[Senate Hearing 114-519]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-519
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 9, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Lester E. Munson III, Staff Director
Jodi B. Herman, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Ford, Majority Chief Counsel
Margaret Taylor, Minority Chief Counsel
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 1
Jones, Dr. Bruce, vice president and director, Foreign Policy
Program, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC................. 48
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Negroponte, Hon. John, vice chairman, Mclarty Associates,
Washington, DC................................................. 46
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Power, Hon. Samantha, United States Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, New York, NY............................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to questions for the record submitted to Ambassador
Samantha Power by Senator Bob Corker........................... 60
(iii)
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
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Wednesday, December 9, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Johnson, Flake,
Gardner, Perdue, Isakson, Barrasso, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen,
Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
come to order.
I want to thank our witness. I know she has significant
responsibilities right now at the U.N. Security Council. Ben
and I had a chance this week to meet with her and all the
members. Quite educational, I hope on both sides. But we
certainly appreciate you being here, and I will introduce you
in just a moment.
Today's hearing will review the United Nations peacekeeping
operations and explore opportunities for reform to make U.N.
peacekeeping work better in U.S. national interests.
As a permanent member of the Security Council and the
largest contributor by far to the U.N. peacekeeping budget, the
U.S. has a particular interest in how U.N. peacekeeping
mandates are set and operations are carried out. The United
States cannot be everywhere all the time. There is an important
role for U.N. peacekeeping in supporting U.S. interests for
security and stability around the world.
Today's U.N. peacekeeping is evolving in many ways.
Traditionally, missions have focused primarily on negotiating
peace agreements, inserting blue helmets to separate
conflicting parties to implement these agreements, and
generally monitoring and keeping the peace.
U.N. peacekeepers now are being asked to take on new and
difficult responsibilities, such as civilian protection,
disarming active combatants, or developing the capacity to
engage on the antiterrorism front. These new missions and
mandates raise many questions, which we certainly will be
exploring today.
What are the risks when U.N. peacekeepers actively engage
combatants in a warzone? Do U.N. peacekeepers forgo their
neutrality in these instances? And if so, what are the
implications for our interests?
If U.N. peacekeepers are asked to provide logistics support
in humanitarian crises such as the Ebola fight in West Africa,
what challenges does that raise?
I am particularly concerned with recent disturbing reports
of sexual exploitation and abuse by certain U.N. peacekeeping
troops. The current U.N. policy is zero tolerance, but such
abuses continue with disturbing regularity.
So it is our hope to find some common sense ways to address
these issues and explore these and other topics, such as the
U.S. peacekeeping assessment.
We again want to thank our distinguished witness for being
here, and I will turn it over to our ranking member for his
comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Chairman Corker. I very
much appreciate you convening this hearing on an important
topic, and I want to thank all of our distinguished panelists
today, extraordinary individuals who have given so much to our
country. We thank you all for your participation and your
continued service to our country, particularly Ambassador
Powers.
It is good to see you here.
I have long believed the United Nations at its best can be
a powerful partner of the United States, advancing global peace
and security for far less cost and more effectively than if we
act alone. When you add the U.N. presence, it is a global
presence, and that is far preferable than having a U.S. or
sole, one-country presence.
The U.N. does many things right. They assist more than 60
million refugees and displaced people fleeing conflict, famine,
and persecution with lifesaving assistance. It provides food to
90 million people in 80 countries. It vaccinates 58 percent of
the world's children, saving no less than 3 million lives.
Recently, it launched the sustainable development goals,
which it fully embraced. It could have a powerful impact
globally on reducing corruption and poor governance.
In short, the U.N. is capable of and has already done a
great deal of good in the world. But I believe that the U.N.
could be stronger and much more effective, if there were
greater transparency and accountability across the entire
organization.
The U.N.'s continuing anti-Israel bias is deeply unhelpful
to our shared interests in a peaceful, stable Middle East.
In the case of Syria, the Assad regime continues its
indiscriminate barrel-bombing and slaughter of civilians. And
those responsible for war crimes have yet to be held
accountable.
But let us be clear. The United States could not ensure
international security alone nor should it have to. The United
Nations and specifically the U.N. peacekeeping remains one of
the best burden-sharing tools we have to help end war, protect
civilian population, and secure territory.
By drawing upon the financial and human capacities of all
U.N. member states, the U.N. peacekeeping helps the United
States share the responsibility of promoting global stability
and reduces the need for unilateral intervention.
United Nations peacekeeping has managed to protect hundreds
of thousands of innocent civilians. With more than 120,000
military and police personnel currently serving as part of 16
missions on four continents, U.N. peacekeepers now represent
the largest deployed military force in the world.
There are more U.N. peacekeeping missions today because
peacekeepers are being asked to do more in increasingly
dangerous, remote, and deadly operational environments. We need
to recognize this and make sure that the United Nations and the
troop-contributing countries are given peacekeepers who are
placed in harm's way the protective equipment, training, and
support that they deserve.
Peacekeepers themselves are often seen as legitimate
targets for attack by extremist groups and others. We saw that
recently in the horrific attacks in Mali, where terrorists
linked to al Qaeda killed 20 people, including an American from
Maryland. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali has suffered 42
fatalities at the hands of the militants since January 2013.
We know that the U.N. peacekeeping is a cost-effective tool
when compared to other military options. The U.N. annual
peacekeeping budget only makes up about 0.5 percent of the
world's total military expenditures.
I think this is a particularly important moment,
considering that we are debating the omnibus and dealing with
the fiscal issues of our country and trying balance our
budgets, so let me bring it closer to home. The U.N. mission,
the cost per peacekeeper per year, is about $16,000. In 2014,
each U.S. soldier in Afghanistan cost $2.1 million. Moreover,
according to the study by the GAO, U.N. peacekeeping operations
are eight times less expensive than funding a comparable U.S.
force.
This is not to say the U.S. share of peacekeeping dues
should continue unchanged. I think the chairman has raised a
good point about reform in the United Nations in the way they
do their budget. The scaled assessment should be reworked, and
I am confident that Ambassador Power and the U.N. team are
focused on that goal as well.
Maintaining the legitimacy of the U.N. peacekeeping is
essential. Nothing will erode it faster than the horrific
reports that we received on sexual abuse by peacekeepers in
certain missions.
I have long been concerned about these disturbing reports
of sexual exploitation and abuse. As the largest contributor to
the United Nations and as the permanent member on the U.N.
Security Council, the United States has a responsibility to
ensure that the United Nations uphold the highest standards of
professionalism in peacekeeping operations. The failure by the
United Nations to hold individual peacekeepers, their
commanders, and troop-contributing countries accountable for
verifiable allegations of abuse is unacceptable.
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recently announced a
series of proposals to combat sexual exploitation and abuse in
peacekeeping at a meeting of the representatives from over 100
troop-contributing countries. That is only a start. More must
be done by both the United Nations and the member states. And I
look forward to hearing about how the United States can
continue to push for these effective reforms.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and having a
robust discussion.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
We have two distinguished panels today, and we want to
thank all who are here to share their wisdom.
Our first witness is the Permanent Representative to the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Samantha Power. We thank
you for being here today with a very tight schedule.
We also thank you for bringing Haley back, who served so
well with Senator Coons here and was one of the bright people
we had here on the committee amongst many.
But we thank you both for being here. If you could keep
your comments to about 5 minutes or so, we would appreciate it,
and then we look forward to Q&A. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAMANTHA POWER, UNITED STATES PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, UNITED STATES MISSION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Ambassador Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Cardin, for convening this hearing. And thank you all,
distinguished members of the committee, for making time to be
here to discuss peacekeeping.
This committee is acutely aware of the extent to which
conflicts on the other side of the globe can come back and
threaten American security. We have seen time and again how
conflicts can displace millions of people, upend markets, and
destabilize entire regions.
All too recently and all too frequently, we have seen how
such instability can attract and enable violent extremist
groups, who exploit the vacuum of authority to terrorize
civilians; recruit new members; and plan, launch, or inspire
attacks.
U.N. peacekeepers play a vital role in the international
community's efforts to address war, violence, and instability.
As President Obama said in September, ``We know that peace
operations are not the solution to every problem, but they do
remain one of the world's most important tools to address armed
conflict.''
Peacekeepers can help resolve conflict, shore up stability,
deny safe harbor to extremists, and protect civilians from
atrocities, all of which serve core American interests and
reflect deep American values, while ensuring greater burden-
sharing by the international community.
This administration has consequently been working
aggressively to ensure that U.N. peacekeeping operations are
better able to meet the demands of international peace and
security, which, as has been noted by both the chairman and the
ranking member, those requirements have changed considerably
over just the last 20 years.
Peacekeepers today are undertaking more missions. The
number of uniformed personnel has risen from fewer than 20,000
15 years ago to over 100,000 today.
They are assuming greater risk. Two-thirds of peacekeepers
are operating in active conflicts, the highest percentage in
history.
And they are assigned broad and increasingly complex
responsibilities, ranging from disarming armed groups to
facilitating the safe delivery of humanitarian aid to
protecting civilians from those who wish them harm.
Today, 98 percent of uniformed personnel in U.N. missions
around the world are under orders to protect civilians as part
of their mandate. This is not your mother's peacekeeping, your
father's peacekeeping, your grandfather's peacekeeping. It has
evolved significantly.
While peacekeeping has never been more important to
American interests, it has also never been more demanding. And
that is why, in September, President Obama issued the first
presidential memorandum on multilateral peace operations in
more than 20 years, directing a wide range of actions to
strengthen and modernize U.N. operations, including by building
partner capacity, providing U.S. support, and leading reform of
U.N. peacekeeping.
I just want to briefly, Mr. Chairman, touch on a few key
lines of effort that we have pursued. These are described in
greater detail in my written submission.
First, we are working to ensure that countries with the
will to perform 21st century peacekeeping, that they have the
capacity to do so. One way we are doing this is through the
African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, or APRRP,
which President Obama announced in August 2014.
Through APRRP, the United States is investing in the
capacity of six African countries that have proven themselves
leaders in peacekeeping. In exchange, these countries have
committed to maintain the forces and equipment necessary to
deploy rapidly.
This initiative builds upon the Global Peace Operations
Initiative launched under President George W. Bush, which is
our primary tool for building partner-nation peacekeeping
capacity, and it will help ensure that more soldiers deployed
for peacekeeping missions will be fully prepared.
I hope that the Senate and House will fully fund this
important initiative in future years.
Second, we are expanding the pool of troop- and police-
contributing countries, and bringing advanced militaries back
into peacekeeping. In September, President Obama convened a
historic high-level summit, the first of its kind, at the U.N.
to rally new commitments to peacekeeping, marking the
culmination of a yearlong effort initiated by Vice President
Biden at the previous U.N. General Assembly. Forty-nine
countries participated and pledged nearly 50,000 additional
troops and police.
Not only that, more of these troops will now come from
advanced militaries, who bring with them equipment and
expertise that is critically needed on the ground. We saw this
in Mali in January this year, when Dutch attack helicopters
helped Bangladeshi infantry repel rebels who had opened fire on
their camp, where civilians were taking refuge.
The United States is making contributions in this respect
as well as one part of our unrivaled contribution to global
peace and security, looking specifically for ways to leverage
our military's unique capabilities to support peacekeeping
operations, including by enabling faster deployment by others.
Third, we are working to ensure a higher standard of
performance and conduct once peacekeeping contingents are
deployed, specifically in two critical areas: the complete
fulfillment of their mandates and the combating of sexual
exploitation and abuse.
The additional troops generated by the President's
September summit will prove invaluable to both goals, by
allowing the U.N. to be more selective as to which troops it
deploys, and now giving it the leverage to repatriate poorly
performing troops and police when necessary, and especially, of
course, in instances where there are credible allegations of
sexual abuse.
With respect to mandate, when peacekeepers deploy in
volatile situations, they have to be prepared to use force to
defend themselves, to protect civilians, and to otherwise carry
out their mandated tasks.
Too often in the past, peacekeepers have shied away, even
when atrocities are being perpetrated. A report by the U.N.'s
internal oversight office in March last year found that in 507
attacks against civilians from 2010 to 2013, peacekeepers
virtually never used force to protect those coming under
attack. Thousands of civilians likely lost their lives as a
result. This cannot continue, and a growing number of leading
troop contributors agree. The 50,000 additional troops and
police should enable more capable, more willing troops and
police to staff these missions.
The same is true on sexual exploitation and violence. And
let me just state the obvious here. We share the outrage of
everyone on this committee, all the American people who are
focused on this issue. Peacekeepers must not abuse civilians.
Sexual abuse and exploitation have no place, it goes without
saying, again, in any society. It is especially abhorrent when
committed by those who take advantage of the trust that
communities are placing in the United Nations, and those
responsible must be held accountable.
Addressing this scourge will require continuing the
important efforts begun by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to
strengthen the implementation of a zero-tolerance policy,
including bolstering reporting and accountability measures, and
pledging to set up an immediate response team to investigate
certain cases. It will also require more vigilance and follow-
through from troop-contributing countries.
There must also be far more transparency in these
investigations, to track cases and ensure that justice is
served.
The U.N. should be able to take advantage now of its newly
expanded pool of soldiers and police by suspending from
peacekeeping any country that does not take seriously the
responsibility to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute
credible allegations.
The fourth and final priority, Mr. Chairman, is to press
for bold institutional reforms within the U.N. itself. We have
seen the U.N. secretariat make profound changes to
peacekeeping, from improved logistics and sustainment to a more
comprehensive approach to crisis situations that integrates
military, police, and civilian tools. But much, much more needs
to be done, and we have spearheaded efforts to enact further
reforms, including longer troop rotations to preserve
institutional memory, penalties for troops who show up without
the necessary equipment to perform their duties.
And we will continue to work aggressively to cut costs. The
U.N. has already, thanks to U.S. leadership, cut the per-
peacekeeper costs by roughly 17 percent since 2008. We are also
working to advance the reforms proposed by the Secretary
General's High-Level Independent Panel on U.N. Peace
Operations, which are intended to address inadequate planning,
slow troop deployment, uneven mission leadership, breakdowns in
command-and-control, and a current set of rules around human
resources and procurement designed for the conference rooms of
New York and not the streets of Bangui.
Let me conclude. In all of the areas I have just described,
we have seen improvements, and the United States has played an
instrumental role in making them possible. But there is much
more to be done.
We are not satisfied with peacekeepers fulfilling only
parts, but not all, of their mandates; with peacekeepers
standing up to protect civilians in some, but not all,
situations; or with soldiers being held accountable for crimes
or misconduct some, but not all, of the time.
The role played by peacekeepers today is too important. For
the sake of our own interests and security, as well as the
millions of innocent people around the world whose lives may
depend on peacekeepers, we will continue working to strengthen
peacekeeping so that it is tailored for the 21st century
threats peacekeepers face.
We appreciate your interest and support and continued
dialogue on these matters. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Power follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Samantha Power
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I am
grateful for this panel's enduring commitment to American leadership at
the United Nations and in the world. And I appreciate the rigor that
your members bring to ensuring the oversight and effective use of our
contributions to the United Nations--a goal we share. I am grateful for
the opportunity to discuss why the United States has such a strong
interest in the success of U.N. peacekeeping and the Administration's
strategy for strengthening this critical national security instrument.
First, I will discuss the growth and evolution of U.N. peacekeeping
over the last decade, including the changing nature of these missions.
Second, I will summarize the Administration's vision for strengthening
U.N. peace operations, including by ensuring that troops and police in
U.N. operations perform professionally and effectively. Third, I will
describe U.S. support for peacekeeping, including the pledges made in
the recently-issued Presidential Memorandum on U.S. Support to U.N.
Peace Operations and at the recent Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping at
the U.N.
Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping
The United States has a vital interest in strengthening
peacekeeping to respond to demands that peacekeepers are currently
struggling to meet. We do not want to live in a world where more than
9,000 children worldwide have been recruited in less than a year to
become child soldiers, as happened in South Sudan. We do not want to
live in a world where religious or ethnic communities who lived
together for decades in harmony, such as the Muslims and Christians in
the Central African Republic, are induced to hate and fear one another.
We do not want to live in a world where violent extremists exploit weak
governments and commit acts of terrorism, as we have seen in Somalia
and recently witnessed in Mali. Nor, of course, do America's foreign
policy leaders, including the distinguished members of this Committee.
Recognizing that our security and our values prevent us from
ignoring these conflicts, the question remains: what can America do to
stop them? Even if the United States has an interest in seeing conflict
abate or civilians protected, that does not mean that U.S. forces
should be doing all of the abating or the protecting. As President
Obama said at West Point last year, ``America must always lead on the
world stage,'' but ``we should not go it alone.'' It should go without
saying that we cannot and we should not send the U.S. military into all
of the places conflict is burning, civilians are hurting, or extremists
are lurking. Just because we have far and away the most capable
military in the world does not mean we should assume risks and burdens
that should be shared by the international community.
This is where peacekeeping comes in. As President Obama affirmed at
the U.N. Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping on September 28, 2015, ``We
know that peace operations are not the solution to every problem, but
they do remain one of the world's most important tools to address armed
conflict.'' When boots on the ground are needed to defuse conflict in
Congo or Mali, peacekeeping is often the best instrument we have.
Peacekeeping operations ensure that other countries help shoulder the
burden, both by contributing uniformed personnel and by sharing the
financial costs of the operations. Provided that peacekeepers actually
deliver on their mandate, multilateral peacekeeping also brings a
greater degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the local population and
the world. Because missions are made up of troops from multiple
countries, with strong representation from the global South, spoilers
and militants have a harder time cynically branding them as having
imperialist designs.
The U.N. has been there at critical junctures to consolidate peace
and security and provide much needed stability after U.S. forces or our
allies have been deployed for peace enforcement or stabilization
operations, as in Haiti, Kosovo and Timor-Leste.
We have a compelling interest in curbing violent conflicts and
preventing suffering--and we need peacekeeping to work. But precisely
at this moment, when we recognize the crucial role peacekeeping can
play in shoring up international security interests, our demands on
peacekeeping are outstripping what it can deliver. Today, we are asking
peacekeepers to do more, in more places, and in more complex conflicts
than at any time in history.
The United States, during both Republican and Democratic
administrations, has turned to peacekeeping operations to advance our
national security interests. There are currently sixteen U.N.
peacekeeping missions worldwide, made up of over 100,000 uniformed
personnel, not to mention the 20,000 troops that the African Union
currently deploys in Somalia. This is up from fewer than 20,000 fifteen
years ago and 50,000 ten years ago.
To stress, this is by far the largest number of peacekeepers
deployed in history. But the numbers only tell a small part of the
story. Today, two-thirds of peacekeepers are operating in active
conflicts, the highest percentage ever. Peacekeepers often deploy to
areas where myriad rebel groups and militias have made clear their
intention to keep fighting. And the warring parties in modern conflicts
increasingly include violent extremist groups, who terrorize civilians
and attack peacekeepers.
We are also asking peacekeepers to take on more responsibilities in
support of sustainable political solutions. We ask U.N. peacekeeping
missions to help with peace processes, assist with re-establishing
state authority and stabilizing states amid deadly attacks by violent
extremists, such as in Mali. We ask them to support the safe delivery
of life-saving humanitarian assistance, such as escorting emergency
shipments of food and medicine to civilians, as peacekeepers have done
in South Sudan. We ask them to protect civilians from atrocities, as in
the Central African Republic (CAR). We ask them to bolster security in
countries emerging from brutal civil wars, such as in Liberia and Cote
d'Ivoire, and to bolster regional stability from the Levant to the
Great Lakes of Africa.
Precisely at this moment--when we are asking more of peacekeeping
than ever before and as we recognize the crucial role it can play in
protecting U.S. interests in just about every mission around the
world--we see both the promise and the pitfalls of contemporary
peacekeeping. We see life-saving impact when peacekeepers are willing
and able to fulfill their mandates and the devastating consequences
when they are not.
In the 21st century, the challenges to U.N. peacekeeping have
changed, and so the international community's response must change with
it. The United Nations is increasingly central to efforts to bring
stability to the world's conflict zones, but too many U.N. peacekeeping
operations are struggling to meet the demands placed upon them.
Missions suffer from operational challenges, including long and overly
complicated mandates, inadequate planning, obstacles to force
generation, slow deployments, weak leadership, lack of critical
enablers, competing chains of command, uneven commitments among troop--
and police--contributing countries to mandate implementation, and
political and administrative obstacles to operations created by the
governments hosting peacekeepers. Additionally, each mission needs a
strong political dialogue and agreement underpinning its efforts, a
premise of their success.
