[Senate Hearing 114-357]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-357
IMPACTS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) ON THE UNITED
STATES INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 29; AUGUST 4; AUGUST 5, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
july 29, 2015
Page
Impacts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the
United States Interests and the Military Balance in the Middle
East........................................................... 1
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense..................... 6
Dempsey, General Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 10
Questions for the Record......................................... 58
august 4, 2015
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Military
Balance in the Middle East..................................... 89
Hayden, General Michael V., USAF (Ret.), Principal, The Chertoff
Group and Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency......... 93
Haass, Richard N., President, Council on Foreign Relations and
Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State... 94
Edelman, Hon. Eric S., Distinguished Fellow, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments and Former Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy..................................................... 99
Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, Goodman Professor of Diplomacy and
International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School................ 110
august 5, 2015
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Military
Balance in the Middle East..................................... 151
Mead, Walter Russell, Distinguished Scholar in American Strategy,
The Hudson Institute and Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs,
Bard College................................................... 154
Singh, Michael, Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.................. 163
Takeyh, Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, The
Council on Foreign Relations................................... 171
Gordon, Philip, Senior Fellow, The Council on Foreign Relations.. 177
Nephew, Richard, Fellow, The Center on Global Energy Policy,
Columbia University............................................ 190
(iii)
IMPACTS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) ON THE UNITED
STATES INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:47 a.m., in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
McCain (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill,
Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Since the time is here and our two
witnesses that we requested to appear are here, I will go ahead
and begin with my opening statement. As I have mentioned----
[Applause.]
Chairman McCain. Hey.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. That was for your opening statement, John.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. There is such anticipation.
[Pause.]
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
begin a series of oversight hearings on the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action [JCPOA], which the United States and other major
powers have signed with Iran.
We welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them for
joining us today. We appreciate Senators Kerry and Secretary
Moniz and Secretary Lew being here. I would, for the record, I
did not request the presence of Secretary Kerry or Moniz or
Secretary Lew. I am glad they are here, at their desire to do
so, since this focus of today's hearing, as befits the role of
this committee, is on the strategic and military implications
of the Iran agreement.
What we want to know, among other things, is how this
agreement will affect regional security, proliferation, and the
balance of power in the Middle East; what impact it may have on
Iran's malign activities and hegemonic ambitions in the region;
what it means for perceptions of American credibility and
resolve among our allies and partners; and what the
consequences are for U.S. defense policy, military planning,
and force structure.
When we consider these broader strategic consequences of
the agreement, the second-order effects, what is already a bad
deal only looks that much worse. To this committee, perhaps of
most concern about the agreement itself pertains to the
verification and monitoring mechanisms.
As has been publicly reported, the inspections of Iran's
facilities will be conducted by the International Atomic Energy
Agency, or IAEA. There will be no Americans allowed on the
ground, and the details of how these monitoring activities will
occur in certain important instances are contained in a
separate agreement between the IAEA and Iran, which the U.S.
Government and the Congress have not seen.
Furthermore, the mechanism to resolve the longstanding
international concerns about the possible military dimensions
of Iran's nuclear program is contained in another side
agreement between Iran and the IAEA, which the U.S. Government
and the Congress have also not seen. To be sure, much is known
about Iran's past weaponization activities, but we can never
know what we do not know, which is why the Director of the IAEA
has said that effective verification depends on resolution of
the PMD [previous military dimensions] issue. How that will
occur we do not know.
This presents a major problem. All of us will soon vote on
the Iran agreement, and the merits of this agreement hinges on
its verifiability. And yet we cannot even read key documents
pertaining to these verification measures, and our own
Government is not even a party to those agreements. I find that
deeply troubling.
What is more troubling are the broader military
implications of this agreement. Iran is not just an arms
control challenge. It is a geopolitical challenge.
For years, many of us have urged the administration to
adopt a broader strategy to counter Iran's malign activities in
the Middle East. Unfortunately, that has not happened. Instead,
we have watched with alarm as Iran's military and intelligence
operatives have stepped up their destabilizing activities and
increased their influence and control in places like Syria,
Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, and Gaza.
Iran has done all of this under the full pressure of a
sanctions. Now Iran will soon receive a windfall of sanctions
relief, estimated at roughly $60 billion or possibly as much as
twice that. Yes, a good amount of that money will surely go to
Iran's domestic priorities. But it is only fair to assume that
billions of dollars that will flow to Iran's Revolutionary
Guards Corps and the Quds Force, money that will likely be used
to boost arms supplies to Iran's terrorist proxies, to sow
chaos and instability across the region, and to double-down on
Bashar Assad right when he needs it most.
This will present a host of new challenges for the
Department of Defense. What is worse, not only could this
agreement strengthen Iran's malign activities in the region, it
is also likely to enhance Iran's acquisition of conventional
military capabilities.
For nearly a decade, an international arms embargo has
significantly hurt Iran's ability to build up and modernize its
aging military. Throughout the nuclear negotiations, the
administration insisted that its diplomacy was limited
exclusively to the nuclear file. Indeed, just a few weeks ago,
General Dempsey told this committee that, ``Under no
circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to
ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.''
And yet, thanks to last-minute concessions by the
administration, that is exactly what this agreement would do.
At Year 5, the international arms embargo will disappear, and
Iran will be free to acquire advanced military capabilities,
such as fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and
anti-access weapons.
At Year 8, international restrictions on Iran's ballistic
missile programs will disappear, and Iran will be free to
acquire through entirely licit means the necessary technology
and materiel for ever more sophisticated ballistic missiles,
including ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles].
And in all of this, Iran will not only have billions of
dollars with which to go on a shopping spree in the
international arms market, but it is also sure to find plenty
of States that are eager to sell those weapons, especially
Russia and China. In this way, the Iran agreement not only
paves Iran's path to a nuclear capability, it will further--it
will further Iran's emergence as a dominant military power in
the Middle East.
This has direct and dangerous implications for U.S. armed
forces. The ultimate guarantee that Iran will not get a nuclear
weapon is not a 109-page document. It is the capability of the
U.S. military to do what is necessary if all else fails. And
yet this agreement would enable Iran to construct the kind of
advanced military arsenal that could make our military option
far costlier to employ.
Instead of enhancing our deterrence of Iran, this agreement
seems to enhance Iran's deterrence of us. In short, if this
agreement fails, the U.S. service members are called upon to
take action against Iran. Their lives could be at greater risk
because of this agreement.
And that is perhaps the most troubling aspect of all about
this agreement, what it means for America's credibility in the
Middle East. Since 1979, Republican and Democratic
administrations have sought to contain the Islamic Republic of
Iran and prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapons
capabilities.
Our allies and partners have entrusted much of their own
security to the United States because they have believed that
our commitment were credible. In this way, America's role in
the region has been to suppress security competition between
states with long histories of mistrust and to prevent that
competition from breaking into open war.
I fear this agreement will further undermine our ability
and willingness to play that vital stabilizing role. Our allies
and partners in the Middle East have increasingly come to
believe that America is withdrawing from the region and doing
so at a time when Iran is aggressively seeking to advance its
hegemonic ambitions.
Now we have reached an agreement that will not only
legitimize the Islamic Republic as a threshold nuclear state
with an industrial enrichment capability, but will also
unshackle its regime and its long-held pursuit of conventional
military power and may actually consolidate the Islamic
Republic's control in Iran for years to come.
After turning three decades of U.S. foreign policy on its
head, is it any wonder that this agreement may lead our allies
and partners to question America's commitment to their
security? As that happens, these states are increasingly likely
to take matters into their own hands, and indeed, we already
see evidence of that.
These fateful decisions may well manifest themselves in
growing regional security competition, new arms races, nuclear
proliferation, and possibly conflict, all of which would demand
more, not less U.S. leadership and presence in the region. It
would be ironic, but not historically unprecedented that a
diplomatic agreement intended to decrease risk of conflict
actually increased those risks instead.
All of us hope that will not be the case now, but it is the
job of the Defense Department to be ready when our highest
hopes fail us, and I fear there is much work to do.
I welcome the witnesses.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And good morning, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Moniz,
Secretary Lew, Secretary Carter, General Dempsey.
Your appearance before the committee comes a little more
than 2 weeks after the world woke up to the news that after 20
months of negotiations, the P5+1 and Iran agreed on the terms
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The agreement, no
matter your position on it, is historic and, if implemented
scrupulously, could serve as a strategic inflection point in
the world's relations with Iran for international
nonproliferation efforts and for the political and security
dynamics in the Middle East.
And I commend the President and his negotiating team, from
Cabinet officials to our Nation's scientists, for their
persistence and hard work.
In the weeks ahead, Congress has a solemn obligation to
carefully review the details of this historic agreement and to
independently, independently validate that the agreement will
meet our common goal of stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon. Today's hearing is part of that obligation, and I look
forward to your testimony.
Secretary Kerry, you were the key architect of this
agreement, and your willingness to take on what I am sure feels
like a thankless endeavor is to be commended. I hope you will
help us understand why it is your assessment that this
agreement is a good deal and how you intend to direct our
diplomats in the field to work with our partners in the region
to address Iran's destabilizing activities in the region.
Secretary Moniz, you played an important role in
negotiations, and you, too, have been a strong advocate for the
Comprehensive Plan of Action throughout. During your testimony,
I hope you will help us understand what gives you confidence in
the technical safeguards built into this agreement,
particularly with regard to, one, the cutting off of Iran's
pathways to a nuclear weapon; two, the cradle-to-grave access
and portability of the supply chain; three, the dedicated
procurement channel to manage all purchases of nuclear supply
groups' trigger lists and dual- use items; and four, the IAEA
additional protocol for enhanced inspections and its design for
detecting elements of a covert weapons program; and finally,
the limitation on Iran's enrichment program.
Secretary Carter, you are a unique Secretary of Defense,
with a Ph.D. in physics, and having spent so much of your
career on nuclear weapons, I look forward to your technical
insights to these elements, as well as those of Secretary
Moniz.
Both Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, while neither of
you were a party to the negotiations, you have both recently
traveled to the Middle East to speak with your counterparts
about the agreement's potential implications for regional
security. During your meetings, you undoubtedly heard the
assessments of our partners and our allies on a range of
issues, including how Iran may use sanctions relief to pursue
its regional ambitions, expand its support to terrorist
proxies, and invest more heavily in its military.
These are serious concerns and ones which I share. Our
partners in Israel see Iran as a significant and ongoing threat
to their national security interests. While Prime Minister
Netanyahu is unlikely to ever endorse this historic deal, it is
incumbent upon the United States to deepen further our
cooperation on military and intelligence matters with Israel
and to better understand the concerns of the Israelis.
It is also critical that our partners and allies in the
Middle East know that the United States will not abandon the
region in the wake of this nuclear agreement and that we will
continue to stand alongside them as we confront common state
and nonstate threats. The May 2015 joint statement following
the U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, meetings at Camp
David provided a road map for how the administration intends to
proceed. It also makes clear that the Department of Defense
will be at the forefront of these efforts.
Critics of the Vienna agreement point to perceived flaws
related to Iran's ballistic missile capability and its support
of terrorist proxies across the region. The Camp David joint
statement outlines our commitment to enhancing the ballistic
missile defense capabilities of the GCC and improving their
interoperability to increase collective defense in order to
counter Iran's support of terrorist proxies.
The joint statement indicates that we will be increasing
our training and exercise engagements with GCC special
operations forces elements so as to better enable our partners
to confront Iran's asymmetric capabilities. These are important
efforts that I look forward to hearing about today.
I want to make one final point. These negotiations focused
on denying Iran a pathway to a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran
would be a more formidable force in the region. And as it has
repeatedly demonstrated, not a force for peace and stability,
but one that supports terror and seeks to impose its will
throughout the Middle East.
Moreover, a nuclear Iran would likely prompt a nuclear arms
race in the region that through action or design could lead to
catastrophe. None of us would condone or ignore Iran's support
of terror or other destabilizing activities in the region, but
the focus of these negotiations were properly focused on
nuclear weapons.
The history of arms control makes this point. As Fred
Kaplan, a noted national security expert pointed out, the
United States-Soviet strategic arms treaties signed throughout
the Cold War didn't require the Soviet Union to disavow
Communism and its support of Third World insurgencies or
institute Jeffersonian democracy. But the deals were still very
useful. They capped and in later years reversed the nuclear
arms race, and they provided a forum for diplomacy, a cooling
off of the distrust and hatred at a time when no other issue
could have done so.
I look forward to the panel's responses as we continue to
understand this agreement and evaluate the capacity to cut off
all pathways to a nuclear device and provide long- term warning
of violations so that an appropriate response can take place.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank the witnesses for being here today.
And Secretary Carter, could we begin with you?
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Carter. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
And with your leave, I think that you preferred, and that
is fine with us, if only I and General Dempsey make opening
statements as the other witnesses----
Chairman McCain. I hope that is agreeable to the other
witnesses?
Secretary Carter. It is. It is, I believe.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ranking Member Reed. Thank you, all the members
of the committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify this
morning on our defense strategy toward this critical region in
the wake, as the--as Senator Reed noted of my travels to the
region last week, the chairman's also, and of course, very
importantly, 2 weeks after the conclusion of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action.
I am pleased to be joined by my fellow Cabinet members, who
can talk in detail about that agreement reached in Vienna. That
deal is an important step, one brought about by the leadership
of President Obama, the persistent diplomacy of Secretaries
Kerry, Moniz, and others, crippling sanctions that Secretary
Lew led and that Congress helped put in place.
It is a good deal because it prevents Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon in a comprehensive and verifiable way. Once
implemented, it will, therefore, remove a critical element of
risk and uncertainty, one element of risk and uncertainty. But
a critical element of risk and uncertainty from the region.
For those reasons and those my colleagues have provided in
testimony before other congressional committees, I urge you to
support it. I also urge you to support the broader elements of
the defense strategy in the Middle East I will describe,
including and especially by supporting a stable and reformed
defense budget to implement it.
The successful negotiation of this deal is one part of our
broader foreign and defense policy. As the most influential
power in the world, we have responsibilities all over the
globe. The Middle East remains important to America's national
interests, and as a result, the Department of Defense is
committed to confronting the region's two principal security
challenges, Iran and ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant].
The department's strategic approach to protecting our
interests and confronting those challenges will remain
unchanged. We will continue to maintain a strong military
posture to deter aggression, to bolster the security of our
friends and allies in the region, especially Israel, to ensure
freedom of navigation in the Gulf, to check Iran's malign
influence, and to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL.
We are also continuing to advance our military capabilities
that provide all options as the President has directed should
Iran walk away from its commitments under this deal. Last week,
I was in the Middle East, and I had the opportunity to visit
with some of our men and women in uniform who are carrying out
this strategy. I know how much all of you care for them, and
like me, you are proud of their impressive work.
And I will tell you this morning what I told them. We are
continuing full speed ahead, standing with our friends,
standing up to ISIL, and standing against Iran's malign
activity.
On ISIL, as I testified earlier this month, we have the
right strategy in place, built on nine synchronized lines of
effort, to achieve ISIL's lasting defeat. But we continue to
strengthen execution. Today, in Iraq and other places, we are
working with partners on the ground and in global coalition to
enable capable and motivated ground forces to win back Iraq's
sovereignty and peace on its own territory.
I saw several parts of that effort last week and spoke with
some of our partners on the ground. We are headed in the right
direction in this counter ISIL effort. We have made some
progress, but we need to make more.
On Iran, this new deal, when implemented, will place
significant limitations on Iran that will effectively cut off
its pathways to the fissile material for a nuclear bomb. But it
is also important to note that it places no limitations--let me
repeat that--no limitations on what the Department of Defense
can and will do to pursue our defense strategy in the region.
It places no limits on our forces, our partnerships and
alliances, our intensive and ongoing security cooperation, or
on our development and fielding of new military capabilities,
capabilities we will continue to advance.
If Iran were to commit aggression, our robust force posture
ensures we can rapidly surge an overwhelming array of forces
into the region, leveraging our most advanced capabilities,
married with sophisticated munitions that put no target out of
reach.
Iran and its proxies will still present security
challenges. Iran supports the Assad regime in Syria, backs
Hezbollah in Lebanon whose fighting positions, by the way, I
observed firsthand during a visit to Israel's northern border
last week with the Israeli defense minister, and is
contributing to disorder in Yemen. And Iran still directs
hostility and violence to our closest ally in the region,
Israel.
In the face of that malign activity, we will continue to
meet our commitments to our friends and allies in the region,
especially Israel, and continue to build on and enhance our
cooperation in meaningful ways. I made that clear last week in
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq.
I also made clear that we will continue to maintain our
robust regional force posture, ashore and afloat, which
includes tens of thousands of American personnel on our most
sophisticated ground, maritime, and air and ballistic missile
defense assets.
Our friends understand, despite our differences with some
of them about the merits of this deal, that we have an enduring
commitment to deterrence and to regional security. I am proud
to say that our defense partnerships in the region have never
been stronger. And as I made clear in Israel and as we agreed
at Camp David with our Gulf partners, as Senator Reed
indicated, we are committed to making them even stronger and
more capable against a range of threats.
The United States will maintain its ironclad commitment to
Israel's qualitative military edge, or QME. We will keep
providing Israel with advanced capabilities. For example, next
year Israel will be our first and only friend in the region
flying the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
We continue to work with Israel on ballistic missile
defense systems--in fact, three of them--the Iron Dome, David's
Sling, and the Arrow system for missiles of progressively
increasing range.
And we are working multilaterally and bilaterally to
improve the capability and capacity of our Gulf partners also.
At the GCC summit at Camp David, hosted by the President in
May, and last week with Saudi leaders, I stressed a number of
functional areas that will be critical to enabling Gulf
countries to play a stronger regional role, including maritime
forces; ground forces, including especially special operations
and counterterrorism forces; air and ballistic missile defense
forces; and cyber protection.
We also conduct over 50 military exercises a year with our
regional partners. And we have offered sophisticated defense
equipment, including the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense] ballistic missile defense system and long-range
precision strike capabilities to some of our Gulf partners.
In conclusion, this is a good deal because it removes a
continued source of threat and uncertainty in a comprehensive
and verifiable way by preventing Iran from getting a nuclear
weapon. It is a deal that takes no option away from a future
President. This is an important achievement and a deal that
deserves your support.
Meanwhile, the United States, the Department of Defense,
and the men and women of the finest fighting force the world
has ever known, with your support, will continue to be
committed to the defense of America's interests, friends, and
allies, to counter ISIL and Iran's malign influence, and to
uphold the President's commitment that Iran will not obtain a
nuclear weapon should it walk away from this deal.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee:
thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning--after my trip to
the Middle East last week--on our defense strategy in the region. And I
am pleased to be joined by my fellow Cabinet members who can talk in
detail about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached in Vienna
earlier this month.
That deal is an important step . . . one brought about by the
leadership of President Obama, the persistent diplomacy of Secretaries
Kerry and Moniz and others, and the crippling sanctions Secretary Lew
led and that Congress helped to put in place.
It is a good deal. It prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon
in a comprehensive and verifiable way. Once implemented, it will
therefore remove a critical element of risk and uncertainty from the
region. For those reasons, and those my colleagues have provided in
testimony before other Congressional committees, I urge you to support
it. I also urge you to support the broader elements of the defense
strategy in the Middle East I will describe, including and especially
by supporting a stable and reformed defense budget.
The successful negotiation of this deal is one part of our broader
foreign and defense policy. As the most influential power in the world,
we have responsibilities all around the globe. The Middle East remains
important to America's national interests. And, as a result, the
Department of Defense is committed to confronting the region's two
principal security challenges: Iran and ISIL.
The Department's strategic approach to protecting our interests and
confronting those challenges will remain unchanged. We will continue to
maintain a strong military posture to deter aggression; to bolster the
security of our friends and allies in the region, especially Israel; to
ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf; to check Iran's malign
influence; and to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. We're also
continuing to advance our military capabilities that provide all
options, as the President has directed, should Iran walk away from its
commitments under this deal.
Last week, I was in the Middle East, and I had the opportunity to
visit with some of our men and women in uniform who are carrying out
this strategy. I know how much all of you care for our personnel, and
like me, you are proud of their impressive work. And I will tell you
this morning what I told them: we're continuing full speed ahead--
standing with our friends, standing up to ISIL, and standing against
Iran's malign activity.
On ISIL, as I testified earlier this month, we have the right
strategy in place--built on nine, synchronized lines of effort--to
achieve ISIL's lasting defeat. But we continue to strengthen execution.
Today, in Iraq and other places, we are working--with partners on the
ground and in a global coalition--to enable capable and motivated
ground forces to win back Iraq's sovereignty and peace in its own
territory. I saw several parts of this effort last week and spoke with
some of our partners on the ground. We're headed in the right direction
in this counter-ISIL effort: we've made some progress; but we need to
make more.
On Iran, this new deal--when implemented--will place significant
limitations on Iran that will effectively cut off its pathways to the
fissile material for a nuclear bomb. But it is also important to note
that it places no limitations--let me repeat that, no limitations--on
what the Department of Defense can and will do to pursue our defense
strategy in the region. It places no limits on our forces, our
partnerships and alliances, our intensive and ongoing security
cooperation, or on our development and fielding of new military
capabilities--capabilities we will continue to advance.
If Iran were to commit aggression, our robust force posture ensures
we can rapidly surge an overwhelming array of forces into the region,
leveraging our most advanced capabilities, married with sophisticated
munitions that put no target out of reach.
Iran and its proxies will still present security challenges. Iran
supports the Assad regime in Syria, backs Hizballah in Lebanon--whose
fighting positions I observed firsthand during a visit to Israel's
northern border last week--and is contributing to disorder in Yemen.
And Iran still directs hostility and violence to our closest ally in
the region, Israel.
In the face of that malign activity, we will continue to meet our
commitments to our friends and allies in the region, especially Israel,
and continue to build on and enhance our cooperation in meaningful
ways. I made that clear last week in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Iraq. I also made clear that we will continue to maintain our robust
regional force posture ashore and afloat, which includes tens of
thousands of American personnel and our most sophisticated ground,
maritime, air, and ballistic missile defense assets.
Our friends understand, despite our differences with some of them
about the merits of this deal, that we have an enduring commitment to
deterrence and to regional security. I am proud to say that our defense
partnerships in the region have never been stronger. And, as I made
clear in Israel and as we agreed at Camp David with our Gulf partners,
we're committed to making them even stronger and more capable against a
range of threats.
The United States will maintain its ironclad commitment to Israel's
qualitative military edge. And we will keep providing Israel with
advanced capabilities--for example, next year, Israel will be our first
and only friend in the region flying the F-35 stealth fighter.
And we are working multilaterally and bilaterally to improve the
capacity and capabilities of our Gulf partners. At the GCC Summit at
Camp David hosted by the President in May, and last with week with
Saudi leaders, I stressed a number of functional areas that will be
critical to enabling Gulf countries to play a stronger regional role:
including maritime forces, ground forces including especially special
operations and counterterrorism forces, air and ballistic missile
defense forces, and cyber protection. We also conduct over 50 military
exercises a year with our regional partners, including the
International Mine Counter Measure Exercise, and the Eagle Resolve and
Eager Lion exercises, which deepen coordination and interoperability.
And, we've offered sophisticated defense equipment, including the THAAD
[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] ballistic missile defense system
and long-range precision strike capabilities, to some of our Gulf
partners.
In conclusion, this is a good deal because it removes a continued
source of threat and uncertainty in a comprehensive and verifiable way
by preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. It is a deal that
takes no option away from a future President. This is an important
achievement and a deal that deserves your support.
Meanwhile, the United States, the Department of Defense, and the
men and women of the finest fighting force the world has ever known,
with your support, will continue to be committed to the defense of
America's interests, friends, and allies, to counter ISIL and Iran's
malign influence, and to uphold the President's commitment that Iran
will not obtain a nuclear weapon should it walk away from this deal.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Dempsey?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
and the members of this committee, for the opportunity to
address your questions regarding the military implications of
the negotiated deal with Iran.
Given our discussion before this body just a few weeks ago,
I will keep my comments brief.
As I have stated previously, I was consulted on the
military implications during the course of the negotiations and
provided my best military advice appropriately. If followed,
the deal addresses one critical and the most dangerous point of
friction with the Iranian regime. But as I have stated
repeatedly, there are at least five other malign activities
which give us and our regional partners concern.
These run the gamut from ballistic missile technology to
weapons trafficking, to the use of surrogates and proxies, to
naval mines and undersea activity, and last, but not least, to
malicious activity in cyberspace. The negotiated deal does not
alleviate our concerns in those five areas. The negotiated deal
does not change the military options at our disposal.
And in our ongoing efforts to counter the Iranian regime's
malign activities, we will continue to engage our partners in
the region to reassure them and to address these areas.
Ultimately, time and Iranian behavior will determine if the
nuclear agreement is effective and sustainable. In the interim,
I will continue to provide my best military advice and present
military options.
With that, I stand subject to your questions.
Chairman McCain. I mention to my colleagues we have a vote
on right now, and usually we bounce back and forth, but I think
that this is important enough for us to recess for until the
completion of the second vote. I understand there is two, that
one is ending right now and the other is beginning.
So I would ask the indulgence of our witnesses, and I
apologize if they--if we could recess for approximately 10
minutes while we are able to complete these two votes. I think
this hearing is important enough not to have us bounce back and
forth because I think all members would like to hear the
complete testimony.
So, again, my apologies. We will stand down for 10--10
minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman McCain. The committee will reconvene, and I want
to thank the witnesses for their patience. I am sure they
understand that from time to time, we are required to vote.
So I want to thank the witnesses for being here.
And General Dempsey, your statement has been completed. And
is there any other statements that would like to be made? Then
we will begin with questions, and we will have 5 minutes.
Secretary Carter, the issue has arisen that there is side
agreements that have been made between the IAEA and Iran that
apparently the Congress has not been made privy to, and could I
ask that since these IAEA agreements, side agreements have to
do with the weapons programs of the Iranians and the inspection
and verification of those programs, will we in Congress receive
the information concerning those side agreements in order to
make a judgment as to the degree of verification?
Secretary Carter. Chairman, I think it is important that
the content of those agreements and the manner in which they
provide for verification of the nuclear undertakings Iran is
making in this agreement and the procedures of the IAEA be
known to the Congress. I can't speak for the actual specific
documents themselves. I am sure Secretary Moniz or Secretary
Kerry can.
But it is an important part of the verification of the
agreement, and obviously, verification is an important part of
any--any agreement. Let me ask Secretary Moniz if he wants to
add anything on the specifics of the IAEA?
Secretary Moniz. Well, thank you, Ash.
I could certainly add that the--first of all, to be honest,
sir, I would not call them side agreements in the sense that
the agreement in the JCPOA is that Iran must cooperate for the
IAEA to complete its process on PMD. Then the IAEA, as is
standard, negotiates a safeguards confidential document with
the country to define the protocols that will----
Chairman McCain. Those protocols--those protocols are very
important, Mr. Secretary. Are we going to be aware of those
protocols? Because we know that with any agreement with a
country such as Iran, the devil is in the details.
Secretary Moniz. All I can say is that--well, first of all,
I personally have not seen those documents.
Chairman McCain. Which is astounding, to be honest with
you. That is----
Secretary Moniz. Well----
Chairman McCain.--absolutely astounding that you have not
seen the documents that are about the requirement for
verification.
Secretary Moniz. All I can say is that the agreement
requires their cooperation with the IAEA, and this is the
standard practice of the IAEA, whose independence is very
critical to all of us.
Chairman McCain. What is critical to all of us, Mr.
Secretary, that we have verification of the--and inspections of
Iranian activities because they have a clear record of
cheating.
Secretary Moniz. We agree.
Chairman McCain. So, so we agree, all of us, I believe,
that we should see those instruments of verification.
Otherwise, how can we make a judgment as to these--this
agreement can be enforced and verify with a country that has a
long record of cheating?
Secretary Moniz. The IAEA will, of course, then take the
information that Iran must provide by October 15th and complete
their report. And at that time, I think we will understand the
IAEA's confidence in their--in their verification measures.
Chairman McCain. So we are----
Secretary Moniz. Building up, I might say, a very long
history of this.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
Chairman McCain. So we are then dependent on the confidence
of the IAEA, not the actual viewing of the agreement and
verification. I don't think many of us would agree with that
process.
General Dempsey, you told the committee just a few weeks
ago, ``Under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on
Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms
trafficking.'' Now we are seeing after 5 years a relief of
sanctions on conventional arms and, of course, 8 years
ballistic missiles.
How does that comport with the terms of this agreement with
the statement that you made before the committee?
General Dempsey. Well, it won't surprise you, Chairman, to
know that my recommendation was to keep pressure on Iran on the
other malign activities for as long as possible, and that
recommendation was made. And then it entered into the
negotiating process.
I will say I think that time works for us as well as Iran
in this regard, and so with the agreement made, and having had
the opportunity to give my advice, I support it.
Chairman McCain. Do you, Secretary Carter, believe that--
that Iran will change its behavior as a result, if this
agreement is finalized? And have you seen any indication of
that?
Secretary Carter. I have not, Mr. Chairman. And speaking
just from my own judgment, I don't foresee that or have any
reason to foresee that. That is why it is important that the
agreement be verifiable. That is why it is important that Iran
not have a nuclear weapon, and that is also why it is important
that we keep doing everything that we need to do.
Defend our friends and allies, remain strong in the Gulf,
freedom of navigation, ballistic missile defense, all the
things we are doing. We need to keep doing those things, and
the agreement doesn't limit us in any way.
Obviously, if Iran changes its behavior, that would be a
welcome thing. But I see no reason to foresee that, Chairman,
personally.
Chairman McCain. I see no reason to foresee it, and I see
them now with about $50 billion or $60 billion with which to
pursue those malign activities, and I have seen Secretary Lew's
testimony and others that don't worry, they will be using it
for domestic purposes. They are doing it now with the assets
that they have. One can only imagine what they might be doing
with 50 billion or 60 billion additional dollars.
Look, I just would like to say again I know that the
witnesses have very busy schedules, and I am grateful that you
sought to testify before the committee today in order to help
us understand this issue. And I thank you.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carter, you indicated in your statement that the
United States has not given up any of its military options with
respect to the region and to the Iranians. And I would presume
also it has not given up any of its military intelligence and
national intelligence operations with respect to Iran.
And those intelligence operations, I would presume, would
be focused in great detail on potential violations of this
treaty. Is that your sense, too?
Secretary Carter. Yes. Without going into detail here,
certainly we have intelligence activities focused on the
Iranian nuclear program. But we have on everything else they
are doing, malign activity, Quds Force, ballistic missiles,
arms transfers, the whole--the whole thing. It is a very
important intelligence effort.
Senator Reed. And Secretary Moniz, I understand that
General Clapper yesterday indicated that he is confident, I
think is a reasonable explanation, of the intelligence
community's ability to detect any significant violation of the
treaties with or without direct contact with IAEA. Is that a
fair judgment in your mind?
Secretary Moniz. Yes. In fact, he and I, Clapper, CIA
[Central Intelligence Agency] Deputy Director Cohen, National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency head Cardillo all made
statements. Clapper in particular said that we would have far
greater insight into the Iranian program with the agreement.
And I would add that far greater insight will persist
essentially forever.
Senator Reed. General Dempsey, in your military assessment,
what is more effective in delaying or stopping the Iranian
nuclear program at this time or in the near future, a military
strike or this P5+1 agreement?
General Dempsey. Well, first, Senator, I would like to
point out that the military options remain.
Senator Reed. Right.
General Dempsey. Second, I think that a negotiated
settlement provides a more durable and reduces near-term risk,
which buys time to work with regional partners to address the
other malign activities. But there are about five military
implications. You have invited me here today to talk about the
military implications, if you would allow me?
Senator Reed. Please.
General Dempsey. I mean, the first is it does reduce the
risk of a near-term conflict with Iran over their nuclear
program. Second, another military implication is we have to
sustain those options. They have to be preserved into the
future.
Third, there is clearly the opportunity for Iran to use
some of the revenue that they gain for malign purposes, and
that bears watching and collaboration with our regional
partners, including Israel.
Fourth, this will require us to strengthen our
relationships and our collaboration in that part of the world.
Then derivative of that is, fifth, we will have to--we should
maintain and will maintain our forward presence.
Those are the military implications.
Senator Reed. The GCC in terms of the military
expenditures, roughly double what the Iranians spend and has a
capacity of even going much higher, given their revenues. Is
that a fair assessment?
General Dempsey. Yeah, double is probably the average.
Certain countries far more than that.
Senator Reed. And one of the factors that we are going to
have to work with our allies in the region is making sure that
they are--those resources are focused and can deter or defeat
any aggression or proxy aggression by the Iranians, and that is
the whole point, I think, of the collaboration that you are
undertaking?
General Dempsey. We have got a series of initiatives, both
with the Israelis and the GCC, to better position ourselves to
address those other malign activities.
Senator Reed. And so, we have a situation develop where the
resources are available. We are trying to reorganize in
collaboration with the regional partners so they are much more
effective to respond. So, essentially, we are not ignoring
these hostile threats by the Iranians on the ground through
proxy or anything else. Indeed, we are, in a sense, amping up
our activities.
Is that fair?
General Dempsey. Well, what I would say, Senator, is you
know my responsibility is to articulate risk and provide
options to our elected leaders in how to mitigate them. And
this does cause us to have to increase our military. We have to
pay more attention to the malign activities.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Right now in the middle of one of the largest bills of the
year, and I am the sponsor. Therefore, I haven't been in on all
this fun. So I read this morning to see what happened
yesterday, Secretary Kerry. This is in the, I guess, the
Washington Post.
President Obama promised that his nuclear deal with Iran
would not be based on trust, but rather unprecedented
verification. Now it turns out Obama's verification regime is
based on trust after all. Trust in two secret side agreements
negotiated exclusively between Iran and the International
Atomic Energy Agency that apparently no one, including the
Obama administration, has seen.
And it goes on to say, ``It turns out that only two
parties, the IAEA and Iran, get to actually see it. However----
'' Well, and then further, in the U.S. News and World Report,
it says, ``By law, the administration is required to provide
Congress with the contents of the nuclear deal and all related
matters and annexes.''
Secretary Kerry, do you agree with that analysis of the
law, what your requirement is?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, let me just say to clarify on the
earlier part of the question, Congress will be fully briefed on
this--on this agreement in a classified session. And indeed,
one of our key negotiators, the day- to-day lead negotiator,
Wendy Sherman, was briefed on it. And Ernie Moniz was likewise
briefed on it. So we are aware of what the basics of it are.
It is standard procedure. I mean, there are 189 countries
that have an agreement with the IAEA that are signed up to the
NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty]. Not that many have agreements.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, but my question is, are we entitled
to all the related materials and indexes?
Secretary Kerry. Correct. But, yes, those that are part of
the agreement, per se. This is, by reference, and we--no
country has access to the confidential agreements directly of
the IAEA and a country.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I can't--I don't mean to interrupt
you, but my time is limited here. I can't imagine that this
wouldn't be a part of what we all would be briefed on.
Now yesterday, when Congressman Poe asked the question, he
said the secret deal. Secretary Rice said that she has seen the
deal with the IAEA, and she is going to share it with Congress.
Now that is the question, if you have seen it since----
Secretary Kerry. No, but----
Senator Inhofe. Did you see it at the same time or prior to
the time that Secretary Rice saw it?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, National Security Adviser Rice
has not seen it.
Senator Inhofe. Well, she said she did yesterday.
Secretary Kerry. No, she has been briefed on it.
Senator Inhofe. Well, she did.
Secretary Kerry. I gave her exact quote to Congressman Poe,
and the exact quote is that she has seen--she has been briefed
on it. She hasn't actually seen the agreement.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I will give you her quote and make
sure it is in the record here. It says, ``She said she did. She
did see it. She did evaluate it. She said she did 6 days ago.''
That is 7 days ago now. She said 6 days ago she had seen it and
reviewed it and that Congress will get to see it in a
classified session.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Congressman, you are quoting--
Senator, you are quoting Congressman Poe.
Senator Inhofe. Who is quoting her. This is in quotation
marks.
Secretary Kerry. And I corrected him with her direct quote,
which we took from public record. Her quote says that she has
been briefed. She has not seen it.
Senator Inhofe. I have not seen that because I don't think
that she did correct that. That was specific on something that
happened 6 days before. As a matter of fact, that was in The
Hill magazine.
Secretary Kerry. The White House press--the White House
press briefing directly----
Senator Inhofe. The Hill magazine was--had something about
that, and that was prior to the time. It was 7 days ago today,
Secretary Kerry, that we had a confidential, classified
briefing, right? I was there. You were there. Most of the
people at this table were there.
And I would say this. In a classified session, you can't
say what was said, but was that addressed at all?
Secretary Kerry. It was.
Senator Inhofe. Was that addressed at all?
Secretary Kerry. It was addressed. It was. A question came
up about it, and the answer was given that, of course, Congress
will be briefed with respect to the contents. And of course,
you need to be briefed. Everybody needs to be briefed.
Senator Inhofe. My point is, Mr. Secretary, that that was a
classified session where we were in a position to be briefed at
that time, and we weren't.
Secretary Kerry. I don't think we had the full material to
brief. I didn't have it, anyway. But we are prepared, and I
think Wendy Sherman is going to be briefing very shortly on
that, Senator.
But what we did provide, what we can provide is the actual
road map that the IAEA put out, and the IAEA has issued a full
road map of what their expectations are.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that. But I am talking about
the deal, the secret documents. That is what I am referring to.
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is not--it is a confidential
agreement. It is being--it is being postured as this great sort
of----
Senator Inhofe. I think----
Secretary Kerry. It is a confidential agreement, which is
the standard procedure of the IAEA, and we have lived with the
IAEA, Senator. We have relied on the IAEA for years and years.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Secretary Kerry. And historically, the IAEA always creates
what is called a comprehensive safeguards agreement, a CSA,
which they negotiate with a country, and we don't get that
exact--it is not shared with the world. And there are reasons
that it is confidential that have to do with what you can get
out of that country, but we do get briefed on it.
We are aware of it. Secretary Moniz has actually made some
recommendations to the IAEA for them to actually tighten it up
a bit. I think, Secretary Moniz, you might--you have certainly
got confidence in it, in what you have heard----
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Secretary, my time has expired. But I
would say to the chairman, it is incomprehensible that we
didn't have full access to that, and I think most of the people
agree with that.
But my time expired. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Gentlemen all, thank you for your public service.
Mr. Secretary Lew, I want to go down a different road. We
have heard so many different commentaries about how much of a
windfall the sanctions relief would be for Iran. We have heard
$100 billion, $150 billion. The chairman is speaking of $50
billion or $60 billion.
You tell me if this is correct. That basically, sanctions
relief of what has been withheld is about $100 billion, but in
that $100 billion, there are contractual obligations of Iran to
pay some $50 billion. And therefore, the net that would
approximately come to Iran would be about $50 billion.
Is that somewhere in the ballpark? That is correct?
Secretary Lew. Senator, that is roughly correct. I am happy
to walk down the numbers, to the best of my knowledge.
Senator Nelson. You don't need to. I am trying to get
concepts here.
Secretary Lew. Well, the one thing I would add is there is
between $50 billion and $60 billion that is accessible. But
that money is not sitting in U.S. banks.
Senator Nelson. That is where I wanted to go. That money is
sitting in foreign banks, is it not?
Secretary Lew. It is sitting around the world in countries
like China and India and many other countries.
Senator Nelson. China, India, Japan, even Taiwan, and UAE
[United Arab Emirates], those banks?
Secretary Lew. Correct.
Senator Nelson. Therefore, if we denied the lifting of
economic sanctions, that money is in the hands of foreign
banks. What, in your professional opinion, is the likelihood
that that money would be released----
Secretary Lew. Well, just to be clear, Senator----
Senator Nelson.--to Iran?
Secretary Lew. It is Iran's money that is tied up because
of sanctions. So they have sold oil. The money has gone into
these foreign accounts, and it is sitting there. If this
agreement, this deal were to be rejected, the question is what
do those other banks do?
I don't think they will feel bound to hold that money the
way they have held it in an escrow away from Iran, and I think
without a nuclear agreement, some of that money will start
going back to Iran if there is no agreement, if this agreement
is rejected.
Senator Nelson. So, to recapitulate then, if we were to
reject it, the money is likely to flow because it is in the
hands of foreign banks that would not be compelled to adhere to
the United States wishes at that point. Is that correct?
Secretary Lew. Right. We do, obviously, have sanctions that
we could impose in other ways, but this money is not sitting in
U.S. banks. We can't lock it up directly. We need the
cooperation of other governments, other central banks, other
banks in order to keep this money from Iran.
And just to add one more detail, I think the notion that
somehow a $50 billion, $60 billion check gets written is wrong.
They can't spend all this money. This is the foreign Reserve
that they need to settle their foreign transactions.
They are already using--doing transactions in some of these
countries that are permitted, using their foreign Reserves as
exchange. They still will need to buy things overseas. So they
can't just spend all this money, or their ability to conduct
international commerce goes away.
And as I have said before, they have hundreds of billions
of dollars of competing domestic needs. So while I can't say
that not a penny will go to malign purposes. I have never said
that. I think the magnitude of resources available is highly
exaggerated by the notion of thinking that it is some $50
billion transfer.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary Moniz, can you explain to the
committee the insight that you, we--the United States
Government--will have as a result of this agreement on their
uranium centrifuge program, number one, and, number two, on
their plutonium program as a result of the agreement stating
there has to be modifications and/or dismantlement of the
plutonium reactor?
Secretary Moniz. Yes, Senator. On the uranium centrifuges,
we will have--well, the IAEA will have daily access and the use
of advanced technologies to make sure that all of the idle ones
are locked up and used only as replacements for broken ones.
And they will confirm that they are broken.
In addition, for 20 years, we will have containment and
surveillance of all manufacturing of key centrifuge parts. So
it is, as General Clapper said, we have tremendously enhanced
insight into their program.
On the plutonium, we will take--they will be required to
take out the core part of the reactor, fill it with concrete.
And then with international collaboration, and we will be part
of that, we will make sure that the replacement reactor is the
one that reduces plutonium production by about a factor of 10.
So it is way below the amount needed for a weapon.
But second, they have also agreed that belt and suspenders,
that the spent fuel for life, which is where the plutonium
resides, will be sent out of the country. So we have very, very
good containment there.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you.
I have been a member of and chair now the Strategic
Subcommittee. I worked with Senator Donnelly and Senator Nelson
over the years. It has been the unified view of the world's
developed nations that Iran not have a nuclear weapon. It is a
grave threat to peace in the world.
Secretary Kissinger, sitting where you are, said a few
months ago that if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, he named Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt would get nuclear weapons. Proliferation
dangers are very real, and that is why the whole world and even
the U.N. [United Nations] has been firm on this.
So I am very worried about where we are, and I believe the
initial error was the commencement of negotiations in 2009
after President Bush had pulled back from that because of the
behavior of Iran. And experts in the region warned us that the
Iranians are exceedingly patient, that talking can be a trap.
And the deeper you get into this talk, the less able you
are to take corrective action and to alter the situation as we
see it. So now we are at the end. The Iranians see long term,
and I am afraid that we have endangered the goal that we had it
pretty well a unanimous nation, world behind.
Secretary Carter, do you believe that Iran represents the
world's foremost sponsor of terrorism?
Secretary Carter. Let us see, state sponsor, probably so.
I--there are, unfortunately, it is such a kaleidoscope these
days that there are lots of sources of terror. But I think for
state sponsorship, that is probably accurate.
Senator Sessions. I think that is consensus. Secretary
Kerry testified yes to that question yesterday in the House.
Secretary Carter. Right.
Senator Sessions. And I wish it weren't so.
Secretary Carter. Me, too.
Senator Sessions. And there is a goal and dream that
somehow Iran could be brought in from the cold and we can work
with them, but I believe that it was former adviser to
President Reagan, Bud MacFarlane, who said revolutionaries
don't go back on the revolution. And you believe that the
Supreme Leader Khamenei remains committed to the revolutionary
goals of the Iranian revolution?
Secretary Carter. I only read what he says, which suggests
that he does.
Senator Sessions. I think he does. I don't think he has any
intention to abandon that. Hasn't he--he was recently at an
event and led a rally in which chants punctuated the rally,
``Death to America. Death to Israel.'' Do you believe that
those reflect his views?
Secretary Carter. Again, I am not an expert, but certainly
I can read the newspaper. Certainly seems so, and that is the
reason to be so concerned about Iran, Iran's malign activities,
support for terrorism, and especially to make sure they don't
get a nuclear weapon, as which is key.
Senator Sessions. I think that is the only conclusion we
can reach. I think he means what he says. We can think it is
strange and unserious and not serious, but it is serious. It
represents the radical ideological agenda of this regime, which
makes it a pariah regime, which makes this a danger to the
entire world.
And negotiating an agreement that allows them to obtain
missiles is also dangerous, even if it is 5 years or 8 years
out. Iranians are very patient.
Now you were asked earlier about this, and you said, ``The
reason we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that
the `I' in ICBM stands for `intercontinental,' which means
having the capability to fly from Iran to the United States,
and we don't want that.''
I think that was a very clear policy decision of the United
States. But doesn't this agreement allow after at least 8
years--and they have been known to cheat--to purchase on the
open market items that would help assist them in building an
ICBM system capable of reaching the United States?
Secretary Carter. Well, I am, and I think we all need to be
very concerned about their ballistic missile activities with or
without this agreement. That is why ballistic missile defense
is so important, including ballistic missile defense of the
United States.
I spoke earlier about ballistic missile defense of Israel,
which we also worked very hard with Israel on.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think the administration and you
have supported missile defense for the United States.
Secretary Carter. And also--I think we have, too.
Senator Sessions. And you say they shouldn't have this
capability, and we should stop it. And this agreement, does it
not, allows them to purchase anything they need on the world
market after the date in the agreement?
Secretary Kerry. No, Senator. Could I answer that? It
actually does not.
The 8 years represent the best that we were obviously able
to negotiate with 3 countries of the 7, who said there should
be nothing. But we were comfortable accepting the idea of the
8, which, by the way, still leaves us those 8 years with
Chapter 7 enforcement with respect to that. But we were
comfortable because we have a number of other tools already
available to us, Senator, which we can apply to be able to
prosecute their efforts with respect to missiles.
Specifically, we have the Missile Technology Control
Regime. We have the executive order of the President of the
United States, which allows him to sanction anybody who is
providing any materials whatsoever for missile construction. We
have the Proliferation Security Initiative with 100 countries,
which allows us to block the transfer of materials for weapons
construction.
We have the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act.
We have an additional two executive orders. So we have huge
tools available to us way into the future----
Senator Sessions. It seems to me that last agreement, this
agreement would trump that.
Secretary Kerry. No, there is no trumping of anything.
These are all existing. We also have----
Senator Sessions. I don't know what the language is in the
agreement for if it is not--has no meaning, Senator Kerry.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, these are additional agreements
that we have outside of this agreement, which allow us to
continue to protect us with respect to missile development. We
also have additional U.N. [United Nations] sanctions that
prohibit the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, prohibit the flow of
weapons to Iraqi Shia, prohibit the flow of weapons to Houthi,
prohibit the flow of weapons to----
Senator Sessions. Well, they are flowing now, are they not?
Secretary Kerry. Indeed, because they haven't been
enforced, which is precisely what the administration has
decided we need to do more effectively. And that is why in 3
days, I am meeting with the whole GCC in Doha to lay out the
very specifics of the proposal for how we are going to push
back against Iran.
But I would leave you with one thought, Senator. You have
adequately and appropriately pointed to the rhetoric of the
leader and to the things they are doing. Simple question. If
that is what they want to do, are you better off preventing
them from having a nuclear weapon, or do you want to go right
back to where we were when they had 19,000 centrifuges, 12,000
kilograms of material, enough for 10 to 12 bombs.
They have already mastered the fuel cycle. So don't be
looking 15 years down the road. Right now, they have this
ability. And we are stopping that. We are taking that away from
them and providing a lifetime----
Chairman McCain. The Senator's time has expired.
Secretary Kerry.--inspection.
Chairman McCain. How did that North Korean one deal work
out for you?
Senator McCaskill?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, I can give you the complete
differentiation.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill is--your time is
expired. Senator McCaskill?
Secretary Kerry. It didn't work out for me. I didn't cut
the deal.
Senator McCaskill. General Dempsey, is there anything in
this agreement that would constrain our ability to take any
military action that our country thought was necessary against
Iran?
General Dempsey. No, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. Secretary Lew, I am concerned about the
alternative to the deal. And one of the things I don't think
has been covered enough in all of the testimony that has
occurred, and I think all of us are following all of this very
closely. I got the point that Senator Nelson was trying to make
that the money is not in our control, and it appears, looking
at it, if all the other countries walk away from us, if we
reject this deal, that they are going to get the money one way
or another.
Either they are going to get the money because they are
entitled to it if we do the deal, or they are going to get the
money because we can't control it. But I don't know that that
is completely accurate.
And I think it is important because this is not about is
this a good deal? This is also about what happens if we don't
do this deal? And I think it is important to talk about whether
the power the United States would have if this deal was
rejected to, in fact, force our will on these countries that
hold this money.
We have a lot of tools at our disposal, as the major
economic power that we are. A lot of these are our NATO allies.
Obviously, Japan. So I think it is fair that we shouldn't just
say if we walk away from this deal, they are going to get all
the money, and they are going--I think it is fair to try to
really drill down, and you try to give us a picture.
Let us assume, I know none of you want to assume that this
deal is rejected. But let us assume it is. At that moment, what
power do we have as a country to keep this money from flowing
to Iran and its nefarious activities?
Secretary Lew. Senator, that is a very fair question. And
obviously, nobody can give you an entirely precise answer
because there is perfectly legal ways for them to use some of
this money now.
For example, if they buy Chinese goods, they can pay with
their Reserves that are held in China. So they could make the
decision that they are going to acquire the things they need to
acquire through the countries where they have Reserves and chip
away at those Reserves.
The question of what our unilateral sanctions can do versus
multilateral sanctions is a complicated one. We have powerful,
powerful unilateral tools. The United States is the world's
banking center. The dollar is the Reserve currency.
Transactions that go through U.S. financial institutions are
within our grasp.
But that doesn't give us the ability to reach out to all
foreign banks and to all foreign transactions. And I think that
it is at our own peril if we have a sanctions regime where we
are enforcing unilateral sanctions that the rest of the world
is rejecting, which is very different from what has been going
on over these last few years.
We have worked bilaterally with countries around the world
to do things against their own economic interest because they
agreed with us on the imperative of stopping Iran from getting
a nuclear weapon.
If they see us walk away from an agreement that they
believe would stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, I think
the degree of cooperation we get goes down considerably. It is
not black and white. It is not we go from being able to do
everything to doing nothing. But what has made the sanctions
regime so effective these last few years is the fact that we
have had the international cooperation.
India and China have been buying less oil from Iran than
would have been good for their economy. How do you enforce
bilaterally with countries around the world doing things
against their interest just by saying we insist?
So there are things we can do. There are certainly ways
that----
Senator McCaskill. I think it----
Secretary Lew. But it gets much harder.
Senator McCaskill. And I appreciate that answer. But I
really think it would be helpful for those of us who are really
trying to analyze both scenarios if you all would try, to your
best ability, put in writing what you envision, what would be
our best effort at keeping Iran isolated if, in fact, this deal
is rejected.
Because I don't think it is fair for us just to assume that
we have no power if this deal is rejected because, clearly, we
still are going to have a lot of power.
I am almost out of time. This is an important question, I
think, for Secretary Moniz. And I know this is a hard question
to give an exact answer to. But do you believe that if we walk
away from this deal, Iran has a nuclear weapon by Christmas?
Secretary Moniz. Well, I can't really answer that question.
What I can say is----
Senator McCaskill. Do your best. I think it is important
for us to know how close they are.
Secretary Moniz. They--well. They are a nuclear threshold
state today. They could certainly generate the nuclear
materials within months, which is before Christmas. And what is
then the unknown is the degree to which they have completed,
which we can't discuss right now, other weaponization
requirements.
That is what, of course, the IAEA, in building up its
dossier over many years, which it now needs to complete, have
certainly identified, labeled Iran as having had a structured
program of activities relevant to nuclear weapons in the past.
So it is a threshold state, and that is the risk we face. The
deal will walk them back from that threshold and give us
permanently more insight into their--into any weapons program
they might choose to pursue.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. They are a nuclear threshold state, and
they have denied all along that they had any intention of doing
so up and to the present time. I think that is instructive.
I think Senator McCaskill may be onto something here with
regard to all of the options before us. My friend Senator Reed
asked a question about are we better off with a negotiated
settlement or a military strike, as if those are the only two
alternatives. Of course, we know that those are not the only
two alternatives.
I wish our European friends, our Western allies had not
been so eager to leave the sanctions regime, but they were. The
United States could go it alone. And as the Secretary pointed
out, we do have unilateral tools that would be effective.
So, you know, continue trying to get a good deal, continued
unilateral tools on the part of the United States, making
people choose between banking with America and banking with
Iran. Those tools are there.
Let me say to you, General Dempsey, I appreciate your
service, and I appreciate the many times you have come before
this committee. We have disagreed and agreed from time to time.
It would seem to me that your brief nine- sentence opening
statement to this committee today amounts to damning this
agreement with faint praise, I have to say.
You mentioned that there are six areas in which Iran is a
bad actor, and you say five--five of these malign activities
give us real concern, and you list them. But then you end and
give us these words of assurance.
``Ultimately, time and Iranian behavior will determine if
the nuclear agreement is effective and sustainable.'' That,
sir, does not give me a confidence level, and I just have to
tell you that, based upon your very brief and I think tepid
endorsement of this agreement.
With regard to the conventional arms embargo, as late as
the spring, we weren't hearing about this. General Dempsey,
when did you become aware that there would be this huge relief
from the conventional arms embargo, and isn't it a fact that it
caught you by surprise?
General Dempsey. Well, first, Senator, I would ask you not
to characterize my statement as tepid nor enthusiastic, but
rather pragmatic. And I have said from the start that relieving
the risk of a nuclear conflict with Iran diplomatically is
superior to trying to do that militarily, but I will sustain
the military options in case that becomes necessary.
As to your question about timing, I was consulted or asked
for my advice episodically when military implications became
part of the conversation. And probably about a week or two
before the agreement was finalized, I gave my final
recommendation regarding sanctions.
Senator Wicker. Well, late--that is very late in the
agreement, and I would just say it seems to me that the advice
that we have been getting on the other side of this agreement
down through the months and over time, this--this massive
retreat from conventional arms embargos is something new and
something very troubling.
Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, in the minute I have left
that the assessment of the facts and the assessment of the
effect this agreement will have by neighbors in the region I
think is so instructive, should be so instructive to this
Congress. And I don't blame my friends on the Democratic side
of the aisle for having concerns also.
It is striking that from right to left, every ideology
within the country of Israel is opposed to this agreement. It
is striking that the Arab neighbors, the Saudis and others, are
alarmed at this deal.
And I would submit to the record, Mr. Chairman, in the
closing seconds an op-ed by Ari Shavit, senior correspondent
for left of center Israeli newspaper Haaretz, in which he says,
``The Iranian negotiating team succeeded in destroying
completely the sanctions mechanism.'' He points out that, ``The
United States, European Union, Britain, France, Russia, and
China recognize again and again Iran's right to develop
advanced centrifuges, which could be 5 to 10 times bigger than
the capacity of the old ones.''
``This means,'' Mr. Shavit concludes, ``that the
international community is not only enabling, but actually
ensuring the establishment of a new Iranian nuclear program,
which will be immeasurably more powerful and dangerous than its
predecessor.''
I submit this article for the record, Mr. Chairman----
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Wicker.--with a great deal of concern.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all very much, both for your efforts on this
negotiation and for being here today.
Secretary Carter, you were in the Middle East last week.
Can you tell us what you heard from our allies in the Middle
East about how they felt about this agreement, specifically
Saudi Arabia and Israel? Obviously, we have heard what Prime
Minister Netanyahu has had to say.
Secretary Carter. Sure. Sure, Senator.
Beginning with Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu was very
clear, as he has been clear publicly in his opposition to the
deal. We discussed that, but then we discussed many other
things as well.
Hezbollah's activity up on the border with Lebanon. In
fact, I visited there. Our missile defense activities, our
cybersecurity cooperation, our intelligence cooperation, lots
of other regional issues. And so, we discussed many topics, but
he was very clear.
Senator Shaheen. And excuse me for interrupting, but would
you agree with Senator Wicker's characterization that the
Israelis were united in their opposition to the agreement from
left to right?
Secretary Carter. I only spoke about this to the prime
minister, of course, who is the leader of their country. He
was, as he has been publicly, very, very clear.
Senator Shaheen. And what did you hear from some of our
Arab allies in the Middle East?
Secretary Carter. I spoke to the king of Saudi Arabia, who
repeated to me a statement he had issued a few days before
supporting the agreement. He referenced that--again, I don't
think this is violating any confidence--that the verification
and, as he put it, snapback provisions were particularly
important to him. So he referenced those things.
And then, again, we went on to talk about other things that
are more related to the defense agenda, including the--his air
force's munitions, cyber concerns that Saudi Arabia has, and
something that we started to discuss at the GCC, namely Saudi
Arabia's role in countering ISIL, which is a whole other
subject there.
Senator Shaheen. And did you hear from any of our other
Arab allies in the Middle East that they support the agreement?
Secretary Carter. I spoke to the Jordanians about it.
Again, this wasn't a major topic with them. We had a lot of
other things to talk about.
But did not express any opposition. I don't recall exactly
what they said.
Senator Shaheen. Okay.
Secretary Carter. It wasn't really the subject of our
meeting there. Those are the three places that I met with.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Dempsey, is there a military option, short of
invasion, that would roll back Iran's nuclear program more
substantially over the next 10 years than the JCPOA does, in
your opinion?
General Dempsey. Well, I would have to make assumptions
about how often we would be compelled to conduct airstrikes or
stand up munitions. But the military options that exist would
disrupt the program by several years, but there is nothing to
say we couldn't repeat it if necessary.
Senator Shaheen. And do you have--is there any intelligence
information to suggest what Iran's response would be, should we
engage in an airstrike against them?
General Dempsey. Yes, I wouldn't say it rises to the level
of intelligence. But the analysis suggests that they would
counter our presence in the region at every opportunity and use
these other malign activities that they have available to them.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Secretary Moniz, there has been a lot of discussion about
the 24-day delay, and you have testified in the Foreign
Relations Committee that to the extent to which we would be
able to detect nuclear activity--so uranium--in an extended
period beyond the 24-day delay.
What if the activity does not include nuclear material, to
what extent are you--do you believe we could detect other
activity other than uranium-related or nuclear-related
activity?
Secretary Moniz. Well, Senator, first of all, permit me to
reinforce the fact that having the 24-day period is itself new
in the sense that there has never been any time limit in terms
of access to undeclared sites. Again, to repeat, on nuclear
materials, we have very, very sensitive capabilities, and
historically, those have been proved. And we can add more in
classified context.
With regard to non-nuclear materials, it gets more
difficult. However, when one has nuclear weapon specialized
activities, such as explosively driven neutron initiators, we
would not be without tools to detect activities in that kind of
a time period.
But clearly, as one gets farther and farther away into, let
us say, just conventional explosives testing, which is
something militaries do normally, then it is a question of
intelligence putting together the context for suspicious
activities. But nuclear material, in the end, you need to do
nuclear materials to get to the weapon, and that is where we
have extraordinary techniques.
Mr. Chairman, if I may add one more comment? If you permit,
just to go back to Senator Wicker's comment on advanced
centrifuges, I don't know that particular article you quoted.
But it appears to have forgotten to mention that their most
advanced machines, which are 5 their current
machines, they are already operating at full cascade level, two
different machines.
And those are going to be dismantled before this--before
this is implemented.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I am informed that Senator Ernst is
required to preside over the vital proceedings on the floor of
the United States Senate, which is critical to her presence. So
I would ask the indulgence of my colleagues to allow her to
proceed.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
colleagues.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
This will be one of the most significant votes that we take
as members of Congress, moving forward. So I believe it is
imperative that we get this right.
Not long ago, the United States discovered that we had had
a data breach at OPM [the Office of Personnel Management].
Simple. Data, personnel records had been tapped into. So that
just is laying the groundwork of where I am going next.
Secretary Carter and Secretary Moniz, I am very concerned
regarding the Government's ability to detect, deter, and defeat
cyber attacks on our Government, particularly by China, Russia,
and Iran. With respect to Iran in particular, according to
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Iran has
conducted cyber attacks on U.S. Government officials involved
in nuclear nonproliferation, hacking which compromised the
Marine Corps intranet, Sands Las Vegas Casino, and attacks
against U.S. banks.
In relation to the Iran deal, these attacks, along with
recent successful attacks against OPM, leads me to have less
than full confidence in our own cyber capabilities, let alone
the cyber capabilities of the IAEA. It is vital IAEA has a
lock-tight ability to protect its equipment and technology,
vital to ensuring effective monitoring of Iranian facilities
under this agreement against cyber attacks.
Just simple ``yes'' or ``no,'' Secretary Carter. Are you
concerned regarding Iran's ability to impact the effectiveness
of IAEA monitoring equipment through cyber?
Secretary Carter. I am sorry. I can't give you a ``yes'' or
``no'' answer to that. I am very concerned about Iranian cyber
activity, and you named three countries. I could go on with the
ones.
This is a big problem. And sadly, I share the lack of
confidence you have in the adequacy of our defenses. In the
Defense Department, you would think with all that we have paid
attention to protecting our own networks, that we would be
secure. But we are not, and we know that.
And it is not just Iran, but it is others as well. And that
is why we are trying to make investments in that area and pull
up our socks in the cyber area.
Senator Ernst. So----
Secretary Carter. But I can't reassure you on the cyber
front.
Senator Ernst. I am very concerned about this. Secretary
Moniz, yes or no, do you share a concern that this could be
vulnerable?
Secretary Moniz. Oh, I absolutely share a concern. But the
IAEA does have some robust technologies in terms of----
Senator Ernst. They are much more advanced than the United
States?
Secretary Moniz. I didn't say that, no. Look, cyber is
tough. General Dempsey also mentioned cyber is something that
keeps us up all the time, and we have to develop our
capabilities.
Senator Ernst. Fantastic. I have no confidence that we
would not be able to know if there were tampering involvement
going on as we try and monitor these activities or as IAEA
tries to monitor these activities.
Secretary Moniz. The IAEA, Senator, is, of course, quite
aware of this, and they do have measures.
Senator Ernst. And I hope that they improve those measures.
I do believe that we are vulnerable, as we have seen with our
own infrastructure.
And General Dempsey, we have heard some other discussion
today about the choices that the President has with this
agreement. Now 2 weeks ago, many of our news outlets, USA
Today, others had quoted President Obama as the choice is the
Iran nuclear deal or war. This seems to be a military decision,
and I understand that you advise the President on these issues.
Is that what you have told the President is that we either
take this deal or we go to war?
General Dempsey. No. At no time did that come up in our
conversation, nor did I make that comment.
Senator Ernst. Who is advising the President then that we
must go to war if this deal is not signed?
General Dempsey. I can't answer that. I can tell you that
we have a range of options, and I always present them.
Senator Ernst. And I thank you for that. Because I do think
and I think it is imperative that everybody on this panel
understand that there are other options available out there,
and a multitude of options. We are taught in the military about
DIME, diplomatic options, information operations, military
operations, and economic types of sanctions and opportunities
that we might have.
So for the President to outright reject everything but war
is outrageous to me. And I do hope that you are able to better
advise him that he needs to be careful with his language
because that seems to be the rhetoric we are hearing out there
is that we either go to war or we accept this deal, and I
reject that premise.
General Dempsey. As long as we agree that the--that
military strikes on a sovereign nation is an act of war. But
there are things between here and there.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. I agree, General Dempsey.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, you answered--well, first of all, let me
thank everybody at this table for your service to our Nation
and the hard work and dedicated service that produced this
agreement. Whether we vote for it or not, and I have made no
decision for myself, I think the Nation owes you its gratitude
for the hard work that you have done.
Is it fair to say, General Dempsey, that the breakout time
for Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon will return to what it is now, about 2 to 3 months,
after the 10-year period?
General Dempsey. I don't know that it is fair to say that
because I think that some of the additional protocols and
things which are out of my area of expertise could inhibit them
for a longer period of time.
Senator Blumenthal. Let us assume for the moment that, in
fact, the breakout time is reduced at the end of that 10-year
period to essentially what it is now. Will the United States be
in a stronger or weaker position militarily if the military
option is necessary for some future President?
General Dempsey. The chairman earlier correctly pointed out
that Iran could procure some weapon systems that could make our
military option more difficult but will not make it more
impossible. And I think the answer to your question, Senator,
is depends how we use the time between now and then, and we
have got to plan with our allies in the region to increase
their capabilities over that period of time.
So if we use the time wisely and we have the resources
necessary to do it, we should not assume we would be in a
weakened position.
Senator Blumenthal. Because the expectation has to be that
the Iranians will use that time to build their conventional
forces. At the very least, they will have more revenue from
various sources as the sanctions are lifted, substantial
revenue. Is that correct?
General Dempsey. Yes, but they are starting from an
extraordinarily weakened position conventionally. But in the
asymmetric arena, they are starting from a position of relative
capability.
Senator Blumenthal. Where I am going with this question is
what changes in military force structure do you think the
United States has to take, both to make sure that our National
security is assured and also that our allies' is as well? What
specific changes should the Armed Services Committee be
supporting in the near and longer term?
General Dempsey. Well, I mean, that is almost a separate
hearing. But I would suggest to you that we really need to have
the kind of budget certainty that the Secretary of Defense has
articulated. And then, second, that we should not at this point
in time consider reducing our force presence in the Middle East
area of responsibility.
Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lew, let me turn to the
economic sanctions that could be available, which my colleague
from Iowa has mentioned. Can those be put back in place? Can
the United States alone, even without our allies, use its
finance system and its banks to implement a severe sanctions
system?
Secretary Lew. Senator, we certainly have very significant
tools that we have used unilaterally and we could use again
unilaterally. But what we have seen over the last several years
is the impact of multilateral sanctions that have truly had a
crushing impact on Iran's economy.
It has brought them to the table. They have reached the
agreement that we are here discussing. I think the notion that
we can unilaterally equal or surpass that is something that is
inconsistent with what we have learned.
Senator Blumenthal. We may not be able to equal or surpass
it, but we can certainly make a significant and also severely
damaging effort if we choose to do so. Is that right?
Secretary Lew. We can. And what I would say is,
importantly, that the snapback provisions that are in this
agreement, if Iran violates it, make it so that both the U.S.
and the international sanctions would be back in place, which
puts us in the strongest position.
Senator Blumenthal. The challenge will be to mobilize our
partners in that effort.
Secretary Lew. Well, actually, I don't think it is a
challenge. The way it was constructed, it is a very strong
snapback provision. The international sanctions snap back in a
way that we can work our will by exercising a veto if there is
a disagreement with us.
Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Kerry, did you have a
comment? I noticed that you seemed to be----
Secretary Kerry. Well, there is a surreality here. I mean,
and with all due respect, the Senator from Iowa is not here.
But the President of the United States is not mandating war. He
is not--doesn't want to go war. It is not his choice, and he is
not advocating war.
What he is saying is that if you analyze the alternatives
here, and this is what I mean by surreality, when you say could
the United States continue some sanctions? To what end? To
negotiate? I mean, with whom?
Do you think the ayatollah is going to come back and
negotiate after he has already negotiated?
Chairman McCain. Secretary Kerry, the time has expired.
Please shorten your remarks.
Secretary Kerry. Could I just finish one thing, Senator?
Chairman McCain. Yes.
Secretary Kerry. The reason that the President talks about
the possibility of war is Iran has already made it clear that
if this is rejected, they consider themselves free to go back
and enrich and to go back to where they were with the 12,000
kilograms, 10 to 12 bombs, et cetera.
And the inevitable consequence of that will be a ``What are
you going to do about it?'' next step. We will have lost the
international support because the international community is
ready to enforce this deal. If we reject this unilaterally,
they walk away.
So you have huge difficulty with the sanctions, and you
lose your capacity to have the support for the military strike
if there had to be one. It is not a choice the President wants
to make, but it is the inevitable consequence of Iran moving to
assert what they believe is their right in the furtherance of
their program.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the chairman. I want to
thank all the witnesses for being here.
I also want to take this opportunity. It is probably going
to be the last time that General Dempsey testifies before the
committee. I want to thank you for your dedicated service and
for the service of your family.
And I know, General, that when you appeared before the
committee on July 7th, I was actually the person who asked you
about there had been floated some views in the press at that
time that Iran was pushing for lifting of the resolution on
ballistic missiles and the resolution of arms, which we now
know are in the agreement at 5 years and 8 years.
Just to be clear, when you came before the committee then,
you said under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on
Iran on those issues. So was it your military recommendation
that we not agree to lifting of those sanctions?
General Dempsey. Yes. And I used the phrase ``as long as
possible,'' and then that was the point at which the
negotiation continued. But, yes, that was my military advice.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I also wanted to ask you about an issue I know Senator
Ernst had talked about in the Iranian cyber activity. And a
number of years ago, we saw that there was an interruption of
Iran's nuclear program through some other cyber activity, I
think was reported, called Stuxnet. And that was reported in
the press, I believe.
In this agreement, according to paragraph 10.2 of Annex 3
of the deal, the United States is actually obligated under this
agreement to help strengthen Iran's ability to protect against
sabotage of its nuclear program. It might be hard for Americans
to believe that we would agree to help Iran protect against
sabotage of its nuclear program in light of its prior
intentions.
And General Dempsey, I wanted to ask your opinion on that.
Do you think it is a good idea for the United States to help
Iran actually protect its nuclear program against sabotage?
General Dempsey. I hadn't thought about that, Senator, and
I would like to have the opportunity to do so. I will say there
is--back to the cyber question that was asked earlier. I think
next week this committee and the Senate will consider some
cyber legislation that we have been eager to see passed for
some time so we can get ourselves better protected.
Senator Ayotte. Well, when we know that Iran continues
malign activity on the cyber front, the idea that we would
agree to help them protect its nuclear program against
sabotage. And I assume, as I read this language, that that
would also obligate us to inform the Israelis--inform Iran if
the Israelis were undertaking any kind of activities that might
undermine its nuclear program, at least if we are going to
adhere to the plain language of this agreement.
So I wanted to also ask about this idea. We have heard a
lot about sanctions, and sanctions, as I understand, Iran has
written the United Nations on July 20th about the sanctions
regime. And one of the issues that has concerned me about this
agreement is that once the sanctions, the long list of mainly
congressionally mandated sanctions that will be lifted under
this agreement are undertaken, if Iran, for example, engages in
terrorist activity, which it is known to do, separate from the
nuclear program, Iran seems to have taken the position in its
letter to the U.N.
And I have actually read the agreement, and I have been
concerned that the agreement provides the same that, in fact,
Iran says it is understood that reintroduction or reimposition,
including through extension of the sanctions and restrictive
measures, will constitute significant nonperformance, which
would relieve Iran from its commitments in part or in whole.
So my question is, as I read this, I am deeply concerned
that if we want to reimpose the toughest sanctions on issues
related to their terrorist activities and support for
terrorism, which is another tool in the toolbox, General, aside
from our military options, that Iran can then walk away from
this agreement.
And if the answer is you disagree with this
characterization, please tell me where in the plain language of
this agreement am I wrong.
Secretary Lew. Senator, the language says we can't reimpose
the nuclear sanctions if Iran complies with the nuclear
agreement. We have never given away any of our ability to use
other sanctions regimes--terrorism or human rights or----
Senator Ayotte. But, Secretary Lew, with all due respect,
the nuclear sanctions are the toughest sanctions that we would
impose in other context, too, including on crude oil, oil and
gas, on----
Secretary Lew. Senator, we Reserve the right, if there is a
financial institution that is engaging in financing terrorism,
to put sanctions back on that institution. That is not a
violation of the agreement. It is not a nuclear sanction.
Senator Ayotte. But Iran seems to take a different
position.
Secretary Lew. Well, what Iran does believe is that we can
take the nuclear sanctions, put a different label on them, and
put them right into place. And what we would have to do is make
the case, as we have on many occasions, that institutions
should be sanctioned for their behavior on terrorism and human
rights and regional destabilization.
We will continue to do that. We will do it vigilantly, and
all of our sanctions that apply in that area still stand.
Secretary Kerry. There is no restraint.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And General Dempsey, thank you also. Every time we say
good-bye to you, you come back in another week on another
panel. And I know it is not by choice, but we are thrilled to
have you here again.
Thank you very much for your service.
Mr. Secretary, Secretary of Energy, if a year from now we
have suspicions that something is going on at Parchin, does the
IAEA have access to go inside that building and see it or not?
Secretary Moniz. Well, again, we certainly have, through
the initial protocol and this agreement, access anywhere that
there is suspicion of nuclear activity. The protocols, again, I
would have to see with the IAEA, but it is certainly a
different--forward looking is very different from resolving the
possible military dimensions of----
Senator Donnelly. We need to know forward looking on this,
on whether it is Parchin or other military facilities, does the
IAEA have access to go inside those facilities?
Secretary Moniz. They certainly must have the access
granted to, again, resolve the issues that they need to
resolve. They must have integrity in the process.
Secretary Kerry. And if they do not, Senator, they would be
in material breach of the agreement.
Senator Donnelly. Okay. So this is different moving forward
than what has gone in the past?
Secretary Kerry. It is not only--yes, it is different. And
there is a different mechanism to bring it to a close for the
15 years. But even under the additional protocol, speaking to
Senator McCain's concern about North Korea, the lesson of North
Korea produced the additional protocol, and now there is the
additional protocol and the modified code, which have huge new
requirements for access.
Senator Donnelly. Secretary Lew and maybe Secretary Kerry
on this. One of the proposals that has been put forward is to
say no to this deal and then to tell the other countries who
are involved in regards to sanctions that a viable alternative
is to simply say to France, Germany, Britain, and others,
``Choose us or choose them as you move forward economically,''
that, you know, if you are going to continue to do business
with Iran, then you can't do business with us.
Do you see that as viable moving forward?
Secretary Lew. Senator, we do have powerful tools that make
it very dangerous for foreign business to violate U.S. laws.
