[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PEACEKEEPERS: ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AND
ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE
UNITED NATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 13, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-200
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina KAREN BASS, California
CURT CLAWSON, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Brett Schaefer, Jay Kingham Fellow in International
Regulatory Affairs, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The
Heritage Foundation............................................ 4
Aicha Elbasri, Ph.D., author (former spokesperson, United
Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, United Nations)....... 25
Mr. Peter Gallo (former Investigator, Office of Internal
Oversight Services, United Nations)............................ 39
Mr. Jordie Hannum, senior director, Better World Campaign........ 55
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Brett Schaefer: Prepared statement........................... 7
Aicha Elbasri, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 29
Mr. Peter Gallo: Prepared statement.............................. 42
Mr. Jordie Hannum: Prepared statement............................ 57
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 88
Hearing minutes.................................................. 89
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations:
Photographs referenced by Aicha Elbasri, Ph.D.................. 90
Statement from Ms. Beatrice Edwards of the Government
Accountability Project....................................... 93
Proposal for Reform by Mr. Peter Gallo......................... 100
Statement from AIDS-Free World's Code Blue campaign............ 103
PEACEKEEPERS: ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE
AND ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE
UNITED NATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order, and good
afternoon to everybody.
First of all, let me apologize for being late. We had a
series of four votes and it has disrupted everyone's schedule,
but especially yours. So, I do apologize to you for that.
Today's hearing, examining the consequences of sexual
exploitation by the United Nations peacekeepers, marks the
second in the series we are holding this year on the critical
issue of lack of accountability at the United Nations and its
subsidiary institutions. It follows our February hearing which
exposed illicit technology transfers to rogue regimes,
corruption at the World Intellectual Property Organization, and
the harassment of whistleblowers who sought to redress these
wrongs.
It also follows on the series of hearings that this
subcommittee held about a decade ago when we examined
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of minors by U.N.
peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
need for true reform that would end the victimizing of the
vulnerable by those who are supposed to be the protectors. I
would note, parenthetically, that as a result of that, we did
have Jane Holl Lute, who was then working at the United
Nations, who I think was equally disappointed and frustrated,
despite her Herculean efforts, to get the U.N. system to
recognize that the peacekeepers, to a person, have to be
protectors and never predators.
Sadly, what was happening in the DRC more than 10 years ago
today is repeated in places such as Central African Republic
and in Haiti. At the time of our hearing on the DRC, I noted
that we were there to examine credible evidence of gross sexual
misconduct and exploitation of refugees and vulnerable people
by U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel assigned to the
U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
These allegations typically involved peacekeepers' sexual
conduct with Congolese women and girls, usually in exchange for
food or small sums of money. According to the United Nations,
these contacts occurred with sickening frequencies and may
involve girls under the age of 18, with some as young as 11 to
14 years of age. Even more troubling were the allegations of
rape, forced prostitution, and demands of sex for jobs by U.N.
civilian personnel.
We will hear from witnesses today who will tell us how
little things have changed and how a culture of turning a blind
eye and covering pervades the U.N. bureaucracy, not just in the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but in the very U.N.
entities that are supposed to investigate wrongdoing and ensure
accountability.
Perhaps even worse still, we will hear from a witness who
will tell how in Darfur U.N. peacekeepers stood idly by while
civilians were killed by Sudanese militias aligned with the
government and how the U.N. sought to cover up accurate reports
of what was happening. This is so horrifying that it brings to
mind the atrocities that were committed in Srebrenica in 1995,
when Dutch peacekeepers shut their eyes and ears to the killing
of unarmed citizens, as a matter of fact, facilitated their
getting on buses in order to go to their horrific deaths.
I will never forget, soon after that happened we had the
chief translator who was there with Koratich and the Dutch
peacekeeping commander. He lost pretty much the entirety of his
family and couldn't believe the enabling that happened in that
so-called U.N. safe haven, again, which cost the lives of well
over 8,000 Muslims. And I have been back to Srebrenica and it
is a black mark, if ever there was one, on the U.N. efforts.
What compounds the tragedy today is that peacekeeping is
essential to healing a broken world. The protectors can never
be the predators.
During our February hearing on WIPO I noted that a culture
of corruption has beset the U.N. and other international
organizations, and how the sexual exploitation of minors
occurring in U.N. peacekeeping missions transformed ostensible
emissaries of mercy into envoys of exploitation. I also stated
my belief that by shining a light we could help victims, help
end corruption, bring healing, and, hopefully, true systemic
reform.
That is my hope and desire for today's hearing, which will
be a further catalyst to action on the part of this
subcommittee, which is why we want to experts to convey your
best insights and wisdom to us, that by calling attention to
what is happening will spur reform.
It is said that the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has
finally awakened to the true extent of the corruption and is
taking steps to end the culture of impunity and
dysfunctionality that has characterized U.N. peacekeeping and
U.N. oversight. I certainly--and I am sure it is shared by our
distinguished witnesses--hope that that is true, and that it is
not merely cosmetic.
The U.N. has laudable and, to be fair, very difficult
goals, but we must be steadfast in holding the U.N. accountable
for its action and the way the results, good and bad, of the
U.N. work. American taxpayers provide more support for the U.N.
peacekeepers than those of any other country and, with that, we
in Congress bear a fiduciary onus not only to the taxpayers,
but also to those innocents in countries who have been harmed
by the actions more than a few rotten apples.
I hope that today's revelations and testimony will ensure
that the spotlight continues to shine on the U.N. and that, as
a result, what is broken will be fixed and people in need of
healing will be given respite from their afflictions.
I would like to now introduce our distinguished witnesses.
I do believe we should be joined shortly by Ranking Member
Karen Bass. When she does come, if you don't mind, our
witnesses, I will turn to her for comments that she might have.
Let me begin, first, with Mr. Brett Schaefer who is Jay
Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at The
Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. The
United Nations is one of his areas of expertise. He speaks
frequently and publishes on issues related to the world body
and its activities. He regularly addresses business leaders,
congressional staff, and academics, has testified before
Congress before, and has appeared on a variety of radio and TV
programs speaking on these issues. Mr. Schaefer joined Heritage
in 1995 and worked at the Pentagon as an assistant for
international criminal court, a policy from March 2003 to March
2004.
Then, we would like to go to Dr. Aicha Elbasri, who was the
spokeswoman for UNAMID, the United Nations-African Union
Mission in Darfur between 2012 and April 2013. She is the
winner of the 2015 Ridenhour Prize for Truth-Telling for
blowing the whistle on the U.N. coverup of atrocities mainly
committed by Sudan's Government forces, sometimes under U.N.
watch. Between 2000 and 2013, she held a number of reporting,
media, and communication positions within the U.N. system in
New York, the Middle East, and Africa. Dr. Elbasri is a
published author and has contributed articles to various
newspapers and magazines in the United States, the UK, France,
and the Arab Region.
We will, then, hear from Mr. Peter Gallo, formerly with the
Office of Internal Oversight Services, the United Nations. Mr.
Gallo joined the U.N. in March 2011, where he was an
investigator in the Investigations Division of the Office of
Internal Oversight Services. Prior to joining the U.N., he
spent 18 years as an investigator in the private sector in
Asia, where he was recognized as an authority on money
laundering. Mr. Gallo was admitted to the practice of law in
his home country of Scotland, Hong Kong, and in New York. He
has had a number of articles published on money laundering and
investigations management, spoken at numerous conferences, and
taught courses in these subjects as an adjunct lecturer in Hong
Kong.
We will, then, hear from Mr. Jordie Hannum who has almost
20 years of legislative, analytical, and advocacy experience,
including roles on Capitol Hill, political campaigns, and
within NGOs. As a senior director of the Better World Campaign,
he guides its legislative and advocacy efforts around the
support for United Nations. During his tenure, he has testified
in front of Congress on the U.N.'s value, traveled to South
Sudan, researched civilian protection, and written on the
importance of U.S. engagement in peacekeeping. Previously, he
worked on a senatorial campaign, a Presidential campaign, and
here in the House.
So, welcome to all four of our distinguished witnesses.
Mr. Schaefer, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MR. BRETT SCHAEFER, JAY KINGHAM FELLOW IN
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AFFAIRS, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR
FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Schaefer. Mr. Chairman and other members of the
subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to come
here today to discuss the problems and concerns with U.N.
peacekeeping, including recent allegations of abuse and the
absence of accountability.
In my opinion, it is in the interest of the U.S. to have an
effective United Nations. For this to happen, the U.N. must
carry out its responsibilities competently and effectively and
efficiently. It must operate in a transparent and accountable
fashion. It must hold itself and its employees and
representatives to the highest standards of conduct. This is
particularly critical for U.N. peacekeeping where the
organization sends civilian and uniformed personnel to protect
and assist the most vulnerable. Unfortunately, the current
organization falls gravely short.
First, U.N. peacekeeping is being conducted with
unprecedented pace, scope, and ambition. These increasing
demands have revealed ongoing serious concerns and problems,
including poor transparency, mismanagement and corruption that
have led to waste, fraud, and abuse in procurement and
contracting; negligence and disregard that can lead to
unintended tragedy such as the introduction of cholera into
Haiti by U.N. peacekeepers; engaging in partnerships with
governments that are non-democratic, corrupt, or hostile to
human rights; and depending on peacekeepers to defend civilians
despite a documented widespread reluctance to respond when
civilians under their protection are threatened.
All these problems and others should lead to a stronger
oversight by an independent inspector general equivalent in the
U.N., which is currently lacking, and fundamental reevaluation
of longstanding operations and those with robust mandates in
situations of conflict to ensure that the missions are
effective within the capabilities and willingness of the troops
provided, and achieving their mandates.
Second, because the U.N. and its employees enjoy broad
protections and immunities, the organization has an extremely
heavy responsibility to self-scrutinize, self-police, self-
correct, and punish wrongdoing. Unfortunately, accountability
in the organization has been lacking.
Focusing specifically on peacekeeping, the most troubling
problem is the frequency with which civilian and military
personnel prey on the very people that they are supposed to
protect. Last year it was revealed that senior U.N. officials
tried to bury detailed knowledge of abuses by non-U.N.
peacekeepers in the Central African Republic. Worst, they then
tried to fire whistleblower Anders Kompass for sending those
details outside the U.N., so they might be addressed.
A U.N.-appointed independent review panel released a report
in December condemning the U.N. for ``a gross institutional
failure to respond to the allegations in a meaningful way.''
Unfortunately, the trends for sexual exploitation and abuse
by U.N. personnel are going the wrong way. In 2014, there were
80 allegations. In 2015, the U.N. reported 99 allegations.
Sixteen of those allegations occurred in 10 peacekeeping
operations and involved individuals from 25 different nations.
Thirty allegations involved U.N. personnel in organizations,
funds, and programs not related to U.N. peacekeeping.
Last month, however, the Code Blue Campaign announced that
they had learned of 108 new cases of sexual exploitation abuse
in the Central African Republic. The problem appears to be
getting worse, not better.
The U.N. has responded to this problem through some much
overdue transparency in identifying the nationalities of those
accused and announcing a series of changes in how such
incidents should be reported, investigated, and addressed. The
Security Council has endorsed the plan, and we have seen
repatriation of troops and units with patterns of misconduct
for, I believe, the first time.
However, the problem has never been the stated intent of
the organization to address these problems. The problem has
always been a failure to follow through on those stated plans.
Specifically, the U.N. effort hinges on a number of suggested
changes that have been ``requested'' of the troop-contributing
countries. However, it is far from clear that there is a
commitment by the troop-contributing countries to implement and
adhere to those changes.
Making problems worse, the U.N. also seems to have an
embedded hostility toward whistleblowers who can serve as a
critical safety valve for reporting mismanagement and
misconduct. The fear of reporting wrongdoing undermines the
effectiveness and integrity of the U.N., and it must be shored
up.
Finally, the methodology for assigning the cost of
peacekeeping disproportionately shifts the costs away from the
bulk of the membership and onto a relative handful of high-
income countries like the U.S. Specifically, the U.S. is
assessed over 28.5 percent of U.N. peacekeeping. The least-
assessed countries pay 0.0001 percent of that cost. For the
peacekeeping budget, the U.S. is assessed more than 185 member
states combined. The U.S. will be assessed over $2.3 billion
under this peacekeeping budget. The least-assessed countries
will be assessed about $8,300. Nearly 80 countries will be
assessed a total of less than $100,000, and over half the
membership will be assessed less than $1 million.