U.S. Strategy for Strengthening Peacekeeping
On September 28, the day of the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping,
President Obama issued a new policy Memorandum on U.S. Support to Peace
Operations, the first presidential guidance to address U.S. support to
peace operations in over twenty years. The policy reaffirms the strong
support of the United States for U.N. peace operations and directs the
interagency to take on a wide range of actions to strengthen and
modernize U.N. operations for a new era. Our strategy prioritizes three
lines of effort: building partner capacity and strengthening partner
accountability; providing U.S. support; and leading reform of U.N.
peacekeeping. I will now outline these efforts in detail.
First, we need to expand and deepen the pool of troop--and police--
contributing countries, and bring advanced militaries back into
peacekeeping. At the U.N. Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping hosted by
President Obama, the Secretary-General and eight other Member States,
high-level leaders from 49 countries and three international
organizations made pledges that far exceeded our expectations.
Twenty-one European countries made pledges, marking a welcome
return of Europe to U.N. peacekeeping. Malaysia announced significant
infantry, police, and engineering capabilities. Finland pledged
multiple military units, including special forces. Chile--helicopters,
hospitals, and engineering units. Colombia declared its intent to
deploy multiple infantry battalions over the next few years. And China
announced that it will establish a significant standby force that will
be ready to deploy immediately in times of crises.
Leaders from every part of the world pledged approximately 12 field
hospitals, 15 engineering companies, and 40 helicopters, as well as
approximately 20 formed police units and over two-dozen infantry
battalions. At the summit, and in the days that followed, countries
committed to providing nearly 50,000 additional troops and police to
U.N. peacekeeping. If countries deliver on these contributions--and we
will join the U.N. in ensuring that they do--UN peacekeeping will be
positioned to improve significantly its performance. The U.N. will have
the capacity to fill long-standing gaps in operations--from attack
helicopters to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units. If
a new mission is created or an existing one significantly expanded, as
sadly is sometimes the case, the U.N. will be able to put troops and
police more quickly into the field.
Second, we need to ensure that countries with the will to perform
21st century peacekeeping have the capacity they need to do so. Because
African leaders see first-hand the consequences of unchecked conflicts,
several have been at the forefront of embracing a new approach to
peacekeeping, one that seeks to more effectively execute the tasks
assigned to peacekeepers and in particular the responsibility to
protect civilians. The African Union has demonstrated a commitment to
building rapid response capability on the continent, and the United
States is leading a coalition of international partners in support of
these efforts. Last year, President Obama announced a new initiative at
the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit: the African Peacekeeping Rapid
Response Partnership (APRRP). The United States is investing in the
capacity of a core group of six countries--Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda,
Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda.
The idea is to deepen our investment in those militaries that have
a track record of deploying troops to peacekeeping operations and that
are committed to protecting civilians from violence. To give just one
example, Rwanda's troops were among the first boots on the ground when
conflicts erupted in the Central Africa Republic. Rwandans understand
the importance of getting peacekeeping right, having experienced the
catastrophic consequences of it going terribly wrong. And because
Rwandans robustly carry out their mission mandates, the people in
countries where they serve trust them; troops from other countries who
serve alongside them see what robust peacekeeping looks like; and
aggressors who would attack civilians fear them.
The United States remains the largest trainer and equipper of
military and police contingents deploying to peacekeeping operations.
We have trained hundreds of thousands of peacekeepers in the past
decade through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), launched
under President Bush. While we must ensure the GPOI program remains
robust and responsive, as it serves as our primary tool for building
partner nations' peacekeeping capacities, APRRP is an important
supplement. Our military experts will work alongside partners like
Rwanda to strengthen their institutions and capabilities so they can
rapidly deploy troops when crises emerge, and supply and sustain their
forces in hostile environments. In exchange for this support, these
countries have committed to maintain the forces and equipment necessary
to undertake those rapid deployments. I strongly encourage the Senate
and House to fully fund this important initiative in future years.
Third, we need to ensure that peacekeepers perform what is asked of
them. Some troop-contributors disagree with the scope of
responsibilities that the Security Council has assigned their troops.
These countries sometimes cite the basic principles of U.N.
peacekeeping, and hearken back to the earliest peacekeeping missions--
in which blue helmets were deployed at the invitation of warring
parties to observe a ceasefire along a demarcated line, such as one
between Israel and Syria, or India and Pakistan. In that context, it
was absolutely vital that peacekeepers had the states parties' consent,
that they behaved impartially, and that they observed and reported
infractions.
These missions are still critical, but for more than twenty years,
peacekeeping has been evolving. The Security Council first tasked a
peacekeeping mission with the responsibility to protect civilians in
Sierra Leone in 1999--in the face of the brutal civil war in that
country. While it is national governments' responsibility to take care
of their own people, peacekeeping operations have a vital obligation to
step in when they fail to do so. This duty is not theoretical. Today,
10 missions--constituting almost 98 percent of U.N. uniformed personnel
across the world--are charged with protecting civilians. If
peacekeeping is to be effective in the 21st century, we must close the
gap between the mandates the international community asks peacekeepers
to undertake, and the willingness and ability of peacekeepers to
successfully execute them. If we do not, it not only puts the lives of
civilians and peacekeepers at risk, but undermines the credibility and
legitimacy of peacekeeping everywhere. This is one of the most
important efforts underway today.
The good news is that there is a growing consensus around what
modern peacekeeping looks like. In May, drawing on its direct knowledge
of what it means when U.N. peacekeepers do not protect civilians,
Rwanda channeled its lessons learned from the field into a set of best
practices for the protection of civilians by peacekeeping missions.
These ``Kigali Principles'' call, for example, for troop-contributing
countries to ensure that the military commander of a peacekeeping
contingent has prior authority to use force as needed. When a commander
has to radio back to capital to seek permission, it may mean not being
able to react in time to repel a fast-approaching attack on a nearby
village.
In the span of just a few months, a diverse group of major troop-
contributing countries have endorsed the ``Kigali Principles,''
including Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, Uruguay, the Netherlands,
Italy, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Already, one-third of all troops
currently serving in U.N. and AU peacekeeping operations come from
countries that have endorsed the ``Kigali Principles''--and that
proportion is rising. These principles are a new blueprint for
peacekeepers--and especially infantry--deploying into volatile
situations.
This growing clarity, together with the significant new
contributions announced at the September summit, can change the impact
that peacekeepers have in the field. In the past, the scant supply of
troops and police meant that neither the U.N. nor the countries
contributing the lion's share of peacekeepers could afford to be
selective without leaving significant gaps in missions. However, the
summit pledges of nearly 50,000 troops and police should enable more
capable, more willing troops and police to staff peacekeeping missions.
Troop- and police-contributing countries that have qualms with
particular mandates, or doubts about their capacity to do what is asked
of them, no longer need to deploy to missions simply because nobody
else will.
For its part, the U.N. must demonstrate leadership by strengthening
its monitoring and evaluation of troops and police in the field. When
underperformance results from a lack of appropriate training and
equipping, we must help to build those capabilities over time. When it
is a matter of misconduct, refusal to follow commands, or implement
mandated tasks, or take seriously the imperative to root out
misconduct, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse, the U.N. must
repatriate those responsible. For the first time in two decades, the
surplus of troops and police allows the U.N. to do just that.
Fourth, we need to press the U.N. to make bold institutional
reforms. Last year, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed a High-Level
Independent Panel on U.N. Peace Operations to undertake a thorough
review of U.N. peacekeeping and political missions. The Panel released
an in-depth report that included reform recommendations, many of which
align with long-standing U.S. priorities. In September, the Secretary-
General released his report outlining his intentions to implement the
Panel's recommendations ranging from improved logistics and sustainment
through its Department of Field Support, to a more comprehensive
approach to crisis situations that integrates military, police, and
civilian tools.
The Administration is currently focused on several key areas of
institutional reform.
We are working to strengthen the U.N.'s assessment and planning
work, which includes: supporting the use of sequenced mandates;
encouraging the review and revision of conflict analysis tools across
the system; and, supporting improved assessment analysis and planning
capabilities. Better analysis and planning and the sequencing of
mandates not only help to tailor peace operations to better suit often
dynamic contexts, but we predict could also result in cost savings. For
example, more tailored peace operations could help ensure that the U.N.
isn't being asked to deploy expensive state-capacity building
components before a host-state government has the credibility or
ability to absorb such support.
We are supporting efforts to enhance the U.N.'s ability to
undertake strategic force generation and deploy rapidly. This is an
area in dire need of improvement, as we have seen in the long lead
times getting troops into Mali, CAR and South Sudan. Rapid deployment
of peacekeeping missions can be critical to stabilizing crisis
situations, yet we have seen continued shortfalls in staffing-up
missions such as in the emergency surge the Security Council authorized
for the mission in South Sudan. We must look at what structures and
arrangements the U.N. needs to best support the rapid deployment of
peacekeepers and equipment.
We are encouraging the Secretary-General and appropriate heads of
U.N. departments and divisions to undertake administrative reform and
cultural shifts that will empower the field and allow for flexibility
and responsiveness. The U.N.'s ability to respond to needs in the field
is hamstrung by burdensome policies and procedures and a culture overly
concerned with compliance on paper versus outcomes in practice. Getting
the right leadership is also critical for mission success. The U.N. can
improve its selection process for senior mission leaders, including by
prioritizing leadership and management skills, increasing commitments
to gender diversity among qualified leaders, and developing meaningful
mandatory training for senior leaders. The U.N. should also rigorously
assess the performance of senior mission leaders and remove ineffective
leaders when warranted. We are encouraging these efforts at the U.N.
and working with the U.N. to enhance its training of senior mission
leadership.
We also continue to support vigorously the Secretary-General's
implementation of his zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and
abuse (SEA). We have been particularly outraged at those especially
egregious cases of SEA that have been reported in CAR, for example.
Those who prey on the vulnerable communities they are sent to protect
undermine the very foundation of peacekeeping. There is no excuse for
inaction, and we must all do more to ensure those responsible for these
heinous acts are held accountable.
I greatly appreciate the leadership you've shown on this issue, Mr.
Chairman, and am fully aware of how important this issue is to the
Committee. Like you, I believe that even a single case of SEA is one
too many. The United States has long been a leader in pushing for
stronger prevention measures, and concrete steps to ensure
accountability for those responsible for SEA.
Despite the horrific incidents that have been recently reported,
the U.N. has come a long way in recent years in responding to the
scourge of SEA with strong support from the United States. However,
there is a lot of work that still remains in preventing and addressing
SEA. We remain concerned that many SEA perpetrators commit these acts,
which are often crimes, with impunity and that many SEA victims never
report such to the U.N.
In order to address this accountability gap, and to improve
prevention measures and assistance to victims, the U.S. government is
instituting a ``full court press.'' We are working with our partners to
ensure that the Secretary-General remains fully committed and empowered
to implement this policy. At the President's Peacekeeping Summit at the
U.N. in September, for example, 42 countries signed onto the Summit
Declaration, which affirmed support for the Secretary-General's zero
tolerance policy, and confirmed commitments to rigorous vetting and
training of uniformed personnel, swift and thorough investigations, and
appropriate accountability measures and timely reporting to the U.N. on
all allegations.
Because we know that SEA is an issue that affects all member
states, we are developing a whole-of-government strategy to improve
prevention of SEA and enhance transparency and accountability for
perpetrators. President Obama's recent memorandum on U.N. peacekeeping
highlighted the importance of combatting SEA, and some of the
initiatives that the U.S. government is undertaking.
To effectively combat SEA, we are working to track individual cases
where there is information available, following up with the appropriate
authorities, analyzing the strengths and weakness of current policies,
and providing support or applying pressure as appropriate to the U.N.
We are further exploring setting a requirement for rigorous pre-
deployment training in the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy on
SEA. And, we will be highlighting instances of SEA in the annual human
rights report. In addition to elevating incidents of SEA, these acts
will pressure, incentivize, and enable troop- and police-contributing
countries to better handle SEA.
Perhaps the greatest challenge in our efforts to eliminate SEA has
been the lack of transparency on allegations. Although we need to
ensure the appropriate procedures are followed and that privacy is
respected for all those accused of SEA, the U.N. and Member States
should know the nationality of alleged perpetrators, the status of
investigations, and the outcome of disciplinary or prosecutorial
action, or of sanctions imposed by the U.N. Unfortunately, we rarely
have access to this type of information. Our initiatives with the U.N.
have been largely focused on increasing transparency in this regard,
specifically to ensure accountability. The lack of data has been very
problematic, because it prevents us from following-up with governments
and fully analyzing the factors that most contribute to SEA: whether it
is a lack of discipline, cultures of tolerance within missions, or lack
of training, as these all differ across troop- and police-contributing
countries and across U.N. peacekeeping operations. It has also been
difficult to track the U.N.'s follow up on specific cases, since in the
past we have not known for sure what country is responsible.
We applaud the Secretary-General's commitment to publicizing the
nationality of individuals against whom credible allegations of SEA
have been made in his next annual report on this issue. This idea
originated in the Secretary-General's 2012 report on SEA, where he
noted his intention to ``provide country-specific information on the
number of credible allegations being investigated by Member States in
reports to the General Assembly.''
This information will better enable us to use our own diplomatic
efforts to ensure accountability. Once we know which country's
personnel have been accused of misconduct, we will have a much better
understanding of the nature of the problem, the actual size of the
accountability gap, and how to better target our response. In cases
where countries have repeated SEA violations, we will be able to work
bilaterally to address capacity issues and to encourage countries to
take appropriate action.
We are also working with the U.N. to improve standard operating
procedures for SEA prevention, reporting, and investigations. The
Secretary-General has taken a strong stance and very decisive action on
SEA. In response to repeated allegations of SEA in MINUSCA, the U.N.'s
peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic, he requested
and accepted the resignation of his Special Representative Babacar Gaye
in August of this year. His recent reports on SEA in peacekeeping
outline very detailed steps he is taking under his own authority to
address SEA. These include: community outreach strategies to increase
awareness about SEA and reporting mechanisms; establishing Immediate
Response Teams to preserve evidence following allegations; tighter
timelines for SEA investigations; and, suspending payments to troop and
police contributing countries in connection with individuals alleged to
have committed SEA. We welcome the Secretary-General's leadership on
SEA.
Finally, the United States continues to explore ways to support a
more predictable and flexible funding mechanism to support AU peace
operations, conditioned on increased AU financing and operational
capacities, and compliance with U.N. regulations, rules, and policies,
including financial rules, as well as with international humanitarian
and human rights law, as applicable. These operations provide a
creative and oftentimes cost-effective alternative to U.N. peacekeeping
when environments are particularly volatile such as Somalia or early on
in CAR.
U.S. Support for U.N. Peacekeeping
In order to fulfill the first goal outlined above--building partner
capacity--the United States must continue to show leadership in
supporting peacekeeping operations. Not only is this support good for
peacekeeping, it also positions us to be maximally effective in driving
changes that will strengthen peacekeeping, and deliver greater results
from our investments.
As President Obama said in his remarks at the Summit, ``We are here
today, together, to strengthen and reform U.N. peacekeeping because our
common security demands it. This is not something that we do for
others; this is something that we do collectively because our
collective security depends on it.'' In concert with the other Summit
participants' pledges, President Obama announced his intention to
significantly increase the number of U.S. personnel serving under the
U.N. flag by working to double our contribution of military staff
officers serving as individuals or teams in U.N. missions.
Additional U.S. commitments announced at the Summit are aimed at
supporting U.N. peacekeeping in three key areas. First, to reduce
response time and support rapid response, the United States is prepared
to offer access to our unparalleled strategic air- and sealift
capabilities to support U.N. deployments in crisis situations. Second,
the United States is prepared to provide engineering support, an
important enabler of U.N. operations and another comparative U.S.
strength, which could include technical expertise and making available
military engineers for specific projects on a project-by-project basis,
where there is an urgent need that the United States is uniquely
positioned to address. These units would remain under existing policies
on U.S. command and control. Third, the United States plans to pre-
position defense equipment to accelerate equipping and deployment of
personnel to U.N. and regional peacekeeping operations, essential in
crises. The United States will also factor U.N. and regional
peacekeeping needs as a priority in determining which countries receive
appropriate U.S. surplus defense equipment.
The United States will endeavor to increase its already substantial
contributions to building the capacity of the U.N. and partner nations
that contribute to peace operations in the following areas: in-mission
training and mentoring, technology, leadership training, police pre-
deployment training and counter-IED training and assessment.
For example, the United States is committing to make available
mobile training teams on a case-by-case basis for deployment alongside
partners who are contributing forces and deploying into a peace
operation. U.S. personnel plan to work directly with U.N. experts to
identify cost-effective technology solutions for needs in countering
IEDs, force protection, protection of civilians, collaborative
planning, information-led operations, rapid deployment of vanguard
forces, and expeditionary logistics. The United States intends to
increase its already significant contributions to U.N. police in
peacekeeping by allocating another $2 million--subject to congressional
notification--to develop and expand the capability of African partners
deploying police personnel, specifically to enhance their ability to
meet the challenges of violent extremism in missions such as the one in
Mali. The United States is also contributing $2 million specifically
for counter-IED training and intends to offer to deploy U.S. military
counter-IED specialists to conduct strategic and operational-level
assessments alongside select U.N. peacekeeping operations. Importantly,
these commitments will not require the budgeting of additional funds,
as they are all either reimbursable by the U.N. or funded within
existing programs.
In addition, through the GPOI program, the United States is
currently helping 50 partner countries and three regional organizations
build the capacity to deploy to and effectively perform in U.N.
peacekeeping missions. The GPOI model builds partner countries'
training self-sufficiency and supports the development of critically
needed enabling capabilities--such as lift, logistics, and medical
units. Program activities not only address the short-term requirement
of providing capable troops to missions but also provide a lasting
foundation to support the peacekeeping needs of the future.
Conclusion
Although we remain focused on the unique opportunity for reform in
2016 and beyond, we should not forget that U.N. peacekeeping is
stronger than it was two decades ago. The U.N. has improved logistics
and sustainment through its Department of Field Support by modernizing
its supply chain and asset management systems; it has strengthened
lines of communication with headquarters; it has created an inspector-
general function to evaluate candidly the U.N.'s performance; it has
introduced a capabilities-based reimbursement system for troops; and it
has developed a far more integrated approach to crisis situations,
drawing on military, police, and civilian tools.
In closing, let me reflect on the budget. The lines of effort I
have just described are all critical to ensuring peacekeeping better
addresses 21st century challenges. They demonstrate the need for U.S.
leadership. And to exercise that leadership, the United States must pay
our U.N. dues in full and on time.
I understand the frustration that many Americans feel with the
United States paying a substantial share of the U.N.'s peacekeeping and
regular budgets. We agree that the formula should be changed to reflect
the realities of today's world. But, until that happens, if we suggest
we should pay less and withhold our full dues at this critical moment,
we will not only go against our commitments, but we will also
dramatically undercut our ability to achieve needed reforms, undermine
our leadership and erode our credibility with partners.
This does not mean we should simply sign over a large check and
look the other way. On the contrary, as diligent stewards of taxpayer
funds, over the last six years, we have pressed hard to improve the
cost-efficiency of peacekeeping and to prevent significant new costs.
Through U.S.-led reform efforts, the U.N. has cut the cost per-
peacekeeper by roughly 17 percent--that's one-sixth of the cost reduced
through efficiencies and streamlining. We have also aggressively fought
cost increases, saving hundreds of millions of dollars per year by
prevailing on other countries for a more modest increase in the long-
frozen reimbursement rate for U.N. peacekeepers. And we have pressed to
streamline and right-size missions where warranted by changing
conditions on the ground. In the Ivory Coast, we have cut the number of
mandated troops in half, from around 10,000 to 5,000. In Haiti, we have
reduced the number of mandated troops from nearly 9,000 after the 2010
earthquake to just over 2,000 today. We were on course to do the same
in Liberia prior to the outbreak of Ebola. These efforts ensure
governments do not use peacekeepers as an excuse not to take
responsibility for their citizens' own security. And streamlining
missions frees up troops and resources that are needed elsewhere.