And if they do business and violate our sanctions, we will
enforce.
Whether we can do that against the whole world effectively
without doing damage to our own economy is something that we
have to have serious considerations about. It is one thing when
we are taking action in concert with the world. It is another
thing if we are standing on our own.
So the ability of a technical sanction to work is not the
same as it being effective or necessarily adding up to what we
would like to accomplish.
Senator Donnelly. Okay. Secretary Carter, have you--I know
you are talking to the GCC countries. You have been in the
region there.
It seems to me that one of the challenges here is
confidence, confidence that they will be safe, that Israel will
be safe. That is what this comes from is making sure that your
child can be safe and sleep safe that night. And that is what
Mr. Netanyahu was trying to ensure, and that is what we are
trying to ensure.
So, as you look at it when you talk to our GCC friends and
others, is there any putting together of a plan that says to
Iran not one more inch? That as we move forward, you will see
from year to year to year that in Yemen not one more inch, that
against Hezbollah there will be massive retaliation if there is
actions, that we will stand with the Sunni tribal leaders in
Anbar to make sure that they have success, and we will be
viable and strong against whatever, you know, efforts Iran has
in Iraq.
To lay out the plan, let people know, let Iran know in
advance would help create, I think, a better sense of
confidence that there is a reason--that there is a reason to
stand with us.
Secretary Carter. I think that is extremely important, and
that is what the GCC countries are looking for in my
conversations with them, namely the continued commitment of the
United States to help them protect themselves so they can sleep
well at night, maintain our regional role, counter Iran's
malign influence and activities. At the same time, they
recognize perfectly well what has been said up here, which is
an Iran with nuclear weapons would be an enormous problem and
are supportive of an agreement that heads that off.
But at the same time, they want to make sure that we are
there. That is what the GCC countries were told at Camp David
by the President. My trip was in part to solidify all of the
things we are doing----
Senator Donnelly. I am just about out of time. So I just
want to finish by saying I think it is important to publicly
state a ``not one inch more'' policy. And then, additionally, I
am not at all comfortable with our people who are still in
Iran. They have to come home. I wish they had come home as part
of this agreement, and I know you do, too.
But this cannot rest because we don't leave anybody behind,
and we don't intend to leave them behind either.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Moniz, I would like to follow up a little bit on
what Senator Blumenthal was asking you about with regards to
the breakout time. What are some of the main factors that you
consider when you calculate that breakout time?
Secretary Moniz. Well, the key factors are the enrichment
capacity and the stockpile of enriched uranium. But there are
many other factors as well which come in, such as the rate at
which additional capacity could be built in during a breakout
time. So all of this comes in to our National laboratory
evaluation.
Senator Fischer. That would include the number of
centrifuges as well. Is that correct?
Secretary Moniz. Correct.
Senator Fischer. After 15 years of this agreement, what
limits do you think will be in place on those things that you
just mentioned?
Secretary Moniz. Well, after 15 years, they will probably
expand their capacity after those restraints, and that is why
such a key element is the--are the verification measures that
we put in place for all time, basically.
Senator Fischer. So we are talking about tracking the
nuclear material to make sure it is not diverted from a
civilian program. Correct?
Secretary Moniz. And that is 25 years, right.
Senator Fischer. Correct. We are basically just checking
Iran's math. Correct?
Secretary Moniz. Checking the math? Well, no, we are
checking our math, if you like. So the idea is to follow----
Senator Fischer. We are checking our math.
Secretary Moniz. And for 20 years, we follow all the
manufacturing. So it is the supply chain that we follow. Making
a--and our intelligence people will tell you that to actually
reproduce the entire supply chain covertly probably in multiple
places would be very, very difficult to conceal.
Senator Fischer. And we are just looking at, of course, the
declared facilities. Is that correct?
Secretary Moniz. No. We have--we have, of course, strong
measures in the declared facilities. But key is the undeclared
facilities, which, by definition, ultimately rests on the
actions of our and our allies' and friends' intelligence
capacity.
Senator Fischer. And do you believe--well, do you have
confidence in that capacity that we will be able to locate any
undeclared facilities and pressure Iran to allow us to make
sure that we have verification in those as well?
Secretary Moniz. Well, again, I would go back to the
statements of General Clapper and Cardillo and Cohen. Again,
Clapper said specifically that this will give us much greater
insight into what they are doing. That then leads us, and other
intelligence agencies that we work with, to point IAEA in the
right place, and now we have a unique new tool of a finite time
to get access to that place, or they are in material breach.
Senator Fischer. Are you concerned at all on what I view as
the discrepancies between statements made by our administration
and compare those to what is being--statements being made by
the adviser to the supreme leader when it comes to access to
allowing the IAEA to look at the military centers in Iran?
Where I think I believe I have heard our administration say
that we do have access to those. They are declared facilities.
But yet the adviser to the supreme leader says the access of
inspectors from the IAEA or from any other body to Iran's
military centers is forbidden. Who is correct on that?
Secretary Moniz. Well, I think we are correct. First of
all, I just might point out that there were many statements
made before Lausanne, before Vienna, that you could----
Senator Fischer. This one was made July 21st.
Secretary Moniz. Yes, but I am saying there were many
statements made before then, and you can check those statements
against the agreement. They don't square up all the time, shall
we say?
Senator Fischer. How are you----
Secretary Moniz. Now in terms of----
Senator Fischer. How are you going to reconcile that?
Secretary Moniz. In terms of the new--those statements were
very clear. First of all, the aim is not to go to military
sites, and by the way, it is not us, it is IAEA, of course. The
aim is to go to where there is there suspicious or suspicion of
nuclear-relevant activities.
If they are in a military site, doesn't matter. There is
still the IAEA access to those sites.
Senator Fischer. I only have a few seconds left, but I
would hope that you would reconcile those statements for the
public. You have stated that----
Secretary Moniz. We cannot control their statements.
Senator Fischer. You have stated that the 24-day waiting
period for international inspectors won't allow the regime to
conceal any illegal activity. But as I read the agreement and
many other people have pointed out, the inspectors' request to
visit those sites could be delayed much longer than 24 days.
I know that you are not concerned about the 24-day period.
You believe that we would or the IAEA would be able to handle
that. But if you look at different parts in Section Q of Annex
1 of the agreement, I think we have the potential that we are
looking at an 89-day delay. Do you think that would be
possible, and how confident are you about us being able to
inspect then?
Secretary Moniz. No, we certainly--we certainly cannot
allow for that. I might say I did not say any illegal activity.
I focused specifically or especially on activity with nuclear
material as my real focus, number one. And number two is the
IAEA, at any sign of lack of cooperation, they have to launch
the process with their request for access. Then comes the 24
days.
As I have mentioned also, there is in the unclassified
literature an example in Iran of a 6-month delay, an attempt to
conceal which did not work. They were caught red-handed.
Senator Fischer. You said you wouldn't allow the 89 day.
You just couldn't allow that. How many days after 24 days would
you allow?
Secretary Moniz. No, none after 24 days. It is that the
process to launch the formal request for access from IAEA has
got to be prompt. That launches the 24-day clock, and that is
the end.
Senator Fischer. You would not allow anything past that?
Secretary Moniz. I would not.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Secretary Moniz. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for joining us. Thank you for your
intense work on this. Obviously, we all care about the National
security of the United States and our allies.
Secretary Moniz, you and I had a very long conversation
about nuclear details, and what I would like you to discuss
with the committee specifically is the nuclear capabilities
that Iran has today are considerable, and most experts have
given it a 2- to 3-month timeframe to have enough enriched
uranium for one bomb.
I would like you to talk a little bit about their nuclear
expertise and, if left unchecked, how quickly can they ramp up
to greater production to more highly enriched uranium if--
excluding this deal arrangement?
And then, after you have described that, I would like you
to describe what the ramp-up time would look like, post 8, 10,
15 years. Because what I understand from reading the agreement
is that you have spent a lot of time identifying what can be
changed and modified in the three existing facilities so that
they don't run a military risk.
And so, I would like that more fully described, and
obviously, and the last point I want you to address is my
constituents are very concerned about clandestine operations.
To the extent you can talk about this in this setting, I would
like you to address how you detect a clandestine enrichment
facility during the agreement.
Secretary Moniz. Quite a few questions, Senator. In terms
of their current capacity, well, they have again demonstrated
the capacity to enrich uranium. That is clear. But I do want to
emphasize that they have also demonstrated they have enriched
to 20 percent enrichment.
Twenty percent is the cut-off that the IAEA uses for low-
enriched and high-enriched uranium. But the point here is that
the amount of work needed to get to 20 percent is nearly all
the work you need to get to 90 percent, which would be weapons
grade.
So they have the capability, and as I have already
mentioned, they already have full cascades running of the next
generation five times more powerful. This agreement will have
those dismantled at the time of implementation. So what is
critical is we are rolling them back in every dimension of
their program for at least a considerable period.
Now in terms of the breakout time, again, the President was
very clear and our P5+1 partners were very clear that a
quantitative criterion for the negotiation was there had to be
at least a 1-year breakout time in terms of fissile material
for at least 10 years. We have accomplished that with this
agreement. Our lab scientists are fully behind this, as are
those of other countries.
Then that will roll off and after 15 years at some point,
depending upon what they do, then we can revert, we may revert
to the current kinds of breakout times for fissionable
material. We still need to keep the lid on weaponization
activities and make sure those are not taken. And that was a
notable improvement from Lausanne to Vienna for that.
Senator Gillibrand. Right. So the agreements says they
can't ever make the steps towards weaponization?
Secretary Moniz. They can't ever make those steps, and that
is the point where we will be much better off at that time than
today because we will still have enhanced verification
procedures that can point our and other intelligence agencies
to any violations.
Senator Gillibrand. And after modifications at Arak, is
there any way at that you can reverse those modifications and
make it a heavy water plutonium facility again?
Secretary Moniz. The Arak reactor, in its redesign, would
provide us in this language a breakout time of years.
Senator Gillibrand. Right. So to unwind, it would be
significant?
Secretary Moniz. Because once it is online, they would need
years of operation to get enough plutonium to be relevant, and
the IAEA would detect their change of the operation within 1 or
2 months.
Senator Gillibrand. And with regard to Fordow, what is the
assessment there? After modifications, if they wanted to breach
the agreement and try to get up and running again, does that
take a significant amount of time?
Secretary Moniz. Well, first of all, yes. Because, first of
all, most of the centrifuge and infrastructure will not only be
stripped out completely, but they will not even be stored at
Fordow. They must be taken up to Natanz.
Second, we will have a major international not only IAEA
daily presence, but an international presence--the Russians
working with them on stable isotopes, new science
opportunities. If they kick everybody out, you know----
Senator Gillibrand. Right away?
Secretary Moniz. The alarm bells go off.
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, with my last few
seconds, do our military options become marginally better or
worse before or after the agreement?
Secretary Carter. If the agreement is implemented, they
become marginally better for the reason that under the
agreement, the facilities are--we learn more about them. Many
of them are dismantled, and so in that sense, that purely
technical military sense, becomes somewhat easier.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I want to discuss the two secret side deals between the
IAEA and Iran. I had to travel to Vienna last weekend to
discover the existence of these side deals. The administration
has now confirmed their existence. There is still some lack of
clarity about their content.
Secretary Kerry, have you read either of these two side
deals between the IAEA and Iran?
Secretary Kerry. No, I haven't read it.
Senator Cotton. Have you read any previous drafts?
Secretary Kerry. No, I haven't.
Senator Cotton. On any form--paper, tablet, computer?
Secretary Kerry. I have been briefed. I have been briefed
through our team that met with the IAEA.
Senator Cotton. Did anyone on your team read the text of
these agreements?
Secretary Kerry. I believe one person may have read it at
the--at the facility but doesn't have it. They don't possess
it.
Senator Cotton. What is that person's name?
Secretary Kerry. It is possible. I don't know for sure, but
it is possible Wendy Sherman may have. But I don't know that
for sure.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Moniz, have you read the text of
these agreements?
Secretary Moniz. No, sir. I have not seen them.
Senator Cotton. Have you read any prior version?
Secretary Moniz. No, sir.
Senator Cotton. On any medium--computer, tablet, phone?
Secretary Moniz. No. No.
Senator Cotton. Has anyone on your team at the Department
of Energy?
Secretary Moniz. Not--I am not sure. I don't know. I think
not, but I am not sure about that. I can ask in terms of the
technical team may have--maybe somebody saw something.
Senator Cotton. Please do and get back to us.
Secretary Moniz. Okay.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Kerry, besides potentially Under
Secretary Sherman, has, to your knowledge, anyone else in the
United States Government reviewed the text of these agreements?
Secretary Kerry. Not that I am aware of. I don't know. I
don't think so.
Senator Cotton. If Under Secretary Sherman has read the
text of these agreements, even if they are not in her
possession, does that not undercut the claims of
confidentiality between the IAEA and Iran?
Secretary Kerry. I don't know whether she read a summary or
a draft, I have no idea. I said I think, and I am not sure. But
I know she is briefing the Senate very shortly, Senator. So she
will be briefing in a classified setting.
Senator Cotton. I have received several classified
briefings about the deal, and I look forward to another one.
But what Congress would like is the text of these agreements,
as required by U.S. law.
Certain published reports starting--or most recently with
the Associated Press yesterday say that the content of the side
deal that discusses Parchin, the military base where detonators
for nuclear devices may have been tested, will allow Iran to
collect their own samples and submit those samples to the IAEA,
much like an NFL [National Football League] player taking his
own urine sample and sending it to Roger Goodell for a drug
test.
Can you confirm or deny that that is the content of those
side deals?
Secretary Kerry. I can't here in this session. But what I
can confirm is that Secretary Moniz, in his discussions both
with the IAEA and with the team, made recommendations to them
and I believe is satisfied that this can--whatever the process
is, that the process will be able to provide the answers we
need.
I don't know, Secretary Moniz, if you want to add anything
to that?
Senator Cotton. Actually, no, I would like to stick with
you, Secretary Kerry. Why can't we confirm or deny the content
of these agreements in public? Why is this classified? It is
not a sensitive U.S. Government document. The ayatollahs know
what they agreed to.
Secretary Kerry. Because we respect the process of the
IAEA, and we don't have their authorization to reveal what is a
confidential agreement between them and another country.
Senator Cotton. So the ayatollahs will know what they
agreed to, but not the American people?
Secretary Kerry. Well, the--no, not exactly. Because we
will share with you in the classified briefing what we
understand the context to be. But they negotiated the agreement
with the IAEA.
The IAEA is an independent entity under the United Nations,
Senator, as I know you know. And under I don't know even at
this point what the law says about the United States requiring
something which another entity's laws prohibit. So we have to
see whether that is a conflict of law or not.
Senator Cotton. Well, U.S. law requires any deal between
any party, not just the United States, to be submitted to
Congress before the 60-day clock begins to tick. To the extent
the IAEA, which I respect for the very admirable work they do,
which is often not supported by their member states, says it is
unprecedented, I would say this deal is without precedent. And
past precedence with cooperative countries like South Korea
or--I am sorry, South Africa cannot be cited.
I would like to move on to a second topic, specifically
Iran's support for terrorism. Could I have Chart 1, please?
General Dempsey, this chart describes a particularly
powerful kind of roadside bomb known as an explosively formed
penetrator. Are you familiar with what it shows?
General Dempsey. I am, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Could you explain exactly what the bottom
diagram shows of how an explosively formed penetrator works?
General Dempsey. A copper cone is melted at super high
temperatures and projected and essentially burns its way
through armor plate.
Senator Cotton. The copper disk travels at about 6,000 feet
per second.
Could I have Chart 2, please? So we can see what happens to
a Humvee when a ball of fire travels at 6,000 feet per second.
General Dempsey, is that familiar to you?
General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator Cotton. Do you know how many American troops were
killed by such explosively formed penetrators?
General Dempsey. That particular incident or in general?
Senator Cotton. No, in general.
General Dempsey. Several hundred.
Senator Cotton. Was Iran a main supplier of these
explosively formed penetrators?
General Dempsey. Yes. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Was Qasem Soleimani and the Quds Force and
the Revolutionary Guard Corps the main perpetrators in Iran?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Kerry, those entities and Qasem
Soleimani will ultimately receive sanctions relief from this
deal, not necessarily from the United States Government, but
from the United Nations and the European Union. What should we
say to the Gold Star moms and dads of the over 500 American
troops who were killed by an Iranian ball of fire traveling
6,000 feet per second?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we should tell them, obviously,
first of all, how extraordinarily grateful we are for the
service of their loved ones. We should also make it very, very
clear that under the United States initiative, Qasem Soleimani
will never be relieved of any sanctions.
We would also tell them and lay out to them what we intend
to do, which has not been done yet sufficiently, to push back
against Iran's behavior, that we have a number of laws in
place, requirements by which we will be able to prevent Iran
from transferring these weapons.
And we have already engaged, Senator, in very forward-
leaning initiatives to do that. We specifically turned around a
convoy recently in the last months that was bringing weapons to
Yemen, and we have been crystal clear, and I will be even more
clear when I meet with the Gulf states, about our united
efforts to hold them accountable for these kinds of activities.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, all. My time has expired.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask this question of all of the witnesses.
But I would like to start with Secretary Carter and Chairman
Dempsey.
In your assessment and without getting into specifics which
cannot be discussed in this open setting, is there any
military, military strategy or response that would achieve the
same goals as the agreement before us without embroiling the
United States and our allies in a potentially devastating long-
term war in the region?
And I would like a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer, given the
setting. Starting with Secretary Carter?
Secretary Carter. I am sorry to be difficult on that, but I
just need to understand the question a little bit more. Do you
mean if there is no deal, and Iran gets a nuclear weapon?
Senator Hirono. If there no deal.
Secretary Carter. Then we have a serious issue.
Senator Hirono. Well, not even that----
Secretary Carter. We don't give up at that point, but we
would have to defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies in
the face of that reality. Is that responsive to your question?
Senator Hirono. Well, the reality is that without this
agreement, Iran can produce a nuclear bomb in 2 to 3 months.
So, without this agreement, is there any military--I will
reiterate the question. Is there any military strategy or
response that would achieve the same goals as this agreement?
More yes? More no?
Secretary Carter. I am going to have to say that there is a
military response--maybe this is responsive to your question,
Senator. There is a military option, which I know you have been
briefed on, which has the effect, as I have said earlier, of
setting back the Iranian nuclear program.
It doesn't stop it forever, but it substantially sets it
back. We have talked about that publicly for quite a while. We
work on that. And so, if that is responsive to your question,
that exists.
Senator Hirono. But Mr. Secretary, the other part of my
question is, though, yes, we can have a military response that
would set them back, but would that military response involve
us in a--basically a long-term war in that region? Would that
be a highly likely outcome in the military?
Secretary Carter. Iran would surely respond to such an
attack. So in a hypothetical situation in which that occurred,
which this deal is intended to make unnecessary, Iran could
respond for sure.
Senator Hirono. Chairman Dempsey?
General Dempsey. One of my jobs, Senator, is never let the
Nation run out of options. So we would not run out of options,
but they would become increasingly costly, to be sure.
Senator Hirono. And long term?
General Dempsey. And long term.
Senator Hirono. Yes. Secretary Kerry, would you care to
respond and the other members of the panel?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I think--I think General Dempsey
answered the question earlier when he said that the deal is far
more durable and provides a more durable option and longer
term, a period of time where it would be much more durable than
the military option.
I mean, my--look, I think it is pretty clear that if Iran
were to start enriching or move back to its program, we have no
inspectors. We have no sanctions that are universal. The United
States can have them, but we have already seen sanctions don't
get them to give up the program.
So you are stuck with a situation of what will change the
dynamic of their program. And the fact is then you are in, as
Secretary Carter has said and as General Dempsey has just said,
they will respond. And then we will respond, and then it is
back and forth.
The question is, where does that end, and how does it end?
And does it accomplish the goal of getting rid of their
program? We don't believe so.
We believe this agreement accomplishes the goal and
provides us with the support on a continuing basis of the
international community.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Let me go on to another question because I am running out
of time. This is for Secretary Carter and, again, Chairman
Dempsey. Are you contemplating any changes in our force
posture, assuming this agreement goes into effect and stays in
effect?
Secretary Carter. Yes. It is a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer.
Yes, but if I could say more----
Senator Hirono. Well, this is not a ``yes'' or ``no''
answer.
Secretary Carter. If I could say more, Senator, in all
seriousness?
Senator Hirono. Briefly.
Secretary Carter. Yes. We are doing a great deal in the
Gulf. That is what I was there talking to our Gulf partners
about. That is what we talked about at the GCC summit a few
months ago.
We are doing a great deal with Israel. I mentioned missile
defense, the F-35 qualitative military edge. So this is a
dynamic region with or without a deal, and one that has Iran
and other problems to boot. And so, we have to and are doing a
lot to strengthen our posture and our alliances and
partnerships in the region, and we will continue to do so.
Senator Hirono. General Dempsey, would you like to weigh
in?
General Dempsey. With Israel, we are working on ballistic
missile defense, maritime security, counterterrorism, and
counter tunneling, which is a new and emerging challenge for
the state of Israel.
And with the GCC, it is ballistic missile defense, special
operating forces, maritime, counterterror, and cyber.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I would like to tell the committee that
the witnesses have to leave at 12:45 p.m. So the order will be
Senator Rounds, Senator King, Senator Tillis, Senator Sullivan,
Lee, and Graham. And no one else. I am sorry.
So, Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
Today, you have gone through 15 different interrogators. I
get to be number 16. One of the things that happens when you
are number 16 is a lot of the questions that you have got have
been asked. But it also gives you an opportunity to try to
analyze and see just exactly what it is all about and what the
real issues are, and I would like to just begin with this.
It seems to me that one of the concerns that we have is, is
if we assume that we have a rogue nation who is a threshold
state today with regard to nuclear weapons, the goal of this
was to eliminate them from having nuclear weapons or, in the
second position, to delay the implementation or their
capabilities with regard to nuclear weapons.
I would like to know from the panel, and it is very simple,
are we stopping them from getting nuclear weapons, or are we
delaying them for a period of 10 to 15 years from getting
nuclear weapons? In your opinion, General?
General Dempsey. Well, my opinion, sir, our Government's
policy has been they will not get a nuclear weapon, and nothing
we are talking about here today should change that policy.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Moniz?
Secretary Moniz. I agree with General Dempsey, and in terms
of our capabilities to make sure that they are not pursuing a
nuclear weapon, this agreement will leave us better off with
the agreement than without the agreement forever.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Carter, Secretary Carter?
Secretary Carter. I concur with those two.
Secretary Lew. Senator, I have worn many hats in this
administration. In each one, I have said Iran will not be
permitted to get a nuclear weapon. I believe that deeply.
Senator Rounds. Secretary Kerry?
Secretary Kerry. And I agree. The President's policy is
they won't get it. There is no--if they were to try to not
implement this agreement or the implementation is not full, the
other options are still available to us. They will not get a
weapon.
Secretary Moniz. So, if I may?
Senator Rounds. Yes.
Secretary Moniz. Just one note just to say that, in
addition, I think it is significant that the agreement codifies
with the P5+1 that Iran will never get a nuclear weapon.
Senator Rounds. And yet here is my question then,
gentlemen. It appears to me that in each time I have heard the
discussion comes back down to for a period of 10 years, we have
something in terms of the agreement that restricts them. But
somewhere between 10 and 15 years we change, and that during
that time period, they can begin because there is nothing in
the agreement which stops them from moving back into and adding
to their nuclear capabilities.
If they are a threshold state today and if we have delayed
them, that is one thing. But if, at the end of this time
period, they may freely pursue nuclear options, then I think
that is really the gist that we are trying to decide.
But along that line, and General Dempsey, I appreciated
your thoughts here earlier when you said that you were
pragmatic with regards to your comments. It seems to me that we
had an embargo, which was in place, which many of us were
relying on when it came to both an arms embargo and also with
regard to ICBMs. You indicated that just matter of fact on July
7th of this year, you have heard it earlier, your quote was,
``Under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran
relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms
trafficking.''
Secretary Carter said, ``The reason that we want to stop
Iran from having an ICBM program is that the ``I'' in ICBM
stands for ``intercontinental,'' which means having the
capability to fly from Iran to the United States, and we don't
want that.''
Secretary Kerry indicated that there were other ways in
which we could handle the situation. If we had an embargo in
place and we had concerns about this, what is the purpose for
the embargo if we had other means in the first place?
General, clearly, this--seems to me that you were pretty
clear that this was not exactly the kind of advice that you
were suggesting that they allow this to come out?
General Dempsey. Well, as I have said, Senator, I would
have been happy to see the embargos maintained in perpetuity. I
think the question would have to be asked, were they likely to
be sustained in perpetuity, given that they were imposed to
bring Iran to the table? Once Iran came to the table, it then
became truly a negotiation.
And sanctions are only one way to keep pressure on those
other malign activities. We have other instruments and other
military options to pursue.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, if I could add to that? We--
obviously, all of us would prefer have it there forever and
ever. The problem is we are dealing with a U.N. resolution, the
nuclear resolution, 1929, which said that the Iranians, if they
come to negotiate and suspend, then all the sanctions would be
lifted. That was what was contemplated by the empowering
resolution here.
Now the arms embargo was slid in at the very last minute by
then-U.N. Permanent Representative Susan Rice. She got it in,
and it really sort of slid into the nuclear provision itself.
But under the nuclear provision, at the end of a period of
time, when the IAEA would draw its broad conclusion, this would
have been lifted completely anyway, and we had no power to stop
that. So, in effect, our getting the 8 years was a victory. Our
getting the 5 years was a victory. But we have these other
tools that completely strengthen our ability to do it in
perpetuity.
Senator Rounds. Secretary Carter, would you say that the--
that today Iran does not have the capability of getting ICBM
and that 10 years from now, based upon the provisions in place
without the embargo, that they would still not be able to have
an ICBM?
Secretary Carter. They don't have an ICBM today. I wouldn't
rule out that in 10 years Iran could progress to an ICBM. We
have seen in North Korea develop and test missiles of
increasing range, and they can do that on their own, as the
North Koreans have done without a lot of external help.
Now that doesn't mean they would, and that is not a crystal
ball of the future. But judging from principally the experience
with North Korea, you can't rule that out, and that is why we
need to protect ourselves, whichever, whatever happens with the
nuclear agreement, protect ourselves with missile defenses,
with the other statutory and other international agreement
protections that we have, deterrence and everything else.
Chairman McCain. Senator King? Your time has expired,
Senator.
Senator King? And I would ask the Senators to respect the
time limit.
Senator King. You heard the chairman. We are going to try
to go through some of these questions as quickly as possible.
Secretary Lew, what would the allies' reaction be in terms
of the sanctions if the U.S. rejected this agreement?
Secretary Lew. Senator, I think that they have made clear
that they think the agreement should be put into force. I don't
want to speak for any of them, but they are already taking
actions to show that they are beginning to deal with Iran in a
different way.
The vice chancellor of Germany was over there with a group
of business people. There is a French delegation over there. I
think that, you know, they are going to take a very dim view of
our rejecting this agreement.
On the other hand, I do believe they respect our unilateral
sanctions. They fear them, and that will put them in a very
difficult bind. But I don't think that we will have as much
capacity to bring the world community together in that
situation as we have had up until now.
Senator King. And I suspect the reaction would be different
among--China and Russia may have a different reaction than
Germany?
Secretary Lew. Yes. And I think if you look at like the
developing countries, countries like India, they are not in the
P5+1. And I just pick them because they are a big economy that
is dependent on oil imports.
We have had a sustained diplomatic engagement with many
countries to keep them in line with our oil sanctions. That
will get harder and harder if they see the rest of the world
going another way. They are going to look and ask how much
capacity do we have to take enforcement actions? Can they find
ways around them?
And ultimately, they will start doing business more and
more in other countries.
Senator King. Would it be fair to say that the sanctions
regime would fray, if not unravel?
Secretary Lew. I think that is fair. I have been trying to
be measured.
Senator King. Erode?
Secretary Lew. Yes, I have been trying to be measured
because I don't believe it is black and white. I think it would
start to fray, yes.
Senator King. I appreciate that. Secretary Carter, you just
visited the Middle East. Is the danger of proliferation greater
or lesser as a result of this agreement? In other words, are
the allies or some of our allies in that region who may think
about their own weapon, are they less likely to acquire a
weapon because of this agreement or more likely?
Secretary Carter. Well, I think logic would suggest that if
the agreement is implemented, meaning that Iran doesn't have a
nuclear weapon, that it is less likely that other states in the
region get a nuclear weapon.
Senator King. Mr. Moniz, I know we are going to have a lot
of time to talk about this, but there has been all this
discussion about the secret agreement. It is true, is it not,
that this agreement between the IAEA and Iran applies to the
past--the past actions of Iran with regard to nuclear weapons
at Parchin and other places but does not apply to future
inspections?
We know what the future inspection regime is going to be in
order to implement this agreement. Is that correct?
Secretary Moniz. That is correct. Again, what the JCPOA
accomplished is forcing Iran to cooperate with IAEA to finish
the examination of past behavior.
Senator King. So the so-called ``secret agreement'' is for
a small part of this deal, but it is not the essence of it,
which is the inspections and verification of Iran's compliance
from today forward?
Secretary Moniz. That is correct, yes.
Senator King. And finally, in 28 seconds, this famous 24
days. Is there any way that they could clean up a facility
where they had been processing fissile material sufficiently
that it could not be discovered if the inspection took place
after 24 days?
Secretary Moniz. Well, you know, I can never say 0.00
percent, but--but with very, very high confidence, I think we
would find nuclear material utilization evidence. Certainly the
risk of getting caught would be extremely high.
Senator King. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I hope that--I want to get back to, and Chairman Dempsey, I
will start with you. But I want to go back to what you said, I
think, in one of your responses to the malign activities that I
believe that Secretary Carter in response to a question says he
has no reason to believe that they will change.
That is the Iran terror network. That is their increasing
threat in terms of cyberterrorism. It is their ballistic
missile program. It is their weapons trafficking. We could get
into human rights violations, all the other things they are
guilty of. We could get into an ayatollah sending a tweet out
that has the image of some have said it is the President, some
says it is an American. It is someone wearing an American lapel
pin.
These people are evil people, and they are going to
continue to expand in the areas where they think they can. They
are people who have violated 27 international agreements or
treaties.
They have violated some of the terms of the
Nonproliferation Treaty. Some of that language is similar, as I
understand, in the agreement that we have here today.
So they are a dangerous--they are dangerous. I understand
why you would be concerned with the nuclear threat because it
could limit other military options if it existed.
So my question is if this deal goes through, what does our
posture look like in the Middle East and with our partners over
the next 2 years? What looks measurably different to make us
feel like we are in a position to make it untenable to the
Iranian leadership to move forward with a nuclear weapon?
General Dempsey. Senator, first, I do want to highlight the
fact that when we talk about Iran, it is really the regime, and
I know you know that.
Senator Tillis. There is no doubt about it. It is not about
the Iranian people.
General Dempsey. It is not the Iranian people. It is Qasem
Soleimani, the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps], Quds
Force, and their leadership. The Iranian people, there is some
reason to hope that this would actually cause them to
understand that there is a place for them in the international
community.
But how does our posture change? Our posture changes on the
basis of these areas on which we have agreed to work with our
partners, both Israel and the GCC nations. And we are very
muscular. We have a muscular posture in the region right now.
For the most part, it will stay the same, but it may shift
its activities a bit.
Senator Tillis. Secretary Carter or Chairman Dempsey, I am
trying to get my hands around the thought process that would
make the Saudis less likely to acquire a nuclear weapon,
probably acquire a nuclear weapon most likely from Pakistan, a
warhead, and a ballistic missile from China that is capable of
delivering a Pakistani warhead.
Why would any of the leadership in Saudi Arabia, and then
as a result of that, you only need one to spark other nuclear
proliferation. Why on earth, if we are talking about a nation
that has violated a number of treaties and agreements, the
possibility that that could occur and a nation having to be
prepared to have their own deterrent, where is the logic in
this agreement preventing them from going ahead and moving
forward and having that capability themselves?
Secretary Carter. Well, the agreement doesn't limit what
anybody else does.
Senator Tillis. Yes, I agree with you. I am saying why
wouldn't they?
Secretary Carter. The logic--I can't speak for any of those
countries, but the logic is that if Iran is effectively
prevented from having a nuclear weapon, which is the purpose of
this, then that cause at least for a Saudi Arabia or an Egypt
or a Turkey to get their own nuclear weapon is removed, and
logic would suggest that. I can't speak for the psychology, but
that is what logic would suggest.
With respect to Iranian behavior, I mean, this comes down
to a question of managing that risk because we see exactly what
Iran's--they say what at least the leadership is thinking. And
the point is that it is better if they don't have a nuclear
weapon than if they do.
This is an effective way of making sure that they don't
have a nuclear weapon. It does not eliminate all risk,
especially with Iran.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Carter, some have suggested that military strikes
against Iran could be both quick and effective, without
acknowledging the costs and consequences and risks that that
might entail. Could you talk a little bit about what the
primary risks, both to the U.S. and to our allies, would be if
we had to take that course of action?
And could you speak to what would set Iran's nuclear
program back further, a military strike or this accord in terms
of timeline?
Secretary Carter. Well, speaking now just very generally
and not specifically, the two things that make the successful
implementation of the agreement preferable from that point of
view to a strike is that the effects of a strike are temporary.
And second, that Iran would, as I said earlier, respond to an
American military strike upon Iran, and one needs to think
through then what the subsequent steps are, including the
possibility that Iran, at that point, would become
irreconcilably committed to getting a nuclear weapon.
Now I say that is predicated on the effective
implementation of this agreement. And effectively implemented,
the agreement stops Iran from getting a nuclear weapon not just
for 10 years and not just for 15 years, but by dint of the
provision Secretary Moniz was talking about, way beyond that.
So we are comparing that situation, which is effective
implementation, complete implementation of this agreement, to
the military option.
Now we also have to recognize that there may not be
effective implementation of this agreement. We have to
recognize there may not be any agreement and so forth, and that
is why we are under instructions from the President to preserve
and, indeed, we are improving--and I can't go into that here--
the military option.
Because temporary as it is and so forth, it needs to be
there because that is our fallback if it is the only path left.
Senator Heinrich. Since we are pursuing this accord, under
this accord, do you think that that option gets more effective
and stronger or less effective over the course of
implementation of this deal?
Secretary Carter. As I indicated earlier, from a purely
technical and military point of view, it gets marginally more
effective, and the reason for that is that we have a more
complete understanding of where everything is that could be
associated with their nuclear program that we might strike and
have more detail about the nature of those things. And so, it
just follows that we----
Senator Heinrich. That makes perfect sense. Secretary
Moniz, I want to get you because I don't have a lot of time
left. But can you talk a little bit, from the point of view of
a nuclear physicist, about why it is so difficult to--if you
have a covert facility where enrichment occurs, why it is so
hard to sort of clean up the signs of having uranium or, for
that matter, plutonium at a facility like that?
And would you answer the question, would an undeclared
facility itself be a violation of the JCPOA?
Secretary Moniz. Well, on the second part, absolutely an
undeclared facility would be--would be a violation, and I
think, frankly, a stern response would be in order.
With regard to the cover-up, there is not too much we can
say here in public. But just to say that the dealing with
nuclear materials, whether it is enrichment or looking at the
characteristics of uranium in an explosive situation, for
example, would tend to leave lots of very, very small
particles, difficult to clean up. But beyond that, we could
talk in a classified environment.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you both very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
You know, one of the frustrations that you are seeing here
with the Congress is we are reading it. We are digging into it.
And yet when we have questions, looking at the language, we
seem to get these spin answers that don't seem to comport with
the language.
So, Secretary Lew, Secretary Kerry, I want to go back to
the snapback provision. But is there a term called ``the
snapback provision'' in the agreement?
Secretary Kerry. I don't think it is specifically referred
to as such.
Senator Sullivan. No, there isn't. The word ``snapback'' is
not in the agreement.
Secretary Lew. No, but it is created by the----
Senator Sullivan. Let me let me make my point, Mr.
Secretary. I got a lot of questions, and I don't have a lot of
time.
I think it would be helpful if you didn't use that term
much. It is not in the agreement. I think, in some ways, it is
deceitful because it is an illusion. And I think that, in many
ways, the provision in the agreement--and I will have my
question--the snapback is actually more focused on the United
States than it is Iran.
And as you know, Mr. Secretary, those of us who were
involved, I was, in the Bush administration with getting
countries to actually economically isolate Iran, we used a lot
of leverage. We did use leverage with countries, saying, hey,
you either are going to be in their market or ours. And that
was effective.
But it goes to this idea if there is some kind of snapback,
that was a slog. That wasn't a snap. That took years to get
countries to divest out of the Iranian economy. It will take
years to do it again.
But let me ask a hypothetical. It was actually a question I
asked during the closed hearing. A number of Senators,
Republicans and Democrats, were not satisfied with the answer,
and it focuses a little bit on what Senator Ayotte said.
So let us assume sanctions are lifted. We get the,
whatever, $60 billion--the Iranians are looking for $120
billion of additional investment. So that is on top of what we
would have in terms of whether it is $59 billion or $60
billion.
No violations of the agreement. The economy is humming
along. There is an act of terrorism. By the way, the sanctions
that are lifted are Annex 2, which is essentially all our
bullets. This is a lot of American power, including the
unilateral sanctions that you mentioned, Secretary Lew, on the
financial system.
An act of terrorism happens. It is big. They kill more
American troops. They blow up a consulate. It is likely. I
think it is likely that they are going to do that in the next
10 years.
The Congress is upset. The new President is upset. We
impose sanctions. We reimpose Annex 2 sanctions. This is our
power.
And Mr. Secretary, Secretary Lew, I am glad that you have
talked about how this is power. We do have a lot of unilateral
power with regard to sanctions. So then Iran cites paragraph 26
of the agreement, and I am going to read it.
It says, ``Iran will treat such a reintroduction or
reimposition of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its
commitments.'' Deal is over.
They are cranking. Their economy is cranking. We just
sanction them for terrorism with these sanctions, and they can
walk. They can legally walk from this agreement.
So let me ask you this. If we ever, ever impose so- called
snapback sanctions, isn't the deal over? Where am I wrong on
that question?
Secretary Lew. Well, Senator, we would snap sanctions back
once they violated the agreement.
Senator Sullivan. No, no. I am talking about--no, no. I am
not talking about a violation of the agreement.
Secretary Lew. Let us talk about two different about two
different worlds. One, they violate----
Senator Sullivan. Answer the question. You didn't answer it
in the closed setting. You are not answering it now.
Secretary Lew. You asked two questions. I was answering the
first one. I was just taking them in order.
The first set of questions you asked was about the
snapback, does it work? Yes, it works because if they violate
the agreement, our unilateral sanctions, we can do. As you
know, I have the authority to put those back into place. The
U.N. sanctions were structured so they will go back into place.
Senator Sullivan. And they can walk.
Secretary Lew. No. That is if they violate the nuclear
agreement. So scenario one is they violate the nuclear
agreement.
Scenario two, they blow up some facility. They take an act
of terrorism. They do something non-nuclear. We have the right
to put these kinds of measures in place. They are not nuclear
sanctions at that point. They are terrorism sanctions at that
point.
Senator Sullivan. Iran has stated that it will treat such
reintroduction, reimposition of the sanctions in Annex 2----
Secretary Lew. But, Senator, it is not----
Senator Sullivan.--in Annex 2 as grounds to cease
performing its commitments. How am I not reading that
correctly?
Secretary Lew. Sir, Annex 2 illustrates, lists the nuclear
sanctions----
Chairman McCain. The Senator's time has expired.
Senator Sullivan. I know what is in Annex 2. It is huge.
Secretary Lew. Right.
Senator Sullivan. The Senator's time has expired.
Secretary Lew. And I am happy to pursue this in greater
detail. It is an important issue, but we have not given away
our ability to put these kinds of measures in place for non-
nuclear purposes, provided they comply with the nuclear
agreement.
If they don't live with the nuclear agreement, they go back
for violation of the nuclear agreement.
Senator Sullivan. I think the Iranians have a different
view.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee?
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have got a number of questions regarding the military
implications of this deal. There is one other issue I want to
follow up on, though.
Secretary Kerry, why isn't this a treaty? And as a treaty,
why isn't it subject to advice and consent with two-thirds of
the Senate concurring?
Secretary Kerry. Well, there are many reasons why, Senator,
not the least of which is that we don't have diplomatic
relations with Iran. This is a situation with a multilateral
agreement with many countries, and you don't normally negotiate
a treaty in that kind of context. So it is a political
agreement, and we believe that the leverages that are in it
through the snapback of sanctions, through the oversight and
the inspections are very powerful incentives for Iran's
compliance.
Senator Lee. Okay. I would note that there is nothing in
Article II, Section 2 that limits the definition of treaty
along the lines of what you described. And in fact, nothing in
your definition of the term ``treaty'' on the State
Department's own Web site limits it that way, and it defines
``treaty'' as ``a formal written agreement between sovereign
states or between states and international organizations.''
It doesn't limit it to the fact that it has to be between
two. I don't think that is an adequate answer, but we will move
on.
General Dempsey, presumably, one of the weapon systems that
Iran is likely to acquire and that Russia has indicated a
willingness to sell would be an advanced air defense system.
Can you describe for us what kind of impact this might have on
U.S. military operations? For example, a hostage rescue
operation, reconnaissance operations, and so forth?
General Dempsey. Yes, there is no question, Senator, it
would make application of the military option to reduce their
nuclear capability more difficult and--but not impossible. But
more difficult.
Senator Lee. Thank you.
Now Wendy Sherman, the chief negotiator for the United
States during these talks, stated in February of last year, of
2014, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iranian
ballistic missiles were ``indeed going to be part of something
that would have to be addressed as part of the comprehensive
agreement.''
Now, Secretary Kerry, at that time, was Secretary Sherman
referring to lifting the U.N. embargo on ballistic technology
when she made this statement to the Foreign Relations
Committee, or did the United States intend to include
restrictions on ballistic missiles in this agreement?
Secretary Kerry. Well, it does include. In fact, it is
under Chapter 7 and enforceable therefore under the United
Nations Article 41. And there are restrictions within this
agreement.
And I would also comment on the earlier question that the
defensive weapons are not covered by the embargo. So the S-300,
for instance, from Russia is not covered anyway.
Senator Lee. I do have to ask you another question,
Secretary Kerry. Given the fact that one of the problems that
we have got with Iran, one of the reasons why we are so
concerned about Iran getting nuclear weapons has to do with the
fact that this is a roguish state, a state that has made not
only threats, but taken aggressive actions toward the United
States and her allies.
It has taken--made threats to wipe Israel off the map, for
example. There are real reasons why we don't want them getting
nuclear arms.
In light of the fact that that is the biggest reason why we
are so concerned, why we are willing to enter into negotiations
to possibly lift sanctions against Iran, giving Iran a big
economic benefit, why, why on earth didn't we insist as a
condition precedent to getting any deal at all that Iran, for
the love of God, cease and desist from its terrorist ambitions,
cease and desist from making comments like that it wants to
wipe Israel off the map, cease and desist from undertaking and
funding acts of terrorism against the United States and her
allies?
Secretary Kerry. Well, as was mentioned earlier, look, it
would be great and ideal if one could negotiate that. I am not
sure how long it would take. And given the imperatives that we
had with respect to Iran's 19,000 centrifuges, 12,000 kilograms
of weapons fissile material equal to 10 to 12 bombs already,
their mastering of the fuel cycle, and their near imminent
finishing of the Arak reactor, which would have produced
weapons-grade plutonium at the rate of two weapons a year, we
felt that we had to keep this targeted on the greatest threat
of all that you have just defined, which is the potential of
their having a nuclear weapon.
And if, indeed, they are meaning to translate their slogans
of ``death to America, death to Israel'' into policy, then
getting rid of the nuclear weapon is everybody's first
imperative here. So that is what we focused on because we knew
that you could get tangled up. Our definition, you know, one
man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist.
You can be fighting forever on the issue of Sunni, Shia,
definitions of who is protecting whom, and you won't get
anywhere. You literally will not get there. That is why we
separated those activities.
Now that does not----
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Secretary Kerry. That does not reduce our commitment, as we
have defined here again and again, to push back on every one of
those activities. But it is easier to push back against an Iran
that doesn't have a nuclear weapon than one that does.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin has one question, I
believe?
Senator Manchin. I just have one. Yes, one question very
quick.
I read--and I just want to go over this and just any
reaction you may have. Fareed Zakaria wrote, and I read this in
my local paper back home.
``Let us imagine the opponents of the nuclear agreement
with Iran get their way. The United States Congress kills it.
What is the most likely consequence? Within 1 year, Iran would
have more than 25,000 centrifuges. Its breakout time would
shrink to mere weeks, and the sanction against it would
crumble. How is this in America's national interest, Israel's
or Saudi Arabia's or any of the people in that area?''
And they say it is not a plausible scenario. In 2005, three
European powers rejected a nuclear deal with Iran with 2 years
of negotiation. So all I would ask is if this does collapse,
does it put them on an accelerated--with their intentions being
shown already, does it put them on an accelerated path? And I
think maybe it might be----
Secretary Kerry. Well, we believe so. The President
believes it. Our intel community believes it. Our intel
community has made it very clear to us what--that there is no
return to negotiations with this ayatollah and that they will
then believe we have given them the reason that they have to
develop a nuclear weapon.
Senator Manchin. Well, let me just say----
Secretary Kerry. Because we won't deal in good faith.
Senator Manchin. John--I'm sorry, Secretary. Between
November 2012 and 2013, even when we had the noose around their
neck, they still produced 6,000 more centrifuges. So their
determination is to do it no matter how much we have them
strangled. Correct?
And Secretary Moniz, have you all followed that as far as--
--
Secretary Moniz. That is quite correct, yes.
Senator Manchin. So they are determined. They are going to
move forward?
Secretary Moniz. Absolutely. They have declared they would
go to hundreds of thousands of SWU [Separative Work Unit]
versus the current 20,000----
Senator Manchin. And you believe in the heart of hearts and
deep in your soul----
Chairman McCain. The one question is now expired.
Senator Graham?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
General Dempsey, do you believe the Iranians have been
trying to build a bomb or a nuclear power program for peaceful
purposes all of these years?
General Dempsey. I believe they have a militarization
aspiration.
Senator Graham. Who is the commander-in-chief of the
Iranian armed forces, Secretary Carter? Who calls the shots?
Secretary Carter. The supreme leader.
Senator Graham. Who decides if Iran goes to war? The
supreme leader, right?
Secretary Carter. I believe so, yes.
Senator Graham. Who decides if they try to break out, the
supreme leader?
Secretary Carter. Yes.
Senator Graham. Does the supreme leader's religious views
compel him over time to destroy Israel and attack America?
Secretary Carter. I don't know. I don't know the man. I
only----
Senator Graham. Well, let me tell you, I do.
Secretary Carter.--read what he says. I read what he says.
Senator Graham. I know the man. I know what he wants. And
if you don't know that, this is not a good deal.
Could we win a war with Iran? Who wins the war between us
and Iran? Who wins? Do you have any doubt who wins?
Secretary Carter. No. The United States wins a war.
Senator Graham. We win. Is it your testimony here that
Saudi Arabia is okay with this deal, and they have committed to
you they are not going to feel compelled to get a bomb because
of this deal?
Secretary Carter. No. My testimony is that I can't speak
for Saudi Arabia. I have spoken to Saudi Arabia.
Senator Graham. Well, you have spoken for Saudi Arabia all
over the American media, reassuring everybody on this committee
they are okay.
Secretary Carter. I reported what they said. So----
Senator Graham. Well, you think they were lying to you?
Secretary Carter. Of course not. Of course not.
Senator Graham. Or do you think they would want weapons? Do
you think they were telling you what you wanted to hear to give
them weapons?
Secretary Carter. I only could say what they said. This is
a little bit like what is the ayatollah thinking? I only read
what he says.
Senator Graham. Yes, okay. Fine.
Secretary Carter. And I just take it at face value.
Senator Graham. Who is your counterpart, Mr. Moniz? What is
his name?
Secretary Moniz. Mr. Salehi.
Senator Graham. Have you read what he said on July 22nd,
according to Middle East Media Research Institute, about the
side deal? He said, let us see, ``We have reached an
understanding with the IAEA. God willing, there will be very
positive results. We do not accept the PMD [Previous Military
Dimensions] arrangement. We don't agree with that, and we
reject the concept.''
What kind of arrangement has he made to make him feel so
positive?
Secretary Moniz. First of all, I had not read it. That is
the first question----
Senator Graham. I am going to give it to you.
Secretary Moniz. Second----
Senator Graham. You don't have to answer. Would it be
surprising to you that he is telling the Iranian people don't
worry about this side deal. We are going to get a good outcome?
Secretary Moniz. I assume what he is suggesting is that----
Senator Graham. Well, if you didn't know about it----
Secretary Moniz. Is that there were no nuclear materials in
Parchin, and that remains to be seen. That is my assumption,
but I don't know.
Senator Graham. I assumed that he is saying that we have
reached an arrangement that we are okay with. That is what I
assume, but the difference does matter.
Secretary Moniz. I would read it differently just from
hearing it.
Senator Graham. Okay. Well, we don't know what he means.
And apparently, we don't know what the ayatollah wants. I know
what he means. He means he has reached an agreement where they
don't have to worry about an inspection, and I think the
ayatollah will eventually acquire a nuclear weapon unless
somebody stops him.
Do our allies in Israel, across all party lines, believe
this is a bad deal, Secretary Kerry?
Secretary Kerry. No. Not everybody believes it is a bad
deal.
Senator Graham. Name one political party in Israel.
Secretary Kerry. Oh, political party? I am sorry.
Senator Graham. Yes, people who are actually governing the
country. Name one political party in Israel that is for this
deal.
Secretary Kerry. I didn't hear you say political party.
Senator Graham. I am sorry. I----
Secretary Kerry. Political parties are opposed.
Senator Graham. Every political party in Israel is opposed
to this deal. So when you speak about Israel in this deal, it
is not BiBi [Netanyahu], it is everybody.
Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. No, Senator, it is not.
Chairman McCain. The Senator's time has----
Secretary Kerry. It is actually not everybody. Ami Ayalon,
the former head of Shin Bet----
Senator Graham. Not a political party.
Secretary Kerry. No, but you said everybody in Israel.
Chairman McCain. The time has expired. I don't think we--
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I would ask that your
answers be brief because my time is limited.
General Soleimani, the head of the al-Quds Forces, has more
blood of American service members on his hands than any living
terrorist. Under this agreement, the sanctions on General
Soleimani are lifted.
Now Secretary Kerry said to the families of those men and
women who gave their lives, who were killed by General
Soleimani we should apologize.
Secretary Kerry. I never said we should apologize.
Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, I understand that the Joint
Personnel Recovery Agency has a classified list of roughly 500
American soldiers who were murdered by Iranian IEDs [improvised
explosive devices]. I would ask, Secretary Carter, so that we
can do what Secretary Kerry suggested, that the Defense
Department release that list to every member of this committee,
declassify that list and release it directly to the service
members' families who were murdered by General Soleimani.
Secretary Carter. Well, let me look into that, and I will
get back to you, Senator.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I never said the word
``apology.'' I never mentioned apologize. I said we should
thank them for their extraordinary service. I never said a word
``apologize.'' Please, don't distort my words.
Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, it is duly noted that you do
not apologize to the families of the service members who were
murdered by the Iranian military.
Secretary Kerry. That is not what I said, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Do you apologize or not? I don't want to put
words in your mouth. So which one is it?
Secretary Kerry. I thank them. I thank them for their
extraordinary service, and I would remind them that the United
States of America will never take the sanctions off Qasem
Soleimani.
Senator Cruz. Sir, I just want clarity. Do you apologize or
not? Because you wanted to clarify that point.
Secretary Kerry. I said we thank them for their service,
but we will not take the sanctions off Qasem Soleimani.
Senator Cruz. All right. Secretary Moniz, I want to turn to
a different question. The single greatest threat to the United
States if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon is that of an
electromagnetic pulse, a nuclear weapon detonated in the
atmosphere over the Eastern Seaboard that could kill tens of
millions of Americans.
On July 23rd in testimony before Congress, you told the
United States Senate you hadn't read the congressionally
mandated commission on EMPs [electromagnetic pulses] and that
you didn't know what an EMP was.
Secretary Moniz. That is incorrect. I said I did not know
this 2008 report recommendations. I said I was quite familiar
with the issue, and we all know about EMPs from airburst
nuclear weapons.
Senator Cruz. Secretary Moniz, let me read the testimony
verbatim so that I don't mischaracterize you.
``Senator Johnson--'' Let me--sir, let me read what you
said.
Secretary Moniz. Please.
Senator Cruz. ``Senator Johnson: Are you familiar with the
EMPs commission's 2008 report?''
``No, I am not, sir.''
``You are not? Do you know--do you know what an EMP is?''
``You will have to explain it to me, please.''
Secretary Moniz. What?
Senator Cruz. I find that stunning. This is testimony. You
can read the record.
Secretary Moniz. That was about the report. If you read
further in the testimony, you will see my explicit statement.
Of course, I know about the issue. I happen to know something
about nuclear weapons. I know about EMPs. I know about various
actions----
Senator Cruz. Do you agree that an EMP detonated by Iran in
the atmosphere could kill tens of millions of Americans?
Secretary Moniz. An EMP detonated by anyone obviously is a
very potent weapon.
Senator Cruz. It could kill tens of millions of Americans.
Do you agree with that?
Secretary Moniz. That would depend, obviously, on the
specifics of the case.
Senator Cruz. But do you agree that it could?
Secretary Moniz. It depends upon the specifics. These are
highly variable.
Senator Cruz. Does that mean, yes, it could?
Secretary Moniz. I said it is highly variable in its
impact.
Senator Cruz. Okay. You are refusing to answer the
question.
Secretary Carter, is it correct that Iran is the leading
state sponsor of terrorism in the world?
Secretary Carter. I was asked before, and I believe that is
true, yes.
Senator Cruz. Do you have any doubt whatsoever if in excess
of $100 billion goes to Iran that some of that money will go to
jihadists who will use it to murder Americans?
Secretary Carter. I can't say that. I can say that their
malign activities about which we are extremely concerned are
quite well funded today.
Senator Cruz. Okay. But finally, because I just have a
second left----
Secretary Carter. And it is those malign activities and the
rest of the conduct that makes it so important that they not
also have a nuclear weapon.
Senator Cruz. Finally, because I just have a second left,
Secretary Kerry, you told Senator Lee that this was not a
treaty because we don't have diplomatic relations with Iran. I
would note that is directly contrary to the testimony you gave
yesterday to the House.
Secretary Kerry. No, it is----
Senator Cruz. When you were asked--when you were asked why
is this not considered a treaty? And I will read your answer
verbatim.
``Well, Congressman, I spent quite a few years----''
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I know what I----
Senator Cruz. Sir, let me ask the question.
Secretary Kerry. You are not reading my whole answer
because I also said what I just said.
Senator Cruz. Well, Congressman--Secretary Kerry?
Chairman McCain. The Senator's time--I apologize. The
Senator's time has expired, and I promised the witnesses that I
would get them out, as every member that wanted to was able to
ask questions.
I would appreciate--I want to tell the witnesses I
appreciate their patience. I know it has been a very long
morning for them. I also know that they appreciate the gravity
of this issue and the importance of allowing every member of
the committee to at least ask questions and be informed by your
testimony.
So, Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, could we keep the record open
in case there are Senators that have written questions?
Chairman McCain. I am sure that Senator Manchin will have a
written question for you.
Senator Nelson. And I will as well.
Chairman McCain. So--as will Senator Nelson.
Chairman McCain. So I want to thank the witnesses, and this
is a very important issue and the testimony has been very
important I think not only to members of the committee, but the
entire Senate. I thank the witnesses.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
trust with gulf allies
Senator Wicker. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, let me start
by making some observations about the Persian Gulf, and then ask some
questions about our allies in the Gulf--specifically Saudi Arabia and
the UAE. In 2009 the U.S. entered into a civilian nuclear energy
cooperation agreement or 123 agreement with the United Arab Emirates
(UAE). As part of the agreement, the UAE renounced the military use of
nuclear technology and signed the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which
institutes a more stringent inspections regime on the UAE's nuclear
activities.
The UAE 123 agreement is now known as the nonproliferation ``gold
standard'' for nuclear cooperation agreements. I would observe that
this gold standard addresses Israel's primary concerns about nuclear
cooperation with our partners in the Gulf. I would also observe that
the U.S. has not reached a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia because the
Saudis will not agree to an agreement that achieves a similar gold
standard.
Finally, I'd observe that despite being a party to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran swore never to obtain nuclear
weapons or to use nuclear technology for military purposes. But Iran
has consistently cheated and lied to the IAEA for 30 years, with seven
of eight major nuclear sites started secretly in violation of the NPT.
1. Secretary Carter, you recently returned from a visit to Saudi
Arabia. How did you explain to our Saudi friends that the
Administration trusts Iran more than we trust the Saudis? How would you
explain to our friends in the UAE that the Administration trusts Iran
more than we trust the Emirates?
Secretary Carter. To be clear, the nuclear accord with Iran is not
about trust but about verification. As Secretary of Defense, I will
continue to ensure that appropriate military options are available to
the President. During my trip to Saudi Arabia in July, I conveyed this
message at the highest levels of the Saudi government and reiterated
that the Iran nuclear deal is in our common interest as it will further
a more stable and secure region. Furthermore, I reminded the Saudis of
the strength of our strategic partnership, as well as that U.S.
assurances to protect Saudi Arabia's security do not change in light of
a nuclear agreement with Iran. The United States continues to work with
each country--as well as multilaterally with the Gulf Cooperation
Council States--toward strengthening the regional security architecture
in a manner that, combined with the strong U.S. military force posture
in the region, deters Iran from coercing its neighbors. My message to
the United Arab Emirates is and will remain in the same vein. Advanced
partnerships with our Gulf partners, as well as the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, clearly support U.S., Saudi, and Emirati strategic
interests in Middle East stability.
2. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, based on your engagement with
your Saudi counterparts, is it your professional military judgement
that the Saudi military and intelligence services view Iran as a
threat? The U.S. has Patriot missile batteries on alert in Bahrain. Is
it correct to say that these missile batteries are intended to thwart a
missile attack from Iran?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
iran and the military option
Senator Wicker. The arms embargo and ballistic missile restrictions
on Iran will be lifted not later than eight years from now, and
possibly much sooner.
3. What problems do you see the lifting of these restrictions
creating for our regional allies and for our own forces operating in
the Middle East?
Secretary Carter. The only arms and missile sanctions that will be
relieved are those that were put in place by the United Nations
Security Council, which expressly linked the sanctions to concerns
about Iran's nuclear program. The United States has a number of
domestic and other multilateral authorities related to counterterrorism
and counter proliferation that we will continue to use to counter
Iran's destabilizing activities. Those tools include sanctions under
U.S. law that generally target weapons of mass destruction and missile
proliferation around the world. The United States will continue efforts
to counter missile proliferation to Iran through the use of U.S.
domestic law sanctions, export controls, and the 34-country Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Finally, the U.S. military is
postured in the region to act as a deterrent against any Iranian
military aggression.
Furthermore, the Department will continue to advocate for strong
international responses, including U.S. action, if Iran should violate
U.S. or other multilateral sanctions. Coalition efforts to stop Iranian
shipments to Yemen demonstrate our resolve on this matter.
General Dempsey. Our regional allies understand that the United
States is committed to defense of the region. Our military remains
engaged through forward basing, joint and combined exercises, and
senior-leader engagements. In my discussions with our allies in the
region, they express their confidence in our security cooperation and
security assistance efforts to develop their respective armed forces
into a deterrent force to counter Iran's malign activities in the gulf.
4. Senator Wicker. What steps can we take to deal with the
challenges created by Iran expanding its activities in these arenas?
Secretary Carter. The Administration is fully aware of the threat
posed by the Iranian ballistic missile program. That is why the
Administration has taken the steps to ensure that the United States is
protected today by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system from
potential Iranian Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles. The
Administration is also taking steps to increase the effectiveness of
the GMD system by 1) improving the reliability of the Ground-Based
Interceptor kill vehicle; 2) deploying a Long-Range Discrimination
Radar in Alaska; and 3) enhancing the discrimination capabilities of
currently deployed ground-based sensors. The Department continuously
monitors Iran's efforts to develop ballistic missiles and are prepared
to take steps, as necessary, to ensure that the United States remains
protected from future Iranian threats.
General Dempsey. The first step will be to prevent Iran from
acquiring advanced, offensive weapons by working with our partners to
be selective in what they choose to sell to Iran. With respect to
curbing ballistic missile acquisition, we will continue to employ the
Missile Technology Control Regime members' voluntary export. I don't
assume that these efforts will be 100 percent successful, so the second
step will be to deter and contain Iran's conventional and ballistic
missile capabilities. If Iran continues to abide by the JCPOA, they
will one day be able to legally import and export weapons, but we will
retain the right--through multiple UNSCRs--to interdict illegal
shipments to their proxies. In addition to enabling our partners'
conventional forces, we will also help to build missile defenses in
both the region and at home that will significantly diminish Iran's
ballistic missile threat.
arms embargo and missile embargo
Senator Wicker. The JCPOA makes no mention of the arms embargo or
the missile embargo. Rather, these provisions were included in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. Regarding this, Foreign
Minister Zarif said on July 21, ``The issue of missiles and the
purchase and sale of arms is implicitly beyond the [scope of the] deal.
It is only included in a resolution and its non-implementation will not
be considered a violation of the deal,''
5. General Dempsey, according to UN Security Council Resolution
2231, the arms embargo on Iran will be lifted if the IAEA submits a
report that concludes that Iran's nuclear program is peaceful. General
Dempsey, is that of concern to you?
General Dempsey. While it is unlikely that the IAEA will reach its
Broader Conclusions before the 5 or 8 year thresholds, it may do so if
Iran proved cooperative, open and honest about its program. The JCPOA
buys us time while we continue to focus on Iranian malign activity.
6. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, can you clarify whether
violations of the arms embargo would be considered violations of the
JCPOA? Would we be able to snapback sanctions should Iran violate the
arms and missile embargos?
General Dempsey. Yes, a violation of the arms embargo would be a
violation of the JCPOA. According to the agreement, the U.S. may
unilaterally respond to an Iranian violation by choosing not to meet
its commitments in whole or in part. The U.S. may also invoke its
option to call for a U.N. Security Council vote to maintain the
suspension of sanctions. Under the agreement, the U.S. may act
unilaterally to snap-back sanctions through its veto option as a
standing member of the U.N. Security Council.
7. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, is Iran continuing to provide
arms to Shiite militias in Iraq? To Houthi rebels in Yemen? To the
Assad regime? To Hezbollah? If the answer is yes, isn't Iran already
violating key UNSC resolutions?
General Dempsey. Iran has sent arms and humanitarian aid to the
Houthis, supported the Assad regime through weapons, funds, and
advisors, and remains Lebanese Hezbollah's principal supporter. As a
result, Iran is in violation of a number of UNSCRs including the
resolution that established the arms embargo against Iran, UNSCR 1747.
qualitative military edge
Senator Wicker. We are Israel's strongest strategic ally. We work
closely together in areas like missile and cyber defense and to uphold
the IDF's qualitative military edge (QME). Israel believes this deal
with Iran will create significant additional defense challenges.
8. General Dempsey, beyond the high-profile and valued cooperation
on programs like Iron Dome, David Sling and the sale of the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter, how can we work more closely with Israel to tangibly
bolster their security and deterrence in this more challenging regional
strategic environment?
General Dempsey. The United States is Israel's strongest strategic
ally. Preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge remains a priority.
Our military cooperation with the Israel Defense Force is extensive and
we will continue to work closely with our Israeli partners to
prioritize Israel's security concerns and support them through the most
advanced technology.
ballistic missiles
Senator Wicker. The threat from ballistic missiles, rockets and
cruise missiles continues to expand with terrifying speed across the
Mideast. These weapons are being regularly used in Egypt, Gaza, Syria,
Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere throughout the region. And yet we have just
concluded an agreement with the nation supplying most of these weapons
to its Middle East proxies in which constraints on such delivery
systems are noticeably absent. In fact, the nuclear deal with Iran
actually lifts current missile restrictions on Tehran after eight
years. The Iranian regime certainly can be expected to increase its
missile programs with investment from unfrozen financial assets in
order to project strategic dominance while waiting out the decade-long
clock limiting its atomic arms program.
9. General Dempsey, what is your current assessment of Iran's
ballistic missile program and the capabilities of the U.S. and our
regional allies to defend against Iranian missile attacks?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, do you foresee the possibility
that if Iran's ballistic missile capabilities continue to expand in
size and sophistication there may be a similar phenomenon with other
regional states?
General Dempsey. Yes, the other regional states feel threatened by
Iran and will look to improve their ballistic missile defense
capabilities as well as seek an offensive strike capability to counter
potential Iranian aggression.
11. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, what are the consequences for
U.S. and partner security of Iran's unrestricted missile and rocket
developments? Is there a probability that our Gulf partners will seek
their own advanced surface-to-surface delivery systems in response?
What is the risk for American forces in theater?
General Dempsey. Iran's missile and rocket development continues to
pose a potential threat for U.S. forces and partner nations in the
region. I believe our Gulf partners will seek their own advanced
surface-to-surface delivery systems. Iran's missile and rocket
capability will place our own forces operating in the Middle East in
more danger as Iran develops more capable weapon systems and continues
its malign activities in the region.
12. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, what more--beyond current
activities--do our Israeli partners need from us in countering the
ballistic capabilities of Iran and its proxies that surround the Jewish
state on virtually all sides?
General Dempsey. We are commited to working with Israel to address
the Iranian ballistic missile threat. We are co-developing missile
defense technology with Israel on David's Sling and the Arrow system
and continue to prioritize Israel missile defense efforts. Since 2001,
we have provided over three billion dollars for Ballistic Missile
Defense to Israel, including funding for Iron Dome. More recently, the
Secretary visited Israel in July and discussed this topic with both
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Ya'alon. Our continued
work with Israel on the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missile forces
is steadfast.
Senator Wicker. Current assessments of Iran's capabilities indicate
the range, accuracy and quantity of Iran's ballistic arsenal today is
improving dramatically in real time. Iran has been successfully using
its space launcher program as a civilian cover for development of an
ICBM.
13. General Dempsey, can U.S. and allied missile defenses
sufficiently cope with this rapidly-evolving situation?
General Dempsey. We are matching the threat through the deployment
and development of missile defense systems as part of European Phased
Adaptive Approach capability as the US contribution to NATO ballistic
missile defense. We currently have a radar system deployed to Turkey
and an Aegis BMD ship in the Eastern Mediterranean. Soon we will
activate the Aegis Ashore site in Romania and begin construction of one
in Poland.
implications for israel
Senator Wicker. Secretary Carter, you had the opportunity to visit
Israel last week and General Dempsey, you did the same last month. As
you both no doubt heard, the Israeli defense and security leadership
have profound reservations about the Iran agreement--viewing it as so
fundamentally flawed as to be in essence an international recognition
of Iran as an emergent nuclear weapons state in the region.
14. Secretary Carter, what can you tell us about Israel's concerns
about the proposed deal, based on your conversations with your Israeli
counterparts?
Secretary Carter. Israel has made its concerns with the nuclear
agreement with Iran well known. The concerns shared with me during my
visit to Israel are consistent with those being publicly articulated.
Friends can disagree, however, and ultimately I believe that the best
way to protect Israel from a nuclear-armed Iran is the negotiated
nuclear framework reached between the P5+1 and Iran. The United States
is steadfast in its commitment to Israel's security. During my visit to
Israel last month, I discussed with Minister of Defense Ya'alon several
opportunities for deepening cooperation with Israel, including on
Iranian missile threats and asymmetric regional challenges.
countering iranian regional activities
Senator Wicker. I think we all can agree that Iran is unlikely to
change its regional behavior in the wake of this agreement. If
anything, flush with new resources, Iran will increase its regional
mischief. The administration has indicated the U.S. will continue to
confront Iran in the region.
15. Secretary Carter, what specific actions will the U.S. take if
Iran, after sanctions relief, provides more funding to terrorist groups
and expands its malign activities in the region?
Secretary Carter. First, Iran's economy is faltering and I would
expect that any financial gains Iran realizes from sanctions relief
will be needed for the domestic economy--some Iranian leaders have said
as much. Iran needs about half a trillion dollars to meet pressing
investment needs and government obligations. That said, Iranian support
to militants or terrorists does not require substantial resources.
Therefore, it is important to focus on strategies that counter this
behavior, especially by working with our partners in the Gulf. The
United States has sufficient domestic authorities--including sanctions
authority under U.S. law--to counter Iran's support for terrorism and
other destabilizing activities. The United States continues to enforce
U.S. sanctions based on Iran's support for terrorism and human rights
abuses. The United States will also continue to work with key partners
to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the region.
Deterrence is always a complex enterprise, but our partnerships and
preparations keep us well postured to counter Iranian destabilizing
activity. The Department will remain vigilant, but as the President
stated, Iran won't use the majority of sanctions relief for its support
to terrorism, and the United States' unilateral sanctions targeting
those activities will remain in place. The Department will continue to
work with interagency partners to check Iranian destabilizing
activities.
16. Senator Wicker. Secretary Carter, what is your plan to confront
Iranian actions in Lebanon, in Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq and in the
Palestinian territories?
Secretary Carter. The United States will continue to counter
Iranian malign influence in the region. The Department remains prepared
and postured to bolster the security of regional partners, including
Israel, to defend against aggression and to ensure freedom of
navigation in the Gulf. The United States remain cognizant of Iran's
continued support for the Assad regime in Syria, and that Iran has
supported rebel groups in Yemen and throughout the region. U.S. forces
will remain postured to challenge that activity when it runs counter to
U.S. interests or destabilizes the region.
The President has made clear his readiness to further strengthen
U.S. support to Israel's security, including through negotiating a new
ten-year Foreign Military Financing (FMF) memorandum of understanding
and increasing missile defense funding. The Department is also
supplying Israel with a large resupply package of essential munitions
to deter and defend against any threats.
Furthermore, the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit at Camp
David was about strengthening historical partnerships in order to
confront new challenges facing the Middle East. There was a recognition
that all of the GCC States, as well as the United States, need to
commit to broadening and deepening bilateral U.S.-GCC relationships to
advance our shared regional security interests.
Toward this shared goal of advancing the U.S.-GCC partnership, the
United States and the GCC States seek to develop strengthened
capabilities and coordination on issues such as maritime security,
cyber security, ballistic missile defense and arms transfers, special
operations forces, and exercises and training.
17. Senator Wicker. Secretary Carter, based on your conversations
in the region last week, do you believe that Iran is part of the
problem or part of the solution in Syria and Iraq?
Secretary Carter. The Department of Defense has no plans to
cooperate with Iran directly on Syria or Iraq. With that in mind, there
is some space for Iran to begin playing a more constructive role in the
region, specifically in Syria as it relates to a transition of power to
end the Syrian civil war.
Senator Wicker. Last week, Secretary Kerry told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the U.S. will work to enforce UN Security
Council Resolution 1701, which prohibits the transfer of weapons to
Hezbollah.
18. Secretary Carter, how is the Pentagon planning to prevent the
transfer of weapons to Hezbollah?
Secretary Carter. The Department will rely on bilateral cooperation
with countries in the region to block Iranian access to their territory
for activities related to the illicit shipping of arms or missiles. The
Department is already preparing with our Gulf partners--as discussed
between the President and Gulf leaders at Camp David in May--to ramp up
regional interdiction activities to ensure continued restrictions on
Iranian missile and arms activity. Executive Orders 12938 and 13382
authorize U.S. sanctions on foreign persons involved in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of
delivery, including missiles capable of delivering such weapons, by a
country of proliferation concern, such as Iran. The Iran, North Korea,
and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006 provides for U.S. sanctions on
entities and individuals involved in the transfer or acquisition of
ballistic and cruise missiles. The Lethal Military Equipment Sanctions
provision in the Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996, and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, also provide
for U.S. sanctions in certain cases involving the sale or transfer of
conventional arms. In addition, Executive Order 13224 provides for the
imposition of sanctions on persons that provide material support to
Hizballah, an entity designated under that executive order.
The Department will still rely on a series of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) that levy arms embargos relating
to key countries of concern and help counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region. Iranian arms transfers to prohibited
recipients would thus still be a violation of UNSCRs, including to the
Houthis in Yemen, to non-state actors in Iraq (including Shia
militants), to non-state actors in Lebanon (including Hizballah), to
Libya, and to North Korea. The Department will work with over 100
countries around the world that are participants in the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) to help limit Iranian missile-related imports
or exports. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) also plays a
critical role in preventing the spread of critical missile technology.
The MTCR Guidelines maintain a strong presumption of denial of the
transfer of Category I systems, which include ballistic missiles. The
Department will continue to rely on countries' adherence to the MTCR
Guidelines to stop transports in support of Iran's missile program.
inspections and verification
Senator Wicker. Throughout the negotiations, including in the weeks
prior to the agreement, the administration promised ``anywhere,
anytime'' inspections. The agreement now allows ``managed access'' and
could take up to 24 days to resolve any disputes over access and allow
actual inspections.
19. Secretary Carter, the administration argues that having IAEA
inspectors on the ground is going to give us additional insight into
the Iranian nuclear program. Under the JCPOA, will these inspectors
have the freedom to go to any other Iranian sites, including military
sites, at-will?
Secretary Carter. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
will be able to get timely access to the places it needs to go, or Iran
will be in violation of the agreement. If the IAEA has a question about
an undeclared facility, it will be able to request timely access
through the Additional Protocol. This access requires notice of at
least 24 hours--but such access has proven very successful in deterring
and detecting illicit activities around the world. Even if Iran were to
attempt to clean out a location before granting access, radioactive
evidence is not easily removed. IAEA testing almost certainly would
detect the recent presence of nuclear material if it had been present.