This helps explain why member states are not necessarily
all that enthusiastic or encouraged to actually conclude
peacekeeping missions or constrain their costs. They don't pay
very much for them, and that leads to a lack of incentive for
them to fulfill their oversight role or to pursue budgetary
restraint. A long-term solution requires a more equitable
distribution of the cost of U.N. activities, so that all member
states have this kind of incentive.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize the critical role played
by Congress in U.N. reform issues in the past through the use
of financial carrots and sticks. In my opinion, Congress can be
a very effective ally of the executive branch in pursuing U.N.
reform and pressure the organization to adopt the reforms and
changes that are necessary and have been illustrated to be far
overdue with the incidents that we have seen over the past
year.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schaefer follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Mr. Schaefer, thank you very much. I know you
had a much longer version. Without objection, that longer
version and those of our other distinguished witnesses, and any
other materials you would like to introduce into the record,
will be made a part of the record.
Mr. Schaefer. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Doctor?
STATEMENT OF AICHA ELBASRI, PH.D., AUTHOR (FORMER SPOKESPERSON,
UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR, UNITED NATIONS)
Ms. Elbasri. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Bass, and members of this subcommittee. Thank you for inviting
me to address you today.
My testimony will focus on the U.N. coverup of serious
crimes committed mostly by the Sudanese Government in Darfur
between August 2012 and April 2013. I would also testify on the
failure of the U.N. to investigate these charges which led to
the absence of accountability and the perpetuation of the
Darfur tragedy.
Soon after I joined the United Nations-African Union
Mission in Darfur, known as UNAMID, in August 2012, I received
a call from a journalist who inquired about reports of violence
in an area called Tawila in North Darfur. When I checked with
UNAMID, I was told that the situation was calm. I conveyed this
line to the journalist, and it turned out to be a lie.
In fact, 3 days later, I received reports on the
displacements of hundreds of families in the same area due to
violent attacks. I immediately alerted my supervisor, Ms.
Aichatou Mindaoudou, who was the acting chief of UNAMID. Ms.
Mindaoudou ordered a verification mission which confirmed that,
between August 24-26, 2012, government soldiers raided three
villages. For 3 consecutive days they assaulted men and
children, raped women and girls, destroyed their farms and
looted their properties. This forced up to 5,000 villagers to
flee for their lives.
The government forces attacked these people because they
suspected them of supporting the rebels, and they
systematically called them, asked them to identify their
tribes, and reserved the harshest treatment to the Zaghawa
tribesmen.
But UNAMID didn't authorize me to convey any of this
information to the journalist who asked for it. It did provide
the Chief of DPKO, Mr. Herve Ladsous, with the confirmation of
the Tawila attack, but there was no mention of it in the
Secretary-General's report to the Security Council covering
this period.
Although UNAMID leadership expected me to do as I was told
and ask no questions, I continued to raise concerns about the
mission reports. Consequently, I faced censorship and
hostility, especially from Mr. Karen Tchalian, the Russian
chief of staff of UNAMID who controlled the flow of information
within the mission as well as the communication with the U.N.
Headquarters in New York. But Mr. Tchalian wasn't acting alone.
He enjoyed the support of other senior staff, especially the
Somali Deputy Joint Special Representative for Operations, Mr.
Mohamed Yonis, who is now the Foreign Minister of Somaliland.
One example of how information control played out occurred
after the Sudanese Government committed a massacre in an area
called Hashaba from September 25-27, 2012. The Sudanese Air
Force first dropped bombs on the area, and when the bombing
stopped, a large group of soldiers and militiamen stormed the
area. They killed and injured people who were trying to escape.
Soon after the journalists began inquiring about the
attack, I recommended that the mission issue a public
statement, but Tchalian imposed an information blackout, even
after the mission saw the evidence of the massacre for
themselves. UNAMID established that at least 39 men, 20 women,
and 11 children were killed in this attack which was carried
out by the government forces.
In addition, Tchalian drafted and compiled a code cable
that Yonis signed off on October 7 which distorted the facts
documented by internal reports. They described the attack as
part of intertribal conflicts over land and resources. They
attributed the attack to some Arab groups acting in total
independence from the government and insisted that the Sudanese
forces were not involved in the attack. By doing so, they
cleared the government from responsibility for mass murder.
When I had a conversation with Mr. Tchalian about the
Hashaba attack on civilians, his response shocked me, and I
quote, ``So what?'' he told me. ``The Americans flattened
Fallujah. Why can't the Sudanese Government bomb its own
people?,'' he told me.
It was then that I first considered resigning, but my
supervisor, Ms. Mindaoudou, convinced me to stay and help her
change things and tell the truth. But, within a few months, I
realized that there was no place for the truth in UNAMID. The
instructions given by Tchalian and Yonis to peacekeepers in the
field didn't change. They told them not to report the
government bombing unless they had seen the craters themselves.
As a result, when peacekeepers saw the Sudanese military
planes hovering over villages, dropping bombs, and when they
heard loud explosions and saw smoke, they still couldn't
confirm that the bombing took place. Consequently, the
deliberate bombardment of civilians would be characterized as
alleged bombing.
What made the coverup by Tchalian and Yonis so effective
was the fact that they were assisted by others in U.N.
Headquarters in New York. Even when UNAMID troops witnessed and
took photos of civilians being shot about 2 meters away from
their own base, by the time the attack was mentioned in the
Secretary-General's report the civilian deaths were attributed
to being caught in the crossfire.
And if you allow me, I can show you just four photos. In
this photo, on the morning of September 5, 2012 at 7:45, some
100 armed government militiamen known as the Janjaweed gathered
around 2 meters away from UNAMID base near Kutum in North
Darfur.
Next. Yes, in this one, this photo shows how UNAMID closely
monitored the militias from its base near Kutum throughout the
morning of September 5. And you can see how quite close the
militia and the UNAMID forces were.
Next. At 11:25 a.m., the militia stopped a group of
civilians in a truck. They shot dead one man, injured eight
others, while UNAMID forces were monitoring and taking these
photos. A few days later, two more victims succumbed to their
injuries.
Next, please. Here is the response of the UNAMID. They took
care of the dead and the injured.
Next, please. And here is the real problem. This is how
both the Secretary-General reported on the incidents and the
press release. The reports of Mr. Ban Ki Moon said about these
incidents that ``the following day one civilian was killed and
eight others were injured in the crossfire of a firefight
between armed militia and government regular forces on the
outskirts of the town''; whereas, the UNAMID press release
described this incident on the red line: ``On 5 September armed
men alleged fired at the local civilians, resulting in
additional casualties.''
While it is true that UNAMID concealed many attacks, it
kept the Chief of DPKO, Mr. Herve Ladsous, informed of the most
alarming shifts in the war in Darfur. This is some of what Mr.
Ladsous and others in his department knew and concealed from
Ban Ki Moon's report to the Security Council: First, the
government violated the Security Council Resolution 1556 by
integrating the Janjaweed militias in its own auxiliary forces
instead of disarming and neutralizing them.
Second, the Sudanese Air Force deployed attack helicopters
and Antonov aircraft in Darfur, in violation of the U.N. arms
embargo.
Third, the government embarked on the second phase of its
ethnic-cleansing campaign which targeted the non-Arab ethnic
Zaghawa population.
Fourth, crimes committed by the rebels included physical
assault, abduction, looting, and the possible use of the local
population as human shields.
And fifth, the government forces deliberately attacked and
killed U.N. peacekeepers.
By hiding these facts, DPKO kept the Security Council in
the dark, resulting in that body making misinformed decisions.
After 8 months in UNAMID, the vast and systematic nature of
the coverup was clear to me. By then, I had reasons to fear for
my own safety because of threats made by Mr. Tchalian. I
resigned, left Sudan, and wrote my end-of-mission report in
May. In this report, I asked DPKO to look into the serious
violations and concerns I had raised. I received no response.
So, in August 2013, I formally requested that the U.N. Office
of Internal Oversight Services, OIOS, investigate the coverup,
but OIOS also failed to investigate.
By then, I was working for the U.N. Population Fund known
as UNFPA, but I knew that I couldn't keep my post if I were to
expose publicly what I had witnessed. The U.N.'s awful record
of retaliation against whistleblowers compelled me to resign
again.
By April 2014, Foreign Policy Magazine exposed the affair
based on the documents I had shared with them. This prompted
the International Criminal Court to call on Mr. Ban Ki Moon to
carry out a thorough public, independent inquiry. But Mr. Ban
Ki Moon chose to order a dubious review panel that concealed
its terms of reference, didn't include a single investigator,
never set foot in Darfur, and ended up denying the coverup.
The Secretary-General commissioned a review that became a
whitewash, and no one was held accountable for misleading the
international community and the Security Council. And when the
United States, Britain, and France requested the firing of Mr.
Tchalian, Russia opposed it. Assured of Russia's and China's
protection, the Sudanese Government extended its genocide
campaign to the Nuba Mountains and beyond.
This is today's U.N., an organization that is increasingly
failing to bring or keep peace, a rotten system that covers up
atrocities, attacks whistleblowers, lacks accountability, and
promotes impunity. Since the organization seems under no
obligation to be accountable, it is the member states' duty to
act. Therefore, I respectfully request that this committee
consider the following reforms: First, establish a truly
independent investigative entity that is not part of the U.N.
Secretariat, but reports directly and separately to the member
states.
Second, reconsider the leadership of DPKO which has been
headed by France since 1997. The best way for the U.S. to
address endless scandals in a failing and broken DPKO and
ensure the efficient use of U.S. taxpayers' money is to take
the lead of this critical department.
Third, look into the State Department's certification
process. It continues to certify that the U.N. is implementing
best practice whistleblower protections, despite evidence to
the contrary, preventing a 15-percent reduction in U.S.
funding, according to the law.
And fourth, extend whistleblowers' protection to the U.N.
peacekeepers police officers, contractors, and victims.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Elbasri follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Dr. Elbasri, thank you very much for your
testimony and for risking so much, as you have as a
whistleblower yourself, and for your recommendations. So, thank
you.
Mr. Gallo?
STATEMENT OF MR. PETER GALLO (FORMER INVESTIGATOR, OFFICE OF
INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, UNITED NATIONS)
Mr. Gallo. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass,
for this invitation to testify. I am very well aware it is an
honor and a privilege to be here.
I worked as an investigator in the U.N. Office of Internal
Oversight Services, OIOS, for 4 years from 2011 to 2015. I have
provided you the written statement which summarizes my personal
experience and which I hope illustrates how accountability
within the U.N. is inconsistent to the point of being
nonexistent.
OIOS was established to be independent and to investigate
internal misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse.
And the member states expect OIOS to do that. But,
unfortunately, by a combination of assessments of misconduct
complaints by other departments and referrals of cases by OIOS
to other departments, the reporting of misconduct in the
organization is manipulated.
Most of what is reported to OIOS is filtered through an
entirely separate office within the Department of Field Support
and Conduct and Discipline, who have no mandate to investigate
anything, but will assess complaints of misconduct they receive
from field missions.
That process often results in those complaints being
dismissed as lacking in credibility. In practice, these
assessments also identify witnesses who can then be
discredited, bribed, or intimidated. If the matter must be
investigated by OIOS, by the time the investigators arrive,
which will be 3 weeks later, material witnesses have often been
paid off, retracted their complaints, or disappeared.
Also, rather than investigating many complaints themselves,
OIOS often refers them to other departments, and often to the
very department that has the most to lose if the information
turns out to be proven true. And I have given you several
examples of that in my statement.
It is also no accident that the head of Conduct and
Discipline, Mrs. Mercedes Gervilla, is married to Michael
Dudley, the Deputy Director of the OIOS Investigation Division.
Now the U.N. and the Ethics Office see no conflict in this, but
the concern is that OIOS will never challenge any assessment by
Conduct and Discipline that is a complaint is not credible. And
if a complaint about something potentially embarrassing is
received, instead of investigating it themselves, OIOS will
refer it back to the Department of Field Support or somewhere
where it can be made to disappear.