When the stakes are as high as they are in these conflicts--when
shortfalls can result in atrocities committed, communities uprooted,
and entire societies split along ethnic or religious lines--getting it
right some of the time is not good enough. Peacekeeping must be
consistently outstanding. We will keep working with our partners to
bring about the kind of reforms upon which the security of millions of
people around the world may depend. And we will continue to work
relentlessly to make peacekeeping as efficient as possible without
undermining its effectiveness, in close coordination with the Congress
and especially this critically important Committee.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for those comments.
Senator Isakson and I were in Darfur years ago and just
infuriated by the caveats that the U.N. peacekeepers had. They
could only fire at people when they were fired upon. You had
women going out and collecting wood from their villages being
raped, abused, people being murdered by the Janjaweed. Yet
those caveats remained.
So we have evolved, as you mentioned. This is not our
father's peacekeeping mission anymore.
As we have evolved these missions, though, and people now
are placing themselves as peacekeepers more in the center of
conflicts, in some cases taking sides, how has this changed the
way the U.N. is viewed in these peacekeeping missions? I assume
you believe this is in our national interests for us to be in
these missions certainly, I do. But how has this changed the
way these blue hats are viewed in these areas?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator Corker. It is an
excellent question.
I think one of the lines that the U.N. struggles to walk is
that it has, on the one hand, peacekeepers that are charged
with an aggressive enforcement of mandates, which entail
protecting civilians, not just protecting peacekeepers
themselves, as was once the case. You have that on one hand.
Then you have U.N. country programs that often look
indistinguishable. They are all driving around in white
vehicles, unarmed, passing out food, providing shelter, trying
to provide counseling to those who have been victimized by
sexual abuse.
So it has been challenging, the blurring of functions
across these missions. But the only thing worse than
confronting that challenge of having people in society
distinguish who does what, is actually people in these
societies rely on peacekeepers, know that the mandate says
protect civilians, and have those peacekeepers bunkered and
more interested, again, in collecting a paycheck and then going
home than actually being out and about and delivering on the
promise of that blue flag.
So, again, it varies per conflict area. I think we have
come a long way. But as I noted, the statistics are not
inspiring. I mean, there are still many troop-contributing
countries who send their troops in without the very strict
guidance that you will be sent home if you do not enforce the
mandate you are given.
The Chairman. Yes. I appreciate the comment Senator Cardin
made about the cost. But, as I understand it, for some of these
countries, even though the cost to us is far less than having
U.S. soldiers there, the pay for these soldiers is far greater
than they would otherwise receive in their own countries. And,
actually, if I understand correctly, that money goes to the
national governments of those countries. And so these countries
are benefiting financially in sending troops there.
Is that correct, in some cases, in some of the lower income
countries? And is that feeding this situation of actually
having troops there that are not, if you will, carrying out
their mandates in an appropriate way, with soldiers not
qualified or trained and not properly equipped? Talk to us a
little bit about what is driving having folks within the
peacekeeping missions that are that are certainly not
conducting themselves in a professional manner.
Ambassador Power. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, again. It
reflects a real understanding of the dynamics in some of these
missions.
Again, the performance is uneven. The motivation is uneven.
The incentive for troops is uneven. If you take, for instance,
Rwandan peacekeepers, who do get a more substantial stipend by
serving in peacekeeping missions than they might if they were
at home, but they are totally driven by what happened in their
country 21 years ago and actually view protecting civilians as
a way of showing the world what should have been done when the
genocide unfolded in Rwanda.
Contrast that with other troops, again, who institutionally
are not given the guidance from capital that they need to be
out and about, that, yes, there are risks entailed with
patrolling, but there are risks also that are entailed by being
bunkered.
I think on the question, the very specific question of the
stipend, as Senator Cardin said, this is a very good deal for
the American taxpayer. These are extremely difficult
environments, not only because of the risks of militia and
government forces targeting peacekeepers as they are out and
about, but also just the conditions in terms of logistics,
access to water. I mean, these are missions that are not
expending resources in the manner that our missions do when
they deploy internationally. The logistic tail is not nearly as
fulsome.
So I think it is important to incentivize their
participation. Some countries are doing it because they are
able, again, to secure additional resources that they are
investing in ways that sometimes we do not have full visibility
into, sometimes in professionalizing their militaries,
sometimes in other parts of their government.
But I think Senator Cardin's point is very, very important.
We are getting a lot out of the 100,000-plus troops who are
active in these conflict areas. These are places where, in some
instances, if you look at Mali or Lebanon, places that are
really cutting-edge theaters in terms of terrorism and
extremism, and if it weren't for U.N. peacekeepers who were
there putting their lives at risk, it may come to the United
States at some point in order for us to advance our security.
The Chairman. As it relates to the issues of the abuse that
has taken place that is, obviously, abhorrent, in fairness, I
think people on both sides of the aisle have concerns about the
U.N.'s ability to actually put reforms in place. And we
understand how the U.N. operates, and I know you talked about
the leader's desire to create reforms. We sent a letter
suggesting that we have onsite court marshals by the countries
to handle peacekeeping soldiers accused of crimes be tried, by
the way, under their own country military preocedures to reduce
impunity. We also made some other suggestions.
What is your sense that those types of reforms can be
implemented, relative to peacekeeping?
Ambassador Power. Well, as Ambassador Negroponte behind me
I think will attest, through the life of the U.N. you have a
challenge, always, on reform, in the sense that there are two
places you have to secure--will and follow-through.
The first is with the countries that comprise the U.N. So
every troop-contributing country to peacekeeping has to be
prepared to look at the kinds of ideas that you put in your
letter that we have been pushing in new York and implement in
their own military changes to ensure follow-though, oversight
in the first instance, follow-through on investigation, and
accountability, whether a court martial or some kind of
prosecution in civilian court.
And again, there is probably no one-size-fits-all solution,
because every country has its own set of procedures, again, for
following up on abuse of any kind.
Then there is the U.N. itself, which has to be much
aggressive in shining a spotlight on those countries that are
not taking the steps that are needed.
I think that we have seen improvements. This is, again, not
something one should cite as an improvement. It should never
have been the case that it was otherwise. But those individuals
who were alleged to be involved in sexual abuse now are not
being paid by the U.N. They are being recalled to their
capital. Training and vetting now is changing, so that there is
training on preventing sexual abuse and exploitation.
You had an idea, I believe, in your letter about a claims
kind of commission. I think the U.N. is looking at creating a
victim support trust fund, which is something, of course, we
would wish to support as well. It is going to require going
back to member states and getting resources to put into that,
but maybe some of the docked pay of those against whom there
are allegations could be used in service of such a fund. And
then I think having more aggressive onsite investigative
capacity, so that less time passes between an allegation and an
actual follow-through.
Lastly, the two aspects of reform come together. In order
to secure meaningful reform that actually matters for potential
victims or people who have already been victimized, there has
to be more transparency between what is actually going on in
the field and then what we are made aware of in New York.
Too often, we hear from NGOs or from journalists about
sexual abuse and exploitation, rather than from the U.N.
itself. And if we are to go to a developing country and try to
enhance their capacity, their training on the front end, their
capacity to investigate on the backend of an allegation, we
have to know who has been accused of doing what at what period,
and be in a position to offer support.
If there are countries who are shirking their obligation to
carry out investigations, we have to know so that we can look
at our bilateral leverage and whether we might suspend some
forms of assistance, if, in fact, there is a recurrent pattern
of not actually taking seriously the zero-tolerance policy.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. My time is up. And as a
courtesy, I want to move on.
I do hope through questioning at some point and--I know the
President has made additional pledges to the U.N. beyond our
normal peacekeeping budgeting. I hope at some point it will
come to light as to where those resources are planned to come
from. But thank you again for being here.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Ambassador Power, for your service to our
country.
As I said in my opening statement, I am a strong supporter
of the mission of the United Nations and the incredible
progress it has made in global issues. I want to talk about
transparency and accountability. It has come up quite a bit on
several subjects.
One of the, I think, clearest ways to try to help the
safety of civilians is to hold President Assad of Syria
accountable for violating international war-crime-type
activities. So do we have your commitment, as our Ambassador in
the United Nations, that we will seek full accountability by
President Assad for the war crimes that he has committed in any
of these negotiations that take place in regard to the
resolution of Syria?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Well, let me say that one of my more unsuccessful days in
my office, since this body was good enough to confirm me for my
job, was pursuing a referral of the war crimes and crimes
against humanity carried out in Syria to the International
Criminal Court. That was a resolution we brought to the U.N.
Security Council. Notwithstanding our own nonparticipation in
the ICC, we believe that is a venue that should be looking at
chemical weapons attacks and barrel-bomb attacks and systematic
torture. And, of course, that effort at a referral was vetoed
by Russia, a veto supported by China.
Senator Cardin. I do understand there are going to be
negotiations that will involve the United States. And the
United States is going to have to sign off on those
negotiations. Do I have your commitment that your position at
the United Nations will be to hold President Assad accountable
for the type of activities you just described?
Ambassador Power. The ultimate settlement in Syria is
going to be between the opposition and the Syrian Government.
The United States position on accountability I hope is well-
known. We are absolutely supportive and have been aggressively
supportive in building an evidentiary base so as to ensure that
Assad and other people responsible for war crimes are held
accountable.
Senator Cardin. It is not up to the government and
opposition to determine whether a person has violated
international standards on conduct of war. War crimes are
global. It is global accountability.
Ambassador Power. I think there are two separate issues.
One is what is the standard or the threshold question for where
accountability should be provided or whether prosecution or a
truth commission, the whole set of tactical question about how
accountability should be pursued.
There is a related, overlapping question of what the terms
of a political settlement would be. I mean, this is not
something that is on the verge of happening, so I think the
details on accountability have not yet been fleshed out, and it
is something we should consult on.
But I want to underscore that the final agreement has to be
something that both the opposition and the government can get
behind.
Senator Cardin. I understand that. It does not quite answer
my question.
Let me make my position clear, and I think the members of
this committee. If President Assad is not held accountable,
there will not be support for any solution in regard to Syria.
I will just make that pretty clear from the beginning.
Let me talk to issue number two on transparency and
accountability. The chairman has already talked about that, the
abuse allegations. If this is not done in an open manner, where
there is complete understanding and disclosure of what is
taking place, the confidence factor of those responsible for
these abuses being held accountable will not be there.
Ambassador Power. I agree completely. I mean, I am not
sure what to add.
As I said, there has been insufficient reporting back to
the Security Council. We have now taken sexual abuse and
exploitation and made it an issue to be discussed in the
Security Council. The Secretary General has now committed to
reporting back.
Senator Cardin. And I have seen the specific
recommendations, and they are good. But you have to follow
through on it, and it has to be done in a way that the
international community, the activists, those who are following
this, can be confident that those who are responsible have
truly been held accountable, so that this will not happen in
the future, will not be tolerated in the future. You said zero
tolerance, which we agree.
That is, I think, the important point, that it is not just
a closed investigation, but that we have an open closure of
this issue and a commitment on how to go forward on how these
matters will be handled.
Ambassador Power. I think right now, Senator, it is very
fair to say that victims who come forward do so at their own
peril, and do not do so with confidence that having taken that
risk, having potentially ostracized themselves in their own
communities, that there is even going to be accountability on
the backend. That has to change entirely. I suspect if it does
change, you may well see more people coming forward.
Senator Cardin. So let me get to my third point on
transparency and accountability, and that is the budget system
at the United Nations. It is anything but open and clear and
transparent. That is nothing new. It has been that way for a
long time.
It is hard for me to understand why our assessment on the
peacekeeping is 28.36 percent, if I am correct, which is almost
three times higher than the next country and is significantly
higher than our general allocation for the U.N. budget.
That does not seem to me to be a transparent way to budget.
So can you just briefly inform us as to the U.S. position in
regard to a fair allocation of the U.N. budget in an open and
transparent manner?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
The formula on the U.S. share of the peacekeeping budget is
a very complex formula. Let me say in brief that it is some
combination of our share of the global economy plus a premium
that we pay by being a permanent member of the Security Council
and, particularly with the veto, getting to dictate whether a
mission comes into existence or whether it does not, along with
the other permanent members as a whole, along with the rest of
the Security Council. So we pay a premium for being a permanent
member.
We were able to secure the cap on our regular budget. The
formula would actually have us pay at a higher rate if not for
the 22 percent cap that Ambassador Holbrooke secured now going
on 15 years ago.
The one thing I want to stress is that our emphasis is on
ensuring that countries that are contributing more and more to
the global economy are paying more of their share. We are in
the midst of scales negotiations now on our share of the
peacekeeping budget. Our emphasis, again, has been on ensuring
countries, you can see their economic growth, but you do not
see a correlation in terms of their contribution.
The Chinese contribution to peacekeeping has more than
doubled in the last 10 years. And I think we can anticipate
that the Chinese share is going to be up around 10 percent,
which would be a tripling of its share. Similarly, the Russian
contribution has doubled. Again, China and Russia being two of
the five permanent members on the council.
Senator Cardin. Well, we should point out that China is
still about one-fourth of the United States, less than one-
fourth. And Russia is about one-eighth of the United States.
It just seems to us that that 22 percent cap, we understand
that and that was well-deserved, the way that came out. It
looks like the United Nations is equalizing through the
peacekeeping percentage and that the 22 percent cap is being
violated because of our higher contributions to the
peacekeeping efforts.
I just urge you that the more transparent this process, the
better it is going to be, I think, received politically in our
country. And we do think the 22 percent is a fair number. We
think it should be honored and be honored in the peacekeeping.
Ambassador Power. I just want to underscore that when the
agreement was secured on the 22 percent cap, no similar
agreement was secured as it related to peacekeeping. In fact,
having the 22 percent cap actually helps us in the peacekeeping
realm because 22 percent becomes the baseline on which these
premiums are agreed to.
I want to stress, we share the same objective. We want to
get other countries to step up and pay their share. We still
believe that if you look, again, at what this means for U.S.
national security--I think this is, again, a version of the
argument you made at the beginning--that even when you compare
it to NATO, where the United States bears the lion's share of
defense investments, that having the rest of the world paying
72 percent of the peacekeeping budget is a good deal for the
American taxpayer.
Senator Cardin. And my last point and I hope this will be
covered, as the chairman said, by others, the safety of
civilians is critically important. You stressed the increased
number commitment made in the meeting in September.
It seems to me it is not a matter of numbers of personnel.
Do they have the will to go in and stand in front of civilians
to protect them? We have not seen that.
So I am not sure I was comforted by your reply that we have
greater capacity by number. If we do not have greater capacity
by will, the civilian population is going to be at great risk.
Ambassador Power. If I may, Senator, just respond briefly.
The point that I emphasized in my testimony was that we
have succeeded now in getting contributions, or commitments, I
should say, not yet contributions, from advanced militaries.
Europe had gotten out of peacekeeping, by and large, over
the course of the last 20 years, and we think it is really
important that they get back in. There is no necessary
correlation always between being an advanced military and
having the political will to put yourself in harm's way to
protect civilians.
But we think that, again, giving the U.N. the choice--now
it has a pool from which it can choose. And if there are people
who show insufficient will and want to spend more time in their
bases than out and about protecting civilians, we think having
this pool of forces, which include, again, more professional
and advanced militaries and better aviation and engineering and
infantry capabilities, giving the U.N. that selectivity is
going to mean over time that the performance of these
peacekeepers is going to improve.
So numbers alone do not mean anything, if you have 50,000
commitments of people who do not have political will. But we
see in that pool, actually, substantial commitments from those
we think do have that will.
The Chairman. Before turning to Senator Perdue, I just want
to thank the ranking member for bringing up an issue that is
brought up consistently, certainly, on our side of the aisle. I
want to thank him for that.
I do want to just emphasize that with NATO, which I know is
not in your jurisdiction, we have become the provider of
security services. Our NATO allies, generally speaking, are the
consumer of security services.
And the same thing is happening with peacekeeping at the
U.N. I know it is a different set of actors.
But the very people that stymie our efforts to pursue our
interests--China, for instance--are taking advantage of us with
respect to sharing the peacekeeping costs. So yes, it is in our
U.S. national interests that we have peacekeeping missions and
that we have stability and security around the world. But I
think we continue to be not as good as we should be at forcing
other nations to also be responsible.
So I want to thank Senator Cardin for bringing this
important issue up. It is infuriating--infuriating--to have the
lack of transparency that exists at the U.N. I think, over
time, it will erode support. Such support is already not
particularly high because of the many issues we see going
unattended, like not dealing with the ballistic missiles that
are being fired by Iran in violation of UNSCR 1929.
So I would just say, I am glad there is bipartisan concern.
I hope that you can address it.
With that, Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me also echo that. I want to compliment the ranking
member for continuing to bring this up. I wanted to talk about
that just in a second.
Right now, we are spending about $2 billion just in the
peacekeeping force for the United States. I think that is our
contribution. Because of the assessment disagreement, we are
some $345 million in arrears, I think, in terms of what the
U.N. says we owe them.
I would like to point out also, Mr. Chairman, that it is
not just the percentages here in relation to the size of the
GDP. Also, I think, it should be taken into account the
percentage of GDPs in these countries that are spent on their
own military. That also bears to the global security situation.
So I think given the situation we have the in the U.S.,
Madam Ambassador, in the last few years, 35 percent to 40
percent of what we have been spending is borrowed, I think this
is a very timely time to have that really serious conversation
in the U.N. I applaud you guys for doing that.
I have two quick questions.
First, I want to thank you for what you are doing. Given
your high school years in Georgia, we claim you and we are
proud of what you are doing.
So I want to talk about Hezbollah, and I want to talk about
Lebanon in just a minute.
You know, in 1978, UNIFIL was created there as the interim
force in Lebanon. Some 12,000 troops are there from the U.N.
Resolution 1701 in 2006 strengthened the mandate there to
monitor and to preclude the illegal transport of weapons into
Lebanon. And yet we know today they have an estimated 120,000,
150,000 rockets, some of these very sophisticated guided
weapons. It is very troubling.
So it looks to me like, if that mandate was directed to
keep weapons out of Lebanon, they are failing against that
mandate.
Can you talk a little bit about their current role there?
And what is their role against 1701? And then we have had
reports that there have been threats around reprisals if they
report violations and so forth. What can we do to strengthen
UNIFIL there and to preclude Lebanon from the illegal transport
of these dangerous weapons?
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
UNIFIL has, I think, played an ameliorative role since 2006
in calming the situation, but there is no question that
Hezbollah has been able to maintain and expand an arsenal. And
we have and continue to urge UNIFIL to be more aggressive in
patrolling, in monitoring, in speaking out about violations of
the UNIFIL mandate.
And I think that what you have seen, actually, in recent
months is at least more transparency on the part of UNIFIL. I
mean, part of the challenge here is, as we know from
confronting terrorist organizations in other parts of the
world, when you are not at war with those terrorist
organizations, you are using political pressure, particularly
by Lebanon's own sovereign institutions, which are themselves
very weak, as we know from the current paralysis in Lebanon.
You are shining a spotlight. You are trying to ensure
interdiction of weapons before they even get into the theater
in question.
So UNIFIL is not a perfect fix for everything that ails
Lebanon or for the threat posed by Hezbollah. But it has a
responsibility to be vocal and to take very seriously its
reporting mandate, also so countries in the region, including
our friends, know what is happening in an area from which
threats have come routinely in recent decades.
Senator Perdue. Also, let me just ask you to add a comment
or two about Syria. The U.N. Disengagement Observer Force,
UNDOF, has actually withdrawn from the Golan on the Syrian
side, because of the fighting there. Can you speak to their
role now? And how are they interacting with IDF in that?
And I have one last question.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
I mean, you are right that there has been a
reconfiguration. This is something UNDOF has done in close
consultation with the Government of Israel. Given the stakes
here, it is a response to the fact that al-Nusra made advances
on one side of the line. And right now this is----
Senator Perdue. They actually kidnapped some of the U.N.
forces.
Ambassador Power. Exactly, Senator, they did. And the
release of those forces had to be negotiated.
And I will say, even that incident showed, it is not the
same as civilian protection, but an unevenness in how the
different units responded, which again is life in the U.N. Some
holding onto their weapons, refusing to be cowed. Others
handing over their weapons and, unfortunately, in a manner that
left UNDOF weaker and where those weapons had to be
replenished.
But we again view this as a temporary relocation. We still
believe the prior configuration is the stabilizing
configuration. But I think the Israelis are well-aware as well
that the circumstances do not lend themselves to putting the
observers on the other side of the line.