And, most importantly, we will have robust insight into every part of
Iran's nuclear program. Certain transparency measures will last for 15
years, others for 20 to 25 years, and some will last forever--such as
Iran's adherence to the Additional Protocol. With this transparency, if
Iran tried to reverse course and break out, we would see it and have
time to respond.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
enrichment or advanced centrifuges
20. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Moniz, how many countries produce
their own nuclear power but don't enrich their own uranium?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
21. Senator Ayotte. Why did we agree to allow Iran to build
advanced centrifuges in the first 10 years of the deal?
Secretary Kerry. Under the JCPOA, Iran is constrained to using only
its first generation IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium for the first
10 years. Testing of Iran's more advanced centrifuge designs will be
significantly constrained. Iran will have the option after Year 10 to
undertake a gradual development of its enrichment program, consistent
with an enrichment research and development plan, but it will be
limited to enriching only up to 3.67 percent and constrained to a 300
kg stockpile of this low-enriched uranium for another five years. These
limitations are important to ensuring that Iran's breakout timeline
does not drop dramatically after Year 10. Importantly, the transparency
measures under the JCPOA will ensure unparalleled insight into Iran's
program. Certain transparency and monitoring measures will last for 15
years, others for 20-25 years, and some will last indefinitely--such as
Iran's adherence to the Additional Protocol. After 15 years, should we
suspect Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, we would have the same
options available to us then as we do today to prevent such an effort
from coming to fruition.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
22. Senator Ayotte. What kind of centrifuge research and
development can Iran undertake in the first 10 years under the JCPOA?
Secretary Kerry. Under the JCPOA, Iran is constrained to using only
its first generation IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium for the first
10 years. Research and development related to Iran's more advanced
centrifuge designs will be significantly constrained. Under the JCPOA,
Iran may only continue to conduct centrifuge research and development
in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran may build
or test, with or without uranium, only those centrifuges specified in
the JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran must conduct all testing of centrifuges
with uranium only at Natanz, and must conduct all mechanical testing of
centrifuges only at Natanz and the Tehran Research Centre. For 10
years, Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium must only include IR-4, IR-5,
IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges. Mechanical testing on up to two single
centrifuges for each type may be carried out only on the IR-2m, IR-4,
IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8.
Consistent with the JCPOA, Iran may continue the testing of a
single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10
centrifuge machines for 10 years. Iran may only test a single IR-5
centrifuge machine for 10 years. Iran may continue testing of the IR-6
on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades, and may
commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a half
years before the end of Year 10. Iran may commence testing of the IR-8
on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades, and may
commence the testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a
half years before the end of Year 10. Iran must proceed from single
centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical
sequence.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
excluding congress
23. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Kerry, does the administration
believe the U.N. Security Council's Resolution is legally binding on
the United States if Congress rejects the deal?
Secretary Kerry. Nothing in the resolution requires the United
States to take any action that would be inconsistent with the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA). If Congress were to enact
a resolution of disapproval over a veto by the President, the United
States would not be under any legal obligation to cease the application
of U.S. sanctions on Iran (as contemplated by the JCPOA) as a result of
the UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2231. In fact, the
same is true if such a resolution is not enacted.
However, if Congress were to override a veto on a resolution of
disapproval and the United States walked away from this deal, the most
likely scenario would be that Iran would refuse to meet its commitments
under the JCPOA, the JCPOA would collapse, and the UN sanctions relief
contemplated under UNSC Resolution 2231 would never materialize. This
is because the UN sanctions relief under UNSC Resolution 2231 does not
occur until the IAEA verifies that Iran has taken the nuclear steps
outlined in the JCPOA. Without sanctions relief from the United States,
Iran would not disconnect centrifuges, or get rid of its uranium
stockpile, or fill the core of the current Arak reactor with concrete.
In such a scenario, the existing UNSC sanctions regime would remain in
place, but we anticipate that it would be much harder to ensure that
these measures are adequately enforced. If the United States walked
away from the strong deal that has been negotiated, other states would
be less willing to cooperate with us in enforcing these measures, such
as by interdicting suspicious cargo at our request. This would put us
in the worst possible position of having no deal on the nuclear side,
and losing our leverage to ensure the effectiveness of multilateral and
national sanctions.
24. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Kerry, if Congress rejects this deal,
will the President attempt to implement portions of it anyway?
Secretary Kerry. Any action by the President to implement the JCPOA
will be taken consistent with U.S. law, including the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA).
If Congress rejected the deal by enacting a joint resolution of
disapproval, the United States would not be in a position to fulfill
its sanctions relief commitments under the JCPOA because of the
restrictions under INARA. The expected result would be that Iran would
refuse to meet its commitments, and the JCPOA would collapse. Without
sanctions relief from the United States, Iran would very likely not
take the significant nuclear steps required by the JCPOA to roll back
and constrain its nuclear program, or provide unprecedented access to
monitor it. In this scenario, the existing UNSC sanctions regime would
remain in place because the IAEA would not be in a position to confirm
that Iran has taken the nuclear steps outlined in the JCPOA. Compliance
with these and other sanctions would begin to erode, however, as
countries perceived that the U.S. had turned its back on a feasible
negotiated solution. This would put us in the worst possible position
of losing our constraints on Iran's nuclear program while our leverage
begins to ebb.
25. Senator Ayotte. Would you characterize the Iran deal as a
``significant arms control agreement''?
Secretary Carter. No, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is not
an arms control agreement. It is a strong non-proliferation deal that
cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a nuclear bomb. It is not an ``arms
control agreement'' in that it does not limit U.S. arms in any way and
is not a legally binding international agreement.
Secretary Kerry. The JCPOA is a strong non-proliferation deal that
cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb. The JCPOA goes beyond
standard IAEA safeguards requirements in providing for assured access
to undeclared locations. It contains the most comprehensive inspection
and verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program.
It is not an ``arms control agreement'' in that it does not limit U.S.
arms in any way and is not a legally binding international agreement.
centrifuges
Senator Ayotte. The administration, including in Secretary Kerry's
testimony for the hearing, has repeatedly emphasized that the deal will
require Iran to get rid of ``two-thirds of its installed centrifuges.''
26. Secretary Moniz, under the deal, how many Iranian centrifuges
would be dismantled and destroyed--as opposed to disconnected and
moved?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
27. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Moniz, if Iran were to violate the
agreement and move to reinstall 1,000 IR-2 centrifuges for use in a
breakout, how long would that take?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
inspections and verification
Senator Ayotte. The deal establishes a tedious and time-consuming
process that we can expect Tehran to exploit for gaining access to
undeclared sites. As I understand it, the IAEA cannot even begin this
24-day process until after it informs Iran of its concern about a site,
requests ``clarification,'' and awaits Tehran's explanation. (Appendix
1, page 23, para 75.)
28. Secretary Moniz, this initial process will alert Iran to the
IAEA's suspicions, and will take an undetermined amount of time. The
JCPOA was supposedly crafted under the assumption that Iran will try to
cheat. Assuming Iran will delay an inspection as long as it can within
the terms of the plan--how long could it take from when the IAEA
notifies Iran of its concern with an undeclared site until inspectors
can enter the site?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
29. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Moniz, for undeclared sites, it could
take much longer than 24 days, couldn't it?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Ayotte. A great deal of weaponization work does not include
nuclear material and does not leave a radioactive footprint.
30. Secretary Moniz, won't Iran be able to conceal or move non-
nuclear related weaponization work easily within the 24 day window?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Ayotte. As Olli Heinonen, the former Deputy Director
General for Safeguards of IAEA, has testified, ``A 24-day adjudicated
timeline reduces detection probabilities exactly where the system is
weakest: detecting undeclared facilities and materials.''
31. Secretary Moniz, while monitoring facilities with satellites
during the 24 day period will detect large-scale efforts at deception,
i.e. re-paving areas, ferreting out nuclear material or equipment, how
will you prevent Iran from covering up other activities, like computer
modeling for weaponization purposes?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
32. Senator Ayotte. What happens if during the 24 day period we
observe Iran cleansing a site?
Secretary Kerry. If Iran were to deny an International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) request for access to a suspicious undeclared
location, and Iran and the IAEA cannot resolve the issue within 14
days, the issue is brought to the Joint Commission, which then has
seven days to consider the issue. If Iran still will not provide access
but five members of the Joint Commission (such as the United States,
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union) determine that
access is necessary, Iran must then provide access within three days.
Iran understands that any failure to cooperate with the IAEA will
raise significant suspicions among the P5+1 and could lead to a
snapback of sanctions. Following a request for access by the IAEA to a
suspicious undeclared location, we would continue to closely monitor
for indications that Iran was attempting to sanitize a site, and would
respond appropriately should we observe such sanitization activities.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
33. Senator Ayotte. Would this constitute a significant violation
of the agreement?
Secretary Kerry. If we believe that there has been a violation
related to any commitment in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), we can refer the issue to the Joint Commission. If, after a
short period of time, our concerns are not resolved to our
satisfaction, we could notify the United Nations (UN) Security Council
that we believe Iran's actions constitute ``significant non-
performance'' of its JCPOA commitments. We have full discretion to
determine what is and is not significant non-performance.
The United States has the ability to re-impose both unilateral and
multilateral nuclear-related sanctions in the event of non-performance
by Iran. And, in the case of UN sanctions, under UN Security Council
Resolution 2231 we could do so even over the objections of any member
of the Security Council, including China or Russia. In addition, we
have a range of other options for addressing minor non-compliance.
These include snapping back certain domestic sanctions to respond to
minor but persistent violations of the JCPOA. Our ability to calibrate
our response will serve as a deterrent to Iranian violations of the
deal.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
34. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Moniz, will the IAEA inspectors be
able to move around the country without Iranian approval? The former
Deputy Director General for Safeguards of IAEA, Olli Heinonen, has said
that nuclear bombs or warheads can be put together in a relatively
small space, some 239 square yards in size. How can the inspectors find
a place like that without freedom to move without prior approval?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
35. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Moniz, what happens if after the 24
day period Iran has still not provided access to a site? Are there
consequences spelled out in the agreement for specific violations?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Ayotte. As part of the IAEA process of requesting site
access, the agency must provide Iran ``reasons for access in writing
and will make available relevant information.''
36. Secretary Moniz, couldn't this reveal sources and methods and
jeopardize future monitoring capability? Will we be limited in the
number of times we are willing to come forward because we are concerned
about exposing our sources?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
nuclear arms race in the middle east
37. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter, isn't it detrimental to U.S.
national security interests to have more countries in the Middle East
enriching uranium?
Secretary Carter. I do not anticipate a nuclear arms race because
of the deal. However, the Department will remain vigilant on this issue
and watch regional developments closely. I believe this agreement will
verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and curtail,
rather than exacerbate, the risk of an arms race. Additionally, the
United States will remain committed to ensuring compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by all parties to the treaty, not just
Iran. The United States retains authorities and capabilities to prevent
nuclear proliferation around the globe, and continue to use these
effectively.
38. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Carter, isn't it reasonable to say
that the more countries we have enriching uranium in the Middle East,
the more likely it is that bad actors or terrorist groups could get
their hands on nuclear materials that could be used against Americans?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
Senator Ayotte. Referring to the nuclear negotiations with Iran,
former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal, recently told
BBC ``I've always said whatever comes out of these talks, we will want
the same. So if Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to whatever
level, it's not just Saudi Arabia that's going to ask for that. The
whole world will be an open door to go that route without any
inhibition . . .''
39. Secretary Moniz, if this deal goes forward and Iran's
enrichment program is legitimized and recognized, isn't it likely that
countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE will develop their own
enrichment programs as well?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
deal implementation independent of iaea report on previous military
dimensions
Senator Ayotte. On July 22, the Head of Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran said, ``By December 15, at the end of the year, the issue (of
the PMD) should be determined. The IAEA will submit its report to the
board of governors. It will only submit it. The Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action will continue independently of the results of this
report.''
40. Secretary Kerry, will the implementation of this deal continue
independently of the results of the IAEA report on Iran's previous
military dimensions?
Secretary Kerry. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
Iran have agreed on a time-limited ``Roadmap'' through which Iran will
address the IAEA's concerns regarding past and present issues,
including the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear
program and those specific issues set out in the IAEA Director
General's November 2011 report. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), Iran must complete the activities required of it in
this Roadmap by October 15, well in advance of any sanctions relief.
The IAEA will report whether or not Iran has taken those steps. If Iran
does not take those steps, we will not provide sanctions relief.
duration
41. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Kerry, does the new U.N. resolution
expire in ten years?
Secretary Kerry. Ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day all provisions
of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 will be terminated,
unless UN sanctions on Iran have been snapped back as permitted by the
resolution. The P5+1 have indicated their intention to extend the
snapback provisions of UNSCR 2231 for an additional five years beyond
the resolution's ten-year duration.
42. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Kerry, what does that mean for
Iranian restrictions and obligations after the ten year mark?
Secretary Kerry. This is a long-term deal that has many elements
and different phases, and some key elements that last forever. UNSCR
2231's snapback provision will provide a significant incentive for Iran
to meet its commitments for the ten years of the resolution, plus an
additional five years if the P5+1 are able to extend the snapback
provision as they have stated they will do. However, the risk that
UNSCR sanctions will snap back is not the only incentive for Iran to
meet its commitments, as U.S. and EU sanctions may be re-imposed at any
time if Iran fails to comply with the JCPOA.
For 10 years, Iran will be subject to very strict limitations on
its domestic enrichment capacity and research and development--ensuring
a breakout time of at least a year.
For at least 15 years, Iran will be subject to strict limitations
on core elements of its nuclear program, including an enriched uranium
stockpile limit of 300 kg of UF6; a limit on heavy water, consistent
with Iran's needs following conversion of the Arak reactor; no uranium
enrichment or fissile material at the Fordow facility; all enrichment
capped at no more than 3.67 percent, far short of what is usable in a
nuclear weapon; no production of reactor fuel in Iran unless approved
by the United States and our partners; and no reprocessing of
irradiated nuclear fuel, which prevents the acquisition of plutonium
for weapons.
In addition, for 15 years, Iran is committed not to conduct work on
uranium or plutonium metals, which are essential elements for a nuclear
weapon; not to seek or acquire highly enriched uranium or plutonium,
either indigenously or through foreign procurement; and not to work
with other countries on enrichment technologies absent approval by the
Joint Commission established under the JCPOA. Inspections and
transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years, with some
continuing for 25 years and others lasting forever. For example, the
deal provides for Iran's ratification of the IAEA's Additional
Protocol, which would make those transparency obligations permanent.
All spent fuel from the Arak reactor will be shipped out of Iran
for the lifetime of the reactor. Iran has also committed indefinitely
to not engage in specific activities that could contribute to the
design and development of a nuclear weapon. It has also committed to
rely only on light water for its future nuclear reactors.
43. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Kerry, do the snapback sanction
provisions extend beyond 10 years?
Secretary Kerry. The P5+1 have indicated in writing their intention
to extend the snapback provision of UNSCR 2231 for an additional five
years beyond the ten-year duration of that resolution. With respect to
U.S. sanctions, we can snap back our sanctions at any time if Iran
violates its JCPOA commitments.
snap back sanctions
Senator Ayotte. Foreign Minister Zarif reportedly told Iran's
parliament recently that ``the surge of foreign businesses into the
country [after sanctions are lifted] would make it difficult for the
United Nations to restore sanctions.''
He said the ``swarming of business for reinvesting their money is
the biggest barrier for such an action.'' He also said the P5+1
countries ``would hesitate to seek renewed sanctions if the move cut
off new and lucrative business ties to the Iranian market.''
44. Won't the rush of cash and investment back into Iran after
sanctions are lifted give the Iranians increased immunity to the
possible re-imposition of sanctions and will create a broad and
formidable international European, Russian, and Chinese government and
business coalition opposed to the re-imposition of sanctions?
Secretary Kerry. We have been very clear that should Iran violate
its commitments under the JCPOA after we have suspended sanctions, we
will be able to promptly snap back both U.S. and UN sanctions, and our
EU colleagues have made clear their intention to do so with respect to
their sanctions as well. In the event that there is an Iranian
violation, we expect to have strong international support for
sanctions, as evidenced by the broad international coalition that we
have built in recent years in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.
Moreover, while the increased economic activity of our partners with
Iran could raise the cost of snapping back sanctions, it is important
to bear in mind that this increased economic activity also
significantly raises the cost to Iran of non-compliance given the
threat of snapback.
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
45. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Kerry, in a noteworthy comment, Zarif
also reportedly reassured Iran's parliament that sanctions can be
restored only for a major breach of the deal and not for a small
infraction. Doesn't that comment suggest that Iran, consistent with
their past behavior, does not plan to fully abide by the agreement?
Secretary Kerry. While we would not want to speculate on Foreign
Minister's Zarif's intent, the fact remains that under the JCPOA and
under our own sanctions laws, we have a wide range of options to
respond to any Iranian non-compliance, from significant non-performance
to more minor instances of non-compliance.
Specifically, the United States has the ability to re-impose
unilateral and multilateral nuclear-related sanctions in the event of
Iran's non-performance. In the case of UN sanctions, under UN Security
Council Resolution 2231 we could do so over the objections of any
member of the Security Council, including China or Russia, if we deemed
Iran's actions to constitute ``significant non-performance,'' and we
would judge for ourselves what non-performance was ``significant.''
This unilateral ability to snap back all of the UNSC sanctions gives us
extraordinary leverage to get cooperation from other countries if we
seek to take lesser steps instead. In addition, we have a range of
other options for addressing relatively minor non-compliance. These
include designating specific entities that are involved in activities
inconsistent with the JCPOA, snapping back certain domestic sanctions
to respond to minor but persistent violations of the JCPOA, or using
our leverage in the Joint Commission on procurement requests.
arms embargo and missile restrictions
Senator Ayotte. The JCPOA makes no mention of the arms embargo or
the missile embargo. Rather, these provisions were included in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. On July 26, 2015, Iran's
Defense Minister said, ``Missile-related issues have never been on
agenda of the nuclear talks and the Islamic system will resolutely
implement its programs in this field.''
On July 22, 2015, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister said ``Whenever we
consider it necessary for our own security, [or] to help our allies in
the region we will provide weapons. . . . We don't feel shy. We will
provide weapons to whomever and whenever we consider appropriate. And
we will buy weapons from wherever we can.''
According to UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the arms embargo
on Iran will be lifted as soon as the IAEA submits a report that
concludes that Iran's nuclear program is peaceful.
46. Could the IAEA make that determination before five or eight
years? So does that mean that the arms embargo and missile restrictions
could be lifted sooner than five and eight years, respectively?
Secretary Kerry. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution
2231 (2015), transfers of certain types of arms and related materiel to
Iran remain prohibited for a period of five years and transfers of
ballistic missile-related items, technology, and assistance to Iran
remain prohibited for eight years, unless the IAEA reaches the Broader
Conclusion that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities
in Iran and all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful
activities. Based on the IAEA's past practice in other countries and
the extent of Iran's nuclear program, we expect it will take a
substantial number of years of applying the Additional Protocol and
evaluating the full range of Iranian nuclear activities to reach that
milestone.
Separate from the UN Security Council restrictions, we will
continue to implement a number of robust domestic and multilateral
authorities related to counter-terrorism and proliferation to address
Iran's arms and ballistic missile activities. For example, we will keep
in place the U.S. sanctions that apply to Iran's missile program,
including the ``secondary'' sanctions that apply to foreign banks that
engage in transactions with entities that have been designated for
their role in Iran's missile program, and will continue our efforts to
counter the spread of missiles and related technology to or from Iran
through the use of U.S. sanctions, export controls, and cooperation
with partner states, including through the 34-country Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Secretary Carter. Annex B of United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 calls upon Iran to ``not undertake any activity
related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering
nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile
technology.'' The resolution also prohibits certain arms and missile-
related transfers to or from Iran absent approval on a case-by-case
basis by the UN Security Council. The United States would be able to
block UN Security Council approval of any transfer of weapons or
ballistic missile-related items covered by the restrictions that remain
in force under UNSCR 2231, and it is difficult to imagine any
circumstance in which we would consider allowing the Council to approve
such a transfer. This arms embargo is to remain in place for five years
and the missile-related restrictions are to remain in place for eight
years, unless the IAEA reaches the Broader Conclusion that there are no
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and all nuclear
material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. Based on the IAEA's
past practice in other countries and the extent of Iran's nuclear
program, we expect it will take a substantial number of years of
applying the Additional Protocol and evaluating the full range of
Iranian nuclear activities to reach that milestone. After that, there
are still a number of domestic and multilateral authorities related to
missile proliferation that the United States can continue to use to
disrupt transfers of missile-related technologies to Iran.
The Administration is fully aware of the threat posed by the
Iranian ballistic missile program. That is why the Department has taken
the steps to ensure that the United States is protected today by the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system from potential Iranian
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Administration is also taking
steps to increase the effectiveness of the GMD system by 1) improving
the reliability of the Ground-Based Interceptor kill vehicle, 2)
deploying a Long-Range Discrimination Radar in Alaska, and 3) enhancing
the discrimination capabilities of the currently deployed ground-based
sensors. The Department continuously monitors Iran's efforts to develop
ballistic missiles and is prepared to ensure the United States remains
protected from future Iranian threats.
General Dempsey. Although it is highly unlikely, if the IAEA
reaches a Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains
in peaceful activities before the five or eight year embargos are set
to end, then the restrictions could be lifted early.
47. Senator Ayotte. Can you clarify whether violations of the arms
embargo would be considered violations of the JCPOA? Would we be able
to snapback sanctions should Iran violate the arms and missile
embargos? Would the administration do so?
Secretary Kerry. The arms embargo and missile-related restrictions
on Iran under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1929 were designed
to pressure Iran specifically to address the international community's
concerns with its nuclear program. UNSCR 1929 anticipated that these
restrictions would be lifted as Iran addressed these concerns. Not
surprisingly, Iran and Russia pushed for an immediate lifting of the
arms embargo and missile restrictions as soon as Iran took the key
nuclear steps provided for in the JCPOA. Through hard bargaining, we
were able to ensure that UNSCR 2231 endorsing the JCPOA extends arms-
and missile-related restrictions for a significant period of time after
the JCPOA takes effect, even though these restrictions are not part of
the JCPOA. Even after these restrictions on Iran are lifted, we can
still rely on a broad set of multilateral and unilateral tools,
including other UNSCRs and domestic sanctions, to continue to restrict
Iranian conventional arms and missiles. We will also keep in place the
U.S. sanctions that apply to Iran's missile program, including the
``secondary'' sanctions that apply to foreign banks that engage in
transactions with entities that have been designated for their role in
the missile program.
Secretary Carter. Annex B to United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 provides for a five-year-long arms embargo and
eight-year-long missile-related restrictions on Iran (which would end
earlier if the IAEA reaches the Broader Conclusion that there are no
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and all nuclear
material in Iran remains in peaceful activities). However, it is our
understanding that Iranian attempts to circumvent these restrictions,
which are not directed against the nuclear program, would not be
considered a violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA). With that in mind, the administration would take any
prohibited arms transfers or missile procurement attempts seriously,
and act accordingly to respond to noncompliance by Iran and any nation
supporting such efforts within the framework of existing UN sanctions,
international counter proliferation regimes, and U.S. laws. We will
continue to have a range of unilateral and multilateral means available
to halt Iranian arms transfers and restrict Iran's missile program,
just as we do today. Recent coalition efforts to stop Iranian military
shipments to the Houthis in Yemen demonstrate our resolve and our
capabilities on this matter.
General Dempsey. Yes, a violation of the arms embargo would be a
violation of the JCPOA.
According to the agreement, the U.S. may unilaterally respond to an
Iranian violation by choosing not to meet its commitments in whole or
in part. The U.S. may also invoke its option to call for a U.N.
Security Council vote to maintain the suspension of sanctions. Under
the agreement, the U.S. may act unilaterally to snap-back sanctions
through its veto option as a standing member of the U.N. Security
Council.
48. Senator Ayotte. Is Iran continuing to provide arms to Shiite
militias in Iraq? To Houthi rebels in Yemen? To the Assad regime? To
Hezbollah?
Secretary Kerry. The U.S. sees Iran clearly for what it is: the
world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism; a supporter of terrorist
groups such as Hizballah and Hamas; a backer of the Asad regime's
brutality in Syria; and a force for instability in Yemen. That is why
we will maintain and continue to aggressively enforce our sanctions
against Iran's support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the
region, and human rights abuses. If Iran intensifies these actions,
we--along with our partners--will combat them.
U.S. support to our regional partners will continue to be key to
countering Iranian aggression in the region. That is why we are working
to expand our cooperation across the board with regional partners that
share our concerns over Iran, as the President agreed with regional
leaders at the Camp David summit in May. This effort will strengthen
our regional partners across a range of areas, while making clear we
will not accept Iranian efforts to spread instability and strengthen
its terrorist proxies.
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. Yes, Iran has provided arms to all of these
entities.
49. Senator Ayotte. If the answer is yes, isn't Iran already
violating key UNSC resolutions?
Secretary Kerry. We are certainly concerned that Iran continues to
violate the UN sanctions imposed against it, including through illicit
procurement and arms transfers. Iran's export of weapons, including to
some of the most extreme and irresponsible actors in the region,
remains a serious factor fostering instability. We continue to deter
and respond to such violations, including through interdiction,
sanctions, and law enforcement measures, as appropriate.
We also have longstanding engagement with the United Nations on
sanctions evasion issues related to Iran. We report violations and
bring issues to the Sanctions Committee and the UN Panel of Experts
when we have releasable information and doing so would further our
nonproliferation objectives. Other countries are expected to do the
same. We continue to work closely with likeminded partners on the UN
Security Council to urge the Security Council's Iran Sanctions
Committee to follow up on reported sanctions violations.
Secretary Carter. Any Iranian arms transfers to Houthis in Yemen,
non-state actors in Lebanon (including Hizballah), and/or Iraqi Shi'a
militias would violate relevant UN Security Council resolutions that
call upon all member States to comply fully and effectively with UN
Security Council-mandated arms embargoes on providing weapons to these
groups.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer.
breakout time after year 15
50. Senator Fischer. Secretary Moniz, you stated that Iran would
probably expand their capacity to enrich uranium after 15 years of this
agreement. Please elaborate on the impact this increased capacity could
have on Iran's breakout time to produce a sufficient amount of highly
enriched material for a nuclear weapon in year 16 and beyond, including
any factors that will prevent said breakout time from being reduced
significantly below the one-year period this agreement seeks to ensure
until year 15?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
civil nuclear cooperation
51. Senator Fischer. Secretary Moniz, are there any plans for the
United States to directly finance modifications to Arak or any other
part of Iran's nuclear program?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
52. Senator Fischer. Secretary Moniz, the agreement includes
numerous provisions related to civilian nuclear cooperation; has any
U.S. assistance been offered? Please describe the assistance you
believe you are authorized to provide.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
possible military dimensions (pmd)
53. Senator Fischer. Secretary Kerry, will Congress be able to
review in a timely manner the full extent of the IAEA's final
assessment, described in paragraph 8 of the ``Roadmap for Clarification
of Past and Present Outstanding Issues'' and scheduled to be submitted
to the Board of Governors by December 15, 2015?
Secretary Kerry. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), the IAEA will provide to the IAEA Board of Governors by
December 15, 2015, the IAEA's final assessment on the resolution of all
past and present outstanding issues regarding the Possible Military
Dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Consistent with past practice, we
expect the report will be made public by the Board of Governors. We
will continue to brief Congress in a timely manner on the PMD
investigation.
54. Senator Fischer. Secretary Kerry, you have stated that Iran
will not receive any type of sanctions relief until the outstanding
issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director General's report
(GOV/2011/65) and often described the possible military dimensions
(PMDs) of Iran's nuclear program, are clarified. Do all the members of
the E3/EU+3 share this view? Please provide the specific legal basis
contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for denying
Iran sanctions relief if these issues are not clarified.
Secretary Kerry. We have always said that we consider Iran
addressing Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) with the IAEA to be of
critical importance, and the P5+1--including all of our E3 partners--
has spoken with one voice on this throughout the negotiations. It is
this unity that provided the leverage the IAEA needed to secure the
Roadmap Agreement with Iran.
Under the Roadmap, Iran agreed to a time-bounded process to address
the IAEA's concerns regarding past and present issues, including the
Possible Military Dimensions of Iran's nuclear program and those
specific issues set out in the IAEA Director General's November 2011
report.
To be clear, this process cannot stretch out forever. Iran has
committed in the JCPOA to take all the steps required of it under the
Roadmap by October 15. Iran will obtain sanctions relief only if it
takes those steps--in addition to the other major nuclear steps it must
take.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Sullivan
sanctions
55. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Lew, under the Dispute Resolution
Mechanism of the agreement, Sec. 37 language suggests that foreign
investors would be allowed to fulfill the length of newly negotiated
contracts with Iran, even in the aftermath of a violation or act of
terrorism. The language itself states that `` . . . provisions [of the
old UN Security Council resolutions] would not apply with retroactive
effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian
individuals and entities prior to the date of application.'' How does
this grandfather clause impact the fidelity of a ``snapback'' sanctions
regime when foreign investors have the legal authority, under this
agreement, to complete their contracts?
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
56. Senator Sullivan. Secretaries Kerry and Lew, the agreement
outlines the parameters of an ``implementation day'' which includes the
``comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as
multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program,
including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and
energy.'' Although this occurs with IAEA verification that Iran has
completed certain commitments over a couple of months, why are the bulk
of these sanctions being lifted at the beginning, and not incrementally
over several years? Typically in diplomacy, we exchange one thing for
another and so on and so forth, until the final objective is achieved.
Why did we give up all of the benefits upfront, by lifting the entire
scope of Annex II sanctions before Iran achieved a series of benchmarks
or swore to disavow acts of terrorism?
Secretary Kerry. Iran must complete a series of key nuclear-related
measures, as verified by the IAEA, before it receives any sanctions
relief under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These
measures are substantial and extensive. They include the export of
Iran's enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg of uranium
hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent, the removal and storage of
two-thirds of its centrifuges (an amount totaling well over 12,000
centrifuges), the removal and permanent disablement of the existing
reactor core at Arak, and the implementation of a number of additional
transparency measures. The cumulative effect of these steps would leave
Iran with a breakout time to acquire enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon at one year or more, and would increase our visibility
into any would-be breakout attempt. Iran must take all of these steps
before receiving any JCPOA sanctions relief.
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
57. Senator Sullivan. Secretaries Kerry and Lew, I posed a
hypothetical in today's hearing: All sanctions against Iran have been
lifted. Its economy is humming. It's abiding by the nuclear agreement.
And then it commits a major act of terrorism, killing American
civilians or soldiers. The Congress and the president then re-impose
biting sanctions. However, Iran cites Paragraphs 26 and 37 within the
agreement pertaining to sanctions relief, which state that if
``sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as
grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole
or in part.'' They also refer to their own interpretation of that
clause filed with the U.N. Security Council which states: ``It is
understood that reintroduction or re-imposition, including through
extension of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute
significant non-performance which would relieve Iran from its
commitments in part or in whole.'' In my mind, if we impose sanctions
in any respect, the deal is over. If this is not the case, please
elaborate.
Secretary Kerry. It is essential to recall that this deal does not
provide for all U.S. sanctions on Iran to be lifted. All of our non-
nuclear sanctions authorities remain in place and are unaffected by the
JCPOA.
In any event, we would not violate the JCPOA if we imposed new
sanctions on Iran for supporting terrorism, committing human rights
abuses, acquiring ballistic missile technology, or any other non-
nuclear reason. We have been clear about this fact with Iran and the
other P5+1 countries. Additionally, the JCPOA does not provide Iran any
relief from U.S. sanctions under these authorities.
What we have committed to do is quite specific: not to re-impose
those specific nuclear-related sanctions provisions specified in Annex
II to the JCPOA and not to impose new nuclear-related sanctions,
contingent on Iran abiding by its JCPOA commitments. That does not mean
that we would be precluded from sanctioning specific Iranian actors or
sectors if the circumstances warranted. All of our other sanctions
authorities remain in place and are unaffected by the JCPOA.
Additionally, we have made it clear to Iran that we would continue to
use and enforce sanctions to address its other troubling activities,
including its destabilizing activities in the region. That said, this
does not give us free rein to simply re-impose tomorrow all of our
nuclear-related sanctions under some other pretext. Iran would
obviously see that as bad faith, as would our international partners.
In the end, if we decide to impose new sanctions, it will be important
that we have a credible rationale for doing so. This has always been
the case and will be no different in the future.
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
language and technical nuances of jcpoa
58. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kerry, the Senate Armed Services
Committee has heard testimony from several high ranking military
officials, that Iran is or has been responsible for facilitating the
maiming or deaths of hundreds--if not thousands--of American troops.
Yet in 2007, then Iranian Ambassador to the U.N., Javad Zarif
maintained that ``Iran has no interest in providing weapons to any
insurgents groups in Iraq'' and that ``the United States . . . is
trying to find or fabricate evidence.'' It has been reported that you
have a constructive relationship with the now Iranian Foreign Minister.
The State Department has additionally acknowledged that you have logged
more one-on-one time with him than with any other foreign minister
since becoming Secretary of State. Given the substance of this
relationship, has he ever acknowledged or admitted that Iran is
directly or indirectly responsible for the maiming and deaths of
American servicemen?
Secretary Kerry. We will continue to counter Iran's destabilizing
and threatening actions in the Middle East region aggressively. We have
made very clear to the Iranian regime these activities are
unacceptable. I have often raised regional conflicts with Foreign
Minister Zarif as part of our ongoing discussions. The President and I
are committed to working closely with Israel, the Gulf countries, and
our other regional partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities
in the region.
59. Senator Sullivan. Secretaries Kerry and Lew, the JCPOA lays out
how the P5+1 desires a ``new relationship'' with Iran. Typically, in a
contract such sentiments are expressed by both parties, but nowhere in
the 150 pages of this agreement, do you see Iran making a reciprocal
pledge. Secretaries, don't you think this is indicative of manner in
which Iran currently views the United States and do you see this
attitude undergoing a transformational change in 10 years or so when
the UN Security Councils concludes its ``consideration of the Iran
nuclear issue''?
Secretary Kerry. We have been clear from the beginning of this
process that these negotiations are only about the nuclear issue and
that our end goal is preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon
and ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is and will remain peaceful
going forward.
There are different trends inside of Iran. It is possible that if
the JCPOA is properly implemented, and Iran's economy improves as a
consequence of sanctions relief, it would strengthen the hand of
moderate forces inside of Iran. However, the key point is that the deal
is not dependent on anticipating those changes. If they do not change
at all, we are still better off having the deal.
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
60. Senator Sullivan. Secretaries Kerry and Moniz, my colleague,
Senator Ayotte raised a very good question regarding United States
cooperation in ``strengthening Iran's ability to protect against, and
respond to nuclear security threats--including sabotage.'' Given the
United States' past history in facilitating disruptions and subversions
of Iran's nuclear program, does this agreement now prevent us from
conducting similar operations in the future?
Secretary Kerry. We believe that the JCPOA, if implemented, will be
the most effective means to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear
weapon and ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is and will remain
peaceful going forward. We expect Iran to meet its commitments under
the JCPOA. To be absolutely clear, the JCPOA in no way commits us to
defend Iran's nuclear facilities. The language in the JCPOA is designed
to help bring Iran's nuclear security and safety practices in line with
those used by other peaceful nuclear programs around the world. It is
in the interest of all countries that nuclear material be safeguarded
from nuclear accidents, theft and terrorist attacks, including cyber-
attacks, so any training provided by the IAEA or others will be solely
for that purpose.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
icbm/conventional weapons ban
61. Senator Sullivan. General Dempsey, earlier this month you told
this committee that ``under no circumstances should we relieve pressure
on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms
trafficking.'' General Dempsey, Secretary Carter, can you provide any
rationale on why our negotiators have conceded on this incredibly
important issue and whether or not this concession is in the United
States' national security interests? Would a military response by the
United States be riskier in 8 years, when Iran has both conventional
weapons and ICBM's, than it would be now, should they commit a major
act of terrorism?
Secretary Carter. It is the Department of Defense's job to plan and
prepare for contingencies in the event that Iran chooses to violate the
nuclear agreement. The Department continuously evaluates and updates
U.S. forces posture to ensure a qualitative military advantage in the
Middle East and are able to address Iran's malign behavior
appropriately. There are no limits placed on the Department's
preparedness as a result of this agreement. All military options remain
on the table.
Additionally, even once the UN Security Council's arms embargo and
missile restrictions on Iran are lifted, the United States can continue
to restrict Iranian conventional arms and missile-related transfers.
There is a comprehensive set of multilateral and unilateral tools,
including sanctions that can be relied on to restrict these transfers.
General Dempsey. I was not part of the negotiation process, however
as I understand it, our team decided that because the embargo was based
on Iran's nuclear activity, maintaining the UN embargo was impossible.
As the lifting the embargos is contingent on Iranian compliance with
the deal, and because we will still maintain authorities to interdict
shipments to Iranian proxies like Hezbollah, I am comfortable with the
terms of the agreement.
Although Iran may buy weapons from Russia and China, developing
into a conventional power would take time. A globally integrated
economy would best support a modern conventional force. Conversely,
should Iran continue to agitate and support malign activity, the
country's pariah status and resultant poor economic performance will
likely check traditional military power. Whichever direction Iran
takes, U.S. military forces will continue to outmatch Iranian
capabilities by advancing our own weapons and building partner
capacity.
miscellaneous
62. Senator Sullivan. General Dempsey, given your own review of the
agreement and analysis of the potential strengths and weaknesses--
especially as it pertains to upholding American national security
interests--do you endorse this agreement?
General Dempsey. The agreement is not the military's to endorse.
That said, this deal clearly makes it more difficult for Iran to move
towards a nuclear weapon than without an agreement. The deal primarily
rolls back Iran's nuclear program and provides the international
community with unprecedented access to Iran's nuclear facilities and
nuclear supply chain.
In any case, we are confident in our military options and stand
determined in our commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
dod consultation on negotiations
63. Senator Lee. How often and under what circumstances were you,
other members of the Joint Chiefs, or the Commander of CENTCOM
consulted by members of the negotiating team on the military dimensions
of the Iran agreement? Where there ever points in these consultations
where you or DOD personnel disagreed with the direction of the
negotiations or specific aspects to which our negotiators were
agreeing?
Secretary Carter. The negotiating team kept the Department updated
on the direction of negotiations and frequently consulted with myself
and General Dempsey in regards to the military dimensions of the Iran
agreement. The Department of Defense believes this is a good deal,
because it verifiably blocks all pathways for Iran to achieve a nuclear
weapon.
General Dempsey. Throughout the negotiations, I performed my role
as the principal military advisor to the President. Because of the
complexity of constraints placed on Iran to comply with the deal, I am
comfortable with the terms of the agreement.
iran's funding for proxies
64. Senator Lee. How has Iran historically dispersed funding and
military assistance to its proxies in the Middle East, is there
anything in this agreement that will prohibit this new economic
windfall from being used to fund such operations, and what impact will
a large increase of funding and assistance to these proxies have on
American forces and the security of our allies in the region? What will
be done to protect our forces in the region from these threats?
Secretary Carter. Iran faces a major economic challenge, and we
would expect that any financial gains from sanctions relief will be
needed for its domestic economy--and some Iranian leaders have said as
much. Iran needs about half a trillion dollars to meet pressing
investment needs and government obligations. Conversely, Iranian
support to militants or terrorists does not require substantial
resources. It is therefore more effective for the United States to
focus on strategies that counter this behavior, especially by working
with our partners in the Gulf.
But regardless of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the
Department remains absolutely committed to supporting the safety and
security of our regional partners, especially Israel. The President has
expressed his desire to strengthen our security partnership with Israel
through efforts such as a new ten-year Foreign Military Financing
agreement and increased missile defense funding. Additionally, the
U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit at Camp David was about
strengthening historical partnerships in order to confront new
challenges facing the Middle East. There was a recognition that all of
the GCC partners, as well as the United States, need to commit to
broadening and deepening bilateral U.S.-GCC relationships and the
multilateral U.S.-GCC relationship, to the advancement of our shared
regional security interests.
Finally, there are numerous domestic authorities--sanctions or
otherwise--to counter Iran's support for terrorism or other
destabilizing activities. The Department will continue to work with
interagency partners to check Iran's destabilizing activities. The
Department is an important part of a broader government effort to
counter these malign behaviors.
Secretary Kerry. The U.S. sees Iran clearly for what it is: the
world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism; a supporter of terrorist
groups such as Hizballah and Hamas; a backer of the Asad regime's
brutality in Syria; and a force for instability in Yemen. That is why
we will maintain and continue to aggressively enforce our sanctions
against Iran's support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the
region, and human rights abuses. If Iran intensifies these activities,
we--along with our partners--will combat them.
Iran has used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force
(IRGC-QF) to implement its foreign policy objectives and provide cover
for intelligence operations. The IRGC-QF is the regime's primary
mechanism for cultivating and supporting destabilizing activities
abroad.
However, of Iran's approximately $100 billion in overseas foreign
reserves, we estimate that, after sanctions relief, Iran will be able
to freely access only slightly more than half--a little over $50
billion. That is because over $20 billion is dedicated to projects with
China, where it cannot be freely spent, and tens of billions in
additional funds are effectively non-performing loans to Iran's energy
and banking sectors that are unlikely to be repaid, at least not in the
next few years.
U.S. sanctions on the IRGC will not be relieved under this deal.
The United States will also maintain sanctions on the IRGC-QF, its
leadership, and its entire network of front companies. This includes
secondary sanctions that would penalize foreign financial institutions
that engage in transactions with any of these designated entities. We
retain the ability to impose additional sanctions on individuals and
entities providing support to the IRGC or those involved in supporting
terrorism or human rights abuses, if circumstances warrant.
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
lifting of the arms embargos
65. Senator Lee. When the conventional weapons and ballistic
missile embargos are lifted, what specific weapons and technology do
you believe Iran is most likely to acquire, and for what purpose? What
countries do you anticipate will be supplying Iran with these weapons,
and will the United States have any level of control over, or oversight
on, what Iran is acquiring and how it will be used?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
Secretary Kerry. The existing UNSCRs impose obligations on all
States to implement the arms and missile embargoes and provide
authorities to facilitate enforcement. To work, they are dependent on
the compliance of all UN Member States, not Iran's compliance. Under
UNSCR 2231 that endorsed the JCPOA, those sanctions will continue for
another five and eight years after Adoption Day (or until the IAEA
reaches the broader conclusion that all nuclear materials in Iran
remain in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier).
After that, we will retain a number of unilateral and multilateral
tools to counter Iran's arms transfers and other destabilizing
activities in the region. We would refer you to the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence with any further questions regarding
Iranian procurement intentions and activities. Any discussion of
specific procurements by Iran would need to be in a classified setting.
66. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, given that the embargo on
ballistic missile technology could be lifted in 8 years, do you
anticipate that this agreement will have any impact on our current
regional and homeland missile defense plans?
Secretary Carter. In the near term, we do not anticipate that the
nuclear agreement will have any impact on our missile defense plans.
Iran's large and growing ballistic missile force continues to present
substantial risks to our deployed forces and bases in the Middle East
and Europe, to our NATO European Allies and partners, as well as to
Israel and our Gulf Cooperation Council partners. The United States
will maintain its missile defense posture across the Middle East, and
will continue to encourage partners to build interoperable ballistic
missile defense systems through acquisition of U.S. platforms and
enhanced cooperation. We will continue with plans to deploy U.S.
missile defenses in Europe. We are also enhancing and modernizing our
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which provides protection of the
U.S. homeland against Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
attacks from countries like North Korea and Iran.
In the future, we will reevaluate our missile defense plans and
make adjustments, if necessary, to meet the Iranian ballistic missile
threat. This could include expanding our homeland missile defense
system to defend against an emerging ICBM threat from Iran.
regional rivalries with iran
67. Senator Lee. General Dempsey, if Gulf countries and others in
the region who view Iran as a geopolitical rival or existential threat
do not believe that this agreement will prevent Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon, or believe that Iran is in violation of the agreement,
how do you anticipate they will respond? What role would the United
States play in any potential conflict stemming from a suspected Iranian
nuclear program?
General Dempsey. Although Saudi Arabia and others in the region
have noted concerns publicly over this deal it is unlikely that they
would pursue a nuclear program in the way Iran has over the last
decade. We continue to work with our partners in the region regarding
the development of peaceful nuclear power and to encourage a Middle
East that is fully compliant with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
ongoing iranian policies and u.s. posture
68. Senator Lee. Secretary Carter, in an address in Tehran last
week, Ayatollah Khamenei stated: ``Our policy towards the arrogant U.S.
government will not change at all'', amid chants of ``Death to
America'' and ``Death to Israel''. Again, this is a country whose
policy towards the United States has included direct or indirect
responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of U.S. military personnel
over the past 35 years and countless acts of terror and belligerence
towards our allies. How will the continuation of these Iranian policies
towards the United States impact our military posture in the CENTCOM
area of responsibility and intelligence posture around the world?
Secretary Carter. Existing partnerships and preparations keep the
United States well-postured to counter Iranian destabilizing activity.
The Administration remains cognizant of Iran's continued support for
the Assad regime in Syria, and the extent to which Iran has supported
rebel groups in Yemen and throughout the region. The United States will
remain postured to challenge that activity when it runs counter to U.S.
interests or destabilizes the region.
Additionally, the Defense Department will continue to work with
interagency partners to check Iran's destabilizing activities. The
Department is an important part of a broader government effort to
counter these malign behaviors, and continues to maintain plans,
preparations, and posture to be able to execute a robust military
option, if called upon to do so.
consideration of jcpoa as a treaty
69. Senator Lee. Secretary Kerry, you have given several
justifications at hearings on this agreement as to why it was not
submitted as a treaty for advise and consent in the Senate. Why
specifically was the decision made not to submit this as a treaty, and
how does the Department of State define ``treaty'' and determine if an
agreement will be a treaty or an executive agreement?
Secretary Kerry. The JCPOA is neither a treaty nor an executive
agreement. The JCPOA consists of political commitments between Iran and
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China,
and the European Union. The United States has a longstanding practice
of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in
political commitments.
The JCPOA does not need to be a binding agreement under
international law to be rigorous and enforceable; verifiability and
transparency are built into the deal itself, and leverage and
accountability flow from our ability to re-impose sanctions, including
UN Security Council sanctions, if Iran does not fulfil its commitments
with respect to its nuclear program.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Cruz
iranian threat with nuclear weapon
70. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, in your personal opinion, how
grave is the threat of an Iranian regime that possesses nuclear
weapons? Is there any reason we shouldn't believe them when they
declare their intentions to destroy Israel and the United States?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
71. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, as the Acting Commander of
Central Command in 2007 through early 2008, I presume that you met with
the leadership of our allies in the Middle East? Can you provide your
opinion on what their reaction to a nuclear Iran will be? Will our
allies in the Middle East seek to increase their conventional military
capability? Do you believe our allies in the Middle East will be forced
to purchase or develop their own nuclear weapons, or do you foresee
them having to do both?
General Dempsey. I have had long-lasting relationships with leaders
in the Middle East from my time at Central Command, as you noted, but
also during my tenure as Chairman. I have discussed the JCPOA with
leaders throughout the region. If you are asking what their reactions
to the deal have been, it runs the gamut. Israel has very publically
expressed opposition, other countries have privately expressed some
concern, some have expressed support, and some have not expressed a
strong opinion either way. If you are asking what their response would
be to an Iranian regime with nuclear weapons that is a hypothetical
that I cannot answer. I will say that the JCPOA was designed
specifically to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If Iran
cheats on the deal, and if our very strong verification regime fails,
and if Iran develops nuclear weapons, it is likely that other Middle
East allies that have the resources will look to bolster their own
military capabilities as well. That is why one of our priorities in the
Department of Defense is to reassure our partners in the Middle East
through continued military-to-military engagement.
72. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, you recently travelled through
the Middle East and talked to some of those same leaders. What did they
tell you about their concerns, and what actions do you see them taking?
Which country's reaction to the agreement alarmed you the most?
Secretary Carter. During my late July trip to the Middle East, I
discussed common strategic threats with partners in the region, and
sought to advance our bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Although
our Gulf country partners are rightfully skeptical of Iran's
intentions, they understand that the lack of trust in Iran is precisely
why the President sought a nuclear agreement that relies on
verification to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Further,
our Gulf partners understand fully that the U.S. commitment to regional
security is enduring. Our Gulf partners also understand that the U.S.
commitment of a robust military presence in the region will continue to
serve as the ultimate deterrent against any aggression they could face.
73. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, as I understand it, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency is designed to provide the Defense Department's
core expertise with respect to countering the threats from weapons of
mass destruction. How much did the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
participate and inform decision making during the negotiation process?
If so, how much deference was given to their expertise during the
negotiations led by Secretary Kerry? What is DTRA's foremost concern
with the JCPOA?
Secretary Carter. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency/US Strategic
Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction was not
involved in the negotiations on the JCPOA. The negotiating team kept
the Department updated on the direction of negotiations and frequently
consulted with myself and General Dempsey in regards to the military
dimensions of the Iran agreement. The Department believes this is a
good deal, because it verifiably blocks all pathways for Iran to
achieve a nuclear weapon.
74. Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, the Iranian Supreme Leader's top
adviser for international affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati stated that
``(the westerners) have made some comments about defensive and missile
issues, but Iran will not allow them to visit our military centers and
interfere in decisions about the type of Iran's defensive weapons.''
Iranian Ground Force Commander, Brigadier General Ahmad Reza
Pourdastan, echoed similar statements as well. What mechanisms will we
have to detect, interdict, or delay nuclear capabilities if we suspect
that Iran is using military facilities to violate the terms of the
agreement, particularly if they deny inspectors access to the sites
after exhausting any proposed alternative arrangements, a review by the
Joint Commission, and potentially the dispute resolution process?
Secretary Kerry. If any JCPOA participant has reason to believe
that Iran is using military facilities or any other facility to violate
the terms of the JCPOA, it would have the option to share that
information with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the
IAEA could request access as appropriate to clarify any questions. If
Iran were to deny an IAEA request for access to a suspicious undeclared
location, including military facilities, and Iran and the IAEA cannot
resolve the issue within 14 days, the issue is brought to the Joint
Commission, which then has seven days to consider the issue. If Iran
still will not provide access but five members of the Joint Commission
(such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the
European Union) determine that access is necessary, Iran must then
provide access within three days.
Iran understands that any failure to cooperate with the IAEA will
raise significant suspicions among the P5+1 and could lead to a
snapback of sanctions. Following a request for access by the IAEA to a
suspicious undeclared location, we would continue to closely monitor
for indications that Iran was attempting to sanitize a site, and would
respond appropriately should we observe such sanitization activities.
The United States has the ability to re-impose both unilateral and
multilateral nuclear-related sanctions in the event of non-performance
by Iran. And, in the case of UN sanctions, under UN Security Council
Resolution 2231, we could do so even over the objections of any member
of the Security Council, including China or Russia. In addition, we
have a range of other options for addressing minor non-compliance.
These include snapping back certain domestic sanctions to respond to
minor but persistent violations of the JCPOA. Our ability to calibrate
our response will serve as a deterrent to Iranian violations of the
deal.
75. Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, the JCPOA stipulates that its
signatories will cooperate with Iran to provide technical assistance,
facilitate commercial licenses for supply of nuclear fuel, collaborate
on technology projects, and most worrisome ``nuclear security.'' This
entails ``training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability
to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear
facilities and systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable
nuclear security and physical protection systems,'' as well as to
``strengthen Iran's ability to protect against, and respond to nuclear
security threats, including sabotage, as well as to enable effective
and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems.'' If
military facilities are still viewed to be of concern, does the fact
that other nations will be able to improve the physical defense
capabilities at Iran's nuclear sites concern you? Can any such action
on behalf of the US to address these military sites be deemed grounds
for Iran to pull out of the deal?
Secretary Kerry. Nothing in Annex III of the JCPOA requires the
United States to participate in any specific cooperation activity. The
language in the JCPOA is designed to help bring Iran's nuclear security
and safety practices in line with those used by other peaceful nuclear
programs around the world. It is in the interest of all countries that
nuclear material be safeguarded from nuclear accidents, theft and
terrorist attacks; any training provided by the IAEA or others would be
for that purpose. While there could be some activities where it would
be beneficial for the United States to participate, we would only
participate in such an engagement after a careful review to ensure that
it meets our overall policy objectives and in ways that are consistent
with our laws and regulations, which significantly restrict the types
of interactions that we could have. Any cooperation with Iran in these
areas would be with respect to declared, peaceful nuclear facilities
operating consistently with the requirements of the JCPOA. We would not
expect this to include any military facilities.
We believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), if
implemented, will be the most effective means to ensure that Iran does
not obtain a nuclear weapon and ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is
and will remain peaceful going forward.
76. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, what possible rationale is
there in providing assistance to the Iranians for hardening their
nuclear facilities, when we must reserve the capability and the will to
strike and destroy those facilities in the event the Iranians fail to
comply?
Secretary Carter. To clarify, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) does not commit the United States--or any of our P5+1
partners--to undertake any particular nuclear cooperation activity with
Iran, with the exception of Russia's explicit commitment to stable
isotope production at the Fordow facility. The JCPOA does contemplate
the possibility of cooperative activities to assist in ensuring Iranian
facilities are in compliance with global nuclear safety standards. This
is work that the International Atomic Energy Agency and its member
states, including the United States, carry out in dozens of countries
around the world. I believe it would be irresponsible not to provide
basic cooperation to improve Iran's capacity to prevent the theft or
diversion of these nuclear materials. None of the work would reduce our
ability to take military action against Iran if that was necessary to
prevent their pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
With that in mind, the Department's primary responsibility with
regard to the nuclear deal is to ensure that the President has all
military options available for any Iran contingency. Therefore, the
Department will maintain the plans, preparations, and posture to be
able to execute a robust military option, if called upon to do so. If
Iran violates the agreement, options that are available today will be
available to any U.S. President in the future. The United States will
likely be in a far stronger position 10 or 15 years from now, when Iran
is further away from a nuclear weapon, and with the inspections and
transparency measures in place that allow us to monitor the Iranian
program.
77. Senator Cruz. Secretary Carter, throughout these negotiations,
proponents of this deal have stated that the alternative to the deal is
war. That statement is nonsense. Walking away wouldn't have led to war;
it would have led to a better deal. This deal doesn't prevent war; it
leads to a conflict with Iran. As we continue to decrease the size of
our military to historic levels, Iran is increasing their military
spending by a third next year, funded by the $100 billion signing bonus
Secretary Kerry is providing them. Just last month, the Navy announced
that it would have to remove its aircraft carrier presence from the
Arabian Gulf for a couple months because they simply don't have the
capacity. How capable and prepared are we to protect our allies? How
much improvement in air and missile defense has been accomplished
across the Gulf Cooperation Council and Israel?
Secretary Carter. The United States remains fully committed to
maintaining the defense capacity necessary to protect national security
interests in the region, including security assurances to regional
partners. Extensive access to the region provides the capacity and
capability to respond credibly and effectively to regional threats, as
well as the capacity to assess regional threats rapidly and
efficiently. Furthermore, U.S. defense support for Israel remains
ironclad and has reached unprecedented levels under this
Administration. The Administration recognizes that Israel faces missile
threats from a number of actors in the region. That is why in addition
to Foreign Military Financing assistance, the United States has
provided more than $3 billion in missile defense assistance to Israel
since 2001. The Department has worked with Israel to develop a multi-
layered missile defense architecture that includes Iron Dome, David's
Sling, and Arrow. The U.S. Government also continues to work toward
advancing the U.S.- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security partnership
as discussed at the Camp David Summit in May. The Department is focused
on advancing cooperation in numerous areas, including in missile
defense and military preparedness. In broadening and deepening the U.S.
security relationship with GCC States through increased collaboration,
coordination, and capacity-building, we bolster our ability to mitigate
potential regional security threats.
78. Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, do you believe that Iran could
develop significantly more capable air defense systems between now and
when the deal lapses that might change its calculus on agreement
compliance?
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
hezbollah/arms
79. Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, this week you attempted to ease
these concerns regarding arms transfers to Hezbollah, stating: ``There
is a U.N. resolution, 1701, that prevents the transfer of any weapons
to Hezbollah. That will continue, and what we need to do is make sure
we're enforcing it.'' Yet, President Obama said in a recent press
conference: ``It's not like the U.N. has the capacity to police what
Iran is doing.'' Are the American people and our allies relying on the
assurances of a UNSC resolution, one which has not been enforced in
terms of Hezbollah, or will the United States monitor and prevent
illicit weapons transfers throughout the Middle East?
Secretary Kerry. We will continue to use the multilateral and
unilateral tools that are available to us to counter the transfer of
weapons to Hezbollah.
The existing UNSCRs impose obligations on all States to implement
the arms embargo on Iran and provide authorities to facilitate
enforcement. Under UNSCR 2231 that endorsed the JCPOA, those sanctions
will continue for another five years after Adoption Day (or until the
IAEA reaches the broader conclusion that all nuclear materials in Iran
remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier).
After that, we will continue to have a number of other unilateral
and multilateral tools available to us to counter Iran's arms transfers
and other destabilizing activities in the region. Equally important, we
also continue to work with our partners to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region and disrupt Iran's weapons transfers.
80. Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, Annex B of UNSC Resolution 2231
stipulates the five-year conventional weapons embargo extension and the
eight-year ballistic missile embargo extension can be waived subject to
``a case-by-case'' determination of the Security Council. Under what
circumstances will the UNSC approve arms sales to or from Iran?
Secretary Kerry. The United States would be able to block UN
Security Council approval of any transfer of weapons or ballistic
missile-related items covered by the restrictions that remain in force
under UNSCR 2231, and it is difficult to imagine any circumstance in
which we would consider allowing the Council to approve such a
transfer.
81. Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, will the US come to the aid of
Israel in the event Iranian arms in Hezbollah hands are used or
deployed on our ally?
Secretary Kerry. The JCPOA does not alter our relationship with
Israel or our unwavering commitment to Israel's security and right to
self-defense. We will continue to aggressively counter Iran's
destabilizing actions in the region.
We are also helping Israel address new and complex security threats
by continuing to ensure Israel's Qualitative Military Edge. We remain
committed to working together with Israel to provide new capabilities
to detect and destroy terror tunnels, build highly effective rocket and
missile defense systems to protect the Israeli people, and help Israel
improve its cyber-defense capabilities.
possible military dimensions
82. Senator Cruz. Former CIA and DNI Director Michael Hayden said
this past month: ``We, of course, do not have total knowledge of how
much progress the Iranians had made . . . I was stunned about a month
ago when Sec. Kerry declared that we had ``absolute knowledge'' of
their weaponization effort and that we need not overly focus on the
past. I know of no American intelligence officer who would claim that
we have ``absolute knowledge'' of the Iranian weaponization program.''
Last month, former Defense Department senior analyst J. Matthew McInnis
said: ``We have a long history of getting it wrong on these states'
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs . . . No intelligence
professional would ever (or should ever) say they have absolute
confidence in their knowledge on any subject, let alone on an
adversary's nuclear program. But the president and the secretary appear
to be expecting exactly that of our intelligence officers. Moreover,
they are basing the legitimacy and success of a nuclear agreement on
it. Expecting the US intelligence community to have `absolute
knowledge' of a subject is unprecedented, and frankly absurd.'' At this
moment, does the US intelligence community have full knowledge of
Iran's past activities in relation to the possible military dimension?
If the US does not obtain such knowledge, how are our officials
supposed to gauge Iran's progress without a baseline to reference?
Secretary Kerry. A 2007 Director of National Intelligence report
assessed with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military
entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear
weapons.
Our ability to implement this deal is not linked to Iran's past
work. This deal is about what Iran's nuclear program will look like in
the future, and about Iran taking steps to show that it is not
undertaking current or future nuclear weapons work. We are confident
that this deal can verifiably ensure that Iran's nuclear program will
remain peaceful going forward.
Under the JCPOA, Iran must provide the IAEA with the information
and access required under the Roadmap Agreement to investigate concerns
regarding Iran's nuclear program in the past.
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
General Dempsey. [Deleted.]
83. Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, as I understand it, the
``Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues'' is
a mere framework that calls for ``separate arrangements,'' solely
between the IAEA and Iran, to address undeclared sites, past
activities, and Parchin. Congress is not able to review these
arrangements, and therefore has no basis to judge the progress or lack
thereof regarding Iran's possible military dimension. Additionally,
none of the P5 countries are allowed to view these separate
arrangements. This constitutes extraordinary terms of confidentiality.
Are any other similar separate arrangements between the IAEA and any
state under its inspection subject to comparable levels of
confidentiality?
Secretary Kerry. In the JCPOA, Iran committed to take certain steps
set forth in the Roadmap Agreement negotiated between the IAEA and
Iran. The Roadmap refers to two ``separate arrangements'' between the
IAEA and Iran. Within the IAEA system, such arrangements related to
safeguards procedures and inspection activities are confidential and
are not released to other member states. The United States does not
have a right to demand these documents from the IAEA. However, the
United States was briefed on these separate arrangements, and we have
briefed and will continue to brief Congress on them as well.
It is standard practice for the IAEA and member states to treat
bilateral documents as ``safeguards confidential.'' This is a principle
the United States has championed throughout the IAEA's existence to
protect both proprietary and proliferation-sensitive information. There
are many cases where states would have liked access to safeguards
information, including the denuclearization efforts in South Africa,
investigations in South Korea, and efforts to safeguard enrichment
plants in Brazil and elsewhere, but where that information remained
confidential.
84. Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, why are the terms of these
``separate arrangements'' so stringent that not even the P5 countries
are allowed to view it?
Secretary Kerry. In the JCPOA, Iran committed to take certain steps
set forth in the Roadmap Agreement negotiated between the IAEA and
Iran. The Roadmap refers to two ``separate arrangements'' between the
IAEA and Iran. Within the IAEA system, such arrangements related to
safeguards procedures and inspection activities are confidential and
are not released to other member states.
It is standard practice for the IAEA and member states to treat
bilateral documents as ``safeguards confidential.'' This is a principle
the United States has championed throughout the IAEA's existence to
protect both proprietary and proliferation-sensitive information. The
United States does not have a right to demand these documents from the
IAEA. However, the United States was briefed on these separate
arrangements, and we have briefed and will continue to brief Congress
on them as well.
85. Senator Cruz. Secretary Kerry, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency is responsible for partnering, verifying, researching,
responding, defending, and preparing against the full threat spectrum--
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives.
According to DTRA's website, the agency partners with ``countries that
have been our allies for centuries, and we partner with countries that
have recently opened their doors to the United States . . . with any
country that wants to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction,
or be prepared for a crisis involving WMD.'' Did DTRA in any way
participate in negotiating the JCPOA before a final agreement was
struck?'' Has DTRA been consulted on the terms of the JCPOA since it
was released? Can you verify that DTRA will not be a partner in
protecting or securing Iran's nuclear facilities, pursuant to Annex III
Section D, whether through technology development, academic workshops,
or information sharing?
Secretary Kerry. The negotiation of the JCPOA was a fully
interagency effort of the U.S. government. Implementation of the deal
will similarly draw on the full spectrum of expertise within the U.S.
interagency, including, where appropriate, the Department of Defense.
Nothing in Annex III of the JCPOA requires the United States to
participate in any specific cooperation activity. While there could be
some activities where it would be beneficial for the United States to
participate, we would only participate in such an engagement after a
careful review to ensure that it meets our overall policy objectives
and in ways that are consistent with our laws and regulations, which
significantly restrict the types of interactions that we could have.
iaea inspections and verification
86. Senator Cruz. Please explain the rationale for a potential
delay of up to 24 days for IAEA inspections.
Secretary Kerry. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
includes the most comprehensive and rigorous verification regime ever
negotiated, including an unprecedented access provision that ensures
both timely and effective IAEA access to any undeclared location in
Iran necessary to verify Iran's compliance, including at military
locations.
To be clear, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location
with 24 hours' notice under the Additional Protocol, which Iran will
implement under this deal. This deal does not change that baseline. It
enhances it, by creating a new mechanism to ensure the IAEA gets the
access it needs to undeclared locations and by setting a firm limit to
resolve access issues--24 days. Without the special access provisions
we negotiated in the JCPOA, Iran could stonewall the IAEA for years and
not be in violation. The IAEA has been seeking access to the Parchin
facility for well over three years.
Either Iran must provide the necessary access to resolve the IAEA's
concerns within 24 days (at the maximum), or Iran would be in violation
of its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments and
sanctions could be snapped back. Our experts believe, and the history
in Iran and elsewhere has shown, that a site contaminated with nuclear
materials is very unlikely to be successfully sanitized within 24 days,
or longer for that matter.
Iran understands that any failure to cooperate with the IAEA will
raise significant suspicions among the P5+1 and would likely lead to a
snapback of sanctions. If Iran refused access after a decision of the
Joint Commission, the United States could take appropriate action at
that time.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
87. Senator Cruz. Is the IAEA relying on Iran to provide samples
from the Parchin site? If so, who or what entity in Iran is designated
to carry out this task?
Secretary Kerry. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), Iran must complete the activities required of it in the
``Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues
regarding Iran's Nuclear Program with the IAEA.'' This includes a
separate arrangement on Parchin. This arrangement, like other
arrangements related to safeguards agreements and inspections
activities, is confidential within the IAEA system. We cannot address
publicly the details of what the Roadmap activities entail. As we have
said before--and as we briefed Congress fully in classified settings--
the U.S. government's nuclear experts are confident that the Agency's
plans for Parchin are technically sound. Finally, Iran will not get
additional sanctions relief until the IAEA verifies that Iran has
completed its nuclear steps, including those related to PMD.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
88. Senator Cruz. Secretary Moniz, the JCPOA limits the stockpile
of enriched uranium, or its equivalent in chemical forms, at 300 kg of
up to 3.67 percent. However, Annex I outlines three significant
instances when enriched uranium is not counted toward this limit when:
(1) fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia are used at Russian reactors
inside Iran, (2) when enriched uranium from other countries is used in
Iran's reactors, and (3) when enriched uranium in fuel assemblies are
manufactured in Iran. How will the IAEA account for this additional
uranium, and will it be reported on?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
89. Senator Cruz. The JCPOA stipulates that, in the event Iran
seeks to purchase fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets, the
signatories to the Agreement ``will supply a quantity of 19.75 percent
enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) and deliver [it] to Iran.'' Can you
guarantee that the United States will not engage as a supplier of
enriched uranium oxide to Iran when it seeks to purchase this material?
Secretary Kerry. Under the JCPOA, Iran will seek to enter into a
commercial contract for the external supply of fuel for the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR). In the case of lack of conclusion of such a
contract with a fuel supplier, the E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity (in
increments no greater than approximately 5 kg) of enriched uranium
oxide to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of TRR fuel and target
fabrication. Nothing in the JCPOA would require such a transfer
specifically from the United States.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
iran sanctions
90. Senator Nelson. Secretary Lew, If Congress does not permit
sanctions to be lifted under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPA), will other countries continue to cooperate with U.S.
sanctions? Specifically, will countries that import Iranian oil--China,
India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan--continue to comply with
sanctions imposed by Section 1245 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239)?
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
91. Senator Nelson. Secretary Lew, could the Department of Treasury
compel their continued cooperation with threat of economic sanction?
Would such a threat be credible?
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
negative iranian activity in the middle east
Senator Gillibrand. We've heard a lot of concerns about the fact
that this deal did not address Iran's bad behavior in the region.
92. Secretary Kerry, what were the Administration's reasons for not
addressing these issues?
Secretary Kerry. Iran's destabilizing activities in the region are
a top concern of the Administration. An Iran with a nuclear weapon
would make this aggressive behavior even more concerning. That is why
the Administration believes the first step is to prevent Iran from
developing a nuclear weapon. This arrangement addresses that concern by
ensuring that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon as we continue our
work to hold Tehran accountable for its destabilizing regional
activities, including its support for terrorism. The President is
committed to working closely with Israel, the Gulf countries, and our
other regional partners to do just that.
93. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Kerry, how will we ensure that
the loosening of sanctions and the integration of Iran into the world
economy does not backfire and generate more violence in the region?
Secretary Kerry. We remain vigilant against threats to regional
stability from Iran, and have not let up on our efforts to address
Iran's support for terrorism and destabilizing activities in the
region, including through designations of Iranians involved in support
for terrorism during the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) period. We have
made clear to Iran that we will continue to utilize all our tools to
disrupt such activities by Iran. First, we are undermining Iran's
capacity to execute attacks directly or through its partners and
proxies by expanding our cooperation with and strengthening the
capacity of regional partners. Second, we are working to restrict
Iran's ability to move money and material for illicit purposes through
sanctions and interdiction actions when necessary. Third, we remain
committed to Israel's security and that of our other regional allies
and we continue to build up our partners' capacity to defend themselves
against Iranian aggression. Fourth, we are working unilaterally and
with allies to weaken Hizballah's financial networks. Finally, we are
working to disrupt Iran's relationships with its partners by
publicizing Iran's meddling wherever we can and over the long-term by
strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law in countries
facing threats from Iranian proxy activities.
94. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, do you anticipate that
Iran will use some of its freed-up cash to fund its proxies like the
Houthis in Yemen, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and
Hamas in Gaza?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
95. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, what is the U.S. counter-
strategy?
Secretary Carter. The Defense Department's primary responsibility
with regard to the nuclear agreement is to ensure that the President
has all military options available for any Iran contingency. The
Department will maintain plans, preparations, and posture to be able to
execute a robust military option, if called upon to do so. The
Department remains prepared and postured to bolster the security of
regional partners, including Israel, to defend against aggression,
ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, and to check Iranian malign
influence. Finally, the Department is postured and prepared to respond
to possible Iranian non-compliance with the agreement.
verification
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, the Additional Protocol
specifies that for access to undeclared and other sites, ``advance
notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and
the activities to be carried out during such access.'' The JCPOA says
the IAEA will ``provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will
make available relevant information.'' I have talked to IAEA inspection
experts who both have told me that the amount of information required
under the JCPOA for access to an undeclared site appears to be greater
than under the Additional Protocol.
96. Secretary Moniz, can you explain to me why the agreement
requires the IAEA to ``make available relevant information'' when the
Additional Protocol does not? Could this requirement to ``make
available relevant information'' be difficult to implement and perhaps
inhibit a request for access if, for example, the request is based on
intelligence information?
Secretary Moniz, the Administration has indicated that it would
take no more than 24 days to gain access to an undeclared site where
there is suspicion of activities contrary to the JCPOA. However, the
JCPOA also that states that the 24 day clock begins with the ``IAEA's
initial request for access'' and the initial request for access cannot
be made until after a request for clarification and Iran's response,
potentially creating a delay longer than 24 days. According to the
agreement, once a site is identified by the agency, and before the
``IAEA's initial request for access,'' the IAEA must ``provide Iran the
basis for such concerns and request clarification'' and then allow Iran
to attempt to explain. The IAEA can only request access if ``If Iran's
explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns.
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
97. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, does this initial period
potentially extend the time for access significantly beyond 24 days
from the time a suspicious site is identified by the IAEA and the
concern is communicated to Iran?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
98. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, some have suggested that
the 24 day clock begins with the initial request for clarification,
notwithstanding the language of the agreement. If this is the
Administration position, has Iran agreed to this?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
99. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, what kind of cheating
could Iran do within 24 days?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
100. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, according to Dr. Olli
Heinonen, former Deputy Director of the IAEA, Iran could theoretically
sanitize a suspected site of materials--including nuclear materials--
within 2 weeks and has done so in the past. Do you agree with this
assessment? Why or why not?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
101. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, some analysts believe
that if Iran is allowed to continue to enrich nuclear materials, even
for allegedly peaceful purposes, that other countries in the region
will follow suit and begin their own nuclear programs. What is your
assessment of this likelihood? Will this deal lead to a nuclearization
of the Middle East?
Secretary Carter. [Deleted.]
102. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, this agreement begins
with a significant roll back of Iran's capabilities and levels of
inspection that include access to known facilities, limitations on the
number of centrifuges they can have spinning, the 24-day access window
and oversight of the supply chain. But over time, these restrictions
and additional access are eliminated and after 25 years, all that is
left are Iran's responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty and
the Additional Protocol. Can you walk us through what we gain in the
interim and at the end of 25 years, are we back where we started?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
103. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, what kind of inspections
regime (frequency, access, and clear consequences) will be necessary to
create an effective deterrent so Iran will not cheat?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
104. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, does the IAEA have those
capabilities?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
105. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, Iran's clandestine
activities, rather than just the existing facilities, are of great
concern considering its history. What do we know about Iran's past
efforts to cheat and set up a clandestine program?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
past military dimensions
106. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, what do we still need to
learn through the PMD process with the IAEA?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
107. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, what, if anything, does
this deal do in response to that?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
108. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, what guarantees are there
that the deal's PMD process will cover everything clandestine that's
potentially out there?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
109. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Carter, will the access for
these first 10-15 years help in the future should Iran later be found
to have developed a covert program and broken its commitments under the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and Additional Protocol?
Secretary Carter. Ten or fifteen years from now, the United States
will likely be in a far stronger position with Iran further away from a
nuclear weapon, and with the inspections and transparency measures in
place that allow for stronger international monitoring of the Iranian
program than would be in place without this deal. I will not comment on
the specifics of military planning, but I am confident in the
Department's ability to serve as an insurance policy against possible
Iranian non-compliance.
110. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, Which countries have the
best weapons inspectors? Will they be on the ground in Iran?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
111. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, The agreement calls for
130+ inspectors from IAEA to monitor Iran's program. In your opinion,
is this number sufficient?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
112. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, Does IAEA have sufficient
technical expertise to adequately monitor Iran's nuclear program,
particularly any clandestine activities?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
113. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, what about IAEA's funding
and resources? Are they sufficient?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
114. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, what if anything can the
U.S. do to strengthen the IAEA's hand?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
115. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Moniz, Do you believe that, at
the end of the 10-15 years of more restricted activity, Iran will be a
``nuclear threshold'' state capable of being able to move rapidly to
weaponization?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
116. Senator Gillibrand. Do you have any concerns about Russia
reprocessing spent fuel from Arak or with converting centrifuges at
Fordow to isotope production?
Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Secretary Kerry. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), Iran must export all spent fuel from the redesigned Arak
reactor, for the lifetime of the reactor, to a mutually determined
location in a P5+1 country or third country, for further treatment or
disposition, as provided for in relevant contracts between the parties.