What we are seeing with reports of more and more cases of
sexual abuse by peacekeepers, particularly in the Central
African Republic, I attribute to one thing, and that is
attention by the press, particularly as a consequence of the
Code Blue Campaign. Because of that, reports are being brought
to the attention of OIOS directly.
This press attention began last year with the U.N.'s
attempt to retaliate against Mr. Anders Kompass for having had
the initiative and the integrity to do something about the
sexual abuse of children. But the Kompass case also
demonstrates something else, and that was that Susanna
Malcorra, who was Ban Ki Moon's chief of staff at the time, was
taking the decisions and was driving the investigation and that
shows that OIOS is not independent. It is actually a resource
used by senior management for political ends. The term I have
used in the past is that it was a private gestapo, and I will
stand by that comment.
OIOS's credibility has been damaged by that and, also, by
the Nguyen-Kropp and Postica case where Deputy Director Dudley
was found to have tampered with evidence and then retaliated
against investigators who reported that. The U.N. only took
action against one person following that case, and I am pleased
to say that was me. That was not for evidence tampering. That
was for making a satirical reference to the evidence tampering
from a whiteboard that nobody saw.
A couple of weeks earlier, I had reported another OIOS
investigator for what I believe was perjury. That was
overlooked. The Investigations Director, Mike Stefanovic, was
subject to an investigation for a comment he had made 18 months
earlier about rats in the New York subway. When he tried to
bring a countercomplaint against the OIOS unit chief for
reporting that in bad faith and for misleading the tribunal,
the U.N. was not interested.
The concern is that a U.N. staff member who reports serious
misconduct is committing career suicide, and the Ethics Office
simply fails to protect them. Now my own experience is detailed
in the written statement, and I would also draw your attention
to the Nartey case, when the Ethics Director failed to obey a
court order to protect a staff member. Now that case was doubly
ironic because the official responsible for the retaliation, a
Mr. Barabanov, had earlier been found by OIOS to have illegally
obtained a U.N. firearm, and the U.N. Director General in
Nairobi had tried to have him disciplined for that at the time,
but, instead, it was she who ended up being dismissed.
That is the reality of accountability in the U.N. It is
dependent on who you are and who you know, and maybe a third
one, what you know about who you know. The dysfunction in the
U.N. cannot be dismissed as a few isolated problems or
attributed to be a few bad apples. These problems are deeply
ingrained in the culture of the organization.
Now I can, and I frequently do, laugh about it, but I am
not here today because this is funny. It is not a joke for the
women working in the U.N. who are afraid to report sexual
harassment. It is not a joke for the member states whose tax
dollars are embezzled and squandered paying for this charade.
And it is most certainly not a joke for the women and children
raped and sexually exploited with near impunity by the
organization that they must rely on for their very survival.
It is for their sake, and certainly not mine, that I urge
you to act and to take control of the investigation of
wrongdoing by the U.N., because the organization itself has
proved incapable of policing itself.
In closing, I would like to thank the committee again for
inviting me. And I also have to thank you on behalf of the many
current U.N. staff members. They appreciate your addressing
this issue, but they cannot say so.
And I will be happy to take your questions afterwards.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallo follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Smith. Mr. Gallo, thank you very much for your
testimony and for your courage because you have suffered
retaliation. And thank you for being here.
Mr. Hannum?
STATEMENT OF MR. JORDIE HANNUM, SENIOR DIRECTOR, BETTER WORLD
CAMPAIGN
Mr. Hannum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Bass, for inviting me to appear before the committee today. I
used to work on the staff of Congresswoman Connie Morella, and
it is a pleasure to be back on the House side.
I now work at the Better World Campaign, which aims to
highlight the value of a strong U.S.-U.N. relationship. But, as
your subcommittee knows and as some of the witnesses have
outlined, there is a cancer within the United Nations; namely,
sexual abuse by peacekeepers.
The victims of this abuse are real, as are the
consequences. Just 2 weeks ago, a 16-year-old girl was alleged
raped by a Congolese peacekeeper in a hotel room. Hearing
horrendous reports like these from the Central African
Republic, it would be natural to demand the withdrawal of all
U.N. peacekeepers, but this basic instinct to protect needs to
be balanced against the good that peacekeepers continue to do
there. The U.N. mission in CAR has played a critical role in
reducing ethnic violence, facilitating democratic elections,
and fostering the highest economic growth in 15 years. So, the
question is, how do we support the vital work being done by
U.N. peacekeepers in CAR and elsewhere and at the same time
implement meaningful steps to stop sexual exploitation and
abuse by peacekeepers? We believe if the U.N. is to root out
the bad actors, whether they hail from the developed or
developing world, they must show that their newly-announced
policies endorsed by the Security Council will be implementable
with unshakeable resolve.
This month the Secretary-General took dramatic steps to
improve transparency, naming and shaming the nations whose
troops are accused of abuses. He has also kicked out an entire
military contingent over evidence of widespread and systematic
abuse, again, a first. Though overdue, these actions are the
right course.
Even so, these measures will mean nothing unless they are
actively and consistently enforced. Further, we argue that for
those countries where there is evidence of widespread abuse
they also should be blocked from joining new missions.
At the same time, this does not mean that the international
community should accept a weak response to conflict and mass
atrocities. Rather, we must demand that more countries shoulder
the load. As it stands, there is a shortage of well-trained
troops for a growing number of increasingly-complex, dangerous
missions.
The significant increase in the size and scope of
peacekeeping missions, together with the near withdrawal from
peacekeeping by European and American forces, has taxed the
ability of the U.N. to recruit the best-trained and equipped
troops. If peacekeeping is to ultimately address sexual abuse,
the responsibility must not sit with the U.N. alone. Other
member states need to answer the bell.
The United States, in particular, can play an important
role in the areas of training, accountability, investigations,
and vetting, as outlined in my written testimony. But I must
also say that, as we rightly call out the U.N. for its anemic
response on abuse, we must not lose sight of the overall
importance of its missions. The U.N. currently oversees 16
operations with over 100,000 personnel, the largest deployed
military force in the world. Over the past several decades,
both Republican and Democratic administrations have strongly
supported peacekeeping. This is because it can mean the
difference between life and death in the places it deploys.
A 2013 study found that deploying large numbers of U.N.
peacekeepers ``dramatically reduces civilian killings.'' In
South Sudan, where I know you just were, Congresswoman Bass,
U.N. forces are currently working to protect nearly 200,000
civilians. In CAR, Amnesty International just released a report
saying U.N. peacekeepers have ``saved many lives and prevented
much bloodshed.''
In addition, these missions are much less expensive than
U.S. forces and have the strong support of our military.
Admiral Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs under
Presidents Bush and Obama, said, ``U.N. peacekeepers help
promote stability and are very much in our national interest.''
Now it is true that the U.S. pays the largest portion of
the U.N.'s peacekeeping budget, but we also wield veto power
over the size of that budget due to our presence on the U.N.
Security Council. That special status also puts the U.S. in a
unique position to push for peacekeeping reform.
I would further argue that we are best able to pressure the
U.N. for changes when we are fully engaged and paying our dues.
As a result, we have been able to move forward many important
reforms at the U.N. Of most relevance, in March the U.S.
championed and the U.N. endorsed several of the stringent new
abuse measures I have just discussed.
In addition, U.S. engagement at the U.N. has led to vital
cost-cutting reforms, including reducing the cost per
peacekeeper by 18 percent and the number of support staff by
3,000. Thus, if we are to eradicate the cancer within the U.N.
right now, it is more important than ever that we remain fully
and dutifully engaged. Only then can we ensure that the scourge
of sexual abuse and exploitation can be eliminated.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hannum follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony and
insights.
Let me begin with some questions, beginning, first, if I
would, with Dr. Elbasri. The whistleblower protections that you
have outlined, Congress, in 2014 and 2015 did pass into law.
And WIPO is pretty much the one, and they don't derive their
money from us in terms of percentage of our giving. It is from
other sources. And that was brought out very, very clearly in
our hearing just a few months ago.
Why do you think the administration has not tried, or has
it applied the 15-percent withholding to some of the other
agencies? And others might want to jump in on this. Because it
seems to me, when you have a penalty and you fail to use it, it
is the victims that are the ones who are hurt. That includes
victims within the U.N. system itself who would like, as Mr.
Gallo said, to speak out, but, obviously can't because there is
a fear of retaliation. Is there an enforcement problem on the
part of the U.S. in terms of applying that law?
Secondly, when we heard of the allegations, and they turned
out to be true, of rape and horrific sexual abuse of young
children in DR Congo, not only did I go there, I went to Goma,
met with the peacekeepers, met with the government officials
there, but I also held a series of hearings. We got ironclad
promises from the United Nations. Kofi Annan issued his zero-
tolerance policy, which looked fabulous on paper. By the time
we got to the third hearing in the hearing series, we dubbed
that hearing ``zero-tolerance, zero-compliance'' because it was
just not being implemented at the tactical and the operational
level.
So, I am hopeful that Ban Ki Moon is serious, but you are
only as good as your chain in command. It would seem--and your
recommendations, all of you, on this would be very helpful--if
OIOS is not independent, as you have said, Mr. Gallo, that is a
huge chink in the armor of protection.
It seems to me that there ought to be prosecutions of those
who commit these terrible crimes, and naming and shaming, that
lasts for a day and, then, the country moves on. There is a
whole lot of naming and shaming going on at the U.N. all the
time, but it doesn't have any impact.
I think disqualification might be a more apt way of
countries or brigades, or whatever, certainly individuals, and
the maintenance of a list of people, so others don't get on the
list again and end up 5 years later being deployed to recommit
their abuse.
So, if you could speak to that? How do we get the OIOS to
be independent again? The enforcement of the U.S. law, how do
we make that better? Again, a sanction that is not implemented
is a paper promise that becomes very weak and, then,
nonexistent in reality.
The cholera issue, Mr. Schaefer, thank you for bringing
attention to that. Some of you might want to speak to how well
peacekeepers are vetted in terms of health to ensure that
communicable diseases are not brought with them to
extraordinarily vulnerable populations whose immune systems are
next to nil who could pick up those diseases, like what
happened in Haiti.
I have other questions, but that is an opening. Yes?
Ms. Elbasri. Thank you. Thank you for these questions.
Regarding the first one, which is the reduction of 15
percent of the U.S. contribution and the law that passed
regarding this issue, it hasn't been implemented widely because
there is a problem with the U.S. Department of State
certification process. What happens is that, so far, since the
law has been adopted 2 years ago, the only case that we have is
the WIPO case. But many organizations, including the Government
Accountability Project, documented ample evidence that shows
that the U.N. is not abiding, is not complying with the
implementation of best practice whistleblower protections.
There are many cases that can be communicated to you, drawn
on this issue. So, we are wondering why the lack of
implementation of best practice whistleblower protections is
not documented in this certification process. So, I think it is
the mechanism, that there is something wrong with the mechanism
here that needs to be looked at. So, this is the first
question.
Regarding the issue of rape and the zero-tolerance policy,
I think what we hear about right now is the tip of the iceberg.
Most of the attention is directed toward the troops, the
countries that are contributing the troops, but the problem is
much wider than that. We are talking about civilians. Local
populations, being raped and sexually abused by the
international peacekeeper police forces, by also the civilians
within the missions. And we are not hearing the U.N. talking
about this.
There is a very important report that came out in 2013
which clearly said that the information we have, really it is a
drop in the ocean. Why? Because of this huge reporting
mechanism, there are problems with the reporting at the U.N.
and this is across the board, absolutely. And this is across
the board.
This is not limited to the DPKO. This is a problem within
every agency I have worked with. I noticed the same problem.
The U.N. is not telling the truth about the reality. It is not
telling the truth about the misconduct of its own troops. It is
seeing things, but not saying it. And the whole problem starts
there. If you are not telling the truth, there is nothing you
can address later on. You will be basically just addressing the
surface.
Mr. Smith. Since you were so much involved with it, why the
coverup of, as you pointed out, the hundreds of Sudanese
soldiers, up to 150 military vehicles raided three villages,
and then, you went on to describe the terrible consequences of
that? Why cover that up?