Senator Perdue. The last question I have with the time
remaining, Ambassador, the chairman mentioned it, is on the
violations of Iran. We have been concerned since the JCPOA that
Iran would violate our agreement incrementally. They are
violating the U.N. agreement not incrementally, but in a major
way--these are Resolutions 1929 and 2231--with the launch in
October. And then we have reports in the last week or so of a
second launch.
What is the U.N. doing in relation to those violations and
the sanctions that back those up?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator. Yes, this is
something that I have had occasion to talk to the chairman
about. And it is music to a U.N. Ambassador's ears when
Resolution 1929, Resolution 2231 just roll off the tongue of
Members of Congress.
Resolution 1929 has been an incredibly important foundation
to the international sanctions regime. The ballistic missile
launch from October is a violation of 1929. As soon as we
confirmed the launch, we brought it to the Security Council. We
now are going to be discussing it on Tuesday. The U.N.
machinery always works slowly.
The panel of experts is looking at it. We have provided all
the information that we have on it.
And, in a way, the Security Council is an important venue
for increasing the political costs on Iran when they violate
Resolution 1929.
I would note, of course, that the JCPOA is aimed at
dismantling Iran's nuclear weapons program, so that the threat
that Iran poses in any aspect of its military is much
diminished.
The Security Council sanctions body operates by consensus.
This is something that over time benefits the United States.
But on something like that, it means we have to convince all
members of the committee also to support our desired
designations or any further form of accountability.
Senator Perdue. So what is the U.S. trying to move forward
in terms of strengthening the sanctions?
Ambassador Power. Well, it is the U.N. machinery. We have
to get the report back from the panel of experts. We will
discuss it in the committee. And then we will look at what the
right tool is.
I think it is very important, also, to look at the
bilateral tools we have. We maintain sanctions, as you know,
and will, even after implementation day, on ballistic missiles,
on counterterrorism, on human rights. And I think we many of
the individuals involved in their ballistic missile program
have already been sanctioned, as you well know, over the years.
So trying to secure a nexus between this launch and any
particular individual entity is a challenge that we need to
take on.
But I think looking at the Security Council and our
bilateral tools as complementary is very important in this
regard.
Senator Perdue. Thank you. Thank you again for your
service.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin and I both emphasized with the Security
Council 2 days ago that, look, let us face it. The possible
military dimensions piece, we thought they might get a D-. They
got an F. A total hoax. A total hoax.
Non-action here is just going to empower them to continue
to violate. And I think what the Ambassador just said is the
U.N. is going to do nothing--nothing--because China and Russia
will block that from occurring.
So I do hope they are preparing their bilateral efforts.
It is disappointing that, again, we provide the resources
that we do, and yet we have countries that will not cause other
countries to live up to their obligations and block that. So it
is very disappointing.
Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking
Member Cardin.
And thank you, Ambassador Power, for your tireless and
dedicated service, your advocacy for human rights, your
leadership in representing us at the United Nations, and your
passion for the difficult and demanding mission that you are
carrying out on behalf of our Nation.
I share the concerns expressed by many colleagues about the
active enforcement of the JCPOA and ongoing work to enforce
U.N. Security Council resolutions.
I was pleased to hear there is an upcoming meeting of
finance ministers around the U.N. Security Council and look
forward to continuing to work closely with you and Secretary
Lew and others in the administration to make sure that we are
using all the tools we can to enforce the sanctions that remain
in place and to re-impose sanctions, should Iranian behavior
demonstrate the necessity of doing so.
I have had the opportunity to visit U.N. peacekeepers in
the field in a number countries, and have seen both the
positive that they can accomplish in countries like Liberia and
the DRC, and some of the very real challenges, particularly
where, as you noted in your opening testimony, there is a
disconnect between the mission to protect civilians and the
training equipment, leadership, and inclination or will to do
so.
So start, if you would, by just focusing on whether there
is a mismatch between U.N. Security Council mandates and what
troop-contributor countries are really trained and prepared to
do.
I was very encouraged by the President's leadership in
renewing a call to more advanced militaries to deliver not just
logistics and intelligence and supplies, but trainers and
troops.
How do we connect the mandates, the mission, and the
capacity to deliver in the field?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Let me come back, maybe if I could, just by way of response
to something Senator Corker mentioned before, which is the
contrast with NATO. I mean, I just want to underscore this
really is an example where we have national security interests
in peacekeepers, in troops from other countries, performing
ably. This is not a NATO situation where we are carrying a
disproportionate share of the troop burden. We are carrying a
large share of the financial burden. And that is something,
again, we are working to ensure is allocated more fairly.
I think on the mandate troop-contributor disconnect, which
is real, and I think it is real across the board, the first
thing you have to do is get more quality troops. It has been,
as you know well, a supply-driven market insofar as the U.N.
basically goes begging bowl in hand to different countries.
There is no standing army that exists in New York. The
Secretary General does not have anything at his disposal beyond
what he can extract from U.N. member states.
That process had yielded a very uneven set of troops and
police to participate in these missions, some who have
extensive military experience at home and we know are capable
troops, but once they get in a peacekeeping setting, they do
not fundamentally believe in a civilian protection mandate.
They want to go back to traditional principles of peacekeeping,
the way peacekeeping was done back in the 1970s and 1980s. And
that is just not the world we are in.
So I think the first answer is you increase the
sophistication, the training, the professionalization of the
troops, and there is going to be an effect on the ability to
perform the mandates.
But the second answer is on us, as a permanent member of
the Security Council, which is, there needs to be more
prioritization in the way that these mandates are put in place.
It is hard in the real world to prioritize, because you look at
a situation like that in South Sudan or that in Congo, and what
of the tasks that those peacekeepers are slated to perform
would you give up? Would you give up demobilization? Would you
give up security sector reform? Would you give up human rights
monitoring? Would you give up attention to child soldiers or
sexual violence? Of course not.
So you need to make sure that the missions are right-sized.
You need, maybe, to do some sequencing in terms of building out
some of those capabilities over time. And the U.N. country team
and our bilateral assistance also needs to be involved in
strengthening state institutions, because fundamentally whether
it is the Central African Republic or eastern Congo or South
Sudan, U.N. peacekeepers de facto are having to perform the
work of states, because the states themselves are so weak.
And so, again, there is no panacea. And for all of the
complaints that we have about U.N. peacekeeping, I would
challenge all of us to imagine what any one of those countries
would be like without this somewhat stabilizing presence. But
it is not going to be a cure-all for as long as you have state
institutions that do not function, or leaders that are corrupt,
or militia on the loose who are interested in carrying out
horrors against their civilians.
Senator Coons. I have seen exactly those challenges in the
countries I referenced, among others. So I continue as an
appropriator to advocate for funding peacekeeping and for
dealing with some of these challenges. So it is very
encouraging for me to see your engagement and hard work on
reform, because for this to be cost-effective and yet reflect
our values, we need to make some real progress in the areas
around accountability and protection of civilians that you have
referenced.
Let me just ask sort of a last question and then take what
time you have left to answer. I am concerned about sort of
growing the universe of capable peacekeepers, both in Africa
and globally. China made a pledge of a standby force of 8,000
peacekeepers, and I am interested in what you think is the
future, where they will or will not be deployed, what this
commitment means. And I am concerned about the African Union
and A-Prep, and would love to hear how you see that playing out
going forward, and how we can sustain that investment in a
continent-wide force.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
Well, again, I just want to stress how unusual President
Obama's personal leadership on this has been. And he has
basically told us that anything he can do to ensure that these
commitments are followed through on, he is prepared to invest
his own time, and the Vice President the same.
So we are dealing with a set of challenges at a level that
I do not think we have seen before, and with a degree of
aggressiveness that we have not seen before from the United
States, notwithstanding the fact that, again, on a bipartisan
basis I think successive administrations have seen the value of
this tool in the American and multilateral toolbox.
I think that the A-Prep and the China question kind of come
together a little bit. We have a major issue in terms of the
delay between the time a mandate is given a U.N. peacekeeping
force and the time in which troops and police are deployed into
theater.
Now again, some of this just goes back to the troop-
contributing countries and their ability to turn on a dime, and
train, and get configured, and get their equipment all lined
up.
A-Prep is designed to take the six militaries, all of whom
are have a good record within peacekeeping of being aggressive
in protecting civilians and having the political will to go to
dangerous places, and we aim to then ensure through deepening
our provision of equipment and the particular forms of training
we offer, that they can get into the theater more quickly than
they have been up to this point. A lot of them lack their own
ability to lift themselves, so sometimes we have to be
involved, as we were in the Central African Republic for the
Burundians and Rwandans, to swoop in and actually carry people
into harm's way. But they need to acquire, over time, the lift
and the self-sustainment, and, again, this ability to if not be
formally on standby, to be ready to go when the 911 comes.
China's commitment of 8,000 troops is a very large piece of
business and was a very significant announcement out of
President Obama's summit. I do not think we, yet, have a sense,
nor does the U.N., of how they imagine allocating that set of
forces over time.
Right now, they have just deployed their first infantry
battalion ever, and that is in South Sudan. The reports are
quite promising in terms of how active those troops are, out
and about, but also protecting civilians in the displaced
person camps.
So we need to look and see how the U.N. chooses to use that
commitment.
Rapid response, if that were something that China could put
on offer, where you could actually lose less time between the
time the international community comes together with a
consensus that a mission is needed and the time when troops
show up. I mean, in South Sudan we are 2 years after the
original deployment, and they are still not at full troop
strength. And that is a recurring pattern. So we would welcome
rapid response.
Of course, we also need to make sure that any peacekeeper
that deploys has the mindset where they are willing to protect
civilians and put themselves at risk for the sake of the
mandate.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Thank you, Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Gardner?
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Ambassador, for your time and
testimony today. And, of course, thank you as well for your
service to this country.
I want to follow up a little bit on what Chairman Corker
and Senator Perdue were asking about, and that is Security
Council Resolutions 1929 and 2231. Of course, we know there was
a second ballistic missile test from Iran, which was a clear
violation of these resolutions.
After the first launch in October, we referred, as you
said, the matter to the United Nations, and called on it to
``review this matter quickly and recommend appropriate
action.'' On October 22, I believe you stated, and I quote,
``The United States will continue to press the Security Council
to respond effectively to any future violations of U.N.
Security Council resolutions. Full and robust enforcement of
all relevant U.N. measures is and will remain critical.''
So as of today, has the United Nations Security Council or
sanctions committee taken any actions in response to the
Iranian missile test? And I believe the answer is, no, they are
meeting Tuesday. Is that correct?
Ambassador Power. Yes. Beyond having Security Council
discussions of the matter, there has been no follow-on action.
Discussions are a form of U.N. action. It is a little bit like
hearing is a form of congressional action. So we have had
multiple discussions.
Senator Gardner. The Tuesday meeting, can you describe the
actions that will be taken in that Tuesday meeting?
Ambassador Power. We will hear back. Well, we will
actually probably not yet hear back from the panel of experts.
But if we are in a position to confirm the recent launch, this
is something that we would bring to the council. We are not yet
in a position to confirm, but are looking to confirm those
reports, if warranted.
And again, we will get an update from the U.N. in terms of
when the panel of experts' report is going to come back.
Senator Gardner. And so this launch needs to be confirmed,
but the last launch, we still have not taken any action on the
last launch?
Ambassador Power. Again, we have taken action.
Senator Gardner. What are those actions?
Ambassador Power. We confirmed the violation. We brought
it to the U.N. Security Council, and the panel of experts is
investigating the matter and will report back.
Senator Gardner. So what other actions has the
administration taken in response to the missile test, other
than taking it to the panel, talking about it, and having a
meeting?
Ambassador Power. We are looking also, as I mentioned
earlier, at the bilateral sanctions tools that we have at our
disposal. So that is something, again, that the Treasury
Department is following up on.
Senator Gardner. What unilateral measures are we
considering?
Ambassador Power. I believe sanctions designations,
bearing in mind that that most actors--I shouldn't say
``most''--many of the actors involved in ballistic missile
launches in the program itself are already sanctioned under
U.S. law.
Senator Gardner. And are we considering stopping sanctions
relief from proceeding or rescinded any previous relief, as a
result of these actions?
Ambassador Power. The JCPOA, as you know, the sanctions
relief associated with the JCPOA, will not occur until after
the initial steps have been taken and the IAEA has verified
that those initial nuclear-related steps are taken.
But I want to underscore, again, that the point of the
JCPOA is to dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons program, and that
is a really important area of emphasis for us.
Senator Gardner. So more important than the ballistic
missile concerns?
Ambassador Power. I do not want to talk about relative
importance, but taking away Iran's--I think this is something
all of us can agree upon--actually ensuring that Iran does not
develop a nuclear weapon is a huge priority.
Senator Gardner. You mentioned in your opening statement,
you said, and I quote, ``exploit vacuum of authority.'' I think
you were referring to actors in the Middle East and other
terrorists, that they were maybe trying to exploit a vacuum of
authority.
By not imposing sanctions, by not designating individuals,
by not doing anything other than talking, are we not allowing
exploitation of a vacuum of authority?
Ambassador Power. This administration has put in place, in
the case of the Iran sanctions regime, as you know, this body,
the Congress, in the first instance, and then amplified and
extended by what we have done at the U.N., the most devastating
sanctions regime in the 70-year history of the United Nations.
So I do not think there is a void or a vacuum. Iran has
seen the consequences of violating international norms. We also
have a sanction snapback provision that I think few around the
world would have thought we could have secured as part of this
deal, which would allow any single country to snap back in the
event of significant noncompliance with the deal.
So sanctions are a really important tool. The sanctions
that this Congress has put in place is one reason we are in the
position we are now to ensure that Iran does not develop a
nuclear weapon.
Senator Gardner. But nothing has been done, other than a
meeting coming up on Tuesday with a panel of experts on a
ballistic missile violation.
Ambassador Power. We have increased, and will continue to
increase, the political cost to Iran when it violates U.N.
Security Council resolutions.
Senator Gardner. Could you give me an example of that?
Ambassador Power. The work that Iran does to try to ensure
that the U.N. Security Council does not even discuss ballistic
missile launches, I assure you, is a testament to actually the
stigma that they still associate with our bringing these issues
before the Security Council, the same with the panel of experts
actually discussing this and documenting any violation.
This is something that Iran, which, of course, wants to
become a nation like any other nation within the U.N., they
find it very frustrating that they continue to be scrutinized.
They have never recognized, as you know, the U.N. Security
Council resolutions, so the fact that the council keeps
functioning, keeps oversight, keeps the spotlight on, increases
the political cost, is an important step.
Senator Gardner. In October, many members of this committee
sent a letter to the Secretary of State talking about Iran's
October 10 ballistic missile. The letter talks about a range of
unilateral, multilateral tools available to counter Iran's
missile-related activities on past occasions, imposed penalties
under domestic authorities on foreign persons and entities
engaged in proliferation activities.
But we have done nothing. We have imposed no penalties
under domestic authorities or on foreign persons and entities,
as a result of these two launches. Is that correct?
Ambassador Power. I want to just underscore the importance
of the broader ballistic missile defense efforts that we make.
I feel like I have answered the question you have just posed
several times, so let me try a different broadening approach,
which is our response to Iranian ballistic missile launches is
also a defense response. It is also the Proliferation Security
Initiative. It is everything that has come out of Camp David
and our engagement with the Gulf countries to ensure
interoperability. It is the Iron Dome and all of the other
bilateral defense arrangements that we have with the country of
Israel, many of which are getting deepened, as you know, in
consultations.
Senator Gardner. They have launched twice. Is that working?
If they have had two launches now, one in October, one
recently, is it----
Ambassador Power. I mean, if one is thinking in terms of
regional defense, one has to take measures in order to try to
ensure that our partners in the region have the tools to defend
themselves.
Even if you had a designation against someone involved in
the ballistic missiles program, the number one deterrent and
preventive measure is going to be regional defense. That is
where our emphasis was.
If I were here and we had designated another actor
bilaterally--let us say we find one that has not already been
designated and designate, I do not think that that would
address your concern about Iran's ballistic missile program,
nor should it.
So again, Iran has systematically ignored U.N. Security
Council resolutions over the life of the entire international
Security Council regime. The sanctions themselves were so
crippling and brought us to the place where we could secure
this deal because the other countries in the international
system would be sanctioned if they were engaging with Iran in
prohibited behavior.
Senator Gardner. This systematic ignoring of the
resolutions, does that not give you concern about their
willingness to comply, going forward?
Ambassador Power. That is why we have snapback. That is
why we have verification monitoring on the ground. As the
President said from the beginning, this is not an agreement
predicated on trust, particularly in light of Iran's past
behavior, past behavior, again, confirmed by the IAEA PMD
report.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Before going on to Senator Kaine, I just want
to reiterate, I think what Ben and I did the other day with you
and the other members. I think regardless of how people may
have voted on the Iran agreement, we understand that it is what
is governing our actions right now with Iran. And I think on
both sides of the aisle, regardless of how people voted, we
want to make sure the agreement is implemented in the way that
it was laid out.
And I think there has been a concern on both sides of the
aisle that there is an air of permissiveness that is developing
that will cause the likelihood of any pushback on Iranian
violations over time to become less real. And I think that is
what he's getting at and I think what people on both sides of
aisle have been concerned about.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 says they shall not
undertake any ballistic activity. Unfortunately, JPOA says ``is
called upon.'' I do not know whether Iran views that as
permissive language.
But this is an issue that I think many people on both sides
of the aisle are concerned about. I cannot speak for everyone.
And what we are seeing is, again, not very vigilant steps
being taken, and it is setting a precedent for the future.
With that, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, Ambassador Power.
You gave an interview to the PBS NewsHour on December 4,
and you noted that more progress needs to be made in uniting
the anti-ISIL coalition. Would our unified resolve against ISIL
be clearer to our allies, to our troops, and to ISIL if
Congress was willing to finally debate and vote on this matter
after 16 months of war?
Ambassador Power. Yes, Senator. Thank you for your
leadership on this issue from the very start.
I think people are puzzled as to why--people that I work
with, I should say, day-to-day up at the U.N.--are puzzled,
given the priority that the American people and, on a
bipartisan basis, both houses of Congress attach to the anti-
ISIL struggle and all of the attention to it that has come over
the course of the last 2 years as to how we cannot arrive at
some consensus in order to be able to enshrine in legislation
that which we say is true, which is, again, that this has the
bipartisan backing of the American people and of the Congress.
So I think it would be a really important signal if we
could get that AUMF done.
Senator Kaine. I have not done the research on this, but
just from headlines and my memory, it strikes me that at least
three of the U.N. Security Council nations--Britain, France,
and, I am sad to say, Russia--have had their legislative bodies
vote to confirm and approve after a debate their military
activity against terrorism in Syria and Iraq. Is that correct?
Ambassador Power. That is my understanding, as well, and I
think other countries who are part of the coalition, but not on
the Security Council, also, we could add to that list.
Senator Kaine. Germany, for example.
Ambassador Power. Denmark, et cetera.
Senator Kaine. Bundestag acted last week.
Ambassador Power. Yes.
Senator Markey. Last week, the chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator McCain, said this, he did not say
this approvingly, so I do not want to suggest that he was
saying it approvingly, but when he was asked when an
authorization vote would occur in Congress, he said, ``It may
require an attack on the United States of America.''
In terms of you being able to do your job well, would it be
a good idea for Congress to wait that long?
Ambassador Power. No, it would not be a good idea for
Congress to wait that long. I think this should be one issue
that everyone in this country can agree upon, even those who
have differences over tactics, over the number of trainers, or
different aspects of the operations as they are unfolding.
Everyone should agree that defeating and degrading ISIL and
showing the world that this is something that is backed by the
Congress, rendering these operations sustainable and enduring
over what is a long struggle, would just be invaluable.
Senator Kaine. The President started this war against ISIL
on August 8, which was 16 months ago yesterday. A year ago
Friday, the only vote that has happened in Congress, in terms
of an authorization, occurred in this committee on December 11,
2014, an authorization that was reported to the Senate floor
where no action was taken on it.
The RAND Corporation issued a report to the Pentagon this
week that said relying upon the 2001 and 2002 authorizations at
a minimum involved legal gymnastics that were not helpful, and
urged Congress to take action. It is just my hope that we will
do that, and it is my hope that it will not take a kind of
cataclysm that was suggested, again, disapprovingly by Senator
McCain. I think Senator McCain views it the way that I do, that
he thinks Congress should act.