While there are no such contracts to date, we would welcome one of our
P5+1 partners--including Russia--taking on this role.
Regarding Fordow, the JCPOA provides for two centrifuge cascades to
be modified for the production of stable isotopes, conducted in joint
partnership between Russia and Iran on the basis of mutually agreed
arrangements. We welcome Russia's willingness to cooperate with Iran on
activities to transition the Fordow facility from a uranium enrichment
facility--which is its current use without a JCPOA--to a nuclear,
physics, and technology center without nuclear material and where no
uranium enrichment or uranium enrichment research and development is
conducted.
ramifications of congress rejecting deal
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Kerry, the Administration has stated
that the consequences would be ``catastrophic'' if Congress were to
reject the agreement.
117. Secretary Kerry, please walk us through exactly what you
foresee happening in such a scenario.
Secretary Kerry. If Congress rejects the deal, the United States
would not be in a position to fulfill its sanctions relief commitments
under the JCPOA because of the restrictions under the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act (INARA). The expected result would be that Iran
would refuse to meet its commitments, and the JCPOA would collapse.
Without sanctions relief from the United States, Iran would very likely
not take the significant nuclear steps the JCPOA requires to roll back
and constrain its nuclear program, or to provide unprecedented access
to monitor it. In this scenario, the existing UNSC sanctions regime
would remain in place because the IAEA would not be in a position to
confirm that Iran has taken the nuclear steps outlined in the JCPOA.
Compliance with these and other sanctions would begin to erode,
however, as countries perceived that the U.S. had turned its back on a
feasible negotiated solution. This would put us in the worst possible
position of losing our constraints on Iran's nuclear program while our
leverage begins to weaken.
118. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Kerry, please explain why it
wouldn't be possible for the P5+1 to return to negotiations to get a
stronger deal.
Secretary Kerry. Our international partners joined us in applying
tough sanctions to Iran because we made the case that Iran's nuclear
program was an uncontained threat to global security. Sanctions were
used to bring Iran to the negotiating table, which worked. Now, after
two years of negotiating with Iran, the international community does
not believe that ramping up sanctions will result in a better deal.
Instead, should Congress reject the deal and impose new sanctions, the
international community would blame us for walking away from a credible
solution and would move forward with their desire to re-engage with
Iran. We would no longer be able to maintain the tough international
sanctions regime that forced Iran to negotiate.
The countries whose cooperation we need--including those in the
European Union, China, Japan, India and South Korea, as well as the
companies and banks that handle their oil purchases and hold foreign
reserves--are among the largest economies in the world. These partners,
should they believe our efforts to negotiate a nuclear deal were
disingenuous, would likely decide to stop cooperating with our
sanctions.
If Congress voted to reject the deal, we would go from a situation
in which Iran is isolated to one in which the United States is
isolated. That would be damaging in general, but would represent a
significant setback in our ability to mitigate the profound threat to
international peace and security the Iranian nuclear program poses.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
sanctions on iranian banks
119. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lew, thank you for your efforts
and those at treasury working to stop terror financing and the entire
OFAC team. You have a real challenge here with this proposed agreement
because it is a Sisyphean task to disambiguate Iranian banks involved
in terror financing from those involved in financing Iran's covert
nuclear program. They are really two sides of the same coin, both state
enterprises of the Government of Iran. With Iran being a state sponsor
of terror, I am deeply troubled that the sanctions relief in this
proposed agreement will allow banks engaged in terror financing back
into SWIFT and global commerce. While I have been assured that Bank
Saderat remains sanctioned because of its terror finance activities,
Oner Bank, which is a bank directly owned or controlled by Bank Saderat
is removed from sanctions. Likewise, Karafarin Bank is given sanction
relief. As you know the Karafarin Bank is a private bank controlled by
Iran's Supreme Leader, Seyed Ali Khamenei, through holding companies.
Please explain to the Committee how the private bank of the Ayatollah
is not engaged in terror financing.
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
120. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Lew, another example is Bank
Tejerat. This bank financed Iran's attempts to acquire yellowcake
uranium. But it also supports the activities of subsidiaries and
subordinates of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and we know
the IRGC is coordinating terrorism across the Middle East as we speak.
So will you pledge today that Bank Tejerat will remain on our SDN
(Specialty Designated Nationals) list and that you will work with our
EU allies keep this and the other banks I mentioned out of the SWIFT
system?
Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION
(JCPOA) AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
----------
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and
Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Before we commence the hearing, I would
like to say, since a quorum is now present, I ask the committee
to consider two civilian nominations and a list of 1,476
pending military nominations.
First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
Ms. Joyce Louise Connery to be a member of the Defense Nuclear
Facility Safety Board, and Mr. Joseph Bruce Hamilton to be a
member of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board. Is there a
motion to favorably report these two civilian nominations to
the Senate?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
Senator Inhofe. It's me.
Chairman McCain. All in favor?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman McCain. All those opposed?
[No response.]
Chairman McCain. The ayes have it.
Second, I ask the committee to consider a list of 1,476
pending military nominations, including General Mark A. Milley
to be Chief of Staff of the Army, Admiral John R.--John M.
Richardson to be Chief of Naval Operations, and Lieutenant
General Robert B. Neller to be General and Commandant of the
Marine Corps.
Of these nominations, 298 nominations are 1 day short of
the committee's requirement that nominations be in committee
for 7 days before we report them out. No objection has been
raised, these nominations. I recommend the committee waive the
7-day rule in order to permit the confirmation of the
nominations of these officers before the Senate goes out for
the August recess.
Is there a motion to favorably report these 1,476 military
nominations to the Senate?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman McCain. All in favor, say aye.
[A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman McCain. The motion carries. This--a significant
turnover in the--on the leadership--top leadership of the
United States military.
The committee meets today for our second oversight hearing
on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which the United
States and other major powers have signed with Iran.
We welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them for
joining us today: General Michael Hayden, Principal at the
Chertoff Group and former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency; Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Goodman Professor of
Diplomacy and International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy
School and former Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs; Ambassador Eric Edelman, Distinguished Fellow at the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and former Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Dr. Richard Haass,
President of the Council on Foreign Relations and former
Director of Policy Planning at the State Department. A very
distinguished panel, and I thank all of them for coming to
testify before us today.
The committee's oversight is primarily focused on the
strategic and military implications of the agreement, which is
the responsibilities of the Armed Services Committee. Among
other things, we want to know how this agreement will affect
regional security, proliferation, and the balance of power in
the Middle East; what impact it may have on Iran's malign
activities and hegemonic----
Senator Reed. Dominating-the-region stuff.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain.--ambitions in the region--hegemonic
ambitions in the region; what it means for perceptions of
American credibility and resolve among our allies and partners;
and what the consequences are for U.S. defense policy, military
planning, and force posture.
From this broader strategic perspective, this bad deal only
looks that much worse. The committee is eager to hear our
witnesses' assessments of the vital details of this agreement,
especially the verification and monitoring mechanisms, which
include two side agreements between the IAEA and Iran, neither
of which the administration or the Congress have seen. At the
same time, what is even more troubling are the military
implications of this agreement.
Iran is not just an arms-control challenge, it is a
geopolitical challenge. For years, many of us have urged the
administration to adopt a regional strategy to counter Iran's
malign activities in the Middle East. Unfortunately, if such a
strategy exists, there is no evidence of it. Instead, we have
watched with alarm as Iran's military and intelligence
operatives have stepped up their destabilizing activities in
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Gaza, and elsewhere. Iran
did all of this under the full pressure of sanctions. Now Iran
will receive a windfall of sanctions relief estimated at
roughly $60 billion, or possibly much more. It is only fair to
assume that billions of additional dollars will soon flow to
the Iran's Revolutionary Guards Force, or Quds Force, money
that will be used to boost arms supplies to Iran's terrorist
proxies, to sow chaos and instability across the region, and
double down on Bashar Assad right when he needs it most. This
will present a host of new challenges for the Department of
Defense.
This agreement will not only strengthen Iran's malign
activities in the region, it will also further Iran's emergence
as a dominant military power in the Middle East. Despite
repeated assurances that negotiations were strictly limited to
the nuclear program, the administration made major concessions
related to conventional weapons and ballistic missiles,
concessions that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
warned, before the agreement, should occur under, quote, ``no
circumstances.''
In 8 years, this agreement would lift restrictions on
ballistic missiles whose only conceivable military purpose
would be to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States
and its allies. In 5 years, this agreement would lift the
international arms embargo against Iran, freeing up the regime
to acquire advanced conventional military capabilities. With
billions of dollars in sanctions relief, Iran is sure to find
plenty of states that are eager to sell those weapons,
especially Russia and China.
These concessions have direct and dangerous implications
for the U.S. military. The administration says that the
military option will remain on the table if Iran violates the
agreement. And that is true. Yet, the agreement itself would
enable Iran to construct the very kind of advanced military
arsenal, the anti-access and area denial capabilities, that
could raise the cost of employing our military option. In
short, if this agreement fails, United States servicemembers
are called upon to take action against Iran, their lives would
be at greater risk because of this agreement.
And that is perhaps most troubling of all about this
agreement, what it means for America's credibility in the
Middle East. For decades, the United States has sought to
suppress security competition in the region between states with
long histories of hostility toward one another and to prevent
war. I fear this agreement could further undermine our ability
and willingness to play that vital stabilizing role.
Our allies and partners in the Middle East have
increasingly come to believe that America is withdrawing from
the region, and doing so at a time when Iran is aggressively
seeking to advance its ambitions. Now we have reached an
agreement that will only legitimize the Islamic Republic as a
threshold nuclear state with an industrial enrichment
capability, but will also unshackle this regime and its long-
held pursuit of conventional military power, and may actually
consolidate the current regime's control in Iran for years to
come.
The President and his advisors are fond of saying that the
only alternative to this deal is war. This kind of false choice
is all too familiar from this administration. And these cheap
scare tactics have no place in a national security debate of
this magnitude. And our military leaders know better. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, told this
committee last week, quote, ``We have a range of options.''
Likewise, the President's nominee to be the next Chief of Naval
Operation testified that, quote, ``There are other options
besides going to war.''
In addition to your analysis of the agreement and its
consequences, all of us are eager to hear from each of you
today what realistic alternatives there is to this agreement
and what role the Congress should now play.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And we are, indeed, fortunate to have before us today
witnesses that have served time in the military and our
diplomatic service, intelligence entities of our government.
They have a wide range of knowledge and experience in issues
relating to the Middle East, nonproliferation, asymmetric
warfare, and matters of war and peace in general.
This is our second hearing relating to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA. And I want to thank
Chairman McCain for his effort to make sure the committee is
presented with a range of views and opinions on the JCPOA.
In the weeks ahead, Congress has an obligation to review
carefully the details of this agreement and to validate that
the agreement will meet our common goal of stopping Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. This week's hearings are part of
that effort.
Last week, the committee held a hearing with the
Secretaries of Treasury, State, Defense, and Energy, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That hearing was
important, as it provided the committee with the
administration's views on the agreement, plans for regional
engagement in the months and years ahead, and an opportunity to
better understand the details of the agreement, from Iran's
enrichment capabilities under the JCPOA to how snap-back
provisions and sanctions would be imposed if the terms of the
agreement were violated.
I hope our witnesses today will provide their assessment of
whether the deal is in--the best available option to present
the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon, both in the near
and long term. I specifically hope they will address a number
of areas: the terms of the agreement itself, particularly with
respect to cutting off a path to a nuclear device, past
military dimensions of the program, duration, and the breakout
time necessary for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon; the
alternatives, if any, to the JCPOA--and I think these
alternatives are something that we must consider; three, the
inspection regime under the deal, including lessons learned
from past international inspections that have been incorporated
into this deal; four, the role and capacity of the
International Agency--the Atomic Energy Agency to implement
this deal; and finally, the sanctions regime under the JCPOA,
and availability of those tools to be used against Iran in
situations of terrorism, regional destabilization activities,
and human rights abuses.
While the implementation of this agreement will not be
performed by the Department of Defense, the Department will
have a critical role in implementing the regional engagement
policies and programs laid out at Camp David with our Gulf
Cooperation Council partners. Secretary Kerry is in the region
this week and is working with our GCC partners for the next
steps of this policy: to enhance the ballistic missile defense
capability of the GCC and to improve their interoperability and
collective defense against asymmetric threats. These are
important efforts that I look forward to hearing about today.
Israel rightly views Iran as a significant ongoing threat
to their national security interest. And, while Prime Minister
Netanyahu is unlikely to ever endorse this agreement, the
United States should make every effort to deepen further our
cooperation on military and intelligence matters with Israel. I
would be interested in hearing the assessment of the witnesses
on how the United States might successfully move forward with
the Netanyahu government if this agreement is ultimately
adopted.
I want to make one final point. These negotiations focused
on denying Iran a pathway to a nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon
would be a more critical factor in the region. In fact, Iran
would be a more formidable force in the region if it had a
nuclear weapon, and, as it is repeatedly demonstrated, not a
force for peace and stability, but one that supports terror and
seeks to impose its will throughout the Middle East. Moreover,
a nuclear Iran would likely prompt a regional nuclear arms race
that, through accident or design, could lead to catastrophe.
None of us would condone or ignore Iran's support of terror or
other destabilizing activities in the region, but these
negotiations were properly focused on nuclear weapon.
I look forward to the panel's responses as we continue to
deepen our understanding of this agreement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Welcome the witnesses.
General Hayden, we'll begin with you.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF (RET.), PRINCIPAL,
THE CHERTOFF GROUP AND FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
General Hayden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman,
for the invitation and including me in such a distinguished
panel.
I actually will be very brief in my opening remarks,
because I know we've got an awful lot of questions with which
we have to deal.
I do appreciate, however, in my conversation with the
committee staff, that the committee seems to be organizing its
inquiry along a pattern of what I will call--the staff
doesn't--what I will call three bubbles:
One bubble is the nature of the agreement itself. And
that's the part that the President has asked us to focus on. He
actually has said, ``Judge this agreement on whether or not it
prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon in the next 10
years.'' I actually think that's a fairly narrow focus, and
that is not the only consideration that we must bring to mind
in considering this agreement. Now, we can argue within that
bubble as to whether or not it's actually sufficient for that
more narrowly defined task with regard to possible military
dimensions, the inspection regime, the realism of snap-back
inspections, and so on. And I'm sure we will discuss that,
going forward. But, frankly, of the three bubbles I'm going to
describe, it's probably, in my eye, the most favorable, despite
its weaknesses.
A second bubble has to do with time. Where are we in 10
years? And where we will be in 10 years, if the agreement is
honored, we will be, within Iran, with an industrial strength
nuclear complex and permanent nuclear weapons threshold status.
That's what we have negotiated. And so, I think that's also a
second very important consideration, not just what it does from
zero to 10.
And then, finally and perhaps most immediately, it's what
the agreement does now to all the other aspects of Iranian
behavior that are so troubling to us: what they do with regard
to support to terrorism, Hamas, Hezbollah, their activity in
Iraq, in Lebanon, shoring up the Bashar al-Assad government in
Syria, and, of course, their contribution to the civil war in
Yemen. Iran is doing that now, and is doing that as an
isolated, impoverished, considered, renegade nation-state in
the region. What might Iran be doing in those regards if Iran
is no longer isolated, no longer considered renegade, brought
back into the family of nations, and considerably richer than
it is today?
Mr. Chairman, the night before you arrived at Aspen, a few
weeks ago, General Clapper was out in the big tent answering
some questions, and he was asked about the agreement. And his
bottom line was, ``A terrorist-supporting state without a
nuclear weapon, a terrorist-supporting state with a nuclear
weapon, I think the choice is clear.'' Jim's a good friend, and
that is an incredibly important consideration. But, I don't
think we can isolate ourselves to that consideration. As soon
as he said it, I kind of perked up and said, ``Let me give''--I
didn't say it out loud, but to myself--``Let me give you a
contrary calculus.'' Okay? ``A terrorist-supporting state,
isolated, renegade, impoverished, and not able to have normal
dialogue or intercourse with the community of nations, and a
terrorist-supporting state rich, engaged, accepted, and
legitimated.'' Those are the kinds of problems I think the
immediate and predictable--not only--beyond that, inevitable--
byproducts, even if bubble one were acceptable, that we would
have to deal with before we consider the entire agreement
acceptable.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know we'll have lots
of questions, going forward.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Dr. Haass.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. HAASS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dr. Haass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
opportunity.
Look, this agreement with Iran, like any agreement, is
filled with compromise. And I would say the--what we can simply
do is summarize it as a tradeoff. Inconsistent, I think, with
what General Hayden said, the agreement places significant
limits on what Iran is permitted to do in the nuclear sphere
for 10 to 15 years. But, these limits, even if respected in
full, come at a steep price. And there's essentially two
principal prices. One is that it certainly facilitates Iran's
efforts to carry out what I would call an imperial foreign
policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, starting now. And
secondly, the agreement does not in any way resolve the
problems posed by Iran's actual or potential nuclear
capabilities. And indeed, many of these problems grow
significantly worse as we come out to 10 or 15 years.
My own view is that a better agreement could and should
have been materialized, but I also understand this is
unprovable, and this is why historians can make a living. So, I
will simply address the agreement that we have before us. But,
I do think it needs to be judged on its merits rather than on
the hopes it might lead to some type of a political
transformation of Iran. We simply cannot know what, if any,
effect it will have on Iran. And I think this is one we can
argue round or flat. It could just as easily encourage
radicalism in Iran as it could encourage moderation.
I also have three baskets, not bubbles:
One is the question of compliance. Given Iran's history,
there's ample reason for concern. My own prediction, and it's
just that, is, Iran may well be tempted to cut corners and
engage in what you might describe as retail noncompliance, but
probably not wholesale noncompliance, lest it risk the
reintroduction of sanctions or even military attack. I also
come to this conclusion because I think, from Iran's point of
view, this is a good agreement, and it would be undisciplined
on their part if they were to engage in wholesale
noncompliance. Still, we've to guard against it, and I think we
ought to be explicit as to what the penalties would be if they
were to do that.
On the regional side, as I said, Iran is an imperial power,
and sanctions relief will be an enabler for them to do all the
things they have been doing, but on a larger scale, and it
could well extend, among other things, to Syrian civil war.
This comes against the backdrop, I would simply add, of a
Middle East which is already the least successful part of the
world. I've used the analogy that the Middle East is a latter-
day 30-years war of political and religious strife within and
across boundaries. I see nothing in this agreement that will
make that situation better, and, quite possibly, it will make
it worse.
And I'm happy to discuss, if people want, what I think,
therefore, we need to think about doing in places like Iraq, in
Syria and other places in the region. I would simply say, more
broadly, is that we need to discourage the Saudis and others
from developing a nuclear option to hedge against what Iran
might do down the road. I mean, as bad as the Middle East now,
a Middle East with one or more additional nuclear threshold
states or actual states would be a nightmare, particularly
since several of these regimes are brittle. So, it's not just
simply the question of nuclear use that we have to think about,
it's the loss of custodianship over nuclear weapons and
materials.
Establishing strategic trust--or reestablishing strategic
trust with Israel, I would also put high on the list. And, for
the Israelis and others, including Jordan and other countries,
we have got to have real, strategic dialogues to make sure they
can contend with the very real threats, either stemming from
Iran, ISIS, or what have you.
My third area of concern deals with the long-term nuclear.
And, in some areas, I think that's the most serious. It's
necessary, but not sufficient, that Iran not be able to
assemble one or more nuclear weapons down the road. And one
thing I would recommend immediately is consultations with
European and regional governments to deal with the question of
a follow-on agreement to this one. What--again, if I'm right in
my analysis that this agreement buys us 10 or 15 years, then we
need to begin immediately on what is the aftermath. Because 10
or 15 years is not all that much. And we, ourselves, need to do
serious planning, not simply diplomatically, but about
sanctions, covert action, and military force.
Now, I'm aware that you all, unlike me, have the
responsibility to vote on this agreement. And I--as I've said,
I believe it is a flawed agreement. But, I also think the
framing is important here. And the issue before the Congress is
not whether the agreement is good or bad, but whether, from
this point on, the United States would be better or worse off
with or without it. And I simply think there are several
drawbacks to passing a resolution of disapproval, presumably
overriding a presidential veto. And the two most serious ones
are obviously what Iran could do in the nuclear realm in the
short run, and secondly, the questions and doubts this would
raise, not simply in the region, but around the world, about
American reliability and predictability.
At the other end of the scale or spectrum is the option of
voting for the agreement. But, that would do nothing to address
the flaws and the drawbacks and shortcomings of the agreement
that exists.
So, let me just put on the table a third option that I
think is worth exploring, which is the idea to associate or
link or somehow accompany any vote on this agreement with
either legislation or some type of a formal communication
between the White House and the Congress about American
policies that would deal with each one of these three baskets.
What would be American policy in the case of noncompliance?
What would be certain principles that would guide American
policy towards regional challenges? And what would be the
principles and policies that would guide U.S.--the United
States over the 10- and 15-year period and beyond when it came
to Iranian policies in the nuclear realm. And what this--what
the statements or these--this accompanying legislation would
lay out is what would be intolerable and what the United States
is prepared to do in the event of certain types of Iranian
behavior. And I think such a statement would both have elements
of reassurance to our friends and allies to help manage their
behavior, but also send clear warnings to Iran about what would
be the consequences of certain actions on their part.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Haass follows:]
Prepared Statement by Richard N. Haass
Mr. Chairman: Thank you for this opportunity to speak about the
``Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action'' (JCPOA) signed on July 14 by
representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council, Germany, and Iran. I want to make it clear that what you are
about to hear are my personal views and should not be interpreted as
representing the Council on Foreign Relations, which takes no
institutional positions.
The agreement with Iran, like any agreement, is a compromise,
filled with elements that are attractive from the vantage point of US
national security as well as elements that are anything but. A simple
way of summarizing the pact and its consequences is that at its core
the accord represents a strategic tradeoff. On one hand, the agreement
places significant limits on what Iran is permitted to do in the
nuclear realm for the next ten to fifteen years. But these limits, even
if respected in full, come at a steep price. The agreement almost
certainly facilitates Iran's efforts to promote its national security
objectives throughout the region (many of which are inconsistent with
our own) over that same period. And second, the agreement does not
resolve the problems posed by Iran's actual and potential nuclear
capabilities. Many of these problems will become greater as we approach
the ten year point (when restrictions on the quantity and quality of
centrifuges come to an end) and its fifteen year point (when
restrictions pertaining to the quality and quantity of enriched uranium
also end).
I was not a participant in the negotiations; nor was I privy to its
secrets. My view is that a better agreement could and should have
materialized. But this debate is better left to historians. I will as a
result address the agreement that exists. I would say at the outset it
should be judged on its merits rather than on hopes it might lead (to
borrow a term used by George Kennan in another context) to a mellowing
of Iran. This is of course possible, but the agreement also could have
just the opposite effect. We cannot know whether Iran will be
transformed, much less how or how much. So the only things that makes
sense to do now is to assess the agreement as a transaction and to
predict as carefully as possible what effects it will likely have on
Iran's capabilities as opposed to its intentions.
I want to focus on three areas: on the nuclear dimension as
detailed in the agreement; on the regional; and on nuclear issues over
the longer term.
There is understandable concern as to whether Iran will comply with
the letter and spirit of the agreement. Compliance cannot be assumed
given Iran's history of misleading the IAEA, the lack of sufficient
data provided as to Iran's nuclear past, the time permitted Iran to
delay access to inspectors after site-specific concerns are raised, and
the difficulty likely to be experienced in reintroducing sanctions. My
own prediction is that Iran may be tempted to cut corners and engage in
retail but not wholesale non-compliance lest it risk the reintroduction
of sanctions and/or military attack. I should add that I come to this
prediction in part because I believe that Iran benefits significantly
from the accord and will likely see it in its own interest to mostly
comply. But this cannot be assumed and may be wrong, meaning the United
States, with as many other governments as it can persuade to go along,
should both make Iran aware of the penalties for non-compliance and
position itself to implement them if need be. I am assuming that the
response to sustained non-compliance would be renewed sanctions and
that any military action on our part would be reserved to an Iranian
attempt at breaking out and fielding one or more nuclear weapons.
The regional dimension is more complex and more certain to be
problem. Iran is an imperial power that seeks a major and possibly
dominant role in the region. Sanctions relief will give it much greater
means to pursue its goals, including helping minority and majority
Shi'ite populations in neighboring countries, arming and funding
proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, propping up the government in
Damascus, and adding to sectarianism in Iraq by its unconditional
support of the government and Shia militias. The agreement could well
extend the Syrian civil war, as Iran will have new resources with which
to back the Assad government. I hope that Iran will see that Assad's
continuation in power only fuels a conflict that provides recruiting
opportunities for the Islamic State, which Iranian officials rightly
see as a threat to themselves and the region. Unfortunately, such a
change in thinking and policy is a long shot at best.
The United States needs to develop a policy for the region that can
deal with a more capable, aggressive Iran. To be more precise, though,
it is unrealistic to envision a single or comprehensive US policy for a
part of the world that is and will continue to be afflicted by multiple
challenges. As I have written elsewhere, the Middle East is in the
early throes of what appears to be a modern day 30 Years War in which
politics and religion will fuel conflict within and across boundaries
for decades, resulting in a Middle East that looks very different from
the one the world has grown familiar with over the past century.
I will put forward approaches for a few of these challenges. In
Iraq, I would suggest the United States expand its intelligence,
military, economic, and political ties with both the Kurds and Sunni
tribes in the West. Over time, this has the potential to result in
gradual progress in the struggle against the Islamic State.
Prospects for progress in Syria are poorer. The effort to build a
viable opposition to both the government and various groups including
but not limited to the Islamic State promises to be slow, difficult,
anything but assured of success. A diplomatic push designed to produce
a viable successor government to the Assad regime is worth exploring
and, if possible, implementing. European governments likely would be
supportive; the first test will be to determine Russian receptivity. If
this is forthcoming, then a joint approach to Iran would be called for.
I want to make two points here. First, as important as it would be
to see the Assad regime ousted, there must be high confidence in the
viability of its successor. Not only would Russia and Iran insist on
it, but the United States should as well. Only with a viable successor
can there be confidence the situation would not be exploited by the
Islamic State and result in the establishment of a caliphate
headquartered in Damascus and a massacre of Alawites and Christians.
Some sort of a multinational force may well be essential.
Second, such a scenario assumes a diplomatic approach to Iran. This
should cause no problems here or elsewhere. Differences with Iran in
the nuclear and other realms should not preclude diplomatic
explorations and cooperation where it can materialize because interests
are aligned. Syria is one such possibility, as is Afghanistan. But such
diplomatic overtures should not stop the United States acting, be it to
interdict arms shipments from Iran to governments or non-state actors;
nor should diplomatic outreach in any way constrain the United States
from speaking out in reaction to internal political developments within
Iran. New sanctions should also be considered when Iran takes steps
outside the nuclear realms but still judged to be detrimental to other
US interests.
Close consultations will be required with Saudi Arabia over any
number of policies, including Syria. But three subjects in particular
should figure in US-Saudi talks. First, the United States needs to work
to discourage Saudi Arabia and others developing a nuclear option to
hedge against what Iran might do down the road. A Middle East with
nuclear materials in the hands of warring, potentially unstable regimes
would be a nightmare. This could involve assurances as to what will not
be tolerated (say, enrichment above a specified level) when it comes to
Iran as well as calibrated security guarantees to Saudi Arabia and
others. Second, the Saudis should be encouraged to reconsider their
current ambitious policy in Yemen, which seems destined to be a costly
and unsuccessful distraction. The Saudi government would be wiser to
concentrate on contending with internal threats to its security. And
thirdly, Washington and Riyadh should maintain a close dialogue on
energy issues as lower oil prices offer one way of limiting Iran's
capacity to pursue programs and policies detrimental to US and Saudi
interests.
The agreement with Iran does not alter the reality that Egypt is
pursuing a political trajectory unlikely to result in sustained
stability or that Jordan will need help in coping with a massive
refugee burden. Reestablishing strategic trust with Israel is a must,
as is making sure it as well as other friends in the region have what
they need to deal with threats to their security. (It matters not
whether the threats come from Iran, the Islamic State, or elsewhere.)
The United States should also step up its criticism of Turkey for both
attacking the Kurds and for allowing its territory to be used as a
pipeline for recruits to reach Syria and join the Islamic State.
The third area of concern linked to the nuclear pact with Iran
stems from its medium and long-term capabilities in the nuclear realm.
It is necessary but not sufficient that Iran not be permitted to
assemble one or more nuclear bombs. It is also necessary that it not be
allowed to develop the ability to field a large arsenal of weapons with
little or no warning. This calls for consultations with European and
regional governments to begin sooner rather than later on a follow-on
agreement to the current JCPOA. The use of sanctions, covert action,
and military force should also be addressed in this context.
I am aware that members of Congress have the responsibility to vote
on the Iran agreement. As I have said, it is a flawed agreement. But
the issue before the Congress is not whether the agreement is good or
bad but whether from this point on the United States is better or worse
off with it. It needs to be recognized that passage of a resolution of
disapproval (presumably overriding a presidential veto) entails several
major drawbacks. First, it would allow Iran to resume nuclear activity
in an unconstrained manner, increasing the odds the United States would
be faced with a decision--possibly as soon as this year or next--as to
whether to tolerate the emergence of a threshold or actual nuclear
weapons state or use military force against it. Second, by acting
unilaterally at this point, the United States would make itself rather
than Iran the issue. In this vein, imposing unilateral sanctions would
hurt Iran but not enough to make it alter the basics of its nuclear
program. Third, voting the agreement down and calling for a reopening
of negotiations with the aim of producing a better agreement is not a
real option as there would insufficient international support for so
doing. Here, again, the United States would likely isolate itself, not
Iran. And fourth, voting down the agreement would reinforce questions
and doubts around the world as to American political divisions and
dysfunction. Reliability and predictability are essential attributes
for a great power that must at one and the same time both reassure and
deter.
The alternative to voting against the agreement is obviously to
vote for it. The problem with a simple vote that defeats a resolution
of disapproval and that expresses unconditional support of the JCPOA is
that it does not address the serious problems the agreement either
exacerbated or failed to resolve.
So let me suggest a third path. What I would encourage members to
explore is whether a vote for the pact (against a resolution of
disapproval) could be associated or linked with policies designed to
address and compensate for the weaknesses and likely adverse
consequences of the agreement. I can imagine such assurances in the
form of legislation voted on by the Congress and signed by the
president or a communication from the president to the Congress,
possibly followed up by a joint resolution. Whatever the form, it would
have to deal with either what the United States would not tolerate or
what the United States would do in the face of Iranian non-compliance
with the recent agreement, Iran's long-term nuclear growth, and Iranian
regional activities.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for asking me to meet with you and
your colleagues here today. I of course look forward to any questions
or comments you may have.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Dr. Haass.
Ambassador Edelman.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC S. EDELMAN, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS AND FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ambassador Edelman. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, thank
you very much for inviting me to join this panel today. I'm
delighted to be here with them and before you.
I submitted to the committee staff yesterday a lengthy
statement, and I would ask that it be included in the----
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
Ambassador Edelman.--on the record.
First, let me say that I agree with much of what General
Hayden and Richard Haass have said, but not all. The most
important point I want to make this morning is, I think that
you all are to be commended for the deliberation that you are
engaging in on this agreement. I believe that major arms-
control agreements that bind the Nation in matters vital to the
national interest ought to rest on a strong public consensus.
And that's the reason why the Founders vested the power to
ratify treaties with the Senate. And, although this is not a
treaty--I recognize it's not a treaty--I think the general
proposition still remains very sound, so I appreciate the due
diligence with which you're approaching this.
As Richard's colleague, Ray Takeyh, and I wrote in the
Washington Post last month, I believe that the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Agreement is deeply flawed because it
concedes an enrichment capability that's too large to Iran, a
sunset clause that's too short, a verification regime that's
too leaky, and enforcement mechanisms that are too suspect. The
Institute for Science and International Security, which is one
of the premier nonpartisan authorities on nonproliferation in
general, has assessed that, on the agreement, after year 10,
and particularly after year 15, as limits on its nuclear
program end, Iran could reemerge as a major nuclear threat.
Even if the deal succeeds during the first 10 years, it's
unknowable whether the agreement will continue to accomplish
its fundamental goal of preventing Iran from getting nuclear
weapons in the long term.
As Leon Wieseltier wrote earlier this week in The Atlantic,
10 years is a young person's idea of a long time. And I'm--
unfortunately, now reached the age where I'm allowed to say
things like that.
I need to say that I've come to this judgment with some
difficulty, because I've spent 30 years in the Foreign Service
as a colleague of Ambassador Burns, and I have a strong belief
in deference to executive authority in the conduct of foreign
relations. And a multilateral agreement negotiated over many
years should not be rejected for light or transient causes, for
the reasons that Dr. Haass just mentioned in his statement. The
only legitimate grounds for doing so, I believe, are when you
believe that the agreement is so manifestly deleterious to the
national interest that it warrants rejection and renegotiation.
And I believe this agreement meets that standard because it
will put the imprimatur of the international community and the
United States on an industrial-scale enrichment program that
will leave Iran, even if the negotiated limits are adhered to,
as a threshold nuclear state when the various provisions
expire, as General Hayden said just a minute ago. This, in
effect, reverses 50 years of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
As my SAIS colleague, Michael Mandelbaum, wrote last week,
``We are abandoning the policy of prohibiting the spread of
enrichment technology even to friendly democratic governments.
And, as a result, it will henceforth be extremely difficult to
prevent other countries, at first in the Middle East, but
ultimately elsewhere, particularly in East Asia, from equipping
themselves with the capacity for enrichment. In my view, this
prospect of Iranian nuclear latency will, in turn, put the
Middle East on the path to a catastrophic arms race.''
The sanctions regime, with its snap-back provisions, I'm
afraid will not be easily reconstituted once we have the entry
into force of this agreement. And I would say, tellingly, that
Foreign Minister Zarif noted, a few days ago, that sanctions
would only be reimposed on Iran in case of serious violations
of its obligations, and not in the case of small-scale
violations--to Dr. Haass's point. So, the Iranians are already
telling us that they're not worried about being held to account
for incremental violation of the agreement. And, given Iran's
history of serial violation of its earlier obligations under
the NPT, I think there's a heavy burden on advocates of the
agreement to show that the verification provisions will be
adequate.
We were told during the course of the negotiation that we
would have anytime/anywhere verification for nondeclared sites.
We now know that we're going to have a much more complicated
set of provisions that will leave potentially 24 days for Iran
to deny and--engage in denial and deception about its nuclear
activities if it, in fact, is violating the agreement.
The President has said that there's--you know, this is not
really a long time, it doesn't really matter, you can't really
hide this activity. But, again, the Institute for Science and
International Security has said that, in fact, these cumbersome
procedures for requesting access to undeclared sites would
allow Iran to disguise many small-scale nuclear and nuclear-
weapons-related activities, including high-explosive testing
related to nuclear weapons, small centrifuge manufacturing, and
small centrifuge plants using advanced centrifuges.
The termination of the United States-led sanctions against
Iran's energy, financial, and industrial sectors would
repatriate as much as $150 billion, if all the frozen funds
that Iran has accumulated are released, to rebuild its
straightened economy and to modernize its military. As, again,
Foreign Minister Zarif recently told the Majlis, once the
structure of sanctions collapses, it will be impossible to
reconstruct it.
The deal, itself, will legitimize years of illegitimate
conduct and enhance Iran's drive for hegemony--that's easy for
me to say----
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Edelman.--and, through sanctions relief that
will provide for the modernization of Iranian military
capabilities across the board and increasing its support for
proxies and for terror.
One example of what might happen is an effort by Iran to
shift the strategic balance back in Syria against the Assad
regime once and for all. Tehran's military assistance to
Baghdad and its extension of control through Shiite militias
can be expected to continue. It may feel empowered to take a--
undertake a counteroffensive to the gains that have been made
by the progovernment forces in Yemen in the last few days. And
the larger strategic problem I think we face is that Iranian
hegemony in Yemen could be matched by additional Iranian moves
in Saudi Arabia's eastern province as well as in Bahrain, and
thus, put Riyadh in the equivalent of an East-West strategic
vice. Even an Iranian policy in Yemen that was not able to
achieve its maximal gains would deepen the security vacuum,
which has been a boon to the growth of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula.
With our allies dismayed and increasingly concerned about
the value of U.S. guarantees, they will become more inclined to
pursue policies of self-help. For Israel, this means trying to
manage an intrinsically unstable virtual nuclear balance with
Iran. Both Iran and Israel will face a high potential penalty
for not shooting first in a crisis. Both countries will
necessarily adopt extremely high alert postures and be certain
to pursue preemptive strategies that will lead to chronic--what
we used to call, in the Cold War days, chronic crisis
instability.
For Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab allies, the result
will be further efforts to seek new security partners, perhaps
bringing China into the Gulf arena as a major security player--
we've already seen some indications of that--and increased
pursuit of conventional arms, as well as seeking their own
latent nuclear capability to offset Iran's relatively short
breakout timeline. Unfortunately, it seems that the interaction
between three or more nuclear-armed powers in the region would
be much more prone to miscalculation and escalation than in the
bipolar competition that characterized the Cold War. As Henry
Kissinger and George Shultz wrote in the Wall Street Journal
recently, ``Traditional theories of deterrence assumed a series
of bilateral equations. Do we now envision an interlocking
series of rivalries, with each nuclear program counterbalancing
others in the region?''
There will be other knock-on effects, as Chairman McCain
indicated in his opening statement, in the region across the
Middle East as a result of this agreement. United States
conventional deterrence in the traditional forms--carrier
strike groups, expeditionary strike capability, long-range
strategic airpower, and, when needed, boots on the ground--will
become increasingly difficult to maintain in the region as
Iran's own military power grows and improves. In fact, we're
already under stress due to budgetary and other constraints, as
Admiral Richardson admitted last week in his confirmation
hearing.
Because it--Tehran knows it cannot compete head to head
with U.S. conventional capabilities, it has long pursued an
asymmetric anti-access area-denial strategy, including mobile
missile launchers, the development of anti-ship cruise
missiles, advanced air defenses, burying and hardening its
nuclear facilities, increasingly effective torpedoes, smart
mines, and possibly, in the future, anti-ship ballistic
missiles akin to those that are being deployed by China in the
Pacific to hold United States carriers at greater risk, albeit
on a smaller scale.
The problems--one of the major problems I find with the
agreement is the fact that, in 5 and 8 years respectively, and
possibly shorter, depending on the agreement of the powers, the
U.N. embargos on conventional arms and ballistic missiles to
Iran will come off. And Foreign Minister Zarif, again, recently
underscored to the Majlis that Iran's pursuit of its ballistic
missile and other defense capabilities while violating existing
U.N. Security Council Resolutions will not violate the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Agreement.
As a result, I don't think, in the future, you and your
colleagues, nor my former colleagues in the Department of
Defense, will be able to maintain the assumption of unimpeded
access and control in all domains of warfare in the Persian
Gulf that we have had in the past. I think we're going to have
to expand our regional military presence to reassure Israel and
the Gulf states and to deter Iran. And, as Iran's A2AD
capabilities mature, the United States must take concerted
efforts to maintain or achieve superiority in a range of areas,
including long-range strike, advanced bunker-buster munitions
like the massive ordnance penetrator, sustainable unmanned ISR
and strike platforms, advanced integrated and layered air and
missile defenses for our in-theater forces and for our allies,
and greater capability for undersea precision strike, and
perhaps relying on close-in weapon system and directed energy
to defend our fielded forces against cruise missile and
swarming boat attacks. This is going to be extremely difficult,
particularly in an environment where defense spending is
constrained under the caps of the Budget Control Act and
sequestration, a subject about which I've had the privilege of
testifying before this committee in the past.
The administration's constant refrain has been that no
other agreement would have been possible, and this is the best
deal achievable, and the only alternative is war. I reject all
of those propositions. As the historian E.H. Carr once
suggested, ``In politics, the belief that certain facts are
unalterable or certain trends are irresistible commonly
reflects a lack of desire or a lack of interest to change or
resist them.'' I believe the U.S. still has options, short of
war, that it could exercise to try and secure a more acceptable
agreement. Iran is in violation of multiple legally binding
U.N. Security Council Resolutions, some of them negotiated by
my colleague to the left. Its regime relies heavily on energy
export revenues and remains vulnerable both to sanctions and
the persistently low price of oil, which is likely to remain
low for the next several years. It is footing the bill and
providing the manpower to keep its proxies on the front lines
in Syria and Iraq. And those proxies are facing rising pressure
at home to keep morale high and continue the fight in the wake
of extremely high casualties. And I see that the Washington
Institute has just released a study this morning about the IRGC
casualties in Syria.
In short, Iran needs an agreement more than the United
States. And, while I recognize that rejecting the current deal
will create a great deal of discomfort for the administration,
and will be very messy and a very vexing task to renegotiate, I
still believe that the United States has powerful tools, in the
form of sanctions, to discourage others from making a headlong
embrace of Iran, a fact which a number of our P5+1 partners
have recently acknowledged, even though it's been a bit of a
discomforting acknowledgment for them.
Finally, let me make one observation about something Dr.
Haass said which I think was important, which is, if this
agreement is rejected, the administration has argued that it's
possible--and others have suggested--it's possible Iran might
make a sprint to a bomb. Now, on the one hand, that contradicts
some of the argumentation that the administration has made
about the fatwah that's been issued by the Supreme Leader
against nuclear weapons, and also against a longstanding
conclusion of the intelligence community--and I'd defer to
General Hayden here--that the Iranians have tried to put in
place the means to have a nuclear weapon, but have not made the
decision to actually weaponize. But, we do need to recognize
that that is a possibility and that Iran might do that. And so,
I would encourage the Congress, whether you approve or
disapprove of the agreement in the end, to add to it a--an
authorization for the use of force to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability under either
eventuality--that is to say either the approval or disapproval
of the agreement--in order send a very strong signal to Iran
that the objective for which we were negotiating, preventing
them from getting a nuclear weapon, will be realized.
Thank you very much for your time and attention. I look
forward to questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Eric Edelman
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Eric Edelman
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, thank
you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the full range of issues connected with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, including regional
security and United States defense policy in the Middle East. I have
followed this issue for more than a decade as the United States
Ambassador to Turkey and then as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Since retiring from government service in 2009, I have continued to
track the progress of Iran's nuclear program and the negotiating effort
to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. I have
worked with several of my colleagues at the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments on the broader threat that the program presents
to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and regional security in the
Middle East. I am also the co-chair with Ambassador Dennis Ross of a
bipartisan Iran Task Force sponsored by the Gemunder Center for Defense
and Strategy that has produced a series of detailed appraisals of the
negotiations and now the JCPOA, but I want to stress that my comments
today reflect only my personal views.
First, let me say that I appreciate the care and deliberation that
you and your colleagues are taking in examining this agreement. Major
arms control agreements that bind the nation in matters vital to the
national interest should rest on a broad public consensus and not
purely on the preferences and actions of one individual. That is why
the Founders required treaties to be ratified by a two-thirds majority
of the Senate. As Constitutional scholar George Anastaplo observed many
years ago,
The arrangements in Section 2 with respect to treaties and
appointments take it for granted that the Senate can be
depended upon to be as well equipped as the President to know,
or at least to be told, what is needed by the Country from time
to time. The Senate shares the Executive power here, however
convenient it may be to vest in a single man the negotiation of
treaties . . . The President is not assumed to know things the
Senate does not know or that the Senate cannot be told in
appropriate circumstances.
Although this agreement is not a treaty, I believe the general
proposition remains sound. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ George Anastaplo, The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 112.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As I wrote with my colleague and Iran Task Force member Ray Takeyh
in The Washington Post last month, a careful examination of the JCPOA
reveals that it is deeply flawed because ``It concedes an enrichment
capacity that is too large; sunset clauses that are too short; a
verification regime that is too leaky; and enforcement mechanisms that
are too suspect.'' \2\ The Institute for Science and International
Security, one of the most respected non-partisan authorities on non-
proliferation in general and Iran's nuclear program in particular, was
straightforward in its assessment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Eric Edelman and Ray Takeyh, ``On Iran, Congress Should Just
Say No,'' Washington Post, July 17, 2015.
After year 10, and particularly after year 15, as limits on its
nuclear program end, Iran could reemerge as a major nuclear
threat. Even if the deal succeeds during the first ten years,
it is unknowable whether the agreement will continue to
accomplish its fundamental goal of preventing Iran from getting
nuclear weapons in the long term. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), The
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ``Kicks the Can Down the Road'': How
to Prepare for the Day When the Can Finally Lands (Washington, DC:
ISIS, July, 22, 2015).
Given these serious concerns, among many others, I believe the most
judicious course is for Congress to disapprove the agreement, which
would then allow for a more stringent deal to be renegotiated. As a
career Foreign Service Officer for nearly 30 years, with a strong
belief in the role of executive authority in foreign affairs, I have
come to this recommendation extremely reluctantly. A multilateral
agreement, negotiated over many years, should not be rejected for light
or transient causes. The only legitimate grounds for doing so is when
one believes that an agreement is so manifestly deleterious to the
national security that it warrants rejection and renegotiation. In this
case, I believe this agreement will put the imprimatur of the
international community and the United States of America on an
industrial-scale enrichment program that will leave Iran--even if the
negotiated limits on enrichment are adhered to scrupulously--as a
threshold nuclear state when the various provisions expire. President
Obama conceded as much in an interview with NPR in April, when he
observed, ``In year 13, 14, 15, they have advanced centrifuges that
enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that point the breakout times
would have shrunk almost down to zero.'' The Institute for Science and
International Security analysis cited above confirms the President's
judgment, noting that after 15 years, ``Iran's breakout timelines could
shrink to just days.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Transcript: President Obama's Full NPR Interview on Iran
Nuclear Deal,'' NPR, April 7, 2015; and ISIS, ``The Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action ``Kicks the Can Down the Road.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This agreement reverses almost 50 years of U.S. non-proliferation
policy. As my colleague at Johns Hopkins SAIS, Michael Mandelbaum, has
noted, the agreement abandons the ``policy of prohibiting the spread of
enrichment technology even to friendly democratic governments . . . as
a result, it will henceforth be extremely difficult to prevent other
countries, at first in the Middle East but ultimately elsewhere,
particularly in East Asia, from equipping themselves with the capacity
for enrichment.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Michael Mandelbaum, ``The Iran Deal: It's The Deterrence,
Stupid,'' The American Interest, July 30, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is likely, in my view, that the prospect of Iranian nuclear
latency will, in turn, put the Middle East on the path to a
catastrophic arms race. Five to ten or twelve years down the road, such
an arms race is likely to result in a more proliferated region, with
multiple adversaries, each armed with small and vulnerable nuclear
arsenals struggling to co-exist in an inherently unstable strategic
environment. The flight times between the competitors will be mere
minutes, and hence the decision-making space will be considerably
constrained. This would present an unprecedented challenge for the
region, the United States, and the world at large with every
possibility that the ultimate weapons will be used by accident or
miscalculation for the first time since 1945.
jcpoa shortcomings
Last week, the Task Force I co-chair issued a detailed assessment
of the problems and questions posed by the JCPOA. This is a deal that
would essentially legitimize Iran's nuclear program, require the
international community to provide it with assistance, and leave it as
a threshold nuclear state, with no clear mechanisms that would remain
after the provisions sunset to ensure that Iran will adhere to its Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.mechanisms that would remain
after the provisions sunset to ensure that Iran will adhere to its Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.mechanisms that would remain
after the provisions sunset to ensure that Iran will adhere to its Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ JINSA Gemunder Center Iran Task Force, Scorecard for the Final
Deal with Iran (Washington, DC: JINSA, July 29, 2015); Jonathan Ruhe,
the associate director at the Gemunder Center has provided me with
invaluable assistance in preparing this statement. The report is
available at www.jinsa.org/publications/scorecard-final-deal-iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, though Iran's breakout time would be rolled back over the
next decade and beyond, all major restrictions on its nuclear and
conventional military programs would be removed over 5-15 years,
including the prohibition on new nuclear-related facilities.
Furthermore, the sanctions regime that originally weakened Iran and
brought it to the negotiating table to begin with would be rolled back
quickly with Iran getting an early windfall when its frozen assets are
released. The sanctions regime, despite the efforts to create a ``snap-
back'' mechanism, could not be easily reconstituted. Tellingly, Foreign
Minister Zarif has noted that sanctions could be ``re-imposed on Iran
only in case of serious violation of its obligations and not in case of
small-scale violations.'' In other words, Iran doesn't need to worry
about being held to account for incremental violation of the agreement.
\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``Foreign Investments in Iran to Serve as Barrier for Sanctions
Snapback--FM,'' Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio Farhang,
July 21, 2015, available via BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit. I am
indebted to my colleague Ray Takeyh for drawing my attention to these
statements by Foreign Minister Zarif.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Iran's nuclear activities would be made more transparent by
some of the requirements of the JCPOA, these measures would still be
insufficient to detect or deter every possible attempt at a breakout or
sneak out. The failure to secure the much bruited ``anytime/anywhere''
inspections standard is a case in point. As a recent Institute for
Science and International Security study notes, under the cumbersome
procedures for requesting access to undeclared sites:
Iran could likely move and disguise many small scale nuclear
and nuclear-weapon-related activities. These include:
High explosive testing related to nuclear weapons;
Small centrifuge manufacturing plant;
Small centrifuge plant that uses advanced centrifuges
(in this case, we assume a facility of tens of, or at most a
few hundred, centrifuges organized in specially designed
facilities suitable for rapid removal and with a containment
system). \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ISIS, Verification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(Washington DC: ISIS, July 28, 2015), p. 7.
I have focused here on the question of verification, as opposed to
other deficiencies, because the history of arms control arrangements is
replete with instances of cheating--Versailles, the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaties, and INF Treaties offer just a few examples--and
because Iran's record of serial violation of earlier NPT obligations
creates a particular burden on defenders of this arrangement.
Whether or not Iran complies fully--and there are diverse reasons
to believe it would not--the net result would be a regime in a much
stronger position than it is today. The termination of United States-
led sanctions against Iran's energy, financial, and industrial sectors
would repatriate as much as $150 billion in frozen funds while allowing
Iran to rebuild its straitened economy through rejuvenated oil exports
and foreign investment. Moreover, the Iranian leadership is counting on
a surge of business activity, unleashed by the ending of sanctions, to
immunize them against future efforts to re-impose sanctions in the
event that Iran violates the agreement. As Foreign Minister Zarif
recently noted, ``Once the structure of the sanctions collapses, it
will be impossible to reconstruct it.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Foreign Investments in Iran to Serve as Barrier for Sanctions
Snapback--FM,'' Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio Farhang.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined with lifting the U.N. arms embargo and sanctions against
Iran's ballistic missile program within eight years and possibly less,
these increased revenues would enable the country to modernize and
expand its military capabilities across the board and to boost its
support for terrorist and other proxy forces across the Middle East. At
the same time, the JCPOA's sunset provisions would transform Iran from
a near-pariah to being treated ``in the same manner as that of any
other non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.'' The ``deal'' itself
will legitimize years of illegitimate conduct and will enhance its
drive for hegemony, and through sanctions relief, it will provide the
means and mechanisms to accomplish this end. Therefore, rather than
being isolated and restrained, Iran would be unleashed by the sunset of
the agreement to continue its struggle for mastery in the Middle East.
Iran's Supreme Leader has said as much in the days and weeks since the
JCPOA was signed in Vienna (amidst a number of large public rallies
marked by the continuing mantra of ``Death to America,'' which seems to
be a core ideological principle of the current regime). \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Aresu Eqbali and Asa Fitch, ``Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Says Nuclear Deal Won't Change U.S. Ties,'' Wall Street Journal, July
18, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
regional impact
With a latent nuclear deterrent, enhanced military capabilities,
and bolstered revenues, Iran would attempt to push its influence
further around the Middle East through proxies and subversion. Even
under the weight of crippling sanctions, Tehran has backed Bashar al-
Assad to the hilt in the Syrian Civil War, spending billions of dollars
and inserting the forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) and its proxies in Hezbollah ever more deeply in major combat
operations to keep the regime on life support. An influx of cash from
sanctions relief could encourage Iran to try to shift the strategic
balance back in the regime's favor once and for all. Subsequently
Hezbollah, which has been forced to direct much of its energy to
defending the Syrian regime, could re-prioritize the ``resistance''
struggle and increase the already significant threat to Israel on both
the Lebanese and Syrian fronts. Undoubtedly it would enjoy even greater
support from Iran after the agreement. This is no small consideration,
since Hezbollah already possesses roughly 100,000 rockets and missiles,
including many long-range surface-to-surface and sophisticated anti-
tank and anti-ship missiles.
Tehran's military assistance and political control in Baghdad (and
possibly Erbil) would increase as well, allowing it to further
consolidate its grip over Shia-majority swathes of the country while
doing nothing to soften the sharp sectarian divisions that foster
instability within and beyond Iraq. This would play a role in driving
the radicalization of Iraqi Sunnis, in effect, recruiting new foot
soldiers for ISIL. Similarly in Yemen, Iran's support for the Shia-
affiliated Houthi insurrection has already helped unravel that
country's tenuous efforts at constitutional reform, while
simultaneously hindering United States counterterrorism cooperation and
creating a potential quagmire for Saudi Arabia and other United States
regional allies. The larger strategic problem is that Iranian hegemony
in Yemen could be matched by additional Iranian moves in Saudi's
Eastern Province as well as in Bahrain (both majority Shia), and thus
put Riyadh in an east-west strategic vice. An increase in Iran's
influence there could create myriad challenges, including: the growth
of a proxy force on Riyadh's doorstep and greater instability astride a
global energy chokepoint in Bab el-Mandeb. Even an Iranian policy that
did not achieve its maximal aims would result in deepening the security
vacuum within Yemen, which has proven to be a boon to the growth of al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Many of these problems potentially could be mitigated or addressed
by the United States in cooperation with its allies. U.S. policy,
however, has been self-defeating in this regard. Our closest regional
partners, namely Israel and the Gulf Arab states, have been
disconcerted by the Iran nuclear deal. The serial concessions that
moved United States redlines in the nuclear negotiations from
prevention of an Iranian nuclear capability to limiting the time for
breakout to one year, as well as the failure to enforce the red line on
Syrian CW use two years ago, have called into question the credibility
of United States promises to defend our allies against a reinvigorated
and resurgent Iran. Finally, and most importantly, the actual terms of
the JCPOA confront our allies with the prospect of a nuclear-capable
Iran that is better situated to realize its hegemonic aspirations in
the Middle East.
With our allies dismayed and increasingly concerned about the value
of U.S. guarantees, they will become more inclined to pursue policies
of self-help. For Israel, this means trying to manage an intrinsically
unstable virtual nuclear balance with Iran. Given the geographic,
demographic, and military asymmetries between Iran and Israel (and the
high potential penalty for not shooting first in a crisis), both
countries will assume extremely high alert postures and be certain to
pursue pre-emptive strategies that will lead to chronic crisis
instability.
For Saudi Arabia and our other Sunni Arab allies, the result will
be further efforts to seek new security partners, perhaps bringing
China into the Gulf arena as a major security player, and increased
pursuit of conventional arms as well as seeking a latent nuclear
capability of their own to offset Iran's relatively short breakout
timeline. Unfortunately, it seems likely that the interaction among
three or more nuclear-armed powers in the region would be more prone to
miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery,
``The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,'' Foreign Affairs, January/February
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Cold War the spread of nuclear weapons among United States
allies was a collective good, since Britain, France, and the United
States were members of the same formal security alliance, with a
nuclear planning group to coordinate deterrence efforts and official
policy declaring nuclear weapons integral to Western Europe's
collective defense. A similar process in the Middle East would be a
zero-sum phenomenon, since an unstable Iran-Israel nuclear dyad would
be replicated between both countries and Saudi Arabia, were Riyadh to
pursue an arsenal, and so on with Turkey, Egypt, or others. As Henry
Kissinger and George Shultz commented recently, ``Traditional theories
of deterrence assumed a series of bilateral equations. Do we now
envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear
program counterbalancing others in the region?'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Henry Kissinger and George P. Shultz, ``The Iran Deal and Its
Consequences,'' Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
military effects
These regional impacts would be daunting enough for U.S. defense
planners who already face serious difficulties maintaining credible
conventional deterrence in the region, given the prevailing trends and
budgetary constraints. The aforementioned shortcomings of the JCPOA,
however, will have knock-on military effects across the Middle East.
United States conventional deterrence, in the forms of carrier
strike groups, expeditionary strike capability, long-range strategic
airpower, and (when needed) boots on the ground, will become
increasingly difficult to maintain as Iran's own military power grows
and improves. In fact, they are already under stress due to budgetary
and other constraints, as Admiral Richardson admitted last week during
his confirmation hearing. \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Travis J. Tritten and Chris Church, ``Admiral: Carrier Gap in
Persian Gulf hinders War effort,'' Stars and Stripes, July 30, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because Tehran knows it cannot compete head-to-head with the United
States in conventional capabilities, it has long pursued its own
asymmetric anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Gulf,
including: mobile missile launchers, anti-ship cruise missiles,
advanced air-defense systems, new deeply-buried and hardened nuclear
facilities, increasingly effective torpedoes, smart mines, and possibly
anti-ship ballistic missiles akin to those deployed by China in the
Pacific Ocean to hold United States carriers at greater risk, albeit on
a smaller scale.
As the JCPOA sunsets, Iran will be able to access the materiel and
technology to bolster these forces. Russia and China, not to mention
Iran, pushed for the lifting of the arms embargo and ballistic missile
restrictions not because they believed the windfall in unfrozen assets
would ameliorate the condition of the long-suffering Iranian people,
but because Iran wished to secure, and Russia and China hoped to sell,
precisely these capabilities. \14\ Foreign Minister Zarif recently
underscored to the Majlis that Iran's pursuit of ballistic missile and
other enhancements of its defense capabilities, while violating
existing UNSCRs, is not a violation of the JCPOA. \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ David Lerman and Anthony Capaccio, ``How Iran Arms Embargo
Became Key Sticking Point in Vienna Talks,'' Bloomberg, July 10, 2015.
\15\ For a more detailed background on Iran's pursuit of anti-
access/area-denial capabilities in past years, see Andrew Krepinevich,
Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2010), pp. 27-36; for Zarif's comment see ``Iran Can Deny
Access to Nuclear, Military Sites Under Deal--FM,'' Voice of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio Farhang, July 21, 2015, available via
BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit. I am grateful to Ray Takeyh for
providing this reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, the United States will not be able to rely, as it has
for the past 30 years, on an assumption that it will have unimpeded
access and control in all the domains of warfare in the Persian Gulf.
In the wake of this deal, the United States will likely have to expand
its regional military presence to reassure Israel and the Gulf States
and to deter Iran. The Iranians, however, would now have an additional
$150 billion dollars to beef up its A2/AD capabilities, the IRGC Quds
Force, and the ability to project power regionally through subversion
and proxies. The United States will need to upgrade both its own and
allied capabilities to counter this growing threat from Iran and will
likely have to ``reassess the validity of its legacy planning
assumptions, operational concepts, and forward military posture for the
Persian Gulf.'' In particular this means developing concepts that
enable the United States to fight both within range of Iranian missile
forces as well as from extended range. \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ An excellent preliminary examination of future requirements to
counter Iran's emerging A2/AD complex is Mark Gunzinger with Chris
Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran's Anti-
Access and Area-Denial Threats (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2011), quotation on p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The potential acquisition by Iran of an upgraded S-300 air defense
systems from Russia--which appears already to be in the works--as well
as upgrades for its outdated air fleet and potential expansion of its
nuclear infrastructure, would pose a severe challenge to the air
supremacy currently enjoyed by United States forces in and around the
Persian Gulf. \17\ Thus far, Tehran's attempts to challenge the status
quo in the Strait have been met with firm demonstrations from the
United States Navy that underscore Iran's inability to mount any
realistic opposition--most notably sending additional United States
carrier battle groups into the Gulf. As time goes on these steps may
carry greater risk for U.S. forces than we assume today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Russia modernizing S-300 missile system for Iran: RIA,
citing Putin aide,'' Reuters, July 30, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Iran's A2/AD capabilities mature, the United States must make
concerted efforts to maintain or achieve superiority in a range of
areas, including: long-range U.S. strike and stealth capabilities;
advanced bunker buster munitions like the Massive Ordnance Penetrator
(MOP); sustainable unmanned intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance strike platforms; and advanced, integrated, and layered
air and missile defense systems for its in-theater forces and for its
allies. We will need to develop greater capability for undersea
precision strike and the ability, perhaps relying on close-in weapon
systems and directed energy weapons, to defend our fielded forces in
the theatre against cruise missile and swarming fast boat attacks. All
of this will be extremely difficult, especially in an environment where
defense spending is constrained under caps imposed by the Budget
Control Act of 2011 and the continuing threat of
sequestration.environment where defense spending is constrained under
caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the continuing
threat of sequestration.environment where defense spending is
constrained under caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and
the continuing threat of sequestration. \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See Mark Gunzinger with Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating
from Range to Defeat Iran's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
jcpoa alternatives
The Administration's constant refrain has been that no other
agreement would have been possible; that this is the best deal that
could have been achieved, and that the only alternative is war. I
reject these propositions. As the historian E. H. Carr once suggested,
``In politics, the belief that certain facts are unalterable or certain
trends irresistible commonly reflects a lack of desire or lack of
interest to change or resist them.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939
(London: Macmillan and Company, 1939), p. 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A better deal--an acceptable deal that ensures basic U.S. national
security interests--is possible and absolutely necessary. The many
deficiencies of the agreement need to be addressed now, as they will
not be susceptible to remediation after Iran has received the upfront
benefits of sanctions relief. Our Iran Task Force has maintained
throughout the negotiations that Iranian concessions will come only if
Tehran believes it has more to lose than its counterparts. Fortunately,
the United States still has options short of war that it could exercise
to secure an acceptable agreement. Iran is in violation of multiple
legally binding U.N. Security Council resolutions. Its regime relies
heavily on energy export revenues and remains vulnerable both to
sanctions and to oil prices that will likely remain low for the next
year or more. It is footing the bill, and providing manpower, to keep
its proxies on the frontlines in Syria and Iraq, even as those proxies
face rising pressures at home to keep morale high and continue the
fight.
For all these and other reasons, Iran needs an agreement more than
the United States. Rejecting the current deal will create discomfort
for the Administration, and will require it or its successor to embark
on a new round of diplomacy. This will undoubtedly be a messy, vexing
task for whoever takes it on, but the United States retains powerful
tools in the form of sanctions to discourage others from undertaking a
headlong embrace of Iran--a fact which some of our P5+1 partners have
recently acknowledged, much to their discomfort. \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ 20 Josh Rogin, ``Top French Official Contradicts Kerry on Iran
Deal,'' Bloomberg View, July 30, 2015; French officials have denied
that Monsieur Audibert made these comments, but other members of the
congressional delegation who heard him say these things have
corroborated the initial account. Furthermore, Audibert in his denial
to Le Monde has reinforced the potential power of the U.S. sanctions.
The original story is found at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/
2015-07-30/top-french-official-contradicts-kerry-on-iran-deal. For the
denial and follow-up see http://freebeacon.com/national-security/
lawmakers-confirm-french-diplomat-supports-congress-rejecting-iran-
deal/; and http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20150731.OBS3527/info-
obs-le-conseiller-diplomatique-de-hollande-au-centre-d-une-polemique-a-
washington.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Administration has suggested that, in the event the agreement
is blocked by Congress, Iran might sprint to a bomb (although this
contradicts both the Administration position that the Supreme Leader
has issued a fatwa against pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the
intelligence community's consistent assessment that Iran is pursuing
the means to build weapons, but has not made a decision to proceed with
weaponization). The reality is that Iran could undertake such an
effort, but only at great potential peril to itself. Congress might
consider raising the potential costs by coupling its disapproval of the
deal with authorization for the use of force to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
To succeed, a new round of negotiations must use increasing
pressure, including additional authorities beyond the tools that
Congress has already provided. This is crucial if we hope to redress
the manifest inadequacies of the existing agreement. Otherwise, we will
put ourselves on a path that leads to a catastrophic war in the Middle
East.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for my time, and I look forward to the
Committee's questions.
ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an
independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to
promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy
and investment options. CSBA's analysis focuses on key questions
related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and
its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on
matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Ambassador Burns.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, GOODMAN PROFESSOR OF
DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, thank you--Senator Reed,
members of the committee. It's an honor to testify. I
appreciate it. It's an honor to testify with three great public
servants and friends of mine, to my right.
Mr. Chairman, I've submitted my written testimony. I'll
just cite a few quick points to summarize my views.
I support this agreement that the Obama administration has
negotiated. I think it will help to prevent Iran from becoming
a nuclear weapons power. I think the agreement also has many
advantages that are specific to us. It's going to arrest Iran's
forward movement of the last 10 years since Ahmadinejad took
over, in 2005. And it's going to freeze their program for the
next decade or more. It will effectively prevent Iran from
producing fissile material for a weapon through uranium
enrichment or plutonium processing. Its current breakout time--
and this, I think, is the most significant advantage we have--
the administration says now it's 2 to 3 months; under this
agreement, for 10 to 15 years, Iran's breakout time would be
extended to a year. So, we have line of sight. We have the
opportunity to act, should Iran subvert the agreement. There
will also be significantly strengthened inspections of the
nuclear supply chain to the Iranian plants for the next 25
years, and the additional protocol.
The sanctions are important. They're not going to be lifted
until Iran implements the agreement in every respect. That
could be 3 to 4 to 5 to 6 months. I don't anticipate it any
sooner. And the administration has to maintain sanctions on
Iran for terrorism violations and human rights violations.
A final advantage. This is an opportunity for us to deter
Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state through diplomacy and
negotiations rather than by war. I certainly support the
President's right--obligation to use force, if necessary, but,
if we can take this step first, our country is far stronger.
My second point, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, while the
benefits are substantial, there are risks. And my colleagues
have pointed out the risks. I don't want to minimize those
risks. The most significant, for me, is that the superstructure
of Iran's enrichment and plutonium programs will remain intact.
They'll be frozen, they'll be in mothballs, they can be taken
out of mothballs. Ten to 15 years from now, Iran could
reconstitute--I think, will--a civil nuclear program. It could
possibly use that civil nuclear program as a base to construct
a covert program.
So, the first 10 to 15 years of this agreement are a
decided advantage for the United States. It's the follow-on 10
or 15 years that represent a major challenge for us. And,
should Iran seek a nuclear weapon during that time, the United
States would need to do something that's going to be difficult:
reconstitute a global sanctions regime and also have the will
and the capacity to use force to prevent Iran from becoming a
nuclear-weapons power. I don't think it's impossible, but it
would depend on a strong and assertive and self-confident
American President at the time, either President Obama's
successor or the person after that.
A final risk, Mr. Chairman. The conventional arms sales and
ballistic missiles, the compromise that they'll end in 5 and 8
years, respectively, I remain opposed to this compromise. I
don't think it's in our interest. I'm sorry that it was made.
What it will mean is that we'll have to reconstitute a
coalition of sanctions countries against Iran 5 years from now
on conventional weapons, 8 years from now on ballistic
missiles.
Third point. I see the nuclear deal much in the way that I
think Dr. Haass does, as a combination of benefits and of
risks. And I, thus, fully understand why this is a difficult
vote for many members, and why you're deliberating in the way
that you are. I would suggest that all of us--and I certainly
include myself in this--need to go beyond the conventional
wisdoms as we think about Iran. For example, I don't believe
that congressional defeat of the President's proposal would
lead inevitably to war, as some in the administration are
saying. But, neither do I believe that the nuclear deal leads
inevitably to an Iranian nuclear weapon, as some of the critics
are suggesting. I think a lot's going to depend on the United
States. Can we create strategic deterrence against the
Iranians? Can we coerce and intimidate them from becoming a
nuclear-weapons power, not in the next 10 years, because we'll
freeze them, but in the follow-on 10 to 15 years? In that
respect, the no-deal solution that many critics believe is
preferable--and that would be walking away, ending the talks,
continuing to sanction Iran, and negotiating a better deal--
it's an option that deserves to be looked at. I mean, I think
we have a responsibility to look at it.
I've tried to think about this. Ultimately, I think it
probable that such a course would leave us weaker rather than
stronger. It's not at all certain to me--and I spent the years
2005 to 2008 working with the P5 as a member of it, sanctioning
Iran--not at all certain that our partners would follow us out
the door if we walked out unilaterally. Global unity that we've
created, both President Bush and President Obama, against Iran,
the sanctions regime, I think it would--not automatically,
probably not even quickly--but, over time, it would begin to
fray, and it would weaken. And, most importantly, the
restrictions that have frozen Iran's nuclear program since
January 2004, and that would freeze them for the next 10 to 15
years, they'd be lifted, because I think the Iranian response,
the likely response, would be to walk away from--itself, from
the deal if we chose to do so. So, instead of Iran being a year
away from a nuclear weapon, it would go back to being a nuclear
threshold state in this no-deal scenario.
So, on balance, I believe the benefits outweigh the risks.
In fact, I think there are greater risks in rejecting this
agreement, because it would free Iran from the considerable
restrictions that they will have to live under for a very long
time.
Just two more points, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
patience.
My fourth point. To implement the deal successfully,
however, the administration, I think, has to do more to
strengthen our strategic deterrence and to coerce the Iranians
over the short and long term. So, specifically, I hope, maybe
as early as tomorrow, when the President makes his speech, that
the President will threaten publicly and unambiguously that the
United States would and should use force against Iran, should
it break the agreement and race towards a nuclear weapon. The
U.S. should certainly reaffirm what Secretary Kerry's been
trying to do this week with the Gulf Cooperation Council--
reaffirm our support for the Gulf Cooperation countries--and,
as the Pentagon is trying to do--strengthen their missile
defense and strengthen their ability to defend themselves.
The President also needs to close ranks with Israel. It's a
glaring problem for American policy in the Middle East when we
are openly feuding with our strongest partner. That's a two-way
street. And so, both leaders need to do this. But, certainly,
especially for this committee, as the United States negotiates
its next 10-year military assistance agreement with Israel--the
current one expires in 2017--assuring Israel's qualitative
military edge should be a priority for the United States. So,
in effect--and this gets to the point of your hearing today on
the regional implications--as we going forward with a nuclear
deal, we will simultaneously need to go forward to contain Iran
in the Middle East. And we'll have a greater success, as
Senator Reed has suggested in his opening remarks, of
containing Iran if it's a non-nuclear state over the next 10 to
15 years than it would have been as a nuclear-weapon state.
Finally, I recommend that Congress support the agreement. I
fear a vote of disapproval will weaken the United States and
our credibility in the region. It would let Iran off the hook.
It would leave Iran closer to a nuclear weapon. I think what
Dr. Haass has suggested at the end of his remarks is
instructive. Could the Congress also pass accompanying
legislation that might seek to strengthen our ability to be the
strongest power in the Middle East and to coerce Iran in the
future?
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed and members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to testify on the international
agreement to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power.
This is one of the most urgent and important challenges for our
country, for our European allies as well as for Israel and our Arab
partners in the Middle East. The United States must thwart Iran's
nuclear weapons ambitions and its determination to become the dominant
military power in the region.
This will be a long-term struggle requiring the focus and
determination of the next two American Presidents after President Obama
to ensure Iran complies with the agreement. We should thus marshal our
diplomatic, economic and military strength to block Iran now and to
contain its power in the region in the years ahead.
With this in mind, I support the Iran nuclear agreement and urge
the Congress to vote in favor of it in September.
This is, understandably, a difficult decision for many members of
Congress. It is an agreement that includes clear benefits for our
national security but risks, as well. It is also a painful agreement,
involving trade-offs and compromises with a bitter adversary of our
country--the government of Iran.
I believe, however, that if it is implemented effectively, the
agreement will restrict and weaken Iran's nuclear program for more than
a decade and help to deny it a nuclear weapons capacity over the long
term. That crucial advantage has convinced me that the Obama
Administration is right to seek Congressional approval for this
agreement.
I have followed the Iran nuclear issue closely for the last decade.
From 2005 until 2008, I had lead responsibility in the State Department
on Iran policy. During the second term of the George W. Bush
Administration, we worked hard to blunt Iran's nuclear efforts. We
created in 2005 the group that has since led the global effort against
Iran--the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and
Germany (the P-5 plus One). This group offered to negotiate with Iran
in 2006 and again in 2007. We were rebuffed on both occasions by the
Iranian regime.
When Iran accelerated its nuclear research program, we turned to
sanctions. I helped to negotiate for the U.S. the first three United
Nations Security Council Chapter VII sanctions resolutions to punish
Iran for its actions. Led by the Treasury Department, we initiated
United States financial sanctions and encouraged the European Union to
do the same. We built a global coalition against Iran. While Iran
became increasingly isolated, however, it chose to accelerate its
nuclear research efforts in defiance of international law.
When President Obama came into office in 2009, Iran had made
considerable progress in advancing its uranium and plutonium programs.
It made further progress in his first years in office and was on its
way to become, in effect, a nuclear threshold state. In response,
President Obama expanded the sanctions and coordinated an aggressive
international campaign to punish and isolate the Iranian regime.
Congress made a vital contribution by strengthening American
sanctions even further. This increasingly global and comprehensive
sanctions campaign weakened the Iranian economy and ultimately
convinced the Iranian government to agree to negotiate during the past
eighteen months.
The Obama and Bush Administrations and the Congress acted over ten
years to expand American leverage against Iran and to coerce it to
accept negotiations. Despite these efforts, Iran was far along the
nuclear continuum when negotiations began in earnest in 2013.
It made sense for the United States to commit to negotiations with
Iran in 2013. We retained then, as we do now, the capacity and right to
use military force to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon
should that be necessary. It is important to note that there were
alternative negotiating frameworks available to the Obama
Administration in 2013 that might have served our interest in
containing Iran's nuclear program more effectively. But, the issue
before the Congress now is the specific agreement that has been
negotiated by the Obama team. That is thus the focus of my own
testimony today.
In my judgment, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
negotiated by Secretaries Kerry and Moniz is a solid and sensible
agreement. It has many concrete advantages for the United States.