Ms. Elbasri. Well, that is exactly what I wanted, a truly
independent inquiry. I wanted to see why. I mean, there are
speculations. I can only guess that there are some people at
the level of the leadership of the mission who have some
agendas other than the U.N. agendas and the mission. I hope
that there will be an inquiry about this.
But there is also a culture at the U.N. to cover up. People
cover up for different reasons, for saving the image of the
U.N., for not embarrassing themselves, for keeping their jobs;
also, for the partnership with dictatorship regimes. There are
so many reasons for the coverup that need to be addressed.
So, talking about certain problems and referring to the
very few bad apples, I think we are not helping the U.N. by
advancing such a diagnosis. The problem is systematic. It is a
system problem, not a person problem. It is the U.N. is broken
today, and addressing an issue has to start with the truth
instead of assaulting truth and going hand in hand with the
coverup. The U.N. should be the first to promote truth and
truth-telling and promoting the truth-tellers instead of
assaulting whistleblowers.
Mr. Smith. Can I just ask--and all of you might want to
respond to this, in addition to the original questions--are
there instances of individuals, once repatriated, that were
prosecuted and got significant jail time for their crimes
against children and women and other vulnerable people?
Ms. Elbasri. I think there were a few cases in troop
contributing countries. I believe it was India. But it is
insignificant if you compare that, of course, with the number
of the allegations.
And I just want to touch on the independence of the U.N.
Honestly, we don't have time, actually, to hold ourselves with
some illusions. OIOS will never be independent because it
reports to the Secretary-General; it reports to the U.N. Any
organization that doesn't report directly and separately to the
member states will never be independent.
Thank you.
Mr. Gallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On the subject of the 15-percent budget withholding, I
think it is important to realize that in the 12 months after
that was passed the United Nations Appeal Tribunal decided the
case of Wasserstrom. Mr. Wasserstrom was seriously retaliated
against over a number of years. The significance of that appeal
court decision was that, because of the way that the
regulations were written, which is ST/SGB/2005/21, what should
happen is that, when the staff member applies for whistleblower
protection, the Ethics Office makes a recommendation to the
Secretary-General that he be protected accordingly.
The Appeals Tribunal decided that, because it was only a
recommendation that the staff member did not have a legal right
to challenge the decision of the Ethics Office. That basically
means that whistleblower protection is a privilege and not a
right, and it is a privilege which is dependent on, if you
like, the grace and favor of the Secretary-General, which
essentially means the 38th floor, which is essentially the
people you are requiring the protection from. From memory, I
think that came out halfway through 2014, and I have certainly
not heard of, I have not seen any documentation, I have not
heard any rumors of revisions to the legislation.
The example I have given you in the written statement, in
order to get whistleblower protection in the U.N., you require
something called a protected act, which is essentially making a
report of misconduct or cooperating with an audit or
investigation. Now, in my case, I applied for whistleblower
protection, and it was rejected on the grounds that the
complaint which I had made did not contain evidence.
With respect, the wording of the regulation says
``information or evidence.'' My complaint was 2,000 words long,
referred to a specific email on a specific date by a specific
person, which I claimed was coercion.
But the point is that all the Ethics Office has to do is
dismiss that on grounds of credibility and that it does not
appear to support a reasonable belief that misconduct has
occurred, in which case that disables it. It can, then, deem to
be not a protected act and, consequently, no whistleblower
protection applies.
The authority on the statistics for whistleblower
protection lies with the Government Accountability Project who
I believe worked out the statistics at the time that it was
something of the order of like 1 percent of applications for
whistleblower protection were granted. Okay?
Mr. Smith. Anybody else? Yes?
Mr. Hannum. Thank you.
So, just a couple--on the whistleblower point, we will just
way that we, the witnesses here have made some excellent points
that certainly our organization has supported, and I know some
U.N. officials have said there are key whistleblower reforms
that need to be made. One, lessening the onus on the
whistleblower themselves, one providing more confidentiality,
and, three, also increasing the personal liability toward
someone who retaliates. We absolutely support those.
I just want to make a general point, though, on withholding
just in general, the concept, because it was mentioned in
testimony, and it has certainly been mentioned before that this
is the way that we are going to get things done--that we should
withhold funds to the U.N.
In general, Democratic and Republican administrations have
been opposed to withholding as a way to advance reform. In
2005, the Hyde bill, a centerpiece of that was withholding
dues. The Bush administration was opposed to it ``because it
would detract and undermine our efforts to change the U.N.''
In 2011, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a
hearing where George W. Bush's Ambassador Mark Wallace, who was
the Representative for U.N. Management and Reform, said that it
would not be ``wise or beneficial to use withholding funds to
implement change.''
Certainly, we believe that the best way to advance change
is to pay our dues, but, then, to be at the table and pressure
the U.N. and use our diplomatic leverage. And we have seen the
benefits of that over the past few years. If you look at the
Security Council Resolution on sexual exploitation and abuse,
2272, that was written by the United States, it called for
things and endorsed the Secretary-General. And many member
states were opposed to it. But because of our good standing and
our leverage, we were able to advance it.
As I mentioned in my testimony, there have been a number of
important cost-cutting reforms. There were major changes pushed
by the U.S. Mission this December to changes in how staff
salaries are calculated. This could lead to hundreds of
millions in savings. And again, that doesn't happen if we are
not there at the table in good standing and, then, to say,
look, we are here, but now we are asking for these changes. I
think that is why it is important.
I think in terms of sexual exploitation and abuse, what the
Secretary-General has called for, the naming and shaming,
kicking out countries, that is absolutely critical and it is
something the U.S. has supported. I think it is extremely
important.
I also want to address the question on jail time. So, that
has been a major problem with the U.N., but I would also say
other armies in terms of just the overall investigations, I
think, of the investigations which have been found to be
substantiated. Only in 55 percent has there been any type of
disciplinary action. That is something in our testimony that
would call that the U.S. really needs to use its bilateral
pressure on countries.
But I would say, sadly, this is a problem for major armies
and countries. In terms of the French troops and in CAR there
has been no accountability for what the French troops have
done, no punishments yet.
And I saw just a few days ago a report in terms of the U.S.
military. It was actually looking at Japan, but these were DOD
documents showing that hundreds of cases of U.S. personnel,
almost no personnel went to prison, and in 30 cases all they
got was a letter of reprimand. And this was for rape and sexual
abuse. So, this is a major problem, but not just for the U.N.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Schaefer. Thank you.
I think you were asking why the administration doesn't hold
organizations to account for failure to fully implement
whistleblower protections or to enforce the standards that they
do have. Mr. Hannum laid out quite well the mindset, which is
we don't want to upset the apple cart; we don't want to ruffle
feathers in the organization.
Oftentimes, what happens is the U.S. administration,
Republican or Democrat, will have very specific, often
controversial policy objectives that they want to achieve
through the organization. In that calculus reform of the
organization frequently comes second. That is the way it works.
They have a policy agenda. They want to achieve that. Pursuing
reform of the organization, whistleblower protections, and
other changes will perhaps upset other member states and lessen
the ability for us to get the policy objectives done.
And that is actually why Congress has a role here. Congress
can provide perspective and instructions on reform through
legislation that would require and assist the administration to
focus--and it doesn't matter whether it is Democrat or
Republican--on achieving some of these fundamental
institutional reforms.
I will point out that OIOS actually was established because
Congress was threatening to withhold money in 1994. There was
no inspector general equivalent at all in the U.N. organization
until the U.S. withheld money, and we withheld it because of
instances of waste, fraud, and abuse that the Congress at that
time thought were unacceptable. That threat of withholding
resulted in fundamental change. And the OIOS, although remains
inadequate, wouldn't have existed at all without Congress.
Second, on the sexual exploitation and abuse and the
Security Council Resolution, if you take a look at that
resolution, it urges member states to do things. It calls on
member states to do things. It requests member states to do
things. It does not instruct the member states to do anything,
the troop-contributing countries. It is not a binding document
that forces troop-contributing countries to do anything. It
asks them to.
As we have seen in the past, what happens in these
instances is that the U.N. does just enough to deflect
attention away from the scandal and the press attention long
enough for the eyes to go somewhere else, and then, we don't
see the follow-through.
The U.N. has had a zero-tolerance policy on sexual
explotation and abuse for over a decade now. And yet, here we
are having this hearing, talking about the exact same problems
that led to that zero-tolerance policy back then. It is a lack
of follow-through.
When you have requests from member states--the Secretary-
General's report is like this, too--it has lots of ambitious
plans, lots of agendas in there that are in development that
have yet to be concluded, that are projected to be implemented,
that request the member states to do X, Y, and Z, but it
doesn't actually require them to do that.
I am sorry, there was another question. Oh, OIOS
independence, that is a fundamental problem. The Office of
Independent Oversight Services, the lack of independence,
everything has to go through the bureaucracy. When you are
reporting on the actions of the bureaucracy, yet you have to
report through the bureaucracy, that is not an independent
system. You can't expect it to operate in an independent
fashion under that scenario. It doesn't have an independent
budget. Therefore, it has to go through the regular system for
resources, which is very problematic. That needs to be fixed.
I would also suggest--and I make this suggestion in my
testimony, I believe--that the U.S. State Department should set
up a separate IG unit in the State Department's IG Office to
look specifically at international organizations like the
United Nations. We are the largest contributor to those
organizations. We have a very strong interest in making sure
that taxpayer funds are used well there. I think that we should
set up a dedicated unit to look into not just peacekeeping, but
the U.N. system as a whole and have a series of experts set up
there to do that.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ms. Bass?
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much for your testimony and, also,
for your courage, all of the panelists.
I wanted to ask some questions and really kind of focusing
on what are the solutions. I always have difficulty with the
idea of the U.S. withholding money, though, because to me it
seems like that just increases the resentment of the U.S. So, I
am not really sure how that produces reforms.
But my colleague here, Mr. Chair, was just mentioning how
in hearings that have been held before, then all of these
promises were made and never really enforced. I was wondering
if the U.S. has continued to raise that within the U.N., and
are there promises that the U.S. could participate in a
hearing, too? So, kind of where do we fall in those lists of
promises?
And when you mentioned more countries sharing the load, and
I looked at the numbers for the European countries, how they
have gone down dramatically, have we, the U.S., raised this
with the EU?
So, those are a couple of questions that I would like to
start with. Then, I have some other questions. I guess I am
directing it to Schaefer and Hannum.
Mr. Schaefer. Thank you.
Yes, the U.S. raises these issues a lot of times. It raises
them in the Security Council. It raises them in statements when
the missions come up. It raised them when these press incidents
happen that bring issues and problems to light. The U.S. makes
statements and says we need to address this; we recommend that
we do X, Y, and Z.
Again, the lack of institutional follow-through and embrace
of those recommendations or the failure of the organization
itself to implement what we are calling for is habitual.
Ms. Bass. Within the----
Mr. Schaefer. And I will give you a specific example of
that.
Ms. Bass. Hold on a second. Within the U.N.'s governance
structure, because I am not familiar with it, is it possible
for there to be a resolution----
Mr. Schaefer. Sure, sure.
Ms. Bass [continuing]. Demands, that requires that?
Mr. Schaefer. Yes. There are two different ways to do that.
One, in terms of U.N. peacekeeping, the Security Council can
issue a binding resolution instructing all the peacekeeping
operations how they should conduct themselves and how they
should conduct their treatment of troop-contributing countries.
The General Assembly is the legislative body that, in
essence, instructs the Secretariat on its rules, and the
General Assembly can pass a resolution telling the Secretary-
General and the Secretariat how to address various matters in a
very direct way.
Ms. Bass. So, has the U.S. attempted to do that and it has
been vetoed by the Security Council or have we not attempted
to?
Mr. Schaefer. Generally, to get something through it will
be watered down, as Mr. Hannum mentioned the resolution that
the U.S. offered on sexual exploitation and abuse earlier this
month. Egypt voted against it. They didn't want even the weak
standards that were included in that resolution to go forward.
And it is generally a negotiating process. You do have to
get a certain number of countries to support it, and you also
have to avoid a veto by the five permanent members to get that
resolution through in the Security Council.