Let me ask you this, moving to peacekeeping, a good news
story, you talked about European nations having scaled back
peacekeeping operations. A good news story for this committee
and for this Congress is Colombia stepping up in September and
saying they wanted to devote 5,000 troops to the U.N.
peacekeeping mission. Colombia is also a peacekeeping
participant in the multinational force and observers in the
Sinai, as of relatively recently.
We sometimes wonder whether U.S. engagement on a diplomatic
way can make a difference. Colombia is an example of failed
state to international security partner in a way that I think
this committee in a bipartisan way can be proud. And, also,
three administrations, the Clinton administration, the Bush
administration, and the Obama administration, have had a
dedication to that.
Talk about nations like Colombia who are coming into
providing peacekeeping forces for the first time and the degree
to which we can encourage them.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
We view that commitment in very much the same way. It
seemed also a real reflection of, however difficult the peace
process is, and there is a lot of work left to do, but their
confidence they are going to get where they need to get to be
in a position to free up resources to be part of international
peace and security.
Latin America has a huge contribution to make. One of the
significant features of the President's summit was a number of
Latin American countries announcing that they were prepared to
do peacekeeping out of hemisphere, because a lot of Latin
American countries had been dedicating their forces in Haiti.
I want to particularly commend Uruguay, because they have
actually been taking lead within the region at mobilizing
different contributions, working with the Colombians, saying
this is how it worked for us, this is how it will work for you.
I also want to commend Mexico, which I visited recently,
which has announced that it will break new ground and be
involved in peacekeeping for the first time. It is in the midst
of discussions now with the U.N. as to what form that will
take.
If I could just touch upon, because I think it is such an
important point, the larger point, the pulling up from Latin
America, which is the dividend for us when a country makes
progress domestically, whether in terms of democratization or
in terms of conflict resolution.
I just am back from Sri Lanka, a place that, in the wake of
its defeat of the LTTE, the people who, in effect, coined the
suicide bomb, really regressed in terms of creeping
authoritarianism, horrible atrocities carried out at the tail
end of the war and no accountability for that.
Now there has been a change in government. Not only do we
see them domestically taking on issues of accountability,
trying to work on reconciliation with the Tamil population, but
we also see their behavior within international institutions
transformed, also making a very substantial commitment to
peacekeeping, the stand they take on human rights resolutions,
on Syria, on North Korea, et cetera, shifting.
So I want to just dwell on this point because sometimes one
looks at the U.N. and it is just this black box where we are
not getting the returns that we want, we are not getting the
votes that we want. The way the U.N. changes over time is
countries that comprise it change, and they become more at
peace within themselves. They democratize. Their institutions
get stronger. And we see a payoff, again, in terms of the
critical mass of countries then that we have as partners in New
York to work with.
Right now, it is still the case, though, that more than
half the countries in the U.N. are not democratic. That affects
the extent to which the U.N. is going to be a tool on democracy
promotion or human rights enforcement, et cetera.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you. The vote has gone off, and Senator
Isakson is next. After him is Senator Menendez.
I would ask you, if you would, to chair the meeting while
you are asking questions.
Senator Isakson. I am going to be very brief, because I
have to go to the floor, too.
The Chairman. Okay, then Senator Murphy is next after
Senator Menendez. If we would just keep it going, and I am
going to bolt and come back. And thank you both very much. I
know it will be orderly, regardless.
Senator Isakson. So you want me to yield to Senator Murphy
after I finish?
The Chairman. If Menendez is not back. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for calling this hearing. I am going to be very
brief, because I have to do a part of this in just a minute on
the floor.
But required reading of every Member of Congress and of
every Ambassador to the United Nations ought to be Samantha
Power's book ``A Problem from U.N. .'' If that book had been
read, a lot of the problems we are talking about today in
peacekeeping missions and rape being used as a military tactic
and things like that, we would be a lot further along than we
are today. That is a great book and everybody should read it.
Senator Corker and I went to Rwanda. We know about the
Kigali Principles, and that is my first question to you.
As a country, have we adopted the Kigali Principles? Has
the United States of America done that?
Ambassador Power. As you know, we are not a substantial
contributor to peacekeeping. So these principals so far have
been embraced by the big countries that are putting thousands
of troops in harm's way. We have 40 police officer and 40
military officers, all of whom we are incredibly grateful for.
So we have not yet, but more for that reason than any
substantive objection. If you support our joining, I can convey
that back.
Senator Isakson. Let me make my point. When I read your
speech last night, you did not include this part in the speech,
but it is in the printed speech, you talked the Kigali
Principles and what they were developed from, which was a
learning lesson, I think, from what you pointed out in ``A
Problem from U.N. ,'' your book.
The Kigali Principles, as I understand it, is that
peacekeepers, their countries need to affirm that their troops
will have the authorization to use force when necessary and do
not have to radio back to headquarters to get approval. Is that
correct?
Ambassador Power. Correct, sir.
Senator Isakson. That is our problem in the Middle East
right now, in terms of the United States. I do not think we
have enough of that type of authorization for the rules of
engagement of our own troops. I commend you for raising it on
this question. But I think it is a bigger question, in terms of
our being able to be effective, and that is to have the troops
in the field that you have deployed, either for peacekeeping or
for war, if you are at war, to have the actual authority for
use of force they need to carry out their mission.
It kind of struck me that we were congratulating Sri Lanka
and Korea and a lot of people who provide peacekeeping troops.
Yet we as a country have very limited rules of engagement
authorization right now as a practice in our own country. So
that is my reason for bringing the point up.
Ambassador Power. If I may just respond briefly, Senator,
while you are here. You know, my impression is not that. I
think that what President Obama has conveyed to the Secretary
of Defense and to the chairman and to his commander, General
Austin and the commanders on the ground, is a desire to offer
strategic guidance, discuss any big shifts in the strategy at a
senior level to make sure everybody is on the same page.
But there is a huge amount of tactical and operational
flexibility that these commanders have. And I think you have
seen, certainly, the President say publically what he has also
conveyed many times privately in the Situation Room, which is,
if there are ideas for how we can pursue this campaign more
expeditiously in ways that increase the security dividend for
the American people sooner, I want to see those ideas.
And so I am in these meetings where we are discussing the
way ahead in our anti-ISIL strategy, and I, again, have not
heard the commanders not getting the flexibility that they
seek.
Senator Isakson. Thank you for your answer, and thank you
for your service.
My last question is not a question but a statement, and
that is to thank you. Your wagon is loaded and gets a new load
every day, and I think you are doing a terrific job. But I
would underscore, as I leave, Senator Cardin's remarks, and
those of Senator Perdue and the chairman, the more
transparency, the better for the U.N. There is a lot of
suspicion, a lot of misunderstandings. And there is a lot of
lack of trust out there in the general public. The more
transparency we can have, particularly on who is paying what
and how they are paying their share, would be helpful to the
U.N. mission in having the support it really needs to carry out
its intent from the beginning.
Ambassador Power. Well, Senator, that gives me the chance
to invite you to New York so you can get immersed in those
budget numbers firsthand. But we would really welcome visits by
members of this body, and we would give you a good and deep
tour of the U.N. and so many of the Africa-related issues that
you have worked so hard on.
As you know, the U.N. is on the frontlines.
Senator Isakson. Invitation accepted.
Ambassador Power. Okay, great. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Good morning, Ambassador Power.
The evening of the President's Sunday night speech, there
was a series of social media postings by a really wonderful
reporter from the New York Times, Rukmini Callimachi. She wrote
a piece based on those observations the next day and the title
was ``U.S. Strategy Seeks to Avoid ISIS Prophecy.'' And the
idea is that, if you really understand the fundamentals, the
building blocks, of the religious perversion of ISIS, it is
built upon a prophecy, a hope, a belief, that ultimately they
are going to be in a military contest on the ground with the
United States and with Western powers. I suspect that that
acknowledgement is part of what made the President in that
speech talk about not only the things we should do but the
things we shouldn't do.
I understand that we are not going to be putting U.N.
peacekeepers on the ground inside a complicated, violent civil
war any time soon, but from a broader perspective, can you talk
about, as we try to confront organizations that are in
countries like Mali that have peacekeeping forces, that are
trying to goad the West and, in particular, the United States
into a military confrontation, why multinational and
multiethnic forces are going to be perhaps best positioned,
much better positioned than a majority U.S. force, to try to
preserve peace and order? And maybe as part of that answer,
talk about the contributions that majority-Muslim nations make
to peacekeeping or could or should make in the future, if that
is amongst the reasons why we should be paying more attention
to investment in peacekeeping.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator Murphy. It is a
complex question and set of ideas within it.
I think a key to effective deployments is legitimacy. And
one of the things that multinational deployments can offer, but
can also forfeit, as we have been talking about in the context
of sexual abuse, is a perception of legitimacy, a perception
that the whole world is behind a peacekeeping mission.
In truth, I think have a 65-nation coalition also enhances
legitimacy. And the fact that countries from the region are
part of that against ISIL is very important. It was something
that was very important to the President to secure that kind of
regional support.
The one thing that I would note in areas where terrorists
are active, and Mali now with 44 deaths of peacekeepers just
over the life of a mission that has been in place only a few
years underscores, is that there can be a mismatch between U.N.
peacekeeping and even robust U.N. peacekeeping, which we
support, and the Kigali Principles show that a lot of other
troop-contributing countries support, and these kinds of
environments where extremists and terrorists, yes, they may
make the United States their number one target, if they have
that opportunity, but if there are no Americans around, they
are also perfectly prepared to target Chadians and Dutch
peacekeepers and Burkina Faso peacekeepers.
So I want to stress that I agree very much, I think, with
the logic of the article that you have described and found it a
very powerful look at ISIL's ideology.
I will use the question as an occasion to alert the
committee to the extent to which peacekeeping is being
increasingly seen as a soft target for terrorists and
extremists in those environments that they inhabit. And we have
a really significant national interest in hardening these
missions, in ensuring that they have the training they need to
operate in these evermore not only complex environments because
conflict is still going on, but complex because you combine
conflict and the actual fact that the peacekeepers themselves
are a target.
And just to give you one example of how I think the Defense
Department has been responsive in this regard, we are now doing
more and more counter-IED training for peacekeepers. I mean,
talk about not your mother's peacekeeping. If anybody would
have imagined at the outset of peacekeeping that people would
have to train against IEDs that were presumably targeting the
peacekeepers themselves, I am not sure peacekeeping would have
ever gotten off the ground.
So I think your larger point is right. Having countries who
know the language, I think that is a critical component, that
have cultural overlap with those countries in which they are
operating is really important.
The only other challenge is that sometimes countries can be
too familiar with a country. One of the reasons the
international community went to U.N. peacekeeping in the first
place is to try to inject actually more distance so there would
be a greater perception of independence and one would not be
seen as being a stakeholder on one side or the other.
So all of these factors, I think, need to be taken into
account.
Senator Murphy. [Presiding] Well, thank you. And let me add
my thanks to Senator Isakson for the number of heavy lifts that
you undertake for us every day in New York. Thank you for your
time.
And I will turn it over to Senator Menendez.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
And in appreciation of the chairman's courtesies, I am not
going to ask for unanimous consent for anything I want right
now, since I am here alone. [Laughter.]
Senator Menendez. So let me let me, first of all,
Ambassador, say I appreciate your service to our country, and I
have a high regard for you.
And my own personal view is that, left to your own devices,
on some issues, you might be more forward-leaning. You do not
need to respond to that. It is just my observation.
Having said that, however, let me enlarge this conversation
about peacekeeping. I know some of my colleagues have broached
this subject already.
Peacekeeping is, yes, very important in the sense of what
the core of this hearing is about, but part of the way in which
you keep the peace is to make sure that the will of the
international community is observed and that it is not
violated, and if it is violated, that there are consequences so
that, hopefully, a continuation of that breach does not lead to
the outbreak of war and, therefore, what flows from that.
So I want to come to the issue of Iran. I know several of
my colleagues have pursued the core of the missile test. But
first of all, I would like to ask you, would you agree with me
that for well over a decade, Iran, as you have said in response
to some of my colleagues' questions, did not recognize U.N.
Security Council resolutions and moved their nuclear program
forward to a point in which it got so big--too-big-to-fail, in
the bank context? Well, this was too big to actually end.
So they violated the international will purposely, and in
doing so were able to get to a point that they largely wanted
to. Would that be a fair observation?
Ambassador Power. Yes, they violated international
resolutions and built up their program. Again, I think this is
probably not the venue to get into the extent of the program.
Senator Menendez. No.
Ambassador Power. But such that----
Senator Menendez. That is pretty well-documented.
Ambassador Power. Yes.
Senator Menendez. But in any event, and in plenty of public
discourse, as well.
But the point is they violated international resolutions
for----
Ambassador Power. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez.--the better part of a decade.
Ambassador Power. Yes.
Senator Menendez. And during those violations, they
progressed, for a good period of time without the type of
sanctions regime that was largely generated by the Congress,
not by the executive branch.
And so I look at that, and I look at your acknowledgement
that they have not recognized Security Council resolutions, and
I say to myself, there is a history here and a pattern. If you
go visit the Archives building with me, over its mantel it
says, ``What is past is prologue.''
And I have a real concern that what we have here is a lack
of will by the United States and as a leader in this regard by
our partners in going ahead and making sure that Iran
understands that you cannot violate the international will
without consequence, which I consider, even as I did not
support the agreement, that to the extent that the agreement is
going to produce any benefits, Iran must clearly understand
that there will be consequences for not following that
agreement.
And the message it seems to me that we are sending and that
we have sent as a country in various iterations is quite the
contrary.
So we, basically, have no real action. I heard your
responses about referring it to the committee and having
discussions. I get the U.N. process. But the bottom line is
there have been no real actions, no consequence.
Now they have a second test, and we are talking about
verifying. But at the end of the day, it took place and there
will be no real consequence.
We would like to see the Security Council be the venue for
a multilateral consequence, but we hear nothing in the interim
about an individual consequence.
We see a set of circumstances in which I predicted as well
as a whole host of others that on the question of Parchin, we
were going to basically sweep this under the rug and ultimately
dismiss it, which is now the resolution that is presently being
circulated at the IAEA to close this chapter, because we want
something bad enough we are willing to go ahead and overlook.
In doing so, I think we make a grave mistake.
We did that with Cuba, because we wanted to create
relations with Cuba even though they violated Security Council
resolutions and shipped missiles and MiGs under tons of sugar
to North Korea. Nothing happened to them.
So when we want something bad enough--when I say ``we,''
the administration wants something bad enough--they are willing
to overlook. And that is a dangerous proposition, a dangerous
proposition.
So what is it that we are going to do to send a real,
clear, unequivocal, unambiguous message to the Iranians,
because we were all assured here that notwithstanding the
nuclear portfolio, that we could be robustly active and take
actions on nonnuclear issues. Well, this is a nonnuclear issue.
And conversation is not an action.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
So let me use this also as an occasion, since Senator
Corker is back, to address a comment he made earlier, which is
in keeping with what you are saying, which is his impression of
a kind of greater permissiveness and your statement that
somehow if you want it bad enough, you are willing to overlook,
et cetera.
The way that this administration and our predecessors
responded in New York to prior recurrent, as it happens over
the life of the regime, violations of U.N. Security Council
resolutions has not changed. There is no difference in the way
that we go through this procedure, what we seek to do in New
York at the U.N. Security Council. And, frankly, there is not
even much difference in terms of the kinds of resistance we
face from predictable quarters.
The Security Council regime, as you well know, built out
and force multiplied on the sanctions that Congress put in
place. And it is that regime that caused Iran to make a series
of concessions that for I think the three of you here were not
deemed satisfactory, but went well beyond what would have been
achievable without the sanctions regime, and gives us the
confidence, again, that this is a good deal and one that will
dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons program.
The objective we have----
Senator Menendez. With all due respect, I am not talking
about the deal anymore. We are past that.
Ambassador Power. No, we are talking about implementation
of the deal.
Senator Menendez. I am talking about making sure that we
have enforcement of Security Council resolutions that are
meaningful.
Ambassador Power. Agreed. Agreed.
But, again, sort of the accusation is that we are seeing
things differently than you, because we have a vested interest
in seeing this deal implemented. We have a collective, as I
think all of you agree, vested interest in seeing this deal
implemented, because we do not want Iran to ever obtain a
nuclear weapon. That is our objective.
And we have put in place measures. It is the expanded
verification and monitoring, and even the PMD. For all of the
dissatisfaction that has been expressed about the report and
our approach to it, fundamentally, the IAEA was able to get
access to Parchin in a way that it had not been able to in the
past.
The snapback of the sanctions regime is an incredibly
important tool in our arsenal, and it is leverage. Senator
Corker said the other day to the Security Council that we will
have given up all our leverage on the frontend. That is just
not true. We will have that hanging over implementation,
reporting of violations, going forward. And we will have in our
toolbox the bilateral sanctions measures as a way of responding
to lesser incidents of noncompliance and lesser violations.
So, again, the U.N. Security Council is one venue, and we
will do as we have been doing for a decade, which is call a
spade a spade, bring forward violations, increase the political
cost, ensure that Iran is isolated for its violations of 1929
now and 2231, once the implementation day progresses.
But we also have a set of other tools aimed at getting at
Iranian bad behavior, including ones on this body.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may, since my time has
expired, let me just make a comment.
You know, I appreciate your answer. You are very good at
answering, but not answering.
So let me just say that you talk about snapback, those
sanctions that you admit and the administration has
increasingly admitted brought Iran to the table, they expire
this coming year. And you all negotiated away, at least as I
read the agreement, the ability for the administration to
support a reauthorization of it, which I intend push for,
because the snapback means nothing if cannot snap back to
something that is meaningful. And the administration just will
not talk about that reauthorization, because, as I read the
agreement, they do not have the wherewithal to agree to a
reauthorization. They gave it away.
And then the last point, another example, enforcing
Resolution 1701, the transfer of arms to Hezbollah. During the
review of Iran nuclear agreement and defending the lifting of
the U.N. arms embargo, the administration repeatedly emphasized
that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 remains in place,
and that prevents the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, and we
are going to make sure that that is the case.
Well, since the announcement of the JCPOA, Hezbollah has
continued to receive arms from outside of Lebanon. So what
steps have UNIFIL taken to stop the transfer of arms to
Hezbollah? What steps have we taken to stop those transfers?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator. I addressed this
question earlier for Senator Perdue, but it is a very important
question.
I think the point that was made over the course of the
discussion about the JCPOA is that authorities, that this body
and we were understandably concerned, were going away or could
go away at some point under the JCPOA. Many of those
authorities were elsewhere in other Security Council
resolutions. So I think that was the implication of 1701, in
that context.
Look, as I said earlier, Hezbollah is a terrorist
organization, and UNIFIL is a peacekeeping mission. UNIFIL's
job is to do everything in its power to deter Hezbollah from
amassing weapons, to call a spade a spade, and to call them out
when they are, to alert us and other stakeholders to anything
that comes to their attention that, again, is alarming in this
regard.
As you know, over the life of UNIFIL, I think it has had a
constructive effect on events on the ground. I do not think the
Government of Israel would support its perpetuation if it had
not. But is it a panacea for Hezbollah? No, it is not. And, no,
it will not be.
I think that we have really pressed the U.N. to step up its
reporting and to sound the alarm and to shine the spotlight and
to do the things that it can do. But in terms of armed
confrontation with Hezbollah, that is not something UNIFIL is
perusing.
We are also trying to enhance the capabilities of troops
who comprise UNIFIL, which is one of the stronger missions,
because of the European presence. And we are hopeful, again,
that the peacekeeping summit that the President chaired will
give us a broader pool of troops to draw from, so as to make
sure that that mission is right-sized.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
just say that no consequences is a green light to violations.
And that is what I see us doing.
The Chairman. [Presiding] Thank you.
Before I turn to Senator Markey, while Senator Menendez is
here, it is true that it is highly unlikely that the U.N.
Security Council will take any actions relative to the
violations of UNSCR 1929. Is that correct?
Ambassador Power. Again, we have already taken action.
The Chairman. The answer is yes.
Ambassador Power. We have already taken action.
The Chairman. But----
Ambassador Power. We have brought the issue to the
Council. This is what we did----
The Chairman. But I am talking about as far as sanctions,
penalties.
Ambassador Power. I would not assess that----
The Chairman. It is not likely that Russia or China will go
along with----
Ambassador Power. I share your assessment on Russia and
China.
The Chairman. Okay, so let me just say this.
Ambassador Power. Yes.
