[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SOUTH SUDAN'S PROSPECTS FOR
PEACE AND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 27, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-208
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina KAREN BASS, California
CURT CLAWSON, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Donald Booth, Special Envoy to Sudan and South
Sudan, U.S. Department of State................................ 6
Mr. Bob Leavitt, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency
for International Development.................................. 18
Mr. John Prendergast, founding director, Enough Project.......... 41
Mr. Matt Wells, program officer, Center for Civilians in Conflict 53
Luka Biong Deng Kuol, Ph.D., global fellow, Peace Research
Institute Oslo................................................. 64
Augustino Ting Mayai, Ph.D., director of research, The Sudd
Institute...................................................... 86
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Donald Booth: Prepared statement................... 9
Mr. Bob Leavitt: Prepared statement.............................. 20
Mr. John Prendergast: Prepared statement......................... 44
Mr. Matt Wells: Prepared statement............................... 56
Luka Biong Deng Kuol, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................. 67
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 100
Hearing minutes.................................................. 101
Mr. John Prendergast: Information on the Frontier Security Group. 102
SOUTH SUDAN'S PROSPECTS FOR
PEACE AND SECURITY
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. And good afternoon to everybody and thank you
for being here.
On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became the
world's newest nation. In a referendum held in January of that
year, nearly 99 percent of the population voted to become
independent from the Republic of Sudan. Although there are
those who felt the South Sudanese were not prepared for
independence, the people of that country believed otherwise and
rejoiced in severing their ties to the regime in Khartoum after
many years of war and efforts to undermine the South.
Unfortunately, the people's rejoicing was short-lived. The
lack of infrastructure and transparent governance frustrated
any hope of progress for this fledgling nation. Despite
significant arable land, agricultural production did not
increase largely due to a lack of transportation and power
infrastructure needed which also prevented significant mining
or manufacturing operations.
Nearly 5 years after independence, South Sudan remains
heavily dependent on its oil production which represents as
much as 98 percent of its revenue. As the price of oil has
fallen worldwide, South Sudan became the producer earning the
least from each barrel of oil, estimated between $9 and $12 a
barrel. Although an increase in agricultural would have helped
bridge the gap, the displacement of so many farmers, the
continued insecurity, and the recent spread of violence to the
agricultural heartland prevents any benefits agriculture could
have provided. Consequently, South Sudan has projected that a
negative growth rate this year of nearly 8 percent.
More than 2.4 million people have been displaced by the
conflict just since December 2013; 706,600 of them are now
refugees in neighboring Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya.
United Nations officials estimate that more 6 million people
need humanitarian aid and nearly a quarter of the country's
population, or 2.8 million, are facing life-threatening hunger.
Bob Leavitt, Deputy Assistant Administrator for USAID will
testify today that ``half of all Sudanese--meaning 6.1 million
people--are in need of humanitarian assistance or protection
this year.'' And, ``Over half of all children aged 6 to 15--or
1.8 million children--are not in school in South Sudan, the
highest proportion in any country.''
Efforts to address the needs of the South Sudanese people
have been blocked by various fighting forces--at least 52
relief workers have been killed since the civil war began--and
according to United Nations there are numerous reports of
harassment, threats and active hostility toward aid workers.
Apparently, targeted attacks to prevent aid from reaching
certain communities have meant that far too many people in need
of help cannot be helped even in U.N. compounds which have also
come under attack.
Greg Simpkins and I were scheduled to visit South Sudan on
a trip that unfortunately coincided with the eruption of the
violence in December 2013, so that trip was cancelled at the
request of the State Department. But for more than 20 months
since, fighting between forces led by Salva Kiir and former
Vice President Riek Machar continued without stoppage despite
several ceasefire agreements. In fact, the targeting of
populations and oil facilities became worse the closer the
signing of a final agreement came as both sides competed for
territory before agreeing to halt hostilities.
Unspeakable human rights violations have occurred as
documented by the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South
Sudan, and U.N. reports have corroborated that. The interethnic
violence, Dinka-Nuer conflict, has now devolved into
interethnic animosity involving clans within larger ethnic
groups.
Matt Wells of the Center for Civilians in Conflict includes
a very touching and sad, tragic interview with Rebecca, a 29-
year-old victim who lost her husband. She says in part, ``[t]he
government soldiers came in and were looking for Nuers; they
killed all the Nuers they found. When the [armed opposition]
attacked, they killed the Dinkas and other tribes . . . [o]ur
dead relatives will never come back. But we need to know [those
responsible]. Then we can decide to forgive them or send them
to prison. I want to know why they killed innocent civilians,
why did they kill our children,'' she says. ``The government
must recognize our suffering [and] rebuild our homes. Once [our
homes are rebuilt,] our children [are back in] school, we have
medicine, and the guns have stopped banging in my head, I will
have [what I need.]''
We should be honest that both President Salva Kiir and
returning Vice President Machar don't control all the forces
still in the field. The burgeoning of militias into the
national army has produced units more loyal to their commanders
than to the government. Meanwhile, Machar's hastily assembled
rebellion also lacks strict chain of command, therefore
achieving a lasting end to the fighting will take more than a
peace accord that has been signed by these two men.
The United States has played a major role in ending South
Sudan's long and destructive war with Sudan and was
instrumental in its independence. Since then, the U.S.
Government has been the leading donor contributing
approximately $1.5 billion in humanitarian aid.
Today's hearing will examine the role of the United States,
the role it has played and continues to play in search of
peace, stability, and prosperity. And I want to thank our very
distinguished witnesses for the role they have personally
played in that effort. The State Department will describe the
successes and failures hopefully in the nearly 5-year effort.
Witnesses on both panels will explain how the optimism of 2013
devolved to the barbarism we are trying to overcome today.
Let me just say to all my colleagues that we look forward
to their testimony. I would like to now yield to Eliot Engel,
the ranking member of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs,
for any opening comments he might have.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. As the
ranking member of the full committee, I want to once again
thank you for calling this hearing and thank you for the good
work that you do. Ambassador Booth, Mr. Leavitt, thank you for
your service and for your testimony today. The two of you know
as well as anyone the dire situation facing South Sudan.
Since the war broke out more than 2 years ago, both
parties, parties on both sides, have committed gross violations
of human rights and humanitarian law. Approximately 16,000
child soldiers have been recruited mostly by the rebel forces,
ethnically targeted rape has been prevalent on both sides, and
in February, government forces were involved in an attack on
the U.N. protection of a civilian's camp at Malakal. At least
30 internally displaced persons lost their lives in this
attack, more than 120 were injured, and about one third of the
camp was burned to the ground.
The humanitarian picture in South Sudan is truly
catastrophic. Nearly 3 million people are facing starvation,
yet only 17 percent of the funding needed to respond to this
crisis has been provided. Amid these reports I was glad to hear
that this morning the United States announced more than $86
million in additional humanitarian assistance to help affected
people in South Sudan.
What makes this a crime and really a pity is that we had
such high hopes when South Sudan was formed and thought that
would be the beginning of a new era in the area, instead
unfortunately things have gotten worse.
Yet even those trying to provide relief face danger. At
least 52 aid workers have been killed since the onset of
violence in December 2013, and many others have been harassed,
threatened, and in some cases savagely beaten. Humanitarian
convoys are subject to extortion at multiple illegal
checkpoints throughout the country, multiplying the cost of the
humanitarian response the people of South Sudan desperately
need.
On top of everything, I have deep misgivings about the
peace deal meant to put an end to this violence. The peace
agreement signed in August is a bargain negotiated by the
political elites who created this conflict in the first place.
I fear that it essentially resets the political landscape to
what it was at the outset of the conflict and has little to do
with the millions of people who have been affected.
So we need to ask ourselves what can we do to support
reconciliation at the local and national levels to help prevent
new flare-ups of violence. This is especially important in
light of the government's decision to press ahead with the
division of the country's 10 states into 28 states, a move that
has created localized conflicts in parts of the country that
had been relatively peaceful.
Moreover, I worry that warring parties are simply paying
lip service to issues of justice, reconciliation and
accountability, thereby ensuring that the cycle of impunity
will continue. Contrary to the intent of the peace agreement,
the manmade conflict in South Sudan is expanding and the
country's people of course deserve better.
We know there aren't a lot of good options, but in my view
we should go forward with an arms embargo. For months the
United States has considered such a measure to ensure
compliance with the peace process. However, with the return of
opposition leader Riek Machar to Juba yesterday, implementation
of such a plan has lagged behind schedule. All the while a
supply of arms and ammunition to both sides has prolonged and
escalated the conflict.
I am glad Mr. Machar has returned and consider this an
important but modest step forward. Much more needs to be done,
and I am concerned that more weapons entering South Sudan will
only keep the parties from making further progress. We
shouldn't think of an arms embargo as a point of leverage but
as a means by which to prevent further suffering. The U.N.
Panel of Experts on South Sudan has endorsed this approach, and
Ambassadors from Angola, Senegal, Spain, France, New Zealand,
and the UK, all members of the Security Council, have indicated
support.
So this is clearly far from a solution, but I think it puts
us on the right side of history and could help move this
situation in the right direction. I look forward to our
witnesses and seeing what they have to say about what they
think can be done, and again I want to applaud our chairman for
shining a light on this difficult challenge.
I am going to have to leave in a few minutes. I have a
longstanding appointment with one of the Ambassadors, but I
will be reading the transcript of the hearing and will keep in
touch with Mr. Smith and work together with him as we have for
many, many years. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
witnesses as well.
Mr. Smith. I want to thank Ranking Member Engel for his
excellent statement, for his leadership, and for passage of his
important bill yesterday on the floor. Congratulations on that.
I would like to now yield to Mr. Donovan from Staten
Island.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time so we have more
time to hear from the witnesses, but I appreciate your offer.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Smith. I would like to yield to Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Smith, and I also want
to acknowledge the leadership of Ranking Member Bass, and thank
you for calling this hearing on South Sudan's prospect for
peace. And thank you to our witnesses, and I look forward to
hearing from both of you on the situation in South Sudan.
Like most observers I was optimistic when after almost 40
years of war between Sudan and the South Sudanese, which
claimed more than 2\1/2\ million lives and displaced more than
4\1/2\ million people, South Sudan emerged in 2011 as the
world's newest country. However, the civil war that has ravaged
the country since 2013 has had a devastating impact.
Today, South Sudan faces another post-conflict
reconciliation process, massive and chronic humanitarian needs,
high level corruption, and widespread displacement of its
population. This conflict has displaced more than 2.3 million
South Sudanese since December 2013, and the U.N. estimates that
over 6.1 million people need humanitarian aid and 2.8 million
people face life-threatening hunger.
The human rights situation is horrific, with assertions
from the U.N. and from U.N. officials that targeted attacks
against civilians and U.N. personnel may constitute war crimes
or crimes against humanity. The U.N. Mission in the Republic of
South Sudan reports that gross violations of human rights and
serious violations of humanitarian law have occurred on a
massive scale with civilians often targeted along ethnic lines.
And UNICEF estimates that the warring sides have recruited as
many as 16,000 child soldiers and that conflict related sexual
violence against civilians is prevalent.
There are many serious challenges that remain as South
Sudan moves toward implementing its peace agreement. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses about the prospect for
peace and what the United States and the international
community can do to improve prospects for peace in the country
and begin to tackle the enormous humanitarian needs of the
South Sudanese people. And with that I thank you and I yield
back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. I would like to yield
to Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to
say I was fortunate enough to be able to address Secretary
Kerry when he testified before our Appropriations subcommittee,
and I asked him if the U.S. is willing to hold war criminals in
South Sudan accountable by imposing additional targeted
sanctions and an arms embargo to show that we are actually
serious about the peace agreement and that violating its terms
will not be tolerated. I felt like the U.S. was about to get
serious when he responded very assertively that the
international community is absolutely prepared to put into
place individual sanctions for a range of things that may have
been committed in the course of the war.
But since then, unfortunately, not one additional person
has been subject to sanctions or an asset freeze by the U.N. or
by the U.S. Russia continues to block U.S. and UK motions at
the U.N. Security Council, as you know, for an arms embargo
with seemingly no pushback from the administration. Also, the
February attack on a protected civilian site was without
question facilitated by government soldiers and aligned forces.
This was a deliberate attack on a U.N. base, sanctioned by
the Government of South Sudan, with its soldiers killing over
30 and injuring over 100, deliberately and systematically
burning down sections of the camp occupied by ethnic groups
aligned with the opposition. Government forces turned to ash
3,700 civilian shelters, along with clinics, water tankers,
nutrition centers, schools, et cetera.
I hope that you address some of these issues in your
testimony here today. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you
for the opportunity to make a statement and I yield back.
Mr. Capuano. First, I just want to appreciate the
opportunity to sit with you and to listen. I have been involved
with the Sudan issue for awhile. Welcome, Ambassador Booth and
Mr. Leavitt. They do great work. And with that I am going to
yield back and listen to them.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, and thank you for coming,
for your longstanding leadership on Sudan.
I would like to now welcome our two very distinguished
representatives from the administration, who are themselves
leaders when it comes to Sudan. Ambassador Donald Booth was
appointed U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan on August
28, 2013. He previously served as Ambassador to Ethiopia,
Zambia, and Liberia.
Prior to that he was director of the Office of Technical
and Specialized Agencies at the Department of State's Bureau of
International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Booth has also
served as director of the Office of West African Affairs,
deputy director of the Office of Southern African Affairs,
economic counselor in Athens, and division chief for Bilateral
Trade Affairs at the Department of State.