In the General Assembly it is even worse. I mean, you have
to get a majority of the General Assembly to support it, and a
lot of those countries either aren't interested in
whistleblower protection policies, for example, or in terms of
the sense of troop-contributing countries, many of them are
major troop contributors. And so, they don't want to have the
standards put into place by the General Assembly that they,
themselves, may oppose domestically.
Ms. Bass. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Hannum?
Mr. Hannum. Thank you.
Yes, a couple of things just in terms of demands. Our
Director Peter Yeo just put out an op-ed the other day in The
LA Times talking about--it is called ``No More Rapists in
Peacekeeping.'' It was quite blunt.
But the importance of certainly what the Secretary-General
did in naming and shaming, kicking out countries. But what will
be critical going forward is to hold firm there, that countries
with widespread and systematic abuse are not allowed back in,
that this is absolutely essential and the Security Council
needs to back it.
Now, in order for this to be successful, part of the
problem is peacekeeping operations have been a lot larger, a
lot more complex, and a lot more dangerous. In places like CAR
and Mali, when there are demands, the international community
is saying there is a crisis happening right now, there are not
that many countries that raise their hands. And so, the U.N.
can sometimes be in a difficult situation.
So, a year from now, when there is a crisis, where there
will be--Burundi or you name it--the U.N. needs to hold firm
and say countries with a bad record cannot come in, but there
also needs to be other member states who can fit the bill, who
are well-trained and well-equipped.
You are exactly right, the EU 20 years ago we were at 40
percent of peacekeeping troops. Now that is 6 percent. The U.S.
20 years ago was about 700 troops. They are now at 70.
And so, I think the U.S. can help here. It made very
important strides with the leadership summit last September at
the U.N. General Assembly. That was important. There were
40,000 pledges for that. So, I think it will be critical for
the U.S. to push countries to make that those pledges
materialize; also, to make sure that countries are actually
raising their hands for CAR and Mali. So, these things are
necessary.
But I would make one other point, just in terms of, well,
we should just demand this and we should demand that. And we
can talk about how much the U.S. pays. That is true, but the
U.S. does not provide that many troops. They are for the most
part provided by the developing world. And as I said, these
peacekeeping operations, this is not what it was 20 years ago.
This is not observing a ceasefire. This is going into a place
like Mali, which is the frontline on the war on terror, South
Sudan, where the government is actively targeting you, and
asking people to go to someone else's civil war and potentially
die. In Mali, 60 peacekeepers have died in the past 18 months;
three more died today. These are very dangerous places.
To just go in and say, ``I need you to do this, this, and
this,'' that is not going to play particularly well. That
doesn't mean we take a soft touch and do nothing. We should
absolutely use our leverage. But, at the same time, to get buy-
in, we need troop-contributing countries to actually want to do
this. And if we are simply demanding things and, then, saying,
``Oh, well, the U.S. is doing this,'' you create a north/south
divide.
So, we need to also be able to work with countries because
these peacekeeping missions are increasingly dangerous and
difficult, and we need well-trained, well-equipped troops to go
there. If we are making all sorts of demands without particular
support and working with countries, then we are going to find
even fewer troops and it is going to be even more difficult to
address atrocities when they arise.
Ms. Bass. Well, I was in South Sudan just a couple of
months ago in November. I went there to see the peacekeeping
because I had not seen that before. I was extremely impressed
with the people that were there, the people that I met. And it
was very clear it was dangerous. As a matter of fact, I think
the month before I was there several of the peacekeepers had
been taken hostage. They were released eventually, but it
wasn't like they were just sitting back and watching.
One of the things I worry about is some of the countries
like Burundi, for example, that contribute troops to
peacekeeping, it seems like it is a way to deal with the
employment issue in these countries. And so, I worry about
that.
I wanted to know what the role is with the AU. So, we
talked about the EU. What is the role with the AU in terms of
the accountability and, also, increasing the number of troops
that are contributed by AU countries?
Mr. Hannum. Yes. Thank you.
In terms of the AU, there are a couple of hybrid missions.
UNAMID is one. The mission in Somalia is another; the UNAMID
mission supported by the U.N.
And there is potential, there is promise in some cases to
say you have got troops who are closer to the action who should
be there. I think Dr. Elbasri could say that there are
certainly issues with the AU troops, and there was a paper just
the other day by Paul Williams talking about some of the
problems with AU troops, the accountability, training. So, it
is certainly worthy of consideration, but it is not a magic
bullet by any stretch.
Ms. Elbasri. Thank you. Thank you for this question, a very
important one.
Regarding the AU, I can just share with you what I saw.
What I saw there is a huge discrepancy between African
countries. Between 2012 and 2013, the nations that were
contributing the largest troops were Rwanda followed by
Nigeria. If you compare the troops between these two countries,
you end up really asking questions whether they were both
Africans. The Rwandan troops were known for being well-trained,
well-equipped, disciplined; whereas, the Nigerian troops had
all kinds of problems.
I saw with my own eyes peacekeepers with holes in their
shoes, peacekeepers who actually didn't know how to hold the
weapons, peacekeepers who were not trained at all. And there
were jokes in the senior management meetings about cooks being
recruited as peacekeepers.
So, there are all kinds of problems with the African Union
countries. As you said, there is an employment issue because,
as you know, each country that contributes a soldier makes
$1,000 a month, and you just have to multiply those by the
1,000 troops they send.
So, there isn't a commitment from every single country.
Every single nation is sending troops for a reason, political
or an economic reason. But one thing is certain. In general,
there is a huge problem of performance, lack of equipment, lack
of training, and lack of command.
The main problem that was faced by UNAMID is the fact that
the battalions in the field were not responding to the command
of UNAMID. They were requesting the command of their own
countries, and there were a couple of countries that were not
abiding by the command of the force commander in UNAMID. And
that is something that is not unique to UNAMID. It is a problem
that has been witnessed in almost every single mission.
So, it is extremely difficult to work within a unified
command. But, as far as the African Union troops, there are
huge problems, capacity problems, political problems, and also
performance problems. And probably UNAMID is one of the best
examples one can give.
Mr. Schaefer. If I could just follow up on that one last
point, which is the compensation for the peacekeepers, it is
about $1,400 per month right now. And there are strong economic
and, also, just practical reasons for troop-contributing
countries to contribute there.
First, they often make more money through the compensation
per troop from the U.N., which is $1,400 a month, roughly, than
they do for the cost of the peacekeeper themselves. And so,
that can actually be a plus-up for their own defense budget.
Sending them on peacekeeping operations is a training
exercise. It can help professionalize them. It can help assist
their efforts to bolster the capabilities of their troops. It
can also serve as a way to get practical experience and
deployment abroad for their troops. So, there are a lot of
incentives for troop-contributing countries to engage in U.N.
peacekeeping.
And I think it is naive to think that if you just expect
them and demand that they increase standards for training, if
you increase standards for enforcement and investigation on
sexual exploitation and abuse and other problems, that they
would be completely disincentivized from engaging in this
process. There are a lot of benefits to this for the troop-
contributing countries, and asking them to increase their own
standards I think is a very reasonable ask, and you would not
see a lot of troop-contributing countries decide not to
participate in the future if you did that.
Mr. Hannum. If I could just follow up one thing. I mean, to
be clear, though, it is true they do it for a number of
different reasons. The total amount works to about $16,000 a
year. But, yes, there are benefits, but in terms of the reality
of peacekeeping right now, not a lot of countries are raising
their hands to go to CAR and Mali. So, they may do it, but they
also may die there. So, the notion that this is just something
that they can do because there's trainings--I mean, these
missions are increasingly dangerous. The highest number of
missions in history right now, two-thirds are in active places
of conflict.
So, absolutely, they do it for all sorts of different
reasons, but you get what you pay for, too. If we cut this down
significantly, you are going to have more poorly-trained
troops. And studies have shown that the worse-trained troops
there are, the more problems you have.
So, absolutely, by no means are we saying that we shouldn't
push for reforms. In the testimony I lay out a number of
different things that we need to do on training. We have an
existing framework right now with the GPOI program through the
State Department. That should be much stronger. That should be
augmented with more focus on sexual exploitation and abuse.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Cicilline?
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Smith. I, first, want to
thank you and Ranking Member Bass for calling this hearing
today and to thank all the witnesses for the work that you are
doing, for being here today.
I am very proud to be the co-chair of the Congressional
Peacekeeping Caucus, which I formed with my colleague Adam
Kinzinger. And we formed this because we recognize the
important role that peacekeepers play in maintaining
international peace and stability and the impact peacekeeping
missions have on the United States and our own national
security.
But we also formed the Caucus with the intention of taking
a closer look at the areas that are in need of reform. I think,
like everyone else who has learned about these repeated
allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation against U.N.
peacekeeping forces around the world, we are all, I think, very
concerned about that and really alarmed at the inability of the
U.N. to effectively prevent this kind of abuse and to hold
perpetrators accountable when it happens.
I do think I want to really thank you, Mr. Hannum, for your
comments because I do think the notion of sort of disengaging
from the U.N. as an effective way to bring about real reform
and accountability would be a tragic mistake. In fact, I think
this is a moment when we have to deepen our involvement and
really engage in an even more serious way. If we are going to
hope to see any real progress, it is going to require U.S.
leadership. And so, I think the notion of not paying our dues
or not playing an active role will make success in terms of
reforming less likely. And I appreciate your comments on that.
My first question really is, it strikes me that, as you
analyze where U.N. peacekeepers are and who contributes to
them, without oversimplifying it, my sense is that it is the
poor countries that provide the troops and the affluent
countries that supply the money. And it may be that that is
part of the challenge because it is not surprising that some of
the poorer countries don't have the same resources for the kind
of training and professional development of soldiers that more
affluent countries might have.
And so, I wonder whether any of you see that question about
really training, because we can get to the question about
whistleblowers and accountability in a moment, but preventing
it from happening I think has to be our first focus.
My first question really is, is there some role that
Congress can play that we should be advocating for at the U.N.
that will really enhance the professionalization and the
training that is made available to the soldiers who actually
participate in peacekeeping to supplement what poor countries
may either not be doing because they can't or not be doing
because they won't? But we will start with that.
Mr. Hannum. Yes. Thank you.
So, there are a couple of things. One, I will say that an
important first step, you are exactly right, the dynamic over
the past 20 years is mostly countries from the developing world
who are providing troops and wealthier nations who are
financing it.
A key step that happened this September was the leadership
summit at the U.N. General Assembly. With U.S. leadership, it
led to pledges of 40,000 more troops, and China said it would
provide a standby force of 8,000. Also, importantly, a number
of enabling assets like helicopters. So, that was key, and
there just needed to be a greater supply. This was a greater
supply from a much larger universe of troops. So, that was
important. Making sure those pledges materialize will be key.
On the training front, you are exactly right, Congressman.
This is an opportunity I think for the U.S. We have an existing
structure, as I said, through the GPOI program, the State
Department that has trained over 200,000 peacekeepers over the
last decade. But that training is basic. It is a basic level of
training, how to hold a gun. And so, certainly, in terms of
sexual exploitation and abuse, that should be augmented.
But I think one of the other issues is, again, these
peacekeeping missions are so much different than they were 20
years ago, where they were for the most part kind of observing
ceasefires. Now the challenges in Mali are different than what
they are in CAR, different than what they are in South Sudan.
That training really needs to be tailored.
Again, the U.S. is not going to be providing troops anytime
soon, but we have such expertise here. I was in South Sudan in
August and just talking with some U.S. troops there. They said
just what a difference in influx of just a few troops would
make just in terms of professionalization.
But, on the training side, we should really use these
existing structures--this is not a significant amount of
resources--but use our existing structures to make sure the
training is tailored to where they are going and, then, also,
it addresses certainly the sexual exploitation and abuse.
Ms. Elbasri. Well, you are right about the general trend.
It is the poor countries that are contributing troops and
richer countries that are paying for the peacekeeping budgets,
although there is a shift I must mention, which is China. China
is now part of the top 10 contributing countries. It is a major
change. They are sending more troops to other countries, and we
have seen it now with South Sudan. Basically, they are sending
the troops where they have some vested interest to look after.