First, the agreement will arrest Iran's rapid forward movement on
its nuclear research programs over the past decade since the
inauguration of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It will
essentially freeze that program. The restrictions the United States
negotiated will effectively prevent Iran from producing fissile
material for a nuclear weapon (either through uranium enrichment or the
plutonium process) at its nuclear facilities for at least ten to
fifteen years.
The number of centrifuges at the Natanz plant will be reduced by
two thirds. Use of advanced centrifuges will not be permitted for a
decade. Iran's store of enriched uranium will be restricted to levels
below those needed for a nuclear device. In addition, there will be no
enrichment at all at the Fordow plant for fifteen years.
The Administration also succeeded in blocking Iran's plutonium
program. The core of the Arak Heavy Water Reactor will be dismantled.
The reactor will be transformed to make it impossible to produce
sufficient quantities of plutonium for a nuclear device. Spent fuel
will be transported out of Iran. There will be no reprocessing of fuel
for at least fifteen years.
The most important advantage for the U.S is that Iran's current
breakout time to a nuclear weapon will be lengthened from two to three
months now to roughly one year once the agreement is implemented. This
is a substantial benefit for our security and those of our friends in
the Middle East. It sets back the Iranian nuclear program by a
significant margin and was a major concession by the Iranian government
in this negotiation.
Significantly strengthened inspections of Iran's nuclear supply
chain for the next twenty-five years is a second advantage of the
nuclear agreement. Iran has also agreed to be subjected to permanent
and enhanced IAEA verification and monitoring under the Additional
Protocol. This will give the IAEA much greater insights into Iran's
nuclear program and will increase substantially the probability of the
United States detecting any Iranian deviations from the agreement.
Third, sanctions will not be lifted until Iran implements the
agreement in every respect. This could take up to three to six months.
The United States and other countries should demand full and
unambiguous Iranian implementation to deconstruct and modify its
nuclear program according to the letter of the agreement. And, after
sanctions are lifted, we must be ready and willing to re-impose them
should Iran seek to cut corners, cheat or test the integrity of the
agreement in any way.
A final advantage, Mr. Chairman, is that this agreement gives us a
chance to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon through diplomacy and
negotiations, rather than through war. While the United States should
be ready to use force against Iran if it approaches our red line of
acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the more effective strategy at this
point is to coerce them through negotiations. And, it will be more
advantageous for the United States to contain a non-nuclear Iran in the
Middle East for the next decade than to contend with a country on the
threshold of a nuclear weapon. In this respect, I admire the
commitment, energy and the achievements of Secretary Kerry, Secretary
Moniz and their team.
While the benefits of this agreement for the U.S. are substantial,
there are also risks in moving ahead. The most significant, in my
judgment, is that while Iran's program will be frozen for a decade, the
superstructure of its nuclear apparatus will remain intact, much of it
in mothballs. Iran could choose to rebuild a civil nuclear program
after the restrictions begin to end ten to fifteen years from now. This
could give Tehran a base from which to attempt to build a covert
nuclear weapons program at some point in the future.
Here is where considerable challenges may arise for the U.S. and
its allies. While we can be confident Iran's program will be
effectively stymied for the first ten to fifteen years of the
agreement, many of those restrictions will loosen and disappear
altogether in the decade after. We will need to put in place a series
of mitigating measures to deter Iran from diverting any part of its
revived civil nuclear program to military activities.
President Obama and his team will need to reassure Congress about
the effectiveness and credibility of these initiatives to keep Iran
away from a nuclear weapon after the first decade of this agreement.
This should include a direct, public and unambiguous American
commitment to use military force to deter Iran should it ever get close
to construction of a nuclear weapon. In addition, the United States
should assemble a coalition of strong partners willing to re-impose
sanctions should Iran deviate from the agreement. The United States and
its partners should also bolster the capacity of the IAEA and our own
governments to be fully capable of detecting Iranian cheating. In sum,
we will have to construct a long-term strategic deterrent to convince
the Iranian government that it is not in its interest to pursue a
nuclear weapons program a decade from now.
Containing Iran will be a difficult challenge for American
diplomacy. I differ with those critics, however, who believe that the
expiration of the agreement will make Iranian acquisition of a nuclear
weapon all but certain a decade or two from now. Much will depend on
the Iranian leadership at that time. Will they want to risk another
generation of international isolation and sanctions if they drive
toward a nuclear weapon? Will they risk the possibility of an American
or Israeli use of military force in response? A decision by Iran to
turn back to a nuclear weapons ambition is a possibility, but by no
means a certainty. The actions and resolve of the United States will
have a major impact on Iran's calculations. It will be up to the
President and Congress at that time to make clear to Iran that we will
be ready to use any option available to us, including the use of
military force, to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power.
The overall effectiveness of the agreement will thus require the
Obama Administration and its successors to maintain a very tough
inspections regime and to be ready to re-impose sanctions if Iran seeks
an illicit nuclear weapons program in the future.
Congress is right to focus on these concerns and to require
concrete assurances from the Administration that they can be overcome.
Specifically, the Administration will need to focus hard on the
possibility that Iran will cheat, as it has done so often in the past
and attempt to construct covert facilities. Should this occur, the U.S.
would need to ensure that the ``managed inspections'' set out in the
agreement would work effectively. If Iran were to violate the
agreement, American sanctions should be re-imposed. Gaining broader
international agreement for sanctions would be a more effective way to
intimidate the Iranian authorities. This would be a priority, but also
a challenging hurdle, for American diplomacy.
A final risk is the agreement that the prohibitions on Iran's
conventional arms sales and purchases and ballistic missiles will end
in five and eight years, respectively, after the agreement is in force.
I remain opposed to this compromise. In my view, it could embolden Iran
and strengthen its conventional capacity in ways detrimental to our own
interest. The next United States Administration will need to construct
a new coalition to attempt to restrict and sanction Iran in these two
areas.
On balance, however, I believe the nuclear deal will deliver more
advantages than disadvantages to the U.S. There are greater risks, in
my judgment, in turning down the agreement and freeing Iran from the
considerable set of restrictions it has now accepted for the next
decade and beyond.
Most importantly, I do not see a more effective, credible or
realistic alternative that would give the United States a greater
probability at this point of preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon. That
is the key question members of Congress should ask before you vote. Is
there a more effective way forward than the one negotiated by the Obama
Administration?
The most common criticism of the nuclear deal is that the United
States should have walked away from the talks during the last year,
sanctioned Iran further and attempted to negotiate a better and
stronger agreement. Some experts have recommended that Congress vote to
disapprove the President's policies or to pass a bill that would alter
the deal in such a way that a fundamental renegotiation of the
agreement would be necessary.
If I thought it was realistic to renegotiate the agreement to make
it stronger, I would support that option. But, I don't believe it would
be possible to do so and, at the same time, to maintain the integrity
of our coalition against Iran.
While this ``No Deal'' scenario could play out in many, different
ways, I think it is probable that it would leave the United States
weaker, rather than stronger, in confronting Iran's nuclear program. If
the United States left the negotiations unilaterally, I don't believe
it is likely that Russia and China and even possibly the European
allies and other key international economic powers would follow us out
the door. These countries are all strong supporters of the nuclear deal
before the Congress today. The global coalition and the sanctions
regime we spent the last ten years building would likely fray and
weaken over time. We would lose the strong leverage that brought Iran
to the negotiating table. While American sanctions were very important
in convincing Iran to negotiate, it was the global nature of the
sanctions with buy-in from nearly every major economy in the world,
that also made a critical difference in cutting off Iran from the
international banking and financial system during the past few years.
All of these benefits would be at risk after a U.S. walkout.
Most importantly, the strong restrictions that have effectively
frozen Iran's nuclear program since January 2014 would all be lifted if
the negotiations are ended. The negotiated agreement would cease to be
in force. Iran would be free to resume its advanced uranium enrichment
and plutonium programs. We would lose the IAEA's insights into Iran's
program as the inspections regime would weaken. Iran would not be one
year away from a bomb under the Obama agreement but on the threshold of
a nuclear weapons capability.
While I don't agree that this `No Deal'' scenario would lead
inevitably to war, it would leave the U.S. worse off. On balance, this
alternative is not preferable to the concrete restrictions on Iran's
program ensured by the nuclear deal.
If it seeks to disapprove the President's policy, Congress should
offer a realistic and effective alternative. But, I am unaware of any
credible alternative that would serve our interests more effectively at
this point than the agreement proposed by the Obama Administration and
the other major countries of the world.
Rather than vote to disapprove the President's policy, I hope
members of both parties will work with the Administration to strengthen
the ability of the United States to implement the agreement
successfully and to contain simultaneously Iranian power in the Middle
East.
We should create, in effect, a two-track American policy towards
Iran in the future. On the one hand, we should work to ensure Iran
implements the nuclear deal. On the other hand, we will need to
construct a renewed effort with Israel, Turkey and our friends in the
Arab world to contain Iran's growing power in the region.
Now that we are talking to Iran again after thirty-five years of
minimal contact, there may be issues on which contact with Tehran will
be in our interest. Protecting the Afghan government from Taliban
assaults is one such possibility. Convincing Iran to withdraw its
support for President Assad in Syria is another.
But, I do not believe we will experience anything approaching a
normal relationship with the Iranian government as some in our own
country have suggested. This is not the time to restore full diplomatic
relations with its government. There is too much that still separates
us to justify such a decision. In fact, our larger interests in the
Middle East require the creation of a coalition of countries to oppose
Iran as it makes an assertive push for power into the heart of the
Sunni world in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The United States will
have greater success, however, in confronting a non-nuclear Iran over
the next decade rather than an Iran with nuclear weapons. This is
another advantage of the nuclear deal.
With this in mind, there is more the Obama Administration can do to
ensure effective implementation of the nuclear deal and to push back
against a more assertive Iranian policy in the region. Here are some
concrete suggestions toward that end.
A first-order diplomatic priority should be for the
United States to do everything in its power to maintain the ability to
re-impose sanctions on Iran, if necessary. Russia and, especially,
China will likely be weak and undependable partners in this regard. The
United States should thus focus on securing commitments from the
European allies that they will work with us to re-impose sanctions in
the future, if necessary. The Administration should also convince
Japan, South Korea, India and other major economies to be ready to
curtail commercial links to Iran should it violate the nuclear
agreement;
The United States should set a very high bar for Iran on
implementation of the agreement. Specifically, the United States should
call attention to even the most minor Iranian transgressions from the
start of the implementation process. If we don't set an exacting
standard, Iran may well diminish the integrity of the inspections
regime by cutting corners and testing its limits. Establishing a tough-
minded policy now is the right way to convince Iran there will be
immediate penalties should it not implement the deal fully and
completely;
The United States should reaffirm publicly that we have
vital national interests in the Persian Gulf and that we will use
military force, if necessary, to defend them. That was the essence of
the Carter Doctrine of the late 1970s and has been the policy of
Republican and Democratic Administrations since. President Obama should
continue the campaign he has already begun to assemble a strong
coalition of Gulf States to contain Iranian power in the region. This
will require accelerated military assistance to our Arab partners and a
strong, visible and continuous American military presence in the
region;
The United States should also try to close ranks with
Israel and to strengthen even further our long-standing military
partnership. The United States-Israel ten-year military assistance
agreement that I led in negotiating in 2007 expires in two years. The
Obama Administration could reaffirm our ongoing commitment to Israel's
Qualitative Military Edge (QME) over any potential aggressor in the
Middle East region. The Administration should accelerate military
technology transfers to Israel to head off any potential challenge to
Israel from Iran or, as is more likely, from its proxies, Hezbollah and
Hamas.
The United States and Israel should also make a renewed effort to
diminish their public divisions. President Obama should take steps to
work more effectively with Prime Minister Netanyahu. But, repairing
such a wide public dispute requires both leaders to make it work. Prime
Minister Netanyahu would be well advised to diminish his excessive
public criticism of the United States government. I found in my
diplomatic career that allies work best when they work out their
differences privately rather than publicly.
President Obama should reaffirm publicly and in the most
unmistakable terms, his readiness to deploy military force to strike
Iran should it violate the agreement and seek to race toward a nuclear
weapon. This would help to create a more durable American strategic
deterrence to convince Iran that abiding by the nuclear agreement is in
its best interest.
Finally, the United States should also press Iran to meet
the grievances of American families who lost their loved ones in
Iranian-inspired attacks on American citizens in past decades. This
includes, of course, the bombings of the United States Embassy in
Beirut and the United States Marine Barracks in 1983. It also includes
the assassination of Dr. Malcolm Kerr, President of the American
University of Beirut, in January 1984. His family has brought suit
against Iran in United States Federal Court as they believe Iran
authorized his murder through its proxies in Lebanon. There are many
other such civilian cases against Iran. Implementation of the nuclear
deal should not be made conditional on resolution of these cases, in my
judgment. But, we should not agree to resume full diplomatic relations
until Iran has agreed to settle them. By raising them now, we would
send Iran an unmistakable signal that we expect these cases to be
adjudicated fairly and with justice for the American families in the
future.
At the same time, the Administration must continue to
press as an urgent priority for the release of those Americans
imprisoned or missing in Iran.
These steps would help to strengthen our ability to implement the
Iran nuclear agreement and to put Iran on notice that it has a long way
to go before it can resume a normal relationship with the United
States.
Successful implementation of the nuclear deal will require strong,
self confident and determined American leadership. We are the
indispensable center of the P-5 plus One group that negotiated the
agreement. We have to insist on full Iranian implementation of the
agreement. We must assemble an Arab coalition to contain Iran in the
region. And we have to remain Israel's strong and faithful partner in a
violent, turbulent, revolutionary era in Middle East history.
Mr. Chairman, I urge members of Congress to support this agreement.
A vote of disapproval in the absence of a credible alternative, would,
after ten years of effort, be self-defeating for our country.
If Congress votes to disapprove and manages to override the
President's veto, it would very likely dismantle the agreement, lead to
the gradual disintegration of the global sanctions regime and remove
all current restrictions on Iran's nuclear efforts. Such a result would
leave Iran closer to a nuclear weapon. That is not a sensible course
for our country.
I also fear a vote of disapproval would weaken the effectiveness
and credibility of the United States in the Middle East and around the
world.
There is another path open to Congress. Work with the President to
strengthen America's position in the Middle East. Move forward with the
nuclear deal. Push back against Iranian power in the region. A Congress
that sought greater unity with President Obama would help to strengthen
our country for the struggles that are inevitably ahead with Iran in
the years to come.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you.
I want to thank the witnesses for very important testimony.
And I note that all--a large number of my colleagues paid close
attention.
Is there any agreement among--disagreement among the
witnesses that Iran is the largest state sponsor of terror in
the world? Is there anyone who disagrees with that?
[No audible response.]
Chairman McCain. Is there any disagreement that the Iranian
are now spending billions of dollars on those adventures,
whether it be in Iraq or Syria or Yemen, or even now, we--I
understand they are providing weapons to the Taliban--is there
anyone who disagrees with their activities throughout the
region?
[No audible response.]
Chairman McCain. Is there any doubt that they're spending
quite a bit of money on these efforts to destabilize and exert
their influence in these nations?
[No audible response.]
Chairman McCain. Well, if that's true, then obviously
verification is a key issue. And we understand now that, quote,
``side agreements'' have been made between the IAEA and Iran on
the vital issue of verification. Is there anyone that thinks--
that doesn't think that Congress should be informed as to this
vital part of the enforcement of any agreement?
[No audible response.]
Chairman McCain. Well, then I guess my question is that--
oh, and, in case we missed it, I'd like to have the witnesses'
comment on the top advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who
appeared on al-Jazeera on July 31st and was asked about United
Nations (U.N.) inspection of Iran's military sites. Here's how
he replied, according to the translation, quote, ``Regardless
of how the P5+1 countries interpret the nuclear agreement,
their entry into our military sites is absolutely forbidden.
The entry of any foreigner, including International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors or any other inspector, to the
sensitive military sites of the Islamic Republican--Republic is
forbidden, no matter what.''
What do--first of all, if all those facts are true that you
agreed to, and verification is a key item, here we are faced
with these statements--and it's not the first one that's made a
statement about entry into military sites--but also, shouldn't
the Congress know, shouldn't the American people--more
importantly, shouldn't the American people know that there is
verification the--on a--about inspections, and they should not
be some secret side agreement that no one knows about? Isn't
this a critical item in ensuring that the nation that has been
the constant violator, the constant cheater of international
law concerning nuclear weapons--isn't--doesn't this give reason
to some very deep concern on the part of those of us who are
responsible and the American people?
I'll begin with--well, I'll begin with you, Ambassador
Burns, and we'll work the other way.
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do agree with you. You know, the protocol here with the
IAEA is that, when it has an agreement with any member state,
they're confidential. But, it----
Chairman McCain. Yes. But, you know that this is not with
any other state, Ambassador. I've heard that line. This is a
country that has consistently cheated. It's not Brazil. So, to
just dismiss it in that way, I think, is, frankly, pure
sophistry.
Go right ahead.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Burns. I was actually just going to make--say
exactly what you said.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Burns. However, I think, in this case----
Chairman McCain. I have factitized.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Burns. It's okay. I'm in violent agreement with
you on this question.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Burns. I think, in the--they lied about the
existence of Natanz. They lied about the existence of Fordow.
We have to assume they're going to cheat, on the margins or
grossly, in the future. They're in the dock of international
public opinion. A way should be found for the IAEA Secretary
General to brief in full the United States Government about
what's in the agreement. And I think the administration should
find a way, perhaps in classified session, to brief the
Congress. I agree with that.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Ambassador Edelman.
Ambassador Edelman. Mr. Chairman, there are two issues
here, I think.
Chairman McCain. I apologize for interrupting a--what I
wanted to hear, Ambassador.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Edelman. There are two issues, I think, with the
verification provisions. One, I talked about in my statement,
which is the 24 days between a challenge to see a suspect,
undeclared site, and the potential of actually getting access
to it.
The side agreements with the IAEA have to do with the issue
of past military dimensions to Iran's activity and Iran being
held to account for all that and cooperating with the IAEA to
resolve those issues.
The problem here is that, until that is accomplished, I
don't understand, for the life of me, how you can even begin to
assess the verification provisions, because we won't know
exactly the full scale of what their activity encompassed. So,
that part is extremely important. And I agree with you, Mr.
Chairman, there is no reason why the IAEA should not be able to
explain to members of the Senate how they are going to go about
working through with Iran the account--accounting for what Iran
did in the past. That seems to me to be just a basic that one
couldn't even begin to go forward without having.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Haass.
Dr. Haass. Senator, we have a structural problem here,
which is--because the IAEA is essentially a gentlemen's regime.
It's a cooperative arrangement, where countries essentially
declare what is meant to be inspected, and the IAEA is meant
not to discover so much as confirm. The IAEA essentially
doesn't have hunting licenses, it has very restricted licenses
to go look at certain places, under certain conditions, at
certain times. That is clearly not adequate, given Iran's
histories. We've got a problem there.
I would think the United States would want to have very
candid conversations with the IAEA. We would want to establish
a regime for intelligence-sharing that might be unique to the
Iran situation.
And, coming back to something I had in my statement, this
is exactly the sort of area where I think Congress and the
administration ought to spell out, in terms of what are the--
what are our expectations about what Iran and the--would allow
the IAEA to do? And what would be the consequences if Iran were
not prepared to do that? And, very early on, I think we should
test this. We've had all these statements by the Iranians about
certain things are off limits, including military bases. Let's
test that. Let's very quickly see what they're prepared to--if
this thing unravels--if this agreement unravels after a month
or 2 months, so be it. But, I think it's important that, if it
were to unravel, that it is because the Iranians are unprepared
to meet their obligations. So, very quickly on, we ought to
test them, and we ought to hold them to a very high standard.
Chairman McCain. General Hayden.
General Hayden. I agree with everything that's been said so
far. And, Senator, I would add that, in my view, that Iranian
statement is an accurate reflection of what it is that the
Iranians believe they have and have not agreed to. We claim
that we will have access to the sites. And there are a lot of
meanings tucked under the word ``access.'' I would press our
administration to define precisely whether or not ``access''
includes physical presence in the site, to enter and go about
the facility, not whether you allow technical equipment, Geiger
counters, or cameras to be entered into the facility by the
Iranians.
And then I guess I'd offer one additional caution. We
should not allow our executive branch to tell you that access
will be sufficient based upon the definitions provided by the
IAEA, because, as Richard just pointed out, that's not the kind
of organization that they are. I think, absent your forcing
that issue, access will not include physical entry into any
facility the Iranians do not want to permit physical entry.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Burns, one of the arguments against the
arrangement is that there's a better arrangement out there. Do
you think that there is an arrangement out there, short of a
military confrontation, that would be supported by the
international community if we stepped back and essentially
either try to increase sanctions or just step back and wait for
the Iranians to come back to the table?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think this is the best
alternative available to us right now. We could go back 10
years, 5 years, and perhaps design a different framework to
these negotiations. Many of us would. But, this is the
agreement that's been negotiated. And, as I said in my oral
remarks, I fear that if the United States is the one that walks
away, the Iranians will have agreed to this, they'll have
accepted--they'll have made major concessions, their program
frozen for 10 to 15 years. It would give them the upper hand.
It would be complicating in two respects. Beyond our
agreement with the Europeans--the European oil and gas embargo,
the European financial sanctions--we've been able to get the
Indians, the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Indonesians
onboard. I think it's that global coalition that would fray and
weaken first.
And second, I think we'd also have problems with the
Europeans. The Germans, the French, and the British all support
this agreement. Their Parliaments are very likely--I think
almost certainly--to support these agreements, given the nature
of their systems. And so, we--they would be in a tough spot. I
think their inclination would be to try to help us figure out a
way forward. But, extraterritorial sanctions, which some
Members of Congress have said would be our key instrument,
would be very controversial in allied countries in Europe,
unfortunately. And I think it would be difficult to carry that.
The EU also has to reauthorize sanctions, and they vote by
consensus. And so, of the 28 EU members, I can think of three
to four who would be sorely tempted to withhold consensus,
meaning the sanctions would end. So, keeping this coalition
together is critical.
What we've had, over 10 years now in the Bush and Obama
administrations, is leverage over the Iranians--through the
global coalition, through the financial and--sanctions, and
through the Security Council Resolutions. That's what we would
give up. And so, I don't see walking away, waiting for a better
deal, as a credible alternative.
Senator Reed. And if we did walk away, would there be an
internal dynamic in Iran, because of their institutional and
political structures, to sort of show us that they're going to
go forward now, because they've given their best? They're going
to start accelerating their development of fissile material,
they're going to essentially get back on the path they were,
which would bring forward very quickly options that we might
have to contemplate--either intelligence options or military
options?
Ambassador Burns. I suspect that the--if we walked out and
abrogated, effectively, the agreement by failing to implement
it, the Iranians would feel compelled not to abide by the
agreement. And, I think, for domestic reasons, but also for
reasons of trying to position themselves perhaps for the next
round of this drama, they would lift the restrictions that
they've agreed to. They'd go back to being a threshold nuclear
state.
And, you know, we've had the upper hand over the last 10
years because most of the rest of the world feared the Iranians
were heading towards a nuclear weapon. If we walk out first, I
think that reduces our credibility to keep it together.
Senator Reed. And just very quickly, Secretary Kerry was
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) yesterday. It appears
that they've endorsed it, maybe with not enthusiasm, but--is
that your impression?
Ambassador Burns. You know, I--it is. I mean, the statement
by the Qatari Foreign Minister said that they would support
this agreement, and they would it implemented. They also want
their defenses strengthened. And there is also announcement by
several dozen Israeli officials--former officials--Shin Bet
Mossad military yesterday--I don't think they embraced the
deal, but they said that the--Israel should go along with it
and work on strengthening Israeli-United States relations.
Senator Reed. Dr. Haass, I thought your statement was--no
surprise--very insightful. And one of the lines is critical,
``But, the issue before the Congress is not whether the
agreement is good or bad, but whether, from the point of it
on--this point on, the United States is better or worse off
with it.'' I know you've proposed a third track, but I think,
essentially, we're on one track of a motion to disapprove, and
then whether it's veto, and the veto sustained. So, basically,
the track is, either this agreement's going to be eventually
sustained or it's rejected. And my presumption from your
comments is that, with all the shortcomings, that you would
feel that, on that track, sustaining the agreement makes more
sense.
Dr. Haass. It's always odd to push back against someone who
gave you a compliment.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. I respect you. That's why I asked the
question.
Dr. Haass. Thank you, sir. And it's mutual.
I would, at this point, urge you and your colleagues to
think, though, about some version of what I would call the
third track. I mean, for example, Ambassador Edelman talked
about the authorization for the use of military force. General
Hayden talked about the conditions of access. Ambassador Burns
talked about certain things we do with our allies. I could
imagine a comprehensive statement--and I'm not a legal or
political expert on what form it would take--presidential
communication, legislation, resolution, what have you--but,
something that would address the shortcomings, and, in some
ways, fill out. This is a narrow agreement. It's not just a
flawed agreement, in some ways, but it's a narrow agreement.
And even if it were flawless, there would be lots of issues.
And I would think it's very much in our interest to do that,
because one of our jobs here is to reassure friends in the
region, so they don't follow suit, and it's to signal Iran so--
in particular, on the longer-term nuclear question. I--that, to
me, is the biggest single set of concerns. And I would, very
early on, sit down with the--ourselves and then the Europeans
to think about what a follow-on framework would look like.
Let me just make one other point. I think it's--Senator
McCain and I were talking about this a little bit beforehand--I
find it frustrating and, in some ways, sad and problematic, we
are where we are today, having this hearing. And I wish,
earlier on, the administration and the Congress had worked more
in tandem. And I think that would have strengthened our hand,
vis-a-vis the Europeans, the Chinese, the Russians, and also
the Iranians, so we could have come up with a sense of minimal
collective requirements or standards. So, now we're in a after-
the-fact situation trying to do that. It is imperfect. But, I
still think it's--some version of that still makes the most
sense at this point.
General Hayden. May I add just one comment to what Dr.
Haass just said, Senator?
There are global implications to the nonproliferation
regime, as well as regional implications. And I am--and so, Dr.
Haass suggests a second regime after the 10-year period.
Because there is such a danger to the global nonproliferation
regime that this agreement actually explicitly says, (a) Iran
gets all the benefits of an NPT party, but no other NPT party
should believe that anything in this agreement sets a precedent
for them. And so, what you've got if you don't go to a second
agreement is a regime with the Iranians that then threatens to
undercut global nonproliferation.
Senator Reed. My time expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to make this real quick since we have a full
panel up here and everyone has to have access to their time.
You know, prior to the time the first reports came out, I
have to tell you--and I'll address this to General Hayden and
to Ambassador Edelman, because I know you guys better than the
other two--prior to that time, I just thought the mere concept
of negotiating with terrorists seems not a good idea. But, then
there are two things that came out that I've realized that,
when I go back to Oklahoma and talk to real people, that are
problems with this. One is the lack of verification, the other
is the billions of dollars going to terrorists. And I--I've--
the last person I would expect to say what she said were the
words that came from Susan Rice. She's the one that said things
that were not true about Benghazi, on the Sunni programs. And
when she came out and said--I think this is with Wolf Blitzer,
and this is a quote--she said, ``We should expect that some
portion of that money would go to the Iranian military and
could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior that we
have seen in the region up until now.''
Now, I really believe, building on that, that this could
fund the terrorism efforts through Hamas in Palestine, Bashar
al-Assad in Syria, Yemen, and the rest of the places. The
Pentagon currently estimates that Iran provides approximately
$200 million a year to Hezbollah, alone. Now, on that thing, I
asked the two of them, ``What am I overlooking?'' I mean, isn't
that pretty obvious, just on its face, that this would expand
the use of money going to terrorists?
General Hayden?
General Hayden. Very quickly, Senator. Of course it will.
Now, the intelligence community put out an estimate that was, I
think, intentionally leaked, that most of the money would not
go. But, you know, ``most'' is like 51 cents on the dollar, so
that leaves an awful lot of headroom for that estimate----
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
General Hayden.--beyond that. Right? Let's just imagine a
world in which none of it goes. You realize that you've created
a situation for the Iranian regime, where they can do guns and
butter, that there is no pressure, internally on the regime,
for continuing their current behavior, which is not the case
today before the sanctions are lifted. But, I agree, it's even
worse than guns and butter. It's more guns and butter.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, I thought--
Ambassador?
Ambassador Edelman. I agree, Senator Inhofe, with what
General Hayden just said, and I would add one--you know, one
other factor here, which is the fact that the Iranians, at the
last minute in the negotiations, suggested that the price for
getting the deal was to lift the conventional arms embargo and
the embargo on ballistic missiles in the U.N. Security Council,
which my colleague earlier talked about, and that it was
supported vigorously by Russia, I don't think, as I might have
said in my earlier career as a Sovietologist, was ``by
accident, comrade.'' This happened because the Iranians intend
to use with this windfall--to use it to purchase advanced
conventional systems with anti-access area denial elements to
it, and the people who are going to sell it to them are going
to be Russia and China.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Very good answers.
The second thing that I looked at was, you know, if you're
talking about 5 days, 10 days, 24 days, or whatever length of
time, if you have to give a site warning that an inspection is
going to take place, which that immediately sent up a red flag
to me, then we had the statements by the Deputy Director
Heinonen, who said that a 24-day adjudicated timeline reduces
detection possibilities. He goes on to talk about what all can
be done.
Now, during the last hearing, Senator Fischer pursued it a
little bit with Secretary Moniz and talked about the timeline.
And I got a little confused there, because, first of all, you
start off with the 24 days. We know how that's broken out.
However, if Iran believes that any or all of the--you know, are
not meeting their equipment--their commitments, it could refer
the issue to the Joint Commission for 15 days, then the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs for another 15 days. Now, that's a
total of 54 days. Now, I don't know how much further it could
go out. Is--do you agree that that could happen, in terms of
something that would have to be verified?
Ambassador Edelman. I'm aware of the provisions that you've
talked about with regard to referring issues to the Joint
Commission. You know, like any agreement, you know, we're going
to find out, once it's actually in place, how it actually will
work. But, I think it is possible that you could get a longer-
than-24-day period from the----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
Ambassador Edelman.--request to an inspection.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, okay.
Ambassador Edelman. I think that's----
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that adds up to----
Ambassador Edelman.--perfectly plausible.
Senator Inhofe.--some 56 days.
General Hayden, do you think that they would be able to
cover up a lot of stuff in 24 days, leave alone 56 days?
General Hayden. Well, more time is better. And again, I
think we all agree----
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Hayden.--that there's not going to be a sprint out
to a new Natanz somewhere. It will be--there will be cheating,
but it will be incremental. And that'll be the kind that will
be very, very difficult.
And, Senator, one additional thing. In addition to your
adding onto the back end, there's some fuzziness at the front
end before the 24-day clock starts, because there's a dialogue
between the IAEA and the Iranians about what it is--to identify
what really the issues are, about which facilities.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. I want to thank all of you for very
reasoned statements. And this is--I consider it one of the most
important decisions that I will make. And I'm sure all of us in
the Senate feel that same responsibility.
General Hayden, in your opening comments, and later
amplified, you think it will be more guns and butter if the
agreement goes through, and you characterized it earlier,
versus if the deal is rejected, it would be a more impoverished
Iran.
And so, I want to take that and ask Ambassador Burns--given
the fact that, when you subtract out all of what Iran owes
under contracts, it's my understanding it's a net of about $56
billion that would flow to Iran, most of which are in the banks
of five countries: China, India, Taiwan, Japan, and South
Korea. So, if the deal is rejected, my question is, What's the
incentive for those banks in those foreign countries that hold
those dollars for Iran's oil if those countries want additional
Iranian oil--is there any incentive for them to keep them and,
therefore, keep Iran impoverished?
Ambassador Burns. I think one of the problems is--and I've
been in a couple of hearings now, and Senators and
congresspeople are focusing on this issue, is--there's really
no Plan B. The expectation by all the adherents to this
agreement is that it's going to go forward. But, if it does
fall apart, for whatever reason--or if the United States
Congress decides to disapprove, and the President can't sustain
a veto--I think there's going to be a dynamic that develops
that's not going to be in our favor.
I've paid attention, of course, to Secretary Lew's
testimony about the amount of money he thinks would be
available to the Iranians. I'm not competent to answer the
question specifically. I would think some of that money will go
to long-term contracts, some will have to go to the Iranian
economy, because it's been so impoverished. They'll have to
spend on social welfare, infrastructure projects. No question,
some of it will go to the IRGC, given the relationship of
Qassem Soleimani, the head of the IRGC Quds Force, to the
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. That's to our disadvantage. And
that's what we're going to have to compensate for.
But, I look at this from a very practical viewpoint. I
think if we get into this realm where the deal falls apart, the
Iranians have more of the advantage than we do. And I think we
will lose the grip on the international sanctions regime. And
some of those banks around the world that have been--that had
funded the Iranians, some of the long-term contracts will come
back. It will be difficult, in that scenario, to impose
extraterritorial sanctions, even in Europe, because the
consensus would have broken down. So, I really don't see the
logic of that no-deal scenario. And that's why I prefer and
support the President's initiative.
Senator Nelson. I've been reading some of these annexes.
And the one on access, which is Annex Q, it goes through this
process on undeclared sites, that so many days, and so many
days, and a vote of this Council, five of the eight members,
another 7 days and 3 days, which is the maximum of 24 days. If
Iran still balks at giving us access, giving the IAEA access,
to an undeclared site after that process, and, with the overlay
of our intelligence, isn't it pretty well that we're going to
be able to understand that that is covert activity, and we
could operate accordingly?
Anyone.
General Hayden. I guess I'll take that, Senator, because
I've--in my previous life, I would be the one going into the
Oval with the case.
There's actually a phenomenon in intelligence that
describes that dilemma. It's called the Phenomenon of the
Unpleasant Fact. And you're going in to your senior leadership
with something that cuts across their policy goals, their
policy preferences, and maybe even their politics. And there,
the burden of proof is incredibly high. So, I actually think
it's going to take a long time to convince any President who
would believe in the deal to go ahead and put the deal at risk
by responding to what still is ambiguous behavior. And then,
even after you've convinced our government, it's going to be
even more difficult to convince other governments that further
action has to be taken if your evidence remains ambiguous.
There will always be arguments for alternative explanations.
Senator Nelson. You can't--I don't think you can hide
traces of enriched uranium. And that's why I think the IAEA
plus our intelligence apparatus is going to be able to find it.
General Hayden. No, I--number one, there would--there can
be cheating that actually could approach being substantial
without enrichment activity. But, I assumed in your scenario,
Senator Nelson, that the IAEA would not get physical access in
order to go ahead and do the swipes for the detection of
isotopes. And that's what I meant by ``and it will remain
ambiguous.''
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you all for your wise insight and
help us make some tough decisions here.
I asked Secretary Carter, last week, and Secretary Kerry
testified before the House last week that Iran is the number-
one world sponsor of terrorism. So, we're negotiating with a
very problematic country whose religion transcends, sometimes,
normal political discourse, I think, creates an ideological
extremism that's dangerous there.
Dr. Haass, you mentioned the historical perspective. I
remember Mr. O'Hanlon, from Brookings, testifying. I followed
up on something he said about the fact that this may be 30, 40-
plus years of dealing with this spasm of Islamic extremism that
we're seeing. And he just said, ``Yes.'' That was his answer.
So, what we do with Iran, would you agree, should be
consistent with an overall historic strategy, over decades
perhaps, to help subside this extremism that we're seeing?
Dr. Haass. In principle, yes. But, in practice, it's going
to be extraordinarily hard, simply because, even though Iran
would say, from their point of view, the principal threat to
stability in the region is the Islamic State, much of what Iran
is doing is actually encouraging people to go join that
organization by, for example, using Shiite militias inside of
Iraq or supporting the Assad government. So, Iran's own policy,
I would argue, is against their own professed self-interest.
And that's why this is going to be so difficult.
It's one of the reasons, Senator, I'll be honest with you,
I am so pessimistic about the trajectory of this part of this
world. We haven't even discussed Turkey, we haven't discussed
Egypt, we haven't discussed Yemen. We could--Saudi Arabia's own
internal dynamics. I think there's more fault lines in this
part of the world than we have fingers on our hands. And Iran
is a significant, but not the sole, contributor to the
pathologies of this part of the world.
Senator Sessions. Ambassador Edelman, it seems to me that
we've gotten into this negotiation improvidently. Bush
administration said we can't negotiate with this terrorist
state. And President Obama decided to commence those
negotiations. A wise Middle Eastern leader told us that you've
got to know how to get out of a talking trap; otherwise, you
can't--you know, you lose all kind of ability to act.
So, I guess what I'm asking, first and foremost--it seems
to me that the--that an agreement of any kind with Iran should
be founded on a--as part of an overall strategy to deal with
the problems in the Middle East. And it seems to me this has
been an ad hoc agreement, this situation that started talking
that we couldn't get out of it, and now we've ended up with an
agreement that, I agree with you, does not serve the national
interest. Is that incorrect, or you have any thoughts on that?
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Sessions, thank you.
First, I think, in fairness, although we were not directly
involved in the negotiations with Iran during the Bush
administration, my colleague to the left was constantly working
with the then-EU3. And I believe, at the very end of the Bush
administration, the other Ambassador, Burns, actually
participated in one round of negotiations. So----
Senator Sessions. Were those official negotiations?
Ambassador Edelman. They were official negotiations, but--
and his participation was brief and fleeting, I would say, but
it was a part of the process.
You're right that--and, first, one of the occupational
hazards of negotiating is, negotiators get the bit in their
teeth, understandably; they work on something, and then they
want to get a conclusion, they want to get a deal. And there is
always the danger that the objective--in this case, preventing
Iran from developing a nuclear weapon--gets lost, particularly
in the final effort to conclude a deal, which is difficult and
arduous. And, in this case, I think the negotiators got a lot
of things. If you read the entire document, there are a lot of
things I would have been--you know, I would have predicted they
wouldn't have gotten. It's, you know, surprising in some of the
limits, et cetera. But, the overall result, I agree with you,
is not satisfactory.
The--I think that, you know, my colleague, Ambassador
Burns, said there seems to be no Plan B. I don't quite
understand that. I mean, the administration said, throughout
the negotiation, it was prepared to walk away from a bad deal.
It said repeatedly that a bad deal was worse than no deal. So,
presumably, if they were prepared to walk away, there had to be
some Plan B somewhere, because someone had to be thinking about
what they were going to do if they didn't actually get the
deal. So, the idea that there's no other deal out there that's
available, I don't think is credible.
I would add another thought experiment to this. Let's say,
for the sake of argument, that the Majlis actually act before
you all do. And let's say, for the sake of argument, the Majlis
were to reject the deal. I don't believe that the
administration's first response would be, ``Oh, my God, there's
no deal. Now we have to go to war.'' I think they would say,
``We've got to figure out a way to get the Iranians back to the
table and start negotiating again and get a--you know, get
something we can do.'' I don't understand why that principle
wouldn't apply to this body, as well.
Senator Sessions. Do you think--just to--do you--all right.
My time is up. I'm sorry. He didn't answer the question.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all of you. This is extremely enlightening,
and it's extremely important, and I think the decision that we
make is one of the toughest decisions any of us have ever made
since I've been here. And I'm sure the rest of our committee
here agrees. But, it's one that's going to have world
implications, not just to the United States, and not just Iran.
With that being said, I look back in history. I grew up at
a period of time when Iran was a friendly nation or a favored
nation, with the Shah. And I remember, 1979, we had 52 hostages
that were held for 444 days. The regime changed. I don't know
if any of--look--of you all look back in history, thinking this
regime would withstand 36 years. Did anybody predict they would
be able to hang on for that long? And if that's the situation
or evaluation, do we believe that they are on the brink of
breaking, to where the people will revolt and change because of
the hardship after 36 years? I would have thought--this
hardship's been going on for quite some time. They didn't
progress like they did prior to this regime change in '79. And
if that would be the case, then what's the chance of this
regime changing if we do the deal or don't do the deal? Which
puts more pressure on them? Because I would think the only way
we're going to change that country, or even that part of the
world, is if some of these regimes and some of these people who
want a--more of a peaceful life are going to be able to take
hold again. So, that's one question.
And also, the other question I would have is, Is there any
possible way of stopping the flow of money if we walk away from
the deal? I think we've touched on it. I think Senator Nelson
asked the question. I know we all have been thinking about
that. But, we act like we're in control. And if we walk away,
the money--we just put a grip on it, and nothing moves.
The third thing I would ask you all is, If you were going
to meet with the P5+1--if you were sitting down with all the
representatives, whether they be ambassadors or spokespeople
for these countries, what question would you ask?
So, we'll start with the third, if you--first--regime
change. Can it be done if--with or without the deal? And then
down to the three.
So, we can start either way you want to start. Do you want
to start?
General Hayden. Regime change has not been the American
objective, looking backward as far as my experience allows me
to see. That said, the Iranian leadership has never wavered
from the conviction that this was always all about regime
change. So, that's made our dialogue with them even more
complex.
I would say that one course of action gives a better chance
of coercing regime change. That's no deal. And then, there are
hopes that, if you do have this deal, you might entice regime
change because of integrating the state, the people, into the
larger community. I actually think both chances are very low. I
don't think it's going to happen.
Senator Manchin. Money?
General Hayden. One more on regime change. That is most--
actually, looking at it, it is most tightly tied to
demographics, and it's a nation's youth bulge that creates
disturbances that lead to regime change. It's very--it's
actually a very predictive indicator. Egypt just went through a
youth bulge. Our youth bulge was----
Senator Manchin. I'm sorry, General, we're going to have be
very quickly, because I--I'm running out of time.
General Hayden. Our youth bulge was '68 to '70. The
Iranians are now on the back end of their youth bulge.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Money, Dr. Haass? Or which way--do whatever, real quick.
Dr. Haass. Regime change, I don't think it's in the cards,
unfortunately.
Senator Manchin. Either way.
Dr. Haass. Either way.
Senator Manchin. With or without.
Dr. Haass. It's the impact--first of all, it's likely to be
slight, either way. Second of all, you can't count on it.
Senator Manchin. Gotcha.
Dr. Haass. Regime change may happen----
Senator Manchin. Gotcha.
Dr. Haass.--for reasons that we can't predict. If it does,
it could be for the better, it could be for the worse. Took the
Soviet Union over 70 years, happened rather quickly at the end.
But, it simply--to me, it--it's more wishful thinking right now
than it's----
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Dr. Haass.--than a strategy.
P5+1. I would sit down, very quickly, and have the
conversation both about how to deal with noncompliance, and,
second of all, how to deal with the long-term nuclear
challenge. Because this agreement stores it up, if you will,
for years 10 and years 15.
Very quickly, I'm worried that too many think--people think
this agreement solves the problem. It parks the problem. And
that's the conversation I would begin with the P5+1.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Manchin, excellent questions.
In the interest of time, I won't add anything on the regime
change----
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Ambassador Edelman.--question, except to say I think, on
the margin, this agreement strengthens the regime rather than
weakens it.
On the flow of money, I think actually there are ways to
staunch it. I think a strong vote in the Congress against this
deal would help staunch it. And the reason I say that is the
comments that my former colleague, Jacques Audibert, the French
National Security Advisor to President Hollande, made in
denying the conversations he allegedly had with some members of
the House. He did say that he told them that it would be a
powerful disincentive, given the kind of penalties BNP Paribas
paid for violating U.S. sanctions.
Senator Manchin. Could I have Mr. Burns just answer the
two--
Ambassador Edelman. Yeah.
Senator Manchin.--because we just ran out of time.
Real quick.
Ambassador Burns. Very quickly. We should hope for regime
change, but we can't bank on it. And I would say this is a
tough regime which will likely survive, unfortunately.
On the money, long line of European and Asian officials and
businesspeople in Tehran ministries over the last weekend. So,
I think it would be very difficult for us to kind of reimpose
and rejigger that whole sanctions regime if we walked away.
And finally, on the last question, I was in the P5+1 for 3
years. They need to stick with us on sanctions reimposition. I
think the Europeans would. I don't think the Russians and
Chinese would.
Senator Manchin. And your question to P5 would be what,
right today?
Ambassador Burns. Excuse me?
Senator Manchin. Your----
Ambassador Burns. My question would be, we--I think it's
inevitable the Iranians will test the restrictions and try to
cheat. And we're going to need P5 unity. And that's one of the
downsides. It's going to be difficult to have----
Senator Manchin. Commitment to do that. Thank you.
I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]: Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for being here. This has been
very helpful.
One of the issues that General Hayden raised, and some of
you have raised on the inspection regime on undeclared sites--I
think, if you look at the language in Annex 1, Section Q, that
lays out the procedure for undeclared sites, it--I don't see
anywhere in that Annex--in fact, what I see in it, in
paragraphs 75 and 76, is that, first, the IAEA has to raise the
concerns of undeclared sites to the Iranians, then, at that
point, they actually have to put in writing their concerns. The
Iranians have an opportunity to respond, and they actually get
to suggest alternatives to what the IAEA would like, in terms
of access to undeclared sites.
So, in that language, to General Hayden's point, do you
remain concerned, if the IAEA is not given physical access to
undeclared sites, that that could undermine their ability, even
if you use the most advanced testing to know, in fact, whether
an undeclared site is being used for their nuclear program? I
mean, is this a real issue?
As I look at this--by the way, I think this is a lawyer's
dream. I mean, as we look at the back-and-forth on this, I
mean, I can only imagine, my prior life as a litigator, I could
have a ball with this.
I'd just like your comment on physical access. Nothing in
this can I see guarantees us any--or the IAEA, obviously--any
physical access to their undeclared sites.
Dr. Haass. I'd say two things. It--you're right, it doesn't
guarantee it. The question of access is not explicitly defined.
But, second of all, we shouldn't kid ourselves. For certain
activities, even physical access is not a panacea. By
definition, undeclared sites are just that. You can't know
something is going on if you don't know what's going on. So,
for example, if there's certain weaponization activity going on
at an undeclared site, by definition we're not going to have
access to it, because we won't know it's going on. And certain
types of activities don't leave traces. So, even physical
access is valuable, as it would be in some cases, is not a
solution. Inspection is meant to be a cooperative enterprise.
And I think we have to accept the limits that we've got a
noncooperative party on the other end of this agreement.
Senator Ayotte. Ambassador?
Ambassador Burns. Thank you very much, Senator.
If we get into this realm of the managed inspections, the
24 days, we're into, likely, a significant violation. If the
Iranians ultimately, in those 24 days, don't provide access,
that's a violation of the agreement. And I think we would have
the--if we're serious and we would prosecute this, we would
have the upper hand in getting a lot of international support--
not from everybody, but from key countries.
Senator Ayotte. So, one other--I have a number of
questions, but--Dr. Haass, you mentioned that we need to
reassure our friends in the region so they don't follow suit.
One of the issues that many of us have heard an earful about is
from our allies in the region and their potential desire to
have threshold programs or programs, themselves, to hedge
against the Iranian program, and that this is a real concern
for us as a result of their ability to keep their
infrastructure in this agreement. Could you all comment as to
what the impact could be on our allies in the region, in terms
of their own nuclear programs or desire for this capability?
Dr. Haass. What it's going to take is the combination of
things. One is going to be that they're going to have
confidence in how we pursue this, noncompliance as well as
follow-on--there's clear ceilings, shall we say, on Iranian
capabilities. We're going to have to look at defensive systems
of all sorts for these countries.
I actually think the most interesting area may well be
security guarantees. If we don't want them to each go down that
path themselves, the question then is, What are we prepared to
do for them and with them in this area? Because, despite our
best efforts, Iran may still achieve, you know, at a minimum,
threshold status. So, I think if we don't want--and we don't
want--the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Saudis, and others
going down that path, then I think it's actually a big debate
for the United States, which is, To what extent are we prepared
to put, however conditional, various types of nuclear umbrellas
out there in the region?
Senator Ayotte. Do others want to comment on that?
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Ayotte, I would just add one
thing, which is, if you take a country like the UAE, which has
signed a 123 Agreement with the gold standard of no enrichment,
they have been very vocal about, you know, what this means for
them now that this very large industrial-scale program is being
okayed by the international community. You see that in Saudi
Arabia, as well. So, I think the concern you've expressed is
extremely well placed and goes to General Hayden's comment
about the threat that this agreement, I think, represents to
the broader nonproliferation regime over time.
General Hayden. And, Senator, one solution is to compensate
with conventional weapons to our allies in the region, which
has its own second- and third-order effects with regard to the
balance between the Arabs and the Israelis. And we may end up,
as a byproduct of this agreement, with a far more militarized
Persian Gulf than we've had in the past.
Ambassador Burns. One option for President Obama and his
successor is to reaffirm the doctrine that the Persian Gulf is
vital for the national security interests of our country. I
think all administrations, Republican and Democrat, have
essentially said that since Jimmy Carter's administration, but
we haven't heard it in those terms, clear terms from the Obama
administration. That would help to reassure the Gulf allies.
Senator Ayotte. I thank all of you for being here.
Appreciate your insight.
Chairman McCain [presiding]: Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
And thank you all very much for being here this morning.
You have all suggested, and I have heard this in virtually
every other hearing on this Iran deal, that the likelihood of
Iran breaching this agreement is more that they would breach it
incrementally rather than that they would walk away or have a
very flagrant breach. And so, one of the things that we ought
to be thinking about if it goes forward is what other measures
we could take with the other signatories to the agreement that
would show Iran that we are strong and we're not going to
tolerate those incremental breaches.
So, I wonder if you could speak--and maybe I'll start with
you, Dr. Haass--about what other steps that we should be
thinking about as we're looking at the potential for
incremental breaches.
Dr. Haass. Well, again, I think your premise is exactly
right, and I think the Iranians--getting back to something
General Hayden said--hope that the inevitable ambiguity gives
them protection and that these issues get talked to death and,
at the end, there's no clarity. But, I--what I would think is--
the only response I can think of is that we have--how would I
put it?--lesser responses to lesser breaches. If we only have
all-or-nothing responses, then I----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Dr. Haass.--I think we tie ourselves in knots. So, we ought
to have gradations of responses, if you will, in some ways
geared to the breaches. I think we have a much better chance of
getting something like that through the P5+1, the--something
that seems, if you will, proportionate.
Also, could I say one other thing? We have to think about
if there is something of a breach, what is our goal? And our
goal is not simply to penalize at that point, it's also to get
the Iranians back into compliance. And I think that's got to be
an important part of our policy, as well.
Senator Shaheen. And so, what are--Ambassador Edelman----
Ambassador Edelman. Yeah.
Senator Shaheen.--what are other actions that we might
take?
Ambassador Edelman. You know, Senator Shaheen, you've
raised an important question, and it's one that I find
particularly troubling, because my own experience in government
is--and I'm saying it in light of the comments by Minister
Zarif, that, ``Basically, oh, we're only going to get penalized
for big violations, not for little violations.'' Of course, you
pile little violations up on top of each other incrementally
over time, and it can actually amount to, you know, serious
capability being developed.
The problem is, as General Hayden said earlier in the
hearing, you're always going to be dealing with ambiguous
information. There will be an argument inside the intelligence
community first about whether this information actually is a
violation----
Senator Shaheen. And----
Ambassador Edelman.--and how important the violation is.
Then we'll have an----
Senator Shaheen. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but----
Ambassador Edelman.--then we'll have an interagency debate
about it.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. But, what I'm
suggesting is that--what I think everyone was saying is that,
if an agreement goes forward, we ought to be prepared that
we're going to respond to those incremental breaches. And so,
what--what's the menu of options that we've got, to do that?
Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador Burns. I think the administration is prepared
and should set a very high bar for the Iranians; meaning, if
you anticipate that they're going to begin to cheat, you have
to be very tough-minded and call them on those early rounds, or
else they're going to be emboldened, the way that Foreign
Minister Zarif predicted in his public statement. And, at least
from my own understanding of the administration's position,
they're determined to be very tough-minded at the beginning.
And I think that's what we have to be. We'll have to have the
Europeans with us. In a strange sort of way, President Putin
has stayed with President Obama on this particular issue,
despite our sanctions on Russia over Ukraine. The Russians
don't want Iran to become a nuclear-weapons power. I'm not
predicting they're going to be a great partner, but you have to
work on the Russians, as well.
Senator Shaheen. Let me also ask--I think it was you again,
Dr. Haass, and Ambassador Edelman, as well, who suggested that
there were other steps that Congress could take, should an
agreement go forward, that would help strengthen the U.S.
position with respect to any agreement. And, Ambassador
Edelman, you suggested an AUMF, which, you know, I think many
of us might be open to, except that we haven't been able to get
an AUMF done on the actions that were taken against ISIS. But,
what other kinds of measures are you suggesting that Congress
might take that would help to strengthen our position?
Dr. Haass?
Dr. Haass. It's a longer conversation than your time limit
would have, but certainly we would spell out of some of the
parameters of the follow-on nuclear deal beyond the 10 and 15
years. I actually think that would be critical, dealing with,
for example, questions of levels of arrangement. Just because
the agreement ends at certain points, and may not preclude Iran
from doing certain things, doesn't mean we couldn't put into
place something that would be a follow-on that would preclude
those things, or say, ``If you are tempted to do it, here would
be the results or the consequences.'' So, I would think that is
high on the list. We would also talk about some of the help we
would provide for other countries in the region against certain
kinds of threats from Iran.
But, essentially, Senator, I would go through each of the
three baskets--the noncompliance basket, the regional basket,
and the follow-on nuclear basket--and say, each one of those,
what do we see as the problems or the shortcomings or the
issues likely to arise? What can we do now, looking at them--
some would be immediate, some would be towards the future--to
reinforce this agreement? And that--that's the conversation I
think Congress should be having with the executive branch,
sooner rather than later.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you all very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I would like to follow up on an answer that
General Hayden gave to Senator Reed on his questions dealing
with precedent and nonproliferation. As you all probably know,
in paragraph 11 of the preamble, it states that, ``This
agreement should not be considered as setting precedents for
any other state.'' And, Ambassador Edelman, in your beginning
comments, in your opening comments, you said that this
agreement reverses 50 years of nonproliferation policy, even to
friendly governments. So, a couple of questions, here.
First question. Does including a caveat like this in the
preamble, does that really accomplish anything? And my second
question would be, To what extent will this agreement impact
future nuclear cooperation agreements?
You know, if we're prepared to embrace the idea of a serial
violator building an enrichment program, and leave open the
possibility that they begin reprocessing activities in 15
years, I don't see how we can object to extending similar terms
to other countries that actually have good nonproliferation
records.
So, I would like you to begin, in any order you'd like to.
Ambassador Edelman, would you like to start?
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Fischer, yeah, you've put your
finger on something that I found troubling in the agreement, as
well. And I think what you're seeing there is that the
administration has gotten that inserted into the agreement so
that it can say, in principle, we have denied Iran the right to
enrich; we've just recognized it, in practice, because we're
allowing them to have an industrial-scale enrichment
capability. So, that's why I think you see it there. And I
think, notwithstanding the fact that people say it's not a
precedent, other people will say that it's a precedent, just
as, for instance, we asserted that the recognition of Kosovo's
independence unilaterally was not a precedent; Russia used that
precedent against us in 2008, in Georgia.
Dr. Haass. Two things. Whenever you say something is not a
precedent, it's the equivalent of saying, ``With all due
respect.''
[Laughter.]
Dr. Haass. And you inevitably run into it.
That said, Iran is sui generis. And a lot of the countries
we're going to have to deal with nuclear programs are not Iran,
thank God. Iran is an outlier. Whether it's the UAE or
potentially Saudi Arabia. I mean, they are qualitatively
different sorts of challenges.
So, I think we ought to, to the best we can, deal with this
as a one-off. Yes, it's going to be pushed in our face
sometimes with people that are saying, ``Well, you agreed to
this,'' and we're going to have to argue, ``But, that was a
special case.''
So, I think it is in our interest, to the extent this is a
problematic agreement, to make it as sui generis as we can,
understanding that others are going to cite it. But, it's not
the same as most-favored-nation status. It's not that
problematic, because we're not dealing with a world of rogues.
Iran is, to some extent, an outlier, as is North Korea and
several others. And the more likely conversation is going to be
one, two, or three agreements with friends. And I think that is
a qualitatively different sort of conversation.
Senator Fischer. So, you think, if a country that we are
somewhat friendly with, if they want to say, ``Okay, for 15
years, we won't be running centrifuges, we're not going to
reprocess any reactor fuel, you know, we're going to abide by
that for 15 years, but, you know, hey, 15 years later, all
those bets are off,'' what's the option then?
Ambassador Edelman. Well, but we've had the----
Senator Fischer. We're going to say, ``But, you're a good
actor, you're not going to do this.''
Ambassador Edelman. But, that's exactly what's worked. Look
at Japan, look at South Korea, and others. We've had a whole
experience of close American relationships which have been, I
would argue, the best nonproliferation tool available to the
United States. So, to the extent we have good relations and
there's confidence in American reliability, then I don't think
we have to worry about proliferation across the board.
So, at the end of the day, proliferation is part of a
larger thing, called American foreign and national security
policy. We've got to get the larger thing right. Then we'll be
in a better position to address proliferation pressures, just
as we have in Asia. People predicted many countries in the
Asia-Pacific would go down certain paths. They have not, I
would argue, because we had military presence, we had credible
security arrangements and commitments to them, and, with them,
we dealt with their adversaries. So, I don't think, if you
will, it is hopeless in this area.
Senator Fischer. I'm running out of time.
So, if Iran decides it wants to build a reprocessing spent-
reactor fuel and produce highly enriched uranium or build a
massive uranium enrichment program after year 15 of this
agreement, what are our options?
Ambassador Burns. Our options will be to reimpose--well,
first of all, they have--they will have the right to
reconstitute a civil nuclear program. The danger will be, Will
they use it as a cover for a covert military program? And we'll
have--this is where it gets challenging for us in years 10 to
15 to 20 to 25--we'll have to, I think, reassert our ability to
use military force, should they get close to a weapon, and
reimpose a sanctions regime, should that be necessary.
So, in essence, we'll be back, if you will, to what we've
been doing for the last 10 years, in trying to contain them.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here, and thank you for your very
thoughtful and insightful testimony today.
Dr. Haass, I think that one of the very important points
you make is that we can agree or disagree that a better
agreement could and should have materialized. Many of us, I
think, have expressed the view that a better agreement was not
only possible, but perhaps should have been reached. But, the
reality today is that we have this agreement. And the question
before us is not the one for historians, as you've said, it's
what the consequences are, the practical and real-world
effects. And I know that you said that you did not have time,
in response to my colleague Senator Shaheen's question about
what the follow-on could be, but perhaps you could expand on
what you think, specifically, the Congress could insist on the
administration doing, even if there are the votes to sustain
the President's veto.
Dr. Haass. Senator, I'd want to think about it in greater
detail and have that conversation with some other experts,
including the three gentlemen at this table for whom I have
great respect. But, I would think that we would want to have
certain limits on Iranian enrichment levels, possibly on the
amount of enriched material. I would probably want to have
limits on delivery systems. I would want to talk about what
exactly is the--is meant by the implementation of the
additional protocol, what is our understanding of that. So, I
would want to, essentially, keep ceilings and tabs on the
Iranian nuclear program beyond 10 and 15 years.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an open-ended
document. I believe our approach to Iran in the nuclear realm
ought to be similarly open-ended. And we ought to decide in our
own minds what--to what degree--what's an acceptable threshold
and what isn't. Because, I think, to simply say that Iran is
allowed to be a threshold nuclear power, but not a nuclear-
weapon state, that leaves me uneasy, because that could--
because it would mean zero breakout time, and that would put
tremendous pressures on others to follow suit. So, where I
think we ought to be detailing is, What sort of--what is our
definition of an acceptable threshold? And I would want to get
into--in many ways, many of the things addressed by this
agreement for 10 and 15 years, I want to--I would want to see
how they could be extended, either in their current form or in
a modified form.
Senator Blumenthal. And I hope that conversation will
continue even before the Congress has to vote on this issue.
General Hayden, if the United States Congress rejects this
agreement, does it lead to a better agreement? And, if so, how?
General Hayden. It could lead to a better agreement, but it
would require a powerful amount of American enthusiasm for Plan
B. You don't improve on Plan A without really strong American
leadership. And that may actually be an important factor as to
how much willingness the current administration would have into
pursuing Plan B.
I think it was Ambassador Edelman who suggested, earlier,
you know, that there always seemed to--there had to have been a
Plan B; otherwise, you can't make the statement that, you know,
a bad agreement is worse than no agreement. But, there doesn't
seem to have been any construct put forward the--what Plan B
might look like. And so, again, very powerful American
leadership, probably from both political branches.
With regard to the Iranians, I don't think they sprint to a
weapon. I think we get more of the same. Actually, they're--
actually, I think it's more likely that they abide by the
agreement for a time period, rather than sprinting to a weapon,
in order to try to create a wedge between ourselves and our,
particularly, European allies. And I think the way it settles
over time is the incremental growth of the Iranian nuclear
system, not a sprint to weapons.
To be very candid, Senator, we were never convinced they
were going to build a weapon. I mean, if this were a weapon, it
was our belief that Iranian foreign policy is best served by
parking right here, because, unlike the North Koreans, cooking
one of these things off in the desert pushes a whole bunch of
things into the red, not into the green. And, unfortunately, I
think what the agreement, in its current form, has created is
this, if they just have a bit of strategic patience.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time has expired. But, this issue obviously is immensely
complicated. I have a lot more questions, and hope that I can
explore them with members of this panel in another setting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all for being here today.
General Hayden, you've spent a career in the American
intelligence community, from the lowest levels to the very
highest levels. I've heard it reported that you once said,
``Intelligence is not a fact; otherwise, it wouldn't be called
intelligence.'' I have the highest regard for the professionals
in our intelligence community, but I want to review briefly the
history of assessments of foreign countries' pursuit or
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq--twice--
North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Do you think the U.S.
intelligence community has provided timely and accurate
assessments, down to a month-by-month timeline, of these
countries' pursuit or obtaining of nuclear weapons?
General Hayden. No, of course not, Senator. And hence, my
earlier comments and other testimonies that, absent an invasive
inspection regime, American intelligence alone can't give you
sufficient confidence in the agreement.
Senator Cotton. And the reason it's so hard is that these
countries are very good at concealing their intentions and
capabilities, and it can often be hard to develop assets that
reveal those to us?
General Hayden. Iran, much to my disappointment,
particularly to the President I served, was a very hard human
intelligence target. And, in many ways, that's what you need in
order to detect this, because the physical evidence of at least
the early stages of breakout is very hard to come by.
Senator Cotton. What, then, is your level of confidence of
the United States intelligence community's ability to have deep
insight into Iran's intentions and capabilities down to the
nearly month-by-month assessment necessary?
General Hayden. Yeah, I wouldn't go, Senator, month by
month. Back to my phenomenon of the unpleasant fact, how much
evidence do you have to have in your folder to go in to tell
the President his favorite plan is now off the rails? So, month
by month would be very hard.
But, again, back to my point, within the 10-year period,
the best part of this agreement is Richard's basket or my
bubble of the agreement itself, because it does create some
fairly robust ability. Not that they won't cheat. They will
cheat. That's unarguable. But, I think the cheating will be
roughly at the margins, and not that breakout or sprint.
Senator Cotton. Do you expect that to happen in declared
facilities, like Natanz or Fordow----
General Hayden. No.
Senator Cotton.--or in undeclared sites?
General Hayden. No, of course not. It would be in
undeclared sites. It's always in undeclared sites.
Senator Cotton. In a country two and a half times the size
of Texas.
General Hayden. Senator, Fordow was pretty far along. We
count it as an intelligence success, but Fordow was pretty far
along before we discovered it. We learned about Natanz from an
Iranian opposition group.
Senator Cotton. I want to move now to the alternatives to
this deal, or, more specifically, what would happen if Congress
were to disapprove this deal and override the President's veto.
I know there's a lot of proponents of the deal who say, ``It's
this deal or war.''
Ambassador Edelman, recently a French diplomat, speaking to
several Members of Congress, said that was not the case. Could
you elaborate on that perspective and share your opinion of his
perspective?
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Cotton, I think you're talking
about my colleague, Jacques Audibert, the French President's
National Security Advisor. There is some dispute about what he
actually said, since he's denied part of it, but I think what's
not disputable is that he made it clear that a vote against the
deal would have a very chilling effect on people going back
into Iran, because of the potential penalties and lack of
access to the United States financial system. And that, I
think, is an important fact to bear in mind when we think about
potentially walking away from the deal and renegotiating it. We
have lots of tools at our disposal.
Senator Cotton. What do we think would happen if the
Iranian Parliament voted to reject this deal? Surely, it is a
rubber stamp for the Supreme Leader, but, nonetheless, they
still have scheduled a vote a few weeks after our vote in this
Congress.
Dr. Haass. As you say, it's unlikely, sir. If it were to
happen, I think current arrangements would remain in place, in
terms of sanctions, because it would be seen as their doing.
So, I think there would be no major move afoot. The real
question, What would Iran do in the nuclear sense? Again, I
would think more drift than sprint, because that would be the
sort of thing that they would think would be--would not
stimulate or trigger the sort of reaction they supposedly would
want to avoid.
Senator Cotton. Ambassador Edelman, one final question,
because my time is running short. Given the fact that a
nuclearized Middle East, if this deal one day leads to that,
would likely have countries with limited nuclear stockpiles,
limited delivery vehicles, very-near-distances limited
communications, less stable governments than we saw during the
Cold War in the Soviet Union and the United States, what do you
assess the risk of genuine outright nuclear war in the Middle
East to be?
Ambassador Edelman. I think, potentially, Senator, it's
very high. Back in the Cold War, nuclear strategists identified
something called the ``N country problem,'' which was--it was
possible to understand how a nuclear balance of power would
work between two parties, but, once you got multiple parties
into it, it seemed to be an insoluble paradox. And, in the
Middle East, it would be heightened by the fact that you have
very, very short flight times, you'd have relatively small
arsenals, at least at the beginning, and you've have enormous
incentives on the part of all parties to preempt. And I think
there's a very real chance you would end up with nuclear use in
anger for the first time since 1945.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all. My time's expired.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank you and the staff for putting together
these hearings and giving us an opportunity to listen to some
very provocative and thoughtful commentaries. I'm finding this
a very difficult issue. It seems to me it's all about weighing
risks--weighing the risks of going into this arrangement,
weighing the risks of not going in. And, of course, weighing
those risks means alternatives.
And you gentlemen have done a pretty good job today of
picking out many of the defects in this agreement, which I
agree are there, but the real question then becomes--is, What
is the alternative?
Ambassador Burns has testified that--and it seem to me
logical--that if the agreement is rejected, two things happen.
One is, Iran reverts to a situation where they have essentially
an unfettered nuclear program, and, secondly, the sanctions
will inevitably--and here's where the choice of verb is
difficult--erode, fray--unravel may be too strong a word. But,
I don't see it--how it's possible to argue that the sanctions
will be stronger if this deal is rejected unilaterally by the
United States after it's been adopted by the U.N. Security
Council.
General Hayden, you made the point that the agreement
itself may not be that bad for 10 to 15 years. As I see it,
what we're essentially buying is 15 years of a nuclear-free
Iran, and, if Iran starts to misbehave in a nuclear sense at
the end of 15 years, we have the same options we have today. In
fact, we may even be in a stronger position, because then we
will be working with the rest of the world to impose those
sanctions rather than working at cross-purposes with the rest
of the world. Would you--help me out here.
General Hayden. Sure. If the Iranians--and back to the
baskets again, the----
Senator King. Right.
General Hayden.--one out there in the future--if the
Iranians begin to misbehave after the limitations in the
current agreement expire, they're misbehaving from an
incredibly higher baseline, in terms of what----
Senator King. In what sense?
General Hayden. In what is legitimately allowed the Iranian
state, in terms of their nuclear industry. All right? And
frankly, they will have time to do things on the margins to
improve their capacities. So, I think it's very important, as
Dr. Haass says, a second regime out here that keeps meaningful
limits----
Senator King. Well, right now, they're--the--all the
intelligence is that they're 2 to 3 months from a breakout.
Would they be closer than that----
General Hayden. Oh, yes.
Senator King.--the 10 or 15 years?
General Hayden. I mean, even in the administration's
calculations, when you get out there, somewhere between 13 and
17, the breakout period for sufficient fissile material, which
is what we're measuring here----
Senator King. Right.
General Hayden.--gets below the current 2 to 3 months. So,
that--so, you run that danger, even if you continue to have the
tools you have on the table. And frankly, since Nick was
involved in building the tools currently on the table, that
doesn't happen quickly. That's going to take time.
The other aspect that makes me uncomfortable are the more
immediate effects of empowering a state that should still be a
renegade state, of empowering a state by welcoming it back into
the family of nations, and really giving it the wherewithal to
do all the other things they want to do.
Giving additional way of thinking about this, Senator----
Senator King. I'm very limited on time.
General Hayden. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'll----
Senator King. Let me follow up on that.
Ambassador Burns, what would be the effect of--within Iran,
of a unilateral American rejection, in terms of the
relationship between the hardliners and Rawani and Zarif?
Ambassador Burns. Well, there is tension between them,
there's no question about it. This not a monolithic regime. And
I would--in that hypothetical instance, I would think that
there would be tremendous pressure in the Iranian system not to
race towards a bomb--I think we all agree on that--but to
reconstitute a nuclear threshold state so they'd be able to
enrich uranium further, develop weapons-grade uranium, and
continue to work on their plutonium processing. That would, I
think, be--the rationale for that would be to reposition
themselves for the next round of this.
I think that would be a real problem for us, because if
we're the one that walks out first in this hypothetical
example, we're going to lose our leadership both--we're the
political organizer of the global coalition to isolate them,
and we've been the organizer of all the sanctions resolutions,
in the U.N. and elsewhere. And so, we lose our ability, I
think, to keep that coalition together. And that's why I, for
practical reasons, believe that--I think the plan can work--the
administration's plan. It gets very difficult, as my colleagues
and I are suggesting, after years 10 to 15, and you have to
reconstitute the system and the will to contain the Iranians.
Senator King. Two quick points. One is, I want to associate
myself with Senators Shaheen and Blumenthal, and Mr. Haass--Dr.
Haass, and--all of you. You must help us think through
agreement-plus. What is the--what is--what can Congress do to
strengthen the implementation of this agreement and be sure
that it is abided by? And I know that there are people here
thinking about that. And, to the extent you can provide input,
I think that's important.
The only other point I would make is, we've been talking
mostly about the IAEA, as if that's it for verification. But,
the fact is that we'll have five and probably six intelligence
agencies watching intently--and I mean that literally--and
working with the IAEA. So, I think it's important to realize
that this isn't just the IAEA, that there is a combined
intelligence capability that is quite vigorous.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. This
has been an enlightening discussion, I think, very good for all
of us to participate in and hear your areas of expertise.
It has been brought up a couple of times already today, and
I want to make it very clear--a couple of you have affirmed
this--but, I would like to ask each of you, yes or no--a simple
yes-or-no question, and then we can come back and talk a little
bit more about it. But, the President made very clear, several
weeks ago--very, very clear--that it was either this nuclear
agreement or war. There was no in between. It was either the
agreement, sign it, have it done, or we are going to war.
General Dempsey pushed back on this. Admiral Richardson pushed
back on this. They agreed that there are other options
available. So, just simple yes or no. If we don't sign this
agreement, are we going to war?
General Hayden.
General Hayden. There's no necessity to go to war if we
don't sign this agreement. There are actions in between those
two extremes.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Dr. Haass.
Dr. Haass. I would echo that, but I can't rule out that
Iran would not take steps that would force the United States to
contemplate the use of military force. We would have to decide
what, at some point, we deem to be intolerable.
Senator Ernst. But, do you think there are other options
before we get to war?
Dr. Haass. Absolutely, from sanctions to covert action of
various types, and so forth.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Ambassador?
Ambassador Edelman. Yes, Senator Ernst, I agree with you, I
don't think those are the only alternatives.
Senator Ernst. And Ambassador Burns.
Ambassador Burns. I don't believe that war would be
inevitable. Possible. But, I do think congressional disapproval
would weaken the U.S. and our ability to hold the sanctions
regime together, which has been the key factor.
Senator Ernst. And I think there has been some very good
discussion today. I think it's very, again, enlightening that
we have gone from, a number of weeks ago, many people, whenever
I would bring up this topic about having other options
available, ``Why are we just talking about war?'' Now we're
having very good discussion about other things that we need to
do, as the United States, to protect not only our population
but our friends in that region and around the world.
A number of weeks ago, this was not happening. People were
either saying, ``We're going to sign this agreement or we're
going to war.'' There are a lot of things that we can do. And,
unfortunately, I think these discussions should have occurred
much more significantly during the negotiations process. Now
we're at a point, we either take the deal, or not, and try and
unilaterally come up with things that we can do as a country to
push back on Iran. Do you agree with that?
Dr. Haass. Violently, I agree with that. And I think we
would have had far more negotiating leverage, had Congress been
involved sooner. I remember--and Senator McCain and Senator
Reed and others will remember, because we all go way back--when
you used to have Senators and Congressmen as part of
delegations. I would--I think the idea of joint negotiating
approaches so Congress, if you will, is in on the takeoff as
well as the landing--because, right now, you're right, we
have--we have, I always say, poor choices and very few of them.
It would have been much better to have expanded the range of
choices and to improve the quality of the choices. And I think
there ought to be some lessons derived for future
administrations and future Congresses about how to conduct
negotiations. Because we're leaving ourselves in a very
difficult place if we only get to this point after the deal, if
you will, is signed, sealed, and delivered.
Senator Ernst. We are between a rock and a hard place right
now. Most certainly.
Iran's chief terrorist is, of course, I think, General
Soleimani. And we have talked a little bit about this gentleman
today. And great article just out by Lieutenant General,
Retired, Michael Barbero, ``Empowering the Iranian Who Murdered
Americans.'' I think 20 percent of the deaths in Iraq have been
attributed to the EFPs that the General had put in place--
Soleimani. I think it's good that we remember that this
gentleman now is in good standing, once this agreement goes
into place. And this is a man who I don't think is going to
curb his terrorist activity or backing of Hezbollah and Hamas
and many of these other organizations. How will this deal
empower this general?
General Hayden, can you speak to that, please?