We will then hear from Bob Leavitt who serves as deputy
assistant administrator for USAID's Bureau for Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. Mr. Leavitt has over 20
years experience managing humanitarian and development
assistance programs and national security policies. From 2012
until joining the Bureau in September 2014, he served as
USAID's executive secretary and senior advisor for national
security affairs.
While on detail from USAID, Mr. Leavitt served as the
director of African Affairs at the National Security Council at
the White House from 2009 to 2012. He joined USAID in 2001 as a
conflict resolution specialist in the Bureau for Africa after
he worked for Catholic Relief Services from 1994 to 2000.
Ambassador Booth, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD BOOTH, SPECIAL ENVOY TO SUDAN
AND SOUTH SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Booth. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Bass, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to speak before you today.
Yesterday, April 26th, former Vice President Riek Machar
returned to Juba and was sworn in as First Vice President by
President Salva Kiir. Now this represents a significant step
toward formation of the Transitional Government of National
Unity that both leaders had committed to when they signed the
peace agreement 8 months ago. We expect the Transitional
Government to be formed and constituted within days now.
However, this will not in and of itself deliver peace and
restore national unity. To achieve those outcomes, South
Sudan's leaders will need to work together for the people of
South Sudan.
I would like to note that progress this week came only
after bouts of obstructionism by both sides. The progress of
the last few days would not have happened without the intensive
personal diplomacy of Ambassador Phee and her team in Juba as
well as Ambassador Haslach and her team in Addis Ababa. They
worked tirelessly to overcome the many last-minute hurdles that
delayed First Vice President Machar's return.
Looking forward, the parties in the Transitional Government
will have to demonstrate that they can and will work together
to make tough decisions, to break old habits, and accept a new
and intrusive degree of international financial oversight in
order to convince the world of their seriousness in leading
South Sudan to a better future.
The United States is ready to help the Transitional
Government do right by its people, but we need to see that this
government will not repeat past mistakes. The United States
will press for full implementation of the peace agreement,
particularly the reform agenda contained therein. And there I
am referring to, first, economic reform. South Sudan needs to
undertake rigorous macro economic reforms. It cannot spend what
it doesn't have. It is time for austerity as well as revised
spending priorities.
We are coordinating with other international donors to
ensure that any financial commitments in support of the
Transitional Government will be conditioned on its acceptance
of international oversight of its revenues and expenditures.
Specifically, we believe that an external expenditure oversight
mechanism needs to be established. To be seen as a credible
partner, the Transitional Government also needs to demonstrate
its commitment to allowing full and unfettered humanitarian
access to all parts of the country.
For too long South Sudan has been the victim of some
corrupt leaders and their mismanagement of its economy and
natural resources. This cannot continue. To that end, my office
and others in the administration are pursuing measures to
identify and act against those responsible for wanton
corruption and theft. We want to see a Transitional Government
in which corruption is no longer the scourge that it has been
in the past, and we will not neglect the possibility of trying
to recover stolen money.
Second, security sector reform. For more than a generation
South Sudanese society has been dominated by armed groups and
by the perception that conflict brings rewards. It is
imperative that men under arms be able to transition to
peaceful and productive citizens. This disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration effort will require
significant resources and enormous creativity to have a chance
of success. South Sudan, however, must emerge from the
transitional period as a state with an army and not an army
running a state.
And third, reconciliation and accountability. We fully
support the peace agreement's provision for the Hybrid Court
for South Sudan to be established by the African Union, as well
as the establishment of a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation,
and Healing. We are pleased to see that the African Union has
begun initial preparations to create the court and we are
prepared to support it.
Ethnic grievance fueled this most recent war, and to
prevent another the crimes of the conflict must be addressed
consistent with both South Sudanese values as well as
international norms. It is easy to name the ways that this
agreement might fail, and it is easy to find cause for
pessimism.
We were appalled by the violence at the U.N. Protection of
Civilians site in Malakal in February in which men in SPLA
uniforms opened fire on civilians. We are dismayed by the death
toll of humanitarian aid workers, and we continue to be
concerned about the government's 28 states plan, which has
complicated implementation of the peace agreement and stoked
grievances among communities. We have made clear to both sides
that this kind of behavior has to end.
I want to be clear that if any of South Sudan's leaders
continue to work against implementation of the agreement, we
are prepared to employ any measure to include sanctions and an
arms embargo which we believe could change their behavior. I
believe we must remain, however, committed to helping South
Sudan work toward the laudable goals contained in the peace
agreement. It really is more than just an accommodation between
warring factions. It has important reform elements.
The people of South Sudan, the people we have spent $1.6
billion in humanitarian assistance to support since the
conflict began, are the reason we cannot throw up our hands in
frustration. They are the reason we must be prepared to support
the Transitional Government if and when it begins demonstrating
its commitment to implementing the agreement. Any other course
of action would simply abandon those South Sudanese to a future
of more conflict and deprivation. These are the same South
Sudanese who with our support for their right of self-
determination voted for independence in 2011 and who deserve a
country that lives up to the promise of its beginnings.
Finally, I want to thank the members of the subcommittee
for your ongoing attention to South Sudan and its people, and
thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Booth follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ambassador Booth, and thank
you for your personal efforts that have been extraordinary.
Mr. Leavitt.
STATEMENT OF MR. BOB LEAVITT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Leavitt. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for holding this hearing
and thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Today I would like to highlight the humanitarian crisis in
South Sudan and how USAID has adapted its response to the
situation. We join the Special Envoy in calling the
Transitional Government of National Unity to begin to address
the country's urgent challenges.
South Sudan's economy is in crisis. Its people struggle to
find enough to eat, and human rights abuses continue with
impunity. The recent exodus of South Sudanese into Darfur,
Sudan, shows the desperation that many face. A total of 2\1/2\
million South Sudanese have fled their homes. Approximately one
in four South Sudanese are experiencing extreme, life-
threatening hunger. This year will likely be the most food
insecure since South Sudan gained its independence.
The U.S. Government and our partners continue to do
everything possible to help the people of South Sudan,
providing nearly $1.6 billion in humanitarian assistance since
December 2013. This includes the $86 million we announced
earlier today. Every month we reach 1.3 million South Sudanese
with life-saving food assistance, protection, clean water, and
sanitation. We have moved over 344,000 metric tons of food
assistance, which is enough to fill the equivalent of 18,000
tractor trailers back-to-back between here and New York City.
Our partners also provide trauma and protection support to
children and survivors of gender-based violence. I want to
express our deep appreciation for our partners and colleagues
on the ground for their courage and their commitment to save
the lives of the South Sudanese. They continue to face
significant security challenges and access challenges.
Warring parties and armed actors have killed 52 aid
workers, a dozen more since we testified last in December 2015.
The parties are obligated under the peace agreement to allow
humanitarian aid to flow without interference, yet aid workers
continue to deal with lengthy negotiations, numerous
checkpoints and other obstacles. I would like to thank
Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Phee in Juba for repeatedly
intervening to secure humanitarian access when it counts most.
USAID has shifted its long term assistance from helping to
build the institutions of the new South Sudanese state to
investing directly in the South Sudanese people. We educate
children where they are now, including in Protection of
Civilians sites at U.N. compounds across South Sudan. We have
enrolled nearly 148,000 children, more than triple the number
of students in the Washington, DC, public school system.
Despite these efforts, over half of all children age 6 to 15
are not in school in South Sudan, the highest proportion in any
country.
We collaborate with other donors to support basic health
care including maternal and child health services and
immunizations. We are helping the South Sudanese regain their
ability to make a living. We recently announced a new effort to
help communities in food insecured states to recover assets
such as farming tools and seeds, and improving their nutrition.
These investments will help reduce their dependency on
emergency assistance.
As Ambassador Booth highlighted, paving a way for
transitional justice processes will be critical for South
Sudan's future. USAID has piloted a program that helps
communities overcome trauma that perpetuates historic
grievances. We are also working with the South Sudan Council of
Churches to engage the South Sudanese in grassroots healing and
reconciliation, and we launched a peace center to educate
citizens about the peace agreement.
We all want to see South Sudan move forward. The
Transitional Government of National Unity must set the country
on a path to peace and development. We expect the Transitional
Government to prevent the extortion and physical threats of aid
workers and to allow full freedom of movement for all
civilians. We expect them to prioritize their country's health
and other development needs.
As part of our mission to end extreme poverty and promote
democratic resilient societies, we will continue to invest in
the people of South Sudan and their efforts to build a more
prosperous, peaceful future. I want to thank Congress and this
subcommittee for your commitment to the South Sudanese people.
Your support makes our life-saving work possible. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leavitt follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much, Mr. Leavitt.
To begin, just a few opening questions. First, Ambassador
Booth, you talked about any measure being on the table. You
might want to elaborate a little bit. Of course this is a time
of some heightened hope, but we know that hope coupled with the
credible threat of a downside, a sanction, personal especially,
can sharpen the mind.
The impact on food security, or food insecurity more
appropriately termed, on vulnerable persons, since it is very
hard to get food aid as well as medicines to targeted
populations, what impact do we know--Mr. Leavitt, you might
want to speak to this--is having on the elderly, children,
particularly pregnant women?
We know the great gamechanger of the first 1,000 days from
conception to the second birthday, is any of that happening now
in South Sudan? Are we about to see a period of stunting and
other kinds of consequences, maladies that could be prevented?
Fifteen thousand child soldiers, is that accurate? Is it more
or less? What is being done to reintegrate those kids?
John Prendergast says that one factor not addressed, and he
goes on to talk about the main driver being unchecked greed. He
talks about looting frenzy, violent kleptocracy, looting and
killing with impunity, but he suggests that the one factor that
has not been addressed is this issue of unchecked greed; your
response to that.
And Matt Wells in his comments points out that in February,
Senegal, Angola, UK, and France supported an arms embargo and
suggests that U.S. leadership has been lacking on an arms
embargo. If the U.S. were to strongly support an arms embargo
it is likely that the position would prevail in the Security
Council; your reaction and thoughts on that.
Mr. Leavitt. Chairman Smith, I will begin with the impact
on the elderly and the children regarding this situation. USAID
is concentrated on the situation affecting the most vulnerable
people in the country.
Just to give you an example of how we are targeting
children and elderly, in the case of children USAID provides
health and nutrition assistance to some of the most vulnerable
in some of the most dangerous and vulnerable areas of the
country. What that translates into, what that looks like is an
example of an 8-month-old boy in the State of Jonglei late last
year got malaria. He got terribly sick, dehydrated, and became
less than 10 pounds in weight. The mother carried that boy for
6 hours to get to the first accessible clinic.
That was funded by USAID's partner IMA, health
international. That organization provided specialized
therapeutic assistance to that child in nutrition support. That
child gained back 3 pounds over the course of 5 weeks, and at
that point in time the mother was able to care for the child
and to bring the child back home. This assistance, the health
assistance and nutrition assistance that USAID and its partners
bring to bear sometimes in remote and dangerous areas makes a
significant difference.
In terms of children and elderly, also making sure that our
activities do no harm and our activities support the needs of
such vulnerable populations, we have partners that have helped
train communities that have been vulnerable to conflict and to
displacement to be prepared, when necessary, to flee. And our
partners have provided training for communities to have escape
plans, evacuation routes, run bags, and in one recent case that
training was actually utilized just a day or so after it was
received. And that training also looked at how to care for the
elderly, how to make sure that we are caring for the needs of
the children and the elderly as people flee.
Ambassador Booth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
tackle the child soldiers question first. I don't think there
is a really reliable number of the numbers that have been
recruited, because a lot of children who have ended up in the
conflict have been parts of militias and other groups such as
the infamous Nuer White Army, which is really a traditional
hunting band, which has been suborned at times in this conflict
in support of the opposition.
But, and clearly when we look at a DDR program, one of the
first actions and where we would like to have U.S.
participation in early intervention is in identifying child
soldiers and getting them separated and out and into some sort
of psychosocial counseling so they can be reintegrated into
society. Child soldiers----
Mr. Smith [continuing]. For counseling?
Ambassador Booth. The capacity in country does not. We
would have to----
Mr. Smith. Is it even close? I mean, how quickly could that
be stood up?
Ambassador Booth. You would have to bring in outside
experts to work on this and find people in South Sudan who have
some rudimentary skills and work with them to add to that. But
this whole question of child soldiers is something that I
engaged with the Minister of Defense on even before this
conflict broke out, and I think we had a commitment from the
government at that point and they were working toward actually
tackling this problem in a serious way. The conflict obviously
set that back.
The question about measures to take if the leaders don't
cooperate, I mentioned in my oral remarks that really we have
sort of everything on the table. We are prepared to look at
sanctions. We are prepared to look at an arms embargo. I think
one of the key elements though is what I discussed, which is we
really want to make sure that resources of the country are
going to be utilized for the people of the country. And so we
are taking a careful look at what has been stolen in the past
and who stole it, so we are definitely going to pursue that.
Mr. Smith. If I could interrupt briefly, is Enough Project
of help to you, The Sentry, their project--are you working with
them on that?
Ambassador Booth. We certainly are working with them. They
have shared information with us. We have been discussing this
with them. I think it is a good information collection
gathering effort, but we now need to take that forward in ways
that the U.S. Government is uniquely qualified to do whether it
is through our FinCEN at Treasury which looks at this issue on
a systemic basis, or through the Department of Justice which
would look at things in an individual case basis.