But the question that the European and U.S. contribution of
troops has changed has to do with the change in the makeup of
the peacekeeping. As you mentioned, quite clearly, the
peacekeepers are operating in a danger zone, I mean combat
zones. This is not what peacekeeping is about.
We have departed from the three core principles of
peacekeeping, which is impartiality or neutrality, the non-use
of force unless necessary, and also the consent of all parties
of conflicts. We have put that aside since 1999 at least, and
we have been sending peacekeepers without doing anything about
peace. This is a major problem with peacekeeping today.
Today, if you look at Mali, we are not talking about
peacekeepers. These are troops, U.N. troops, that are fighting
terrorism. Most of the countries that know the region, they
think that the U.N. has nothing to do with this fight because,
in doing so, first of all, it doesn't have the capacity; it
doesn't have the ability. And we are talking about peacekeepers
who are sent to keep peace, not to fight war and let alone
terrorism.
You have a country like DRC, Congo, where the mission has
been mandated to fight rebels. This has never been part of the
U.N. mandates. You have other areas where you have the
peacekeepers running after gangs. This is a huge change for
peacekeeping. It is alarming.
And I can tell you that, as far as I am concerned, when I
left UNAMID, I didn't think of myself as a former peacekeeper.
I thought of myself as a former warkeeper. In Darfur we didn't
keep peace. We kept genocide. It is really sad to say that, but
most of the peacekeeping missions today, they are keeping wars;
they are keeping conflicts running since 1948.
If you look at Kashmir, what the U.N. is doing, what is
called generally frozen conflicts. Whether it is Kashmir,
Cyprus, or Western Sahara, these are timebombs. We have seen
recently a major crisis in Western Sahara when Mr. Ban Ki Moon
walked into the region and, without consulting, without
visiting Morocco, and completely it has formed into a major
crisis with the polisario, threatening to go back to holding
arms.
These are considered frozen conflicts that the U.N. has
been keeping for so many decades, but these are timebombs. I
think what I want to say here is that we should go back to the
U.N. keeping peace, but bringing in peace first in order to
keep it, instead of waging wars and keeping wars ongoing.
Thank you.
Mr. Schaefer. I just want to echo what she said about the
type of missions that the U.N. traditionally engaged in versus
what we are engaged in today, very different operations, very
different circumstances. And there should be an underlying
question about whether the U.N. is actually the most suitable
vehicle for engaging in those types of operations.
If you take a look at Mali, when did the U.N. get involved?
It got involved after the French intervention. So, the French
got in there, they intervened, and, then, they handed it as
quickly as they possibly could off to the U.N. Well, there
should be an expectation that, if the French considered it
enough in their interest to intervene in the first place, that
maybe they should have a responsibility and an interest in
seeing it through to the point where a U.N. operation actually
could responsibly assume those tasks.
On longstanding operations, I agree. A lot of these
operations involve situations that are potentially fractious
and could reignite, but you also have to question yourself,
what have we been doing? You have a U.N. operation in Kashmir
since 1949. You have had Cyprus since the 1960s. You have got
Lebanon since the 1970s; the Syria operation, UNDOF, since the
1970s; MINURSO since 1991.
After two, three, four, five, six decades, you have to ask
yourself, when are we going to see progress being made toward
resolution rather than just keeping the parties from open
warfare? We need to be focused on that part of the equation. If
you could do that, you would have more resources for current
operations because the troops that are tied up there could be
moved someplace else, and the resources that are tied up there
could be moved and applied to more current crises.
And the final question or the final point I want to make is
on U.S. training of peacekeepers. I think the U.S. has a very
important role in training. I think it is very important that
we do that. I think it is very important that the U.S., in
particular, do that because our standards and our expectations
are well laid out and it is what we expect. We want to make
sure that others hear that message and they implement it in
terms of their own operations.
But a key problem, Mr. Hannum mentioned that there are
200,000 that have been trained under this program. Where are
they? There is insufficient retention of the people that we
train. They go in; they go out, or the training lapses and they
don't adhere to those standards. Retention is a critical point
of this.
If we are actually trying to make sure that we have
peacekeepers available that are trained to the standards that
we expect, we need to make sure that those peacekeepers are
actually there, retained and available for deployment. So, that
is a key element of this that I think needs to be emphasized.
Mr. Cicilline. If I may, Mr. Chairman, one more question?
Okay.
So, there have been a number of suggestions made about
things we could advocate for at the U.N., maybe a different
resolution that makes some of this compulsory rather than
advisory. And I think recognizing it is an international
organization, that may be difficult, but it is certainly
something we should consider, and a number of other reforms
that have been suggested and a number of things that I think
that we could suggest or press the Secretary-General to do.
But my final question is, are there any actions that you
think Congress could take to accelerate the reforms that you
have all testified today or any other action you would take
that would help respond to this very serious problem that we
see with respect to the conduct of the peacekeepers?
If you had one thing you would recommend Congress to do?
Mr. Schaefer. Well, we have addressed a number of issues
here today. OIOS independence is something that we know a great
deal about, how to do an inspector general unit and make it
independent. OIOS was established because of congressional
withholding. I think that we should say exactly what we mean by
an independent inspector general equivalent there and how that
needs to be implemented. I would endorse using financial
withholding if the U.N. proves reluctant on that. It is
obviously necessary.
In terms of sexual exploitation and abuse, I think that the
U.S. should go to the Security Council and demand a compulsory
resolution saying that troop-contributing countries have to do
A, B, and C, which they have endorsed and which the Secretary-
General has endorsed. And if they don't follow through with
that, then, again, I think congressional action is merited
because the U.N. is 193 member states, but one thing they do
listen to is financial incentives. And we have seen that
repeatedly in the past, not just with the OIOS, but with the
budgetary process in the 1980s, the Helms-Biden changes and
reforms, and over and over and again.
I have spoken with Ambassador Wallace. I know he testified
differently when he was the Bush administration, but privately
he thinks that financial withholding has a very significant
impact on the receptiveness of various reforms in terms of U.N.
bureaucratic procedures and changes.
Ms. Elbasri. I think for the U.N. to address all these
issues, the truth has to come out, which we have seen in my
case and almost every case, the OIOS is incapable of carrying
out independent investigations. So, we would definitely press
for a truly independent investigative entity that doesn't
report actually to the Secretary-General/Secretariat, but,
rather, to the member states. I think that is a core
recommendation.
But, also, I agree with Mr. Schaefer on the financial
incentive. It is very important to help implement that law
because at some point we have to show that we are serious about
the laws that are passed and we are serious about, you know,
holding the U.N. accountable for mistreating whistleblowers,
which have become the main channel of knowledge/information
about what really goes on in the U.N. So, we can't afford these
retaliations, these continued retaliations against them. It is
very important to take action there.
And it is also very important to look at the State
Department certification process to see what is going wrong.
Mr. Gallo. Thank you.
And I would also add my voice to the withholding side of
the argument, reluctantly as though it may be, and, also, that
OIOS has to be replaced with a truly independent body. We have
been focusing on the peacekeeping troops, which present a
peculiar problem because they are subject to their own national
disciplines.
I would draw your attention to a report which I actually
worked on, I believe it was the later half of 2013, which was
an analysis of what was reported to OIOS in terms of sexual
exploitation and abuse cases. What I found was that the numbers
of reports were coming in equally, such that they were split,
more or less, 50/50 between the civilian staff and the
peacekeepers.
Now, in a typical large peacekeeping mission, you may have
20,000 relatively-disciplined peacekeeping troops and less than
2,000 civilian staff and police personnel. So, if you are
getting equal numbers of reports from there, the problem is, in
fact, much, much more acute amongst the civilian staff.
And there is something which can be changed and I believe
should be changed as a policy decision. That is the waiver of
privileges and immunities. The system in place at the moment
relies on the privilege and immunities being waived at the end
of the process.
When OIOS carries out an investigation into a rape, for
example, what are they actually investigating? They are not
investigating the rape as a criminal offense. They are
investigating whether that constituted a breach of the staff
rules for which that staff member may be fired. That can take,
at the speed at which the U.N. likes to move investigations,
that could take 5 years. At that point, and only at that point,
will the organization consider waiving privileges and
immunities, so that that staff member can be referred to the
national authorities for criminal prosecution.
By that time, the witnesses have relocated, can't be found.
There is no DNA evidence. And where, in fact, is the subject
himself? He has separated from the U.N. and has returned to his
home country. So, you are giving a problem to a country like
South Sudan; ``Go and apply to the Government of Poland for
extradition to this guy who no longer lives there and has
probably retired to Spain or somewhere else.''
One of the things I believe that should be done under a
reformed investigation agency is that the privileges and
immunities should be waived at the point in the investigation
when reasonable grounds to establish that a criminal offense
has taken place. At that point, the matter becomes a criminal
matter and it can be referred for criminal prosecution.
There is still an ongoing role for monitoring for human
rights abuses and legal defense and everything else that the
U.N. can do, but, under normal circumstances everywhere else in
the world, if you have a conflict between a civil action and a
criminal action, it is the criminal which takes priority, and
the U.N. is doing it the other way around. If there is a rape
case, it should be investigated as a criminal case first.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Hannum. Thank you very much.
Sorry. Just one other point on withholding, since there are
several recommendations. Withholding is not new; it has been
around. And again, this is something that Democratic and
Republican administrations have been opposed to. The Bush
administration was very clear when there was a bill. Its
central premise was withholding, and they were against it.
In terms of Mr. Wallace and what he said privately,
publicly I mean he could have said anything he wanted, and
publicly he said it would not be wise or beneficial to use
withholding funds to implement change. So, it is not something
that has worked well before. We are best placed if we are
paying our dues and, then, at the table and pressuring.
In terms of your question, Congressman, on what Congress
can do, I think the big thing, again, is the U.S. has no
appetite for the U.S. to provide troops. The U.S. can provide
technical expertise. It can also provide enabling assets. And I
think that is key.
A good example, I was in South Sudan in August and talking
with U.S.-U.N. folks, and they were talking about medevac and
casualty evacuation. And due to a lack of assets, one of the
problems is the U.N. does not have a capability to medevac many
of its soldiers, meaning someone could go out, be shot in the
leg, and not be picked up for 4 days. You can imagine in the
U.S. that would be laughed at, if you couldn't provide medevac
for soldiers.
So, what this means in practice is, then, there are fewer
missions that go out and deploy. And so, you do have this
hunkering down, which is a major problem with the U.N.
And I asked them, ``Well, what are we talking about?'' And
the U.S. person said four helicopters. Four helicopters would
make a huge difference in our ability to go out there and
forward-deploy. That means protect civilians and not just kind
of hunker down.
So, that is something absolutely this is not a huge ticket
item, but this is something, I think when the U.S. talks about
its assistance, it should really look at whether it is
helicopters. And there are partnerships with the National Guard
that exist where it can be done and vehicles. These are ways
that the U.S. could make a big difference.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Just a few followup questions and final questions. And
thank you again for your time, your expertise. It really is
helpful.
We are thinking of drafting a bill, and would invite your
maximum input as to what it might look like, to try to
encourage significant whistleblower reform at the United
Nations. Simultaneous with today, the Foreign Relations
Committee on the Senate side, of course, is holding a hearing.
We are very, very concerned about this. So, again, any
particular thoughts you might have over and above what you have
included in your testimonies and your responses would be
greatly appreciated.
Let me just ask a few final questions. Without objection,
testimony, written testimony, by Beatrice Edwards from the
Government Accountability Project will be included in the
record.
She points out, very rightly, that whistleblowers are both
important and vulnerable agents of accountability. And on the
sexual exploitation and abuse in the missions, she points out
that allegations are underreported for many reasons, cites some
of those reasons. She says the official data grossly
underestimates the problem and, at worst, they actively
misrepresent the entire issue, which is a very, very
significant indictment of the validity of what is happening on
the ground.
And then, she points out that cronyism and nepotism is
especially pronounced in its oversight offices. These personnel
constitute networks through which managers protect each other
and themselves from accountability. Relatives and friends
occupy high-level positions where they also avail themselves of
the exemptions joined by U.N. officials from external scrutiny.
Your thoughts on that?