The Chairman. When you say that it is untrue what I said,
relative to----
Ambassador Power. That the administration was being more
permissive in terms of sanctions violations. That was what I
heard you say.
The Chairman. Well, we will see. Nothing has happened yet.
What I said was that the leverage shifts to Iran. They are
at breakneck speed dismantling so that they get the sanctions
relief they are after, which we would expect. Now people
believe that in January or February, they will get all of the
sanctions relief they are after.
And for you to say that snapback is a real tool when it is
contingent upon the countries that are participating
implementing back those sanctions, and we have countries like
Russia and China, which probably, likely, we know, are not
going to push back against this issue.
If there are incremental violations, all of the leverage is
with Iran. That is a fact. It is not incorrect. It is with Iran
because there is no way that this administration is going to
consider challenging an incremental violation because they know
all Iran has to do is step out. And they know that Russia and
China and, candidly, probably our Western friends in Europe are
not really going to force them to comply.
So it is a true statement, not an untrue statement, that
the leverage ends up with Iran because they have what they
want. We have given it up, and we have partners at the U.N.
Security Council that are not going to cooperate with us.
Senator Markey?
Senator Cardin. Let me just interject for one second. I
apologize to Senator Markey.
I think a lot of us share that frustration. I would just
urge us to work with our European allies on the timing of a
response to the violation of the ballistic missiles.
We all share the frustration that there is unlikely to be
sanction action by the Security Council, but if we demonstrate
action with our European partners, particularly in the P5, I
think it would be a signal to Iran that these types of
activities are not going to go unchallenged.
Ambassador Power. Senator Markey, would you mind if I just
respond very briefly? I am so sorry.
But I want to underscore that when we went to the council
once we confirmed the violation on October 10, we did so with
the United Kingdom, with France, and with Germany. And I think
doing something like that irrespective of what further tangible
outcome we were able to secure from the council is going to be
very important in perhaps even broadening that.
Mr. Chairman, the one thing I feel compelled to say is that
when you say they are going with breakneck speed to dismantle,
it is very important to remember that that is a good thing.
That is what we want, that breakneck speed, the dismantlement.
So understanding again that there is pay for performance as
part of the deal, that is the way that we have incentivized
them moving forward and allowing the inspectors in.
But sometimes in the way that this is discussed, you would
think that that is not a good thing. That is a good thing. That
is the point of the deal, to get them to dismantle their
program.
The Chairman. No, I understand that. I understand they are
dismantling antique centrifuges, and we are allowing them to
continue development of IR-2s, IR-4s, IR-6s, IR-8s. I
understand that.
And look, again, I do not want to re-debate the agreement.
What I think we are focused on right now is that the
international community knows that they violated UNSCR 1929,
and in essence, they are violating the spirit of JPOA, where
they are called upon not to do this. And we all know that the
U.N. Security Council is not going to take action.
That is what is important to us, because we believe that
after they get the sanctions relief, after they dismantle these
antiques that they are using right now, these IR-1s, that they
are going to push the envelope.
And we believe that you and others there, by not taking
even bilateral action yet, are helping create an air of
permissiveness.
Even though we like you and respect you, we have a policy
difference here. This is not directed at you. It is directed at
the U.N. Security Council.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Thank you for all your great work, Ambassador. I know it is
global and complex, but you just serve our country so well.
Thank you.
Could we come back, if we could for a second, to Syria?
When I look at Assad, when I look at all of his supporters
inside of the country, he has upwards of 30 percent of the army
as Sunni soldiers who will not be viewed well when there is a
peace agreement by the other Sunni soldiers that have been
trying to depose Assad for all these years--similarly, the
Alawite soldiers who are fighting for him.
So they will be looking for protection, if there is a peace
agreement. And I think Secretary Kerry and his entire team are
doing a great job in moving us toward that. But there will have
to be protection for these people to avoid--and I think they
would be foolish not to anticipate this--what happened in Iraq,
what happened in Libya, what happened in Egypt.
So they are going to be looking for protection, and that
kind of looks to the U.N. It looks to these blue-helmeted
soldiers to come in and to give some level of guarantee that
there will protection for them if they lay down their guns.
Otherwise, I do not see a resolution of it. I just see a
protracted war where no matter how hard you try to negotiate a
peaceful settlement, you just wind up with an ever-continuing
conflict.
So could you talk about that a little bit and what role
U.N. peacekeepers could play in a post-peace agreement,
understanding that we are far from that, but just looking at,
anticipating, a potential role for the U.N. or some other
multinational force to move in and to give some guarantees?
Otherwise, I do not think Assad is ever leaving. You just
look at it from a perspective of human nature and looking at
what has happened in all these other countries, they will be
dead. They will be killed. I mean, the revenge motivation is
just going to be so high, given the tragedy that has affected
these other families. And then we have yet another cycle that
we have participated in.
So how could the U.N. or another multinational force play a
constructive role?
Ambassador Power. Well, there is no shortage of very
complex dimensions to imagining a political settlement for
Syria. But you put your finger on I think one the hardest
issues of all, which would be any notional reintegration of
Syrian moderate opposition forces with Syrian Government
troops, whether the air force, which have been involved in
barrel-bombing and chemical weapons use, or the infantry. I
mean, it is going to be extremely difficult. And as you say, we
are not at this point of the discussions.
But in order for there to be an agreement on a political
transition by mutual consent, which is the catchphrase from
Geneva and is the operative principle for Vienna, that is going
to be one of the questions that both sides are asking, because
it cuts in the other direction as well. When moderate
opposition forces go back to their home communities from which
they have been purged, what happens to them if the forces in
control remain, in large, government forces?
So where that confidence-building comes from, who the
guarantors are of any kind of reintegration--and this gets back
to Senator Cardin's question earlier--what the accountability
mechanism is whereby there can be some healing or truth telling
and punishment for those who committed the worst violations,
all of those modalities have to be worked through.
Senator Markey. On both sides.
Ambassador Power. On both sides, again, yes, absolutely.
Now in terms of the near term, we have ISIL with a very
extensive presence in Syria that is shrinking but nonetheless
would be a significant consideration for any outside country
thinking about deploying troops to Syria. We have al Qaeda's
affiliate al-Nusra as well. Part of what is being worked
through in Vienna, as you know, are definitions of who is a
terrorist and who is not, so that there can be, at a strategic
level at least, an idea that everybody can go against these
forces together.
But I think what you would need, if one was going with a
troop presence from the outside, would you would have to make a
judgment that a troop presence would do more good than harm,
that it would invite and create more confidence. To have that
confidence, those Alawites and Sunni soldiers on the government
side and then Sunni moderates on the other side are going to
have to believe that those troops are going to protect them, if
they get attacked.
If you look at U.N. peacekeeping missions as the first part
of the hearing, that is not always the case around the world,
right? Some troop contributors, that is not a role they play
eagerly, even if that is part of the mandate.
So then you could look at a regional force or a green-
hatted force of some kind. You would still ask that question:
Are troop contributors ready to invest themselves in enforcing
this agreement? Is that something that some of our allies would
be a part of?
And the only caution I would give in terms of a regional
force, which is something I think that is being looked at--
again, all the costs and benefits of all of these permutations
have to be thought through. On the one hand, you would have the
language. You would have the cultural affinities. But in the
case of many of the regional players, they have been
stakeholders in this conflict, so the idea is that they would
then be seen as impartial.
So finding a confidence-building mechanism that does not
run afoul of being seen to be a party to the conflict, and
where they would be willing to put their troops in harm's way
on behalf of this agreement, is going to be one of the
challenges we have to think through if the parties deem an
outside force a necessary part of this political agreement.
Senator Markey. I do not see how you can avoid it. I just
think that the recrimination coefficient is going to be
historically high. The carnage has just been so great on both
sides. And the bitterness, the acrimony will not settle out for
decades. And we need some mechanism as an intervention that
allows for a period of reconciliation, of healing.
And I think in the absence of a very well thought out plan
that is put together, and I think it should be put together
sooner rather than later just a concept that could move in to
assuage the concerns that all parties are going to have, that
the removal of Assad does not ultimately lead to a repetition
syndrome breaking out inside of the country in yet a different
cycle that seeks to extract a revenge against those with whom
they have grievances.
So I just think the sooner we kind of think that through
and what we are going to put in there, I think the better the
conversations that we can have to give some assurances to the
more responsible parties who might want to end this war that
the death toll is not just going to continue to mount.
So removing Assad is just one step. I think that it has to
be accompanied by a set of guarantees that it is just not going
to be mass carnage afterward.
But I think I feel very good knowing that you are there and
Secretary Kerry is there and thinking all these issues through.
Thank you so much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you for being with us. I think
you can see that that we are getting close to the end here.
I do want to chase just for a moment, if I could, the
conversation you had with Senator Kaine.
Do your colleagues at the United Nations think that somehow
Congress and the American people do not want to defeat ISIS?
Ambassador Power. I do not think they would have that
impression. My response was that they are puzzled as to why we
cannot come up with an authorization here together----
The Chairman. And are they puzzled by the fact that the
administration has told us over and over and over again here at
this committee--Secretary Kerry, Secretary Carter, the White
House sending over notes--that they have all the authorities
they need to continue the fight against terrorism that was
authorized in 2001? Is that confusing to them?
Ambassador Power. I think, again, I was not speaking----
The Chairman. That is your----
Ambassador Power. If I may, I was not speaking to the
legal authorities question. I do not think anybody questions
whether or not the United States has the authority to carry out
the campaign that we are carrying out.
I think the question is, as a political symbol and as
reinforcement of the effort that we are making, that there
should be an ability to get consensus here.
The Chairman. Well, there is consensus. I mean, the
President has the authority----
Ambassador Power. I am sorry. My response was on an AUMF,
consensus on an AUMF.
The Chairman. It is a little game that is being played. It
is difficult for me to understand. I mean, on one hand, witness
after witness after witness comes up here and tells us they
have all the authorities they need. And then people like you
and others come up and talk about how it would be nice.
I guess I do not get it. I voted for an authorization in
2013. I helped craft it to go against Assad. And we turned away
from that.
So certainly, this committee is willing to take up tough
issues when a declaration of war is occurring.
And has the President declared war on ISIS? Has he declared
war on ISIS? Has he laid out a strategy publicly to defeat
ISIS?
So I just want to say, I am sorry this cutesy thing that
has been occurring recently, especially over the last 2 weeks.
I am having difficulty understanding when I agree with the
administration. They have every authority that they need to
defeat and destroy ISIS.
So I do not know what is up. Maybe the President is
receiving criticism, and he is trying to deflect that to
Congress somehow. I do not know what is occurring.
But all I can say with you, I am in full agreement with the
administration that the 2001 authorization, while certainly on
the edges, gives them the authority to do everything they could
possibly want to do to destroy ISIS. And I believe that
everyone in the world, everyone in the world, understands that
Congress wants to see that happen.
Ambassador Power. Let me be clear. The President has
himself, as you know, made clear that he has the authority to
prosecute this campaign effectively. I was responding to
Senator Kaine's comment that a number of the other countries in
the coalition have gone through a domestic legislative process
of----
The Chairman. They did not have the authorities to do what
they were doing. They did not have the authorities. Is that
correct?
Ambassador Power. I would have to go case by case, and I
am not familiar with the domestic legal machinations in these
countries.
The Chairman. Well, certainly, Great Britain's or U.K.'s
unwillingness----
Ambassador Power. Yes, I think in parliamentary systems,
they need to go through the exercise that they have gone
through.
I think this is a reason though that the question is a
little bit more in the air than it has been over the last 6
months up in New York.
The Chairman. I think it is in the air for----
Ambassador Power. But the President has said he has the
authorities he needs. There is no resurrecting or surfacing
this issue for any other reason.
The Chairman. So you agree 100 percent that the President
has the authority.
Ambassador Power. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Has the President declared war on ISIS, by
the way?
Ambassador Power. I believe he has said we are going to
defeat and destroy ISIS, ISIL.
The Chairman. Look, we thank you for being here today and
certainly respect the job that you have. You are very bright
and intelligent. Sometimes I take issue with you when I feel
like you are carrying too much the administration's line. But I
understand sometimes you feel compelled to do so.
I thank you for being here, and we wish you well as you
take demonstrative action against UNSCR 1929 being violated
over the next week or so. Thank you.
So our next panel will consist of two more outstanding
witnesses. The first witness is the Honorable John Negroponte,
vice chairman of McLarty and Associates and former United
States Permanent Representative to the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, the same job our former witness is occupying.
Our second witness will be Dr. Bruce Jones, vice president
of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institute.
Again, we thank Ambassador Power for being here. Both of
you have witnessed what just happened. We hope you can
summarize your thoughts in about 5 minutes. And we look forward
to questions.
Again, thank you for being here.
John, why don't you start?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN NEGROPONTE, VICE CHAIRMAN, MCLARTY
ASSOCIATES, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ambassador Negroponte. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman
Corker, Ranking Member Cardin. It is a pleasure to appear
before you this morning to discuss United Nations peacekeeping,
a subject of importance to United States security.
When I was Ambassador to the United Nations, this subject
was frequently on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council.
During my tenure there, peacekeeping operations were stood up
in Sierra Leone and Liberia, among other countries. And, of
course, we also renewed a number of operations that continue to
this day, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Western Sahara, and so-forth.
I want to state categorically at the outset my conviction
that United States' support for U.N. peacekeeping operations is
in the overwhelming national security interests of our country.
There are three major reasons for, which I hold this view. I
call these three arguments, first, cost; second, the boots-on-
the-ground argument; and three, legitimacy. I will explain each
of these thoughts further.
First, with respect to cost, the United Nations has more
than 100,000 troops deployed in peacekeeping operations around
the world today. The approximate cost of deploying these forces
is $8 billion per year, which, of course, is a small fraction
of what we spend in our own national defense budget.
Our share of these costs is less than $3 billion, a small
fraction, again, and some illustrative figures were cited by
Senator Cardin, a small fraction of what it would cost to
deploy United States forces on similar missions.
This is not a trivial argument. In today's world and with
the high cost of deploying U.S. forces to overseas missions,
clearly it is an important advantage for us to know that we
have considerably less expensive options available to us
regarding whose forces might be available to carry out an
intervention we deem to be in our interests.
Second, the boots-on-the-ground argument, this, of course,
is an argument related to financial costs. Just as we benefit
from the lower cost of U.N. peacekeeping budgets as compared to
our own defense spending, we also do not deploy our own combat
forces to these situations.
This is a huge benefit. It is hard to imagine sustained
public support for a hypothetical situation wherein U.S. combat
units were deployed to five or 10 peacekeeping operations
abroad. The costs in U.S. blood and treasure would be
unacceptably high. And the spotlight on the situations in which
U.S. forces were involved could undermine the kind of support
and patience required in some of these very difficult
situations.
So support for U.N. PKOs saves us from having to
contemplate these possibilities. It also enables us to think
about choices other than a stark selection between U.S. boots
on the ground, on the one hand, or nothing at all.
Third, legitimacy. How many times have we undertaken or
contemplated intervention without the legitimating imprimatur
of a United Nations Security Council resolution?
In early 2003, I was in the well of the Security Council
arguing for a Chapter VII Security Council resolution
permitting the use of force against Iraq. We failed to achieve
that resolution and soon thereafter intervened in Iraq with a
coalition of the willing.
I am not saying that a PKO would have been appropriate at
that point in time in Iraq. But what I do want to highlight is
that we subsequently paid a high domestic and international
price for intervening in Iraq without the support and blessing
of a U.N. Security Council resolution.
By definition, a U.N. peacekeeping operation has consensus
support within the P5 and the blessing of a Security Council
resolution.
This is an important political and legal advantage, which
should not be dismissed lightly.
Senator Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, I know there are
issues regarding the effectiveness, comportment, and leadership
of some PKOs, and these are issues that will require continued
attention and effort from troop-contributing and other U.N.
members alike. And given our leadership role in the world and
our status as the U.N.'s largest single financial contributor,
we have a special responsibility in this regard. But whatever
imperfections or blemishes might exist in the U.N. peacekeeping
setup, it is our responsibility to help address these issues in
a constructive way.
With steady engagement from the U.S. and others, I foresee
continued improvement in the performance and utility of PKOs
and even their more creative use in addressing some of the very
difficult security challenges around the globe.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
committee on such an important topic. I would be pleased to try
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Negroponte follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Negroponte
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you this
morning to discuss United Nations Peacekeeping, a subject of importance
to United States security.
When I was Ambassador to the United Nations, this subject was
frequently on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council. During my tenure
there peacekeeping operations were stood up in Sierra Leone and
Liberia, among other countries and, of course, we also renewed a number
of operations that continue to this day, such as in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the Western Sahara and so-forth.
I want to state categorically at the outset my conviction that
United States support for U.N. peacekeeping operations is in the
overwhelming national security interest of our country. There are three
major reasons for which I hold this view. I call these three arguments:
1) Cost; 2) ``Boots on the Ground''; and 3) Legitimacy. I will explain
each of these three thoughts further. But before I do, let me mention
what I consider to be the fundamental rationale for PKO's in the first
place. Situations arise around the world, either because of state-to-
state conflict, civil strife or state failure that require outside
forces to maintain peace and order. And these forces are frequently
required in substantial numbers because numbers matter when it comes to
keeping the peace. Send peacekeepers in adequate numbers to deal with a
situation and their presence can have a rapid calming effect. Send them
in insufficient numbers and their deterrent effect can be degraded,
thereby inviting trouble from those opposed to the peace we are trying
to uphold. More and more, U.N. peacekeepers have been called upon to
maintain the peace in situations of civil strife, especially in Africa.
And protecting endangered civilians has increasingly been included in
their mandates. Though the record of U.N. PKO's has been mixed, their
efforts over the years have resulted in some important successes.
Let me return to the three factors I alluded to earlier: 1) First,
cost: The U.N. has more than 100,000 troops deployed in PKO's around
the world today. The approximate cost of deploying these forces is $8
billion per year. Our share of these costs is less than $3 billion, a
small fraction of what it would cost to deploy US forces on similar
missions. This not a trivial argument. In today's world and with the
high cost of deploying US forces to overseas missions, clearly it is an
important advantage for us to know that we have considerably less
expensive options available to us regarding whose forces might be
available to carry out an intervention we deem to be in our interest;
2) Second: The ``Boots on the Ground'' argument: This of course is
an argument related to financial costs. Just as we benefit from the
lower cost of U.N. peacekeeping budgets as compared to our own defense
spending, we also do not deploy our own combat forces to these
situations. This is a huge benefit. It is hard to imagine sustained
public support for a hypothetical situation wherein US combat units
were deployed to five or ten PKO's abroad. The costs in US blood and
treasure would be unacceptably high and the spotlight on the situations
in which US forces were involved could undermine the kind of public
support and patience required in some of these very difficult
situations. So, support for U.N. PKO's saves us from having to
contemplate these possibilities. It also enables us to think about
choices other than US boots on the ground or nothing at all;
3) Third, Legitimacy: How many times have we undertaken or
contemplated intervention without the legitimating imprimatur of a U.N.
Security Council Resolution? In early 2003 I was in the well of the
Security Council arguing for a Chapter VII UNSC resolution permitting
the use of force against Iraq. We failed to achieve that resolution and
soon thereafter intervened in Iraq with a coalition of the willing. I
am not saying that a PKO would have been appropriate at that point in
time in Iraq. But what I do want to highlight is that we subsequently
paid a high domestic and international price for intervening in Iraq
without the support and blessing of a UNSC resolution. By definition, a
U.N. PKO has consensus support within the P-5 and the blessing of a
Security Council Resolution. This is an important political and legal
advantage which should not be dismissed lightly.
Senator Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Committee: I
know there are issues regarding the effectiveness, comportment and
leadership of some PKO's; and these are issues that will require
continued attention and effort from troop contributing and other U.N.
members alike. And given our leadership role in the world and our
status as the U.N.'s largest single financial contributor, we have a
special responsibility in this regard. But whatever imperfections or
blemishes might exist in the U.N. Peacekeeping setup, it is our
responsibility to help address these issues in a constructive way. With
steady engagement from the US and others, I foresee continued
improvement in the performance and utility of PKO's and even their more
creative use in addressing some of the very difficult security
challenges around the globe.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee on
such an important topic. I would be pleased to try to answer any
questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Dr. Jones?
STATEMENT OF DR. BRUCE JONES, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Jones. Thank you very much. Chairman Corker, Ranking
Member Cardin, thank you for having me appear before this body,
and thank you for your leadership in sustaining attention to
this issue.