And there is also an Executive order that gives us the
ability to deny visas to people that are involved in corruption
at well, so there are a number of tools out there we can use.
Mr. Smith. So you have sufficient authority for tools to
hold individuals to account?
Ambassador Booth. We have a broad range of tools that we
can use should people be backsliding. The other big tool that
we can use, frankly, is going to be getting those countries in
the region who have no interest in having a failed state on
their border to put their own pressures on, and often that is
much more effective than what we can do from the U.S.
This gets to the question about the unchecked greed and
corruption. Again we are trying to tackle that in two ways. One
is looking at what has happened in the past, but more
importantly, as I said in my remarks, we want to make sure that
with this government there is transparency in its public
finances. And we have already put the existing government as
well as the opposition before they came together on notice that
we would be looking for some sort of expenditure control
mechanism to be in place. Otherwise, it would be very difficult
to justify putting additional resources in support of
stabilization of the macroeconomy.
So that is a push we have been working with our
international partners on. We have had a number of meetings,
most recently last month, here in Washington with key donors.
And then on the events in the Security Council about the
arms embargo last month, at that time the focus of the efforts
was to ensure that former Vice President Machar returned to
Juba and the Transitional Government was stood up. And so the
idea was not to punish for the fact that it wasn't stood up,
but to encourage the parties to get it formed and to implement
the peace agreement.
And so we looked at what we could do that would have an
impact that would incentivize both sides, and there the embargo
actually came up short because it would incentivize the
government much more which could have led to greater resistance
from the opposition. And so that was the problem that we were
dealing with at the time. Now that they are one government it
should be easier to exert some of those types of pressures.
Mr. Smith. A deployment of 13,000 peacekeepers, is that
about right? Is it enough?
Ambassador Booth. The U.N. increased the peacekeeping
ceiling to 12,500 troops in December 2013, and then added
another 500 to the ceiling in December 2015. Those troops have
not been found and recruited yet to deploy to the mission, and
it took about 18 months to even do the first bump-up. So there
is a problem of finding people, troop contributing countries,
and I think the role of the U.N. Mission, protection of
civilians, will begin to change with the Transitional
Government.
With a Transitional Government that is functioning you
should have people beginning to feel safe that they can now
leave these U.N. camps, can begin to leave the IDP camps and go
home. And that will also be the main thing, I think, that will
alleviate the humanitarian crisis facing the country.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ranking Member Bass.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for conducting
this hearing and also for our witnesses.
While we welcome the return of Riek Machar to Juba, we
recognize that for all parties concerned, including the United
States, much hard work must be done to address effectively the
current situation on the ground and help move this pivotal
country and its people forward in peace.
I had the opportunity to visit South Sudan twice over the
last few years and the opportunity to meet with the people and
the leaders of the world's youngest country. During my first
visit, a congressional delegation in May 2012, almost a year
after South Sudan's independence, there were high expectations
of what independence could mean for the country, the region,
and the diaspora.
My last visit to South Sudan with my colleague Mr. Capuano
was in November of last year. The difference between this visit
and the first visit could not have been more stark. Last
November there was an atmosphere of fear and desperation. I saw
and met victims of physical attacks and the internally
displaced all desperate for access to humanitarian assistance.
I also heard about countless accounts of human rights
abuses and about the degradation of women and their children in
an environment where there appeared increasingly to be a lack
of compassion. Against the backdrop of increasing intercommunal
strife, perhaps the most telling statistics are those of South
Sudanese seeking refuge in neighboring countries including
Sudan.
Since December 2013, the beginning of this crisis, the U.N.
reports over 200,000 new South Sudanese arrived in Sudan. These
refugees are in addition to the 200,000 South Sudanese who fled
to Ethiopia, the ones who fled to Uganda, and the approximately
100,000 that fled to Kenya. In addition, South Sudan has an
internally displaced population of approximately 1 million
people.
A major concern of all of us who monitor closely
humanitarian issues is the blatant intimidation and killings of
humanitarian workers, the majority of whom are South Sudanese.
While we were there, I believe it was, Mr. Capuano, 2 weeks
before we got there, there was a humanitarian mission where the
boat was hijacked and everybody was held hostage for a couple
of weeks and everything on the boat was stolen. I am also
concerned about food consumption and the increasing crisis, the
food insecurity which both witnesses have referenced.
But before I close I want to note what I hope is a prospect
for peace, and that is the South Sudanese-Americans, the former
Lost Boys and Lost Girls. We had a policy breakfast about this
last week. There are a number of them that I am sure are here
in the room today, and if there are they should raise their
hands. These were former Lost Boys and Lost Girls who came to
our country years ago and have made incredible accomplishments,
becoming doctors and nurses and playing a very positive role in
U.S. society.
And so I am considering introducing legislation that might
have our Government support some of them returning, and I
wanted to know your opinions about that and how we might do
that in a constructive way. Many of them in my conversations--
and Mr. Capuano and I met with a group of, I think it was
probably about 25 who came from all over the country and they
have accomplished a tremendous amount here, but, you know, they
have left family back in South Sudan and many of them have
expressed an interest in returning, and I want to know your
thoughts on that. The leadership vacuum that exists there now,
and if you think they might be able to return and make some
contribution.
I also want to know, I mean, I realize that Vice President
Machar just returned, but I want to know if you have heard any
reports of anything that has happened. I guess he has just been
there a few days and I know he brought a tremendous number of
forces with him. But what is the sentiment? What is happening
now? So perhaps you could answer those couple of questions
before I continue on.
Ambassador Booth. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. Let
me answer the second, or the last part of it, first, about Riek
Machar's return and the impact in Juba. I think one indicator
is the strengthening of the South Sudanese pound today, so I
think the markets are reacting favorably as one indication.
The reception that he was given yesterday when he went
directly from the airport upon arrival to the presidential
grounds for the swearing-in, and the speech that was made by
President Kiir in particular, was very, I think, uplifting. The
President apologized not only to the people of South Sudan for
the conflict, but he apologized to the international community
for----
Ms. Bass. Good.
Ambassador Booth [continuing]. What has happened. And he
raised the hands of both Riek Machar and Vice President Wani
Igga, who is from Equatoria, so the three major regions of
South Sudan together, and said we are going to work together
and we are going to implement this agreement and we are going
to restore our country.
So I think the atmospherics initially have been very good
and I commend the parties for that. There is still a lot of
tough work ahead, and I anticipate that there are issues that
were not fully resolved in the peace agreement and will
continue to be contentious in going forward. But that is the
real test. Can they show that they can work together? Can they
compromise? And that is the challenge that is ahead of them and
the challenge that we are putting to them.
Ms. Bass. Let me interrupt you for a second. When we were
there and we met with President Kiir, the whole idea of the new
states that were created he left us with the impression--and
Mr. Capuano, I think you would agree. But he left us with the
impression that that was not necessarily going to be
implemented right away, because how could these parties come
together and agree to divide leadership and create a new
government and then in the meantime he goes and doubles the
geographic areas? And I don't know how Machar is supposed share
power in that situation.
Do you, is it your impression--and we were there in
November. Is it your impression that he moved forward with the
creation of these new states or did he keep it to the number
that is was before, which I think it was at 12--10? So he went
from 10 to 28 states.
Ambassador Booth. Unfortunately, Congresswoman, on
Christmas Eve, the President did promulgate the order to create
the 28 states. And despite strong pressure that they not move
forward and actually implement that, though, they did move
forward over the last couple of months appointing governors and
other officials.
The events in Malakal at the PoC camp, the underlying
tensions for that were most likely a result of this 28 state
decision where the Shilluk community in particular felt they
were being displaced because Malakal has been moved from a
Shilluk dominated area to a Dinka dominated area. So the 28
states created not only difficulties in implementation of the
agreement, which was based on power sharing in 10 states, but
also created these additional ethnic tensions which have played
out not only in Malakal but also in Western Equatoria and
Western Bahr el Ghazal.
Ms. Bass. You know, practically speaking, what did they do,
roll up on the governor's mansion and tell the governor he has
got to leave?
Ambassador Booth. Well, in one case, in effect yes that did
happen in Pibor, and there was fighting in Pibor town as a
result of that as one governor replaced another. We have pushed
very hard and with the support of the international partners
and President Mogae, who is running the JMEC, the monitoring
mechanism responsible for oversight of the implementation of
the agreement, to push for the issue to be put off until the
Transitional Government is formed, and for there to be a
boundary commission that would look at what the borders of the
states would be and also, frankly, to take a look again at the
subdivision of the country. Frankly, South Sudan cannot afford
28 states at this point.
Ms. Bass. Did they redo the power sharing with Machar?
Ambassador Booth. That is an issue that is still
complicated, because power sharing at the state level as I said
was based on 10 states. The government has said any state that,
new state that came from one of the states that the opposition
would have gotten the majority in, then the opposition would
get the majority there.
So instead of the opposition having a majority of the state
government in 10 states it would have an opposition majority
in, I believe, 6 states. Sorry, three of the 10 versus 6 of the
28. That issue is one of those unresolved issues that is out
there. I think this 28 state question will be something that
preoccupies the Transitional Government in its early days,
among other things.
You also asked about security. Yes, there was provision in
the security agreement that followed the peace agreement for
Riek Machar to have security in Juba. They have now mainly
deployed there including elements of the Joint Integrated
Police that will be responsible for security of the city.
Ms. Bass. Well, before I run out of time though, if you
wouldn't mind, the question I asked about the Lost Boys and
Girls who are men and women and they are no longer lost, but
what your thoughts are about that.
Ambassador Booth. Clearly, there are a number of people,
Lost Boys and Girls, others from the diaspora that have skills
that would definitely benefit South Sudan. Some have gone back.
You mentioned a leadership vacuum. I think the leaders there
would argue that there is no leadership vacuum. There are
plenty of potential leaders in the country.
Ms. Bass. Okay.
Ambassador Booth. But I think I know what you were
referring to.
Ms. Bass. I wasn't necessarily referring to the President
and the Vice President. But I mean, I think there is lots of
layers although that is debatable as well. Yes, right. A lot of
new governors are needed, right?
Ambassador Booth. Hopefully we won't need as many governors
either. There are those types of programs. The World Bank has
one known as TOKTEN, which is the transfer of knowledge, which
brings back diaspora members, helps fund them. So those are
programs that have worked in some countries.
There is always resistance, however, particularly when a
country is coming out of conflict, to having people who have
not been there come back and take over, particularly more
highly paid positions. But South Sudan clearly does need
expertise, so whenever I meet with diaspora I encourage them to
indeed look for how they can contribute, whether going back or
staying here and contributing from here. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. I yield to the
distinguished chairman of the full committee, Chairman Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Chairman, for holding this.
I know how involved you and Congresswoman Bass have been on
this issue and in pushing for U.S. engagement on this issue,
and we thank you for that. And I think yesterday with the
return of Riek Machar to Juba we see maybe, for once, a real
opportunity here. We thank the Embassy for their work in that
regard of getting him there. But I think establishing a
Transitional Government is obviously the cornerstone of the
step we have to take.
One of my frustrations through all of this is that we have
not utilized the arms embargo to shut down the weaponry that
continues to escalate. And now that we have a peace process, I
think it begins to lay the foundation for the administration
having argued, well, it is punitive to do that. I don't think
it was punitive, but now it is conditional, right? It is a
condition I would hope, Ambassador, it is a condition of the
deal that we cut off the arms flow.
And I think the problem is that with these factions so
heavily armed now and spending their resources on those
armaments, and with the deep distrust that they have, and I
have spoken to both sides of this conflict, but they are now
confined in the capital, and one miscommunication could spark
an absolute explosion within the capital of not just the start
of another conflict, but the loss of human life in that
crossfire, which would really be catastrophic.
So on that point, I think we have long used this argument
of an embargo as an empty threat. I see some of the witness
testimony here that shows that witnesses are going to testify
to the fact that in the past actual imposition of an embargo
has shut down the amount of violence. The threat of an embargo
without imposing it? No, no. That often actually increases the
conflict as these continue to ramp up. So I am just back to
something that I have, Ambassador Booth, long been haranguing
about but I just think it is really important now.
Lastly, if they are going to respect the ceasefire why
would they still want to build up their arsenals? So I think
from that standpoint that is just one additional argument why
part of this has to be to prevent that cycle. It has been
widely reported that this past February there was expressed
support at the U.N. Security Council. What I saw was the UK,
France, our friends among African Union members all in support
of that, so that is a good thing. And I don't know how bad
things have to get to get to the point where the U.S. is on
board, but I would suggest we are past that point, not to
belabor it.
The last point I would make here is that the financial
coffers are nearly empty. They are not going to be able to
repay any debts, probably, in Juba. So Ambassador Booth, I am
pleased to read in your testimony that the administration is
coordinating with other international donors to ensure
financial commitments to support the Transitional Government
will be conditioned on international oversight of both the
revenue side of this and the expenditure side. I think it is
vital. It is vital because, frankly, both sides have a long
history with respect to, we will just call it corruption, or
misuse of funds.