Secondly, I do believe sanctions should be prudently and
judiciously applied in our civil rights law certainly and any
other time we mean business. I am the prime author of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which was opposed, most of
it, by the Clinton administration, although Bill Clinton signed
it at the end. But I held the hearings and we heard from
Secretary Koh, Harold Koh, who didn't even want the TIP Report.
He just wanted the human rights reports to have enhanced
reporting on trafficking, no TIP office, and no sanctions.
My belief is--and, thankfully, it was a bipartisan belief--
was that you have got to have a penalty phase, particularly in
human rights law, or else everybody will be onboard, but
implementation will be less than stellar, if not outright
disappointing. Thankfully, we do have a broad consensus now as
to why the Trafficking Victims Protection Act should be fully
embraced, including its sanctions regime.
But, again, I think--and I take your point--withholding
should be used. You would disagree with this, but I think it
did get us to the OIOS, I believe.
I remember when Dick Thornburgh testified in the 1980s, the
former Attorney General. I was at those hearings. And he could
not have been clearer of the need for inspector generals that
are robust and independent, which still we are striving in some
way to achieve, which has not happened.
So, you might want to speak to this statement, again, by
Beatrice Edwards.
Dr. Elbasri, your third point, what would an independent
judicial body look like? Maybe any or all of you might want to
touch on that as well, because I think that should be a policy
goal for these whistleblowers, and just to bring accountability
to the U.N.
Your fourth point about the U.N. DPKO being run by French
leaders and the need for reform there, if you could elaborate
on that as well? Obviously, Kofi Annan had that job once, and
we have Rwanda. As a matter of fact, I even chaired hearings
when we had the famous fax and Lieutenant-General Dallaire as
well, who talked about what could have been, had they only been
responsive to what was set before them in terms of an impending
genocide in Rwanda.
But why that would make a difference? I think you are
suggesting in your testimony it ought to be us; it should be
the United States perhaps to take that. If you could elaborate
on that?
And then, on military training, in 2003 and 2005, I did the
reauthorizations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. We
put in provisions to provide minimum standards for peacekeeper,
how is a country doing or not doing relevant to its military?
Are they adhering to a code of conduct that does not become
predatory or facilitating trafficking?
We also had language in there dealing with peacekeeping and
what is happening in all of the potential peacekeeping
deploying bodies, from NATO to the U.N., to African Union, to
others.
I was in Brazil after our law went into effect. I met with
a number of Brazilian leaders on TIP in Brasilia. I kept saying
to them, ``What are you teaching your troops before they are
deployed?'' So, I finally got the packet, and it was an hour-
long ``this is what trafficking is.'' And it was informative;
it was interesting. But it didn't have the sense of these are
what the victims look like; this is what happens.
And I would say, parenthetically, George Bush did an
Executive order. And it actually came about because of a Fox
News reporter who literally walked into my office and said,
``Take a look at this tape.'' And he had pictures of American
service personnel in Seoul, South Korea, outside of the so-
called ``juicy bars'' with protection forces outside and inside
were indigenous South Koreans, women from the Philippines, and
even Russia, who told him on camera, ``We can't leave here.
They have taken our passports,'' if they were foreigners, ``and
we are slaves.''
Thankfully, Joseph Schmitz, the IG for the Department of
Defense, at our request, did a global assessment focused first
on Kosovo and South Korea and came back with a scathing
indictment of our own military. And then, Bush did a zero-
tolerance and changed the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Now I say all that because our military gets it. Whether or
not they always implement it, I think it is a good record. But
anything can stand improvement.
But we need to share those best practices much more
robustly than we do. I think the TIP office is made up of an
extraordinarily dedicated group of Foreign Service Officers and
leaders who can share that expertise with countries.
And I am not sure, because I have asked--maybe you have
better insights--does the U.N., does our U.S. Mission in New
York really utilize TIP for training, especially of these
peacekeepers, before, maybe even during, and then, after action
with deployment?
Mr. Hannum. Just a quick point there. Mr. Chairman, under
your leadership on the trafficking bill, I think you are
exactly right that this is an opportunity. We should be, in
terms of the pressure and from what we outlined a little bit in
the op-ed, it is that it is troops with widespread and
systematic abuse, but we should also be looking at other areas
and, then, putting pressure on those countries. There are
watchlists. There are watchlists that use rape as a weapon of
war, children soldiers. We should be using these and making
sure that countries with terrible track records are not being
pulled into peacekeeping.
In terms of the whistleblowing, I will turn it over to
these folks who obviously know it better than I.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ms. Elbasri. On the independence of judiciary, the reason
it was called for by the governments that come to these
projects, by other organizations, by many whistleblowers, is
that the fact that the judiciary at the U.N. is not working,
just like other institutions. I think that GAP had documented
that over 400 cases, only 4 percent of the cases were
recognized by the U.N. as retaliation cases. Even then, nothing
had happened. There was no recourse for these whistleblowers.
So, it is exactly like the investigation. Whistleblowers
need an independent body to look at their case and, also, to
have access to independent justice in order to address the
wrongdoing suffered by the U.N. It is a very important cause.
The second issue--and I am glad that you raised this
question, this followup question--about the reason why I
strongly believe that the United States should take care of the
DPKO and take over the French leadership which has started in
1997. The reason why I am saying this is that I have observed
and studied the military doctrine under which the peacekeeping
is operating since then, since 1997. It is not a U.N.
peacekeeping doctrine. It is a French military doctrine.
And what is the doctrine about? It is about, first,
renouncing to the impartiality, which is a very important
principle for the U.N. It is also about reversing the use of
force, which used to be limited to self-defense. But, under the
French military doctrine, it is the use of force beyond self-
defense. In many cases it is actually an aggressive action.
The other principle is sending peacekeepers in areas where
there is no peace to keep. This is called, in terms of
peacekeeping, the gray areas between peace and war. Frankly,
these are combat zones.
So, what we have witnessed since 1997, when the French took
over DPKO, is a militarization of peacekeeping. You look at
every single peacekeeping mission that was deployed since then,
since 1997, and you have two things.
First of all, it is super-militarized. We are no longer
talking about blue helmets bringing peace to these areas and
comforting the population, observing the ceasefire, et cetera.
We are talking about peacekeepers who are going after gangs,
rebels, siding with governments, and giving up on every single
principle of the peacekeeping.
We are also seeing something else. Most of the peacekeeping
operations that were deployed recently, they were deployed in
what is usually called as ``sphere of influence.'' Well, if you
are a Moroccan-American national like myself, we look at it as
post-colonial deployment.
Most of the people are extremely upset about the fact that
France continues to act like the gendarme of Africa. What we
have witnessed since 1997 is a country that is not looking
after the interest of the member states of the U.N., but,
rather, after the interest of France, at the expense of
peacekeeping in general.
So, we ended up, of course, with DRC, the Congo, with the
regime change, and the U.N. mandates in the Ivory Coast. We
ended up in fighting war that the U.N. has nothing to do with,
which is terrorism in Mali. I think we are actually moving into
a much more dangerous situation if we don't put an end to this
trend. People in Africa, countries that are plagued with these
wars, they don't want to see a former colonial power imposing a
will on the population, siding with dictatorships. And what is
of most interest is that this affects the image of the U.N. and
peacekeeping.
So, it is time for me to see the U.S. really reflect about
18 years of a French leadership of peacekeeping. It is time to
draw a line and say, ``Is this what we want?'' Right now, as
you already said, we are sending peacekeepers to combat zones,
and this is not what the U.N. peacekeeping is about.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Go ahead.
Mr. Gallo. Mr. Chairman, you asked about cronyism. The word
is absolutely. You cannot have senior people in the department
who are supposed to be investigating fraud and misconduct who
have been found to have retaliated, and been found to tamper
with evidence and investigations. You cannot seriously expect
members to report anything to them. It is simply not going to
happen.
The question of cronyism and everything I believe can be
addressed by the imposition of an independent body which
reports. So, you have the investigation agency reporting to the
General Assembly. That has to be done essentially on a weekly
basis.
You asked what would such a body look like. The monitoring
that it requires to be done is essentially in three areas. One
of them is in the intake of investigations and the intake of
complaints. Now at the moment we have a very highly-fragmented
system. The previous director, Mr. Stefanovic, made enormous
efforts himself to try to impose a single portal for receiving
complaints. That is not done. There is no reason why it
shouldn't be possible in this day and age for all complaints to
come into one single point. The system was actually purchased
and is in place. It is just there is a reluctance to use it.
The reason there is a reluctance to use it is because it makes
it very difficult to make cases disappear. So, the intake of
the investigations is something. Of course, the approval as to
what is going to be investigated and what can be bid has to be
subject to oversight.
Mr. Smith. Is confidentiality assured or is it compromised
in cases, if somebody does make a complaint? How sure are they
that it is not being shared by email or any other way with
other people in the building?
Mr. Gallo. I am not sure that is a major problem. I mean,
it can be, but it is very difficult to answer on a general
basis. The reality is in most cases it is fairly simple to
identify who the complainant was who is really the aggrieved
party. So, there isn't a major investigative activity to find
out who to retaliate against.
As I say, the second issue is the approval of reports as to
what is going forward and disciplined decisions, the decision
to actually charge someone with misconduct. Now at the moment
that is vested in the Assistant Secretary-General of Human
Resources. And, I have seen cases where staff members have been
investigated and found to have received bribes and actually
just been admonished for it and given a letter and told not to
do it again. Well, that is not actually a disincentive for
anything.
But these things can be done, and there is, I believe, a
compromise which would, I think, satisfy everyone that the
investigation function can be replaced in such a way that it
does not require grievous withholding of the budget. If you can
give me a week or 10 days, I would like to get back to you on
that one.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Schaefer. And the issue of confidentiality, I believe
with the Anders Kompass case, the Ethics Office was complicit
in an effort to try to identify him and retaliate against him.
So, the independence and the confidentiality was certainly a
problem in that case.
On the broader issue of resourcing and protection of
civilians, the U.N. did a study in 2014 which looked into U.N.
peacekeeping operations with a mandate to protect civilians.
And they found that, of 570 reported incidences, the
peacekeepers did not respond in 406, or 80 percent of those
incidents where civilians were attacked.
I don't believe helicopters are going to respond or fix
that problem. That is a lack of will and a lack of dedication
or a lack of willingness to put themselves in harm's way to
protect civilians on the part of the peacekeepers and the
troop-contributing countries.
Mr. Smith. Is that because the mandate is not robust
enough?
Mr. Schaefer. No, the mandate specifically instructs them
to protect civilians. So, the instruction is there. The troops
themselves do not meet that mandate. Because this was only on
those missions where there is a specific instruction from the
Security Council within the mandate to protect civilians. So,
this is not a situation where, if only we had better equipment,
we would have been able to protect civilians. That is not the
case here. This is a case where there is a distinct lack of
willingness on the part of the troops to fulfill that part of
the mandate, and that is the core of the problem.
The troop-contributing countries got together and they said
in the Kigali Principles, ``We are going to fix this problem.''
I haven't seen any real evidence that they have fixed it, and I
would be really interested to get a detailed report on exactly
what has been done and what the real-world impact of those
principles has been on the missions where this problem was
reported on the part of the U.N.
Ms. Elbasri. Very briefly, the other reason why these
peacekeepers who were deployed under what are called the
``robust peacekeeping missions,'' whether it is in Mali, in
DRC, or in Liberia, is that they were just not able to be
everywhere. Most of the attacks took place in places where the
peacekeepers didn't have a presence.
And this takes us to the other problem. We are giving
people the illusion that the peacekeepers can protect
civilians, but, in reality, they just cannot. They cannot
protect all civilians everywhere and every how. It is
impossible. Only a state can.
Peacekeepers, even if they have the best helicopters in
there, they have the best-trained peacekeepers, if they have
the best willingness to do so, they cannot be everywhere. If
you deploy them in a place like Darfur, they just can't
operate. Why? Because in order to shoot at the government
forces, they need to have the authorization from the
government. So, this is just a surreal situation.
Look at every peacekeeping operation. In Darfur, it is
probably the best example. We are sending peacekeepers to
protect civilians from the government which is protecting the
peacekeepers. It just doesn't make any sense. It is impossible
for the peacekeepers to protect all civilians from a government
that protects them.