We have covered a lot of ground, so I will be brief and
just try to reinforce a couple of points and raise a couple of
additional ones.
I think this body well understands the purpose of
peacekeeping is to give the United States a tool for what I
have described as manning the outer perimeter, for burden-
sharing in conflicts where we have an interest but we do not
want to have to deploy U.S. forces or tackle the issue
ourselves. I think that is well-understood in this body.
I think it is important to remember that in the majority of
the cases where the U.N. is deployed, it is not deployed alone.
It is often a regional organization and the U.N. co-deployed in
a hybrid operation. I think we do not focus on that enough. The
U.N. is an important part of the equation, but it is not the
only part of the equation. And we need to sustain attention to
the way that regional organizations expand the reach of the
U.N. and reinforce what the U.N. can do.
That being said, of course, the U.N., as you as you both
highlighted, as a burden-sharing tool, as a global burden-
sharing tool, gives us the capacity to reach across the globe,
to get Indian troops to work with us in Central Africa, or
Brazilian troops to work with us in East Timor as they did, or
European forces working with us in Haiti, that regional
organizations cannot perform.
And so for all its flaws and weaknesses, the U.N. is the
only genuinely global burden-sharing tool we have. And I think
it is extremely important at a time when--Senator Murphy I
think mentioned Colombia, but there are others like Korea and
Indonesia and Brazil, rising democracies who want to do more on
the international stage. The U.N. is the only tool that they
have to do that.
So how do we improve the U.N.'s performance? I think of
this as having four dimensions: effectiveness, efficiency,
legitimacy, and leadership.
Effectiveness, I want to reinforce something that
Ambassador Power said that I think is important, which is
bringing countries with advanced military capabilities back
into the U.N. A number of you stressed the complexity of the
challenges that the U.N. confronts. I think we have to be clear
eyed about the fact in a number of cases, the U.N. is operating
in theaters where transnational terrorist organizations also
are operating. Those are not challenges that can be met by
troops with low-order capabilities.
When we look at the situation in Mali, when we look at the
situation in different contexts, we are going to have to see
peacekeeping have within it countries with advanced military
capabilities to perform the functions of protection of
civilians and implementation of mandates. So I am very
supportive of the administration efforts to bring European and
rising states back into peacekeeping.
An additional point that I would make, and again, Senator
Murphy touched on it, is that there are different ways that the
U.N. can structure its missions. We tend to focus on blue
helmet operations, which are commanded by the Secretary. There
is actually an alternative, which are multinational force
operations, where a single member state takes the command. And
that is sometimes an effective tool, because there are member
states like Canada and Australia and others who have a far
higher degree of capability in command and control and
intelligence than the U.N. Secretary has at his disposal. That
variation of using an U.N.-authorized multinational force is
something I think we should be thinking about more than we
sometimes do.
Quickly, on efficiency, nobody would accuse the U.N. of
being an efficient organization. But it has made an important
step forward with the creation of the Department of Field
Support, which is a separate tool to structure and manage the
U.N. field operations. The absurdity is that the politics of
the General Assembly means that the Department of Field Support
still has to run all of its decisions past the Department of
Management, which is the headquarters tool. So the same tool
that manages workshops and conferences in New York has to
approve all the decisions of a more nimble tool, the Department
of Field Support.
I think one of the things the United States could do is
work in a coalition to change that, so that the Department of
Field Support has more direct authority to oversee and
implement peacekeeping operations without that kind of extra
layer of a dual-key system, which is inefficient. And, of
course, we have to keep working on this scale assessment issue.
Third, I would just reiterate the things that are being
said on sexual exploitation. I think the U.N. makes a
fundamental mistake when it does not recognize that even though
this is an issue of a minority of troops and a minority of
missions, it severely erodes the legitimacy of the U.N. on the
ground and in capitals.
You have all said a number of things already about the
United States putting the right kind of pressure on the U.N. to
live up to a zero-tolerance policy, which, rather belatedly,
Ban Ki-Moon came to.
And that goes to my last point, and I will end here, which
is that this is also about leadership. We are coming to the end
of Ban Ki-Moon's term, and I think it should be a matter of
priority for the United States, when they get into the business
of selecting a new Secretary General, to be paying attention to
the question of whether they are focused on the effectiveness
and efficiency of the U.N. in contributing to international
peace and security and to work closely with the Secretary
General when she or he is selected and other members of the P5
to make sure that she has available to her a deep roster of
political organizational talent on which to draw in selecting
top officials for the management of political peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations.
I will end there.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statment of Dr. Bruce Jones
Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address this body on the
timely and consequential subject of peacekeeping and the U.S. national
interest.
I'd like to start with four main points, and then suggest some key
areas for reform.
First, when we address the subject of international peacekeeping,
we have to start with an essential question: does the United States
want to have at its disposal a tool for burden-sharing for far-flung
crises, or does it want to do the job itself? That's the fundamental
issue.
The right way to think about international peacekeeping is as a
tool for sharing the burden of ``manning the outer perimeter.'' We're
never going to rely on international peacekeeping for core security
tasks, but when we move beyond those matters of primary national
security, we have three choices: do nothing, and live with the
consequences--in the form of refugees, in the form of spreading
instability, in the form of safe havens for terror networks; tackle
these problems ourselves--even when they arise in places like the
Central African Republic or northern Uganda or Yemen or northern Mali;
or build and manage multilateral tools for maintaining stability and
security in non-vital regions that distribute the commitment among many
nations. It seems evident that the third of these is the only credible
option--building tools for burden-sharing in the mission to uphold
stability. The existence of such tools doesn't preclude U.S.
engagement, but it gives us options.
Second, then, we have to look at the tools at our disposal,
including but not limited to the U.N. It's rarely the case that the
U.N. is the sole tool we are going to use to tackle a problem of civil
war or humanitarian crisis. There are regional organizations, NATO, the
African Union, and coalitions of the willing; as well as tools for the
development of economic and governance institutions, such as the World
Bank. In the vast majority of cases today, two or more of these
entities are involved in producing solutions or tamping down problems.
One of the weaknesses of current U.S. policy is that we treat these
institutions or tools as if they are stand-alone entities; in
actuality, they almost always work in concert, albeit in imperfect
ways. This is all the more important given that we now confront a U.N.
Security Council in which Russia is inclined to block unified action,
at least in cases where it is directly involved.
Third, that being said, we should take the signal from the reality
that in the vast majority of those cases, the U.N. does play an
important role--in the humanitarian response; in the political
response; and in the security response--all of which are supported
through the peacekeeping tool. The reason the U.N. shows up in so many
cases arises from a very basic but very important fact: The United
Nations is a global institution, rather than a regional one, making
it's tools global in scope. U.N. peacekeeping is the only mechanism we
have at our disposal that allows us to combine forces from every region
in the world to tackle crises or conflicts wherever they occur.
Regional organizations can't produce Indian troops working with us in
central Africa; or Brazilian troops working with us in East Timor, as
they did; or European forces working with us in Haiti. Thus, for all
its flaws and weaknesses, the U.N. is the only tool available to us for
genuinely global burden-sharing. And that's all the more important at a
point in time when rising democracies like Korea, Indonesia, and Brazil
want to do more, not less, on the international stage, and don't have
any alternatives to the U.N.
Fourth, and critically, when we hear about peacekeeping, we hear
most about failures and setbacks. Even the most optimistic literature
about U.N. and international peacekeeping suggests that it fails
approximately 40% of the time. But that should not obscure the 60% of
the time when it succeeds, or succeeds in part--either helping to end a
war, securing a part of territory, or protecting a portion of a
population.\1\ Success is not categorized by the building, or
rebuilding, of secure democracies overnight--we have to have maintain
reasonable expectations of peacekeeping.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For the comprehensive study behind these figures, see Virginia
Page Fortna's 2008 book: ``Does Peacekeeping Work?'', specifically
chapter five. See: Fortna, V. P. (2008). Does Peacekeeping Work?
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So how do we improve the ratio between success and failure? We have
to work on four fronts:
This is about effectiveness--and first and foremost that means
getting better quality troops into the U.N.
It's about efficiency, especially cost efficiency.
It's about putting an end to sexual exploitation and abuse--actions
that erode the local and international legitimacy of
peacekeeping.
And it's about leadership.
The most important issue is effectiveness--if the U.N. isn't
helping to create a solution, then the question of whether its
operations are efficient or legitimate is moot. The most important
determinant of effectiveness is the quality of troops that participate
in operations--that is to say, their capacity to undertake complex
stabilization operations. When conflicts are relatively easy, i.e. when
the state or the rebels in question are of low capacity, then the U.N.
can draw troops from whichever nation is willing, gathering a coalition
for action that can keep the lid on things. But, as we confront more
resilient actors in tougher settings--especially as the geography of
intra-state and proxy conflict shifts from sub-Saharan Africa to the
Middle East and North Africa--we need the participation of both the
European allies and the rising powers if we're going to have the
capable troops needed to produce security outcomes required on the
ground. This is all the more true as we deal with the reality that in a
growing portion of wars, at least one actor is engaged in terrorist
activities, often with a transnational link.
I am therefore very supportive of the Obama Administration's
efforts--colloquially, the Biden initiative--to bring European actors
back into the fold and engage rising states in U.N. peacekeeping
efforts for the provision of both troops and enabling capacities.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For an overview of the Biden initiative, see: Office of the
Press Secretary, The White House. (2014, September 26). Summit on U.N.
Peacekeeping [Fact sheet]. Retrieved December 6, 2015, from
Whitehouse.gov website: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/09/26/fact-sheet-summit-un-peacekeeping.
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Effectiveness also means being flexible about how we structure
these forces. We tend to focus on the traditional ``blue helmet''
operations, that is, operations controlled centrally by the U.N.
Secretariat. There's a powerful alternative in the U.N.'s toolkit,
namely U.N.-mandated multi-national forces. These are operations that
fly under a U.N. banner but are led and commanded by an individual
state, rather than the U.N. Secretariat. Australia has led such
multinational forces (in East Timor), as has Canada (in the Congo). The
United States commands such a force in the Sinai (MFO Sinai). We should
put more emphasis on using this option, and some of its variants.
It would be worth the effort for the United States to do a detailed
examination of the range of alternatives available to the U.N.--from
blue helmet operations to multi-national forces to so-called hybrid
operations (where the U.N. and a regional organization fuse their
forces into a single structure); such a study would enable the United
States to better support and more firmly encourage the U.N. to explore
a variety of options when confronted with an emerging conflict.
Then let's turn to efficiency. Nobody would accuse the U.N. of
being an efficient organization. However, to be fair, during Ban Ki-
Moon's term, two dynamic women, Susanna Malcorra and Ameerah Haq,
effectively built the U.N.'s Department of Field Support into a more
robust tool for undertaking complex field operations.
Unfortunately, the U.N.'s rules still mean that decisions made in
the Department of Field Support are subject to the arcane and
cumbersome tools of the Department of Management, which oversees
headquarters operations. This dual key system introduces major
inefficiencies and unnecessary redundancy. The United States could
lead, or at a minimum offer support for, a political coalition to build
on the new proposals from Ban Ki-Moon's high-level panel to increase
the flexibility and efficiency of the U.N.'s field support tools.\3\
This set of ideas is similar in spirit to a proposal made by former
U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations Ambassador John
Bolton for stand-alone management arrangements for U.N. peacekeeping.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations was
convened on 31 October 2014 ``to undertake a thorough review of United
Nations peace operations today and the emerging needs of the future.''
See: ``Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People''
[PDF]. (2015, June). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO--
Report--1--June--2015.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over time, of course, the United States will also have to secure a
better arrangement for U.N. peacekeeping dues: a situation where the
U.S. share of the global economy has shrunk from approximately 25% to
21%, and its share of U.N. peacekeeping dues has grown to 28%, is
obviously unsustainable.\4\ China has shown that it is willing to do
more in voluntary funding of the U.N.'s operations, and its own rates
continue to rise; but eventually this scale of assessment will have to
be reworked. But the United States also has to recognize that, contra
the ``American decline'' narrative, it is still the only global power,
the only power with the capability to act in every theater, and thus
the actor that most profits in real terms from burden-sharing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The U.N.'s figures for fiscal year 2016 have the United States
contributing 28.38% of total peacekeeping dues. See: ``Financing
Peacekeeping.'' (n.d.). Retrieved December 6, 2015, from U.N.org
website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.N. also has to address a problem that eats away at its
legitimacy--sexual exploitation and abuse. No other issue so profoundly
erodes the trust of local populations, or the confidence of the
international community, in U.N. operations than incidences of sexual
misconduct or abuse by U.N. peacekeepers. Let's be clear: this is a
problem of a very small number of troops in a minority of operations.
But the U.N. leadership makes a grave mistake when it doesn't recognize
that it's a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of U.N. operations.
Kofi Annan eventually recognized this, and adopted a zero tolerance
strategy; and, rather belatedly, Ban Ki-moon has recognized this, and
has adopted a new, tougher policy.\5\ The United States should be
vigilant in maintaining the necessary oversight to ensure that the
Secretary-General fulfills the promise of this new policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For a 2004 statement from Secretary General Kofi Annan, see:
Annan, K. (2004, November 19). Statement by the Secretary-General on
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the U.N. Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) [Press release]. Retrieved
from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1189. For Secretary-General
Ban's recent statements on sexual assault in the Central African
Republic, Ban, K.-M. (2015, August 12). Opening remarks to press on the
Central African Republic [Press release]. Retrieved from http://
www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments--
full.asp?statID=2714#.VmTuiIv45UQ
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, this is about leadership--at headquarters, and in the
field. There's no percentage in commenting here on personalities. And
we're coming to the end of Ban Ki-moon's term, so soon there will be a
new leadership team at the U.N. In preparation for this new window of
opportunity, the United States should elevate the prioritization of the
identification and the selection of a Secretary-General committed to
effective and efficient U.N. contributions to international security;
and we should work closely with the incoming Secretary-General and the
other members of the P5 to make sure that she has available to her a
deep roster of political and organizational talent from which to draw
in selecting top officials for the management of political,
peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.
It has become fashionable to describe the United States as a power
in decline. I disagree. The United States is the only power with
political, economic, and military clout both at a global level and in
every region of the world. America is the only power capable of
convening states (and actors beyond states) of every stripe, of every
income level, and from every region. It has an extraordinary suite of
allies. The dynamism of the American private sector has been on vivid
display in the energy renaissance and the economic recovery from the
2009 global financial crisis.\6\ China, India, and other actors have
rising capacity to be sure, and with it, spreading interests. But for
now, only the United States has a global responsibility, and only the
United States can build the coalitions and the multilateral instruments
for global security. A peacekeeping tool that is adequately manned,
resourced, and supported is an important tool in upholding that
security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For a comprehensive account of these factors, see: Jones, B.
(2014). ``Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension
between Rivalry and Restraint.'' Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, only with sustained U.S. attention will it be possible to
ensure that we have available to us a sufficient suite of tools for
stabilization and peacekeeping, at the U.N. and beyond, to meet the
American interests of supporting stability without over taxing U.S.
treasure and overextending U.S. forces.
Thank you again for the opportunity to address this committee.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both. I know we got off on a
lot of different topics in the last panel that were a little
different than the main subject, but it is rare we have the
opportunity to talk to the Ambassador.
We thank you both. We know you are both friends. And
obviously, with just Ben and I here, even though this will all
be part of the record, which is appreciated, this is more of a
conversation.
You both have experienced the frustration of seeing
peacekeeping operations where people were being abused and
brutalized, and yet the caveats that existed kept peacekeepers
from really being able to intervene. So we have moved in a more
forward manner, which from my standpoint is welcomed as we have
seen helpless people be brutalized in certain areas.
What are, though, some of the challenges that, from your
perspective, we most need to think about relative to that? I
mean, in essence, it is an extension in some cases of actually
carrying out semi-kinetic activities, right? So what are some
of the things that we as a body ought to be thinking about as
we progress down that path?
Dr. Jones. Thank you very much. That is an excellent
question, and I think it is extremely well-put.
It is interesting to observe. At the U.N., I think you face
two challenges. One, over time, as countries with more advanced
capabilities, Europeans and others, have not been participating
in peacekeeping, the practice has sort of lowered to the
capability of the troops. So the willingness to go out and
undertake kinetic activities, to protect civilians, to defeat
rebel forces, et cetera, has diminished, and that is a
challenge.
So getting more capable troops back into peacekeeping is
the first necessary step.
I think an important question is what can the United States
do to stiffen their will or to ensure that they are going to
have will or support. One of the things I would put on the
table--by the way, I would say, I am not among those who think
that the United States has to put troops into peacekeeping. I
do not think that that is the correct approach. I think that
the United States has unique capabilities in airlift and
intelligence and other kinds of things that are more important.
I would add to it over-the-horizon extraction. If we are
going to ask countries to put troops on the line and take
risks, first of all, it is helpful if they are more capable
troops, because they are undertaking that mission. But if we
are willing to provide over-the-horizon extraction and support
and defense capabilities, the risks that they are taking is
lessened. So I think we can be in a stronger position in
encouraging people to take those risks and to take those
flights if we are willing to help them if they get stuck.
Ambassador Negroponte. If I could add, first of all, I
would definitely agree with Dr. Jones that capacity-building,
and I think that is what he was talking about in the instance,
is really one of the most important challenges, if not the most
important challenge we face with respect to U.N. peacekeeping.
There was also mentioned earlier in the testimony this
morning about the time it takes sometimes to mobilize some of
these missions. I think the Security Council and the
peacekeeping department has become more effective at that.
I would add, with respect to capacity-building, the
challenge we have in ensuring that there is sort of uniform
level of capacity amongst the officers that are leading these
different missions around the world.
I am not aware that the U.N. has any kind of peacekeeping
academy. It would seem to me, if you have military deployments
in excess of 100,000 people around the world, I mean, we have
an academy for each of our four uniformed services in the
United States. And I wonder if some kind of training
institution, where you would cycle current and potential
leaders of future peacekeeping missions, whether that would not
be an idea worth consideration. I mean, you would have to sit
down at the drawing boards and think about how you do that, but
anyway, that is one idea I would like to leave for your
consideration.
The Chairman. Dr. Jones, you mentioned that you do not
think it is appropriate for the U.S. to have ground troops, if
you will, involved. As it relates to our NATO efforts, we
obviously have everything involved, money, equipment,
personnel. Again, we are the provider of security services.
Unfortunately, most of the members of NATO are consumers of
security services.
Here, we are the largest provider of monetary resources,
and, as I understand it, we have committed 42 officers to be
part of peacekeeping.
But just for the record, could you tease out why it is you
said what you just said? You say we should not be involved with
ground troops because?
Dr. Jones. Thank you. It comes up a lot. It has come up a
lot in the last year as the administration has been pushing the
Europeans and other states to do more. One of the responses has
been, ``Well, are you going to? Are you going to put troops
in?'' As I said, I think the things that only the United States
can do include airlift, signals intelligence, and some of the
command and control functions that you just referred to.
I would not be doctrinaire about it. I do not think there
is no circumstance where the United States should put troops
in. I would recall that we have actually, historically. In
1995, the United States had troops under the command of a
Canadian-led multinational force in eastern Zaire. We have done
it. It is not impossible to do.
But by and large, it seems to me that we are better off
when other troops are willing to be on the frontlines of this.
Senator Murphy talked about the notion of having multiethnic
and multinational forces.
The simple reality is that the United States is going to
attract attention. There are going to be a lot of people who
want to fight the United States. I think we are simply raising
a red flag to a bull when we put U.S. forces on the ground in a
number of these situations. We are much better off performing
those functions that only we can provide, as well, as I
mentioned, over-the-horizon rescue and support operations, and
ask others to be on the frontlines.
The Chairman. It is generally the same approach, as has
been discussed by most, and that is in Syria we would like to
have Arab faces on the ground more predominantly than Western
faces, right? It just helps ensure that there is a more
cohesive nature, if you will, relative to what is happening on
the ground.
Typically, we have had a policy, have we not, that U.S.
troops are not going to be commanded by people other than U.S.
officers, too? Is that correct?
Dr. Jones. We have had that policy. As I said, we have
occasionally violated it. U.S. forces were under Canadian
command in multinational force operations in Zaire very
briefly. But I think as a general rule, it is the right policy.
And more to the point, as I said, there are simply too many
occasions in which participation by the United States would
change the political texture of the force in ways that I think
would amplify the resistance to the force rather than the
opposite.