And I would ask what actions will the administration take
if the South Sudan Transitional Government does not accept the
prerequisite oversight mechanisms? I think that is wise to let
them know that there will be consequences if they try to skirt
that. Will we be ready to walk away from the table if they
refuse that? And have we considered adding any new names to the
U.S. or U.N. sanctions list? A lot of time has gone by. We
haven't wrapped that list up, and there are some pretty bad
actors involved and I think we have to be mindful of that. We
don't want to create a perception of immunity. So I will allow
you to respond. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Booth. Thank you, Chairman. It is good to see
you again. Let me address the issue about arms. We all agree
that there are far too many arms in South Sudan and that they
certainly don't need anymore. And particularly now that they
are together in a Transitional Government, there is no point in
continuing to build up the arms stockpiles.
I think one of the ways that is most effective to get at
this, and would be more effective even than an arms embargo--if
it was supported particularly by the region--and there are many
in the Security Council who do not support it and it was not
even a unanimous support about a month ago when it was raised
by the African members, so it is not an easy lift in the
Security Council by any means. But the way to get at this
problem, really, is through the public financial management
approach that we are proposing.
I mentioned also macroeconomic reform, and one of the
things in order to make this government budget anywhere near
being financeable they are going to have to make major
concessions. And one that has been recommended to them by the
IMF is that capital expenditures need to be cut basically to
zero. Now capital expenditures is weapons as well, and so if we
can use the financial side of our approach to this to get at
preventing additional weapons from getting into South Sudan
that would be, I think, an easier way to do it and a more
effective way to do it.
I think, also, the Council support for this followed
immediately after the events in the PoC site in Malakal and
since then has diminished in ardor for doing this, and even
more so given the fact that the Transitional Government is
about to be formed with Riek Machar there. You asked what we
would do if they don't accept sort of the transparency of the
public finances. I think the answer there is they don't get the
type of money that they would need to do things like stabilize
the economy, to implement reconstruction, and really to move
forward in any meaningful way on DDR.
This country, because of the decline in the price of oil,
and since oil had been the major, over 90 percent, source of
their revenue, the country is now really in a very difficult
position. And so they really are going to need the help and
support of the international financial institutions and donor
partners. So we, I think, are in a good position to be able to
achieve the type of intrusive role that we have been proposing.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador.
I see John Prendergast here. I just wanted to thank him for
getting me into Sudan even if it was without a visa. John,
thanks. Thanks for being with us today.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you again to our witnesses. I want to
just focus for a moment on the question of the child soldiers.
And I am wondering whether you, Ambassador, or Mr. Leavitt,
could talk a little bit about what we are doing to both prevent
more child soldiers and to help secure the release of existing
child soldiers, and to the chairman's question how large is the
problem?
Ambassador Booth. Well, Congressman, as I said we don't
have a totally accurate number because these are not formal
military organizations. And, you know, many of the militia
groups, I mentioned the Nuer White Army as an example, where
they traditionally have brought younger children in as part of
their cattle-raiding activities, and when these cattle raiding
activities become part of the conflict, yes, they become child
soldiers.
So the scope of the problem is something that needs to be
defined as we go into this DDR program. As I said, one of the
top priorities would be to get the children away from other
combatants, to get them into some sort of psychosocial
counseling program, reintegrated back into their society,
hopefully with their families.
Mr. Cicilline. But that is not happening at all right now.
Ambassador Booth. That is not happening because there
hasn't been a security sector reform program so there hasn't
been a start to DDR yet. But there has been a start of soldiers
going to cantonment sites, which is a rather loose term because
these are not sort of formal barracks but more the villages
where they would be then registered and accounted for, and so
that is when we can start that process.
But that is something that we would need, you know, to
probably work with other partners to ensure there is sufficient
funding to get that done. But the child soldiers is clearly one
of the top priorities for DDR.
Mr. Leavitt. As a part of USAID's emergency education
activities, 148,000 children have been enrolled, children and
adolescents. That does not target former combatants, former
child combatants, but there are former child soldiers who had
served as combatants that are a part of those programs. And
some of those former combatants have received psychosocial
treatment.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And with respect to the issue of
the endemic corruption that seems to plague South Sudan since
the very days of its formation, what can we do working with the
regional governments to help the South Sudanese leverage their
natural resources to make sure that the proceeds from those
resources actually go to the people and not line the pockets of
the political leadership? You know, what other steps can we
take to help incentivize or advocate for that kind of approach?
And secondly, would you just speak a little bit on what was
the rationale for the creation of the additional states? Was it
simply to give more appointments of governors, or was there
some underlying policy, and how do you think that is likely to
sort of unfold?
Ambassador Booth. Well, on the issue of corruption and--
particularly how do you make sure that the resources that come
to the state, basically the oil revenues, get used for the
benefit of the state--that was something that we had identified
during the peace negotiations, and we pressed hard for
inclusion in the peace agreement of an intrusive public
financial management oversight system. That was, I think,
understandably resisted by some other countries in the region
who are not particularly interested in setting precedents like
that.
But with the declining price of oil and the prolongation of
the conflict, South Sudan is now in a position where it really
has virtually no revenue, and so we are taking another run at
this as a group of donors in conjunction with the international
financial institutions to try to make sure that indeed what is
owed to the state gets collected, goes to the Ministry of
Finance, the Central Bank, and then is spent according to the
budget so that there aren't a lot of extra budgetary
expenditures, no one showing up at the Central Bank saying
where is my $200,000 that I asked for this morning? That has
been a perennial problem in South Sudan and one that needs to
be stopped.
The 28 states issue is interesting. During the peace
negotiations the opposition pushed very hard for a formal
declaration that South Sudan would be a Federal country, a
Federal system of government, and the opposition pushed for 21
states in that Federal system. The government at that time,
Salva Kiir, supported by the mediation and by others such as
ourselves, said the structure of a state is a fundamental issue
that should be decided when you draft your permanent
constitution. It shouldn't be something decided around a
negotiating table over a peace agreement.
That prevailed during the negotiations, and so it was
rather shocking that President Kiir would float this then 3
months after having signed the peace agreement, something he
had vigorously opposed during the negotiations. It was really
done as a political ploy, I think, by both sides to
particularly gain support from the Equatorias.
The three Equatorian states have long been supporters of a
Federal approach in South Sudan, and so there was a sort of
jockeying for political support that was going on. This
unfortunately has created more ethnic tensions in parts of
South Sudan and more violence. And so this has to be addressed
by the Transitional Government as a priority matter.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
chairman of the full committee for letting me sit in today. I
sit on the Appropriations Committee, the Subcommittee on State
and Foreign Operations, which is why I am here today and why I
have taken an interest in your testimony, for obvious reasons,
where our money is going and how it is being spent. I
appreciate your testimony and your job, and I also appreciate
the sensitivity of diplomacy and how we must proceed forward
despite certain setbacks.
But I do find very interesting some of the things that we
have heard today, especially from the chairman. I know we talk
about being disappointed and condemning violations of
ceasefires, attacks on U.N. compounds, and the killing of
civilians by government forces. I know recently Susan Rice went
so far as to demand that the Government of South Sudan
investigate the attack it orchestrated against its own citizens
itself, and bring itself to justice as if it was the United
States.
If we the United States aren't publicly willing to hold
those accountable for atrocities committed throughout the
course of the war, and hold those accountable who raided the
public finances to support the purchase of military equipment
used to conduct systematic killings of civilians, it is kind of
hard to fathom that this government is going to do that
themselves. They are just not going to do it. It is not going
to happen.
So I think as an appropriator and somebody who votes to
spend money on things that I think are important, that we need
to send a message to let the people know that we are serious
that we are on the side of the people and not the leaders,
whether it be the government or opposition. And we need to
really tell when we look at these leaders that when we say and
we demand a stand-down order that that is what we demand, and
not sort of, you know, well, it is a touchy situation because
governments are just forming and, you know, we don't want to
have sanctions or an arms embargo, because there shouldn't be
arms coming in from either side.
I mean, you know, we have talked in our office to people
that are in the NGO community. If there was a real arms
embargo, it would have a real impact. The threat or sort of
like these half measures, I think, actually sends, as I think
that Chairman Royce was saying, actually has a
counterproductive consequence.
So I guess my question is this. As an appropriator,
somebody who votes to spend money, why are we allowing war
criminals and war profiteers to dictate our policy while they
deliberately lie, cheat, and steal from us? And how has the
international community held those responsible accountable for
these war crimes and what is it doing to stop attacks like this
from happening again? And what is it going to take to hit these
guys where it hurts--I am talking about the leaders on both
sides--so that our people, our taxpayers in this country, feel
confident that their tax dollars are not being wasted? Thank
you.
Ambassador Booth. Thank you, Congressman. You raised two
issues, accountability for war crimes and also accountability
for the money that has been spent. On the issue of war crimes,
gross violations of human rights, this is why the peace
agreement includes the provision for the creation of this
Hybrid Court for South Sudan which would be created by the
African Union, and they have begun to work on that. It will be
hybrid. It will be with South Sudan. But the leadership of it
will be coming from the African Union, and they have started
work and we are prepared to support that.
Last May, Secretary Kerry pledged $5 million as an initial
down payment if you will to support this effort. We take
accountability for gross violations of human rights seriously
and we will be in the forefront of pressing for that. We were
the ones who pressed for the release of the African Union's
Commission of Inquiry report. We have been very active in the
U.N. Human Rights Council.
We have managed to get a resolution this past January or
February that creates a panel of experts that will continue the
work of looking at what has happened. My office, in conjunction
with our Human Rights Bureau, is also funding a documentation
center so that South Sudanese themselves can document what has
happened so that information is there for accountability
purposes.
In terms of the money, you mentioned that an effective arms
embargo would have an impact. We fully agree. The problem has
been: Could you get an effective arms embargo? You need to have
the cooperation of the immediate neighbors, and during the
course of this conflict there were divisions in the immediate
neighbors and those divisions played out in terms of support of
arms and other equipment moving to both sides of this conflict.
This is where again we worked very hard to help bring the
immediate neighbors together and the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), which ran the mediation. And
President Obama's participation in a meeting with the heads of
state of IGAD back in July, we think really was a major element
in the breakthrough of getting them on the same page, and we
had a month after that the signing of the peace agreement. So
that is what is absolutely required if you want to have an
effective arms embargo.
But as I mentioned, I think we can get at this problem of
spending money on arms, when there needs to be money spent on
food and medicine and roads, through the very intrusive public
financial management controls that we are proposing to the
Transitional Government.
And in terms of protecting American taxpayer money that is
exactly why we are proposing this. We want to make sure not
just that we know how our money is being used, but how the
money that is South Sudan's money is being used for the benefit
of the people. And until South Sudan starts to move, put much
more of its money, in fact all of its meager resources at this
point, to the benefit of its people and to reconstruction that
would be the trigger for us to then look at whether we could
help. But we need to make sure that the practices of the past,
whether it is corruption or, you know, misaligned spending
priorities, need to be corrected.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Capuano.
Mr. Capuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again I want to
appreciate the opportunity to be here as well, as not a member
of the committee but a longtime observer and supporter of the
creation of South Sudan.
Mr. Leavitt, I want to start out by saying thank you. I
can't tell you how much most of us love what the USAID does.
You represent the best of America around the world in dangerous
situations. As you said the 52, if I remember the last number,
of your people have been killed and, you know, never mind all
those who have been harassed and threatened with bodily harm
and actually received bodily harm that weren't killed. So I
want to say thank you and appreciate that and I would love to
be able to do more to help them.
But I also want to be real clear though. USAID doesn't
operate in a vacuum, you operate with a lot of other partners
around the world. And when we were in there, when we were in
Sudan we watched as people were given their rations for the
month and we were told unequivocally by the camp owners that
the food that they were given was calculated to last 20 days
for the month, not that the food would, but that the
nutritional value of that food was 20 days' worth.
So with all the work that we are doing, with all the money
we are sending, we are still not providing people the absolute
minimum to sustain themselves. And with that Ambassador, again
we have worked together for many years now and you know how
much I appreciate your effort and your work. And actually, more
than anything else I appreciate your patience which I don't
have. You have to have it. I don't.
But I do want to go back to the sanctions just a little
bit. I want to be real clear that my support for sanctions, not
just general sanctions in arms, there are so many small arms in
that country, the sanctions are not going to do anything to
remove them. However, if the sanctions, this is my opinion,
were directly focused to the large arms that did not exist in
that country more than a year or 2 ago, which cost millions of
dollars for helicopters, millions of dollars for vehicles that
can pursue people through swamps, it changed the face of that
conflict dramatically.
It is bad enough when bad actors are doing bad things, but
then when they chase the civilian, the unarmed civilian
population out of a village and then they can pursue them with
a helicopter and they can pursue them with vehicles that can
get through swamps, that changes it dramatically. It is bad
enough to be able to live in a swamp, live nearby in the forest
to be able to not even be able to do that is something that I
would argue that if we focus directly on the heavier arms,
especially now, the country, no one can argue that they need
them now. And if we can't get sanctions through the U.N. there
are other ways that I will trust you are more capable of
pursuing than I am.
But again for me the focus is, not that I wouldn't like to
give it up all arms, but on those heavy arms in particular, and
as you know we have had this discussion before. I would
personally like to see chasing particularly the worst actors. I
would love to see their personal funds chased. And I say that
because, you know, they aren't just sitting in a mattress in
South Sudan. They are not in gold bars. They are sitting in
banks in Kenya and Uganda for the most part. And, you know, it
is cash that they have stolen from our money, from USAID, not
just like cash but items that they stole from you and then
sold, and it is readily available.
And again I know we have had this discussion before and we
have to go vote, but I wanted to add my voice to that which you
have heard before, but I wanted to do it here for the record as
well.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Let me just conclude with
one final, a very brief question, and elaborate for the record
if you would. With regards to child survival, are children
getting the vaccinations that they absolutely need to survive
and to prosper? And the first 1,000 days of life which I know
South Sudan has agreed to, is that a priority of USAID to
ensure that that nutrition and supplementation to reduce
maternal mortality as well as child mortality being
prioritized?
Mr. Leavitt. Our health activities and nutrition activities
do very much focus on women and children at this time. With
regards to vaccinations I can take that for the record and
provide you the details on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from Mr. Bob Leavitt to Question Asked During
the Hearing by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith
For many years, USAID assistance to South Sudan has included
childhood vaccinations against major vaccine preventable diseases which
include polio, measles, and diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus
Hepatitis B and Haemophilus influenza type B), as a core part of our
basic health services. USAID helps South Sudan with the purchase of new
vaccines through its global investment in Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance,
and with the aim optimizing the global investment, the USAID mission in
South Sudan supports activities to strengthen routine immunization
systems, including service delivery which is necessary for the delivery
the vaccines. USAID is an anchor donor for Gavi with more $200 million
in annual contribution and South Sudan is one of the Gavi priority
countries for vaccines and health systems.
South Sudan's national immunization program is largely supported by
international development partners, including USAID and Gavi. USAID
actively participates in the National Interagency Coordinating
Committee to ensure that Gavi funds are used strategically in support
of routine immunization activities in South Sudan. As part of ongoing
health activities, USAID-funded programs will continue to work with
county health departments and state ministries of health to implement
the ``Reaching Every District/County'' strategy in all eight states
covered by a multi-donor health fund (supported by USAID, the United
Kingdom, Canada, European Union, and Sweden). The eight states covered
by the fund are Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria; Western and
Northern Bahr el Ghazal; Lakes; Unity and Warrap. The World Bank
supports basic health services in the remaining two states, Upper Nile
and Jonglei.
In the last three years, routine immunization activities in South
Sudan have been significantly affected by conflict, particularly in the
northern part of the country. Consequently, the national administrative
immunization coverage (DPT-3/PENTA-3) has dropped from nearly 70
percent in 2011 to 56 percent in 2015. USAID support has been essential
in preventing these rates from dropping even further. Because strong
routine immunization depends on a functional health system,
improvements will take time. In the interim, USAID continues to work
with other partners, including the World Health Organization and
UNICEF, to support integrated immunization campaigns for polio,
measles, and vitamin A supplementation, as well as to improve routine
immunization through periodic accelerated vaccination outreach
activities.
USAID humanitarian programs support immunization campaigns for
measles and polio as part of essential primary health care for
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and children at risk of
malnutrition, both within IDP sites and through mobile clinic outreach
services. In addition, USAID supported cholera oral vaccination
campaigns in congested IDP sites to respond to and mitigate cholera
outbreaks in 2015.
Preventing stunting requires a multi-sectoral approach in the first
1000 days. USAID supports the provision of safe water and sanitation
facilities, as well as training on safe hygiene practices, to prevent
and mitigate the negative effects of diarrheal disease on health and
nutrition. In addition, education for caregivers on infant and young
child feeding practices helps to promote optimal nutrition with the
resources available to families. Psychosocial stimulation can also be
an important factor for preventing stunting among young children. USAID
provides community-based psychosocial support services for conflict-
affected children and mothers to enhance their emotional and
psychosocial wellbeing, such as through provision of recreational
spaces and activities.
These activities complement USAID humanitarian and food assistance
programs, which aim to address the immediate nutritional needs of
children and pregnant and lactating women in South Sudan and save lives
while mitigating the longer-term developmental impacts of the conflict.
USAID supports 10 partners to deliver life-saving treatment for
children aged 6 to 59 months and pregnant and lactating women who
suffer from acute malnutrition. Since the crisis began, USAID has
provided over 1,300 tons of Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF) to
UNICEF for the treatment of severe acute malnutrition and over 3,600
tons of Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food (RUSF) through the World Food
Program for the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition. USAID
humanitarian funding also enables provision of primary health care and
maternal and antenatal services in the UN Mission in the Republic of
South Sudan Protection of Civilians sites and other locations
sheltering large numbers of IDPs.
In addition, in early June, the Ministry of Health, in coordination
with relevant line ministries, donors, UN agencies, NGOs, and other
civil society organizations, held a high-level advocacy meeting on
Scaling Up Nutrition, signaling its intention to revitalize the
movement to end malnutrition in South Sudan. USAID will work with other
stakeholders to support this process in the coming months.
Mr. Smith. Because, you know, in the past even when there
were conflicts, and one of my first, I actually worked on this
issue since I have been in Congress for 36 years, but I will
never forget when the FMLN and President Duarte even in the
height of their conflict in El Salvador had days of tranquility
in order to vaccinate the children. And hundreds of thousands
of children were protected against polio, diphtheria, and a
number of other child killing diseases, and I just hope that is
a priority. If you could get back to us on that, it is
extremely important.
We stand in recess. We have four votes and then we will
reconvene for Panel II. Thank you so much.
[Recess.]
Mr. Smith. The hearing will resume. We do have some members
en route so I thought I would wait, but I think if we wait too
long we will have another set of votes. So I do apologize for
that set that intervened. I do want to say a brief statement
about this prayer petition for South Sudan.
Deborah Fikes may have left but she was with us earlier
from the World Evangelical Alliance, 104,000 signatures on a
resolution committing those people to prayer asking our leaders
to take bold action to ensure peace is realized in South Sudan
by doing everything in their diplomatic power to stop the flow
of weapons and ammunition that are fueling the violence and
ensuring that those who stand in the way of peace are held
accountable, to quote from the petition. So I thank her for
providing the subcommittee with that.
I would now like to introduce our distinguished panel, and
I do hope the members make their way. There are no more votes
for at least 1\1/2\ hours.
Beginning first with Mr. John Prendergast who is a human
rights activist, best-selling author, and co-founder of the
Enough Project, an initiative to end genocide and crimes
against humanity, John has worked for the National Security
Council under President Clinton, the State Department, and in
congressional offices. He has also worked for the National
Intelligence Council, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, the
International Crisis Group, and the U.S. Institute for Peace.
He has helped fund schools in Darfurian refugee camps and
helped launch the Satellite Sentinel Project with actor and
activist George Clooney. Mr. Prendergast has worked for peace
in Africa for more than \1/4\ of a century and has been a
frequent and an expert witness that this subcommittee and other
subcommittees do rely on for insight and counsel. So thank you,
John, for being here.
We will then hear from Mr. Matt Wells who works on Africa
and peacekeeping at the Center for Civilians in Conflict, or
CIVIC, with a particular focus on South Sudan. Mr. Wells has
undertaken extensive field research on the recent conflict in
South Sudan, examining issues including the targeting of
civilians by armed actors, the protection of civilians by the
U.N. peacekeeping Mission, and civilian perspectives on the
peace process and transitional justice.
Prior to joining CIVIC, Matt was an Africa researcher at
Human Rights Watch where he led work in Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal,
Liberia, Zambia, and he is widely quoted in a number of major
news outlets who seek him out for his opinion and insight.
We will then hear from Dr. Luka Biong Deng who is a global
fellow at Peace Research Institute Oslo and a fellow at Rift
Valley Institute. He has taught at the University of Juba in
South Sudan. He was a resident senior fellow at the Carr Center
for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, and visiting
fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the
University of Sussex in the United Kingdom.
He served as director of the Center for Peace and
Development Studies at the University of Juba, a minister in
the Office of the President of Southern Sudan, and a national
minister of Cabinet Affairs of the Sudan until he resigned in
May 2011.
We will then hear from Dr. Augustino Ting Mayai who is
director of research at the Sudd Institute. His major research
interests include childhood mortality differentials in Sudan
and South Sudan, applied quantitative methodology, applied
development research, social accountability and public service
delivery, and the demography of conflicts and violence.
Prior to co-founding the Sudd Institute, he worked in a
wide range of research projects sponsored by the Office of the
President of South Sudan, the World Bank, UNICEF, Integrity
Research and Consultancy, Capacity Building Trust Fund, and the
U.S. National Science Foundation.
So welcome to all four of you. Please proceed, Mr.
Prendergast, as you would like.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, FOUNDING DIRECTOR, ENOUGH
PROJECT
Mr. Prendergast. Well, thank you, Chairman Smith and
Ranking Member Bass, for your unwavering commitment to the
people of Africa. On a personal note, and this is rather
humbling, it has taken me now 30 years to finally identify the
primary root cause of suffering in South Sudan and the
surrounding region of east and central Africa.
The international community is spending upwards of $2
billion a year in South Sudan, but almost nothing is being done
about the root cause. In South Sudan, the state has been
transformed into a predatory criminal enterprise that serves
only the interests of those at the top of the power pyramid.
Competing factions of the ruling party have hijacked the state
itself and are using its institutions, along with deadly force,
to finance and fortify networks aimed at self-enrichment and
maintaining power.
Corruption and violence are not aberrations; they are the
system itself. This is the definition of a violent kleptocracy.
Unless it is addressed, we are just treating the symptoms not
the causes of these cyclical conflicts. Investigations that we
have conducted with the Enough Project's new initiative The
Sentry have identified numerous cases of large scale
embezzlement through procurement fraud, outright looting of the
country's natural resources, and countless examples of
unexplained wealth.
Funds are routinely and sometimes blatantly misappropriated
and diverted away from South Sudan's central bank. In other
cases, contracts are awarded to well connected insiders. Money
is transferred, but the services are never delivered. We are
going to go public with some of these cases very soon.
So addressing root causes you need to involve the building
of leverage, which until now has been a cripplingly and
puzzlingly insufficient part of international efforts to
support peace and human rights in Africa. And, I say it is a
puzzle because when the United States wants to counter
terrorism or when we want to rein in nuclear ambitions, when we
want to undermine drug traffickers, a basic element of the
strategy to achieve these objectives is to build leverage
through the use of financial statecraft tools.
Biting enforcement of sanctions, anti-money laundering
measures, prosecutions, asset seizure and forfeiture, and other
economic tools of 21st century foreign policy are key
instruments in securing U.S. foreign policy goals. How strange
and disappointing it is that these tools are not utilized for
promoting peace and human rights in South Sudan and more
broadly in Africa.
The surest way in our view to build leverage is by hitting
the leaders of rival kleptocratic factions in South Sudan where
it hurts the most and the place where they are most vulnerable,
which is in their wallets. This requires a hard target,
transnational search of dirty money and corrupt deals made by
government officials, by rebel leaders, by arms traffickers,
complicit bankers, and mining and oil company representatives.
Now the bulk of my written testimony contains very specific
recommendations for building that leverage to dismantle the
violent kleptocracy in Juba, but given the time constraints I
will just focus on a few--two for Congress, two for the
administration, and one for countering an American war
profiteer.
First, Congress can do a lot to focus policymakers'
attention in the Obama administration, but I will highlight two
specific recommendations. First is passing the Global Magnitsky
Act. That is a catalytic piece of legislation, and we commend
your original sponsorship of the bill, Mr. Chairman. We hope
everyone on this subcommittee can be convinced over time to
become a co-sponsor of that bill.
Secondly, Congress can ensure that the government agencies
that are responsible for administering and enforcing targeted
sanctions and other tools of foreign policy of economic
statecraft, particularly the Office of Foreign Assets Control
in Treasury, have sufficient resources and staff to create
peace, for real pressure for peace and human rights.
Now, moving quickly to the administration to the executive
branch, they can do so much more to create the leverage
necessary for the United States to be able to support and
influence the peace process and undergird efforts of human
rights that South Sudanese are making. I strongly welcome what
Ambassador Booth said just a little while ago about corruption.
Those are great words. We have got to see action.
First I would say, first specific thing, and again there
are lots of specifics in the testimony, is that the proper use
of targeted sanctions is really critical in all of this. We
need to go after much higher level officials and then seriously
enforce those sanctions working to freeze and seize the ill-
gotten assets that are identifiable.
Secondly, some of the South Sudanese who are already
sanctioned have continued--listen to this. These are guys
already sanctioned and they are continuing to openly travel and
bank in international financial institutions. This is
embarrassing. It completely undermines what we are trying to do
and makes us into a paper tiger.
The Department of Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network should investigate these sanctions violations by banks
and others and begin to discuss consequences with the sanction-
busting countries and banks. FinCen, as it is known, should
also send out a request to U.S. financial institutions
inquiring about senior Sudanese officials suspected of grand
corruption and money laundering. These actions could have a
chilling impact on the facilitation of corrupt activities
internationally.
Finally, a word about a firm run by a U.S. citizen that
feeds into this violent kleptocracy. Evidence obtained by our
Sentry initiative appears to indicate that a subsidiary of
Blackwater founder Erik Prince's new company, Frontier Services
Group, has arranged to provide services to South Sudan's
military--despite repeated assertions by FSG that it is not
involved in security contracts in South Sudan--services that
would require special authorization from the State Department
that Prince's company has reportedly not obtained.
Congress can work to hold these war profiteers to account
by urging the State Department and the Justice Department to
thoroughly examine whether Prince and associates have violated
United States laws and trade restrictions. Thank you for the
opportunity and your commitments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Smith. Thank you so much, Mr. Prendergast.
Mr. Wells.
STATEMENT OF MR. MATT WELLS, PROGRAM OFFICER, CENTER FOR
CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT
Mr. Wells. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass,
members of the committee. I greatly appreciate the opportunity
to testify today about South Sudan. I focus on South Sudan and
peacekeeping for Center for Civilians in Conflict, which works
to improve the protection for civilians caught in conflicts
around the world. Over the last year I have interviewed several
hundred civilians affected by the conflict in South Sudan, as
well as officials from the U.N. peacekeeping Mission, the
Government of South Sudan, the opposition, and local civil
society.
I was most recently in South Sudan in March, investigating
an attack on a U.N. peacekeeping base that housed 47,000
internally displaced persons. While there, I interviewed a man
named Jameis who first fled violence in January 2014 when the
armed opposition captured his village. He went to Malakal town
but the conflicts soon forced him to flee again, this time to
the other side of the Nile.
Last year, the double threat of food insecurity and attacks
by SPLA helicopter gunships meant he was displaced once more,
this time to the U.N. PoC site in Malakal. He thought not for
the first time that he had found refuge from this conflict's
relentless targeting of civilians, yet on February 17 and 18,
intercommunal violence within the PoC site deteriorated further
when armed attackers including SPLA soldiers entered through a
cut in the camp's fencing and proceeded to shoot and kill
civilians and to burn down systematically parts of the camp. At
least 30 people were killed, more than 120 wounded, many by
gunshot, and about one third of the camp was destroyed.
This man's experience is unfortunately far from unique. I
interviewed women who were subjected to sexual violence as
their homes were set ablaze, who have survived by eating water
lilies after fleeing to the swamps only to be pursued even
there by armed groups, and who after taking refuge in U.N.
bases have been subjected to sexual violence and other abuses
merely while trying to collect firewood outside the camp.
The much delayed return of Vice President Machar represents
a notable step in the peace process, but it is just that--a
step, and one that does not in and of itself greatly change the
risks of violence. The U.S. needs to ramp up its engagement on
other key issues that will allow people the ability to begin
rebuilding their lives without fear that armed groups will
continue terrorizing them.
In that vein I will speak quickly about five issues in
particular. First, transitional justice. U.S. support is needed
to ensure the implementation of all of the transitional justice
mechanisms outlined under the peace agreement. In interviews
that we and others have undertaken in South Sudan, civilians,
regardless of political and ethnic affiliation, have widely
expressed support for criminal accountability, locally driven
reconciliation, and compensation.
Criminal justice can begin to address the impunity that has
made it acceptable to target civilians. Local reconciliation
can bridge communal divisions that have been created or
exacerbated by the conflict and by ethnic targeting. And
compensation can help respond to communities' urgent needs
including rebuilding schools and clinics and returning stolen
cattle, a key source of wealth in South Sudan but also a
potential driver of violence.
Second, conflict over land. The U.S. should use its
leverage to ensure that any decision about the issue of 28
states is made through an inclusive process that involves all
of the country's ethnic groups without favoritism based on
loyalty during the conflict. The February violence in Malakal
PoC is linked to the 28 states decree issue as is recent
violence around Pibor and elsewhere.
Third, an arms embargo, which I have been glad to hear much
discussion about today. The U.S. should support an arms embargo
through the U.N. Security Council. Even after the peace
agreement signing, civilians continue to be targeted in many
parts of the country, including areas of the country where
there previously was not conflict. There is little reason to
believe that abuses will stop simply because the Transitional
Government is formed.
An arms embargo will help protect civilians from future
attack and reduce unlawful attacks by both sides. As was
mentioned, African countries on the Security Council, notably
Senegal and Angola, publicly expressed support as have the UK
and France, yet the U.S. extended any decision about an arms
embargo until June. The time for empty threats is over. The
parties to the conflict have been given every chance to stop
targeting civilians.
Fourth, security sector reform. U.S. support through both
carrots and sticks is critical for meaningful reform of the
SPLA and police. The splintering of the SPLA during the
conflict has demonstrated that despite U.S. investment the
military remains less a national institution than a collection
of armed groups driven primarily by political and ethnic
concerns and loyalty to specific commanders.
The U.S. needs to learn lessons from its past engagement
and ensure that the governments and military take serious a
SPLA professionalization that builds a national military that
protects rather than targets civilians.
Fifth and finally, U.N. peacekeeping performance. The U.S.
has shown great leadership in working to support and improve
U.N. peacekeeping. That should continue as the U.N. Mission in
South Sudan will continue to have a critical role in protecting
civilians from harm. There are more than 2 million people
displaced today, including 186,000 in six U.N. bases. The
mission has saved lives, but it has often been limited in
projecting force outside these bases. And during the February
violence in Malakal PoC, UNMISS's response was simply
inadequate, as we detail in a recent report.
The U.N. has encouragingly set up a Board of Inquiry. We
believe it is critical that the U.N. make public a version of
that report and address any shortcomings identified. In
addition, if the board finds that specific units failed to
intervene and protect civilians, the U.N. Secretariat with
support from member states like the U.S. should ensure
accountability.
I would like to again express my appreciation to the
subcommittee for holding this hearing at a critical moment. The
peace process has focused largely on bringing back President
Kiir and Vice President Machar and the armies that fought for
them. U.S. leadership is critical to ensure the wider conflict
dynamics are addressed, and that can't wait. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Wells.
Dr. Deng.
STATEMENT OF LUKA BIONG DENG KUOL, PH.D., GLOBAL FELLOW, PEACE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO
Mr. Deng Kuol. Yes, first of all, thank you very much, and
one is really honored for having this timely opportunity for to
make this hearing on South Sudan's prospects for peace and
security. But it is also the time that you have a lot of
pressure to keep South Sudan in the radar of your focus, I
think this is highly appreciated.
Maybe what I would like to share with you what went wrong
in South Sudan, are there opportunities or challenges for
ensuring peace and security. And third, what needs to be done
to make sure that peace and security will be holding in South
Sudan.
I think I want to start first with this issue of what went
wrong. I think given the fact that United States and
international community and indeed the people of South Sudan
they wanted to have the independence, hard-won independence, it
raises a lot of question why South Sudan has slid to civil war,
because better understanding of this, the genesis of this
crisis, is critical for us to look at issues of peace and
stability.
That so many people have been putting a lot of myth about
this conflict, sometimes being described as ethnic politics
between Nuer and Dinka, and even sometimes it is a power
struggle within the SPLM, or even sometimes it is being
described as kleptocracy, as corrupt and then neo-patrimonial
system of governance, I think for me this mystification of the
bigger picture.
South Sudan is a complex issue. It needs be understood in a
very comprehensive way. And I think because not getting it
right will--we did some work on these issues about looking at
conflict from a different dimension. But I think it is very
important also when we are talking about South Sudan to
highlight some of the issues, the conditions that resulted in
why South Sudan has slid into--this is a country that had
simultaneously three transitions.
It transitioned from war to peace. It transitioned from
liberation movement to government and you know in most cases
could result into a curse of liberation, and then it
transitioned from one united Sudan to an independent country.
And they had this shock of loss of their leader and also
coupled with the fact that they rely on the oil, but which I
think and then coupled with the weak institutions, and given
the fact also having a bad neighbor like Sudan. Because these
are the things that any country subjected to these conditions
definitely should slide toward--are there opportunities?
Yes, indeed there are opportunities. One is this peace
agreement. For me, this peace agreement, we made analysis in
comparison of the CPA. It managed to address most of the root
causes of the conflict and it is very important, the fact that
although the government raised some concern, the people of
South Sudan they see it as only opportunity. And even the
Parliament unanimously endorsed this peace agreement. And for
me, this is very important for us to focus on this peace
agreement and there are some positive developments happening
given the fact also the government took some measures
especially on issues of investigation about atrocities.
Another important opportunity is the SPLM Reunification
Agreement. I think, you know, it is very important for us, the
crisis, the genesis of the crisis started from the SPLM. We
cannot have democracy without politics. We cannot have politics
without political parties. And that is why we believe the
reunification of SPLM it is very important. I know the U.S.
Government are reluctant to support this reunification of the
SPLM, and in a sense that will give SPLM the monopoly of power.
I think it is very important to revisit your look at the SPLM.
Then one of these challenges, and now this is a few of
these challenges. This agreement despite the good aspect it is
elite power sharing agreement. It is addressing the elites. It
is not addressing the non-state security actors so there is a
very big gap between this agreement and the people on the
ground. I think we have to be mindful about that one. Second,
the issue of the status of the 28 states, the two parties have
irreconcilable positions but should not obstruct the peace
agreement.
Third, the security sector arrangement, we need to refocus
on it, and then this is a top priority. Third, the final status
of Abyei. The Abyei Agreement was actually authored by the
United States and they have given the chance for the Bashir to
dismantle, to obstruct the Abyei Boundaries Commission, the
Abyei International Arbitration, and actually people say the
U.S. abandoned the issue of Abyei and has given even Bashir the
chance to do. Abyei will be coming a very thorn in the
relationship between Sudan and South Sudan.
Third, the unfinish of the CPA. We cannot talk about peace
and security without talking about Nuba Mountain and south in
Blue Nile. Fourth, the role of Sudan. Sudan will continue to
play a negative role in destabilizing, and in actual effect
because of its diplomatic relation now it has been to defy its
image to the level that now people want to actually to relax
their relationship with Sudan.
Sudan is central and it will continue to destabilize South
Sudan, and I think even the issue I see to be out of the
humanitarian, I mean, human rights abuses have been committed
now as we talk in Nuba Mountain and south in Blue Nile and even
in Darfur. So we cannot talk about establishing South Sudan
without focusing on issues of Sudan. Definitely, Sudan will be
quite important. What can be done?
First, I believe making the cost of non-implementation more
than the cost of implementation. The parties should be made to
believe that by not implementing this peace agreement they will
pay the price. And I want to appreciate the stand of the
international community, the African Union, but indeed even the
threat of sanctions, actually they are actually paying off. But
let us mention also the peace is beneficial to the people of
South Sudan. Let us focus on agriculture.
Second, sequencing peace and then justice and
accountability, I think that as looking at the fact that
Government of South Sudan conducted its own investigation about
atrocities committed in Juba, let us use this one as the basis
for accountability in the Hybrid Court, but equally let us
encourage the even the SPLM in a position to conduct their own
investigation about these atrocities. Let us make them take to
account for this one.
Third, the non-state security actors, let us focus on them,
especially the youth and then the issue of defense. And I agree
with you, the defense and security sector reform, Abyei, it is
very important for the U.S. Government because you are the
author of the peace agreement, to renew your commitment so that
the people of Abyei actually--because they will not live within
any other option except to conduct their own referendum.
And then the last one, a community engagement, let this
peace agreement be owned by the people, because these elites
they are actually interested in their own political gains. It
is when this peace agreement is owned by the people this is
where we can be able to.
And lastly, please, South Sudan is so viable, and it is
very important let us look at the bright side of it. You
invested heavily, and I believe one day these people of South
Sudan will rise up to realize their potential. It is an
investment that is worth it. And thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Deng Kuol follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Smith. Dr. Deng, thank you very much for your testimony
and for your insights.
I would like to now, Dr. Mayai.
STATEMENT OF AUGUSTINO TING MAYAI, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH,
THE SUDD INSTITUTE
Mr. Mayai. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Ranking Member Bass. I am delighted to be here and be given the
opportunity to present before you on the current affairs of
South Sudan, my country. I just returned from there about a
month ago. My contribution today focuses on the role of youth
and engendering and sustaining peace and prosperity in South
Sudan.
This is particularly essential in the nation where well
over 60 percent of the total population constitutes persons age
30 years or younger. And this nation as known to many in the
world, South Sudan is basically a country of youth who are
rarely involved in its most important affairs such as
governance.
Although a relatively large population of youth, it is good
for development, as labor economists suggest, it could also be
a source of tragedy, especially in the absence of strategic
engagement of this group in productive economic activities.
This situation is worsened by the fact that South Sudan's
literacy rate is lower than 30 percent. This means that the
human capital, it is really low and that affects the country.
Lack of educational opportunities, high unemployment rate,
and political subjugation, as is the case in present-day South
Sudan make youth a liability for a sustainable peace and
development. As we know, it has been the South Sudanese youth
who have actually been fighting on both sides of the just
concluded civil war and prior wars of liberation.
This seems to be a common experience in most contexts,
developing contexts, and not age reflected highly in South
Sudan. As South Sudan returns to normalcy now that Dr. Riek has
returned for peace to be implemented, how to turn this large
population of youth into an opportunity will be a tremendous
test. With properly targeted investment in this group, both
locally and internationally with the U.S. Government being
involved, South Sudan could be on its way to prosperity,
joining the rest of the productive democracies.
When given opportunity the youths make an incredible
difference. A perfect example in our context concerned that of
the Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan who came to the United States
15 years ago, displaced by a brutal civil war in the early
1990s as unaccompanied minors, this community that faced a
hopeless future at the time lived in various refugee camps both
in South Sudan and the neighboring eastern African nations
before coming to the U.S., going to Canada, and Australia.
Prior to resettlement opportunities, thousands of older boys
joined the war of liberation, with the majority being either
killed or wounded in action. Between 2000 and 2004, the U.S.
Government took the initiative to resettle over 4,000 Lost Boys
and Girls in the U.S.
Being in a conducive environment and armed with adequate
economic opportunities to better themselves, the Lost Boys and
Girls quickly made an indelible mark here in the U.S. and back
home. In a few years, this group acquired quality education
from world-class institutions and gained remarkable work
experience including serving in the U.S. Armed Forces.
A generation committed to matters of stability back home,
the group takes education as instruments for personal and
societal fortification very seriously with as many as 20
members of this group obtaining doctorates in medicine and
philosophy, many of them have now returned to South Sudan to
support peace and development.
Although confronted with challenges of South Sudan's
political instability and personal economic opportunity
responsibilities, the Lost Boys and Girls in their limited ways
are currently making important contributions back home through,
for example, the Valentino Achak Deng Foundation, John Dau
Foundation, School of Public Service at the University of Juba,
the SUDD Institute and Marol Academy and many other
initiatives. Likewise, four of the Lost Boys that obtained
their degrees between 2013 and 2015 returned to South Sudan to
teach and provide services for the people of South Sudan,
earning less than $500 a month.
Benjamin Machar, a colleague of mine, defended his
dissertation a week ago, he is now on his way to South Sudan to
support development there. With sustainable peace and increased
support from the U.S. Government and South Sudan and its other
partners, the Lost Boys and Girls can continue to significantly
impact lives in South Sudan.
As the agreement on the resolution of conflict in South
Sudan gets implemented in the next few years, there will be
need to support the Government of South Sudan in skills
development and strategic allocation of those skills across
different sectors. With support from the U.S. Government, the
Lost Boys and Girls who have already acquired both necessary
academic skills and sufficient work experience in the U.S.
could mightily assist in this endeavor. In particular, the U.S.
Government should rejuvenate the skill transfer program
instituted in 2006. That taps into the skilled Lost Boys and
Girls community to augment institutional and peace building
programming in South Sudan.
Gladly, a former U.S. Representative, Frank Wolf of
Virginia, was one of the first U.S. officials to recognize this
necessity, introducing the return of the Lost Boys and Girls of
Sudan Act in the House in 2007. Revisiting this program is
timely if the U.S. is to institute a speedy and sustainable
impact in South Sudan.
This initiative not only fosters institutional strength and
stability for an incredibly distressed nation, it also paves
ways for healthy leadership successions, encourages the youth
to have a voice in subnational and national policy dialogues,
and amplifies young people's involvement in local development
and peace programming. It places young people at the center of
highly desired progress, subsequently creating a sense of
responsibility and ownership of their future.
What is more assuring that many of the Lost Boys and Girls
are ready to return home in pursuit of peace and prosperity,
but their return is not without economic hurdles as many now
have families to cater to and educational loans to repay.
Therefore, a project similar to the Yes Youth Can in Kenya that
was financed by the U.S. Government could be replicated in
South Sudan.
In a nutshell, Mr. Chairman, as peace partner the U.S.
Government may wish to consider an increased strategic
investment in skill transfer programs and the greater
involvement of youth and institutional initiatives, building
initiatives in South Sudan. The U.S. Government may also wish
to extend more support through educational and policy
institutions such as School of Public Service at the University
of Juba, the SUDD Institute, Center for Peace and Development
Studies, and Ebony Center for Strategic Studies. With these few
remarks, thank you very much.
[Mr. Mayai did not submit a prepared statement.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much for your testimony, for
your recommendations and suggestions, and for referencing one,
an idea that was proffered by Congressman Frank Wolf who is a
good friend of mine and certainly a great friend of Africa.
Let me just ask a couple of questions. Before I do, I just
want to recognize that David Abramowitz is here. David has been
a longtime champion of human rights, combating trafficking, he
is the managing director of Humanity United, and I want to
thank him for his lifelong commitment and for being here today
and for, as he always does, offering very valid recommendations
to all of us on how do we proceed on these important issues. He
was chief counsel to the Democratic side of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs for about more than 10 years, so thank you,
David, for being here.
I would like to ask a few questions and then yield to my
good friend and colleague from California.
Mr. Prendergast, you talked about the one factor not being
addressed. I raised it with both Ambassador Booth earlier today
as well as with Mr. Leavitt, and that is this unchecked greed.
And I think, you know, and all of you might want to speak to
this. You used multiple synonyms, each one, with varying
degrees of intensity, certainly looting frenzy, violent
kleptocracy, looting and killing with impunity. And I think,
you know, human nature being what it is, we find in countries
all around the world very often at the core root besides just
an attraction to power there is often this unbridled wealth
that certain people are able to accumulate when they abuse
power.
If you could speak to how well or poorly the administration
is doing. You made very specific recommendations including
FinCEN, the access to financial institutions in terms of money
laundering and the like, you might want to elaborate on that. I
asked Ambassador Booth earlier about your program whether or
not they were plugging in, how well or poorly has that occurred
in your opinion? Are they looking to you for recommendations?
Because it seems to me you take out the financial incentive,
the ill begotten gains from abuse financially, it certainly
might lead to a better governance. Maybe not great governance,
but a better governance.
Secondly, Mr. Wells, you mentioned criminal justice, and
you might want to elaborate how that might proceed since so
many acts, barbaric acts have occurred. There are so many
victims. The case study you cited, which I repeated in part in
my opening, I mean she said, and I thought it was interesting,
Rebecca, that she is not sure if she wants them prosecuted but
she wants to know who they are. And then you do go into the
idea of a reconciliation process. Perhaps all of you might want
to elaborate on what that might look like. Of course the wounds
are still fresh, so justice certainly is something that is on
the minds of many people, so if you could on that.
Dr. Deng, you made a very excellent point about the cost of
non-implementation must be higher than implementation. If you
might want to elaborate on what that cost entails, to whom? Are
you talking about individuals, to the government itself? And
you also made an excellent point about ensuring ownership of
the peace agreement by the people themselves. How exactly does
that occur? How do you bring the people who are, do they need
to be the beneficiaries or as they have been of recent the
date, the victims of bad governance and certainly this
violence, how do you bring them into that equation?
And all of you, if you might want to, because I asked the
question earlier of Mr. Leavitt, the whole issue of the health
and well being of the Sudanese people. It seems to me that I
was a little disturbed that Mr. Leavitt couldn't say chapter
and verse this is what the vaccination program looks like, we
are doing this despite the difficulties, there is a commitment
here to vaccinate children against childhood killers, because
we all remember the child survival revolution. One of the key
pillars, one of them was oral rehydration therapy, and he did
give an example of a young child who seems to have gotten that
because of the huge dehydration issues.
But vaccinations are one of the wonders of the world, and
if we don't adequately pay attention to that--and again with
deep respect to Mr. Leavitt, he will get back to us I am sure--
that should have just rolled off his lips that this is what
they are doing on childhood vaccinations. And in like manner,
since Sudan is part of the scaling up program for the first
1,000 days, that is to me the most transformational program
ever for reducing maternal mortality in those places where
women got the nutrition and the food as well as their unborn
children and then their newly born children, maternal mortality
has dropped like a rock.
So it needs to be prioritized and I am not sure now whether
or not it is, perhaps you have some insights on that as well. I
have other questions, but I will yield to Ms. Bass after those
questions are fielded. Thank you.
Mr. Prendergast. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think
the first point I would make is that kleptocracy, the idea that
a system of government--in our country, in many countries
around the world we expect government to secure the rule of
law, to deliver social services and all of the things that
people expect. In a number of countries around the world, where
corruption is no longer an aberration but is actually the
purpose and point of the system, unless there is an alteration
of the calculations of those that are in power in some way--and
it is hard to make those alterations and calculations purely
from internal efforts.
People work assiduously like the two folks on the panel
here from South Sudan, to my left, who have with many, many of
their colleagues worked for so long for human rights and peace
and democracy and transparency in South Sudan, but they need
help from the outside as well. And I think that accountability,
basic accountability is what so many, when all of us spend time
in South Sudan, so many people are screaming for,
accountability for the commission of war crimes and
accountability for the financial crimes that have left a
country that is one of the most fabulously wealthy in natural
resources completely and totally impoverished. Everything that
wasn't nailed down has been externalized, offshored by the
leaders of these two factions in a variety of, whether in bank
accounts or in opulent houses and all the other kinds of things
that you do when you have that kind of money.
So here is the problem, and I think that Ambassador Booth
sort of put his finger on it unwittingly. They always talk
about the importance of reining in corruption, they always talk
about the importance of accountability, but when it is time to
act, when it is time to vote for the arms embargo, when it is
time to impose a targeted, biting, enforced sanctions on
higher-level officials, when it is time to begin to investigate
banks for money laundering for some of these institutions and
individuals in South Sudan and their international
collaborators, when it is time to do that, other competing
priorities emerge and people say, well, wait a minute, we don't
want to upset the apple cart. Riek is about to come back to
Juba. We have got to do this, we have got to do that. There is
always something else that takes just a little higher priority
than taking the action.
Well, you do that long enough and suddenly, or over time,
the parties act like they expect us not to do anything. They no
longer take our threats seriously. We become the paper tiger
that is written about so many times throughout history. And I
think that is where we are right now in South Sudan, frankly,
is we are the paper tiger. Threatening to do this, threatening
to do that but never imposing.
And then when we actually impose sanctions on a few mid-
level officers, we don't enforce them, so they are traveling
around the region banking, doing whatever they want to do with
no consequence. Our inaction emboldens these folks to continue
to commit atrocities on the ground. Violence is still occurring
in a number of the states throughout South Sudan irregardless
of the machinations politically in Juba. People need to be held
accountable for that.
So the only way, in sum, the only way to reverse that
dynamic is for us to start acting, to choose certain high
profile, important actions that we can take that can begin to
introduce a sense of accountability, to begin to chip away at
the impunity that these folks feel in Juba that they can do
anything they want to do, they can take anything they want to
take, and they can kill anyone who they want to kill with
absolutely no consequence.
Mr. Wells. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On criminal justice and accountability, I think the
positive thing is that the peace agreement in many ways gives
us the foundation to address these issues through calling for
the establishment of three mechanisms in particular, the Hybrid
Court, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the
Compensation and Reparation Authority. So the foundation is
there. What is key now is starting progress, to get these
institutions set up and working.
On the Hybrid Court, you know, and criminal accountability
in particular, there was a great study done by the South Sudan
Law Society last year that showed that 93 percent of people
that they interviewed in a large study favored criminal
prosecutions for crimes that had been committed. There is an
overwhelming desire amongst the South Sudanese to see criminal
accountability. And the African Union has taken a notable and
important leading role to that end. They will be in charge of
helping set up the Hybrid Court.
What is critical to see from the U.S. is support for that--
technical assistance, financial assistance--so that the Hybrid
Court can begin to do its work. And right now what we really
need to see is the collection and preservation of evidence.
Each day that goes by we are losing the ability to access much
of the evidence that is needed. So right now it can't happen
fast enough to get the process started for collecting and
preserving evidence.
On the reconciliation point, you know, in interviews that
we have done around the country, the key thing that people say
is that this has to happen both at the national level and at
the local level. It is not enough to set up a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission that sits in Juba and focuses on the
elite. We need a process that engages people around the country
that addresses not only the national conflict dynamics that my
fellow panelists have talked about, but also many of the local
factors that are driving inter- and intracommunal violence.
And the third thing is the Compensation and Reparation
Authority that is often forgotten about. We talk a lot about
criminal accountability, we talk a lot about reconciliation,
but we don't talk about this issue of compensation and
reparations. And for many people, getting some sort of
immediate assistance given the fact that their villages have
been burned, their schools have been destroyed, their clinics
have been destroyed, many of them have had their crops
destroyed, their seeds for future harvests destroyed, and so
there is an urgent need to allow people to begin rebuilding
their lives.
There is a lot of discussion around how to best set up this
Compensation and Reparation Authority, and I think it needs to
ultimately follow two tracks. One that longer term perhaps
addresses individual reparations, but that more immediately
focuses on collective issues, how to help villages begin to
rebuild their lives, and how to address issues like the huge
amount of cattle that have been stolen throughout the conflict
and that will inevitably drive violence going forward.
Mr. Smith. Well, can I just ask you before going to Dr.
Deng, on the Hybrid Court did you just say that the U.S. is not
providing money?
Mr. Wells. No, I am saying they need to provide money.
There has been, I think, a statement of $5 million, I think,
they expressed last year that they would provide for the Court.
Financial assistance is incredibly important. We also need to
see from the U.S., given how many people here have experience
with hybrid courts or international criminal justice more
generally, the provision of technical assistance to help work
on things like again the collection and preservation of
evidence, how to best protect judges and investigators and
prosecutors that would be involved in this, how to set up a
witness protection program because ultimately people who come
forward will face retaliation, so how can we set up witness
protection. I think the U.S. has a critical role to play in
working with the AU on all of those issues.
Mr. Smith. But, you know, there are people, and we have had
David Crane testify several times before this subcommittee
about the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which did magnificent
things and Charles Taylor is now serving 50 years because of
that court.
If there is something more that we need to be doing, Ms.
Bass and I were just talking, perhaps we need to do a letter or
to be in touch again with the administration about making sure
that money does flow, because you are right. As time goes on,
witnesses are lost, information, memories fade, and then the
fear of retaliation without the right kinds of checks,
including for prosecutors and judges, you know, I am not sure
myself what the parameters are in terms of how many potential
people would be prosecuted.
How high up do you go and how low, I should say, on the
people who have killed, maimed, do you actually go? But we will
follow up and we will do it in a totally bipartisan way because
we are on one accord, right. I think that is----
Mr. Wells. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Dr. Deng.
