection
to a leader that is important.
Something that I just want to close with in answering your
question, one of the things that we have not seen in American
prisons yet has been this hierarchy where theological leaders,
Salafists with gravitas are in prison. We get a lot of low-
level people who have been connected to the movement who are
converts or through social networks or the internet. So we
haven't seen yet, in other words, a network top-down, with the
exception of Sheikh Rahman and a couple of other examples,
where they have that gravitas.
But interestingly enough, in France, where they segregated,
for instance, clerics, nonetheless, one of the Paris massacre
killers was in direct communication in prison, gets released,
is monitored, and then 5 or 6 years later commits an act of
brutal terrorism. So what we have to do is be flexible, and in
some instances monitoring may be necessary. But if we are going
to do so, we have to look at the individual characteristics and
understand that fanatics come across the ideological spectrum.
We want to go make sure that we look at people such as
Coulibaly over in France, who did those terrible attacks, but
also James Von Brunn who tried to do an armed attack on the
Federal Reserve, and then decades later, shot up the Holocaust
Museum. Or the head of the White Patriot Party who, in the
1980s, was incarcerated, and then goes, shoots up a Jewish
center decades later.
We have to be careful with all extremists and look at their
individual situations in order to come up with a CVE counter-
extremism rehabilitative or monitoring program. It has got to
be individualized. It has got to be culturally-specific.
Mr. King. I am over my time.
Mr. Bjelopera, do you have anything to add? Then I will go
to Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Bjelopera. Just one slight comment. I defer to my
fellow witnesses and their expertise in this area. But to
paraphrase a scholar, the vast majority of people who hold
radical beliefs don't necessarily become terrorists, and
terrorists may not themselves primarily be driven by radical
beliefs.
In such a challenging environment, it is extremely
difficult to figure out who is going to become a terrorist, who
isn't, when to intervene, and how to intervene, and I can only
begin to fathom the challenges that prison officials and law
enforcement face in this area.
Mr. King. Thank you. Mr. Higgins, as much time as you want.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Mr. Bjelopera, in your testimony,
you described non-traditional form of Islam practiced in United
States prisons termed ``Prison Islam.'' This form of Islam is
not necessarily consistent with jihadist principles. Is there a
trend in U.S. prisons that would suggest that the current form
of Prison Islam is being supplanted by a more extreme form of
jihadist Islam?
Mr. Bjelopera. Thank you. It is very difficult to, given
public information, publicly-available sources, to dip into
that realm and understand trends and broad currents in terms of
faith, in terms of radical beliefs. Again, I would defer to
people who have studied prisons directly or worked in prisons
directly who may have greater expertise in the general trends.
One of the other challenging issues here is that our prison
system isn't unitary. There are all sorts of different levels
of prisons and different structures of authority.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Parker.
Mr. Parker. I would say, you know, again, that is very hard
to determine. One of the recommendations that I made was there
is definitely a need for more social science research in our
facilities. Correctional administrators must be willing to open
the doors to allow researchers in. Academic facilities must be
willing to go through the--work with individuals through the
IRB process to get research approved for prisoners. There is a
big data set there that we are missing as far as research
inside of our correctional facilities.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. You know, interesting enough, in the past, when
prisoners converted to Islam it actually had a positive impact
with regard to rehabilitation in many, many instances. Giving
up many vices and violence and becoming more introspective, is
a part of the Islamic faith. Indeed, introspection during the
month of Ramadan, for instance, proclamation of faith, prayer 5
times a day, and adhering to, for instance, dietary rituals
puts a structure, and in many ways, in the past, in many
instances, had had a positive effect.
Here is the problem. We currently now, according to
publicly-available sources, have 900 open investigations
relating to ISIS and related extremists. We have seen that
there have been approximately 125 prosecutions, and the average
defendant that we have seen has been about age 31. The top 5
charges have been providing material support to terrorism or
terrorist groups, both foreign and domestic, money laundering,
et cetera. So we have two things that are happening in this eye
of the storm.
Last year, we haven't had a lot of prosecutions relative to
what we had 10 years ago. So we had like 200 or something like
that. Yet we have 900 open investigations. We had 1,200 cases
in 2002, so we are in the eye of the storm now. One of the
things I have to say is, in August 2001, there was a New York
Times op ed, which spoke quite authoritatively using
retrospective data on how Salafist jihadist terrorism wasn't a
problem, and then weeks later we have the 9/11 attacks.
We are in such a fluid situation both with the overall
terror threat matrix and with respect to ISIS and other groups.
In this month's American Behavioral Scientist, which I co-
edited, I did an article about one small group of 22 people
that had an internet presence that in 2009 to 2010 was linked
to the 30 to 40 percent of terrorist plots in the United
States.
Now we have a sophisticated quasi-state recruiting effort
using the internet, with 900 investigations in 50 States. What
is going to happen when these people come into prison in
greater numbers and there may be people with more clerical
authority? So we just don't know. By the same token, we have
Christian identity adherents who are very upset with the kinds
of changes that are going on in society now.
The Klan hit its biggest zenith at a time of similar change
almost 100 years ago. So we have basically a chaotic, very
fluid structure--I am sorry, situation with regard to extremism
that is coming from different places. I am worried that the
salutory effects that exist now are temporary, and that in the
future, as more people come in who have been radicalized
through the most sophisticated effort we have ever seen in
history involving technology, that this may very well change
within a very short time.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much. I would ask that the
Chair recognize Congressman Langevin to participate in this
hearing.