General Hayden. Sure. Senator, in terms of direct impact,
he wasn't going to travel to the United States anyway, or show
up at the U.N., so--but, we talked earlier about unleashing
resources that can now be put at his disposal to continue doing
what he's been doing. And frankly, it couldn't possibly come at
a worse time. I mean, the man routinely is on the ground in
Iraq directing Shiite militia. And now we're giving him
additional resources.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you. And I think it's wise to
remember that all of us that serve in the Senate probably have
constituents and families in our States that have members that
were killed overseas as a direct result from those EFPs.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Most of you have indicated that we have other options,
should we walk away from this agreement. But, I am wondering,
you know, what the scenario would be; because, if we walk away
from an agreement, unless we enter into another agreement, the
reality of which becomes questionable, given that we probably
won't be able to rely on our P5+1 partners to go along with us
in trying to renegotiate another agreement, doesn't that create
the scenario, as I think Dr. Burns acknowledged, that it--this
scenario increases the potential that we would have to resort
to military action to stop Iran from proceeding apace with
building a nuclear bomb? That is not a question, but an
observation, based on the testimony that I've heard today.
General Hayden, as a former Director of the CIA, does this
agreement improve the intelligent community's ability to gain
intelligence on Iran's nuclear activities?
General Hayden. It does, in the zero-to-10-year period,
with the invasive inspection regime. I mean, assuming at least
moderate Iranian compliance with that, you do have more
detailed knowledge than we would otherwise have.
Senator Hirono. So, during this period, as we get more
detailed information--intelligence--which I assume your
assessment of the enhanceability for us to gain intelligence
based on this agreement--as a result of this agreement, that we
could, at the end of 15 years, or even before then, determine
what else we could consider doing to prevent Iran from becoming
a nuclear power.
General Hayden. Again, as Dr. Haass pointed out, in order
to continue that invasive inspection regime, that window into
what it is they're doing, I don't think there is any deus ex
machina that's going to happen in the next 10 or 15 years
that's going to allow us to do this remotely. And so, as part
of the negotiation of a follow-on agreement, we would still
need to have that kind of invasive inspection regime.
Senator Hirono. But, during the period that we have this
enhanced inspection--well, this enhanced capability to gather
intelligence, I would think that we would therefore be able to
determine what else we can do at the end of 15 years.
If someone else wants to weigh in on this, I see--yes.
Ambassador Burns. I'd be happy to.
I think----
Senator Hirono. Dr. Burns.
Ambassador Burns. I listed, in my oral statement, some
measures that the administration can take now, things they
haven't done and said, to try and create a stronger containment
coalition of the Iranians, because the Iranians are striking
into the heart of the Sunni world. And then, on your question,
Senator, we already have to think ahead to the time when this--
these restrictions lapse, 10 to 15 years after the agreement
takes effect. We'll have to reconstitute much of what the Bush
and the Obama administrations built up over the last 10 years.
Now, I support the agreement, because I think the value of
freezing them for the next 10 or 15 years is considerable. But,
I also see that, if the Iranian regime stays in place--and I
think it's probable that it will, although we can't predict--
and if they do try to reconstitute their program, we're going
to have to have an American President who will be very, very
assiduous in rebuilding the coalition. So, you have to start
that now and keep our closest allies with us.
Senator Hirono. One of the very interesting aspects to this
hearing and all of your testimony, which I appreciate very
much, is asking Congress to think about what we could be doing
now during--you know, to address the eventuality, possibility
of, at the end of 15 years, as General Hayden has said, that
Iran would have sufficient fissile material to break out with a
nuclear weapon in a very short time. So, thank you all for
really pushing us toward that kind of consideration now, rather
than waiting til the end of 15 years.
Regarding the potential for Iran changing its behavior, I
realize that we should be looking at the agreement itself.
However, I'd like to ask Dr. Burns, What is the likelihood that
this agreement and Iran's compliance with it could lead to a
moderating of Iran's behavior to the outside world, as well as
its--to its own people? And what else besides this agreement
would increase the likelihood of a moderate Iran?
We'll start with you, Dr. Burns.
Ambassador Burns. Thank you very much----
Senator Hirono. We may have to end with you. I'm running
out of time.
Ambassador Burns.--Senator, because I live in an academic
institution, I have to tell you, I'm not Dr. Burns, I don't
have a Ph.D.----
Senator Hirono. Oh, excuse me.
Ambassador Burns.--just to be fully transparent. There are
other Ph.D.'s here.
Senator Hirono. Dr. Haass.
Ambassador Burns. I would say that we--it would be a very
ineffective argument for the administration to make that we
should go forward with a nuclear deal because it'll change
Iran. I don't think Iran's going to change as long as the
Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard hold so much of the
power. So, that can't be a reason. I don't hear the
administration saying that now. And I think that's fortunate.
The reason to go ahead is because we're in a long-term
struggle with them, and we can now gain the advantage, over the
next 10 to 15 years, to freeze their nuclear program. But, as
we've all been saying, we have to think strategically long-
term, both in terms of mitigating measures against their
nuclear program and containment measures against their military
effectiveness--Syria, Lebanon, Hamas, Hezbollah, Yemen. They're
a real problem, and we have to push back against them.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Edelman, I'll--I'd like to start with you, but
I'd--I would invite in any of the panelists to chime in if they
have comments.
What is the likelihood that Iran will live up to the terms
of the agreement? In other words, maybe another way of saying--
a negative way of saying it--what's the likelihood that they're
going to cheat? Do you believe they're going to cheat? And in
what way will they cheat?
Ambassador Edelman. If they don't cheat, it will be the
first time that they haven't cheated on their NPT and nuclear
obligations to the----
Senator Tillis. I think there are some 27 international
agreements or treaties where they've documented having cheated
in the past. So, we know they're going to cheat. Is there any
doubt among the panelists that they're going to cheat at some
level, push the edges?
[No response.]
Senator Tillis. So, Ambassador Burns, you mentioned about
how the--voting down this agreement could substantially weaken
our sanctions regime. But, let's assume that you're in a
position where you have to deal with that. We've voted down the
agreement, our partners, who are--I know, Foreign Ministers and
CEOs, business leaders who travel into Iran in large numbers
trying to figure out how they can invest and how they can
become a part of the economic turnaround of that nation, but--
so, you've got that hand dealt you. You've got--have a lot of
these partners that have gone to Iran. We've identified a need
to apply economic sanctions again. What do you do to make the
best of that situation?
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator. And very quickly if I
could just say on your last question, I think it's probable
that their self-interest will be that they will appear to be
living up to the agreement. I think they'll try to keep it.
But, no question in my mind, they'll cut and cheat on the
margins. That's why we have to watch them.
On your hypothetical question, if we were given the
scenario of a congressional disapproval, override the
President's veto, and--I think we would want to begin with
Britain and France and Germany to try to reconstitute a way
forward to pick up the pieces. And that would be to keep the
sanctions regime together and try to convince the Iranians that
they're better off living with an agreement that would take
another set of negotiations. So, you'd probably be back into
the negotiating game.
I've testified that I think you're right to look at the
option, because if that option could work, that would be a
logical way forward. I don't think it can work, and I think,
actually, there are more deficiencies there than there are
possibilities for us.
Senator Tillis. Do you think that that is driven largely by
these other countries believing this is a good deal on the pure
merits of keeping Iran from having a nuclear weapon? Or is a
lot of their motivation the economic benefit that they have by
removing the sanctions and setting up shop in Iran?
Ambassador Burns. I think there are varying motivations. I
really trust that the British and the French and the Germans
want to see Iran denied a nuclear weapon. They started these
negotiations 3 years before we did, in 2002. They've been at it
a long time.
The Russians, I think, are an interesting case, because the
Russians lie closer to Iran than anyone else, geographically. I
don't think the Russians want to see them become a nuclear
weapons power, but the Russians want to cut us down to size,
unfortunately, and that operates to be--it's a conflict in our
relationship.
Chinese, I think, are motivated by commercial imperatives.
Senator Tillis. Well, that's, maybe, the question I would
ask of any of the panelists to opine. The--we talk about the--
and I think, Ambassador Edelman, it was in your comments that
you submitted for the record, that, you know, this--whether
it's 140 billion or the discount of $56 billion, what we
haven't really talked about is projecting the net positive
economic impact through foreign investment that's going to
occur. China's going to invest in Iranian infrastructure for
the purposes of having oil or lower-cost energy coming to them.
All of these various industries are going to come there, and I
begin to believe that, over a 10-year period, that the $56
billion that we're talking about, you can argue, for one reason
or another, may or may not flow back into--or 140 billion,
whatever the number is--but there could be tens of billions,
hundreds of billions--dollars--more in economic benefit over
this timeframe that would be absolutely available to fund
terrorist operations, proxy wars, all the other malign
activities that they're involved in. Do you agree with that?
Dr. Haass?
Dr. Haass. The answer is, there could be a lot of money to
do it. That said, a lot of terrorism is actually fairly cheap.
I mean, Iran's doing pretty well under the current
circumstances. I think it also points to the importance of
keeping--you know, of energy policy, because the last thing we
want is Iran also to get a windfall out of oil prices, which is
something we haven't really talked today.
I'd say one other thing on the economics. What we don't
know--and I think it's the optimist side--I put it out; I'm not
sure I believe in it, but I mention it--is that this will set
in motion certain dynamics within Iranian society. And I think,
you know, the optimistic side would say it'll strengthen
certain middle class elements. So, while the regime will get
some credit for improving the society, it might also set in
motion some longer-term dynamics of demands for change. And
none of us is smart enough to know how these things play out.
Senator Tillis. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Tillis, if I could just add to
what my colleague has said in response to you. I--one of the
problems I have with waiting 10 or 15 years and then addressing
this is precisely what you're saying. The two tools we've had,
the threat of military force and the impact of the sanctions,
are both going to be much less powerful tools 15 years from
now--or 10 years from now, even--than they are today. And
that's one reason why I think, as messy and problematic as it
will be to reject the deal today, I would rather do it now and
try and put the pieces back together now than wait 10 or 15
years.
General Hayden. I'd just add one additional thought to
Eric--to Ambassador Edelman's point.
It--in my view, it will be more difficult to get a
multilateral sanctions snap-back than it will be to continue
sanctions under a proposed Plan B.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
You know, one of the things that strikes me as I've read
through this agreement now is, there's a lot of asymmetry, in
terms of commitments and obligations. Let me just give you one
example, Ambassador Burns. There's a--up front, a phrase that
says, ``The P5+1 expresses its desire to build a new
relationship with Iran.'' And normally, as you would imagine in
international diplomacy, you would normally get a reciprocal
kind of statement in a lot of agreements, wouldn't you?
Ambassador Burns. It would be advisable. I don't think
we're going to have a new relationship. I think it will be a
continuation of the same in trying to contain them.
Senator Sullivan. But, there's no kind of reciprocal
statement from Iran. So, we're saying we want a new
relationship. In the agreement, we say it. But, the agreement
doesn't say the Iranians want a new relationship with the West.
Why do you think that's the case?
Ambassador Burns. As you know, Senator, I was not part of
these negotiations, so I can't account for it. But, what we're
seeing is these conflicting statements, even 10 days ago----
Senator Sullivan. Yeah.
Ambassador Burns.--saying, from the Iranian side, ``No
access to military sites.'' If they don't give access to
military sites, they're in violation of the agreement in the
opening stages. So, this agreement will test them.
Senator Sullivan. But, I mean, the--it's pretty obvious to
me they--we say we want a new relationship. In the text,
they're silent. As a matter of fact, they're not silent. After
the agreement's signed, they're doing the ``Death to the--Death
to America'' chanting, and it's clear they clearly don't want--
or didn't want to commit to a new relationship, even though it
seems like a lot of what we have in here is focused on that.
General Hayden, I wanted to kind of go into another area,
in terms of asymmetry in the agreement. You know, the
administration said they didn't want to include terrorism,
human rights, weapons programs, even the hostage situation,
because they were focused on the nuclear agreement, only, as
part of this. And yet, if you look at the details of this
agreement, there are all kinds of affirmative actions that
we're supposed to take, you know, including helping them with
finance, helping them with their energy sector, helping them
import commercial aircraft, literally helping them import
pistachios, Iranian rugs. One of the--so, there's a lot of
affirmative duties we have that have nothing to do with the
nuclear side of this.
One of these--it's a little unclear who the obligation is
to, but it also says that we're, quote, supposed to
``strengthen Iran's ability to protect against sabotage in the
nuclear facility--its nuclear facilities.'' Do you think that
is remotely a good idea? And is that a commitment the United
States should--or anyone--should take up? And if we're
preventing sabotage, do we have to prevent our allies--say, the
Israelis--to prevent sabotage? Hasn't sabotage helped us, to be
blunt?
General Hayden. Well, it's hard for me to talk about this
in detail, but the plain-English reading of the sentence you
just read would put a requirement, a legal responsibility, on
us to protect the current--the negotiated Iranian nuclear
program from any destructive activity, even if it were mounted
by a friend of the United States.
Senator Sullivan. Is that in the United States national
interest to do that?
General Hayden. I----
Senator Sullivan. In your experience?
General Hayden. It is overly complicated. I--it's hard for
me to comment, in open session, on what the fine print means.
I'm surprised to see that in there. I'm surprised that,
although we insisted that ballistic missiles be talked about,
they were thrown off the table at Iranian insistence, until the
11th hour, and then they were brought up by the Iranians in
order to get out from under----
Senator Sullivan. Ambassador--sorry, General--Ambassador
Edelman, do you think that's a good idea?
Ambassador Edelman. I cannot----
Senator Sullivan. Do you think that's in----
Ambassador Edelman. I cannot imagine, Senator Sullivan, how
that could possibly be in the best interest of the United
States, and it's one of the reasons why I'm opposed to this
agreement.
Senator Sullivan. Is it in the best interest of some of our
allies in the Middle East?
Ambassador Edelman. Absolutely not.
Senator Sullivan. Let me just turn to one other area that
has been a real big concern of mine. You know, a lot of us--
Ambassador Burns, Edelman, we worked together on the whole
effort to economically isolate Iran, and there's a lot that's
been talked about this snap-back provision. And, as you know,
it took years to get our European allies, who were not
motivated to really help out, initially, to divest out of Iran.
And, as you mentioned, they're already very quickly going and
reinvesting in Iran.
One of the things I'm most concerned about the snap-back
provision--it's being sold as this really important thing--
powerful, prompt--but, it seems to me more of an illusion,
because there's a provision throughout the agreement--paragraph
37, paragraph 26, and other areas--where the Iranians
essentially say, ``If any sanctions are reinstated, in whole or
in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing
its commitments under the agreement.'' So, it seems to me the
snap-back provision is more aimed at us, it's more a boomerang
provision, than it is at them, because if we ever reimpose
sanctions, they can legally--legally--walk away from the deal.
Secretary Kerry and Secretary Lew have been asked this
question a number of times. They don't seem to be able to have
a good answer for it. Are you concerned about this kind of
illusory snap-back provision?
Ambassador Burns. I think the snap-back provisions are
going to be a challenge for us. We had the great--I had the
great pleasure to work with you in a previous capacity on this,
Senator, and we're going to have to, I think, have some
agreements up front with the Europeans that they're going to be
with us--those three Europeans--France, Germany, and Britain--
when there are serious violations. If the Iranians take the
position that the imposition of sanctions for Iranian
violations ends the agreement, ``Well, the agreement's off''--
--
Senator Sullivan. It's in there.
Ambassador Burns.--then the agreement's off, and then the
United States, whatever administration is in power, will have
the right to do what we have to do to keep them away from a
nuclear weapon. So, I actually don't think that puts pressure
on us. I think it's a--if the Iranians take that position, that
gives us an opening, if the agreement's not working, to
abrogate the agreement, theoretically.
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Sullivan, I mean, I, too, am a
little worried about the snap-back provisions, for a couple of
reasons. One is, it seems to me there's a contradiction at the
heart of the argument that the administration has made on
behalf of snap-back. On the one hand, they argue that the
sanctions regime--correctly, by itself--has not stopped Iran's
nuclear program; but, if Iran violates the nuclear agreement,
the penalty we're going to impose on them is snapping back the
sanctions. So, right from the get-go, there's a problem.
I will give the negotiators enormous credit. The provisions
for snap-back are a--very, very cleverly, you know,
constructed, but I think there's a political problem, which is
that the way that we guarantee snap-back is that the United
States would have to veto the resolution in the Security
Council that would allow the sanctions relief to continue. The
United States, I think, always finds it difficult to wield the
veto in the Security Council. We've done it from time to time
to protect Israel and a few other things, but we don't use the
veto lightly. And I think this is going to be much harder to
actually implement the snap-back than people have argued it
will be.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Burns, General Dempsey said, a few weeks ago, to
Senator Ayotte's question about Iran and ballistic missile
capabilities, that, quote, ``Under no circumstances should we
relieve pressure on Iran, relative to ballistic missile
capabilities and arms trafficking,'' unquote. What do you think
was the reasoning to allow the world's leading sponsor of
terrorism--and, by the way, that's a title that was bestowed
upon them by no less than our own State Department--to receive
the gift of a sunset on U.N. sanctions in these two areas in 5
and 8 years, respectively?
Ambassador Edelman. Thank you, Senator.
I said, earlier, that I oppose this compromise that ends
the conventional weapons and ballistic missile sanctions
imposed in 2007 and 2010 by the United Nations. What I heard
from the administration, though, is somewhat reassuring. They
say that, when these sanctions--when these U.N. sanctions,
global sanctions, expire, that they will--or the next
administration--will have to reimpose, certainly American
sanctions, but also try to put together a coalition of
countries to sanction the Iranians. It's not in our interest to
see the Iranians be able to import Russian or Chinese military
technology, and it's certainly not in our interest to see them
develop ballistic missiles.
Senator Rounds. It's interesting that, in an Armed Services
hearing on this deal last week, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter
confirmed to me that, under this deal, he could not rule out
Iran acquiring an intercontinental ballistic missile in 10
years. This means that Iran could have the capability of
producing a weapon that could reach the United States soil in a
decade. A week before that, General Paul Selva, now the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told me that--during his
confirmation hearing--that Iran remains the leading state
sponsor of terrorism, and sanctions relief agreed to in the
nuclear deal could be used by Iran to continue to--or continue
to sponsor terrorism.
Gentlemen, do you believe that, with this agreement, the
U.S. and our allies are safer today than we were a year ago,
and will we be safer when this agreement ends in 10 years?
Ambassador Burns. I believe that we'll be--we are going to
be safer over the next 10 years. That's the reason I'm
supporting the President on this. If we freeze their program,
then we have 10 to 15 years of insight into what they're doing,
and severe restrictions on their program.
Second question is tougher. And again, I think, as many of
us have said, and I've certainly said, we're going to have to
be really good and forceful at putting back in place, if the
same Iranian regime is in power, some of these restrictive
measures, on our own and with a coalition, to ensure our safety
in that 10-to-25-year period.
Senator Rounds. Gentlemen?
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Rounds, as Senator King said
earlier, I think, a lot of this discussion that some of the
panelists were discussing among ourselves before the hearing is
a question of balancing risks. And my own view is that this
deal, I would say, marginally improves our situation on the
nuclear question over the next 10 years, but at the peril of
various other threats to safety and security of the United
States in the short term, outside the nuclear realm, and again
in the nuclear realm at the expiration date of the deal.
Dr. Haass. Consensus on that. Which, again, is why I--I
didn't begin here, but I came out with the position that we
need to think about how we buttress this agreement to deal with
the downsides, in that the immediate regional problems, it will
exacerbate; and the longer-term nuclear problems, I fear it
will increase. So, I think anyone who's inclined to vote
against the resolution of disapproval for the agreement should
think very hard about how that vote is accompanied by steps--
statements and steps that I believe will offset the--you know,
the truly problematic parts of this arrangement.
General Hayden. Yeah, I think that my colleague has said it
very well. In essence, there is some buying down of the nuclear
risk, which was, frankly, somewhat theoretical and always long
term. And the coin we've used to buy that down is embracing
some concrete immediate risks and the danger of what happens
after the 10-year period.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses. There's a lot more
of this to be discussed, and--but, I think you've given the
committee a very excellent depiction of the challenges. And I
appreciate very much that you've taken the time to be with us.
Hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
----------
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning, everyone. The
committee meets today for our third oversight hearing on the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which the United States and
other major powers have signed with Iran.
We welcome our distinguished witnesses, and thank them for
joining us today: Professor Walter Russell Mead, Distinguished
Scholar in American Strategy at The Hudson Institute and
Professor of Foreign Affairs at Bard College; Michael Singh,
the Senior Fellow and Managing Director of The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Ray Takeyh, the Senior
Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at The Council on Foreign
Relations; Dr. Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow at The Council on
Foreign Relations; and Richard Nephew, Fellow at The Center for
Global Energy Policy at Columbia University.
This committee's oversight is focused on the strategic and
military implications of the nuclear deal with Iran. Among
other things, we want to know how this agreement will affect
regional security, proliferation, and the balance of power in
the Middle East, what impact it may have on Iran's malign
activities and ambitions to dominate the region, what it means
for perceptions of American credibility among our allies and
partners, and what the consequences are for U.S. defense
policy, military planning, and force posture.
From this broader strategic perspective and following the
testimony given in our two previous hearings on this topic,
this bad deal, to me, only looks much worse. The committee is
eager to hear from our witnesses on whether this deal is the
best we can do and what realistic alternatives exist. Given
that even the administration acknowledges Iranian aggression,
support for terrorism and rogue regimes, and destabilizing
behavior are likely to continue, what should United States
strategy toward Iran look like?
The administration suggests that any criticism of this deal
is tantamount to a call to war. Such scare tactics are to be
expected from this administration, but they have no place in a
debate of this magnitude. Our military leaders have also
rejected the administration's false choice. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, told this committee, just last
week, quote, ``We have a range of options.'' Likewise, the
President's nominee to be the next Chief of Naval Operations
testified that, quote, ``There are other options besides going
to war.'' We ask our witnesses to provide their candid
assessments of what realistic alternatives to this deal might
be.
The strategic and military implications of this agreement
are perhaps even more troubling than the terms, themselves.
Iran is more than an arms control challenge. It's a
geopolitical challenge that demands a comprehensive strategy.
For years, many of us have argued--have urged the
administration to adopt a regional strategy to counter Iran's
malign activities in the Middle East. Unfortunately, if such a
strategy exists, there is no evidence of it.
President Obama likes to say that this deal is built on
verification rather than trust. But, consider what we've
already verified about Iran's activities and intentions, and
contrast that to our own strategic drift. We know that, over
the past decade, Iran's military and intelligence operatives
have stepped up their destabilizing activities in Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Gaza, and elsewhere. Iran did this
despite the full pressure of sanctions. Imagine what it could
do with even a small portion of the windfall of sanctions
relief, estimated at roughly $60 billion, or probably much
more.
It's reasonable to assume that billions of additional
dollars will soon flow to Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, or
Quds Force, money that will likely be used to boost arms
supplies to Iran's terrorist proxies and double down on Bashar
Assad, right when he needs it most. We know that Iran intends
to become the dominant military power in the Middle East. Yet,
despite repeated assurances that negotiations were strictly
limited to the nuclear program, the administration made major
concessions related to conventional weapons and ballistic
missiles, concessions that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff warned, before the agreement, should occur, quote,
``under no circumstances.
In 5 years, this agreement would lift the international
arms embargo against Iran, freeing up the regime to acquire
advanced conventional military capabilities from eager sellers,
such as Russia and China. In 8 years, it would lift
restrictions on ballistic missiles, whose only conceivable
military purpose would be to deliver nuclear weapons against
America and its allies. We know that these concessions have
dangerous implications for the men and women serving in our
military. This agreement would enable Iran to construct the
kind of advanced military arsenal the anti-access and area
denial capabilities that could raise the risk of employing our
military options, should Iran violate its obligations. In
short, if this agreement fails, the lives of U.S.
servicemembers could be at greater risk.
We know that our allies and partners in the Middle East
have increasingly come to believe that America is withdrawing
from the region, and is doing so at a time when Iran is
aggressively seeking to advance its ambitions. Now we have
reached an agreement that will not only legitimize the Islamic
Republic as a threshold nuclear state with an industrial
enrichment capability, but will also unshackle this regime and
its long-held pursuit of conventional military power, and may
actually consolidate the current regime's control in Iran for
years to come. That is perhaps most troubling of all about this
agreement, what it means for America's credibility in the
Middle East.
For decades, the United States has sought to suppress
security competition in the region between states with long
histories of hostility toward one another and to prevent war. I
fear this agreement could further undermine our ability and
willingness to play that vital stabilizing role. For the sake
of our own security, as well as that of our allies, I believe
we cannot afford to let that happen.
Once again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing
before us today. I look forward to their testimony.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, to the witnesses.
Over the past 2 weeks, the Chairman has assembled a series
of hearings on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the
JCPOA. Last week, the President's representatives, four Cabinet
Secretaries and the country's most senior military officer,
made the case for the agreement, both on the terms of the deal,
itself, and the way forward with our friends and allies in the
Middle East. Yesterday, the committee heard from a number of
former senior government officials with experience in
diplomatic, intelligence, and military communities. Today, the
committee will hear from additional witnesses who bring with
them a vast and extraordinary array of experience on the
region, on nonproliferation issues, and sanctions
implementation policy.
Thank you, again, gentlemen.
I want to thank the Chairman for assembling this series of
hearings with the committee. They have provided a superb venue
for attempting to understand the dynamics that shaped the P5+1
[5 permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus
Germany] negotiations and for assessing the impacts of the
agreement on Iran's calculations with respect to its nuclear
program and their regional ambitions.
I want to pose the same question to this panel that I asked
yesterday. First and foremost, I hope you will provide an
assessment of whether the deal is the best available option to
prevent the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon. I also
specifically hope each of you will address, first, the terms of
the agreement itself, particularly with respect to cutting off
a path to a nuclear device, the sufficiency of the duration of
the elements of the agreement, and the breakout time necessary
for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. Second, the alternative,
if any, to the JCPOA. Third, the inspections regime under the
deal, including any lessons learned from past international
inspection regimes that have been incorporated into this
proposal. Fourth, the role and capacity of the International
Atomic Energy Agency to implement this agreement. Finally, the
sanctions regime under the JCPOA, the availability of similar
tools the United States will have at its disposal for targeting
Iran as a result of support for terrorism, regional
stabilization, and human rights abuses.
Aside from the JCPOA, I'd also appreciate the witnesses
providing their assessment of two other critical issues. First,
while the P5+1 negotiated agreement, none of them share a
border with Iran. Our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council,
the GCC, all share land or maritime borders with Iran. This
makes Iran's activities in the region a far more tangible
problem for them. A Camp David summit earlier this year
continued our engagement with the GCC partners on this issue.
Secretary Kerry was not only in the region this week, but
appears to have elicited their support for the agreement going
forward. But, we have to continue to support their efforts, in
terms of their defenses, their ability to respond to asymmetric
threats from Iran. I hope our witnesses can provide some detail
and context in this issue, too.
Second, Israel rightly views Iran as a significant and
ongoing threat to their national security interests. I'd be
appreciate in hearing the witnesses' assessment of how the
United States might move forward with Israel under this
agreement, if it is eventually supported, to protect our shared
national security interests. In fact, that'll be a key factor,
going forward.
Once again, I look forward to the panel's responses.
I also must apologize, because I have to rush up, in a few
minutes, to the Banking Committee, who is also having a
hearing. So, my departure is because of the coincidence of
hearings, not anything else.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank the witnesses again, and we'll begin with you,
Professor Mead.
STATEMENT OF WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR IN
AMERICAN STRATEGY, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE AND CHACE PROFESSOR OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BARD COLLEGE
Mr. Mead. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed,
distinguished members of the----
Chairman McCain: Could I just say, all of the testimony
that is submitted will be part of the record. The written
testimony.
Thank you----
Mr. Mead. Great.
Chairman McCain. Professor.
Mr. Mead. Thank you.
I'm honored to have the opportunity to speak this morning.
I cannot speak with any particular acuity about issues of
verification or nuclear engineering. That's not my approach to
this. I'm interested in this agreement as part of the broader
framework of American Middle East policy. So, I will speak
briefly about our interests in the Middle East, the issues that
we have with Iran based on those issues, and then the
implications of that for this agreement.
United States has long had strong interests in the Middle
East. I want to talk primarily about our interests in oil.
There are some who believe that the fracking revolution,
unconventional shale and oil here in the United States which
lessens our energy dependency on the Middle East, will
therefore lessen American interests in the Middle East. I'd
like to suggest that's probably not correct, because the flow--
orderly flow--secure flow of oil from the Middle East to the
major economic and industrial zones of the world is vital to
their prosperity. If that oil supply were to be interrupted to
Japan, China, and Europe, the American economy would rapidly
suffer devastating consequences. This also--the fact that the
United States is able to provide the security of the
international oil flow is, to use the Chairman's phrase this
morning, you know, an important aspect of our suppression of
security competition, not simply in the Middle East, but by
ensuring that countries like China, Japan, and others don't
feel the need to maintain massive naval and intercontinental
forces to secure the oil supply. So, this--our position in the
Middle East is critical to America's global strategy of trying
to preserve peace and promote prosperity. America's own
lessening dependence on that oil does not change that
dependency.
Given that, how do we think about our interests in the
Middle East and our security there? We have, since, really, the
Franklin Roosevelt administration, taken the view, as a
country, that we do not want any single power to have the
ability to interrupt or to endanger that flow of oil, whether
it was an external power, like the Soviet Union seeking to
dominate the region from outside, or an internal leader, like
Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait, attempting to impose
something like that kind of control. We have always sought to
make sure that no single power can hold the world and us to
that kind of blackmail.
Today, it is--it's the reality that, essentially, the only
power that is capable of posing a danger of that kind would be
Iran, Islamic Republic of Iran, as the strongest regional
power, and one which, over a number of years, has been
demonstrating a determination, at great cost and risk, to
expand its regional footprint. So, when we think about this
nuclear agreement with Iran, or, indeed, any agreement that the
United States and Iran would make, we need to think about, How
does this agreement play into that situation?
One should also note that an additional threat that we face
in the Middle East today, the rise of radical groups intent on
an ideology of jihad, whether regionally or globally, that
this, to some degree, is being exacerbated by the rise of Iran.
The radical groups, like ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria] and al-Qaeda, are deriving a great deal of legitimacy,
funding, and recruiting strength from the sense, in the Sunni
world in particular, that there's a religious conflict going on
between the Sunni version of Islam, the Shiite version of
Islam, and Iran as the captain of Team Shiite, so to speak, has
been winning. This is creating a sense of fear, even
desperation, that makes fanatical forms of ideology and very
radical organizations attractive, not only to young men who are
looking for something to do with their lives, but even to
wealthy people in the Gulf and others who may be increasingly
persuaded to fund them.
I won't test the patience of the committee by delving too
deeply into these issues, but it is, I think, worth noting
that, whatever else it may do, the JCPOA has the effect of
strengthening Iran's position in the region at a point when
other powers in the region. Indeed, many American officials
believe that the greatest danger to the region is an imbalance
of power that favors Iran. Simply by removing sanctions, by
ending Iran's diplomatic isolation, increasing its resources,
not merely with the sort of tranche of money that comes from
unfreezing of frozen assets, but by accelerating Iran's
economic growth over a period of time so that it has more
resources for various activities, simply geopolitically, leave
aside the question of whether or not it's a good or bad deal on
the nuclear issue--simply geopolitically and regionally, this
deal represents a very important success for Iran. It increases
Iran's capacities at a time when concern over those capacities
is very high.
That means that we need to be thinking, as a country, What
is our policy? What do we do about this? Certainly some of
Secretary Kerry's recent diplomacy in the Gulf and elsewhere
has been about trying to reassure countries who feel threatened
by both the rise of Iran and the boost that it's likely to
receive from this agreement. It's commendable that he's seeking
to reassure these countries, but what we should all understand
is that their need to be reassured is not out of some sort of
case of nerves; they are actually accurately reading the
regional impact of this agreement.
So, we actually now come down, I think, as a country--we
have to think, What are our--what policy will we adopt? Is
this--regionally speaking--is this nuclear agreement the first
step in a rapprochement with Iran so that, now having resolved
the nuclear issue, we try to reach ever-closer cooperation with
Iran on a wider range of issues? If that's the case, again, I
would suggest that the regional unrest will grow, and the alarm
of other countries who would fear that the United States and
Iran, over their heads, are remaking the region in a way that
they don't like--we can expect greater instability in response
to that. Or, having taken the nuclear issue off the table, as
proponents of the deal suggest we're doing, does this then free
us up for a much more vigorous policy of containing Iran in the
region--in particular, in Syria, which, for a number of
reasons, is the most important focus, I think, of regional
politics today in that part of the world? Are we going--you
know, are we, for example, going to say, ``Well, we can't
really take a strong line against Assad, Iran's client, in
Syria, because otherwise Iran might walk away from the nuclear
agreement.'' If that's our thinking, then, in a sense, we have
contained and constrained ourselves. Or do we say, ``All right,
now that we have this agreement, we need to work much harder on
containing Iran's ambitions and ensuring the balance of power
in the Gulf''?
So, I would just suggest to you, as Senators who are
working to make up your minds and inform your colleagues about
whether or not this agreement with Iran should receive
Congressional support and ratification, that you should not
simply look at the nuclear dimensions of the deal, though
obviously they are vitally important, but you must also
consider this agreement, like any agreement between nations, as
a step in a regional and geopolitical policy, and think
through, Is this agreement leaving the United States in a
stronger or a weaker position? Also, What assurances are you
getting from the administration about the regional policies
that it intends to follow this agreement with? Are we moving
toward containment, or are we moving to engagement, are we
moving in some other direction? I, myself, sense a lack of
clarity about this sometimes in Washington. I hope, Senators,
that you will be able to get us a clear answer as to where
we're going.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Walter Russell Mead follows:]
Prepared Statement of Walter Russell Mead
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee:
It's a great honor to be invited to testify before this august
committee and its distinguished members. That is especially true at a
moment like this, when the Committee is called on to advise the Senate
on a matter of great national importance. I am not presumptuous enough
to tell the members of this committee how to vote on the JCPOA; to make
that decision you must look at many factors. My testimony does not
concern the technical specifications of the agreement, the strength of
the inspections regime, or the verifiability of key provisions. My job
is to offer the Committee some thoughts about the impact of the
agreement on regional politics and to present some concerns that can
inform your thinking as you proceed.
Mr. Chairman, no agreement stands alone. Ultimately, the JCPOA will
be not be judged as a standalone agreement; it will be judged as part
of a policy aimed at securing American interests in a vital region at
the lowest feasible risk and cost. It would be a mistake to think of
this agreement simply in the context of nuclear weapons. It also needs
to be examined in the light of important non-nuclear policy issues in a
region of vital importance to the United States. At a time when the
Middle East is in its most volatile, unsettled state in a century, and
when a sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims is
spreading, this agreement affects the balance of power, relations with
our existing allies and perceptions of America's role in the sectarian
conflict. To reach an appropriate decision about this agreement, Mr.
Chairman, the United States Senate needs to consider the agreement's
likely impact on important American interests and relationships across
the Middle East, and to a lesser extent, elsewhere.
To assist your analysis I will cover three topics this morning,
reviewing the key interests of the United States in the region, the
current situation in the region, and the likely impact of the JCPOA on
those interests. I will conclude by offering some suggestions to the
Committee about the questions you should be asking as you continue to
review this matter with your colleagues, with scholars and
practitioners in the field and with officials in the executive branch.
When asked to identify America's principal interests in the Middle
East, most people will agree with President Obama's summary: oil and
the security of Israel \1\. Israel is a valuable American ally and
partner, an outpost of democracy, and, as the national state of the
Jewish people, both a refuge from persecution and a shining example of
what a free people can accomplish. With roots that date back to the
19th century and even earlier, the bipartisan American commitment to
the establishment of a secure homeland for the Jewish people is one of
the oldest and most durable elements of our foreign policy. Every
president since Woodrow Wilson endorsed this position, and ever since
the Lodge-Fish joint resolution of 1922 endorsed the Balfour
Declaration, bipartisan majorities in both Houses of the United States
Congress have been steadfast in their support.
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\1\ http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120847.
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Oil has played a role in American policy for almost as long. Access
to Middle Eastern oil was an important military concern during and
after World War Two, and the success of the Marshall Plan depended in
part on increased Middle Eastern production in the early years of the
Cold War. In recent decades, growing American demand for oil made the
United States itself at least partially dependent on imported oil from
the Middle East. The revolution in shale oil and gas has changed that
picture, and many experts now believe that North America as a whole
will be an energy exporting region for the foreseeable future.
Some have argued that energy independence will relegate Middle
Eastern oil to a second tier of American interests and that an energy
independent America will be less concerned about the security and
stability of the Middle East. Perhaps unfortunately, this is not the
case. If the Middle East is no longer necessary for America's own
energy needs, oil from this region remains vital to our friends, allies
and economic partners around the world. If war in the Middle East, or
the actions of a powerful regional hegemon seeking to blackmail the
world should cut the flow of oil from the Middle East to Europe, India,
China and/or Japan, the economic consequences to the United States
would be enormous. American manufacturing companies operate globally
and their overseas operations and supply chains would be serious
affected by a disruption in energy supplies. The profits of American
corporations depend on a healthy global economy; these companies would
see their sales and profits drop as the consequences of the oil supply
disruption rippled across the world. Stock markets globally would be
severely affected, including in the United States. Worst of all, the
world's interdependent financial system would suffer severe shocks, and
the health and solvency of American banks would come under severe
pressure.
The United States may not be dependent on the Middle East for our
domestic energy supply, but the American economy remains profoundly and
permanently entangled in the global economy. Prosperity will not endure
here if the global economy suffers massive disruption, and
interruptions or severe constrictions in the flow of oil and gas from
the Middle East will remain capable of causing this kind of
unacceptable disruption for the foreseeable future.
Some might argue that, given the importance of Middle Eastern oil
to the rest of the world, the United States could reduce our
involvement in the Middle East with the assurance that other countries
would step in to fill the vacuum. Why, some ask, should the United
States assume the costs and risks of ensuring the flow of oil to other
rich and powerful states around the world?
The answers to this question go to the heart of American grand
strategy for the last 100 years. As the bloodshed and destruction of
warfare has increased, Americans have sought above all else to prevent
wars between great powers from breaking out. While all war is
destructive and horrifying, wars in which great powers, with their
enormous technological and economic capabilities, turn their full
strength against one another, have the potential to destroy
civilization or human life itself. To make such wars less likely, the
United States has worked to create an interdependent global system in
which all countries depend so heavily on global flows of trade and
investment that no country can contemplate cutting itself off from this
system through starting wars. At the same time, the United States has
worked to ensure the safe and secure passage of commerce across the
world's oceans, taking questions like energy out of the realm of
geopolitical competition.
In the Middle East, these policies have meant that since World War
Two the United States has acted to prevent any power or combination of
powers either inside or outside the region from gaining the ability to
blackmail the world by threatening to interrupt the flow of oil to the
great markets of Asia and Europe. Whether the danger came from external
powers like the Soviet Union (which occupied part of Iran and
threatened Turkey in the early years of the Cold War) or from ambitious
leaders within the region (like Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait),
the United States has acted to ensure the security and political
independence of the oil producing states of the region.
These policies have helped create the longest era of great power
peace in modern times. They have also reduced the cost of America's
military commitments. Because other countries do not feel the need to
maintain large forces with an intercontinental capacity to protect
their global trade, the United States has been able to maintain a
global presence at a far lower cost than would be feasible if the
world's major economic powers were engaged in competitive military
build ups. A strong American presence in the Middle East and on the
high seas has the effect of suppressing security competition worldwide,
enabling America's most important interests to be secured with much
less cost than would otherwise be possible.
Should the United States withdraw from this role, the world would
likely see increased competition among other powers. China, for
example, would see a greater need to protect its oil security,
accelerating the build up of its armed forces. Japan and India would
both likely see this build up as a threat to their own energy and
maritime security and would accelerate build ups of their own. Trust
among these powers, already weak, would erode, and the dynamics of a
zero-sum competition for security and access to resources would drive
them towards greater hostility and more dangerous policies. Under those
circumstances, American prosperity and security would be much harder to
defend than they are now, and the risks of great power conflict would
intensify. America's Middle East policy is not just about the Middle
East; it is about America's global interest in a peaceful and
prosperous world.
The starting point for any American strategy in the Middle East
today must be the basic approach that has served us well since the
presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. America's vital interests require us
to look to the safety and the security of the Middle Eastern oil
producing states, ensuring that no power, either external or regional,
gains the power to interfere with the smooth and stable supply of oil
and gas to the great economic and industrial centers of the world.
As we look at the region today, these vital American interests are
not as well secured as one would wish. Today's Middle East is
threatened by conflicts that could lead to immense humanitarian
disasters against which the horror of the Libyan and Syrian civil
conflicts would appear small scale. Whether considered from the
humanitarian standpoint or from the perspective of vital American
interests, the dangers facing us in the Middle East today are immense,
and it is against this background that the value of the JCPOA or indeed
of any major policy step involving the region needs to be understood.
One danger is presented by the rise of Iran and the consequences of
its efforts to increase its power in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond.
Iran is the one country at the moment that appears to believe that it
has both the capacity and the will to establish a hegemonic position in
the region. Iran could challenge vital American interests in two ways.
It could come close to success in this regional strategy, presenting
the United States with the choice of accepting Iranian hegemony or
engaging in conflict. Alternatively, an Iranian bid for control, while
ultimately falling short, could create such chaos and upheaval in the
region that normal governance would break down and some oil exporting
countries could be paralyzed by international or civil conflict.
Another danger comes from the surge in fanaticism among some Sunni
groups, in part because of the fear inspired by what many see as an
Iranian-backed surge of Shiite power across the region. Under the wrong
circumstances fanatical movements like ISIS could either conquer or
make ungovernable wide stretches of the Middle East, including
important oil producing provinces and countries. The successful
establishment of a `caliphate' or some other form of radical and
revolutionary governance across strategically important areas could
present the United States with the choice between military intervention
or accepting the establishment of a hegemonic regional power. Short of
that, insurrections or guerilla conflicts involving fanatical groups
could destabilize key countries. Additionally, groups based in
territory controlled by these forces and accessing financial and other
resources under their control could plan and carry out major attacks
against western targets as al-Qaeda did from Taliban controlled
territory in 2001.
Beyond the danger of Sunni radicalism, there is the danger that the
sectarian conflict between Sunni radicals and Shiite radicals aligned
with Iran now taking shape would so seriously destabilize the region
and important countries in it that the oil supply could not be secured.
In this scenario, even if neither side in the sectarian war achieved
anything like dominance, the social upheavals, economic distress and
surge in violence and hate fueled by an escalating religious conflict
could lead to conditions in which the oil industry could no longer
function in a stable and orderly way.
the jcpoa and the regional crisis
In evaluating the JCPOA, the Senate needs to apply two tests. The
first, which is where most of the attention so far has been
concentrated, is the question of whether the agreement offers a path to
resolve the question of Iran's drive for nuclear weapons. The second
test is of equal importance when it comes to determining the prudence
and desirability of Congressional support for the existing agreement.
That second question is whether the JCPOA will advance or hinder
America's vital interests in the region other than our interest in
preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran. Does the JCPOA make it more
or less likely that any of the three dangers referenced above--of an
Iranian drive for hegemony, of a similar movement by fanatical Sunni-
based groups, or of an intensifying and escalating sectarian war that
destabilizes the region--will come to pass?
For the JCPOA to serve the American interest in the Middle East it
needs to pass both tests; the agreement must block Iran's path to
nuclear weapons, and it must help (or at the very least, not hinder)
America's broader regional agenda. My purpose in appearing before the
Committee today, Mr. Chairman, is to offer some suggestions about how
the Members of this Committee and their colleagues in the Senate can
determine whether the JCPOA advances, hinders or leaves unchanged
America's pursuit of its vital interests in a combustible region at a
critical time.
This is a complex problem; the question of the effects of the JCPOA
on Iran's nuclear program is more technical than political, depending
more on the nature of the limits and the verification protocols, though
questions remain about whether the United States and the other
signatories will have the political will to enforce it. The effect of
the JCPOA on the regional situation depends much more on perception and
policy. How will Iran, our allies and other forces in the region view
the agreement? How does the agreement weaken or strengthen Iran on the
ground? What policies will the United States and Iran pursue in the
region and toward each other should the agreement come into full force?
One thing seems clear: if the JCPOA fails to contain Iran's nuclear
program, and Iran gets a nuclear weapon, the agreement will be a
disaster in regional politics as well. Iran's drive toward regional
hegemony will receive a powerful boost, the strength of fanatical
movements in the Sunni world will be boosted by a sense of apocalyptic
fear and rage, and the sectarian conflict will intensify in ways that
are both unpredictable and, probably, very dangerous for American
interests.
But what if the JCPOA is successful on the nuclear front, even
temporarily, and is seen to have stopped or slowed Iran's drive for the
bomb? Or, perhaps more probably, suppose there is a period of time in
which the success or failure of the JCPOA on the nuclear issue is
unclear? During this uncertain interval, one that could last for some
time, how will the JCPOA affect the regional balance of forces?
Here, the news is bad. Whatever the JCPOA does in terms of the
nuclear program, when it comes to the conventional balance in the
region the JCPOA appears to strengthen Iran. The end of sanctions does
not just result in a ``windfall'' gain to Iran as frozen assets are
released; it also adds substantial and growing amounts to Iran's
national income as normal trade relations resume, as Iranian oil
production expands, and as access to markets for new technology and
spare parts increases the productivity of Iranian society. In the short
term this means that Iran will have more money with which to support
regional allies like the Assad regime in Damascus; in the medium term
as conventional weapons restrictions are lifted Iran will have the
opportunity to strengthen both defensive and offensive arms
capabilities; in the medium to long term Iran's greater economic clout
will substantially increase its political weight both in the region and
in world affairs, giving it new allies and making a return to sanctions
and isolation increasingly unlikely.
These worries loom larger because Iran, under sanctions and
suffering serious economic privation, has nevertheless been able to
operate effectively in regional politics, scoring gains against Sunni
adversaries that have seriously alarmed some of its neighbors. If an
isolated and economically challenged Iran could achieve such results,
one must ask what it can achieve under the more favorable conditions
that will follow the implementation of the JCPOA.
It is worth noting in this context that many of Iran's neighbors do
not share the Obama Administration's view that the greatest danger from
Iran flows from its nuclear program. Rather, the fear is that Iran's
large population, sectarian fervor and powerful security institutions
make it potentially the most powerful state in the region and a threat
to the security of its neighbors. For many Saudis in particular, whose
close ties to Pakistan's security establishment give them confidence
that an Iranian nuclear weapon could be offset by the existence of the
Pakistani arsenal, the nuclear program in Iran is much less threatening
than Iran's apparent ability and willingness to support militias,
rebels and Iran-aligned governments across the region.
Although Gulf governments have issued pro forma statements in
support of the JCPOA, their fear and distrust of Iran, and their lack
of comfort with American regional policy have led to dramatic shifts in
their policy as they seek to offset the perceived negative consequences
of the JCPOA on the regional balance. The most spectacular (and
alarming) changes have been seen in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia.
The Kingdom has departed from a long history of quiet and cautious
policy and initiated a series of high risk, high profile steps that
testify to a deep sense of distress and unease with American policy and
its consequences for the regional balance.
The inevitable increase in Iranian conventional resources and
capabilities that follows the JCPOA can damage American interests in
three ways. First, if Iran devotes even some of its gains from the
agreements to its regional allies and hegemonic goals, it could create
a major crisis in the region that would require massive American
intervention to avoid the danger of having one country dominate the oil
wealth of the entire Gulf. Some countries would be endangered directly
by subversion or conflict; others, increasingly surrounded by Iranian
clients and allies, would feel the need to align their foreign policy
and their oil production and pricing strategies with Iran. The United
States could be faced with a triumphalist Iranian regime that would be
able to manipulate world oil prices and supplies. It would be extremely
difficult for future presidents to create effective coalitions to limit
or balance Iran under these circumstances.
Second, fear of Iran can drive American allies and other actors in
the region to actions that destabilize the region or run counter to
American interests. Concerns about potential proliferation among other
regional countries who want to balance the Iranian nuclear program are
one example of the potential `blowback' from the JCPOA. But there are
others. Saudi Arabia and other oil producing Gulf states could for
example `circle the wagons' among Sunni states, tightening their links
with military and intelligence services in countries like Egypt and
Pakistan in ways that undercut important American goals. Many Gulf
countries will see the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear capacity and
growth in the quality and quantity of its arsenal of delivery systems
as an important deterrent and counter to Iran. This could only
intensify the arms race in South Asia and increase the chances of
conflict between India and Pakistan. It will also likely lead to more
resources and power going to figures in the military and nuclear
establishment who share radical ideologies uncomfortably close to those
of al-Qaeda and other dangerous groups. Bringing Pakistan more fully
into Middle East politics would be a natural and obvious move for oil
rich Sunni states alarmed by a rising Iran.
More broadly, fear of a rising Iran increases the incentives for
rich individuals and states to deepen their links with fanatical
organizations and fighters. Fanatical anti-Shiite fighters may, from an
American standpoint, be terrorists who are as anti-western as they are
anti-Iran. If Iran's regional power is seen as rising, however, many in
the Sunni world will be tempted to support these organizations as
indispensible allies in the fight against Iran.
Finally, the perception, plausible to some however incorrect, that
Iran now has tacit American support in its quest for regional hegemony
will act as a powerful recruiting incentive for radical pro-Sunni
jihadi groups throughout the Sunni world. Sectarian conflicts feed on
apocalyptic fears; the perception that Shiite `heretics' are
threatening the Islamic heartland and holy cities in the Arabian
Peninsula will make it significantly easier for radicals to recruit new
fighters--and to raise the money to employ, train and arm them.
evaluating jcpoa
Elected officials charged with determining whether JCPOA
strengthens or weakens the American position will need to balance a
number of factors in determining whether or not the agreement merits
Congressional support. This must necessarily be a judgment call;
officials will have to weigh probabilities and balance the strengths
and weaknesses of the agreement. For example, if the agreement is found
to have a very strong ability to stop the progress of Iran's nuclear
program, those gains might be worth some regional difficulties. On the
other hand, it is quite possible that the regional consequences of the
agreement would be so severe that even a relatively effective nuclear
agreement could be a net negative for American interests in the region.
Judgments about the regional impact of the JCPOA must take one
other factor into account: Administration policy in the region could
substantially limit or seriously exacerbate the impact of the agreement
on the regional situation. To reach useful conclusions on the likely
consequences of this agreement, Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues
will need to consult with the Administration to determine as far as
possible what the future course of American policy toward the Middle
East and Iran will be.
There are two possible courses the United States can take. One
would be to see the JCPOA as the first step in a policy of
accommodating Iran looking to detente or an even closer relationship.
Alternatively, the JCPOA could be seen as an effort to facilitate a
tougher policy of regional containment by taking the dangers of nuclear
proliferation off the table. Much depends on which course the
Administration chooses.
A policy of accommodation will maximize `blowback' from the JCPOA,
throwing the region and America's key alliances into deep disarray. The
more credible the perception is that the United States is prepared to
accept and perhaps facilitate a large regional role for Iran, the more
the United States will be seen as having taken the anti-Sunni side in a
widening sectarian war. Gulf states who have long considered the United
States a reliable protector will see American policy as a threat to
their security and will explore new policy options with potentially
very dangerous consequences for stability and American interests. The
gap between radical and fanatical fighting groups and militias on the
one hand and governing elites in the Sunni world will compress;
alignments that are unthinkable today could become quite likely if key
Sunni states come to believe that the United States has chosen Iran and
the Shiite in the sectarian war. Such a course of action is also more
likely to empower hardliners in Iran, as they will be able to make a
plausible case that Iran has a historic opportunity to vault into the
ranks of leading global powers by consolidating its power in the
critical Gulf area.
American allies in the Middle East are well aware of this dynamic.
This is why they have been seeking more arms and stronger political
commitments from the United States as they brace for the impact of a
stronger and richer Iran in the wake of this agreement. Fueling a
conventional arms race in the region and making additional commitments
to protect threatened states are among the consequences of this
agreement; the Congress should take care to inform itself about the
nature of these new commitments and engagements that the JCPOA has made
necessary.
A robust policy of regional containment combined with other
pressures on Iran could significantly reduce the negative consequences
of the agreement on American interests. This would almost certainly
involve a much more active American role in Syria, where the struggle
between a variety of Sunni groups and the Iran-aligned Assad regime has
transfixed the region and led to the worst and most dangerous outbreak
of Middle Eastern violence since the Iran-Iraq War. For many countries
in the region, including close historical allies of the United States,
a strong American military commitment to the overthrow of the Assad
government would serve as an acid test for American seriousness against
Iran. Certainly any line of American policy that fails to lead to the
emergence of a Syrian government in Damascus that satisfies Sunni
opinion will be seen throughout the region as ratifying Iran's regional
dominance.
A similar logic applies to Iraq. If American aid to anti-ISIS
forces in Iraq goes primarily to Shiite militias and regime forces seen
as aligned with Iran, many Sunnis in Iraq and beyond will conclude that
the United States is pro-Iran and anti-Sunni. The JCPOA increases the
pressure on the United States to deepen its involvement in Iraq even as
it makes the politics of that involvement more complex.
Many of those supporting the JCPOA argue that the alternative to
the agreement is an American war with Iran. Ironically, in order to
balance the regional consequences of the agreement, the United States
may well need to assume an increased risk of war in Syria and other
frontline states.
One of the reasons that the period leading up to the JCPOA has been
so volatile in the Middle East is that many regional observers have
concluded that American policy in the region is based on an American
acceptance of Iranian hegemony on the ground. For the conspiracy
minded, and their number is legion, this goes back to the Bush
administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and then to turn the
country over to its Shiite majority. From an American point of view,
whatever one thought of the war itself, the establishment of majority
rule represented the triumph of our beliefs in democracy; many in the
Middle East viewed it as a deliberate choice by the United States to
promote Iran and to check Sunni power. Suspicion intensified when the
United States then, despite talk about `red lines' and statements that
Assad `must go' remained inactive in Syria as casualties and the
refugee toll mounted. Where the majority is Shiite, many said, the
United States supports majority rule. Where the majority is Sunni, the
United States does nothing.
That perception has become destabilizing in a region where
escalating sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiite increasingly
dominates the agenda; endorsing the JCPOA without also making major
changes in American regional policy would confirm that perception and
further drive the region in the direction of radical polarization,
religious war, and transnational conflict.
conclusion
As the Congress deliberates over whether or not to endorse the
JCPOA, it must pay close attention to the entire mix of American
policies in the region of which the JCPOA will be one part. The JCPOA
on its own strengthens Iran's hand in the region by reducing its
isolation and adding significantly to its economic resources. Unless
this effect is offset by a much more robust policy of containing Iran,
centered on a focused drive for regime change in Damascus, the JCPOA
will make the Middle East as a whole less secure, and increase the
prospect that the United States will be forced to choose between war
and strategic setbacks that gravely undermine America's global strategy
and our peace and prosperity at home.
Chairman McCain. I certainly hope so.
Mr. Singh.
Thank you, Dr. Professor Mead.
Mr. Singh.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, LANE-SWIG SENIOR FELLOW AND
MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST
POLICY
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
members of the committee.
The nuclear agreement with Iran contains strong points and
weak points. My judgment, however, is that it leaves Iran with
a significant nuclear weapons capability. Indeed, it allows
Iran, I think, to improve that capability over the life of the
deal while obtaining broad upfront sanctions relief.
I believe this has been Iran's twofold objective throughout
the talks. It has escaped, rather than had to confront, a
strategic choice between retaining its nuclear weapons option,
on the one hand, and diplomatic and economic rehabilitation, on
the other. I detail the nuclear aspects of the agreement in my
written testimony, and I'm not going to dwell on those now.
This is relevant to the topic at hand because Iran's
nuclear ambitions are not separate from, but are part and
parcel of, its regional strategy, which emphasizes, as
Professor Mead was talking about, projecting Iranian power
while creating an inhospitable environment for the United
States and our allies. Iran doesn't accomplish this through
conventional military power, in which its lacking, but through
asymmetric capabilities, such as proxies, arms trafficking,
sea-denial tactics, cyber activities, and missiles. There's
nothing in the accord that requires or even incentivizes Iran
to alter these policies. Indeed, I'd say the deal seems more
likely to facilitate Iran's regional strategy. Iran will have
additional resources, should it wish to help financially
squeeze proxies, like Hezbollah--and I think we saw, in the
Wall Street Journal this morning, a story that the Houthis in
Yemen are also feeling a financial squeeze--to ensure that its
militias in Iraq can outmatch the official security services
there, as they do in Lebanon, and to buy political influence in
places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
With the removal of the ban on the export of arms by Iran,
and the lifting of the sanctions on the import of arms to Iran
in no more than 5 years, Iran will face fewer impediments to
arming its proxies. We do have other authorities, both U.N.
[United Nations] and U.S. authorities, to address such activity
in some circumstances, but those have been little used, and I'd
say they are weakened rather than strengthened by this accord.
Secretary Kerry, in a recent interview, he acknowledged that
we're not doing much interdiction, but he said we would double
down in the wake of the deal. I'm afraid that, for folks in the
region, that doesn't really carry credibility.
Such actions by Iran are likely going to spur a reaction by
United States allies in the region who consider Iran their
chief rival. They may act more aggressively and autonomously to
counter Iranian policies--proxies, rather. This is a dynamic
we're obviously already seeing in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and
elsewhere. They may choose to pursue nuclear capabilities of
their own to supplement that.
As Professor Mead said, increased Iranian intervention, I
think, would also feed already rampant sectarian polarization
in the region, because that interventionism by Iran fuels
support and recruitment for the likes of ISIS, and it worries
the Sunnis in the region.
Beyond the Middle East, if we extend this further, Iran is
likely to bolster its ties, I think, with Russia and China, who
share with Iran an interest in challenging the United States-
led international order. That cooperation is likely to be not
just diplomatic and economic in nature, but also military.
Moscow and Beijing are Iran's largest suppliers of arms. Russia
is likely not just to provide Iran with nonsanctioned systems,
such as the S-300 or even a more advanced air-defense system,
but also to come immediately to the Security Council to request
exemptions for other types of arms exports to Iran. It'll be
up, frankly, to the United States to stand against those
requests. Will we do so in every circumstance remains to be
seen.
Russia and China will also be able to assist Iran's
ballistic missile program when sanctions are lifted in 8 years.
This is particularly important, I think, for Iran's pursuit of
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], because that would
benefit enormously from foreign assistance, given the limited
pool of knowledge on this particular topic.
A particular challenge, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, to
United States interests in the region is Iran's pursuit of a
rudimentary, for now, anti-access area denial strategy in the
Gulf. The region is well suited to such a strategy, because of
its narrow confines, its highly concentrated population
centers, and its target-rich environment, when it comes to,
say, vulnerable energy infrastructure. It's undoubtedly an
area--A2/AD [anti-access area denial]--where Chinese assistance
would be invaluable, since we see Beijing pursuing its own A2/
AD capabilities in the western Pacific on a much larger scale.
One defense analyst from CSBA has suggested that Iran could
enhance its A2/AD strategy with select high-end technology,
such as missiles--enhanced missiles, and expanded low-end
investment in sea mines, fast attack craft, and the well-armed
proxies that it currently fields.
Some of these regional effects that I'm talking about
would, of course, result from any nuclear deal not preceded by
an Iranian strategic shift. That's why it's so important to
ensure that the benefits of such a deal outweigh these costs.
As it is, I think we're going to need to invest significant
resources to offset the downsides of the accord. These will
include increased resources for the intel community and the
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to monitor Iran, to
monitor Iranian compliance. We'll need to repair relations with
our regional allies, like Israel and the Gulf states, and
increase assistance to those allies. I think we're going to
need to review our military posture to ensure we're positioned
to counter Iranian A2/AD efforts, which I believe has to be
done in the context of an overall increase in defense resources
if it's going to be seen as credible by our adversaries. I
think we'll need more proactive policies to counter Iranian
activities in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere.
I do worry, as Professor Mead said, that we'll be self-
deterred from responding to violations of this accord. You--we
see this dynamic with the INF Treaty [Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty] and Russia. We've seen this dynamic with
Syria and the Chemical Weapons Accord. There was a very good
article about Syria on--in the Wall Street Journal, a couple of
weeks ago, that delved into this very topic. I think that we're
going to need to be careful, in the wake of the deal, to avoid
incrementally shifting our own policies in a misguided effort
either to bolster Rouhani and pragmatists in Iran against a
hardline backlash there, or to demonstrate the transformative
effects of the deal. We should disincentivize Iran's
destabilizing behavior, incentivize more constructive policies.
But, the strategic shift should be Iran's, not ours.
It seems to me the bottom line is that we've negotiated a
weak agreement and painted ourselves into a diplomatic corner.
I agree with you, though, Mr. Chairman, that the alternative to
the deal is not war, but, rather, a mess with our allies, some
very important allies.
In the longer run, though, I'd argue that the real question
is not whether we're going to need an alternative policy, or
whether we need an alternative policy, but when. Even in the
best-case scenario, the limits the deal imposes on Iran are
narrow limits, and even those will start phasing out in 5 to 15
years. If the deal works as intended, the agreement will buy
time for us, but it also buys time for Iran. Iran's going to
use that to advantage.
Thanks very much.
[The prepared statement of Michael Singh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Singh
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the nuclear agreement with Iran and its implications for the United
States and the Middle East.
america's objectives and iran's
When we analyze foreign policy, the first question should be what
interest or objective is served by a particular policy. A good policy
should clearly advance U.S. interests and should complement rather than
clash with our larger strategy, unless the policy in question heralds
an entirely new strategy that can be clearly articulated and
implemented. A prudent, conservative foreign policy should clearly
deliver benefits that outweigh its costs or, by incurring certain
costs, forestall an even greater projected cost.
The objective in this case is not--and has never been--simply to
conclude a nuclear agreement with Iran. A deal is a means toward an
end, not an end in itself. The intended end in this case is to prevent
Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon, in order to safeguard our
interests in the Middle East and beyond, which would be clearly
threatened by such a development. While this objective has long enjoyed
consensus bipartisan support, the question that has divided
policymakers--acutely in recent years--is how to accomplish it when
faced with an Iranian leadership apparently willing to entertain great
cost and risk to expand Iran's nuclear weapons capability.
At the outset of the recently concluded diplomacy--the P5+1 process
devised in 2005--the United States strategy was to persuade Iranian
leaders to embark on a broad ``strategic shift,'' recognizing that the
costs of their regional strategy outweighed the benefits. The logic of
this approach was that Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions were not
separate from but an integral part of a larger security strategy, and
only a strategic shift would sustainably end those ambitions.
Absent such a strategic shift, the sensible stance was to insist on
the suspension of Iran's nuclear efforts and dismantlement of its
nuclear infrastructure. Even if Iran retained the desire for nuclear
weapons, it would be denied the means to develop them, and a ban on
nuclear fuel cycle and related activities would be less challenging to
police than limitations on the same activities would be. Such an
approach would also offer an appealing symmetry--the dismantling of
Iran's nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure and related activities in
exchange for the dismantling of sanctions.
Absent such dismantling, the most sensible approach would have been
to deny Iran at least those elements of its nuclear program most
essential to retaining the option to build a nuclear weapon in the
future--to deny it a nuclear weapons capability, practically speaking.
Yet retaining that option appears to have been a key Iranian objective
in these negotiations.
Iran's negotiating positions over the past decade-plus of nuclear
talks suggest a twofold objective: securing the removal of sanctions
while retaining a nuclear weapons capability. While Iran has throughout
the negotiations proven willing to brook temporary limitations on
certain nuclear activities, it has steadfastly refused to consider
steps--for example, forgoing advanced enrichment R&D, providing access
to suspected weaponization sites and scientists, or accepting
limitations on missile activities or permanent constraints of any
kind--that would foreclose the future development of a nuclear weapon.
Indeed, Iran's behavior makes little sense absent a desire for
nuclear weapons. It can obtain reactor fuel from abroad, as do most
countries that utilize nuclear energy. Furthermore, an indigenous fuel
cycle is marginal to Iran's energy security, given its rich endowment
of fossil fuels. Rather, it is Iran's secret pursuit of that fuel cycle
and other nuclear weapons-applicable technology that has proven a
greater threat to its energy security in the form of sanctions on its
hydrocarbon, financial, and other sectors.
assessing the nuclear accord
It is instructive to assess the extent to which the agreement
advances the United States and Iranian objectives described above.
Nuclear weapons development requires three lines of action--fuel
fabrication, weaponization, and development of a delivery vehicle. It
also presumably requires secrecy, since being caught at the task would
entail risk of a military response.
When it comes to fuel fabrication, the nuclear agreement leaves
Iran in possession of a full nuclear supply chain from uranium mining
to enrichment, and also leaves in place the heavy water reactor at
Arak. These are subject to various temporary restrictions--Iran agrees
to cap the number and type of centrifuges installed, the level to which
it enriches, and the amount of low-enriched uranium it stockpiles, and
converts its heavy water reactor at Arak to avoid producing weapons-
grade plutonium. It also agrees not to build new enrichment, heavy
water, and reprocessing facilities.
Two points stand out as most concerning, however: Iran is permitted
to continue research and development on advanced centrifuges and to
begin deploying such centrifuges after just eight and a half years.
Because such centrifuges are designed to enrich uranium much more
efficiently than Iran's existing ``IR-1'' centrifuges, they are far
better suited to a covert weapons-development effort--far fewer of
them, operating for less time, would be required to produce weapons-
grade fuel. Second, the restrictions described above phase out ten to
fifteen years from now, meaning that at that time Iran would face few
technical impediments to reducing its breakout time substantially.
When it comes to weaponization, the agreement commits Iran not to
``engage in activities, including at the R&D level, which could
contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device.'' \1\ But
the question is how Iran's adherence to this commitment can be
verified, especially since such activities tend to be secretive by
their very nature. Indeed, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
reporting suggests that Iran has already engaged in various
``activities related to the development of a nuclear explosive
device,'' \2\ part of what the IAEA terms the ``possible military
dimensions'' (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, part C, para 16
\2\ IAEA GOV/2011/65
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many analysts have urged that Iran be required as part of any
agreement to disclose the extent of its past (and possibly ongoing)
weaponization and other clandestine nuclear efforts so that inspectors
understand what progress Iran made, and provide the IAEA with the
necessary access to ensure that such efforts are not resumed. The
agreement does not appear to meet these criteria. It does not specify
that inspectors must be given access to weapons-related sites and
personnel, or that full disclosure of past weaponization and other
clandestine nuclear work is required for the agreement's implementation
to proceed. Without such provisions, I do not believe we can have
confidence that Iran's work on nuclear weapons will not be resumed
(perhaps by elements of Iran's security apparatus, and perhaps even
without the knowledge of the civilian officials with whom inspectors
interact) or even that it has ceased.
In the area of delivery vehicles, the agreement contains no
limitations whatsoever as far as I can tell. Iran is not required to
limit its ballistic missile development and testing, nor does the list
of ``activities which could contribute to the design and development of
a nuclear explosive device'' from which Iran agrees to refrain in Annex
I of the agreement include any mention of missile reentry vehicles,
despite their inclusion in the IAEA's accounting of PMD. Indeed, the
binding ban on Iran ``undertak[ing] any activity related to ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches
using ballistic missile technology'' \3\ contained in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1929, is replaced with nonbinding, hortatory
language \4\ in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, op9
\4\ U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, Annex B, para 3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effect of this shift is that as of ``Implementation Day'' of
the nuclear accord, Iran will not be barred from conducting ballistic
missile launches or pursuing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, which
are an essential part of any modern nuclear weapons program. This
concern has even been voiced in the past by Russian officials. In 2008,
following a failed Iranian missile test, then-Deputy Foreign Minister
Aleksandr Losyukov said the test added ``to general suspicions of Iran
regarding its potential desire to build nuclear weapons.'' \5\ When
sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile program are lifted in eight
years, it will also be able to receive foreign assistance, which has
been described in the past by United States officials as essential to
its ability to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
While some United States secondary sanctions on missile cooperation
with Iran will remain in place, these are insufficiently robust to
deter Iran's likely partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 5 ``Iran: Russia Says New Rocket Raises Nuclear 'Suspicions,'''
Associated Press,
February 7, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taken together, these weaknesses suggest that the agreement will
permit Iran to retain the option to build a nuclear weapon in the
future. Indeed, the agreement could be seen as a means by which Iran
buys time to perfect, in some cases with international assistance, the
technologies--advanced centrifuges, weaponization, and long-range
ballistic missiles--required to build a nuclear weapon in the future.
In my view, this is not by accident--Iran's ``red lines'' seem to have
been designed to shape this outcome, implying again that Iran's purpose
in the talks has been to obtain sanctions relief while retaining or
even improving its nuclear weapons capability.
The strength of the agreement must instead rest, then, on our
ability to detect and deter any such weapons-development effort,
whether covert or overt. Unfortunately, the inspection mechanism in the
accord does not appear up to this task. While robust monitoring will be
in place at declared sites, the United States intelligence community
assessed in 2007 that Iran ``probably would use covert facilities--
rather than its declared nuclear sites--for the production of highly-
enriched uranium for a weapon.'' \6\ The agreement does not, however,
permit inspectors anything approaching unfettered access to suspect
sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather, after an indefinite back-and-forth with Iran regarding
suspicious activity, the IAEA could formally request access to a site,
which would initiate a deliberative process lasting as many as twenty-
four days. If, however, Iran continued to deny inspectors access at the
end of this period, the matter might not be resolved for another thirty
to sixty-five days--bringing the delay to fifty-four to eighty-nine
days--or even longer if any of these periods were extended by consensus
of a ``Joint Commission'' consisting of Iran, the EU, and the P5+1.
This is far too long a delay to permit inspectors to do their jobs
effectively.
Combined with Iran potentially not being required to disclose and
provide access to PMD-related sites, personnel, and documentation, and
a missile program that is not subject to inspection at all to my
knowledge, the result is an inspection regime that falls short of what
is necessary to detect covert nuclear activity. This inadequacy is
compounded by the fact that Iran's breakout time even at declared sites
could potentially diminish to near zero once the restrictions on its
enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities phase out in ten to
fifteen years, rendering it practically improbable to halt a breakout
attempt even with monitoring in place.
The inspection regime is further undermined by the agreement's
enforcement mechanism. The only remedy for noncompliance--whether the
refusal of access to inspectors by Iran or any other violation--is the
termination of the accord and the reimposition of previous U.N.
resolutions, in which case Iran has asserted that it would consider its
obligations under the agreement null and void. The implication is that
small violations of Iran's obligations are likely to go unpunished, and
access requests are likely to face a high bar, for fear of unraveling
the accord entirely--the IAEA may hesitate to make a formal access
request for fear of being party to the agreement's collapse, and the
other parties to the accord may hesitate to support the IAEA if they
do. Violations of Iran's other obligations may be explained away as
inadvertent, the work of rogue elements within Iran, or otherwise not
worth risking the entire accord over.
As is often the case with such agreements, the leverage will be
with the less risk-averse party. The United States has not, for
example, imposed any cost on Russia for its reported violation of the
INF Treaty, nor on Syria for apparently violating its commitment to
destroy its chemical weapons. Indeed, in both cases U.S. officials have
appeared loath even to acknowledge the violations. Iran has already
indicated its intention to test the inspection regime by asserting that
access to military sites will be refused as a rule. The absence of
``snap'' inspections will remove a psychological barrier to cheating
and further encourage such risk-taking. Even in the event sanctions
snap back, their initial effect is likely to be only psychological or
symbolic--their economic impact will take far more time to be felt,
much less to affect Iran's decisions.
Military force remains an option in extremis to enforce the
agreement. However, the military option may prove more difficult to
exercise in the future given the international legitimacy the accord
grants to Iran's nuclear activities, the international involvement in
those activities that it permits, any steps by Iran to further harden
its nuclear sites against attack, and the likely return of
international investment and commerce to Iran.
In sum, the nuclear agreement is best thought of as a form of
containment: Iran will retain its nuclear weapons capability, and the
United States and our allies will attempt to prevent it from being
used. But it is a containment policy in which we agree in advance to
gradually lower our defenses by phasing out the limitations on Iran's
nuclear activities by a date certain, and limit our own toolkit by
lifting sanctions nearly comprehensively up front. In past proposals,
the United States had made the easing of restrictions dependent on
Iran's own behavior. Under this accord, all Iran need do is bide its
time and the restrictions will be lifted regardless of its policies.
The incentive for Iran is therefore simply to wait: to avoid
significant overt nonperformance under the accord, but not to alter in
any fundamental way its nuclear ambitions or regional strategy.
broader implications of the nuclear agreement
The challenge to United States interests posed by Iran goes well
beyond its nuclear and missile program. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Martin Dempsey recently told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that the threats posed by Iran also included its support for
proxies, arms trafficking, sea-based mines, and cyber activities. These
and other Iranian activities threaten our interest in nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, freedom of navigation, and cybersecurity, and
directly challenge a United States regional strategy focused on
ensuring regional stability and bolstering the security of our allies.
President Obama has asserted that the agreement does not presume
any improvement in Iranian behavior on these fronts, though he has
expressed hope that Iran's behavior will in fact change as a result of
the deal. However, in the short term at least, Iran's behavior in the
region is more likely to worsen than improve.
Anti-Americanism is central to the ideology of the Iranian regime,
and Iranian leaders--having just reached a diplomatic compromise with
the United States--may feel the need to reaffirm its anti-American bona
fides. The agreement is also widely perceived as a victory for Iranian
pragmatists led by President Hassan Rouhani and was, according to
Secretary of State John Kerry, \7\ opposed by the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and other hardliners. Iran's Supreme Leader, widely
regarded as seeking to balance the regime's contentious factions, may
feel the need in the agreement's wake to give freer rein to those
hardliners to prevent one faction from becoming too powerful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Secretary of State John Kerry at the Council on Foreign
Relations, July 24, 2015
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Iranian regional behavior is not driven solely by United
States policy or this nuclear accord, but by events in the region
themselves. Iran's security strategy, in part compensating for a lack
of conventional military power, has focused on building asymmetric
power through proxies and surrogates who are able to project Iranian
power and keep potential foes such as Israel and Sunni Arab states
occupied far from Iran's borders.
There is nothing in the agreement that requires Iran to change this
strategy, or that would forestall a spike in malign Iranian behavior.
Quite the opposite--the agreement will provide Iran with an influx of
financial resources, some portion of which seem likely to go to foreign
priorities such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen. An infusion of
Iranian funds could have salutary effects on the Assad regime, which
has reportedly depended on Iranian assistance, for example receiving a
fresh $1 billion line of credit from Tehran just last month; on
Hezbollah, which has reportedly seen assistance from Iran decline as
the latter was squeezed by sanctions; on Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ), which has reportedly been suffering from financial duress; and
on Hamas, which seeks to rebuild military capacity degraded in its last
round of fighting with Israel. It could also be used to step up
recruiting for Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq, to ensure
that Iraqi Shiite militias backed by Iran are better resourced than
official Iraqi security services, and to buy increased political
influence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ For more examples, see ``The Regional Impact of Additional
Iranian Money,'' PolicyWatch 2456, The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, July 28, 2015, http://www. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/the-regional-impact-of-additional-iranian-money.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agreement will also lift the ban on ballistic missile tests and
the designations of certain entities involved in Iran's regional
troublemaking, such as (in eight years) the IRGC-Qods Force. It will
also remove, in no more than five years, sanctions barring the transfer
of arms to Iran--paving the way for the possible modernization of
Iran's relatively antiquated conventional forces--and will lift by my
reading the ban on Iran exporting arms itself.than five years,
sanctions barring the transfer of arms to Iran--paving the way for the
possible modernization of Iran's relatively antiquated conventional
forces--and will lift by my reading the ban on Iran exporting arms
itself.than five years, sanctions barring the transfer of arms to
Iran--paving the way for the possible modernization of Iran's
relatively antiquated conventional forces--and will lift by my reading
the ban on Iran exporting arms itself. \9\ While in some circumstances
other authorities exist to prohibit arms transfers to Iranian proxies,
these measures have been poorly enforced and seem likely to be weakened
further, not strengthened, by this agreement. As a result, and seeing
as regional conflicts in which Iran is embroiled show little sign of
abating, there is more reason to believe that Iran's regional
activities will increase rather than deminish, including the
proliferation of sophisticated arms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747, op5
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some regard Iran as a potential partner against the likes of
ISIS, in fact any uptick in Iranian regional troublemaking stands to
benefit ISIS and its ilk, which feed off the sectarian polarization
Iran's activities foster. In addition, because many United States
allies in the region see Iran and its proxies as a major threat to
their security, they are likely to respond to any increase in Iranian
adventurism. To an extent, we are already witnessing these dynamics
playing out around the region. To make matters worse, United States
allies may also seek in the wake of the accord to match Iran's nuclear
capabilities to ensure they could respond rapidly to any Iranian
nuclear breakout; while there is no guarantee they will do so, the
incentive is clear. Our reassurances to them will be met with
skepticism in light of our relative inaction thus far to counter
Iranian regional aggression, and in light of our failure to follow
through on similar assurances given to Ukraine in 1994 as part of our
pursuit of a different arms control treaty.
This incentive will remain even if, as some hope, the Iranian
regime becomes friendlier or more constructive in the coming years.
Even a different regime in Tehran may not wish to concede a nuclear
capability that has been granted international legitimacy. Given the
long history of rivalry between Iran and its major neighbors, the
presence of a large, advanced nuclear program in Iran will likely
prompt a balancing reaction in the region regardless of Tehran's
attitude toward the United States.
The agreement also seems likely to foster closer diplomatic,
economic, and military ties between Iran and a host of states outside
the region, including India, Pakistan, Russia, and especially China.
Sino-Iranian trade has been growing despite sanctions, and even China's
energy imports from Iran have reached record highs in 2014-2015 despite
NDAA sanctions calling for states to reduce their oil trade with Iran.
In addition, China-Iran military ties have increased, with Chinese
fighter jets landing in Iran to refuel and Chinese warships paying a
call to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas in recent years. Chinese and
Iranian defense officials have called for expansion of these ties, and
the lifting or phasing out of sanctions will smooth the way for this to
occur.
All of this is on its face would appear to constitute a significant
strategic reversal by the United States--accommodating Iranian nuclear
expansion after years of opposing it, lifting sanctions on Iran after
years of expanding them, and facilitating Iran's financial and
diplomatic reintegration into the international community after years
of seeking to isolate it. These actions stand in opposition to
longstanding United States strategy in the Middle East, which aimed to
foster regional stability and prosperity by bolstering the security of
allies, effectively countering those who challenged our mutual
interests, and preventing inroads by hegemons from inside or outside
the region. This conflict between our actions and our stated strategy
inevitably leads allies to conclude either that our commitment to that
strategy and to the region itself is diminished, or that we are
embarking on a broader strategic realignment.
looking ahead
One of the chief defenses offered for the nuclear agreement is
that, whatever its shortcomings, it is preferable to the alternatives.
It is one thing to say, however, that a negotiated agreement of some
sort was preferable to alternatives such as military conflict or
acquiescence, and another entirely to claim that this is the best
accord that could have been negotiated. I have little doubt that
different tactics could have produced a stronger agreement. Indeed, it
is the very denigration of our alternatives and failure to credibly
project consequences--whether sanctions or military force--for Iran of
failing to accept strict limitations on its nuclear activities that in
my view most contributed to the weakness of this accord. The notion
that Iran would have marched inexorably toward a nuclear weapon were it
not for this deal ignores the considerable deterrent effect that
further sanctions and the credible threat of military force would
likely have had on Iranian decisionmaking.
Such assertions on both sides, however, are now largely a matter
for historical debate. The more immediately relevant question is
whether to implement the accord. If the deal cannot muster sufficient
domestic support, it should like any rejected agreement be
renegotiated. There is no particular reason it cannot be, though the
other parties are likely to resist. Ordinarily they would nevertheless
require U.S. participation for the termination of international
sanctions, but the recent passage of a U.N. Security Council resolution
endorsing the accord and setting a schedule for lifting sanctions gives
rise to the possibility--the text of the deal is not clear on this
point--that the deal's implementation could proceed even without the
United States fulfilling our obligations.
It is also possible that Iran would refuse to implement its
obligations were the deal rejected by the United States, and that it
would find sympathy from partners such as Russia and China. Because,
however, our allies would remain committed to preventing Iran from
developing a nuclear weapon, Iranian noncompliance would not be met
with resignation but would likely lead to a resumption of previous
efforts to resolve the crisis through diplomacy and pressure. None of
these scenarios is by any means an easy one; our policy to date will
not be without consequences.
If the nuclear accord is implemented, U.S. policymakers will need
to contend with the new reality it creates. We must avoid the
temptation to overlook harmful Iranian policies or offer unilateral
concessions in a misguided effort to bolster one regime faction against
another, but instead establish clear disincentives for destabilizing
behavior and incentives for constructive behavior by Tehran. It will be
important to ensure that the United States intelligence community and
IAEA have sufficient resources to monitor Iranian nuclear efforts, to
strengthen the United States position in the Middle East by
reinvigorating our regional alliances, to restore the credibility of
United States military deterrence in the context of an overall
strengthening of United States defense resources, to more firmly
counter Iranian regional actions while pressing Iran to play a more
constructive regional role, and to respond quickly to violations of
Iran's nuclear obligations as well as activities not covered by the
agreement such as provocative missile tests. Frankly these are
objectives we should have been pursuing now for years--not merely
considering as a consequence of a nuclear accord--but have neglected.
Most difficult of all, the next president is almost certain to find
the nuclear constraints imposed on Iran by this accord to be
unsatisfactory, if for no other reason than those limitations will
begin to expire by the end of the next president's tenure if he or she
is reelected. In this sense, the question is not whether, but when, we
will need to devise an alternative policy toward Iran's nuclear and
regional activities. The next president will need to rebuild
international support for a strengthened Iran policy with fewer tools
at his or her disposal, and may well be doing so in a less favorable
international context given recent shifts in the international security
environment and the likely strengthened diplomatic, economic, and
strategic ties Iran may enjoy with other states in the future.
As I noted at the outset, sensible foreign policy must clearly
advance American interests at a cost that is outweighed by the policy's
projected benefits. It is not clear that the nuclear agreement with
Iran meets these criteria. It does not clearly achieve the objective it
sets out to--the prevention of a nuclear-armed Iran--nor does it
complement our broader strategy in the Middle East or our global
nonproliferation strategy. Instead, it entails significant costs that
are justified primarily by conjuring the specter of an even more costly
war no analyst believed was imminent.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Takeyh.
STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES, THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Dr. Takeyh. Thanks, Chairman, for inviting me, as well as
Senator Reed, in his absence.
I think it's fair to say, and I think it's indisputable to
start with, the suggestion that this agreement has been
negotiated with a rather peculiar regime, perhaps one of the
most peculiar in annals of history. Most non-Western
revolutionary states eventually abandon their ideological
mission for sake of integration into the global economy and the
international system. This has not been the case with Iran. Its
leaders remain committed to an ideology rooted in anti-
Americanism and anti-Zionism. This resilience of Iran's
Islamist enmities is, indeed, striking. Iran's leadership
continues to cling to radical policies that are just not
detrimental to its national interests, but have been rejected
by a large segment of its population.
The question then becomes, What is the impact of this
nuclear agreement on Iran and its regional surge? I think you
have to think about Iranian foreign policy as before and after
2011, because they're very strikingly different. Since the Arab
Awakenings of 2011, the post-colonials Arab state system has
essentially collapsed. That system was predicated on a dominant
state of Egypt and Iraq. Egypt is too preoccupied with its
internal squabbles to become a real player seeking regional
leadership. Iraq is a fragmented state led by a Shiite
government that's also from the Arab Councils.
Iran has embarked on a dramatic new mission that is seeking
to project this power in corners of the Middle East it never
thought possible. This is not traditional Iranian foreign
policy of supporting terrorism and rejectionist groups against
Israel. This is essentially a new form of imperialism that is
becking Iran. Imperialism may be attractive, but it is also
financially burdensome. Without this arms control agreement and
the financial rewards it will bring, in terms of sanctions
relief, release of entrapped funds, and new investments, Iran
would find it difficult to subsidize its imperial surge.
It is often suggested--it may have been suggested here--
that the United States can still redress Iran's malign
activities, irrespective of the agreement. However, in the wake
of the nuclear agreement, the United States will have a
diminished coercive power to achieve this task. The fact of the
matter is, for the past 30 years we have responded to Iranian
terrorism and Iranian regional aggression by applying economic
sanctions. As a result of this agreement, the United States is
committed to relieving those sanctions over a period of time.
Today, Iran is segregated from the global financial markets,
and sanctions inhibit the Central Bank. As they essentially
diminish over time, the room for United States President's--
future United States President's coercive options will
correspondingly be parsed. Subsequent administrations may have
no choice but to use force or accommodate Iran's
transgressions, whatever those transgressions may be.
Some have argued--the administration witnesses have argued
that the United States is still committed to pushing back on
Iran in the region, irrespective of this arms control
agreement. They should be asked how, specifically, they are
planning to do that. How are we planning to dislodge Iran from
deep penetration of Iraq? Nobody has thought more about this
than the chairman. This may actually require employment of
American forces. The low estimates I've seen is 10 to 15,000
troops. Are they prepared for that? How are we prepared to
dislodge Iran from Syria and support of the Assad dynasty, one
of its most consequential clients? How are we going to--
Hezbollah and the Shiite militias who are acting as Iran's
lethal proxies?
In the Gulf, the suggestion has been made that we're going
to sell more arms, which I don't think will do the trick. As a
matter of fact, I would suggest it's counterproductive. These
countries have deep-seated structural economic problems.
Additional money spent on that is unlikely to ameliorate those
problem. Iran doesn't seek to invade the Gulf country, it seeks
to subvert them. Therefore, by selling more arms and using
those resources away from vital economic tasks, we exacerbate
the problems of the Gulf without necessarily creating a barrier
to a projection of Iranian power.
Finally, let me address briefly the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, and hopefully suggest some ideas for its
revision that may broaden its appeal and make it stronger. My
colleague, Eric Edelman, who was here yesterday in the wise man
hearing, kind of suggested some ways ahead. I'd like to
reiterate some of those that perhaps will be found useful.
There are others. You can have your own suggestion.
I have not seen, and I continue not to see, any credible
defense of the ``sunset clause''. I haven't seen it because it
doesn't exist. One thing I would say is the--what the United
States should do is essentially try to suggest that, after
expiration of the sunset clause, all members of the P5+1, plus
Iran, should vote on whether the restrictions should be
continued for additional 10 years; and every 10 years, we
should vote on that--the members of the treaty should vote on
that. This way, essentially we can determine Iran's nuclear
program going ahead by a majority vote among the signatories of
the agreement, as opposed to some arbitrary timeclock. A
majority vote every 10 years, I think, would be--the precedent
for that is the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty]. NPT expired
after 25 years, and then all member states voted to extend its
restrictions.
A second suggestion I would make, we really ought to go
back and revisit the notion of if Iran should develop IR8s, the
advanced centrifuges. Vice President Salehi has suggested that
it operates 17 times faster than IR1 centrifuges that Iran
currently have, more than its current stockpile, allowing the
Islamic Republic to dramatically increase its enrichment
capacity and provide--capability. At the very least, these
machines should not be allowed to develop.
This particular agreement suffers from the same structural
agreement that, to be frank, every arms control agreement in
the past has. It is not equipped to deal with marginal
incremental violations. To be fair, no arms control agreement
is. INF was bought up here, as well. This is particularly the
case because, as has been mentioned in this hearing, Iranian
violations are likely to be incremental. Foreign Minister
Zarif, in his presentation of the nuclear agreement to the
Parliament, said, and I quote--''Sanctions can be reimposed on
Iran only in case of serious violation of its obligation and
not in case of small-scale violations.'' How do you deal with
that, incremental violations that Foreign Minister Zarif is
promising? The entire defense leadership of Iran--General
Ja'afari, the head of the Revolutionary Guards, Defense
Minister Dehghan, and the head of the ground forces, General
Pourdastan--have suggested, since the enactment of the treaty,
that they will not provide access to military installations.
That's something that we have to deal with. Again, incremental
violations are difficult to prosecute. That's the history of
arms control agreement. This agreement falls within it.
Finally, let me say, I have heard--Secretary Kerry, in
particular, but others have suggested that the Revolutionary
Guards are against this agreement. Frankly, I don't see that. I
know where to look for this sort of a thing. I have surveyed
all their public speaking. I have surveyed all the publication
and media outlets that are related to them. They have suggested
that they will not allow access to facilities, but I have not
seen the opposition. The most succinct presentation of the
Revolutionary Guard position was in--2 days ago, in one of
their newspapers, Javan--translated ``Young''--and assessed
some like this--pardon the translation--ultimately--quote,
``Ultimately, the positive achievements of the nuclear
agreement is that it increases the power of the Islamic
Republic in the region. It has made Iran's regional allies
happy. It has made its adversaries unhappy.'' I think that's a
fairly succinct presentation of the Revolutionary Guards. I see
the notion that they're opposing it as farfetched.
I will say, some of the measures that I suggested for
reconsidering the agreement can actually help strengthen it and
actually provide a greater bipartisan foundation for the
agreement that can potentially forestall an Iranian bomb, stem
proliferation cascade in the Middle East, and hopefully anchor
this agreement on the greater bipartisan foundation, therefore
ensuring its durability.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Takeyh follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ray Takeyh
the permanent revolution
More than three decades after its founding, the Islamic Republic
remains an outlier in international relations. Most non-Western,
revolutionary states eventually eschew a rigidly ideological foreign
policy and accept the fundamental legitimacy of the international
system. But Iran's leaders have remained committed to an ideology
rooted in anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism. The resilience of Iran's
Islamist enmities is striking. Iran's leadership continues to cling to
radical policies even when such practices are detrimental to the
country's other stated national interests and even when a sizable
portion of the population rejects them.
The question then becomes why Iran's ruling elite continues to
maintain this ideological template? After all, other revolutionary
regimes, after initially using foreign policy for ideological purposes,
later moved away from that approach. Why has China become more
pragmatic but not Iran? The answer is that the Islamic Republic is
different from its revolutionary counterparts in that the ideology of
its state is its religion. It may be a politicized and radicalized
variation of Shia Islam, but religion is the official dogma.
Revolutionary regimes usually change when their ardent supporters grow
disillusioned and abandon their faith. It is, after all, much easier to
be an ex-Marxist than an ex-Shia. In one instance, renouncing one's
faith is political defection; in the other, apostasy. Although the
Islamic Republic has become widely unpopular, for a small but fervent
segment of the population it is still an important experiment in
realizing God's will on earth.
Iran's revolution continues to challenge the concept of nation-
state and the prevailing norms of the international system. The essence
of Islamic Republic's message is that the vitality of its vision at
home is contingent on its relentless export. Moreover, because God's
vision was not confined to a single nation, Iran's foreign policy would
be an extension of its domestic revolutionary turmoil. For the clerical
state, the global order is divided between two competing entities,
nations whose priorities are defined by Western conventions; and Iran,
whose ostensible purpose is to redeem a divine mandate. Of course, no
country can persist on ideology alone. Iran has to operate its economy,
deal with regional exigencies and meet the demands of its growing
population. But its international relations would be characterized by
revolutionary impulses continually struggling against the pull of
pragmatism.
The Islamic Republic's internationalism has to have an antagonist,
a foil against which to define itself. A caricatured concept of the
West has become the central pillar of the mullahs' Islamist
imagination. The Western powers are rapacious imperialists determined
to exploit the region's wealth for their own aggrandizement. Islamist
themes soon followed, portraying the West as seeking to subjugate
Muslims and impose its cultural template in the name of modernity.
Disunity among Muslims, the autocracies populating the region, the
failure of the Arab clerical class to assume the mantle of opposition
and the young people's attraction to alien ideologies are seen as
byproducts of a Western plot to sustain its dominance over Islam's
realm.
In many ways, China's experience encapsulates the paradigm of the
life cycle of a non-Western revolutionary state. Initially, the new
regime rejects the existing state system and norms of international
behavior. Foreign-policy decision making is dominated by ideological
considerations, even if there are concessions made to pragmatic
concerns. But, over time, a clear trajectory emerges. As new leaders
come to power, the ideology is modified and later abandoned in favor of
``normal'' relations with other countries, usually to promote economic
development and modernization.
Thus, Western policymakers continue to be puzzled over why Iran has
not yet become a post-revolutionary country. What makes this case more
peculiar is that by the late 1990s, Iran did appear to be following in
the footsteps of states such as China and Vietnam. Yet this evolution
was stymied by the resilience of the Islamic Republic's ideological
mission. The institutional juggernaut of the revolution has contributed
to this success, as has the elite molded in Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini's austere image. But Iran's foreign policy also has played a
crucial role in sustaining this domestic ideological identity. A narrow
segment of the conservative elite, commanding key institutions of the
state, has fashioned a foreign policy designed to maintain the
ideological character of the regime. That remains a key ingredient in
determining how the Islamic Republic thinks of itself and its role in a
changing Middle East.
iran and the new middle east in the aftermath of the nuclear agreement
For much of the past three decades, the Islamic Republic's
inflammatory rhetoric and aggressive posture concealed the reality of
its strategic loneliness. Iran is, after all, a Persian nation
surrounded by Arab states who were suspicious of its revolution and its
proclaimed objectives. The Gulf sheikdoms arrayed themselves behind the
American shield, Iraq sustained its animosity toward Iran long after
the end of its war, and the incumbent Sunni republics maintained a
steady belligerence. Iran nurtured its lethal Hezbollah protege and
aided Palestinian rejectionist groups, but appeared hemmed in by the
wall of Arab hostility. All this changed when Iraq was reclaimed by the
Shias and the Arab Spring shook the foundations of the Sunni order.
Today, the guardians of the Islamic Republic see a unique opportunity
to project their power in a region beset by unpredictable transitions.
The key actors defining Iran's regional policy are not its urbane
diplomats mingling with their Western counterparts in Europe, but the
Revolutionary Guards, particularly the famed Quds Brigade. For the
commander of the Quds Brigade, General Qassim Soleimani, the struggle
to evict America from the region began in Iraq. ``After the fall of
Saddam, there was talk by various individuals that they should manage
Iraq, but with Iraq's religious leaders and Iran's influence, America
could not reach that goal,'' proclaimed Soleimani. The struggle moved
on and today ``Syria is the frontline of resistance.'' For the
hardliners, the Sunni states attempting to dislodge Assad is really a
means of weakening Iran. The survival and success of the Assad dynasty
is now a central element of Iran's foreign policy.
The question then becomes what impact the nuclear deal will have on
Iran and its regional surge. How will the Islamic Republic spend the
billions of dollars it would receive as a result of the accord?
Proponents of agreement insist that Iran will funnel much of this
newfound wealth into its depleted economy. By their telling, even
during dire economic times, Iran prioritized funding for its malign
activities and thus does not need to steer new money in their
direction. Such a curious justification overlooks how Iran's regional
policies, and its internal dynamics, are undergoing momentous changes.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands as one of the most successful
Persian imperialists in the history of modern Iran. In the 1970s, at
the height of his power, the shah did not enjoy a commanding influence
in Iraq. Lebanon's factional politics continued to elude him, the Assad
dynasty was no mere subsidiary of Iran, and the Persian Gulf emirates
resisted his pretensions. Today, Khamenei has essential control of much
of the Iraqi state, he is the most important external actor in Syria,
and Hezbollah provides him with not just a means of manipulating
Lebanon's politics, but also shock troops who can be deployed on
various war fronts. In the Gulf, the United States' crumbling alliances
offer Iran many tempting opportunities.
Proponents of the view that Iran will not become a more aggressive
regional power in the aftermath of a deal ignore how the Middle East
has evolved since the Arab awakenings of 2011. The post-colonial Arab
state system that featured the dominant nations of Egypt and Iraq is no
more. Egypt is too preoccupied with internal squabbles to offer
regional leadership while Iraq is a fragmented nation ruled by a Shia
government ostracized from Sunni Arab councils. Iran has embarked on a
dramatic new mission and is seeking to project its power into corners
of the Middle East in ways that were never possible before. This is not
traditional Iranian foreign policy with its sponsorship of terrorism
and support for rejectionist groups targeting Israel; imperialism
beckons the mullahs, but it is also economically burdensome. Without an
arms control agreement and the financial rewards it will bring--such as
sanctions relief, the release of funds entrapped abroad, and new
investments--Iran would find it difficult to subsidize this imperial
surge.
Still, the claim that Iran will invest a portion of the economic
spoils of a deal on domestic needs is not entirely wrong. President
Hassan Rouhani belongs to the wing of Iranian politics that has long
been attracted to the so-called China model, whereby a regime purchases
domestic consent by providing a measure of economic opportunity to its
stifled citizenry. Two years into Rouhani's tenure, his government
stands as one of the most repressive in the post-revolutionary period.
Many civil society activists languish in prison, media censorship has
continued unabated, and the intelligence services remain abusive and
unaccountable. The state cannot sustain such an oppressive order
without ameliorating some of its constituents' misfortunes. It may come
to pass that Iran, with its small, badly mismanaged economy, will not
be able to emulate China's authoritarian model, especially since the
Green Movement that enlivened Iran six years ago continues to cast a
long shadow. But to have any hope of success in his aims, Rouhani needs
an arms control agreement as much as Khamenei's Islamist imperialism.
The much-discussed terms of the impending agreement with Iran thus
offer the theocracy all that it wants. The accord would concede a vast
enrichment capacity, as well as accepting both a heavy water plant and
a well-fortified underground enrichment facility that the United States
once vowed to shutter. It would permit an elaborate research and
development program while relying on an inspection regime that falls
short of indispensable ``anytime, anywhere'' access. In the meantime,
the sanctions architecture will be diminished, and the notion of ever
``snapping back'' sanctions into place once they are lifted is
delusional. Because the agreement itself would be term-limited, there
would be no practical limits on Iran's nuclear ambitions upon its
expiration.
containing iran and maintaining the joint comprehensive plan of action:
The defenders of the nuclear agreement with Iran insist that the
United States can still hold Iran accountable for its pernicious
policies, regardless of an accord. Such assurances miss the point that
maintenance of an arms control agreement is not always consistent with
a coercive policy.
Signing a nuclear agreement with a nation acknowledges that that
state is a responsible actor. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
suggests that the Islamic Republic will be left with a substantial
nuclear infrastructure that is likely to grow, over time, in size and
sophistication. By concluding an accord with Iran, the Obama
administration is effectively vouching that the clerical regime is a
suitable custodian of nuclear technologies and that it can be trusted
with a program that may eventually reach an industrial scale. A nuclear
agreement would not only legitimize Iran's program but also signal to
the region that the United States sees Iran as a power whose claims
have to be taken into account.
In the American imagination, arms control and detente are joined.
Many in Washington are likely to call for improved relations with Iran
given the deal. If the two powers can settle the nuclear issue, this
thinking holds, then surely they can cooperate on topics of common
concern such as the rise of Islamic State and ending Syria's civil war.
A superpower that has grown tired of the burdens of the Arab world can
reasonably turn to a seemingly responsible stakeholder to stabilize the
region. Now, consider that in the 1970s the United States, feeling
overstretched, turned to another arms control partner, the Soviet
Union, for help extracting itself from Southeast Asia. The history of
such actions isn't the only concern here: The notion of constraining
Iran has no place in a policy that looks for areas of cooperation
between the two states.
Even if the United States were determined to hold the line and push
back against Iran's actions in the region, in the wake of a nuclear
deal it may not have the necessary coercive power. For much of the past
three decades, Washington has responded to Iranian terrorism and
regional aggression by applying economic sanctions. But a nuclear
agreement would commit the United States to lessening the financial
pressure on Iran. Today, Iran is segregated from the global financial
markets and sanctions inhibit its central bank. But with such sanctions
revoked under an accord, future U.S. presidents' coercive options will
be sparse. Subsequent administrations may have no choice but to use
force or accommodate Iran, whatever its actions.
Unlike the United States, revolutionary regimes that enter nuclear
agreements tend to see them as pathways to asserting power. During the
heydays of arms control in the 1970s, the Soviet Union embarked on one
of the most aggressive stages of its foreign policy. Moscow and its
proxies took up the cause of militant actors throughout the Third
World. As part of the Helsinki Accords, the Kremlin obtained from
Washington a formal recognition of its sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe. The decade ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--the
first time the Soviet Union had invaded a country outside Eastern
Europe. In retrospect, these were a series of foolish and costly
decisions. The Soviet experience, however, belies the notion that arms
control accords moderate ideological regimes.
The Islamic Republic looks upon the United States as a crestfallen
imperial state seeking to dispense with its Arab inheritance. A staple
of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's rhetoric is that the United
States is a declining power, beset by problems at home. In his telling,
it is the United States that needed an arms control agreement as a
means of paving its exit from the Middle East. With Iran's actions and
posture suggesting it is about to embark on its own expansive imperial
mission, there might be little in way of coercive leverage that
Washington can bring to bear. A hegemonic Iran may yet be the most
consequential legacy of a nuclear accord.
the road ahead
The United States cannot have a viable strategy of pushing back on
Iran without re-considering key aspects of the JCPOA. As the JCPOA
stands today, it is one of the most technologically permissive arms
control accords in history. It is an agreement that is likely to spark
a cascade of proliferation as Iran's rivals and enemies seek to match
its capabilities. However, a number of revisions to the agreement can
help in strengthening it and ensuring that it is a less-deficient
accord.
My colleague Eric Edelman and I recently proposed that the United
States should return to the negotiating table and revisit some of the
most problematic aspects of this agreement:
1. One of the most problematic aspects of the JCPOA is its sunset
clause whereby the most essential restraints on Iran's program begin to
fade in a decade. The United States should insist that upon the
expiration of the sunset clause, the P5 + 1 countries and Iran should
vote on whether to extend the agreement for an additional 10 years. A
majority vote every 10 years should determine the longevity of the
treaty and not some arbitrary time-clock. The precedent for such a move
is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) itself. After the NPT
expired after 25 years, it was not simply cast aside but all member
states voted to extend it in perpetuity.
2. Limit Iran's centrifuges to IR-1s: The other disturbing aspect
of the JCPOA is its research and development stipulations. Under the
current agreement, Iran will have a right to begin installing advanced
IR-8 centrifuges starting year 8. These machines operate approximately
17 times faster than Iran's current stock of centrifuges, allowing the
Islamic Republic to dramatically increase its enrichment capacity.
Moreover, given how few such machines will be needed to enrich uranium,
Iran can easily develop small, surreptitious installations that may
escape detection. By limiting Iran to its more primitive models, we can
best guard against a sneak out option.
3. A more intrusive inspection regime: There has been much debate
about ``anytime anywhere'' inspections versus the current plan that
calls for an elaborate procedures and a 24-day waiting period. The
inspection modality should resemble to the extent possible the South
African model. When South Africa finally renounced its nuclear weapons,
it provided the IAEA a full accounting of its previous nuclear history
and access to its military installations. South Africa declared that it
was prepared to offer the IAEA anytime, anywhere access. In practice,
this meant that the inspectors could visit sites in South Africa in as
little as a day. South Africa was determined to disarm and thus had no
qualms about such extraordinary procedures. If Iran is similarly
committed to proving its goodwill, it should concede to such a
verification system.
4. The JCPOA has sensibly stipulated that all of Iran's spent fuel
from its plutonium production will be send out permanently. A similar
procedure should be in place for Iran's enriched uranium. In essence,
the enrichment aspect of the agreement should mirror its plutonium
dimension.
5. The agreement must also address Iran's ballistic missile
arsenal. The delivery systems are an indispensable aspect of Iran's
nuclear weapons program. It is inconceivable that the pathways to
Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations can be obstructed without addressing
this important pillar of that program.
These and other measures can best forestall and Iranian bomb and
stem the proliferation cascade in the Middle East. These steps are
fairly modest and reasonable. It is unlikely that America's negotiating
partners would disagree that these measures strengthen the agreement
and perhaps anchor it on a bipartisan footing. I believe that the
European states would support the United States should it want to
revise aspects of this agreement. Nor do I think that a Russian
Federation that views Iran's oil sector as competitive to its own
petroleum industry will strenuously object. If these powers agree,
China will not obstruct a consensus rooted on simple but important set
of demands.
The one way that Congress can ensure that the executive branch
returns to the negotiating table is to disapprove the JCPOA as it
currently stands. There are ample precedents in the history of arms
control whereby congressional objections has led U.S. diplomats to
return to the table. During the Cold War, Senator Henry Jackson refused
to approve SALT I unless the Nixon Administration agreed to his
amendment that all future arms control accords between the United
States and the Soviet Union must aim for strategic parity. His
amendment expressed a sense of Congress that requested ``the President
to seek future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United
States to levels of inter-continental strategic forces inferior to the
limits provided for the Soviet Union.'' The Threshold Test Ban Treaty
of 1974 was also initially blocked by the Senate because of concerns
over Soviet compliance. To ease congressional anxieties, the Nixon/Ford
administrations had to engage in two additional years of negotiations.
During the presidency of Bill Clinton, the Senate agreed to the
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Test Ban Treaty only after
inclusion of 28 conditions.
These and many other such examples testify to the important role
that Congress has played in ensuring that the United States negotiates
the best possible agreement. Given the enormous flaws of the JCPOA and
the enormity of its importance, the Congress should aim to do no less.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Dr. Gordon.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW, THE COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Dr. Gordon. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, Senators. I
really appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee
this morning.
Like other speakers, I think this is a hugely consequential
issue, and it really deserves all of the attention you and
other committees are giving it.
As I think many of you know, I was part of the
administration from 2013 to 2015. I was the White House
Coordinator for the Middle East, so I was very much involved in
the efforts to get this agreement. But, obviously, here this
morning I'm speaking as a private citizen and expressing only
my personal views.
My bottom line on this agreement is that I think it's in
the National security interests of the United States, and I
hope Congress will support it. I say that, not because I think
it is a perfect deal. It's not a perfect deal. Like every one
of you, I could spell out a number of ways in which it could be
better and stronger. In fact, Ray just did so, and I would be
happy to have all of the elements that he presented.
The reason I think it's a good deal and I hope you'll
support it is that I just think it's far better than any
realistic alternative. Without this deal, I am afraid we would
very quickly be put in a position of facing a choice between an
Iran that is steadily advancing its nuclear capabilities, as it
has over the last decade, or using military force to
temporarily stop it.
As for the option that some always want to hope for, that
we just keep on the pressure until Iran comes back to the table
for a better deal or a perfect deal, I'm afraid that's an
illusion. Think about, for the past decade, we have had
significant sanctions on Iran, and, during that period of time,
we've seen Iran steadily advance its program to where it is
today, from zero to 19,000 centrifuges, accumulating a very
significant stockpile of low-enriched uranium, enough to make a
number of nuclear weapons, an almost completed heavy water
reactor at Arak. All without significant monitoring and
verification. So, that's why I'm afraid--and continuing
research and development on advanced centrifuges--and that's
why I'm afraid that, if we reject this deal, we will end up not
with a better one, but with an Iran that continues down the
path that it has been on.
It's worth thinking about other cases, as well, when you
think about this issue. Can we just continue to squeeze them
until they give us everything we want? We squeezed North Korea
pretty hard. North Korea is far poorer and more isolated than
Iran. The result was not them coming and giving us everything
we wanted, but a nuclear weapon state. We squeezed Iraq pretty
hard, to the point of genuinely crippling sanctions, and
demanded absolute access, and, instead of coming to the table
and giving us everything we want, we actually had to implement
that credible threat of force.
Every case is different, but my point in mentioning those
cases is simply to underscore that there's no guarantee that,
even if we could maintain these powerful sanctions and had a
credible threat of force, that Iran would come back to the
table and give us everything we want. I think there's plenty of
reason, actually, to believe that it would not.
So, the issue is not whether we can use leverage to get
Iran to agree with our list of desirables, but whether this
deal that we were able to negotiate effectively cuts off its
path to a nuclear weapon, which is what the sanctions were put
in place to do. I think it does, thanks to the joint efforts of
Congress and the administration to put the sanctions regime in
place.
Now, others have made the positive case for how, in the
administration and now others, have made the--the other
witnesses before this committee and others--have explained how
it blocks off those paths. I won't take my time to do that,
because I know even that case has left a number of Senators
with concerns, and I'd rather just take my time and address a
couple of those concerns. My written testimony goes into more,
but just let me just mention three that I know are high on many
lists.
One, which was central to this hearing this morning, is the
issue of Iran using freed-up financial assets to pursue
nefarious ends in the region. We are all rightly concerned that
Iran will use some of the assets it gains from sanctions relief
to support its regional foreign policy agenda, which, in many
ways, threatens our partners and our interests. I don't think
that's invalid. Therefore, in an ideal world, we would keep all
of these sanctions in place and freeze all of Iran's assets,
and get a good nuclear deal at the same time. But, frankly,
that was never a realistic option. The deal on the table--any
nuclear deal, even one that left Iran with 500 centrifuges or
zero centrifuges instead of 5,000, always implied that there
would be sanctions relief in exchange for the nuclear
agreement. So, in that sense, to insist that sanctions be--
relief be excluded from a nuclear deal with Iran is probably to
exclude a nuclear deal, itself. If you don't have a nuclear
deal, that means no nuclear constraints, no enhanced monitor
and verification, an Iran that continues to do all of these
nefarious things that it--as it has been doing while under
sanctions, and, I think, genuinely increasing difficulties in
getting our partners to maintain sanctions once it's clear--
once it became clear that our aim went beyond the nuclear issue
and essentially involved transforming Iran's foreign policy,
which is a highly desirable goal, but one unlikely to receive
the support of the international community to pursue these
sanctions. I am confident that, through continued and increased
military and intelligence support for our partners in the
region, who, by the way, collectively spend far more on defense
than Iran does, we can continue to contain Iran just as we did
before these international sanctions were put in place. I'd be
happy to elaborate on the--that in the discussion.
A second major concern, I know, of a number of Senators, is
that the deal allows Iran's nuclear program to expand once the
so-called ``sunset provisions'' expire. Again, I would say the
same thing. In an ideal world, we would have negotiated an
agreement that lasted indefinitely or at least for many
decades. Obviously, the administration sought to get as long an
agreement as possible. But here, too, I don't think it was
realistic to imagine that Iran was ever going to agree to a
deal that it--kept the same tight constraints on its civil
nuclear energy program forever. Asking for that deal would mean
no deal, and tomorrow Iran could proceed with its program. So,
while this part of the agreement also isn't perfect, it
nonetheless involves some very serious constraints for a very
significant amount of time: until 2025 for the number of
centrifuges, until 2030 for the limited nuclear stockpile,
until 2035 for centrifuge production, until 2040 for access to
uranium mines and mills in Iran, and indefinitely for adherence
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the commitment not to pursue
nuclear weapons, and the application of the IAEA's additional
protocol, which requires access by inspectors to any suspected
sites.
Finally, the premise of the deal, we should keep in mind,
is that Iran used this quite long period of time to demonstrate
that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. If it fails
to do that, all of the same options available to us now will be
available to us then, including sanctions and military force--I
think more likely, in that case, with the support of the
international community. I think there are ways we can
reinforce this insistence that Iran use this period to
demonstrate its peaceful intentions. Again, be glad to
elaborate those--on those in the discussion.
The third concern I'll mention here very briefly is that
inspections are not sufficiently rigorous. I respectfully
disagree with that assessment. There's been a lot of focus on
this--the standard of so-called anytime/anywhere inspections,
which I think is an unrealistic standard only likely to apply
after a military defeat or occupation. I think there's been a
failure to appreciate just how extensive the verification
mechanisms in this agreement are, including not just the
increased monitoring and daily access to the declared
enrichment facilities, but the monitoring of the entire nuclear
fuel cycle. In other words, to cheat successfully, Iran would
have to somehow mine and mill uranium, convert it to gas at an
industrial facility, enrich that gas to a weapons-grade
enriched uranium at a different facility, and successfully
develop a covert weaponization program, all at the time--at the
same time, while escaping different monitoring programs.
Anything is possible, but I think that's a rather implausible
scenario. The most important thing to say about it, of course,
is, whatever you think about this inspections regime, it's
better than the one we would have if we didn't have this
agreement, which is much more minimal and would allow Iran to
do all of these things tomorrow.
Again, my written testimony goes into some of the other
concerns I know you have, so I will just sum up, again, by
repeating, Mr. Chairman and others, I don't want to suggest for
a minute that these--that the concerns that I listed, or
others, are not legitimate. They absolutely are. Again, that's
why I appreciate these kinds of hearings. But, I do believe
that, when you weigh the advantages and the disadvantage of the
deal, the advantages outweigh them, and that's why I hope
Members of Congress will support it.
As I've said, we can all describe ways to make this deal,
quote/unquote, ``better,'' but holding out for a perfect deal
could mean no deal at all, and I really do believe that
rejection of the agreement at this point, which, of course, was
supported by every member of the U.N. Security Council and just
about every country in the world, would result, not in a better
deal, but in the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear
program while making it more difficult to keep international
sanctions in place.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement by Philip Gordon
Thank You, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and all the other
distinguished members of this Committee for inviting me to testify here
this morning. The Iran nuclear deal is a hugely consequential issue for
our country and the world, and it deserves the serious debate it is
getting before this and other Committees and in the Congress and the
country as a whole. As you know, from March 2013 until April 2015 I was
the White House Coordinator for the Middle East and therefore
intimately involved in the effort to reach this agreement, right up
until the Lausanne Framework was announced on April 2. Here this
morning, of course, I am speaking as a private citizen and expressing
only my personal views.
My bottom line is that this agreement is in the national security
interest of the United States, and I believe Congress should approve
it. I say that not because it is a perfect deal--it is not, and I, like
all of you, could easily come up with a list of changes we would make
if it were only up to us. Instead I support it because I believe that
it is far better than any realistic alternative. Without this deal we
would very quickly face the unpalatable choice between acquiescing to
an Iranian nuclear weapons capability or using military force to
temporarily stop it. As for the option of simply maintaining pressure
and threatening force until the Iranians accept a so-called ``better
deal,'' I believe that is an illusion. For the past decade and more, we
have increased sanctions pressure on Iran with the goal of getting it
to abandon its program entirely--and the result has been a steady
expansion of that program to where it is today--19,000 centrifuges; a
stockpile of more than ten tons of low-enriched uranium (LEU); an
almost completed heavy-water reactor at Arak; and increasingly advanced
research and development (R&D) of centrifuges. I believe that rejecting
this deal would result not in Iran agreeing to all our demands or even
a ``better deal'' but the continued expansion of that program.
Keep in mind that in North Korea--a country many times poorer and
more isolated than Iran--we hoped maximizing economic pressure would
bring the regime to its knees and oblige it to give up its weapons
program, and instead North Korea became a nuclear-weapons state. In
Iraq, we imposed starvation-inducing sanctions to deprive the Iraqis of
the wherewithal to continue with their WMD [weapons of mass
distruction] programs. We insisted Saddam Hussein allow completely
unfettered access to his weapons sites or face war, he refused, and we
ended up going to war. The point is there is no guarantee that even
powerful sanctions and the threat of force will lead Iran to eliminate
all aspects of its nuclear program, and plenty of reason to think that
it will not. The issue is not whether we can use leverage to get Iran
to agree to everything we might want, but whether this deal ensures
that Iran's nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful. I
believe it does, thanks to the efforts of Congress and the
administration to leverage sanctions in pursuit of that goal.
Others have testified before this Committee and others about the
many ways this deal blocks Iran's path to a nuclear weapons capability.
These include reducing Iran's number of installed centrifuges by two-
thirds; reducing its stockpile of LEU to just 300 kg for 15 years;
reconfiguring the heavy-water reactor at Arak; constraining centrifuge
R&D; and providing for rigorous monitoring backed by the possibility of
sanctions ``snapback.'' These and other steps--which are required prior
to any sanctions relief for Iran--will mean that Iran's breakout
timeline (the time required to enrich enough uranium for one nuclear
weapon) will be extended from the two months it is today to at least a
year--more than enough time to detect violations and respond as
necessary, including with renewed sanctions and/or the use of military
force. Still, I know many Senators still have concerns--legitimate
concerns, I might add--so I would like to address them head on.
One major concern is that the deal frees up financial assets that
will be put to nefarious ends. We are all rightly concerned that Iran
will use some of the assets it gains from sanctions relief to support
its regional foreign policy agenda, which in many ways threatens our
partners and our interests. Thus in an ideal world we could keep all
the current sanctions on Iran and get a good nuclear deal at the same
time. But that was never a realistic option, and the concerns about
lifting sanctions would be the same whether the deal allowed Iran to
keep 5,000 centrifuges, or zero. To insist that sanctions relief be
excluded from a nuclear deal, in other words, would be to exclude a
nuclear deal itself. This would mean no nuclear constraints, no
enhanced monitoring or verification, no end to Iranian meddling even
while sanctions are still in place, and increasing difficulties in
getting international partners to maintain sanctions once it was clear
our aims went beyond the nuclear issue.
I am confident that through continued and increased military and
intelligence support to our partners in the region--who collectively
spend many times more on defense than Iran does--we can continue to
contain Iran, just as we did before the international sanctions were
put in place. I am also confident that rejecting any nuclear deal that
unfreezes Iran's assets and provides for sanctions relief would leave
the nuclear issue unresolved and force us to watch Iran's program grow
or stop it with military force--all without support from our partners.
The challenge of dealing with Iran in the region would of course be far
greater if Iran were allowed to become a nuclear-weapons state.
A second concern is that the deal allows Iran's nuclear program to
expand once the ``sunset'' provisions expire. Again in an ideal world,
all the constraints on Iran's nuclear program would be indefinite, or
at least last for many decades. But here, too, it was never realistic
to expect Iran would agree to indefinite restrictions on its civil
energy program. While not perfect, many of the most important
restrictions last for a very long time--until 2025 for number of
centrifuges; until 2030 for the limited nuclear stockpile; until 2035
for centrifuge production; until 2040 for access to Iran's uranium
mines and mills; and indefinitely for adherence to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons,
and the application of the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which requires
access by inspectors to any suspected sites. Finally, the premise of
the deal is that Iran must use this period of time to demonstrate that
its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. If it fails to do that,
all of the same options available to us now will be available to us
then, including sanctions and military force. To reinforce this point,
the President and Congress should make clear now that violations of the
agreement during this period will be considered inconsistent with
Iran's pledge never to seek nuclear weapons, and the United States will
act accordingly. Even after certain restrictions expire, other Iranian
actions--such as the development of highly-enriched uranium--could also
be considered indications of intent inconsistent with the agreement. In
any case, whatever concerns we might have about sunset provisions would
have to be even greater about the absence of a deal--since without a
deal Iran can begin doing all of these things right away.
A third concern is that inspections are not sufficiently rigorous.
I disagree with this assessment. There has been much focus on the
unrealistic standard of ``anywhere, anytime'' inspections, which no
sovereign country would ever accept, except after a military defeat or
under occupation. I think there has also been a failure to appreciate
just how extensive the verification mechanisms in this agreement are,
including not just continued monitoring and daily access to declared
enrichment facilities but the monitoring of the entire nuclear fuel
cycle. To cheat successfully, Iran would have to somehow mine and mill
uranium, convert it to gas at an industrial facility, enrich it to
weapons grade at a different facility, and successfully develop a
covert weaponization program--all without being detected by separate
monitoring regimes. Anything is possible, but that is a rather
implausible scenario.
I also believe there has been significant misunderstanding of the
notion that Iran has ``24 days'' to allow for inspections. The IAEA's
Additional Protocol--which Iran agreed in this deal to implement
forever--requires Iran to provide access whenever and wherever the IAEA
needs it. The problem is that there has never been a mechanism for
resolving disputes over access, meaning that even AP signatories could
drag out a dispute over access forever. That is what this agreement
adds, and which never existed before. So while in certain circumstances
Iran may be able to find ways to keep inspectors out of a suspected
site for up to 24 days, that process itself would set off clear alarm
bells, and Iran can certainly not hide an entire nuclear fuel chain
under the alleged protection of this provision.
Finally and perhaps most importantly: Whatever you think of the
inspections regime--and as you can tell I think it's pretty good--it is
far better than the inspections regime we would have in the absence of
this agreement.
A fourth concern is that ``snapback'' of sanctions is not strong
enough. Actually, I believe our power to snap back international
sanctions is one of the most impressive aspects of this agreement.
During the negotiations, Iran (as well as Russia and China) vigorously
opposed leaving this power in United States hands, for the Russians as
a matter of principle and for the Iranians because it could lead
companies to think twice before investing in Iran. But that is
effectively what they have done. While disputes must pass through a
somewhat convoluted resolution process involving a Joint Commission and
an Advisory Board, the bottom line is that if the United States says
Iran has not complied with the agreement, not just United States but
also United Nations sanctions can be re-imposed. That power should
provide a strong disincentive against any Iranian temptation to cheat.
It will also give companies reason to pause before investing in Iran
absent evidence that Iran intends to abide fully by the agreement.
Finally, there is the concern that the agreement will spur nuclear
proliferation throughout the Middle East. All Americans are rightly
concerned about the potential for nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East, which is one reason why this deal is so important. It is
legitimate to worry that if Iran is eventually allowed to develop a
large-scale uranium enrichment program, other states in the region will
demand one as well.
But I believe this concern is overstated. Iran, after all, already
has a fairly large-scale enrichment program--built up starting in the
early 2000s and including domestic uranium mining and milling, gas
conversion, and centrifuge production and R&D--and no one has yet
sought to duplicate it. Nuclear enrichment is a costly, technologically
challenging, and for most countries unnecessary process that raises
international alarm bells about a country's intentions. In any case,
for at least a decade this deal pushes Iran significantly further away
from a nuclear capability rather than bringing it closer--it would make
little sense for countries in the region to forego their own nuclear
capability while Iran is two months away from nuclear breakout but
decide to pursue one when that timeline is extended to over a year.
There are, moreover, steps we can take to mitigate the risk of
other countries seeking their own nuclear programs. The first, to state
the obvious, is to ensure that Iran does not develop the capacity to
build a nuclear weapon--which this agreement does--and to reiterate the
President's pledge to do whatever is necessary to prevent that. The
second--which the administration is already doing--is to bolster our
defense cooperation with regional partners to ensure they do not feel
vulnerable vis ` vis Iran, and to make clear in word and in deed that
the United States will not allow Iran to use even a potential nuclear
weapons capability to threaten them.
While none of these measures can guarantee that others in the
region will not show an eventual interest in their own nuclear programs
if this deal goes ahead, consider the scenario in the absence of a
deal: Iran advances its program, installs more centrifuges, builds a
large LEU stockpile, and finishes its heavy water reactor at Arak. That
scenario seems far more likely to lead others in the region to imitate
Iran than the implementation of this deal.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I do not want to suggest for one minute
that these are not legitimate concerns, or that the deal is somehow
perfect. I do, however, firmly believe that the advantages of this deal
strongly outweigh the disadvantages, and urge Members of Congress to
support it. As I have said, we can all describe ways we could make the
deal ``better,'' but holding out for a perfect deal could mean no deal
at all. I believe that rejection of this agreement--supported by the
entire U.N. Security Council and just about every country in the world,
including all the key players on sanctions--would result not in a
better deal but rather in the continued expansion of the Iranian
nuclear program while making it difficult to keep international
sanctions in place. It would not necessarily result in war, but it
could well mean having to decide soon between allowing the continued
expansion of that program and using military force to stop it. This
agreement would set back the Iranian program significantly while
providing for unprecedented monitoring of that program, which seems a
better option than either of those two paths.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Nephew.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD NEPHEW, FELLOW, THE CENTER ON GLOBAL
ENERGY POLICY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Mr. Nephew. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member
Reed, and other distinguished members of this committee, for
the privilege of speaking to you today.
I will focus my remarks on three reasons to conclude that
this is a good deal, from a regional perspective.
First, it will create a 10- to 15-year band of time in
which fears of an Iranian nuclear weapon will be much reduced.
Since 2005, Iranian breakout time has dwindled to 2 to 3
months. Prior to the Joint [Comprehensive] Plan of Action,
there were fears that Iran could stage an undetected breakout.
With this deal, such an effort is not possible from declared
facilities, and far more difficult to pull off from covert
facilities. This is a welcome development for regional
stability.
Second, I believe this deal will reduce the chances of a
nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The argument that a deal
creates the strategic pretext for Arab nuclear weapons programs
is logically flawed. Iran has been building its enrichment
program for decades, and, in the last 10 years, notwithstanding
U.N. Security Council obligations to stop. If there was ever a
time to pursue enrichment, it was then. But, we simply have not
seen any evidence that countries in the region are seriously
pursuing enrichment programs, let alone nuclear weapons. The
most advanced nuclear state in the Arab world, the UAE, has
specifically pledged not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities. In exchange, the UAE [United Arab Emirates] is
constructing advanced power reactors that will provide it with
the civil nuclear energy it wants without the proliferation
risks we all fear. There has been no indication that the UAE
will backtrack on the decision it's made, or that any other
country in the Middle East is prepared to undertake the massive
effort required to construct an enrichment program. Similarly,
though many offhandedly suggest that the Saudis could buy a
warhead from Pakistan, even the request would present real
problems for the Pakistanis, who are still emerging from the
pariah status that AQ Khan [Abdul Qadeer Khan] created.
Pakistan's rebuff of Saudi Arabia's request for ground troops
in Yemen suggest Pakistan will not accede to every Saudi
request.
Third, this agreement may be the start of a process of
integrating Iran better into the international community and
moderating its bad behavior. This may not happen. At a minimum,
Iran's leaders will have to wrestle with the benefits and risks
of economic openness as a result of this deal, as well as the
threat of returning sanctions if they break its terms.
Now, of course, the deal does not solve everything and, as
other witnesses have testified, may make some problems worse in
the region. Since 1979, Iran has supported terrorism in causes
we oppose, even when impoverished by war or sanctions. The
nuclear deal does not address this problem, but neither did
strategic economic pressure. It is unlikely that holding back
relief, at the risk of a nuclear deal, would have.
To better manage the regional implications of the deal, I
believe that four steps ought to be taken:
First, we should and must continue to reaffirm our support
for our partners in the region. This should include arms sales,
but only as part of a broader package of cooperation across the
security and economic spheres. The United States should also
stand ready to use force against Iran, should it cheat on the
deal. This is a meaningful concept for the GCC [Gulf
Cooperation Council], which acknowledged the crucial nature of
U.S. security assurances in its statement on Monday in support
of the deal.
Second, we must have an active intelligence-sharing
relationship, particularly with respect to Iran and its
compliance with the nuclear deal. Partners will trust the
situation remains in control if they know what we know.
Third, we must have an active nuclear cooperation policy
with countries throughout the Arab world. Through these, we
should demonstrate that effective civil nuclear programs can be
built without enrichment and reprocessing, in practice, even if
prohibitions are not part of cooperation agreements.
Fourth, we must enforce the terms of the deal vigorously,
as well as use our sanctions authorities to target Iranian
activities throughout the region. This deal is not U.S.
unilateral sanctions disarmament. Snap-back is always possible
and scalable. Beyond the nuclear issue, the United States
retains a number of sanctions authorities that will continue to
exact consequences for Iranian violations of human rights and
damage Iran's ability to engage in terrorism financing. The
United States will still be able to pressure banks and
companies into not doing business with the IRGC [Iran's
Revoluntionary Guards Corps], the Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani,
and Iran's military and missile forces. This is both due to
direct risk of U.S. secondary sanctions, which remain in place,
and an improvement in international banking practices since 9/
11. The United States will also retain its ability to impose
sanctions on those trading with Iran in conventional arms, as
well as with respect to ballistic missiles, even after U.N.
restrictions lapse.
That said, we ought to seek ways to enhance these
authorities. Certainly, Iran could judge that United States
sanctions in these areas are unacceptable, and walk away.
Partners could, likewise, view the United States as being in
the wrong if our sanctions enforcement appears capricious. But,
international reaction to U.S. actions will always depend on
the context. If the rationale for doing so is credible, then we
can convince others to support us. For Iran, it will have to
face the prospect of all of our sanctions coming back into
play. This will present real difficulties to decisionmakers in
Tehran.
To conclude, though it is not a perfect deal, I believe
that the nuclear deal reached by the United States, the P5+1
partners, and Iran meets our needs, preserves our future
options, and improves the security and stability of the Middle
East. I urge Congress to make the right choice and to support
it.
[The prepared statement of Richard Nephew follows:]
Prepared Statement by Richard Nephew
Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and other
distinguished members of this Committee for inviting me to speak here
today. It is a privilege and an honor to speak to you on a subject to
which I have devoted nearly twelve years of my professional life as a
civil servant at the Department of Energy, Department of State, and
National Security Council: how to address the problems created by
Iran's nuclear program. In my current position at the Center on Global
Energy Policy at Columbia, I have continued my study of the use of
economic statecraft to deal with such national security challenges,
with Iran as the centerpiece.
I would like to begin by extending my personal gratitude to the
members of the United States negotiating team, all of whom set aside
personal commitments large and small in the pursuit of the agreement
reached in Vienna on July 14. Regardless of how one evaluates this
deal, one cannot contest that the people who worked so hard and
diligently to conclude it did so with anything other than the intention
of addressing a profound threat to U.S. national security. These men
and women, many of whom I can call friends, are dedicated to stopping
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Some of them have pursued this
goal for decades. We are all most fortunate that this country produces
diplomats, civil servants, and experts like these.
I would like to offer here my evaluation of the Iran nuclear deal
first as a general matter and then focus specifically on the regional
implications of the deal. In doing so, I will describe what the deal
itself has achieved, the consequences of this achievement, and the
alternatives that would be facing us absent the deal. I come to the
conclusion that, compared to the most realistic alternatives, this deal
is a very good one.
The agreement reached two weeks ago will prevent Iran from having a
credible opportunity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material for use
in a bomb for at least 10 years and likely beyond that. It does this
through a combination of restrictions and monitoring that will ensure
Iran faces a long path to weapons-acquisition, which can be detected
almost as soon as it begins. In this respect, President Obama and his
successors will have the time they need to evaluate Iranian compliance
with the agreement, and to take any necessary decisions to address
Iranian deficiencies.
This includes the use of military force. President Obama has not
taken this off of the table through this deal, nor would any President.
Instead, President Obama has ensured that if such a decision is ever
needed, it can be undertaken with greater time and clarity as to
Iranian intentions.
setting the context
To some degree, Iran has been at the precipice of a nuclear weapons
capability since it first began operating centrifuges at the
underground Natanz plant in 2007. Both Presidents Bush and Obama have
had to consider regularly whether the Iranian nuclear program was
getting out of hand, growing too large to be addressed through
diplomacy.
In my opinion, we were reaching just such a dangerous crossroads in
2013. Iran's nuclear program had grown to involve over 20,000 installed
centrifuges, nearly 7,000 kilograms of up-to-5 percent enriched uranium
gas (enough for multiple weapons), nearly 200 kilograms of up-to-20
percent enriched uranium gas (nearly enough for one weapon), and a
reactor at Arak that was nearly finished. Moreover, Iranian cooperation
with inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was
stagnant, with access granted to confirm only that declared nuclear
material was where it ought to be. While important, outstanding
questions about Iran's past nuclear program remained unaddressed and
with little prospect of answers or access forthcoming.
At the same time, sanctions were beginning to run out of steam.
International oil prices were over $100 a barrel and prospects for
taking away further Iranian oil revenues were slim. Despite aggressive
diplomatic efforts, including at the Presidential level, we were
getting fewer returns on our demands for oil reductions. Iran was the
worse for our sanctions, suffering a GDP contraction of 6.6 percent
between 2012-2013 according to the World Bank. \1\ Unemployment was
high, as was inflation. But, still, Iran was continuing to expand its
nuclear program and engage in all manner of destabilizing activities in
the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ World Bank data, downloaded on July 20, 2015, and available at:
http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-republic?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This was leading to calls both within the United States and from
our partners to consider military action. The problem was that no one
could articulate a theory of such action that would be decisive in
stopping Iran from ever getting a nuclear weapon without involving
regime change.
Faced with this situation, the United States decided to test the
proposition that newly-elected President Rouhani was committed to
fulfilling his campaign promise to seek removal of sanctions and a new
relationship with the international community. Talks began in secret to
see if a first step arrangement could be concluded that would, if not
step back from the brink of military confrontation or an Iranian
nuclear weapon, at least hold us at the lip. Such an arrangement would
require--and did elicit in the end--major nuclear concessions from the
Iranians. They would be forced to halt their progress, something they
had sworn never to do, and even roll the program back in key respects.
Sanctions relief would need to be part of it, in order to to create
incentives to keep Iran negotiating for a final deal. It had to promise
Iran a return on its investment but not make a final deal meaningless.
The result was the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), a much-derided
document at the time of its announcement but one that I think even
critics would grudgingly agree has served these purposes well.
Iran made clear during the negotiations on the JPOA that they would
not be able to accept it as a permanent arrangement; the sanctions
still in place were too severe and political pressure would prove toxic
for Rouhani if talks went on too long. So, they wanted to complete the
deal faster. Unfortunately, a similar desire to speed up the
negotiations also emerged from the United States and some of our
partners, despite the fact that Iran gave up much in its nuclear
program for a modest amount of relief. This was the first time, but not
the last, that opponents of the deal in the United States and Iran
share a common view. Unfortunately, a similar desire to speed up the
negotiations on a comprehensive deal emerged from the United States and
some of our partners, despite the fact that--for a modest amount of
relief--Iran gave up much. It was the first time, but not the last,
that opponents of a deal in both the United States and Iran were in
full agreement.
As a direct consequence, deadlines were established that Iran
sought to use as leverage against the United States. Iran came to
believe that the deadlines put in place were more important for United
States negotiators than for themselves, leading to inevitable delays in
Iranian decision-making and extended talks.
Still, the United States did not rush into a deal. Had it done so,
talks would not have been extended first in July 2014, then in
November, and then multiple times at the end of June and into July
2015. Instead, the U.S. negotiators demonstrated time and again that,
as Secretary Kerry said, ``we will not rush and we will not be
rushed.''
In the end, the Administration successfully demonstrated to Iran
that, if it wished to conclude a nuclear deal, then it would have to
make a number of concessions on issues that no less an authority than
the Supreme Leader had established as red lines. Admittedly, this did
not surprise me. Iranian negotiating style often involves brinksmanship
and some degree of exaggeration. It is only through testing and
prodding such red lines that the real limits of Iran's negotiating room
could be established. For this reason, key red lines--like the
requirement that immediate sanctions relief be furnished before any
nuclear changes could be implemented or that R&D continue without
restriction or even that Iran would require 190,000 centrifuges in the
near term--were broken by Iran in the final deal.
evaluating the nuclear aspects of the deal
The result of these negotiations is a deal that, in my view,
satisfies U.S. national security objectives. I define these as being:
1. Lengthening the time that Iran would need to produce enough
nuclear material for one nuclear weapon; and,
2. Ensuring that, during this time, any such attempt could be
quickly detected, such that the entire length of the breakout time is
available for response.
With respect to the first objective, the deal manifestly delivers.
The deal negotiated by the P5+1 will create a one year or longer
breakout timeline for Iran's declared nuclear program for the first ten
years of the implementation phase of the deal. That's just for uranium;
for plutonium, the breakout timeline is far longer, potentially
measurable in decades. Why?
With respect to uranium, the deal restricts Iran's installed
centrifuges to just over 6,000 IR-1 type machines for 10 years. Iran
will be able to do some small scale enrichment using advanced machines
at the end of this time period, but in numbers far too modest to
contribute to breakout. This limitation will also hold back the
progress of Iran's enrichment program. One does not go immediately from
small scale enrichment on small numbers of centrifuges to installing
and operating thousands of machines. Iran will have to spend time
perfecting these machines and it is unreasonable to expect that they
will achieve perfection in a few months of work. Iran has spent nearly
twenty years working on the IR-1 centrifuge, 1970s technology that it
bought outright, and only managed to operate this centrifuge at roughly
half of its design capacity.
Iran will also be limited to solely 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent
U-235 in any form for 15 years. This restriction alone would hold Iran
back from quick breakout because 60-70 percent of the work required for
a bomb is in the initial period of enrichment from natural levels to 84
percent.
But, combined with the centrifuge limits, Iran will be a year away
for at least 10 years--until 2025--and anywhere from 6-12 months away
for another 5 years beyond that. It is also important to note that,
during this time, inspectors will have continuous, online enrichment
monitoring of Iran's centrifuges. So, if a move to breakout were to
take place, it could be detected almost immediately through a system of
sophisticated, secure sensors.
After that, it is true that breakout probably will narrow. But,
only with respect to the declared uranium path. For plutonium, the
breakout timeline is multiple years long and will not shrink for a
considerable length of time. The Arak reactor's modification will
render it incapable of producing such plutonium, essentially
permanently because of difficulty of modifying the reactor core of a
once-operated reactor. Iran's agreement to not engage in reprocessing
R&D, to construct a reprocessing facility, or to construct a reactor
capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium in useful quantities will
last until 2030. But the impact of this decision will go farther:
having been stymied in this work for so long, it is unreasonable to
expect a rapid improvement in Iran's capabilities or physical capacity.
Judging by how long Iran has been building the Arak reactor (i.e.,
since 2007), it is reasonable to argue that it would be 2035 at least
before Iran could have another such reactor, let alone spent fuel
reprocessing capabilities.
Breakout is not the sole measure of a deal. But, compared to the
status quo--2-3 months to breakout for uranium, with 1-2 weapons worth
of plutonium being produced per year at Arak--we are far better off
with the deal than without it.
The deal also offers much by way of timely detection. Daily access
to Iran's most sensitive nuclear sites remains possible. But,
continuous monitoring--including through use of sophisticated new
safeguards technology--may make this unnecessary. The right to utilize
advanced monitoring technology is perhaps one of the most important if
unsung elements of the deal, reducing cost and labor burdens while also
dealing with problems of immediate access that would have constantly
raised questions as to whether Iran was cheating at any particular
moment.
Beyond the declared facilities, there is an impressive array of
monitoring provisions with respect to all of the key aspects of the
nuclear fuel cycle. From uranium production through centrifuge
manufacturing, the IAEA will have the right to monitor what Iran is
doing to ensure that it cannot be diverted to a covert path. Similarly,
Iran will be forced to utilize a procurement channel that enables the
United States to have a vote on what Iran can procure and end use
verification by exporters and, in some cases, the IAEA. Some of these
provisions lapse at the ten year mark but others--including the
important provisions on centrifuge manufacturing and uranium
production--continue for 20 and 25 years respectively. This means that
the world will have visibility into Iran's nuclear program beyond the
international norm, even enhanced by the Additional protocol, until
2040. Of course, the access Iran is required to provide under its
Comprehensive Safeguards Arrangement and Additional Protocol will
continue so long as Iran is adhering to those treaties; a decision to
withdraw from either would, naturally, trigger an international
response.
Some may argue that the time available to the President is far less
than promised, seeing as there is now a dispute resolution process that
participants are obliged to observe if there are difficulties with
JCPOA implementation. This process could take perhaps as long as 80
days. But, within a 1 year breakout time, that is still enough time to
seek new diplomatic action, based on the reapplication of pressure via
the snap-back mechanisms that would be triggered at the end of that
process as well as additional sanctions.
Moreover, we must bear in mind that any contingency that requires
less time than 80 days is also probably not one that sanctions would
have addressed in any event. Exposure of an ongoing, near-breakout and
covert Iranian nuclear weapons program would prompt consideration of
military options more than sanctions, and I personally believe that use
of force would be the best course of action in this instance. At the
same time, more modest actions prompting snap-back also would be less
likely to shrink the breakout time by any discernible degree. Discovery
that Iran has 100 more kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium would
be a problem. But, it would not shorten breakout below the snap-back
threshold.
In my view, therefore, any discussion of snap-back and the dispute
process needs to be based on a thorough evaluation of likely scenarios
and responses. Doing so results in different expectations for the risk
created by any particular Iranian violation.
after the sunset
Even some skeptics may agree that, within a 10-15 year band of
time, the deal may work as designed. However, this is distinct from the
concerns that exist about what would happen after the deal's main
restrictions end in 2030. Some, most notably Prime Minister Netanyahu,
have alleged that it is in this fashion that the deal paves the way to
an Iranian nuclear weapon.
I disagree. First, the argument against sunset presupposes that
there is either no point in time in which Iran could be trusted with a
nuclear program--or, anyway, the Islamic Republic of Iran--or that
negotiations could possibly have delivered a sunset far longer than
what is in the deal. Having experienced these talks personally, I can
vouch for the fact that there was no scenario in which Iran would
accept voluntarily the absence of a serious nuclear program for
decades. If the Iranian negotiators had delivered such a deal, people--
including important people in the security services--would be right to
ask why Iran endured sanctions for as long as it did. Moreover, Iran
has become an advocate for the entire non-nuclear world in its defense
of a nuclear program including enrichment. Expecting Iran to back away
from that role, even in return for sanctions relief, went beyond what
negotiations could achieve.
Some would argue in response that this does not mean that sunset of
10 years is acceptable. Certainly, I too would have preferred a multi-
decade long set of restrictions. But, it is legitimate to question why
that would be necessary as well as to ask how many years would be
enough to build confidence. Given that, taken in combination, the
restrictions and access provisions extend in some respects for 15-25
years, it is reasonable to argue that sunset will be a prolonged
affair.
During this time period, of course, the United States is also free
to abrogate the agreement and to declare that Iran's nuclear program,
at the time, remains a concern. Successful execution of this step will
require effective diplomacy and the right context at the time. But, it
is achievable if a future President decides that no other options would
work. Of course, a future President could also decide that Iran's
nuclear program must be met with force.
but what about sanctions?
A major complaint about the nuclear deal is that it provides Iran
with far too much sanctions relief and that the practical effect of
increasing trade with Iran will render snap-back ineffective.
First, on the issue of scale, it is a blunt reality that Iran was
not going to accept major restrictions on its nuclear program and
invasive monitoring on the cheap. No one in the United States
government would disagree that Iran should take these steps without
compensation, seeing as it is Iran that stands in violation of its
international obligations. But, in the real world, this is not a
sustainable argument. Just as Iran could not scrap its nuclear program
to make a deal work, Iran could also not accept nuclear steps being
taken without reciprocation. De-escalation of the nuclear program
required de-escalation of sanctions.
Faced with this reality, the Administration did the right thing in
leveraging sanctions relief for maximum, early nuclear steps. Instead
of debating whether one sanction was worth 10 centrifuges, the
Administration cut Iran a deal: in exchange for big nuclear steps, big
sanctions relief could be given. Iran is now under every incentive to
take the steps required of it as soon as possible (and, arguably, would
be even now removing centrifuges if the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review
Act had not been passed, mandating the present 60 day review period).
The United States insisted, and Iran agreed, that no such sanctions
relief could be enacted until the IAEA verifies that Iran has done its
part. As a result, we will be able to see--and have the IAEA report--
that Iran has done everything required of it before any relief flows.
But, the sanctions relief provided by the United States does not
equate with unilateral sanctions disarmament. The United States retains
a number of sanctions authorities that will continue to damage Iran's
ability to engage in terrorism financing, as well as to exact
consequences for violations of Iranian human rights and other
destabilizing activities. This includes the all-too-important tool of
secondary sanctions through the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability and Divestment Act or CISADA. With this tool, the United
States will still be able to pressure banks and companies against doing
business with the IRGC, Qods Force, Qassem Solemani, and Iran's
military and missile forces. The EU and U.N. decisions to remove some
of these entities from their own sanctions list is therefore important
to Iran mainly as a symbolic step; practically, these entities and
individuals will find their international business activities stymied
due to the centrality of the United States in global finance until they
correct their own behavior in the eyes of the United States.
Moreover, the United States will retain its ability to impose
sanctions on entities and individuals trading with Iran in conventional
arms and ballistic missiles, even after U.N. restrictions in this
regard lapse in 5 and 8 years respectively. The U.N.'s provisions were
important in terms of setting international approval and backstopping
for U.S. unilateral efforts. But, they were conditioned, even as early
as 2006 and 2007, on Iran's failure to fulfill its nuclear obligations.
Even the earliest UNSC resolutions laid out a package in which these
sanctions would be terminated when Iran satisfied the P5+1 and IAEA on
the nuclear issue. Further, it is the consequence of U.S. sanctions on
these targets that can best deter bad behavior. Similarly,
international export controls governing transfers of these types will
remain fully in force.
Second, on the issue of snap-back, Iran's growing international
economic integration will cut both ways. Certainly, it is possible that
the politics around future Iran sanctions will be prejudicial to rapid
snap-back. However, the structure of the dispute process gives even
just one country the right to insist that the UNSC consider whatever
matter is in question with respect to compliance with the deal. The
deal structures the snapback of UNSC sanctions such that the P5 veto
power only works to end sanctions relief. In other words, though the
process may need to be navigated, in the end, even acting alone, the
United States can bring existing UNSC sanctions back into operation.
As noted, this could come with political costs. Many skeptics point
to these costs as likely meaning that no such snapback would ever be
triggered. But, many of these same skeptics also argue that it is
theoretically possible to end the deal now and keep international
partners moving forward with the imposition of sanctions. This is out
of joint with reality and practical experience. Simply put,
international reaction to U.S. actions now or in the future will always
depend on the context and narrative. If the rationale for doing so is
credible and the context demands action, then chances for success will
always be higher.
Additionally, Iran too would have much to lose if snapback were to
be triggered. Iran's leaders would therefore have to carefully evaluate
the costs and benefits of any course of action that threatens the
integrity of the nuclear deal. These costs will grow as Iran's economy
recovers and grows. Explaining to Iran's people why a civil nuclear
program has gone out of alignment with any practical needs, prompting
reversion of sanctions, would prove a difficult conversation for
Tehran, maybe as difficult as the one the United States would need to
have with partners about the imperative of reapplying sanctions.
regional implications
I would like to concentrate on two different sets of regional
implications. The first is the risk that Iran will plow its hard-won
sanctions relief into terrorism and regional troublemaking. The second
is that Iran's enrichment program will spawn a cascade of new nuclear
programs through the Middle East. I will conclude with some thoughts on
how to address these implications.
Terrorism
It is certainly true that Iran will continue to support terrorism
and activities that we oppose throughout the region. No level of
sanctions could stop them from doing so. This is a government that has,
after all, funded and armed radical elements since the fall of the Shah
of Iran in 1979, through the Iran-Iraq War, and after the
intensification of crippling sanctions in 2010. Tehran continued to
invest in the Assad regime, despite the immediate loss of over a
quarter of its 2012 oil revenues from sanctions imposed in December
2011, and $60 billion in potential revenues from that point forward.
Likewise, Iran has assisted Shiite militants in Iraq, the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and is now supporting the Houthis in Yemen, despite major
economic crisis at home. Clearly, money is no consideration for the
Iranians when it comes to support for terrorism.
But, money is important when it comes to Iran's domestic front.
Iran's population as well as its leaders know how much money is at
stake, and how it can be used. It is implausible that, after the
Supreme Leader allowed Rouhani to be elected president in 2013 on a
platform pledging economic recovery--in part, through promises of
sanctions relief--either man would support initiatives that leave the
Iranian population in the cold in order to protect foreign groups and
leaders like Assad. To do so would be to risk the very instability and
threat to the regime that the Iranian government have sought to prevent
by seeking sanctions relief through this deal.
Since the international community intensified sanctions against
Iran in 2010, Iran has only grown more desperate. For example, the
country's oil sector now needs anywhere from $50 to $100 billion in
investment to improve production, a point that Iranian officials,
including Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, have emphasized
repeatedly over the past two years. External investment was cut off by
sanctions, and Iran has not had the spare capital to maintain, much
less improve, its facilities. Nor has it enjoyed access to new
technologies that could enhance oil field productivity.
Oil is, of course, only one part of Iran's economy, which includes
struggling industries like automobile and domestic manufacturing. To
avoid an over-dependence on global oil markets, Iran has also made it
state policy to build a diversified export economy. Given the
prevailing low global oil prices, Iran is likely to continue trying to
strengthen other sectors to maximize its growth potential and limit its
vulnerability to an uncertain market.
Lest observers assume that Iran would have turned its entire
economy into a terrorism-financing machine if only it had the money,
consider the fact that the most intensive sanctions on the country are
only 3 years old. Before January 2012, oil sales were bringing in
nearly $88 billion a year, money that Tehran largely spent as any
government would: on domestic priorities--not solely to back anti
Western interests. If the LA Times is to believed, this is a conclusion
that CIA has itself reached.
As with the effort to wean its economy off oil, Iran has also
sought to reduce costly subsidies on everything from food, to housing,
to energy, in order to improve the economy's efficiency, reduce waste,
and spur competitiveness. But sanctions targeting Iranian oil revenues
hampered that effort, as the country lacked the hard currency--and
political will--to forge ahead with subsidy reform, at least until
Rouhani's election. It is now struggling to complete this project, one
that sanctions relief would undoubtedly boost by providing Iran with
fresh revenue and reducing its citizens' dependence on government
handouts. This is particularly important for Rouhani, who will be
looking to shore up domestic support in the run-up to parliamentary
elections in February 2016 and to win reelection in 2017.
But beyond this, any rosy expectations for Iran's economy must be
tempered by the reality that oil, still its primary economic driver, is
worth less today than in years past and is predicted to stay that way
for the foreseeable future. Iran simply won't have as much money coming
in on an annual basis, due to global economic conditions, until the
rest of its economy picks up speed. Even if Tehran had wanted to spend
$100 billion on nefarious side projects a few years ago (and let's be
clear: given $100 billion was more than the entire annual oil export
revenue for Iran at the time, even when prices were high, this would
hardly be credible), it makes even less sense today.
Consequently, it is much more likely that only a portion of the
liberated $100 billion and any future revenues will go to support
Tehran's regional adventurism. No one knows how much, but experts have
made some educated guesses, suggesting that the regime has spent
anywhere from $3.5 to $20 billion a year in Syria, figures that pale in
comparison to annual military spending by the United States and the
Gulf Cooperation Council. \2\ This is not to say that Iran cannot do a
lot of damage with a few billion more dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Stockholm International Peach Research Institute, ``SIPRI
Military Expenditures Database,'' http://www.sipri.org/research/
armaments/milex/milex--database.
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But, Iran will have to deal with residual United States and
international sanctions inhibiting it. As mentioned earlier, this
includes sanctions that preserve the secondary application of U.S.
sanctions on foreign businesses and banks. But, beyond this, since 9/
11, the international banking system has adopted new standards and
helped create intergovernmental groups like the Financial Action Task
Force [FATF] to crack down on money laundering and terrorism financing.
Banks monitor their business far more aggressively now than ever before
to detect and prevent such activities, in part by using the best
practices and guidelines developed by FATF. Banks are also under
greater scrutiny by their national regulators--and, in fact, by the
U.S. Treasury Department--to keep their systems from being used by
terrorists and their financiers for illicit acts.
Moreover, if need be, Washington and its partners can always
augment sanctions to deal with specific Iranian threats, such as Iran's
conventional arms market. These could be modeled on an existing
authority, like sanctions covering the manufacture, shipping, and
financing of weapons of mass destruction. Far be it from abandoning
sanctions as a tool after the nuclear deal, the United States could use
sanctions as an effective deterrent in this regional context. Care,
however, will have to be taken to avoid giving Iran a pretext to argue
that the United States is undermining the very sanctions relief that
made a nuclear deal possible in the first place.
In this context, several observers have suggested that it might be
necessary to undertake strategic economic pressure against Iran as we
have done to deal with the nuclear program. I think that this is
probably unnecessary and potentially a mistake. First, we already have
applied strategic economic pressure on Iran and did not meaningfully
change its regional approach. Though the sanctions we applied on Iran
from 2010-2013 were nuclear in focus, Iran felt no distinction. Nor did
it respond by making accommodations on the terrorism front, as it did
on the nuclear program. I believe this is because both the causes to
which Iran is dedicated in the region are too dear to it to abridge and
the financial requirements for the support of terrorism are relatively
meager. To get the kind of economic pressure that would be required to
get Iran to discontinue its financial support for terrorism--rather
than reduce it, as probably did take place--we would have to establish
the same kind of sanctions regime against Iraq in the 1990s, reducing
Iran to a starvation diet.
It is highly doubtful that our most important sanctions partners
would support us in such an endeavor and the risk of sanctions leakage
would be significant. But, even if they did, for how long would we
prepared to keep such a regime in place? For, if we relaxed the
pressure at some point, it is doubtful that Iran would abandon future
support for terrorism. Ultimately, in my view, such a path leads us to
requiring regime change, with all the complications that this would
bring.
Instead, I believe that the use of targeted financial sanctions
pressure to cut off nodes is a better, more effective approach to
dealing with support for terrorism, as part of a larger approach I will
describe below.
Regional Proliferation
The second main concern posited is that Iran will fan the flames of
regional nuclear proliferation, leading to nuclear weapons programs
throughout the Arab world as a counter to Iran's now entrenched nuclear
program.
I strongly disagree that this is the likely result of this deal.
Moreover, I believe we have adequate tools to prevent such an outcome.
First, this argument presupposes that countries have been waiting
for a negotiated outcome to enshrine Iran's enrichment program into
international law to launch their own nuclear programs. But, this
argument implicitly suggests that while a deal to constrain Iran's
nuclear program might motivate others to launch a breakout, Iran's
relatively unconstrained last ten years did not. If there is a logic to
Arab nuclear weapons efforts, then it is that they cannot count on
anyone else to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear arms and must
counterbalance Iran themselves. If this were truly their view, then why
only start now? We should be seeing signs of nuclear weapons breakout
around the region.
Instead, we see either nuclear programs being undertaken with an
explicit, if bounded, unilateral renunciation of uranium enrichment (as
in the UAE) or with far less direction and interest than would be
expected (as in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, principally). There have been
periodic statements of interest in nuclear energy by other countries in
the region and even some efforts to establish the legal and scientific
infrastructure that could facilitate a larger program. But, the most
advanced Arab nuclear program is in the UAE and, as noted, it is being
built on the back of a non-enrichment pledge that no one in the UAE has
suggested they will renounce. If a nuclear arms race has been launched,
it may be the most modest one in history.
Of course, an argument can be made that, prior to the nuclear deal,
Iran was under perpetual threat of military conflict with the United
States. Now, with a deal, it is not. Such a mindset ignores the fact
that President Obama has explicitly retained the military option for
dealing with Iran's nuclear program and that several candidates to
succeed him have done the same (if not indicated that military strikes
would be a preferred approach to diplomacy). But, it is arguable that
conditions have changed and, therefore, so must the security calculus
of Arab countries.
The flaw in this argument, though, is that several states in the
region have already stated their support for the deal, including those
most often identified as the likeliest to match Iran with their own
nuclear programs: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Turkey. The Gulf
Cooperation Council issued its own statement of support on August 3,
with the Foreign Minister of Qatar saying all of their behalf: ``We are
confident that what they undertook makes this region safer and more
stable.'' \3\ The GCC's statement also underscored the degree to which
United States security assurances bring comfort to its membership.
True, any of these countries could be concealing their security fears
in order not to offend either the United States or Iran. But, taken in
combination with the fact that none of them also has announced a
decision to establish an enrichment program with which to compete
against Iran--which would be entirely legitimate under the NPT's
current rules--it is pure conjecture to argue that the arms race has
been launched.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Gordon, Michael, August 3, 2015, ``John Kerry Wins Gulf States'
Cautious Support for Iran Deal,'' New York Times, Available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/world/middleeast/gulf-states-cautiously-
support-iran-nuclear-deal.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage &
module=second-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The statement that is used most often to contradict this positive
assessment is that of former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al
Faisel, who has often indicated that Saudi Arabia will insist on
matching directly any physical capabilities that Iran has. \4\
Presumably, this means that the Saudis will now seek to build their own
enrichment plant to match Iran's and to invest in the capabilities
required to bring it to the nuclear weapons threshold. But, we have not
seen that thus far. What we have seen is a willingness to spend some
money to develop science centers that, one day, could train the experts
required to start a nuclear weapons project. We have seen willingness
to explore the construction of reactors, but the physical
infrastructure has yet to be built or pursued seriously. \5\ To acquire
even an enrichment program--much less a nuclear weapons program--would
require a massive expansion of Saudi expenditure and investment.
Certainly, the Saudis have the money to finance the attempt but every
day that they do not is another day deep into the future that they
would be able to turn finance into nuclear material. It takes time to
develop such capabilities. The Manhattan Project was a war-time
endeavor financed by the world's strongest economy and aided by some of
the finest scientific minds in the world. Nuclear weapons programs in
China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have taken far longer. Iran's
enrichment program started in the late 1980s, but on the backs of
scientists who took their training at United States universities in the
late 1960s and 1970s. Iran's first reactor, supplied by the United
States, was delivered in 1967. These things take time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Usher, Barbara Plett, March 16, 2015, ``Iran Deal Could Start
Nuclear Fuel Race: Saudi Arabia,'' BBC, Available at: http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31901961
\5\ Esfandiary, Dina and Ariane Tabatabai, April 22, 2015, ``Why
Nuclear Dominoes Won't Fall in the Middle East,'' Available at: http://
thebulletin.org/why-nuclear-dominoes-wont-fall-middle-east8236
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, there has long been a theory that Saudi Arabia could
purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan, drawing on the long history of
support the Saudis have given the Pakistanis (which some say even
involved financing the Pakistani nuclear weapons program). But, the
Pakistanis have their own problems, none of which would be assisted by
transferring nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology or even
enrichment technology to a non-nuclear weapon state. Pakistan has
sought to emerge from the pariah status it attained when A.Q. Khan sold
uranium enrichment elsewhere in the Middle East (notably, to Iran and
Libya but not to Saudi Arabia), one reason why--when the Bush
Administration sought to overturn decades of nonproliferation practice
by creating an India-specific set of carveouts to the nonproliferation
regime--Pakistan was left in the cold. Moreover, Pakistan has already
demonstrated independence from Saudi Arabia in turning down the Saudi
request for ground troops in Yemen this spring.
Egypt faces similar technical problems, while the UAE and Turkey
have made clear that they have different priorities than matching
Iran's enrichment program (the latter aided by the maintenance of the
NATO nuclear umbrella).
But, let us briefly consider an alternative scenario in which the
Iranian nuclear program is not constrained by a nuclear deal. If those
arguing that nuclear proliferation will begin immediately, then killing
this deal would logically become the starting pistol for an arms race
as well. Iran's nuclear program would almost certainly be rejuvenated,
with thousands of new centrifuges and a completed Arak reactor only the
most visible manifestations of a dedicated Iranian capabilities drive.
Some have argued that a better deal would emerge from this, though this
argues that Iran could be forced to agree to lower centrifuge numbers,
longer terms, and more intrusive inspections after the United States
becomes the diplomatic pariah for ending a deal most states in the
world support. Assuming that is not the case, then the only response
would be accommodation of even greater Iranian nuclear capabilities
through a new deal--with a United States bluff having been called--or
military action. Unless regime change were envisioned, military action
is more likely to create an incentive for Iran to develop a nuclear
deterrent in the future. As a consequence, more likely to spur the arms
race that so many fear now.
u.s. policy response
The above analysis lays out a reasoned examination of why the
region will not spiral out of control simply because of the nuclear
deal we are here to discuss. But, this is not to say that the United
States should rest on its laurels. I recommend four specific steps to
manage the consequences of the deal and to ensure that the doomsday
scenarios I doubt will occur are clearly avoided.
First, the United States must continue to reaffirm its support for
our partners in the region. This should involve arms sales, but must go
beyond that. We should maintain a robust military presence in the
region and ability to quickly bring military assets to bear throughout
it. We should also explore ways of working with Arab countries to make
their military response force a capable, coherent and useful instrument
to challenge and contain Iranian regional bad behavior. Most important,
we need to demonstrate that, though we have global interests, we have
regional priorities, foremost of these the security of our regional
partners. Coordination of activities in the region to combat terrorism
is an important part of the endeavor, as are continued strategic
dialogues about how to handle the various problems that exist in the
region. Importantly, dialogue must be a true two-way street in which
the United States is free to share its perspectives and analysis, as
are U.S. partners. This may include uncomfortable conversations about
domestic situations in partner countries that could offer openings to
Iranian troublemaking. Friends might not like hearing such things and
resent the implied condescension, but it is the responsibility of
friends to pass along tough messages as well as physical support.
Second, we need to maintain robust intelligence-sharing with
countries in the region about Iran's activities and, importantly,
compliance with the nuclear deal. Some things will need to be protected
given sources and methods concerns, but the general modus operandi
ought to be transparency when it comes to the nuclear deal. Only
through confidence that intelligence cooperation is full and forthright
will partners believe that they know all that we know about Iranian
strategic intentions and capabilities. That can only come with enhanced
coordination and sharing.
Third, the United States must strive to be an active, positive
nuclear cooperation partner with countries in the region. Trying to put
the genie back into the bottle by denying nuclear cooperation with
countries like Saudi Arabia unless they foreswear any future
possibility of uranium enrichment on their territories was always a
complicated--and probably impossible--proposition. Now, it is
undeniably more difficult. But, nuclear cooperation can put us in a
stronger position to discourage the exercise of the enrichment option,
which is not precluded by the NPT. We have never been able to convince
any country to relinquish forever its capacity to produce enriched
uranium at home. Even the ``gold standard'' nuclear cooperation
agreement with the UAE contains the possibility of the UAE backing out
of its no-enrichment pledge if it so chooses as well as an expiration
date, Instead of pressing for a self-denying legal commitment, we must
concentrate on removing the incentives to pursue enrichment or
reprocessing by providing cradle-to-grave nuclear supply and by
demonstrating our reliability as nuclear trading partners.
Fourth, we must continue to enforce our existing sanctions to deal
with Iranian terrorism, destabilizing regional activities and
violations of human rights. As noted above, Iran has reserved the right
to react negatively to such decisions by withdrawing from the nuclear
deal. This is not the unprecedented, unacceptable sign of a weak
agreement that critics are making it out to be, but rather a standard
principle of national sovereignty. Even the NPT has a withdrawal
provision. But, Iran will face consequences should it decide to do so.
Iran is less likely to withdraw from this nuclear deal in response to
credible enforcement of non-nuclear-related sanctions than it is in
response to broad sectoral-based sanctions for non-nuclear reasons. To
this end, even new authorities could potentially be adopted so long as
they do not overlap the terms of the sanctions relief provided in the
JCPOA or give Iran a credible argument that it is being deprived of the
relief its nuclear restrictions have purchased. One such concept could
be the promulgation of sanctions authorities, including an Executive
Order, that permits sanctions against those who traffic in conventional
arms to or from Iran. This would remove the need to demonstrate that
such arms are going to a particular end use, making the legal hurdles
less. Iran may choose to ignore these sanctions or protest them, but we
can enforce them nonetheless and continue to make such trade anathema.
Of course, we can continue to enforce the U.N.'s and our specific
sanctions covering transfers to terrorist groups, Assad's forces in
Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen.
conclusion
I believe that the nuclear agreement reached by the United States,
its P5+1 partners, and Iran is a good deal. It is not a perfect deal.
There are things that, in a perfect world, would be changed, starting
with the fact that--ideally--Iran would not be permitted to engage in
enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water activities in perpetuity. Such
an Iran would also be forced to change into a better actor in the
region and beyond.
But, we do not have the luxury of that world. Instead, we face two
options. We can either accept the deal that has been negotiated. Or, we
can turn our backs on it. To do so is to go in an ill-defined
alternative scenario. Some argue that in this scenario, sanctions can
be intensified in order to achieve a better deal. Still others argue
that military action could be undertaken. But, each of these courses of
action would require taking significant risks that either they would
not be successful and, in the attempt, that we would lose the support
of the international community. An Iran strategy based on ``going it
alone'' is not a recipe for success.
Moreover, while pursuing such an alternative, Iran would either
wait expectantly for the sucker punch to be delivered that would
complete the job of undoing global support for United States efforts,
or march forward on its nuclear program, beginning the operations of
thousands of new centrifuges and constructing the Arak reactor in its
original, bomb-factory design.
For, at this point, there is no magical middle ground to be
occupied. If the United States rejects the deal now, it will not be
possible to negotiate a new one and certainly not before Iran
undertakes a potentially dramatic expansion of its nuclear program.
This is because of both the politics that will be associated with doing
so in Iran--whose leaders would convincingly argue ``if the United
States is not going to fulfill this deal, what is to say they would
fulfill a future one?''--and because the JPOA would collapse at the
same time as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Some argue that
Iran could continue to observe its JPOA commitments and so could the
United States. But, United States law now makes that impossible. Under
the terms of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), if a joint
resolution of disapproval is passed by Congress, the JPOA can no longer
be observed by the United States as a legal matter. The law states that
the President is no longer permitted to provide relief from sanctions
established by Congressional action. So, waivers could not be extended
under the statutory authorities in place.
As such, the Executive Branch would have to restart efforts to
reduce Iranian oil exports--paused under the JPOA--and impose sanctions
for the movement of Central Bank of Iran funds. It is inconceivable
that, even if Iran wished to keep the JPOA afloat, Iran would accept
United States efforts to reduce Iran's oil exports by holding steady on
the nuclear program. So, even if new laws are not adopted by Congress
or the Executive Branch, U.S. sanctions under the JPOA would again be
active and in need of enforcement.
Would international partners join us in this effort? It is highly
doubtful and certainly not with the vigor needed to be effective. As
such, the United States would be brought into confrontation with key
trading partners.
So, Congress must make the choice that it asserted was essential in
the passage of INARA and decide if the alternative to the JCPOA is
worth it. Leadership and vision from Congress, as the President has
shown in pursuing this deal, is now needed. I urge Congress to make the
right choice, and to support this deal.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Professor Mead, as a result of this--maybe I'd ask all the
witnesses, beginning with you, Professor Mead--do you
anticipate Iran's support for the spread of terrorism and
influence throughout other Middle East to increase or decrease
as a result of this agreement? We know that they are in Yemen
and Iraq and Syria and Lebanon, and now we have reports of them
providing--the Iranians providing weapons to the Taliban. Do
you believe that their efforts as--and status as the world's
number-one supporter of terrorism would increase or decrease?
Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman, I believe the Iranians will use the
opportunities offered by this agreement to expand their efforts
to become stronger, to push their enemies back, and to redesign
the Middle East in their own image.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Singh?
Mr. Singh. I think that, at the very least, there's no
indication that they'll decrease it, and I think there's good
reasons to think that they could increase it as a result of the
agreement, for a couple of different reasons. One is that you
may see them want to reaffirm their anti-American bona fides in
the wake of having made a diplomatic deal with the United
States, since anti-Americanism is so core to the regime's
identity. Second, I think that, because the Supreme Leader of
Iran has generally tried to balance the different factions of
the regime, to the extent this is seen as a victory for
President Rouhani and the pragmatists, he may have a desire to
sort of throw a bone to the hardliners in the IRGC [Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corps] and so forth by giving them freer
rein in other realms.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Takeyh.
Dr. Takeyh. As I mentioned, Chairman, the international
relations of Islamic Republic, in my view, should be thought
about in two segments--'79 to 2011, 2011 to today. In aftermath
of 2011, we see a much more aggressive expansionist Iran,
simply because there are more opportunities with the collapse
of the regional state system as a result of Arab Awakenings.
So, as they respond to those opportunities with additional
funds, I expect a surge of Iranian imperialism and terrorism.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Gordon?
Dr. Gordon. As I said in my testimony, Iran is, indeed, a
leading state sponsor of terrorism, and it is right to worry
that they would use some of the assets----
Chairman McCain. My question was, Do you think it will
increase or decrease?
Dr. Gordon. I'm not sure that it will have a direct effect
on what is----
Chairman McCain. So, you're not sure.
Dr. Gordon.--Iran is already doing.
Chairman McCain. So, you're not sure. I've got to----
Mr. Nephew.
Mr. Nephew. Senator, I think that the Iranians are going to
continue the policies they've had for the last 35 years. But,
they weren't going to change them without a nuclear deal, as
well.
Chairman McCain. I see. So, it's okay to have a nuclear
deal and no restraint on their terrorist activities. Is that
your answer, Mr. Nephew?
Mr. Nephew. No, Senator. In fact, I said, a number of
different ways, that we should have restraint on their
terrorism support. We have a lot of policies that we can use to
do that.
Chairman McCain. The question is, now that they have $50-60
billion, or whatever additional they have, that they will--in
the view of at least this Senator and others, they will
increase their terrorist activities--more refugees, more
killing, more expansionist into other countries in the region.
Professor Mead, what do you make of the statements by the
Gulf countries and the Saudis? A sort of a conditional
endorsement of this agreement?
Mr. Mead. Well, Senator, I think they're making the best
agreement--best step they can, from their own point of view.
They see a fait accompli, and they think they might as well see
if they can--what they can get from the United States by, at
least in public, appearing to go along, though I must say, very
cautiously, I suspect that if some of you were to go over to
the region and speak with them privately, you might hear a more
alarmed response.
Chairman McCain. I've already heard that, yes.
Mr. Singh, we have various quotes from individuals in the
Iranian regime that are saying, for example, that there will be
no inspections of any military facility. What are we to make of
those comments by more than one senior members of this regime?
Mr. Singh. Well, Senator, the agreement obviously gives
Iran the ability to say no if the IAEA requests access to
sites. So, I think that what you see now are the Iranians, not
just for domestic consumption, but also for our consumption and
the IAEA's consumption, trying to condition us to understand
what they will and won't accept, to sort of already start
testing this clause of the agreement about our access to
undeclared or suspect sites. What you've heard, for example,
from Ali Akbar Velayati, who is the Foreign Policy Advisor to
the Supreme Leader, is, ``Anytime we get a request for access
to military sites, the answer is no.'' That should be
unacceptable to us, and it will set up a confrontation to
demand access and get access to those sites.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Takeyh?
Dr. Takeyh. I think, as Mike suggested, there will be a
real issue of contention.
I just want to say one thing about inspection regime in
this particular agreement, which is prolonged, and the notion
that the only way you can get a different agreement is through
armistice after the war. One of the things I did in the 1980s,
when I was in college, I studied arms control, which in 1989
didn't seem like a very good decision, but, actually, in
retrospect, it is. South Africa actually agreed, during the
time of when it was cleansing itself of nuclear weapons, to
allow inspectors anytime/anywhere access, which they identified
as one day. That was the arrangement that was essentially
informally worked out with the IAEA. That process took a number
of years for IAEA to validate that South Africa is no longer
husbanding nuclear weapons. But, we have had inspections that
are much more time-sensitive in the past for a country that was
ruled by Nelson Mandela.
Chairman McCain. Well, of course, it's also--the repeated
refrain is ``the best deal we could get.'' That certainly is in
the eye of the beholder. In the view of Dr. Kissinger and
former Secretary [of State] Shultz, in the Wall Street Journal,
this negotiation, more from doing away with Iran's efforts to
attain nuclear weapons, to delaying the Iranian acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Singh, you made a very interesting point, which is
that, in the aftermath of the agreement, if it's withheld, the
leadership in Iran could try to placate their most, you know,
aggressive forces by giving them a freer hand. There's a flip
side to that, that if the agreement is rejected by the United
States, wouldn't it be a temptation to sort of vent their
displeasure by increasing their terrorism activities in the
region, and--otherwise, it would appear that they're just
simply accepting the fact that the sanctions are in place and
that, you know, they're just unwittingly going along with the
U.S.?
Mr. Singh. Well, Senator, I think that--as I mentioned
before in response to Senator McCain, I don't think that their
regional strategy is going to change fundamentally as a result
of the deal. I don't think it would change if there were no
deal. I think that their regional strategy is what it is,
essentially.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. Singh. What the deal does is, it perhaps facilitates
that regional strategy. If there is no deal, I have no doubt
that you'll have people in Tehran sort of crowing about the
unreliability of the United States, and so forth. Again, what
is the practical impact, in terms of what they do? I doubt that
it causes a fundamental change. We're already seeing, as Dr.
Takeyh mentioned, an expansion in what they're doing.
Senator Reed. But, it--that expansion--I think the point
that you make would--could be facilitated by additional
resources, but their strategy, their terrorism, et cetera, that
trajectory is set, regardless of the outcome of the nuclear
negotiation.
Mr. Singh. I think it is. There's a flip side to that,
though, which is, their nuclear weapons ambitions are part of
that strategy. That strategy I mentioned about anti-access and
area denial, about projecting power and restricting our ability
to operate in the region, is undoubtedly enhanced by having
either a threshold nuclear weapons capability or an actual
nuclear weapon. So, that's why we had, sort of at the outset of
these negotiations, when I was involved from the NSC [National
Security Council], thought that, for a nuclear agreement to be
sustainable, you had to have a strategic shift by Iran. Since
we haven't seen that strategic shift, I think, fundamentally,
the nuclear weapons ambitions remain in place.
Senator Reed. Those nuclear ambitions are at least
suspended--there are various terms: parked, delayed, made more
complicated--by the agreement, at least.
Mr. Singh. Well, I----
Senator Reed. They're made more complicated.
Mr. Singh. I think that--as I mentioned, I think that
Iran's objective has been twofold. I think they've wanted to
have--to sort of cement that nuclear weapons option while
getting the sanctions relief. I think the accomplishment, from
the Iranian point of view here--and President Rouhani of Iran
has sort of suggested this, he hasn't said it explicitly--is
that now Iran's nuclear weapons program--he would say Iran's
nuclear program--is legitimized, essentially. Iran's enrichment
activities and other activities are accepted rather than
considered illegal or illicit by the Security Council. So, it
locks that option into place so that, if Iran wanted to
exercise it in the future, whether because the sunsets expire,
whether through covert means, which I actually think is much
more likely, they have that option in place.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Dr. Gordon, the same--similar set of questions, in terms
of--the agreement's rejected, I think there's--seems to be a
consensus that the terrorism trajectory continues, maybe with
more energy, or less. But, in terms of suspending, at least,
their--or shackling a bit--their nuclear potential, that
disrupts their overall strategy of combining this near-nuclear
state with terrorism.
Dr. Gordon. Right. As I said in response to Senator McCain,
I'm not sure there's a direct link between this deal and their
terrorism activities, which they will probably pursue. It is
true--so, I agree with Mike on that score--they will have a
little bit more resources to put to that, but those resources,
you know, have other obligations on them, as well.
I would note that most of their terrorism-supporting
activities are not particularly cost-sensitive. I mean, Iran is
devoting to terrorism what it chooses to devote to terrorism.
More money in the coffers is not likely to make a significant
difference there. So, my concern is--in the rejection scenario
that you talk about, is that it doesn't have a major impact on
the continued support of terrorism, which is obviously a huge
problem we need to confront, but, at the same time, we lose the
nuclear deal.
Senator Reed. It essentially accelerates this strategy of
enhanced terrorism with enhanced nuclear capabilities, so it's
not 10 years out, it's several years out----
Dr. Gordon. Which----
Senator Reed.--or we're forced to make a choice very
quickly about more severe steps.
Dr. Gordon. Exactly. That would be the worst of all world,
if they were able to move forward on the nuclear front while
still pursuing the terrorism agenda.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Singh. Senator, can I just clarify one point here?
Senator Reed. Sure. Sure. Absolutely.
Mr. Singh. There's a point of disagreement, because I think
that we shouldn't minimize the impact of additional resources.
If you look at the state of groups like Hezbollah, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the Houthis, and so forth, in Yemen,
there is plenty of reporting that's out in the open source to
suggest that these groups are financially squeezed, that
support for Hezbollah has gone down, Islamic Jihad has had to
close offices, Hamas was decimated, obviously, by the last
round of fighting with Israel. So, additional resources, I
think, can actually make a big difference.
Then the other thing to bear in mind is, with the arms
export ban to Iran lifted, with those arms sanctions being
lifted in 5 years, with the ballistic missile sanctions being
lifted, there could be a qualitative increase in what Israel--
I'm sorry--what Iran is able to provide to groups like
Hezbollah, which are facing Israel and other allies. So,
replacing rockets with guided missiles, for example. Those are
important things.
Senator Reed. Let me, on the other side, though, just to
put it on the table and be evenhanded, is that this opening to
the West--the trade, the commerce, the more interaction--will
have a very difficult--it will have an effect, difficult to
measure, but it might even be a counter effect, in that they
have, now, a little bit more to lose, in terms of some more
provocative activity, if they're beginning to see a major
increase in interaction with the international community. I--my
time's expired, but I just----
Mr. Singh. I mean--you know, I can't rule that out, but I
would say we haven't seen that, you know, with China, for
example, which is opened economically to the world.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. Singh. It's not really diminished the danger, in a
sense. Also, you know, we haven't had a great success in the
past in getting, say, European support for terrorism sanctions
on Iran.
Senator Reed. But, that might change, too, given the fact
that we have now got their agreement with the nuclear side. Now
we can shift forces. I don't want to abuse my time, but thank
you, Mr. Singh.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
another excellent panel. It's--provides some real insight to
Congress on the issues that we face.
I appreciate your testimony.
Dr. Takeyh, you said it was curious how Iran is acting,
because their actions, by any objective standard, seem to be
contrary to their people's interest in--to the interest of
the--of Iran as a nation, which I would agree. That is evidence
to me that maybe Bud McFarlane was correct to say, ``This is
another revolutionary regime, and real revolutionaries don't
change.'' You look at Castro, you look at North Korea, you look
at these situations. They've asked their devotees to commit
everything to this division, and they won't--they are loathe to
give it up. Does that--do we not underestimate the religious,
ideological drive behind this regime?
Dr. Takeyh. I agree with that, Senator. I think that Iran's
revolution has to be considered differently than China, Cuba,
or, for that matter, the Soviet Union, because it is possible
for some of those revolutionaries to kind of move on. To become
an ex-Marxist is a sign of intellectual maturity. But, in this
particular case, the religion--to be fair, a travesty and
radicalized version--is the ideology of the state. There are
people in the Islamic Republic hierarchy that believe the
mission of the state is to realize God's will on earth, and
they get to determine what God's will is. I mean, to ask them
to abandon Marxism is maturity, to become an ex-Shi'ite is
apostasy. This is serious stuff. I think this is one of the
reason why Iran's revolution has not had the trajectory of
previous revolutions, whereby over time they tend to mellow out
and perhaps even, for sake of global integration, become less
radical. I don't see that in here.
Senator Sessions. I think that's correct. I think we
underestimate the power of religion in this circumstance.
Professor Mead, if we were to end--undertake this
agreement, it seems to me it ought to be undertaken as part of
an overall strategy for the Middle East in the spasm of
violence that we've seen, and that may continue for several
decades, I would think. You think of the George Kennan ideas
that framed our response to communism, and this expansionist
tendencies. Don't you think that what we need as a Nation is
people, like the last two panels we've had, seriously analyzing
the future of the Middle East, the nature of the extremist
ideology that's there, and developing a long-term,
sophisticated policy to rebut it and to try to diminish it over
time?
Mr. Mead. Senator, I think you've put your finger on
something very important. As I've listened to some of the other
testimony that's come before this committee in recent hearings,
I'm struck that what we're not really hearing is, even from
supporters of the agreement, the idea, ``Well, this is part of
a well-orchestrated general strategy for the Middle East. This
is what we're trying to accomplish. This is why this agreement
is a step forward.'' We're simply seeing the agreement defended
as, ``Okay, there is a nuclear problem, and this, we hope, will
be a solution to the nuclear problem, or at least it's less of
a nonsolution than no agreement would be.'' But, what we--you
know, what we're also hearing in the background is a kind of a
universal confession of failure of strategy.
What is our strategy for ISIS? Are we fighting Assad first,
then ISIS? ISIS first, then Assad? Neither? Both? Something
entirely different? I think I've rarely, in my lifetime--
although I certainly have heard moments of strategic
incoherence, I've rarely seen American policy on such a wide
scale on so many issues in such a vital region seem to be so
incoherent. I'm still waiting to see what our strategy in Libya
is. So--or why we intervened in Libya, which was of really
rather insignificant strategic importance, and have done
nothing in Syria, which is enormously more important. Why not
both? Why not neither?
So, we do, I think, need, as a country, to have the kind of
discussion about the Middle East that we had about Soviet
expansionism in the 1940s, and to try to work our way toward
some kind of general bipartisan agreement or confidence in an
analytical approach to, really, a very vital part of the world.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think you've said it well. I do
believe it's possible that we get a bipartisan approach. If we
agreed to that kind of strategy, then we could be more willing
to understand tactical decisions that are made along the way.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership and for having
these important hearings.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a
fascinating hearing.
Dr. Mead, before we begin, I've got to say, when I see
Hudson Institute, a bell rings. Herman Kahn. Wasn't he with the
Hudson Institute?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir, he was.
Senator King. A great theoretician of the early Cold War.
Mr. Mead. Exactly.
Senator King. I remember that term.
A thought experiment. What if Iran had never had a nuclear
program, no interest in nuclear weapons, no enrichment, zero. I
would suggest we would still be having this discussion about
how to contain Iran. But, the whole emphasis of the last 5
years or more--10 years--has been, ``Let's get rid of Iran's
nuclear capacity, and then we deal with the other issues.'' I
would agree with the Chairman that we don't have an overall
strategy. We should. But, the first element in the strategy was
to not have a nuclear-armed Iran. That's why we're discussing
what we're discussing here.
What's bothered me about the discussion today and as this
has evolved is that the rationale for the sanctions seems to
have migrated. The sanctions were imposed--and, Mr. Gordon, you
were--you participated in putting the P5+1 together--it was all
about the nuclear weapons. Now people are saying, ``Oh, we
can't release the sanctions because it will be used for other
things.'' If there had been no nuclear weapons program, there
wouldn't have been sanctions, or they wouldn't have been to the
extent that they are today.
Dr. Mead, think with me on this. Do you see what I'm
saying?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir, Senator. I guess what I would say is
that I would agree that, from the beginning, we should have
been thinking holistically about Iran and the region, and that
the--that thinking about its nuclear capacity, thinking about
its regional ambitions, and so on, ought to have been a single
policy.
Senator King. But, when Ronald Reagan was talking about
arms control, he wasn't demanding that Russia--or the Soviet
Union change its immigration policy or forswear expansionism or
adventurism. He said, ``Let's control nuclear weapons.'' You
deal with these issues one at a time, it seems to me.
Mr. Mead. Well, it--actually, in President Reagan's case, I
think he was doing it--he was--he did have a kind of a full-
bore strategy, a controversial strategy rolling back in
Nicaragua and so on, so that actually, by the time he was
engaged in serious nuclear talks with the Soviet Union, he had
already laid down a number of markers and put them in a kind of
a constrained position.
Senator King. But, that wasn't part of the nuclear----
Mr. Mead. What I'm--right, but that was a precondition. In
his mind, the idea was, you demonstrate----
Senator King. Right, right.
Mr. Mead.--to the Soviets that the other expansion can't
work, simultaneously outbuilding them in strategic weapons.
Senator King. I agree, I think that the strategy is
twofold: (a) get rid of nuclear weapons in Iran, and (b) then
develop the containment strategy, as Senator Sessions
suggested, George Kennan or some other similar strategy.
Mr. Gordon, one of the--we met, yesterday, with the
Ambassadors of each of the P5+1. The question was asked, ``What
is the likelihood of reconstituting the international
sanctions, should the Congress reject this agreement?'' The
term used by one of the Ambassadors was ``farfetched.'' You
helped put that coalition together. How would you characterize
the likelihood that these sanctions can be strengthened rather
than erode, subject to an American rejection?
Dr. Gordon. Senator, I think ``farfetched'' is probably a
good description. As I described, this is now an agreement that
has been reached and supported by every member of the P5+1, by
the Security Council, and just about every country in the
world. To come back and say that, you know, ``We've just
decided, after all, not to go along with it, but, by the way,
we want you to keep on the sanctions,'' which were so tough to
get them to agree to in the first place, is just very difficult
to imagine.
I would add, even if somehow, you know, through the threat
of secondary sanctions--you know, I don't believe that it would
collapse, the next day. We would have our secondary sanctions,
and we would keep most countries onboard, at least to a limited
degree. But, even under those circumstances, Iran could
continue to advance its program.
Senator King. Dr. Singh, you mentioned, we haven't been
able to get much European support for terrorism sanctions.
Isn't that part of the problem, here? We're trying to separate
these issues, deal with the nuclear and then deal with the
terrorism. But, if we reject this agreement and try to get buy-
in from the Europeans on a broader sanctions regime that would
include terrorism, didn't you, yourself, concede that that
might be somewhat difficult?
Mr. Singh. I think, Senator, I would actually describe the
history of this issue differently than you described it. I was
Director for Iran at the National Security Council in 2005 and
2006, and then Senior Director for the Middle East after that.
Actually, then we had quite a broad strategy of countering Iran
in the region as well as taking on the nuclear program. We saw
those things as connected to one another because of the view
that the nuclear weapons program was a part of Iran's regional
strategy. In the--one of the reasons we went to the P5+1 and
the U.N. on the nuclear issue was, that was the issue where it
was easier to get, for example, the Russians and Chinese
onboard. Iran doesn't direct its terrorism against Russia and
China; it directs it against the United States and our allies.
So, I would say that we have actually moved away--further
away from that kind of broader approach. To date, over the
past, say, 7 years, we haven't really pushed back on the
Iranians, which is why it's not credible to folks in the region
for us to say, ``Well, we're going to start now.'' This doesn't
look like the way you would start a serious strategy of pushing
back on the Iranians, nor does it necessarily give you the
tools. In fact, you're sacrificing quite a few of the tools
you'd use to do that.
Senator King. My time is expired, but I--and I take your
point. I agree that this--there has to be a twofold strategy:
nuclear and non-nuclear. We haven't been as effective as we
should have been on the second part, I agree.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. As a proud foot soldier in the Reagan
revolution, I tell my friend from Maine, when Ronald Reagan
said, ``Tear down this wall,'' he wasn't talking about nuclear
weapons. Ronald Reagan understood that we had to emphasize
human rights, we had to emphasize all of the aspects and
virtues of democracy and freedom, and then the nuclear weapons
agreements followed. That's history.
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. This has been
one of many of a series of great discussions that we have had
on this issue, so thank you for taking the time and providing
the input necessary.
I'm going to sound a little bit like a broken record. I've
asked this question over and over again of the last few panels,
but I would like to ask each of you: In the middle of July, the
President came out, and he stated, ``We either sign this
nuclear agreement or it's war.'' Sign the agreement or it's
war. Not, ``We'll work a little more on diplomatic relations,
sanctions''--he said, ``it's war.'' So, we either go along with
this or America's going to war, evidently.
Do you believe that to be true, yes or no?
Dr. Mead?
Mr. Mead. No, Senator.
Senator Ernst. Mr. Singh.
Mr. Singh. No, Senator.
Dr. Takeyh. No, Senator.
Senator Ernst. Dr. Gordon?
Dr. Gordon. I don't think it's automatically war, but it
does, as I tried to underscore, put us in a position of either
seeing Iran's program continue or implementing that credible
use of force, which is war.
Senator Ernst. Okay, and I'll come back to you in a second,
Dr. Gordon, thank you.
Mr. Nephew?
Mr. Nephew. Senator, I would agree with Dr. Gordon. I think
that, over time, it will lead to an escalatory spiral that
leads us to war, yes.
Senator Ernst. In time, it could lead to war, but not
definitive. Is that correct, Mr. Nephew?
Mr. Nephew. Senator, I would say that I find the likelihood
of getting a diplomatic resolution dims dramatically if we
reject this deal. So, therefore, I do believe that we will have
an escalating Iranian nuclear program, an ever-expanding one
that sanctions will not be able to control. I think that leads
us to war.
Senator Ernst. Okay.
Dr. Gordon, I'll go back to you, because you stated you did
work in the administration for a period of years, so you were
assisting with these efforts for the nuclear agreement. Is that
correct?
Dr. Gordon. Yes.
Senator Ernst. Okay. When I spoke to General Dempsey, the
other day, who is the President's senior military advisor, I
asked him if he had recommended that to the President, and he
stated, no, that he had not recommended that. He did believe
that there----
Dr. Gordon. I'm sorry, recommended?
Senator Ernst. That we would go to war if this agreement
were not signed. He stated that he did believe there were other
options that could be explored before we automatically made the
assumption that the United States would engage in war with
Iran. So, he rejected that. I asked him if he knew who was
advising him on that, and he said he did not know. Yesterday,
the panel rejected the notion that war was the obvious solution
if we did not sign the agreement.
So, are you the one that was advising the President that we
would go to war, or we should go to war, if this deal was not
signed?
Dr. Gordon. Senator, I don't think, and I don't know anyone
who thinks, that, if this deal is not implemented, that, very
quickly, Iran makes a dash for a bomb and the United States
uses force. That's not, I think, the realistic way to think
about it.
I think the realistic way to think about it is, there are
one of three options if this deal doesn't go ahead. Either, and
ideally, we get a better deal, the Supreme Leader decides that,
after all, he can make more concessions, he comes back to the
table in 3 months or 6 months or a year, and he gives us
everything we want. That would obviously be ideal. I just don't
think it's realistic.
If that doesn't happen, if the Iranians don't come back and
agree to all of the things we would like, then it's really one
of two things. They steadily proceed with their program, as
they've been doing over 10 years, and, instead of 19,000
centrifuges, they have 30,000; instead of a--an LEU [low-
enriched uranium] stockpile of 10 tons, they have 20 tons; they
complete the heavy water reactor at Arak; they do their
research and development on the IR8s. Then we have to decide:
we either watch that happen and then have a hearing, in a year
or two, when they've done all of that and they're basically on
the verge of a nuclear weapons capability, or have one; or we
implement the credible use of force to stop them. That's what I
think people mean when they say they're worried that, if we
don't do this deal, there will be a conflict.
Senator Ernst. I would reject the outright notion that we
would go to war. I do think we need to take a step back and
consider this.
I want to look at the--because we are talking about
regional strategy, I do believe that Iran has a regional
strategy, and they are a state sponsor of terrorism. I think
this furthers their reign of terrorism in the region and around
the globe. I think it makes them very powerful. On the other
hand, the United States does not have a strategy in that
region. If we had a strategy, and this nuclear agreement was
involved in that, I don't think it would have been necessary to
send Secretary Carter from country to country to talk with our
allies in that region to, you know, ease their fears. I don't
see that that would have happened if we had that strategy.
I would love to visit more, Mr. Singh, about--just very
briefly, if I might, Mr. Chairman--just very quickly--I would
like to look at the repercussions in Iraq. Iran is a very
powerful nation through its proxies of terrorism, whether it's
in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, you name it. What does this do
to Iraq, with Iran having further means to empower the Shiite
militia? Does that really lend credibility to a multisectarian
Iraqi government, or do we see that falling apart, with greater
power going to the Iraqi Shiite militia?
Mr. Singh. I don't think that it's helpful. I think that
the problem with this alliance of convenience with Iran in Iraq
to combat ISIS, even though neither the United States or Iran
likes ISIS, and both would like to see ISIS defeated, is that
Iran's actions are meant, I think, to sort of bolster Iranian
influence in the influence of Iran's proxies in Iraq. So, what
I worry that you'll see is Iran using some of its resources,
using the freedom from sanctions to further strengthen its own
militias, which are answerable to Tehran rather than to the
government in Baghdad, as well as to buy political influence.
We've seen this pattern in places like Lebanon. It doesn't sort
of contribute to our goals and our interests in the region.
Quite the opposite, in the longer run.
Senator Ernst. Thank you----
Dr. Takeyh. ISIS is----
Senator Ernst.--very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Dr. Takeyh. Can I just respond to that----
Senator Ernst. Yes.
Dr. Takeyh.--Mr. Chairman, very briefly? Because I think
there's been a discussion about this windfall, where it's going
to be felt. I think the ramifications of this nuclear
agreement, the economic ramifications--I don't know how it
would affect the trajectory of terrorism; I suspect it will be
more. But, it will be particularly felt in Iraq and Syria, in
terms of prolongation of the Syrian Civil War, when the
military balance changes in disfavor of President Assad.
In Iraq, the Iranians are talking about application of the
Hezbollah model to the Shiite militias. Mainly, those Shiite
militias will be used outside Iraq, whether it's in Syria or
whether it's elsewhere. So, essentially, the notion is that, in
due course, you have mini Hezbollahs being created along that--
Lebanon being the model for Iraq, a fragmented state, and
Shiite militias following the model of Hezbollah, in terms of
being employed by Iran in various other exigencies in the
region.
Chairman McCain. Senator----
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
Mr. Singh, I certainly, like Senator King, agree with the
premise that you're all making that we need a comprehensive
strategy in the Middle East. I guess I would take a little
issue with the effectiveness of that strategy under President
Bush, because, at least with respect to the nuclear program in
Iran, which is--my recollection is correct, when he became
President, they had about 160 or so centrifuges, and, by the
time he left office, they had 19,000. So, I do think we need a
different approach to address Iran's march towards a nuclear
weapon.
What I'm trying to get some better understanding of is what
you all believe should be part of the comprehensive strategy in
the Middle East, in addition to trying to address Iran's
nuclear program.
Dr. Takeyh, you raised concerns about providing arms to
Middle Eastern countries. As you're probably aware, last month
Saudi Arabia requested 600 new Patriot missile interceptors.
So, can you talk about whether you think this kind of support
for Arab countries is something that we should continue to
pursue? Or do you think we should say we're not going to
support arms for any Arab countries?
Dr. Takeyh. Oh, I think the Saudi state is in considerable
degree of difficulty today, in terms of thinking about its
future. Since the inception of House of Saud, in earlier 20th
century, they had a sort of a national compact, whereby they
actually deliberately weakened their military, in terms of
conscription, in terms of developing an officer corps that's
not related to the royal family, and developed a national guard
for internal security purposes. That actually worked well, in
terms of preservation of House of Saud. If you look at every
Middle Eastern country, they had a military coup--Libya, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Yemen. Saudi Arabia is the one
place where the monarchy has not displaced by military, because
they have kept the military weak. The purchases that they have
made of these----
Senator Shaheen. Well, Jordan hasn't, either, I would
argue.
Dr. Takeyh. Yeah, that's right. The--so, the two
monarchies. Basically, they have kept the military weak. They
have to rethink their national compact. They have to
essentially engage in conscription, developing an officer
corps. They have the population base to do that, but they
haven't had the political will, because of the concern about
their own population.
Going forward, I think Saudi Arabia has many problems, in
terms of changing complexion of the oil market. So, I do agree
with the President----
Senator Shaheen. Okay. But----
Dr. Takeyh.--in one respect.
Senator Shaheen.--should we give them those interceptors,
or not?
Dr. Takeyh. I think they should be considered in line with
Syria's deep-seated structural reforms that Saudi Arabia has to
make to its economy, and the way it deals with its citizens,
and----
Senator Shaheen. So, you think we should qualify that kind
of----
Dr. Takeyh. Yeah.
Senator Shaheen.--military assistance.
Dr. Takeyh. I think--as I said, I think President Obama is
absolutely right when he says these countries have to
strengthen their internal mechanisms and political systems.
Senator Shaheen. Dr. Gordon, can you talk about what other
kinds of efforts we should be thinking about in the Middle East
as we're trying to develop a comprehensive strategy that
accompanies any arms agreement?
Dr. Gordon. Sure. I mean, on this issue of comprehensive
strategy, I do think it is important to acknowledge, right off
the bat--and Senator King alluded to this--this deal doesn't
provide that.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Dr. Gordon. It doesn't. It doesn't resolve the Iran
problem, it doesn't resolve the terrorism problem, and it
doesn't deal with this huge structural change that we're seeing
in the Middle East. So, no one should try to defend it, or
even, I think, decide on it, on that criterion. What it does is
take the nuclear issue off the table for a good 10 or 15 years,
which is not bad, in the context of all of the issues you
discussed. So, I think that's just important to state.
In terms of what we do in the meantime, I think the two
elements of what you're talking about, and what Ray just
replied on, are exactly right. We do need to stand by these
allies. To the extent Iran will use its additional assets to
threaten them, I think we do have to stand by all of our Gulf
partners, give them the reassurance. That includes military
sales, intelligence cooperation, and defense. But, I think it
is also true, as was just said, that, in the long run, their
vulnerabilities are less, in terms of advanced missile defense
than in terms of the soundness of their societies, and they
need to work on that, as well.
Senator Shaheen. So, Mr. Nephew, I asked you this question
in a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee. I think it's
appropriate to raise it again, because several of you
referenced the fact that if Iran's going to cheat on this
agreement, it's likely to be incremental and not flagrant, and
therefore, present other challenges for the P5+1, in terms of
how we respond to that. So, it's not going to be automatic
snap-back as the result.
So, can you talk about some of the other options that we
should be thinking about, in terms of preparing the partners in
this agreement, should it go forward, that we need to respond
to any incremental violations?
Mr. Nephew. Certainly, Senator. I think that the first one
of those is the fact that sanctions snap-back can be scalable.
Secretary Lew has testified to this effect. But, if there were
to be a smaller-scale violation on the part of the Iranians,
sanctions relief can be terminated in one particular area or
another. That can have impact.
Second, we can also use the procurement channel that's been
established as part of this deal to clamp down on nuclear-
related transfers going to Iran.
Third, we can use the dispute process to consider
additional constraints on Iranian nuclear activities. If they
are found to be enriching too much uranium at one particular
point, there can be an agreement that, in exchange for not
snapping back all the sanctions, that Iran's enriched uranium
stockpile would have to be smaller for some period of time.
I think the point is, the dispute process that's in this
deal gives us flexibility to scale our response to what Iran
actually does.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for being here. This is very
helpful.
I wanted to ask Dr. Takeyh, what--can you explain for us
our--the history of Iran when it comes to hiding its nuclear
activity at facilities, such as Natanz, Fordow, and Parchin,
and how the international community--how successful they were
at that?
Dr. Takeyh. Well, I think every nuclear facility that Iran
has today at some point was an illicit facility, in terms of
the fact that it was operated. Iranians do have their own
explanations for why that is the case. Only after detection,
after pressure by the international community, you began to see
a measure of inspection and verification coming into being.
I think the international community was successful, in
terms of application of pressure on Iran over time that caused
it to perhaps reconsider some of the strategy, but the overall
trajectory has been, as you suggest, that they essentially
embark on illicit programs when the opportunity is there.
Senator Ayotte. So, I would like to get our panel's take
on--having looked at the language in the agreement on the
process for undeclared sites, it strikes me as very attenuated.
As you look at this process, the IAEA first has to provide Iran
the basis for the concerns, in writing, regarding the
undeclared materials or sites, activities. They have to let
them know, you know, how do they want access to this. Iran
actually gets to respond with alternatives to whatever access
the IAEA wants. If you look at the plain language of it, those
alternatives don't necessarily include physical access. That's
been a real issue if we're thinking about the type of testing.
There's been some reports that I've seen, that have actually
been confirmed, that, in fact, Iran doesn't want to allow
physical testing even at a facility like Parchin, that we're
aware of.
So, I wanted to ask all of you what you thought, in terms
of the process that's in place when it comes to undeclared
sites, as opposed to the ones that we had--that Dr. Gordon
referred to, the regular--the very continuous monitoring of.
Because I think we have a history here that we need to be
cognizant of.
Mr. Singh?
Mr. Singh. Sure. Well, I think your assessment is correct.
There is, first, this back-and-forth of indefinite duration
between Iran and the IAEA to ``clarify,'' quote/unquote, the
questions the IAEA may have about a site. Only after that is
complete does--can the IAEA make its formal request for access,
which starts that 24-day clock.
You know, we have experience with the Iranians about this
in the past, which folks aren't, I think, talking about enough.
There have been several sites--three, in particular--where this
has played out in the past, and the Iranians have proven to get
better every time at hiding evidence of illicit activity.
So, I disagree with those who say that 24 days is not
enough to hide evidence of illicit activity. It may be that, if
we're lucky, they can't hide it all. But, that's very different
from saying that we'll know what happened there. I think that
places way too much, sort of, certitude on this process.
Senator Ayotte. If you're not guaranteed physical access,
yourself, to me that becomes insufficient, in terms of knowing
exactly what has occurred at a facility.
Mr. Singh. Even if you have physical access, Senator, you
have physical access after they've had an opportunity to engage
in various forms of hiding evidence. We saw this, again, at at
least three different sites in Iran in the past.
Dr. Takeyh. Just one thing. It's important to acknowledge
that Iran is in violation of the safeguard agreements today.
It--as General Amano is here, his agency does not have access.
The first work plan between Iran and the IAEA was negotiated in
2007, and that remains incomplete. It was negotiated, at that
time, by Ali Larijani. So, there are problems with that.
Arms control verification works only when it's
collaborative. If it doesn't--it's not collaborative, it's
antagonistic, there's no mechanism that can assure its success.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I think one of the warnings we're
seeing is, they're already issuing statements that are contrary
to what we would, I think, expect from this agreement, in terms
of inspection, access.
Yes.
Mr. Nephew. Senator, if I may. I would disagree with my
fellow witnesses here about the inspection access. I actually
think it's a material improvement over the current situation.
Twenty-four days is actually quite sufficient to detect a lot
of different nuclear activities, especially the most
significant ones. I would just point out that I think the three
facilities that Mr. Singh was referring to--actually, two of
them involve pretty dramatic steps that were taken to sanitize
the facilities, one of which was a complete failure. So, in the
Clay Electric experience, for instance, the Iranians had over 6
months to sanitize the facility, and they failed. Enriched
uranium was detected. In the Lavizan facility, the Iranians
were so terrified about IAEA access that they bulldozed the
entire facility down to 3 feet of topsoil because they didn't
want to have access. We used that, in 2006 and 2007, to sell
U.N. sanctions against Iran.
Senator Ayotte. Can I ask you this? Don't you think
physical access is important?
Mr. Nephew. Absolutely. Physical access can still be
required by the IAEA. The IAEA is allowed to consider
alternative means of access to the facility, but they can say
no. They can say we must go.
Senator Ayotte. Yes.
Dr. Gordon. The only thing I would add, briefly, without
getting too much into the details of all of this is, the bottom
line in the agreement is that, if we're not satisfied after
this back-and-forth and what you've described as this
attenuated process--if we are not satisfied, sanctions--not
just U.S. sanctions, but U.N. sanctions--go back in place.
That's new and different.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I think the details very much matter
in all of this. I have many more questions, but this--I
appreciate all of you for being here, and your expertise on
this issue.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Singh, wasn't it that Anatan was not
detected by anyone but the Iranians of informing us?
Mr. Singh. I'm sorry, Chairman, could you repeat that?
Chairman McCain. Wasn't the facility at Anatan concealed
effectively until the Iranians, themselves, the opposition,
gave us that information?
Mr. Singh. Well, I think it's a relevant point, absolutely,
Mr. Chairman, that--you know, this all started when we caught
the Iranians redhanded at doing exactly the things that we're
talking about. The process ends with these facilities not being
dismantled, not being--you know, not requiring to sort of
reverse what they've done but actually all this being
legitimized. You know, we see this dynamic, where the less
risk-averse party in these treaties--and you could draw a
connection with the INF Treaty, with the Syria chemical weapons
issue--has the leverage. It comes down, not just to the details
of the inspections, but, Where is the political will? At the
end of the day, if we detect something untoward, do we have the
political will to do something about it?
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to focus a little bit on what would happen if the
United States walks away or rejects this agreement. Dr. Gordon
has laid out--described three things that he believes will
happen. One, we would get a better agreement. Two, Iran--if we
don't get a better agreement, Iran will continue its path
toward becoming a nuclear power. Third, the United States
will--assuming we don't have another agreement, the United
States will either watch Iran doing this or, at some point, we
will need to decide whether to take military action.
I'd like to ask the other panelists, Do you agree with
these three events or description of what would happen if we
walk away from this deal?
We can start with you----
Mr. Mead. Senator----
Senator Hirono.--Dr. Mead.
Mr. Mead. Thank you, Senator.
It's a good question. I think that it would be wrong to
assume that all rejections of the deal are equal, in the sense
that one might really see where perhaps the administration and
the Congress came together and saying, ``Well, maybe some
incremental changes or some things would allow Congress to give
support for the deal.'' Then there might well be a bit of a
momentum, because the other parties to this deal do want to see
it succeed, that there might be ways of making some positive
changes. So, I would just suggest that one ought to think,
``Okay, it's not we just--do we turn the light switch on or
off. Maybe there's a dimmer switch or something.'' We need to
think--we need to craft the response that----
Senator Hirono. I think that's a----
Mr. Mead.--the United States makes.
Senator Hirono.--that's a more nuanced way to look at this
situation. But, what we are likely going to be faced with is an
up-or-down vote on whether or not we agree with the deal. So,
let us assume that we are--if the United States rejects this
agreement, and the three items that were laid out by Dr.
Gordon--would you agree that those are the kinds of
eventualities that we would be faced with?
Mr. Mead. I would say that's why I would urge the Senate
and the administration to try to avoid a kind of a car crash
like that.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Singh?
Mr. Singh. I think that, you know, anything we say is
inherently speculative. That's true of what you'll hear from,
say, the European Ambassadors, as well, because they want you
to approve the deal.
I think that if Congress were to disapprove, and the U.S.
weren't to participate in the deal, then I really see sort of
two branches, in terms of possibilities. One is that the other
parties go ahead and implement the deal. That puts us,
obviously, in an awkward situation. Second would be, the other
parties--and, I think, Iran, in particular--choose not to
implement the deal. They also choose to walk away. Then, in a
sense, we are back to the drawing board. I don't agree that
that ends, necessarily, with force, because I think it's
important to bear in mind that these other states are not
acting out of goodwill or anything like that towards the United
States. They'll act in accordance to their interests. So,
they'll evaluate what's in their interest to do. Is it more in
their interest to take diplomatic actions, in hopes of averting
this type of military conflict? Or is it more in their interest
to simply, say, walk away, and so forth?
I don't think that our allies who have been part of this
process, with the objective of stopping Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon, and with the objective of averting a war over
this question, would simply abandon that objective. I think
they'll still try to do those same things that brought them to
this process.
Senator Hirono. Well, that's another interesting
perspective, because this is a deal that was made by the P5+1,
and there is a question as to what kind of a deal remains if
the United States walks away from it.
Mr.--Dr. Takeyh?
Dr. Takeyh. Certainly. In my testimony, I suggested five,
six things that could be done to----
Senator Hirono. I believe----
Dr. Takeyh.--revisions to the----
Senator Hirono.--your first was that we should renegotiate
a stronger agreement.
Dr. Takeyh. Well, I think, specific aspects of the
agreement--the sunset clause, the IR8s, and so forth. So, we
can go back and actually try to strengthen the agreement in
that particular sense. The history of arms control, from SALT-1
on, is replete with renegotiating arms control agreements that
have been agreed on. I think this----
Senator Hirono. But----
Dr. Takeyh.--falls----
Senator Hirono. Excuse me, I'm running out of time. But,
before we can get to a renegotiation posture, we would have to
reject this agreement.
Dr. Takeyh. I think, at this particular point, given where
we are--the only way we can get to the aftermath of----
Senator Hirono. There are a lot of questions as to whether
or not our P5+1 partners would even get back to the table. In
fact, yesterday, I specifically asked the Ambassadors to the
United States from the U.K., China, and Russia whether their
countries would come back to the table to renegotiate if the
United States walked away, and they said no.
Dr. Gordon? We've already gotten to your----
Mr. Nephew, would you like to respond? Very briefly.
Mr. Nephew. Yes, Senator, I basically would agree with what
Dr. Gordon was saying. The only point I would just add to Dr.
Singh's point about ``Could we get a better deal some down--
someday down the road?''--we should all bear in mind, we'll
probably be negotiating over a much larger Iranian nuclear
program at that point in time. The idea that we managed to get
from 10,000 centrifuges down to 5 in this deal is somehow going
to be improved when we're sitting at 30,000 centrifuges, I
think is pretty farfetched.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Mr. Singh. Can I just say--I'm sorry--in response to that.
That's--I think that's true, no matter what. In the future,
Iran will have a bigger nuclear program. We'll still, at--when
these things start phasing out, the limitations start phasing
out, in 10 to 15 years, want to stop Iran from expanding it in
certain ways. So, we'll be back to this issue, trying--I think,
with less tools--to renegotiate. So, I don't think we should be
under the illusion that this is going to be permanent. We'll be
back to this issue, one way or the other, in the future.
Chairman McCain. You can rebut, Mr. Nephew.
Mr. Nephew. Thank you, Senator.
I mean, I don't think that Mr. Singh is entirely incorrect
on this point. We will have to be dealing with this problem,
going into the future. But, I think 15 years from now is a much
different environment that we'll be dealing with than we'd be
dealing with at this particular moment in time. Second, I think
it's folly to suggest that the tools that we have now remain
the tools that we have if we reject this deal.
Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. I'd like to continue this line of
questioning, because this is the area of interest that a lot of
us have: What happens if we reject the deal?
Specifically, I'd like a little more thought on, What do
you think Iran will do when America rejects the deal? Because
what we heard from the Ambassadors yesterday is, their
skepticism about whether anybody would come back to the table
was very much informed by their knowledge of their negotiating
partners in Iran. They, in fact, said that they believed Iran
would be so disgusted with the United States that they would
say--and the hardliners would win and say, ``Obviously, you
can't trust America. They're the enemy we always thought they
were. We are never giving them the opportunity to do this
again.'' They based that conclusion on Iran's previous behavior
when the Bush administration attempted a negotiation. Because
the Bush administration attempted a sincere negotiation, but,
at that time, there was no willingness to allow any production,
even for peaceful means, and so, Iran rejected it, straight
out, and we were left with nothing. From that time period, they
had a few hundred centrifuges, and now they have several
thousand centrifuges. So, they obviously have continued to
invest to perfect their nuclear program, to make it more
sophisticated.
So, from your expertise, I'd like to know, well, What do
you think the disposition of Iran will be if we reject the
deal? From some experts, we've heard, to date, that they will
complete their production, they will refine to--in 2 to 3
months to have enough fissile material for one bomb. If they
feel that militarization is their only option, then we have
several options, most of them are military, to respond to that,
if we choose to--choose to take that course. So, please talk
about, if we reject the deal, what are the reactions,
specifically with regard to Iran and with a likelihood of full
production as to a bomb?
Start on this end and go down.
Mr. Nephew. Thank you, Senator.
So, my view is that the Iranians would, first off, say that
they're not going to negotiate on their nuclear program again
under the current United States President. I think they would
argue that, having been defeated in the Congress, there's no
chance that they would negotiate with him again.
Now, the big issue with that is, that means that we've got
at least 18 more months of Iranian nuclear expansion. I think--
--
Senator Gillibrand. Right.
Mr. Nephew.--the Iranians would install more centrifuges,
they would begin to operate them. I think they would complete
the Arak reactor. I think we'd be, therefore, dealing with a
bigger, more problematic program.
Senator Gillibrand. And----
Mr. Nephew. I also think----
Senator Gillibrand. If they complete the Arak reactor, we
can no longer bomb it, correct? Because that cannot be a bomb
target once it's completed, because then it's a nuclear fallout
site, correct?
Mr. Nephew. Well, certainly once it's operational, it is
much more complicated to attack the facility, that's true.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
Mr. Nephew. I would make one additional last point, which
is, I think Iran would also attempt to undermine the
international support behind our sanctions program. I think
they'd be much more successful now than they were in the past,
because they'd be able to say, ``The original premise of the
sanctions effort was international consensus on the nuclear
issue. The Americans said they wanted a nuclear deal. They've
just proven they don't.'' So, I believe that, at this point, a
lot of countries in the region--beyond that, in the world--
would say, ``What is the reason why we're supporting these
sanctions now?''
Dr. Gordon. Senator, it's an excellent question. I think
you were right to bring up precedent in thinking about it,
because, obviously, looking into the future, we can only
speculate. As we do look back, we do have a little bit of
experience in going to Iran and insisting on certain goals,
like zero enrichment, and seeing that result in an ever-
expanding program.
I find it highly implausible that, if we reject the deal
now--and we'd be doing so in the name of getting a better
agreement--highly implausible that Iran would come back to the
table--again, whether this year or in 18 months--and
renegotiate what they feel they negotiated, not, you know, in
some quick back-of-the-envelope deal, but over a 2-year period
of painstaking negotiations with the P5+1 partners, missing 4
or 5 deadlines because we couldn't get to a deal, an 18-day
final end game going over every single painfully negotiated
detail--the idea that they would come back to that, even after
it was endorsed by the Security Council, and give us a better
deal is unlikely. So, we can go for it, but I think that's why
the more likely scenario, as Richard said, was that they would
say, ``Fine, you walked away, we feel free to carry on with
this program,'' which they would do, and it would expand. To be
clear, and I'll end with this, I don't think it means Iran
makes a dash for a bomb. I don't think that they suddenly start
declaring their intention to pursue a nuclear weapon. They'd do
what they've done over the past decade, which is gradually
expand their program----
Senator Gillibrand. Hold it at 20 percent enrichment.
Dr. Gordon. Maybe.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you think they would just, maybe,
continue to develop their centrifuges, but keep it at 20
percent, which I think is the limit, and not go beyond that?
Dr. Gordon. I think they would incrementally advance, right
across the board, and slowly, so that there's never one moment
where they're crossing some----
Senator Gillibrand. In breach or in----
Mr. Nephew. Right. We would find ourselves, in X-amount of
time, with just a much bigger program, and therefore, a much
bigger problem.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Your rebuttal, Mr. Singh.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Or Mr. Takeyh.
Yeah, go ahead.
Mr. Singh. I think it's just--it's important to bear in
mind--I agree that I think Iran would likely walk away. The
sensible thing for Iran to do, frankly, would be to implement
the deal anyway. I don't think Iran would do the sensible
thing. I think they would walk away if we walked away. But, the
question of what, then, would guide their behavior--I think,
you need to remember, Why is Iran in this negotiation, anyway?
Not because they want to be, but because, in a sense, they had
to be. So, I think it'll really depend on, How do we shape the
environment in that circumstance? I would not suggest to you
that it would be easy, but I would suggest to you that things
like deterrence, things like credible red-lines, things like,
you know, sort of, diplomacy will be just as important then as
they have been all along.
The other point I would make about this is--I know that the
choice facing all of you is binary, and I respect that greatly.
But, I don't think we should think of this as a binary
situation out in the real world. The negotiations, I think,
will continue, one way or the other. I mean, if you look at the
history--and I know you're all very familiar with the history
of these arms control agreements--say, North Korea, the history
of this issue, itself, and the agreements we reached with Iran
in 2003-2004--these negotiations are likely to continue. We're,
as Secretary Kerry has said, likely to going to want to take up
other issues with the Iranians. So, one way or another, we're
going to have additional issues to bring to the Iranians. The
question, I think, is, What sort of tools are we going to have,
going forward? What sort of framework will the next President
inherit if he or she wants to further strengthen the nuclear
constraints on Iran?--which I think will be necessary. That's a
very critical question here, as well. This doesn't end now.
This continues.
Chairman McCain. So, then we'll--the importance of this
question will go to you, either Dr. Gordon or Mr. Nephew, and
then to Mr. Takeyh.
Please respond on this issue. You want to respond again
to--we'll orchestrate this debate.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Nephew. Well, Senator, I mean, again, I don't want to
abuse your time. I think my view is that, you know, Mr. Singh
may be correct, that there will continue to be, you know,
ongoing negotiations and ongoing attempts to resolve the issue.
But, I think, if we look back from 2005, frankly, all the way
to 2013, there were P5+1 meetings with Iran, but they weren't
getting anywhere, because the Iranians were insisting on
incredibly impossible red lines. It's because, I think, in
part, they didn't believe that international pressure was going
to require them to make the kinds of concessions we would need.
In my view, sir, I think that's what would happen here, as
well. Yes, there would be a process, but it wouldn't resolve in
a good deal.
Chairman McCain. Could part of that reason have been the
economic sanctions hurting their economy that changed their
attitude? Dr. Gordon?
Dr. Gordon. It could. The reason I pointed out the cases--
the previous cases of North Korea and Iraq is to remind that,
even when sanctions pressure is enormous and countries are
genuinely crippled, they don't necessarily come to the table
and give us everything that we want. So, I think it would be
wrong to assume that, just because--even if we manage to keep
sanctions in place, which is an open question if we rejected
the deal, I think, would be tough, as we heard earlier, but,
even if we did, I don't think we can assume Iran would come
back to the table and make major concessions.
I don't want to pretend that only this deal could have been
negotiated, that our team--you know, that there's no other
conceivable deal. You can imagine details that might have come
out differently. I do think it's implausible that, on the big
questions people are worried about, like sanctions relief for
Iran, that there would be some deal where they would come to
the table, ``Give us the nuclear commitments we want for
decades,'' but not get their frozen assets released. That--you
could give me the best negotiating team in history, backed by
the most credible force in history, and I don't think Iran
comes to the table and does that deal. I think we just have to
accept that.
Chairman McCain. Well, let's hope it's not like the great
deal we made with North Korea.
Dr. Takeyh, go ahead.
Dr. Takeyh. I get a chance to rebut everybody.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Takeyh. Why does--it is important to suggest that Iran
has participated in the negotiations since 2002 for reasons
other than the nuclear issue, for attempting to get economic
measures, for attempting to shield its nuclear installations
from military retribution. That doesn't happen during the--to
attempt to shield this regional surge from military pushback,
because you don't push back on a country. Of course, it cannot
legalize or legitimize its nuclear program in absence of the
negotiating table. So, the negotiating table has served Iran's
purpose, as does, in my judgment, this agreement.
I'm very focused, as I have been in this testimony, on IR8
centrifuges that Iran wants to bring online. If there is no
agreement, Iran will not be able to do so for 8 years. If there
is an agreement, Iran will not be able to do for 8 years. Why
do I say that? In March, Abbas Araghchi, their negotiator, and,
twice since, Vice President Salehi has said that they needed 8
to 10 years to introduce these generation of centrifuges, and
that's the R&D [research and development] deal he says they
negotiated. So, that's a very disturbing aspect of this
particular accord.
Finally, we do have to be prepared for a massive
industrialization of Iran's nuclear program. Vice President
Salehi has gone before the Iranian Parliament and asked for
budgetary allocation to expand their scientific cadre, nuclear
engineers, to 20,000 people. Currently, it's about 5,000. So--
and they also put into place, as this agreement allows, their
technological precursors for advanced centrifuges. They are
getting ready to embark, within the confines and context of
this agreement, to a very massive and sophisticated nuclear
program.
One more thing that this treaty allows--this agreement
allows is, international community, during the time that Mr.
Nephew and Phil were talking about, had tried to sabotage
Iran's program, had tried to sanction it, had tried to
essentially forestall it. Under this particular agreement, it
enables it. This agreement stipulates that Iran can have access
to international market----
Senator Gillibrand. Can I just ask you one question----
Dr. Takeyh. Yeah.
Senator Gillibrand.--about that? Do you take any--is there
any benefit to the fact that they've created vulnerabilities in
their nuclear program, the fact that they're going to cement
Arak, the fact that they are going to take centrifuges out of
Fordow, which is harder to bomb, the fact that the only
centrifuges that are going to be in production will be in a
aboveground facility that's very easy to target, particularly
once we're on the ground--that is creating a military
vulnerability, from my perspective, and that was agreed to by
our Secretary of Defense and our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Does that not show some level of--I don't know--concession on
their part?
Dr. Takeyh. I think this agreement has some legitimate and
important benefits. I do think those benefits--no agreement is
perfect. You have to judge the agreement by scale of
imperfection. This agreement imposes some important short-term
restraints, but it stipulate a projection of Iranian program.
It is the first arms control agreement in history that
stabilizes a file and then envisions its rapid trajectory
upwards. That's the problem with it.
It is, I must confess, a uniquely--an American agreement.
It doesn't deal--it postpones problems for the later time, has
entitlements and everything else.
Chairman McCain. We're very good at that.
Professor Mead, do you want to summarize, here, since you--
--
Mr. Mead. Well----
Chairman McCain.--began this conversation?
Mr. Mead. Yeah. Let me conclude with a--with an
observation, here, which is, I think, that the United States
has actually, through this entire negotiation, sort of ignored
two of our principal sources of leverage, things that we might
well gain by reasserting. One is that, historically, agreements
of this magnitude that constitute this fundamental change in
American foreign policy, have gone through the treaty process,
requiring ratification by the Senate. Often, in order to gain
ratification, particularly since Woodrow Wilson's misadventure
at the Treaty of Versailles, this has meant bringing along a
bipartisan delegation to be involved in the negotiations, and
to ensure the kind of advice and consent of the Senate on an
ongoing basis. This has actually had the impact of
strengthening America's hands in negotiations, because it
brings the will of Congress in from the beginning, and, in this
particular case, our partners in the P5+1 would have understood
more clearly what America's real red lines were. By choosing to
take this negotiation in another way and trying to, I think,
fundamentally distort the concept of execute agreement to avoid
the traditional and, I think, legal constitutional process, we
actually lost leverage as a country.
The other element of unsurpassed American leverage in this
kind of negotiation is our ability to impact the strategic
situation in the region by a focused, coordinated American
policy, which coordinates our stance on Iran's regional
expansion with our approach to its nuclear weapons in
negotiations. Essentially, we've abdicated that.
I'm not trying to say, by the way, that it was great under
the Bush administration, and now it's terrible. The last thing
I'd want to do would be to make some kind of partisan point. I
think we can all point back to a number of things that have
gone awry, here.
But, nevertheless, we've really been--we tied, not one, but
both hands behind our back. So, I'm not surprised, again, that
what comes out of this is an agreement, where even the
defenders tell you how terrible it is and how sorry they are
that it isn't better. I--and my suggestion would be that, for
the United States, it would actually be better to engage in
this negotiation using the leverage that, in fact, as a
country, we do have.
Chairman McCain. Could I say that I thank the witnesses. I
thank them for this discussion. I thank them for their point of
view.
This may be, in some respects, the most important vote that
any Senator, no matter how long we've been in the United States
Senate, will take. We, I think, have been educated and informed
by your knowledge and your presentation today. I appreciate it
very much, and I know that all the members of this committee
do, as we move forward to a day in September when there will be
a very seminal vote on this issue.
I thank the witnesses.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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