Ambassador Negroponte. Whereas the enablers do not
necessarily have that same kind of a profile, and yet there is
no other country as capable as we are of producing these vital
enablers to these missions.
The Chairman. Ambassador, you have had this role. You have
been at the United Nations. Senator Cardin, which I appreciate
deeply, raised the issue of just our payments. We have 22
percent of the world's gross domestic product and yet we
contribute 28.5 percent of the budget here.
Our other ``associates,'' if you will, at the United
Nations obviously are not doing their part, otherwise our
amount would not be 28.5 percent.
We find this same to be the case--I have referred to it now
three times--at NATO. It is where we desire for things to
happen, it seems more so than others, and, therefore, we end up
being financially exposed more than others.
You have been in this role. Tell us from your perspective
what we as a country can do to seek equilibrium and to cause
other countries to play their appropriate roles.
Ambassador Negroponte. Well, it is frustrating. And I
think you are right, Senator, to talk about kind of the
mysterious ways in which the budget is negotiated, and very
often right at the end of the year just before Christmas, when
everyone is in a rush to get out of there. Somehow at 3 o'clock
in the morning, the U.N. budget gets agreed upon. So sometimes
you get some rather anomalous situations that will arise.
But I think we just have to keep working on that. I
recognize that we have not been as successful as we ought to
have been in keeping the peacekeeping assessments down.
But again, in proportion to what it would cost to field
other kinds of forces or our own military expenditures for our
own defense establishment, we are talking about relatively
small amounts of money. Therefore, I think we just need to do
our best but recognize that we may not achieve everything that
we hope to achieve in those negotiations.
But I am also reassured that some countries now are putting
up more resources than they had before. I am glad to hear that
China is going to be assessed something on the order of 10
percent for peacekeeping, which, if I recall correctly, is a
significant departure from 10 or 15 years ago when their
contribution was a fraction of that.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Mr. Ambassador, as you were describing the
U.N. budget process, I thought you were describing the U.S.
budget process. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Negroponte. I do not know where they learned
those lessons.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Jones, thank you very much for your
service. And you come here with a great deal of expertise on
the United Nations, having worked as adviser to Secretary
General.
Ambassador Negroponte, you served in that position as
Ambassador, and you have served in so many other positions of
foreign policy.
I want to follow up on the reform issues, and I will tell
you why.
But first, let me suggest to the chairman, your suggestion
on training is a very important suggestion. I serve on the
Board of Visitors of the U.S. Naval Academy, and I see
firsthand the availability of training at the U.S. Naval
Academy for some of our allied countries. We do train at our
service academies foreign students.
I think an arrangement with the United Nations in regards
to their peacekeeping command may very well be a viable option
to get greater capacity. And I would ask our staff to take a
look at that, to see whether we can look at how our service
academies could assist in this regard.
It also helps us, because having a more diversified student
body at our academies prepares us for the global missions that
our military command needs to be aware of.
So I thought that was a very good suggestion, and I would
ask if our staffs could perhaps follow up on that and see
whether that is a viable option.
But I want to talk about the scale of assessments and the
how these numbers come about. But I put it in context of a
Senator who strongly supports the United Nations and its
mission and its budget.
But if we were to put it a U.N. reform bill on the floor of
the United States Senate, the type of amendments that would be
offered and the types of potential restrictions on U.S.
participation in the United Nations, getting a majority vote,
perhaps even a 60-vote threshold, is real. The reason for that
is because of the lack of transparency in the United Nations
and the illogical way that they go about their budgeting.
We talk about burden-sharing, and we recognize that it is
disproportionate, that the U.S. taxpayers have been asked to
take on a much stronger commitment than the developed
countries, those who have the capacity to do a lot more. It is
true in NATO. It is true in our coalitions. It is true in
individual participation globally. And it is certainly true in
the United Nations.
So I understand that we are getting a good value for our
contributions to the U.N. I never doubt that. I agree with you
completely. And the peacekeeping missions are critically
important to the U.S.
But it seems to me that we have not been as effective as we
need to in the transparency and reform within the United
Nations process. And if we do not deal with it in a way that is
understandable to the U.S. political system, then there could
be negative consequences to the U.S. participation at the
United Nations.
So it is for that reason that I cannot justify a 22 percent
budget allocation and then 28.5 percent on peacekeeping,
particularly in light of all the other commitments that U.S.
taxpayers are making to international security issues. I would
just like to get your advice as to the most effective way for
this Senator and for the Congress to weigh in, in a
constructive way, so that we can get the type of reforms we
need in the United Nations.
Ambassador Negroponte. Well, I am not as current on these
issues as I was when I was serving in that position, but I was
the beneficiary of Richard Holbrooke's successful negotiation
with respect to the last big arrears situation. It took
incredible work on his part, the kind of work that only Richard
Holbrooke was capable of. It was jawboning with membership,
with the secretariat, working hard with Congress, like Ms.
Power, bringing the Security Council down to visit the Senate,
which I think was a very, very good idea. I am sure you
imparted this message to them when you met with them. Those are
the right people to pass that message to.
I think it just requires an intensive diplomatic effort
with these countries to try and correct that situation. I am
pleased we have a 22 percent assessment for the general
assessment for the U.N. Holbrooke left that issue somewhat
unresolved. If I remember correctly, it was 26-point-something-
or-other, and now it has gone up a percentage point or 2 since
he reached his agreement.
But I think we just have to work that one really hard. And
what I would hate to see happen is that the arrears become so
large that then it becomes some kind of a crisis situation with
regard to whether or not we are going to continue our support,
which would undermine our support for the United Nations. That
is the danger that I think you are describing.
Dr. Jones. I do not have much to add. I would just add one
point of context, which is sort of ironical.
We spent a lot of the last few years hearing countries talk
about how the United States is in a decline, a relative decline
in the United States, all this kind of stuff. I profoundly
disagree with that underlying notion. The reason I mention it
in this case is, when you look at the scale of assessments, it
was about 30 percent in the height of the post-Cold War period.
It declined to about 25 percent as we made continual progress
to bring the scale of assessment in line with our share of
world GDP. And it has gone back up over the last 3 years. It
has gone back up to 28 percent since the global financial
crisis because we have done much better in recovering from the
global financial crisis than a number of our allies and
partners in Europe and others.
And so it is a kind of irony of the moment that whereas
people talk about U.S. decline----
Senator Cardin. It is my understanding that the difference
between 22 percent and 28 percent is not our share in the
global economy. It is justified by our seat on the Security
Council, which many of us interpret it is to bust the 22
percent cap.
Dr. Jones. It is both, because the formula starts with what
is the share of GDP. You pay a premium by being rich, so rich
countries pay more per share of GDP than poor countries. And
then we pay an additional premium by virtue of being a
permanent member. So it was going down as our global share of
GDP went down, and it has gone back up a little bit. So it is
just a worth remembering the irony.
But I do not disagree with anything that Ambassador
Negroponte said in terms of the need to keep pushing on this.
And it is an issue that is going to have to be made an
important priority with the incoming Secretary General. They
are going to have to make it clear to the incoming Secretary
General that to sustain support for the United Nations, it is
impossible to explain to the American public why we pay an
outsized share of this bill.
It is true that we have an outsized interest--an outsized
interest--in the performance. We are the only power that has
interests in every region of the world and at the global level.
So we have an outsized interest here as well.
And to a certain extent, in all honesty, that reduces our
leverage. Everybody knows that we have an outsized interest in
these things.
Senator Cardin. Because we have assumed greater burdens, we
have even greater burdens.
Dr. Jones. Correct.
Senator Cardin. That is an interesting way of looking at
it.
Let me ask one last question, if I might.
Ambassador Power was pretty firm and optimistic about the
September 28 meeting of the countries that are contributing
resources to the U.N. peacekeeping. The commitments, she
continues to state, are just that--commitments. They have not
been delivered yet.
Have you had a chance to review the September 28 results?
And are you optimistic that, in fact, this will have greater
participation by the countries that are capable of doing more?
What is your prognosis on this?
Dr. Jones. Well, I had the honor of being invited to that
meeting by the administration, so I was there for that. And I
have been involved in helping the U.N. and the administration
think through the preparation for it. I am semi-optimistic.
I think that the Europeans, in particular, as they have
drawn down in Afghanistan, they have capabilities that they are
not using. In that context, they can contribute. The Dutch in
Mali I think are the most important example of what we have
seen so far.
I think they recognize they have a deep interest that if
they are going to come to terms with their migration problem
and their refugee problem, they have to go and solve it in the
places where it originates. So they have an interest in helping
to stabilize conflicts in Africa and beyond. So I am somewhat
optimistic.
I would be very optimistic were it not for a very different
reality, which is Russia and Ukraine, which is causing European
governments, fully understandably, to reprioritize back to some
older kinds of concerns about NATO, about the containment of
Russia, et cetera. That is going to put pressure on European
defense budgets, and it is going to put pressure on European
militaries to be worried about things other than conflicts in
Africa.
And so the two things are, unfortunately, happening at the
same time. I think there is a genuine will from Europeans and
from the other countries like Korea that I mentioned to
participate in U.N. peacekeeping. But at the same time, we are
facing new challenges from China, from Russia, et cetera. Those
are going to put different kinds of pressures.
So I think she is very right to push the argument. I think
the administration is right to pursue that initiative. But
there are going to be other challenges we confront at the same
time that will I think diminish the full impact that it might
have had otherwise, unfortunately.
Ambassador Negroponte. I think we need to keep the
spotlight on it. I think that was a great initiative by the
President and has to be followed up.
The other thing I might add with respect to contributing
countries is one encouraging region of the world in that regard
is the willingness of certain Latin American countries to
contribute to peacekeeping, global peacekeeping, which they
have been reluctant to do in the past. I mean, the mention of
Colombia, for example, and Brazil, too.
I thought that was encouraging, and I think it is something
the U.N. needs to avail itself of.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you both for your service.
The Chairman. Thank you.
One of the great privileges that we have around here is the
access to people like you who are so respected and have the
ability to share wisdom with us and experiences. We know that
every day when we come to work, so we want to thank you for
your continued involvement in issues of importance to our
country. Thank you for being here today.
As you will see, a lot of our members make themselves
present by asking questions later. So without objection, first
of all, the record will be open until the close of business
Friday. But if you could respond in a fairly timely manner,
that would also be appreciated.
The Chairman. We thank you for your service to our country,
and we thank you for being here today.
And with that, the meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Ambassador
Samantha Power by Senator Bob Corker
Question. During the September U.N. Peacekeeping Summit, the United
States, as well as other member states, made significant commitments to
enhancing peacekeeping capabilities. The administration has stated that
funding for this will not come from U.S. assessed contributions to
international peacekeeping (CIPA account) but from elsewhere.
What is the approximate funding figure the President will be
requesting in his budget to fund these commitments?
From what agencies and accounts will this funding be drawn?
Answer. The Leaders' Summit on September 28 generated commitments
by 49 countries plus the EU, NATO, and African Union to contribute
aviation, infantry, police, and other critical support to U.N.
peacekeeping operations. The Summit demonstrated the multiplier effect
that can occur when countries come together to address some of the
world's most pressing problems.
The Department of State is participating in an interagency
discussion about steps the United States can take to continue to ensure
that the United Nations has the means to fulfill its role in preventing
the outbreak, escalation, and spread of conflicts. The Department of
Defense is an important partner in this discussion.
Currently we do not foresee new activities having any significant
impact on FY 2016 funding requirements. There may be minor changes as
we refocus some of our efforts, and we look forward to working with you
on any adjustments going forward.
We are currently formulating the FY 2017 President's Budget, which
will be presented to Congress in early February 2017, and we will
consult with you regarding any resource requirements for FY 2017 at
that time.
Question. I recently wrote to Secretary Kerry regarding steps to
reduce the risk of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse. This
appears to be a chronic problem for the U.N. I understand that the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations created an internal task force to address
this issue and that an action plan exists.
What policy proposals are being considered as part of the action
plan and what steps will you take to implement them?
Do you think this is a priority for the current U.N. leadership? If
so, what makes you believe that this time is different?
How will the U.S. Mission at the United Nations press the next
Secretary General to maintain the momentum on addressing sexual
exploitation and abuse?
Answer. The U.S. Mission to the U.N. created an internal task force
on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) to take a serious look at the
causes of and solutions to SEA in U.N. peacekeeping, a reflection of
our government-wide commitment to preventing SEA. The measures the task
force is reviewing include how best to support and/or put pressure on
the U.N. and its member states as appropriate. The task force is
examining how best to engage member states, both bilaterally and
through multilateral fora, on both better policy and practice.
The U.N. Secretary-General has expressed deep commitment to the
initiatives he championed regarding SEA, as seen outlined in his latest
reports involving SEA, including his own implementation report on the
recommendations of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace
Operations. Next, we expect that his February 2016 annual report on SEA
will provide country-specific information on those troop and police
contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) whose uniformed personnel face
credible allegations of SEA.
More broadly, the U.N. is in the process of implementing more than
40 proposals from the Secretary-General's February 2015 report. The
most significant measures include: establishing immediate response
teams in peacekeeping missions to gather and preserve evidence for use
in investigations; adopting a six-month timeline for completion of
investigations of SEA and calling on member states to adhere to the
same timeline; strengthening its complaint reception framework to
ensure mechanisms are in place within communities where people can come
forward, in confidence, to raise complaints regarding U.N. personnel;
strengthening administrative measures against civilian staff members
found to have committed SEA, including withholding entitlements;
suspending pay to TCCs/PCCs for personnel accused of SEA on the basis
of credible allegations; and, setting out the framework for a trust
fund to provide support and assistance to survivors and children born
as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers.
We will begin discussions on the issue of sexual misconduct with
the next Secretary-General from the beginning of his or her tenure, to
ensure that reforms set in motion by the current Secretary-General are
strengthened and institutionalized, and to urge the next Secretary-
General's continued engagement. We will continue to press at all
levels, in New York, in the field, and with troop and police
contributing countries on this serious issue.
Question. With respect to peacekeeping operations, generally
speaking, the U.N. Security Council authorizes the mission while the
U.N. Secretary General, through the office of peacekeeping operations,
runs the mission.
How actively involved is the U.N. Security Council in oversight of
the mission? How often does the Council travel to review a
mission's operations and progress, firsthand?
What are your thoughts on having the U.N. Security Council
establish, for each mission, its own ombudsman with full
authority to review and conduct oversight of the peacekeeping
mission and who would report directly to the Security Council
when mission mandates are renewed?
Answer. As the body responsible for authorizing U.N. peacekeeping
operations, the Security Council (UNSC) actively seeks and receives
through several different channels reporting, briefings, and other
information to oversee each mission's performance. Such information is
critically important in helping the UNSC to determine what each
mission's mandate should be, the size and composition of the force
needed, the duration of the mandate, as well as any other needed
changes or adjustments.
The UNSC makes trips, as needed and as possible, throughout the
year to peacekeeping missions and trouble spots. For example, during
2015, Security Council members visited Haiti, the Central African
Republic, and Burundi, as well as the headquarters of the African Union
in Addis Ababa. However, the UNSC's primary oversight is conducted in
New York. The formal channels for UNSC oversight include written
reports by the Secretary-General to the UNSC, which the Council
generally requests on a quarterly or semi-annual basis; regular oral
briefings to the UNSC by U.N. officials, as well as by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) responsible for a
particular peacekeeping mission; and consultations in the UNSC on
mandate renewal resolutions in which UNSC members discuss any changes
needed to a mission's mandate. Such changes may include updates to the
mandated tasks, associated increases or reductions in the number of
uniformed personnel, and modifications in the composition of the force.
The Council can also request additional assessments of missions when it
is considering reconfiguration, drawdown, or transition. The Council
often asks the Secretary-General to identify benchmarks for progress
and to incorporate an evaluation of the mission against those
benchmarks in his regular reports.
Council members also have access to a number of other oversight
materials produced by various U.N. mechanisms, such as the U.N.'s
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which provides oversight
for the larger U.N. system; its audits and evaluation reports are
available online. The Secretary-General also releases annual budget
performance reports on each peacekeeping operation.
The United States continues to press the U.N. for greater oversight
of its peacekeeping missions, particularly in the areas of financial
controls and conduct and discipline. We believe the conduct and
discipline units in missions must be stronger and better staffed. The
United States was instrumental in the creation of, and supports the
strengthening of, the Office of the Director for Peacekeeping Strategic
Partnership, which is intended to provide services akin to an inspector
general to identify gaps that affect the delivery of mandates by U.N.
peacekeeping missions and make recommendations on systemic issues
related to U.N. peacekeeping operations. We also believe that more
comprehensive reporting by the Secretary-General on performance would
improve the Council's ability to exercise its oversight
responsibilities. We have called for and support the U.N.'s evaluation
of the impact of specific mandated tasks, such as the U.N.'s current
revamping of its indicators to evaluate the impact of protection of
civilians tasks.
The idea of the UNSC directly appointing an ombudsperson for each
U.N. peacekeeping mission raises a number of issues that require
careful consideration, including:
Scope of Mandate: The Council would need to determine the issues
appropriately addressed by an ombudsperson to avoid conflicting
with the oversight responsibilities of the SRSG for the
management of his/her mission's personnel and resources or the
existing auditing, conduct and discipline, performance, and
evaluation mechanisms in the U.N. system, including those
mentioned above.
Relationship vis-a-vis the SRSG: Currently, the SRSG is responsible
for overseeing the overall effectiveness of the mission under
his or her charge. The appointment of an ombudsperson raises
the potential for conflicting signals between SRSGs and Force
Commanders and ombudspersons, which could be counterproductive
to the mission's performance if such dynamics undermine the
authority of the SRSG or the Force Commander to direct and
manage the mission or their strategies for achieving the
mission's mandate.
Selection Process and Funding Issues: The Council would need to
determine how it would select ombudspersons and their staffs,
if not through the Secretary-General. It would also have to
determine how to fund ombudspersons positions and staffs if the
positions were not established through the UNGA Fifth Committee
process. We would welcome further staff-level discussions on
this idea.
Question. Unfortunately, peacekeepers sometimes commit acts of
violence against the people they have been sent to protect. The
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (Article
VIII, Section 29) states that the U.N. "shall make provisions for
appropriate modes of settlement" with respect to disputes. This would
include claims by civilians hurt by the negligence or intentional acts
of U.N. personnel or those under their authority.
It is my understanding that since 1990, the United Nations has not
once created a standing claims commission despite 32 Status of
Forces Agreements providing for the creation of one in the
event of damages. If true, why has the U.N. not taken steps to
address this problem?
With respect to establishing such modes of settlement or claims
commissions, do you support the principle that the TCCs
responsible for misconduct should pay any damages for harm
caused by the officers and soldiers who serve under its flag?
Answer. It is also our understanding that the U.N. has generally
settled claims through local claims review boards, and that neither the
U.N. nor the host countries have created standing claims commissions
referenced in status of forces agreements (SOFAs) between the U.N. and
host countries. A local claims review board is an internal board
established within a U.N. Mission, responsible for settling third party
claims in country. A local claims review board can also refer a claim
to U.N. Headquarters for approval or disapproval if the settlement
amount exceeds the authorized limit of the board. Local claims review
boards have generally been effective in resolving instances of
negligence.
We support the idea that the U.N. should provide appropriate
victims' assistance related to misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers, and
understand that the U.N. is currently working on a policy to devise
such a system of assistance in the context of sexual exploitation and
abuse (SEA) cases.
Abuses and violations committed by peacekeepers are unacceptable,
undermine a peacekeeping mission's ability to carry out its mandate,
and damage a mission's relationship with the community.
Question. Does the U.N. system have in place protocols to disbar
contractors who have been found by a competent authority to be guilty
of negligence or intentional acts which have led to injuries or deaths
among a host country population? If not, should the U.N. establish such
a system of debarment?
Answer. Chapter 7 of the United Nations Procurement Manual provides
for suspension or removal from the U.N.'s Register of Vendors of any
vendor under formal investigation or sanctioned by a national authority
for engaging in proscribed practices that include, but are not limited
to, corruption, fraud, coercion, collusion, obstruction, and other
unethical practices.
Chapter 7 of the Procurement Manual also provides for suspension or
removal of a vendor for actions that create financial, operational,
reputational and other undue risks to the United Nations. Negligent or
intentional acts that were harmful to a host country population would
fall within the realm of proscribed activities for which a contractor
would be removed the U.N.'s list of eligible vendors.
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