Mr. King. Without objection, so ordered. It is a pleasure.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. King. I now recognize the Chairman of the
Transportation Security Subcommittee, Mr. Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on
something a little different here, and that is, the access to
information that prisoners have that might lead to
radicalization. I know you have the word of fellow inmates, but
I just concluded a study from the Foreign Fighters Task Force
with ISIS, and it is painfully clear that ISIS is radicalizing
people over the internet at an alarming rate. The question I
have for each of you is, on the Federal prison level as well as
the State prison level, what type of media access do they have?
I know it is some of it is monitored, some of it is not
from my days as a Federal prosecutor for 20 years, and I got a
lot of good information on that over the years to bring cases.
But I am concerned about their access to the internet, I am
concerned about their access to various sources of media which
seem to be never-ending these days.
So if you could each comment on that for me, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Bjelopera. I can comment only in general terms. I would
imagine that they have much less or less access than they would
on the outside. One of the factors that I would also throw in
there is that many of these suspects related to ISIS who are
being put into the system, arguably have short-term experience
in terms of radicalization on the outside, and so it will be
interesting to see what happens on the inside of prison cells
to these people who haven't spent maybe years or decades, maybe
just months or weeks thinking about radical violent jihadist
things.
Mr. Katko. Again, my thing is once they get in there, what
do they have access to? That is the more important question.
Mr. Parker. Thank you. One of the primary points that I
would like to make is, just because someone is in a
correctional environment, don't assume they don't have access
to the information.
Mr. Katko. That is my point.
Mr. Parker. You know, in today's correctional environment,
not only in Tennessee but across this Nation, we fight every
day to keep illegal cell phones out of our facilities. We have
been in touch--a lot of other correctional agencies have been
in communications with FCC to try to come up with a solution
that would disable these phones inside that correctional
environment.
We are not allowed to jam the cell phone signal inside the
correctional facility. So the only other options at this point
is very expensive other technology that often becomes outdated
within a year.
We try to monitor the literature that comes in through our
mail rooms. Most prisons do. They have a monitoring process.
One of the things that is critical there, though, is that we
have staff that is trained to recognize that message, that
violent extremist message, the message that we will not allow
in our facilities. You have to have people at that ground
level, correctional-officer-level, properly trained to
recognize that and to catch that coming through the filters
that we have for inmates receiving information.
They have access to their family, they have access to the
television, they watch the news. So an inmate with an illegal
cell phone in prison has a lot of access to the media and also
what is going on in the world.
Mr. Katko. Now, what about their access to the internet or
anything? Do they have any access to computers?
Mr. Parker. Well, they have access to computers, but a
computer that they would have access to in the facility is
basically locked down. They can't get to a lot of internet
sites. It is very limited. But a person with an illegal smart
phone inside the facility has access to the internet.
Mr. Katko. Okay. Then, of course, they have access to books
and magazines, and they also have access to telephones to talk
to individuals.
Mr. Parker. Absolutely. That is a constant struggle. That
is one of the things that a corrections department has to have
their security threat group coordinators that work in
conjunction with the mailroom staff to vet that material coming
in to identify that message before it gets to the inmate.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Yes. One of the things, you know, very
interesting, again, what I would like to get permission to do,
because of these questions, is to introduce into the record
some of the articles that we have in this month's American
Behavioral Scientist, which in some way is responsive to these
questions. One of my colleagues--two of my colleagues,
actually, Pete Simi and Bryan Bubolz, wrote about how folks get
radicalized, and they listed 4 things, and at the top was
internet propaganda. Of course, there is social networks,
religious and political leaders, and then there is intergroup
conflicts, which can be catalytic, anything from Waco, for
instance, to the civil war in the Middle East.
I can't tell you how important----
Mr. King. Without objection, that article will be
introduced into the record.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The document has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I can't tell
you how important this recruitment has been, again, across the
ideological spectrum. So you can get the Turner Diaries, which
has been linked to such things as the Oklahoma City bombing.
Look at page 39 of that book. It describes a truck bomb attack
on a Federal facility at 9:00 in the morning, and that book was
sold by Timothy McVeigh below cost to get the word out.
David Lane was in prison. David Lane was a part of a group
called The Order that was inspired by this book, the Turner
Diaries. The 14 words about preserving the white race that the
Charleston shooter used, he would send materials out through
his wife while he was in prison. So now we have not only that,
the Turner Diaries is on the internet. We also have Dabiq
Magazine, on-line ISIS magazine, we have Inspire magazine by
AQAP. Right after the Boston Marathon bombings, I was on
National television, I said, you know, this is really
interesting. There is this magazine that just came out, and you
know what was in it, a recipe to make a pressure cooker bomb.
Indeed, what came out at the trial was the Tsarnaev brothers
had that magazine.
So internet access is extremely important to the
recruitment. But what I am saying to you is, it is important
across the ideological spectrum, and what we must not do is
say, well, we are just going to go after one type of extremist
because what I can tell you in this business, like politics and
baseball, what you might think in June, come October will be a
different story.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
Mr. King. I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
just say how really good our witnesses are. I mean, they are--
you know, that is a credit to you.
Mr. King. Once again, we agree.
Mr. Thompson. Well, yeah, yeah, yeah, and you see we are a
good committee.