So, I think the whole framework of peacekeeping is
completely flawed. It is time to be honest about it. It is time
to define what is peacekeeping, what the peacekeeping can do,
what it cannot do. They cannot protect all civilians. All the
history that we have witnessed in Rwanda, in Srebrenica, and
also in Somalia showed that. Whether the peacekeepers are best
equipped, the most robust, or if they are weak, you know, not
prepared, they just cannot protect all civilians. That is why I
go back to what I said. What we need is peace before
peacekeepers.
Thank you.
Mr. Hannum. If I could just make one other point, Dr.
Elbasri and Brett made some very excellent points and
fundamental points about peacekeeping. And there is a host of
challenges, and there was a major report just done by the U.N.,
the high-level report calling out some of these.
And there are challenges with protection of civilians. But
I do want to point out that there have been studies looking at
peacekeepers and protection of civilians. There was a 2013
study by American researchers and Swedish researchers that
looked at this, and looked at what is the difference between a
force not there, a small force, and a sufficiently-large force.
And it found that if there is either a small force or no force,
that it works out to about 100 civilians a month who are
killed. If there is a U.N. force of 8,000, that number goes to
two a month.
U.N. peacekeepers are not perfect by any stretch, but they
do often serve an incredibly important role on protection of
civilians. And there have been a number of other studies about
reducing incidents of civil war. So, while it is not perfect, I
do want to say that many peacekeepers do serve honorably and
make a huge difference in the places where they are deployed.
Mr. Smith. When you talked about reporting to member states
as opposed to the 38th floor, in our WIPO hearing it was made
abundantly clear that the WIPO General Assembly Chairman,
Ambassador Duque of Colombia, has a report. The United States,
our Mission, as well as that of Switzerland have asked that it
be released, and we are still waiting.
It gets into the area of the theater of the absurd because
it only brings, I think, dishonor on those who cover these
things up, as well as it hurts real victims, whistleblowers who
are trying to do the right thing for the right reasons.
So, how do we get the U.N. to change that kind of modus
operandi? Why hasn't Ambassador Duque released that report? I
mean, does it implicate people, do you think? That would be
speculation.
But it is a systemic problem, and how do you compel?
Getting back again to the idea of withholding, there were a
number of bipartisan initiatives that led to a huge so-called
arrearage back in the 1990s that we allegedly owed. And one of
those was for UNPROFOR, which had a miserable, miserable--let
me say it again--a miserable record, a very bad mandate. It led
to Srebrenica and other safe haven debacles. And yet,
contributing countries were demanding that we get that money,
including the UK, to them for the UNPROFOR deployment. And yet,
we withheld it, I think out of very valid reasons.
Yes, Mr. Schaefer?
Mr. Schaefer. Let me just say that reporting to the General
Assembly is not going to be a panacea on this at all. If you
take a look back at a very concrete example, after Oil for
Food, the U.S. was able to use that scandal to establish
something called the Procurement Task Force, which was an
independent unit to go after procurement fraud in the United
Nations.
They were very successful. Their efforts resulted in the
conviction of several prominent U.N. senior officials. But
because those officials were of certain nationalities, in the
case of the Procurement Task, Russian and Singaporean, those
two countries led an effort in the General Assembly to prevent
the reauthorization of the Procurement Task Force. They
eliminated it because there was resentment by the governments
whose nationals were found to be criminally complicit in
corrupt schemes at the United Nations.
So, just reporting to the General Assembly doesn't remove
the politics from this, which is one of the reasons why I think
the State Department needs to have its own dedicated unit for
international organizations in its Inspector General office. At
least then we can know that you will have some sort of external
effort to inspect, and the cooperation with that unit needs to
be made----
Mr. Smith. How do they overcome, if you don't mind me
interrupting, the U.N.'s assertion that we have no right to any
of those documents, which they will assert?
Mr. Schaefer. They do that with the GAO now.
Mr. Smith. I know they do it with the GAO, right.
Mr. Schaefer. Again, this goes back to financial levers.
How do you force the U.N. to comply with a lot of this? And
that is, if you don't do it, then we will actually withhold
money.
This is one of the reasons why the U.S. Government won't
follow through on the whistleblower protections, is because
they know that the organizations want the money. They don't
want to create discomfort or distrust or ruffle feathers in the
organization. So, they give the waivers.
But, if you make financial contributions complicit on
cooperation in this area, then I think that you will see
cooperation. They very much want the resources. The U.S. is the
largest contributor. It is the biggest lever that we have. And
if we want to see external oversight of the U.N.'s operations,
then that is the way to go. Otherwise, you will very much see
resistance.
Thank you.
Ms. Elbasri. I just want to echo what Mr. Schaefer just
said. It is very important to stick to the law and also show
that, if the U.N. doesn't conduct itself as it should, there
should be a penalty. This has worked everywhere. I don't see
why it wouldn't work for the U.N. We haven't tried it. So,
let's first try it and see. And I am pretty convinced that they
will take the law, but also whatever recommendation and
obligations they are under, they will take it much more
seriously.
In general, I think the problem with the U.N. right now, it
is acting like the emperor. They feel, I mean senior managers
at the U.N. Have you seen any senior U.N. official, whether the
Secretary-General or other ever resign or pushed to resign? No.
Why? Because we treat them like the Catholic Church before
everyone knew what was going on. I think this is a problem.
I mean, this is one of my colleagues and a U.N.
whistleblower who made this amazing comparison. You know, if
you compare the U.N. to the Catholic Church, I think we are
exactly in the same situation. We are just starting to see, we
are just starting to talk about what is wrong. For quite a long
time, we held it as something sacred, as something taboo that
no one wanted to talk about, because we all love the U.N. As a
whistleblower, I did what I did because I believe in a better
U.N., because I believe in a better world. A better world will
not start until we fix the U.N.
I know that to fix it we have to be truthful. We have to
say the painful truth that very few people are ready today to
hear. I believe that penalty, discipline, taking a firm stand
is the way to go.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Again, getting back to the WIPO, one of the
speculative conclusions that we drew as to why this report has
not been, it is to protect the Director General of the WIPO.
Well, if that is not the case, just release it.
But let me just get my final question, and you have been
very gracious with your time, and I am very grateful for that.
What happens to the victims? You, Mr. Gallo, mentioned that a
number of the sexual exploitation and abuse cases are kept low,
but they filter through the local conduct and discipline teams,
which obviously if that is happening, that hurts the victims.
When I was in the DR Congo, I kept saying, ``What happened
to those little girls? Where are they? Are they getting any
kind of assistance, help, compassion, empathy? Or are they just
left to fend for themselves somewhere?'' Do you know? Does
anybody know what is happening?
Mr. Gallo. I believe the ultimate condemnation on that, Mr.
Chairman, is if you look at the number of officials of the
U.N., particularly the Office of Legal Affairs, that knew that
there were children being sexually abused in the Central
African Republic and did nothing--not only did they do nothing,
but they obstructed the French in the attempt to investigate
it. That, to me, is just shocking and intolerable.
From the point of view of this question, if a complainant
can actually get the complaint as far as the OIOS, I think that
is probably half the battle. What you are seeing now with the
increase in attention focused on the Central African Republic,
I do not believe that that is a function of decrease of
discipline. I believe this situation is just coming to public
attention because the press are interested in it, and the press
are getting it, raising the attention, such that OIOS cannot
ignore it.
But the numbers are still tiny when you look at the total
number. I think there were 27 complaints from the entire world
last year. And the only reason that there were 108 found in one
province of the Central African Republic alone is because
somebody went out and looked.
There has been no willingness, there has been no proactive
enforcement. Nobody actually goes out. Neither the conduct and
discipline teams or anyone else, OIOS does not have the staff
to actually go out trying to police these issues.
And that is why I said, if the staff don't trust the
investigation service, the whole thing is falling apart at that
point. One of the questions that I don't like to be asked is
when staff members ask me, ``Should I report this?'' What am I
supposed to say? Then they ask me, ``Will I be retaliated
against for this?''
The likelihood of you being retaliated against is in direct
proportion to the importance of what you are reporting. Someone
who is going to report the fuel pump attendant who takes a
gallon of kerosene home to sell for beer money or to fuel his
stove at home, he is going to get prosecuted. They are going to
throw him to the wolves, but nobody is interested in looking at
senior officials who are probably bleeding the system dry for
millions and millions of dollars.
And what concerns me, and has always concerned me, is not
so much what OIOS is investigating, but what they are not
investigating. This comes back to this question of the intake
function. All right? The number of financial cases that are
rejected on the grounds that that is not misconduct, it is a
management issue. ST/SGB/273, which is the mandate which covers
the mandate for the Investigation Division, includes an
investigation of mismanagement and abuse of resources. Nobody
can remember the last time there was an investigation into
mismanagement of the abuse of resources.
If you can at least get that far, if people will copy
reports to their permanent missions, or whatever, I believe you
are going to see a difference. I believe that is why the
centralized reporting system is different, because I think you
are going to see very significant differences in the statistics
of what is reported if everything is monitored and everything
is controlled because there is an online tracking system for
it.
Mr. Hannum. Yes, I can just echo Mr. Gallo's comments on
the just outrageous delays and inaction by the U.N. I can't
speak to everything he said.
To your specific question, though, can you find out the
victims, is there support, yes. In the Secretary-General's
report, in terms of the last report which doesn't include the
most recent allegations, but it had the number of victims, the
number who are receiving assistance. I think it was at 13. I
would be happy to provide it to you.
So, there are currently victim services provided. That is
money from the mission that goes to local providers who, then,
provide the care.
One of the things the Secretary-General called for was a
Victim Trust Fund, which could basically bolster that, provide
more resources. That is currently set up. And actually, for
those peacekeepers that are kicked out and their payments are
withheld, that money is, then, used for the Trust Fund.
There are a number of just important questions on kind of
the breadth of services that will be required. The General
Assembly will be having that debate in the next couple of
weeks. I know this is something that Jane Holl Lute is looking
very closely at.
And it is something where, in order for that Trust Fund to
be robust, it is something where member states would need to
look at kind of strengthening it. But there are certainly some
services provided. There needs to be more. But I would be happy
to provide it to you.
Mr. Schaefer. Just a few concluding points. One is that
there is a provision in most U.N. peacekeeping operations. They
sign the SOFA, which provides for a Standing Claims Commission
to be set up. These aren't set up. And so, there is really no
recourse for a lot of people to go and actually lodge
complaints for damages that are done to them by the
peacekeeping presence or by the peacekeeping forces themselves.
This should be mandatory. It should be an automatic step.
As soon as a mission is set up, those Standing Claims
Commissions should be set up as well. The U.N. has provisions
inside of it that sort of allow monetary damages and they cap
them at a certain level. But in terms of instances of
criminality where someone is raped and they are seeking
compensation for the criminal act, I think it is important to
tie the compensation to the perpetrator.
If you go to a U.N. Trust Fund, what message are you
sending to the units themselves? You are saying that the member
states, or whoever decides to contribute to the Trust Fund, are
going to be paying the damages that you potentially commit. The
troop-contributing country or the troops themselves, the person
that committed the crime needs to be held responsible for the
compensation for their actions. And that I think is an
important thing. It would increase incentives for discipline,
self-discipline, but also discipline by the troop-contributing
country to make sure that their own troops don't misbehave in
the way that we have been seeing.
Thank you.
Mr. Hannum. Just to follow up, I wasn't saying that the
Victim Trust Fund should be the end-all. Absolutely, they
should be punished. I am saying, at the very least, they should
provide some services because in some places the justice is
quite slow.
Mr. Smith. Yes. Thank you.
Ms. Elbasri. Just about the question what happened to the
victims, I think this question should be asked of the French.
Unfortunately, it has been now almost 2 years since they
learned about the allegations. We were told that they started
an investigation immediately, which was in July 2014. And so
far, no French peacekeeper has been held to account. So, what
kind of an example is France giving the organization when it
comes to such serious crimes? So, it goes back to the
leadership of France today that needs to be questioned.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Again, thank you so much for yours very, very
wise counsel and insights, and insightful commentary. Your
thoughts on what a bill, if we can craft such a thing, would
look like would be very much welcomed. And thank you again for
your extraordinary service. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the RecordNotice deg.
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations