[Senate Hearing 114-342]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-342
UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS TO COUNTER THE ISLAMIC
STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ AND
SYRIA
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 21; JULY 7; SEPTEMBER 16; DECEMBER 9, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
may 21, 2015
Page
United States Policy in Iraq and Syria........................... 1
Keane, GEN John M., USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army........................................................... 4
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Christopher Delmuth Chair and Director,
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute........ 10
Harvey, COL Derek J., USA (Ret.), Director, Global Initiative for
Civil Society and Conflict, University of South Florida........ 13
Katulis, Brian, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress...... 16
Questions for the Record......................................... 47
july 7, 2015
Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Strategy..... 49
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense..................... 54
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 59
Questions for the Record......................................... 100
september 16, 2015
United States Military Operations to Counter the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant............................................ 117
Wormuth, Hon. Christine E., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 121
Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command.. 126
Questions for the Record......................................... 169
december 9, 2015
United States Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant and United States Policy Toward Iraq and Syria...... 185
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by
General Paul J. Selva, USAF, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff....................................................... 189
Questions for the Record......................................... 243
(iii)
UNITED STATES POLICY IN IRAQ AND SYRIA
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 21, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Cruz, Reed,
Nelson, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Now that Senator Ernst is here, we can
begin.
[Laughter.]
The committee meets today to receive testimony on United
States policy in Iraq and Syria.
I want to thank each of our expert witnesses for appearing
before us today on this critical and complex topic.
Before I go any further, the Secretary of Defense and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were invited to appear.
Admittedly, very short notice, and we will be asking them to
appear after the recess is over, depending on whether the bill
is on the floor, or not. But, we certainly would like to hear
from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs.
Today, we have General Jack Keane, former Vice Chief of
Staff for the Army and chairman of the Institute for the Study
of War.
General Keane, we're pleased you could take time from your
duties on FOX News to being with us today.
Dr. Fred Kagan, who is--that's a joke--Dr. Fred Kagan,
director----
[Laughter.]
Dr. Fred Kagan, the Director of the Critical Threats
Project at the American Enterprise Institute; Colonel Derek
Harvey, U.S. Army (Retired), Director of the Global Initiative
for Civil Society and Conflict at the University of South
Florida; and Brian Katulis, who is a Senior Fellow at the
Center for American Progress.
Could I point out, for the benefit of my colleagues, that
General Keane and Dr. Kagan were key elements and individuals
who went over to the White House in 2006 to talk to then-
President George W. Bush concerning the need for a surge,
that--the strategy in Iraq was failing at that time, and they
were two of the major architects--and I know they'll give
credit to many others, but two of the major architects of the
surge, which turned out to be, at great sacrifice of American
blood and treasure, a success.
The black flags of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) are now flying over yet another major Iraqi city,
Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's Anbar Province, and reports
overnight suggest that ISIL now controls the Syrian city of
Palmyra, as well. This hearing does not--is not about the fall
of any one city, as important as those losses are, but, rather,
what these defeats have revealed about the limitations of an
overly constrained American air campaign, the weaknesses of
Iraqi forces, the growing malign role of Iran, and the
ineffectiveness and inadequacy of United States military
support of--for our Iraqi and Syrian partners. But, most
concerning, it highlights the shortcomings of the
administration's indecisive policy, inadequate commitment, and
incoherent strategy. This misguided approach has failed to
stop, if not fostered, the expansion of ISIL to a dozen
countries. The loss of Ramadi, once the symbol of Iraqis
working together with brave young Americans in uniform to
defeat al-Qaeda, must be recognized as a significant defeat.
ISIL's victory gives it the appearance of strength and boosts
its ability to recruit more fighters while reinforcing Iran's
narrative that only it and its proxies can rescue Iraq.
The fall of Ramadi and capture by ISIL of American-supplied
military equipment is another setback for the United States and
further undermines our credibility as a reliable strategic
partner in the region.
And yet, the Obama administration seems unwilling or unable
to grasp the strategic significance. As ISIL terrorists
ransacked Ramadi--by the way, the Pentagon's news page ran a
story with the headline, ``Strategy to Defeat ISIL is
Working.'' Secretary of State John Kerry said Ramadi was a mere
``target of opportunity.'' And 2 days ago, when a review should
have been well underway to correct an incoherent strategy that
is woefully under-resourced, the White House Press Secretary,
Josh Ernst, said, ``Are we going to light our hair on fire
every time there's a setback?'' I would point out for my
colleagues that maybe his hair isn't on fire, but there are
bodies on fire in the streets of Ramadi as we speak.
The disaster of Ramadi should lead to a complete overhaul
of U.S. Strategy. The President has stated, ``Our goal is
degrading and ultimately destroying ISIL,'' but neither
strategy nor resources support this goal. Our efforts in Iraq
may actually be aggravating the conditions that gave rise to
ISIL in the first place by relying on brutal Iranian-backed
Shi'a militias and insufficiently empowering Sunni Iraqis. At
best, this increases Iran's malign influence. At worst, it
reinforces ISIL's rhetoric that it is the only force standing
against violent sectarian Iranian-backed militias.
President Obama has cleverly maneuvered us into the
position that Sunni Iraqis that we--think we support Iran, and
Shi'a Iraqis think we support ISIL. But, the situation is far
worse in Syria. The Iran-backed Assad regime, together with
Iranian proxies like Hezbollah, continues the slaughter that
has killed more than 200,000 Syrians and displaced 10 million
more. Despite this tragedy, the administration has defined its
policy in Syria more by what it will not do rather than the--by
the end state we aim to achieve. Although the United States
military's train-and-equip program for moderate Syrian forces
is now finally providing assistance to vetted fighters, the
administration still has not decided whether it will defend
Syrian opposition against Assad's barrel bombs upon their
return to Syria. Refusing to support the forces we train is not
only ineffective, it is immoral.
While it is still unclear what President Obama is willing
to do in Syria, it is clear our partners do not draw confidence
from statements of what we will not do. Ramadi's fall should
lead our Nation's leaders to reconsider its indecisive policy
and incoherent strategy that has enabled ISIL's expansion,
undermined regional stability, strengthened Iran, and harmed
America's credibility. What we desperately need is a
comprehensive strategy, the decisive application of an
increased, but still limited, amount of United States military
power, and a concerted effort by the Iraqi Government to
recruit, train, and equip Sunni forces. This will require
disciplined thinking, clear priorities, a strategy supported by
adequate resources, and, most of all, the leadership and
resolve of the President to succeed.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on these
important questions.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, first, let me thank the chairman for
calling this timely and very, very important hearing, and also
thank Senator Nelson for acting as the Ranking Member today. I
have two Appropriations Committee--one Appropriations Committee
and one Bank Committee markup, and I apologize, I cannot be
here.
With that, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to
yield to Senator Nelson.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
what I'm going to do is just put my statement in the record
so we can get on to it.
But, what you underscore is certainly accurate. The fall of
Ramadi--what is the Abadi government going to do? Do they have
the capability of getting Sunnis to come in and take up the
fight against ISIS? And so, we need, as you all testified to
us--How far are we along in implementing the counter-ISIS
campaign in Iraq? And what has the Abadi government done to
empower the Sunni tribes to resist ISIS? And what does Ramadi
mean about retaking Mosul? And will these events force Iraq's
political leadership to overcome their differences in their
attempts at government?
So, with those questions, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]
Prepared statement by Senator Bill Nelson
I'd like to welcome our witnesses this morning, and thank them for
being willing to testify on such short notice.
The recent headlines about the fall of Ramadi, and the brutal
massacre of civilians that followed, demonstrate once again the extreme
threat that the self-declared Islamic State, or ISIS, poses to the
people of Iraq and Syria; to the wider region, extending from North
Africa to South Asia; and to the world.
The response in some quarters to this news has been to declare that
the entire strategy in Iraq is called into question, or to claim that
the Iraq strategy has collapsed.Others, while calling the events in
Ramadi a significant setback, argue that the United States should not
abandon its Iraq strategy, in particular the fundamental principle that
this is not America's war, but Iraq's, though the United States and its
coalition partners can help support the Iraqi government in that
existential fight.
Accordingly, Ramadi should be seen as a wake up call that the Abadi
government needs to do more to include the Sunnis and build the
capabilities of the Sunni tribes to take the fight to ISIL.
The committee would be interested in getting our
witnesses'perspectiveson the significance of the events in Ramadi
within the context of the broader conflict with ISIS.Some of the policy
questions that arise include:
How far along are we in implementing the counter-ISIS
campaign in Iraq, how long will it take, and is there a need for
strategic patience as we build the military and political capabilities
in Iraq required to confront ISIS?
What has the Abadi Government done to empower the Sunni
tribes to resist ISIS, and what more needs to be done?
What does the fall of Ramadi mean for the campaign to
retake Mosul and should there be a shift to an ``Anbar First''
strategy, which would put off the Mosul offensive until after a
counteroffensive to retake Ramadi and other key Sunni cities?
Will these events force Iraq's political leadership to
overcome their differences and govern inclusively, in a manner that
addresses long-standing grievances of Sunnis, Kurds, and other minority
communities?
I look forward to our witnesses testimony this morning.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
And, you know, Palmyra is one of the historic places on
Earth, and, as it's being threatened now, we know what ISIS
does to these antiquities. We're about to perhaps,
unfortunately, see another destruction of an obviously
irreplaceable historic heritage sites that--it would be another
great tragedy along the lines of the destruction of the
Buddhist statues at Bamiyan, years ago.
Welcome the witnesses.
And, General Keane, we'll begin with you. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER VICE CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
General Keane. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member
Reed, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
committee. I appreciate you inviting me back to testify.
I was here a few months ago dealing with global security
challenges facing the United States. And I must say, I was
pretty impressed with the bipartisan support for the challenges
our country is facing and the way you're willing to work
together to come to grips with it.
I'm honored to be here with my distinguished colleagues.
Obviously, I know Fred Kagan and Derek Harvey very well.
They're long and close associates. As much as Fred and I may
have had some impact on the previous administration in changing
their strategy--and there were others who were working towards
that end, as well--Derek Harvey, sitting here, was the catalyst
for understanding the enemy. He was pushing against the
intelligence group think that existed at the time. And he
defined that enemy better than anybody did in this town. And
that was the beginning of understanding what was happening to
us, why it was happening, and what Fred and I thought we could
realistically do about it. So, I'm honored to be here with all
of them.
I've got some maps up there that you may want to use to get
a reference. It's always good to see where things are
happening, to understand the scale and magnitude.
You know, approximately 9 months ago, the President
announced the U.S. public policy----
Chairman McCain. General, could you give me a second? I
don't think we have----
General Keane. We have to get the chairman maps. Okay.
Approximately 9 months ago, the President announced the
U.S. public policy that, along with our coalition partners, the
United States would degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS. Weeks
later, he changed ``destroy ISIS'' to ``defeat,'' a more
appropriate term.
A strategy was crafted to accomplish this objective, which
consisted among some things as humanitarian assistance,
undermining the ISIS ideology, countering the finances,
providing military assistance to our Iraqi partners, to include
airstrikes into Syria, and assisting the Iraqi Government
politically to move toward a more representative government,
which actually, obviously, led to a change in governments. I
cannot address undermining the ideology and the finances in
this testimony. It's beyond my expertise.
While there has been some progress and some success,
looking at this strategy today, we know now that the conceptual
plan is fundamentally flawed. The resources provided to support
Iraq are far from adequate. The timing and urgency to provide
arms, equipment, and training is insufficient. And, as such, we
are not only failing, we are, in fact, losing this war.
Moreover, I can say with certainty that this strategy will not
defeat ISIS.
As to the concept, ISIS, who is headquartered in Syria,
recruits, trains, and resupplies in Syria, controls large
swaths of territory in Syria--and you can look at your map
there to take a look at that--to include the entire Euphrates
River Valley in Syria from Iraq to the Turkish border. It
connects now to the Euphrates River Valley in Anbar Province,
which leads to the suburbs of Baghdad. And it's currently
expanding to the west as far as Damascus. And they just seized,
as the Chairman mentioned, Palmyra City and Palmyra Air Base in
Central City--in central Syria, aligning the central east-west
corridor from Iraq all the way to homes in the west in Syria.
And yet--and yet--we have no strategy to defeat ISIS in
Syria. We have no ground force, which is the defeat mechanism.
Yes, we have airpower. And, despite the success at Khobani--and
yes, we have degraded ISIS command and control in Syria, their
logistics, and we have killed many ISIS fighters--but, airpower
would not defeat ISIS. It has not been able to deny ISIS
freedom of maneuver and the ability to attack at will. Syria is
ISIS's sanctuary. We cannot succeed in Iraq if ISIS is allowed
to maintain that sanctuary in Syria. We need a strategy now to
defeat ISIS in Syria.
As you can see on the map that deals with the global
rings--take a look at that--many ISIS--on that ISIS map--ISIS
is expanding beyond Iraq and Syria into Sinai, Yemen, Libya,
and Afghanistan. This is where they actually have people on the
ground, and they have actually provided resources, and they
have--actually have a contract written and signed with the
people on the ground who are affiliated with them. And they're
also inspiring and motivating radical sympathizers throughout
the world, which are depicted in that map on yellow, as we are
painfully aware of in Europe and in the United States and
Australia. Yet, there is no strategy with our allies to counter
that expansion. I would go further to say there is no strategy
to counter the destabilization of the Middle East.
As to Iraq, it certainly makes sense to assist Iraq in
reclaiming lost territory and avoid deploying United States
ground combat units. However, ISIS, despite some setbacks, is
on the offense, with the ability to attack at will anyplace,
anytime. And, particularly, the fall of Ramadi has exposed the
weakness of the current Iraq strategy. It is more than just a
setback.
Politically, the administration deserves credit for helping
to usher out the Maliki government and bring the new Abadi
government in. However, Abadi is isolated, is undermined by
Maliki, who is still and remains a nefarious character, and
others within Abadi's own party. Abadi is unduly influenced by
Iran. And the United States is not nearly as consequential as
it should be. A United States objective should be, politically,
to reduce Iran's influence. We need a focused diplomatic and
political effort with the Abadi government, with the best
people we have available to do it.
Militarily, clearly the Iraqi army is a serious problem.
While some have fought heroically, many have not. There are
serious leadership, discipline, morale, and competence issues.
This will take time to fix. But, if we believe that Iraq is
important to United States security, then we must help them fix
it. And it will take many more trainers and a much more
concerted effort to put in the best leaders available.
The Sunni tribal force is almost nonexistent, yet we cannot
reclaim the Sunni territory that has been lost, particularly
Anbar Province and Mosul, and we cannot hold the territory
after we have reclaimed it if we do not have a Sunni tribal
force. The Abadi Government must authorize this force, and the
United States should arm, equip, and train it. They must know
that the Iraqi Government and the United States is behind them.
Right now, they know the Iraqi Government is not. Their
families are being killed by the hundreds, eventually by the
thousands. They are disillusioned by the United States, in
terms of its lack of support.
The Peshmerga. They're skilled, they're willed, they will
fight. They need arms, and they need advisors, down at the
fighting level, to assist them with planning, execution, and to
call in airstrikes.
The Shi'a militia are largely protecting Baghdad. Most of
what ISIS owns is Sunni territory. If we use the Shi'a militia
to reclaim that territory and hold it, Iran has undue
influence, politically, in Iraq as a result of it, and the
Sunni people will suffer under the hand and the gun of the
Shi'a militias. We must, in fact, reduce their influence.
The role of advisors. Advisors are only at brigade
headquarters and above, currently. This is flawed. Advisor
teams must be with the units that are fighting, at least at the
battalion level, which is what we did in the past so
successfully. Advisors, as the name implies, helps units plan
and execute, and it also builds their confidence in themselves.
They are also forward air controllers and can direct airpower
as well as attack helicopters. The war in Iraq is largely
close-combat urban warfare, which demands the bombs be guided
from our airplanes to the ground by people on the ground.
Seventy-five percent of the sorties that we're currently
running with our attack aircraft come back without dropping
bombs, mostly because they cannot acquire the target or
properly identify the target. Forward air controllers fix that
problem.
Special Operation Forces direct-action teams should be
employed, not as an exception, which is what we successfully
saw this last weekend in Syria with the raid, but routinely in
Iraq and Syria against the ISIS leadership and critical
infrastructure. Similar to what we have done in Iraq and
Afghanistan in the past during the surges, when Fred and I were
there, as well as Colonel Harvey, we averaged--the surges in
Iraq and Afghanistan, we averaged somewhere between eight to
ten of these operations a night. In fact, when the UBL raid was
taking place in Pakistan, there were nine of these going on in
Afghanistan that very night.
We should also do large-scale raids. What does that mean?
We should use elements like Rangers to conduct attacks at night
over critical infrastructure to kill ISIS fighters who are
difficult to dig out with airpower at altitude. These are
surprise attacks. They're not intended to stay. They're in and
out maybe one night. We stay, at the most, a couple of days,
depending on how much of a fight we're getting into.
We desperately need enablers to assist the Iraqi Security
Forces. This is crucial support that helps them succeed on the
battlefield. What is it? Robust intelligence capability. We
have some, but we've got to ramp it up more than what we have.
Increased UAVs, not to assist airpower, which we're currently
doing in terms of surveillance, but to assist ground forces.
That's a different application, and it's a different type of
UAV. We need attack aviation. That's Apache helicopters. And we
need other helicopters to assist the ground forces. C-130
transports to move troops and supplies and other logistics
support. And we need increased U.S. command-and-control
headquarters to help control the increase of trainers,
advisors, and others that I'm suggesting here.
Obviously, what I am suggesting is increased United States
political and military involvement in Iraq, which begins to
shore up many of the weaknesses of the current strategy. While
I believe we can still do this without U.S. and allied combat
brigades, it is much more difficult now than what it was 9
months ago. I believe we have to do some serious contingency
planning for the introduction of ground combat brigades, both
United States and allied.
Finally, we need to get past our political psychosis on
Iraq which is defined by the questions: Should the United
States have gone into Iraq in 2003? Should the United States
left Iraq in 2011? While they were crucial U.S. policy
decisions, there is--and there is much to learn from them, and
we have--we've got to get past it. ISIS is much more than Iraq.
Our forces should be what the--our focus should be what the
President started out with: defeating ISIS. That will take
political will. And war is a test of wills. It will take
accepting risk. It will take accepting casualties. It will take
focus. And it will take increased U.S. resources. And it will
take honest evaluations as--and assessments.
What I fear is this. I hear a disturbing and frightening
echo of the summer of 2006, when administration, senior
government--when a different administration, senior government
officials, and military senior generals came before this
committee and, in the face of compelling evidence that our
strategy in Iraq was failing, these officials looked at you and
defended that strategy and told you that, overall, the strategy
was succeeding. You and your predecessors took a strong
bipartisan exception to those opinions. Many, as a result of
it, wanted to give up on Iraq. Others wanted to do something
about fixing the problem.
I hope you choose the latter and get on with helping to fix
the problem. And I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[Supplemental material to the statement of General Keane
follows:]
Chairman McCain. Dr. Kagan.
STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, CHRISTOPHER DELMUTH CHAIR
AND DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, thank you very
much for calling this hearing. And thank so many of you for
attending. It shows a sense of urgency about the problem on the
part of this committee that it's hard to detect in the rest of
the administration. So, I'm very grateful to the committee, as
always, for the opportunity to speak, but for the attention
that it's trying to focus on this problem.
I receive, every day, a superb daily rollup of activities
in the region produced by my team in the Critical Threats
Project and the team at the Institute for the Study of War. I
can't read it all anymore. It's too long. It's too long because
the region is engulfed in war. It's sort of hard to tell that
from the isolated headlines that pop up and fade away. But,
we--this is the regional war. This is the beginning of the
regional war. It could get a lot worse, but this is a war that
is becoming a sectarian war across the region. It is a war
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, fought largely by proxies, but
now, dismayingly, also directly. There are some people who
think that it's a good thing that the Saudis and others are
acting independently. I would suggest that they take a look at
the historical efficacy of Saudi military forces and ask
themselves if they think that that's really a reed we want to
rest our weight on.
And I think we can focus too heavily on what the Iraqi
Security Forces are doing, or not doing, as we have in the
past. They're not doing enough. Prime Minister Abadi is in a
box. We have helped put him there with our policies. So, it's
not sufficient just to look at and criticize what the Iraqis
are doing. We really do need to look in a mirror and look at
what we are doing or not doing.
As I follow the daily reports, I see a coherent enemy
strategy across the region. I see deliberate enemy operations,
which you can actually depict on a map. And I commend to you a
terrific report by the Institute for the Study of War called
``ISIS Captures Ramadi,'' which actually has a military--old-
fashioned military-style map showing the ISIS maneuvers,
because they are maneuvering. This is not a terrorist
organization. This is an army that is conducting military
maneuvers on an operational level with a great deal of skill.
It is not an accident that Ramadi fell over the weekend and
Palmyra fell yesterday. It is not an accident that there were
ISIS attacks in Beiji and at the refinery, that there was a
prison break in Diyala, that there were threats against the--
not the Hajj--a pilgrimage in Baghdad, and then Ramadi was
decisively attacked and taken. This was a coherent campaign
plan, and a very intelligent one, very well executed. This is a
serious threat. What I can't discern from the daily operations,
let alone from the statements of the administration, is any
coherent American strategy to respond to this threat.
And I want to talk about the threat for a minute. ISIS is
one of the most evil organizations that has ever existed in the
world. We really have to reckon with that. This is not a minor
annoyance. This is not a group that maybe we can negotiate with
down the road someday. This is a group that is committed to the
destruction of everything decent in the world. And the evidence
of that is the wanton destruction, uncalled for even by their
own ideology, frankly, of antiquities thousands of years old
that represent the heart of the emergence of human civilization
in the West. This is a group that sells captives into slavery.
It's a major source of financing for them, actually. This is a
room--a group that engages deliberately in mass rape. This is a
group that conducts mass murder. And this is a group that is
calling for and condoning and supporting and encouraging lone-
wolf attacks, and it will soon, I think, not be just lone-wolf
attacks, in the United States and the west. This is a group of
unfathomable evil. Unfortunately, they are extremely effective.
And they have a degree of military capability--not terrorist
capability--that we have not seen before in an al-Qaeda
organization. This is not something where we should be
spectators. This is not something where we should just say, as
some people do, ``Well, just let them kill each other.'' This
is unacceptable, from a moral perspective and from a U.S.
national security perspective, to just watch a group like this
succeed in this way.
I want to make the point that, of course, any criticism of
the White House today is received--at least from our side--is
received as a partisan attack. I want to make the point that if
that was the case, then I must have been a Democrat in 2006,
because we were attacking the Bush administration with the
Senator--with the chairman and a number of other members of the
committee, as aggressively, or, in fact, more aggressively,
than we've ever critiqued this White House. The fact is that
what matters is that the strategy is failing, as it was failing
in 2006, only we are in a much worse strategic position today
than we ever were in 2006, because it's not just Iraq.
I note that, to speak of the issue of urgency, the Iranians
seem to feel a certain sense of urgency about this, as well.
And their Minister of Defense, General Dehghan, was in Baghdad
over the last few days, signing defense cooperation agreements,
ostensibly, but surely working to coordinate Iranian support on
the ground. The Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader,
Velayati, was in Damascus and Beirut, talking with Bashar al-
Assad and Hassan Nasrallah, no doubt coordinating plans to, I
assume, maintain and increase the military deployment of
Hezbollah forces in Syria and possibly ask Assad what his plan
is, given the circumstances. Those are very senior leaders. I
don't notice that we have sent senior leaders of that rank, or
anything close to it, to speak with Prime Minister Abadi. And,
of course, we have no one to speak with, effectively, in Syria.
Senator Nelson asked about what this means for the counter-
ISIS campaign. It means that the campaign that has been
described by the administration and our general officers is
completely derailed. I do not believe that there is any
reasonable prospect that it will be possible to retake Mosul
this year. I think the fight for Ramadi will be hard enough. I
think that these operations in and around Ramadi demonstrate
that the Iraqi Security Forces, at current levels of United
States support, are not capable even of defending their
territory against determined ISIS attack, let alone clearing a
major ISIS safe haven.
So, we are--our campaign strategy is completely derailed,
in my view. I think it was a campaign strategy, as the Chairman
pointed out, that was of limited likelihood to be successful,
in any event, because it addressed only part of the problem and
left a major safe haven effectively untouched. But, such as it
was, it's over.
My colleague, Derek Harvey, will speak in some more detail
about what kinds of troops and enablers are required. I agree
with General Keane--I'm even willing to put a number on the
table--I think that we need to have a total of 15- to 20,000
United States troops in Iraq in order to provide the necessary
enablers, advisors, and so forth. I think anything less than
that is simply unserious.
And I think we really need to do that, because, I think,
otherwise, we're looking at an ISIS state that is going to
persist. We're looking at an ISIS state that is going to
continue to govern territory, that is going to continue to have
resources that we simply cannot afford to let an evil enemy of
this variety have. And I think it is a major United States
national security priority to respond to this, especially as
it's become clear that it's beyond the capabilities of the
Iraqis.
And lastly, I want to make two larger points that are
directly relevant to this committee. One is, you cannot argue
for a forceful strategy in Iraq and defend the sequester. Our
Armed Forces have been seriously damaged by the sequester. It
needs to be removed immediately. In fact, the Armed Forces
budget needs to be increased significantly. We are at war,
whether we like it or not, and the longer this President
refuses to address it, the worse it's going to be when we
become engaged. We need to be preparing for that now.
And lastly, we need to be strengthening our abilities to
collect intelligence, and not weakening them. This is not the
moment to dismantle our capabilities to see what the enemy is
doing. This is the moment to be engaged in wise reform of
oversight of the intelligence community. And so, It is ironic
that one of your colleagues spent yesterday arguing for the
elimination of a program important to our national security.
So, I think there are things that the administration can do
and things that Congress can do, but it's going to be a tough
fight.
I thank the committee for listening to me this morning.
Chairman McCain. Colonel Harvey.
STATEMENT OF COL DEREK J. HARVEY, USA (RET.), DIRECTOR, GLOBAL
INITIATIVE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH
FLORIDA
Colonel Harvey. Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and members
of the committee, thank you for having me here. I appreciate
the opportunity.
I want to begin with focusing on the Islamic State and the
trends in Iraq. I believe that, even before the fall of Ramadi,
the best that could be said is that Baghdad was holding the
line. Even with the success in Tikrit, there's great difficulty
in holding that terrain. And even in areas that have been
cleared earlier in northern Diyala Province in eastern Saladin,
ISIS has worked their way back in. They just changed their
profile, went to ground, and now they're infiltrating back in
and conducting attacks and rebuilding their capabilities.
Over the past month, they've continued to do shaping
operations in the Baghdad area, western Baghdad. In one day,
just a couple of days ago, there were eight IEDs, two VBIEDs,
and several small-arms skirmishes in Baghdad itself. That's to
say nothing about what's going on in Abu Ghraib and other areas
around the belts of Baghdad.
They continue to hold the line along the Kurdish front,
north in the Nineveh area around Mosul, and they've expanded
successfully in other areas, particularly in Syria. They are
very good at doing shaping operations. They are taking
advantage of their interior lines of communication. They are
well armed, well resourced, and well led.
I think the fall of Ramadi should lead to questions about
the progress asserted by the Pentagon and the administration.
There are two strategically important Sunni Arab cities in
Iraq: Mosul, the second largest city, which was a former
Ottoman capital, and, of course, Ramadi, which is the capital
of the largest geographic province. And ISIS controls Raqqa,
which is another provincial capital, but it's in Syria. The
fall of Ramadi renews the sense that ISIS has momentum, which
is important for rallying Sunni Arabs who may be on the fence
in this fight, and also could aid with foreign fighter
recruitment and some funding.
without an alternative, Sunni Arabs, tribes, and the
peoples in the region, without someone to protect them and lead
them, are going to fall into the camp of the Islamic State,
particularly as this campaign becomes increasingly polarized.
And the movement of Shi'a militias, Popular Mobilization units,
into Anbar Province is going to contribute to this
polarization. And I fully expect that the Islamic State, in the
near future, will try to conduct operations in Karbala and
Najaf to further inflame this fight. That is part of their
major strategy, to polarize this fight between the different
communities.
Now, I would note that ISIS has many challenges and
weaknesses, but the problem is that ISIS is not losing. I
believe that the United States has continued to underestimate
the Islamic State, which I suspect shows a lack of
understanding about the Islamic State, its capabilities,
strengths, and weaknesses and how it sees the fight and a path
to victory.
We've seen this story before. It's like deja vu, for me. We
focus too much on our own activity, our own programs, our own
budgets, but we're not focusing on the impact on the enemy. And
the enemy has a vote.
From public statements, we're not looking at the right
things, and the metrics and measures that are asserted by the
military, the Pentagon, are not really appropriate. The number
of airstrikes is interesting, but irrelevant. What is the
effect on the enemy and its capacity to fight? Stating that
ISIS has lost 25 percent of the territory it conquered is
interesting, but it's really not relevant, because ISIS did not
control eastern Saladin or northern Diyala or some of the other
areas, but they're still there. They're contesting, and they're
rebuilding, and they're shaping. So, that is a false metric
that's been put out.
Striking oil infrastructure in Syria is a good thing, and
it's been degraded. But, the enemy has a vote. It's--their
efforts there have been complicated. They've reduced their
production. But, they've adapted, and, creatively, they have
developed miniature mobile refinement capabilities, even using
blow-dryer air heaters to make refined product. It is crude,
yet it is a sophisticated adaptation. And crude is still going
to Turkey. And they are producing enough fuel for their own
requirements. They're still earning millions of dollars every
month from oil in Syria. It's been degraded, but I think the
lower cost of oil on the markets has had just as much of an
impact as any operations we've conducted. And again, they have
adapted.
The same for funding and foreign fighter flow. They are
still very resilient and adaptive in working around the actions
that have been taken. And the actions that have been taken on
foreign fighter flow and going after finances have been weak
and not very assertive, not well resourced. And I'll talk more
about that.
ISIS is excelling at a hybrid war. They're fighting
conventionally, as needed, they're adapting, and they're
employing terrorist techniques--coercion, assassination,
subversion--as necessary, depending upon the terrain. It is
showing that it can hold key terrain, fight hard, and
synchronize operations across space and time. And they respond
with agility to secure tactical and operational advantages and
overmatch, as we saw in Ramadi. They are very effective, they
are well led. They are skilled, and they have professional-
quality leadership and command-and-control. And they know the
geography, they know the terrain, and they know the human
terrain in these areas very, very, very well. They are
ruthless, and they are committed and determined. And they're
exhibiting the will to fight. And they're fighting for power,
they're fighting for ideological reasons, but, for many Sunni
Arabs who are frustrated and angered about their condition in
life and how they have been treated by Baghdad, they're
fighting for their land, their families, and their future. And
they are not motivated by a hardline Salafist Takfiri
annihilationist agenda, but they're fighting anyway, because
they're fighting for their own lives and their own future, and
they're fearful.
There are many Sunni military-aged males, to date, that
have not taken sides in this fight. It's just a matter of time,
if this polarization continues and we let this drag on, that
ISIS will gain more and more recruits from the Iraqi population
base. The Iraqi fight with ISIS is not dominated by foreign
fighters. This is a homegrown fight, and we have to keep that
in mind. ISIS, as Fred mentioned, maintains operational freedom
in most of the Sunni Arab provinces, and they appear stronger
because, importantly, relatively, their opposition is very
weak.
Now, the Sunni Arab political and tribal leaders are weak
and divided, and seen as illegitimate by many within these
Sunni Arab provinces. And too many Sunni Arabs are on the
fence. They've been given no reason to come onto the side of
the Baghdad government or to come to us. Prime Minister Abadi's
government is weak and divided, and is increasingly undermined
by Shi'a opposition. Same with the Iraqi Security Forces that
are small, weak, poorly resourced, and not well led. And it
will take far too long to train and rebuild them to make a
difference this year.
Moreover, I assess that there is a concerted effort to
undermine the efficacy of the Iraqi Security Forces by Shi'a
militias, Iranian proxies, and some members within the
government, including the Dawa Party, particularly some members
in the Ministry of Interior. They seek to weaken the Iraqi
Security Forces and provide alternative institutions of power
that they control.
Again, the coalition is weak. We could talk about that, but
there's not a lot of allied cooperation and resources put into
this fight.
Lastly, the U.S. lines of operation, for the most part,
have been poorly resourced, both in theater and at the
interagency level right here in Washington, DC. I do not see
the urgency or the resourcing within Treasury or the
intelligence community or others to really energy and
aggressively go after this fight in this region.
So, although U.S. airstrikes, I believe, have complicated
the ISIS operations, the air campaign has not been decisive.
It's been relatively small and limited. And the Islamic State,
as I mentioned, has been adaptive and creative. Importantly,
they remain well armed and well resourced. And our lines of
operation, be it counter-finance, counter-foreign-fighter flow,
delegitimizing the brand, the training, building of the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF), and the military campaign, at best,
appear disjointed, poorly resourced, and lack an effective
framework to bring it all together. I think we need to relook
this.
And, with that, I'll look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Katulis, thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS
Mr. Katulis. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Nelson and all of your distinguished colleagues. It's a real
honor to be here today.
Mr. Chairman, your efforts, over the last few months, to
elevate our national security debate have been incredible and
very important, the hearings that you held earlier this year
and everything that the members of the committee have been
doing have been very important for our country as we look at
the world and not just the Middle East.
Mr. Chairman, I prepared written testimony. With your
permission, I'd like to submit that for the record----
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
Mr. Katulis.--this afternoon.
It's really an honor, here, to be with the copanelists, who
I have great respect for, not only their expertise, but their
service to country. And what I wanted to do this morning with
my remarks is to try to complement their insights with what I
focus on in my own work, which is looking at dynamics within
the region and the strategic dynamics, and nesting the problem
of Iraq, Syria, and ISIS within that. And, Mr. Chairman, you
said, at the outset, beforehand, that you'd like to discuss
concrete steps. So, while I give my analysis of what I think is
happening in Iraq, Syria, the region, and more broadly, I will
offer some ideas that I hope we can discuss, some of which I
think members of the panel have proposed in legislation.
The way I see the challenge--and I don't disagree with much
of what was said here earlier--the challenge of ISIS, I think,
operates on three different levels, or three concentric
circles:
The first is Iraq and Syria, quite obviously. That's where
the devastation has been astounding over the last few years.
And many of the steps, I think, that have been proposed here,
in terms of security measures and security cooperation
measures, is something that I, frankly--it's a little outside
of my expertise to evaluate. I look at the political and
strategic dynamics. But, I do think, inside of Iraq, no matter
what we've done or what we do in the coming years, every type
of security assistance should be implemented with a close eye
to internal political and power dynamics. And, at this stunning
moment--and what happened in Ramadi, I think, should shock
everybody--we should keep an eye on these measures of what we
need to do to help our Iraqi partners on the security front,
but understand what we have learned over the last 10 years
plus, is that the political dynamics are terribly important.
In those regards, what I think we need to do and the Obama
administration needs to do is to hold the Iraqi Government
accountable for a lot of the ideas that have been discussed, in
terms of arming Sunni tribes, building a national guard. If you
look at what the Obama administration did last summer--and I
was a supporter of this measure of using security assistance as
leverage to help the Iraqis create a different type of Iraqi
Government--we need to continue that process. When the police
in Ramadi were not being funded, when concepts like the
national guard still remain stuck in parliament, it makes it
hard for any number of U.S. trainers to actually do their job
if those mechanisms are in place.
A second thing I think we need to start to entertain--and I
know people are discussing this--is the notion of greater
decentralization inside of Iraq, decentralization of authority,
in some of the proposals that people have discussed about
mechanisms for giving arms directly to Sunni tribes or to
Kurdish forces. Again, I think we should consider that and
balance it against the overall objective of trying to keep Iraq
together.
The second component, obviously, is Syria. And this, in my
view, is the weakest link in the overall approach in this first
circle. And Mr. Chairman, Senator Kaine, many others, have
highlighted this, but we need to do something about this. The
gap between the Obama administration's stated goals and what
we're actually doing to shape the environment on the ground is
alarming. In my view, we need to accelerate that which the
administration proposed and you funded, the training and
equipping of third-way forces. We need to link these efforts to
the broader regional dynamics. What's happening in Syria right
now is a very complicated engagement by actors in the region.
If you see not only ISIS's gains, but the gains of Jabhat al-
Nusra, al-Qaeda's front, this--these gains don't come from
nowhere. They're being offered support from various actors in
the region. And the main point is that the end state in Syria,
which is often described by the administration in ways that our
tactics don't link up with what we want to achieve.
But, the overall point in this first circle--Iraq and
Syria--which I hope you take away and I think we need to
discuss some more, is, How do you link these problems and how
we address them? What worries me is that, quite often, we look
at a challenge in Iraq, or a corner of Iraq, but we don't link
it to the broader problem of Iraq and Syria. Last summer, ISIS
effectively eroded the borders between these two countries. And
what we've had over the last year or so is a debate about a
series of different tactics, some of which have been
implemented, and some have not. And I think if we can all bring
our thinking together to talk about, How do we actually have an
integrated strategy that focuses on ISIS, both in Iraq and
Syria?
On the second level, the regional level--and here I hope we
can think a little bit more about this--but, for essentially
the last 4 or 5 years, the Middle East has slipped into this
period of fragmentation. Not only has Iraq and Syrian state
structures collapsed, we've seen Libya and Yemen feel these
strains. And a big part of what is going on--and this challenge
of ISIS and where it comes from--is the struggle between the
regional powers: Iran and Saudi Arabia, but there are other
actors, too. Much of it is sectarian, but the conflict is
multidimensional. It is multifaceted. Our resources matter, but
Iran, Saudi Arabia, others, have been funding their own
proxies. And what I think is missing, in terms of the U.S.
leadership on all of this, is accounting for all of these
efforts. How do we actually better organize and come up with a
better strategic conception?
Essentially, since 2003 and the Iraq War, when we made the
decision to move from a strategic posture of dual containment
of Iran and Iraq, I think we've been struggling for: What is
our overarching strategy in the Middle East? We made some gains
at certain periods, as was noted, in the surge in Iraq in 2007-
2008, but the broader picture of ``What is the United States
trying to do in the region?''--I think, still that question has
not been answered.
I think the Obama administration, rightfully, has taken
some positive steps in the right direction. The building of an
anti-ISIL coalition that has 62 countries in it, including key
stakeholders in the region, is an important opportunity, one
that I don't think has been fully seized yet by the
administration. Its engagements in that coalition effort has
been episodic. In February, for instance, we had a Countering
Violent Extremism Summit. And the questions of ``What then,
after the summit?'' I think remain unanswered, to a large
extent.
Just last week was a very important summit with the GCC
nations and, I think, an important communique. As with
everything in life, and with this administration, the followup
is going to be very important. Those commitments, not only to
Iraq and the fight in Syria, but the broader fight against
ISIS, there needs to be implementation.
Finally, one last point on the equilibrium point, because I
know it's a big debate up here, is the question of equilibrium
in the broader region. The Obama administration often speaks of
its engagement with Iran and the diplomatic engagement on the
nuclear front as an opportunity to achieve some new type of
equilibrium in the region. I share that aspiration. But, we
need to be clear-eyed about how hard that will be at a time
when Iran, when other actors in the region, are actually
investing in a number of different proxy wars. We need to be
clear about how realistic that is and what we're trying to do.
And on the final point, on the international level--and
I'll close here--quite clearly, this problem of ISIS is
connected in ways that the problems that Derek and General
Keane and Dr. Kagan dealt with in the previous decade--it's
much more complicated by the fact that you have more than
15,000 foreign fighters flooding into--and perhaps the number
is higher. And what I would suggest, at the international level
and our analysis, is that the debate about ISIS is terribly
important, but it's moving very quickly. The debate that many
people are having on Syria right now is the fight between
Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIL, and a number of different actors. And I
would say that 14 years after 9/11, nearly 14 years, if you
look at this broader landscape, beyond Iraq and Syria, and Iraq
and Syria as the epicenter, this new trend toward Salafist
jihadism, and the growth of it, is something that we actually
haven't wrestled with, that we need to widen the landscape and
keep focused on it to assess what we're doing and whether we're
applying resources to meet those threats.
So, in conclusion, I hope the events of the last week or so
and, I hope our discussion today, is a constructive wake-up
call about what we can do to move from what I think has been a
largely reactive crisis management and somewhat tactical
approach to the problem set, not only over the last year or
two, but over the last decade. And I hope that the events can
motivate all of us, including you, with your leadership, to
drive towards the sorts of unity that we need in things like an
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, a national
conversation that reinvigorates our sense of purpose. Because,
as Derek and others have described, this is a very dangerous
adversary. We've not yet created that strategy, the holistic
strategy to actually defeat them. And we can.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Well, I thank you.
Could I mention to my colleagues that a vote is on, and, if
you'd like to go and come back, please do so. I'll try to
continue the hearing. I may have to pause. But, I know that you
have questions for the panel, so maybe we could work it that
way, however you'd like.
I'd like to begin by picking up a little bit on what Mr.
Katulis just said. This is this whole idea of the perception of
Iran and what the prospects are. Because it seems to me that--
and the necessity to be clear-eyed about it--because it seems
to me that one of the reasons why we were not acting more
aggressively against Bashar Assad has got to do with this
idea--or, in my view, illusion--that once we conclude the
nuclear agreement, there will be a whole new relationship with
Iran in the Middle East, which, in my conversations with our
friends in the Sunni Arab states, scares the heck out of them.
So, I--maybe I could ask the panel about--it seems to me,
in my view, that it is a real impediment to any real
significant action in Syria. For example, the Free Syrian Army,
what little there is that we are training, we have not told--
or, the administration has said there is no policy yet about,
when we send these young men that we are training back into
Syria, that--whether we would protect them from Bashar Assad's
barrel bombing. It seems to me that that--that there's a degree
of immorality associated with telling people you're going to
train and equip them, and then not protect them from being
killed when they go back in, and that they are only to fight
ISIS and not Bashar Assad, the father of ISIS.
So, I'd maybe begin with you, General Keane, and--because
it--I don't think that Americans are fully aware of this
contradiction, here.
General Keane. Yes. Well, Senator, I agree, in principle,
here, with what you're saying.
Just a--so, our audience and the committee can understand,
we may forget that, early on in the rebellion against Assad,
the momentum was actually on the opposition forces side. Many
people in this town were predicting that the regime was going
to fall. I think we can all recall that.
Chairman McCain. That was testimony before this committee
by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, yes.
General Keane. And that opposition force came to town here
and got many on their dance card to--they needed additional
arms and ammunition--specifically, antitank weapons and
antiaircraft weapons--to deal with a conventional military.
They were stuck with rifles, machine guns, RPGs, and the like.
That early encounter in 2012 was denied--late 2011, early 2012.
And then the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) became convinced
that we could actually vet the Free Syrian Army--and I will say
that the Institute for the Study of War had some impact on
providing them information that assisted them with that
conclusion. And General Petraeus would have met that, when he--
as the Director at the time. And he presented a briefing to
Secretaries Clinton and Panetta and Dempsey--General Dempsey--
and they agreed with him that it was--this force could, in
fact, be armed, equipped, and trained robustly. But, the
administration did not do that. And, tragically, as a result of
that, the Free Syrian Army now is a mere shadow of its former
self. There's, frankly, not much of it left.
Chairman McCain. And could I add----
General Keane. Go ahead.
Chairman McCain.--in desperation, isn't it true that they
have now joined forces with al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda-affiliated
organization. Is that true?
General Keane. Well, organizations that were a part of
their organization, you know, have broken from them. They were
Islamic organizations, not radicalized, and they have joined
with Jabhat al-Nusra, who is--who has gained more territories,
more aggressive, and has had more success against the regime
than any force out there. So, that is true.
And what we're doing is--and I know the committee's been
briefed on this--we're attempting to train 5,000 people that
would become part of the Free Syrian Army. But, what
organization are they going to plug into? And it's totally
disconnected, because the Free Syrian Army is not fighting
ISIS. They don't have the wherewithal to fight ISIS and the
regime. They're fighting the regime. So, we're training forces
that will join Free Syrian Army, in theory. And, indeed, they
will fight the regime forces, which has nothing to do with
ISIS, at the moment. So, that's how flawed the strategy is in
Syria. It makes no sense. We don't have ground forces.
As the chairman suggests, Does it make any sense to train
these forces, arm them and equip them and provide them some
leadership, and then put them back into the fight against
Assad's conventional military, which will bomb them and attack
them with conventional artillery, mortars, and, obviously,
barrel bombs and the like?
So, that strategy in Syria is flawed. And obviously, the
only way that ISIS will eventually be defeated in Syria is with
some kind of a ground force. Our allies in the region are
suggesting to us--and we having--we're not agreeing with them--
is that what we should do is deal with Assad, change the
momentum against Assad by shutting down his airpower, using no-
fly zones and buffer zones to achieve that end, and that change
in military--in momentum, militarily on the battlefield can
shift the political equation to get some kind of a settlement.
Now, listen, that's arguable whether that's achievable, or
not. But, sitting here and doing nothing, and permitting this
to go on, I think that's quite irresponsible, in terms of the
humanitarian catastrophe that's taking place there, and also
that ISIS is expanding and gaining in strength in Syria every
single week and month.
So, the Syrian strategy needs to be thought out. It needs
to lead to a situation where we have our Arab--where we have a
coalition of Arabs in the region, and possibly the Turks
participating also. And they would likely ask us to participate
in a coalition to deal with ISIS in Syria. And I do think we
should listen to them about dealing with Assad and that regime
first, in some limited capacity, to change the political
equation.
Chairman McCain. I'm going to have to go vote. I'd like to
hear the--from the other witnesses. I'm going to have to go
vote.
Senator Ernst.
If someone isn't back yet after you, we will take a brief
pause until my return.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I really do
appreciate it very much, and I apologize that I had to step
out.
But, I do agree with the panel, that we need a
comprehensive strategy. Right now, there is no strategy. As an
element and--really, just as an element, I do want to talk a
little bit more about arming the Kurds. Of course, this is a
passion of mine. So, over the past couple of months, I have
been advocating for the administration to increase its support
to the Kurdish regional government in Iraq to fight ISIS. And I
believe that this is a commonsense proposal, considering the
Peshmerga's willingness to fight--they are willing to fight--in
close combat. And it is truly unmatched by any other group in
that region in the fight against ISIS.
The Kurdish people have been vital in supporting our
coalition efforts to defeat ISIS and in providing support to
around the 1.6 million displaced persons from Iraq and Syria.
And also, for the past quarter century, Iraqi Kurds have proven
to be reliable partners by supporting United States interests
every time that we have sought their assistance. And I have
spoken with many of the men that have served up in that region,
and they always state what great allies the Kurds have been to
them in our fight. So, they are proven to be great allies of
ours.
Earlier this week, former CIA and NSA Director, General
Michael Hayden, once again spoke for the need to increase
United States support to the Kurds in the fight against ISIS.
And, on Tuesday, General Hayden said, ``I would double down on
the Kurds. Their military has the virtue of showing up when it
comes to a fight, and they've been our friends in the area for
decades.''
I would tend to agree with him. But, I would love to ask
each of you to please explain that, if you do agree with
General Hayden's assessment or if you disagree, and maybe why.
So, please, to the panel--General Keane, if we might start with
you.
Thank you.
General Keane. Yes, certainly I agree with that. The
problem we have is--and they've told you, and they've told
others, that they're not getting the kinds of arms that they
need, the quantity of those arms are not there. We're passing
that through the Iraqi Government. We probably should have
continued the covert problem--program we did have with--passing
it through the Central Intelligence Agency, and we probably
would have had them armed by now if we did it robustly. But,
they also need advisors. Because, when they're fighting, they
need coordination with airpower to make their ground operations
that much more effective.
I would say this. As good as the Kurds are, they have,
also, a limited interest in what they're willing to fight for
inside Iraq. And they certainly are not going to participate in
reclaiming Anbar Province and other parts of Iraq. So, yes, we
have to do what we should for the Kurds, but we also need to
recognize that a lot more needs to be done with others, as
well.
I'll leave it to my colleagues, here, who have more
information than I do.
Senator Ernst. Right. Thank you.
Dr. Kagan.
Dr. Kagan. Thank you, Senator.
I agree with General Keane, especially about the last
point. We certainly should help the Kurds defend Kurdistan.
There's no question about that. And we could be doing more than
we are. But, the Kurds cannot retake Arab Iraq for--on behalf
of the Arabs. And I think, in--although the Kurds are not
remotely--I don't want to put the Kurds in the category of
Shi'a militias, because they absolutely are not, and they don't
behave that way. Nevertheless, I think if you saw large Kurdish
forces in Mosul for a long period of time, you would find that
you would have an ethnic war on your hands that would not be in
our interest and would make room for ISIS or its successor to
come in. So, I don't think the Kurds could actually do what we
need them to do, even if they wanted to.
I would only add that, although I agree that we should--
that the Kurds have been very reliable allies, fighting on the
ground against our common enemies, they have been less than
helpful in Baghdad, repeatedly, and they still are being
somewhat less than helpful than they might be, on a number of
issues, including demands for oil revenues and various other
things.
I do believe that we should assist them in their defense,
but I also think that we should use that assistance as leverage
to try to get the Kurds to think a little bit more about the
interests of Iraq as a whole, from a political standpoint, than
they sometimes do.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Colonel Harvey.
Colonel Harvey. I agree with what has already been said on
this issue. I would add that the Sunni Arab communities along
the green line, the fault lines, are tremendous numbers of
friction points there, about territory, about past grievances.
So, we would have to be very careful about how we--how they
would be employed. And I think, you know, that's about making
sure that there are red lines about how far they could go in
coordination, where they are willing to fight along the
frontiers where the Islamic State controls land. We do not want
to further polarize these communities more than they are
already. But, arming them effectively and developing a
mechanism to accommodate Baghdad's interest about knowing
what's being delivered, but making sure that it gets
delivered--we have to figure a way to just get that done and
coordinate that, but deliver those weapons that are going to be
very important to the defense of those Kurdish lands.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Mr. Katulis. Very quickly, Senator, three points.
First, in principle, I think it's an idea worth--worthy of
consideration. The first point, though--in my recent visits to
Kurdistan, the divisions that still exist inside of the Kurdish
Peshmerga, and some of the political divisions--the KDP and the
PUK having separate lines of control--to actually implement
that effectively, they'll need to deal with those divisions.
The second is that you have actors in the region, including
us, beyond us, regional actors who have offered some of this
support. And sometimes it's been blocked by Baghdad, itself.
There are sensitivities to even the proposal, because it leads
to questions of, ``Oh, are you trying to break up Iraq?'' And I
think we need to be careful in the presentation of that.
Which leads to a third point relevant to Iraq, to Syria, to
the region more broadly. The more that the United States or
other actors within the region invest in subnational actors or
nonstate actors for the benefit of trying to defeat terrorist
organizations like ISIS, there's advantages to that, because
oftentimes they're more capable, as we've seen with the Kurdish
Peshmerga. There's a potential long-term disadvantage to it, in
that the fragmentation of states, the--could accelerate if--if
we're working in the short term to defeat a threat and to deal
with a counterterrorism issue, but the building blocks that
we're putting into place actually then contribute to what I've
seen, especially in Syria--and again, I'm not arguing against
it; it's just the potential downside risk in the long term, the
notion that we could further inadvertently accelerate the
fragmentation of these state entities.
Senator Ernst. Well, thank you. I appreciate that very
much. And the idea, I believe, and where I am coming from, is
that we simply have no strategy in that region, not one that
has been communicated clearly to any of us. So, I think
establishing at least a safe zone--I do agree that the
Peshmerga--their interest is only in Kurdistan, it is not
moving out into the rest of Iraq. I understand that. But, at
least establishing a safe zone within Iraq that is free of ISIS
is a step in the right direction. I think we need to think
about that, we need to pursue that.
But, any thoughts on where--just your idea of where the
administration needs to go, at this point? I still see some
reluctance coming from the administration on admitting that
ISIS continues to expand, not just within Iraq, but also
globally. I--any thoughts on what we need to do or how we can
work with the administration on developing a strategy, one that
will work?
Yes, please.
Mr. Katulis. I would stress, again, where I focus on, which
is the regional aspects. I think what the United States can do
more of--my colleagues have talked about, militarily and other
things--it's beyond my expertise. The fact that the anti-ISIL
coalition has five working groups--a military one, one on
countering violent extremism, on counterterrorism funding, on
foreign fighters and stabilization--I would suggest that those
mechanisms are a great template, but also that they've not been
used effectively.
And, going back to the point I was trying to make, in the
region, that I think it's wise to actually try to channel the
resources and the efforts of others to much more constructive
ends. We often debate about what we do. And I think we need to
do more. That's clear. And I think we need to lead. But, using
these mechanisms in the anti-ISIL coalition more effectively,
having more followup on things like--we often think it's soft,
but it's not--the countering-violent-extremism efforts, it's
not sufficient to me to have a 1- or 2-day conference without
any clear, precise followups. And I--I mean, I think they're
talking about it, but we need to have great clarity to our
regional partners in knowing--those in the coalition--of,
``Okay, this is what we're going to do.'' In the way that
General Keane and Derek and Dr. Harvey have talked about--Dr.
Kagan have talked about--in the military steps, we also need a
campaign that is multifaceted on those regards, that, again,
nests at its core what we do, but in partnership with others.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Yes, sir.
Colonel Harvey. I think that, given the President's
strategy and the lines of operation that they have had, I don't
think those were ever given an opportunity to succeed, because,
even though I thought that they were insufficient to the task
last summer, in September, when he declared them, they have not
been adequately resourced, organized, or executed, to date.
Again, as I said in my opening statement, that's here in
Washington, DC, at the interagency level, as well as in
theater.
So, if we're not going to be determined to achieve results
and have leadership that drives the interagency and makes this
a matter of urgency and criticality to the United States, then
we're not going to get where we need to go. So, you need to,
first, be determined to achieve results.
Two, we need to think about some core objectives here. One,
we can fight ISIS and still contain Iran and seek to achieve an
independent Iraq that is not a client of Tehran. In order to do
that, we need to support Sunni Arab engagement and political
inclusion. Without adequate force structure on the ground, and
commitment, you cannot get out there and engage with the Sunni
Arabs, you can't move around the battlespace. And they won't
believe you're serious unless you put enough skin in the game.
And to do that, we're going to need, in my judgment, about
15,000 or more enhancement of U.S. force structure in theater.
And to go to what General Keane said, we need probably two
brigades, we need aviation--a mixed aviation brigade, you need
some artillery, you need enhanced direct-action SOF operational
capabilities to--for direct action. Direct action brings you
the intelligence, which you then share and allows you to go
after those networks.
The Islamic State has not been stressed across its large
perimeter that it has, from the Syrian border up along the
Kurdish green line. They have tremendous vulnerabilities. But,
they have had the initiative, because they have not been
pressed along that large frontal area that they have.
Senator Ernst. Sir, so, just to be clear, you are stating
that you believe 15,000 additional troops and aviation assets
to directly engage ISIS as a combat----
Colonel Harvey. No, I want them to be there to provide the
enablers, support for the Iraqi Security Forces for direct
action of the Special Operations Forces for indirect fires,
advisors embedded with Iraqi Security Forces or Ministry of
Interior elements, in a way that gets us on the ground, can
bring in our capabilities. I'm not advising that we put troops
on the ground in combat outposts in Ramadi, clearing streets,
you know, and communities and neighborhoods in a direct-action
way. But, we need to be out there enabling and providing
support and protection for Sunni Arab tribal militias, helping
them grow and develop, and then that gives us influence that
can reach into the political domain in the--these provinces,
but also in Baghdad. It's hard to have influence if you don't
have skin in the game.
Senator Ernst. I would agree with that. I would also state,
though, that anytime you do engage more of those types of
troops on the ground, you may say that it is a train-and-assist
mission, and that may be heavier on the assist mission, but we
are engaging in combat at that point. I don't think there's any
way that you avoid that. And I don't want to mislead the
American people, because certainly there is danger anytime that
we put troops on the ground. So, I'm not saying I would
support, or not support, that measure, but I do believe that
you are correct, sir, in that we do need to engage if we expect
others to engage. We know that the airstrikes are not doing it.
So, thank you for that perspective.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I want to second what Derek said, and
agree with him about the need to deploy forces. I agree with
you, and I know that Derek also does, that it's--the purpose of
talking about train, advise, and assist, in this context, is
not to imply that American troops are not going to be in
combat. Of course they are, if we're doing our job. But, I
think the point that Derek was trying to make, which is very
important, is that we're not anticipating putting American
brigades in Ramadi and having them clear, house to house, the
way we have done previously.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Dr. Kagan. That's not what we're looking at.
I have to say, we, as a Nation, are defeated as long as we
do not have the will to fight this war. And I would assess
right now, we seem to be showing that we do not have the will
to fight this war. And until and unless the--beginning with the
President, there is a demonstration that we have the will to
fight, we are going to lose this war. And so, what Congress has
to do, what we all have to do, is find any way that we can to
persuade the President to own this fight, to recognize that
it's a war, to recognize that we must win, and to help develop
the will among the American people to fight this.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
General Keane. The thing--the only thing I would add is
that you do have to look at this strategically. When you
think--the World Trade Center in 1993 was the introduction of
radical Islam directly against the United States, not using
proxies that the Iranians did since 1980. That was followed by
Embassy bombings in Africa, the USS Cole, and September 11. To
date, we've gone through three administrations, and we've never
developed a comprehensive strategy to deal with it. We're
sitting here today without one, despite all of that killing,
despite all of the aggressiveness and assertiveness that this
enemy has showed. We have always looked at this narrowly. And
it's tragic that we do. And we're more sophisticated than that.
Yes, the solution is right in front of us. When you look at
this map--look at--this is just ISIS. If I put al-Qaeda on the
map, it would be worse. This is a regional and global problem
that can only be solved by those countries who are being
affected by this, either directly or indirectly. This is not
about the United States dealing with all of this; this is about
the United States, when we're hosting a conference, like we
just did, as opposed to shaking hands and slapping everybody on
the back, which we did, we should have hosted a conference that
came out with a strategy on what to do with this, plans on what
to do with this. What is the level of contribution that's going
to deal with this? We don't develop that strategy. Together, we
can design a comprehensive strategy that does undermine the
ideology, that does take their finances away, and that does
meet this threat, militarily, where it needs to be met.
We cannot do this by ourselves. We have no comprehensive
strategies to deal with radical Islam, to include ISIS. We have
no strategy in the region to deal with the morphing of radical
Islam, as defined by ISIS and al-Qaeda. We certainly--as we've
all been saying, we have no strategy immediately to deal--
effective strategy to deal with this issue in Iraq and Syria.
So, I agree with you, that is the start point that we
should have to deal with this problem. Then you start to put
underneath that those things that make sense. And we've got to
bring our allies into this in a very cohesive way. Listen,
they've--we have their attention. The Iranians are forcing
their attention, ISIS is forcing their attention, and the
spread of al-Qaeda. We have to help them organize to do this
effort, and bring the means to deal with that. And not all of
that is kinetic. And certainly most of it is not U.S. military
power.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you very much.
And, General Keane, you brought up Iranian influences. And
since I have come into the Senate, I have been very, very
concerned about the Iranian influence with the Shi'a militia.
Here we have the Shi'a militia pushing back against ISIS, and I
would love to hear a little bit more about that Iranian
influence with the Shi'a militia. Where do we go from here?
Assuming that we do take care of ISIS, the Shi'a are
controlling areas, but their intent, I think, could easily turn
against American influences, American soldiers that might be on
the ground there. So, as we look at arming the Shi'a militia,
if we talk about that, engaging with them, just remembering
that they are being influenced heavily by the Iranians, and--
what would your thoughts be on that?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I'd like to say I don't think the
Shi'a--the Iraqi Shi'a are the problem. And there are elements
in the Popular Mobilization Forces and so forth that I think
are not pro-Iranian and do not desire to be governed by Iran.
We've seen this repeatedly. And, of course, this is the view of
Grand Ayatollah Sistani and his--the people who follow him, is
that Iraq is an Arab country, it's not a Persian country, and
they don't want to be dominated by Persians.
However, the most effective Shi'a militia forces are part
of the Iranian military, de facto. The Badr Corps, run by Hadi
al-Amiri, reports to Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the
Quds Force. Kata'ib Hezbollah, run by Muhandis, reports to
Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Quds Force. And we have seen
this repeatedly. So, we have--it's not a Shi'a problem. It is a
specific problem of Iranian--they're no longer even really
proxies. They're now really extensions of the Iranian irregular
military forces, and those are the elements that are now
leading the charge into Ramadi, which is unacceptable.
They also helped to get us off track by launching the
attack on Tikrit on their own, spontaneously, which then
failed, and we had to bail them out, which was an enormous
positive turning point for us, because it demonstrated the
limitations of the ability of those Iranian-controlled Iraqi
militias to take this fight to the enemy. We have just not only
undone that benefit that we gained from that, but moved many
steps back. And if, in fact, these groups are successful in
retaking even part of Ramadi, when the troops that we backed
failed, it will demonstrate the viability of these elements
within Iraq in a catastrophic way that will undermine Prime--
any independence Prime Minister Abadi might have, any
independence the ISF might have, and be a significant extension
of Iranian military power, not just political influence, in the
region.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. I'd just----
Senator Ernst. Yes, I--my time is way over, Senator.
Chairman McCain. I was going to say, I'm glad you were able
to have----
Senator Ernst. I could go all day.
Chairman McCain:--this encounter. I hope you'll have them
over to your house for dinner.
Senator Ernst. I would love that.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Chairman McCain. Before I turn to Senator Kaine--and I
apologize for this disjointedness of the votes on the floor--
I--maybe, General Keane and Colonel Harvey, particularly you
two, can respond to this. I don't know if there's a real
logical argument to the--that would counter what has been said
here today, as far as the assessment of the overall situation
is concerned, because I think the facts on the ground are--
would indicate that there's strong support for the argument or
the position that you have stated. But yet, we have members of
the military, who many years of experience, who have fought in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and yet, as military spokesmen, or even
military leaders, make statements that are totally divorced, if
not--I won't say ``reality,'' but certainly is directly counter
to the testimony that you have given here today. I do not
understand it.
Maybe, Colonel Harvey, could I begin with you?
Colonel Harvey. Sir, what I find is, quite often our
commanders and leaders are misreading the operational
environment that they're dealing with. They don't understand
the enemy well enough. And part of the problem there is, the
intelligence that they get is reporting of information, it's
not being put in context in a very insightful and deep way to
understand how they are organized, how they really think,
tactically, operationally, and strategically. It's reporting
history rather than thinking about who they really are and what
the enemy's doing.
Chairman McCain. Does that account for statements like,
``We're winning''?
Colonel Harvey. Because they're looking at the wrong
metrics. As I said in my opening statement, sir, you know, in
order to get the context, you really need to deep--have the
deep dives and focus in on this, and quit looking at this on a
day-to-day basis. And you have to have an operational
construct. You have to understand who the enemy is and how
they're going to win. You--and probably we need better
alternative analysis about this, and be truthful to ourselves
about how we're doing in our lines of operation.
Chairman McCain. So, this is an argument for Team B.
Colonel Harvey. In part, yes, sir. We had group-think
before, in 2005 and 2006. In May have 2006, we were being told
that everything's on track----
Chairman McCain. I----
Colonel Harvey:--we're doing fine.
Chairman McCain. I remember it well.
Colonel Harvey. Yes, sir.
They get built-in assumptions and they're focused in what
their mission set is. Where is the order to actually impose our
will and defeat the enemy? How are we going to align our force
structure and all of our national capabilities, in partnership
with allies and folks on the ground that we can count on, to
build momentum, to impose our will, to establish security? We
don't think in those terms anymore. We talk about management
rather than breaking the will of the enemy.
Chairman McCain. General Keane.
General Keane. Yes, sir. I mean, it--I share your
frustration. I know we all share it. We talk about it among
ourselves quite a bit. We just had a spokesperson, last week--I
think that's probably what you're referring to--who made a
report, you know, to the American people at large, that we, in
fact, were succeeding against ISIS, that we're pushing back
against them, and that they're only capable of conducting small
attacks against us.
Chairman McCain. Right----
General Keane. That hasn't----
Chairman McCain.--before Ramadi fell.
General Keane. That hasn't been true since we started, and
certainly isn't true now. So, one, how do we--this committee
members, when I provided testimony in 2006 and we were pushing
against the narrative at that time by senior generals and
Secretaries of Defense, et cetera, we were asked the same
question. How could that be? How could capable people, well-
intentioned, be so wrong, in general sense, is the issue. And I
think once we make up our minds that we're going to do
something inside this military culture, we drive towards it.
And we have a tendency, to a fault, to see those indices that
contribute to what that mission success is, and to disregard--
not wholly, but to minimize those things that are really
pushing against it. That's inside our culture.
How do you fix that? One way, and one way only: competent
leadership fixes that. You don't permit that to happen, because
you are driving honest, tough, deep-dive assessments of what's
taking place, ``This is what we're trying to do. These are the
four things we said we were going to do. How are we doing
that?''
How could you ever come to the conclusion that ISIS is
losing if it enjoys freedom of maneuver, a principle of
warfare, and it can attack, at will, any place of its choosing
at any time of its choosing? If a force has that capability to
do that, and gets results as a--as a manifestation of that,
then that force, in fact, by definition, is winning.
And so, the leader should say to those subordinates below
him, say, ``What are you talking about? You're--what you're
telling me, none of that makes any sense. This is what this
force is doing. This is what they're capable of. We have got
this wrong, and how are we going to fix it?'' That is about
competent leadership.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm jealous of my colleague's 13 minutes, and I hope my
other colleagues don't come back, and then I may try your
patience and go over time.
Dr. Kagan, you said something that I wrote down, just like
a bolt of lightning, ``We should not just be spectators.'' You
were going through the atrocities that ISIL is committing, and
who they are, and how dangerous they are, ``We should not just
be spectators.'' We are spectators. Congress--Congress has been
a spectator. Since August 8, we've been a spectator.
Absent the one vote, in September, that we took to arm
Syrian moderates, there is no evidence that Congress is
concerned at all about ISIL. None. Our allies have no evidence
that Congress is concerned--as an institution; I'm not talking
about individuals--our allies have no evidence that Congress is
concerned about ISIL. ISIL has no evidence that Congress is
concerned about ISIL. But, most tragically, the thousands of
people--United States men and women in service who are deployed
and fighting this battle every day, they have no evidence that
Congress is concerned about ISIL, in the least.
We've been at war since August 8. Everybody calls it a war.
The President calls it a war. Within 2 weeks, the Article 2
mission to defend the Embassy and the Consulate in Arbil were
pretty safe. He said, ``We've got to go on the offense against
ISIL.'' And Presidents since Jefferson have basically said that
was the dividing line between an Article 2 power of the
Commander in Chief and an Article 1 power, where Congress has
got to declare war or authorize military action.
But, now, for 9 and a half months, we have failed to do
what is our fundamental job, what only we are supposed to do--
there's not been a declaration of war, there's not been an
authorization for use of military force, there's been no House
committee action, there's been no House floor debate or vote.
There was one committee vote, in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in December, but there's been no meaningful floor
debate and no meaningful Senate floor action.
How strange it is. We're in a Congress that loves to punch
this President as an imperial President, and threaten lawsuits
against him when he does stuff without congressional approval.
In the most solemn responsibility under Article 1 that Congress
has, we have been silent, when we've got all these people
overseas who are risking their lives every day, we have been
silent. It's Congress that's the spectators. We've got
opinions. You know, we'd call the play differently. But, we're
spectators when we ought to be decisionmakers.
This is now a war, into the 10th month, without a clear
legal basis. I call it extralegal or even illegal. The
President, himself, has, in his own words, acknowledged that
he's gone past the Article 2 power of imminent defense. The
claim that the 2001 or 2002 authorizations cover an
organization that didn't form until 2 years after September 11,
that doesn't make any sense. It doesn't make any sense
whatsoever.
And yet, Congress has come up with one excuse after another
to avoid taking action. The first excuse was this. The
leaders--both parties, both houses--the four leaders went to
the White House in June and said, ``Do not make us take action
on this war. You do what you want. Do not make us take action
in Congress before the midterm elections.'' And Congress
adjourned, with an ongoing war, 6 weeks before a midterm
election. The earliest adjournment since 1960 before a midterm
election with an ongoing war, and we haven't done anything
about it.
After the mid-term election, then it was, ``Well, but now
the Senate's going to change hands, so we shouldn't do anything
gas a lameduck Senate, because there will be a new Senate.''
So, we waited til January.
Then we came in, and a lot of folks said, ``Well, you know,
we shouldn't do our Article 1 job, because the President hasn't
sent us a draft authorization.'' I harshly criticize the
administration for not sending in a draft authorization over
right when they started this legal action. But, the fact that
they didn't doesn't excuse Congress for not doing the job we're
supposed to do.
Now there's been an authorization pending before Congress
since February 17, more than 3 months, and we still haven't
done anything. I don't know what the excuse is now.
I think you can only conclude that we don't want to take it
up because we're either indifferent to this threat--and I don't
think that's true. I think the real reason is, we don't have
the backbone to take it up and do the job that Congress is
supposed to do. And what that means is, while we're not doing
our job, there are others who are doing their job. We deployed
thousands into the theater of battle, two folks who are pilots,
off the deck of the Theodore Roosevelt, which was--which is
home-ported in Virginia, crashed a plane on takeoff the other
day. We're deploying thousands, and they're risking their
lives. We have had deaths of American servicemen in connection
with Operation Inherent Resolve. We had--have had deaths of
American civilians who were held hostage. ISIL didn't start
executing American hostages until after we started bombing them
on August 8. So, we've had American deaths as a result of this
war. We still haven't done anything. We've had over 3,000
airstrikes that the United States has--and we still haven't
done anything. Now the costs passed the $2 billion mark in
April, and we still haven't done anything.
It's just--I never would have contemplated, before I came
to this body, that there would be a situation in which Congress
would tolerate an ongoing war and just stand back and say,
``Well, I guess the President can just do whatever the
President wants to do.'' It's just not supposed to be that way.
And one of the reasons I'm glad that the Chair called this
committee today, as I'm hoping that the challenging events of
last weekend--not only the fall of Ramadi, but if you go into
the details of that Special Forces operation in Syria--very,
very serious. We were lucky that we didn't lose U.S. lives in
that operation. It was very well done. But, this is complicated
and detailed, and it's going to go on for a very long time. And
I just wonder how much longer Congress is going to just be a
spectator.
I mean, we can criticize the White House and the
administration strategy--and I'm going to, and we ought to keep
doing it if we don't like it--but, we really haven't earned the
right--we haven't earned the right to be critics as long as we
stand back and don't do the one thing that Congress is supposed
to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I know there's a question in there
somewhere.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Well, thank you.
Here's my question. Does the current strategy in Iraq and
Syria have any chance to succeed?
General Keane. Well, Senator, that's really been the basis
of our testimony.
Senator Graham. Well, I didn't hear it, so just----
General Keane. I know.
Senator Graham.--say no.
General Keane. We'll gladly say it again.
Senator Graham. Yes, say it again.
General Keane. And respect you asking the question, quite
frankly. The answer is no. It's----
Senator Graham. Does everybody agree the answer is no? Does
everybody agree that, in the current configuration, that the
problems in Iraq and Syria present a direct threat to the
homeland?
General Keane. Yes.
Dr. Kagan. Yes.
Colonel Harvey. Yes.
Senator Graham. I had a conversation with the CIA Director,
yesterday, who echoed that sentiment. So, the average American
needs to understand that failure in Iraq and Syria is putting
the Homeland at risk because so many foreign fighters are
flowing in, and they have the ability, potentially, to hit us
here at home. Is that all correct?
General Keane. Yes.
Senator Graham. And I think, General Keane, you've
described this strategy as not enough. Is that correct?
General Keane. Yes. Absolutely. It's far from it. And we
all, collectively, laid out some details to support that.
Senator Graham. Do you see any way to defeat ISIL in Syria
without a substantial Arab army involved?
General Keane. I don't know how you get there. I mean,
obviously, if we deployed tens of thousands of troops,
ourselves, we could defeat ISIS in Syria. I don't think anybody
here would recommend such an event. I think the people who have
vested interests there should be involved, and I think they
would get involved. I mean, you know that they've said as much,
but we have to do something to change the momentum of the Assad
regime.
Senator Graham. Dr. Kagan, is it fair to say that no Arab
army is going into Syria unless part of the--one of the
objectives is to take Assad down?
Dr. Kagan. Absolutely, Senator. That's going to be a
precondition for--
Senator Graham. Because they're not going to just fight
ISIL and leave Assad in power, therefore giving the place to
Syria. Is that correct?
Dr. Kagan. On the contrary, sir.
Senator Graham. I mean, to Iran.
Dr. Kagan. On the contrary, sir. What we're seeing, I
think, is increasing levels of support of various varieties to
Jabhat al-Nusra as an alternative to the----
Senator Graham. So, I want people to understand that our
strategy is to empower a radical Islamic Sunni group to fight
Assad rather than having an army on the ground that--made up of
allies. Is that fairly accurate?
We're choosing to work with terrorists----
Dr. Kagan. I think----
Senator Graham.--or somebody's--the Arabs are choosing to
work with terrorists, because there's a vacuum created by us.
Dr. Kagan. I think some people are choosing to work with
terrorists because of the vacuum that we have created. I don't
think that's the intent of our policy.
Senator Graham. No, but that's the effect of the policy.
Dr. Kagan. I believe it is, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So, we find ourselves where our allies in
the region are supporting a terrorist group as a last-resort
proposition because America is AWOL.
Colonel Harvey, at the end of the day, do you see a
scenario of dislodging ISIL, taking Assad out, that doesn't
require a sustained commitment by the world to put Syria back
together?
Colonel Harvey. No, I do not see.
Senator Graham. We're talking years, and billions of
dollars.
Colonel Harvey. I believe so, sir, yes.
Senator Graham. All right. Sir, I don't want to butcher
your last name. If this war keeps going on the way it is a year
from now, do you worry about Jordan and Lebanon being affected?
Mr. Katulis. I do, and especially Jordan, a country I've
lived in and studied as a Fulbright scholar. We are doing
important things to help strengthen that government, but it is
feeling the force of not only the----
Senator Graham. If we lost the King of Jordan, we'd be
losing one of the most trustworthy allies in the region. Is
that correct?
Mr. Katulis. Correct.
Senator Graham. I was told yesterday that there are more
Syrian children in elementary school in Lebanon than Lebanese
children. Does that surprise anybody?
Mr. Katulis. It doesn't surprise me, but it should shock
all of us.
Senator Graham. Well, it should shock everybody. I've just
made a statement that there are more kids in elementary school
in Lebanon from Syria than Lebanese kids. So, if this war
continues in its current fashion, it will create unending chaos
in the Mideast that will change the map for generations to
come. Do you all agree with that?
Mr. Katulis. Yes.
General Keane. Yes.
Senator Graham. And there is no way to get Iraq right until
you deal with Syria in a responsible manner. Is that correct?
General Keane. That is correct.
Colonel Harvey. Correct.
Senator Graham. Iran is all in when it comes to Syria.
Assad wouldn't last 15 minutes without Iran's help. Do you
agree?
Colonel Harvey. It's been critical to sustaining the Assad
regime. They don't----
Senator Graham. Do you agree that, if we gave Iranians,
say, $50 billion as a signing bonus for their nuclear program,
it's highly likely that some of that money would go to Assad?
General Keane. And to the rest of his proxies that are
seeking domination of the Middle East.
Senator Graham. Have you seen anything to suggest the
Iranians are changing their behavior for the better when it
comes to the region?
Dr. Kagan. On the contrary, sir. They're becoming more
aggressive in many facets.
Senator Graham. Would you say they're the most aggressive
they've been in modern times?
Dr. Kagan. Yes, sir.
General Keane. Yes.
Senator Graham. Would you say that the Iranians are
directly responsible for topping--toppling a pro-American
government in Yemen by supporting the Houthis?
General Keane. They contributed to it, for sure.
Senator Graham. Would you agree with me that, now that
we've lost our eyes and ears in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula is growing as a threat to the Homeland?
Colonel Harvey. Yes.
Dr. Kagan. Not only that, but ISIS is also gaining position
in Yemen.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that Syria is now a
perfect forum to launch an attack from the United States
because there are so many foreign fighters with Western
passports?
Colonel Harvey. Yes.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the Shi'a militia
on the ground in Iraq are controlled by the Iranians?
Colonel Harvey. Yes.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that we're doing
permanent damage to the ability of Iraq to reconstruct if we
allow the Shi'a militia to continue to have dominance on the
battlefield?
General Keane. Yes.
Colonel Harvey. Yes.
Senator Graham. Do you see any good thing coming from this
strategy being continued?
General Keane. No.
Colonel Harvey. No, sir.
General Keane. It's destined to fail.
Senator Graham. And there is a better way. We just have to
choose that way.
Colonel Harvey. Correct, sir.
General Keane. Correct.
Senator Graham. There is a better way. Do you all agree?
Colonel Harvey. Yes, sir.
General Keane. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Any more----
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. Thank you
for your service and your leadership.
I'd like to ask the panel, first, for your assessment of
the current level of success we are seeing in the military
campaign against ISIS.
Dr. Kagan. It is failing, Senator. That's our--I think our
assessment, generally, across the board, is that it is failing
in Iraq, it is failing in Syria, and it is failing across the
board in the region.
Senator Cruz. Why is it failing?
Dr. Kagan. In my view, it was ill-conceived to begin with,
because it focused exclusively on Iraq. It was badly under-
resourced, and excessive restraints and constraints have been
put on the limited resources that we were willing to deploy.
Senator Cruz. Could you please elaborate on the excessive
constraints that have been placed on our military?
Dr. Kagan. Yes, sir.
We have forces in theater that could have made a
significant difference, I believe, in the fight for Ramadi, had
they been allowed to embed at lower levels, had they been
allowed to perform functions of forward air controllers and
bring in precision air support, had the--some of the rotary-
wing aviation that we have in theater been used in direct
support of that fight, had the forces that we have in theater
been able to go out to the tribes and reach out to them
directly rather than relying on the tribes to come to them.
There were a number of things that even this limited force
could have done, I think, that would have made a difference.
But, the force was probably too limited to be decisive, in any
event.
General Keane. Yes. Now, just to add on to that, I mean--
you know, the military--these other components to the
President's strategy, as you know--and there's huge problems
with them, as well--but the military component is clearly
under-resourced. There's not enough trainers, there's not
enough advisors. And the role of the advisors is fundamentally
flawed, itself. The advisors have to be down where the units
are doing the fighting, at least at the battalion level. What
reason is that? Because they help them plan, they help them
execute, they contribute to their success, they have the
capability to call in airstrikes, they have the capability to
use drones in support of those ground forces to help acquire
intelligence for them, and they can use attack helicopters, as
well.
And therefore, the airstrikes that we currently have, which
are excellent in taking out command and control, other
infrastructure, logistic infrastructures, depots--essentially,
facilities--they get--it starts to fall off very rapidly when
you're dealing with mobile targets. And then, Senator, the
overwhelming amount of combat that takes place, to use military
terms, is close combat in urban centers that are populated and
where we get--we, our forces, Iraqi forces--get very close to
the enemy. To be able to do that, you have to guide the bombs
from that airplane, take control of them. And that's called
close air support. That's what we need the forward air
controllers for.
So, the effectiveness of our airpower is this: 75 percent
of the missions that are flown come back with their bombs,
because they cannot acquire the target or properly identify the
target so they have some assurances that they're not going to
hit--hurt somebody with those bombs that we don't want to be
hurt. That changes dramatically if we put those forward air
controllers on the ground.
I'll tell you what. If you're fighting as the fighting took
place in Ramadi, and, as that fight unfolded, the scenario
was--they had prepared, for weeks, to get to Ramadi. This was
not due to a sandstorm. This is taking out supporting towns,
other attacks, diversionary attacks, that led to, finally, an
assault using suicide-bombers' vehicles to do that. If that
force had antitank weapons, they could have killed those
vehicles. If they had Apache helicopters, they could have
killed those vehicles. Those vehicles blew up and destroyed
almost entire blocks, and destroyed entire units, because the
explosives were so heavy on it.
After that came the fighting forces, themselves. If--again,
if we had close air support, we could easily deal with those
fighting forces before they actually closed with the Iraqi
military. Apache helicopters, close air support, would have
significantly impacted them. And then we have a close fight,
and assuming the Iraqi forces could deal with that.
But, I would tell you this. Many of those Iraqi forces--
it's not reported--did fight heroically in Ramadi. And a lot of
them fled. But, that resolve gets stiffened very quickly when
they watch those suicide bombers get blown up before they get
to them, when they watch those units--those caravans coming
down the road after them get blown up before they get to them,
because we have proper surveillance, we have resources that can
deal with that--antitank guided missiles and the like. We start
to change the dimension on the battlefield very significantly
as a result of providing them with the proper resources.
These are the constraints that are out there that are
manifesting itself in the behavior of the Iraqi Security
Forces. They have their own problems--leadership, discipline,
morale, and competence. I'm not suggesting that they don't.
But, there's a lot we could do that could make a difference.
Senator Cruz. Let me ask one final question, which is: The
administration is currently declining to arm the Kurds. The
Peshmerga are fighting ISIS. They are effective fighters. They
have been allies of America. In my judgment, the policy of not
arming the Kurds makes very little sense. I would be interested
in the panel's assessment of, Should we be arming the Kurds?
And is the current policy reasonable and effective in defeating
ISIS?
Dr. Kagan. Sir, we--I think it's a consensus on the panel
that we should be helping the Kurds defend themselves, but that
the Kurds will not be able to be effective partners in retaking
the portions of Arab Iraq that ISIS now controls, but that
certainly we should be helping the Kurds defend themselves, I
think.
Chairman McCain. Could I point out the--actually, we're not
refusing to arm the Kurds. The problem is, it goes through
Baghdad, and the Kurds continue to complain that there is not
the kind of facilitation of the delivery of those weapons. But,
the Senator's point is, for all practical purposes, I think,
correct.
Senator King.
Senator King. One of the--a phrase you just used struck a
chord with me. It--there was weeks in preparation for going to
Ramadi--raises the question of intelligence. And, General
Keane, would you comment? Do we have adequate intelligence? Do
we have any intelligence? And have we become too reliant on
signals intelligence and, therefore, don't have human beings
giving us information?
General Keane. Yes, I mean, that's a great question. And
it's more appropriately put to the military leaders when they
come in here, because they have the details of it, and--but,
this much I do know. My sensing, from talking to my sources, is
the intelligence function is not robust enough. And it--yes, we
are relying on national intelligence sources and some regional
intelligence sources. Some of that is surveillance, some of
that is, you know, signals intelligence, as well. But, there's
a lot more that we can do to assist them. We use surveillance a
lot to assist the use of airpower, because it's not controlled
by forward air controllers. We need different kinds of
surveillance in there to assist ground forces.
When we were fighting in Iraq, and now finishing up in
Afghanistan, our maneuver units used different kinds of drones.
They've much smaller. They don't stay up, necessarily, as long
as the ones that assist the airpower function. And they assist
the ground commanders. That kind of capability there,
controlled by United States, would dramatically make a
difference for the ground forces that are in the fight, because
that would give them the ability to see the preparations the
enemy is making, to see the execution before they--it impacts
on them, and, most importantly, to do something about it.
I think the entire intelligence function has got to be put
under review. We have a tendency to focus on other things that
are kinetic----
Senator King. Right.
General Keane.--but the intelligence function, in this kind
of warfare, is significant, in terms of its enhancing ground
forces and air forces to be able to use their capabilities to
the fullest.
Senator King. And it's unfortunate that we continue to--we
seem to continue to be surprised.
Did you----
Colonel Harvey. Sir, if I could, on the Ramadi issue,
just--I'm at the University of South Florida, and, you know, we
drafted a paper outlining that Ramadi was going to fall, early
last week, and we were looking at data that's only available to
us through open-source information, but understanding the
enemy, their intent, trying to get inside how they're
orchestrating the fight. And it's not just about having the
intelligence, it's knowing what to do with the information and
how to think about it.
The warnings were there, the indicators were there. If we
could see it, at the University of South Florida, and others
here in--like the Institute for the Study of War, I think, also
saw that--then we shouldn't have been making public statements,
midweek, officially saying that Ramadi was not going to fall,
that it wasn't really under threat, because that creates
another problem of its own, because then you have the collapse,
and it looks like there's a real problem in our communication
and understanding at the most--highest levels of our
government.
Senator King. Well, and also it makes the ISIS look
invincible and more powerful, and that's--helps in their
recruiting, and it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
You've made a strong case for things like close air
support, forward controllers, all of those kinds of things.
But, isn't one of the fundamental problems--we could have all
of those assets, but, if the Iraqi Security Forces don't have
the will to fight, and if the local population doesn't have
the--any confidence in the government in Baghdad, it's still a
very difficult, if not impossible, proposition. Can you give me
some thoughts on that?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I agree with the statement that you
made. If those two conditions are true, then it's difficult, to
impossible. I don't think it's true that the Iraqi forces don't
have the will to fight. I think they do have the will to fight.
But, I think, as General Keane pointed out and as we've seen
repeatedly, will to fight is one thing, belief in your ability
to succeed is another critical component to will to fight. And
that's one of the things that we have provided, historically,
to our allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also to NATO allies
and various other partners who rely on our overmatching
military capabilities just as much as the Iraqis would. We can
make it so that the Iraqis don't have to worry about being
overrun. That's what we used to do. We are allowing them to be
overrun in these circumstances. And that erodes their will to
fight, significantly.
Your point about the political accommodation is also
incredibly important. We absolutely need to have an Iraqi
Government that is prepared to reach out to Sunni effectively.
And we haven't seen that. Unfortunately, the more that we try
to subcontract these conflicts to local forces in preference to
our own----
Senator King. Then you're talking about the----
Dr. Kagan.--you get a----
Senator King.--Shi'a militia.
Dr. Kagan. Exactly, sir.
Senator King. Which only exacerbates the sectarian
conflict, which makes ISIS look good to the Sunni chiefs in
Anbar.
Dr. Kagan. Or more tolerable, perhaps, than the
alternatives.
Senator King. Yes. I don't think they look good to anybody.
Dr. Kagan. Yes, sir.
Senator King. It's--but, if they don't have confidence--I
mean, isn't that one of the fundamental problems here, is that
ISIS has been swimming in, if not a friendly sea, at least a
neutral sea, in terms of the Sunni provinces?
Dr. Kagan. I think it's a very fearful sea. And I think
that that's--you know, we shouldn't forget that terrorism works
both ways, and these guys are incredibly brutal in dealing with
the populations that they control. So, people are going to
require a certain amount of assurance that, if they rise up
against these guys, that they will win, because it--the
alternative is that they will be completely destroyed as
communities.
General Keane. You know, the other thing is, the force that
we had in Iraq, the Iraqi Security Force that took us--it took
us a while to get them to be effective, to be frank about it.
And one of the things that made them very effective during the
surge period, where General Petraeus changed the dimension on
the battlefield, and he said, ``We're not just going to provide
them advisors, we're going to ask them to fight side by side
with us''--platoon, side by side; company, side by side;
battalion, side by side. That dimension exponentially increased
the capability of the force, because they could see what right
looked like. They could see it. It was right there. A sergeant
could see a U.S. sergeant's performance, how he acted under
stress. Soldiers could see it. Other leaders could see their
counterparts' performance.
So, that force grew rather dramatically, and we were there
multiple weeks throughout 2007 and 2008, the three of us on
this side of the table. And that was an effective force. And I
can tell you for a fact, because I saw it with my own eyes, I
saw battalion commanders, brigade commanders, and division
commanders distinguish themselves in combat and under
significant stress. And we felt good about that force. We were
saying, ``Wow, they finally--they've got it together.'' What
happened to that force? Well, so much attention has been placed
on Maliki's malice in what he did to undermine his political
opponents. He destroyed that force, because he saw those
distinguished leaders, who were accomplished as a result of
their performance on the battlefield, and their people were
devoted to them--he saw them as threats to him, politically as
well as his political opponents. And he undermined that force.
He purged that force.
So, that force is not there, the one that we used to have.
He put in these political phonies and cranks and other people
who didn't have the military competence. Well, that--changing
leadership and getting that leadership back, and others who are
willing to have that kind of commitment and competence, that
takes a little time to fix. But, the fact that we did have it,
Senator, at one time, and it was pretty good, tells you that
there is something there that we can work with, and we can get
it back there. Whether that can be done in time is another
issue.
Senator King. Looks around--I may be the chair now, so I'm
going to give myself another 10 seconds.
One simple question, though. In 2007-2008, how many
Americans were in Iraq?
General Keane. Certainly. I mean, we had somewhere in the
neighborhood--correct me if I'm wrong, guys--about 130,000 in
Iraq. And that's how that force grew to the--but, what I'm
saying to you is that, when we finished, when we had completed
our involvement in Iraq, the force that we'd left there was a
capable force, the Iraqi Security Force.
Senator King. I understand that. The question is, What do
we have to do to rebuild it? That's the question.
I'm out of time.
Senator Sullivan [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.
I wanted to talk at--initially, about the issue of
credibility. There's been a lot of discussion about how we've
lost credibility with our allies in places like Syria. But, I
also want to talk about the importance of the issue of
credibility with the American people. And there has been, I
think, a narrative in the administration that has not been
helpful, in that there's been an emphasis on the fact that we
are now--our combat role in the Middle East is now finished.
Well, of course, it isn't finished. Just tell that to the
pilots who are flying daily missions. We think of combat in
terms of the infantry soldiers, but a lot of times we forget
the brave men and women who are flying these missions, daily.
And they're--that's combat. And obviously, also, with the
recent Delta Force mission by some very brave Americans, that's
boots on the ground. So, we're in combat. We even have boots on
the ground, but there's still this narrative that somehow we're
done.
So, General Keane, what I wanted to ask you, first of all,
is, Do you think that this narrative, which is a false one, in
my view, has inhibited our ability to actually develop a robust
strategy we're talking about? Do we need JTACs, do we need
other forces on the ground? And yet, we're competing with a
narrative from the White House that says, ``No, no, no, no,
we're done.'' And it seems to me that would be a limiting
factor to developing a strategy that ultimately is--would do
what we all want it to do, which is protect America's national
security interests.
General Keane. Well, yes, I certainly--when I look at it
and try to speculate about what is driving some of our
decisions, what is driving our narrative, you know, one of the
things I've observed since I've been closer to it in recent
years than when I was when I was a younger officer, is that
most administrations, Democratic or Republican, have a tendency
to overreact to what took place in the previous administration.
And I think this one is no exception to that, making a--making
it a principle of the administration to have a guarantor that
we will not be involved in any military activity in the Middle
East or in South Asia that could lead to another protracted
war. And I think that's probably good--a good principle. But,
the issue is, that should not trump what's necessary to do,
given the fact that ISIS represents a new organization----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
General Keane.--with new leadership, a new vision, in terms
of its global and regional strategy, and that it is a barbaric
organization committing genocide, assassination, enslavement of
women, and raping of women, as we all know, and that it is
fully intent on conducting a religious war based on their
ideology. And we cannot let the rearview mirror of Iraq and
Afghanistan so disincentivize us to deal with the reality of
what this is. And I'm convinced that the American people, when
we inform them----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
General Keane.--and we educate them, and we take them
through this--I mean, I dealt with the Bush administration.
They never truly explained what radical Islam is and why it was
so dangerous. We never truly took apart the ideology.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
General Keane. We never truly fashioned a strategy to deal
with it in a comprehensive way.
Senator Sullivan. Can I--I'd like to follow up----
General Keane. Here we sit, with the same problem today.
Senator Sullivan. I think that's a great point, and it's
something that I think--my own view is that you're directly on
point. If we level with the American people, talk about the
threats, talk about the strategy, that--it's really important--
many of you have been raising that--I think everybody
recognizes what we--you know, once we lay that out, what we
would or wouldn't have to do to address it.
So, let me ask a kind of a related question for Mr. Kagan.
You've written on the long war, the idea of--that I think
sometimes we look at what's going on with ISIS and other issues
in the Middle East and think, ``Hey, we're going to have this
done in a couple of months--18 months, 20 months, maybe a
couple of years.'' Do you think that there is an importance to
having the leadership, both in terms of Congress, but
particularly the executive branch, talk more broadly--and
again, level with the American people--about that this might be
a generational conflict, this might be akin to the Cold War,
where we've got to lay out a broad strategy--and, Mr. Katulis,
I think your point, early on in your testimony, about the need
for a strategic concept is so important--lay out a strategy
that the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the
American people can get behind, and then execute it. And level
with the American people that this might not be done in 18
months.
So, would any of you care--Mr. Kagan, I know you've written
about the long war. Could you--would you feel free to talk
about that?
And, Mr. Katulis, I'd be very interested--when you talked
about the strategic concept. What is it? Obviously, 20 seconds
left, that's a big topic. But, if you could point us in the
direction of your writings or some principles that all of you
have thought about, I think that would be very helpful.
Mr. Kagan?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I mean, this is a generational struggle
that we're in, at least. It may be longer than----
Senator Sullivan. But, we don't talk about it that way, do
we----
Dr. Kagan. No, on the----
Senator Sullivan.--very much?
Dr. Kagan.--contrary. I think your first--the point that
you opened with is a very important one, that when the
administration's narrative is that we're ending the wars, it is
impossible to develop an--a coherent strategy for fighting the
wars. And we do need to understand that this is a war. This
is--these are battle fronts on a common war that is going to
last for a long time. And we don't get to end it unless we win.
But, you don't get to decide--we may not be interested in war,
but war is interested in us. And this is going to continue to
be a problem. And we need to level with the American people, as
you say, as a basis for developing any kind of strategy. I
totally agree with you.
Mr. Katulis. I think we need to define what we want to
achieve. Quite often over the last 14 years, in Afghanistan, in
Iraq, now with ISIL, we define our objectives in terms of what
we're going to counter and defeat. That's important. But, what
has been missing, I think, comprehensively, whether it's in a
particular theater, like Iraq or Syria or Afghanistan, is the
definition of what we actually need to leave behind in those
societies, how we help others help themselves.
I do believe, at certain points--President Bush certainly
did this; certain points, President Obama does this--talks
about the long-term nature of this. If you look at their
planning documents, at least, for the anti-ISIL strategy, it
doesn't say, ``Let's end this.'' As the administration used to
say about Afghanistan and Iraq, ``We're going to end it at a
particular period of time.'' It extends into who will be the
next President.
But, your point is terribly important, and I have written
several articles and a book about this, too. It's important,
because, for our own society, there is a new generation, called
Millennials, that are actually, this year, in number, larger
than the Baby Boomers or--I'm a Generation X-er. Our leaders
aren't messaging in a cohesive way. And I think part of it is
the partisanship that we have in our politics and other things.
And I--I'm a strong centrist internationalist. I believe that
we need to bring the American people along with us.
And something Senator Kaine has said here earlier and
before is that the debate that we need to be having on the
authorization of the use of military force, and action on it--
this is a moment which has not been seized. You could criticize
the administration or you could criticize whomever in Congress.
There's been this muddle. And I think part of the reason, it
goes back to, we actually haven't defined for the American
public, in the way that Fred and others have argued here, that
the United States has a special leadership role in the world.
Our leadership--countries in the region are still looking to us
to actually do more. But, we need to actually take those steps
beyond the questions on military and security steps, which are
terribly important. We need to actually, then, talk about, How
do we defeat these ideologies? We've done it before, with
Naziism or Communism. You know, they're on the margins. Our
model is much better. Our values are better. But, what happened
to the battle of ideas? We had that debate for a couple of
years after September 11. We kind of rediscovered it for a
little bit. But, I think our ADD, our attention deficit
disorder, in our own society--and that's what I would say is,
as thought leaders, as leaders in Congress, we all have a
responsibility to continue to talk about this in a sustained
way.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. We've all had one round, but if
anybody has a second round--I'm just going to seize the moment,
here, to continue for a few minutes, if we can.
I'm interested--we've had visits in the Senate Foreign
Relations from leaders that are our allies--King--the King of
Jordan, in January; the Emir of Qatar, in February. We've had
discussions with Saudi leadership, including the Saudi
Ambassador. And every time we have these discussions, I ask
them, ``Tell us what you think the role of the United States
should be, vis-a-vis ISIL, the battle against ISIL.'' And, in
particular, because this is a point of difference among some on
the Foreign Relations Committee, I've asked about the--their
thought about American ground troops. I want to tell you what
they've said, but then I'm curious about your opinions about
what they've said.
The King of Jordan said, ``That would be a mistake. This is
our battle, not yours. And if it gets positioned as the United
States against ISIL, then that will not be a helpful thing. If
it's--we stand up against the terrorist threat in our own
region, and the United States helps us in a vigorous way, but
clearly a supporter, not the main driver, that's the way this
should position, and significant U.S. ground troops would--just
like the United States is doing 90 percent of the airstrikes,
the significant U.S. ground troops would make this the United
States against ISIL.''
The Emir of Qatar said, similarly, ``If there's significant
ground troop presence from the United States, this will be
the--a recruiting bonanza for ISIL.''
In Saudi Arabia--and this--the meetings with the Saudis
occurred right after the Saudis had gone in a major way into
Yemen, but--so, they're--you know, they're willing, at least
somewhere, to take some significant military action to deal
with threats in their own region, but they also said, ``U.S.
ground troops against ISIL would be problematic.''
Now, I don't--you know, I'm not--I didn't read that to say,
``not even one,'' or ``under no circumstances.'' But, they were
very wary about the notion of U.S. ground troops.
So, we're trying to work that out on the Foreign Relations
Committee as we think about an authorization. Are they right?
Are they wrong? Of, if they're right, how would you square that
with what a U.S. presence, U.S. support should mean?
Mr. Katulis. If I could start. It's why I--the thrust of my
remarks were on this coalition.
I actually think, for all of the criticisms of the Obama
administration's strategy, some of which I share, this is the
one component that simply did not exist before. It's one that
has been underutilized, I believe. I do think that things like
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit last week, though
there were a lot of optics and news articles about it, there is
a conversation to try to build on, What can we do in
partnership with them?
So, I think if there's one thing we should have learned
from 2003 to 2010 or '11 in Iraq, is that, yes, U.S. forces can
have an important impact on the security situation there. But,
there's also downsides to having such a visible presence.
I don't think anyone on the panel--unless I misheard it--
was talking about ever going back to, say, a 2006-2007 posture.
But, I do think striking the right balance is the key question.
I think the administration has been understandably reticent
about what it does in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and other
places, given the unforced errors on the part of the United
States. But, this regional dynamic has shifted quite a lot,
which is what I was trying to emphasize.
The region, itself, recognizes that the United States, in a
very visible presence on the ground, does have significant
downsides for their own legitimacy with their own populations.
The region also is taking action in what it sees as its own
self-interest. What I was trying to say, in terms of a
multidimensional--it's not only security support; it's
investment in media campaigns and different political forces
across the region.
Where I think the U.S. strategy right now--and again, it's
more honed in on what my expertise and focus is--where we need
to enhance it more is working with those reliable partners,
from Jordan to the United Arab Emirates to Saudi Arabia to a
number of different allies, including the Kurds we've talked
about, and some of the Iraqis, to actually take what has been a
significantly larger amount of resources in energy and activity
and channel it towards more constructive purposes. I don't see
that happening in Yemen right now. I don't see that happening
yet in Syria. And I don't see that happening in many other
theaters.
So, I think the basic answer to the question--the leaders
that you spoke with, I think, are reflecting a very popular
view at the popular level in their countries, as well. They
understand that, for whatever happened in the Iraq War, the
surge, and other things, the United States is better sort of
seen as a backbone of support behind them, as opposed to
visibly out in the front.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I think we need to distinguish between
the ideal and reality. Ideally, of course it would be better
for regional states to take care of regional problems, and
regional militaries to be involved, with a caveat that we do
have a regional war going on, and the regional actors we're
talking about are being seen as on one side of that. So, we
need to think about what the Iranian reaction would be to Saudi
divisions deploying into Iraq on behalf of the Iraqis. I don't
think we would enjoy that very much. And I think it might be
worse, actually, than the Iranian reaction to the deployment of
U.S. forces in there. So, it's a complicated dynamic.
But, look, in the world of reality, the Jordanians, they
don't have the forces to do this. The Saudis don't have--the
regional militaries are not capable of providing the kind of
assistance to Iraq that we can provide. They don't have it in
their force structure, they don't have it in their----
Senator Kaine. How about the Turks?
Dr. Kagan. The Turks might be able to provide some element
of it, although no one provides the capability that the United
States provides to its allies, including the Turks, and they
would still be dependent on us.
But, again, the--I'm really not sure that the optics of the
return of the Ottoman Empire in force to Iraq would be better
than the optics of having a limited number of American troops
on the ground there. So, I think that the regional leaders
you're talking to are expressing an ideal version of a strategy
which we would all like to see, but it's not in accord with
reality.
And, as you think about an AUMF, I would say an AUMF in
which Congress micromanages what forces can or cannot be sent,
and thereby, in my opinion, infringes somewhat on the
prerogative of the President to choose how to fight a war that
Congress authorizes, but also, in this circumstances, that
would constrain the deployment of American ground forces when
they are so clearly necessary, would be extremely damaging.
Colonel Harvey. Senator Kaine, if I could.
This reminds me of the myth that I heard in Iraq about:
United States forces were the generator of the antibodies that
caused the insurgency. It was a real misreading of what was
going on in Iraq in the drivers of the fight.
We have to be focused on what are U.S. interests and how do
we defeat this enemy. And the seeds of strategic failure are
found in failing to define that enemy, define our interests,
the costs, and the risks. And if we do those things, and we
think about our interests, it will drive us to engage more
seriously than we have, in my mind. I think it's a very similar
situation today. We study radicalization, recruitment for the
foreign fighter flow. The United States presence in Iraq is not
going to dramatically increase the foreign fighter flow. It is
being driven by a range of issues and the different types of
recruits that are being pulled in from Tunisia and elsewhere.
The driver within Iraq is not the United States presence, it's
Shi'a domination, it's the fear for their future and their own
lives and lack of political inclusion, et cetera. That's the
issue we need to get our head around.
General Keane. Yes, I agree with what everybody's said
here, and I think we talk past each other a little bit on this
issue. No one here, certainly, is advocating that we should
have ground units that are occupying towns and villages, and
securing them, and therefore, protecting them from ISIS attack
that would put us right in the mainstream of defending against
ISIS. Now, I think that's unnecessary, and it would be a
mistake. But also, when we have a policy that says ``no boots
on the ground,'' that doesn't make any sense, either, because
it denies us from having advisors that have a role to play, it
denies us with--from forward air controllers that have a role
to play, as we pointed out, and other military capabilities
that are unique to us. And we've elaborated on what they are.
They are significant enablers that make--would make a
difference in what the 60 nations have agreed to do, which is
support the Iraqi ground forces, as imperfect as they are. But,
let's give them a better hand to play than what we are doing.
And I don't believe there is a single nation that would object
to anything of what we are describing is--are enablers that
would make a difference.
Second, when it comes to Syria, I think this is a
difference. And if you spoke to them about that, you know what
their view is about Assad. We've already dealt with that in the
regime. And they know full well that the deal with ISIS in
Syria, this is going to take a ground force, and they would
have to contribute to that ground force. I would think that
they would logically ask us to participate in that with them.
We would--I don't think we would necessarily have to be the
largest contributor, but I think we would have to participate.
And I think they would reasonably want us, too, because of our
experience and our capabilities, if we would actually lead it.
Maybe not.
But, I think those two things would probably be on the
table for discussion. And I think it's reasonable that that
kind of allocation of United States capability and leadership
to deal with ISIS in Syria is, in fact, an eventuality.
Senator Kaine. Senator Blumenthal, do you have questions
for the panel?
Senator Blumenthal. I do. Thank you very much.
Thank you all for being here and for your very thoughtful
and eloquent remarks. I was here for the beginning remarks.
Unfortunately, as so often happens here, I was diverted to
another committee meeting after our vote.
I want to come back to what Mr. Kagan was describing as the
``evil'' of ISIS/ISIL and the absolutely horrid, unspeakable
acts of brutality that they commit--mass rape, mass murder. And
I agree with you that they are one of the most evil, maybe the
most evil institution in history. We can argue about it. But,
when I go home this weekend, most folks are going to ask me,
What's the threat to the United States? And 50 years from now,
others will be sitting where you are, and where I am, talking
about probably other evil institutions that are committing mass
brutality. Because that seems to be, unfortunately and
tragically, the nature of the human condition. It's happened
throughout our history. And I think the ordinary person in
Connecticut over the Memorial Day weekend is going to wonder
what our role should be in stopping that from occurring unless
there is a threat to this country. So, perhaps you and others
on the panel could tell me what I should tell the people of
Connecticut about why the United States should be involved,
whether it is Special Operations Forces or better air support
or whatever the involvement is, and why that matters to our
security.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I think it's a fair question. And, as a
Connecticut native, I'm--I am concerned about what you have to
tell the Connecticut people to get them onboard with this.
May I start by saying--as I was driving down to Virginia
the other day, I drove past the Holocaust Museum, and I saw,
again, the sign that's up there that is always there, which is
``Never Again.'' And I would submit that we need--one of the
things we need to tell the American people is that America is
not historically a country that watches these kinds of
atrocities on this scale occur and does nothing. It actually is
a core American value to take a stand against these kind of--we
do it very late, we did--we try to talk ourselves out of it, we
have long arguments about it, but, ultimately, we generally do
it. And that's one of the things that makes us America. And I
think we really shouldn't lose sight of that moral imperative
as we talk about this.
But, your comments are very well taken, sir. The reality
is, ISIS poses a clear and present danger to the United States
Homeland. It has already been encouraging, condoning, and
applauding lone-wolf attacks here. It has made it clear that it
has the objective of attacking America and the West, that it is
actively recruiting cells in America and the West. And it will
do that with the resources of a ministate behind it, which is
something that we have never seen before with al-Qaeda. This is
not a group of bandits hanging out in the mountains in
Afghanistan. And that attack was devastating enough. But, if we
reflect on the resources that ISIS has access to, controlling
Mosul, Fallujah, Ramadi, al-Raqqa, oil infrastructure, the
resources that were in various universities in Mosul and so
forth, that--thousands of fighters, tens of thousands of
recruits--this is an army, and this is an army that is very
sophisticated and has an ability to conduct operational
military planning and execute it that is in advance of anything
that I've seen from any of these groups. And it has declared
its intention to come after the United States, and shown a
willingness to do that. That is something that I think the
people of Connecticut need to be concerned about.
General Keane. Yes, I would certainly agree with what Fred
is saying, is that it should be a concern to us, in a couple of
ways. Certainly, what they are doing to motivate and inspire
others who are not necessarily in the region but are in other
countries and are--can identify with this movement, and many of
them are self-radicalized or possibly they're already
radicalized, but they're motivated to take action, and take
violent action. We've seen plenty of evidence of that.
And the longer you permit the organization to succeed--can
you imagine what has gone out on the Internet from ISIS around
the world as a result of their success in Ramadi, and how that
has motivated others, that ISIS, in fact, is winning, and
they're standing up against the United States, they're standing
up against these strong allies of the United States in the
region and Europe, and they're actually winning? So, there's
huge danger there. As long as you let this organization stay
and we don't decapitate it, then they--the motivation and
inspiration of self-radicalization continues to grow. That's
one thing.
The second thing is, in the region itself--and we showed on
a map--they're moving into other countries at the same time
they're defending what they have in Syria and Iraq, and
expanding in those countries. This is what makes this
organization so very different than what we've dealt with in
the past. And they're looking at Libya as a--because of the
social and political upheaval in Libya--and there's hardly a
government there and anybody to push back on it--they're going
to put huge resources in there. Why are we concerned about
that? Our interests in the region, our interests in North
Africa, that would be on the southern tip of NATO there, not
too many miles away from Italy. In Afghanistan, they have
expanded rapidly, beyond most of our expectations, I would
assume, into eight provinces in Afghanistan. Now, we have
interests in Afghanistan, for obvious reasons.
So, this is a movement that we can tie directly to the
security of the American people and to our national security
objectives of the United States in this region and in South
Asia.
Senator Blumenthal. So, it--if I can put it a different
way, just to conclude, it's more than--and, by the way,
American values are directly and inevitably linked to stopping
human atrocities. I agree totally with you, Mr. Kagan. But, our
interests go beyond that--those values. And, by the way, all of
the reasons that you've articulated are the reasons that I
voted for the training and equipping measures that have been
implemented. But, my frustration is that, as you also have
observed, there is a huge gap between the goals and missions
that we've outlined for the United States and the actual action
that we're undertaking. The train-and-equip activities are way
behind what we might have hoped by this point, and there's no
clear timetable for really achieving the level of capability
that we expected or hoped.
So, I think this has been a very sobering morning, and I
thank you all for being here.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Well, I also want to thank the
witnesses. It's been, I think, very helpful to all members.
This is not an issue that's going away, so I'm sure we'll be
seeing you again.
Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
united states strategy in iraq, syria, and the middle east
1. Senator Inhofe. General Keane, what is the perception of the
United States military and our current use of force in Iraq and Syria
in the Middle East? Do you think we have a commitment issue?
General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
2. Senator Inhofe. General Keane, Dr. Kagan, Colonel Harvey, and
Mr. Katulis, in your opinion, what should be the political objectives
of United States policy in the Middle East, how does Iraq and Syria
play into that strategy, and what is your assessment of how well we are
doing at achieving them?
General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Dr. Kagan did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Colonel Harvey did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Mr. Katulis. United States political objectives in the Middle East
are to help foster more stable, inclusive, and pluralistic societies
throughout the region. This task is not an easy one, and will take
years if not decades to fully realize.
Iraq and Syria today are the exact opposites of what the United
States wants to see in the Middle East--violentand unstable, with
exclusionary politics fostering deep divisions and endangering minority
populations likeChristians and Yazidis.
A key component of United States strategy in Iraq is to try and
foster a more inclusive government under Prime MinisterAbadi that will
give all Iraqis a stake in their political system. It is less clear how
the U.S. aims to achieve amore stable, inclusive, and pluralistic Syria
given the strategy currently in place.
In Iraq, the United States has done fairly well given the tools at
hand in trying to create a more inclusive andpluralistic politics. We
played a major role in pushing Prime Minister Maliki out of power and
putting PrimeMinister Abadi in, which remains a major step forward. But
since then, Iraqi politics has largely stymied ourefforts to encourage
a more pluralistic and inclusive Iraq through legislative measures like
the Iraqi NationalGuard proposal.
3. Senator Inhofe. Colonel Harvey, the current plan is to train and
equip about 5,000 moderate opposition fighters in Syria a year. Do you
believe that goal is achievable and will it make a difference?
Colonel Harvey did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
fall of ramadi
4. Senator Inhofe. General Keane, what are your thoughts on the
Iraqi security forces retreat out of Ramadi?
General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
iran in iraq
5. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kagan, General Petraeus said he thinks Iran
is as big of a threat as ISIL to the long-term future of Iraq. Do you
agree?
Dr. Kagan did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
6. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kagan, what are Iranian intentions in Iraq?
What is our leverage to counter Iranian influence in Iraq?
Dr. Kagan did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
u.s military mission and the iraqi security force
7. Senator Inhofe. Colonel Harvey, has the sectarian configuration
of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) changed since their collapse under
the pressure of ISIL last year--have they become more balanced and
inclusive or more Shia-dominated? How would you go about helping the
Iraqi security forces become more integrated and more inclusive?
Colonel Harvey did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
8. Senator Inhofe. Colonel Harvey, what kind of force protection
concerns do you have for United States forces in Iraq?
Colonel Harvey did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL) STRATEGY
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Sessions,
Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Lee, Graham,
Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and
Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning.
The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today, as soon as
the media allows us to see the witnesses, to receive testimony
on the U.S. strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL).
I am grateful to our distinguished witnesses for appearing
before us today.
The risk posed by ISIL must be seen in the context of what
many of America's most accomplished leaders and foreign policy
experts have described as the most complex and uncertain
international environment since the end of World War II. All
across the globe, America's interests in security and stability
are at risk.
As part of a broader strategy to dominate eastern Europe,
Vladimir Putin's Russia continues its onslaught in Ukraine,
with Russian troops and equipment leading an asymmetric
campaign to undermine Ukraine's Government and independence as
the United States has refused the Ukrainians weapons for its
defense.
China's destabilizing behavior also poses a growing
challenge to United States national interests: its reclamation
and militarization of vast land features in the South China
Sea, its continued military buildup, and of course, its blatant
and undeterred cyber attacks against the United States.
Iran is expanding its malign activities and hegemonic
ambitions across the Middle East, as we see clearly in Lebanon,
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere, and yet, some in the
administration seem to operate under the delusion that a
nuclear agreement could lead to a new modus vivendi with the
Islamic Republic.
In Syria, Bashar Assad's slaughter of his own people, which
has been the single greatest contributor to the rise and
continued success of ISIL, goes on and on and on, aided by
Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. For 4 years, the President has
said Assad must go as a part of a political transition in
Syria, but conditions on the ground have never allowed it.
Tragically, that remains true today.
What each of these growing threats has in common is a
failure of deterrence, brought on by a dangerous perception of
American weakness and lack of resolve, which our adversaries
have taken as a provocative invitation for hostility.
When it comes to ISIL, President Obama's comments yesterday
at the Pentagon reveal the disturbing degree of self-delusion
that characterizes the administration's thinking. It is right
but ultimately irrelevant to point out, as the President did,
that we have conducted thousands of airstrikes, taken out many
ISIL fighters and much equipment, and pushed it out of some
territory. None of the so-called progress that the President
cited suggests that we are on a path to success.
Since U.S. and coalition air strikes began last year, ISIL
has continued to enjoy battlefield successes, including taking
Ramadi and other key terrain in Iraq, holding over half the
territory in Syria, and controlling every border post between
Iraq and Syria. Moreover, the longer ISIL remains undefeated in
Iraq and Syria, the more potent its message is to those around
the world who may be radicalized and inspired to join the group
and spread violence and mayhem on its behalf.
It is not that we are doing nothing; it is that there is no
compelling reason to believe that anything we are doing
currently will be sufficient to achieve the President's long-
stated goal of degrading and ultimately destroying ISIL, either
in the short term or the long term. Our means and our current
level of effort are not aligned with our ends. That suggests we
are not winning, and when you are not winning in war, you are
losing.
The reality today is that ISIL continues to gain territory
in Iraq and Syria, while expanding its influence and presence
across the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. There is no
responsible ground force in either Iraq or Syria that is both
willing and able to take territory away from ISIL and hold it,
and none of our current training efforts of moderate Syrians,
Sunni tribes, or Iraqi Security Forces are as yet capable of
producing such a ground force. It is unclear why the latest
gradual escalation of effort, the deployment of a few hundred
additional advisors to Anbar, will make a difference that our
previous efforts failed to achieve.
While our coalition may own the skies, as the President
said yesterday, our air campaign against ISIL continues to be
limited significantly by overly restrictive rules of engagement
and a lack of ground intelligence, which only gets worse as
ISIL moves into urban areas to avoid coalition bombing. Any
pilot will tell you that they are only as good as the targets
they receive, and when three-quarters of our air missions
against ISIL still return to base without dropping weapons,
that is indicative of a fundamental problem with our air
campaign.
What is worse, none of our efforts against ISIL in Iraq can
succeed while the conflict in Syria continues, and with it the
conditions for ISIL's continued growth, recruitment, and
radicalization of Muslims around the world. As published media
reports indicate, our Syrian train and equip program is anemic
and struggling because our stated goal does not include going
after Assad and his regime forces, and we still do not provide
the forces we are training with the enabling capabilities to
succeed in any engagement they may face inside Syria.
Given the poor numbers of recruited and trained Syrian
fighters thus far, I am doubtful we can achieve our goal of
training a few thousand this year. But even if the program
achieves its goal, it is doubtful that it will make a strategic
difference on the battlefield. Yes, we need a political
solution in Syria. But no such solution is possible with Bashar
Assad still in power. Unless and until the United States leads
a coalition effort to put far greater battlefield pressure on
Assad, a political solution will never be within reach, the
conflict will grind on, and ISIL will thrive.
The lack of a coherent strategy has resulted in the spread
of ISIL around the world, to Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, and even to
Afghanistan, where I visited last weekend. Afghanistan is
certainly not Iraq, but the parallels are eerily familiar. As
in Iraq, the United States is contemplating a drastic reduction
in force presence that places at risk the hard-won gains of the
last decade. While Afghanistan's security forces are improving
in quality, they are still missing the same set of key
capabilities the Iraqis were missing when the United States
withdrew in 2011, including intelligence, aviation, special
operations, and logistics capabilities. At the current pace,
our military commanders know these capabilities will remain
critically underdeveloped at the end of 2016, when President
Obama has announced that United States and coalition forces
will dramatically downsize to a presence solely in Kabul.
We have seen this movie before. If we make the same
mistakes, we should expect similarly tragic results. I do not
want to attend another hearing like this with your successors
trying to figure out a strategy to clean up after avoidable
mistakes. What that means is that the President must provide
our commanders on the ground with necessary forces,
capabilities, and the authorities to help our Afghan partners
in continuing to secure their country and defeat our terrorist
enemies together.
ISIL is not 10 feet tall. It can be and must be defeated.
But that will never happen if we continue to delude ourselves
about our current campaign. The President is fond of the truism
that there is no military solution to ISIL or any other
problem. What he has so often failed to realize is that there
is sometimes a major military dimension to achieving a
political solution. This was the critical lesson that the
United States learned in the Iraq surge. We must learn again.
Security on the ground is a precondition to political
reconciliation, not the other way around.
The unfortunate irony is that a President elected in
opposition to the war in Iraq is repeating some of its worst
strategic mistakes. What is worse, despite obvious indications
that the current strategy against ISIL is failing, he has yet
to find the courage of his predecessor to admit mistakes and
choose a new direction. This needs to happen sooner rather than
later, or the disaster the next President will inherit in the
Middle East but also far beyond it will be overwhelming.
It is clear we are living in a time of unprecedented
turmoil. We see it on our television screens every day: ISIL's
spread across the Middle East, Russia's invasion of Ukraine,
and China's maritime expansion in Asia.
Once again, I thank our witnesses and look forward to their
testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Secretary Carter, General Dempsey. Thank you.
This morning's hearing is an important opportunity for this
committee to hear from the administration regarding its
strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
or ISIL. It follows up on the committee's hearing in May with
outside witnesses regarding the counter-ISIL strategy.
ISIL, with its violent, extremist ideology and brutal
military capabilities, poses a clear threat to the stability of
the Middle East, Africa, and beyond, and a threat to the United
States and our partners' interests in those regions and,
indeed, even in the Homeland. ISIL's campaign to establish a
caliphate threatens to create a breeding ground for training
extremist fighters, attracting foreign fighters intent on
returning to Western countries to carry out attacks, and
inspiring others in the United States and elsewhere to commit
violence. The American people recognize the threat posed by
ISIL but, at the same time, are appropriately wary, after
nearly a decade and a half of United States military
involvement overseas, about being drawn deeper into a seemingly
intractable Middle East conflict.
As part of the administration's whole-of-government
strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) has the lead for two
of the nine lines of effort against ISIL and plays a supporting
role for the efforts of a number of other departments and
agencies. This committee has provided essential resources to
the Department to implement the strategy through funding of the
overseas contingency operations fund, including the President's
request for both the Iraq and Syria train and equip funds and
$1 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. However,
the severe cuts mandated by sequestration puts at risk the
ability of the civilian departments of our Government,
including the State Department, the United States Agency for
International Aid and Development, and the Department of
Homeland Security, and Treasury Department to carry out fully
the other seven lines of effort that comprise our counter-ISIL
strategy. The effect of sequestration could be that the United
States Government is having to fight ISIL literally with one
hand tied behind its back. The success of the strategy depends
on getting both our military and civilian departments the
necessary resources to confront ISIL.
At this committee's hearing in May, several witnesses
called for expanding the United States military involvement in
Iraq and Syria in response to ISIL's seizure of the Anbar
provincial capital of Ramadi and ISIL's gains in Syria. The
President's announcement last month of an additional 450 United
States troops to be deployed to Iraq to train and assist Iraqi
Security Forces begins to address the critical need to bring
local Sunni tribes into the fight against ISIL. We will be
interested in hearing from our witnesses what additional steps
they would recommend for expanding the presence of Sunni
fighters in the Iraqi Security Forces and to ensure that
Kurdish Peshmerga receive expeditiously the weapons they need
to counter ISIL in the fight.
In many respects, the current challenges in Iraq result
from two intersecting forces: the rise of ISIL and the
deterioration of the Iraqi security forces and complementary
governmental capacities. Many of the factors and personalities
forming ISIL can be traced to the invasion and occupation of
Iraq. Planning for that war failed to account for deep-seated
sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shia within the region,
which gave rise to grievances that fueled the rise of ISIL. In
addition, many of the factors contributing to the deterioration
of Iraq Security Forces can be traced to the actions of Prime
Minister Maliki, in particular his replacement of competent
leaders in the military with cronies loyal to himself.
Iran's role in Iraq and the broader region must never be
forgotten either. Many of the aforementioned actions by Maliki
were at the behest of Iran or certainly with their
acquiescence. Iran's influence on Iraq's political
decisionmaking can be seen even prior to the 2008 visit of the
Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Baghdad. Today, Iran has its
own military boots on the ground in both Iraq and Syria, and it
continues to support its proxies. We must keep a close eye on
Iran and assess carefully their interests at the tactical and
strategic level.
As we work with the coalition to counter the threat of
ISIL, it will be useful to obtain your perspective on these and
other factors as we endeavor to reshape our policies and our
strategy.
Ultimately, though, one of the key lessons from the Iraq
war is that no amount of United States or coalition military
assistance or boots on the ground will lead to the lasting
defeat of violent extremism if the underlying political causes
that allow such extremism to arise and thrive are not
addressed. In Iraq, the Abadi Government must continue to take
substantive steps to govern in a more inclusive manner, address
longstanding grievances of Iraq's sectarian and ethnic
minorities, expand the integration of Sunnis and Kurds into
Iraq's military and political structures, and disarm Iranian-
backed Shia militias.
In Syria, moderate and extreme elements to the opposition
have made tactical gains against ISIL and the regime, but ISIL
remains the dominant force in western Syria. Absent a moderate
opposition that is willing to and capable of taking territory
from ISIL and holding it, any change in the status quo is
unlikely. Bolstered by critical outside assistance, the Assad
regime remains in the seat of power in Damascus, but has ceded
territory in recent months. Despite these territorial shifts in
the ground battle in Syria, a defeat on the battlefield is not
the most likely end to the battle in Syria. A political
solution that addresses grievances and a broad range of
constituencies in Syria is the only pathway to a sustainable
solution.
When I met with military and political leaders in Iraq
earlier this year, they emphasized that United States and
coalition forces are at the beginning of a multiyear campaign
against ISIL. They stressed the need for strategic patience. I
hope our witnesses today will provide their perspective on just
where we are in the long fight and what to expect in the coming
months and years ahead.
I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
I welcome the witnesses. Secretary Carter?
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Reed, and members of this committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to come before you to address your questions and
concerns about this campaign.
I want to especially thank the chairman for going to
Afghanistan over his Fourth of July weekend, which I
appreciate. Visiting the troops means a lot to us, sir.
As all of you know from your travels around the world,
there is a high demand everywhere in the world for American
leadership, from Asia, where I saw some of you in May, to
Europe, where I was 2 weeks ago. The Obama administration and
the members of this committee have helped ensure that we meet
that demand, and I thank you for that.
The same is true in the Middle East where we are standing
by our friends like Israel, working to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon and otherwise exercising malign
influence and confronting ISIL, which is the subject of this
hearing.
It was also the subject of a meeting yesterday at the
Pentagon where President Obama and Chairman Dempsey and I
discussed our counter-ISIL campaign with senior defense and
interagency leaders. We all agreed that ISIL represents a grave
threat and that it must be and will be dealt a lasting defeat.
That is our objective, which is shared by a global coalition
that reflects both the worldwide consensus on the need to
counter ISIL and the practical requirement for others to do
their part. The administration's strategy to achieve that
objective, as the Joint Chiefs' doctrinal definition of
strategy puts it, integrates all the Nation's strengths and
instruments of power, as has been noted. It is executed through
nine synchronized lines of effort.
The first and arguably the most critical line of effort is
the political one, as has also been noted, which is led by the
State Department. This line involves building more effective,
inclusive, and multi-sectarian governance in Iraq.
At the same time, the United States continues to work
diplomatically to bring about a political transition from
Bashar al-Assad to a more inclusive government with which we
can also work to defeat ISIL.
The next two lines of effort are interconnected: to deny
ISIL safe haven and to build partner capacity in Iraq and
Syria. Both are led by DOD which, alongside coalition partners,
is conducting an air campaign, advising, and assisting Iraqi
security forces on the ground, and training and equipping
vetted local forces in Iraq and for Syria.
Before I go on, let me say that these first three political
and military lines of effort have to be in sync, a point that
has been made already. That is a challenge but one we are
working through with our partners in the coalition, on the
ground, and around our Government.
The fourth line of effort is enhancing intelligence
collection on ISIL, which is led by the National
Counterterrorism Center.
The fifth line of effort, disrupting ISIL's finances, is
co-led by Treasury and State.
Lines of effort six and seven, both co-led by State and the
National Counterterrorism Center, are to counter ISIL's
messaging and disrupt the flow of foreign fighters to and from
ISIL, both of which are critical in today's connected and
networked world.
The eighth line of effort, providing humanitarian support
to those affected by the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, is led by
State and AID.
Finally, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Justice
work together to protect the homeland, the ninth line of
effort, by disrupting terrorist threats. In addition to our
full-spectrum cooperative relationship with Department of
Homeland Security and other law enforcement agencies, DOD
personnel continue to strike ISIL elements in Iraq and Syria.
The effective execution of all nine lines of effort by the
United States and its coalition partners is necessary to ensure
ISIL's lasting defeat.
I want to add briefly that there are important classified
dimensions to our approach to ISIL and to the Middle East more
broadly, Mr. Chairman, that we will not be able to discuss in
this meeting but can discuss separately.
Let me turn to the execution of the two lines of effort on
which DOD leads, which our personnel have been performing with
the excellence we all expect of the finest fighting force the
world has ever known.
American servicemembers and their coalition partners have
conducted over 5,000 airstrikes. That air campaign has produced
some clear tactical results: limiting ISIL's freedom of
movement, constraining its ability to reinforce its fighters,
and degrading its command and control. Coalition air support
has also enabled gains by local forces in Iraq and Syria,
including Syrian Kurdish and Arab forces who recently took the
key border town of Tal Abyad from ISIL, cut off one of its key
lines of communication and supply, and put ISIL on the
defensive and its stronghold Raqqah under pressure.
Those examples demonstrate again that where we have a
credible ground force, working in a coordinated way with the
coalition air campaign, ISIL has suffered. That is what makes
the third line of effort, developing the capacity and
capabilities of local forces, so important. Indeed, we know
from recent experience that success against ISIL requires
capable local ground forces. We know from our history in the
region that putting U.S. combat troops on the ground as a
substitute for local forces will not produce enduring results.
That is why we are bolstering Iraq's security forces and
building moderate, vetted Syrian opposition forces. But both of
these efforts need strengthening.
In Iraq, the Iraqi security forces were severely degraded
after four divisions dissolved and Mosul fell a year ago this
June. Our efforts to build partner capacity and advise and
assist ongoing operations involve around 3,550 American
personnel at 6 locations around the country. Their training
work has been slowed, however, by a lack of trainees. As of
June 30th, we have only received enough trainees to be able to
train about 8,800 Iraqi army soldiers and Peshmerga forces, in
addition to some 2,000 CTS personnel. Another 4,000 soldiers,
including 600 CTS personnel, are in training. I have told Iraqi
leaders that while the United States is open to supporting Iraq
more than we already are, we must also see a greater commitment
from all parts of the Iraqi Government.
We are also in the early stages of our train and equip
mission in Syria. 3 months into our program, training is
underway, and we are working to screen and vet almost 7,000
volunteers to ensure that they are committed to fighting ISIL,
pass a counterintelligence screening, and meet standards
prescribed by U.S. law regarding the law of armed conflict and
necessitated by operations. As of July 3rd, we are currently
training about 60 fighters. This number is much smaller than we
had hoped for at this point, partly because of the vetting
standards I just described.
But we know this program is essential. We need a partner on
the ground in Syria to assure ISIL's lasting defeat. As
training progresses, we are learning more about the opposition
groups and building important relationships, which increases
our ability to attract recruits and provides valuable
intelligence for counter-ISIL operations.
We are also working to equip vetted local forces. In Iraq,
after earlier delays, we are expediting delivery of essential
equipment and materiel to the Iraqi Security Forces and working
with the Government of Iraq to ensure this equipment is quickly
passed to Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni tribal forces. In Syria,
we will begin equipping forces as soon as they complete
training.
We are constantly assessing this approach. We did so after
the fall of Ramadi, continued through yesterday with President
Obama at the Pentagon. The strategy is the right one, but its
execution can and will be strengthened, especially on the
ground.
In Iraq, we are focused on increasing participation in and
throughput of our training facilities. An example of this is
our effort at Taqaddum, which has been noted, in Anbar
Province, where we recently deployed approximately 350 of the
additional 450 American personnel authorized.
We assessed our presence at this military base would
provide access to thousands of previously unreachable Sunni
tribesmen. This is in support of the Iraqi Government's own
initiative to increase outreach to the Anbar tribes. As of mid-
June, the Iraqi Government has enrolled and armed an initial
group of 800 Sunni fighters at Taqaddum, and we are supporting
the Iraqi training of 500 additional fighters now at Taqaddum.
The Iraqis have already identified 500 more trainees that will
follow the current group, and we will continue to work to
ensure that these Sunni fighters, which are critical to the
success of our campaign, have the training and equipment needed
to effectively fight ISIL. I should also note that the Anbar
operations center is located at Taqaddum, which is another
reason for that particular geography, so that we can advise and
assist the Iraqi commanders there commanding Sunni forces.
In Syria, we seek to capitalize on the recent successes in
Kobani and Tal Abyad and continue to strike ISIL's nerve center
in Raqqah. At the same time, we are looking for ways to
streamline our train and equip program's vetting process, which
I noted earlier, to get more recruits into the training
pipeline. We are also refining our curriculum, expanding our
outreach to the moderate opposition, and incorporating lessons
learned from the first training class. I am happy to speak
about that more.
In conclusion, I sought to describe to you clearly the
strategy, DOD's execution of its critical lines of effort, and
where our execution can and will and must be strengthened.
Achieving ISIL's lasting defeat will require continued
commitment, steady leadership from the United States and our
global coalition, hard work by our men and women in uniform,
essential complementary and synchronized efforts along the
other seven lines of effort and, most importantly, commitment
and sacrifice by Iraqis and Syrians. Together and with your
continuing support for the men and women of DOD, for which we
are ever grateful, we will achieve ISIL's lasting defeat.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:]
Prepared statement by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee:
thank you for the invitation and for the opportunity to speak with you
this morning.
As all of you know, there is high demand for American leadership in
the world--from Asia, where I saw some of you in May, to Europe, where
I was two weeks ago. The Obama Administration and the members of this
committee have helped ensure the United States meets that demand. Thank
you.
counter-isil lines of effort
The same is true in the Middle East, where we are standing by our
friends, like Israel, working to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon, and confronting ISIL, which is the subject of this hearing. It
was also the subject of a meeting yesterday at the Pentagon where
President Obama, Chairman Dempsey, and I discussed our counter-ISIL
campaign with senior defense and interagency leaders. We all agreed
that ISIL presents a grave threat. And that it must be--and will be--
dealt a lasting defeat.
That is our objective, which is shared by a global coalition that
reflects both the world-wide consensus on the need to counter ISIL and
the practical requirement for others to do their part. The
administration's strategy to achieve that objective--as the Joint
Chiefs' doctrinal definition of strategy puts it--integrates all our
nation's strengths and instruments of power. And it is executed through
nine, synchronized lines of effort.
The first, and arguably most, critical line of effort is the
political one, which is led by the State Department. This line involves
building more effective, inclusive, and multi-sectarian governance in
Iraq.
At the same time, the United States continues to work
diplomatically to bring about a political transition from Bashar al-
Assad to a more inclusive government with which we can also work to
defeat ISIL.
The next two lines of effort are interconnected--to deny ISIL safe
haven, and to build partner capacity in Iraq and Syria. Both are led by
DOD, which, alongside coalition partners, is conducting an air
campaign, advising and assisting Iraqi Security Forces on the ground,
and training and equipping vetted local forces in Iraq and for Syria.
Before I go on, let me say that these first three political and
military lines of effort must be in sync. That's a challenge, but one
that we are working through with our partners in the interagency, in
the coalition, and on the ground.
The fourth line of effort is enhancing intelligence collection on
ISIL, led by the National Counterterrorism Center. The fifth line of
effort, disrupting ISIL's finances, is co-led by Treasury and State.
Lines of effort six and seven, both co-led by State and the
National Counterterrorism Center, are to counter ISIL's messaging and
disrupt the flow of foreign fighters to and from ISIL, both of which
are critical in today's connected and networked world. The eighth line
of effort, providing humanitarian support to those affected by the
conflicts in Iraq and Syria, is led by State and USAID.
Finally, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the
Department of Justice are working together to protect the homeland--the
ninth line of effort--by disrupting terrorist threats. In addition to
our full-spectrum cooperative relationship with DHS and other law
enforcement agencies, DOD personnel continue to strike ISIL elements in
Iraq and Syria.
The effective execution of all nine of these lines of effort by the
United States and its coalition partners is necessary to ensure ISIL's
lasting defeat.
I want to briefly add that there are important classified
dimensions to our approach to ISIL and to the Middle East more broadly,
Mr. Chairman, that we won't be able to discuss in this setting.
execution of dod's lines of effort
Let me turn to the execution of the two lines of effort on which
DOD leads, which our personnel have been performing with the excellence
we all expect of the finest fighting force the world has ever known.
American service members, and their coalition partners, have
conducted over 5,000 airstrikes. That air campaign has produced some
clear tactical results: limiting ISIL's freedom of movement,
constraining its ability to reinforce its fighters, and degrading its
command and control. Coalition air support has also enabled gains by
local forces in Iraq and Syria, including Syrian Kurdish and Arab
forces, who recently took the key border town of Tal Abyad from ISIL,
cut one of its key lines of communication and supply, and put ISIL on
the defensive and its stronghold in Raqqah under pressure.
Those examples demonstrate, again, that where we have had a
credible ground force working in a coordinated way with the coalition
air campaign, ISIL has suffered. That is what makes the third line of
effort--developing the capacity and capabilities of local ground
forces--so important. Indeed, we know from recent experience that
success against ISIL requires capable local ground forces. And we know
from our history in the region that putting U.S. combat troops on the
ground as a substitute for local forces will not produce enduring
results.
That's why we're bolstering Iraq's security forces and building
moderate, vetted Syrian opposition forces. But both of these efforts
need strengthening.
In Iraq, the Iraqi security forces were severely degraded after
four divisions dissolved and Mosul fell a year ago this June. Our
efforts to build partner capacity and advise and assist ongoing
operations involve around 3,550 American personnel at six locations
around the country. Their training work has been slowed, however, by a
lack of trainees: as of June 30, we've only received enough trainees to
be able to train about 8,800 Iraqi Army soldiers and Peshmerga forces,
in addition to some 2,000 CTS personnel. Another 4,000 soldiers,
including 600 CTS personnel, were in training. I've told Iraqi leaders
that while the United States is open to supporting Iraq more than we
already are, we must see a greater commitment from all parts of the
Iraqi government.
We're also in the early stages of our train-and-equip mission in
Syria. Three months into our program, training is underway, and we are
working to screen and vet almost 7,000 volunteers to ensure they are
committed to fighting ISIL, pass a counterintelligence screening, and
meet standards prescribed by U.S. law and necessitated by operations.
As of July 3, we are currently training about 60 fighters. This number
is much smaller than we hoped for at this point, partly because of the
vetting standards I just described.
But we know this program is essential: we need a partner on the
ground in Syria to assure ISIL's lasting defeat. And, as training
progresses, we are learning more about the opposition groups and
building important relationships, which increases our ability to
attract recruits and provides valuable intelligence for counter-ISIL
operations.
We are also working to equip vetted local forces. In Iraq, after
earlier delays, we're expediting delivery of essential equipment and
materiel to the Iraqi Security Forces--and working with the Government
of Iraq to ensure this equipment is quickly passed to Kurdish Peshmerga
and Sunni tribal forces. In Syria, we will begin equipping forces as
they complete training.
strengthening execution
We are constantly assessing our approach--we did so after the fall
of Ramadi, and continued through yesterday with President Obama at the
Pentagon. The strategy is the right one, but its execution can and will
be strengthened . . . especially on the ground.
In Iraq, we're focused on increasing participation in and
throughput of our training facilities. An example of this is our effort
at Taqqadum in Anbar Province, where we recently deployed approximately
350 of the additional 450 American personnel authorized.
While not yet at full operating capacity, we assessed our presence
at this Iraqi military base would provide access to thousands of
previously unreachable Sunni tribesmen. This is in support of the Iraqi
government's own initiative to increase outreach to the Anbar tribes.
As of mid-June, the Iraqi government has enrolled and armed an initial
group of 800 Sunni fighters at Taqaddum, and we are supporting the
Iraqi training of 500 additional fighters now at Taqaddum. The Iraqis
have already identified 500 more trainees that will follow the current
group, so we are pleased with our early efforts. We will continue to
work to ensure that these Sunni fighters, which are critical to the
success of our campaign, have the training and equipment needed to
effectively fight ISIL.
In Syria, we seek to capitalize on recent successes in Kobane and
Tal Abyad and continue to strike ISIL's nerve center in Raqqah. At the
same time, we are looking for ways to streamline our train and equip
program's vetting process to get more recruits into the training
pipeline. We are also refining our curriculum, expanding our outreach
to the moderate opposition, and incorporating lessons learned from the
first training class.
conclusion
In conclusion, I have sought to describe to you clearly our
strategy, the Department of Defense's execution of its critical lines
of effort, and where our execution can--and will--be strengthened.
Achieving ISIL's lasting defeat will require continued commitment .
. . steady leadership--from the United States and our global coalition
. . . hard work by our men and women in uniform . . . essential
complementary and synchronized efforts along the other seven lines of
effort . . . and, most importantly, commitment and sacrifice by brave
Iraqis and Syrians. Together, and with your continuing support for the
men and women of the Department of Defense, for which we are ever
grateful, we will achieve ISIL's lasting defeat.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. General Dempsey?
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Reed and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity
to come back and to chat with you today about the military
component of our strategy against ISIL.
Our starting point has to be the strategic picture in
context. I have said before that the global security
environment is as uncertain as I have ever seen it. The world
is rapidly changing everywhere, and we are seeing significant
shifts in an already complex strategic landscape. ISIL is one
of many concerns. As the chairman mentioned, we are contending
with Russia's revanchism in eastern Europe, China's
assertiveness in the South China Sea, Iran's malign activities
in the Middle East, technical advancements by North Korea,
rising aggression of non-state networks, and a rapidly leveling
playing field in cyber and in space. While our potential
adversaries grow stronger, many of our allies are becoming
increasingly dependent on the United States and on our
assistance, and some of our comparative military advantages
have begun to erode. What makes this uniquely complicated is
that these trends are manifesting themselves simultaneously.
Within the Middle East, I characterize three converging
sets of complexity.
First, several governments are struggling for political
legitimacy because they are not sufficiently pluralistic or
they are not sufficiently accountable to their citizens.
Second, the centuries old Sunni/Shia struggle is very
evident. Weak states are less able to assert independence amid
the tug of war between sectarian regional powers.
Third, we are seeing rising competition between moderate
and radical elements of Islam, and ISIL and others are taking
advantage of that competition.
Within this evolving global context, the role the U.S.
military is taking against the trans-regional threat of ISIL is
appropriately matched to the complexity of the environment and
is at a level of effort that is sustainable over time.
Military power alone, as we have said, will not solve ISIL.
I do not think anyone here would disagree with that. All nine
lines of effort need to be considered in the aggregate. This
campaign focuses on actively reinforcing and hardening our
partners in the region who must and in most cases are taking
responsibility for their own security, and that is an important
point. Enduring stability cannot be imposed in the Middle East
from the outside in. The fight is enabled by the coalition, but
it must be owned by those regional stakeholders.
It bears repeating that this is the beginning of a complex,
nonlinear campaign that will require a sustained effort over an
extended period of time. We have to be just as agile as the
network of terrorists we face. We are constantly evaluating our
approach and making sure we are resourcing it appropriately,
balanced with our other global commitments.
But 4 years and counting of budget uncertainty have made
this balance distinctly harder.
Thank you and I welcome your questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, General.
Mr. Secretary, let me clear up a couple of points before we
get into the strategy. You have stated before you would
recommend a veto of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) to the President. Is that your position?
Secretary Carter. He restated his position yesterday, and I
support it. I am happy to give the reasons for that, if you
would like, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Sure, but you might answer also when you
answer, do you choose between fully funding the President's
defense budget request with Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) funding or funding defense at sequestration levels?
Secretary Carter. Well, the short answer is I am hoping we
can do better than that.
My view has not changed since I came up here a few months
ago on this issue. The chairman alluded to the problem. I very
much hope that a way will be found to come together and get
beyond the gridlock that we have and to give us a budget, a
normal budget process, that provides a stable runway for the
Department. I will explain why that is so important.
We have been going 1 year at a time budgetarily now for
several years straight, and it is extremely disruptive to the
operations of the Department. It is managerially inefficient
because we are doing this herky-jerky process. It is difficult
to have a multiyear national defense strategy, which we must
have, with a 1-year-at-a-time perspective. It is difficult to
run large programs, shipbuilding programs, aircraft programs
efficiently in a 1-year-at-a-time budget.
I also believe, Mr. Chairman, that our people deserve
better. That is, they need a horizon in front of them--our
military people and their families.
Last, I travel around the world, as you all do, and it is
embarrassing that we cannot in successive years now pull
ourselves together before an overall budget approach that
allows us to do what we need to do, which is we program in a
multiyear manner, not in a 1-year-at-a-time manner.
So for all those reasons, Mr. Chairman, I just appeal. It
is not something that I have any particular expertise in, and
it is obviously much bigger than defense because, as noted, the
success of this campaign and the success of our National
security hinges importantly, very importantly on this
Department, the Department that I lead, but also on law
enforcement and homeland security and diplomacy.
Chairman McCain. I understand.
Secretary Carter. So I am hoping, Mr. Chairman, that we can
do better than that choice and that we do not continue down
what I have called a road to nowhere.
Chairman McCain. Well, you may be presented with that
choice, and I would also add this is an authorizing bill. The
Appropriations Committee is where the money is.
But just very quickly, in your confirmation hearing, you
stated in response to my question about whether we should arm
the Ukrainians, quote, I am very much inclined in that
direction, Mr. Chairman, because I think we need to support the
Ukrainians in defending themselves. The nature of those arms I
cannot say right now. I have not confirmed with--but I am
inclined in the direction providing with arms, including to get
to what your question is, lethal arms. Do you still have that
position?
Secretary Carter. I have not changed my thinking in those
months, and I had the occasion to talk to the Ukrainian
Minister of Defense just the other week----
Chairman McCain. Fine. I am just asking whether you still
want to support them--arming them or not. That is a pretty
straightforward question.
Secretary Carter. We are considering that. We have not made
a decision in that regard.
Chairman McCain. Are you still----
Secretary Carter. We are providing----
Chairman McCain. Are you still inclined to providing arms
to the Ukrainians? Please, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Carter. Yes. I have not changed my view.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. That was it. That was a simple
answer to a simple question.
Secretary Carter. But if I can just----
Chairman McCain. No, because I have only got 2 minutes
left. Thank you.
Five thousand airstrikes have been conducted, 75 percent of
the airstrikes return without having dropped a weapon. If there
was ever a compelling argument for forward air controllers, it
seems to me that is the case.
You mentioned we are currently training about 60 fighters.
I got to tell you after 4 years, Mr. Secretary, that is not a
very impressive number. Is it true that with these people that
you are training and equipping to fight in Syria--is it true
that you are telling them they are only there to fight ISIS and
not Bashar Assad? Is that true?
Secretary Carter. Yes. We are telling them that we are
arming and training them in the first instance to go after ISIL
and not the Assad regime. That is our priority and these are
people who are inclined in that direction and come from areas
that have been overrun by ISIL----
Chairman McCain. So in other words, if they are barrel-
bombed by Bashar Assad, they are not----
Secretary Carter. I think we have some obligation to them
once they are inserted in the field.
Chairman McCain. Is that to defend them against barrel-
bombing?
Secretary Carter. Well, that decision will be made when we
introduce fighters into the field.
Chairman McCain. That is of small comfort to those people
you are recruiting right now that that decision will be made
later on. Is that fair to these young men to say we are sending
you in to fight ISIS only, and by the way, we will decide on
the policy whether to defend you if you are barrel-bombed?
Secretary Carter. They know that we will provide support to
them. Exactly what kind of support----
Chairman McCain. Does that mean you will defend them
against Bashar Assad's barrel-bombing? Mr. Secretary, this is
not a very pleasant exchange. I would like to have answers to
questions. Will we tell them that we will defend them against
Bashar Assad's barrel-bombing?
Secretary Carter. I think we have an obligation to help
them----
Chairman McCain. Will we tell them that?
Secretary Carter. We have not told them that.
Chairman McCain. You have not told them that. So you are
recruiting people and not telling them that they are going to
defend them because you have not made the decision yet. Yet,
you want to train them quickly and send them in.
Now, there is success on the part of an outfit called the
Army of Conquest, which is funded and trained and equipped
mostly by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and perhaps others. They are
succeeding. If there are battlefield games, they are achieving
them. Does the United States have any relationship with that
outfit? Because they are fighting against Bashar Assad as well
as ISIS.
Secretary Carter. I will have to get back to you on the
answer to that question because who has that contact is
something that we would have to discuss separately, Mr.
Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense does not maintain a relationship with the
Army of Conquest, which is an extremist-led alliance that includes
Ahrar al-Sham and the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusrah Front. The
Department is open to training a variety of Syrian oppositionist groups
as long as they meet United States vetting standards and are willing to
work within the Department's training, equipping, and support program,
consistent with Section 1209 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2015.
Chairman McCain. The answer is----
Secretary Carter. Can I go back----
Chairman McCain. Go ahead.
Secretary Carter. Can I go back, Mr. Chairman? You
mentioned the question of air sorties and which fraction of
them result in strikes, and I would like to explain those
numbers to you a bit.
In the case where the airstrikes are mounted--and I will
ask the Chairman to elaborate further on this. In the case
where the airstrikes are conducted in a deliberate manner, that
is, one knows at the time the aircraft embarks on the sortie
what the target will be--in those cases, 93 percent of the time
they are concluding the sortie.
When it comes to dynamic targeting, the fraction is much
lower. It is about 37 percent. The reason for that is that in
the case of dynamic targeting, by its nature the aircraft is
deployed with the expectation that a target of opportunity--let
us say something that is moving on the ground or a developing
tactical situation will provide the opportunity for a strike.
That does not happen all the time, but it does happen about 37
percent of the time, a fraction, I should note, that is much
higher than it was in Afghanistan where we did the same thing.
We routinely flew sorties in order to capitalize upon fleeting
opportunities or developing opportunities. So our experience
here is, in fact, better than it is in Afghanistan. But anyway,
that is what explains----
Chairman McCain. Any experienced pilot will tell you that
if you have a forward air controller on the ground to identify
those targets, then the number of targets hit is dramatically
increased. We have no forward air controllers on the ground,
and that, I can tell you, is incredibly frustrating to the
young pilots who are flying these 6\1/2\ hour sorties who feel
that they are not achieving anything, Mr. Secretary. You might
want to talk to them as well since they are the ones that are
doing the fighting.
Secretary Carter. If I can address the question of JTACS, I
think that is a fundamental one, Mr. Chairman, and since you
have raised it, let me go back to the fundamentals of the
strategy which are to support capable and motivated ground
forces while we fight when we find them. We are supporting such
capable and effective ground forces. For example, just to give
one example, the Kurds in northern Syria now.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Secretary, my time is way up. But that
has nothing to do with not having forward air controllers on
the ground. I hate to cut you short but we are 3 minutes----
Secretary Carter. I am just saying we do not rule that out
and our strategy does not----
Chairman McCain. You never rule it out. It has not
happened.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I was struck by your statement. You said
that the first and most critical line with our efforts is a
political one led by the State Department. In your colloquy
with the chairman, you pointed out that there are challenges
with respect to year-to-year OCO funding that is being
proposed. But State does not even have an option to that source
of funding.
So are you concerned that they might be so resource-
deprived under the Budget Control Act that they could not be
the primary--
Secretary Carter. I am. The State Department, the
Department of Homeland Security, other agencies that are
critical to protecting us against ISIL and other threats--they
need resources too. So that is another reason why I appeal for
an overall budget perspective. I realize it involves lots of
moving parts and would require a major coming together to
release the gridlock of the last few years, but I really appeal
for that not just for my own Department, but for the rest of
the national security establishment. I think it is critical.
Senator Reed. Shifting now to the training effort in Iraq,
one of the first issues was the composition of the provisional
forces that rallied a year ago to try to defend Baghdad. It is
overwhelming Shia. Now we are beginning to see Sunnis appear.
First, is that the deliberate cooperation of the government
in Baghdad? Are they finally getting the message that they have
to have the support of the Sunni community? Second, are you
beginning to see a trend that is a positive one in the sense of
the overall participation of Sunnis?
Secretary Carter. We see the commitment of Prime Minister
Abadi, so different from the behavior of his predecessor, to
engage in a multi-sectarian way in the fight against ISIL. That
includes the Kurds and it includes Sunnis. Now, that has gone
slowly, which explains why the numbers are small. We expect
them to grow. We hope they grow. But what we need from the
Iraqi Government is the enrollment of Sunnis in the Iraqi
Security Forces and the commitment of the Iraqi Government to
pay them, to equip them with our help which we provide.
Then to get back to the chairman's question about direct
support to them, when we have effective ground forces under the
control of the Iraqi Government, we are prepared to do more to
support them, but we need to have those effective ground forces
because local forces on the ground, we know from experience, is
the only way to create a lasting defeat of ISIL. That is what
the strategy is all about.
Senator Reed. General Dempsey, can you comment on your
perception of the situation in terms of Sunni forces in Anbar
Province particularly and the government in Baghdad's
relationship with them, expediting weapons, providing support
more than rhetorically but actually?
General Dempsey. I can, Senator. Thanks.
As the Secretary mentioned, the good intentions of Prime
Minister Abadi have not always been met with activity at
echelons or levels of bureaucracy beneath him. So there was a
period of time when, frankly, we had the capability to bring
them in but we could not generate the recruits. That situation
has improved I think probably as a result of their failure in
Ramadi, and what we see now is a renewed effort by the prime
minister to empower his ISF, his Iraqi Security Force, leaders
to reach out to the Sunni tribes and to arm them. It is our
policy to do that through the central government, not directly
because our objective is a unified Iraq. If it became clear
that that was not going to happen, we would have to reconsider
the campaign.
Senator Reed. One of the observations is the leadership at
the tactical level all the way up to brigade and division of
the Iraqi Security Forces continually seems to be unimpressive.
Are there active changes going on right now to ensure that the
leadership at the brigade/division level is competent? In fact,
it is just startling because it appears that ISIL--in fact,
there was some indication there were former Ba'athist officers
operating with them--are much more operationally and tactically
capable than the Iraqi Security Forces. Your comments.
General Dempsey. I do, sir. You know, we tend to look at
the tactical shifting and who owns how much territory and how
many airstrikes, for example. But we also need to watch Iraqi
leadership changes. Recently we received an open source report
that their chief of defense would be retired. We consider that
to be a very positive thing. There are issues up and down the
chain of command.
We also watch carefully the distribution of their budget,
how much money is going into the ministry of defense, how much
is going into the popular mobilization force, how oil is being
generated and the revenues shared. We watch the influence of
the ministry of defense, whether the ISF is the dominant force
for the Government of Iraq or whether that dominance is
shifting to the popular mobilization forces, the relationship
of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police, and we watch the
activities of the Shia militia. In every case, there are
positive indications, and in every case there are indications
that concern us.
Senator Reed. Quickly, Mr. Secretary, because there is just
a moment left. The issues come up about the training and
equipping of forces going into Syria--I would presume the
General might want to comment also--that part of the plan to
insert these forces would be to protect them as much as
possible from any type of response, to focus them on ISIL but
also to put them in places in the country where they would be
much less likely to be engaged. But if they were engaged, they
would not only have the right to defend themselves, but my
presumption would be we would assist them in defending
themselves from attack. Is that a fair estimate?
Secretary Carter. That is my feeling. That is what I said,
that I think we have an obligation to do so. You are right. I
do not expect that occasion to arise anytime soon.
To get to the chairman's point earlier, in the very first
vetting, the thing, Mr. Chairman, that made the numbers so
small--and I said the number is 60, and I can look out at your
faces and you have the same reaction I do, which is that that
is an awfully small number. Why is that number so small, this
in the first class? The reason for that has to do with the
criteria we apply--and some of this is the law--to these
recruits. We do counterintelligence screening. We make sure
that they, for example, are not going to pose a green on blue
threat to their trainers, that they do not have any history of
atrocities. These are all things that are required of us, and
that they are willing to engage in the campaign in a way that
is compliant with the law of armed conflict. All of this is the
legal and I would say principled--I am not arguing with it--
policies of the United States as far as those fighters are
concerned. That is why 60 of them got out the other end of the
process.
Now, General Nagata, who is doing the training--I indicated
he has got 7,000 more--expects that we will do better as we get
better, and that number 60, which is not impressive, will get
larger over time as he learns more, to get to the chairman's
earlier point, about the groups that are willing to cooperate
with us. But when we do get them, they will deserve our support
and we will give our support to them. It is going to take some
time, obviously, to get the numbers up to the point where they
can really have an effect.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Secretary Carter. I should point out, by the way, while we
are talking about fighting in Syria, while these numbers are
small, this particular train and equip--I just need to point
out that there are other capable ground forces fighting both
the regime and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
some of which we can support and do support with intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), airstrikes, and so
forth. I gave the example of the Syrian Kurds. But we would
like to see more, and we are trying to get better at training
them because the number 60, as you all recognize, is not an
impressive number.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, this is a tough job you have undertaken, but
as my wife reminds me when I complain, do not blame me. You
asked for the job. But I am not sure you asked for it. You were
asked to take the job.
But at any rate, Senator McCain's opening comment is
exceedingly important. It goes to the key of what we are here
for. The whole purpose of this hearing is how to confront and
stop ISIS and the Levant. So we want to talk about that, not
all these other strategies, General Dempsey, other threats
around the world. We need a strategy on this problem and I am
deeply disappointed. I do not see the confidence in your
testimony or General Dempsey's testimony. I believe we are
carrying out a strategy that the President has, and I do not
believe it has sufficient respect for the use of military force
necessary to be successful. I mean, I hate to be a critic about
this. This is important.
Senator McCain warned in 2011 we should not pull out all
our troops and we needed to remain engaged in that country. He
has also warned you if we do it in Afghanistan, the same thing
is liable to happen there, both of which would be tragedies of
monumental proportions considering how much we have invested,
the soldiers General Dempsey led in Iraq.
So I am not happy about this. I think ``delusion'' is a
word that is too accurate. So I just wanted to say that here at
the beginning. I hope we will get into more details about what
you plan to do to reverse this action. At some point, the
President is going to have to change his mind, it seems to me.
He cannot just function based on a campaign promise when the
reality is different.
Secretary Carter. Would you like me to address that? It is
a very fair question. Let me just go back to the issue of the
strategy, and then I will say something about Afghanistan.
The strategy for defeating ISIL on the ground in Syria and
Iraq is to train and then enable local forces. That takes some
time.
Senator Sessions. Well, I am aware of that. General Dempsey
was training the Iraqi forces 8 years ago. I visited him in
Iraq. That was his primary responsibility. We have been
training them for nearly a decade and that is not the problem
right now. I think the problem is confidence within the Iraqi
Government and the Iraqi soldiers that they are going to be
supported and that they are going to be victorious. If they had
that confidence, you would get more recruits.
Secretary Carter. I agree with that, and that is what was
lacking under Maliki. You are absolutely right.
Senator Sessions. Well, you just said the strategy--I
believe you used the word ``strategy''--is to support capable
and motivated ground forces where we find them. Well, I think
General Stewart a few months ago testified, the new Defense
Intelligence Agency head, who was there in the al Anbar region
and led the effort that the forces--when they turned it around
in Iraq. General Dempsey, you remember that effort. He said,
when pressed--I felt that he was reluctant because it was not
the administration policy. But he acknowledged that when you
have embedded soldiers, forward observers, the United States
forces embedded with troops moving out into combat situations,
that those Iraqi troops will perform better. Do you agree with
that, General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. I agree that there are points on the
battlefield where the presence of forward observers, JTACS,
embedded, SOF forces, would make them more capable.
Senator Sessions. So is our strategy now--does it remain
that we will not do that?
General Dempsey. I can tell you that I have not recommended
it. Whether we do it or not, I am telling you that I have not
recommended it, Senator. I can explain why, if you would like.
Senator Sessions. Well, I would like to know why.
General Dempsey. Okay. Let us take the issue of airpower
because it seems to be the most prominent one. At a similar
period in the Afghanistan conflict in 2012, the number of
aircraft that returned with their ordnance because there were
not targets available on the ground was 83 percent. It is 65
percent in Iraq right now.
The JTACS and the special force observers are not a silver
bullet to the destruction of ISIL. The silver bullet is getting
the Iraqis to fight.
Senator Sessions. Well, I totally agree with that. I just
believe that if we had a few forces, a thousand forces, in
Mosul, Mosul never would have fallen. So now our policy is to
try to take back this territory? What is the reluctance to use
our special forces here?
This is what bothers me. I understand the problem in Syria
and I am dubious about what we ought to do about Syria. I do
not know. We probably should not have involved ourselves in
Libya. But we committed our Nation in Iraq, General. We have
been deeply committed for over a decade there. So is it now our
policy that you are refusing to even allow special forces to be
embedded with, say, two special forces with 600 Iraqi troops in
a battalion? You are rejecting that idea?
General Dempsey. What I have recommended is that if we find
a unit which is led and is responsive and has an offensive
mission where we can enable them or increase their likelihood
of success, then I will make that recommendation. But to
restore or to put embedded advisors in on a habitual basis, the
environment is just not simply set to do that. By the way, it
is not reluctance. We have 1,600 pilots flying over Iraq and
Syria today. We have 3,500 boots-on-the-ground doing train,
advise, and assist.
Senator Sessions. So if we had a few advisors in the Iraqi
battalions, you are saying that that would not make a positive
impact on their morale and their capabilities to actually win?
General Dempsey. What I am saying, Senator, is that for a
brief, temporal tactical gain, we should wait until we see a
strategic opportunity to do that.
Senator Sessions. Well, I would think if we started having
some wins, ISIS would have fewer recruits and we would have
better morale with the Iraqi recruits too and they would fight
better. It is the chicken and egg perhaps, but I think it is
very important. I hope you will reevaluate that and recommend
to the President we do that because I think without that, we
are not going to be effective.
Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you for being here and the service to our
country. I appreciate it very much.
As you can tell, this is a pretty sensitive subject and it
is a very concerning subject to all of us.
As I go around the State of West Virginia, my little
State--it is a very hawkish State and a very patriotic State
and a lot of veterans--I speak to all of them. They are
confused right now. They really are and you heard the
frustration coming out.
But basically Iraq is not a united country. You have the
Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Kurds. I think, Secretary Carter,
you have said that until they have the will--and I think,
General Dempsey, you have said the same thing--until Iraq has
the will to fight. But which group has the will to fight to
defend the other group? That is what we are having a problem. I
think it has been said, well, if you have a group that is
fighting--and the Kurds want to fight--why do we still have to
make them go through the Baghdad centralized government in
order for them to get the weapons they need to defend
themselves and be aggressive? So they are confused about that.
They are confused about in Syria trying to spend the money
to find people to train, when you acknowledge that we only had
60 of them successful right now and the amount of effort we are
spending there. But yet, I think you said you had the Syrian
Kurds that were fighting and some things of that sort.
I do not know and then I am asked the question. They said
we continue to keep trying to train and arm the Iraqis, and it
seems like all they are doing is supplying ISIL with the
equipment that the Americans are giving them. When are we ever
going to stop giving equipment to the people that will not
defend it and fight for it?
So I guess talking at your level, are you talking to the
White House about rethinking the whole Iraqi position as far as
one centralized government, one Iraq, or maybe a separated
Iraq?
Secretary Carter. I think we are all aware that it is very
difficult to govern Iraq in a multi-sectarian manner. We
thought about all the alternatives to that. I think we all have
actually for years, and I am sure all of you have as well. We
are trying to assist Prime Minister Abadi in governing in a
different way from the way Maliki governed which, as Senator
Sessions noted, led to the disintegration of the Iraqi Security
Forces, the sectarian coloration of them, and that is what
ultimately led to their collapse in Sunni territory.
Senator Manchin. Secretary Carter, if I can ask this
question also along those lines. I have been asked the
question. You just reminded me. They said did we not see signs
that Maliki was incompetent, that he would have gone strictly
to a sectarian position, as he did, not for a strong, united
Iraq. With all the people we have had there, did we not see
that coming and could not have averted that from happening?
Secretary Carter. I can only speak for myself in that
regard. I was not closely involved in it at the time. I
certainly had that concern about Mr. Maliki, and I know that
many of you met with him. I met with him several times, and it
was quite apparent to me.
Now, Prime Minister Abadi says he has a different
intention, which is to govern Iraq from the center but in a
decentralized enough way that the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the
Shia each have enough space to carry on their own welfare in
the way that they wish, but there is a single, integral Iraqi
state. That is what he says he is working towards, and we are
supporting him in that regard. That is why, for example, when
we provide arms to the Kurds, we do it with the consent of the
Iraqi Government in order to indicate that we support the idea
of a single Iraqi Government in Baghdad but we also want the
Kurds in the fight and armed. That has not delayed our arming
of the Kurds.
Senator Manchin. It seems like the biggest problem we have
is with the Sunnis and the Shiites.
Secretary Carter. Then the Sunnis and the Shiites, and this
is why it is so important to take the time to train a truly
multi-sectarian Iraqi force. There are elements of the Iraqi
forces that have that right character, for example, their CTS.
So our strategy, just to go to the beginning, is to train
and equip those local forces. They are essential. Then we can
help them. It is a chicken and egg thing except that you need
to have the capable and motivated ground force. Then we can
enable it rather than to substitute for it, which does not lead
to a lasting result.
Senator Manchin. I would think, General Dempsey, it has
been pointed out here that we have spent multiple years, 10
years plus, a trillion dollars, lost a lot of lives in Iraq,
and we had 100,000 troops there at one time trying to train and
defend and get them motivated. That did not work. So that is
the hard question. I mean, how do you go home and answer that?
How do I go home and answer that we are going to try this over
again? Maybe we will do a better job of retraining. I think
that was the frustration you have seen coming out of Senator
Sessions.
General Dempsey. Well, sure, but I think it is probably
worth mentioning that my judgment about how this will evolve
over time is that it is a generational issue. It is trans-
regional, Senator. There are elements of it in Afghanistan. We
see it in Iraq and Syria. We see it in the Sinai. We see it in
Libya and we cannot just focus like a laser beam on one part of
it. There has to be pressure to cross it. So what we are trying
to do is achieve an enduring defeat, which means we have to
work it through partners because they have more to gain and
more to lose. Finally, we have to find a sustainable level of
effort since I do believe this is a generational challenge.
Senator Manchin. I just think that basically my question
would be, overall are we trying to defend the British lines
that were drawn 100 years ago and putting people in a territory
that they do not believe that that is their country? I mean,
why are we forcing something upon people that do not want to
accept it?
General Dempsey. I will just follow up with you. I also
share that concern, that the Mideast will never be the Mideast
again. So everything that I recommend to the Secretary and to
the President is recommended with the intention of being
flexible enough that we can build upon it if we do find that
inclusive national unity government in Iraq or not.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. I cannot help but mention the situation
was stabilized after the surge and we had won. We predicted if
everybody was pulled out, that the situation would descend into
chaos. It is a fact that thanks to General Petraeus and the
surge and great sacrifice, the Iraq war was won. To ignore that
in that conversation, General Dempsey, is to me intellectually
dishonest.
Senator Ayotte?
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, just for the record, President
George W. Bush signed an agreement with the Maliki Government
to withdraw all forces.
Chairman McCain. We will have this debate later on, but it
was clear that we could have and everybody knows they could
have and the people who were there know they could have.
Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank both of you for being here,
for your service to the country. We appreciate it.
I wanted to ask you, Secretary Carter. You had said in
answer to Senator Manchin that, in fact, the arms that we are
providing to the Kurds, we are doing so with the consent of the
Iraqi Central Government. Does that mean we are doing it
directly or are we going still through the Iraqi Central
Government?
Secretary Carter. First of all, we are not the only ones.
But we and others basically convey the weapons directly to the
Kurds, but we inform the Iraqi Government and get their formal
consent to it. So it does not delay the arming of the Kurds. We
are trying to stick up for basically the central government.
Senator Ayotte. Because previously we had heard complaints
about it originally going through the Iraqi Central Government
and then to the Kurds. So I am glad to hear that we are
directly providing it to the Kurds, letting the Iraqi Central
Government know what we are providing.
Secretary Carter. Mr. Barzhani was here in town. You may
have met with him a few weeks ago. He was grateful for what was
being provided, and he noted that the delays, which was the
principal problem that were experienced early on, are not being
experienced now either in the shipment of our equipment or that
of others, for example, the Germans providing anti-tank
munitions, which they value very much.
But we are trying to stick up for the principle that Iraq
is a single, unitary, multi-sectarian state, and difficult as
that may be, that is much preferred to the alternative, which
is the sectarian disintegration of Iraq.
Senator Ayotte. Let me follow up. So clearly the Kurds are
capable and motivated. At this point, are they receiving all of
the weapons that they have asked for? Because as I understood
it, ISIS unfortunately has captured some of the armaments that
we left in Iraq and some of them heavy armaments. The Kurds are
quite effective, but it is hard if you are out-armed. Are they
now receiving--what have they requested that we are not
providing? If so, why?
Secretary Carter. I will let Chairman Dempsey answer that.
Again, just to say it is not just us. I think there are
more than 12 nations overall arming the Kurds. I noted I was
with the German defense minister over in Germany last week, and
she was providing to the Kurds these critical anti-tank weapons
of a kind the Germans make that is especially effective. So it
is not just us. The Kurds are an example of what we are looking
for, which is an effective ground force that will stick up for
itself, hold together, take and hold territory. That is why we
are providing them with support.
Senator Ayotte. So we agree with that. I think that there
has been broad agreement on that, and so we just want to make
sure that they have what they need.
General Dempsey. Senator, I am not aware of anything that
they have asked for that we have not provided. We probably have
not provided in the quantity that they may have desired, MRAPs
for example, and we are working to address those quantity
issues.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to follow up on a different topic
because, General Dempsey, you mentioned in your testimony some
of the other challenges we face around the world, including the
malign influence of Iran. Recently--I read it today in the
press that, in fact, Iran was actually pushing for the lifting
of the arms embargo at the UN and also the resolution that bans
Iran from developing ballistic missiles. So I wanted to get
both of your thoughts on those two issues. As we look at Iran's
malign influence in the region, as far as I can tell, we still
see Iran not only supporting the Assad regime, Hezbollah, the
Huthi rebels, and also we have heard reports on the Taliban
undermining our interests. So your thoughts on those two
issues?
Secretary Carter. I will start, Marty, if it is okay.
You are right. I cannot speak to what is going on in the
negotiations. Secretary Kerry is conducting those negotiations.
But I agree with your perspective, namely that we have serious
concerns with Iranian malign activities outside of the nuclear
issue, which is the focus of those talks. It is in several
different locations around the region. Whatever happens as far
as an agreement over the nuclear program with respect to Iran
is concerned, I think we--and certainly I feel this--have a
clear duty in DOD, first of all, to defend our friends and
allies, keep a robust posture in the Gulf--our friends and
allies, to include especially Israel--maintain our robust
posture, and continue to maintain the military means to strike
Iran's nuclear program if we were ordered to do so. We work on
all three of those things, and we will work on them whether or
not an agreement is reached in Geneva.
Senator Ayotte. So just to be clear, Mr. Secretary, it does
not sound like, based on what you are saying, given their
malign activities in the region, that it would be a good idea
to lift the arms embargo right now on what Iran receives. Would
you agree with me on that?
Secretary Carter. No. We want them to continue to be
isolated as a military and limited in terms of the kind of
equipment and materiel they are able to get.
Senator Ayotte. Also, can you explain to us why is it
important that we also continue to stop them from having an
ICBM program? Because we know they have one.
Secretary Carter. Yes. Well, the reason that we want to
stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that the ``I'' in ICBM
stands for ``intercontinental,'' which means having the
capability to fly from Iran to the United States, and we do not
want that. That is why we oppose ICBMs.
Mr. Chairman, do you want to add anything on any of those
points?
General Dempsey. Just to answer your question because you
posed it to both of us. Under no circumstances should we
relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile
capabilities and arms trafficking.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I also just wanted to point out something, Secretary
Carter, when the chairman had asked you about the defense
authorization. One thing that I think needs to be pointed out,
the President has said he will veto it. The defense
authorization received 71 votes in the Senate. I would describe
that as very bipartisan. So it troubles me that he would seek
to veto something that received 71 votes.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
I just got back from Iraq with Senator Kaine, who led our
trip. One of the meetings we had was with a number of the Sunni
tribal leaders, and some of them were from the Haditha area. In
talking to them, they said, we have stood with you. We have
faith with you, but we have people who are now eating grass in
our town. We have no food. We have no supplies, and we have
been told the only airlifts that can come in would be on
military transport. Is there anything you can do to help feed
our people? So I wanted to put that before you to see if there
is something we can do to be of aid to these individuals.
Secretary Carter. I will say something about that and then
ask the chairman if he wants to add.
First of all, I want to thank you, Senator Donnelly, also
Senator Kaine, for traveling there. We appreciate it. On behalf
of the 3,550 members of our Armed Forces that are in Iraq and
conducting this fight, thank you for taking the time to go
visit them this Fourth of July weekend.
The humanitarian situation is yet another tragic
consequence of what has gone on in ISIL. It remains one of the
coalition's efforts, as I indicated in my opening statement, to
relieve the humanitarian situation. That is very difficult to
do when there is not order and control on the ground. So this
is why we need to get a security situation that is stable,
ground forces that are capable of seizing territory, holding
territory, and governing. That is the only way to get the
humanitarian situation turned around either in Iraq or in
Syria. It is very sad and it is tragic. In the case of Iraq, as
has been noted, something brought about by the reemergence of
sectarianism in a really tragic way.
Chairman, do you want to add anything?
General Dempsey. One of the reasons we went to Taqaddum Air
Base, also locally called Habineyeh, is to advise and assist in
the Anbar operations center, which is where these kind of
issues should actually migrate through. You should be
interested to know the Iraqis have the capability to address
that. They have C-130J, state-of-the-art----
Senator Donnelly. I know they do but they are not.
General Dempsey. Yes. Well, we will pass it to the guy who
is embedded.
Senator Donnelly. When you are hungry, your stomach does
not tell you want Iraqi food or United States food. You just
want help. One of the bonds created with these tribal leaders
is they said, we have always felt we could count on you.
To follow up on that, as we look at Ramadi and other areas
in the Iraqi armed forces, one of the great tragedies of this
whole thing was that the number of ISIS fighters in Ramadi was
extraordinarily insignificant in terms of the overall number,
but the Iraqi forces headed the other way. So I wanted to hear
your thoughts on making sure that the Iraqi forces know that
there is no back door anymore. There is only one way through
Ramadi and that is forward.
Secretary Carter. I will say something about that, and
then, Chairman, you may want to add.
The way you recount the fall of Ramadi is exactly correct.
Ramadi needs to be retaken, and the way to do it is to have a
force under the competent command and control of Iraqi Security
Forces commanders, which has been a challenge, and a plan and
the means to, as you say, make sure that they do not bog down
and they are able to take Ramadi and move through Ramadi. This
will be a test of the competence of the Iraqi Security Forces,
and it is a test that they must pass. Therefore, our and the
coalition's involvement is to try to train and equip and
support them to be successful, and we are going to take the
time and encourage them to take the time so that the operation,
when they do conduct it, is successful.
Senator Donnelly. One of the side spin-offs, when it is
successful and Ramadi is taken back, is that ISIS will then
look for a quick PR claim somewhere else. So I just want to
make sure that we are ready in surrounding towns and in
surrounding areas, that when Ramadi falls, we know they are
going to step somewhere else and that we have a plan in place
to protect those other towns as well.
General Dempsey. The Ramadi campaign which about a month
ago was about to be executed precipitously, actually with our
help, is now a very deliberate campaign, first to isolate it
and then to go back and recapture it with a supporting effort
in Fallujah. So our presence in the Anbar operations center is
allowing the Iraqi Security Forces to take a more deliberate
campaign approach and to avoid the very toothpaste aspect of
the way ISIL squirts around the battlefield when you squeeze it
in one place and it turns up in another. But this is very much
us helping them understand the threat and formulate a campaign
to address it so that they get credit for it and that they
become credible to the people of Al Anbar Province.
Senator Donnelly. Well, as I am sure you know, the Sunni
tribal leaders--they have a tremendous value for the
relationship they have established over the years with the
United States, established in blood and treasure. So what gives
them confidence more than anything is knowing that not that our
soldiers are in the front, not that our soldiers are in the
combat, but that we are there to help guide and help provide
advice and help provide a plan and help provide air cover is
the other thing that they talked to us about. They said, you
have no idea how our spirits soar when we see your air assets.
So they want to make sure that all of that is going to be in
place as we move forward. Then they are willing to buy in. If
not, they feel their families are exposed.
One last thing I wanted to ask you--I see my time is
running short--and that is in Syria. You do not have to answer
this. I will ask it on a second round. The question comes up so
when Assad goes, if Assad goes, how does the space get filled
with people who we think can be of help as opposed to Nusra or
ISIS? I know that is the tremendous challenge you have too. It
seems like we are getting further behind the curve as opposed
to in front of the curve on that question.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, thank you for appearing today,
for your testimony.
I would like to associate myself with the remarks that
Chairman McCain made earlier today about arming the Ukrainian
Government. He and I traveled there last month, as far as east
as we could go to Dnipopetrovsk. We saw very brave and skilled
soldiers. We saw them doing things like constructing unmanned
aerial vehicles out of Styrofoam to meet their needs. In
addition to the lethal aid they need, they also still need a
substantial amount of nonlethal aid. Some soldiers have the
improved first aid kits that our soldiers have been carrying
overseas. Some soldiers have first aid kits that look like they
came out of the prop scenes in MASH, in addition to radar
systems and radios and so forth.
But moving on to the Islamic State, one point that I do not
think has been discussed here today is the Islamic State in
Egypt. There have been a series of spectacular terrorist
attacks in the Sinai peninsula. The Islamic State takes credit
for those attacks. We still have the multinational force and
observers in the Sinai peninsula, almost 1,800 soldiers, 1,200
of which are American personnel.
Secretary Carter, General Dempsey, can you explain to us
what steps we have taken to ensure that our troops in the Sinai
peninsula are adequately protected and are working with the
Egyptian security forces to not just defend themselves, to try
to defeat the Islamic State in the Sinai peninsula?
Secretary Carter. Thank you. Let me address the Ukraine
part first, and then the Chairman can address Sinai.
First of all, thank you for going to Ukraine. I have been
there many times. The government there and the people there,
particularly in the western part of Ukraine--Vladimir Putin's
conduct there has had the opposite of whatever effect he
thought it might have in terms of attracting Ukraine in the
direction of Russia. He has strengthened the feeling among
Ukrainians, particularly in the western part of the country,
that they want to have a future that they determine, that is
not determined from outside.
To get to your point, we are constantly assessing--and this
gets back to the chairman's earlier point--the kind of
assistance that we provide to the Ukrainians. The principal
kind of assistance, however--I will come back to the military
part in a moment, but I cannot emphasize the importance of
economic assistance to Ukraine, and that is largely in the
hands of the Europeans and so also are the sanctions against
Russia. That is really the main event, and I cannot emphasize
enough the importance of that because that is mostly a matter
for the European Union (EU) rather than the United States. We
are less directly involved, but we certainly support the
European Union (EU) both in its sanctions against Russia, which
we share, but theirs are more important because their volume of
trade is greater, and also their efforts to strengthen the
Ukrainian Government and economy, support reform there and the
independence of Ukraine.
I did talk to, as I mentioned, the defense minister there
about what he needed, and his principal focus was on training.
So as I said, we will constantly reassess that, but we are
assessing that. I am open to what we do in the future. I have
indicated that. I continue to indicate that. But his emphasis
was on training, and we have trainers now in Yavoriv, which is
the principal training range there. That is much appreciated.
He was asking me and us for more of that kind of training. I
think we will continue to do that and to support the Ukrainian
military.
I should say that the defense minister of Ukraine used to
be the interior minister, which is a very good combination
because the Russian and separatist threat is a hybrid kind of
threat, hybrid in the sense that it is signified by the little
green men phenomenon, a combination of the exercise of malign
influence through sort of KGB-type tactics on the one hand and
battlefield operations on the other. He is somebody who really
understands that kind of hybrid warfare. That is really where
he wants our help.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I do not mean to
cut you off, but I do have other questions.
General Dempsey. On the MFO, about 9 months ago,
anticipating and watching the intel stream about the
radicalization of the Sinai and the fact that the Egyptian
armed forces had moved resources to their western border, we
actually did a joint staff integrated vulnerability assessment.
As a result of that, we introduced Blue Force Tracker raid
towers, changed movement techniques, enhanced their
communications, put in some counter-mortar radars, things that
you are very familiar with.
We also have been in touch with our Egyptian armed forces
colleagues. They have increased the number of Egyptian--they
have brought back Egyptian armed forces into the Sinai. They
accompany us on our movements when we make them. Of course, we
recently released some of the capabilities that have been
withheld from them so that they could address their terrorist
threat in the Sinai.
Senator Cotton. You are confident that American personnel
in the Sinai currently has adequate protection against
terrorist there?
General Dempsey. I am confident that they are adequately
protected today, but I fully expect that threat to increase. In
fact, I recently had a conversation with the Secretary about
the future of the MFO mission which really has not changed in
the last 50 years.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I would now like to move to the heart of the Middle East
and the Islamic State. For the record, I think the Islamic
State is a grave and growing threat. But until they develop
their own ballistic missile program and until they have
thousands of centrifuges and tons of uranium, I believe the
Islamic Republic will be a graver threat than the Islamic
State, that is, the Islamic Republic of Iran. My objections to
the course we have taken in the nuclear negotiations are well
known, and I will not repeat them here. But I will note that
Iran remains an anti-American, terror-sponsoring outlaw regime
that is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans
from Lebanon to Iraq, Afghanistan.
General Dempsey, you served three different tours in or
associated with Iraq. How many American soldiers died at the
hands of Iranian militias or explosively formed projectiles
during your command?
General Dempsey. Yes. I recently heard both the Chief of
Staff of the Army and the current U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) Commander put that number at about 500.
Senator Cotton. Hundreds of Americans died and probably
thousands were wounded or suspected of being wounded. What
should we say to their families, the families who lost soldiers
at the hands of Iranian militias or Iranian roadside bombs,
once we reach a deal that is going to give Iran tens of
billions of dollars in sanctions relief and international
legitimacy without them changing their behavior?
General Dempsey. I would tell you what I have told them, is
that solving the nuclear issue diplomatically is a positive
outcome. But make no mistake about it. There are at least five
other malign activities in which Iran is engaged that cause me
grave security concerns, and we will not take our eye off those
five. You know what they are: ballistic missiles, sea-based
mines, cyber activities, arms trafficking, and surrogates and
proxies.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, for being
here and for your commitment.
General Dempsey, you testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that--I quote--I would not recommend we put
United States forces in harm's way--where you were talking
about Iraq--simply to stiffen the spine of local forces. You
continued, if their spine is not stiffened by the threat of
ISIL on their way of life, nothing we do is going to stiffen
their spine.
So, General Dempsey, what is it going to take to stiffen
the spines of the local forces?
General Dempsey. Actually, Senator, what I said was that if
it takes us to stiffen their spine in the face of a threat that
is existential to them, then it does not seem to me that they
are going to be stiffened.
But I do think--you asked me what--the things that we are
doing--and I mentioned a few of them earlier about expanding
our network of points where we touch them, help them train, and
help them target, and help them understand how they integrate
with each other, army and police--I think those things have had
the effect of giving them greater confidence. I just made the
point that I do not think the added step of accompanying them
into combat would make a strategic difference except if we get
to the point where there is a major offensive that we think
could be increased in terms of its probability of success by
our presence.
Senator Hirono. So as far as you are concerned, we are
doing those--taking those steps that will enable them to be
able to fight for themselves because I agree with you that
there is no number of our troops that we can send there that
will result in a lasting kind of situation.
You also talked about your recent trip to Israel where you
discussed various scenarios involving Assad's departure. I do
not know whether Assad's departure is anywhere in the near
future, but let us assume that there is a departure. How would
his departure affect the dynamics of what happens in Syria?
Would ISIL step in to fill the power vacuum? How would Assad's
departure change our strategy regarding ISIL?
General Dempsey. So let me tell you about our military
planning efforts. our Israeli counterparts and our Jordanian
counterparts very much believe that the possibility of either
the regime collapsing or enclaving itself in Tardis, Latakia,
Homs, and Hama is possible. So they were very eager to have
consultations with us about what that would precipitate. Your
description of it is one that at least our regional partners
express, which is to say we do not want this to be a foot race,
if it occurs, between Al Nusra and ISIL and Ansara, all of
these other groups converging on Damascus.
I will not sit here today and tell you that I have the
answer to that, but I will tell you that we are in
consultations, even as I sit here, with the Turks, the
Israelis, and the Jordanians about that scenario.
Senator Hirono. So what you are doing is to prepare for
that possible eventuality and to ensure that these other groups
do not just step in and take over. But let us say that--well,
let me put it this way. If Assad departs, does that somehow
make our mission against ISIL simpler, easier to target? Is
that a way to think about it?
General Dempsey. I am on a roll. That is a subject of great
debate actually. The debate is framed somewhat this way. Is the
presence of Assad the catalyst for these issues, these radical
ideologies, and violent extremist organizations? Or did they
emanate somehow else and they simply use the presence of the
Assad regime as a recruiting tool? Depending on how you answer
that question will largely shape how you think about solving
the problems.
The situation militarily is such that what we are trying to
provide with partners is options, that is to say, we are trying
to form a network of partners, partners that we may not have
conceived before like the YPG, the Syrian Kurds in and around
Kobani and over to the east bank of the Euphrates River. We are
trying to provide options that will allow us to shape and to
react, depending on what the internal situation--how it
evolves, and we are working most closely with those who border
Syria who have, again, the most to gain and the most to lose.
Senator Hirono. Turning to the training that we are doing
with the moderate Syrian forces, we recognize that you are
having great difficulty while training not only the Syrians but
also in Iraq. You have described this as a generational
challenge. So while we are slowly training the local forces to
fight for themselves, what are some of the other things that we
need to be doing contemporaneously? Is it those nine action
items that need to be occurring at the same time as----
Secretary Carter. It is. For example, Senator, if I may, in
recognition of the fact that it is going to take some time to
build the forces that defeat ISIL in the territory of Syria and
Iraq, that is a fact. We are going to do that. I am sure we
will be successful at that, but it is going to take some time.
We need to defend ourselves in the meantime because there are
parts of ISIL that would like to attack us and our friends
around the world. That is where Homeland Security and the FBI
and the rest of our efforts to protect ourselves come in. So on
the one hand, we need to go to the territory where ISIL arose
and defeat it there, and we will do that. But at the same time
and in the meantime, we need to continue to defend our people
and our country against these guys. Some of them have the
ambition to go to Syria, train, and come back to the United
States. You see that already in Europe. We see some signs of
that in the United States.
That is why I was so laborious in describing the nine lines
of effort. The ones we are talking about that we have principal
responsibility are two of those nine. But the others really are
critical as well because, as Senator Cotton said a moment ago,
ISIL is a grave threat. These guys do want to do us harm and
our friends and allies in the region.
If I can say something about this. You asked about the
Assad regime and the Chairman answered that. Obviously, what we
would like to see occur is for Assad to leave the scene but for
the state of Syria not to disintegrate completely because we
know what is down that road: sectarian disintegration. Now,
that is a diplomatic task that is underway, as the Chairman
indicated, and that is the outcome that would be by far
preferable I think not only for the United States and our
National security interests, but for the people of Syria who
are suffering so terribly now. There are so many refugees and
it is really a tragic situation in the human sense. But Assad
needs to go, but the structures of governance need to stay or
we hope they will stay because we know what life is like
without structures of governance in the Middle East.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first of all, let me just say thank you for your
service to the country.
We find ourselves, as you have stated, in a very precarious
position in a number of areas. General Dempsey, as I sat here
and listened to your assessment of the world today from your
point of view, it was alarming to find at location after
location we find ourselves being challenged and we find
ourselves being pressured into positions that perhaps 10 years
ago we would not have found ourselves in, whether it be with
regard to the Pacific Rim areas or whether we find ourselves in
the Ukraine area and so forth. Our challenges are many. Yet, at
the same time, it does not appear that this has come in as a
surprise.
As you moved farther along and specifically into the area
that we had today, which was in terms of our challenges with
ISIL and defeating ISIL, it seems to me that we have found
ourselves once again in a position where there really were not
surprises. But I am just curious. The Secretary stated that in
Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces were severely degraded after
four divisions dissolved and Mosul fell a year ago this June.
The Secretary was not in his position at the time. You were,
sir. Was that a surprise to you?
General Dempsey. Well, they collapsed because of poor
governance and sectarianism. I was surprised at the rapidity of
it. I suppose I would suggest to you that the degree to which
the leadership had been changed out for all the wrong reasons
by the Maliki government were the conditions under which that
occurred.
Senator Rounds. If the four divisions that were lost
there--if they were there today, would four divisions--does
that make a difference between us moving forward with the
defeat of ISIS, or is that not the right number? What is the
right number that it is going to take in terms of boots on the
ground, not American boots on the ground, but literally allied
forces on the ground? What is the number that it takes in order
to move forward with whatever strategies are in place if there
are strategies in place? I am assuming that we will get into
that. What is the number that we want to see on the ground?
General Dempsey. The Commander of CENTCOM has testified
that to recapture Mosul eventually, he believes he will need
approximately nine brigades worth of security forces, six from
the Government of Iraq and three from the Kurdish region. That
would be for Mosul. Then, of course, restoration of the border,
which would be the ultimate step, restoration of their
sovereign territory defined as the border between Syria and
Iraq, that would be largely a Federal police or border issue,
and I am not aware that that number has been identified. But
the initial goal is to form or re-green, re-equip nine
brigades.
Senator Rounds. What is the timeframe that that can be
accomplished in?
General Dempsey. Putting a temporal dimension on this is
risky at best. Because the campaign is dependent on a coalition
and it is dependent on the network of actors that include the
Sunni tribes, the Iraqi Security Forces themselves, the
counter-terrorist service, and the Kurds, the act of describing
when those groups could all come together to establish the
conditions to do this is just difficult to pin down. Even if I
knew the answer to that question, I would be loathe to report
it to you in an open hearing. But I have said from the
beginning that it was probably a 3-year effort to restore
sovereignty to Iraq, and we are 8 months into that.
Senator Rounds. General, we pride ourselves and then we
point out the fact that we truly do have the greatest fighting
force the world has ever seen. Yet, right now we find
ourselves, as the President stated some time ago--he called
ISIS the Jayvee team. Clearly that is not the position that I
think the administration would take today. We have identified
that they are clearly a threat.
We have identified a nine-point plan here, Mr. Secretary,
in which you have identified all of the things that have to
happen, including the defense of our country from these
individuals. At what point during this 3-year timeframe--or
what is the possibility during this 3-year timeframe that the
patience that you have shown, General, and that the Secretary
has alluded to here to build this up--what is the probability
that this timeframe gets away from us? Are we in the position
to make this thing last for 3 years without literally upping on
our own point in order to defend ourselves? At what point does
it look like we are going to have to amp this thing up using
our own resources to a greater degree than what we have today?
General Dempsey. I said 3 years for Iraq, and I have also
described ISIL in general as a generational problem because of
its allure in, notably, the Sunni sect of Islam. Look, we just
have to have a Sunni partner in order to address this challenge
of ISIL. So although I have said 3 years for Iraq, it is more
like a generation, which I suppose is loosely defined as 20
years, to address the violent extremist allure of ISIL in the
Sunni world, and that allure will only be stripped away when
someone actually takes care of them and governs them.
But to your question, are there points at which we should
and would consider the introduction of additional U.S. military
combat capabilities? The answer is yes. I think you have seen
us do that in the raid that we conducted into Syria to capture
and kill the group affiliated with Abu Sayyaf, the financial
network of ISIL. I think that we are always on the alert or
always on the lookout for those opportunities and can use our
capabilities as necessary to deal with those.
Senator Rounds. You feel that you are in a politically
appropriate position and that you would have the backing to
step in when needed to take care of the problem when the time
is right?
General Dempsey. I cannot answer what answer I would
receive. I have the confidence that my recommendation would be
accepted and debated in the context of everything else we are
doing.
General Dempsey. Let me out here if I may, Senator. I think
that part of our strategy is to look for opportunities to do
more in the sense of creating capable ground forces that we can
support. So we kind of welcome those opportunities. We are
taking those opportunities in the case of Syria. So I do not
want to speak for the Chairman, but in terms of is the
opportunity to do more in that sense, not as a substitute for
local people, but as a way of enabling them and assisting them,
that really is the strategy. So I think we welcome those
opportunities when we find them. We are trying to create those
opportunities in the Sunni areas, as was noted earlier. We are
taking some opportunities in the Kurdish area, and we hope that
we have more, including in Syria.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but I
would make one comment, and that is it appears to me that if
our strategy is waiting on other people to get their stuff in
order, it does not seem to be as practical as taking advantage
of and literally going out and proactively taking care of the
problem, if need be. We have the greatest fighting force in the
world, and the last thing in the world I want to see is to have
them engage boots-on-the-ground. But if it means boots on the
ground or additional folks there fighting there, as opposed to
having a successful attack on this Homeland, then I think we
all agree on what we ought to be doing. I just hope that the
strategy includes that as a possibility.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Secretary, Chairman, welcome to you both.
Thank you very much for your service.
Let me start by saying that surge or no surge, I think it
is pretty clear, at least to my constituents, that the Iraq war
remains one of the greatest United States foreign policy
mistakes of the last century and one that I hope we have
learned a few lessons from.
I want to follow up, Secretary, on what Senator Hirono
raised. One lesson that I believe we should have learned by now
is that eliminating one terrible Middle Eastern dictator can
too often lead to even more brutal influences filling the
leadership vacuum. We have seen that play out too many times.
We have seen it to some extent in both Iraq and Libya.
Should we be concerned that Syria post-Assad reality could
create a vacuum that ISIL is in a far better position to fill
than any of the other regional forces? I think we should be
almost as concerned with forces like Al-Nusra Front. If Assad
does fall, should we not have more than discussions on the
table? Should we not have a plan to make sure that some amount
of governance remains particularly in Damascus?
Secretary Carter. Well, yes, we should and we do. That is
our strategy with respect to the political transition. Now, for
reasons that are easy to understand, our influence with Bashar
Assad--ours, that is, United States influence--is not great. So
we are trying to influence those who would influence him to
remove himself from the Government of Damascus while keeping
intact the structures of governance for the very reason you
adduce, which is we know what happens in these Middle Eastern
countries when the structures of government disintegrate. We
would like to not see that happen in Syria, even though we know
that the persistence of Assad at the helm in Damascus is in
fact a fuel for ISIS and others who are fighting him. So he
needs to go to remove that fuel, but we do not want to see the
structures of governance go at the same time. That is the
challenge, but that is what we are trying to achieve.
Senator Heinrich. Well, I think that is certainly the right
goal. I just want to make sure we are prepared for that because
we have sort of missed that ball in the past. Syria is an
enormous country, and if we saw Damascus lose its governance
capability, the implications for the entire region and the
world would be enormous.
Secretary Carter, as you mentioned as well, to be
successful on the ground against ISIL, the fight needs to be
led by local capable ground forces. I do not think we should
give in to impatience. These should not be Western forces.
These should not be American forces. We have certainly heard
that from our partners in places like Jordan. This means that
we have to place a great deal of emphasis on training motivated
and reliable partners, and you have gone a little bit over the
small number of Iraqi Security Forces recruited, what some of
those challenges are, the bottleneck related to the vetting
process.
But are there other factors that you would attribute for
the lack of trainees? I guess one of the questions I have
related to that is what steps, in addition to the steps that
you are taking, is the Iraqi Government taking to address the
shortfall in order to meet those kind of training targets we
would like to see?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator.
I think in Iraq the principal limiting factor on Sunni
trainees, which is one of our focuses, has been their belief
that the government in Baghdad was not fully supportive of
them. That is the challenge before Prime Minister Abadi. He
says he wants to do that, and that is critical because only
Sunnis can take back Anbar. Only Sunnis can govern Anbar when
it is all over. So if we are going to wrest Anbar from the
likes of ISIL, which we must do, we must have Sunnis on our
side. So Abadi is saying all the right things. As the chairman
noted, we are trying to support him in doing all the right
things.
Senator Heinrich. Mr. Secretary, I agree with you
wholeheartedly in your analysis. I guess my concern is, is
Abadi doing enough to begin to generate confidence in the Sunni
population in that region?
Secretary Carter. I think he is doing everything he
personally can. I think he is challenged in Baghdad by others
who would have it the old way, the sectarian way. So he is not
able to make everything happen when and as he said. We have had
some delays and some frustration as a result of that. I think
things are getting better. We are getting more trainees. It was
noted earlier that there is some confidence among Sunni tribes
that we will help them train, equip them, support them, and get
them back in the fight, and that there is a future for them not
even withstanding the difficulties of multi-sectarian
governance in Iraq. That is the path we are on.
In the meantime, just to get back to something that Senator
Rounds said, I think--and I said this before. I just want to
restate it--we need to take action to defend ourselves against
ISIL not just in Iraq and Syria but elsewhere, particularly
foreign fighters, even as we defeat them in the place from
which they arose. They have metastasized now. They aspire to be
a global network. We have to fight them where they are, and we
cannot wait for that. We need to do that, and by the way, we do
that every day, even this past weekend.
Senator Heinrich. Secretary, I want to leave you with one
last question. It is a very general one. You may have seen the
``Politico'' article from a couple of days ago that examined
what it called the Daesh effect, and it is sort of a modern
example of the ancient proverb that the enemy of my enemy is my
friend. Whether it is Hamas or Al Nusra or Iran, there are a
number of entities that may be enemies of the United States,
certainly enemies of our allies, that currently share the same
opposition to ISIL, or Daesh. What are your thoughts on that
observation generally, and would you not agree that it is that
reality that is part of the reason why this is such a
complicated nut to crack?
Secretary Carter. It is a reason why it is complicated.
Again, sectarianism is what brought us to this point. So we are
willing to and we are and have supported elements of the Iraqi
Security Forces that have a very large Shia composition to
them, but if and only if they are under the direction and
control of the Government of Iraq. There are Shia forces in
Iraq that are not under the direction and control, and we will
not support them because that is sectarianism. That is
sectarian civil war. We know it leads down that road, and we
are trying to stop Iraq from going down that road.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Secretary and Chairman, for being with us today.
I appreciate your efforts in this area.
Secretary Carter, I would like to start with you because
right now I am very confused. You had stated earlier and then
you affirmed to Senator Ayotte that we are directly arming the
Kurds in consultation with the Iraqi Government. Would you
state that again, please, sir?
Secretary Carter. Yes. You are using the word ``directly,''
and she used the word ``directly'' and I did too. But let me
just be clear about that, which is that we do it in a way that
does not delay the shipments and does not narrow down the
shipments at all but is by, through, and with the Government of
Iraq. We are sticking with that principle not because we do not
want to help the Kurds and we do not want to help them in a
timely way, but because we also want to stick up for the
principle of multi-sectarianism. So that is the reason. But we
are insistent that it not lead to delays.
As I said, I spoke to Mr. Barzhani when he was over here
and I made sure that he is getting the right kind of equipment
not just from us but the Germans and all the others who are
arming him in a timely manner. They are getting that equipment
and they are performing extremely well with it.
Let me see if the Chair wants to add anything about the
method of arming.
Senator Ernst. So we are arming the Kurds. It is not being
delayed. I know that was stated earlier that there are no
significant delays because I do want to emphasize that over the
last several months, a number of my colleagues and I have been
working on legislation to directly arm the Kurds in
consultation with the Iraqi Government.
I know that you and Secretary Kerry also had very strongly
worded letters to the chairman of this committee emphasizing
that we should not be directly arming the Kurds in consultation
with the Iraqi Government because there were no delays. Yet,
the President now has come out and said that we will be arming
them in an expedited manner. Well, if there were no delays, I
do not understand why now we need an additional several hundred
members of our armed services on the ground in Iraq and that we
are expediting the process. If there were no delays, we do not
need to be expediting the process.
So I just needed to clarify that because it was stated a
number of times that we were directly arming the Kurds, which
Secretary Kerry had said last year he does not have the
authority, the President does not have the authority to do. I
still believe we need to be directly arming them in
consultation with the Iraqi Government.
Following the fall of Ramadi, General Dempsey, you stated
that if the Kurds fail to take measures to be more inclusive
with Sunnis, Kurds, or other groups, U.S. support for the
central government could be curtailed. Sir, considering the
fall of the most western part of Iraq to ISIS, that did not
trigger a decision point on the part of the Iraqi Government
and its commitment to Iraq. I am just not sure what else the
Iraqi Government needs to fail at before the administration
changes its strategy and how we support our willing partners in
Iraq, the Kurdish Peshmerga. They are willing partners and I
think we need to do more for them.
We cannot defeat ISIS in Iraq by continuing to beg, hope,
and pray that the sectarian Iraqi Government, which is still
overshadowed--we have heard it a number of times--by previous
Prime Minister Maliki and Iran. We do not think they would
vigorously defend the Iraqi people equally. I do not believe
they will.
But we have talked also about being more inclusive. That
was mentioned again. ``More inclusive.'' I hear this time and
time again. But I would like a definition of what does ``more
inclusive'' look like and how do we measure ``more inclusive.''
Gentlemen, if you would address that please.
Secretary Carter. I would begin by noting the words of
Prime Minister Abadi when he was here. I think he used the word
``decentralized'' Iraq, and that is one in which there is a
central government in Baghdad and an integral state of Iraq,
but there is substantial opportunity for self-determination
around the country among Sunnis, among Shias, and among Kurds.
It seems to me that is a wise way of approaching what multi-
sectarianism means. I think a government in Baghdad that allows
the different parties there a degree of self-determination to
maintain security within their own territory and to govern
themselves, share in things like the oil wealth in the country
and so forth, that is what he says he is for, and that is the
way he described it when he was here in Washington to all of
that.
That is in my judgment certainly better than the
alternative, which is sectarian disintegration, which could
still occur in Iraq. But I think we all, looking into that
abyss, know what resides there. It is further violence for the
citizens of Iraq and further opportunity for groups like ISIL
that are not preoccupied with the long-term welfare of the
territories they occupy. They want to use them for further
violence.
So that is Prime Minister Abadi's definition, and I think
we are trying support him in his aspiration to make good on
that definition.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
General, anything to add there?
General Dempsey. Just militarily what we will be watching
for in terms of the intentions of the Government of Iraq and
its control over groups that are not directly responsive to the
Ministry of Defense is whether there is retribution, whether
they allow--it was Tikrit I was speaking about I think,
Senator. As these families come back to Tikrit after it was
recaptured, I think we are watching and it is worth watching on
whether they are able to return to their homes or not. I think
the same will be true once Ramadi is recaptured, and we will
probably be watching how the campaign in Fallujah unfolds to
ensure that the popular mobilization forces propagate a
campaign that is not characterized by retribution and dramatic
collateral damage. Those are all things to watch carefully.
Senator Ernst. I think we have willing partners there. I
think we need to assist those willing partners.
One further comment, too, just very briefly. You had stated
you have not seen a request list from the Kurds on the type of
equipment and arms that they need. Is that correct?
Secretary Carter. No. I have seen such requests. We have
honored such requests. We have shipped a lot of equipment. I
should once again repeat. It is not just the United States.
There are a number of countries that are equipping the Kurds,
and in some cases, they prefer the equipment of other
countries, for example, German anti-tank weapons. That is
absolutely fine with us, and the Germans are providing those.
Senator Ernst. That is one thing I know that President
Barzhani had also presented to us during his visit with the
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I just wanted
to make sure that we were clear on that and that they have
provided a list of equipment.
Secretary Carter. They did. We discussed exactly the same
list, and I have discussed it with others, for example, the
German defense minister. I mentioned, when I was in Germany a
couple of weeks ago, her commitment to do exactly the same, and
they have done a great job of equipping the Kurds. That is an
example of a competent ground force that also governs within
the territory that it controls, and that is really what we are
looking for in that entire region. It is going to be hard to
get but that is what we are looking for.
Senator Ernst. Well, they are there and I know they are
willing.
So thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses today.
I have a number of questions and concerns about the ongoing
mission against ISIL which I will address, but I have to begin
by just saying my concerns about the administration's strategy
pale--pale--next to my concerns about Congress and what
Congress is doing.
What Congress is supposed to do is to provide a budget to
you to defend the Nation and win this battle, and Congress is
supposed to authorize a war that is now 11 months in. We have
not done either. We are not giving you a budget. We are using a
gimmick, and whether the gimmick is the gimmicks of the past,
continuing resolutions, or the current gimmick du jour, which
is a use of non-recurring OCO funding, we are not giving you
the budget. We are not doing it because--let us just be blunt--
Congress to this point has decided that the budget caps enacted
in August 2011 is a higher national priority than defeating
ISIL. As long as we view that as a higher national priority
than defeating ISIL, we are not going to give you the budget
that you need.
It is my hope, as you testified, Secretary Carter, that we
will find a better path, something like a Murray-Ryan budget
deal. I know the chair has been significant in speaking out for
this as well. But we are not doing what we ought to be doing on
the budget side.
We are also not doing what we ought to be doing under
Article 1, Section 8, which is declaring war. Tomorrow is the
11-month anniversary of the initiation of the bombing campaign
in Sinjar and Irbil. We have spent $3 billion. We have 3,500
people deployed away from their families risking their lives.
Aside from a single vote in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in December, there has not been House committee
action or floor debate of any significance. There has not been
any meaningful debate on the Senate floor about whether or not
we should be engaged in this war, even though three-quarters of
the Members of Congress, by my estimation, believe that there
should be U.S. military action against ISIL with some
differences in detail. But we do not want to have a debate and
vote because we do not want to put our names on it. We do not
want to be held accountable for a vote.
So we can criticize all we want, and I will get into some
criticisms. But bottom line, Congress is not doing either of
the two things we are uniquely supposed to do: provide your
budget to win and authorize war. I think we can make our
criticisms have a much greater legitimacy if as an institution
we would do what we are supposed to do.
I just returned from the region, and just some quick
summaries. Senator Donnelly mentioned it. We are achieving some
significant successes against ISIL in some parts of the
battlefield in Iraq and Syria largely in the areas where we are
relying on partners with the Kurds, the KRG regional government
in Iraq and then Kurds in the north of Syria.
President Barzhani. We met him on Sunday in Irbil. I guess
two Sundays ago. He said this, and this is very important,
especially for any who would say the United States does not
have a strategy. He said thank you to the United States of
America. If the President had not started a bombing campaign on
August 8th near Irbil, we might not be here today. That bombing
campaign likely helped save the existence of the KRG, which has
been a good partner. They lead with that. They do not lead with
we are not getting weapons. They do not lead with we do not
like working with Baghdad. They lead with thank you to the
United States for helping save us, save our region, save our
way of life. That is important for us to acknowledge because
that was not by accident. That is a strategy. We helped save an
important ally by acting, the President acting when he did.
There are challenges too. The Iraqi unification challenge
was very patent as we met with Prime Minister Abadi. There are
mixed reviews. Positive on the intent but mixed on the follow-
through. In the Sunni area in particular, a lot of criticism.
Some support the Anbar governor, supports what Prime Minister
Abadi is doing but a lot of the tribal leaders do not, and a
lot of the tribal leaders do not think we are doing what we can
do. When they look at what we are doing with the Kurds and they
compare with what we are not doing with them, it sticks in
their craw.
Finally, the challenges in Syria are significant.
Let me ask you this question. Today, front page article in
the ``Washington Post'' dealing with the routing of ISIL in
northern Syria. Quote: The unexpected route of Islamic State
forces across a wide arc of territory in the northeastern Syria
heartland has exposed vulnerabilities in the ranks of the
militants and also the limits of the United States-led strategy
devised to confront them. Islamic State fighters had been
driven out of a third of their flagship province of Raqqah in
recent weeks by a Kurdish-led force that has emerged as one of
the most effective American partners in the war. The offensive,
backed by United States airstrikes, has deprived the militants
of control of their most important border crossing with Turkey
and forced them onto the defensive in their self-proclaimed
capital of Raqqah City, something that would have been
unthinkable as recently as a month ago. That is what is
happening right now.
But every success has a challenge, and there is a worm in
this apple and the worm is this. As we have succeeded in our
partnership with the Kurds in northern Syria, it has caused
grave concern by the Turkish Government. It has caused grave
concern by a number of the other Sunni forces in Syria that we
are partnering with. How do we continue to manage the Kurds to
be successful in the battle against ISIL and partner with them
to be successful without causing additional undue challenges in
our effort to also help Sunnis be successful against ISIL?
Secretary Carter. Thank you. By the way, thank you once
again for traveling there. I know it is much appreciated.
Let me start with the Turks. Turkey has a long common
border with both Syria and Iraq, which has remained
disturbingly permeable to foreign fighters and to resupply
throughout the course of this conflict. We have some people
actually talking to the Turks just today, as the Chairman
alluded to a while ago, in order to try to get the Turks to up
their game. They are a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) ally. They have a strong stake in things, in stability
to their south. I believe they could do more along the border.
In the meantime, it is true. The Kurds are acting and
because the Kurds are capable of acting, we are supporting
them. That is successful and it does threaten Raqqah.
I think the tension with respect to the Sunnis is best
managed in the way that we are hoping Prime Minister Abadi will
manage it, namely by letting them each succeed within their own
territory, defeat ISIL, and have substantial--his word is
``decentralization'' of governance in Iraq that allows them a
substantial opportunity to determine their own destiny within
the territory that they control. That is what multi-
sectarianism in Iraq would mean. As you indicated, it is a lot
tougher in Syria, but that is the objective that we have, to
have Sunnis--I would like to see the Sunni tribal leaders that
you met with be as successful as the Kurds are. We would
welcome that. That is what we are trying to stimulate in al
Taqaddum and so forth, and we are willing to do more, as the
Chairman indicated and I indicated, when we have a capable
ground force that we can support the way we did support over
the weekend the Kurds in the north with air power.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
also want to just agree with a line of your questioning
earlier. I think it would be absolutely foolish for us to not
clarify the rules of engagement for the Syrian trained folks
inserted back in the field to make clear that the United States
will support them if they come under attack by the Assad
regime. For them to go back in without a guarantee on that
score, we would lose all credibility if we do not provide that.
I just would encourage the administration to clarify that
aspect of the rules of engagement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, Senator. I have been asking
that question for a long time, and I keep getting the answer,
well, we have not made that policy decision. It is shameful--
shameful--to send people in and not assure them that we will
defend them against attacks by barrel bombs.
Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you.
To build on what we were just talking about, do we have the
legal authority to assist the Free Syrian Army that we train
against Assad? Is there a doubt about that?
Secretary Carter. I am not sure about the legalities of it,
Senator, to be quite honest.
Senator Graham. Let us just put it this way. If there is
any doubt about whether or not we have the legal authority to
protect the troops we train against Assad, please let the
committee know. You do not have to answer right now, but that
is a big decision. If there is a lack of legal authority, I
want to know why and what can we do to fix it.
Secretary Carter. I appreciate it, and I will take that
back. I appreciate that thought.
[The information referred to follows:]
Although we would have to evaluate the facts and circumstances
present at the time, we have concluded that we have sufficient legal
authority to provide combat support to Syrian fighters that DOD has
vetted, or vetted and trained, who come under attack by Syrian
government forces, consistent with the right of United States self-
defense, if the United States action is necessary to effectively
address the threat posed by ISIL to the United States and Iraq and
meets the international law requirements of necessity and
proportionality.
Senator Graham. General Dempsey, thank you for decades of
service. I really appreciate that.
General Dempsey, would you agree that there are more
terrorist organizations with more safe havens, with more
weapons, with more capability, with more men to strike the
homeland than any time since September 11?
General Dempsey. Thank you for your service. I know you
retired recently.
Yes.
Senator Graham. Do you believe that ISIL is expanding in
other countries as we speak?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator Graham. When it comes to Iraq, do you both agree
that partitioning Iraq into three separate countries is
probably not a viable strategy?
Secretary Carter. I certainly agree with that, yes.
Senator Graham. Do you agree that the Sunni world would
object to giving the southern part of Iraq to Iran? That is
what would happen--right--if we partitioned the south. Do you
all agree with that?
Secretary Carter. That sounds like sectarianism to me, and
we know what lies down that road.
Senator Graham. An independent Kurdistan is going to create
a lot of upheaval with Turkey and the region at large. Do you
agree with that? A separate, independent state.
Secretary Carter. For the Turks, a separate, independent
state would be very problematic, and within Iraq, I think a
substantial autonomy within a decentralized but integral Iraq
is still possible. That is what Abadi is trying to do.
Senator Graham. I agree. Do you agree with that, General?
General Dempsey. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. So partitioning I think is not a viable
strategy.
As to the Kurds, do you either one of you believe that the
Kurds have the ability, will to go into liberate Ramadi?
Secretary Carter. I will start that. I think they may have
the ability, and we are, obviously, trying to facilitate their
movement south. Whether they have the will is another matter.
The only reason that I say that is that they are getting, at
that point, to the edge of the territory that is Kurdish.
Senator Graham. That is my point. For anybody to suggest
that the Kurds are the answer to all of our problems, they do
not, quite frankly, know the Mideast. I mean, the Kurds are not
going to liberate Syria. Do you all agree with that? They will
be part of the component, but they are not going to be the
liberating force.
Secretary Carter. Right, part of the component, absolutely.
Senator Graham. As to Assad, what is more likely? President
Obama leaves office in 2017 or Assad goes first?
Secretary Carter. Well, it is certain that President Obama
will leave office.
Senator Graham. No, I know that.
Secretary Carter. So that is an easy question. But turning
to whether Assad will be in power then----
Senator Graham. Who leaves first? Obama or Assad?
Secretary Carter. Well, I certainly hope it is Assad.
Senator Graham. Yes, I do but I do not think so.
So the bottom line, if Assad stays in power, do you worry
about Jordan and Lebanon being a victim of the war in Syria if
it continues the way it is going, that Jordan and Lebanon will
become a casualty of the war in Syria?
Secretary Carter. Well, I think Jordan and Lebanon are
already suffering from the effects of war in Syria. They are
hosting refugees.
Senator Graham. Right. It could even get worse.
Secretary Carter. That is exactly the concern we should all
have. One of the concerns we should have about what is going on
in Syria--it is not just the Syrian people, it is the neighbors
as well.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that no Arab force is
going to go in and fight ISIL alone unless you put Assad on the
table?
Secretary Carter. I see what you are getting at and it gets
back to our train and equip program. We are finding people
whose principal security fear for their own people--and this is
really for their own villages--is ISIL. So they are willing to
go and fight against ISIL. There are others who want to fight
against Assad, and that is another matter entirely.
Senator Graham. Here is my point. They are recruiting more
foreign fighters than we are training Free Syrian Army. The
math does not work. This is never going to result in Assad or
ISIL being degraded or destroyed. The only way I see ISIL to be
degraded or destroyed is for a ground force, regional in
nature, to go into Syria. Do you agree with me that no ground
force made up of Turks, Saudis, Egyptians, you name it are
going into Syria to fight ISIL unless one of the goals is to
replace Assad? They are not going to give half of Syria to
Iran.
Secretary Carter. That sounds sensible to me, and I
certainly wish that such a force would be created. One of the
great disappointments in all of this is that the Sunni world
more broadly is not more involved in this fight.
Senator Graham. Let us dig into that for a moment. If we
went to Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia tomorrow and said we would
like to use your armies, we will be integrated, would you agree
with me for them to say yes, that we would have to make Assad a
target of that army? Are we willing to do that?
Secretary Carter. Let us see. I would guess that--it is
very hypothetical because, sadly, none of them has indicated
their willingness to do anything of that kind under any
circumstances.
But I see what you are driving at, which is will the rest
of the Sunni Middle East participate in this conflict. I
certainly wish they would. The one answer I know, Senator, is
for the Turks. The Turks have stated their position, which is
that they definitely want Assad to go, and the conditions for
any other participation so far have been that they want to
fight against Assad.
Senator Graham. Well, I would suggest you do the following.
You travel a lot. We went to Qatar. We went to Saudi Arabia. We
went all over the Mideast. They told us to a person we would
gladly join forces with you upon the condition that Assad is
part of the target set. Nobody in the United States will tell
them whether or not we are willing to take Assad on militarily
as part of the ground force.
So I would suggest instead of being upset with the Sunni
Arab world, that our problems lie within ourselves, that we are
not putting Assad on the table militarily. Do you agree with
that? Do you think Assad is on the table militarily?
Secretary Carter. Senator, as I am sure you know, his
position on the battlefield is more tenuous today than it has
been for a long time.
Senator Graham. But the point is, is our efforts designed
to take Assad out militarily, or are we focusing just on ISIL?
Secretary Carter. No. Our approach has been, as I think has
been stated clearly for some time, to try to find a political
exit for Bashar Assad rather than a United States-led military
exit. That is the approach.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, and thank you both of you for
your decades of service, and that includes you, Mr. Secretary,
because you have given decades.
I want to follow up on that line of questioning. So if
Assad exited tomorrow, what would be the likely strategy that
we would use going forward?
Secretary Carter. Our strategy would be to encourage the
moderate opposition to partner with the structures of the
government of Damascus not directly associated with Assad or
with his deplorable behavior--and I think we can determine what
that is--keep the structures of government in place, unify with
the moderate Syrian opposition, and create a new government
which is more reflective of the aspirations of the populace
than Assad's is. Then they would, in turn, need to go and
reclaim their territory from ISIL. I think the United States
and the rest of the international coalition would be pleased to
support them in that.
Senator Nelson. Does Assad exiting sooner rather than later
create conditions that are so chaotic for the interest of the
United States or is the interest of the United States in him
leaving sooner than later?
Secretary Carter. I think sooner and in a way, as I
indicated. The reason, to get back to the earlier line of
questioning, for a political rather than a military
transition--for us to support and seek that--is that it is less
disruptive, less chaotic, less sparks, sectarianism, and
therefore violence. That is why it is much to be preferred over
a simple toppling of Assad because you do not know what is on
the other side of a simple toppling of Assad. So I know it is
unsatisfying to talk about a political transition when he
himself gives very little indication of wanting to do that, but
that is much to be preferred if we can have that. Otherwise, we
know what happens when these countries disintegrate.
Senator Nelson. Were a political solution to be found for
his exit which, of course, is going to be difficult with Iran
being his mentor, but Vladimir Putin could be instrumental in
arranging some kind of exit strategy--but were it to be a
political solution, do you think it reasonable that there would
be some accommodation so that the Alawite minority would not be
slaughtered?
Secretary Carter. I think there has to be that ingredient.
I mean, first of all, the Alawite community will fight for the
territory in the northwest. But once again, that is just
further conflict, further civil war. Ethnic cleansing of any
kind is the kind of thing you could see on the other side of a
collapse there. We know how tragic that is for people.
Senator Nelson. What would his arranged exit do with regard
to Hezbollah, and will they resist it the whole way?
Secretary Carter. Hezbollah has been one of the principal
supporters of the Assad regime. So they do not give any
indication of welcoming the path that we are discussing here.
The Russians perhaps. I know that we have been in contact
with the Russians about that over the years, and certainly I
think that they would, if they threw their weight behind such a
transition, be influential with Assad. So I certainly hope they
would but I have no confidence, as I sit here right now, that
they will.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, when you look at a map like
this, a map of Syria that I assume you handed out--somebody
did--that is a mess. Maybe it is the only solution is the
solution of a political exit for Assad so that we can go after
these extremist elements.
By the way, I had to leave the committee to do an interview
on CNN, and the whole focus that they wanted to jump on was
your statement earlier in the hearing that we had only trained
up 60. But I pointed out to them what you said was the vetting
is very difficult, and in fact, we are vetting some several
thousands additional and the vetting is a lot more tortuous
because you certainly do not want to have a guy trained up and
then he turns around and aims his gun back at us.
In Iraq, do you think that this new prime minister has the
capability of getting out of his Shiite mold, and does he have
the capability of bringing in all Shiites with all of the
Iranian influence in his government in order to reach out with
an olive branch to the Sunnis?
Secretary Carter. Thank you.
With respect to the first part of your remarks, I am always
going to be truthful with you, and the number is 60. I think we
have conceded that number before, but I said it today and I
will always tell the truth. That is a small class. It results
from the fact that that is the number that got through the very
rigorous vetting and selection process we have. General Nagata,
who runs that program, believes that he has learned a lot. He
has 7,000 behind that. So I expect those numbers to increase.
But I wanted to tell the truth and I did tell the truth. We
expect that number to improve, but you deserve to know where
things stand and I am telling you where things stand.
With respect to Abadi, there I would say also that he has
indicated to us--and he was here in Washington. I believe he
spoke to many of you as well--his intention to proceed in a way
that is distinctly different from the way his predecessor
proceeded and which led to the situation we now have in Iraq.
We are certainly supporting him in that regard, but one can see
that his intentions are contested in Baghdad. So we continue to
support him. We continue to think, to get back to the earlier
line of questions, that a multi-sectarian future for Iraq is
the best for stability and peace and the best for the defeat of
ISIL. But he will have some substantial influence over that,
but it is clear he does not have absolute control in Baghdad.
We are supporting him.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee?
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, for being
here today.
General Dempsey, I especially want to thank you for your
decades of service to your country and to the cause of freedom.
We wish you the best of luck in your future endeavors. I am not
sure whether this will be the last time we are privileged to
speak with you in a hearing, but regardless, please know how
much we appreciate all you have done for our country.
I want to thank the men and women who are deployed in Iraq
and in so many other places in the Middle East and for their
service to our country. Although they have not been labeled
``combat troops,'' they are still operating under dangerous and
uncertain circumstances and are far removed from their families
and from the people they love.
I want to follow up on the discussion between Senator
McCain and Secretary Carter on how we might support Syrian
rebels once they return from training. Mr. Secretary, you
stated that you believe we have an obligation to those we train
to provide them with protection. I agree with that, and I also
believe we have an obligation to let the American people know
and that you have an obligation to let Congress know and help
us to fully understand what this strategy entails, what that
means, and the funding, the time, and the effort that providing
any such protection might entail and what it will necessitate.
So can you tell us when will DOD fully explain to the
American people and to Congress what the strategy will involve,
what it is going to cost our Government? I have said this
before, but this is something that should have been made clear
last year when the President came up with this plan. But
regardless, it is better late than never. It is good that we do
it now rather than not at all. Can you tell us when that might
occur?
Secretary Carter. I will continuously tell you what is
going on over there with respect to what we are doing in Iraq
and what we are doing with respect to Syria. We are going to
have to--as I said, I think we have an obligation to support
those fighters when they go in. We are going to have to decide
exactly under what conditions and what way we will make that
tactical decision when we introduce them.
But I think the main thing is that we increase that number
from what is now a very small number--and I am not surprised
that it is running on television--into a much larger number. I
think we can do that. The officer who runs this program
believes that he will be able to do that. We will keep you
apprised of our progress, and I will tell you every day what I
know, as I have done here today.
Senator Lee. Thank you. I appreciate that and look forward
to that.
Now, United States strategy in Syria is to empower the,
quote/unquote, moderate opposition to defeat ISIS and to put
enough pressure on the Assad regime to achieve some type of
negotiated peace settlement. For the sake of discussion, let us
say these moderates are successful in degrading ISIS to the
point that they are no longer a factor in Syria. What does
pressuring Assad or his supporters into a negotiated settlement
look like at that point, especially given the military support
from Iran and Hezbollah that they currently enjoy?
Specifically, what role will the United States play in bringing
about the pressure and support to achieve this kind of
settlement?
Secretary Carter. I think the way it would look, the
outcome that we are aiming for is one in which Bashar al Assad
and those who have been associated with his atrocities in Syria
are removed, but the structures of government in Damascus and
in Iraq that remain continue on in an inclusively governed way
that is multi-sectarian, to include Alawites and others, and
that can then turn to the task of regaining its sovereign
territory from ISIL to the east in a project that would look
like what we are working with Baghdad to accomplish to its west
in Iraq. That is the post-Assad transition that would be the
best for the Syrian people and the best for our counter-ISIL
strategy.
Senator Lee. By the way, do you believe the 2001
authorization for the use of military force gives authority
necessary to engage the Assad regime forces that may come into
conflict with any rebels we may train?
Secretary Carter. I am going to be very careful about how I
answer a legal question in that regard, and I would prefer to
get back to you in that regard.
Senator Lee. Okay.
[The information follows:]
The Administration's position is that the 2001 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) would provide authority to conduct
military operations in defense of U.S.--or coalition-trained forces
against ISIL, the Nusrah Front, and other groups that are either part
of or associated forces of al-Qaeda in the same manner as it does for
ongoing U.S. operations against those groups. The Administration has
not interpreted the 2001 AUMF to provide authority to engage Syrian
government forces to defend DOD-trained Syrian fighters.
However, we have concluded that we have sufficient legal authority
to provide combat support to Syrian fighters that DOD has vetted, or
vetted and trained, who come under attack by Syrian government forces,
consistent with the right of United States self-defense, if the United
States action is necessary to effectively address the threat posed by
ISIL to the United States and Iraq and meets the international law
requirements of necessity and proportionality.
Senator Lee. Now, Mr. Secretary, what level of command and
control in your opinion does ISIS leadership have over these
various affiliate groups across the Middle East and northern
Africa, as well as lone wolf individuals or groups in Europe
and the western hemisphere?
Secretary Carter. It is mixed. But in the main--not
entirely, but in the main--what one sees is a mixture of groups
that were already radicalized and already intent upon attacking
the West or attacking Western interests or destabilizing places
in the Middle East rebranding themselves as ISIL because of
this seeming success it had. Then to get to the lone wolf part,
you see people who have had no training, no association with
it, including Americans, who go on the Internet and find
themselves enthralled because whatever lost souls they are,
enthralled by the violence or whatever associated with ISIL and
self-radicalized and unfortunately undertake to do violence. So
you see that spectrum there. You do see some effort by ISIL,
meaning ISIL in Syria and Iraq, to command and control but it
is not exclusively that way.
I say all this because that is very distinctly different
from the al Qaeda model. The al Qaeda model was a very
hierarchical, very clear command and control type terrorist
enemy. That meant they had discipline, and it meant they could
take on big things like September 11. But it also meant that
when we started to go after them, they were vulnerable to
attacks on the command and control structure and on their
logistics structure. ISIL is more resilient because it is more
decentralized and informal in that sense. It takes a different
kind of campaign. We are highly aware of that, as is law
enforcement, by the way.
Senator Lee. Thank you. I see my time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]: Chairman McCain asked that I
recognize Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to this country. I
especially want to thank you, General Dempsey, for the many,
many years that you have served the people of this country and
the military families that have been under you. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Carter, earlier Senator Rounds had a conversation with
General Dempsey about the act of patience and time. I know the
General has counseled patience and he has discussed time. What
role do you see time playing in our strategy? You know, do you
we have a strategy on forces, on containing ISIL? Are we going
to allow them to be able to maintain control of territory for
the next 3 to 5 years? Is that going to be acceptable to us? Do
you see risks with that type of strategy?
Secretary Carter. Well, I think we are going to continue to
strike and apply pressure to ISIL throughout this period. We
are doing it now. We do it every day. It has had some effect.
We are going to continue every single day, as we did over this
past weekend, to defend ourselves against ISIL, including these
homegrown people. All that will go on and has to go on because
we have to protect ourselves in the meantime.
What takes the time--and I think this is what the Chairman
was getting at--is--and this is just in the nature of things--
getting a lasting result. A lasting result is one where not
only is ISIL defeated but they stay defeated. In order for them
to stay defeated, there has to be somebody on that territory
who is keeping the peace and governing and replacing ISIL in
the territory. That takes some time. We are working with the
Kurds to do that. We are working with Sunni tribes. But that is
in the nature of things. We want that to go as quickly as
possible and we are hastening that to the best of our ability,
as are other members of the coalition. But that is the thing
that takes the time to build.
But in the meantime, we have to protect ourselves and we
have to keep pressure on ISIL. We will be doing that
constantly.
Senator Fischer. I agree with you on that.
Oh, General.
General Dempsey. Would you mind?
Senator Fischer. Certainly.
General Dempsey. Because I have thought about this a lot.
Your question is really whether patience increases risk. That
is really your question. I think patience probably does
increase risk to the mission somewhat because it extends the
time when other things could happen. Right? But I think were we
to take more responsibility directly and unilaterally, that
would certainly increase risk in another way. It increases risk
to our force and increases risk to the other missions that we
are held accountable to accomplish globally.
What I get paid for is to give advice to the Secretary of
Defense with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the President
on managing risk. So to your question, does risk increase due
to patience, of course. But the alternative increases risk in
other ways, and it is our job to manage that risk.
Senator Fischer. As you look at managing that risk and you
look at balancing it, how do you reach a decision where you can
maintain that patience when you know that when ISIL controls
that territory that they have now and they continue to advance
in other areas, whether it would be in the region or in Russia,
that that is a recruitment item for them, that it will inspire
attacks, whether it is in that region or elsewhere around the
world? How do you balance that and have the risk that we face
in our homeland continue what I think would continue to grow
because of possibly an overabundance of patience?
General Dempsey. Yes, I will keep at it because, as I said,
this is the issue on which the campaign turns. Correct?
So what you have to be assured of is that as we manage
risk, we look at those things which could threaten U.S. persons
and facilities around the globe and the Homeland. Where we see
risk accruing that could have threatened that national security
interest, there is no hesitance for us to act unilaterally and
decisively.
On the other hand, this campaign is built on the premise
that it relies upon other actors. That necessarily requires a
degree of patience that we need to nurture, we need to
reinforce, and we need to understand in the context of the
other things we are trying to accomplish not only in the Middle
East but globally.
So if you are suggesting that ISIL's threat to the homeland
could increase because of this patience, I concede that risk.
We take on board the responsibility to manage it. But I would
also suggest to you that we would contribute mightily to ISIL's
message as a movement were we to confront them directly on the
ground in Iraq and Syria.
Senator Fischer. If we look at patience, if we look at
restraint, do you not think that with our restraint we are in
many ways encouraging the Iraqis to look elsewhere and to
especially look to Iran and invite them into Iraq where they
are because they know that Iran will be there fighting a common
enemy that they both face at this point? Are we not opening
that door to Iran with this what I kind of view as an
overabundance of patience, which to me is the greatest risk?
General Dempsey. When you look at what we are doing--by the
way, the Government of Iraq has been reaching out to Iran since
roughly 2004. They have probably increased their outreach to
Iran, but it has very little to do with what we are doing or
not doing. It has everything to do with the fact that they
believe that their future is--that it is their turn and that
their particular form of governance, which is not yet inclusive
as it needs to be, is the right form of governance. So they
were going to do this whether we are there or not and whatever
manner in which we exert our influence.
Senator Fischer. So they have boots on the ground in Iraq
through no action of the United States or inaction by the
United States.
General Dempsey. I would say the advisors that have been
sent, the ISR that they are flying, and some of the other
capabilities they provided to the Government of Iraq--I would
agree with you, that they would have provided that whether we
were there----
Senator Fischer. It was a question. It was not a statement
on my part.
General Dempsey. Oh. The answer is yes, they would have
been there regardless of our actions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for the testimony today.
General Dempsey, I want to join my colleagues in commending
you for your decades of service.
Secretary Carter, it was good getting caught up last week.
I appreciate your outstanding service as well to our country.
There has been a lot of criticism of the President when he,
in August 2014 and then just a couple of weeks ago at the G7
meeting, talked about how we do not have a strategy yet with
regard to ISIS. He said that in 2014 and he said it again just
a couple weeks ago.
What he really has not been criticized for and I think is
something that I would like to get your view on is each time he
has talked about the lack of a strategy, he has essentially
kind of put it on your plate. Each time he said, well, the guys
at DOD are kind of coming up with options. We still have not
gotten them yet. DOD is working this. He literally said that, a
version of that, in August 2014 and in June 2015. Did it take
DOD a year to come up with a strategy to defeat ISIS?
Secretary Carter. First of all, thank you for your
conversation. Thanks for everything you are doing, especially
with respect to our Asia-Pacific strategy, Senator. I am very
grateful for that and your travels there and your leadership.
We just spoke yesterday at the Pentagon with the President
about his strategy. The strategy is the one that----
Senator Sullivan. That you laid out.
Secretary Carter.--I described today.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. So he----
Secretary Carter. By the way, he described 8 or 9 months
ago and that does not--and this is important. It involves us,
and we have an important role.
Senator Sullivan. Right.
Secretary Carter. But it involves other parts of the
Government as well. That is one of the reasons to keep
laboriously citing nine lines of effort. There really are nine
lines of effort. We do not directly, for example, try to
interdict self-radicalized Americans. The FBI does that. We do
not do that. But we have to do that while we are working on
these difficult problems of Iraq.
Senator Sullivan. No, Mr. Secretary, I agree 100 percent
with that, and that is why to me, again, it was a little bit--
and maybe you just cannot answer the question directly. I wish
you would. It just goes to some of the process here. The fact
that the President for years has essentially been saying we do
not have a strategy and it is because the guys over at DOD
still have not given me one to me is not--A, it is not how we
develop strategy. As you just mentioned, this strategy needs to
be all instruments of American power. The military is clearly
one, but we need economic, energy, finance, diplomatic, the
whole list. That, of course, has to be developed by the White
House, not by DOD.
So I do not think it took a year for the Pentagon to come
up with a strategy, despite the fact that the President, each
time he said we do not have a strategy, said that it was
essentially your fault. I do not think it was your fault. I
think it was the White House's fault. You know, I just want to
be on record saying that I think that is unfair criticism to be
put on the Chairman or the Secretary to say we do not have a
strategy yet and it is because DOD--but I guess he now can say
we do have a strategy. Is this his strategy?
Secretary Carter. This is the strategy, and it is devised
by the President and the White House. We play a role in it. So
I did not observe any waiting for us to come up with a
strategy.
Senator Sullivan. Well, he actually said it twice.
Secretary Carter. The strategy that I have described, the
nine lines of effort, was I think first described the end of
last summer. It makes common sense that our strategy has all
the parts that the nine lines of effort describe. Yesterday's
meeting was to give him an update and to get his guidance on
how we go forward. We did that. It happened to be at the
Pentagon, and the focus was on the two of the nine lines of
effort that we are responsible for, but there were other
members of the national security community, which is essential
to this, who were present and participated in that discussion.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, you do not to have to answer this, but I do
not want to assume it took a year for the military to come up
with options for the President.
General Dempsey. Well, no, I would be happy to answer it
because we are frequently and constantly adapting options. But
the context of when he said that was he had asked us is there
something more we need to be doing with the Sunni tribes. That
is the context of the question. So the real issue is whether we
should be doing more with the Sunni tribes, and the outcome of
that conversation and the planning that went into it was the
Taqaddum Air Base train, advise, and assist platform.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
I know there has been some discussion with regard to the
NDAA, and I think it is a good bill, a very bipartisan bill.
Senator Reed and Chairman McCain should be commended for the
great work they did.
One of the things that we try and do in the bill in a
number of areas is bolster the credibility where the United
States is seen as having a strategy both supported by the
executive branch and the legislative branch. Some of us think
that our credibility in certain areas of the world has been
weak, and it has been one of the weaknesses of our national
security and foreign policy strategy.
But we tried to do that in a number of areas, and I just
want to provide two examples. You kind of hinted at one, Mr.
Secretary, the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. There is some
strong language in there about the support for that from
Congress, very bipartisan, and how we need to be increasing
troops in the Asia-Pacific.
Also very much a focus that I think is an area that, Mr.
Secretary, you have said we are late in the game in the Arctic.
You may have seen--if you have not, I would recommend you take
a look at it. ``Newsweek'' this week talks about a cover story
on the Arctic. The title is actually ``In the Race to Control
the Arctic, the United States Lags Behind.'' It talks about how
this is developing as the new great game and Kipling's famous
phrase about a critical strategic area, how the Russians are
very, very involved in the Arctic. Mr. Chairman, you actually
in testimony in front of this committee talked about the four
new combat brigades that they are standing up, a new Arctic
brigade, their exercise in the last couple months. Then the
Commandant of the Coast Guard is essentially saying it is a new
geopolitical cold war the United States is in danger of
loosing. We are not even playing in this game at all.
So I just wanted to ask a final comment, Mr. Chairman. You
talked about managing risks, Mr. Chairman. Would removing our
only airborne brigade, BCT, in the Arctic, our only BCT in the
Asia-Pacific--what would that do to our credibility? Would that
bolster our credibility in the Arctic or Asia-Pacific with
regard to the rebalance?
You talked about managing risk. It certainly seems to me,
as Vladimir Putin is militarizing this part of the world, if we
are actually removing forces--removing forces--our only Arctic-
trained forces, that is a way to increase risk because we know
he views weakness as being provocative. They are making a move
in the Arctic. If we start withdrawing troops, the 425 in
particular, I think that heightens risk.
Would either of you care to comment on that?
General Dempsey. Yes. I think it increases risk, but some
of the decisions--and you are talking about the Army in this
case, but some of the choices that the Service Chiefs are going
to have to make, as we continue to go down in terms of
resources--you know, the Army is tasked with going from 490,000
active where they are today to 450,000 in the next 2 years.
They have to come from some place.
Senator Sullivan. But to put that BCT on the block first to
me is inviting--A, Congress is saying do not do it in the NDAA.
But, second, that is going to undermine our credibility not
only in the Arctic. It is going to undermine our rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific strategy. Those are PACOM forces.
General Dempsey. I am not going to predispose the Army's
decision, although it sounds like you may already have some
insight.
Senator Sullivan. No, I do not. I am just making sure the
Army does not make a strategic blunder.
General Dempsey. Right. Although I will tell you this,
Senator, we are familiar with Congress telling us no on the
reforms that we are making not because we are trying to cut
ourselves apart, but because we have $1 trillion--that is a
``T'' not a ``B''--$1 trillion less in budget authority over 10
years. We have some from the beginning it is a disaster.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just do want to mention that if we are looking at BCTs
going to the area where Congress has actually said we need to
increase forces, having our only Asia-Pacific Arctic capability
which, as you know, General, you cannot develop overnight, and
our only airborne capability in the entire Asia-Pacific--to me
that would be a strategic blunder. I think Congress sometimes
comes in and has broader strategic insights than the military
has on occasion, not always. But in my view, this time is one
of them.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me thank
you for your testimony. I personally want to thank you for your
service to the Nation, both of you, particularly, General
Dempsey, as you conclude your uniformed service.
Again with Chairman McCain's direction, I will adjourn the
hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
reliance on shia militias an iran threatens future of iraq
1. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, do you
agree that Baghdad's reliance on Shia militias and Iran represents a
threat to the viability of a unified, stable, multi-sectarian Iraq?
Secretary Carter. Yes, I have concerns about the sectarian nature
of Iran's approach in Iraq. It stands in contrast to the Department's
approach to work by, with, and through a unified, multi-sectarian
government in Baghdad. I also believe that Prime Minister Abadi is
committed to a decentralized, federalized, but multi-sectarian single
state which would not be beholden to Iranian interests. I have seen
some progress, but more time is needed for him to implement his agenda
of political reform.
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)--which includes some Iranian-
backed militias, have played a role in stemming the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant's advance but are not envisioned to remain part of
the forces the Government of Iraq (GOI) relies on in the future. It is
important to distinguish between the PMF and Iranian-backed/controlled
elements. Many of the fighters in the PMF are Iraqi nationalists who
have volunteered to defend their country in response to Grand Ayatollah
Sistani's fatwa last summer, are working within the Iraqi chain of
command, and are conducting operations in Anbar at the request of local
officials. The GOI envisions that many of the militia forces who
responded to the emergency will return home and be demobilized or
formally recruited into the Iraqi security forces or integrated into
the National Guard, once the necessary legislation is passed.
General Dempsey. Reliance on a quasi-government paramilitary
undermines public confidence in the legitimate armed forces and the
government of Iraq and increases the risk of battlefield atrocities
that serve to enflame sectarian tensions.
2. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, why is
Baghdad so reliant on Shiite militias?
Secretary Carter. Baghdad does leverage the Shiite militias'
capabilities to wage the counter-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) fight. Baghdad also uses the Iraqi Army, the Counterterrorism
Service, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Popular Mobilization Forces
(PMF) to counter ISIL. The PMF is a predominantly Shia force but also
includes some Sunni fighters. The PMF has seen some success as a ground
force in preventing ISIL's continued advance, and in reclaiming some
territory. Prime Minister Abadi has made progress in recent months in
expanding the number of Sunni fighters, including from the contested
Anbar province, enrolled in the PMF.
Each of these groups is critical to success in the counter-ISIL
fight. The United States continues to advocate that the Government of
Iraq pursue an inclusive, multi-sectarian approach, including in its
security forces.
General Dempsey. In some situations, the Shia militias have
demonstrated great tenacity in their fights against ISIL, leading them
to have success against ISIL in situations where a better-equipped ISF
did not. But Iraq's future cannot run through militias so we must
continue to assist the ISF in becoming and remaining the credible
security force of the Government of Iraq.
3. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, what
additional steps can we take to more effectively and quickly reduce
Baghdad's reliance on Shiite militias?
Secretary Carter. Two important additional steps need to be taken
to reduce Baghdad's reliance on Shiite militias. First, Sunni fighters
need to be trained and equipped more quickly. Prime Minister Abadi has
made progress in recent months in expanding the number of Sunni
fighters enrolled as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The
Department is pressing the Government of Iraq to ensure that the
Ministry of Defense is equipping Sunni tribal fighters appropriately.
Second, establishing an Iraqi National Guard would be a key mechanism
to integrate Shia and Sunni PMF forces and incorporate federal and
provincial leadership. The Government of Iraq is considering
establishment of a National Guard, which I believe will achieve the
Prime Minister's overall goal of bolstering a federal state in Iraq
with multi-sectarian security forces. The Department is encouraging the
Iraqi government to accelerate approval of a National Guard.
General Dempsey. Two important additional steps need to be taken to
reduce Baghdad's reliance on Shiite militias. First, we need to
continue to push the GOI to accelerate training and equipping of Sunni
fighters. Prime Minister Abadi has made progress in recent months in
expanding the number of Sunni fighters enrolled as part of the Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF). We are also pressing the Iraqi government to
ensure that the Ministry of Defense is appropriately equipping Sunni
tribal fighters. Second, we believe the establishment of an Iraqi
National Guard is a key mechanism needed to integrate Shia and Sunni
PMF forces into an Iraqi organization that has both federal and
provincial leadership. The Government of Iraq is considering the
establishment of a National Guard, which is a critical piece of
legislation that would help achieve the Prime Minister's overall goal
of bolstering a federal state in Iraq with multi-sectarian security
forces. We are pushing the Iraqi government to accelerate approval of a
National Guard.
effectiveness and intensity of air campaign
4. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, what percentage of United
States sorties over Iraq and Syria return without engaging the enemy?
What explains that number? How has that percentage changed over time?
General Dempsey. US sorties are flown to conduct both deliberate
strikes with pre-planned targets and dynamic strikes where the aircraft
engages targets only if they are presented. From the commencement of
airstrikes on 8 August 14 to 1 July 15, only 7 percent of aircraft
flying deliberate strike sorties returned without expending their
ordnance. Approximately 63 percent of aircraft flying dynamic strike
missions returned without expending munitions. This percentage has
stayed relatively constant since combat operations commenced. Of note,
during a comparable timeframe in Afghanistan, 83 percent of aircraft
flying dynamic strike missions returned with their munitions.
Targeting and dynamic engagements are by nature fluid processes.
Aircraft conducting dynamic targeting missions are present to deliver
ordnance on targets should the opportunity arise--targets are not
programmed prior to the mission so employment of ordnance is not
guaranteed. Beyond the type of mission flown, other factors reduce the
number of munitions employed, such as adverse weather, lack of positive
identifications, not having the right type of weapons for the target
type and the ever present collateral damage concerns.
Strike aircraft can and do supports ground forces even without
dropping ordnance. Aircraft are able to conduct should of presence
missions and provide valuable armed over watch in support of ground
forces. Aircraft flying dynamic targeting mission are often able to
achieve desired outcomes without dropping ordnance.
russian violation of the inf-united states responses
5. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, what
specific steps is the United States taking in response to Russia's
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces violation?
Secretary Carter. The Administration is pursuing a three-pronged
approach, including continuing diplomatic efforts, economic
countermeasures, and military countermeasures. A wide range of
potential military response options are being considered.
All the options under consideration are designed to ensure that
Russia gains no significant military advantage from its Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violation. In terms of military
responses, those options that are compliant with the INF Treaty are
under consideration, as I continue to believe that the INF Treaty
serves our interests and those of our allies. The United States will
not take any action inconsistent with our obligations under the INF
Treaty as long as those obligations remain in force.
However the INF Treaty is a two-way street. As I have said
repeatedly, we will not allow the Russian Federation to gain a
significant military advantage through its violation of an arms control
treaty.
Russia remains in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty
while, despite Russian claims to the contrary, the United States
remains in full compliance with its obligations.
General Dempsey. We are considering a wide range of potential
military response options, but no decisions have been made.
All the military options under consideration are designed to ensure
that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation
of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. We are currently
considering those options that are compliant with the INF Treaty, as we
continue to believe the Treaty serves our interests and those of our
allies and Russia. The United States will not take any action
inconsistent with our obligations under the INF Treaty, as long as
those obligations remain in force.
Military options we are considering fall into three broad
categories: Active defenses to counter intermediate- range ground-
launched cruise missiles; counterforce capabilities to prevent
intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and
countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces.
afghanistan
6. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, do you
believe the United States transition in Afghanistan should be calendar
or conditions-based?
Secretary Carter. I have seen that calendar-based timelines have
had a focusing effect in Afghanistan and have led to positive outcomes.
As part of the current plan, the Department continually assesses the
conditions on the ground and the capabilities of the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to ensure the strategy enhances
security and stability in Afghanistan and to be able to recommend
adjustments if necessary.
General Dempsey. Time is in fact a condition; in Afghanistan it has
enabled ownership of the tactical fight by the ANDSF. We have seen that
calendar-based timelines have had a focusing effect in Afghanistan and
have led to positive outcomes. Yet as I have said before, a plan is
something you adjust over time. As part of our current plan, we
continually assess the conditions on the ground and the capabilities of
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to maintain
security and stability in Afghanistan.
7. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, would you
describe the current withdrawal plan as calendar or condition-based?
Secretary Carter. The current drawdown plan uses a time-phased
approach for the withdrawal of United States forces to achieve a more
normalized relationship with the Afghan government now that the combat
mission has ended. The approach also factors in changing conditions on
the ground, allowing for adjustments if necessary. I have seen that
calendar-based timelines have helped the Afghan government, the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), and the United States
focus on what is needed to continue to progress. As part of this plan
and the ongoing train, advise, and assist mission, the Department
continues to assess ANDSF progress and remaining capability gaps to
ensure that they can make progress stick.
General Dempsey. We use calendar-based timelines to focus our
assessment of Afghanistan government's progress. Our decisions have
seen that calendar-based timelines have helped the Afghan government
and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) focus on
what they need to achieve. As part of this plan and the ongoing train,
advise, and assist mission, we continue to assess ANDSF progress and
remaining capability gaps to ensure that the process is sustainable and
make recommended changes to current plans as warranted.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
united states counter-isil strategy and iraqi governance
8. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, how are the
President's nine lines of effort against ISIL being measured for
success?
Secretary Carter. The Department measures the effectiveness of our
efforts to degrade and destroy ISIL by our ability to train and equip--
in quantity and quality--effective partner forces and the ability of
these forces to engage and defeat ISIL and retake territory. Similarly
the success of the air campaign against ISIL is measured through the
Coalition's ability to identify and destroy ISIL targets that degrade
the capacity of the organization to wage the current fight and to
eliminate threats to the homeland. The nine lines of effort are
complementary and require constant synchronization, which is led by the
National Security Council and in close coordination between Secretary
Kerry and myself. Secretary Kerry and I also constantly work with our
colleagues in the Intelligence Community to assess the impact of these
actions on ISIL, and to recalibrate our efforts as appropriate to have
maximum effect.
General Dempsey. The National Security Council is responsible for
the coordination and synchronization of the nine lines of effort to
degrade and destroy ISIL. The Department of Defense is responsible for
two of the nine lines: to deny ISIL safe haven and to build partner
capacity in Iraq and Syria. Alongside our coalition partners, we
measure the effectiveness of our efforts by our ability to train and
equip partner forces and their ability to engage and defeat ISIL;
limiting ISIL's freedom of movement; constraining its ability to
reinforce its fighters; and degrading its command and control.
9. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, how do the Departments
coordinate (amongst themselves and with foreign partners) to avoid
unnecessary duplication of activities under the nine lines of effort?
Secretary Carter. United States departments and agencies with
equities in the counter-ISIL effort are in constant communication
concerning actions taken in support of the lines of effort (LOEs) to
ensure we maximize the effect of our efforts and avoid duplication.
Each LOE has a designated lead, and the lead department or agency
coordinates actions it plans to undertake to accomplish the goals
associated with that LOE. The lead department or agency for each LOE is
responsible for marshalling the relevant expertise and resources from
within the United States Government and implementing the LOE. The
interagency conducts frequent coordination and synchronization meetings
to ensure relevant parties have insight into actions taken to execute
individual LOEs and the broader strategy.
The activities of our foreign partners are coordinated through
Ambassador McGurk in his role as the Special Presidential Envoy for the
Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. He is tasked with coordinating the
complementary activities of the more than 60 coalition countries that
participate in five efforts: 1) providing military support to our
partners; 2) impeding the flow of foreign fighters; 3) stopping ISIL's
financing and funding; 4) addressing humanitarian crises in the region;
and 5) exposing ISIL's true nature. Ambassador McGurk convenes regular
meetings around the world to help ensure that coalition countries are
undertaking activities in a methodical fashion that synchronizes with
United States efforts to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL.
10. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, what is the United States
strategy to address ISIL attacks outside of Syria/Iraq (e.g. Libya,
Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen)?
Secretary Carter. The whole-of-government counter-Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) strategy consists of nine lines of effort.
This is a global strategy that applies wherever there is a threat from
ISIL, not just Iraq and Syria. The nature of our specific actions will
vary according to the situation and it will take time to fully
implement the strategy.
The current focus of the counter-ISIL coalition's efforts is Iraq
and Syria. The Administration also continues to assess the threat posed
by ISIL in other places, to consult with allies and other partners, and
to develop options to address ISIL's expansion.
The only way to achieve a lasting victory against ISIL is to work
with local forces and partners in the region. In Libya, for example,
the Department will be far better positioned to assist the Libyans in
their fight against terrorists nationwide once they come together to
form an inclusive unity government that is a willing and capable
partner. The Administration is working hard, along with many other
members of the international community, to get the warring factions in
Libya to come to an agreement on a unity government.
In Tunisia, in the wake of the attacks at the Bardo Museum and
hotels in Sousse, the Department is reinforcing its support of the
Tunisian military's efforts to counter violent extremism within its
borders. The Department is partnering with Tunisia to enhance its
security sector development and build its internal capacity, with a
focus on border security programs that augment current efforts by the
Tunisians and international community to reduce trans-national
trafficking and provide increased situational awareness.
Although implementing the strategy will take time, the
Administration will assess and monitor the threat to the United States
and its allies posed by ISIL, wherever its elements might be found. The
Administration will not hesitate to take action when necessary. The
recent strike against an al Qaeda-associated militant in Libya
demonstrates the commitment to confronting threats to the United States
wherever they are found, and Libya is no exception, despite the current
turmoil there.
11. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, you testified ``I've told
Iraqi leaders that while the United States is open to supporting Iraq
more than we already are, we must see a greater commitment from all
parts of the Iraqi Government''. What specific area of the Iraqi
Government is a greater commitment required?
Secretary Carter. Additional progress is needed on the inclusion of
all ethno-sectarian groups into the Iraqi political process.
Specifically, Prime Minister Abadi is committed to political inclusion,
but his biggest challenge is getting the rest of the government,
including the Iraqi Council of Representatives, to pass critical
legislation that would engender greater stability in Iraq. Most
importantly, this includes passage of a National Guard law, which is
currently pending in Iraq's Council of Representatives after completing
two readings on the floor. This legislation would be a key tool to help
integrate Shia and Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces into an Iraqi
organization that has both federal and provincial leadership as well as
an important step towards a stable, multi-sectarian Iraqi state.
Additionally, although there has been some progress in generating
capacity in the Iraqi Security Forces through the building partner
capacity (BPC) efforts in Iraq, these BPC activities have the capacity
to train more Iraq Security Forces personnel. The Government of Iraq,
specifically the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Security Forces,
need to commit to sending additional personnel to these sites.
12. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, does the
battlefield situation on the ground dictate the circumstances to where
you would recommend to the President he should directly arm the Iraqi
Kurds and Sunni tribes?
Secretary Carter. The battlefield situation informs the efforts to
train and equip the Iraqi Kurds and Sunni tribes. The United States is
assisting all of the Iraqi Security Forces to deny Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) safe haven. This effort allows space for the
Iraqis to generate forces to go on the offensive against ISIL. The best
way to defeat ISIL and enable a stable, multi-sectarian Iraqi state is
to work by, with, and through the Government of Iraq to deliver arms to
the Iraqi Security Forces, including the Kurdish forces and Sunni
tribes.
General Dempsey. The battlefield situation informs the focus of our
efforts to train and equip the Iraqi Kurds and Sunni tribes. The United
States is broadly assisting Iraqi Security Forces in efforts to deny
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) safe haven, and this is
allowing space for the Iraqis to generate forces to go on the offensive
against ISIL. We continue to believe that the best way to defeat the
ISIL and enable a stable, multi-sectarian Iraqi state is to work by,
with, and through the Government of Iraq to deliver arms to the Iraqi
Security Forces, including the Kurdish forces and Sunni tribes.
13. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, under what
battlefield situation would you recommend to the President he should
directly arm the Iraqi Kurds and Sunni tribes?
Secretary Carter. The most effective means of delivering the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) a lasting defeat is to work
by, with, and through the Iraqi government. The current battlefield
situation and outlook for the campaign against ISIL are not cause to
change this approach.
The Government of Iraq has supported the arming of the Kurdish
Peshmerga to combat ISIL. A significant amount of military assistance
has been provided to the Kurdish Regional Government. The Government of
Iraq has also made progress in recent months to incorporate more Sunni
tribal fighters into the Popular Mobilization Forces. The Government of
Iraq has also provided weapons to tribal elements in Anbar operating
with the Iraqi Security Forces. These actions demonstrate the
Government of Iraq's intent to allow weapons to go to both the Kurds
and Sunni tribes in the collective effort to defeat ISIL.
General Dempsey. We continue to believe that the most effective
means of providing United States support to Kurdish security forces and
Sunni tribes is to work by, with, and through the Iraqi government.
As evidenced by the significant sums of military assistance
provided to the Kurdish Regional Government, the Government of Iraq has
supported the arming of the Kurdish Peshmerga to combat ISIL. The
Government of Iraq has also made progress in recent months to
incorporate more Sunni tribal fighters into the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF), including by providing weapons to tribal elements in
Anbar operating with the Iraqi Security Forces. These actions
demonstrate the Government of Iraq's intent to allow weapons to go to
both the Kurds and Sunni tribes in the collective effort to defeat
ISIL.
14. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, can Prime Minister Abadi
executive order the creation of the Sunni National Guard?
Secretary Carter. Prime Minister Abadi has used his executive
authority to restructure Iraq's security forces over the past year. He
has created the Popular Mobilization Forces and recruited a significant
number of Sunnis to this effort. I would defer to the State Department
on the question of whether, under the Iraqi constitution, Prime
Minister Abadi could create the National Guard by executive order.
15. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, have you
recommended to Prime Minister Abadi or to the President that Prime
Minister Abadi executive order the creation of the Sunni National
Guard?
Secretary Carter. I defer this answer to the State Department which
is responsible for making recommendations on this and other diplomatic
issues. I would note that the Prime Minister has used his executive
authority to re-structure Iraq's security forces over the past year--
for example, the creation of the Popular Mobilization Forces, for which
a significant number of Sunnis have been recruited. The National Guard
proposal in Iraq is one of several legislative reforms aimed at
decentralizing Iraqi governance. It is envisioned that the National
Guard will represent each of Iraq's 18 provinces and the proposal
should ultimately take shape through action from Iraq's legislative
branch, the Council of Representatives.
General Dempsey. We would refer you to the State Department who has
the lead for making political recommendations on this and other
diplomatic issues.
However, we would note that the Prime Minister has used his
executive authority to re-structure Iraq's Security Forces (ISF) over
the past year--for example, the creation of the Popular Mobilization
Forces, for which a significant number of Sunnis have been recruited.
Additionally, since it is envisioned that the National Guard will
represent each of Iraq's 18 provinces, which makes it one of several
proposed legislative reforms aimed at decentralizing Iraq's governance,
we believe that it should ultimately take full shape through action
from Iraq's legislative branch, the Council of Representatives.
16. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, does Hadi al-Amiri's growing
influence within the Iraqi Government improve inclusiveness or reduce
sectarian tension for the Iraqi people?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
17. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, do you believe Hadi al-Amiri
has the greatest influence in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
iraq train and equip
18. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, is the Department directly
arming the Kurdistan Regional Government or any other units associated
with the Iraqi Government?
Secretary Carter. United States policy is to work in coordination
with the Government of Iraq on assistance to the Kurdish Regional
Government. Elements of the Kurdistan Regional Government are among the
recipients of support provided by the Department of Defense. Such
support included arms and ammunition.
19. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, what is the step-by-step
process from United States custody to Iraqi Government and Kurdistan
Regional Government custody of weapons and equipment provided through
the Iraq Train and Equip program or any other program in which the
United States provides weapons and equipment to the Kurdistan Regional
Government or associated forces?
Secretary Carter. There are several mechanisms for delivery of
equipment to Kurdish forces; however, regardless of the mechanism, all
equipment is coordinated by, with, and through the Government of Iraq
(GOI).
First, we purchase weapons and equipment using the Iraq Train and
Equip Fund (ITEF). Items are delivered first to Kuwait for inventory
and packaging; they are then moved forward into Iraq under the control
of Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq (CJTF-I), Combined Joint Forces Land
Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I), and the Office of Security
Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I); and finally they are signed over to Peshmerga
units through the GOI. To date, United States Government, GOI, and
Peshmerga representatives have all been present in Erbil to accept
transfers.
Second, weapons and equipment have been provided to Kurdish forces
under Presidential Drawdown, Excess Defense Article, and Foreign
Military Financing authorities. The GOI submits a Letter of Request
(LOR) and signs a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA). United States
Central Command and CJTF-I facilitate delivery of those items to Erbil,
where United States Government, GOI, and Peshmerga representatives
transfer deliveries through the GOI to the Kurdish forces.
Finally, weapons and equipment have been provided to Kurdish forces
through the Kurdish Resupply Task Force, for which the United States
coordinates donations and arranges for transportation of donated items.
Regardless of their origin, a diplomatic clearance request must be
submitted to the GOI for the incoming defense articles. The next step
is to fly the equipment to Baghdad for customs inspection, which may
last 24 hours, but it only averages 2-4 hours. Finally, the equipment
is flown to Erbil, where it is received by a logistics representative
from the Kurdish Regional Government.
20. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, on June
10, 2015, the President announced that he was ``expediting'' the
delivery of weapons and equipment to the Kurdistan Regional Government.
How has the process of delivering weapons, equipment, and training to
the Kurdistan Regional Government changed since he made this
announcement?
Secretary Carter. The process of delivering equipment has not
changed, but the Department has worked to accelerate delivery under the
existing process in two ways since the President's announcement. First,
the United States has worked with the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to accelerate the transfer of items
to the KRG. Second, when production lines are not current or the type
of equipment needed is not in stock, the President has directed, as he
has at certain junctures in the past, the Department to expedite and
prioritize production for counter-Islamic State needs or to look to
other countries to provide weapons expeditiously.
General Dempsey. The process of delivering equipment has not
changed, but we have worked to accelerate delivery under the existing
process in two ways since the President's announcement. First, the
United States has worked with the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to accelerate the transfer of items
to the KRG. Second, when production lines are not current or we do not
possess in our stocks the type of equipment needed, the President has
directed, as he has at certain junctures in the past, us to expedite
and prioritize production for counter-ISIL needs or to look to other
countries to provide weapons expeditiously to the counter-ISIL fight.
21. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, what
delays or inefficiencies were resolved as a result of expediting
weapons and equipment to the Kurdistan Regional Government?
Secretary Carter. Putting pressure on both US and Government of
Iraq (GOI) systems to accelerate or simply put more focus on items
intended for delivery to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) helped
synchronize activities within the US and Coalition side of the process.
The synchronized activities helped streamline processes on the Iraqi
side so that these items were still delivered ``by, with, and through''
the GoI. These deliveries were then synchronized with other demands
from within Iraq and USG.
The challenges are equally due to the need to develop Iraqi and KRG
operational (predictive) planning capability as it is the shortage of
stock pertaining to the demands of the day. In that context, these
items were delivered in relatively short order from the time the
request had been officially received through Iraq and/or Combined Joint
Task Force representation. Items may not be immediately available as
every requirement is identified. Production lines may not be current
and we have to turn them back on. The Department may not possess in the
stocks the type of equipment used by a foreign entity. The President
has directed, as he has at certain junctures in the past, to expedite
production or to look to other countries to provide weapons
expeditiously.
General Dempsey. Putting pressure on both United States and
Government of Iraq (GOI) systems to accelerate delivery, or simply to
put more focus on timely delivery of weapons and equipment to the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), helped synchronize activities
within the United States and Coalition side of the process. Iraqi
processes were also streamlined in that the weapons and equipment were
still delivered ``by, with, and through'' the GOI--and were
synchronized with other demands from within Iraq and the United States.
In addition, the status of production lines can affect delivery times.
Sometimes, production lines are not current and we have to turn them
back on, or we do not possess in U.S. stocks the type of equipment used
by a particular foreign country. The President has directed, as he has
at certain junctures in the past, to expedite production or look to
other countries to provide weapons expeditiously in the counter-ISIL
fight. Moreover, because not all requirements can be filled as soon as
they are identified, we continue to work with the GOI and the KRG to
develop operational (predictive) planning capabilities. In that
context, weapons and equipment have been delivered in relatively short
order from the time the requests were received.
22. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, do you
support directly arming the Sunni tribal forces?
Secretary Carter. No. Directly arming specific groups without
coordinating with the Government of Iraq (GOI) would undermine United
States efforts to foster a unified, multi-sectarian government, which I
view as a necessary step in the overall effort to deliver a lasting
defeat to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). At this
time, direct arming of Sunni tribal forces or any sub-group of Iraqi
Security Forces would be counter-productive to the overall goal of
countering the ISIL. In order to achieve lasting effects against ISIL,
all elements of the GOI must work together.
General Dempsey. No. Directly arming specific groups without
coordinating with the Government of Iraq (GOI) would undermine United
States efforts to foster a unified, multi-sectarian government, which
we view as a necessary step in the overall effort to counter ISIL. At
this time, direct arming of Sunni tribal forces or any sub-group of
Iraqi Security Forces would be counter-productive to the overall goal
of countering the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In order
to achieve lasting effects against ISIL, all elements of the GOI must
work together.
23. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, is it a
requirement Iraqi Sunni tribal forces are provided with weapons and
equipment in a sufficient quantity and in a timely manner to ultimately
defeat ISIL?
Secretary Carter. Yes, the inclusion of Sunni tribal forces in the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and their training and equipping in a
timely manner is critical to reaching the overall goal of defeating the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
United States policy remains that the Government of Iraq (GOI) must
concur with provision of all equipment and weapons to the Sunni tribal
forces. Despite a slow start on GOI arming of Sunni tribes, trends are
moving in the right direction--the number of armed Sunni tribal
fighters in Anbar has tripled since April, and the United States
presence at Taqaddum Air Base is helping to foster greater GOI support
to the Sunni tribal forces. In fact, the GOI has distributed weapons to
more than 800 Sunni forces in recent weeks, and several hundred Sunni
forces are currently receiving training at Taqaddum.
General Dempsey. Yes, the inclusion of Sunni tribal forces in the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and their training and equipping in a
timely manner is critical to reaching the overall goal of defeating the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
United States policy remains that the Government of Iraq (GOI) must
concur with all equipment and weapons that DOD provides to the Sunni
tribal forces. Despite a slow start on GOI arming of Sunni tribes,
trends are moving in the right direction--the number of armed Sunni
tribal fighters in Anbar has tripled since April--and our presence at
Taqaddum Air Base is helping to foster greater GOI support to the Sunni
tribal forces. In fact, the GOI has distributed weapons to more than
800 Sunni forces in recent weeks, and several hundred Sunni forces are
currently receiving training at Taqaddum.
24. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, what
confidence do you have that the Iraqi Government can provide Sunni
tribal forces with weapons and equipment in a sufficient quantity and
in a timely manner to ultimately defeat ISIL?
Secretary Carter. I have confidence that Prime Minister Abadi and
his government are working to provide sufficient weapons and equipment
to the Sunni tribes in a timely manner. Despite a slow start on GOI
arming of Sunni tribes, trends are moving in the right direction--the
number of armed Sunni forces in Anbar has tripled since April--and
United States forces presence at Taqaddum Air Base is helping. In fact,
the GOI has distributed weapons to more than 800 Sunni forces in recent
weeks, and several hundred Sunni forces are currently receiving
training at Taqaddum. The Department will continue to evaluate whether
this initiative moves forward at a sufficient pace to ultimately defeat
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is also important
to note that the pace of equipping is not the only variable that will
determine success against ISIL.
General Dempsey. We have confidence that Prime Minister Abadi and
his government are working to provide sufficient weapons and equipment
to the Sunni tribes in a timely manner. Despite a slow start on GOI
arming of Sunni tribes, trends are moving in the right direction--the
number of armed Sunni forces in Anbar has tripled since April--and
United States forces presence at Taqaddum Air Base is helping. In fact,
the GOI has distributed weapons to more than 800 Sunni forces in recent
weeks, and several hundred Sunni forces are currently receiving
training at Taqaddum. We will continue to evaluate whether this
initiative moves forward at a sufficient pace to make the necessary
progress to ultimately defeat ISIL. It is also important to note that
the pace of equipping is not the only variable that will determine
success against ISIL.
25. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, would the Department require
congressional authorization to directly arm the Sunni tribal forces in
consultation with the Iraqi Government?
Secretary Carter. No, the Department has sufficient authorities
under the Iraq Train and Equip Fund authority to provide assistance to
military and other security forces of or associated with the Government
of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local
security forces, with a national security mission. No additional
authorities are needed.
26. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, what coalition nations are
directly arming the Kurdistan Regional Government?
Secretary Carter. Coalition partners have provided weapons and/or
equipment to the Peshmerga through the Government of Iraq (GOI) using
either the United States-directed resupply task force or by
coordinating directly with the GOI in Baghdad. The donating countries
to date are: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Germany, Hungary, Jordan, Macedonia, and the United Kingdom.
27. Senator Ernst. General Dempsey, does the wide variety in types
of ammunition, weapons, and equipment provided to the Kurdistan
Regional Government have a negative impact on combat operations or
coalition training of Peshmerga?
General Dempsey. The ammunition, weapons, and equipment provided to
the Peshmerga has been in direct response to specific requests for
those items by the Kurdistan Regional Government. In addition, the
United States has provided ``train the trainer'' capabilities to
Coalition partners training Peshmerga forces on the employment of
delivered arms, ammunition, and materiel (AAM). Our assessment is the
various AAM that the United States and partner-nations have donated and
delivered to Kurdish/Peshmerga forces have directly contributed to the
combat effectiveness of the Peshmerga against ISIL.
iraqi shia militias also known as popular mobilization forces
28. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, what is
the impact of Shia militia recruiting on the ability of the Iraqi
Government to recruit Iraqis for the Iraqi Security Force?
Secretary Carter. The Department does not have a clear picture of
Shia militia recruiting and the impact of Shia militia recruiting on
the ability of the Iraqi Government to recruit Iraqis for the Iraqi
Security Force (ISF). In part, this is because the United States is not
involved in ISF recruiting. The Department is training, equipping,
advising, and assisting forces that have been properly vetted after
being recruited by the Government of Iraq. The Department does know
that, in some instances, salary payments from Shia groups have been a
significant inducement for recruits.
General Dempsey. These is a little evidence that PMF recruitment
efforts have severely altered the Iraqi Government's ability to acquire
recruits for Iraqi Security Forces, but if ISF losses mount alongside
PMF successes or large pay and equipment gaps between the two groups
arise, it may have a significant impact in the future.
29. Senator Ernst. General Dempsey, outside of Baghdad, where do
Shia militias have greater numerical strength and/or greater combat
capability, than the ISF?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Ernst. General Dempsey, at what point do you assess
Shia militias and Popular Mobilization Forces will have numerical
superiority or greater combat power over the Iraqi Security Forces?
General Dempsey. We do not assess this scenario is likely in the
near future.
31. Senator Ernst. General Dempsey, what is the fastest growing
military organization in Iraq--ISIL, Shia militias/Popular Mobilization
Forces, Peshmerga, or Iraqi Security Forces?
General Dempsey. The PMF has been the fastest growing force since
June 2014 as they have gone from nothing to having tens of thousands of
fighters. However, recruitment has leveled off. None of the groups are
currently experiencing rapid growth.
32. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, approximately how much funding
does Iran provide the Iraqi Security Forces to fight ISIL?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, please
describe the influence Iran has in deciding who is provided with
weapons and equipment provided by the Iraqi Government?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
34. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, what types
of heavy weapons and equipment are provided by the Iraqi Government to
the Popular Mobilization Forces?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
35. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, does the
Iraqi Government provide certain types of weapons and equipment to the
Popular Mobilization Forces which they do not provide to the Peshmerga?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. No, Baghdad has provided similar weapons and
equipment to both the PMF and Peshmerga forces in the past, but
provides them more consistently to PMF engaged in current operations.
36. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, in what
ways are the combat power of the Popular Mobilization Forces greater
than the combat power of the Peshmerga?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. The PMF has more consistent access to armored
vehicles, tanks and anti-tanks weapons. It also enjoys better access to
Iraqi ammunition supplies.
37. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter, would the seizure of Kirkuk
Province by Shia militias be a positive development for United States
interests?
Secretary Carter. No. An internal struggle for control of Kirkuk
between Shia and Kurdish forces would run counter to United States
interests in Iraq and the region. I believe that a stable, multi-
sectarian Iraq is the only way to ensure the long-term defeat of the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In keeping with this, I
believe that a coordinated effort by all of Iraq's security forces, to
include Kurdish and Popular Mobilization Forces, working together and
with the central government to drive out ISIL forces, would affirm the
Government of Iraq's efforts toward inclusivity and be consistent with
United States interests.
38. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, how would
using Iraqi Kurdistan as a coalition base of operations to support
Operation Inherent Resolve enhance the coalition's ability to degrade
and defeat ISIL?
Secretary Carter. The United States and Coalition already use the
Iraqi Kurdistan Region as a base of operations to support Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR). This access is integral to the success of OIR.
Current efforts include, but are not limited to, the train and equip
site in Erbil, which supports the training and equipping of Kurdish
forces, and Coalition advise and assist activities throughout Kurdish
areas in Iraq support operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL). The Department continues to evaluate whether basing
other activities in this region would enhance the coalition's ability
to degrade and defeat ISIL in the future, but no additional
determinations have been made at this time.
General Dempsey. Areas of Iraq populated by the Kurdish people have
been used by Coalition forces, since the outset of Operations INHERENT
RESOLVE, to support counter-ISIL operations. We are constantly
evaluating our forward basing strategy to provide the President the
best military advice for effective operations to degrade and ultimately
destroy ISIL.
centcom basing
39. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, how would
expanding the use of Iraqi Kurdistan as a base of operations to support
United States operations in the Middle East enhance our ability to
defeat ISIL and check Iran's influence in the Middle East?
Secretary Carter. I do not believe that expanding the use of Iraqi
Kurdistan as a base of operations is necessary at this time to defeat
the Islamic State and check malign Iranian influence in the region. The
Department is providing a significant amount of support to the Iraqi
Kurdistan Region. I believe our advise and assist as well as our train
and equip efforts throughout the Iraqi Kurdistan Region are currently
aligned appropriately to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant. The Department is constantly evaluating the implementation of
the campaign to ensure it is meeting the campaign's objectives.
General Dempsey. We are confident that we have arrayed out forces
and capabilities in the region in the most effective manner to enable
counter-ISIL operations and reduce Iran's malign influence throughout
the Middle East. Moving forward, we continue to evaluate our forward
basing strategy to provide the President the best military advice for
effective operations to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL, as well as
to check Iran's influence in the region.
40. Senator Ernst. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, have you
recommended to the President he should expand basing and support
operations in Iraqi Kurdistan to enhance operations against ISIL?
Secretary Carter. At this time, I have not recommended expanding
our current posture in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The Department is
providing a significant amount of support to the Iraqi Kurdistan
Region. I believe our advise and assist as well as our train and equip
efforts throughout the Iraqi Kurdistan Region are currently aligned
appropriately to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The
Department is constantly evaluating the implementation of the campaign
to ensure it is meeting the campaign's objectives.
General Dempsey. Iraqi Kurdistan is a critical basing area in DOD's
strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. We are confident that
we have arrayed our forces and capabilities in the region in the most
effective manner to enable counter-ISIL operations. Moving forward, we
will continue to evaluate our forward basing strategy to provide the
President the best military advice to degrade and ultimately destroy
ISIL.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Senator Ted Cruz
isis center of gravity
41. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, has the Joint Staff determined
the Center of Gravity to meet the President's directive to ``ultimately
defeat'' ISIS? If so, what do you assess as the ISIS Center of Gravity?
Is the United States military properly positioned to target the Center
of Gravity, or will the effort be led by one of the directors of the
seven other lines of operations?
General Dempsey. We assess ISIL's has two interconnected centers of
gravity to achieve its strategic goal of restoring the Islamic
Caliphate. The first CoG is ISIL's territorial control in Iraq and
Syria whereby ISIL governs by forces and where it has active, passive,
and tacit support of the population. The second CoG is ISIL's extremist
ideology and its ability to promote it within Iraq and Syria as well as
externally to aspiring jihadists.
acquisition of united states equipment by iranian backed militias
42. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, how much United States equipment
has been provided by Baghdad to Iranian-backed Shia militias?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
43. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, how much United States equipment
has Iranian-backed Shia militias obtained from other means?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
support to iraqi governmental forces
44. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, in May, you stated that Iraqi
Security Forces ``just showed no will to fight'' in explaining the
Islamic State's victory at Ramadi. You added, ``They withdrew from the
site, and that says to me, and I think to most of us, that we have an
issue with the will of the Iraqis to fight ISIS and defend
themselves.'' Is it conceivable that those you identified as Iraqi
Security Forces in Anbar province did not fight because the Central
Government in Baghdad did not provide those forces the military
equipment and support to do so effectively, or do you attribute their
failure primarily to a lack of will?
Secretary Carter. The withdrawal from Ramadi in May by the Iraqi
Security Force (ISF) was due to a combination of lack of proper support
and eroded will to fight after eight months of grinding, continuous
battle with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This
incident illustrates the importance of a capable and motivated Iraqi
ground force that is adequately resourced and supported by the central
government. The forces that fled Ramadi were led poorly, did not
receive regular supplies of weapons or equipment, and did not have
valuable intelligence information about their adversaries. ISIL also
continues to show that it is an adaptive and tenacious adversary. It
has used a variety of tactics in Ramadi, such as suicide vehicle borne
improvised explosive devices, to great effect. Overall, I believe that
these issues, combined with the general problem of a hollow ISF,
contributed to the ISF's decision to retreat from Ramadi.
lack of partners in the iraqi government
45. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, Sunni tribes in Iraq can be
fickle; after years of disenfranchisement under former Prime Minister
Maliki, they seem very unlikely to side with the increasingly sectarian
and Shiite Iraqi Security Forces against ISIS. In fact, we have seen
Sunni tribes in Anbar and other parts of Western Iraq pledging their
loyalty to ISIS. \1\ Not only must this flow of Sunni tribes to our
adversary be stemmed inside Iraq, true gains against ISIS might require
an external, designated Sunni Arab partner to stabilize western Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Sunni Tribes in Iraq's Anbar Province Pledge Support to
ISIL'', Al Jazeera America Staff, 04 June 2015, http://
america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/4/sunni-tribes-in-anbar-iraq-
pledge-support-to-isil.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meanwhile, the Kurds have proven time and again that they are the
most reliable and effective anti-ISIS fighting force on the ground in
Iraq. They have held their lines against thousands of ISIS jihadists,
and have made significant counter-attacks, reducing the territorial
gains of ISIS. Yet, as you confirmed in the hearing, the United States
does not provide direct armament to the Iraqi Kurds, and everything
flows through Baghdad. We do not embed forward observers to coordinate
air strikes against ISIS. We do not truly partner with this fighting
force which has stood beside us resolutely and steadfastly, from the
ouster of Saddam Hussein until now.
Would you agree that we need a Sunni Arab force that we can partner
with to stabilize the Sunni Arab portions of Iraq?
Secretary Carter. Yes, a Sunni force that is part of a multi-
sectarian military security force controlled and supported by the
Government of Iraq is a necessary component of our campaign to repel
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and stabilize Sunni
portions of Iraq. This is why the Department of Defense is working by,
with, and through the Government of Iraq to train and equip Sunni
tribal fighters in Iraq. At al Asad and Taqaddum air bases in Anbar
province, United States and Coalition advisors are working with Iraqi
Security Forces to recruit, train, and equip fighters in the fight
against ISIL.
46. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, do you think a Sunni Arab force
has a real chance of stabilizing Iraq while a civil war continues in
Syria? How will that Sunni Arab force interact and coordinate with Kurd
forces?
Secretary Carter. Continued conflict and instability in Syria will
present challenges to the Iraqi government even after ISIL is dislodged
from Iraq. However, a Government of Iraq that effectively controls and
supports the multi-sectarian security forces of Iraq--to include Sunni
and Shia Popular Mobilization Forces, the Iraqi Army, the
Counterterrorism Service, Kurdish forces, and other local forces such
as police--has the capability to repel ISIL and hold Iraqi territory
despite a continuing civil war in Syria. Our efforts in Iraq and Syria
are complementary. Our Syria strategy has three major components:
airstrikes against ISIL, building a ground force, and pushing for a
negotiated political transition. Iraqi and Kurdish forces on both sides
of the border continue to demonstrate a willingness to work together
through coordinated planning and operations in the fight against ISIL.
47. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, do you think there is any
scenario where relative peace returns to the region while Assad holds
on to power?
General Dempsey. Such a scenario is highly unlikely.
countering the jihadi narrative
48. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, it seems that ISIS is just one
franchise of the global jihadist movement, and that there is a more
decisive battlefield than the physical ground in Raqqa, Mosul, and
Ramadi that ISIS currently controls. Like the Cold War, this true
battlefield is the war of ideas between the Western ideals of peaceful
self-determination, individual dignity, and freedom of religion against
a totalitarian ideology espoused by violent Islamic extremists who kill
anyone who opposes them or takes part in any activity they deem un-
Islamic.
We can't counter the global jihadi narrative because we won't
acknowledge its theological and ideological roots. We have seen a
steady stream of foreign fighters pour into Iraq and Syria, and despite
the fact that we have killed about 13,000 fighters, ISIS has recruited
over 4,000 westerners and continues to recruit about 1,000 fighters a
month. We have utterly failed to discredit the global jihadi narrative.
We have failed to highlight and discredit the charlatans who stitch
together these interpretations of the Koran and the Hadith to sanction
morally repugnant actions against unbelievers in name of Islam.
What are you doing to deconstruct, understand, and counter this
narrative?
General Dempsey. The Department works directly in conjunction with
Department of State, who has been tasked as the lead to counter ISIL's
narrative through the Information Coordination Cell (ICC). In addition
to our work within the ICC construct, the Department participates in
multiple forums and works with both inter-agency partners and academia
to analyze ISIL's propaganda network. The main challenge today is the
size and pace of communications in social media. The information
environment has moved beyond largely non-interactive television and
static websites to social media that can be accessed almost
instantaneously, by anyone, at almost any time. Our ability to assess
the social media environment is extremely challenging because of its
global scale and dynamic, continuously-evolving nature. USCENTCOM
serves as the Department's operational lead across multiple efforts to
blunt ISIL's narrative. Based upon the diffuse nature of the
information environment, which does not respect geographic boundaries,
the Joint Staff looks to synchronize Counter-ISIL efforts with other
Combatant Commands.
providing support to internally displaced persons (idps)
49. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, reportedly, there are now
nearly 1.8 million refugees/IDPs in northern Iraq, under the purview of
the KRG (which itself only has a population of approximately 5
million). If those refugees (of which the overwhelming majority are
Iraqi IDPs) are not properly cared for, they will become a ripe
terrorist recruiting pool for generations.
Do you feel that you have complete transparency as to what, if
anything, the central government in Baghdad is doing to assist their
fellow Kurdish Iraqis in managing this crisis? Is that process
completely transparent? Is the burden of assisting these refugees and
IDP's being equitably distributed between the central government in
Iraq and the KRG?
Secretary Carter. The Government of Iraq (GOI) provides a
significant level of transparency regarding its humanitarian assistance
efforts. GOI has provided humanitarian assistance to Iraqi internally
displaced persons located in northern Iraq and has coordinated on
multiple occasions with Kurdish forces and the Coalition to airlift
life-saving humanitarian supplies to civilians located in northern
Iraq. I would also note that the GOI is experiencing a severe financial
crisis due to low oil prices, diminished capacity, and the ongoing
counter-ISIL fight.
50. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, what are we doing to assist the
Governments of Jordan and Turkey with the enormous numbers of IDPs they
have absorbed in this conflict?
Secretary Carter. I remain concerned by the refugee crisis facing
our partners in the Middle East, including Turkey, where nearly 2
million refugees from Syria and Iraq are living, and Jordan, where
627,000 Syrian refugees have registered through the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees in addition to the hundreds of thousands of
additional refugees who have not registered. The Department of State
and the United States Agency for International Development are best
postured, however, to provide details about the funding and assistance
provided to these partners to support their response to the refugee
crisis.
The Department of Defense closely coordinates with and provides
support to many of these interagency efforts. In Jordan, for example,
the Department engages with the Jordan Armed Forces, through the United
States Embassy in Amman, to ensure United States humanitarian
assistance is able to flow into southern Syria in order to meet the
needs of Syrians who might otherwise choose to seek refuge in Jordan,
thereby lessening the burden that additional refugees would pose on our
regional partners.
approval process for weapons going to kurds
51. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, what is the process of
approving which weapons get to the KRG? Who decides which weapons
requested by the Kurds should go to them? Is it the White House, the
Pentagon, or Baghdad? Please describe the efforts to ensure accurate
and transparent accountability of weapons requested, approved, and then
actually delivered to the KRG. How much time is required for each of
the phases, from request, through to final delivery?
Secretary Carter. The process for approving weapons for Kurdish
forces starts with a request for equipment from the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG). Department of Defense experts on the ground,
including representatives from the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation
Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), the Combined Joint Forces Land Component
Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I), and the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
(OSC-I) then validate the request by ensuring it aligns with
operational requirements, and then the consent of the Government of
Iraq (GOI) is obtained with regard to the validated list. This process
typically takes one-to-two weeks from receipt of a new list until GOI
consent.
There are several mechanisms by which the Department facilitates
the delivery of defense equipment to Kurdish forces; regardless of the
mechanism, all equipment is coordinated by, with, and through the GOI.
First, the Department purchases weapons and equipment using the
Iraq Train and Equip Funds. Items are delivered first to Kuwait for
inventory and packaging; they are then moved forward into Iraq under
the control of CJTF-OIR,CFLCC-I, and OSC-I; and finally they are signed
over to Peshmerga units through the GOI. United States Government, GOI,
and Peshmerga representatives are all present in Erbil to accept
transfers.
Second, for weapons and equipment being provided to Kurdish forces
under Presidential Drawdown, Excess Defense Article, and Foreign
Military Financing authorities, the GOI submits a Letter of Request
(LOR) and signs a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA). United States
Central Command and CJTF-OIR facilitate delivery of those items to
Erbil, where United States Government, GOI, and Peshmerga
representatives transfer deliveries through the GOI to the Kurdish
forces.
Finally, some weapons and equipment are provided to Kurdish forces
through the Kurdish Resupply Task Force, for which the United States
coordinates donations and arranges for transportation of donated items.
Once a coalition partner has committed to donate defense equipment, and
transportation has been arranged, a diplomatic clearance request is
submitted to the GOI for the incoming flight. That process can take up
to 10 days but usually takes a week. The next step is to fly the
equipment to Baghdad for a customs inspection, which can take up to 24
hours, but it takes only 2-4 hours, on average. Finally, the equipment
is flown to Erbil, where it is received by a logistics representative
from the Kurdish Regional Government.
krg representation at future counter-isis coalition meetings
52. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, despite numerous requests from
all levels of the Kurdistan Regional Government to participate as part
of the Iraqi delegation to meetings of the Counter-ISIS Coalition,
their requests have been denied. President Obama has ``commended the
bravery of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces'' for the critical role they
play, and yet, it is understood that Baghdad has refused this access.
How can the administration claim that support for an inclusive Iraqi
Government is paramount to the success of the campaign, unless it also
supports KRG inclusion in all aspects of the discussions? What can you
do to ensure that the Kurds are included in the Iraqi delegation?
Secretary Carter. The United States Government is not in a position
to prescribe who the Government of Iraq (GOI) includes in its own
diplomatic delegations. The GOI, like any sovereign government, is
responsible for representing Iraq in meetings with other sovereign
governments. The United States Government does, however, encourage the
GOI to continue building inclusive governance that represents and is
responsive to all of its citizens. The current GOI is led by a Council
of Ministers that includes ministers from each of Iraq's major societal
components. Senior leaders representing the major Kurdish political
parties are included in this group. These leaders also govern the Iraqi
Kurdistan Region. Coordinating closely with the GOI, the United States
Government, including the Department of Defense, also maintains a
direct relationship with Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) leadership,
both through the KRG mission in Washington and through President
Barzani in Erbil.
long-range anti-tank weapons to counter armored vehicle born improvised
explosive device (vbied)
53. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, ISIS has captured over 1,000
armored vehicles. ISIS is also making make-shift armored vehicles with
after-market armor. The Kurds report that they cannot repel attacks by
these vehicles with light arms like AK-47s, or even with RPGs. The
Kurds report the Milan rocket provided by Germany and Italy is the best
defense but they do not have enough of them. While we have supplied AT-
4s to help Kurdish forces counter this threat, those handheld anti-tank
missiles are too short-ranged to provide adequate standoff from these
large, heavily armored VBIEDs. Are you considering giving them longer
range anti-tank systems such as the Javelin, or is there anything else
the United States can provide to counter this significant threat?
General Dempsey. We have gone to great lengths to address the
priority needs of the KSF. We are providing the Iraqi and Kurdish
forces a variety of anti-tank VBIED systems such as 40 mine-resistant
ambush-protected vehicles, 1,000 AT-4 anti-tank systems, and anti-tank
ammunition. Furthermore, we continue to seek effective coalition
donations for the Kurdish forces by engaging our coalition partners
(like Germany and Italy) to provide defensive systems such as the Milan
rocket that have sufficient range to counter the threats posed by make-
shift armored vehicles. To date, the KSF have received approximately 80
percent of more than 6 million pounds of weapons (over 55,000 weapons)
and ammunition (over 48 million rounds) donated by the coalition. This
support has helped the KSF to regain virtually all of the territory
that had been lost to ISIL.
non-lethal enablers for kurdish forces
54. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, the Kurds report significant
shortages in non-lethal defense items that are nevertheless critical to
their success. This includes helmets, body armor, and night vision
goggles. Due to limitations on their ability to buy such equipment on
the open market and the fact that their budget is severely strained,
they are hoping to receive these from the coalition. What have you told
them you plan to do to help them correct these critical shortages?
Secretary Carter. The Department plans to provide adequate defense
equipment, including non-lethal items, to Kurdish forces through the
Iraq Train and Equip Fund authority, coalition donations, or other
authorities, in coordination with the Government of Iraq.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
counter-isis strategy
55. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Carter, I understand DOD is the lead
for two of the nine lines of effort in the fight against ISIS. How will
the reimposition of the Budget Control Act caps affect the overall
counterterrorism strategy against ISIS, whether or not DOD is provided
with additional OCO funding? How important is the whole-of-government
approach to the ISIS strategy, to include the efforts of DOD, State,
Treasury, Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community?
Secretary Carter. Allowing sequestration to return would deprive
U.S. forces of what they need to accomplish their missions around the
world, including current operations in the Middle East. The short-term
impacts of a return to the Budget Control Act caps would affect all
aspects of the Department. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2016
is roughly $35 billion above sequestration-level caps. More than one-
third of the cuts in fiscal year 2016 would have to come from the
Operation and Maintenance accounts, with unavoidable reductions in
readiness and our ability to shape world events in the interests of the
United States. The longer-term impact of sequestration would damage our
national security, ultimately resulting in a military that is too small
and insufficiently equipped to implement our defense strategy fully.
The Department would be forced to make trade-offs between forward
presence and readiness, as well as between the capability and capacity
of the Joint Force--these trade-offs would have consequences for United
States missions across the globe, including in the Middle East.
The President's whole-of-government approach to the counter-Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) strategy is critical to its
success. The contributions of other Departments and Agencies include
diplomatic action, humanitarian assistance, financial measures to
undermine ISIL, initiatives to stem the flow of foreign fighters, and
expanded intelligence collection against ISIL. This mission of
defeating ISIL cannot be achieved without all these efforts. There is
an enduring connection between our nation's military efforts and those
non-military instruments of national power, and it is essential to
resource our interagency partners at the levels requested in the
President's Budget.
56. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, what is
your assessment of United States efforts to counter ISIS propaganda
campaigns and to delegitimize ISIS in the eyes of those who might
otherwise be drawn to their message? Do you believe there is sufficient
cooperation between the State Department and the Department of Defense
as well as coordination with our allies?
Secretary Carter. The Department has worked closely with the
Information Coordination Cell within the State Department Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, and with other United States
Government communicators including the Broadcasting Board of Governors,
to ensure Department of Defense counter-propaganda efforts both nest
within and support broader interagency strategies. The modern
information environment offers unique challenges to the United States
Government--information operations have moved beyond largely non-
interactive television and static websites to social media that can be
accessed almost instantaneously, by anyone, at almost any time. The
ability to assess the social media environment is extremely challenging
because of its global scale and dynamic, continuously evolving nature.
The Department is working both to ensure counter-propaganda efforts are
agile and responsive to emerging technologies, and to develop
innovative ways to assess their effectiveness in this constantly
changing environment.
General Dempsey. The Department of Defense continues to seek ways
we can support Department of State in countering ISIS propaganda
campaigns and delegitimize ISIS through our unique authorities and
resources. ISIS continues to successfully leverage the information
environment to its advantage. The online space, in particular, is
dynamic and its global span is challenging. Adversary efforts in the
information environment are unencumbered by legal or policy concerns,
very cheap to execute, efforts and policies need to evolve in order to
combat this threat. We continue to made strides in learning more about
the social media environment, and from a whole of government
perspective, how we can collectively assess the effectiveness of our
efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
rules of engagement
57. Senator Kaine. Secretary Carter, during my recent trip to the
Iraq and Turkey, my staff was briefed on details regarding support for
the Syrian militia forces we are training. Specifically, we discussed
the issue surrounding the Rules of Engagement prohibiting the use of
United States airpower to assist in defending United States-trained
Syrian militias against attack by forces from the Assad regime. The
Special Operations Forces charged with this training explained that the
prohibition was severely damaging the credibility of U.S. commitment to
the trainees and likely hampering our recruitment efforts.
Can you confirm whether such a restriction on supporting U.S.-
trained Syrian forces with defensive fires against the Assad regime's
forces exists within the current Rules of Engagement? Will the DOD
change this rule? If so, when? If not, what steps should the Senate
Armed Service Committee take to remove the restriction and ultimately
provide the full spectrum of support and protection to the forces we
train and put in harm's way?
Secretary Carter. The current Operation INHERENT RESOLVE rules of
engagement (ROE) are classified. My staff can provide additional
information regarding those ROE in a classified setting. No action by
the Committee is necessary. The Administration has concluded that there
is sufficient legal authority to provide combat support to Syrian
fighters that DOD has vetted, or vetted and trained, who come under
attack by Syrian government forces, consistent with the right of U.S.
self-defense, if the U.S. action is necessary to effectively address
the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant to the
United States and Iraq and meets the international law requirements of
necessity and proportionality.
UNITED STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS TO COUNTER THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ
AND THE LEVANT
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:53 a.m. in Room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Lee, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and
Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Senator McCain. Well, good morning, all. The Senate Armed
Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
United States strategy and military operations to counter the
Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant, or ISIL.
I want to thank our witnesses, Under Secretary Wormuth and
General Austin, for appearing before us today, and their
continued service to our Nation.
It's been 1 year--it's been 1 year since President Obama
spoke to the Nation about the threat posed by ISIL and
increased United States military operations against us. Many of
us believe that the goal the President laid out, quote, ``to
degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL'' is right. Many of us
agree with a military strategy that seeks to empower local
forces in Iraq and Syria to combat ISIL with United States and
coalition training, equipment, assistance, and airpower. One
year into this campaign, it seems impossible to assert that
ISIL is losing and that we are winning. If you're not winning
in this kind of warfare, you are losing. Stalemate is not
success.
It is accurate that we have conducted thousands of
airstrikes against ISIL, trucks and fighters, bunkers and
buildings. This conjures the illusion of progress, but what
effect has that had? ISIL has lost some territory on the
margin, mainly to Kurdish and Shiite forces, but ISIL has
consolidated control of its core territories and expanded its
control in Syria. It continues to dominate Sunni Arab areas in
both Iraq and Syria. It maintains control of key cities, like
Mosul, Fallujah, and Ramadi. Efforts to retake those
territories appear to have stalled entirely.
Meanwhile, ISIL is expanding globally. It's now operating
in Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and Egypt. Other radical Islamic
groups, like Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia,
have pledged allegiance to ISIL. This appearance of success
only enhances ISIL's ability to radicalize, recruit, and grow.
Published media reports suggest that the CIA's [Central
Intelligence Agency] estimates of ISIL's manpower has remained
constant, despite United States airstrikes, which suggests that
either they were wrong, to begin with, or that ISIL is
replacing its losses in real time. Neither is good. Indeed,
this committee is disturbed by recent whistleblower allegations
that officials at Central Command skewed intelligence
assessments to paint an overly positive picture of conditions
on the ground. We are currently investigating these
allegations, which we take with the utmost seriousness. The
Department of Defense should, as well. If true, these--those
responsible must be held accountable.
Ultimately, it's not--ultimately, it's not that we are
doing nothing to counter ISIL, it is that there is no
compelling reason to believe that anything we are currently
doing will be sufficient to achieve our strategic objective of
degrading and ultimately destroying ISIL. The United States and
our partners do not have the initiative. Our enemies do.
They're capitalizing on our inadequate policy to maintain and
enhance their initiative, as they have for the past 4 years.
Indeed, the situation on the ground is now taking yet another
dramatic turn for the worst, as several recent events make
clear.
Recent published reports state that United States officials
believe that ISIL is using mustard gas and may even be
manufacturing these chemical weapons by themselves. Whether
ISIL is manufacturing chemical weapons themselves or acquired
from former or current stocks maintained by Bashar Assad, this
is a potential nightmare scenario for our partners in the
Middle East and for us. At the same time, the United States
effort to train and equip Syrian rebels to fight ISIL is
clearly and unfortunately failing. The goal was 3,000 fighters
in the first year. Instead, this program has trained and
equipped only 54 fighters, some of whom were killed or captured
by al-Qaeda as soon as they returned to Syria. This program the
administration promised would result in a viable indigenous
ground force in Syria has yet to produce any significant
effects on the battlefield. To be sure, the fixation with
perfect vetting, both in the Congress and the administration,
is contributing to this failure. But, far worse has been the
administration's requirement that this new Syrian force could
only fight ISIL, not the Assad regime, which has killed far
more Syrians than ISIL, and the President's refusal, until just
week's ago, to authorize the close air support and other
military assistance to ensure our Syrian partners would be
successful.
Unfortunately, these contradictions were clear from the
beginning, and many members of this committee warned the
administration to change course. Their failure to do so has
squandered a lot of time, money, and, worst of all,
credibility. For this committee to continue supporting this
program, we need some major changes.
Into this vacuum has now stepped Vladimir Putin. As in
Ukraine and elsewhere, he perceives the administration's
inaction and caution as weakness, and he is taking advantage.
According to media reports, Putin has deployed strike aircraft,
T-90 tanks, Howitzers, armored personnel carriers, Russian
marines, and housing for up to 1,500 personnel in military
bases in western Syria. This is an expansion of Russian power
in the Middle East that we have not seen in 4 decades, and it
will allow Putin to further prop up Assad, fuel his
indiscriminate killing machine, play kingmaker in any
transition, undermine United States goals, policy, and
operations, and ultimately prolong this horrific conflict. The
main beneficiary will be ISIL.
Many of us have said from the beginning--from the
beginning--that the conflict in Syria would not be contained.
For 4 years, we have seen evidence of that: the hundreds of
thousands dead, the millions of driven and displaced people,
the use of chemical weapons, and the rise of the worst
terrorist army in the world. Now we are seeing the latest
manifestation of this failed policy--the flood of people
pouring out of the Middle East--that has led to the worst
refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.
The administration has promised to accept 10,000 refugees
in the coming year. That's a noble gesture. But, unless we
address the cause of this crisis, which is the continued
grinding conflict in Syria, the refugees will keep coming, ISIL
will grow stronger, the Middle East will descend further into
chaos, and United States national security interests will be
put at greater risk.
For 4 years, we have been told that there is no military
solution to this conflict, as if anyone believes there is; and
there are no good options, if anybody--as if anybody believes
there are; that our influence is limited, as if that has not
always been the case; that we will not succeed overnight, as if
our problem is one of time, not policy; and that we cannot
solve every problem in the Middle East, as if that absolves us
of our responsibility to make the situation better, where we
can.
This is not a question of our capacity or our capabilities
or our options. We have options between doing nothing and
invading Iraq and Syria. Many members of this committee have
suggested such options, for years now, and they are still
relevant. We need to put an end to Assad's ability to use
airpower against his people, especially the use of horrific
barrel bombs. Shoot down planes that drop barrel bombs that
slaughter innocent civilians. It's one of the leading killers
of innocent civilians. We need to help establish safe zones,
inside Syria, where refugees and displaced people can be
secure. We need forward air controllers to add precision and
lethality to our air campaign. We need to make significant
changes in order to improve and rapidly expand our training of
Syrian and Iraqi forces. While no one believes that we need to
invade Iraq or Syria, the fact is that we will likely need
additional United States Special Forces and military advisors
to be successful.
I hope our witnesses will not repeat our desired policy
goals and a list of tactical achievements and talk about,
quote, ``nine lines of effort.'' We have heard all of that
before, but we have yet to hear a theory of victory. I hope to
hear one today.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wormuth and General Austin, welcome.
This morning's hearing continues the committee's review of
United States military operations to counter ISIL in Iraq and
Syria, and its growth in the broader Middle East, Africa, and
South Asia. Through its extreme ideological and brutal tactics,
including the reported development and use of chemical weapons,
ISIL has gained control over portions of Syria and Iraq
effectively erasing the border between these countries. This
violent extremist group has slaughtered civilians, enslaved
women and girls, and carried out horrific attacks in ethnic and
religious minorities, and broadcast its barbaric acts on social
media. To escape the violence of ISIL, the Assad regime, and
multiple other armed elements, millions have been displaced or
fled outside Iraq and Syria. The crush of fleeing refugees into
Europe has only added to the sense of urgency regarding the
need to restore security in the region.
The military campaign against ISIL remains complex, with no
easy answers. While the coalition has had success in pushing
ISIL out of some territory, including gains by the Kurdish
Peshmerga in the north, the retaking of Tikrit by Iraqi
Security Forces, and the Syrian Kurds' removal of ISIL along
sections of the border with Turkey, the self-described Islamic
State continues to hold key cities, including al-Raqqa in Syria
and Mosul in Iraq. The Iraq Security Forces' counteroffensive
to take back Ramadi has struggled over the last few months, and
Bashir remains contested. At the same time, Iranian-backed
Shi'a militias have stalled in operations near Fallujah.
Despite its recent setbacks, ISIL is consolidating its control
over the local populations in the areas that it holds in both
Syria and Iraq.
The agreement between the United States and Turkey,
expanding access to land and use of Turkish airbases and
seeking to create an ISIL-free zone on the Syrian side of the
border, is an important step forward. However, the provocative
deployment by Russia of additional military forces to bases in
Syria, under the guise of assisting in countering ISIL efforts,
appears to be an effort by Putin to prop up the Assad regime,
further complicating efforts to restore security in Syria.
These events have raised concerns over whether the current
level of our efforts against ISIL is sufficient. A critical
issue for the military lines of effort within the counter-ISIL
strategy is the progress of the United States Train and Equip
Programs for coalition-backed forces in both Iraq and Syria.
While the United States-led air campaign has had an effect in
degrading ISIL, effective local forces that can take full
advantage of coalition airpower, seize ground from ISIL, and
then hold it, are essential to success.
In Iraq, operations to take Anbar require recruiting
significant numbers of Sunnis into the Iraqi Security Forces
and equipping them to resist the ISIL threat. I am concerned by
reports that Sunni recruitment has fallen short of its targets
and that the Government of Iraq has been slow in delivering
equipment for arming Sunni forces.
In Syria, the DOD [Department of Defense] Syria Train and
Equip Program, according to public reports, has experienced a
variety of setbacks. We'll be interested in your assessment of
this effort. Quite interested.
General, I also hope you will address what you believe
might be done to intensify military operations to counter the
ISIL threat. For example, would you support a more active role
for United States military personnel in facilitating the
engagement with Sunni tribes, or providing advisors within the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense to build institutional capacity, or
accompanying Iraqi Security Forces, on a limited basis, when
direct contact with the enemy is not anticipated?
The ISIL problem is not geographically bounded by Syria and
Iraq. indeed, as the Chairman has pointed out, ISIL-inspired or
-directed groups have appeared in Yemen, Afghanistan, Egypt,
Libya, Nigeria, the Horn of Africa, and the Caucasus, and
elsewhere. General, I am interested in your assessment of the
group's growth in the region and how CENTCOM [United States
Central Command] is contributing to transregional efforts to
combat the group.
Ultimately, the success of the counter-ISIL effort will
depend on a number of nonmilitary factors also, including
whether the reforms Prime Minister Abadi has initiated are
implemented and result in an Iraqi government that is more
inclusive and responsive to the concerns of the Sunnis, Kurds,
religious minorities, and other factions in Iraq society;
whether the international coalition, including states in the
region, can effectively counter ISIL's propaganda, financing,
and the spread of its extreme ideology; and whether a political
solution can be found for the crisis in Syria. These issues are
the primary responsibility of departments other than Department
of Defense, but I assume our witnesses would agree that these
issues are integral to our comprehensive approach to countering
the ISIL threat.
General Austin, I hope that you will also, to the extent
possible, given the ongoing review by the Inspector General,
address questions involving intelligence assessments with
respect to ISIL. It is important that we wait for the Inspector
General's investigation before--complete it--before making a
judgment, but I have no doubt that you will take such
allegations as seriously as we do in Congress. We take them
very seriously. Like Senator McCain, I expect the committee
will be kept apprised of this investigation as it continues,
and be active, in terms of the recommendations.
Let me thank both witnesses for their testimony this
morning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Ms. Wormuth.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member
Reed, as well as members of this committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today to give you an update on the
military aspects of our counter-ISIL campaign.
It's also a pleasure, as always, to be here with General
Austin. We work very closely together every day on a range of
issues, so it's nice to be here with him today.
As the Chairman said, it's been just over a year since the
United States and a coalition of nations began the military
campaign against ISIL. When we began that campaign about a year
ago, ISIL was pushing into Kurdish territory in northern Iraq
and pushing towards Baghdad. Over the past 12 months, ISIL has
lost territory in both Syria and Iraq, despite advances it's
made in Ramadi and Palmyra. Progress has been slow, but steady.
There have definitely been setbacks in the past year. While
not 10 feet tall, ISIL remains a thinking enemy that adapts to
evolving conditions on the battlefield. Our Train and Equip
Programs in Iraq and Syria have faced challenges. In Iraq, the
pace of our program has moved more slowly than we'd like, and,
in Syria, the stringent vetting criteria we're using at the
outset of the program has contributed to smaller numbers than
we'd hoped for. As the military campaign continues in both
countries, we expect there will continue to be challenges
clearing and holding territory.
But, we've also seen progress in the past year. You're all
familiar with the successful operations to take back Kurdish
territory in Iraq, to defeat ISIL in Khobani, and to, more
recently, retake Tikrit, as well as other successful
engagements.
On the political front, Prime Minister Abadi continues to
demonstrate the resolve necessary to confront ISIL, and he is
striving to manage what is a very difficult political landscape
in Baghdad.
In Syria, we've seen some opportunities emerge that we
didn't envision a year ago, particularly in the northern part
of the country, where Syrian Kurds, working with Syrian Arabs,
have successfully pressured ISIL along the Turkish border.
Over a year ago, the President outlined a whole-of-
government strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, and
he emphasized it would be a multiyear campaign. When Secretary
Carter was here in July, he outlined the nine lines of effort
that comprise our strategy, so I won't go over them again in
detail, but I would emphasize it will take more than the
military campaign to be successful. We also need to dry up
ISIL's finances, we need to stop the flow of foreign fighters
into Iraq and Syria, in particular, protect the United States
from potential attacks from ISIL, provide humanitarian
assistance in areas that we are taking back from ISIL, and find
a way to more effectively counter ISIL's very successful
messaging campaign.
As Secretary Carter said to the committee in July, the
administration believes we have the right strategy in place.
We're now focused on implementing the strategy as effectively
as possible. This is very much an interagency effort, with
increasingly better synchronization against all of--across all
of the departments and agencies that are involved. In fact,
Secretary Carter and Secretary Kerry have been meeting together
with their senior staffs to monitor and identify issues in the
campaign. They're meeting tomorrow with NCTC [National
Counterterrorism Center] to focus in particular on foreign
fighters.
DOD, as you know, is responsible for two of the lines of
effort inside the strategy: denying ISIL safe haven and
building partner capacity. So, I'd like to speak briefly to
those areas, and General Austin will also elaborate.
The coalition campaign has degraded ISIL's military
capacity, has removed some of its key leaders and enabled gains
by local forces in Iraq and Syria. The ISF [Iraqi Security
Forces] has regained control of Tikrit from ISIL earlier this
year. Syrian Kurds and Sunni Arab partners have recently taken
the key border town in Syria of Tal Abyad, which severed one of
ISIL's key lines of communication and supply, and put ISIL on
the defensive, and also put more pressure on its stronghold,
Raqqa, in Syria. These examples demonstrate how, when we have
credible ground forces and we support them with our airpower,
ISIL can suffer.
We're also working hard to build the capacity of our
partner forces on the ground. Since we began our efforts, we've
now trained and equipped more than six brigades and provided
training to more than 13,000 Iraqi personnel--Iraqi army,
Kurdish Peshmerga, and counterterrorism service personnel--and
we have more in the pipeline. As Secretary Carter said in July,
however, training for the Iraqi army has been slowed by a lack
of trainees coming into the training sites.
Over the last several weeks, we've had better participation
from Iraqi units at the training sites, and Iraq has actually
expanded the pool of units that are eligible for training. Some
of the units we have trained are now participating more
directly in the fight in areas such as Ramadi, and early
indications are that they are performing well in combat
missions. But, as you all know, they face a difficult fight
ahead, and strong leadership of these forces is going to be
essential.
Our forces on the ground at al-Assad and Taqqatum Airbases,
are involved in advising and training Sunni tribal fighters in
Anbar Province, both through providing direct training and also
through train-the-trainer type of assistance with the Iraqi
Security Forces. In terms of equipping these Sunni tribal
fighters, we've recently delivered a battalion's worth of
equipment to Iraqi officials working with us there on those two
airbases to distribute the equipment to fighters. We're also
now overseeing the distribution of the Government of Iraq's
equipment to these Sunni tribal fighters from these bases. So,
through these kinds of efforts, we now have more than 4,000
Sunni tribal fighters in Anbar Province.
We're also still in the early stages of our Train and Equip
Program in Syria. This effort, I think it's important to
highlight, is just one element of what we're trying to do in
the larger campaign in Syria, which includes an increasing
number of airstrikes as well as supporting partner forces on
the ground, like the Syrian Kurds, the YPG [People's Protection
Units], Sunni Arabs, and other local forces, such as Turkomans,
for example, to try to put pressure on ISIL in northeastern
Syria. These efforts have substantially rolled ISIL back in
this area, and have had significant impacts on ISIL's freedom
of movement and supply lines.
As of September 15th, our Train and Equip Program, the
specific program we have, we're now currently training more
than 100 fighters, and we have additional recruits in the
pipeline. This number is definitely smaller than we had hoped
for, in part because, as the Chairman and others have noted, we
put our trainees through a very rigorous screening process to
meet standards that are very appropriately laid out in U.S.
law. We've closely aligned all of our efforts in all of these
areas with our 62-country coalition. As an example of how we're
doing that, Turkey's recent decision to provide us access to
bases at Incirlik and elsewhere has enabled us to expand the
fight and is strengthening the cohesion of our efforts in
Syria.
Before turning to General Austin, I want to address
Russia's involvement in Syria. We're closely tracking Russia's
recent efforts to deploy additional military equipment and
personnel to Syria, and we're in close touch with our allies
and partners about these developments. Both Russia and Iran
have continued to support, politically and militarily, the
Assad regime, which has systemically murdered its own people
and helped create the conditions of the current conflict and
the rise of ISIL. What we need in Syria urgently is a political
solution to the conflict through a transition away from Assad.
Any actions that empower the regime to escalate the conflict
are unwelcome and would be destabilizing and counterproductive.
This is clearly a very difficult challenge that we face.
We're not going to solve it quickly, but we have the right
components in place to advance our objectives, and we're
dynamically adjusting our campaign to a rapidly changing
battlefield. Achieving a lasting defeat against ISIL is going
to require continued commitment, strong leadership from us and
the global coalition, as well as commitment and sacrifice from
local forces in Iraq and Syria.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wormuth follows:]
The Prepared Statement by Hon. Christine E. Wormuth
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee:
thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of the Committee today
to provide an update on our counter-ISIL campaign.
It has been just over a year since the United States and a
coalition of nations began the military campaign against the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). When we began the campaign, ISIL
was pushing into Kurdish territory in northern Iraq and toward Baghdad.
Over the past 12 months, ISIL has lost territory in both Syria and Iraq
despite advances in Ramadi and Palmyra. Progress has been slow but
steady. The 62-member international coalition to defeat ISIL in Iraq
and Syria--galvanized by the threat ISIL poses to all of our nations--
remains strong.
There have been setbacks along the way. While not 10 feet tall,
ISIL remains an adaptive adversary that can still conduct offensive
operations--as we saw in Ramadi. ISIL is a thinking enemy that adapts
to evolving conditions on the battlefield. Our train and equip programs
in Iraq and Syria have faced challenges--in Iraq the pace of the
program has moved more slowly than we would like, and in Syria we use
stringent vetting criteria that at the outset of the program have
contributed to smaller numbers than we hoped for. As the campaign
continues in both countries, we expect there to be continued challenges
in clearing and holding territory.
We have also seen progress during the past year. You all are
familiar with the successful operations to take back Kurdish territory
in Iraq, defeat ISIL in Kobane, and retake Tikrit--as well as other
successful engagements. On the political front, Prime Minister Abadi in
Iraq continues to demonstrate the resolve necessary to confront ISIL
and is striving to manage the challenging political landscape in
Baghdad. In Syria, we have seen opportunities emerge that we did not
envision a year ago, particularly in the northern tier of the country,
where Syrian Kurds have successfully pressured ISIL along the Turkish
border and, working with Syrian Arabs, have also applied pressure
southward toward Raqqa.
Over a year ago the President outlined a whole of government
strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, and he emphasized it
would be a multi-year campaign. Secretary Carter outlined the nine
lines of effort that comprise our strategy in detail for you in July,
so I won't go over them again except to emphasize that it will take
more than just the military campaign to be successful. We also will
need to dry up ISIL's finances, stop the flows of foreign fighters into
Iraq and Syria in particular, protect the United States from potential
ISIL attacks, provide humanitarian assistance to rebuild areas cleared
of ISIL forces, and find ways to more effectively counter ISIL's very
successful messaging campaign.
As Secretary Carter told this committee in July, the Administration
believes it has the right strategy in place. We are now focused on ways
to improve the implementation of the strategy--this means constantly
evaluating our approach and adapting it as conditions evolve,
opportunities arise, and challenges emerge. This is truly an
interagency effort, with increasingly better synchronization across
departments and agencies to improve the execution of the strategy.
Secretary Carter and Secretary Kerry have been regularly reviewing the
implementation of the counter-ISIL campaign, including a meeting
tomorrow with NCTC on foreign fighters.
The Department of Defense, as you know, is responsible for two
lines of effort inside that strategy--denying ISIL safe haven in Iraq
and Syria, and building partner capacity so that local forces can
defeat ISIL on the ground. I'd like to briefly update you on our
activities in both of these areas.
The coalition air campaign has degraded ISIL's military capacity,
removed some key leaders, and enabled gains by local forces in Iraq and
Syria. Iraqi Security Forces regained control of Tikrit from ISIL
earlier this year, and Syrian Kurds and their Sunni Arab partners
recently took the key border town of Tal Abyad from ISIL, severing one
of its key lines of communication and supply, and putting ISIL on the
defensive and its stronghold in Raqqah under pressure. Those examples
demonstrate, again, that where we have had a credible ground force
supported by coalition air power, ISIL has suffered.
We are also working hard to build the capacity of partner forces on
the ground. Since we began our efforts, we have equipped more than six
brigades and provided training to nearly 13,000 Iraqi personnel,
including Kurds--with more currently in the pipeline. Training for the
Iraqi Army, however, has been slowed by a lack of trainees as the
Secretary of Defense made clear in his July testimony before this
committee.
Over the last several weeks we have had better participation from
Iraqi units at BPC sites and Iraq has expanded the training pool to a
wider set of existing units. The Iraqis are also being more aggressive
about planning ahead to put additional units in training, which should
increase the efficiency of the training effort. Some of the units we
have trained are now participating more directly in the fight in areas
such as Ramadi. Initial indications are that they are performing well
in combat missions, but they face a difficult fight ahead and strong
leadership will be essential.
United States forces on the ground at al Asad and Taqaddum airbases
are involved in advising and training of Sunni tribal fighters in Anbar
province--both through direct training and ``train-the-trainer''
efforts with the Iraqi Security Forces. In terms of equipping these
forces, we've recently delivered a battalion's worth of equipment to
Iraqi officials working with us there to distribute to Sunni tribal
fighters. We are also overseeing distribution of the Government of
Iraq's equipment to tribal fighters from these bases. Through efforts
like this, there are now more than four thousand equipped Sunni tribal
fighters in Anbar.
We are also still in the early stages of our Train and Equip
mission in Syria. This effort is just one element of our larger
campaign in Syria, which includes an increasing number of airstrikes as
well as efforts on the ground with the Syrian Kurds, Sunni Arab, and
other local forces to put pressure on ISIL in northeastern Syria. These
efforts have substantially rolled ISIL back in this area and had
significant impacts on ISIL's freedom of movement and lines of
communication. As of September 15, through our T&E program we are
currently training more than 100 fighters with additional recruits in
the pipeline. This number is much smaller than we hoped for at this
point, partly because we put our volunteers through a very vigorous
screening process to meet standards very appropriately set by U.S. law.
We are closely aligned with the coalition on all of these efforts. As
an example, Turkey's recent decision to provide access and basing at
Incirlik has enabled us to expand our fight against ISIL and further
strengthen the cohesion of our efforts in Syria.
Before turning to General Austin, I also want to address Russia's
involvement in Syria.
We are closely tracking Russia's recent efforts to deploy
additional military equipment and personnel to Syria, and we are in
close touch with our allies and partners about these developments.
Russian and Iranian support to Asad and his regime has prolonged the
conflict in Syria. Both have continued to support, politically and
militarily, a regime that has systematically murdered its own people,
creating the conditions for the current conflict and the rise of ISIL.
What is needed in Syria, urgently, is a political solution to the
conflict through a political transition away from Asad. Any actions
that empower the regime to escalate the conflict are unwelcome, as they
would be destabilizing and counterproductive.
In closing, let me state the obvious: this is a difficult problem.
We will not solve it quickly, but we have the right components in place
to advance our objectives, and we are dynamically adjusting our
campaign to deal with a rapidly changing battlefield. Achieving a
lasting defeat against ISIL is going to require continued commitment
and steady leadership from the United States and the global coalition,
as well as commitment and sacrifice on the part of local forces on the
ground in Iraq and Syria. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. General Austin.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Austin. Good morning, Chairman McCain, Senator
Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. I want to
thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to provide a
current update on the progress achieved over the past year in
support of the ongoing campaign to counter ISIL, or Daesh, in
Iraq and Syria.
I'm pleased to appear here this morning alongside Ms.
Christine Wormuth. Ms. Wormuth is widely respected throughout
the Department of Defense, and we are most grateful to her for
her continued and strong support of our efforts at CENTCOM.
I'll join Christine in making a few brief opening comments, and
then we're prepared to answer your questions.
Before providing a brief update on the counter-ISIL
campaign, I did want to quickly address an important issue. As
the Chairman mentioned, there is an ongoing DOD IG [Inspector
General] investigation looking into allegations concerning the
processing of intelligence information by CENTCOM's
Intelligence Director. Because the allegations are currently
under investigation, it would be premature and inappropriate
for me to discuss this matter. What I will say is, I welcome
the DOD IG's oversight, and, once the investigation is
complete, based upon the findings, you can be assured that I
will take appropriate actions.
Again, I cannot speak to the specifics of the allegations;
however, I would like to take this opportunity to provide some
clarity with respect to how we use intelligence products in the
critical work that we do.
Because of the nature of our mission at CENTCOM, we do
have, and rely on, a robust intelligence enterprise to support
the Command. There are over 1,200 seasoned intelligence
professionals that make up that enterprise, and they do
exceptional work. As a commander, I greatly value and seek
their input and insights. I use the assessments that they
provide me to--together with the inputs that I receive from a
variety of sources that include my commanders on the ground who
I talk to almost every single day, and I consider this broad
range of inputs when making my decisions.
You know, there's been a lot of speculation in the media
about the allegations made to the DOD IG; and one in
particular, I believe, should be addressed and corrected for
the record. Some have expressed concern that CENTCOM
intelligence reports are sent directly to the President. This
is not accurate. As the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence put out to the media last week, and I quote,
``None of the combatant commands are permitted to engage
directly in the President's daily brief process. Rather,
reports are produced by the combatant commands and funneled
through the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] to ensure that
all substantive deliberations and final contributions are
appropriately coordinated,'' end quote.
Again, I cannot comment on the specific allegations. We
will need to wait for the DOD IG to complete its investigation.
But, I did want to provide this additional clarification.
Ladies and gentlemen, with respect to the ongoing
operations in Iraq and Syria today, despite some slow movement
at the tactical level, we continue to make progress across the
battlespace in support of the broader United States Government
strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. Key to the
enduring success of the military campaign is sustained pressure
on ISIL, both from the air and on the ground. The approach that
we adopted relies on indigenous forces to create and sustain
this pressure while also curbing the flow of foreign fighters
and cutting off the enemy's ability to resource himself.
In recent months, Iraq's Security Forces have experienced
some setbacks. This is to be expected in the early stages of a
fight as complex as this one. But, overall, enabled by
coalition airstrikes and our advise-and-assist in building
partner capacity efforts, the Iraqis continue to make progress.
In northern Iraq, the Kurdish Peshmerga have performed
exceptionally well, and the Kurdish-Arab coalition in northeast
Syria is also achieving substantial effects. In fact, over the
past several months, they've retaken more than 17,000 square
kilometers of terrain from the enemy. The effects that they
have achieved serve to create significant opportunities that,
if pursued, could prove devastating for the enemy. The intent
of the military campaign is to degrade and ultimately defeat
the enemy through our own actions and by enabling and
supporting the efforts of our coalition partners and the
indigenous forces in Iraq and Syria. Again, progress is being
made, and this is evidenced by what we see happening in the air
and on the ground in both countries.
I would also point out that the progress reflects, in large
part, the many contributions made by our coalition partners.
The 60-plus-nation coalition represents the strength of this
campaign, and we remain grateful for their strong support.
Success in this campaign will require the continued support of
our coalition partners along with the support of other elements
of the U.S. Government and the international community. More
importantly, it will require that the Iraqis do what is
necessary to address their political challenges. National
reconciliation is absolutely essential to the success in the
counter-ISIL campaign.
We said at the outset that the military campaign to counter
ISIL would take time. It will take time. We should expect that
there will be occasional setbacks along the way, particularly
in the early stages. We also need to keep in mind that we are
supporting and enabling this effort. Our partners, not us, are
in the lead. It is taking a bit longer to get things done, but
it must be this way if we are to achieve lasting and positive
effects.
Fortunately, amidst all the--amidst the many challenges
that exist in Iraq and Syria, we find opportunities and we
remain confident that our actions in pursuit of these
opportunities will continue to produce positive results in the
coming days.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, I
want to thank you once again for the strong support that you
show to our servicemembers, our civilians, and their families.
They are truly exceptional, and they are making important and
lasting contributions to the overall effort.
Again, we appreciate your support. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Austin follows:]
The Prepared Opening Statement by General Lloyd J. Austin III
introduction
We have completed the first year of a multi-year campaign designed
to counter and militarily defeat the self-proclaimed Islamic State
(ISIL), which is commonly referred to by our partners in the region as
``Daesh.'' This terrorist organization presents a very real threat to
stability and security in Iraq and Syria and other parts of the Central
Region and beyond; and, it also poses a potential threat to the United
States homeland and our core national interests in the region. Today,
despite some slow movement at the tactical level, we continue to make
progress across the battlespace in Iraq and Syria in support of the
broader USG strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. We have
achieved measurable effects against this enemy; and, looking ahead, we
are postured to continue to make progress on multiple fronts across the
combined joint operations area. Key to the enduring success of the
military campaign is sustained pressure on ISIL, both from the air and
on the ground; and, using indigenous forces to help create and sustain
that pressure, while also curbing the flow of foreign fighters and
cutting off the enemy's ability to resource himself.
Today, although ISIL is still able to conduct attacks and incite
terror, the organization's overall capability has been disrupted. While
Iraq's security forces have experienced some setbacks, they continue to
make progress, enabled by Coalition airstrikes and our advise and
assist and building partner capacity efforts. They have executed a
number of Coalition-enabled operations against the enemy. In northern
Iraq, the Kurdish Peshmerga have performed exceptionally well. The
Kurdish-Arab Coalition in northeast Syria also is achieving substantial
effects.
Of course, the military piece is just one component of the broader
Counter-ISIL Strategy which consists of nine lines of effort (LOE), to
be executed by all elements of the U.S. Government and with the support
of our Coalition partners. The military is responsible for two of the
nine lines of effort. We are responsible for LOE #2--``Denying ISIL
Safe Haven,'' and that is being accomplished through our support to
indigenous ground forces in Iraq and Syria, primarily through our
precision airstrikes, employment of available Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and our advise and
assist efforts at operational headquarters. We also are responsible for
LOE #3--``Building Partner Capacity,'' which includes our train and
equip programs for both Iraq and Syria and ongoing advise and assist
efforts for Iraq. We must succeed at both in order to set conditions
for the military defeat of ISIL. However, a lasting defeat of this
enemy will require a `whole of government' effort across all nine LOEs.
Most notably, we will need to see stable and inclusive governments in
place in Iraq and Syria; and, we will have to curb the flow of foreign
fighters, cut off ISIL's resourcing and financing, and effectively
counter the enemy's information operations.
We are still in the early stages of this campaign and there is
tough work ahead, and success will require strategic patience. But, the
60-plus nation Counter-ISIL Coalition remains strong and the indigenous
ground forces, with the support of Coalition air operations and our
advise and assist and building partner capacity efforts, continue to
make progress across the battlespace in Iraq and Syria.
the road to mosul, june 2014
On June 10th, 2014, the city of Mosul, Iraq fell to the terrorist
organization, ISIL or ``Daesh.'' Within days, most of Iraq's security
forces had withdrawn from northern Iraq, ISIL was making a strong push
towards Erbil and Baghdad, and the country was in crisis. The U.S.,
with the support of partner nations, responded quickly and decisively
to address the burgeoning crisis.
Key also was understanding the root causes of the instability that
enabled ISIL's rapid push south and west towards the capital city. ISIL
was not a monolith, as it has sometimes been described. What we saw
unfold in the initial stages of the conflict in Iraq was less a
reflection of ISIL's military might and more the result of the Sunnis
simply refusing to stop the organization's advance through the country.
Over a period of years, the Iraqi government under Prime Minister
Maliki had alienated the Sunni and Kurdish populations. This led to
growing unrest and security seams. ISIL saw the opportunity and
launched their attack into Iraq absent resistance from the Sunnis who
viewed ISIL as a means for bringing about a change in their government.
The majority of the Sunnis simply refused to fight for Prime Minister
Maliki. They allowed--and in some cases facilitated--ISIL's push
through the country.
Unfortunately, the security forces were largely incapable of
mounting a credible defense against ISIL. After we departed in 2011,
their skills quickly atrophied. The leadership of the country made a
series of poor decisions; among them was the decision to stop training
the Iraqi security forces and to stop maintaining their equipment.
They, in turn, suffered a number of defeats early on in ISIL's push
towards Baghdad.
the regional campaign plan to counter isil:
One year ago, in September 2014, President Obama announced to the
American people that the United States, with the support of a broad
Coalition, would take action to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately
defeat ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained whole-of-government
strategy. The military effort represents one element of this broader
strategy; and, we are currently in the early stages of our counter-ISIL
military campaign, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The objective of
the military campaign is to defeat the enemy through our own actions
and by enabling the efforts of our Coalition partners and the
indigenous forces on the ground in Iraq and Syria. The plan consists of
a framework with five key elements: COUNTER (HALT), CONTAIN, ENABLE,
ELIMINATE, DEFEAT. Many of the efforts are occurring simultaneously or
near-simultaneously; and, progress is being achieved in all areas.
halting isil's advance
We said that we would first have to halt ISIL's advance; and, we
have done this in Iraq. The enemy is no longer able to conduct large-
scale operations and to seize and hold large swaths of new terrain.
While ISIL is still capable of exploiting weaknesses in counter-ISIL
forces and they can and do operate freely in uncontested terrain, the
enemy's focus has shifted primarily to defending territory in Iraq.
Even in areas where we see increased ISIL activity, like at Ramadi and
Bayji, we assess that the intent of these operations is simply to hold
the terrain and occupy the Iraqi security forces.
A key element of the ongoing effort to degrade ISIL's capability is
our Coalition-led air operations, which have been extraordinarily
effective. Since commencing airstrikes on 8 August 2014 and 23
September 2014 in Iraq and Syria, respectively, Coalition air crews
from 14 partner nations have conducted more than 6,900 total strikes.
They are taking the fight to the enemy in a significant way, and have
greatly enhanced the reach and effectiveness of the indigenous ground
forces.
Coalition airstrikes in support of OIR have proven to be some of
the most precise and disciplined in the history of warfare [>95%
effectiveness rating]. The high level of precision seeks to minimize
collateral damage, even as we preserve an unprecedented tempo in
targeting ISIL's warfighting capability. This is especially important
given the highly-charged sectarian undercurrents at play in the region.
We also are taking advantage of our access to the airbase in Incirlik,
Turkey, and maximizing the additional assets of our partners in Syria.
Turkey is now conducting strikes in Syria, along with a number of other
Coalition partners; and, there are a few countries that are
contemplating joining them.
ISIL is a terrorist organization that, in the early stages of this
fight, was attempting to behave like a conventional military. As the
Coalition increased pressure on the enemy, ISIL reverted back to
operating like an irregular force in many ways, just as we anticipated.
Given the nature of the enemy and the nature of this fight, our air
crews are required to maintain near-constant overhead coverage as they
pursue dynamic targeting opportunities. Their contribution to the
campaign cannot be overstated. The combination of the increasingly
effective air campaign and the growing numbers of indigenous ground
forces affords us more opportunities to pressure ISIL.
Over the past year, Coalition airstrikes have effectively disrupted
ISIL's command and control, interrupted the resourcing of their
operations, and attrited their forces and senior leadership. ISIL's
leadership network has been impacted; and, though the organization has
demonstrated the ability to replace leaders killed or wounded in
action, the replacements are likely to be less skilled and less
experienced. Moreover, reflections of recent strikes indicate a growing
level of distrust, fear of spies, and paranoia across ISIL's
leadership.
Though degrading the enemy will remain a key task throughout the
full duration of the military campaign, our efforts to date have
effectively halted ISIL's advance in Iraq and forced the enemy to fight
mainly defensive operations to prevent further loss of territory and
access to critical lines of communication.
containing isil
In addition to halting ISIL's advance in Iraq, it is imperative
that we continue to help to protect our regional partners' borders and
sovereign spaces. ISIL has eroded stability in the region, placing
neighboring countries, including Jordan and Lebanon, at risk. We
continue to provide critical support to our partners in an effort to
bolster their defenses and enable their activities and operations aimed
at countering ISIL.
Ultimately, we also want to gain control over the remaining border
crossing sites inside of Syria in order to reduce the flow of foreign
fighters. To date, Coalition-enabled efforts by anti-ISIL forces have
disrupted some key lines of communication between Turkey and Syria and
Syria and Iraq. These critical efforts must continue in earnest.
enabling the indigenous forces
We said that we would have to enable the efforts of the indigenous
forces; and, we are doing so in a number of ways. The pace of the
campaign will be dictated by these indigenous forces. We are teaching,
coaching and mentoring them through our Advise and Assist efforts. Our
advisors are co-located with the Iraqi leadership at the Baghdad
Operations Center and the Anbar
Operations Center and they have helped the Iraqis to plan and
oversee multiple ground operations. We also are assisting the Iraqis in
their efforts to regenerate and restructure their security forces
through our Building Partner Capacity (BPC) program. To date, nearly
13,000 Iraqi soldiers have been trained at multiple BPC sites in Iraq,
and more than 3,000 are currently undergoing training, which includes
training to maintain their equipment. Coalition-trained Iraqi Army
forces are currently involved in ongoing operations and holding their
ground. That said, the Iraqis' decision to not accept any risk around
Baghdad by repositioning forces to fight ISIL will continue to limit
their ability to generate sufficient combat power. The Iraqis must
recruit and train new forces. Our BPC and advise and assist efforts are
making a difference, but until the Iraqis commit to a more rapid force
generation, gains will likely remain limited.
We also are in the process of assisting with the training and
equipping of Sunni tribal fighters. More than 3,100 fighters have
successfully completed training; and, 750 additional fighters are
scheduled to undergo training in the coming weeks. This effort
represents a potential `game-changer,' if coupled with meaningful
reconciliation by the Government of Iraq, as the GoI cannot be
successful long-term without the support of its Sunni citizens.
We also are in the process of training and equipping vetted
moderate Syrian opposition forces through our Syria Train & Equip
program. Although the program got off to a slow start, in large part
due to the complex nature of the undertaking, we remain confident that
it will pay dividends going forward. The forces trained will be
additive to and may enable efforts already underway by Syrian Kurds,
Syrian Arabs, and other anti-ISIL forces. At the same time, we are
seeing a shift in momentum in Syria; and, we are looking for ways to
build upon the gains achieved thus far.
Of note, over the past several months, the Syrian Kurds, have
performed exceptionally well in northeast Syria. They, along with
associated Arab elements, have retaken some 17,000 square kilometers
from the enemy. This presents a significant opportunity and potential
inflection point in the Counter-ISIL Campaign. There is the potential
to isolate the capital and remove ISIL from the remaining stretch of
border between Syria and Turkey that it still controls. Counter-ISIL
operations in this stretch of territory could deal a strategic and
ideological blow to ISIL.
eliminating ungoverned space
Through our own actions and by enabling the efforts of our
Coalition partners and the indigenous forces on the ground in Iraq and
Syria, we have disrupted ISIL's capability and eliminating the enemy's
access to ungoverned spaces and to key border crossings and supply
routes in both countries. These efforts will continue to prove
essential to the overall success of the Counter-ISIL Campaign.
defeating isil
We are seeing progress being made in our pursuit of our stated
objectives. Last year, we saw ISIL moving in large convoys unimpeded
throughout Iraq with black flags flying. Iraq's security forces were in
tatters and the troops either refused or were incapable of defending
against the onslaught by ISIL. Since then, with the help of the United
States-led Coalition, the Iraqis have taken some steps towards
rebuilding their forces. The introduction of new commanders has been
particularly helpful. The Iraqis also sent a portion of their forces
through training at our BPC sites; although, they are not filling the
classes to capacity and they do need to do a better job of recruitment
and force generation. In terms of progress achieved, the Iraqis have
planned and executed a number Coalition-enabled military operations,
and they have retaken terrain previously lost to ISIL. Meanwhile,
ISIL's movement is more restricted, and they are adjusting their
patterns of activity to avoid being targeted by Coalition aircraft and
anti-ISIL forces. There is still a great deal of work to be done and a
long road ahead, but at the one-year mark, we are seeing signs of
progress in our military campaign.
the counter-isil coalition
Of course, the United States is not doing this alone. The
contributions being made by our Coalition partners are essential to our
success. Indeed, the 60-plus nation Counter-ISIL Coalition represents
the strength and cohesion of our campaign. In particular, the active
and public involvement of our regional partners, along with a large
number of international partner nations, has greatly enhanced the fight
and sends a clear message to ISIL and other violent extremist
organizations that their actions will not be tolerated.
existing political challenges
We have made measurable progress over the past year. Indeed, we
have set conditions for further progress across all nine lines of
effort. We must build upon the successes achieved to date and take
definitive action in key areas. These areas include the disruption of
the flow of foreign fighters, improved counter-messaging, and
government reforms and reconciliation.
Most notably, the effects of our military efforts will be short-
lived if the Iraqis do not address their political problems. Prime
Minister Haider al-Abadi has vowed to be more inclusive of the Sunnis
and Kurds and other minority groups. We are encouraged by the early
steps he has taken to reach out to the Sunnis and Kurds and we are
urging him to follow through on pledges made in the near-term. We also
are encouraged by his efforts to enact much-needed reforms in the
government. If effectively implemented, these reforms will address
endemic problems in Iraq's political and economic sectors over the
long-term. Enacting the reforms will not be an easy undertaking.
However, these efforts are very important. National reconciliation
remains critical to the success of the counter-ISIL campaign.
our collective goal: the ultimate defeat of isil
We said that the military campaign would take time, and it will
take time. We should expect there will be occasional setbacks along the
way, and particularly in these early stages as we coach and mentor a
force that is actively working to regenerate capability after years of
neglect and poor leadership. We also need to keep in mind that we are
supporting and enabling this effort. We are executing this campaign by,
with, and through the indigenous forces; and, our partners are in the
lead. It must be this way if we are to achieve lasting positive
effects. It is taking a bit longer to get things done as a result; but,
the indigenous forces are making progress, and they continue to build
capability.
Our mission is clear and that is to degrade and militarily defeat
ISIL. In the process, we want to help to change the conditions inside
of Iraq and Syria, so that what we see happening there now, does not
happen again in the future. We have the right strategy and the right
approach to achieve this desired endstate; but, it will take time.
Despite the challenges that exist, we do see progress being made, along
with many opportunities. We are confident that our actions in pursuit
of these opportunities will continue to produce positive results in the
coming months.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, General Austin and Ms.
Wormuth.
I must say, I've been a member of this committee for nearly
30 years, and I have never heard testimony like this. Never.
General Austin, on September 9th, 1 week ago, Chairman
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the fight
against ISIL was, quote, ``tactically stalemated'' with no,
quote, ``dramatic gains on either side.'' So, obviously, you
and the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a
very different view of what the situation is.
So, with all this progress that you're citing and--how long
do you think it's going to take for us to defeat ISIL and to
restore stability in Iraq and Syria?
General Austin. Sir, it will take years. If I may----
Chairman McCain. Take years. Okay.
General Austin.--if I may comment on the Chairman's
comments?
As I spoke to the Chairman yesterday--and we did talk about
this issue, and I--when I took--went back and took a look at
what he said, he also said ISIL's future is increasingly dim as
more nations join the anti-ISIL effort. Although it is
tactically stalemated, with no dramatic gains on either side,
ISIL will move at the speed of its governance, not at the speed
of its military capability. I agree with the Chairman, sir, on
the issue of--there haven't been any dramatic gains on either
side.
Chairman McCain. Dramatic? Yeah, that's different from,
quote, ``tactically stalemated,'' please, General. That's
what--Chairman Dempsey. Chairman Dunford said exactly the same
thing. So, there's clearly a disconnect between your view and
that of our outgoing and incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
So, really, in your view, everything should remain as it
is. For example, do you think we should have a no-fly zone in
Syria?
General Austin. That's a policy decision, and----
Chairman McCain. Would you recommend a no-fly zone in
Syria?
General Austin. I would not recommend that at this point,
sir.
Chairman McCain. Would you--not at this point, 4 years
later--would you recommend telling--setting up a buffer zone in
Syria, where these refugees might be able to come and be
protected from the attacks and slaughter of Bashar Assad?
General Austin. It will take a ground force to be able to
protect refugees if we do that, sir.
Chairman McCain. Would you support a buffer zone, which
would then protect some of these refugees who are being barrel-
bombed and slaughtered by Bashar Assad?
General Austin. I don't see the force available to be able
to protect them, currently, sir, so I would not recommend that
at this point in time.
Chairman McCain. So, we wouldn't be able to shoot down
Bashar Assad's aircraft as they barrel bomb and slaughter
innocent men, women, and children. Is that correct? We don't
have the capability to protect them.
General Austin. We clearly have capability, yes, sir. We
do.
Chairman McCain. But, you wouldn't recommend such action.
General Austin. I would not recommend a buffer zone, at
this point, sir.
Chairman McCain. I see. So, basically, General, what you're
telling us is that everything's fine, as we see hundreds of
thousands of refugees leave and flood Europe, as we're seeing,
now, 250,000 Syrians slaughtered, as you see more and more
Iranian control of the Shiite militia that are the only ones
that are really doing the fighting besides the Peshmerga. As I
say, I have never seen a hearing that is as divorced from the
reality of every outside expert and what you are saying.
Does the massive flow of refugees from Syria have any
effect on what you think we should be doing in Syria?
General Austin. Sir, I want to be clear that I believe that
this is a horrible tragedy, and this is a thing that the entire
international community is going to have to continue to work
together on. So, there's always--we would hope that, as these
refugees continue to be disadvantaged, that we see more
countries joining in to assist in the----
Chairman McCain. So, you would not--you would not support a
policy that would help protect these refugees from being
slaughtered by Bashar Assad with his barrel bombs?
General Austin. Sir, I--it's always in the best--our best
interest to help protect civilians. But, again, I would not
recommend a buffer zone, at this point in time.
Chairman McCain. So, everything is really going well.
General Austin. No, sir, that's not----
Chairman McCain. Well, then if things aren't going well,
and we have had, quote, ``setbacks,'' and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff says it's tactically stalemated, and you
think everything is going well as--pursuing the strategy and
tactics on the ground that we are----
General Austin, I respectfully disagree. I respectfully,
fundamentally disagree. This is an abject failure. The refugees
are the result of it. This is a result of leaving Iraq. You
were there at the meeting when Maliki told Senator Graham and I
that, if the others agreed, he would agree to keep a residual
force there. We never gave him the forces that we wanted to
leave behind, which then set in place the departure of United
States completely from Iraq and set the table for the
catastrophe that we are seeing.
This is--as I say, I have not attended a hearing that is so
grossly distorted as the view of a terrible and tragic
situation as I have seen from the witnesses. By the way,
Senator Graham and I predicted every single thing that is
happening now. I predict that, unless we do something
different, it will remain, as General Dempsey said, stalemated,
which means tragedy.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Both Madam Secretary and General Austin, about a year ago
or more, there was real concern that, essentially, Baghdad
could fall into--to ISIL, that they were virtually unstoppable.
At this point, your assessment of the security, at least at
Baghdad, has that been improved?
General Austin. Sir, it has been greatly improved.
Senator Reed. Going forward now to one of the fundamental
issues is--and I think it's related to the comments that both
you and General Dempsey have made--is--who is--who will have
the advantage, going forward, in terms of the use of time? ISIL
or Iraqi forces supported by the United States? What's your
view on that?
General Austin. Sir, I think, clearly, it's the Iraqi
forces supported by not only the United States, but the 60-
plus-nation coalition.
Senator Reed. Now, one of the things that has been
suggested at--but--not only suggested, but recommended strongly
to the Iraqi government is they create a--national guard units,
Sunni units as well as others, but formally allied with the
government; and that legislation is bogged down in their
parliament. Is that accurate?
General Austin. That's correct, sir.
Senator Reed. So, we are--you know, we could do more,
essentially, if the Iraqis were willing to make some changes,
in terms of their policies. For example, we could at least
contemplate the use of advisors with these National Guard--
Iraqi National Guard units--to be brokers, in terms of
distributing equipment, as well as tactical advice. Is that
something that's possible if we get cooperation?
General Austin. It's clearly possible. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Is it something you would consider if it----
General Austin. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Reed. Yeah. One of the factors, too--and it's--this
is a constant source of inquiry--is that, in fact, recently the
Iraqi parliament, I think, rendered a scathing report about
Prime Minister Maliki's leadership, or lack of leadership,
effectively sort of suggesting that whatever he said couldn't
be trusted. Is that, you know, your estimate of his role of
leading up to this crisis, in fact over many years?
General Austin. Sir, what we saw from the former Prime
Minister was increasingly sectarian behavior and a number of
bad decisions that led to the atrophy of his security forces.
So.
Senator Reed. In fact, according to this report, as I've
seen in the media, that they attribute most of the blame for
the disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces at Maliki's
doorstep, at no one else. Is that at least accurate for their--
the feeling in Iraq?
General Austin. I'd say it's primarily his responsibility.
Those who he appointed in key leader positions enabled that, as
well.
Senator Reed. In terms of your campaign plan, the sense I
have is that you have tried to exploit the area where we have
the most interest against ISIL, and that's Iraq, while
maintaining as much pressure as possible in Syria. Is that the
general outlines of the campaign plan? So that we would
expect--and, frankly, of us--agree--we--I don't think anyone's
seen the progress they'd like to see, but the first progress
would essentially come in Iraq, and then would lead to a better
position against ISIL in Syria. Is that accurate?
General Austin. It is, sir. In Iraq, there is a government
for us to work with initially. There were some forces for us to
begin--to begin to work with. Of course, we had access to
things that could enable us to get our--to get the work done.
Our shaping operations in Syria enabled our work in Iraq, and
are still enabling it.
As we get increasing resources, we're able to increase the
tempo in Syria. So, I think we'll have greater effects, going
forward.
Senator Reed. Just, finally, any general comments. Because
one of the recent developments is the fact that Turkey now is
allowing operations out of Incirlik. They also seem to be much
more cooperative, in an operational sense. What do you expect,
in the next, say, 6 months, that will translate to on the
ground?
General Austin. I think it'll translate to a lot more
pressure on key areas in Syria, sir, like the city of Raqqa,
which has long been a--an ISIL stronghold. So, because of that
access, we'll have the ability to increase the pace and focus
on key places in Syria. So, that'll certainly shape things in
Iraq.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary and
General.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, when Senator Carter was here before this
committee in July, he testified that there were only about 60
Syrian fighters that had been trained in our Train and Equip
Program, and reinserted. We've heard reports about the attacks
on those individuals when they were reinserted back into Syria.
Can you tell us what the total number of trained fighters
remains?
General Austin. It's a small number. The ones that are in
the fight is--we're talking four or five.
Senator Fischer. A New York Times report on September 6
indicated that, among the lessons learned from that experience,
was that these fighters should be returned to Syria in larger
numbers than the 60, obviously larger than the four or five
that are there. Do you agree with that?
General Austin. I agree with that, Senator. Whenever that's
possible, it is in our best interest to make sure that we have
an element that can protect itself. Also, it can go in and
combine efforts with other elements that are on the ground.
Senator Fischer. How do you plan to achieve that? How are
you going to increase the number of fighters when we're looking
at the really tough security screening processes that are in
place now? How are we going to achieve that? How long will that
take? You mentioned earlier about increasing resources. I took
that to mean increasing the number of fighters that you would
place in Syria, and the effect they would have. So, what's the
time period we're looking at, here, and how are you going to do
it? Because I don't think it's been at all successful yet.
General Austin. I--and I certainly agree with you that this
is--this--the new Syrian force program has gotten off to a slow
start. But, I think it's important to remember that this
element is designed to be a complement to all the other things
that we're doing. So, we're going to use, and we are using,
every tool that we have available to us in our inventory. Our
strategy is--or our approach is to utilize indigenous forces to
complement our work from the air on the ground. As we----
Senator Fischer. It's--if I can interrupt you on that
point, I'd--and I'd like to get back to your answer. When you
say to ``complement the work on the ground with airstrikes''--
did I hear--did I just hear you say that?
General Austin. That--the--they have to work in tandem.
The----
Senator Fischer. So, if they're going to work in tandem--
there's a new article out today. Are we going to change
strategy? Because--I think it's in Foreign Policy today that--
it says the United States is drawing up a new plan that's going
to send these trained fighters into Syria that are going to
help direct airstrikes. Is that report correct?
General Austin. I would just say that--ma'am, we'll
continue to look at the best ways to--the best means to employ
these forces as we go forward. We'll capitalize on lessons
learned.
Again, it is really about the full complement of indigenous
forces that we have available to work with. As we mentioned
earlier, the YPG, or the Syrian Kurds, and some Arabs and
Turkomen, have done tremendous work in northeast Syria, and
they have pushed ISIL back from the border. They're currently
somewhere around 40 kilometers or so north of the capital--
the--ISIL's capital city of Raqqa. They'll continue to pressure
ISIL. So, the new Syrian force is additive to that effort.
Senator Fischer. So, with the fighters that we're training
and equipping, is it still the goal to have about 12,000 of
them there? Is that still the goal? What's the expectation,
then, for them?
General Austin. Well, we certainly won't--at the pace we're
going, we won't reach the goal that we had initially
established for ourselves, but the--the overall goal is to make
sure that we have enough mass to be able to get work done on
the ground. Whether it's YPG elements or other elements that
are able to help us, you know, we can still achieve, and are
achieving, the same effects. It's not aspirational. We're
actually doing this today. I think that's lost on a lot of
people.
Senator Fischer. Is the strategy changing for the work on
the ground that you're asking for these fighters?
General Austin. We continue to look at the best means to
employ them. We will do what--ma'am, what you would expect us
to do, and make adjustments as opportunities present
themselves.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. General, I'd--just to follow up, there's
an--Foreign Policy says, ``Anxious to avoid another damaging
setback for the training effort, the White House and the
Pentagon are looking at attaching small numbers of fighters to
larger established forces in northern Syria to ensure the
rebels are better protected on the battlefield by more numerous
experienced troops.'' Can you confirm or deny that that option
is being looked at?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator----
Chairman McCain. Okay.
Ms. Wormuth.--we are reviewing the way forward with----
Chairman McCain. I'm asking if that option is being
considered.
Ms. Wormuth. We are looking at a range of options. One of
the options is----
Chairman McCain. I am asking--look, I'm not asking you to
come before this committee and obfuscate. I'm asking you a
direct question. Is the Pentagon looking at that option? Yes or
no?
Ms. Wormuth. We are looking at that option as----
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Ms. Wormuth.--well as others.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. General, it's my understanding that General
Dempsey recently said that if the United States really seized
control of the campaign against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria], we can speed up ISIS defeat, but that it would come at
a great cost to our servicemembers, and that another group with
another name and ideology would just be back in a couple of
years. Isn't that what you and--understand General Dempsey to
have said, and that you have reaffirmed that here today?
General Austin. Yes, sir, it is. I think it's important
that the people in the country and in the region take ownership
and work to put in place lasting solutions. If we don't do
that, we will be back in another 2 or 3 years.
Senator Nelson. Because of that campaign against ISIS, it
must be won by our coalition partners and the Iraqis, not just
us.
General Austin. That's correct, sir.
Senator Nelson. Would you care to read that statement again
for clarity in your response to the Chairman's question that
General Dempsey had said, in its full context?
General Austin. Yes, sir.
[Pause.]
General Austin. Sir, what the Chairman said was: ISIL's
future is increasingly dim as more nations join the anti-ISIL
effort. He further stated that, although the fight right now is
tactically stalemated, with no dramatic gains on either side,
Iraq will move at the speed of its governance and not at the
speed of its military capability.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have the transcript here in
front of the committee. I would like to reinsert this transmit
of General Dempsey, with your permission.
Chairman McCain. Absolutely. Along with that, we will
include the assessments by General Keane, General Petraeus, the
architect of the surge, and all others who observed this
debacle.
Senator Nelson. Of course.
Chairman McCain. Of course.
[The information referred to follows:]
Statement of General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff before the Senate Committee on Armed Services at hearing to
receive testimony on Counter-ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant) strategy on July 7, 2015.
Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member Reed and members of the
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to come back and to chat with
you today about the military component of our strategy against ISIL.
Our starting point has to be the strategic picture in context. I
have said before that the global security environment is as uncertain
as I have ever seen it. The world is rapidly changing everywhere, and
we are seeing significant shifts in an already complex strategic
landscape. ISIL is one of many concerns. As the chairman mentioned, we
are contending with Russia's revanchism in eastern Europe, China's
assertiveness in the South China Sea, Iran's malign activities in the
Middle East, technical advancements by North Korea, rising aggression
of non-state networks, and a rapidly leveling playing field in cyber
and in space. While our potential adversaries grow stronger, many of
our allies are becoming increasingly dependent on the United States and
on our assistance, and some of our comparative military advantages have
begun to erode. What makes this uniquely complicated is that these
trends are manifesting themselves simultaneously.
Within the Middle East, I characterize three converging sets of
complexity.
First, several governments are struggling for political legitimacy
because they are not sufficiently pluralistic or they are not
sufficiently accountable to their citizens.
Second, the centuries old Sunni/Shiite struggle is very evident.
Weak states are less able to assert independence amid the tug of war
between sectarian regional powers.
Third, we are seeing rising competition between moderate and
radical elements of Islam, and ISIL and others are taking advantage of
that competition.
Within this evolving global context, the role the United States
military is taking against the trans-regional threat of ISIL is
appropriately matched to the complexity of the environment and is at a
level of effort that is sustainable over time.
Military power alone, as we have said, will not solve ISIL. I do
not think anyone here would disagree with that. All nine lines of
effort need to be considered in the aggregate. This campaign focuses on
actively reinforcing and hardening our partners in the region who must
and in most cases are taking responsibility for their own security.
That is an important point. Enduring stability cannot be imposed in the
Middle East from the outside in. The fight is enabled by the coalition,
but it must be owned by those regional stakeholders.
It bears repeating that this is the beginning of a complex,
nonlinear campaign that will require a sustained effort over an
extended period of time. We have to be just as agile as the network of
terrorists we face. We are constantly evaluating our approach and
making sure we are resourcing it appropriately, balanced with our other
global commitments.
But 4 years and counting of budget uncertainty have made this
balance distinctly harder.
Thank you and I welcome your questions.
Senator Nelson. General, give us your assessment that
Russia is building up the military base and sending soldiers
and weapons into Syria to prop up Assad--under, I might say,
the guise of fighting ISIS.
General Austin. Sir, we are witnessing a buildup of forces
in Syria by Russia. As you know, they have been there all
along, but they are increasing their footprint. What they've
stated is that they're--they want to focus on helping to
counter ISIL, as I understand it. That's left to be seen. As
you know, Russia is not very transparent. So, we really don't
know what their true intentions are. But, the introduction of--
potential introduction of additional capability and operations
utilizing that capability could increase the friction in that
battlespace significantly.
Senator Nelson. General, the Senate Defense Authorization
bill calls for 30-percent reduction in headquarters staff
across the Department of Defense, starting with a 7-and-a-half-
percent cut in fiscal year 2016. What impact will that cut have
on your ability to conduct operations? What is CENTCOM [United
States Central Command], if you want to submit for the record,
planning to do to make that cut?
General Austin. Sir, if you take a look at what's going on
in our region currently, you know, from Pakistan, Afghanistan,
to Yemen, to Iraq and Syria, and to increased tensions in other
places throughout the region, it's clear that we have a very
active region. So, in order to manage the things that we need
to manage and work with our partner nations in the region, we
need an appropriate staff to be able to do that. I fully
understand and appreciate, you know, the pressure that the
departments--Department is under, in terms of, you know, the
reduction of the top line on the budget. So, we have to do what
we can do and need to do to tighten our belts. I appreciate
that. But, it makes it increasingly difficult to get things
done.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman.
I want to thank both of you for being here today, and for
your service.
I wanted to follow up and ask about--General, I believe you
testified about the effectiveness of the Syrian Kurds right now
in Syria, in pushing back ISIL. Are we providing support and
weapons to the Syrian Kurds? What assistance are we giving
them, given that, as I heard your testimony--when Senator
Fischer asked me--we only have, as I understand it, four or
five of United States-trained Syrian fighters in this fight.
So, what are we doing to support the Syrian Kurds if they are
effectively pushing back ISIL on the ground?
General Austin. We are providing them a tremendous amount
of air support, which is what they wanted most. As you will
recall, ma'am, these--this is the element--well, a portion of
this element were the folks that hung on at Khobani--valiantly.
It was doubtful, at that point, as to whether or not they would
be able to survive in that environment and continue to do
things. Well, they continued on, and they increased their size
and activity, and they've made a significant difference in the
northeast part of the country.
So, what they've asked from us over time is sustained
airpower, sustained strikes. They have benefited from those
strikes. Because of their aggressiveness, they've made a
tremendous difference in the northeast.
Senator Ayotte. So, just to be clear, they haven't asked
for arms? How does Turkey--how is Turkey acting on the ground,
here, in terms of, obviously--first of all, I want to know:
What have the Syrian Kurds asked for that we haven't given
them? I understand the air support. But, also, how do you view
Turkey's role in all of this? Because, as I see it right now,
this four or five United States-trained fighters--let's not kid
ourselves, that's a joke. So, if they're the only force on the
ground doing something right now, what more can we do to help
them?
General Austin. They--up to this point, they have not asked
us for arms, but it doesn't mean that they won't, ma'am. I
think--and, of course, you know, as we go forward, there are
things that we can do to continue to help--as they try to get
supplies into northern Syria, work with the Kurds in the--in
northern Iraq to help make sure that we have lines of
communication that facilitate that. We're doing that.
They will also need to partner with Syrian Arabs in the
area. They're doing that. We are working with Syrian Arabs,
developing relationships, as well. So, I think it's a
combination of all of these forces that's going--that are going
to make a difference, going forward.
Again, we expect our footprint with the new Syrian forces
to grow over time. And----
Senator Ayotte. So, can you help me on Turkey, what role
Turkey is playing, or not playing, here, that we would like to
see Turkey play?
General Austin. As you know, Senator, Turkey has just
recently come onboard and given us access to their bases, which
is a tremendous capability. It shortens the legs of flights
that our fighter pilots will have to fly. It allows us to be
more responsive. they also are flying strikes in our
formations, and focused on elements--ISIL elements in Syria,
thus far. So, they are adding value. What we've asked them to
do, as well, is to continue to tighten up, or abate, the flow
of foreign fighters and lethal accelerants coming across the
border.
Senator Ayotte. So, I want to ask, before we leave, what
role is Iran playing right now in Syria? How much support are
they providing for the Assad regime? How do we evaluate their
significance in fueling this conflict? Also, their support for
Hezbollah, what has--what role is Hezbollah playing, in terms
of supporting the Assad regime?
General Austin. Well, we know that Iran has been
instrumental in providing support to Syria throughout. We see,
increasingly, that they would like to provide--they want to
provide more support. What that will mean in the future, I
don't know. But, they are active in Syria.
Senator Ayotte. So, perhaps if they had more cash and
money, they might--they would like to provide more support to
the Assad regime.
General Austin. That would be--my assumption would be that
that would be the case.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to also ask with--as--are issues
with these trained fighters--are we going to provide--if
they're under attack--I guess we've got four or five of them,
but if, for some reason, we were able to get more of them
trained, what are we going to do to support them or protect
them?
General Austin. Oh, we will provide air support and ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] to--overwatch and
air support to protect them. With the first class that we put
in, we did--we have done that already. So, we are committed to
doing that, going forward.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. I'm worried, like the rest of my
colleagues--and there have been a number of questions on this
already--about the Train and Equip mission. You know, there's
good news and there's bad news about America's military. The
good news is, is if you give them a job, they figure out a way
to get it done. The bad news is, sometimes you give them a job
and they are not willing to say when it's not going to work. At
what point in time, General Austin, do you envision us
admitting that, while all good intentions and on paper all of
the work was done, but the job of finding willing fighters that
can be screened appropriately when you have the vast majority,
who feel victimized by the current situation in Syria, are
running for the exits? At what point in time, and what is the
discussion ongoing, about the $600 million you're requesting
for next year? That seems very unrealistic to me, in terms of a
request. If, at this juncture, we've successfully completed
five to six, and I believe you said--I--the last information I
had, Ms. Wormuth, was 100--you said ``more than 100.'' What is
the number?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator McCaskill, it's between 100 and 120--
--
Senator McCaskill. Okay.
Ms. Wormuth.--basically.
Senator McCaskill. So, we're counting, on our fingers and
toes at this point, when we had envisioned 5,400 by the end of
the year. I--I'm just worried that this is one of those
instances where the good news about our military is dominating,
``We can do this. We can do this,'' and the practical realities
of this strategy aren't being fully embraced.
General Austin. Thank you, Senator. You know, I absolutely
agree with you, we have the finest troops in the world, and
they will figure out a way to get the job done, one way or the
other. Again, what our Special Operations Forces have done in
northern Syria is--they didn't wait for the new Syrian force
program, or Train and Equip Program, to fully develop. At the
very outset, they began to engage elements like the YPG, and
enable those elements. They are making a difference on the
battlefield. So--and there are tens of thousands of the YPG out
there that are, right now, fighting ISIL. So, because the new--
the Syria Train and Equip Program is slower getting started
than we'd like for it to be, that doesn't mean that we're not
creating effects on the battlefield.
Senator McCaskill. I just want to make sure, General
Austin--I mean, I know the Chairman feels strongly about the
success of the surge, and there was a lot of incredible
American heroes that were part of that surge. But, the other
part of the surge we don't talk about as frequently is that we
paid a lot of people. We paid a lot of people to help us during
the surge. Is this money that we're setting aside for Train and
Equip, would it be better off in direct compensation to some of
that YPG force?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator McCaskill, can I try to address this a
little bit?
As General Austin said, we are reviewing the program, and
we're looking at a range of options. Our Train and Equip
Program is part of a broader effort that we're prosecuting with
the YPG, with the Syrian Arab coalition, and so on. We're
looking at how to have our train and equip program effectively
enable those other efforts. I think, as we go forward and look
at what our options are, we'll absolutely want to look at the
resources we've requested for the next year, and how that fits
in.
But, the forces that we are training, while right now are
small in number and clearly are not going to reach the numbers
that we had planned for, are nevertheless getting terrific
training and very good equipment, and, as such, will be able to
really be force multipliers of those other groups on the ground
that have been very effective, like the Syrian Arab coalition--
--
Senator McCaskill. I just----
Ms. Wormuth.--for example.
Senator McCaskill. If we end up at the end of the year with
us bragging about the difference between 100 and 120, it's time
for a new plan.
Ms. Wormuth. I certainly do not mean to be bragging. We--
the program is much smaller than we hoped.
Senator McCaskill. Yeah.
Ms. Wormuth. We're not bragging.
Senator McCaskill. I don't have much time left, but I want
to just--I know--understand from your testimony, General
Austin, you can't comment about the IG investigation into this
accusation that people are putting pressure on intelligence
analysts to change the tenor of their reports. It's a serious
allegation that strikes at the core of our government, in terms
of our ability to oversee and make decisions around the use of
our military.
I want to say--at the end of this investigation, when you
can discuss it, I want to just put on the record that I, for
one, am going to be watching very carefully about any potential
retaliation against any of the men or women that may have come
forward with allegations. They're--it is incredibly important
that whistleblowers be protected in this space. Depending on
what the investigation finds, I understand that maybe there--
you know, there are other factors I'm not aware of, but I just
wanted to put on the record that I will be paying very close
attention to how these whistleblowers are treated in the
aftermath of this investigation.
General Austin. I absolutely share your concern, Senator.
You have my--I will assure you that we will do everything
within our power to ensure that the whistleblowers remain
protected and that there is no retaliation. This is absolutely
important.
Again, you know, we need oversight by organizations like
the IG, and so we welcome that, and we're going to cooperate
fully, and we'll make sure that we abide by the spirit of this
investigation.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman McCain. I think the
grim nature of your remarks are justified.
Ms. Wormuth, how long has it been since we've had this
Train and Equip Program in effect?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, we started--we started the actual
training earlier this spring.
Senator Sessions. Well----
Ms. Wormuth. So, we started the program in December, when
we got authority from Congress.
Senator Sessions. Right.
Ms. Wormuth. We spent time putting together----
Senator Sessions. So, you have to----
Ms. Wormuth.--the training----
Senator Sessions.--say we started in December. That's when
it was authorized and funding----
Ms. Wormuth. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions.--is provided. We have to acknowledge,
this is a total failure. It's just a failure. I wish it weren't
so, but that's the fact. So, it is time to--way past time to
react to that failure.
I just would say, the whole idea that we've got to wait for
the locals to take ownership and to take the lead and do this
kind of activity without any leadership support sufficient from
the United States or our allies is also a failure. They're not
able to organize well. Mosul has fallen. There's a--divisions
within Iraq that make it very difficult. So, I just wish it
weren't so, but I'm afraid that's the reality we are dealing
with.
We now have, I believe the U.N. says, 4 million refugees, 7
million displaced persons. It's obvious to me that this is a
humanitarian catastrophe. We need to deal with it in an honest
way. The most effective and honest way is to keep people as
close to home as possible. If they can't stay in their homes
because of violence and war, then they ought to be kept as
close to home as possible.
I talked to a senior European official recently, and he
told me that this refugee crisis is the greatest threat to
Europe since World War II. I don't see any plan to make it any
better.
General Austin, we've got to consider creating safe zones
within Syria. I understand there are some places in Syria now
that refugees can stay. we're going to have to keep--we can't
have millions and millions of people walking into Europe. This
goes without--it's hardly worth discussing.
So, I am really worried about this, and wish that we
could--we'd already done much better. By being so slow to act
initially, this is what has resulted. Now the situation is far
more grim than it should be, in my opinion.
General Austin, I do tend to agree with you that a defeat
of ISIL is not the end of the problems in the Middle East.
We've gotten a spasm of extremism that witnesses have told us
may be going on for 50 years. Would you agree with that?
General Austin. I absolutely agree, Senator.
Senator Sessions. One victory here doesn't mean it's a
total victory. There'll be another problem somewhere else as
long as this ideology is out there.
General Austin. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. I just believe, Ms. Wormuth, that we need
a strategy, an understood strategy, bipartisan, in this
Congress, with our allies around the world, to confront this
long-term, multi-decade threat to the western democratic order
and to try to help protect people in the Middle East from this
disaster.
So, I want to ask you, Do we have a strategy of that kind
that our allies and the United States and Congress and
Republicans and Democrats understand and agree on?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I think--we have a strategy to defeat
ISIL, ultimately, in the Middle East, where--it's largely in
the Middle East, but it's obviously spreading to other areas.
There are other dynamics in the Middle East, obviously, that
are a part of this. There's the broader Sunni/Shi'a sectarian
conflict that has gone on for decades. There are the fact that
many of the governments in that region are not very
representative and have internal policies that don't give much
freedoms to their people, so they're--part of--that's part of
what's creating----
Senator Sessions. Well----
Ms. Wormuth.--the problem in the Middle East----
Senator Sessions. I know.
Ms. Wormuth.--as well. A big part of our relationships with
these countries is talking to them about the importance of more
democratic approaches.
Senator Sessions. Well said, in one sense. However, does
that mean that we don't support the King of Jordan?
Ms. Wormuth. Jordan is----
Senator Sessions. No, I'm just asking rhetorically, okay?
Ms. Wormuth. Uh-huh.
Senator Sessions. No, we've got to have a more realistic
policy than that.
I was just reading Henry Kissinger's book on order, and he,
just last night, hit the part about George Kennan and the
containment strategy that maintained Western unity, free world
against the communist totalitarians. It went on for 50 years
almost, ended up when he was successful. This is the way it was
expressed. Soviet expansionism, according to Kennan, was real
and inherent. The conflict was inherent in the two ideologies.
It's incompatible, totalitarian communism and constitutional
democracy. I--and he said it--but it could be, quote,
``contained by an adroit and vigilant application of
counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical
and political points,'' close quote. I don't sense that we have
any such strategy. I'm sorry we don't. I think, also, that
radical Islam, Shari'ah Law, is part--essential component--is
incompatible with constitutional democracy, and we need to work
better.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you both for being here.
Since Senator Sessions' comment about communism and
containment is a good segue into my first question, which is
for Ms. Wormuth. Why do you believe that, 4 years into this
conflict, that Russia is deploying materiel and increased
shipments to the Assad regime and really setting up shop in
Syria in a way that they haven't over the last 4 years?
Ms. Wormuth. Well, Russia has certainly been a supporter of
the Assad regime for some time. I think Putin has spoken more
publicly about the role Russia has played to date. I think part
of what may be happening, part of Putin's calculus may be, that
Assad's regime has been under greater threat in the last
several months, as ISIL has advanced in places like Padmorf--or
Palmyra, excuse me--and Tadmor. So, Putin may be nervous about
the stability of the Assad regime, and may be trying to shore
it up.
Senator Shaheen. Well, given that, how do we assess the
possibility that the Assad regime might fall?
Ms. Wormuth. I think, at this point, the--the assessments
I've read are that the regime actually still has considerable
strength, in terms of its military forces. It's still the most
powerful military force on the ground. The support it receives
from Iran and Russia remains significant. So, there have
certainly been battlefield losses that are concerning, but--and
we are looking at, obviously, how to deal with--we are planning
and thinking about the potential for a significant
retrenchment. But, I think the assessment right now is that the
regime is not in imminent danger of falling
Senator Shaheen. So, if Russia deploys air defense systems
in Syria--maybe this is a question for you, General Austin--are
we concerned that they'll threaten our coalition aircraft?
General Austin. That--if they're trying to operate in the
same space, Senator, that possibility is clearly there.
Senator Shaheen. How are we thinking about responding to
that?
General Austin. Well----
Senator Shaheen. For either of you.
Ms. Wormuth. I think we're still in the early stages of
what exactly Russia is doing. But, one--at the diplomatic
level, we're making very clear that deployments that are going
to shore up the regime and draw out the conflict, are
counterproductive and destabilizing, and that if this is really
about Russia trying to join the fight against ISIL, then we
would expect the kinds of military capabilities they deploy to
be consistent with that.
Senator Shaheen. So, how are we making that clear to
Russia?
Ms. Wormuth. Well, there are a number of channels, but, in
particular, Secretary Kerry speaks to his counterpart very
regularly and has been making that point very clear. Then I
would say, on the military side--and I'm sure General Austin
can elaborate on this--if, in fact, it gets to a point where we
see Russian aircraft operating in that area, we would, I would
imagine, need to set up some sort of deconfliction mechanism so
that we can continue our counter-ISIL campaign there.
Senator Shaheen. General Austin?
General Austin. We know how to do that, Senator. You know,
my utmost concern is protection of my--of our troops. We're
going to make sure that we have the ability to protect
ourselves at all time. You know, there are, on occasion, Syrian
aircraft that are flying in, you know, spaces that are not too
distant from where we're operating, but we're able to make sure
that, number one, we maintain vigilance and, number two, we
keep the--you know, the battlespace--we work in the battlespace
in such a way that we avoid conflict, avoid encounter, if at
all possible.
Senator Shaheen. So, I appreciate that that has been our
policy, to date. Given the total failure of our ability to
influence the outcome of the Syrian Civil War, are we assessing
whether we should take a different response with respect to
Assad? Engaging with the Syrian troops?
Ms. Wormuth. I think we continue to look--we continue to
believe that what would be the best solution is to get a
political transition and get Assad out of the government while
retaining the governance structure so that you don't have a
situation of chaos on the ground.
Russia, with its relationship with the regime, could
potentially contribute to helping find that solution. That
would be a valuable contribution from Russia, as opposed to----
Senator Shaheen. Well, it would be, but there's no
incentive, at this point, for Russia to do that----
Ms. Wormuth. I think----
Senator Shaheen.--is there?
Ms. Wormuth. I think they----
Senator Shaheen. What's the incentive?
Ms. Wormuth. I think their incentive would be to have--they
want, more than anything, a more stable Syria, and they are
quite fearful of ISIL, as well. I mean, they have many, many
Chechens in Russia. They are just as concerned about foreign
fighter flows from ISIL as we are. So, I think Russia does have
an interest in having a more stable Syria. A constructive way
for them to engage would be to work with us, and other
countries who would like to see a transition there, to try to
come up with a diplomatic way to make that transition happen.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly think that would be a
positive outcome, but it's not clear to me that we've seen any
action, in the last 4 and a half years, to suggest that
Russia's going to play a more positive role.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, thank you for your service.
In both Syria and in Iraq, we have displaced individuals
that clearly are part of the discussion on the worldwide stage,
individuals moving into Europe. I'm curious, in terms of the
numbers right now--and this would be a question for either of
you--but, do we have an update on the total number of
individuals who are displaced between Syria and Iraq that you
can share with us this morning?
Ms. Wormuth. I believe, Senator, that it's around 4
million. It's a very large number. I mean, there are more than
a million----
Senator Rounds. No, that would be in--from Syria.
Ms. Wormuth. I thought it was from Syria and Iraq. But, for
example, there's more than a million refugees in Turkey right
now. There are many hundreds of thousands, if not a million,
refugees in Jordan. So, the neighboring countries are already
hosting very large numbers of refugees: Lebanon, Jordan, and
Turkey.
Senator Rounds. Before we're done, could you maybe just
check and see if the numbers that you're providing are----
Ms. Wormuth. Happy to do that.
Senator Rounds.--are up to date? What I'm curious about are
the number of individuals displaced both in Syria and the
number of individuals who are displaced in Iraq, but still
perhaps in Iraq.
Ms. Wormuth. We can get you that right now.
[The information referred to follows:]
The number of Syrian refugees is approximately 4 million. There are
an estimated additional 7.6 million Syrian internally displaced persons
(IDPs). The number of Iraqi IDPs is nearly 3.2 million.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I would appreciate that.
General, the reason for my question is that the--it would
appear that, as this number is a significant number, most
certainly they are part of any concern with regard to military
operations, regardless of where you're at, and our desire not
to do more harm than good in what we provide. Yet, at the same
time, one of our expectations is that we're doing ongoing air
operations throughout the area. We don't want to get into areas
where we're going to actually cause more damage. Yet, right now
you're challenged because you really don't have the forward air
observers that would make it more efficient than what you've
got today. Can you share with us a little bit about what you're
doing to try to improve that situation, and how you would like
to see that handled?
General Austin. Sir, we routinely use all of our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, UAVs
[unmanned aerial vehicles] and manned aircraft, to make sure
that we understand what's going on on the ground before we
employ weapons. We are diligent in our efforts there--not
overly cautious, to the point where we--we're not able to take
advantage of opportunities to engage the enemy, but we are
very, very mindful of, you know, the possibility of committing
civilian casualties there.
Senator Rounds. But, at this time, sir, it's fair to say
that we're not using any of our own forward air observers yet
at all. We don't have any forward air observers on the ground
at all.
General Austin. That's correct, sir. Our JTACS [Joint
Terminal Attack Controllers] are operating in the command
centers. Now, what that does is, it allows the JTACs to have
visibility over, you know, what's going on in the target area,
but it also enables him to gain visibility of where the
friendly troops are. This is one of the biggest challenges that
we encounter throughout this battlespace. In a lot of cases,
the folks we're trying to help don't have a good handle on
where their people are, and that slows down the--you know, our
ability to engage.
Senator Rounds. Currently, when you are training
individuals in Iraq, and those who want to fight, back in
Syria--we understand, and I think there's--I don't think
there's anybody out here that's disagreeing with the fact that
we're not on schedule for getting the number that we want to
have trained. Is that--that is a fair assessment yet, in terms
of the number of individuals that we want to have trained that
are both Iraqi nations and Syrian nationals?
General Austin. I'm sorry, sir. I'm struggling with my
sign, there.
But, you're right, sir. We would like to see a lot more
forces available to be trained. We're encouraging the
Government of Iraq to recruit those forces, bring them onboard
so we can get them into training centers. What we've
discovered--not discovered, but we knew this, going in--is that
those forces that have been trained by us are doing pretty well
on the battlefield.
Senator Rounds. Fair to say, though, General, that one of
the problems we've got, particularly with Syrian fighters is--
is that, in our ability to actually discern which ones we can
use and which ones we're not using, based upon our review of
their background and what they intend to do--if they want to go
in and fight Assad, basically it's eliminating them from being
part of our team. Fair to say, at this point?
General Austin. That's correct, sir. We're focused on
countering ISIL.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Both of you have testified that our very strict vetting
process has resulted in far fewer fighters to--for us to train.
Does this mean that we're turning away thousands of potential
fighters?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I would say two things. One, because
the authority we have focuses our program on fighting ISIL,
there are a number of individuals who might like to receive
training from the United States--or equipment, for that
matter--but, they want to fight the regime. That's not the
focus of our program. Then, in the other--the other way the
standards affect the recruiting pool is, obviously we want to
make sure that we have confidence in the people we bring into
our program, and that we can give them equipment and trust them
to use that appropriately, trust them to fight on the
battlefield in a way that's consistent with the laws of armed
conflict. In many cases, people who might be interested in
volunteering don't meet those standards or are younger than--
young--you know, are under the age of 18, for example, or who
are otherwise not medically qualified.
Senator Hirono. So, is one of the assessments that you're
doing is to review whether or not we're being unrealistic and--
regarding the kinds of factors that we want you to take into
consideration before you will train a particular individual? Is
that one of the areas that you are looking to, which may
require congressional action?
Ms. Wormuth. We certainly are looking at our recruiting and
screening process all of the time. Even before, frankly, the
first class was reinserted, we were looking at how to speed up
our recruiting process and speed up the screening process. We
are looking at the kinds of criteria that we have in place, but
I think our view is that, right now, our criteria are very
consistent with the requirements that Congress gave us. If we
were to loosen them, for example, I think we would absolutely
have to come back to you all and ask for----
Senator Hirono. Well, and that is my question, whether or
not you're seriously considering asking us to reevaluate the
criteria that Congress established.
Now, I know we're talking today a lot about what's going on
on the ground, but our concern is also--and you mentioned this
in your testimony, that you're looking for more effective ways
to counter ISIL's very effective messaging campaign. There are
concerns about ISIL's ability to motivate lone wolves who will
take action without ever having direct contact with ISIL. So--
taking actions in our country as well as elsewhere--so, what
are some of the effective ways that you are countering ISIL's
messaging strategy?
Ms. Wormuth. I think we are taking some steps that are
effective, but we need to do more. Part of what--we have been
working, for example, closely with a number of countries in the
coalition to identify communicators inside of those communities
who have credibility with Muslim populations and who will be
able to lay out a compelling--compelling reasons why ISIL's
theology is completely bankrupt. So, we've been working with
governments to counter violent extremism, we have been working
to get our messages out about military successes that we have
more effectively. But, a lot of it is working with the
private--sort of the private sector and civil society to try to
get the right kinds of messengers to speak to these kinds of
groups. It's a very challenging part of our effort, and I think
we need to do more there.
Senator Hirono. I completely agree with that, because--I do
think that the lone-wolf phenomenon and the problem is one that
we really don't have a very good handle on.
General, I think you mentioned that you thought that there
were signs that Iran would like to be more active in supporting
Syria, and possibly that, because of the agreement and their
getting their hands on more money as the sanctions get lifted,
you said you saw some signs of that, that Iran would like to do
more. So, what are these signs that you were referring to?
Because we know that Iran is already supporting Syria. So, you
know, are you expecting that they're going to put billions more
into their support of Assad?
General Austin. They are already supporting Syria. So----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
General Austin.--you're exactly right.
As things become more dynamic in Syria, and the regime is
increasingly challenged, it's my assessment that Iran will want
to continue to try to shore them up in a greater way.
Senator Hirono. It's not as though our country is going to
just stand by idly while Iran proceeds with that kind of a
program, correct? We're not going to just sit there----
Ms. Wormuth. No, certainly----
Senator Hirono.--while they do that.
Ms. Wormuth.--not. I mean, we absolutely are very focused
on countering Iran's malign activities in Syria as well as the
broader region. We have sanctions of our own that are in place
to try to block arms, for example, going to countries. We have
interdicted, or worked with folks in the coalition to
interdict, weapons going from Iran to the Houthis, for example.
We would continue to try to use those kinds of tools to limit
Iran's ability to support the Syrians.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
important hearing.
Thank you, Secretary Wormuth and General Austin, for taking
the time today to answer our questions. It's deeply
appreciated.
It's been 1 year since President Obama announced to the
world that the United States would undertake a strategy to
degrade and defeat ISIS in order to return some semblance of
stability to Iraq and create an environment that could lead to
a negotiated end to the civil war in Syria.
It was my belief that President Obama's overall goal and
the strategy he outlined to achieve that goal may have been
beset from the outset by some flawed assumptions, some
contradictions, and perhaps an excessive reliance on political
forecasting in a region of the world that is anything but easy
to predict. Now this, compounded by a string of recent events,
is why I think it may be time for us to reassess the way the
United States views this conflict and chooses to respond to it.
I think we need to start by making clear-eyed threat
assessments and prioritizing U.S. national security interests.
General Austin, what's your assessment of the most
significant threats that the conflict in Syria and Iraq pose to
the security of United States citizens and our freedoms? In
other words, at the end of the day, what needs to be
accomplished for the U.S. Government to fulfill and to perform
its constitutional duty to protect the people of the United
States and our interests?
General Austin. This is--thank you, Senator--this is a
transnational threat. If left unchecked, it will continue to
expand and to try to take up or occupy territory and governing.
In doing so, it will try to erase international boundaries, it
will try to do a number of things that will cause tremendous
pain and suffering throughout the region. It will also export
terror--my belief, it will export terror to other parts of the
world, and particularly to places like our homeland. We see the
beginnings of this in this lone-wolf activity that we talk
about. We also see what--we are concerned about individuals who
go into Iraq and Syria and fight as a part of this effort, and
return--or potentially return back to our homeland, and bring
those skills back with them.
So, this is a--it is a threat to us, and I think the threat
will continue to increase.
Senator Lee. Now, the administration's strategy is to
create an environment in Syria that will be likely to lead to a
negotiated settlement of the Civil War, and result in the
removal of Bashar al-Assad from power in Damascus. In your
professional military opinion, General Austin, and given your
knowledge of the region, what level of pressure would need to
be leveraged against Mr. Assad and his supporters in order for
them to capitulate, especially as many Alawites and other
minority groups view some opposition groups as a threat to
their survival? How much investment would need--would be needed
from the coalition countries in order to provide security and
stability in a hypothetical post-Assad Syria?
General Austin. I think that Assad would only be willing,
as you have stated, Senator, to come to the table to negotiate
a settlement if he feels like he is threatened. As things
continue to develop in the country, you know, we see a number
of elements--al-Nusra Front, others that are fighting the
regime, ISIL--you know, their efforts come together and place
increasing pressure on Assad. He is losing--he still has
significant capability, but he's losing capability every day.
Now, the wildcard is when countries like Iran, or
potentially Russia, would--could possibly move in and shore him
up. It could extend things for a bit of time.
Now, in a post-Assad environment, we have to consider that
there are a number of elements there that will continue to be
there and will continue to fight. Al-Nusra is one of those
elements. If there are remnants of ISIL there, they'll continue
to fight. So, it will require some sort of stability force to
go in and make sure that, whatever the transition government
looks like, it has the ability to do its job. So.
Senator Lee. Thank you, General Austin.
I see my time's expired. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize Senator
Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thanks, to our witnesses.
I'm going to start with a compliment, but then I'm going to
revert to form of everybody else on the committee and express
some major concerns.
The complement was, I was in Irbil, Baghdad, Kuwait,
Jordan, and Turkey in late June and early July, and I was in
President Barzani's office, in Irbil, and he said, ``If
President Obama had not started the bombing campaign on Mount
Sinjar on August 8th, we would not be here today.'' He meant
``we,'' the Kurdish people in Kurdistan. He wanted us to extend
our thanks back to the administration and Congress. I also saw
a joint operations command at the airport in Irbil with a very
close coordination between United States forces and the Kurdish
Peshmerga that was very impressive.
However, everywhere else I traveled--to Baghdad and to the
other parts of the region--it seems like there's major
problems. The effort to retake Ramadi that was begun in mid-
July is apparently not going that well, and in Syria, absent
some successes in the Kurdish area near Khobani, has been very,
very disastrous.
I was not an original supporter when Senator McCain raised
the idea of a no-fly humanitarian zone, in the fall of 2013. I
listened to General Dempsey tell us why that was not a good
idea, and I generally agreed with him. But, by the time Senator
King and I went to Lebanon, in February of 2014, and saw a
million refugees already into Lebanon, I became converted. When
Senator McCain pushed the idea of a humanitarian zone first,
there was only about 750,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey. There's
now 1.8 million. It will be 2 million soon. There's 4 million--
the number is 4 million Syrians have fled outside the country,
and there are 7.8 million internally displaced Syrians in the
country. They could easily leave the country, as well. A
humanitarian zone in northern Syria would be very difficult to
do, but I think the benefit of that, compared with 4 million
and then climbing to--it could be 6, it could be 7, it could be
8 million refugees, some of whom could be very, very dangerous,
leaving the country--I think we would have been wise to do it
when Senator McCain suggested it, and I think we would be still
be wise to do it. From having met with a number of Syrian
refugees in Gaziantep, Turkey, an awful lot of those who fled
the country would go back if they felt that there was a place
where basic needs would be met and they would be safe. So, I
would encourage that. That's not your decision to make. I would
encourage that--the administration.
Let me talk about the--General Austin, you said, a second
ago, in response, I think, to Senator McCain's question, that
you thought the war would--the war against ISIL would go on for
years. Is that correct?
General Austin. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Kaine. Just editorial comment. I don't think ``go
on for years'' and ``the chances of success of ISIL are
dimmed,'' I don't think those are compatible statements. That
was a quote from Chairman Dempsey, that ISIL's chances of
success are dimming, the war is going to go on for years. I
don't think those are really compatible statements.
It seems like the ISIL threat is expanding geographically.
We're talking heavily about Iraq and Syria here, but there is
ISIL presence in Libya that we're paying attention to. There's
ISIL presence in Afghanistan, largely disaffected Taliban who
are moving over and claiming allegiance to ISIL. Boko Haram has
pledged allegiance to ISIL, not yet threatening the United
States, as far as I know. There may be some ISIL presence in
Yemen. Is that correct?
General Austin. That is correct, sir, there is.
Senator Kaine. So, the potential battlefield against ISIL
is expanding. We're actually, maybe, engaging in some new
activity. My understanding--General Austin, you indicated we
have undertaken airstrikes to support trained Syrians in Syria,
when they have been threatened by al-Nusra, correct?
General Austin. That's correct, sir.
Senator Kaine. We are also prepared, as of a change in
policy from early August, to undertake airstrikes to protect
those Syrian fighters if they fall under threat and attack by
the Assad regime?
General Austin. That's correct, sir.
Senator Kaine. Now, I tactically completely agree with
that, but I've got to ask, What is the legal precedent for the
United States undertaking military action against forces of the
Assad regime?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, our determination is that, as you
know very well, we can defend against ISIL and al-Nusra under
the 2001 AUMF [the Authorization for Use of Military Force],
and, if our forces are attacked by the regime in a--particular
circumstances, we could--the President could exercise his
Article 2 rights under the Constitution.
Senator Kaine. If our forces--if the U.S. is attacked----
Ms. Wormuth. I'm sorry. If----
Senator Kaine.--Article 2 comes into play.
Ms. Wormuth. I meant our forces, meaning the T&E [Train and
Equip Program] forces that we've trained.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. I will just say, I have not seen an
interpretation of Article 2--ever--that would allow the United
States to undertake action under Article 2 to protect others'
fighters. I just--you can take action under Article 2 to
protect the U.S. The President doesn't need to ask anybody's
permission for that. But, to undertake action to protect
others' fighters, I've never seen an interpretation of Article
2 that would do this.
The last thing I'll say, Mr. Chair, and set aside, there's
a lot more criticism that I would get into here and that a lot
of us have, but I worry that Congress is criticizing you as if
we were editorial writers. We've got a lot of opinions. We're
acting like fans in the stands. We still have not authorized
this war. We still have not authorized this war. I believe it
is being carried out in violation of basic legal principles,
because Congress has not done what Congress is supposed to do.
We can be fans in the stands and throw all the criticisms we
want, but we are in the 14th month of an undeclared war that is
based upon a legal justification that's specious, in my view.
But, Congress has allowed it to happen, completely giving up
their Article 1 responsibilities. Now that we've been told that
the war is going to go on for years, my question is, just to my
colleagues, How long are we going to allow a President to wage
an executive war without a congressional authorization? I think
we're afraid to touch this.
So, we can criticize this all we want. We'll have many more
hearings like this over the course of a number of years. I'm
sure we'll have critical things to say. But, if we're not
willing to do our constitutional duty, I mean, why are we here?
We're not fans. We're supposed to be the owners of this team.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
On behalf of the Chairman, I would recognize Senator
Cotton.
Senator Cotton. If that's the question, I will say the
answer is: Wars are not won with paper resolutions, they are
won with iron resolution. That is clearly lacking in our
strategy right now against the Islamic State.
General Austin, Ms. Wormuth, thank you for coming. General
Austin, in particular, for all the thousands of troopers you
represent, for your service and their service.
I want to speak briefly about the reports that there may
have been some efforts to cook the books about our performance
in the campaign against the Islamic State. I know in your
opening statement you acknowledged this, acknowledged the
problem. There is ongoing investigations, to include with the
IG. But, you have an ongoing challenge in your intelligence
reporting and the way that affects your operations as well as
the command climate. So, putting aside the IG investigation,
could you just tell us what steps you're taking to confront
those challenges that you face on a daily basis?
General Austin. I have recently and continue to emphasize,
Senator, to all of my subordinates, that my expectation is that
I get candid and accurate intelligence assessments, you know,
from my staff. I've also emphasized to my entire command, as I
have in every command that I've had, that the welfare of my
people is extremely important to me. So, you know, I care about
my people. My expectation is that they have a climate that's
conducive to providing for a good, healthy, sound work
environment for them.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I mean, I would have to say,
too, as someone who regularly consumes intelligence community
products on the Islamic State and our campaign against them as
a member of this committee and a member of the Intelligence
Committee, I was very surprised to hear allegations that books
are being cooked, because those products are not painting a
very pretty picture of how this campaign is going.
General Austin, I want to move now to events in Syria, and,
in particular, Russia's military buildup. Published reports
have said, in the last couple of weeks, to include admissions
of senior Russian officials, that Russia is sending aircraft
there, air defense systems, armored personnel carriers, main
battle tanks now, in addition to life support systems, like
modular housing, that are clearly designed for a large and
continued presence. How many airstrikes are--is the coalition
conducting on a daily basis right now in Syria?
General Austin. We're conducting, overall, about 24 or so
airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, and about a third of those are in
Syria. So.
Senator Cotton. What efforts, if any, do we have underway
to deconflict this battlespace now that we have hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of Russians running around with air defense
systems and battle tanks and personnel carriers?
General Austin. Well, we continue to--from a military
perspective, we continue to look at what the possibilities for
encounters are, Senator. We have--we make sure that we have
measures in place to ensure that we don't have an inadvertent
encounter with either Russia--a Russian aircraft or a Syrian
aircraft.
Senator Cotton. Do our pilots have to have 100-percent
positive identification that there is no Russian on a target
before they can strike that target?
General Austin. Well, we've not--the Russians, to my
knowledge, have not started operations, as of this point, so
we've not had to encounter that yet. But, clearly, these are
things that, from a tactical perspective, that we will continue
to work and think through. So.
Senator Cotton. Assad's other main supporter inside of
Syria is Iran, and specifically the Revolutionary Guard Corps
and the Quds Force, which has been present in Syria for years.
Do our pilots have to have 100-percent positive identification
to--that there is no Iranian forces on a target before they
strike that target?
General Austin. Our pilots have to have 100-percent--well,
they have to have certainty, Senator, that there are ISIL
targets there that'll be engaged. Since, as you know, we can
see what we're shooting at or what we're engaging, this is not
an issue. So.
Senator Cotton. Ms. Wormuth, there was a report recently in
the media that Russia offered, in 2012, to help the West remove
Assad from power, and that the United States declined that
offer because we believed that Assad would fall of his own
accord. Is that an accurate report?
Ms. Wormuth. I don't believe that's an accurate report, but
that's obviously from several years ago, and I wasn't in this
position at that time. So, I don't believe it's accurate, but
we're--I don't believe it's accurate.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe that Iran and their proxies
can be a partner in the fight against the Islamic State in any
way in Iraq or Syria?
Ms. Wormuth. No, not really. I mean, we're not cooperating
with Iran right now in Iraq, for example. We are deconflicting
for--you know, as you know well, they certainly have a role
with the--some of the Shiite militia on the ground, some of the
popular--the popular mobilization forces. But, we are not
cooperating, and I don't see Iran as having a productive role
in either Iraq or Syria.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I would agree, given the fact
that their militias in Iraq had to rely on United States
airpower, and now they appear to be relying on Russian forces
in Iran to back up their hapless efforts, that they aren't
going to be a partner. Trying to rely on Iran to defeat the
Islamic State is like trying to rely on gasoline to put out a
fire.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
On behalf of the Chairman, Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General, I just want to touch, for a few moments, on the
intelligence issue. I consider this extremely grave, a grave
issue, because if we don't have reliable intelligence, as
policymakers, and if the President doesn't have reliable
intelligence, we can't make good policy. This keeps happening.
I mean, this goes back to the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, the Iraq
War. This allegation is--these allegations are extremely
serious, and I hope you will--I understand we have an IG
investigation, but, as a commanding officer, I would hope that
you would just be all over this.
I want to ask you a direct question. Have you ever ordered,
suggested, or hinted to any of the intelligence command that
they should sweeten the intelligence reports in order to
portray a more positive view of the success of our efforts in
Iraq or Syria?
General Austin. Absolutely not, Senator King. Absolutely
not.
Senator King. Well, I just hope that you will just stay on
this, because, as you know better than any of us, if you don't
have good intelligence, you're not only going into the battle
blind in--if it's cooked intelligence, you're going into the
battle with one hand tied behind your back. So, I just--I am
extremely concerned about this issue.
This is a question for the record. You used the term
``progress'' in your statement a number of times, progress here
and progress there. Not now, but for the record, I would like a
very specific list of what you consider ``progress,'' where we
are--where we are succeeding. Because, generally, it doesn't
look like that. It looks more like a stalemate. I think, again,
we should have this information. I know some of it is in your
testimony, but I'd like, if you could, just a one-pager on
where you think progress has been made.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Austin. Be happy to provide that, sir. We'll get
that to you right away.
Senator King. Thank you. I think, from a broad question of
policy--and this comes off of a lot of the other discussion
we've had--Assad and ISIS are evil twins. ISIS largely came
into existence in reaction to Assad. In retrospect--and, like
Senator Kaine, I was one who was very reluctant about getting
involved--but, in retrospect, the longer we've left Assad
there, it has created a situation, both a humanitarian crisis
and a situation, that has allowed al-Nusra and ISIL--ISIL
didn't even exist when we first started having these hearings--
and it's allowed them to--it's given them an enemy and an
opportunity to make hay with the population.
So, a strategy that ignores Assad--and, for example, trains
troops to go into Syria to only fight ISIL, but not Assad, I
just think in--I'm--I think we now need to recognize that
that's not a logical strategy. Part of good strategic thinking
is that you modify your strategy according to the--according to
changed circumstances. The circumstances are--and you mentioned
he's losing his capabilities every day. I'm sorry, General,
I've been hearing that at every hearing since 2013, ``Assad is
about to go, he's about to collapse.'' I know you didn't say
that today, but we've got to find a strategy that allows us to
move Assad aside in some way, working with the Russians, if
necessary, or the Iranians, if necessary, because he's the
irritant that's keeping this thing stirred up.
Then, finally, in terms of our troops, the fundamental
problem, it seems to me, is we're not going to defeat ISIS with
just airpower. Everybody knows that. We're trying to rely on a
weak force in Iraq and no force in Syria. How do we refine this
strategy, General? You know that we--in order to root them out
of Mosul, Iraq, or anyplace else, you're going to have to have
troops on the ground. We don't want them to be Americans. How
do we break through this? Clearly, the Train and Equip is just
too little, too late. Your thoughts.
General Austin. We're going to need a greater commitment
from the partners that we're enabling, Senator. You know,
again, if the Iraqis make the commitment to put more troops
through the Train and Equip Program, we'll get them trained and
equipped, and we'll get them into the fight.
Senator King. Are there signs that the Iraqis are willing
to do that? Do they want Mosul back?
General Austin. I think so. I certainly think so. They want
to stabilize Anbar first, and then take on Mosul. But, yes, I
believe that.
Senator King. Ms. Wormuth, give me some thoughts on the
overall strategy here.
Ms. Wormuth. Certainly, Senator. I was going to say, in
terms of getting more Iraqis into the fight, they are, as I
said, increase--they're opening the aperture, in terms of which
units they're putting into our training sites. So, that's going
to help, I think, create additional troops on the ground.
Senator King. I'd like specific numbers on that, by the
way, for the record.
[The information referred to can be found on page 155.]
Ms. Wormuth. Certainly. Certainly.
They are--we see them starting to now plan ahead, in terms
of which units are going into the training pipeline, which,
again, I think indicates a greater sense of urgency on their
part.
On the Syrian side of the ledger, I would say it is clearly
harder to find partners on the ground on the Syrian side of the
ledger. But, one of the things that we didn't envision a year
ago was the partnership, if you will, that we have of our
airpower with the Syrian Kurds and the Syrian Arab coalition
that are operating with them. That group, on its own, won't be
enough, but we are continuing to look for opportunities like
that, even as we review our own Train and Equip Program.
Senator King. Well, I would join in Senator Kaine's remarks
that I really think you need to rethink a strategy about a safe
zone, a no-fly zone, some protection from Assad's barrel bombs.
This is some--I hate it when the Chairman's right, but he's
been talking about this for 2 years, and I--in retrospect, I
think he was right. We've allowed this to just--the atrocity to
go on too long, and it's impacting us, it's impacting the rest
of Europe. I really think that there should be a rethinking of
the nonintervention strategy, not on--not in terms of troops,
but in terms of airpower in order to level the playing field,
bring pressure on Assad and the Russians, so that we can get a
negotiated agreement. Because it doesn't seem to be a prospect
now.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Again, upon--on behalf of the Chairman, Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Ms. Wormuth, you made a--in your opening statement--I'm--
apologize that I had to step out; I had to go to a Judiciary
Committee meeting--but, you made a comment in your opening
statement that I want to focus a little bit of time on through
a series of questions that--hopefully, I can get brief remarks.
You said that ISIS is not 10 feet tall. The reason that I
have a concern with that kind of statement is that it kind of--
it's reminiscent of characterizing them as the JV team. They
are a very serious threat.
Before I go forward, General Austin, I neglected to do what
I always do when I see people in uniform. Thank you for your
service. I know you guys are a part of the solution.
But, when we say that ISIS is not 10 feet tall, they are
the richest threat group of this kind in human history. Through
the seizure of assets for the Iraqi National Bank, I think they
seized some $820 million. Last week, we just had a memorial for
9/11. It's estimated that the 9/11 attacks cost about $500,000.
Through that one asset seizure, if my math is right, that
equates to about 1,600 9/11s, having the resources to strike
that kind of damage in our homeland, in the Middle East, in
Europe, and other places. I think that we need to recognize
them as one of the single greatest threats that we have today.
Of course we have Russia and North Korea, Iran. But, they're at
the front line for people that we have to take seriously. We
have to figure out when we're making progress and when we're
not. That leads to my questions.
Do you feel like you're over your--over the last 24, 36
month, whatever time horizon, General Austin, makes sense to
you--does ISIS control more or less territory, or do they have
greater or less influence in other areas that are emerging as
potential strongholds for ISIS in the future? More or less?
General Austin. Less in Iraq.
Senator Tillis. What's the net? Because we know they're
expanding elsewhere. We know they're changing jerseys in
Afghanistan from al-Qaeda and other groups and Taliban into
ISIS. We've got them operating in other areas. So, what's the
net? More or less?
General Austin. It would be more if you consider----
Senator Tillis. Okay.
Do they have--if you were to compare their resources--their
economic resources over the last 24 or 36 months--do they have
more or less dollars to support their terrorist operations?
General Austin. Less. We have targeted their resources. I
think--they make money, as you know, Senator, off things like
oil collection---
Senator Tillis. Antiquity sales, kidnappings----
General Austin. Right, right. So, we have long--I have
said, on a number of occasions, not only do we have to stop the
flow of foreign fighters, but we have to take away this enemy's
ability to finance the----
Senator Tillis. Okay.
Another measure. I'm trying to come up with this concept of
a dashboard so that when we have the next committee hearing
meeting, I can ask you the same series of questions and see
where the trends are. Do they have more or less influence--are
they--I--they seem to be winning on social media, in terms of
reaching out to people in the homeland, reaching out to people
in Europe. About 6 hours ago, it was posted that some 15-year-
old girl murdered her mother in Europe, was convicted of murder
as a result of being radicalized by some of the social media
presence. Have we stemmed the tide on their continued expansion
of the use of social media to radicalize people internationally
and in the homeland?
Ms. Wormuth. I think they do have a more effective counter-
messaging campaign at this point.
Senator Tillis. Yeah.
Ms. Wormuth. That's an area we need to----
Senator Tillis. It seems----
Ms. Wormuth.--work on.
Senator Tillis.--to be growing. It doesn't--it seems like,
again, in terms of trends, the ground that they're taking, the
places they're heavily influencing, social media--I mean, this
is a--an organization that is trending in the wrong direction
against the greatest superpower that's ever existed.
I want to go back to chemical weapons. Do you think that--
there's been reports--I want to--I only want to talk about
confirmed reports--do you think that their use of chemical
weapons have increased over the last 24 months or are beginning
to see evidence that they're being used in certain areas in
Syria and Iraq? More or less?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, given that they had no apparent use
of chemical weapons at the outset, there have been----
Senator Tillis. So, now there's more.
Ms. Wormuth.--some indications----
Senator Tillis. Okay.
Then, the last question I have is how we're working--I
understand that most of the problem has to deal with the fact
that Iraq has failed to do what they need to do to engage the
Sunni population, but they haven't done it. So, over the course
of the last 24-36 months, has the Sunni population been more or
less inclined to side with ISIS where the conflicts are arising
in Iraq?
Ms. Wormuth. I think we've seen considerable outreach from
Prime Minister Abadi----
Senator Tillis. Has it worked?
Ms. Wormuth.--to the Sunni community. There are now 4,000
Sunni tribal fighters in Anbar that we didn't have 6 months
ago.
Senator Tillis. So, you feel like we're winning, in terms
of engaging the hearts and minds of the Sunni population?
Ms. Wormuth. I think we're bringing more Sunni tribal
fighters into the fight.
Senator Tillis. Okay.
General Austin. I would agree that they're less inclined
to--in Iraq--to side with ISIL. They've seen what ISIL brings
to the table. Most of the Sunnis don't want that, going
forward. But, they do want to be included in the Government of
Iraq. So.
Senator Tillis. I think that they should be if we're going
to have a long-term strategy that has productive engagement.
Thank you very much. I'm sorry, Ranking Member, for going
over my time.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator King has requested an additional question.
Senator King----
Senator King. Not a question, Mr. Chairman.
I want to submit for the record an extraordinary speech by
Robert Gates in 1992, when he was head of the CIA, on the
danger of the politicization of intelligence. It's prescient
and brilliant, which is not surprising, coming from Robert
Gates. I just want to submit it for the record.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
Guarding Against Politicization,
A message to analysts
Guarding Against Politicization
Robert M. Gates
The following remarks by the Director of Central Intelligence were
made on 16 March 1992 in the CIA auditorium.
Bourne Cockran wrote to Winston Churchill in 1895 that, ``What the
people really want to hear is the truth--it is the exciting thing--
speak the simple truth.'' Twenty years later, Churchill himself wrote,
``The truth is incontrovertible; panic may resent it; ignorance may
deride it; malice may destroy it, but there it is.'' Truth, insofar as
we can determine it, is what our work is all about. Indeed our own main
entrance is dominated by the chiseled words, ``And ye shall know the
truth and the truth shall make you free.'' Because seeking truth is
what we are all about as an institution, as professionals, and as
individuals, the possibility--even the perception--that that quest may
be tainted deeply troubles us, as it long has and as it should.
The problem of politicization is as old as the intelligence
business. The missile gap in the late 1950s, the disputes over our work
on Vietnam in the 1960s, the criticisms of pandering to Nixon and
Kissinger on detente in the early 1970s, that we were foils for the
Carter administration on energy in the late 1970s--all these
controversies and more--predated the 1980s. For as long as intelligence
data has been collected and analyzed by human beings, it has been
susceptible to their biases.
Politicization can manifest itself in many ways, but in each case
it boils down to the same essential elements: ``Almost all agree that
it involves deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a
preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence. Most consider
`classic' politicization to be only that which occurs if products are
forced to conform to policymakers' views. A number believe
politicization also results from management pressures to define and
drive certain lines of analysis and substantive viewpoints. Still
others believe that changes in tone or emphasis made during the normal
review or coordination process, and limited means for expressing
alternative viewpoints, also constitute forms of politicization.''
This has been an issue with which all of us have long grappled, but
never as publicly, or as pointedly, as in my confirmation hearings last
fall. I know that for many of you, the segments devoted to
politicization were wrenching, embarrassing, and even humiliating at
times. They pitted friends and colleagues against one another. I know
too that there were strong views on all sides of the debate back here
in the ranks.
While I believed, and argued, that the specific allegations were
unfair and untrue, I came away from that experience determined not only
to find better ways to prevent the reality of policy-driven bias, but
also to reexamine how we deal with perceptions of politicization.
I also came away with a renewed belief that by dealing forthrightly
with the politicization issue, we will also be strengthening our
ability to fulfill our purpose--to provide the highest quality
intelligence, accurate and relevant intelligence, to policymakers.
As a result of those hearings, one of my first moves upon becoming
Director of Central Intelligence was to instruct the Deputy Director
for Intelligence to form a task force to address politicization and to
work with members of the Directorate of Intelligence to come up with
recommendations for future action. In my view, the report provided
valuable insights into the issue and prescribed a variety of measures
to address many of the concerns associated with politicization. I thank
the task force members for their effort and encourage those of you who
have not yet read the report or my resulting decision memorandum to do
so.
In their report, the task force found a persistent and impressive
commitment to objectivity, high ethical standards, and professionalism
in the DI. They found that most analysts and managers remain determined
to resist direct or indirect pressures from policy officials for
products that conform to their views. Moreover, they concluded that
politicization is not perceived to be a pervasive problem by most in
the DI. Indeed, it is not a problem at all in some areas.
But, the task force did find that concerns about politicization are
serious enough to warrant action. Furthermore, most of these concerns
relate to internally generated distortions. Over half the respondents
to the task force's survey said that forcing a product to conform to a
view thought to be held by a manager higher up the chain of command
occurs often enough to be of concern. Most of the charges raised in
discussions with the task force revolved around internal distortions
generated during the review and coordination process.
I agree with the task force that this level of concern is
disturbing, that it goes beyond the degree of frustration that is
inherent to the review process, and that it demands the immediate
attention of Agency management at all levels.
While my comments to you today fulfill a promise I made to Congress
several months ago and respond in part to the task force's
recommendations, I believe I would have scheduled this address
regardless. In the short time that I have been back at the Agency, I
have become more aware of the profound impact the issue of
politicization has had on the morale of analysts and managers alike. It
is not a concern to be dismissed with token gestures. Politicization is
a serious matter, and it has no place at CIA or in the Intelligence
Community.
As best we can, we must engage in a candid discussion of the issue,
devise effective measures to prevent it from occurring, and resolve to
deal decisively with any circumstances that may foster distortions in
our analysis. I hope that our encounter today will launch a process of
greater openness and dialogue.
The DDI and I have accepted the task force recommendations in their
totality, but before I discuss the specifics, I would like to talk with
you further about politicization and the challenge it poses for us as
intelligence analysts. The issue of politicization has dogged American
intelligence for years and reflects the fact that although we belong to
an institution with established norms and procedures, we are all human
and prone to make mistakes and errors in judgment.
Although the task force study focused on the DI, I believe we must
include the National Intelligence Officers and the National
Intelligence Council in the discussion of politicization. They, too,
are engaged in analysis and--given their frequent contact with high-
level policymakers--their work is also vulnerable to distortion.
Let's start by defining the policymakers' proper role in the
intelligence process. I believe that most of you would agree that
policymakers should be able to request intelligence products that
address the issues they are dealing with on a daily basis. Such tasking
is an integral part of the intelligence process. If we ignore
policymaker interests, then our products become irrelevant in the
formulation of our government's foreign policies. I think we also all
would concur that a policymaker should not dictate the line of march
that he or she expects our analysis to take. Nor should we withhold our
assessments because they convey bad news or may not be well received.
The challenge for us as analysts, then, is to produce intelligence
that objectively assesses relevant policy issues--whether it supports
or undermines current policy trends--and to ensure that our product is
read and valued by the policymakers concerned. Ensuring objectivity
means that we explore the issue fully, looking at and vetting all the
available evidence and identifying where gaps, blindspots, or
alternative scenarios exist. Our task is to facilitate an understanding
of the realities of a particular situation and its implications for
U.S. policy.
Getting the policymaker to read our product should not jeopardize
our objectivity; it does not mean sugarcoating our analysis. On the
contrary, it means providing a frank, evenhanded discussion of the
issues. If we know that a policymaker holds a certain viewpoint on an
issue that is different from our analysis, we ought not lightly dismiss
that view but rather address its strengths and weaknesses and then
provide the evidence and reasoning behind our own judgment. I believe
such an approach enhances our credibility and value. I realize,
however, that in many cases the issues may not be clear-cut. In such
situations, we owe it to ourselves to discuss fully how best to
approach the subject before we even set pen to paper. In no instance
should we alter our judgments to make a product more palatable to a
policymaker.
In dealing with policymakers, we also need to keep in mind our role
as intelligence analysts. Managers and analysts alike should meet with
policymakers on a regular basis to exchange views and explore new
ideas. In today's changing world, however, we must guard against taking
on tasks that do not deal with intelligence topics and may be intended
instead to drive a specific policy agenda. Managers and analysts need
to discuss such situations candidly and design products that address
only the intelligence issues at hand.
This brings me to the second aspect of politicization identified by
the task force--the apparent lack of understanding and confidence
between a number of DI analysts and managers. Somehow some seem to have
lost the ability to discuss the substantive or structural aspects of an
intelligence product frankly and in an atmosphere of trust. The task
force report indicates that such circumstances exist in enough offices
to be of concern. Apparently we have lost a sense of professional
collegiality and find ourselves, in many instances, adopting a them-
against-us mentality which fosters perceptions of distortions in the
intelligence process. No one has a monopoly on the truth; we are all
learning new things every day. Although some may be more experienced
than others, no one person should impose his or her view on another.
Dialogue must take place, each participant must be open to new ideas,
and well-grounded alternative views must be represented. There are many
managers and analysts who understand this; unfortunately, many do not.
If an analyst and manager or two analytical, groups interpret
information differently and can't come to a common understanding, the
situation can degenerate into a perception of politicization. If one
group or one person forces his or her line of analysis out over
another, whether by force of his or her position in the management
structure or through control of dissemination channels, it can leave
the perception that that person or group has politicized the process.
I believe the first line of defense against politicization and
analytic distortions is our own personal integrity; I want to spend
some time talking about how each of us must work to ensure the highest
integrity in our work.
Let me talk for a moment to our managers. I believe that managers
are in a special position, particularly branch chiefs, because they are
the ultimate arbiters in any analytical disagreements. They are also
the ones who are charged with teaching and counseling our analysts.
As I see it, managers have three critical responsibilities to
prevent distortions and corruptions of our products. First, managers
have to challenge all of the analysis that comes through them to ensure
its basic analytic soundness, logical validity, and clarity. As part of
this, managers should always require analysts to defend their work.
Second, managers must strive to be open to new ideas and new lines
of analysis from any source. We cannot simply stick with our previous
conceptions and hope to keep pace with our rapidly changing
environment. In the past year, many of the old assumptions that helped
us in our analysis have been invalidated.
Third, I would also strongly concur with the task force in its
conclusion that poor communication is the key source of the widespread
concern within the DI about politicization.
Managers must strive in every interaction they have with analysts
and managers to ensure all communications are clear. Managers must be
able to state clearly why they disagree with a judgment, or how they
want a logical argument reconstructed. We cannot simply say we don't
like it and we'll know what we want when we see it. That is more than a
cop-out, that is a prescription for trouble.
Let me emphasize this last responsibility. Managers, particularly
those who are teaching our less experienced analysts how to do basic
intelligence analysis, cannot afford poor communications. Managers
should be showing analysts the bows and whys behind their decisions,
not just telling them to change words. If you can't tell an analyst why
you don't believe his or her arguments, or if you can't offer a logical
counterargument, then you should take more time to construct your own
analysis.
Most managers in the DI face difficult and highly stressful demands
on their time. In a directorate in which, at each level, the manager is
expected to be part expert, part editor, and part bureaucrat, they are
sometimes tempted to give the people-management side of their jobs
short shrift. Frequently, the result is that suspicions of base motives
arise when there are simply differences of view:
This happens when a division chief is too timid--or
thinks he or she is too busy--to sit down with the analyst and go over
comments on a paper.
It happens when a senior manager makes cryptic or
offensive comments on drafts.
It happens when the office director sits on a paper
indefinitely because he or she lacks the courage to tell an analyst and
his or her management that it is simply unworkable or irrelevant.
It happens when an analyst responds to a reviewer with
legitimate questions or counterarguments, only to discover he or she
has been branded as uncooperative and unwilling to take criticism.
It happens when subordinate managers are afraid to give
bad news, or to admit to their own mistakes, and instead pin everything
unpleasant on someone higher up the chain.
It happens when there are so many layers of excessive
review that some kind of misunderstanding somewhere along the way is
inevitable.
It happens when any manager becomes so intent on ``making
a call'' or ``sharpening the judgments'' or ``defining the office
view'' that he or she oversimplifies the argument or fails to provide
alternative views.
I think you get the idea. Perceptions of politicization or other
kinds of intentional distortion tend to arise in the absence of an
open, creative environment that encourages give-and-take. The manager
who allows the press of business and the frequent need to push and prod
for the best possible product to cause him or her to behave rudely,
abruptly, or imperiously, does so at considerable peril to his or her
reputation for objectivity. I know also that what is necessary is not
the practice of some awkward, feel-good management technique. It is
simply a matter of treating people the right way--with professional
respect, civility, and confidence in their integrity and capabilities.
Managers must create an environment in which analysts feel
comfortable airing substantive differences. Managers must listen; they
must talk; they must erode some of the hierarchy. They must create a
sense of joint ownership of ideas. Managers need to create an
atmosphere in which people can, approach them without fear of
retribution. Managers must--I repeat must--create a barrier-free
environment for ideas.
Now let me address our analysts. Analysts have their own
responsibilities to prevent distortions and politicization from
creeping into our analysis. First and foremost, analysts must be able
to construct clearly a logical analysis of an issue. This includes not
only the ability to write a clear argument, but an ability to examine
one's own biases, assumptions and limitations.
Second, when an analyst sends forward a work to management, he or
she should be prepared and expect to defend that analysis.
Third, every analyst must approach editing, coordination, and
review as a process to improve a piece. An analyst must see the process
as a team effort, with coordinating analysts and managers as team
members who will offer input that must be considered and dealt with. No
analyst should think that his or her view of the world is the only
correct view, or that the opinions and arguments of others are not
worthy of consideration. We must always keep our minds open. As Judge
Learned Hand wrote, ``Opinions are at best provisional hypotheses,
incompletely tested. The more they are tested, after the tests are well
scrutinized, the more assurance we may assume, but they are never
absolutes. So, we must be tolerant of opposite opinions or varying
opinions by the very fact of our incredulity of our own.''
Last, and this is an important point, analysts must always
challenge the arguments and opinions of others, including their
managers. An analyst should not expect his or her analysis to go
unchallenged, and he or she should not be willing to accept the
analysis of others without challenge. By questioning managers and other
analysts on the reasons underlying their comments and judgments,
especially those in conflict with our own, we learn to look at issues
in new ways--sometimes ways that are better. You should rightly
question anyone who cannot defend or explain the reasons behind
disagreements with your analysis.
Also, unwarranted concerns about politicization can arise when
analysts themselves fail to understand their role in the process. We do
produce a corporate product. If the policymaker wants the opinion of a
single individual, he or she can (and frequently does) consult any one
of a dozen outside experts on any given issue. Your work, on the other
hand, counts because it represents the well-considered view of an
entire directorate and, in the case of National Estimates, the entire
Intelligence Community. Analysts themselves must play a critical role
in making the system work. They must do their part to help foster an
open environment. Analysts must understand and practice the corporate
concept. They must discard the academic mindset that says their work is
their own, and they must take into account the views of others during
the coordination process.
What, then, can we do together to counter both real and perceived
distortion of the analytical product? For starters, we can all recommit
ourselves to a solid professional ethic and a high degree of
collegiality. Distortion of analysis is much less likely, and much
easier to spot, if there is a concerted effort at all levels to observe
basic standards:
We must make explicit what is not known and clearly
distinguish between fact, inference, and judgment.
We must recommit ourselves to the good oldfashioned
scientific method--the testing of alternative hypotheses against the
evidence.
We should provide an outlet for different
interpretations, theories, or predictions in our mainline publications,
not just in a staff note or a piece at the back of a monthly.
While we strive for sharp and focused judgments for a
clear assessment of likelihood, we must not dismiss alternatives or
exaggerate our certainty under the guise of making the ``tough calls.''
We are analysts, not umpires, and the game does not depend on our
providing a single judgment. As Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote,
``Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cocksure of many
things that were not so.''
We must protect ourselves from groupthink, an
institutional mindset, or personal bias. We must also avoid the
temptation to weight our arguments or our case as a corrective to the
perceived failings of others.
We must view coordination as an important step in
ensuring that all views have been considered. Indeed, the task force
found that refusal to alter a view or take into account the views of
others during the coordination process frequently leads to charges of
distortion or politicization.
But, above all, we must build an atmosphere of confidence and trust
between analysts and managers. This requires a renewed commitment to
accountability, expertise, and intellectual honesty. Accountability
means standing behind the intelligence that one sends forward and being
held responsible for any distortions that have been imposed upon it. It
is not producing analysis designed to please one's superiors; nor does
it mean that a branch, division, or office's analysis must always be
right. Accountability requires that analysts and managers understand
each other's viewpoints and work together in producing the best
analysis they can.
In doing so, we rely on expertise. Managers should ensure that
analysts are given opportunities to build and hone their substantive
expertise and analytic skills. Managers are chosen to manage their
analysts, not to become superanalysts themselves. In helping their
analysts develop, managers can build a reserve of trust. Analysts, for
their part, must dedicate themselves to becoming experts on their
subject and sharpening their critical thinking skills. This takes
talent; this takes hard work; this takes dedication; and, not least,
this takes time! It follows that managers will demonstrate increased
confidence in analysts of such proven expertise.
Finally, we all need to recognize biases and blindspots--in
ourselves and in others--viewing them not as weaknesses but as
opportunities to grow. Such an approach would allow us to deal more
openly with others and foster a more collegial give-and-take among
analysts and managers. Greater intellectual honesty on everyone's part
can make the process less bureaucratic, less hierarchical, and less of
a win-lose situation.
By improving analyst-manager trust, I believe that concerns about
the review process skewing intelligence can be lessened. Moreover, in
the scope of a more collegial relationship, a manager challenging
assumptions should not be seen as a threat by analysts. On balance, it
is the managers who bear the greater burden of responsibility in the
review process, and they need to have a sound basis for their actions.
In editing and revising intelligence products, I expect managers to
explain their changes in face-to-face exchanges with their analysts and
to be willing to admit when a revision is unwarranted. In turn, I
expect analysts to use evidence and logic when arguing against proposed
revisions in substance, to be open to new approaches and ideas, and to
guard against purely defensive reactions. Expertise is a requirement,
but analysts must not become so wedded to their views that they exclude
well-grounded, alternative arguments.
The issue of analyst-manager communications is paralleled in the
DI-NIC relationship, where NIOs review drafts submitted by DI analysts.
A majority of the time, the process works smoothly. In some instances,
however, tensions have flared over disagreements on substantive
changes. Both sides must endeavor to communicate openly to resolve
differences in views or outline alternative scenarios. Moreover, the
NIOs' access to the DCI is not exclusive; analysts are welcome to bring
their concerns about the estimative process directly to me.
I would like also to address the special obligations and
responsibilities that fall on the Directorate of Intelligence and
Directorate of Operations when CIA is involved in a covert action. For
the DO, a covert action activity does not absolve it of its foreign
intelligence reporting responsibilities. It must meet its professional
obligation to report as accurately and as fully on an area or problem
in which a covert action is under way, as on any other subject. The
DO's task is made harder and scrutiny will be all the more intense
because inevitably the DO will be working against the perception that
its reporting is skewed by involvement in a covert action. In truth, it
is only human nature to expect that those who are trying to implement a
policy will develop strong opinions about, and even attachments to,
that policy. We would be fooling ourselves if we tried to deny that
reality. But all the more reason for the DO, as professional
intelligence officers, to assert their own first obligation to seek and
report the truth. All the more reason that we must reaffirm that those
who are responsible for covert action must not be in a position to
produce, coordinate, or disseminate anything that is, or looks like,
finished intelligence. At the same time, DI analysts must seek out the
expertise in the DO, including in areas where covert action is
involved, where operations and reports officers have great experience,
expertise, and day-to-day working insights. A special burden falls on
the leaders of joint DO-DI Centers, who must ensure that neither the
perception nor the reality of politicization gets a toehold.
There is one other potential problem that I need to talk about. As
we all know, the DO frequently has information that for one reason or
another is not formally disseminated. This may be especially true in
cases involving covert action. The DO, in those cases, must make sure
that the relevant analysts are made privy to the information they need
to strengthen their analytical understanding and work.
In discussing this topic, I would be remiss in not stating that,
with a few exceptions, we have a long history of effectively making
this partnership between the DO and the DI work--where the DI has
earned a well-deserved reputation for independence and insight and the
DO for reporting unblinkingly and accurately even when involved in
covert action.
In its examination of politicization, the task force concluded that
``the solution to the problem of politicization, broadly defined, is
not so much a matter of mechanisms as it is confidence in the integrity
and capabilities of our people. For our recommendations to yield
positive results, every Agency employee from the DCI on down must
demonstrate adherence to the principles of integrity on which objective
analysis rests, and civility, which fosters a trusting, creative
environment.''
While I agree that, first and foremost, attitudes must change to
help us overcome the unease that politicization has produced among
Agency employees, concrete steps should be taken to set a process of
reconciliation and dialogue in motion. As I noted earlier, I fully
endorse the task force's recommended actions. At the risk of reciting a
laundry list of new initiatives, I would like to outline for you the
measures that I have undertaken in an effort to address the problem of
politicization.
As a first step, I pledge to you today my firm commitment to ensure
that analytic objectivity is at the core of every finished intelligence
product and that the importance of people-oriented management is
instilled at every supervisory level. I want to see this Agency excel
in its mission; but to do so, its personnel must have a sense of value
and feel that their contribution matters. I expect every manager in
this organization to echo my commitment and foster an atmosphere of
confidence and trust.
To strengthen management skills and enforce accountability for good
management, I have directed the DDI to initiate a zero-based study of
DI management practices, to mandate that performance appraisal reports
explicitly cite deficiencies in management related to charges of
politicization, and to support initiatives to secure better feedback
from personnel--such as the evaluation forms being developed by the DI/
MAG.
In an effort to assist managers in cultivating the analytic talent
of the people under their supervision, I have asked the DDI to ensure
that DI managers devote greater attention and resources to practical
on-the-job training of analysts--showing them how to gather evidence,
assess sources, make judgments, and write up or brief their analysis,
our so-called ``tradecraft.'' The DDI also should develop a DI
``tradecraft'' manual and work with the Office of Training and
Education to enhance the ``tradecraft'' training that analysts receive
in formal courses. In addition, managers should rely more frequently on
the expertise and experience of senior analysts to assist in developing
new analysts.
As a means of minimizing the chances for distortions and
misperceptions caused by the review process, I have directed the DDI to
institute practical measures to reduce layers of review, encourage
greater flexibility and variety of formatting, and encourage fuller
debate of substantive issues. To achieve these goals, a DI task force
will be established to study the directorate's review and coordination
process. At the risk of prejudging the task force's findings, I expect
to see a noticeable reduction in the layers of review. In addition, I
have asked the DDI to reserve his own substantive review to sensitive
products intended for high-level consumers. I have not and will not
become involved in the review process.
To ensure that our consumers get the benefit of differing analytic
perspectives and to demonstrate the directorate's openness to new ideas
and thoughtful alternative viewpoints, I have asked the DDI to restate
his support for the inclusion of well-reasoned, relevant, and factually
supported alternative views in mainline products, and to appoint a
committee to develop practical means to accomplish this goal.
In an effort to remain vigilant to future instances of
politicization, I have directed all major analytic components to
establish and publicize procedures--within the chain of command--to
deal with allegations of politicization. I also asked the DDI to
appoint a fulltime ombudsman to serve as an independent, informal
counselor for those with complaints about politicization, and he has
asked Dave Peterson to take on that job. Dave will have access to me,
the DDCI, the DDI, and all DI analytic products; he will counsel,
arbitrate, or offer recommendations and have the authority to initiate
inquiries into real or perceived problem areas. While Dave will be
administratively located in the DI, he will be responsible for dealing
with concerns about or allegations of politicization from throughout
the Agency, as well as the NIC and estimative process.He will also
publish an annual report that includes an assessment of the current
level of concern and the effectiveness of measures being taken to
alleviate it.
I have directed that several other measures be taken to guard
against politicization becoming a problem in the future. IG studies of
analytic components shall specifically consider the effectiveness of
the review and coordination processes, and the DDI should make relevant
portions of IG studies of DI components available to a wider audience
within the DI. The DDI should also mandate wider dissemination of
studies by the Product Evaluation Staff, as well as increase the
studies' emphasis on distortions of the product and process and on the
use of alternative analysis. As a follow-up to the task force's
efforts, a survey of DI analysts and managers should be conducted a
year from now on the issue of politicization.
Finally, the DDI and I are committed to encouraging open and
continuing discussion throughout the DI and the NIC of politicization
and will promptly take steps when allegations of problems arise,
particularly in centers and task forces involved with DO operations.
Specifically, I have asked the DDI to encourage all components to
discuss politicization in general, and as it pertains to specific
substantive issues, and to mandate that officers engaged in the conduct
of covert action in areas where policy implementation and analytic
functions are integrated shall not be involved in the formal
coordination of finished analytic products. The DDI, the NIC Chairman,
and the Deputy Director for Operations currently are developing
guidelines to ensure that the entire intelligence production process,
including the preparation of regular intelligence analysis, National
Intelligence Estimates, briefings, etc., including in the DCI centers,
are insulated from the influence of those with responsibility for
implementing and supervising covert action.
I, better than anyone, know that this directorate lives and
breathes skepticism. It is, after all, our stock in trade. No area is
so subject to skepticism--even cynicism--than senior-level rhetoric.
``Show me'' is the watchword. So it should be. I intend to monitor
closely the implementation of these instructions and ensure that they
are carried out. This will be no paper exercise. Actions at every level
and a sustained commitment will be required and, as we go along, the
DDI and I will continue to welcome ideas in implementing the
recommendations.
At the same time, you and I both know that this kind of problem
cannot be directed away. You cannot order integrity, you cannot demand
that a culture preserve its ethics. In the end, preventing distortion
of our analysis depends on where all of us draw the line day in and day
out. We must draw a line:
Between producing a corporate product and suppressing
different views.
Between adjusting stylistic presentation to anticipate
your consumer's predilections, and changing the analysis to pander to
them.
Between making order out of chaos and suppressing
legitimate debate.
Between viewing reporting critically and using evidence
selectively.
Between avoiding wishy-washiness and pretending to be
more certain than we are.
Between being a team player and being a careerist.
Between maintaining efficiency and suppressing legitimate
debate.
Between providing leadership and fostering a fearful,
oppressive climate.
I wish I could look back on my career in the DI--from analyst to
DDI--and say that in each and every case over 25 years I have always
drawn all these lines in all the right places. I can tell you, however,
that as DCI I intend to do everything in my power to guarantee that
analytic objectivity remains the most important of the core values of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
It is my sincere hope that the steps I have outlined will help
alleviate the underlying causes of and concerns about politicization.
Let me reiterate. In our efforts to be policy-relevant, we should not
allow our analysis to become skewed in favor of one policy option or
another. Nor should the views of one individual--manager or analyst--
prevail when wellsourced, well-reasoned arguments support a different
set of judgments. We must improve the analyst-manager relationship, and
the burden is largely on those who lead. Collegiality and honesty
should be two key watchwords in our dealings. We must also avoid
ascribing base motives to those with whom we disagree. Moreover, the
analytic process should vigorously scrutinize all available evidence,
including clandestine reporting, to ensure that underlying policy goals
are not distorting our analysis.
In closing, I want to emphasize that the underlying key to dealing
with this issue of politicization is respect for individuals, trust in
their judgment, confidence in their capabilities, and concern for their
well-being. Managers must tell employees what is expected of them, and
they must hold them responsible for following through. At the same
time, however, managers must give employees the trust and confidence,
as well as the training and control, they need to carry out the task.
They must reward employees for their competence, creativity, and
commitment to the analytic process.
I want respect for the employee again to become a central value of
this organization, and I want that value to run deep. Many managers pay
lipservice to this. I want all of us to deliver, and I think we should
be held accountable for doing so. Because trust begets trust, I am
certain perceptions of politicization would be reduced in the process.
I will make a commitment to you today. My door is always open to
discuss this issue with you. If you believe your work is being
distorted and you are not satisfied your managers are seriously
addressing your concerns, I want to hear from you.
I am very proud of the Directorate of Intelligence. I served in it;
I led it; and I used its analysis to frame policy. I want to see it--
and the people in it--prosper. I have always been greatly impressed
with the breadth and depth of expertise in the DI. I do not want
anybody--inside or outside the Agency--to believe this expertise is
tarnished by political considerations.
I was uncertain how to present my message today--how exactly to say
what I wanted to convey. So, I did what I have often done for years. I
turned to the DI for help. I asked two members of the politicization
task force each to give me a draft of what they thought I should say,
and I asked them to choose two analysts--unknown to me--to do the
same.. My remarks today are an amalgam of those four drafts and my own
views. Though many of the words today originally were not mine, I
believe wholeheartedly in what they express. The sentiments, the views,
are mine if not every word. Those who helped me know who they are, and
I thank them.
Let me conclude then by simply reiterating that the absolute
integrity of our analysis is the most important of the core values of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Policymakers, the Congress, and the
American people must know that our views--right or wrong--represent our
best and most objective possible effort to describe the threats and
opportunities facing the United States. They must know our assessments
are the product of the highest quality and the most honest intelligence
analysis available anywhere in the world. Thank you.
Historical Document
Posted: May 08, 2007 08:48 AM
Last Updated: Aug 04, 2011 12:49 PM
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me thank
the witnesses and adjourn the hearing.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Inhofe
isil capabilities
1. Senator Inhofe. General Austin, what are ISIL capabilities today
compared to last year with regards to the number of fighters, combat
and support equipment, weapons and ammunition, supply lines, and areas
controlled?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Inhofe. General Austin, has the flow of foreign fighters
increased or decreased over the past year? How is that determined?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Inhofe. General Austin and Secretary Wormuth, how is
ISIL funding their operations? Where are they getting their weapons and
ammunition?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
Ms. Wormuth. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Inhofe. General Austin, what are ISIL's centers of
gravity and how is the coalition going after those centers? Are we
effective?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
5. Senator Inhofe. General Austin and Secretary Wormuth, does ISIL
has access to chemical or biological weapons? If yes, have they used
them? What is the likelihood of ISIL expanding their use in the region
and outside the region? What are the implications?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
Ms. Wormuth. [Deleted.]
syria
6. Senator Inhofe. General Austin, what are our strategic
objectives in Syria and what are our specific objectives with regards
to ISIL and Assad? Are any of these objectives at odds with each other?
General Austin. Our strategic military objectives in Syria are to
degrade, dismantle and ultimately defeat ISIL in Syria through air
strikes and other support to indigenous moderate Syrian forces.
With regard to the Asad Regime, our military strategy is designed
to shape the conditions that will lead to an eventual managed political
transition of government that is capable of providing security and
governance for the Syrian people.
These objectives support ongoing diplomatic efforts to change the
course in Syria. These military objectives complement one another by
contributing to the desired end state of a secure Syria and enhanced
regional security.
7. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wormuth, is the refugee crisis being
caused by Assad, ISIL, or both? Can the flow of refugees be stopped
without addressing the Assad regime and ISIL operations in Syria?
Ms. Wormuth. The Syrian refugee crisis is an urgent humanitarian
problem with complex causes. Four years of violence perpetrated by the
Assad regime on its own population, as well as the recent barbaric
extremism demonstrated by ISIL, have contributed to this humanitarian
situation.
There can be no viable solution in Syria without a negotiated
settlement and transition of power between the regime and opposition
forces. A lasting solution to the refugee problem will not be achieved
until a political solution is reached and the Syrian people no longer
feel threatened by their government or extremist groups such as ISIL.
8. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wormuth and General Austin, what is
your assessment of what Russia is trying to accomplish in Syria through
its military buildup of equipment and offensive capabilities? How does
that impact United States objectives in Syria and the region?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
Ms. Wormuth. Russia's military buildup in Syria likely has several
aims. Russia would like to protect its access to airfields and seaports
in the Eastern Mediterranean, protect the Syrian government that
enables Russian presence in Syria, portray itself as a security
guarantor in the region, and engage in counter-terror operations.
Russia has said publicly that it intends to combat ISIL and other
extremist groups; however, it is clear that Russia and Assad do not
distinguish between ISIL and the more moderate Syrian opposition
groups.
Russia's presence in Syria does not change United States
objectives. We will continue our efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL,
which poses a threat to the United States and the international
community. We also will continue to engage with moderate opposition
forces fighting ISIL inside of Syria, and we will continue to be the
largest donor in addressing the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, and
beyond its borders. We, unlike Russia, are joined by a coalition of 65
partners in those efforts. Furthermore, any military-to-military
discussions that the Department of Defense may have with Russia
regarding its presence in Syria will focus on safety procedures for
coalition and United States personnel engaged in military operations in
Syria. In no way will this take away from our strong condemnation of
Russian actions in Ukraine, or change our sanctions and security
support in response to those destabilizing actions. Russian
responsibilities to uphold the Minsk agreements and to redress its
illegal attempted annexation of Crimea are still valid, and our
policies have not changed. We will continue our strong support for
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
9. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wormuth, in your assessment, who fills
the void if Assad is removed?
Ms. Wormuth. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Inhofe. General Austin, what coordination or
communication have you had with your Russian counterparts?
General Austin. Answer updated to reflect current operations. My
staff participated in OSD-level discussions with the Russians on safety
procedures for flight operations in Syria. I signed the Memorandum of
Understanding on 20 October; the agreement regulates all aircraft and
drone flights over Syria.
11. Senator Inhofe. General Austin, does the presence of Russian
military to United States and coalition forces increase the potential
for conflict with Russia and/or Assad's forces?
General Austin. We are actively exploring mechanisms to de-conflict
Coalition and Russian military operations in Syria to prevent
miscalculation, ensure safety of flight, and promote desired
battlefield effects against the enemy, ISIL.
iraq
12. Senator Inhofe. General Austin, do they still need this type of
support today? What happens in the long term if we again remove our
support too soon?
General Austin. Yes, our coalition training and equipping efforts
are still necessary to build combat forces capable of opposing ISIL and
liberating areas under ISIL control. Additionally, the Iraqi military
will continue to rely on United States and Coalition air strikes to
degrade ISIL's command and control, military capabilities, and
sustainment and inhibit the enemy's freedom of movement. Air strikes
thereby provide the Iraqi Army with the time and space needed to build
combat power and confidence.
Furthermore, based on recent history, we assess that removing
Coalition support prematurely risks creating a void that will be
quickly filled by others such as Iran, Russia, and/or China. In the
absence of Coalition support, Iranian influence could serve to further
repress the Sunni population and potentially ignite increased sectarian
conflict in the region.
13. Senator Inhofe. General Austin and Secretary Wormuth, what is
the current presence of Iranian forces in Iraq? What is your assessment
of Iranian long term objective in Iraq? How does that impact United
States objective in Iraq and the region?
General Austin. We assess there are several hundred Iranian
officials in Iraq. This includes both Qods Force and regular Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel providing oversight, guidance,
weapons, and sometimes direct operational support using UAVs,
artillery, and other military systems. These personnel coordinate
operations with elements of Iraq's security forces. Iran refuses to
support operations in which the United States is involved. Iranians
operate almost exclusively in support of the most militant elements of
the Popular Mobilization Forces, such as Kata'ib Hizballah, Asaib Ahl
al Haqq, Badr Organization, the Imam Ali Brigades, and others. Qods
Force Commander Soleimani frequently travels to Iraq to oversee these
efforts.
Iran likely seeks to incorporate Iraq into what it calls the ``axis
of resistance'' against the West. This axis includes Iran, Syria,
Lebanese Hezbollah, responsive proxies throughout the region, and the
recent inclusion of Russia which acts to weaken Western and Allied
influence. As such, Iran seeks the following in Iraq: a Shiite
Islamist-dominated central government with minimal Sunni involvement;
security forces dominated by Iranian allies; minimal United States or
Western presence; a protected Shiite population and Shiite holy sites;
a neutralized ISIL threat; a viable economic partner; and a secure
border.
While Iran and the United States share the goal of defeating ISIL,
Iran's long-term intent for Iraq is at odds with the United States
vision of an independent, inclusive, representative government which
operates according to international norms and is at peace with its
neighbors. Iran seeks to maintain Iraq as a client state with minimal
association with either the West or its Sunni neighbors. As Iran
pursues these objectives, its close collaboration with Shiite militant
groups presents a clear threat to the stability and security of Iraq.
These forces act as Iran's action arm and do not consider themselves
accountable to international law or the Government of Iraq (GoI), and
often complicate Iraqi military operations as evident in the Iranian-
backed Shiite Militant Groups' focus on Fallujah while the GoI
struggles to make progress in Ramadi. Over the long term, Iran's
efforts to create a second security establishment that answers to
Tehran further reduces the GoI's ability to recruit, train, and employ
an effective cross-sectarian security force. Moreover, it limits the
government's ability to act against corruption, terrorism,
sectarianism, and instability, while offering Iran a lever of military
power it can leverage against the GoI or any group that acts against
Iran's interests.
Ms. Wormuth. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
syria political objectives
14. Senator Wicker. General Austin, I'd like to discuss some bigger
picture issues about Syria. It appears to me that a decisive strategy
to counter ISIL requires strategic clarity on our desired political
end-state in Syria. In January of this year, former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger testified to this committee that: ``Today . . . a
situation like Syria where the two main contenders are violently
opposed to America, violently opposed to each other, and a victory for
either of them is not in our interests.'' General Mattis also testified
to this committee in January that: ``I think in this case we have to
get to a very detailed level of understanding what is the political
objective we are out to accomplish. Frankly I don't know what it is
right now.'' Has the President told you what our political objectives
are in Syria right now?
General Austin. The President has been clear in his guidance: ``We
will degrade and ultimately destroy Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant.'' ``In Syria, the only way that the civil war will end--and in
a way so that the Syrian people can unite against ISIL--is an inclusive
political transition to a new government, without Bashar Assad--a
government that serves all Syrians.'' ``It's going to require us to
stabilize Syria in some fashion, and stabilizing Syria in some fashion
means that we've got to get moderate Sunnis who are able to govern and
offer a real alternative and competition to what ISIL has been doing in
some of these spaces.''
15. Senator Wicker. General Austin, what should our political
objectives be in Syria--what is in the realm of the achievable?
General Austin. I would defer to our civilian leadership to
determine our political objectives. United States Central Command
conducts military activities in support of set policy objectives.
However, I do believe the common objective is the defeat of ISIL and a
peaceful transition to a new government--without Bashar Assad--a
government that serves all Syrians.
16. Senator Wicker. General Austin, what are the objectives of our
current air campaign in Syria and is the effort robust enough to
achieve them?
General Austin. The objective of our air efforts in Syria and Iraq
is one part of the larger Coalition campaign to degrade, dismantle, and
ultimately defeat ISIL. Air power provides critical enabling support,
including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and
kinetic fires; through air interdiction of critical ISIL capabilities.
While air power alone will not be able to achieve the campaign's
overall objectives, our current air operations have degraded ISIL's
ability to spread its influence within the region while at the same
time generating additional time and space to allow the indigenous
forces to build needed capability to effectively degrade and defeat
ISIL.
``iraq first strategy''
17. Senator Wicker. The Obama Administration has indicated an
``Iraq First'' strategy and the subsequent military campaign in Syria
seems ill-defined. General Austin, what are the consequences of having
a strategy that is divided by what is to the enemy a nonexistent border
and also dividing it sequentially (``Iraq First'') as the
Administration has done?
General Austin. We view Iraq and Syria as one battlespace with
respect to the fight against ISIL. However, there are differences
between them in terms of access, availability of reliable ground
forces, support from the governments, etc. We stated at the outset that
Iraq is the main effort because there is a government that we can work
with and some amount of reliable ground forces. Further, the Government
of Iraq asked for our support and the support of our Coalition
partners. Because they requested our presence, we have greater access,
freedom of movement, and we're able to provide much-needed support by
way of training and equipping the Iraqi security forces. Meanwhile, in
Syria, we continue to put pressure on the enemy and limit his ability
to operate in ungoverned spaces. By doing so, and by doing what is
necessary to reestablish the border between Syria and Iraq, we will
curb ISIL's ability to send in reinforcements and resupplies from Syria
to Iraq. This will in turn alleviate the pressure from ISIL in Iraq and
enable the Iraqi security forces to effectively counter the enemy and
provide for the defense of their sovereign territory.
syria regime change
18. Senator Wicker. General Austin, how does the United States not
having the explicit goal of removing Assad affect support for United
States efforts in Syria--by Arab and European coalition members and by
Syrians who would like to be part of the moderate Syrian opposition?
General Austin. We currently have 30 nations in the military
coalition participating in combat operations, and that includes six
regional partners. This strong and cohesive coalition maintains the
shared goal to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIL in
accordance with various national policies.
That said, all countries have their own perspectives and their own
priorities. The issue of Assad and the role he will play in Syria going
forward is a very emotional one. Most will agree that there can be no
future for Syria with Assad in power. However, there are some
differences in opinion among members of the Coalition and regional
partners with respect to how and when that transition should occur. We
have to balance our campaign objectives with these diverse national
caveats to ensure Coalition cohesion remains strong.
19. Senator Wicker. General Austin, in your military judgement, how
does the presence of Russian combat troops undermine the moderate
Syrian opposition?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
training and equipping moderate forces
20. Senator Wicker. General Austin, what kind of support is
essential to ensure the success of trained and equipped moderate
opposition fighters we send back to Syria?
General Austin. In order to maximize the potential for success, it
is essential to provide Coalition trained New Syrian Forces reinserted
back into Syria ammunition, materiel support, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance support, operational guidance, and
fires support to fight ISIL. Even with Coalition support, training the
New Syrian Forces and inserting them back into Syria is a long-term
effort that requires time to achieve results. The option of Coalition
boots on the ground should be retained as we seek to build our
understanding of opposition groups. This option would allow us to find,
understand, and create linkages with existing tribal networks. This
will aid our effort to curb the flow of lethal aid and fighters into
Iraq and Syria.
21. Senator Wicker. General Austin, can they survive without that
support?
General Austin. Most Moderate Syrian Opposition forces fighting in
Syria are poorly led, trained, and equipped. However, they are
resourceful, adaptable, and dedicated to their cause. Yes, they can
survive without Coalition support. However, the lack of or the
provision of inadequate Coalition support could drive them to align
with more extremist forces to ensure survivability and secure the
resources they need to sustain the fight. Moderate Syrian Opposition
forces require significant external support if they are to generate the
required combat power to gain the initiative, draw fighters to their
cause, and conduct offensive operations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
number of displaced persons
22. Senator Rounds. Secretary Wormuth, what is the number of
displaced persons associated with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Indclude: 1. Number by country, 2. Number by category to include as a
minimum the number displaced internally and the number of refugees by
country, and 3. The number of religious minorities, e.g. Yazidis in
either category
Ms. Wormuth.
Iraq
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
nearly 3.2 million Iraqis have been internally displaced since January
2014. For Iraqi refugees, the Department of State Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM) monitors refugees in Jordan, Turkey,
Syria, and Lebanon. According to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), 50,856 Iraqis have registered as refugees in
Jordan since January 2013. In August 2015, UNHCR estimate that there
were 144,000 Iraqis residing in Turkey. Humanitarian assistance is
provided based on need, not ethnicity or religion. The Department of
State (PRM) does not retain data of displaced persons based on
ethnicity or religion, such as Yazidi persons displaced or held
captive.
Afghanistan
Since 2002 with the fall of the Taliban, nearly 6 million Afghan
refugees have returned to Afghanistan. Despite the large number of
returnees, there are still 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees in
Pakistan and nearly 1 million registered Afghan refugees in Iran, the
two countries that host significant numbers of Afghan refugees. Many of
these refugees left Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet invasion. As
of June 2015, there are approximately 950,000 internally displaced
persons in Afghanistan due to conflict. The Department of State (PRM)
does not retain data regarding religious minorities in the registered
Afghan refugee population, or those internally displaced.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
turkey and the c-isil effort
23. Senator Ernst. General Austin, while I am glad to hear Turkey
is taking some steps to tighten its borders and conducting operations
against ISIL, it appears as though the Turkish government has mostly
mobilized its political, military, and security apparatus not primarily
to assist the coalition in defeating ISIS--but to fight the Kurdistan
Workers party (PKK), destroy Kurdish political involvement in Turkish
politics, prosecute media outlets critical of the Turkish government,
arrest teenage boys for Facebook posts and journalist trying to do
their jobs and report the news. As Turkish President Erdogan continues
to focus and escalate his military operations against the PKK and the
Kurdish opposition, what do you assess are the near and long term
consequences to the stability of the counter-ISIL coalition and the
coalitions overall effort to defeat ISIL?
General Austin. Turkey's continued support is vital to maintaining
pressure on ISIL, and the Turks' provision of bases for Coalition air
operations and humanitarian support, access to border crossing sites,
overflight authorizations, etc. continue to pay significant dividends.
We condemn recent PKK terrorist attacks within Turkey and respect
Turkey's right to self-defense. Any Turkish military response to those
attacks is separate from their contributions to the counter-ISIL
campaign. That said, turkey's actions directed at the PKK do serve to
complicate an already complicated situation. It diverts much-needed
resources and attention away from the primary focus which is the fight
against ISIL. Although the conflict between the Turks and the PKK does
not appear to threaten the cohesion of the Counter-ISIL Coalition, it
does risk causing increased friction between the Syrian Kurds (YPG) and
the Turks and potentially between the Kurds and the United States and
other members of the coalition. Prior to the resumption of hostilities
between the parties, a ceasefire had been in place since 2013. Ideally,
we would like to see the Turks and the PKK return to a cease fire
agreement.
24. Senator Ernst. General Austin, do you believe it would be in
the best interests of the counter-ISIL coalition and for the overall
fight against ISIS if the Turkish government and PKK both immediately
returned to the peace table and to a ceasefire?
General Austin. It would be in the best interest of our partner
nations, the people of the region, and the Counter-ISIL campaign if the
competing parties would come together and find a peaceful resolution to
their conflicts.
25. Senator Ernst. General Austin, does your Turkish military
counterpart consult or coordinate with you regarding Turkey's military
operations against the PKK?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Ernst. General Austin, is United States Central Command
(CENTCOM) providing any form of assistance to Turkey in support of
Turkey's operations against PKK militants in Iraq or Turkey?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Ernst. General Austin, if CENTCOM is providing any form
of assistance to Turkey in support of Turkey's operations against PKK
militants in Iraq or Turkey, what kind of assistance does CENTCOM
provide to support Turkey's operations against the PKK?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
iraq
28. Senator Ernst. General Austin, a few months ago, while speaking
in Iraqi Kurdistan, General David Petraeus said that Iran ultimately
poses a greater long-term threat to Iraq's stability than ISIL. \1\ Do
you agree with this assessment?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Liz Sly, ``Petraeus: The Islamic State isn't our biggest
problem in Iraq'', Washington Post, March 20, 2015. https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/20/petraeus-the-
islamic-state-isnt-our-biggest-problem-in-iraq/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Austin. What I believe General Petraeus said during his
Washington Post interview was that Shiite Militia, some backed by Iran,
are the foremost threat to Iraq's long-term stability. I do agree with
that statement. Meanwhile, ISIL and other Sunni extremist groups
threaten Iraq's stability now. Unless they are defeated or
marginalized, they will continue to leverage deep-seated Sunni-Shiite
tensions and broader Arab-Kurd tensions in order to maintain support in
Sunni regions.
29. Senator Ernst. General Austin, a few months ago, while speaking
in Iraqi Kurdistan, General David Petraeus said that Iran ultimately
poses a greater long-term threat to Iraq's stability than ISIS. If you
agree with this assessment, please elaborate on why and how you are
working to reduce this long-term threat to United States interests and
to our Iraqi allies?
General Austin. N/A. Refer to questions 28 and 30
30. Senator Ernst. General Austin, a few months ago, while speaking
in Iraqi Kurdistan, General David Petraeus said that Iran ultimately
poses a greater long-term threat to Iraq's stability than ISIS. If you
do not agree with this assessment, please elaborate on who is the
greatest long-term threat to Iraq's stability.
General Austin. I believe the greatest long-term threat to Iraq's
instability is its own inability to resolve its Sunni-Shiite sectarian
issues. The primary challenge remains reconciliation and overcoming the
mistrust and rivalry among ethno-sectarian groups that have intensified
by many years of conflict.
31. Senator Ernst. General Austin, for fiscal year 2015, the
Department received $1.6 billion for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund to
train-and-equip the Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni
tribes, and other local forces. I continue to see photographs in the
open source media displaying Iranian controlled Iraqi Shiite militias
with United States weapons and equipment. Are you arming Iranian
controlled or supported Iraqi Shiite militias with American weapons and
equipment?
General Austin. The United States provides weapons and equipment
directly to the Government of Iraq who then distributes it to forces
that have been vetted consistent with Section 1236 and Leahy Laws and
are under the direct command and control of the Government of Iraq in
support of the Counter-ISIL. The United States does not provide support
of any kind to Iranian-backed Shiite militants.
32. Senator Ernst. General Austin, for fiscal year 2015, the
Department received $1.6 billion for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund to
train-and-equip the Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni
tribes, and other local forces. I continue to see photographs in the
open source media of Iranian controlled Iraqi Shiite militias with
United States weapons and equipment. If you are not providing these
United States weapons and equipment to Iranian controlled Iraqi Shiite
militias, who is?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Ernst. General Austin, for fiscal year 2015, the
Department received $1.6 billion for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund to
train-and-equip the Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni
tribes, and other local forces. I continue to see photographs in the
open source media of Iranian controlled Iraqi Shiite militias with
United States weapons and equipment. What types of United States
weapons and equipment are being obtained by Iranian controlled Shiite
militias?
General Austin. Based on open source reporting, we assess Shiite
militias have obtained, or at least have access to, limited numbers of
M-198 towed howitzers, M113 armored personnel carriers, Navistar 7000
general purpose trucks, M1A1 main battle tanks, High Mobility, Multi-
purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected
Vehicles (MRAP), M4 carbines, and M16 rifles.
34. Senator Ernst. General Austin, for fiscal year 2015, the
Department received $1.6 billion for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund to
train-and-equip the Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni
tribes, and other local forces. I continue to see photographs in the
open source media of Iranian controlled Iraqi Shiite militias with
United States weapons and equipment. What specifically are you doing to
prevent these groups from obtaining United States weapons and
equipment?
General Austin. I share your concern when I see these kinds of
photographs in the open source media and assure you we adhere to
stringent vetting and accountability procedures. We are also working
diligently with the Government of Iraq to identify losses, assess the
cause of the losses, and implement measures to prevent these groups
from obtaining United States weapons and equipment in the future.
Senior level discussions between the United States ambassador and
senior Iraqi leadership have taken place to impress upon the Government
of Iraq the need for accurate accountability. In addition, all United
States-provided defense articles, whether purchased with Iraqi funding
or granted to Iraq, are accounted for under federally-mandated End Use
Management procedures that we believe the Iraqis are complying with.
35. Senator Ernst. General Austin, there continue to be reports of
ISIL using chemical agents to attack the Kurdish Peshmerga. Do you
support providing Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) equipment
and other CBRN defensive equipment to Peshmerga forces to enhance their
force protection?
General Austin. The chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) threat is one of many threats to the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF). I support the providing CBRN protective equipment to the
Peshmerga through the Government of Iraq via the Iraq Train and Equip
Fund authorized by the 2015 Department of Defense Appropriations Act.
36. Senator Ernst. General Austin, this week Lieutenant General
Stewart, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in reference to
the integrity of Iraq and Syria, said, ``I'm having a tough time seeing
it come back together.'' \2\ That he was ``wrestling with the idea that
the Kurds will come back to a central government of Iraq.'' \3\ Do you
agree with that overall assessment?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ken Dilanian, ``DIA chief: Iraq and Syria may not survive as
states'', Military Times, September 10, 2015. http://
www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/09/10/dia-chief-
iraq-and-syria-may-not-survive_states/72027834/
\3\ Ken Dilanian, ``DIA chief: Iraq and Syria may not survive as
states'', Military Times, September 10, 2015. http://
www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/09/10/dia-chief-
iraq-and-syria-may-not-survive_states/72027834/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Austin. We continue to encourage cooperation and support
for a unified Iraq. However, I assess there will be continued friction
between Arabs and Kurds over a number of territorial and legislative
issues. The Counter-ISIL Coalition has been successful in supporting a
unified government through our training and equipping ``by, with and
through'' the Government of Iraq (GoI). To date the GoI and the Iraqi
Kurdish Peshmerga have cooperated and coordinated in support of the
Counter-ISIL campaign and we will continue to encourage this
cooperation.
adversary efforts in syria
37. Senator Ernst. General Austin, over the past few years, Iran
and Russia have been crucial to the survival of the Assad regime. On
the ground, Iranian proxy, Hezbollah, has been key in defending the
Assad regime in ground combat over the past few years. According to
recent statements by the DOD, Russia is establishing a forward
operating base in Syria, sending in additional Russian military
personnel and advanced military equipment. Is there trilateral
cooperation between Assad, Iran, and Russia in efforts to conduct
military operations against the Syrian opposition? If so, could you
describe some of these efforts and how vital they are to the survival
of the Assad regime?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
38. Senator Ernst. General Austin, over the past few years, Iran
and Russia have been crucial to the survival of the Assad regime. On
the ground, Iranian proxy, Hezbollah, has been key in defending the
Assad regime in ground combat over the past few years. According to
recent statements by the DOD, Russia is establishing a forward
operating base in Syria, sending in additional Russian military
personnel and advanced military equipment. If there is trilateral
cooperation between Assad, Iran, and Russia in efforts to conduct
military operations against the Syrian opposition, please describe some
of these efforts and how vital they are to the survival of the Assad
regime.
General Austin. [Deleted.]
39. Senator Ernst. General Austin, over the past few years, Iran
and Russia have been crucial to the survival of the Assad regime. On
the ground, Iranian proxy, Hezbollah, has been key in defending the
Assad regime in ground combat over the past few years. According to
recent statements by the DOD, Russia is establishing a forward
operating base in Syria, sending in additional Russian military
personnel and advanced military equipment. Do you believe Russia, in
the near-term, will commit conventional forces to ground combat in
support of the Assad regime?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
40. Senator Ernst. General Austin, over the past few years, Iran
and Russia have been crucial to the survival of the Assad regime. On
the ground, Iranian proxy, Hezbollah, has been key in defending the
Assad regime in ground combat over the past few years. According to
recent statements by the DOD, Russia is establishing a forward
operating base in Syria, sending in additional Russian military
personnel and advanced military equipment. Under what conditions do you
believe Russia would commit conventional forces to ground combat in
support of the Assad regime?
General Austin. [Deleted.]
41. Senator Ernst. General Austin, during the Hearing, GEN Austin,
you told the Committee that the effort in training Syrian fighters
against ISIL have fallen short and that other options were being
explored to retool the program. Please describe in detail the different
courses of action you recommended to deploy a credible moderate Syrian
opposition force to defeat ISIL.
General Austin. [Deleted.]
potential impacts of the iran nuclear agreement
42. Senator Ernst. General Austin, regarding the Administration's
deal with Iran--I am concerned of potential consequences to our
national security and the security of our allies in the Middle East
brought by the prospect of providing Iran with potentially up to $150
billion in sanctions relief. While a nuclear Iran would be the most
dangerous outcome we could face--Iran, through its proxies in Lebanon,
Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, have been able to dominate much of the Middle
East with AK-47s, RPGs, Katyusha rockets, and a lot of other
unsophisticated military hardware. Specifically, how may Iran's ability
to better support the Assad regime and Shiite militias in Iraq alter
the battlefield in Syria and Iraq?
General Austin. Certainly our regional partners are concerned about
the threat of Iran having a nuclear weapon. Some of our Gulf
Cooperation Council partners do also acknowledge that the lifting of
sanctions could be economically beneficial to the region if Iran
adheres to the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
That said, none view the nuclear issue as being the only concern with
respect to Iran. They are also very concerned about Iran's other malign
activities, including the activities of Iran's Qods Forces, Iran's
advanced cyber and theater ballistic missile capabilities, and their
ability to mine the Straits. We continue to assure our partners that we
share an interest in stability and non-proliferation in the region and
intend to work closely together to further strengthen security
cooperation in that strategically-important region.
43. Senator Ernst. General Austin, what are the risks and concerns
voiced by your Arab military counterparts in the Middle East regarding
the president's Iran Nuclear Agreement?
General Austin. Certainly our regional partners are concerned about
the threat of Iran having a nuclear weapon. Some of our Gulf
Cooperation Council partners do also acknowledge that the lifting of
sanctions could be economically beneficial to the region if Iran
adheres to the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
That said, none view the nuclear issue as being the only concern with
respect to Iran. They are also very concerned about Iran's other malign
activities, including the activities of Iran's Qods Forces, Iran's
advanced cyber and theater ballistic missile capabilities, and their
ability to mine the Straits. We continue to assure our partners that we
share an interest in stability and non-proliferation in the region and
intend to work closely together to further strengthen security
cooperation in that strategically-important region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
progress in iraq
44. Senator Lee. Secretary Wormuth, you stated in front of the
House Armed Services Committee in early March that: ``ISIL's momentum
has been blunted, its ability to mass and maneuver forces has been
degraded, and its leadership cells have been pressured or eliminated,
its command and control and supply lines have been disrupted. In short,
we have put ISIL on the defensive.'' A little more than two months
later, ISIS fighters routed ISF forces and overtook Ramadi, causing the
Iraqi government to reconsider plans to attempt retaking Mosul and
focus on western Iraq. Do you still stand by your March assessment of
the progress made in Iraq in light of the fall of Ramadi and its
failure to be recaptured? If your assessment was correct in March, what
changed between March and May that allowed for this ISIS advance to
occur?
Ms. Wormuth. Yes, I stand by our March assessment. When we began
the campaign against ISIL over a year ago, ISIL was pushing into
Kurdish territory in northern Iraq and toward Baghdad. Over the past
several months, ISIL has lost territory in both Syria and Iraq despite
advances in Ramadi and Palmyra. We anticipated there would be setbacks
in some areas while we make advances in others throughout this
campaign. While Ramadi is an example of a setback and the unique
challenges we face in western Iraq, it does not negate the progress we
have made in other areas of the campaign including northeastern Syria
and northern Iraq.
political solution
45. Senator Lee. Secretary Wormuth, the administration has stated
repeatedly that there must be a political solution to the crisis in
Syria and Iraq, and that this solution must be driven largely by
countries in the Arab world and Europe whose security and economies are
more directly threatened and whose historical, ethnic, and religious
ties give them a better position for mediation. What more needs to be
done by these nations politically and militarily to more effectively
leverage their positions? What further can the United States do to
encourage and facilitate such actions by these countries? Do these
countries, who are all concerned about regional stability, share the
United States' priority of defeating ISIS, or do they prioritize other
actions in the region?
Ms. Wormuth. As President Obama has said, there is no military
solution to the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Therefore we continue to
support a political solution to the conflict in Syria through a genuine
political transition away from President Assad. We have urged all
concerned governments, including our Arab and European partners, to
support this objective, including support to the United Nations' (UN's)
initiative to broker a political transition.
Additionally, more than 60 countries are participating in the
coalition, which includes European and Arab countries, and they share
our priority of defeating ISIL. Like the United States, many countries
must balance focus on the ISIL threat with other national security
priorities to include the growing impact of refugees. Despite this
balancing effort, the Coalition remains firmly committed to countering
ISIL as a step to stabilizing the region. From a military perspective,
we currently have sufficient forces to enable large portions of the
plan, though we continue to work with partners to fill shortfalls. The
recent addition of Turkey to the military campaign has helped fill gaps
in the air campaign both because of the aircraft they are providing
and, perhaps more significantly, because the basing access they have
granted significantly enhances the Coalition's operational flexibility
and logistical efficiencies. In addition, the State Department and
Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
have organized five separate working groups, ranging from countering
foreign fighters to stabilization efforts. These working groups provide
forums by which the United States and its partners share information on
a regular, recurring basis regarding the requirements for success in
the overall campaign. I refer you to the State Department for more
details on the political actions of the coalition.
arming of isis
46. Senator Lee. General Austin, what is your assessment of United
States and coalition efforts to disrupt the funding, recruitment, and
arming of ISIS fighters? Have we seen increases or decreases in ISIS
force structure in the past year, and are we effectively identifying
and moving to dismantle the sources of weapons and finances for ISIS?
General Austin. The efforts of the United States-led Coalition, in
support of the indigenous forces on the ground in Iraq and Syria, are
having a measurable impact on ISIL's overall capability. We've removed
some 20,000 enemy fighters from the battlefield; and, they continue to
recruit additional fighters and move them across the border, primarily
from Turkey into Syria and then into Iraq. Additionally, though our
airstrikes have had a significant impact in terms of degrading ISIL's
weapon production facilities, the enemy is still able to smuggle
explosives precursors, as well as rockets/mortars and small arms,
across the Turkish border. Furthermore, we cannot rule out the
likelihood of ISIL exploiting gray arms dealers and the black market to
supplement its military needs in Syria and Iraq.
Of note, over the past several months, we have slowed ISIL's
ability to generate revenue by targeting the group's oil and gas
production capacity and we continue to work to disrupt their ability to
export/sell these products. From a whole of government perspective, we
are actively disrupting ISIL's revenue generation on a daily basis
(e.g., sale of antiquities, foreign donors, and extortion and taxation
system). We have also made great strides in our efforts to close the
major crossing sites between Turkey and Syria, which ISIL uses to
funnel needed additional fighters, equipment, supplies and revenue. To
date, continuing efforts by the Turks and anti-ISIL forces in northern
Syria have secured 75% of these crossing sites. Over time, these
efforts are expected to greatly decrease the number of foreign fighters
entering the country.
47. Senator Lee. General Austin, since ISIS, as far as we know, is
not producing its own weapons and military equipment, what are the
primary sources of their arms and why has it been so difficult to
starve out their weapons and equipment?
General Austin. ISIL primarily procures weapons from battlefield
seizures of military weapons and equipment, both in Syria and in Iraq.
Additionally, we cannot rule out the likelihood of ISIL exploiting gray
arms dealers and the black market to supplement its military needs in
both countries.
isf
48. Senator Lee. General Austin, one of the key factors in the
failure of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) over the past year and a
half has been a ``lack of will to fight'', as General Dempsey has
called it. We can spend billions of dollars arming and training these
individuals, as we did in the past decade, but these efforts will be
futile if the individuals being trained are not adequately lead or if
they don't believe that the sacrifices they are being called to make
are worthwhile. What is your assessment of the ISF's leadership and
their willingness to fight for the political leaders in Baghdad? Is the
general population that comprises and supports the ISF interested in
fighting ISIS to retake western and northern parts of Iraq, or are they
more concerned with securing and defending their current holdings?
General Austin. The ISF is comprised of and led by individuals with
varying ethnic and sectarian interests. Although their interests align
in terms of protecting their respective ethno-sectarian power bases and
population centers, there are clear delineations in regards to
protecting areas dominated by other ethnicities. The Shiite, for
example, are not inclined to fight (and risk their lives) to liberate
and hold Sunni areas. There are also varying degrees of capability
among the different elements of Iraq's security forces. Iraq's Counter-
Terrorism Services (CTS), for example, have performed very well to
date, as have those units trained by the Coalition through our building
partner capacity program; in contrast, some elements of the ISF have
performed less well and have shown less willingness to take the fight
to the enemy. These elements, generally speaking, suffer from weak
leadership. Strong and capable leadership will prove absolutely
essential to the Iraqis' success going forward.
49. Senator Lee. Secretary Wormuth, has the Iraqi government been
successful in integrating more of Iraq's Sunni population into the ISF
or in working with Sunni tribes in contested areas? Does the Iraqi
government's reliance on Shiite militias and close connections to Iran
further alienate Sunni groups who may otherwise be inclined to fight
ISIS?
Ms. Wormuth. We believe Prime Minister Abadi is committed to
integrating Sunnis into Iraq's security forces. Prime Minister Abadi
has taken positive steps to integrate the Sunni population, including
his five-point plan to stabilize Anbar and outreach to Sunnis,
commitment to passing a National Guard law, and push for political
reforms. The Iraqis have now enrolled more than 6,000 Sunni tribal
fighters in Anbar, which has been helped by our presence at Habbiniyah/
Taqaddum since this summer, and we expect this number to increase as
the campaign evolves. Additionally, Sunni's are being trained as local
police with the expectation they will be critical to the post-ISIL hold
plan post-ISIL. The Department of Defense (DoD) remains concerned about
the role of Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq because they have been
known to intimidate politicians, undermine state control, and attempt
to thwart the Prime Minister's positive outreach to Sunnis. DoD does
not, however, believe there is an over-reliance on Shiite militias by
the Iraqi government. The Iraqi Army and the Counterterrorism Service,
in addition to the police, have played a lead role in operations in and
around Ramadi. With coalition air and advising support, these forces
have been making slow, but steady progress in re-claiming this key
Sunni area from ISIL.
dod strategy
50. Senator Lee. Secretary Wormuth, you stated in front of the
House Armed Services Committee in March that the DOD is working with
agencies across the nine lines of effort in Syria and Iraq to defeat
ISIS. Which of these lines of effort have been completed or are moving
at an acceptable pace in the right direction, and which lines of effort
have been the most difficult to achieve? How would you assess progress
on the first two lines of effort-supporting effective governance in
Iraq and denying ISIL safe-haven?
Ms. Wormuth. In general, progress across the nine lines of effort
has been slow, but steady. Secretary Carter meets frequently with his
counterparts to assess progress and challenges across the other lines
of effort, and we are continuously adapting our efforts as the campaign
evolves. There have certainly been setbacks in the past year as ISIL
has adapted to evolving conditions on the battlefield, and I would not
assess any line of effort to have been completed. We continue to face
challenges, particularly in the messaging space. As the military
campaign to deny ISIL safe haven continues, the Department of Defense
(DoD) expects that there will continue to be challenges clearing and
holding territory. But DoD has also seen progress in the past year,
including the successful operations to recapture Kurdish territory in
Iraq, to defeat ISIL in Kobani, recently to retake Tikrit, and other
successful engagements such as the seizure of Sinjar and al-Hawl. On
the political front, Prime Minister Abadi continues to demonstrate the
resolve necessary to confront ISIL and is striving to manage a very
difficult political landscape in Baghdad. The U.S. Government, with the
State Department in the lead, has focused on bolstering support for PM
Abadi.
51. Senator Lee. Secretary Wormuth, what would be the impact on
coalition strategy, especially the goals of a political transition in
Syria and an inclusive government in Baghdad, if Iran uses access to
new assets to increase its support of President Assad, Hezbollah, and
the Shiite militias in Iraq?
Ms. Wormuth. Our Coalition strategy, to degrade and ultimately
defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), remains sound
regardless if Iran takes actions that inflame regional tensions or that
run counter to United States national interests. We assess that Iran
will use the preponderance of sanctions relief from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action to address its significant domestic and
infrastructure needs; however, we also expect Iran to apply some funds
to its security services. Iran's support for Assad, the Lebanese
Hizballah, and Shiite militias in Iraq is well known. The United States
will continue to use its posture, preparations, plans, and partnerships
to address the threats posed by Iran to United States interests in the
Middle East. We remain keenly aware of Iran's support for militants and
terrorists, its provocative naval activity, and the threats posed by
its conventional military forces. The United States will continue to
support efforts to hold Iran accountable for its destabilizing
behavior. We will also work through the United Nations to enforce non-
nuclear sanctions and will maintain appropriate United States sanctions
against Iran in response to its terrorist activities, human rights
abuses, and ballistic missile program.
jcpoa
52. Senator Lee. General Austin, as the commander of Central
Command, you are responsible for safeguarding U.S. Forces and our
interests in the region as well as planning for future contingencies
and giving advice on how certain actions by the U.S. Government will
impact your ability to execute missions. The success or failure of the
JCPOA (the Iran agreement), will have a significant impact on the
threats our forces are posturing for in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility. How often were you consulted by members of the State
Department negotiating team during the negotiations for the JCPOA?
General Austin. No one from the State Department consulted with me
during the negotiations for the JCPOA.
turkey
53. Senator Lee. The United States has placed specific emphasis on
engaging Turkey and incorporating them into the fight against ISIS.
This puts us in an awkward position with our Kurdish allies, who have
been the most effective fighters against ISIS and who are regarded with
suspicion and hostility by the Turkish government. While the Kurds have
seemingly prioritized fighting against ISIS forces threatening
historically Kurdish lands, the Turkish government and many opposition
groups in Syria place an equal or greater priority on fighting Assad
forces-a priority shared with many extremist groups. General Austin,
how does the United States, and how do you as commander of CENTCOM,
deal with these competing priorities and sometimes-contradictory
alliances when trying to coordinate coalition missions? What has been
most problematic for you in managing these relationships?
General Austin. We manage these challenges through open, honest,
and frequent communications with and among our coalition partners and
we make sure to involve them in the decision-making process as often as
possible. U.S. interests are always our top priority and we do our best
to work with our partners to mitigate any issues. Ultimately, the
primary objective that binds the coalition together is the defeat of
ISIL. To achieve lasting effects against ISIL requires credible and
reliable forces on the ground and building the capacity of these forces
takes time. The strength of the coalition is its cohesion. We
anticipate, identify, and react to challenges as a group and work
together to accomplish our shared mission.
54. Senator Lee. Secretary Wormuth, you were at the forefront of
negotiating with Turkey this summer to increase their involvement with
the coalition. What was discussed in your meetings in regards to the
Kurd's involvement in this coalition, and what were the specific
demands of the Turkish government regarding policy towards President
Assad?
Ms. Wormuth. Our discussions this summer focused on both parties'
desire to intensify our cooperation against ISIL. Turkey agreed to
allow the United States access to air bases in Turkey and committed
Turkish aircraft to Coalition strike missions.
We were clear that the Coalition will continue to support the
efforts of counter-ISIL forces in northern Syria, which includes Syrian
Kurdish, Arab, and Turkoman fighters. We also communicated to Turkey
and others the importance of avoiding tensions and provocative actions
among those engaged in the fight against ISIL. Turkey had no specific
demands in regards to President Assad.
We support Turkey's right to self-defense and proportionate
response to terrorism, and we encourage a return by both sides to the
peace process. Turkey's counter-ISIL strikes are fully integrated into
the Coalition; its national counter-PKK strikes are separate and de-
conflicted from Coalition air operations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
cooking the books on intelligence
The Department of Defense Inspector General's investigation into
CENTCOM's intelligence assessments is extremely concerning. The
American people need confidence that DOD's intelligence products are
apolitical assessments that allow honest debate and, ultimately, the
best-informed decision making. The intelligence community does not
exist to mischaracterize a policy to suit a political agenda.
The fight against ISIS is one of the most serious challenges to our
national security, and Congress demands the unvarnished facts on
President Obama's now year-long effort to combat them. Frankly, there
is an enormous disconnect between the reports from the Department of
Defense and the information widely available in the media. In August,
for example, the DOD claimed that ISIS ``can no longer operate freely
in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where
it once could,'' \4\ while the same press release failed to comment on
ISIS's growing influence in Libya, Yemen, the Caucuses, and even
Europe. \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814--Inherent-
Resolve.
\5\ http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.663214.
55. Senator Cruz. General Austin, I understand there are
limitations to what you can say about an ongoing investigation.
However, it is important that we know your personal guidance regarding
the intelligence estimates prepared by your command. Have you ever
directed and guided your senior intelligence officers what on what
acceptable reports will or will not include? Have you ever given tacit
or overt instructions to omit any items from reports that reflect
negatively on the campaign efforts to date?
General Austin. No, I have never directed and guided any
intelligence officers, on my staff or otherwise, on what was acceptable
to include or not include in their reports, nor have I given tacit or
overt instructions to omit any items from reports that reflect
negatively on Counter-ISIL Campaign efforts. I have made it clear to my
staff from day one of command that I expect them to provide me with
honest and unvarnished assessments.
56. Senator Cruz. General Austin, how confident are you that the
problems with CENTCOM's intelligence products now under investigation
are confined to the mission against ISIS? What assurances can you
provide that there is no contagion into other areas for which CENTCOM
is responsible? Please specifically address the current assessment of
Russia's activities in Syria, and the current assessment of the
potential nuclear dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.
General Austin. These allegations are currently being investigated
by the DoDIG; therefore, it is premature to state that there are, in
fact, problems with CENTCOM's intelligence products. That said, because
of the breadth and nature of the mission at CENTCOM we do rely on a
robust intelligence enterprise to support the command. Our team of
seasoned intelligence professionals does exceptional work. As a
commander, I greatly value and seek their input and insights. I
consider their assessments, along with inputs that I receive from a
variety of other sources that include senior LNOs from other USG
agencies and my commanders on the ground who I talk with on almost a
daily basis. I consider this full range of inputs when making my
decisions.
As for Russia's activities in Syria and Iran's nuclear program, I
stand by the intelligence that has been produced and the statements I
have made to date.
57. Senator Cruz. Secretary Wormuth, in July Secretary Carter and
General Dempsey outlined 9 lines of effort to combat ISIS. I find it
strange to hear the Defense Secretary tell Congress that the most
important line of effort in a war against radical Islamic extremists is
led by the State Department, while ISIS beheads, rapes, tortures its
victims; holds entire cities that once belonged to a sovereign nation,
and expands its influence beyond the region. It underscores that the
Obama Administration's entire approach to ISIS is convoluted and
incoherent. Which agency is running the war against ISIS within our
government, the State Department or Department of Defense? What efforts
are being made within DOD to address that this campaign now spans
across at least three Combatant Commands?
Ms. Wormuth. The President's strategy to defeat ISIL is, and must
be, a whole-of government-effort that integrates all the nation's
strengths and instruments of power. This war cannot be won through
military power alone. Building a more effective, inclusive, and multi-
sectarian governance in Iraq is fundamental to ensure that ISIL cannot
leverage sectarian grievances to propagate its influence. Similarly,
the campaign cannot be successful without a political transition from
Bashar al-Assad to a more inclusive government in Syria. In addition to
these critical political efforts led by the State Department, the
Department of Defense leads the military efforts to deny ISIL safe
haven and to build partner capacity in Iraq and Syria. The DOD, working
with coalition partners, is conducting a major air campaign against
ISIL, advising and assisting Iraqi security forces on the ground, and
training and equipping vetted local forces. Each of these lines of
effort are interdependent and synchronized across the interagency and
combatant commands to ensure sustainable military and non-military
progress.
intent of russian air defense systems
There have been numerous reports about Russia increasing military
assistance to the Assad regime in recent days and weeks. It is clear at
this point that the Russians have no interest in seeing the conflict
end or helping to broker an agreement where Assad leaves power.
However, one aspect about the increasing Russian intervention in Syria
truly concerns me, and the Obama Administration has not adequately
addressed it.
Last week, there were several news reports that in addition to the
tanks, marines, and other weapons that the Russians have been sending
to Syria, they have deployed more anti-aircraft systems, operated by
Russian troops. \6\ I find this particularly troubling.
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\6\ http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-mideast-crisis-
syria-arms-idUSKCN0RB1Q020150911
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is clearly a message to us. ISIS has no air force for the
Russians to target. This can't be viewed in isolation to the larger
trend that Russia is severing all ties to the West, stoking anti-
Western sentiments across the globe, and digging in for a protracted
ideological war against the United States. In Syria, it seems that
Putin is trying to give us a reason to pause, even though we haven't
been targeting Assad's forces, by placing assets that he could use to
kill Americans flying missions against ISIS in Syria, as well as
prevent the United States from actively targeting Assad in the future.
This is another example of ineffective, weak, and incoherent strategy
that invites adversaries to seize the initiative.
58. Senator Cruz. Secretary Wormuth, you stated that ``we're in
close touch with our allies and partners about these developments.''
Unfortunately, Putin doesn't care about us being in touch with our
allies; he understands that we won't respond, and because we show
weakness he does what he wants. He's doing it in Ukraine, he's doing it
in the Arctic, and he's doing it here. Ms. Wormuth, what tangible steps
are you taking in response to Russia's deployment of anti-aircraft
systems into Syria?
Ms. Wormuth. I will not go into the specific U.S. military
responses to threats or systems in an open forum, but I am confident
that the United States military has the capabilities to address
Russia's anti-aircraft systems.
In Syria, United States and Coalition aircraft always have the
right to defend themselves if attacked. The United States and the
Coalition will continue our ongoing air operations as we have from the
very beginning.
The Department of Defense is open to having limited technical air
protocol discussions to ensure the safety of our pilots and our
Coalition. These communications would be solely focused on safety and
would not constitute cooperation with Russia. In no way will this take
away from our strong condemnation of Russia's actions in Ukraine and
the steps we are taking in response to those destabilizing activities.
59. Senator Cruz. Secretary Wormuth, what recommendation would you
make if a Russian missile shot down an American aircraft over ISIS
controlled territory?
Ms. Wormuth. If a Russian missile intentionally shot down a United
States aircraft, I would recommend a swift and forceful response. I
will not get into the details of what specific measures the United
States would take, and the final decision on a response would be the
President's.
60. Senator Cruz. General Austin, have the Russians messaged or
threatened American forces with this deployment of air defenses? Have
they actively targeted or locked onto U.S. aircraft with radar systems,
either in this region or elsewhere?
General Austin. I am not aware of any incidents where the Russians
directly messaged or threatened United States forces and they have not
actively targeted or locked onto United States aircraft.
61. Senator Cruz. General Austin, are you confident that our
recovery capabilities in Syria are adequate to prevent Islamists from
capturing an Airman that has to eject over ISIS controlled territory?
General Austin. I will not put a single U.S. service member in
harm's way without sufficient capability in place to support them and
that includes quick reaction forces and personnel recovery
capabilities. U.S. Central Command is prepared to dedicate all
available resources in the event we have to conduct a personnel
recovery operation for U.S. and Coalition air crews flying in harm's
way in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.
UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE
LEVANT AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ AND SYRIA
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill,
Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. The committee meets
today to receive testimony on the ongoing efforts of the United
States to combat ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant] as
well as United States policy toward Iraq, Syria, and the
broader Middle East.
We welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them for
their appearance today as well as for their continued service
to our Nation.
This morning, our hearts are with the loved ones of the 224
people killed aboard a Russian airliner over Egypt, of the 43
people killed in bombings in Beirut, of the 130 people killed
in Paris, and of the 14 people killed in San Bernardino. Each
one of these atrocities committed or inspired by ISIL has
occurred in just the month and a half since the Secretary last
appeared before this committee. A year and a half since he
appeared, and all of these things have happened. Whatever
illusions anyone may have had that our national security was
not at stake in the conflict in Iraq and Syria or that ISIL was
somehow contained, these attacks make it clear that ISIL's
threat against our homeland is real, direct, and growing, that
we are not winning this war, and that time is not on our side.
Americans have never been more worried about being attacked
than at any time since the months that followed September 11th,
2001. Today's hearing is essential to help the American people
and their elected representatives understand what the
Department of Defense [DOD] is doing to protect our Nation from
this new terrorist threat.
The administration says it has a strategy to destroy ISIL
which it has called, quote, ``an indirect approach,'' unquote.
This means that, instead of taking the fight to ISIL more
directly, the administration seeks to build up local ground
forces in Iraq and Syria, to support them with United States
and coalition airpower, to enable our local partners to
liberate their own lands, and to create conditions for lasting
political settlements. Much of this is what many of us have
been advocating for years. To be sure, we are making some
progress. As I recently saw on a visit to Iraq with Senator
Lindsey Graham, the recent operation to retake Sinjar was
important. Iraqi forces are closing in on Ramadi, though they
still have not finished the job. Our counterterrorism
operations are taking a lot of ISIL fighters off the
battlefield in Iraq and Syria.
All of this represents tactical progress, and it is a
testament to our civilian and military leaders as well as
thousands of U.S. troops hoping--helping to take the fight to
ISIL every day. However, significant challenges remain. The
Iraqi Government is weak and beholden to Iran. The training of
Iraqi Security Forces [ISF] has been slow. The building of
support for the Sunni tribal forces, even slower. At the
current pace, U.N. [United Nations]--U.S. commanders estimate
that ISIL will still control Mosul at the end of next year.
In Syria, what the administration calls its ``strategy''
looks more like a hope. We will not destroy ISIL until Raqqa,
the capital of the caliphate, falls. But, there is still no
ground force that is both willing and able to retake Raqqa, nor
is there a realistic prospect of one emerging soon.
The Syrian Kurds could take Raqqa, but won't. The Syrian
Sunni Arabs want to, but can't, partly due to our failure to
support them. What's worse, our military and diplomatic efforts
are misaligned. Russia and Iraq are doubling down on Bashar
Assad. Russia's airstrikes are still overwhelmingly directed at
coalition-supported groups, and more talks in Vienna will not
convince Vladimir Putin to abandon his idea of Russia's
national interests in Syria. We need leverage to do that, but
nothing we are doing, military or otherwise, is creating the
necessary conditions, both in Putin's mind as well as on the
ground in Syria, to achieve a favorable political settlement.
As a result, the conflict will likely grind on, ISIL will grow
stronger, and the refugees will keep coming.
Meanwhile, ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] is
metastasizing across the region--in Afghanistan, Lebanon,
Egypt, Yemen, and, perhaps most worryingly, in Libya. In short,
the threat is growing and evolving faster than the
administration's efforts to counter it.
The broader shortcomings of the administration's approach
has to do with two assumptions it appears to be making.
The first is that time is on our side, that we can afford
to play out their indirect approach for years while ISIL
continues to hold key terrain, such as Raqqa and Mosul. Time
has never been on our side in this conflict, and it certainly
is not now, after Sinai, Paris, and San Bernardino.
The second assumption is that we should not put U.S. forces
on the ground, because that's what ISIL wants. It is true that
ISIL seeks an apocalyptic conflict with the West, but another
key pillar of ISIL's ideology is the creation of the caliphate.
So, as long as ISIL can claim to possess its caliphate, it
projects an aura of success that is its most powerful tool of
radicalization and recruitment. There are no local forces that
are able and willing to destroy ISIL's caliphate on the ground.
If we will not commit our own forces, then we are accepting the
existence of the caliphate.
On Sunday, President Obama once again resorted to the
strawman argument that his critics want to invade Iraq and
Syria with 100,000 United States troops. No one--no one is
calling for that. What we do need in Iraq is several thousand
additional United States troops to improve and accelerate the
training of Iraqi forces, especially Sunni tribal fighters,
embed with and advise Iraqi units closer to the fight, call in
airstrikes from forward positions, and conduct counterterrorism
operations. Once ISIL is destroyed in Iraq, we must keep a
residual force there, as we should have done before. If we
leave again, the threat will return, and we will have to
intervene again. Iraqis must win the peace, but America has a
major stake in their success, and a unique role to play in
helping them. To do so, we must be present.
In Syria, the United States needs a coherent strategy to
destroy ISIL and end the civil war as soon as possible. Our
military efforts must create the conditions for this outcome.
America must work with its coalition partners to establish and
protect zones inside Syria where refugees can be safe, to deny
the Assad regime the use of airpower and barrel bombs, and to
impose costs on Russia for targeting moderate opposition
groups.
Ultimately, to destroy ISIL in Syria, we will need a
multinational ground force primarily made up of Sunni, Arab,
and European forces, but with a strong United States component,
to do what no local force now can or will: retake Raqqa,
destroy ISIL's caliphate in Syria, and prepare for a long-term
stabilization effort.
Beyond Iraq and Syria, we need to seize the initiative and
roll back ISIS--ISIL's regional expansion. This will require a
greater forward presence of U.S. military and intelligence
teams that can map its networks, destroy them as part of a
broader strategy to support countries and building just and
inclusive governments.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, we have known each other for many
years. I know you to be a skilled and dedicated public servant.
I think you are performing to the best of your abilities as
Secretary of Defense, and I value our partnership on many
issues. It is true that you have made four appearances before
this committee as Secretary. But, when you were nominated for
your position, you agreed to, quote, ``appear and testify, upon
request, before this committee.'' Since your last testimony, as
I mentioned, we have seen ISIL launch or inspire attacks in the
sky over Egypt, in Beirut, in Paris, and here at home, in San
Bernardino. We have also heard the administration roll out
additional actions that it claims are needed to address this
threat. If we are truly at war against ISIL, as the President
says, then we will continue to expect the Secretary of Defense
to provide regular updates to the
Senate Armed Services Committee on the progress of that
war. This is your responsibility to us so we can perform our
responsibilities on behalf of those who elected us.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me welcome Secretary Ash Carter and General Paul Selva.
This morning's hearing is extraordinarily timely, in light
of several recent and very disturbing events, including ISIL
claiming responsibility for the bombing of the Russian
airliner, the attacks on innocent civilians in Beirut and
Paris, and the deadly attack in San Bernardino by what appears
to be self-radicalized individuals. Our hearts go out to the
victims of these terrible and senseless tragedies.
As the President outlined in his speech to the Nation on
Sunday, it is critical that the U.S.-led 60-plus-nation
coalition for defeating ISIL pursue a multidimensional
approach. The United States and its coalition partners are
intensifying their efforts to degrade ISIL militarily and deny
their leaders any safe havens, to cut off ISIL financing, to
interdict the flow of foreign fighters to ISIL-controlled
territories, and to counter the spread of ISIL's murderous
ideology that the President accurately characterized as part of
a cult of death. Such an approach will require the careful
coordination of military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law
enforcement efforts to combat ISIL across the departments of
the United States Government and within our coalition.
Recently, the administration announced a number of steps to
intensify our military efforts in Iraq and Syria. These include
the deployment of A-10s to Turkey, the addition of Special
Operations Forces in northern Syria to assist local forces,
and, most recently, an announcement by you, Secretary Carter,
of the intent to deploy, in full coordination with the
Government of Iraq, an expeditionary targeting force to assist
the Iraqi and Kurdish security forces in removing ISIL leaders
from the battlefield. In addition, coalition partners,
including Britain, France, and Germany, have stepped up their
contributions to the fight against ISIL since the Paris
attacks. I welcome--and I think we all do--these continuing
efforts to reevaluate and enhance our military campaign, and
would be interested in any further steps that may be under
consideration to intensify the military pressure on ISIL in
Iraq and Syria. I think we all agree that that intensity has to
be increased significantly and rapidly.
At the same time, a sustainable defeat of ISIL in the
region requires that ground combat forces be primarily local
forces, though United States Forces can, and I think should,
provide critical advice, assistance, and enablers to assist
these forces and go where they must go to assist these local
forces. Putting large numbers of U.S. troops on the ground, as
has been suggested, I think, by all my colleagues, in Iraq and
Syria, could play, directly or indirectly, into ISIL's
propaganda war.
It's also clear that a sustainable outcome will only be
possible with more inclusive governance by the Haider al-Abadi
government in Baghdad and a political transition in Syria that
puts an end to the brutality of the Assad regime. Russia's
direct engagement in the Syrian conflict will continue to
further reduce the chances of achieving an acceptable political
solution, so long as the Russians remain focused on attacking
the moderate Syrian opposition and claiming to be joining an
anti-ISIL fight, where they are, in effect, trying to degrade
the anti-ISIL--Assad forces.
We will be interested in hearing from our witnesses
regarding the progress of the campaign to defeat ISIL, the
status of our efforts to train, equip, and assist local forces
in Syria and Iraq, and then having--training them to help them
seize territory and hold territory taken from ISIL control.
General, I hope you can also address whether we now have
the right command structure for Operation Inherent Resolve and
whether our military commanders in theater have the flexibility
they need to carry out the campaign plan.
Finally, the committee would be interested to get an
assessment from our witnesses of the factors contributing to
the expansion of ISIL and associated groups beyond the Syria-
Iraq region, as the Chairman has pointed out, and what the
Department needs to counter this threat that is burgeoning
throughout the region.
Again, thank you to the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Welcome, Secretary Carter and General
Selva.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, VICE CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Secretary Carter. Thank you. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss
the U.S. counter-ISIL military campaign with Vice Chairman Paul
Selva, here. Chairman Joseph Dunford is, as you know, currently
visiting our troops deployed around the world this holiday
season, conveying to them the thanks of a grateful Nation for
all they do in our defense. I will soon be doing the same.
Chairman, you're right, and Ranking Member Reed, we are
intensifying the campaign, and have, in the six weeks since I
appeared before you last time. I'm happy to be here today to
describe what we're doing. It's very much along the lines of
what you just described. That is, forces to accompany, to call
an airstrike, to conduct counterterrorism strikes, and train
and equip. So, I'll describe those actions which we're taking.
Because the attacks in Paris and San Bernardino were an
assault upon the civilization that we defend, ISIL requires,
and it will receive, a lasting defeat. The President has
directed us to intensify and adapt the military campaign----,
or, I'm sorry, had directed us to intensify the military
campaign before the Paris attacks. The necessity of
accelerating our efforts, as we're doing, has only been made
more plain by the recent attacks.
We are urging others in the region and around the world to
do the same, because those attacks further highlighted the
stakes that not just the United States, but the world, has in
this fight. The defense of the homeland must be strengthened,
to be sure. But, it is absolutely necessary to defeat ISIL in
its parent tumor in Syria and Iraq, and also to take necessary
action wherever else in the world this evil organization
metastasizes. Achieving these objectives means leveraging all
the components of our Nation's might, as the Chairman noted:
diplomatic, military, and law enforcement, homeland security,
intelligence, economic, informational. That's the right overall
approach, for three principal reasons:
First, the strategy takes the fight to the enemy where they
are, which we must do.
Second, it seeks to develop capable, motivated, local
ground forces as the only force that can assure a lasting
victory. U.S. and international coalition forces can and will
do more to enable them, but we cannot substitute for them.
Third, it seeks to set the conditions for a political
solution to the civil war in Syria and for inclusive governance
in Iraq, both of which are essential, because they're the only
durable ways to prevent a future ISIL-like organization from
re-emerging there. That's why the diplomatic work led by
Secretary John Kerry is the first and absolutely critical line
of effort.
The Defense Department, of course, is centrally responsible
for the military campaign, which is the focus of my statement
today. Through our and our coalition partners' actions, the
military campaign must and will deny ISIL any safe territorial
haven, kill or capture its leadership and forces, and destroy
its organization, all while we seek to identify and then enable
motivated local forces on the ground who can expel ISIL from
the territory it now controls, hold it, and govern it, and
ensure that victory sticks.
Militarily, we're taking new steps each week to gather
momentum on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. I'll take a few
extra minutes this morning to give as much detail as possible
about the new things we're doing, applying multiple pressures
on multiple fronts simultaneously to accelerate ISIL's defeat.
The reality is, we're at war. That's how our troops feel
about it, because they're taking the fight to ISIL every day,
applying the might of the finest fighting force the world has
ever known.
In northern Syria, local forces, with our support, are
fighting along the Ma'ra line, engaging ISIL in the last
remaining pocket of access into Turkey. Meanwhile, a coalition
of Syrian Arabs that we helped equip in northeastern Syria are
fighting alongside Kurdish forces and have recaptured important
terrain, most recently pushing ISIL out of the town of al-Hawl
and at least 900 square kilometers of surrounding territory.
They're now focused on moving south to isolate ISIL's so-called
capital of Raqqa, with the ultimate objective of collapsing its
control over the city.
To build on that, President Obama, on my and Chairman
Dunford's advice, ordered United States Special Operations
Forces to go into Syria to support the fight against ISIL.
American special operators bring a unique set of capabilities
that make them force multipliers, such as intelligence-
gathering, targeting, and enabling local forces. Where we find
further opportunity to leverage such capability, we will not
hesitate to expand it.
Next, in the south of Syria, we're also taking advantage of
opportunities to enable indigenous fighters trained and
equipped by us and other coalition partners to conduct strikes
inside Syria. We're also enhancing Jordan's border control and
defenses with additional military assets and planning
assistance.
Turning to northern Iraq, Peshmerga units, with the help of
United States power, airpower, and advisors, have retaken the
town of Sinjar, cutting the main line of communication between
Raqqa and Mosul, which are the two largest cities under ISIL's
control. To move people and supplies, ISIL must now rely on
backroads, where we will locate and destroy them.
Elsewhere in Iraq, we have about 3,500 troops at six
locations in support of Iraqi Security Forces. There, we've
been providing increased lethal fire and augmenting the
existing training, advising, and assisting program. We're
prepared to do more as Iraq shows capability and motivation in
the counter-ISIL fight and in resolving its political
divisions.
After a frustratingly long time, we are starting to see
some movement in the operation to recapture Ramadi. Over the
past several months, the coalition has provided specialized
training and equipment, including combat engineering
techniques, like in-stride breeching and bulldozing, and
munitions, like AT-4 shoulder-fired missiles, to stop truck
bombs, to the Iraqi Army and its counterterrorism service units
that are now beginning to enter Ramadi neighborhoods from
multiple directions. In fact, in the last 24 hours, the ISF
retook the Anbar Operations Center on the northern bank of the
Euphrates River, across from Ramadi's city center. It is an
important step, but there's still tough fighting ahead. ISIL
has counterattacked several times, but, thus far, the ISF has
shown resilience.
The United States is prepared to assist the Iraqi Army with
additional unique capabilities to help them finish the job,
including attack helicopters and accompanying advisors, if
circumstances dictate and if requested by Prime Minister Abadi.
I mention all this because it represents how we've adapted
in the way we support our Iraqi partners, and it shows that
training, advising, and assisting helps, and works. We will do
more of what works, going forward.
While we're focused on making additional tactical gains,
the overall progress in the Sunni-populated areas of Iraq has
been slow, much to Prime Minister Abadi's and our frustration.
Indeed, with respect to Sunni tribal forces, we are urging the
Iraqi Government to do more to recruit, train, arm, mobilize,
and pay Sunni popular mobilization fighters in their
communities. We continue to engage the Iraqi Government at all
levels to move forward on this critically important aspect of
the counter-ISIL campaign, including working with Sunni local
police to ensure that there's an Iraqi hold force to sustain
future gains.
Next, in full coordination, again, with the Government of
Iraq, we're deploying a specialized expeditionary targeting
force to assist the ISF and Kurdish Peshmerga forces and put
even more pressure on ISIL through a variety of raids and
intelligence-gathering missions. This force will also be in a
position to conduct unilateral operations in Syria.
In Iraq, the force will operate at the invitation of the
Iraqi Government and focus on defending its borders and
building the ISF's ability to conduct similar operations. We
will not be discussing specifics of this expeditionary
targeting force, or its operations, in unclassified settings,
both to protect our forces and to preserve the element of
surprise. We want this expeditionary targeting force to make
ISIL and its leaders wonder, when they go to bed at night,
who's going to be coming in the window.
Chairman Dunford and I recognize that, in principle, there
are alternatives to the strategic approach we have adopted to
drive ISIL from Syrian and Iraqi territory, including the
introduction of a significant foreign ground force,
hypothetically international, but including United States
Forces, even in the absence of capable, motivated, local ground
forces.
While we certainly have the capability to furnish a U.S.
component to such a ground force, we have not recommended this
course of action, for several reasons. In the near term, it
would be a significant undertaking that, much as we may wish
otherwise, realistically we would embark upon largely by
ourselves. It would be ceding our comparative advantage of
Special Forces, mobility, and firepower, instead fighting on
the enemy's terms.
In the medium term, by seeming to Americanize the conflicts
in Iraq and Syria, we could well turn those fighting ISIL, or
inclined to resist their rule, into fighting us instead. As
Chairman Dunford testified last week, quote, ``ISIL would love
nothing more than a large presence of United States forces on
the ground in Iraq and Syria so that they could have a call to
jihad.''
Lastly, in the long term, there would still remain the
problem of securing and governing the territory. These must be
done by local forces. So, in the end, while we can enable them,
we cannot substitute for them.
Next, momentum on the ground, as I've described, in both
Syria and Iraq has been enabled by greatly increased coalition
airstrikes. Additional strike aircraft we've deployed to
Incirlik Airbase in Turkey, along with improved intelligence,
allowed us, in November, to significantly increase our
airstrikes against ISIL to the highest level since the start of
our operations in August 2014. Moreover, because of improved
intelligence and understanding of ISIL's operations, we've
intensified the air campaign against ISIL's war-sustaining oil
enterprise, a critical pillar of ISIL's financial
infrastructure. In addition to destroying fixed facilities,
like wells and processing facilities, we've destroyed nearly
400 of ISIL's oil tanker trucks, reducing a major source of its
daily revenues. There is more to come, too.
We're also improving our capability to eliminate ISIL's
leadership. Since I last appeared before this committee, in
late October, we have removed two more key ISIL figures from
the battlefield; namely, ``Jihadi John,'' an ISIL executioner,
and Abu Nabil, ISIL's leader in Libya. Like previous actions,
these strikes serve notice to ISIL that no target is beyond our
reach.
As our military campaign intensifies on the ground and in
the air, the Defense Department is also developing more
strategic options in the cyberdomain.
These, then, are just nine areas of the adaptations we've
made over the past six weeks to accelerate this campaign and to
see momentum build. President Barack Obama is committed to
doing what it takes as opportunities arise, as we see what
works, and as the enemy adapts, until ISIL is defeated in a
lasting way. The President has consistently supported the
recommendations from me and General Dunford, and we know he is
prepared for us to bring him more. We will.
At the same time that we're constantly looking to do more
in the fight--in this fight, the world must do the same. The
international community, including our allies and partners, has
to step up before another attack like Paris. France was
galvanized by the attack on its capital, and intensified its
role. Britain has now expanded its air campaign to strike ISIL
in Syria. Italy has deployed its most elite police units, like
the Carabinieri, to assist in Iraq. Germany is now making
additional contributions. The Netherlands is actively
considering doing more, as well.
But, we all--let me repeat that--all must do more. Turkey
must do more to control its often porous border. Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf states joined the air portion of the campaign in
the early days--only the air part--but have since been
preoccupied by the conflict in Yemen, both in the air and on
the ground. Just this past week, I personally reached out to my
counterparts in forty countries around the world in the
coalition and asked them to contribute more--in many case,
contribute much more--to enhancing the fight against ISIL. The
types of things I've requested from our partners include
Special Operations Forces, strike and reconnaissance aircraft,
weapons, and munitions, training assistance, and other items.
Meanwhile, as the Chairman noted, Russia, which is publicly
committed to defeating ISIL, has instead largely attacked
opposition forces. It's time for Russia to focus on the right
side of this fight.
Before I conclude, I'd like to respectfully request the
committee's attention to matters that bear upon our security
and its responsibilities:
First, over a month ago, I submitted a request to the four
congressional defense committees, including this one, to
release holds on the final tranche of funds in the Syria
equipping program; that is, some $116 million. We need these
funds to provide and transport ammunition, weapons, and other
equipment to further enable the progress being made against
ISIL in Syria by partners like the Syrian Arab Coalition. All
four committees have failed to act on that request. I ask you
to release these holds, urgently. We should not be impeding the
very momentum we are trying to build.
Next is the necessity to fill key vacancies in the Defense
Department's critical leadership positions. I have appeared
before this committee, as noted, six times over the last ten
months--four times on the Middle East, and twice in just the
last six weeks, on ISIL. While this committee has held 58 full
hearings over the last year, only three have been confirmation
hearings for DOD civilian leaders. DOD currently has 16
nominees awaiting the constitutional advice and consent of the
Senate. Twelve of these 16 are still awaiting even a hearing,
including our nominees to be Secretary of the Army, the Under
Secretaries of each of our three military departments--Army,
Navy, and Air Force--and the Under Secretaries of both
Intelligence and Personnel and Readiness. These positions
should be filled by confirmed nominees, especially in a time of
conflict. So, I welcome that the process is now moving, and I
urge it to move quickly for all of our civilian nominees and
also for our senior military nominations that will be made
early next year.
Finally, as I conclude, I want to commend this committee on
last month's budget deal, which is the kind of deal I called
for back in March. It was a consequential agreement for the
Nation's security. As current funding for the government is set
to expire, it is vital that the two houses now conclude work on
funding all of the government, consistent with the budget deal.
Now is not the time for more gridlock.
I thank this committee in advance for your efforts, because
funding this budget deal is what our national security demands,
and it sends the right message to our troops, our allies, and
our enemies in this time of broad global national security
challenges, and especially in this war.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the United States counter-ISIL
military campaign with Vice Chairman Paul Selva. Chairman Dunford is,
as you know, currently visiting our troops deployed around the world
this holiday season, conveying to them the thanks of a grateful nation
for all they do in our defense. I will soon be doing the same.
The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino were an assault on the
civilization we defend. ISIL requires, and it will receive, a lasting
defeat. The President had directed us to intensify and adapt the
military campaign before the Paris attacks. The necessity of
accelerating our efforts, as we're doing, has only been made more plain
by the recent attacks. We are urging others in the region and around
the world to do the same, because those attacks further highlighted the
stakes that not just the United States but the world has in this fight.
The defense of the homeland must be strengthened, to be sure, but
it is absolutely necessary to defeat ISIL in its parent tumor in Syria
and Iraq, and also to take necessary action wherever else in the world
this evil organization metastasizes. Achieving these objectives means
leveraging all the components of our nation's might--diplomatic,
military, law enforcement, homeland security, intelligence, economic,
informational.
That's the right strategic approach for three principal reasons.
First, it takes the fight to the enemy where they are, as we must do.
Second, it seeks to develop capable, motivated, local ground
forces--as the only force that can assure a lasting victory. U.S. and
international coalition forces can and will do more to enable them, but
we cannot substitute for them.
Third, it seeks to set the conditions for a political solution to
the civil war in Syria and for inclusive governance in Iraq, which are
essential because they are the only durable ways to prevent a future
ISIL-like organization from re-emerging there. That's why the
diplomatic work, led by Secretary Kerry and the State Department, is
the first and absolutely critical line of effort in our strategy.
The Defense Department is, of course, centrally responsible for the
military campaign--the focus of my statement today. Through our and our
coalition partners' actions, the military campaign must and will deny
ISIL any safe territorial haven, kill or capture its leadership and
forces, and destroy its organization--all while we seek to identify and
then enable capable, motivated local forces on the ground who can expel
ISIL from the territory it now controls, hold and govern it, and ensure
that victory sticks.
Militarily, we are taking new steps each week to gather momentum on
the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. I will take a few extra minutes this
morning to give as much detail as possible about the new things we are
doing--applying multiple pressures, on multiple fronts,
simultaneously--to accelerate ISIL's defeat.
The reality is, we are at war. That's how our troops feel about it,
because they're taking the fight to ISIL every day--applying the might
of the finest fighting force the world has ever known.
In northern Syria, local forces, with our support, are fighting
along the Ma'ra line, engaging ISIL in the last remaining pocket of
access into Turkey. Meanwhile, a coalition of Syrian Arabs that we
helped equip in Northeastern Syria are fighting alongside Kurdish
forces and have recaptured important terrain, most recently pushing
ISIL out of the town of Al Hawl and at least 900 square kilometers of
surrounding territory. They are now focused on moving south to isolate
ISIL's so-called capital of Raqqa, with the ultimate objective of
collapsing its control over the city.
To build on that, President Obama, on my and Chairman Dunford's
advice, ordered United States special operations forces to go into
Syria to support the fight against ISIL. American special operators
bring a unique set of capabilities that make them force multipliers,
such as intelligence gathering, targeting, and enabling local forces.
Where we find further opportunity to leverage such capability, we will
not hesitate to expand it.
Next, in the south of Syria, we are also taking advantage of
opportunities to enable indigenous fighters, trained and equipped by us
and other Coalition partners, to conduct strikes inside Syria. We are
also enhancing Jordan's border control and defenses with additional
military assets and planning assistance.
Turning to northern Iraq, Peshmerga units, with the help of United
States air power and advisers, have retaken the town of Sinjar, cutting
the main line of communication between Raqqa and Mosul, the two largest
cities under ISIL's control. To move people and supplies, ISIL now must
rely on backroads, where we will locate and destroy them.
Elsewhere in Iraq, we have about 3,500 troops at six locations in
support of Iraqi Security Forces, or ISF. There, we've been providing
increased lethal fire and augmenting the existing training, advising,
and assisting program. We're prepared to do more as Iraq shows
capability and motivation in the counter-ISIL fight and in resolving
its political divisions.
After a frustratingly long time, we are starting to see some
movement in the operation to recapture Ramadi. Over the past several
months, the coalition has provided specialized training and equipment--
including combat engineering techniques like in-stride breaching and
bulldozing, and munitions like AT-4 shoulder-fired missiles to stop
truck bombs--to the Iraqi Army and counter-terrorism service units that
are now beginning to enter Ramadi neighborhoods from multiple
directions.
In fact, in the last 24 hours, the ISF retook the Anbar Operations
Center on the northern bank of the Euphrates River across from Ramadi's
city center. This is an important step, but there is still tough
fighting ahead. ISIL has counter-attacked several times, but thus far
the ISF has shown resilience. The United States is prepared to assist
the Iraqi Army with additional unique capabilities to help them finish
the job, including attack helicopters and accompanying advisors, if
requested by Prime Minister Abadi.
I mention all this because it represents how we've adapted in the
way we support our Iraqi partners. It shows that training, advising,
and assisting is the right approach. We will do more of what works
going forward.
While we are focused on making additional tactical gains, the
overall progress in the Sunni-populated areas of Iraq has been slow,
much to our and Prime Minister Abadi's frustration. Indeed, with
respect to Sunni tribal forces, we would like to see the government do
more to recruit, train, arm, and mobilize Sunni popular mobilization
fighters in their communities. We continue to engage the Iraqi
Government at all levels to move forward on this critically important
aspect of the counter-ISIL campaign, including working with Sunni local
police to ensure there is an Iraqi hold force to sustain any future
gains.
Next, in full coordination with the government of Iraq, we're
deploying a specialized expeditionary targeting force to assist the ISF
and Kurdish Peshmerga forces and to put even more pressure on ISIL
through a variety of raids and intelligence gathering. While this force
will also be in a position to conduct unilateral operations in Syria,
in Iraq the force will operate at the invitation of the Iraqi
Government and focus on defending its borders and building the ISF's
ability to conduct similar operations. We will not be discussing
specifics of this expeditionary targeting force or its operations in
unclassified settings, both to protect our forces and preserve the
element of surprise. We want this expeditionary targeting force to make
ISIL and its leaders wonder when they go to bed at night, who's going
to be coming in the window?
Chairman Dunford and I recognize that in principle there are
alternatives to the strategic approach we have adopted to drive ISIL
from Syrian and Iraqi territory--including the introduction of a
significant foreign ground force, hypothetically international but
including U.S. Forces, even in the absence of capable, motivated, local
ground forces. While we certainly have the capability to furnish a U.S.
component to such a ground force, we have not recommended this course
of action for several reasons:
In the near-term, it would be a significant undertaking that,
realistically, we would have to do largely by ourselves; and it would
be ceding our comparative advantage of special forces, mobility, and
firepower, instead fighting on the enemy's terms.
In the medium-term, by seeming to Americanize the conflicts in Iraq
and Syria, we could well turn those fighting ISIL or inclined to resist
their rule into fighting us instead. As Chairman Dunford testified last
week, ISIL ``would love nothing more than a large presence of United
States forces on the ground in Iraq and Syria, so that they could have
a call to jihad.''
Lastly, in the long-term, there would still remain the problem of
securing and governing the territory--these must be done by local
forces. So in the end, while we can enable them, we cannot substitute
for them.
Momentum on the ground in both Syria and Iraq has been enabled by
increased coalition airstrikes. Additional strike aircraft we've
deployed to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey along with improved
intelligence allowed us, in November, to significantly increase our
airstrikes against ISIL, to the highest level since the start of our
operations in August 2014.
Moreover, because of improved intelligence and understanding of
ISIL's operations, we've intensified the air campaign against ISIL's
war-sustaining oil enterprise, a critical pillar of ISIL's financial
infrastructure. In addition to destroying fixed facilities like wells
and processing facilities, we've destroyed nearly 400 of ISIL's oil
tanker trucks, reducing a major source of its daily revenues. There's
more to come too.
We're also improving our capability to eliminate ISIL's leadership.
Since I last appeared before this committee in late October, we have
removed two more key ISIL figures from the battlefield--Mohammed
Emwazi, a.k.a ``Jihadi John,'' an ISIL executioner; and Abu Nabil,
ISIL's leader in Libya. Like previous actions, these strikes serve
notice to ISIL that no target is beyond our reach.
As our military campaign intensifies on the ground and in the air,
the Defense Department is also developing more strategic options in the
cyber domain.
These are just nine areas of the adaptations we've made over the
past six weeks to accelerate this campaign, and we've seen momentum
build. President Obama is committed to doing what it takes--as
opportunities arise, as we see what works, and as the enemy adapts--
until ISIL is defeated in a lasting way. The President has consistently
supported the recommendations from me and General Dunford and we know
he is prepared for us to bring him more. We will.
At the same time that we're constantly looking to do more in this
fight, the world must do the same. The international community--
including our allies and partners--has to step up before another attack
like Paris.
France has been galvanized by the attacks in its capital, and the
French have intensified their role. Britain has now expanded its air
campaign to strike ISIL in Syria. Italy has deployed its most elite
police units, the Carabinieri, to assist in Iraq. Germany is now making
additional contributions. The Netherlands is actively considering doing
more as well.
But we all, let me repeat that, we all must do more. Turkey must do
more to control its often porous border. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
states joined the air campaign in the early days, but have since been
pre-occupied by the conflict in Yemen. Just this past week, I
personally reached out to some 40 countries around the world to ask
them to contribute, and in many cases contribute more, to enhancing the
fight against ISIL. The types of things I've requested from our
partners include special operations forces, strike and reconnaissance
aircraft, and weapons and munitions.
Meanwhile, Russia, which has publicly committed to defeating ISIL,
has instead largely attacked opposition forces. It's time for Russia to
focus on the right side of this fight.
Before I conclude, I'd like to respectfully request the committee's
attention to matters that bear upon our security and its
responsibilities.
First, over a month ago I submitted a request to the four
Congressional defense committees, including this one, to release
`holds' on the final tranche of funds in the Syria equipping program--
that is, some $116 million dollars. We need these funds to provide and
transport ammunition, weapons, and other equipment to further enable
the progress being made against ISIL in Syria by partners like the
Syrian Arab Coalition. The committees have failed to act on that
request, and I ask you to release these holds urgently. We should not
be impeding the very momentum we are trying to build.
Next is the necessity to fill key vacancies in the Defense
Department's critical leadership positions. I have appeared before this
committee six times over the last 10 months--four times on the Middle
East, and twice in just the last six weeks on ISIL. While this
committee has held 58 full hearings over the last year, only three have
been confirmation hearings for DOD civilian leaders.
DOD currently has 16 nominees awaiting the Constitutional advice
and consent of the Senate. Twelve of those 16 are still awaiting even a
hearing--including our nominees to be Secretary of the Army, the Under
Secretaries of each of our three military departments--Army, Navy, and
Air Force--and the Under Secretaries of both Intelligence and Personnel
and Readiness. These positions should be filled by confirmed nominees,
especially in a time of conflict. So I welcome that the process is now
moving, and I urge it to move quickly for all of our civilian nominees,
and also for senior military nominations that will be made next year.
Finally, as I conclude, I want to commend this committee on last
month's budget deal, which is the kind of deal I called for back in
March. It was a consequential agreement for the nation's security.
As current funding for government is set to expire, it is vital
that the two houses now conclude work on funding all of government
consistent with the budget deal. Now is not the time for games. I thank
this committee in advance for your efforts, because funding this budget
deal is what our national security demands. It sends the right message
to our troops, our allies and our enemies in this time of broad
national security challenges--and conflict.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In response--Mr.
Secretary--in response to your last two points, one on the
funding, we just received that request last week, but you know
very well it's a result of the absolute failure of the
expenditure of what was judged then to be $43 million and four
or five people were trained. We don't want to approve of
something like that again. We want to--if you want that kind of
funding to train and equip, we want to know what the plan is,
and we don't want to see a repetition of the testimony by the
head of Central Command who said, ``Well, we have four or five
less, and we've spent $43 million.'' We have an obligation to
the taxpayers.
On the nominees, there is four pending before the
United States Senate today, and there is four more who will
be having hearings this afternoon, which takes care of half of
yours.
I'm not going to waste the time of the committee to go back
and forth about threats of vetoes that, in the view of the
majority of this committee, were totally unjustified on the
part of the President, including the failure, still--still,
despite your appearance in my office with the President's
counterterrorism person, that you were going to send me a plan,
you were going to send this committee a plan on the closure of
Guantanamo. We still haven't gotten that plan, Mr. Secretary.
So, if you're a little bit concerned about a lack of
movement, I've been a little concerned about a lack of movement
on Guantanamo for the last seven years.
Secretary Carter. Right.
Chairman McCain. So, I will do what I can to get the four
that are pending before the Senate today confirmed by the
Senate, and I will--we will be having a hearing this afternoon
on the four additional ones.
So----
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate that.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, on the 1st of December, before the House
Armed Services Committee, Congressman J. Randy Forbes asked
General Dunford, quote, ``Have we currently contained ISIL?''
General Dunford, ``We have not contained ISIL.'' Mr. Secretary,
do you agree with General Dunford?
Secretary Carter. I agree with that General Dunford said,
yes.
Chairman McCain. So, if we have not contained ISIL, how are
we to know--believe that we are succeeding against ISIL?
Secretary Carter. I think that we are building momentum
against ISIL. I'm going to be very careful about describing
the--I have described the trajectory of that success all around
Iraq and Syria, some actions we're taking in Libya. It's not my
principal responsibility, but I met, yesterday, with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the FBI
[Federal Bureau of Investigation], the Director of National
Intelligence, and other officials, to talk about what we could
do more to strengthen the defense of the homeland, as the
Department of Defense. But, in our principal responsibility,
which is to take the fight to Syria and Iraq, I've described
the actions that we've taken just since----
Chairman McCain. And----
Secretary Carter.--I appeared last time, and I think they
are building momentum----
Chairman McCain. Thank you. How long do you think it'll be
before we retake Mosul or Raqqa?
Secretary Carter. With respect to Mosul, Mr. Chairman, it
is hard to say, because it--that depends much on the progress
of the Iraqi Security Forces, which I described, in building
themselves into a more capable combat force.
With respect to Ramadi, as I described----
Chairman McCain. Raqqa. Raqqa. Raqqa.
Secretary Carter. Oh, Raqqa. Well, Raqqa, there the--and
you noted this, yourself, Mr. Chairman--the Syrian Kurds to the
north have done an excellent job of clearing their territory.
We're going to----
Chairman McCain. They're not going to----
Secretary Carter.--work with the Syrian Arabs----
Chairman McCain. They're not going to go into Raqqa, and
you and I know that.
Secretary Carter. They're not going to go to Raqqa. No, no,
no. No. It's--the Syrian Arab--it would be the Syrian Arabs.
Chairman McCain. I guess the point is, Mr. Secretary, here
we are with attacks on the homeland, the United States of
America. We have not contained ISIL. We have no timeline--the
timeline I was given when Senator Graham and I went over there
was at least the end of next year before Mosul, and there is no
plan, no strategy, to retake Raqqa. I think it's pretty obvious
to all that, as long as they have a caliphate base, then they
are able to orchestrate attacks such as they've successfully
achieved in the last several weeks, whether it be the--Ankara,
Russian airliner, southern Beirut, Paris, or San Bernardino.
So, here we are with a--and you described some measures that
are probably very helpful, but with no timeline of which to
take out the caliphate from which there are many things
happening, including, according to news reports, developing
chemical weapons. So--and this is why I'm really puzzled.
This morning, by the way, on one of the news shows, former
head of the United States Army--Chief of Staff of the United
States Army, General Ray Odierno, said we ought to have
American contingent of troops on the ground. I, frankly, do not
understand the logic in your statement about--said, while you
certainly have the capability to furnish a U.S. component in
such a ground force, ``we've not recommended, because it would
be a significant undertaking.'' I agree. ``We would have to do
it largely by ourselves.'' I do not agree. ``It would be ceding
our comparative advantage''? We'd be--``And the meaning--in the
medium term, it would seem to Americanize the conflicts.'' Does
somehow--does anybody really believe that if the United States
struck back against the people that just slaughtered some
American in San Bernardino, that somehow that would encourage
them? What encourages them, Mr. Secretary, is success. They
have a pretty serious record, here, of success, just in the
last several--couple of months since you were here.
So, I do not understand why in the world you wouldn't want,
as General Jack Keane, the architect of the surge, the
successful surge, and others, military leaders, including, this
morning, former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, a
small component of American forces with an international force
which could be--if the United States had the credibility, could
be gathered and then go in and take out this caliphate. As long
as the caliphate--I know of no expert who doesn't believe that,
as long as this caliphate exists in Raqqa, they're going to be
able to orchestrate attacks and metastasize, and maybe even
move to Libya.
So, maybe you can help the committee out again that this
would somehow cede a comparative advantage if we went in with a
large Arab force--the Turks and Egyptians, even, and other
Sunni nations--and go in there and take those people out.
There's 20 to 30,000 of them that--it's--they are not giants.
So--but, finally----
Secretary Carter. May I----
Chairman McCain.--someone's going to have to convince me
that airpower alone, and Special Operations Forces, are going
to succeed in the short term in order to prevent further
things, such as San Bernardino. I'd love to hear you response.
Secretary Carter. A couple of things, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, to your main point about more American
forces--and I would say Special Forces, but others, as well,
that train, advise, assist, and accompany--they're not Special
Forces--we are doing----
Chairman McCain. I was talking about a multinational force.
Secretary Carter. Well, there, Mr. Chairman, as I
indicated, I, too, wish that particularly the Sunni Arab
nations of the Gulf would do more. And going way back----
Chairman McCain. They are willing to do so.
Secretary Carter.--to March----
Chairman McCain.--if there's----
Secretary Carter. I've had lengthy conversations with----
Chairman McCain. So have I.
Secretary Carter.--representatives there. Well, I have to
say that I have consistently emphasized to them that they have
a unique role, here, and also, insofar as they're concerned
about Iran, which is another concern they have--and, by the
way, that we have, also--totally different, but serious,
subject also--that what I've emphasized to them is that we
don't like it, but the Iranians are in the game, on the ground.
I very much would like, and we would very much welcome--and
we've repeatedly said this--working with those countries on the
ground, because we believe, as you noted, that they have--would
have a distinctive advantage in a ground fight.
With respect to the Europeans, the Europeans have,
generally speaking, offered to do more within their
capabilities and capacities. I will note here--and there--this
is uneven across Europe, but, in general, I am quite concerned
with the level of investment that Europe is making in its
militaries and its alliance and partnership therefore with the
United States. There is much more that their economies would
enable them to do, and that their history, as standing up for
the same kind of civilized values that we stand up with, really
require of them. So, while we're getting more from the
Europeans--and I indicated I've asked for more--I'd like there
to be still more. So, in that sense, I completely am with you.
I just--I simply in--on the basis of my urgent and
persistent consultations with them, am less--have less high
hopes, perhaps, than you that they would assemble such a force.
We would certainly welcome that.
With that, I also don't want to----
Chairman McCain. Could I just say that I urgently and
fervently asked you for a strategy that you can tell us when
we're going to take Mosul, when we're going to take Raqqa, and
when we're going to wipe out this caliphate. Frankly, I have
not seen that.
General, did you want to add anything?
General Selva. Sir, I would add three points.
First, I agree completely that defending the homeland is
our top priority.
Second, taking the fight----
Chairman McCain. That's helpful.
General Selva.--taking the fight to the caliphate is what
is going on today in Iraq and Syria. The combination of
increasing the momentum with the movements in Iraq in Baiji, as
well as in Ramadi, and partnering with Sunni----
Chairman McCain. Again, General, there is no timeline for
Mosul and Raqqa, which is the basis of the caliphate.
General Selva. Sir, the fight on the ground defines the
progress we will make against the caliphate. We have put
significant pressure on northern Syria. We have taken--with
Syrian Arab coalition partners, have taken significant ground
in the north and the east of Syria. They are using the
equipment that we have provided to put pressure on ISIL's main
lines of communication between Raqqa and Mosul. To provide a
timeline would deny the fact that the enemy on the ground gets
a vote, but they do not have freedom of maneuver. They do not
have operational freedom of maneuver, they do not have tactical
freedom of maneuver.
Chairman McCain. General, they were just able to
orchestrate an attack in San Bernardino, California.
My time is long ago expired.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, we've all come to the conclusion we need
American forces on the ground. The question, very generically,
is how many, and what are they going to do? This is a unique
situation, but we've got some analogies, or at least examples.
One, in Enduring Freedom, we sent in specialized teams of U.S.
personnel and--airpower--and, together with local forces, were
able to disrupt and then ultimately defeat the Taliban. In
Iraqi Freedom, we sent in conventional forces, we won a very
swift and brilliant conventional victory, and then were
confronted with instability and counterinsurgency. It would
seem to me that you're tending to favor the former model, which
would be to have specialized troops in there with our airpower,
et cetera, and that the constraining factor right now is the
local indigenous forces on the ground, particularly Arab
forces--not Kurdish forces, but Arab forces. I am told there's
about 100, sort of, new Syrian fighters that have been trained,
that are on the ground, that are the potential. Can you
elaborate on those comments?
Secretary Carter. I can. First of all, with respect to the
Afghan experience, I agree with your general analysis of the
history of those two incidents. That was a circumstance, in
2001 and 2002, where we were able, very rapidly and extremely
effectively, to leverage a preexisting indigenous force--
namely, largely the Northern Alliance--which we had, over the
previous, geez, decade or so, built up in order to fight the
Soviets. They actually succeeding at expelling the Soviets from
Afghanistan. That force, that organization, and other
organizations of the so-called Mujahideen in those days, we
could quickly link up with again. By providing them--enabling,
exactly in this manner, they would advance. That would cause
the Taliban to expose their positions, and we could cream them
from the air. So, that was a perfect example--ideal. We'd like
to replicate that. Of course, in this current circumstance in
Syria and Iraq, we're having to build those forces, and they
don't exist in the same way that they did in the Northern
Alliance.
With respect to the new Syrian forces--and it gets back to
the funding issue--we did change our approach to training and
equipping Syrian forces. Our early experience there was
disappointing. I've said that. I always told you I'm going to
be very honest about things. That didn't work out very well,
because we were trying to build units from scratch. What our--
the new approach--and by--the one we're asking you to fund, and
we are providing--I'm willing to send up a team today to brief
you further on what we're looking for. But, we really need this
agility if we're going to fight a war, so I'd plead with you to
take the briefings or whatever. We have a reason for requesting
this money. It's different from the old program. We learned our
lesson. We're doing something different, which is this. We're
taking units that have already formed and have undertaken to
combat ISIL. The Syrian Arab coalition is an example of that.
Instead of making--trying to create a brand new force or
recruit a brand new force--and then put them, including by
being on the ground with them, but especially equipping them
and providing them with airpower, amplifying their power. We
hope--and this gets to the Chairman's question about a timeline
for Raqqa--the--that if we make them successful as they move
further south--remember, now these are Syrian Arabs, not
Kurds--the Chairman rightly noted wouldn't be appropriate for
us----
Senator Reed. Right.
Secretary Carter.--to attack largely Arab Raqqa--that they
and their success will build, so to speak, a snowball that
accumulates more fighters as they go. As that accumulates and
there are more of them, we'll do more in--to fall in behind
them, with the objective, then, of them taking Raqqa, which
would be a very important victory in the heart of ISIL
territory.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General, quickly, the command arrangements. General Sean
MacFarland is now the joint commander with operational control
both in Iraq and Syria, I understand. Are you satisfied, and
General Dunford satisfied, that you have the best framework for
command now to integrate all of the DOD elements and ancillary
elements you need?
General Selva. Yes, sir. The Joint Task Force command
structure in Baghdad that covers both Iraq and Syria is more
than adequate to cover the military maneuver that's required
and to orchestrate the forces that are required, and has the
support of Central Command's headquarters as a oversight and
supporting headquarters.
Senator Reed. They have the flexibility to make critical
decisions in a timely way without sort of second-guessing up
and down the line?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your remarks. There's a great deal of
frustration, Secretary Carter, and concern that we're drifting
and reacting and not in--don't have the kind of plan that will
lead to success, number one.
Number two, I understand now the President says he wants an
authorization of force. But, because of the difficulties and
bungling I think that we've seen so far, we're going to have to
know what you're going to do, how you're going to do it, how
it's going to be successful. That is not clear. It's not clear
to the American people. It's not clear to Congress, not clear
to our European allies, our allies in the Middle East, or our
enemies. That's a problem we've got. It's just very real.
Secondly, I think that Secretary Bob Gates was correct to
say we need an overarching strategy for this whole deal with
Islamic extremism in maybe 20, 30, 50 years. We've used the
word ``containment'' to deal with that. However, that does not
mean that, in a long-term strategy of containment of extremism,
that we don't have to act decisively and militarily now.
I just think, and I shared with you, that we're--I believe
the Defense Department is underestimating the significance of
the refugee crisis, the impact it's having in Europe, the
impact it's having in the United States, what's happening from
all this disorder and the flee of human beings and the deaths
that's being caused and the humanitarian disaster that's out
there.
So, it seems to me, does it not to you, that a prompt,
decisive action to create safe zones in Syria, where people
don't have to flee their home country, can be kept safe there,
would be positive as a matter of humanity and as a military
possibility?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Senator. I'll begin, including
on the safe zones, and then perhaps ask the Vice Chairman to
add in. He's done a lot of work on that, as well.
I'll just note, with respect to the AUMF [Authorization for
Use of Military Force], that we have the--I'm not a lawyer, but
I'm told, and I'm glad, otherwise it would be a problem--we
have the authority, legal authority, to do what we want to do.
The AUMF, as I've testified, that the President submitted would
also allow us to do everything we need to do in this campaign.
Senator Sessions. Well, just don't blame the Congress----
Secretary Carter. And----
Senator Sessions.--for not rubberstamping it immediately--
--
Secretary Carter. Yeah. No, I understand----
Senator Sessions.--if we don't understand what the----
Secretary Carter. I think it's okay. In fact, I didn't even
mention it, for just that--for just that reason.
You're right. I--I associate myself with you about acting
decisively. I do recognize that there may be decades of
combating radicalism, in general. But, we need to go after ISIL
in its parent tumor, in Iraq and Syria, now, and urgently. So,
I associate myself with that point of view.
Refugees is a tragic matter. By the way, I--just a reminder
that only about half of other refugees are actually from Syria.
They are also, importantly, from Libya, from Afghanistan, from
throughout Africa. While there are women and children and--
caught up in this circumstance, the great bulk of them are
young people, mostly male, and professionally oriented, who are
looking for work. That's why German companies are at the train
station, recruiting them off the trains for their companies.
That's the reality. But, what does that mean for the countries
from which they come? It's a tremendous talent drain, as well
as a humanitarian issue. So, all the more reason why in Syria,
to the extent that's part of--a major part of the refugee
crisis, we have to get an end to the civil war there and get a
government that can govern decently. Assad's government is not
that.
With respect to safe zones, we have thought about that.
I've certainly thought about that a great deal. I'll begin and
describe--the concept of a safe zone would be to create a patch
of Syria that--wherein people who are inclined to go there
could go there and be protected. They would need to be
protected, because you can foresee that at least ISIL and other
radical groups, and quite possibly elements of the Assad
regime, would undertake to prove that it wasn't safe. So, it
would have to be made safe, and that takes us back to the
question of who--what's the--an appropriate force of that size
to protect a zone of that size? It's--in our estimates, it's
substantial. Again, I don't see, much as I wish otherwise,
anybody offering to furnish that force.
I also think we have thought about who might want to reside
in such a zone. I think it would undesirable if it became a
place into which people were pushed, say, from Turkey or
Europe, expelled, so to speak, into this zone. I don't know
what the people who now live in the zone would think about
other people coming into the zone. That would have to be taken
into account--and whether other people want to live there.
So, it's--so, we have thought about it. It's complicated.
We have not recommended that, because it's an undertaking of
substantial scale, wherein I--my judgment, the costs outweigh
the benefits.
Let me ask General Selva----
Senator Sessions. Just--before you answer, on--a major
European Ambassador told me that the Europeans have recommended
that, and the United States has said no. Is that correct?
Secretary Carter. No European defense leader has indicated
a willingness to do that and contribute to a force to do that.
Senator Sessions. Well, I asked him twice. I said, ``So,
you've recommended that, and the United States is the one
saying no?'' That's what he said, ``Yes.''
Secretary Carter. I haven't observed that, no.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
If you would disagree with any of these statements, I'm
going to summarize a letter that General Lloyd Austin sent to
Senator King about what is the situation in the fight against
ISIL.
Number one, ISIL is losing territory. Correct? I won't go
into all the details that delineate the territory they've lost,
but--because I don't want to take the time, but certainly it's
factually available to any member of the committee or any
American.
Secondly, ISIL is losing leadership. Correct?
Secretary Carter. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. We've--we have, in fact, taken out more
than 100 of ISIL's leadership, including the Special Ops taking
out their chief financial officer, where we gained a great deal
of intelligence about what was funding ISIL. Secondly, air
strikes taking out their online recruiting campaign, the cyber
caliphate, and also the top commander in Libya. Correct?
Secretary Carter. That--that's--and ``Jihadi John,'' the
executioner, another one of note. But, there are many, yes.
Senator McCaskill. We have taken--and they are losing
funding, correct?
Secretary Carter. That is correct.
Senator McCaskill. We have--the coalition airstrikes have
destroyed hundreds of oil transport trucks just in the last 30
days----
Secretary Carter. That's----
Senator McCaskill.--correct?
Secretary Carter.--true.
Senator McCaskill. In addition to oil operations
infrastructure that we have taken out with our airstrikes.
Secretary Carter. True also.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. So, one of our colleagues, who is
not here today, which is interesting, considering this would be
a pretty important hearing if you're running for President, he
has said, quote--this is Senator Cruz--has said, ``We will
utterly destroy ISIS. We will carpet-bomb them into oblivion. I
don't know if sand can glow in the dark, but we're going to
find out.''
How many women and children would be involved if we carpet-
bombed the areas where ISIS is currently a stronghold? What are
we talking about, in terms of lives lost of women and children
in those areas? Does anybody have an estimate?
Secretary Carter. I--Senator, I'll let General Selva speak
that. That is, of course, not our approach. We are very
effective from the air, but we take some----
Senator McCaskill. We're surgical.
Secretary Carter.--which is able to be effective. We're
able to be effective, while minimizing collateral damage.
Senator McCaskill. One of the reasons the locations we took
out was so important is, now we've forced their transport
trucks out into the open, where we can find them and take them
out; whereas, when they're in the city center, we'd kill
thousands of innocent people, correct?
General Selva. Senator, our process is to be as deliberate
as possible, as careful as we can, with the intelligence that
we have, and to discriminately strike targets and avoid
civilian collateral damage. That has been our process since day
one. It has proven very effective. I--that's where I would end
the comment.
Senator McCaskill. Isn't the biggest danger to the homeland
the ability of this extreme jihad viewpoint being transferred
to Americans and them become radicalized and do what these
people did in San Bernardino? Isn't that the biggest threat to
our homeland?
General Selva. Senator, it's clear from ISIL's strategy
that their objective is to cause us to engage in what they
believe is an apocalyptic war with the West. Anything that we
do to feed that particular frame of thinking counters our
national security. We have to be very careful about how we
prosecute a campaign that appears to be an indiscriminate
attempt to attack ISIL and the population that surrounds it.
Senator McCaskill. If we did an indiscriminate carpet-
bombing of a major area, and killed thousands of women and
children, would you assume that would have some impact on their
ability to recruit misguided barbarians, like this couple that
took out more than a dozen innocent people last week? I would
have to assume it would put their recruiting on steroids.
General Selva. Senator, I'm going to avoid anything
hypothetical. What I would say categorically is, the process
you described as your hypothetical question is not the way that
we apply force in combat. It isn't now, nor will it ever be.
Senator McCaskill. Ever.
General Selva. No, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. If we cleared out Raqqa, which I have no
doubt that our military could do, if we could--cleared our
Raqqa or Ramadi, do we have any local force capable of
providing security on the ground in those locations ongoing?
General Selva. Senator, I can't talk about specifically
about Raqqa, because we don't have that kind of intelligence on
Raqqa. In the case of Ramadi, there is a Sunni--predominantly
Sunni police force that is ready to follow in behind the force
that is attempting to take Ramadi back, and it is the intention
of the Iraqi Government to put that police force in place. I
don't, at this instant, have the numbers. I can provide them
for you if you'd like them.
Senator McCaskill. But, in Raqqa, are we aware of any force
that is available to secure and hold Raqqa if we were able to
take it out, or would we have to stay as long as it took?
General Selva. The forces that we are aware of at this
point are the Syrian Democratic Forces that are working with
Kurdish partners that are willing to put pressure on Raqqa.
It's not clear that that force is large enough to be the hold
force and the security force that would follow. That is one of
the reasons that we have advocated and gotten authorities to
put Special Ops Forces into Syria to build that depth of
intelligence to understand which forces are available to put
increasing pressure and a hold force into Raqqa.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. You don't want to neglect World War II,
General Selva, as far as carpet-bombing is concerned.
Senator Sullivan has asked for--to take precedence over his
colleagues.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Fix this mic, here. Thanks. Having a mic issue.
Mr. Secretary, General, good to see you.
You know, I think one of the things that's--you're hearing
here is a common theme, really from all our colleagues, is a
sense of urgency. So, you're laying out the strategy. I think
some of the elements that you've highlighted in your testimony
look like they're useful elements of strategy, but they're--
there's a strong belief that there's a lack of sense of
urgency, here. I think one only had to watch the press
conference between President--with President Obama and
President Francois Hollande, and you saw one leader who was
very urgent, he was going around the world trying to get our
allies motivated on this, and you saw another leader--
unfortunately, it was our President--was very passive. I think,
no matter what the strategy is, if there's not engaged American
leadership, serious leadership, that people believe that we're
in there and committed to the strategy, we're not going to be
able to do any of these things. We've talked about an Arab army
force. They're not going to follow unless they believe we're
fully committed. So, I think that's one of the elements of the
frustration that you see among the members on the committee
today.
Let me ask you, in terms of strategy. Now, this is a bit of
a difficult question, but let's say that there's another, kind
of, San Bernardino event, but maybe much bigger, in our
country, maybe 200 Americans killed, an ISIS-directed attack on
Americans. Would we keep the same strategy right now, or would
we keep the same strategic patience, as the White House calls
it? Assume you had a crystal ball and you saw that coming two
weeks from now or three weeks from now, where 200 Americans are
killed by--would you be satisfied that this should be the
strategy?
Secretary Carter. As far as the military campaign is
concerned, Senator, I just want to say, I share your sense of
urgency. As far as----
Senator Sullivan. But, it doesn't seem like the President
does. I think that's a real common--even members of his own
party have indicated that.
Secretary Carter. He has encouraged General Dunford and me,
and we have encouraged all of our subordinate commanders, as
was asked--said before, to propose ways to accelerate the
campaign. The--he has approved all the ones we've proposed so
far. We expect to propose more, as I indicated, and to gather
momentum in this campaign.
With respect to others following----
Senator Sullivan. So, let me ask just the question I--if
you can address the question I asked. Assume there's a Paris-
like attack, 200 Americans killed. God forbid it happens,
right? None of us want that to happen. But, let's say that
happens and it's directed by ISIS. Would you go back to the
President, saying, ``Keep the same strategy''?
Secretary Carter. Well, look, Senator, if I had more to
recommend to him to accelerate the defeat of ISIL in Syria and
Iraq, I'd be doing it now.
Senator Sullivan. But, isn't that the key question? That we
want to make sure we don't have 200 Americans killed in an
ISIS-like attack, so we should be doing everything now so we
don't have to be motivated to do it once it happens?
Secretary Carter. I think--again, on the military campaign,
it is as I said. With respect to homeland security--and here,
I'd have to refer you to Secretary----
Senator Sullivan. But, they're all related----
Secretary Carter.--Jeh Johnson--of course--and so forth. I
know that you all are considering various provisions in the law
that affect visa waivers and so forth. I think there are
probably some improvements and steps that can be taken in that
direction. If there are, again, I would refer you to Secretary
Johnson and Director James Comey and Attorney General Loretta
Lynch and others on that. I----
Senator Sullivan. Well, Mr. Secretary, I just--I think it's
important. We can't wait for an attack--a big attack--we've
already just had one--on our country to get the President
engaged and more urgent. I think that's the frustration that
you're seeing.
Let me ask a related question on urgency. Do you believe
that the longer ISIS holds territory, that that increases risk
to the homeland? Do you think that's a--so, if they hold more
territory, and they continue to do so, does that increase risk
to our citizens here at home?
Secretary Carter. Whenever a terrorist group finds safe
haven somewhere from which to plot against the United States,
that's a danger to the United States. We've been pursuing such
groups for--since 9/11, and actually before, and we have to do
that with respect to ISIL today. So, yes, that's absolutely
right.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. I appreciate very much your
service, too.
Secretary Carter, I think that, you know, all--you can--the
frustration--I can just speak for the constituents in West
Virginia, all the good people and all the military that we have
from West Virginia. We're just--they ask me the question,
``What's the end game this time? Is it going to repeat what
we've done before? Are we going to get bogged down for 10 years
or more again? American men and women in our National Guard
people put on the front line, in jeopardy?'' So, if ISIS and/or
Assad would fall, if we're able to make that transition, how do
we prevent that being filled by another terrorist group?
Because, you know, we started out with the Taliban we heard
about first, then al-Qaeda, then all the spinoffs of al-Qaeda,
and then ISIS came about. So, they believe that, basically,
when you cut the head off, you can't kill the snake. That's
what they're concerned about. How do you ever have an end game
that has any type of normalty--or normalty from that area, if
it's even possible?
Secretary Carter. Well, I've been speaking, obviously,
mostly of the military campaign and the urgent need----
Senator Manchin. Yeah.
Secretary Carter.--to crush ISIL. You're asking a--the--a
very good question. I said the political line of effort is
fundamental here, because, in order to have what you're
correctly identifying as the end state that will keep the peace
in the long run, there has to be, first of all, in Syria, a
political transition from Assad to a government that includes
some of the opposition--the moderate opposition that's been
countering him, and preserves some of the structure of the
Government of Syria so people can have a government there that
functions and is decent.
In Iraq, a government along the lines that Prime Minister
Abadi says--and I believe he's genuine, he's trying to create
there, which is one he--he calls it, I think, a decentralized
Iraq, namely one in which the different sectarian elements of
Iraqi territory, mainly Sunnis and Shiites and Kurds, can
remain one state, but have enough autonomy within their
different areas that they're not going at each other. That's
absolutely fundamental in both----
Senator Manchin. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Carter.--of those places.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Secretary, if I could ask this
question. I think the perfect--have we identified anybody--any
group that we think's--can take over if Assad's put aside to
where the--I mean, are we able to come to an agreement--and we
have to come to agreement, I would assume--with Russia? Because
they're much involved in that. Iran seems to be having an awful
lot of input in that. Are we three going to be able to come to
agreement of a new leadership in that--that's going to bring
the rebel--so-called friendly rebels in and everyone turns
their efforts towards ISIL?
Secretary Carter. I'd have to refer you to Secretary Kerry
on that matter. But, it--I think that's exactly what he's
trying to do. In addition to the three parties you mentioned--
namely, us and the Russians and the Iranians--and, of course,
the Russians and the Iranians are on the--working in the wrong
direction at the moment, so it means getting them turned
around. But, also I might note, all the Gulf--Sunni Gulf states
that we've talked about, otherwise, would need to be involved,
as well. That's the end state that will keep the peace in
Syria.
Senator Manchin. Can you give me--I understand that they're
currently meeting in Saudi Arabia now, talking about all of
these things that we're talking about right now. Why hasn't the
YPG [People's Protection Units] or the Syrian Kurds been
involved in these talks? Why do you think they haven't--which
has seemed to be the most effective ground troops we have in
Syria right now--of them leading the charges, and they're not
even asked to be at the table. Would that be because we're
trying to please the Saudis and not upset the Turks? Or----
Secretary Carter. Can I get back to you on that question? I
don't know where, diplomatically--I mean, we are obviously in
touch with them. We are--and Secretary Kerry knows that and
is----
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Secretary Carter.--involved with them. I simply----
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Secretary Carter.--would have to give you----
Senator Manchin. The other thing I'd----
Secretary Carter.--a considered answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
The State Department is ably leading these talks and would be best
positioned to respond to this question.
Senator Manchin.--like to get your opinion on is that--you
know, we've been talking about, ``What do we do for the visas--
visa waivers?'' I've had a lot of conversation with different
people from that part of the world that basically have located
in West Virginia. They understand that we have to have a much
tougher, much stronger vetting process, or--they don't want to
relax that at all.
The other thing they would be acceptable to is biometric
scanning. I'm thinking biometric scanning--people can change
their name, they can change their appearance, they can't change
who they are. To me, I think the American people would be a lot
more comfortable if we go down that path and says, ``There will
be no more visas coming to this country unless you've had
biometric scanning and we know who you are.'' That's something
that's accepted, I think, in--is it--is that something that you
think, in your thought process, would be feasible, we could do?
Secretary Carter. I really would need to defer you to the
Department of Homeland Security and so forth on that, Senator.
Very good question. I just simply don't know a good answer.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank you both for being here.
General Selva, could you tell us what percentage of U.S.
sorties are returning in the fight right now against ISIS
without dropping munitions?
General Selva. Madam Senator, it depends on which day and
which target set we're talking about, but roughly 40 percent
come back every day not having struck dynamic targets, with
weapons still aboard.
Senator Ayotte. So, let me ask you this. We asked Central
Command recently whether or not the Department of Defense JTACs
[Joint Terminal Attack Controllers] are operating outside of
operations centers. Basically, what we heard back is that they
weren't. So, I would like to hear from you, Secretary Carter,
and you, General Selva--I mean, we know that the--one of the
things that makes our airstrikes even more effective are the
forward air controllers on the ground calling them in. What is
our position, in fact, on embedding JTACs, whether it's with
the Kurds or Iraqi forces, so that we can more effectively bomb
ISIS and take out the most productive targets to defeat them?
Secretary Carter. First, I'll note a very good memory I
have of your coming to the Pentagon with a number of JTACs----
Senator Ayotte. I did.
Secretary Carter.--a couple of months ago.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate--we met with the JTAC
Associations. Thank you for doing that.
Secretary Carter. Oh, thank you. It was very grateful, and
they're great people, because they represent veterans of a
great capability. And a--that's--we talk about American
comparative advantage, this is one of the things we are
incomparably good at and that is very effective when we do it.
The answer to your question is yes, we are--I want to be
careful about what we're doing actually today, as I speak, but
we are doing that, accompanying. People who have those--and, by
the way, other skills--intelligence skills and other skills
that allow us to leverage a local force and make it much more
powerful by bringing in the full weight of America--America's
might behind it. It's the JTACs and those kind of skills that
create that connection between a motivated local force and the
might of American power.
General Selva, do you want to say anything about JTACs?
General Selva. Senator, in areas where we're not able to
accompany to the nearest point of contact, we have actually
trained Syrian Arabs, members of the New Syrian Forces, as well
as our Iraqi partners, to provide the kind of precision target
identification that's necessary. Then we're passing that pack
through JTACs to be vetted in Ops Centers.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I'm glad to hear this, because what
we were hearing before is that they were only in the Ops
Centers. Obviously, when possible, getting them at the
battalion level is going to make the difference. So, we can
train all the other people we want, but we know our guys are
the best, and women who do this. That they're going to be able
to call in these airstrikes. We've got 40 percent returning. We
can increase that percentage dramatically by having the right
information on the ground.
One question I've gotten a lot of is--you know, I saw, in
your testimony, Secretary Carter, that we've taken out 400 ISIS
fuel trucks at this point. I appreciated the report that there
were 116 of those taken out with the help of A-10s. But, why
did it take so long for us to go after assets like the fuel
trucks, knowing where they were? I think there's a lot of
people that have asked that. Are we going to be more aggressive
in really going after these assets, going forward?
Secretary Carter. Yes, we're going to be more aggressive,
but--and what made it possible was intelligence that we didn't
have before. That is what allowed us to identify those parts of
the oil infrastructure that are being used to fund ISIL. We
greatly increased our insight into that infrastructure in
recent months. This is one of the ways that, as our
intelligence, which I have to say, when I started out, had a
lot of improvement to be done in--there, in terms of collection
and graininess of data and so forth--is getting a lot better.
That is also a huge enabler. Because when those JTACs call in
airstrikes, it's based upon an intelligence foundation. That's
getting--that is what made the critical difference in our
ability to go after the energy infrastructure----
Senator Ayotte. So, I don't want to--I don't want to
interrupt, but I need to, since my time is almost up, and a
really important topic before we leave, and that's Iran. We've
now been informed that Iran has made another missile test, on
November 21st. We know that previously they made a missile test
on October 10th, in violation of existing U.N. resolutions. As
far as I can tell, in raising this with the administration,
nothing has been happening. No response. These are certainly--
our own Ambassador to the U.N. has said the October 10th, clear
violation of the U.N. resolution. You and I have talked,
Secretary Carter, about the importance of stopping them from
having ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missiles] capability.
Yet, they continue to test, in violation of U.N. resolutions.
What's our response?
Secretary Carter. Well, what we're doing, in the Defense
Department--and you may remember, we discussed this shortly
after the nuclear deal was made with Iran--is, basically, we
continue to deter Iran to counter its malign influence, to have
a military presence in the region, which is oriented not only
toward the urgent need to defeat ISIL in its homeland, but we
also have to remember we need to deter and counter Iran, as
well.
As far as its ballistic missile program is concerned, as
you know, we're making some improvements in our--both
qualitative and quantitative--in our missile defense system.
That's principally oriented towards North Korea at the moment,
but it's also a capability that will be relevant against Iran,
in the unfortunate event which--sometime in the future they
were able, as we discussed earlier, to field an ICBM.
On the specific matter of this missile test, I'd refer you
to the U.S./U.N. or our--or the State Department on that. But,
on the military side, we are continuing unchanged in our need
to deter and counter Iranian malign influence in the region.
Senator Ayotte. Let me just say this. I'm all for--I've
been long supporting enhancing our missile defense system in
this country, but there already are existing U.N. resolutions
that they're in violation of, that--in testing these missiles.
If we don't respond to their violations in a very forceful way,
then this agreement--we might as well--you know, this--tear
this JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] up, because it
doesn't matter, because this issue is already a demonstration
of them really backing off on international commitments with
this agreement pending.
Chairman McCain. Before I recognize Senator Donnelly, Mr.
Secretary, you may want to correct the record. We all knew
those fuel trucks were moving back and forth. We've seen them.
We knew it. A decision was not made by the White House to
attack them. I think you may want to correct the record,
because I certainly knew----
Secretary Carter. Well, I can----
Chairman McCain.--that the fuel trucks were----
Secretary Carter. Not a matter of correction at all. I can
clarify, if you--if that would help.
The--that is the case. And the--what the air commanders
were able to do is identify those trucks--and in a classified
setting, I can describe exactly how that information was
obtained--which were directly supporting ISIL. We have and
continue to try to withhold attacks upon that part of the
general infrastructure--energy, electricity, water, et cetera--
that is also necessary for the people of Syria. We're trying to
peel off that which is--which ISIL uses in command and controls
for its own revenue source. We are now able to make that
distinction, which is what enabled the airstrikes, Chairman.
With regard to where that intelligence came from and so
forth, I'd be happy to have somebody come up and tell you in a
classified manner.
Chairman McCain. I'll be glad to. But, I repeat, we knew
those fuel trucks were moving back and forth. We saw them.
Through ISR [Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]--
and the decision was not made in the White House to attack them
or not. You can't tell me they were moving all that stuff back
and forth for over a year and we didn't know about it. I mean,
it's just not possible, given our technologically--
capabilities. But, I'll be glad to hear additional information.
But, I was told directly, in Iraq, that we didn't attack them
because the decision had not been made to attack them, and they
didn't want to harm anybody. So, I'll be glad to call those
people a liar that briefed me that were doing those attacks.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you said before that none of the European
defense ministers has offered to provide troops to creating a
safe zone. Have you asked any of them to provide troops for
creating a safe zone and to provide an area for Syrian
refugees?
Secretary Carter. We've talked to them about all kinds of
capabilities. As I indicated----
Senator Donnelly. Did you ask any of them to provide troops
to help create a safe zone?
Secretary Carter. Well, we believe that a--the costs
outweigh the benefits----
Senator Donnelly. So, you----
Secretary Carter.--of a safe zone. So, that is----
Senator Donnelly. So, it's safe to say----
Secretary Carter.--not something----
Senator Donnelly.--we did not ask them.
Secretary Carter. We--I have not asked them for forces for
that undertaking. I have asked them persistently for forces of
all kinds for undertakings where we think the benefits outweigh
the costs. There are many of those.
Senator Donnelly. What are the answers that you're getting
from the French, from the English, from the Saudis, from the
Jordanians?
Secretary Carter. It varies. But, just to--the French, as I
mentioned, were truly galvanized. I spoke several times to the
French Defense Minister. He came here to the United States.
We've talked. They're doing a great deal more. I'm sorry about
the circumstances that galvanized them----
Senator Donnelly. My expectation----
Secretary Carter.--but I appreciate the help.
Senator Donnelly.--is that if you asked the French Defense
Minister for troops for a safe zone, he would probably offer
them.
Additionally, what I'm trying to find out is--I believe
also, like you and like others, when ISIS holds ground, it
makes it more dangerous for our own country, because they have
a safe haven to work out of. So, I have confidence that we're
working in Iraq to move them out of Iraq. Then we look at
Syria. So, we talk about 100 people in training. They have
20,000 on the ISIS side. How do we get to Raqqa, and when do we
get to Raqqa, when we are training 100 people? Where do the
other people come from?
Secretary Carter. The people that we are now not only
training--in fact, not even principally training, but equipping
and enabling, are Syrian Arab forces that are working with the
Kurdish YPG in the northern part of Syria. They are prepared to
advance. They already have, as I indicated, advanced south. We
are enabling them. We're doing more to enable them. As they do
more, we will do yet more to enable them.
Senator Donnelly. Do we have any timeline----
Secretary Carter. They're the right force to do it, if I
may say, because they're Syrian Arabs.
Senator Donnelly. Well, you know, I was in Saudi Arabia,
and they said, ``We want to put in troops to help.'' Maybe they
told you different. Maybe they wouldn't actually do it. But,
they said they want to put in troops to help. King Abdullah, in
Jordan, said, ``We want to put in troops to help.'' So, you
have Sunnis in Jordan, you have Sunnis in Saudi Arabia who want
to put in troops to move the ball to head toward Raqqa. So, you
have other groups that want to help, as well. Do you not want
their help, or do you not think that they----
Secretary Carter. We welcome everything King Abdullah is
doing, and are very grateful to it. As I said, I've spoken to
the Saudis, and I remind you that the--that we had a--the Gulf
Cooperation Council [GCC] leaders to Camp David, back in--geez,
that was--I think it was April or so--and specifically talked
to them about the creation of a Sunni-Arab combined force. So--
and that has not----
Senator Donnelly. So, why can't we----
Secretary Carter.--materialized among them.
Senator Donnelly.--get that off the ground? Isn't that the
force that gets to Raqqa?
Secretary Carter. Well, it depends on--from one to another.
I would prefer to speak about part of this--these things
privately.
Senator Donnelly. That's fine.
Secretary Carter. But, one thing that's very clear, in the
case of the Saudis, just to--since you mentioned them, has been
the Yemen situation, which has preoccupied a lot of the time
and energy of their forces, as well as their leadership.
Senator Donnelly. I also spoke with some of the Sunni
tribal leaders today. They still have extraordinary
humanitarian needs. Do we have a plan to work to meet those?
Because they still have people who are starving.
Secretary Carter. Yeah, there is. It's a--State Department,
AID [Agency for International Development], and various
international donors are part of that. I can't speak to that
authoritatively. Secretary Kerry could. But, it's important to
note, from the military point of view, from our point of view,
because it's an important part of holding territory once it's
taken. To give you an example, when Tikrit was retaken, it was
important that order be kept, that services be restored, and
that humanitarian assistance be rendered. That's why people are
moving back into Tikrit----
Senator Donnelly. I apologize, Mr. Secretary. I have a vote
I have to get to. I just want to finish up by saying this. It
is strongly believed, by me and many others, that, as long as
Raqqa is held and other areas are held, that dramatically
increases the chance of another attack in our country. When we
ask, ``When are we going to get to Raqqa and move them out?''--
it's not because we're trying to find a date, it's because it's
extraordinarily dangerous to the citizens of this country that
they're there. So, the sooner the better that we clear up the
clutter with the Saudis, the Jordanians, and move on that city.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carter. Amen.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the targeting force. What
impact do you expect that force to have on the battlefield?
Secretary Carter. I'm sorry. Well, I'm hoping it has a very
great effect. That's what it's designed to do. I believe it
will. The--it--the--we envision a variety of missions for--I
want to be careful what I say here--that range from
interdicting individuals on the move, leaders on the move, to
the kind of--well, let me give you two examples where we've
already employed this technique, because, again, I want to be
very careful about operational security here. This is a no-
kidding, you know, force that'll be doing important things.
But, to--I think it would help everyone to understand. If you
remember the raid that killed Abu Sayyaf, that's an example of
the kind of thing that this force could do. Another one was the
freeing of 70 prisoners--ISIL prisoners in which a very heroic
action was taken by a soldier, Joshua----
Senator Fischer. Correct.
Secretary Carter.--Wheeler----
Senator Fischer. We've seen----
Secretary Carter. So, there's an example of the kinds of
things that can be done. It puts the leadership on notice.
It'll get valuable intelligence. It'll free people, in the case
of that kind of mission. So, there's a variety of missions, and
I----
Senator Fischer. Correct. I--if I can, we've seen those two
raids in the last year and a half. Would you anticipate that
we're going to see a greater frequency with this force in the
days and weeks and months ahead?
Secretary Carter. That's absolutely the intent, Senator.
Senator Fischer. I would hope we could have general
conversations--I realize the sensitivity of this force, but I
would hope we could have general conversations about them so we
could lay out truly what the goals are when we're talking about
the force. Do you have any immediate goals in mind for this
targeting force that you can speak about in a--general terms at
this point?
Secretary Carter. In general terms, they fall in the
categories I described: intelligence-gathering, interdiction of
leadership, key nodes, facilitation--and certainly, for you, we
can discuss more in a classified setting also. But, that's the
kind of thing that--it's actually a really--to me, to all of
us, a very flexible and potent tool. So, it would learn from
experience. By using it, one raid builds on another. You know,
the Abu Sayyaf raid built on things, because we gained
understanding, as has been reported.
Senator Fischer. You said that we will do more of what
works, going forward. So, I hope, in a more classified setting,
you can lay out those goals so that we can have something to
measure the success or failure of these raids by them in the
future.
I was also interested in knowing, as the number of raids
are increasing, will General MacFarland receive any authority
to help to plan and order the--that these raids be carried out,
then?
Secretary Carter. Yeah, General MacFarland is in overall
charge of the campaign there. I've made that very clear. I have
great confidence in him, and it's why I created that role, so
that we would have one senior leader in charge of the entire
campaign, covering both Syria and Iraq. That is General
MacFarland, who has--who is extremely experienced.
Senator Fischer. Will he be able to approve those raids by
himself, or will he need to come to you or the President?
Secretary Carter. In many cases, this would be something
that he and General--I think General Austin, remember, also in
the chain of command--otherwise, when--if they come to me for
approval of things that they think require my approval, that's
fine, too. But, there will, and there has to be, a certain
amount of delegation of authority, here, so that the--because,
for one thing, one expects that raids build upon themselves,
and so you can't--you're going to want to strike again after
you're struck once, on the basis of what you've learned from
the first strike. So, we need to have some significant
authority in there.
Senator Fischer. When you said it--it's ``fine, too'' if
they come to you, do you--don't you have that laid out what a--
--
Secretary Carter. We do.
Senator Fischer.--certain plan would be that would
require----
Secretary Carter. Yes, we----
Senator Fischer.--the General, then, to come to you?
Secretary Carter. Yes, we do. It's based on their judgment
about whether approval at my level is required. That's as--I
mean, that's generally true. It's perfectly appropriate in this
case.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let
me recognize Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you.
Before beginning my questions, several references have been
made to a letter, which I received in early November from
General Austin, which laid out a series of steps that had been
taken. I'd like to submit that letter for the record, please.
Senator Reed. Without objection.
Senator King. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator King. Mr. Secretary, it strikes me that this is an
exceedingly complex challenge. I guess that's pretty obvious.
But, part of the problem is, we want to defeat ISIS, but we
want to do it in such a way that doesn't propagate their
ideology around the Muslim world. That really makes it very
difficult. I think the San Bernardino attack is a good example.
There's no evidence that I've heard that that attack was
directed by ISIS. Instead, these people were self-radicalized
and took it upon themselves to perform these heinous acts.
The question is, How do we keep moderate Muslims, the vast
majority of the 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, from falling
into the ISIS trap? ISIS has made it clear that part of their
strategy is to provoke us to Westernizing this conflict and
making it a war of America and the West against Islam, and
thereby pushing heretofore moderate Muslims in their direction.
So, this gets to the question of, How do we take Raqqa, for
example? My understanding is that there's no inclination to use
a large contingent of U.S. troops, but there is a recognition,
as the President has already acknowledged, that there are
places for U.S. troops in a Special Forces kind of setting. Is
this the kind of calculation that you're making?
Secretary Carter. That's exactly correct, yes.
Senator King. How do we--the gap in the strategy, it seems
to me, from the beginning--and I say ``gap,'' that's not a
criticism, that's just the fact--is, Where do we get ground
troops in Syria? Ground troops are available in--Arab ground
troops, Muslim ground troops, are available in Iraq, the Iraqi
Security Forces and the Peshmerga. In Syria, there's not an
available force. That's why, it seems to me, the whole issue of
getting rid of Assad is a key part of this calculation, that
Assad is the lightning rod that, in effect, created ISIS, in
part. If we can work with other parties, particularly Russia,
to move Assad off the stage, then you've got an Arab army, a
Muslim army, in Syria. It's the--all of the opposition, except
perhaps Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Syrian army. That's why, it
seems to me, that's a key part of it. But, the question that
our colleagues are asking is: time. We--somehow we've got to
accelerate the timetable. We can't wait years for Assad to
leave and we turn the guns of the opposition and the Syrian
army on ISIL. Would you--do you share that----
Secretary Carter. I do. I mean, I--as you can hear, I'm all
for urgency and acceleration of the military campaign. I'd like
to see that, too, on the political side. It's trickier.
Secretary Kerry's trying to work toward that end. But, it is
exactly as you say. If we could get a political transition that
brought the Syrian armed forces, that part of which it would be
appropriate to carry forward into a new Syria, plus the
moderate opposition, you'd have a force that could both clear
Syrian territory of radicals and eliminate the civil war, which
is what fuels the violent--this extremism, in the first place--
--
Senator King. Do----
Secretary Carter.--and have a governance of Syria that the
Syrian people deserve.
Senator King. But, there's one piece of this--and you've
mentioned it--you listed a long series of things that we needed
to do, and, at the very end, you said, ``information.'' That's
where we're losing right now. I heard a figure recently that
ISIS posts something like 90,000 posts a day in social media.
Just reading a piece about a young man in the United States, 17
years old, who found this ISIS community online, and he's being
encouraged to move forward. I know it's not in the Department
of Defense, but we--this country has to do a much better job,
it seems to me, of countering the story that ISIS is telling to
attract young people across the world. We're not only engaged
in a military war, here, we're engaged in a war of ideas. Right
now, I think we're--it's somewhere close to a stalemate on the
military side, but we're losing the war of ideas.
Secretary Carter. May I just note, Senator, that it is for
that very reason that yesterday I got together with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the FBI, the
Director of National Intelligence, and we were talking exactly
about that, how--what--the information war. Now, you're right,
it's not principally a defense thing. We don't operate here at
home. We do operate in the cyberdomain. I alluded to that. You
know, we're at war, and we have authorities to use our Cyber
Command in this case, and are identifying opportunities to do
that. At the same time, I just--I have to say, the FBI, the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Director of National
Intelligence are working intensely--they were before San
Bernardino, they're working now--and hence the--on exactly this
question of these people who are----
Senator King. If we----
Secretary Carter.--sitting with a keyboard somewhere in the
United States.
Senator King. If we win a town in Syria and lose 10,000
kids in France or Belgium or Florida or Ohio, that's not
victory. I'd hope, in the councils of war, you will continue to
press that point of view.
Secretary Carter. Will do.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, always good to have you back. I do echo what
Senator McCain said, and I hope you'll come back more often and
share with us your thoughts.
Let me let you be explicit on the issue of Bashar Assad,
because I hear and I read in the paper--for example, December
7, Bloomberg said, ``Obama no longer seems sure Assad should
go.'' Is that true? Do you believe that Mr. Assad should
explicitly be removed from power? Or is there a growing feeling
that perhaps we ought to team up with Assad?
Secretary Carter. I think--and I don't want to speak for
him, but I think what Secretary Kerry is trying to engineer is
the departure of Assad in a way that everyone can support,
which, by the way, includes the Russians, who have a lot of
influence with Assad, so there--it's important to see if you
can get them on the right side of history, here--and that
accomplishes that--and this is important, quite apart from the
atrocities that Assad has committed--in a way that removes him
while the structures of the Syrian state are still relatively
intact, because, to get back to what Senator King was saying a
moment ago, we do want--we do need there to be, after Assad,
an--a Government of Syria that is inclusive, that involves the
forces that have been fighting each other, fighting ISIL and
governing the territory decently. That is exactly the
transition that Secretary Kerry is working----
Senator Wicker. Much like we needed in Iraq after the
successful invasion. I think I understand what you're saying.
But, let's get your testimony on this. To your knowledge, is
the President still resolute in saying that Assad should go and
that a solution is not that we should begin to work with him?
Secretary Carter. No, I--a political transition in which
Assad leaves power and is replaced by a more inclusive form of
government is the outcome that we're trying to----
Senator Wicker. A political solution in which Assad stays
in power, is that acceptable to you?
Secretary Carter. I think what--no, Secretary--what
Secretary----
Senator Wicker. Is it acceptable to the President?
Secretary Carter. Well, what Secretary Kerry is trying to
arrange is----
Senator Wicker. I understand what your testimony just was.
I'm--but, I'm wondering--we need to get this on the record, and
Americans need an answer to this. Is the President steadfast in
having a goal that includes Mr. Assad being removed from power?
Secretary Carter. Well, that's the path that he has--that's
the kind of political transition that he has Secretary of--
Kerry seeking, yes.
Senator Wicker. Would you agree that it would be very
difficult to convince Syrian rebels to fight only ISIS if--and
not Assad--if that were a direction in which the administration
should----
Secretary Carter. We actually have experience in exactly
that matter, and----
Senator Wicker. What is your experience?
Secretary Carter. The experience is that they're--that it's
easier to find fighters who are intent upon fighting Assad than
to find ones that are intent upon fighting ISIL.
Senator Wicker. Do you believe Mr. Assad should be removed
from power?
Secretary Carter. Yeah. I think that to have a decent
government there that is in--that brings the moderate
opposition into governance there is going to require the
departure of Assad. The how, the when, the where, and so forth,
is something that Secretary Kerry is negotiating.
Senator Wicker. Yeah, I----
Secretary Carter. You know, the----
Senator Wicker.--I understand.
Secretary Carter.--civil war has gone on a long time, and
he's been a lightning rod in that civil war. If we want to get
it behind us and defeat ISIL and get peace in Syria, I think
that's going to be necessary, yeah.
Senator Wicker. Well--very good. I may try to follow up
with some questions on the record there.
Let me ask you about no-fly zones. I understand we've had
some testimony today about safe zones. I'll ask you first, Mr.
Secretary, and then if you want to ask the General to add his
thoughts, that would be good.
Safe zone--I mean, no-fly zones would allow Syrians to stay
in their own country instead of seeking to become refugees
anywhere. They would allow Syrian opposition leaders to
exercise sovereignty over Syrian territory. Do you and our
coalition partners have the pilots, personnel, and equipment
required to establish no-fly zones? In particular--I think
maybe earlier, while I was out of the room, there was an
attempt to get you to discuss the coalition partners that might
be able to enforce this. Do you believe President Putin would
challenge our air dominance there and the clearly defined no-
fly zones that we would be seeking to enforce?
First you, Secretary Carter.
Secretary Carter. Sure. On no-fly zones, that's something
that I've discussed for the committee before. That's not a step
we have recommended--again, because the benefits don't warrant
it, in light of the costs. I can explain more, but I'm going to
ask General Selva, who's done a lot of work on that kind of
thing, to comment further.
With respect to the Russians, also, he can comment on the
Memorandum of Understanding there, and it--and the working
relationship we have with the Russian military in the air in--
over Syria right now.
Senator Wicker. Fair enough.
General?
General Selva. Senator, we have the military capacity to
impose a no-fly zone. The question that we need to ask is, Do
we have the political and policy backdrop with which to do so?
I don't mean that in the case of our government, but in the
case of the governments who would challenge the no-fly zone.
So, if we're asking the question, Could we do it?--the answer
is yes. Are we willing to engage the potential of a conflict--a
direct conflict with the Syrian Integrated Air Defense System
or Syrian forces, or, by corollary, a miscalculation with the
Russians, should they choose to contest the no-fly zone? Those
are the questions that have been posed, asked, and answered.
So, military capacity, we have the capacity to do this. We
have not recommended it, because the political situation on the
ground, and the potential for miscalculation and loss of
American life in the air in an attempt to defend the no-fly
zone, don't warrant the no-fly zone, given the fact that, on
the ground, the forces would still contest the safe zone on the
ground.
Senator Wicker. Well, I'm way over my time, but let me just
say that the Secretary mentioned the cost and benefit. When I
think of the benefit that we could have had in the United
States not to be faced with this refugee crisis, the benefit to
Europe if we had given Syrians a place where they could live in
their own country safely, away from these barrel bombs and
the--and these attacks on civilians, it just seems to me that
the benefit of doing so, even now, but certainly having done so
over time, would have been so enormous that it would have
justified whatever cost we might have had to risk.
So, thank you very much for your answers.
I appreciate the Chair indulging me.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. General, I must say, it's one
of the more embarrassing statements I've ever heard from a
uniformed military officer, that we are worried about Syria and
Russia's reaction to saving the lives of thousands and
thousands of Syrians who are being barrel-bombed and massacred.
So far, 240,000 of them. Remarkable performance.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Selva, for being here.
Mr. Secretary, you noted in your testimony that Russia,
which has publicly committed to defeating ISIL, has instead
largely attacked opposition forces. You said, ``It's time for
Russia to focus on the right side of this fight.'' What's it
going to take to have Russia turn its attention to fighting
ISIL rather than propping up Assad?
Secretary Carter. Well, I can't speak for the Russians, but
I have spoken to the Russians, and I have explained to them why
their actions are wrongheaded and counterproductive even from
the point of view of their own security, because it fuels the
civil war in Syria, which we've discussed, which is the
underlying cause of the radicalization that gave rise to ISIL,
which is the very thing they fear. So, their actions are--as
I--the phrase I've used is ``pouring gasoline on the civil war
in Syria.''
Senator Hirono. So--I'm sorry, Mr. Secretary--so, is Russia
fully engaged in the discussions to end the--with us, with
Secretary Kerry and the--some of the other parties that are--
that need to be at the table, in ending the civil war in Syria?
Are they fully engaged in that?
Secretary Carter. I don't want to speak for Secretary Kerry
in that regard--fully engaged. They are certainly engaged. He's
talking to them along the lines that we discussed, along with a
range of other parties that will be necessary to a final
political transition, here.
Senator Hirono. I think there are a lot of people who agree
with the assessment that ending the civil war in Syria is one
of the keys in enabling the United States, as well as Russia
and our other partners, some 60-plus, to focus on defeating
ISIL. I think that that is generally acknowledged, and I
certainly agree with that.
One of the advantages that ISIL has its ability to recruit
young men and women and influence actors around the world
through its online media campaign. San Bernardino is just the
most recent example. In your opinion, how can we counter this
or overcome the effectiveness of ISIL's online presence? I
realize that this is an issue that should be addressed, not
just by--perhaps not even mainly by you, but FBI and the
Director of National Intelligence, Homeland Security, with whom
you met. So, what do we have to do to debase ISIL's ability and
its success in motivating lone wolves in our country and all
across the world in committing terrorist acts?
Secretary Carter. Well, you're right. Here at home, the FBI
and the Department of Homeland Security and Director of
National Intelligence are working along those lines at--to
identify those who are self-radicalizing or plotting using the
Internet. I wouldn't want to speak for them. They're--I can
only tell you that they're intent upon solving that problem.
There is a role, I would say, not in that fight, but it is
related to the fight we are waging, because it's why I think
it's important to strike at and eliminate the parent tumor in
Syria and Iraq, because that's part of the creation of the
narrative that fuels the Internet, which fuels even lone
wolves, and also, where we are able to, to eliminate people who
are trying to recruit our people.
I think the Chairman referred, earlier, to the elimination
of Junaid Hussain, which I reported to you when I was last up
here. He was somebody who was trying to recruit Americans to
attack Americans. No doubt about it.
So, there are some things even we can do--well, not only
``even we'' we can do as the Department of Defense to assist in
this. But, this--a big effort by Director Comey and Secretary
Johnson and the Director of National Intelligence, the Director
of Central Intelligence, on this effort. Now, it began well
before San Bernardino, but San Bernardino illustrates why this
is no-kidding important thing to do.
Senator Hirono. Would you say that debasing the ability of
ISIL to motivate lone wolves--what--people who don't even have
any direct contact with ISIL, but who have access to their
ideology and through the Internet--that this is more of a
whole-of-government approach that we need to take that includes
law enforcement and--local law enforcement as well as people in
the community?
Secretary Carter. Yes. This whole campaign really is a
whole-of-government campaign. Has to be. In today's world, all
these pieces need to be connected.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, my timing--the timer is not
working, so I have absolutely no idea how much time I have
left. Well, in that case, I will stop here.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain.--I'd say to the Senator.
Senator Hirono. I just have one last question, that--we
talk about defeating ISIL. Really, what does that look like? I
mean, what does defeating ISIL look like?
Secretary Carter. In----
Senator Hirono. Including the--preventing the ability of
them to encourage the lone-wolf actors all across the world.
Secretary Carter. In Iraq and Syria, which, as I said, is
necessary--not sufficient, but necessary--it means destroying
their organization, their leadership, their ability to control
territory, their ability to have a source of revenue, and their
ability to claim that they're anything but a bunch of
barbarians, their state. That's what eliminating them--and
that's the end state that we're seeking in Iraq and Syria. Of
course, to make that stick gets us back to what others have
been talking about, the political dimension of it. But, from
the military point of view, that's the objective.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. I'd like to return to this question of no-
fly zones. General Selva, your testimony is that United States
has the military capability to impose a no-fly zone over Syria.
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. A little over two weeks ago, Turkey shot
down a Russian aircraft for violating Turkish airspace. How
many Russian aircrafts have violated Turkish airspace since
that incident?
General Selva. None that I know of.
Senator Cotton. Do you think we can infer a lesson from
Vladimir Putin's conduct in the aftermath of that shootdown,
since he had repeatedly violated Turkish airspace beforehand?
General Selva. I think I'd be very careful in inferring his
decision process to that particular set of circumstances,
because what the Russians have done, as a consequence of that
shootdown, is to beef up their integrated air defense. They've
brought surface-to-air missiles into their base in Latakia,
they've installed surface-to-air missiles around Aleppo. They
have worked with Syrian partners, and the Syrian partners now
have their radars active, which they didn't have just a few
weeks ago.
So, I think it's--it is that set of consequences, when we
think about no-fly zones, that we have to factor into our
calculus. If a no-fly zone is to be defended, and it is to have
effect on the ground, the consequences of activity by surface-
to-air missile systems and air-defense aircraft have to be
factored into the equation. We have the capability to deal with
those. The consequence is a direct confrontation with Russia or
Syria.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Secretary Carter, I noticed that you were smirking at my
question. Could I get your take on that?
Secretary Carter. No, I was--I'm sorry, I was smiling at
the General's----
Senator Cotton. I think it might deserve a smirk. I'm not--
--
Secretary Carter.--directly, but it's hard to----
Senator Cotton.--rebuking you.
Secretary Carter. No, no, no. I was smiling about inferring
Vladimir Putin's intentions. I--and I--he rightly said, it's a
little hard to know. That's all. I was just----
Senator Cotton. Well, I would submit that he repeatedly
violated Turkish airspace until Turkey defended its airspace,
and he has not done that--done so since then, and that maybe we
can learn a lesson from that.
I also want to return to the point that Senator Ayotte was
discussing about the oil trucks that we struck shortly after
the Paris attacks. I believe it was a little over 100. Can you
explain why that didn't happen earlier? I mean, why that didn't
happen six months ago, a year ago?
General Selva. There are two principal reasons. First is
the development of the actual intelligence as to the
contribution of those particular routes to the finances of
ISIL. With respect to the Chairman, those are--that black-and-
gray economy in oil across the region----
Senator Cotton. I--so, I understand that, and I understand
that intelligence can often be hard to develop, especially when
you don't have a presence on the ground. But, I don't
understand what's hard to develop intelligence about tanker
trucks leaving refineries in ISIS-controlled space.
General Selva. The second point, Senator, is that, in an
effort to minimize the civilian casualties, the drivers of
those trucks are not necessarily adherents to ISIL's ideology,
but are Syrians trying to make----
Senator Cotton. I have no doubt about that.
General Selva. So----
Senator Cotton. They're probably Syrians who are driving
trucks, and Islamic State said, ``Drive this truck or we're
going to kill you and cut the heads off your kids.''
General Selva. So, I actually visited with the unit that
prosecuted the attacks on the bulk of those vehicles. They used
a set of tactics, techniques, and procedures [TTPs] that warned
the drivers in advance so they could flee their trucks, and
then destroyed the trucks in situ. We are looking for more
opportunities to do exactly the same thing so that we don't
alienate the civilian population, those that are not ISIL
adherents.
Senator Cotton. I----
General Selva. We'll continue to degrade the infrastructure
for production----
Senator Cotton. I strongly support that. I'm aware of the
TTPs you're discussing, but those are things that our Air Force
have done for a long time to minimize civilian casualties. We
didn't just develop these TTPs in the last month, did we? I
mean, we could leaflet civilians 6 months ago or 12 months ago,
right?
General Selva. They are not new TTPs, but the opportunities
and the places with which to use them are a product of the
intelligence that we developed from our understanding of the
oil infrastructure and distribution network that supports it.
Senator Cotton. I'd like to talk about, now, the rules-of-
engagement decision-making authority. One constant thing I've
heard from senior commanders down to low-level troops in my
travels in the region and here in the United States is that
decisions that were being made in the middle part of the last
decade by O-5s are now being made by three- and four-star
generals, or even civilians, in Washington, and that the rules
of engagement [ROE] have been incredibly restrictive--as the
example, this oil tanker truck example. Secretary Carter, do
you care to comment on what I've been hearing from troops
directly on my trips----
Secretary Carter. I'll start, and then I do want General
Selva to represent professional military judgment in this
matter, so I'd like him--to give him the opportunity to speak,
as well.
The commanders there, the air commanders, have told me--and
I'll let--and General Selva and General Dunford have reported
to me about limitations on the effectiveness of the air
campaign. I have asked about whether our rules of engagement
are a limiting factor that is stopping them from being more
effective. Just two things I'd say about that, and then I'll
let General Selva go into it ion more detail.
They have not changed over time. By the way, they are not--
these are not things that are approved in Washington or
anything, they're--these are things that are done by the air
operators in theater, which is appropriate. The--in--the things
that have really enabled our air--well, let me put--turn it
around and say, the things that have limited it from time to
time, our air campaign, have been, first of all, annoyingly,
weather. That was true a month and a half ago, for a couple of
weeks. But, then more--and that's important--more fundamentally
has been intelligence. We've gotten a lot better intelligence
picture now, and therefore are able to conduct more effective
strikes, which is one reason why we're able to be--to conduct
more strikes, absorb more air capability, because we can get
into Incirlik, from which the sorties were shorter, absorb more
capability from the French and others, and put it to good use,
because we could develop the targets. I always say it's better
to have more airplanes than targets, than targets than
airplanes. So, on some days, a sortie goes out for dynamic
targeting, as opposed to deliberate targeting. Deliberate
targeting, the bombs are almost always dropped. More than 90
percent. Dynamic targeting is where you go out there and hope
that a target that you're thinking might develop actually does
develop. That's an important thing to do, because it's what
stops ISIL from being able to use the roads safely, having to
drive at night with their lights off, all that kind of stuff.
You don't always find those targets. So, sometimes the
airplanes come back with their bombs on them. It's intelligence
that makes all the difference.
General, please.
General Selva. Senator, I haven't met a soldier, sailor,
airman, or marine who wouldn't ask for looser ROE in any active
fight. But, having consulted with the commanders, from the JTF
[Joint Task Force] all the way up to Central Command, I know of
no rules-of-engagement restrictions that have prevented us from
striking targets and that prevented our forces from being as
effective as they can be on the ground. I've consulted with all
of them.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I'm over time. But, Senator Reed, if I can have one moment
to ask a more lighthearted question of General Selva.
For 60 years, NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense
Command] and the Air Force has been tracking Santa over the
skies of North America. Can you assure the boys and girls of
this country that NORAD and the Air Force are fully prepared to
track Santa once again?
General Selva. I don't have a complete intelligence report,
Senator, but I understand that the reindeer have been, in fact,
fed their quantity of oats and are prepared for the delivery of
all of those gifts to those who have been nice and not naughty.
Senator Cotton. Well, I think it's a welcome reminder that,
while most Americans are at home enjoying Christmas with their
families, that our airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines,
whether they're in NORAD or around the world, are out there
keeping us safe and defending our values and what makes this
country great.
General Selva. Sir, not to extend the questioning and the
answering, but I did spend my Thanksgiving with our troops in
Iraq, in Baghdad, Taji, and Arrow, and I can report to you that
their moral is high, and they did phone home and talk to the
people who love them.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much for reminding
us of the service and sacrifice of so many, Senator.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Nelson, please.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carter, I gave a speech recently and showed the
map of Syria and Iraq and the area that ISIS used to occupy
that it no longer occupies and the area that it occupies now
that it did not occupy. The difference is dramatic, that you
all have shrunk the territorial occupation of ISIS. You are to
be congratulated on that.
But, at the end of the day, as you all have already
testified, Syria is not going to be able to contain ISIS until
at least there is a plan for the exit of President Assad. Now,
when that occurs, what is the Arab force that is going to be on
the ground, with the guidance of our Special Operations
Forces--what is--give me a concept of what that makeup is of
that Arab force.
Secretary Carter. Well, it's a very good question, and it
gets to the issue of the end state of the campaign, here, and
the critical political ingredient, because a political
transition in Syria is essential to a durable end state to
this. Because it's the civil war in Syria that started this
whole business in Syria. That would mean--and, at that time,
the force that is now not available because they're fighting
each other, but that could fight ISIL, is the combination of
Syrian forces and the moderate opposition that is now fighting
in Syria. If there's a political settlement, that--in the
meantime, we're using forces--some Kurds up north, the YPG, and
we're trying to accumulate additional Syrian Arabs who want to
take their homes back from ISIL. But, the civil war is,
meanwhile, using up a lot of combat power that could
potentially be used against ISIL.
Senator Nelson. So, you really believe that, once there's a
path for Assad to leave, that Syrian Government forces, which
include Alawites, which are Shiites, are going to join up with
the opposition Sunni forces to go after ISIL.
Secretary Carter. The political transition is exactly to
have a Syria that is once again whole, multisectarian for sure,
like all those states over there, with all the complications
that go with that, and that we see in Iraq. But, that, as an
alternative to sectarianism and the continuation of sectarian
civil----
Senator Nelson. Right.
Secretary Carter.--war, yes.
Senator Nelson. So, go over to Iraq. Is that anti-
sectarian? Is it working, with the forces on the ground that
we're supporting from the air?
Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, Prime Minister
Abadi--I've spoken to him frequently; I'll have an opportunity
to speak to him in coming days when I, too, will be visiting
our troops in theater--is committed precisely to that kind of
vision for Iraq. I believe him. I've talked to him----
Senator Nelson. Do you think he----
Secretary Carter. Well, that's the--whether he can pull it
off in Baghdad is obviously a difficult matter for him. We are
supporting him in that regard, because we believe that the
alternative, which is further sectarian division, civil war,
cleansing, and so forth--we've seen that before. If he can keep
his vision of an Iraq, which, as he called it, is
decentralized, so it's not everybody under the thumb of
Baghdad, because he knows the Kurds and the Sunnis won't go for
that--but, still, the ability to retain an integral state that
keeps peace within its borders--that's what he's----
Senator Nelson. Right.
Secretary Carter.--committed to. That's the end state we
also want in Iraq.
Senator Nelson. Right. So, it's possible that, with Assad
leaving Syria, you could get Syria under control, but
everything could go haywire in Iraq.
Secretary Carter. They are two separate dynamics. There's
one thing I'll mention that I mentioned when I was with you six
weeks ago, and we have--and has subsequently come to pass. I
was talking about the importance of getting the town of
Sinjar--you're talking about territory, but the--but, you know,
a lot of that territory is empty, and it's the towns that
matter. The critical crossing of Sinjar--now, what is Sinjar?
Sinjar is a place in between Mosul and Raqqa. The--to cut ISIL
into its Syrian branch and stop them from cross-feeding is a--
the objective of taking Sinjar. So, in the end, the political
end states are different for Syria and Iraq, absolutely.
Senator Nelson. Understand.
Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one quick question, because
the Department of Defense has asked for $116 million
reprogramming to keep the effort of General Mike Nagata's
training program. Do you support the restarting of that
program?
Secretary Carter. I urgently support that funding. I--but,
I don't describe it, and the documents we sent you don't
describe it, as a restarting of the old program. As I described
earlier, we learned from the old program. It had some success,
but not nearly what we had hoped for. I've told you that that--
for me, that was a disappointment. So, I'm very up front about
that. But, what we're asking for is that--is funds that were
previously earmarked for that to an approach that we think is
more effective, which is precisely one of the ones I've been
describing today. That's why we would urgently like that fund.
I just--you know, I mean, people decry micromanagement, but
micromanagement also comes from--can come from many sources. I
would urge you, please, to avoid that, give us that funding
that we've requested. We submitted the paperwork--I know the
Chairman said, a week ago, and I--I apologize if it was that
recently. My understanding was, it was more than that. But,
this is a war, and I'd simply urge you--I know you're very busy
people who have lots of things to do, but if you can please
give that your earliest attention.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. We will, Mr. Secretary. We
also, obviously, as I mentioned before, would like to know the
details of how it's used. I think that's appropriate. I thank
you.
Secretary Carter. Fair enough.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you both for being here today.
On November the 12th, the President answered the question,
``Is ISIS gaining strength?'' by saying, ``I don't think
they're gaining strength, and I believe we've contained them.''
Now, two weeks before that interview, in Ankara we saw two
bombs kill 102 people, in the Sinai we saw 224 people lose
their lives when the Russian jetliner was downed. On the day of
his interview, in Beirut, two suicide bombers killed 43. Then
the day after his interview, a wave of six terrorist attacks
killed 130 in Paris. Then on December 2, 14 Americans were
killed.
Right now, in another committee hearing down at Judiciary
Committee--I stepped in for a minute before I came back here--
Director Comey said that America is at its highest threat level
since 9/11.
So, I'm trying to square the statement made by our
President on November 12th, that they're not gaining strength
and that we have contained them, with a comment that you made
in the opening, I think, in response to Chairman--the
Chairman's question about how we contain them. What am I
missing, in terms of you saying that we haven't contained them,
the President says that we have and that they're not gaining
strength, with the events that we've--I've just summarized
there? Secretary Carter, I'll start with you, and then General
Selva.
Secretary Carter. Well, we have to defeat ISIL. And----
Senator Tillis. I agree with that, but----
Secretary Carter.--and that----
Senator Tillis.--a part of it is--excuse me, because I want
to try to stick to the time--a part of it has to do with the
President acknowledging the current situation. Do you agree
with his characterization that they're not gaining strengthen--
--
Secretary Carter. The----
Senator Tillis.--and we've contained them?
Secretary Carter. The President has asked me, and asked our
military leaders, to give him recommendations, and to keep
giving him recommendations, to defeat ISIL. That--and he has
approved all the ones that we've taken to him. We expect to
take more. And I think that's----
Senator Tillis. Secretary Carter----
Secretary Carter.--that's the----
Senator Tillis.--have you told the President that they're
not gaining strength and that we've contained them?
Secretary Carter. I have not used--General Dunford said,
last--talked about tactical containment versus strategic
containment, if we're going to use that word. I kind of like
the word ``defeat,'' myself, Senator.
Senator Tillis. General Selva, I want to ask you a question
about some of the airstrikes. I know that you were talking
about the rules of engagement. And it seems to make sense to
try and protect the civilian drivers in the tankers, et cetera.
Back in June, the military officials acknowledged that 75
percent of the planes flying combat missions returned without
dropping their weapons. You, in response to Senator Ayotte's
questions, said that that's now about 40 percent. What's
changed?
General Selva. Senator, we've increased the number of
deliberate strikes, preplanned designated targets, as opposed
to having airplanes looking for dynamic targets in the
environment. We have sufficient airpower in the region to
accomplish both. But, in any case of dynamic targeting, some of
those airplanes are always going to come back with their
ordnance because targets don't present themselves.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Former Deputy Director Mike Morell, of the CIA, made, in a
comment on November the 25th, that we didn't go after oil
wells, actually hitting oil wells that ISIS controls, because
we didn't want to do environmental damage and we didn't want to
destroy infrastructure. Are those still key factors in whether
or not you go after ISIS targets?
General Selva. I don't know of the rules of engagement that
he's talking about, but, as we develop deliberate targets, we
do bring environmental considerations into the factors that we
consider, but they do not limit us from striking the
infrastructure. They just change the way we strike it. So, we
try to do as little environmental damage as possible, but still
limit the capacity of the well to produce.
Senator Tillis. Secretary Carter, maybe just to close out
with this, just to go back to defining the problem. If we
shift--and you made the distinction between tactical and
strategic containment--but, if we shift to a global
perspective, away from the narrow focus of, maybe, tactically,
what we're doing in Iraq and Syria, is there any grounds for
describing ISIS as ``contained''?
Secretary Carter. I'll let General Dunford, who's not here,
speak for himself. I described, and I think we need to be
concerned about--we've talked about metastasis to the homeland,
and we've talked about the necessity of getting the parent
tumor. We have not discussed as much the necessity of going
after ISIL elsewhere. I mentioned Libya. We took out its leader
in Libya. We're going to have to do more in Libya. ISIL is
becoming a magnet for groups that previously existed, in some
cases, that are now rebranding themselves as ISIL. But, it's
worse than that, because in--they're also gaining energy from
the movement in Iraq and Syria, which is why we need to destroy
it in Iraq and Syria. But, this is a worldwide phenomenon. And
I've talked to leaders--I was recently talking to some leaders
in southeast Asia, actually, about many things, but one of the
things they raised is concern about little patches of ISIL and
self-radicalization of the kind that we find.
So, in the Internet Age and the Social Media Age, terrorism
doesn't have any geographic bounds. So, I think we have to
recognize it while we need to attack it geographically on the
ground in Syria and Iraq. That is necessary, it's not
sufficient.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to your--to our witnesses, for your service and
your testimony.
Secretary Carter, do you agree with a recent study done by
the RAND Corporation suggesting that it would be wise for
Congress to pass a new Authorization for Use of Military Force
against ISIL?
Secretary Carter. I haven't seen that study, Senator. I
have testified in favor of the AUMF that the President
submitted, and I welcome that. It's not necessary, literally,
in the sense that we're able to conduct our campaign.
Senator Kaine. The RAND--the study--I would just encourage
you to take a look, because I think it backs up----
Secretary Carter. Will do.
Senator Kaine.--backs up your position; it was reported two
days ago--says that an authorization by Congress would send a
message of resolve to our allies----
Secretary Carter. Would do.
Senator Kaine.--send a message of resolve to ISIL, it would
send a message of resolve to the troops.
Secretary Carter. Troops.
Senator Kaine. RAND, which is, you know, not biased on the
legal analysis, said that, at a minimum, the connection of the
battle against ISIL to the 2001 and 2002 authorizations
requires, quote, ``legal gymnastics'' that it would be wise to
clear up.
Secretary Carter, what message does it send to the 3600
troops that are deployed overseas in this fight at the
holidays, and to the families of the 11 servicemembers who have
lost their lives in Operation Inherent Resolve, and five others
who have been wounded, that Congress has been unwilling to
debate and vote upon this war in the 16 months since it
started?
Secretary Carter. I think that the passage of an AUMF, as
you indicate--and this is one of the reasons why I testified in
favor of it, would be a signal of resolve and support to our
troops. Therefore, I think it's--it is desirable. By the way, a
signal of resolve to our enemies.
I should say, that's not the only thing. I think when you
visit them, as some of you have done in the last week, when you
hold a hearing like this and show that you care what they're
doing, when you go back to your bases and--at home and tell
them how proud you are of them, the family members that are
back here--all that stuff's incredibly important. They need to
know we're behind them. And, you know, I always tell our
people, ``I'm 1,000 percent behind you.'' And----
Senator Kaine. Let me----
Secretary Carter.--if this would add to it----
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you this.
Secretary Carter.--that's good.
Senator Kaine. It--our Chairman, Senator McCain, was quoted
last week--now, this was not an approving quote, this was a
critical quote, in the same way that I am critical of the
current status of affairs where Congress has been silent for 16
months--the quote was that a congressional vote to authorize
war against ISIL doesn't seem forthcoming now, because of
politics here, and that it, quote, ``may require an attack on
the United States of America to force such a vote.'' Would it
wise for Congress to wait that long?
Secretary Carter. Again, I--I'm--I am in favor of the one
that the President submitted. I think, on balance, it would be
a positive thing and a sign that the country's behind the
troops. And, provided it allowed me and General Selva and our
military leaders to do what we think is needed to defeat ISIL--
provided it does that, it--I think the signal it sends of
resolve by this country is a good thing.
Senator Kaine. At least three nations on the U.N. Security
Council--England, France, and, I'm very sorry to say, Russia--
have submitted to their legislative bodies the--a--for a debate
and vote, their engagement in military action in Syria and
Iraq. And other nations, such as Germany, have done the same.
The President started the war against ISIL 16 months ago
yesterday. There's only been one vote in the Senate--it was a
Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote, a year ago Friday.
There hasn't really been action in the House.
I just hope that we would follow--I hate to say this--I
hope we would follow the lead of other nations whose
legislative bodies have decided it was important enough to have
a debate and vote on this before the public.
Second issue I want to just bring up. And this is more just
kind of an observation for you. Senator McCain was the first to
call for the no-fly zones. At the time that he started that, I
didn't agree with him. The reason I didn't is that there were
testimony from General Martin Dempsey and others here that to
do a no-fly zone would run the risk of running across the
Syrian air defenses. To many of us on the committee, that
argument fell away when the administration came and proposed an
aerial attack on Syria after the use of chemical weapons
against Bashar al-Assad. When we reminded them, ``Hey, wait a
minute. You said Syria has really tough air defenses,'' the
administration testimony at that point was, ``Yeah, well, we're
not that worried about them.''
Let me tell you why I think the absence of the humanitarian
zone is going to go down as one of the big mistakes that we've
made, equivalent to the decision not to engage in humanitarian
activity in Rwanda in the 1990s. With respect to Syria, there's
been testimony from the military to us that the Syrian Air
Defense System is really not all that great, and that we could
take care of it. And with respect to Russia, Russia voted for
Security Council Resolution 2139 in February of 2014 calling
for cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid into Syria
without the permission of Bashar al-Assad.
There are few guarantees in life, but I can pretty much
give you this one. Russia would not intervene and try to mess
around with us if we were engaged in a humanitarian effort that
was premised upon a U.N. Security Council Resolution that they
actually voted for. And since February of 2014, we've had the
ability and the legal rationale to enforce that resolution. And
we haven't. And millions of refugees have left the country. If
we had done that then, I think we'd be in much better place
now. And I think we can still do it, and we'd be in much better
place.
So, just in terms of the argument about, ``Here's why we
don't think it's a good idea,'' previous testimony to the
committee by folks from the Pentagon have undercut your
argument with respect to Syria and Russia.
Mr. Chair, I don't have any other questions.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for your service.
The President addressed the Nation Sunday night. Did you
hear his address, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Carter. I did not. I read it.
Senator Graham. Okay. Do you believe that we're at war with
ISIL?
Secretary Carter. I do.
Senator Graham. Do you believe they're at war with us? The
answer is----
Secretary Carter. Yeah.
Senator Graham.--yes, yeah. They would hit our homeland if
they could.
Secretary Carter. For sure. They say that----
Senator Graham. Okay.
Secretary Carter. They say that they--and they indicate
that----
Senator Graham. Is there any place on the planet that you
would take off limits when it comes to fighting ISIL?
Secretary Carter. No, I don't think we can do that, for the
reasons I just--I said earlier. They are metastasizing
everywhere, and everywhere there is--there are information
media, there are going to be people who go online who, maybe,
have never been to Syria or Iraq, or even know where they are--
--
Senator Graham. The answer is----
Secretary Carter.--they only know----
Senator Graham.--no.
Secretary Carter.--where their screen is.
Senator Graham. Right, I agree with you. I think that's a
very good answer. There is noplace on the planet we should give
them safe haven.
Number two, when it comes to time, in terms of this war,
when will it end?
Secretary Carter. As soon as we can possibly bring it to--
--
Senator Graham. Five years? Ten years? Does anybody know?
Secretary Carter. Well, I think that----
Senator Graham. Do you want to put a time limit on how long
we should fight it?
Secretary Carter. I think, in war, it's good to have plans.
I think it was Eisenhower, who----
Senator Graham. Here's my question. Are you willing to put
a time limit on how long we can fight ISIL?
Secretary Carter. I think we have to fight ISIL until ISIL
is defeated everywhere.
Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more.
When it comes to means, do you believe this country should
use all lawful means when it comes to fighting ISIL, depending
on what the circumstances dictate?
Secretary Carter. Sure.
Senator Graham. Do you think Raqqa, Syria, will be--still
will be in the hands of ISIL by January 2017, more or less
likely?
Secretary Carter. I'm sorry, you said--which ones?
Senator Graham. Do you think Raqqa, Syria, will be in the
hands of ISIL----
Secretary Carter. Oh, I very much hope that it won't--that
it would be--that----
Senator Graham. Do you think it's more likely----
Secretary Carter.--it will either be--it not be in the
hands of ISIL or that there--control will be substantially
eroded----
Senator Graham. Okay. So----
Secretary Carter. I hope that. I can't guarantee----
Senator Graham. Right.
Secretary Carter.--that. You can't guarantee anything----
Senator Graham. Right. But----
Secretary Carter.--in war, but it's----
Senator Graham.--we hope----
Secretary Carter.--certainly an objective.
Senator Graham. We all----
Secretary Carter. As soon as possible.
Senator Graham. We all hope, but we're not going to get
there on hope. So, you're a good man. I'm not trying to fight
you, here.
Here's what I've done. I'm making an offer to our President
that I believe this war is going to go on for a long time,
after his presidency. I believe that they're going to go
wherever they can on the planet, and that we should stop them
wherever necessary. And when it comes to means, we should not
limit this Commander in Chief or any other Commander in Chief
when it comes to means. Do you agree with that?
Secretary Carter. Yeah, I do.
Senator Graham. So, I have an Authorization to Use Military
Force, Senator Kaine. It's not limited by geography. It's not--
could you put it up, please--it's not limited by geography,
time, or location. It represents a theory that this President
and future Presidents need to have the same capabilities
against ISIL as we gave--that existed after 9/11 regarding al-
Qaeda.
So, I agree with Senator Kaine that the Congress should be
involved. I am answering the request of the President to get
involved. And here is the question. As Secretary of Defense,
could you support an authorization using military force that
has no limit on geography, time, or lawful means when it comes
to destroying ISIL?
Secretary Carter. Well, I'm not going to invent a new AUMF
here. This is the first time I've studied yours. I'm sorry to--
--
Senator Graham. Okay.
Secretary Carter.--to say. I did support the President's
AUMF, for two principal reasons. The first----
Senator Graham. Do you----
Secretary Carter.--first----
Senator Graham. Do you----
Secretary Carter.--the first was because I thought it
could, exactly as you say, permit us to conduct the campaign
that we need to do to defeat ISIL. That's critical. It did have
a time dimension in it, which I----
Senator Graham. From a military point of view, General, do
you think saying you're going to have a time dimension is
probably a wrong signal to send to the enemy?
General Selva. The context of the time signal makes a
difference. I would prefer not to have one.
Senator Graham. Okay.
General Selva. So I could say to them, ``I'm going to
prosecute you anywhere I find you.''
Senator Graham. That's what I want to say.
General Selva. As long as I----
Senator Graham. I want to say to this President that, ``I
want to give you the tools, that time is no factor when it
comes to destroying ISIL, and location doesn't mean a damn
thing, where, after you--wherever you go, as long as it takes,
whatever is required to defeat you.'' That's the statement I
think America needs to make. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Secretary? ``Whatever it takes, as long as it takes,
wherever we need to go to destroy you,'' when it comes to ISIL.
Secretary Carter. Well, I mean, that's okay, from the point
of view of conducting the military campaign, but you have to--
--
Senator Graham. That's----
Secretary Carter.--but you have to get the votes.
Senator Graham. That's--no, I know.
Secretary Carter. And I--that, I can't----
Senator Graham. Yeah, but, you know----
Secretary Carter.--predict. So----
Senator Graham.--I'm not asking you to vote.
Secretary Carter.--I'm not going to try to craft what it--
what can be passed here, Senator. I've testified in favor of
the AUMF the President----
Senator Graham. Would you vote for this?
Secretary Carter.--submitted.
Senator Graham. Would you vote for this?
Secretary Carter. I don't know. I'm seeing it for the first
time. I'm----
Senator Graham. Well, as Secretary----
Secretary Carter.--not a----
Senator Graham.--Secretary of Defense, do you support the
concept that the President----
Secretary Carter. I support an AUMF that the President
submitted----
Senator Graham. Do you support----
Secretary Carter.--that gives us the authority----
Senator Graham. With----
Secretary Carter.--to wage the war that----
Senator Graham. Just----
Secretary Carter.--we need to wage. That's----
Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Carter.--the important thing.
Senator Graham.--do you support the concept, the authority
that this President should have no time limits placed on his
ability to fight the war? Do you support that concept?
Secretary Carter. I think the AUMF, as submitted, only
recognizes that his term of office----
Senator Graham. I'm not asking you----
Secretary Carter.--comes to an end----
Senator Graham.--about his AUMF.
Secretary Carter.--in a year.
Senator Graham. Right. I agree with that. Do you agree the
next President, whoever he or she may be, should have a AUMF
not limited by time? That's just a smart decision, from the
military point of view. Do you agree with that?
Secretary Carter. Well, it's not----
Senator Graham. When you--are you going to--are you, as
Secretary of Defense, telling me that you want to put limits,
in terms of time, regarding----
Secretary Carter. No, I'm trying to explain to you why--as
I explained to this committee before, why I understood that
there was the three-year time thing----
Senator Graham. I'm not asking you about----
Secretary Carter.--provision. And it was not----
Senator Graham. Listen.
Secretary Carter.--for a military reason.
Senator Graham. Okay, right. But----
Secretary Carter. It was in deference to a future
President.
Senator Graham. Yeah. Okay.
Secretary Carter. And you can agree or disagree----
Senator Graham. Right.
Secretary Carter.--with that, but that was the reason why
it was included----
Senator Graham. Okay.
Secretary Carter.--in there. And I--that was a political
reason----
Senator Graham. Right.
Secretary Carter.--having to do with----
Senator Graham. From a military point of view----
Secretary Carter.--the constitutional system, not a
military----
Senator Graham. From a military--listen to me, please. From
a military point of view, you don't want time limits.
Secretary Carter. I don't think we can--I don't think----
Senator Graham. From a military point of view, you don't
want geographical limits.
Secretary Carter. Yeah, I don't--we don't--we can't have
geographic----
Senator Graham. From a military point of view, you don't
want to take means off the table that are lawful, when it comes
to----
Secretary Carter. And that we----
Senator Graham.--destroying ISIL.
Secretary Carter.--that are useful to this----
Senator Graham. Yeah.
Secretary Carter.--campaign.
Senator Graham. So, to the Congress, if you don't like what
this President or future president does, in terms of fighting
ISIL, defund it. That's your job. I am making a simple
proposition to this President that, ``I will give you whatever
you need, in terms of my authorization to go wherever you need
to go, as long as it takes, to use whatever available tools you
have, within legal limits, to destroy this threat. Mr.
President, are you all in, or not?'' The Secretary of Defense
seems to be indicating this is good military policy.
To my colleagues on the other side, if we produce an
Authorization to Use Military Force restricted by time, means,
or geography, you're sending a message to the enemy I will not
send, you're restricting our ability to defend this homeland,
which is a--an imminent attack is coming. So, I want to have
this debate, like Senator Kaine has suggested. And it is
imperative that the Congress get off the sidelines.
Tim Kaine and I may have a different outcome, but you're
absolutely right, let's have a discussion, let the enemy know,
without hesitation, there is no limitations on time, means, or
location when it comes to destroying ISIL.
``Mr. President, embrace this authorization for you and
future presidents, because the country needs it.''
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and General, for your
fine service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service, Mr. Secretary, General. And
thank you for being here.
I've just come from a vote on the floor, but, before that,
a hearing of the Judiciary Committee, where FBI Director Comey
was testifying about many subjects related closely to the
subject matter of your testimony. Even though the geography may
be different, the threat is the same. And clearly, the strategy
for confronting that threat of terror has to be coordinated and
targeted to what poses the danger to our Nation. And my feeling
is--I agree with you--the reality is, we are at war. That's the
stark, irrefutable reality. And more needs to be done, more
aggressively, more intensely, and more effectively, in using
our Special Operators, advising local forces, supplying and
equipping them, providing them with intelligence, intercepting
communications of our adversaries, and cutting off the flow of
money, which is their lifeblood. And the pace of our present
activities seems inadequate.
Now, we may differ on that point. And you have more on-the-
ground knowledge than I do. But, the American people are
growing impatient and apprehensive. I think that statement, in
fact, is an understatement.
So, I would like to see our strategy become more aggressive
and intensified in combating this threat abroad, in the
theater, where we confront ISIL, and at home, where we confront
terror in our neighborhoods and streets, and where the
adversary is just as real and potentially growing just as
alarmingly.
Are you satisfied that the intersection and coordination
between those two efforts, in the Middle East and elsewhere in
the world and internally at home, is sufficiently aligned and
coordinated that we have the most effective strategic approach?
Secretary Carter. I met, just yesterday, with Director
Comey, also along with the Director of Homeland Security, Jay
Johnson, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper--
John Brennan's out of the country, but his--somebody from CIA
[the Central Intelligence Agency] was there, and other
agencies, working to do exactly what you rightly know is
necessary--say is necessary, namely to align our efforts
overseas, which involve exactly the ingredients that you name,
and you're right, we are looking for opportunities to do more
by using precisely the tools you describe. We're finding them,
and we're strengthening and gaining momentum in the military,
which we need to do, because we need to defeat ISIL over there
as soon as possible. Back here, we haven't--it's a different
kind of challenge, but it's related. Director Comey's working
extremely hard and skillfully on that. And the purpose of my
calling this meeting yesterday was precisely to make sure that
we're all aligned. And we'll continue to do that periodically.
And there are things, by the way, that we can do, as DOD, even
though we obviously don't operate here in the United States the
way the FBI does, in terms of striking their information
infrastructure the same way we strike their energy
infrastructure, their command and control, and so forth, in
Iraq and Syria.
Senator Blumenthal. I thank you for that answer. I agree
totally that the efforts need to be aligned. And, in fact,
better aligned, more seamless than they are now, in terms of
intelligence-sharing and intelligence-gathering, but also
working with our partners in the region, because the troops on
the ground need to be local. We cannot send American troops
back to that part of the world in massive numbers with a combat
mission. There's always the danger of mission creep, even in a
small number. But, I remain dissatisfied that the number of
Special Operators on the ground may be insufficient, and the
pace of sending them there may be too lengthy, and that local
forces, like the Peshmerga, have shown that a robust effort
involving all of those ingredients that are planned to be sent
can make a difference if they're timely and sufficient.
I agree, finally, that an Authorization for the Use of
Military Force is absolutely essential. The reality is, we are
at war. The President deserves a declaration of war. That
declaration may define the kind of conflict that we see, and
provide a forum for debate about the limits we may want to put
on them. But, at least it will provide a framework for public
support that the President needs for this continuing war.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to both of you, for all you do for us to keep us
safe.
I want to start by echoing some of the concerns that have
been stated by my colleagues, Senator Kaine and Senator
Blumenthal. Like them, I feel like, for constitutional reasons,
we ought to be following the process in the Constitution. For
some of the reasons mentioned by Senator Graham, I think it's
important to have the debate and the discussion about the
extent of our involvement there. And that's another nice
process associated with following the constitutional structure.
After the failure of the initial train-and-equip program in
Syria, the Department of Defense seems to have shifted its
focus to equipping forces that are already on the ground in
Syria, such as the Syrian Kurds and Arab groups that we have
somehow, in one way or another, using methods that I'm not
familiar with, deemed to be moderate, or deemed to somehow have
interests that overlap with ours.
Mr. Secretary, can you explain to us how, specifically,
we're vetting this--these groups, how we decide who ought to be
the beneficiary of this program?
Secretary Carter. Well, you're basically right. We--that is
the shift we made, although, you know, we're still willing to
do--we're open to lots of different possibilities with our
train-and-equip program, but the--it is essentially----
Senator Lee. It's not, basically, an equip program rather
than a train-and-equip program, right?
Secretary Carter. No. We take some of the people out for
training. We're willing to do that. And we have those training
sites, so we'll take selected individuals--not the whole unit--
out and give them specialized training in how to connect with
us and how to connect with our enablers. So, there is a
training aspect to it. But, you're right, fundamentally, it's
enabling groups that exist rather than trying to create brand-
new groups. That's the essential correction, I'd say--course
correction that we made.
You asked how they're vetted. They are--they're--it is
their leaders that are vetted, rather than down to the
individual level. And I can get you a description of that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) groups become eligible to receive
United States assistance under the Syria Train and Equip program if the
leaders of the recipient groups have been appropriately vetted. In
other words, at a minimum, they are assessed for associations with
terrorist groups or with Syrian or Iranian Government-aligned militias,
in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) procedures, and provide
a credible commitment to promote respect for human rights and the rule
of law. DOD vets these VSO unit leaders using procedures that include
biographic records review, biometrics, and an interview.
Secretary Carter. And, General Selva, maybe you'd like to
say something about the vetting process in general.
General Selva. We have, in the case of the Syrian Arab
coalition, convinced leaders to come to the Iraqi side of the
border. We have vetted them through public and classified
databases for their relationships and prior conduct, and we
have spent time with them on the items that the Secretary
talked about, how they link to our forces, how they communicate
back their progress. And our relationship with them is
relatively transactional, where we supply them with ammunition
and the advice required to hit strike-specific targets, and
then we watch that progress.
Senator Lee. Once we decide to equip a particular group--I
mean, it sounds like it is--it's made on a group basis, based,
in part, on our assessment of their leaders--what degree of
command and control do we retain over the group in question,
over its leaders, and specifically, perhaps most importantly,
over the supplies that we give them?
General Selva. I could go into much more detail in a
classified environment, but, at the surface level, we don't
exercise command and control. We exercise influence. And the
influence we have is their connection to the enablers, that we
provide fire support through airpower, advice, and training.
Senator Lee. Do the groups that we're supporting in this
capacity, specifically the Syrian Kurds and the Syrian Arabs--
do they--or to what extent do they share the same political
goals and the same vision for Syria in the future?
General Selva. Today, they share the goal of wanting to
take their homes back and defeat ISIL in doing so. And that is
necessary and sufficient to get at the fight in eastern Syria
and working our way back towards Raqqa.
Senator Lee. Are you concerned about the possibility of
their goals shifting? I mean, is it common in the region for
some groups to have one focus one day and then have a priority
shift, perhaps one day having interests that align roughly with
our own goals and with preserving interests that are important
to American national security that might change later?
General Selva. If you'd allow me to discuss that one in a
classified setting on the how we measure and manage that
relationship, it will be much more useful than doing it in open
session.
Senator Lee. Okay.
Can you tell me roughly how many people are involved in
this right now, how many units or how many members they have?
Is that something we can discuss in a nonclassified
environment?
General Selva. Yes, sir. The Syrian Arab coalition, we
brought out roughly 40 of their leaders--I'm sorry--20 of their
leaders, did a full vetting of their allegiances and their
prior conduct. They brought to the battlefield roughly 1600.
The number varies up and down slightly from that number, based
on who's engaged in the fight. But, roughly 1600 fighters that
have worked their way through roughly three villages or three
towns right now in eastern Syria. They started in a place
called al-Hasakah. They have taken al-Hawl, and they are
beginning the preparatory actions to prosecute a third target
that I'd like to keep private at this point.
Senator Lee. Okay.
I see my time is expired. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much for your testimony today. This has been
extremely helpful to our committee. And thank you, obviously,
for your extraordinary service.
In yesterday's hearing, Commander Jeffrey Eggers said that,
while our military victories against ISIL will affect their
ability to recruit new fighters, how we conduct the war will
also affect that ability. Specifically, he said that having
ground troops go into Syria is what ISIL wants.
On Monday, a New York Times article pointed out that in
2003, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had called the Iraq war, quote,
``the blessed invasion,'' because his and ISIL's apocalyptic
vision is that non-Muslims will come to Syria to fight Muslims
and bring about the end of the world.
So, do you believe that a ground war with Western troops
would help or hurt ISIL's recruiting? And which countries are
best positioned to fight ISIL on the ground, in your opinion?
Secretary Carter. The forces that are best positioned to
fight ISIL on the ground in both Iraq and Syria would be local
indigenous forces, particularly Sunni forces, because the ISIL
representation and the territory they occupy is mostly Sunni
territory. Therefore, outside of--well, so in both Iraq and
Syria, Iraqis and Syrian local forces--that's why we're trying
to work with them, that's why we're trying to put a political
end to the civil war in Syria, so that the Syrians stop--
Syrians who are not ISIL--are not ISIL sympathizers, not under
the thumb of ISIL right now, can unite to defeat ISIL.
Next in line--and this is something that I have urged, and
the U.S. has urged now for some months, would be for more of
Sunni Arabs from the Gulf states to become involved, not
necessarily occupying territory, but participating in enabling
local forces there and----
Senator Gillibrand. Have you had any luck there? I mean,
any?
Secretary Carter. Well, they have participated, in the
early days, in the air war. Now, I'm generalizing a little
bit----
Senator Gillibrand. Yeah.
Secretary Carter.--here--and not--generally disinclined to
participate on the ground and, of course, now with the Yemen
conflict, got preoccupied with that. But----
Senator Gillibrand. General?
General Selva. Ma'am, I think your quote of Mr. Zawahiri--
or Zarqawi, I'm sorry--that said, ``Bringing Americans to this
fight is a blessing to the radical Islamic view that ISIL
portrays'' is exactly right. What we don't do enough of is
talking about who ISIL is and what they do. They're barbaric,
they are--they subjugate women, they subjugate children, they
engage in extortion. They are not creating a caliphate that's
consistent with Islamic teaching; they're creating caliphate
that's consistent with their narrative of Western subjugation
and extremist Islam. And it's about their power and enriching
themselves. And so, we need to tell that truth. If we fall into
the trap of radical Islamic violent extremists baiting us into
a ground fight, we're actually doing exactly what they want us
to do.
Senator Gillibrand. Yeah.
General Selva. So, as we work through and with partners
that we can find that are willing to fight, they'll have the
effect we need them to have.
Senator Gillibrand. And can't we be more aggressive with
our allies in the region, particularly Sunni Arab allies, to do
more? I mean, I don't--I haven't seen our success there yet.
So, I'm wondering if you feel there's leverage there to get
that result.
General Selva. We have had support from Turks, from the
Jordanians, as well as from a small number of our Sunni
partners. That is a place where we might be able to exert some
additional effort.
Senator Gillibrand. Just quickly on Turkey, since you raise
it. Obviously, Turkey is critical to the fight against ISIL.
What do you think were Turkish calculations in shooting down
the Russian plane? And has it affected our ability to work with
Russia and Turkey?
General Selva. I can only tell you what I learned from
consultation with my Turkish counterpart the day of the
shootdown. I actually was in Turkey that afternoon after the
shootdown. They believe, and executed against, a incursion into
their airspace. What I pressed him on, though, was securing
their--the Turkish border from end to end. And there is a
roughly 90-kilometer span of the Turkish border through which
ISIL still has a fair number of smuggling lanes that are
relatively open because ISIL controls the Syrian side of that
border. The Turkish have redoubled their efforts. They have
opened up their Terrorist No-Fly List, their Terrorist
Identification Database, and a variety of other techniques to
help seal that border. Much beyond that, if we could do that in
a closed session or a private conversation, that would be----
Senator Gillibrand. That would be fine.
Secretary Carter, do you have anything you'd like to add?
Secretary Carter. No, I think General Selva said it very
well. We--the--Turkey is--shares a border with both Syria and
Iraq. That border has been used as the principal border through
which fighters flowed in both directions. And we've asked the
Turks to do more. They have done some more. We're helping them
do yet more. But, it's critical that they control their border.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Well, of course, ISIS wants, more than
anything else, to preserve their caliphate. No one is arguing
to--that there should be 100,000 troops, although the
President, and obviously you, like to set up the strawmen. It
is clear that, without American participation and leadership,
there is no strategy to take Raqqa, which is their base of
operations where they are planning and orchestrating attacks.
We just saw the manifestation of it, including working on
chemical weapons.
Mr. Secretary, I would beg you to call up General Keane,
General David Petraeus, Secretary Gates, Secretary Leon
Panetta, even former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Ask
all of them, and they will tell you that a safe zone could have
prevented the millions of refugees and the horrible
consequences of at least a quarter of a million people barrel-
bombed.
For you to sit there, General, and say that we'd have to
take out Syrian air defenses is either a stunning display of
ignorance or, again, this whole aspect of avoiding--or making
the problem seem so huge that we can't handle it. All we have
to do is protect a no-fly zone. We don't have to take out a
single airplane--air defense capability of theirs. All we have
to do is tell them, ``If you fly into this area, you're going
to get shot down,'' which we can do with Patriot batteries. And
everybody knows that. And that's why General Keane and General
Petraeus and Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta, and even
Secretary Clinton have said that these things are doable. It's
really saddening to see that, basically, business as usual
while thousands and thousands of Syrians are slaughtered by
this horrible barrel-bombing, which also was accompanied by
acts of chemical weapons.
So, I leave this hearing somewhat depressed, because
clearly there is no strategy to take Raqqa, there is no
motivation to set up a no-fly zone, which, even as I say
Hillary Clinton has supported and every military leader that I
know that was architect of the surge, says you can do it
without much difficulty. But, we are seeing again what we have
seen from this administration for the last four years, since
some of us advocated it, saying that it would be too hard to
do, ignoring the fact that, as long as Bashar Assad continues
to do this horrible barrel-bombing, they're slaughtering
thousands of innocent civilians--men, women, and children.
Where is our moral--where is our--the tradition of the United
States of America? We went to Bosnia after the--after they
ethnically cleansed 8,000 people. This guy has killed 240,000.
And yet, it's too hard for the most powerful nation on Earth to
set up a no-fly zone.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
strategy/end states--isil, iraq, syria, and the middle east
1. Senator Inhofe. What policy objectives were given to Department
of Defense in order to develop a military strategy?
Secretary Carter. The policy objective given to the Department of
Defense was to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant, which guided the development and implementation of the
military campaign plan.
2. Senator Inhofe. Was the Department of Defense given any
constraints in developing a military strategy?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense recognizes that a
successful strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), at its core, is not purely reliant on the military; it is a
strategy that requires a whole of government effort. The military
campaign plan was informed by policy and nested within the broader
national strategy. As the campaign has progressed, I have gained a
clearer assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Coalition's
efforts, and have received approval from the President to accelerate
the military campaign, degrading ISIL's control of territory.
3. Senator Inhofe. Does operational and tactical decision making
and control of operations reside with our commanders in the field or is
it back in the Pentagon or White House?
Secretary Carter. Lieutenant General Sean McFarland, Commander of
the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, is the
commander and the senior leader in charge of the military campaign in
Iraq and Syria. He and United States Central Command Commander General
Austin have broad authorities within Iraq and Syria to prosecute this
campaign.
4. Senator Inhofe. Is current United States strategy just against
ISIL in Iraq and Syria or globally?
Secretary Carter. The strategy against the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) is a global one. It is also absolutely necessary
to focus on defeating the ISIL parent tumor in Syria and Iraq. The
recent strike against ISIL's leader in Libya highlights the recognition
that ISIL is a diverse and global adversary. The Department is looking
for opportunities to degrade and defeat ISIL trans-regionally and
transnationally; every combatant command is engaged in this worldwide
campaign. I would add that it is not merely a kinetic fight. Other
actions like messaging, counter-finance, and foreign fighter flow are
targeting ISIL globally.
5. Senator Inhofe. What are our end states in Iraq and Syria?
No Iranian presence?
No Russian presence?
Stable and unified Iraq with representative Sunni-Shia-
Kurd government?
Stable and unified Syria absent Assad?
Are these end states interlinked with our ISIL end state/
strategy?
Secretary Carter. The desired end-states in Iraq and Syria are for
each to achieve a state of political stability free from the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant: in Iraq through a unified and inclusive
central government; and in Syria through a political transition. Iran
and Russia could play constructive roles in achieving each of these
end-states if they so choose; to date, they have chosen otherwise.
6. Senator Inhofe. What are the required resources and estimated
timeline required to achieve this end state?
Secretary Carter. With the help of Coalition partners, the
Department has intensified offensive operations to degrade and destroy
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) control of territory,
disrupt its command structure by removing its leadership, and reduce
its ability to sustain its war-making enterprise through effective air
strikes and enabling local partners on the ground to seize territory
from ISIL. The timeline required will be based on conditions on the
ground.
7. Senator Inhofe. Do you need ground forces occupying territory to
achieve these end states?
Secretary Carter. Yes, local ground forces responsive to a
sovereign government are needed to achieve lasting stability in Iraq
and Syria and to prevent the rise of additional terrorist groups in the
future. This is why our military strategy combines coalition air power
with enabling capable and motivated local forces on the ground to
achieve a lasting defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
This is coupled with a diplomatic strategy for political settlement to
end the civil war in Syria.
8. Senator Inhofe. You are increasing operations in Syria and Iraq,
deploying additional personnel, expending additional weapons and
placing additional wear and tear on equipment. You are also meeting all
your other global contingency operations requirements that are also
increasing. Will OCO funds cover all of these operations or will you
have to take money out of the base budget??
Secretary Carter. The Department is very concerned that Fiscal Year
(FY) 2016 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requirements may exceed
the enacted FY 2016 OCO funding levels. Increased counter-Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant activities in Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East,
coupled with a slowed drawdown in Afghanistan, are the primary reasons
for concern. The Department identified an unfinanced requirement of
$3.3 billion for these efforts to the FY2016 OCO request. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-113) recognized
this shortfall, but only provided $1.277 billion along with $1.0
billion more in special transfer authority for potential reprogramming.
The Department will review execution rates and spend plans during
its mid-year review in the spring. At that time, the Department will be
in a better position to ascertain the magnitude of any shortfall and
make recommendations to meet the remaining requirements, if necessary.
9. Senator Inhofe. Does the United States need to maintain a long
term presence in Iraq and/or Syria or can we withdrawal when we reach
our end state?
Secretary Carter. The United States is committed to the lasting
defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. I cannot predict or
prescribe hypothetical future force posture in Iraq or Syria.
10. Senator Inhofe. Is the refugee crisis being caused by Assad,
ISIL, a lack of strategy, a power vacuum, or all of the above? Can the
flow of refugees be stopped without addressing the Assad regime and
ISIL operations in Syria?
Secretary Carter. There is no single cause for the refugee crisis.
Some refugees fled the civil war that began when the Assad regime
attacked its own people. Others fled the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant's (ISIL) brutality. Still others fled for the promise of a life
in the West. Resolving the refugee crisis requires both an end to the
civil war and the defeat of ISIL.
To that end, the Department is intensifying the offensive
operations to degrade and collapse ISIL's control of territory, disrupt
its command structure by removing its leadership, and reduce its
ability to sustain its war making enterprises. Where coalition-
supported forces have liberated territory from ISIL, such as in Kobane
and Tal Abyad, some refugees and internally displaced persons have
returned to their homes. They will require security, reconstruction,
humanitarian assistance, and civil services provided by a government
that meets their needs. Extending these conditions to the whole of
Syria is a challenge. There is no purely military solution to the civil
war. To that end, Secretary Kerry has led intense diplomatic efforts
through the International Syria Support Group to seek a political
resolution to the conflict. Until there is both security and
opportunity in Syria for those who fled, it will not be possible to
resolve the refugee crisis.
To address the immediate needs of displaced Syrians, the Department
of Defense, with Congressional support, is providing approximately $115
million in humanitarian assistance. This assistance addresses life-
saving needs in the categories of shelter, health and sanitation, and
water for Syrian refugees and other displaced persons in Lebanon,
Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.
11. Senator Inhofe. Is Russia still attacking United States-trained
Syrian opposition forces?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Inhofe. What does the presence of a S400 surface to air
missiles mean to United States and coalition air operations in Syria
and in Turkey?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
measuring success
13. Senator Inhofe. How are you measuring success in your strategy
against ISIL--territory controlled, number of combat effective units,
end of hostile engagements, integration, and/or surrender?
Secretary Carter. We are measuring success across nine lines of
effort in order to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Given ISIL's hybrid terrorist-state nature,
measuring traditional elements of state power are minimally applicable.
The approach requires a whole-of-government strategy; efforts to remove
ISIL from the battlefield alone will not be sufficient to eliminate the
threat ISIL poses to United States persons and interests in the region
and around the world. In the lines of effort for which the Department
of Defense has the lead--namely, denying ISIL safe haven and building
partner capacity--United States Central Command is measuring success
across five objectives: establishing a Coalition and employing forces;
increasing regional partner capacity and security; degrading ISIL's
military effectiveness; decreasing ISIL's freedom of maneuver in Iraq
and Syria; and degrading ISIL's organizational capabilities.
14. Senator Inhofe. What benchmarks are you using to measure this
success?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense uses five benchmarks
for success in the two lines of effort for which the Department has the
lead--denying safe haven and building partner capacity. These five
objectives include: establishing a Coalition and employing forces;
increasing regional partner capacity and security; degrading the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) military effectiveness;
decreasing ISIL's freedom of maneuver in Iraq and Syria; and degrading
ISIL's organizational capabilities. Given ISIL's hybrid terrorist-state
nature, measuring traditional elements of state power are minimally
applicable.
15. Senator Inhofe. Of our 65 coalition partners, what coalition
partners are conducting ground combat operations and what partners are
conducting air combat operations?
Secretary Carter. Currently, there are 17 coalition partner nations
in Iraq conducting advise and assist and building partner capacity
missions. In addition to the U.S, they are: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden.
Currently, the United States and 12 coalition partners are
conducting air combat operations in Iraq and/or Syria. They are:
Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark France, Great Britain,
Jordan, The Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and UAE.
16. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Carter, you stated that the new
special operations forces are being sent into Iraq would conduct raids,
free hostages, gather intelligence, and capture ISIL leaders. Where are
you going to hold these detainees and for how long?
Secretary Carter. The appropriate disposition for a detainee is
determined, consistent with United States domestic law and
international law, on the basis of all the facts and circumstances,
including the national security interests of the United States and its
allies and partners, and the conduct the detainee has engaged in.
Depending on the circumstances, detainees may be prosecuted in the
United States, detained in their home countries, or detained in a third
country. The Department makes assessments regarding the appropriate
disposition of detainees on a case-by-case basis.
17. Senator Inhofe. Are you sending the right number and type of
forces in Syria and Iraq to achieve your strategy? Have you accurately
defined their mission and objectives?
Secretary Carter. Yes, we are sending the correct number and type
of United States and coalition personnel to Iraq and Syria given
current opportunities and the number of local ground partners assisting
our efforts in those countries. In addition to trainers and advisors in
Iraq, United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) are being
deployed to enable local partners in Iraq and Syria to counter the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant more effectively. Given current
circumstances, their mission and objectives have been accurately
defined. If we identify additional opportunities in Iraq (in
partnership with the Government of Iraq) and in Syria to enable
capable, local partners, I am prepared to recommend to the President to
deploy additional USSOF capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
inf violations
18. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter, according to public reports,
``Russia flight-tested a new ground-launched cruise missile . . . that
United States intelligence agencies say further violates the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.'' On September 29,
before this committee, I asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Work if he
believes that Russia has violated the INF Treaty. Reiterating previous
statements by this administration, he said ``We believe very strongly
that they did.'' Do you still believe that Russia has violated the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty?
Secretary Carter. Yes. Under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, Russia is obligated not to possess, produce, or flight-
test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to
5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.
Russia has built and tested a ground-launched cruise missile system
that violates the Treaty. For additional information, please see the
Annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.
19. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter, despite acknowledging
Moscow's violation of this landmark treaty, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Work said more than two months ago that ``we have not decided on any
particular action at this point.'' When I asked what this
administration was going to do about it, he said, ``we are still in the
midst of negotiating this position.'' What specific steps is the
Department of Defense taking to respond to Russia's violation of the
INF Treaty, and why has it taken so long for the administration to
study this?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense (DOD) has reviewed a
broad range of military response options and, with the interagency,
considered the effect each option could have on either convincing
Russian leadership to return to compliance with the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty or on countering the capability of the
prohibited ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) system. This
assessment was conducted at the same time as new strategic realities
developed in Europe--a Russia that is destabilizing the European
security order by purporting to annex Crimea and conducting illegal
activities in eastern Ukraine, a Russia that is actively seeking to
undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a Russia
that is modernizing its military capabilities across a range of
systems.
In 2015, the Administration determined that the United States
needed to consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the
context of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts
international legal norms and destabilizes the European security order.
Russia is not violating the INF Treaty in isolation from its overall
aggressive behavior; therefore, the Administration concluded that
responses cannot focus solely on the INF Treaty.
Consequently, DOD is committing to many investments irrespective of
Russia's decision to return to compliance with the INF Treaty.
United States responses to Russia's increased aggressive actions,
including its violation of the INF Treaty, involve a broad range of
efforts--within the Department, bilaterally with allies and partners,
and within the NATO Alliance. These responses cover a variety of
initiatives including increasing posture and presence, refocusing
planning and shaping of future military activities in Europe, and
improving defensive measures to deny Russia offensive capabilities by
modifying and expanding air defense systems.
For example, DOD plans to continue the European Reassurance
Initiative (ERI), with $789.3 million requested in fiscal year (FY)
2016. Under the ERI, the United States has maintained a persistent,
rotational air, land, and sea presence in the Baltics and in Central
Europe to reassure Allies and to build up their capacity. ERI also
enables the United States to expand bilateral and multilateral
exercises in Europe in order to improve interoperability and to
strengthen United States warfighting capability in the face of newer
threats from Russia. DOD will continue to seek funding for ERI in FY
2017.
DOD is also transforming its posture in Europe to be more
responsive and sustainable for the 21st century. In order to allow
United States rotational forces to move more quickly and easily to
participate in training and exercises in Europe, DOD is prepositioning
equipment, termed ``European Activity Sets'', which include: tanks,
artillery, infantry fighting vehicles, and other equipment to respond
rapidly to crises and provocation. Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland have offered to host company- to
battalion-sized elements outfitted with this equipment, which will be
moved around the region for training and exercises.
nato
20. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, I asked General James Jones,
USMC (Ret.), in a recent hearing what may happen if the United States
fails to alter its course with respect to Russia's aggression. He
responded, ``I think it's possibly the beginning of the end of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I think it is that serious. We just
can't sit back and let this happen.'' He continued, ``[NATO] should
become more proactive . . . sitting back and being reactive and then
debating it for six months hoping for on-hundred percent consensus
among 28 countries is not a formula for success with Vladimir Putin.''
There is serious concern that a failure to stand up in Moscow in
Ukraine and elsewhere will invite Putin's adventurism in the Baltics--
creating an Article 5 crisis for NATO. Is the Department of Defense re-
evaluating United States defense posture in Europe, and can you provide
an update?
General Selva. The United States' commitment to NATO Article 5
remains Ironclad. In order to demonstrate our willingness and
capability, DOD is re-evaluating our defense posture in Europe to
ensure the United States military can deter and defend against Russian
aggression. We will ensure the U.S. military remains postured to
support ongoing and future contingency operations, counter
transnational threats, deter and defeat Russian aggression, and build
Allied and partner capability. The European Reassurance Initiative
(ERI) has enabled us to increase responsiveness and readiness by pre-
positioning ammunition, fuel and equipment for use in regional training
and exercises, as well as improving infrastructure that enhances NATO
operations and enables Eastern Allies to rapidly receive
reinforcements. ERI also enables us to maintain our increased
rotational force presence along NATO's eastern flank under Operation
ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR) to demonstrate the ability and commitment to act
together with NATO to deter and counter Russian malign influence,
coercion, and aggression. In 2015, we prepositioned additional European
Activity Sets--complete equipment set for one armor brigade combat
team--to bolster NATO's eastern flank. We will continually assess
required presence and equipment prepositioning in order to meet the
demands of an evolving security environment in Europe.
21. Senator Ayotte. General Selva, what specific steps is the
United States taking to make clear to Moscow that we will defend NATO
and honor our Article 5 commitments, including in Eastern Europe?
General Selva. The United States has made clear to Russia through
political, diplomatic, economic, and defense measures that we do not
accept Russia's aggressive foreign policy, and we will defend NATO and
honor our Article 5 commitments. Focusing on defense and military
measures, European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funding has enabled the
United States to increase its military activities in Eastern and
Central Europe to reassure Allies and partners of our solemn commitment
to their security and territorial integrity in the face of aggressive
Russian actions in Ukraine and elsewhere. Through ERI we increased
responsiveness and readiness by pre-positioning ammunition, fuel and
equipment for use in regional training and exercises, as well as
improved infrastructure that enhances NATO operations and enables
Eastern Allies to rapidly receive reinforcements. ERI also enables us
to maintain increased rotational presence along NATO's eastern flank
under Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR) to demonstrate the ability and
commitment to act together with NATO in the face of the challenges from
Russia. Examples of action taken to demonstrate resolve in Eastern
Europe in 2015 include the persistent rotational presence of
approximately 500 Soldiers; organized in company teams of approximately
150 Soldiers training alongside allied forces in Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Poland, the approximate three month deployment of 12 A-
10s to Estonia and 12 F-15Cs to Romania, shorter duration deployments
of A-10s, F-15s, F-16s, F-22s and C-130s to eastern Europe, and
multiple exercises involving thousands of United States forces
throughout 2015. In addition to unilateral U.S. efforts, we are working
with our NATO Allies to implement the Readiness Action Plan (RAP)
agreed to at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. RAP includes a series of
assurance and adaptation activities to enhance NATO's defense posture
and increase NATO's readiness for and responsiveness to security
challenges in and around Europe.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Volume of Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, Release Authorities, and
the National Security Council's Role in the Counter ISIS Campaign
Secretary Carter, during Desert Storm we dropped 88,500 tons of
bombs while conducting over 48,000 strike sorties and averaged over
1,100 sorties per day. \1\ During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 31 day
air campaign against Saddam Hussein averaged over 800 sorties per day.
By contrast, since Obama announced his intention to defeat ISIS, the
United States has conducted a paltry 6,846 air strikes in Iraq and
Syria. \2\ Averaged over the 465 days of operations, that amounts to
less than 15 strikes per day.
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\1\ http://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-gunzinger-and-john-stillion-
the-unserious-air-war-against-isis-1413327871
\2\ http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-
Resolve
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Meanwhile, ISIS continues to control territory across Iraq and
Syria. They rape women from minority communities. They murder
Christians, Muslims, Yazidis, and others in horrific and brutal ways.
According to reports from Pentagon officials, ISIS remains as strong
today as it was before the bombing began, with estimates ranging from a
fighting force of 20,000 to 30,000 persons. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/10/12/islamic-
state-pentagon/73840116/
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The order of magnitude between a serious air campaign that is
focused on destruction of our enemy and the photo-op campaign being
conducted by this Administration is striking. Just as startling are the
reports that this campaign is being so micro-managed by the White
House, that the warfighting expertise of our military leaders is being
overridden by ``little twerp[s] from the NSC.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-
obama-white-house-runs-foreign-policy/2015/08/04/2befb960-2fd7-11e5-
8353-1215475949f4_story.html
22. Senator Cruz. What role is the National Security Council taking
in managing the day to day operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Secretary Carter. The National Security Council does not have a
role in managing the day-to-day operations in Iraq, Syria, or
Afghanistan. For Iraq and Syria, I appointed a commander, Lieutenant
General McFarland, to be in charge of counter-Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) operations. He manages day-to-day operations in Iraq
and Syria and has appropriate authorities delegated to him to undertake
such operations successfully.
In Afghanistan, General Campbell has the authority to manage the
missions he has been given, including the United States
counterterrorism mission focused on defeating al-Qaeda and its
associates and a mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces. He also has the authority to deal
with force protection threats from any individual or group that poses a
threat to United States and coalition personnel.
23. Senator Cruz. Who maintains final approval for the deliberate
target selection process? What authorities have been completely
delegated to the COCOM? Please describe the authorities and permissions
in the targeting process, as written, and as actually practiced.
Secretary Carter. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-Operation
Inherent Resolve Commander is the approval authority for deliberate
strikes in Iraq and Syria. The written process for deliberate targeting
is to pursue Intelligence Community (IC) vetting if necessary; however,
the CJTF has adopted a practice of seeking IC concurrence for all
deliberate targets.
24. Senator Cruz. Who approves strikes against a target of
opportunity observed by an airborne pilot over Iraq or Syria?
Secretary Carter. The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent
Resolve Commander is the Target Engagement Authority for striking
dynamic targets, including targets of opportunity. He may further
delegate this to a general or flag officer (O-7 or higher).
25. Senator Cruz. Can our Special Operations Forces conduct
operations without approvals from the White House or the National
Security Council?
Secretary Carter. Yes. Lieutenant General McFarland is in charge of
operations, and he has appropriate authorities to conduct operations
without approvals from the White House or the National Security
Council.
26. Senator Cruz. How many times per week do our military leaders
and staff officers at the Combatant Command and lower levels of
operations interact with the National Security Council for permissions
or approvals?
Secretary Carter. Lieutenant General McFarland, Commander of the
Combined Joint Task Force--Operation Inherent Resolve, has appropriate
authorities to carry out operations. He does not interact with the
National Security Council for permissions or approvals on a daily or
weekly basis.
27. Senator Cruz. Senator McCaskill is offended that the conduct of
an air campaign might result in unintentional instances of collateral
damage. For all of her sanctimonious lecturing, ISIS is doing
tremendous damage to the civilian populations, with the assistance of a
slow and lumbering Administration that is unwilling to focus its
efforts, nor even correctly identify the threat. Reports indicate that
4,406 documented innocent civilians have been killed by ISIS, \5\ with
estimates going well into the 10s of thousands. How many civilian
casualties has ISIS inflicted on the local populations? How many
refugees have been displaced from their homes?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/12/isis-syria-death-
casualty-count
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Carter. The Department does not keep those statistics.
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees there were 7,632,500 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in
Syria as of June 2015. There is no exact numbers of how many IDPs have
been directly displaced by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,
Syrian Government forces, or the other various countries and factions
fighting in Syria.
28. Senator Cruz. Does the target approval process deny strikes on
locations where there might be a chance of accidental collateral
damage?
Secretary Carter. The target approval process will deny any strike
that exceeds the stated level of acceptable risk for collateral damage.
preventing iranian influence in baghdad from taking advantage of isis
29. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, how do you propose that we
break the influence of the despotic, theocratic Iranian Ayatollah
Khameni over Baghdad now that the central government is almost
completely dependent on the security that Iranian backed militias and
Quds forces provide?
Secretary Carter. The United States is a strong partner to the
Government of Iraq. We are able to provide Iraq with support and combat
capabilities that no other partner, including Iran, can provide. I am
confident in the strength of the United States' partnership with Iraq.
I share your concerns about the sectarian nature of Iran's approach in
Iraq. I believe that sectarianism could pose serious challenges to
Iraq's stability as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is
pushed out of the territory it currently occupies.
Iran does have deep and historic religious, cultural, and economic
ties with Iraq that cannot be ignored. Although Tehran wields influence
in Baghdad, the central Iraqi Government does not depend completely on
Iran or Iranian-backed militias for its security. Iraqi Security Forces
along with Kurdish forces and Sunni fighters--not just the Shia
militias--are all central to the defeat of ISIL and to Iraq's long-term
stability and prosperity. I believe that Prime Minister Abadi is
committed to this vision for Iraq, but more time is needed for him to
implement his reform agenda and to establish an effective and inclusive
government. The Department of Defense encourages all nations to engage
constructively with Iraq to help ensure a stable and inclusive Iraq.
30. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, what are you doing to develop a
strategy that counters Iran's anti-American designs to isolate and harm
our allies using terrorism and violence across the Middle East and the
rest of the world?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense (DOD) addresses the
totality of threats posed by Iran through its Iran policy architecture,
which includes military plans, preparations, posture, and regional
partnerships, recognizing that these DoD policy tools are just one part
of a robust interagency effort to address Iran's support to terrorism
and other destabilizing activities. More specifically, DOD retains and
updates plans that address Iran's conventional and unconventional
threats. Our military preparations and posture serve to deter and, if
necessary, respond to Iranian aggression, including its support to
terrorism. More than 35,000 U.S. military personnel and our most
advanced missile, air, and ground forces are currently deployed to the
region to protect U.S. partners and interests. The Department also
continues to intensify our efforts working with regional and
international partners to counter the threats posed by Iran.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
syria
31. Senator Shaheen. What effect do you expect renewed efforts by
France, the UK, and Germany to have on the fight in Syria?
Secretary Carter. France, the United Kingdom (UK), and Germany's
decision to expand their counter-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) operations in Syria will significantly enhance the Coalition's
efforts to defeat ISIL's parent tumor. On November 15th, French
aircraft began striking key ISIL nodes, such as command and recruitment
centers, ammunition storage facilities, and training camps in Raqqah,
the group's de-facto capital in Syria. The UK also made its impact felt
immediately, launching airstrikes against ISIL oil infrastructure in
eastern Syria on December 3rd mere hours after Parliament approved
these strikes. On December 4th, the German Parliament approved the
deployment of reconnaissance and refueling aircraft to support
Coalition efforts in Syria, adding needed niche capabilities to the
Coalition's fight against ISIL.
Our partners' contributions will continue to accelerate the
campaign in Syria by striking ISIL's military capabilities, severing
its lines of communication, targeting its leadership and economic
infrastructure, and supporting partners on the ground.
General Selva. Renewed efforts of our European allies, particularly
France, the UK, and Germany, have enhanced both military capability and
diplomatic efforts of the Coalition to bring pressure against ISIL on
multiple fronts. Their support in operational planning, intelligence,
logistics, training, and air operations nests effectively within the
military lines of effort and overall campaign plan. More importantly,
the impact is political--solidifying our resolve with concrete actions
to drive ISIL out of Syria, pave the way for a political solution, and
bring stability to the region, which ultimately serves to protect the
homelands in Europe as well as the United States.
regional and coalition efforts
32. Senator Shaheen. As we increase the tempo of air operations are
we at risk of running short of munitions? Do you need additional
funding to replenish our stocks?
Secretary Carter. and General Selva. Increased air operations tempo
is creating shortfalls in some precision guided munitions,
specifically, recent expenditures of Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAMs) and Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) in support of Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR). The Department is developing options to
reprogram fiscal year 2016 funding and adjust future munitions program
funding to recover to pre-OIR levels by fiscal year 2021.
russia
33. Senator Shaheen. What threat does Russia's deployment of S-400
anti-aircraft defenses in Syria pose to our operations and those of our
allies? What steps are we taking to mitigate?
Secretary Carter. and General Selva. [Deleted.]