Mr. Parker, as somebody who is in this business every day,
I find it, that the thought in corrections, obviously, a few
years ago it was lock them up, throw away the key, don't
provide anything to them, and when their time is up, push them
out the door. I think the recidivism rates and other things
that came behind that, people have now started saying we got to
do some other things to try to tamp down the likelihood of
people coming back once they get out.
So is it your experience that if we start looking at this
terrorist threat that potentially can evolve inside the
prisons, we need to look at it as a whole rather than as a
silo? In other words, let's look at all the bad guys and
develop a strategy around that?
Mr. Parker. Absolutely, sir. A couple of points I would
like to make. In the correctionals field, when we talk about
violent extremists, when we talk about the culture and the
environment that we work in every day, that prisoners live in
every day, I think we have to focus on two things. One is the
environment. Now, there is a lot of room left for research in
regards to the environment. What is it about prisons, what is
about about that environment? Again, all prisons are not the
same. What is it about that environment that promotes
radicalization? What can we do, as correctional practitioners,
as lawmakers, to try to change and modify that to mitigate the
threat of radicalization? That is part of my research that we
considered. What can we do on that side?
The other piece is the environment of the rehabilitative
initiatives that we have to put in place. I think you are
exactly right. If we lock people up under the control and
containment model and just deal with the security aspect of
putting them away, putting them in an environment to where they
have no access to anyone else or any programs, then we keep
them there until the day comes when they knock and it is time
to let them go home.
So then we asked ourselves the question, what have we done
to prepare these individuals to return to society? I think that
is exactly right. It doesn't matter if it is an Islamic radical
or if it is a white supremacist. We have to take the same
approach across the board. But it is a very important question
to ask, what are we doing in the corrections field to prepare
these individuals to return to our communities? Because I think
a lot of times we forget, over 90 percent of them will be
returning. That is critical.
A colleague of mine, a Michael Brown that studied at NPS,
addressed this in 2011 when he wrote a thesis on the ripples
that created when we released these terrorists from prison, how
do we know where they are, how do we track them? Do we need to
track a terrorist that is released from BOP back into the
community?
We require other inmates in some categories to be
registered. That is a question I think that needs to be put on
the table and discussed. Do we have a public interest in
knowing where a convicted terrorist lives at, and where they
move to? How does the sheriff or the official police chief or
the DA in a county know who is in their county?
I think those are all relevant questions, but I think more
relevant is that what we do inside that facility to prepare a
person to return. If it is an ideology that promotes extremism
and radicalization, then I think we need to look at possible
solutions that meet due process and civil rights standards,
that we can challenge them and talk to them, have discourse
about what they believe, and try to use every tool we have to
change their mindset or at least to get them to disengage
before we turn them back out into the community.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Levin, are you aware of any
recommendations or research as to what we can look at once a
person leaves a penal institution and get back into society
that meets the civil rights, civil liberties test?
Mr. Levin. Yes. One of the things that I do want to point
out is that we don't imprison ideologies. We imprison flawed
people. So it has got to be individualized and culturally-
specific. I think a lot of times, in this media-driven world
that we are in, you know, sometimes we are seeing all Muslims
all the same and then there is something else and it is all
extremist Nazis all the time. What I am saying is, our center
sees everyone all the time.
You know, I am worried about the animal liberation
extremist. You know, one of the things that we also have to
take into account is, we are presuming that when an extremist
is in prison, for instance, that they will only--if they are
white supremacist, they will only look at white supremacist
material.
There is animal liberation material. There is radical
material across the board which might help them become
operational even if it is not something they share
ideologically.
So I think a couple things: First, we have to look at an
individualized and particularized threat matrix that is
prisoner or released-person specific. What I worry about is
that when we have a CVE program we are going to be looking at
the shot-on-goal coming from here and it very well may come
from here next time. I think there are content and viewpoint
neutral aspects that must be incorporated.
So there might be an animal liberation person that gets
released from prison, and we will have to make sure that their
associational activities might be restricted, their travel
might be restricted if appropriate, their access to the
internet may be restricted; not necessarily because of their
ideology, but because they happen to be a person prone to
violence and certain associations.
We know that when you take a focus on ideology only off the
table, we see that there are various characteristics that many
of these people share. I have interviewed convicted terrorists
in the Middle East, I have interviewed Aryan folks, I have
interviewed Jewish extremists, Animal Liberation, and they
share certain characteristics. When they get to a certain
point, they are a threat irrespective of what ideology they are
looking at.
Certainly, ideology does play a role. Interestingly
enough--and I will close with this--many of the people,
particularly converts, for instance, whether it is people who
came into the Christian identity world, which is a racist
religion of white supremacy--it is not a Christian religion--
where people who go into violent radical Salafist jihadism,
many of them had unique personal issues that prompted them to
anti-social behavior.
We have to look at that as well in the context of the
ideology. If you look at ideology alone, without the
individualized drivers that took people into this, then we are
missing it. Jose Padilla--and it is pronounced Padilla, by the
way--Jose Padilla was a gang member in south Florida.
Bledsoe experimented with different religions. He was the
Little Rock recruitment shooter, bounced from religion to
religion. He had antisocial issues before. So if we are just
saying, well, we are going to have a CVE program that focuses
only on one ideology, then we may very well be looking there
when the shot-on-goal is coming from here. I believe that we
can do so in a Constitutional manner.
Indeed, if we only look at one community, I think there are
not only pragmatic issues but Constitutional issues as well.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. King. First, just for the record, Bledsoe's father
testified before this committee twice, back in 2011.
Mr. Levin. Yes.
Mr. King. Was a very compelling witness.
I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Barletta.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My constituent senior correctional officer Eric Williams of
Nanticoke, Pennsylvania, proudly worked in a United States
prison. He was brutally murdered by convicted gang assassin
Jessie Con-Ui on February 13, 2013. I applaud the decision by
the prosecutors to seek the death penalty for this terrible
crime. I want to thank his coworkers, some of them who are in
town today, for the job they do every day to make our Nation a
safer place.
One simple bill that would help the 39,000-plus employees
working in our Federal prison system is the Eric Williams
Correctional Officer Safety Act, introduced by David McKinley,
Tom Marino, and Matt Cartwright. I am a cosponsor of the bill,
and Pat Toomey has introduced it on the Senate side. It is a
simple, bipartisan bill that will require the Bureau of Prisons
to issue pepper spray to correctional officers and employees in
high- and medium-security prisons.
Assistant Commissioner Parker, can you describe the
conditions under which pepper spray would be helpful to prison
workers, and why would pepper spray be preferable over some
other form of nonlethal weapons?
Mr. Parker. Yes, I would be happy to. Chemical agents are
one of the items that we use for officer protection. When you
look at the level of use of force, it is usually the second
level, third level up. Once you establish physical force, the
chemical agents are available. The only caveat there is to make
sure that individuals are trained in the use of chemical
agents, the proper use of chemical agents.
We issue chemical agents to our officers in Tennessee,
especially those working in maximum custody units and high-
security restricted housing areas. Yes, it is a very productive
tool. You have inmates in physical altercations or even an
inmate that may attack an officer. Chemical agents is one of
the first resources that would be available to use that.
It basically hampers the offender's ability to see. It
disorientates them. So it makes it a lot easier to handle the
inmate. Very productive tool.
Mr. Levin. If I may, as someone who has actually been
sprayed with pepper spray, one thing when I was in the NYPD, we
had someone who--I was not personally involved in this--who was
on drugs and extremely strong and in a close situation. Pepper
spray was ineffective. So I am not opposed to your bill, but
what I can say is sometimes a risk in a closed environment is
that depending on how it is dispersed, it could affect
correctional officers and other prisoners.
Additionally, some of these prisoners are pretty brutal
people. If they were to grab the pepper spray, it could have a
deleterious effect on correctional officers. But I will leave
that to the folks with the training and the design. But having
the opportunity to be armed with pepper spray, it is a tool but
it isn't fool-proof.
Mr. Barletta. Yeah. In this case Con-Ui kicked Williams
down a flight of stairs before brutally beating him and
slashing him to death with two shanks. This may have been a
case had he been able to have something to defend himself, he
would be alive today.
One final question: As a former mayor before I came here,
so how will a local police chief, sheriff, or mayor know if a
terror inmate will be released into their community, and are
you aware of a process for sharing this information?
Mr. Parker. We often notify police chiefs, district
attorneys, judges when we release individuals back into their
communities. I would also say that I am not aware of a process
in regards to a terrorist being released. I would have to defer
to BOP to what their policy is on that. But an important point
that I would point out is, knowing that that individual is back
in your community is good, but I think we have an interest in
knowing where that individual is at.
I mean, again, we don't require them to register. As far as
I know, we don't require them to register. I made this point
earlier. There are some inmates that are released that we
require to register, a database. We know when that individual
moves to another town or moves to another area. Again, I think
that needs to be looked at and needs to be considered, because
it is important that we be able to track these individuals when
they are released.
Mr. Levin. If I could just interject one quick point. Here
is another issue, and you are a former prosecutor. One of the
things that we have seen with regard to the prosecutions from,
let's say, 2002 for the next several years--and that is why I
brought up in the written testimony the different charges. The
Justice Department right after 9/11, properly so, said, you
know, we are not going to wait until plots come to fruition. We
are going to interdict. That is the new strategy.
What that has done is that has cast a wide net that has
ensnared operational folks like the JIS people in southern
California, who interestingly enough, were found because of
just good local police work by the Torrance Police Department,
and then they got the JTTFs involved, you know, the fusion
centers.
We have to make sure that we share information, but not
every person that gets released is going to be of the same
threat level because that net ensnared people who in some
instances were just violently-talking imbeciles as opposed to
operational folks who had a depth of motivation. That is
something that is really important as someone who studies both
hate and extremism.
We have a matrix that involves how operational is someone,
how connected and networked are they, and how shallow or deep
are their hatreds? For instance, an article in Think Progress
this summer talked about white Aryan prison gangs. They are
among the most violent; and indeed, for instance, Aryan
Brotherhood of Texas would kill their own members with lye and
torture them with fire and things like that because they were
criminal syndicates.
But some of these groups will oftentimes partner up with
other folks who are outside of their in-group because it is
effective for drug dealing, for instance. So we have to look at
both the violence, the type of violence, the depth. Because
what we don't want to do is inundate law enforcement with
information that may or may not be specific to an actual
terrorist threat.
One other point with regard to information sharing that all
my colleagues really have begged me to say, and that is, not
only do we want to continue the information sharing, which has
been relatively good in the post-9/11 period with the fusion
centers and even between Federal law enforcement, but there are
a lot of us who are former police officers, former FBI agents,
who are in academia now who would love to get the opportunity
to be able to do some kind of trend analysis but we don't have
access to prisons and prisoners.
That might be something that we should look at, opening up
for the appropriate people, local law enforcement as well as
academia, to get information. Information is the life blood of
what we are doing and in such a fluid situation. What I am
telling you is my testimony might very well, along with my
colleagues and friends here, be somewhat more irrelevant 8
months from now than it is today because of fluidity of the
situation.
When we do share information, what I think is important is
that we have some kind of trained person vetting saying, okay,
this person who has no criminal record and merely was ensnared
with shallow hatreds and low operational efficiency is not the
same as the JIS folks, and that is something that I think is
important. But yes, you are completely correct.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
Mr. King. Does the Ranking Member have any questions?
Mr. Higgins. No.
Mr. King. Recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would welcome our witnesses here today. Thank you for
your testimony. It has been very informative.
To the panel, we know that violent extremism is a global
phenomenon, and we have seen incidents of radicalizations in
prisons around the world. Can you describe similarities and
differences between the prison environments in the United
States and elsewhere, particularly Europe, and what elements
might make the U.S. corrections system more or less likely to
allow prisoners to radicalize?
Mr. Parker. I am not that familiar with the other
correction environments in other countries. In America we
have--a lot of facilities have set standards. The American
Correctional Association sets best practices standards that a
lot of facilities follow. So I feel like the conditions of
confinement in America is pretty good. I believe they have
access to the things they need.
In regards to their living conditions, I think it is very
acceptable. I think there is things that make up that
correctional environment though that I have identified that
could contribute to radicalization, and I have listed those.
You know, I think we have to have a dual strategy where you
have to have a security component and rehabilitative
initiatives inside the facility.
We have to do rigorous vetting and monitoring of prison
chaplains and volunteers. I don't think just a criminal
background check is sufficient. I think we have to understand
and know the message of people who come in, in the volunteer
status to hold these services.
We need to encourage positive inmate family social
interaction and communication. I think that is a positive.
Policies should encourage social science research. I think the
gentleman here has testified to that. We are missing a point
there where there is more work to be done and research inside
of our facilities to detect those issues that might promote
radicalization.
Then provide staff training and developing intel networks
with criminal justice partners. I think we have done a good job
with that. The correctional intelligence initiative works well.
It is a good framework. But it is very important to know that
you have to train those people at that ground level, those
correctional officers, those counselors, those people that deal
with inmates every day, to first of all, recognize and
understand what kind of threatening message we need to
identify, what we need to look for, and how to pass that
information on, where it can be properly vetted with the FBI
and the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Bjelopera. Just a quick comment. One of the big
successes in the post-9/11 era in terms of fighting terrorists
in the United States was the expansion of Joint Terrorism Task
Forces. Based on public information, it seems apparent that BOP
and FBI work extensively on Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
sharing information about what is going on inside and out of
facilities.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Levin. Can I tell you a joke I can't use anymore? It
used to be--and an FBI agent told me this. It used to be, what
did the FBI agent say at the scene of a terrorism attempt? I
would like to thank my local colleagues. We got it all under
control as he screwed the light bulb into the faucet. I can say
that because an FBI agent told me that.
Now the level of cooperation is actually quite good. We
have terrorism early warning groups, JTTFs, fusion centers.
Again, the JIS case was an example of something that should
happen in this context. The Torrance police uncovered some gas
station armed robberies. These folks were operational. They
were going to attack military institutions, National Guard,
Jewish institutions, and Israeli targets, and they came across
material and then got the whole regional consortium together.
Put that back to the assassination of Meir Kahane when
there was a lot of extremist material that was uncovered, but
sat in boxes without being analyzed. So today things are
definitely a lot better, and I would say that anything that
this committee could do to encourage cooperation between law
enforcement.
But let me just say also, NGOs, we have folks in monitoring
entities that are not Government-related and academia who I
think would be a resource. Like, for instance, when we had a
graduate student that was trying to study to make a typology of
what was going on with post-9/11 extremists, it was very
difficult to get information.
Again, I want to make sure that I mention two things:
First, our response has to be individually specific because we
don't have automatons that come out of like a white supremacist
extremism factory or a Salafist jihadist extremism factory or
an Animal Liberation factory. We have folks who, through a
variety of networks, exposure to propaganda, and indeed
personal dysfunctions, go into extremism for different reasons
and in different depths.
One of the things that we know about hatred and extremism,
it is based on three things: No. 1, emotion. What is
emotionally appealing about extremism to these folks? No. 2,
they adhere to a belief system; and then No. 3, some kind of
effective component, affective component, rather, where there
is behavioral change. They can be different.
What we want to make sure is that we get everybody involved
in the matter. As Chairman King knows, even though we are both
Mets fans, Bucky Dent got a hit in 1978. Nobody was looking at
Bucky Dent and the Yankees got into the World Series. So we
really have to be open with respect beyond ideology.
Because some of the people that we are seeing--and this is
something--some of the people that we are seeing go from a
buffet of ideologies, and they become operational with their
own idiosyncratic drivers. So it is not like everyone is in a
tight box. So I think for that reason we have to involve the
Joint Terrorism Task Forces with outside monitoring
organizations and academia who could give them further insight.
Because what we are seeing now is a very diffuse spectrum
of actors that don't fit in boxes. We might have someone
tomorrow who commits an attack with multiple hatreds who does
not fit one particular profile and may have had individuals
strain exposures that catapulted him or her to action. Most of
them are male, though, however.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have other questions I will submit for the
record, but thank you. I yield back.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Before I recognize Mr. Keating, I would like to point out
for the record, I was not expecting a home run off Jeurys
Familia in the ninth inning last night either. That was as big
a surprise as Bucky Dent.
But in any event, as a Massachusetts man, let me introduce
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. I am disappointed in this Bucky Dent
conversation, and, you know, if it wasn't for the Fenway wall,
maybe it wouldn't have gone over there. But that is another
sore subject of discussion.
Mr. King. Before you got here, they were commenting on how
bipartisan we are and how we get along and now you are trying
to interject a Red Sox/New York feud into this. It is really
inappropriate for this committee.
Mr. Keating. Well, for a team that finished as low as ours
did, this is rubbing real salt in the wound. But that is
another topic of terrorism that we will talk about later.
I just want to thank you for being here. But one of the
things I am grappling with and looking at this issue is--and it
is hard for a lot of prison programs to measure the
effectiveness. But what kind of metrics could be used? Mr.
Levin was just talking about how individualized this is, and it
is not a great history right now.
So I guess, I will ask just one question and include two
threads: One is, what did we learn that wasn't working when we
were looking at some of the other programs that are functioning
abroad; and No. 2, what kind of metrics would you be looking at
so we can measure the need and the effectiveness of anything we
do here? Because that is important as well.
Mr. Parker. In the research on the two programs that I
looked at, and of course it was open-source and very hard to
get information, and, again, you have to consider that
information is open source and it is what they reported. So I
understand the issues surrounding that.
But, you know, they talked to--Saudi Arabia and Singapore
both said that it was very important to have individuals who
participated in the program as counselors who were recognized
as legitimate. The detainees had to recognize these individuals
as legitimate and could speak on the issue of the
misinterpretation of the Quran in this case. That was basically
the primary issue that they focused on as a must have for the
program, along with the social support, the families, the
community model they used after the inmate was released.
As far as our metrics, you know, I am not sure how we would
measure that. Again, we have to look at what are we doing now,
and I think that is an important question. What are we doing
now, and where do we want to go in the future? How do we take
that first step to begin looking at a process to prepare these
people to return?
I think also important is the risk assessment. Coming up
with a validated risk assessment that we can use to target
these individuals--or maybe not target them, but to look at
them and to have some type of idea of what kind of programs
they need, what kind of--is supervision possible once they are
released from that correctional environment back into our
communities?
Mr. Keating. What do we have in place now for like some of
the domestic terrorist groups? Do we have programs in place now
for skinheads, some of the other white supremacist-type groups?
Is there applicability back and forth?
Mr. Parker. No, as far as challenging their mindset, the
thought process, no, we track them. We basically track them in
the correctional environment. There is anger management
programs that they can be involved in, things like that. But
no, there is no specific programs that target the ideology that
they use.
Mr. Keating. Okay. Well, thank you, and it is important to
look back at the past, even if it is painful with Bucky Dent.
I will yield back to the Chairman, reminding him that there
was a football game with the Jets recently and New England
Patriots. It is good to be cautious of the present as well as
the past. Thank you for taking the time here.
Mr. Levin. If I may, I will take you to a game in Fenway. I
have always wanted to take my son to a game at Fenway. So you
have a deal.
Just very briefly, Horgan and Braddock, who are two
experts, observed that internationally these programs outside
of the United States involved education, occupational
assistance, mentoring, psychological assistance, and
encouraging a shift to positive social networks away from
extremists, for instance.
In the United States, though, where large numbers of
prisoners are dispersed across Federal and State institutions,
deradicalization programs are not as focused or sophisticated
as some of our smaller allies. But when they are modeled, they
often are modeled, for instance, as my colleague Pete Simi
pointed out, and Mr. Bubolz, they are often modeled off of ones
that have been used in the gang and cult disengagement process,
which may very well be effective.
But, again, we are at the nascent stage of this, and we
don't have a lot of great data. Fifteen years ago there was
something called Operation Grow Hair out of the central
district of California's U.S. Attorney Office, with regard to
skinheads. We just don't know how effective these programs are.
Did these people not reoffend because of the program, or did
they not reoffend because of other factors?
Mr. Keating. Yeah, I think we have to get a handle on the
metrics. We can clearly look at other examples to see how
effective that is.
So again, I thank you. This has been very painful. You have
gone from Bucky Dent to something called Operation Grow Hair.
Mr. Levin. I will never be invited back.
Mr. Keating. So, I am going to lick my wounds, and I yield
back.
Mr. King. Thank you, Bill. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
I have two questions I would like to ask, one to Mr.
Bjelopera: In the 2011 administration CVE strategy, they
included a section on prison radicalization, which included
goals for improved awareness of the risk of extremism in
prisons, enhanced screening to identify inmates with extremist
views, improve detection of recruitment efforts, and increased
information sharing.
The committee has done a lot of oversight over this 2011
strategy, and I don't believe we found very much progress. But,
are you aware of any progress toward these four goals in the
U.S. prison system, and do you have any recommendations for the
best approaches to address these areas?
Mr. Bjelopera. I am not aware of any progress. It doesn't
mean necessarily that there hasn't been. I am just not aware of
any progress from the public record. I would imagine that one
of the things that the administration may consider is looking
at more intervention in terms of prison radicalization and CVE
in prisons, but I am not even sure if that is going on.
Mr. King. Okay. I would like to ask Professor Levin, I
agree with everything you are saying about the skinheads,
Nazis, Aryan Nation, and they are as malevolent and evil as
anyone else, that is a concern I have.