Mr. Deng Kuol. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for
raising these issues. I think this is your non-implementation
to be more expensive than implementation. I think this is very
critical. One, it is very important to focus on the
implementation of peace agreement. This is the desire of the
people of South Sudan.
And the leaders have been entered into this agreement
lukewarmly but not fully with all calculation. And I think that
it is very important that we should make sure for them to fill,
to implement this agreement they have to pay the price. And the
good thing that we have tools available already. For instance,
I think the very fact that the African Union and IGAD, together
with the international communities through the United Nations,
they have agreed to make this the choice of international
community which is accurately reflecting the will of the people
of South Sudan. That by itself is a very important tool that we
should capitalize on.
Second, I think the parties they know that they have
committed crimes and these crimes are documented, and it is
very important to focus on this African Union Commission of
Inquiry. It is a very important document that could be used to
make them believe that non-implementation this is the
consequence. So even without, even with implementation.
And third, you have this the United Nations experts panel,
they have been collecting very good information about some of
them including the economic crimes. And as we talk now, the
people of South Sudan, they know in details who did what, and
these are the things that we should continue documenting them
and to be available.
We were talking about human rights abuses, but I think the
issue of economic crimes, it may not be necessary to add the
Anti-Corruption Commission, but even we can focus on having a
special court for these crimes. The other one, the very fact
that the Government of South Sudan collected some information
for the atrocities, we have seen as a positive thing.
But this information, information about atrocities, they
have not released this information and this should be made
public. And actually, from the information we have there is
SPLA, they did their own investigation. The police did
investigation, the Minister of Justice, and also the President
himself. But these documents are not made available and these
are the homegrown initiative in order to achieve justice.
Because those factors, I think these are the tools that we can
use in all that.
But importantly, and I think this is something I did not
mention. Let us make also scenario analysis. What if the peace
agreement fails? Because we should not be taken by surprise.
They cancel that peace--that this peace agreement may fail is
quite high. Should we be active or should we stop learning as
of now? Because site plans are very important, this analysis is
very important for the parties to know the consequence of non-
implementation.
The other side of it is making the peace agreement
attractive, and this is where I believe that we should learn a
lot of things. The Government of South Sudan, for example, they
are involved in what is called Comprehensive Agricultural
Development Plan. This actually is, I think, supported by JICA,
by--and this is an area that we need to look. When you talk
about the youth, especially the large population, it's about
the whole of agriculture, creating opportunities. And this is
an area that we should make peace agreement attractive.
We may need to invest also in the two leaders, I mean,
Salva and his Vice President, how to work with them; the way
that they enter into this initial relationship is going to be
very fragile, and we need to invest in making them, make sure
that they are working for the good of the people of South
Sudan. If you go for the view of some it is strategy, that they
want to isolate each other, it is by the end of day the people
of South Sudan will pay.
So this is what I meant by making non-implementation more
expensive than the--let me come also the issue that you raise
about the issue of community engagement. There is an
organization called CEPO, Community Empowerment for Progress
Organization. When I was in the Center for Peace and
Development we started having what can we do in order to make
the engagement of the people in this peace agreement; let them
accept the information, but importantly for them to know even
their responsibilities.
And actually, when we said the non-implementation to be
more expensive, it is when the people themselves take it upon
themselves and to let these people to be accountable. What do
we mean, for example, one of the things that we need to be done
for this peace agreement, let the public know that this what it
means for them and for them to follow who is not implementing.
Because these elites are relying on these people, but these
people are equipped--so this is one of the problems, quite
complex, a problem of community empowerment problem by this
organization.
That is, actually I am working with them, advising them
also on this issue of--on the transition of justice, I think I
talked about this sequencing, and it is very important not to
rush for accountability and justice who we don't have the good
platform. The process should start slowly while we are creating
environment for justice and otherwise will be--we have learned
from the experience of Kenya.
What should be done--here is an issue that these people,
they commit themselves to peace. And this is going to be a good
foundation for issues of justice and accountability. But in the
process also, we should start immediately documenting,
documenting the information about the atrocities committed and
especially what John said about economic crimes. For me these
are the things, these are, you can really get the people. Get
with those one, and the other one actually come slowly.
So let the--and then the most important thing is when you
come for election. For me, election is a recipe for another
crisis in South Sudan. Those are the sources really for
election that we are invested. Let us invest in making sure
they are laying the foundation for justice and accountability,
but do it slowly in a way not to spoil the very fact that we
need to focus on the--let me stop here.
Mr. Mayai. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Glad that you
raised a question related to health. South Sudan, for some that
might not be aware of its health statistics, has the highest
mortality rates in the world. And we are talking of statistics
that were collected at post-conflict time. Think of it now that
the conflict has been going on for the last 2 years and so many
people affected across the board. We think that the situation
has worsened. Many people have died as a result of this
conflict adding to the prevailing conditions, poor health
conditions.
But I also want to bring you to the attention that even
with peace, health conditions remain to not be changing much. I
conducted a study. I am a demographer in training, and I
conducted a study that looked at the relationship between
health and spending, the public spending.
JP, I think you should know this. What we found with that
there was no relationship in South Sudan. The more money you
invest in health, basically did not make much of a difference.
What this means is that the money that gets invested in health
doesn't really get spent on health. It goes somewhere else. So
that is the relationship between corruption and health.
What is it that is going on now, UNICEF. The U.N. is still
spearheading providing services in this area. UNICEF recently
was campaigning for vaccination for children. They were
claiming to be pursuing over 300,000 children which is a big
deal, and hopefully they are undergoing that.
But again this leads us back to this, you have the U.N. You
have the U.S. coming there temporarily, but how do you sustain
all these activities down the road, 5 years, 10 years down the
road? That brings us back to the idea of capacity that the
return to the Lost Boys and the Lost Girls is called for; that
they should go back and be doctors and be the administrators in
different capacities. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Since you just finished on that note, Dr. Mayai,
and it was very nice to meet you in South Sudan and then to see
you here as well. You know, in the last panel I raised the
question about the lost men and women going back, and part of
the reaction was, well, that could create some problems because
the existing leadership would not take too kindly to that. But
I would like to know your opinion of that.
You mentioned doctors, you mentioned administrators. It
just seemed to me, but, you know, obviously I was only there
for a couple of days, it didn't seem like there was an
abundance of folks on that level, so that is why it didn't seem
to me like it would create more tension. But I would like, you
know, to know your thoughts on that.
And then while you are thinking about that, Mr.
Prendergast, you started talking about, which I want more
information about, the company that you mentioned and their
involvement on the negative side. And, you know, I mean that is
one of the benefits of our country, right, I mean, we can hold
people accountable. And so I want more information about that.
Now I have your full testimony. I know what you gave was
abbreviated. If it is here, you know, I will look at it, but I
wanted you to talk more about that.
You also talked about the wealth, and I guess that wealth
is overseas because I don't know that it is there. I have
always been leery about sanctions and especially targeted
sanctions, because to me it is just difficult to see how they
have any muscle behind them, but then, you know, you talk about
the wealth, so I guess the wealth is being hidden overseas.
But, you know, sanctioning somebody to tell them that they
can't come to the United States, it is hard for me to
understand how that really, you know, has some punch behind it.
So I would just like to ask those two questions right now, and
then I know they are going to pull us away again for our last
votes.
Mr. Mayai. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Bass. This
is an important question, and it would have been great if
Ambassador Booth was here while I respond to this question.
Before I get into more details into this I want to reference an
effort made by Dr. Luka Biong in 2011 to return about 11 Lost
Boys from here to provide support for an analysis that was
conducted in the Office of the President. Eleven of the Lost
Boys that went, eight remained. They were supported for a year
by the Office of the President with Dr. Luka Biong advising the
team, and eight of the Lost Boys decided to stay. So that
speaks to something.
But let me say this. There is no question of challenges in
terms of reception, but those questions are not related to what
Ambassador Booth really raised earlier and that is the question
of resistance. The question of resistance should be looked at
from this perspective. South Sudan does not have sufficient
economic resources to hire highly qualified individuals, people
with families abroad, people basically that have loans to pay.
South Sudan does not have that, but that does not translate
into South Sudan not wanting these people to work in different
arenas.
I just made a reference to the 11 members of my group that
went back, I also would like to make a reference to the group
that was recruited in 2006 on the skills transfer program.
Majority of these people did not come back. Some of them became
ministers and GGs in the government. That also shows the
commitment of the government to integrate those individuals.
The problem is that the few that returning and get
integrated are not enough to exert that effort that is needed
to change the system. So I think we should not be too
pessimistic about the government actually trying to----
Ms. Bass. Well, how is that viewed from the other side? I
mean, you know, that is great what you just said, but then are
they viewed as taking sides? How does the other faction view?
Mr. Mayai. The other faction as in which?
Ms. Bass. Oh, Machar. I mean, you know, the folks that
split from the government.
Mr. Mayai. Each political group has its own opinion.
Ms. Bass. I am sorry?
Mr. Mayai. I mean, each political group has its own
opinion. And I think----
Ms. Bass. So at this point in time, if people were to go
back when the government is being reformed, restructured, and
both sides are there, would the folks that go back be viewed as
taking Kiir's side?
Mr. Mayai. I don't see that because both sides have members
here.
Ms. Bass. Oh, okay. Okay.
Mr. Mayai. And across the board here and Australia and
Canada, and the recruitment should be fair enough to include
all the qualified individuals to be able to go back and work. I
don't think that would be a problem.
Ms. Bass. Okay. Thank you. And I know that they have called
votes now, so we have just a couple more minutes.
Mr. Prendergast. Thanks. Okay, four very, very quick
points. First, on the Frontier Services Group, we will give you
all the information we have----
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Prendergast [continuing]. So both of you can have that.
Number two, The Sentry, which is this new initiative we
have begun, George Clooney and I have hired a team of financial
forensic investigators and they are following the money all
throughout east and central Africa but into the international
system. Not to try and blame folks on the ground, because it
takes two to tango in corruption.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Prendergast. So we are looking at the banks, the mining
companies, the oil companies, arms dealers, logistics
companies, anyone who is facilitating or profiting from human
misery. That is the agenda.
Ms. Bass. I am assuming this is our money too, right? This
is our money, meaning U.S. taxpayers' money?
Mr. Prendergast. Oh, that is being taken? Yes.
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Prendergast. So there are lots of different ways that
these guys make money. Most of it is through the looting of the
natural resource wealth.
Ms. Bass. Oh, okay.
Mr. Prendergast. So that the vast preponderance of the
money that is being stolen from east and central Africa is
gold, oil, diamonds, all the rest of it. But then they steal
anything that isn't like--so the aid money that comes in.
Contracting is a major thing, especially military contracting,
you know, all that kind of stuff.
So we have been sharing information with Treasury, Justice,
and State, and other governments that can potentially act. We
will, in about 2 months, begin to come up here and start
briefing you guys on the dossiers that we are building on a
number of these networks, and then we will go public later on
in the year.
Third, where did the wealth go? It is not millions, it is
billions. I mean, the money just poured in. Remember, before
independence there was a 6-year period when there was an
interim administration. When that interim administration was
stood up in 2006, the oil wealth sharing deal went into effect.
So literally billions of dollars began to come into the
coffers of a new administration that was administering the
South Sudanese territory with no checks and balances. Of course
most of it disappeared. None of it went into services, none of
it went into infrastructure. It, as you said, somebody said in
this thing, human nature. It is not surprising. It has happened
all over the world. This is not a uniquely South Sudanese or
African or any other thing. This is normal. If you don't have
the institutions then you don't have the oversight. It is going
to happen.
So slowly, steadily, and these guys have talked about the
very, very important parts of this peace deal that create these
oversight mechanisms, that will begin to help. But in the
meantime, and this goes to your point about why do you use
targeted sanctions. Well, one has to assume that if there are
no consequences for stealing millions, in fact billions, of
dollars, it is going to continue. So if you apply very
specifically targeted sanctions on folks that have benefited
dramatically from the ill-gotten gains, the money that was
meant for the people of South----
Ms. Bass. Like freezing the money.
Mr. Prendergast. Freezing that money, seizing it----
Ms. Bass. Okay. That makes sense, right.
Mr. Prendergast [continuing]. And returning it. That is the
ultimate objective.
Ms. Bass. Yes. Sure.
Mr. Prendergast. Return it to the people of South Sudan, at
least some percentage of it. You could fund the entire
development budget of South Sudan for the next decade with some
of the money that was--some of it. So I think that is a really
important, and that is fundamental to our theory of change.
If you create those consequences for corruption, if you
create those consequences for mass atrocities you begin to
affect the calculations of people. That is the beginning, and I
think that is our role as outsiders. And we can support folks
on the inside, Augustino and Luka and all of their allies and
organizations, but on the front lines of working on these
problems at least the thing we could do is to make sure that
when that money goes outside the country we can grab it----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Prendergast [continuing]. And say no, it has got to go
back. It is not fair that people are living in houses with
swimming pools all over the world, some small group of those
people, and their kids are going to the best schools around the
world, and there is a famine in the country from which they
came.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Prendergast. That is just ultimately unacceptable.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. I think we are out of time, but please. You
know, you do want to answer? Sure. I apologize deeply. Thank
you for your insights, counsel, any additional things you would
like to provide to us, anything that prompted, you know, like a
further answer to that question posed by Ms. Bass?
Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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