But the question I have is, those who are evil that existed
prior to September 11. After September 11, whether it is the
Department of Homeland Security or the Committee on Homeland
Security, or even the NYPD which you are familiar with. You
know that for years the NYPD was monitoring these extremist
organizations, including certainly skinheads, I am aware of,
and others; and yet after 9/11 they set up a special
counterterrorism unit to deal with this unique form of Islamist
terrorism.
In the prison system, is there one system to address
extremists or in view of the international dimension of the
threat that comes from Islamic terrorism? Again they killed
more people maybe than anyone who has come out of prison, but
the potential of a mass disaster because of the international
dimension of the Islamist threat, does that warrant, in effect,
two different systems of monitoring radicalization in the
prisons?
Mr. Levin. They didn't come out of the prison system
though. He did not----
Mr. King. No, no, I am just saying as far as the potential
evil. I am not saying he came out of the prison.
Mr. Levin. Oh, sure. Sure.
Mr. King. I am just saying that obviously there are cases
where domestic radicals, domestic extremists can cause large
casualties, no doubt about it. So I am not talking about really
the extent of the evil. I am talking about the nature of the
dimension and the international dimension that comes with
Islamist jihadists.
Mr. Levin. Sure. But, you know, there is an international
dimension, for instance, to anti-Muslim violence. When I go to
bed at night, I worry about an extremist shooting up a mosque
in addition to worrying about a Salafist jihadist and in
addition to worrying about all these other folks.
Look, narcoterrorism has an international----
Mr. King. But again, we go like to the NYPD, you are
familiar with 2,000 people working on Islamist jihad in
addition to what they are doing as far as the other radical
groups.
Mr. Levin. Right. But I would say, though, is that with
regard to the risk of violence, for instance, narcoterrorism
has an international component. We are now seeing for instance
in Israel the Israeli Government classifying Jewish extremists
as terrorists and using their rules like that. We haven't seen
that yet come here. What I am saying is, I am concerned about
the shots-on-goal that come from close to the goal, back at the
end of the ice.
So, if there is an international component, by all means,
we don't have to put blinders onto it. But the Animal
Liberation world has an international component to it, for
instance. You know, the violence actually in Europe with regard
to the Animal Liberation people has been worse.
So yes, if there is an international component, we
shouldn't put blinders on. What I am worried about is something
where it is all Muslims all the time and we craft something
that will be perceived in the Muslim community as being
discriminatory and then lose some of our best allies in this.
Some of the most wonderful people that I have worked in the
counter extremism world, have been from the Muslim American or
Arab American community, who are as concerned about this as
others. So, yes, in the abstract, let's, you know, let's look
where the bad guys my come from. Where I am worried about, if
it is something that operationally either is overinclusive with
respect to politically-protected speech, I am concerned.
You know, look, we had a speaker come to our university who
was friendly with two presidents of religious organizations at
schools that were involved in plots over in Britain. I have
chronicled an award-winning piece that I did for the
intelligence report about a home-grown American Muslim
extremist who go on college campuses and say all kind of
things.
However, the United States Supreme Court has said that
abstract advocacy of violence is something that is
Constitutionally protected, and it is separate from
particularized incitement. Where the problem arises is when we
have, I think, good people--I work with people in law
enforcement. I love law enforcement. I am blessed to be the
least successful law enforcement member of my family.
But we have to be careful to not cast a wide net that would
take folks who are merely political dissenters as opposed to
people who are actually fomenting immediate calls to violence.
In particular, if we concentrate merely on just one community.
Because in Orange County, California, we had a recent case with
an ISIS supporter who wrote a letter and said, ``je suie,'' not
``je suis,'' ``je suie Al Qaeda.'' You know who turned him in?
His mother. So we want to make sure that we don't alienate the
very communities that we need to fight this effort.
Mr. King. I guess the difference is one of degree, because
we do have organized crime bureaus, we have narcotics bureaus,
which are different dimensions of attacks, different types of
attacks. I just believe that Islamist jihadism is a separate
form of threat to the United States and it doesn't mean we
should cut back on organized crime monitoring or going after
narcoterrorists.
But there is to me a unique dimension to the Islamist
threat today, which is why the whole Department of Homeland
Security was created, why the NYPD has set up a 2,000-person
counterterrorism unit in New York because of the nature of it.
They are still looking at organized crime. They are still
looking for skinheads. They are looking at the drug dealers,
and they have separate units for all of those.
But they also have a separate one for counterterrorism
which is focused right now on the Muslim community in New York
because that is where the threat comes. As they focused on the
Italian community during the glory days of the Mafia and the
Irish community during the days of the Westies and the west
side of Manhattan.
So I guess what I am saying, no one is saying go after
Muslims, but I just think there is a unique dimension to that
threat which has to be admitted and acknowledged without saying
all Muslims are evil. When I had my hearings on Islamic
radicalization, the key witnesses we had supporting my position
were Muslims.
So it is not that we are trying to demonize Muslims anyway,
but that is where the threat is coming from, just as the threat
from the Mafia came from the Italian American community and the
threat from the Westies came from the Irish American
communities. That is really the point I am making on that.
Mr. Levin. Our center by the way, as I put in our
testimony, our center regards the Salafist jihadist threat as
the most profound threat facing our country today. But what I
am concerned about is that not everyone is as well-versed in
this area as you are, and there are people who will exploit
this sliver. We have 2.7 million or more Muslim Americans in
the United States who exploit the sliver for some kind of other
agenda.
We have in the United States, unfortunately, in the words
of Fareed Zakaria, an Islamophobe industry. We see this on
different things in the white supremacy world. Any time a Jew
does something bad, it is a headline on Stormfront. Or anytime
an African American, you know, spits on the sidewalk, it is a
big thing on the neo-Nazi sites. All I am saying is we don't
operate in a vacuum, and we have to let law enforcement
investigate where the problems are.
When I was in the NYPD, we had an officer shot to death by
a mobster, and we went crazy on the mob at that point. The
Salafist jihadist threat represents the most profound terrorist
threat to the United States right now. I acknowledge that. What
I am concerned about is that there are not people who are as
even-tempered as you----
Mr. King. Wow, put that in the record.
Mr. Levin. No, but, you know, you read this stuff every
day. You know, let me just say, God bless this whole committee.
God bless this whole committee and the bipartisanship that you
have shown because my son's safety depends on you.
Unfortunately, there are people who exploit things. CNN did
a whole thing where there were people who were not qualified
who were Islamophobes who were giving trainings to law
enforcement. You know, we have to make sure that the care that
you have taken in getting people to come before your committee
is exhibited by people in law enforcement.
What sometimes happens is that we get--look, we get into a
point where conservatives might feel that they are being
targeted because we look at far right wing. What we have to do
is approach it in a professional way that you have. We should
definitely look at the places where extremists are. That is how
we break up these plots.
But we also have to be careful that we understand that no
extremist group has a monopoly and that we exert due care that
we are not casting such a net as to exclude other types of
extremists or people who are not, but yet hold politically
differing views from the two of us.
Mr. King. Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Yes. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for this outstanding panel of witnesses. This has been a very,
very enlightening experience and we appreciate it very much.
Mr. Levin, in your testimony you had indicated that former
FBI supervisor Dr. Carl Jensen, III, writing in this month's
American Behavioral Scientist that you coedited, forecasted
over the next 5 years terrorists will make increasing use of
technology, forge new alliances and hybrid structures, and
morph between politics, criminal enterprises, and even gangs.
We on this committee have both a budgetary and oversight
responsibility. We had mentioned, and I think they have been
highly successful thus far, the fusion centers, the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. So structurally, I think law enforcement
post-9/11 has become more cooperative in the sharing of
information intelligence, toward the goal of thwarting
terrorist activity.
Are the resources available to meet the new trends over the
next 5 years? If you can comment on that.
Mr. Levin. Partly so. Again, one of the things I really
think is important, you know, I reached out to folks in the
counterterrorism community. These are heroes. I wrote to one
saying, gosh, I am going before this committee, you know. He
said, well, I am working from 2:00 in the morning until 10:00,
you know, contact me. These are people who are 24/7 working on
things. Here is some of the problems: I think we have to have
alacrity in pivoting to different threats. Right now, as I
said, our center regards the Salafist jihadist threat as the
most prominent one, but it is a close call.
You know, I remember before Oklahoma City people regarding
the alarming rise of militias, most of whom, by the way, were
nonviolent. But we are now seeing in society a splintering.
There are so many angry, distrustful people. If you look at the
polls of trust for Congress, of the media, of medicine, of
academia, it has plummeted in recent decades.
So people across a broad range can hook into a variety of
antisocial and conspiratorial ideologies. If I may--and I hope
I am not, you know, going to get disinvited for another
hearing--we have to have that alacrity, and that includes if we
have to look at the Animal Liberation people, let's do it. But
by the same token, there have been concerns that the
investigations relating to far right--and I am not talking
about considered people of good will, who I adore who are my
closest friends, we have to have alacrity as the threats come
up, because we are in such a fluid environment.
If we can depoliticize it. Because, you know, one of the
things that Attorney General Ashcroft, to his credit, who is
vigorously opposed to abortion, he went after those violent
people, who in very similar models to Salafist jihadists use
faith and the internet to target people.
What I think we must do is have funding that is not only
towards the Salafist jihadist threat, which I regard as the
most prominent one, but also to collecting trend analysis on
other threats, which many people have come to me off the
record, say, hey, if you ever get to talk to a Congressman, say
this. What they tell me--this isn't me. This is people in law
enforcement and intel saying, can we have a little bit more
funding and alacrity to look at a variety of threats,
particularly from the far right but also others as well.
We might be talking about Jewish extremists next year
because of what is going on in the Middle East. We might be
talking about Palestinian extremism. It is a very fluid
situation, and we have to have that alacrity to pivot to where
the threat not only is today, but where it will be 18 months
from now.
Mr. Higgins. Yeah. See, you know, counterterrorism is all
about what didn't happen, and you rarely get credit for what
didn't happen. Fighting counterterrorism, the whole objective
is keeping things from happening. Perhaps, you know, we are too
reactive to the previous, or immediate threat and not visionary
enough to have that fluidity to diversify our efforts to
anticipate the emerging trends, because obviously that is going
to be very, very important in our counterterrorism efforts as
well.
With that, I will yield back, thank you, sir.
Mr. King. Thank you, Brian.
I am going to thank all the witnesses. This has been a
terrific hearing. I want to thank you for your valuable
testimony. I want to thank the Members for their questions.
Also, the Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for you, and so we would like to ask you to respond
to those in writing if they do come in.
Now pursuant to committee rule 7(e), the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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