[Senate Hearing 114-725]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-725
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE
PACIFIC AND INTERNATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 13, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
Rob Strayer, Majority Chief Counsel
Margaret Taylor, Minority Chief Counsel
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
--------
SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE
PACIFIC
AND INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY
CORY GARDNER, Colorado, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachussetts
MARCO RUBIO, Florida JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Gardner, Cory, U.S. Senator From Colorado........................ 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 2
Prepared statement...........................................
Blair, Admiral Dennis C., chairman and CEO, Sasdawa Peace
Foundation, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Washington,
DC............................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Campbell, Hon. Kurt M., chairman, Center for a New American
Society, former Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC...................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
(iii)
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and
International Cybersecurity Policy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Cory Gardner,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Gardner, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, and
Cardin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. This hearing will come to order. Let me
welcome you all to the seventh hearing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and
International Cyber Security Policy for the 114th Congress, and
our second hearing in 2016.
Thank you both for being here.
I want to thank Ranking Member Cardin, and, of course, for
his work on the full committee as well. It is a heavy schedule
that you are carrying, so thank you, and thanks for your
cooperation as we continue to look into these important issues
and the work we are doing together on this subcommittee. This
subcommittee has been very productive on a lot of great work
that we have been able to do together, so thank you, Senator
Cardin, for that.
We have a full slate this morning with a full committee
hearing on nominees to follow at 11:30. I hope everybody stays
for that. I know there is a lot of family here as well, so
thank you and welcome to the committee. So I will keep my
opening remarks short on the first half of this hearing.
Today's hearing at 10:30 discusses the issues concerning
the South China Sea and comes on the heels of a very important
ruling that could reshape the Asia-Pacific region and global
security in general.
Yesterday, an international tribunal issued an important
ruling in favor of our allies the Philippines and against the
People's Republic of China. The panel ruled that China breached
the sovereign rights of the Philippines with regard to the
maritime disputes between those two nations and invalidated
China's sovereignty claims over almost the entirety of the
South China Sea called the nine-dash line.
In the last several years, China has significantly upped
the ante and undertaken a massive effort to reclaim a number of
disputed features in the South China Sea and to militarize
these features. According to the Department of Defense, since
Chinese land reclamation efforts began in December 2013, China
has reclaimed more than 2,900 acres of land and has deployed
artillery, aircraft, runways, and buildings, and positioned
radars and other equipment.
While the United States is not directly a party to this
dispute and takes no position on the sovereignty claims among
the various claimants, this ruling is important to our national
security for several reasons.
First, the South China Sea is one of the most strategically
important commercial waterways in the world. Almost 30 percent
of the world's maritime trade transits the South China Sea
annually, including approximately $1.2 trillion in shipborne
trade and shipborne trade bound for the United States.
Second, the ruling reinforces the rights of our military to
operate freely in the region, utilizing our longstanding
international rights of innocent passage and transit on the
high seas, the rights long-established by international law.
Since October 2015, the United States Navy has conducted
three freedom of navigation operations in the area to assert
these very rights and to challenge China's groundless
sovereignty claims.
Last month, I attended the Shangri-La Dialogue, along with
a number of my colleagues, and we heard a tremendous amount of
concern from regional leaders not only about the South China
Sea, but also whether the United States can endure as a
regional and global leader.
There should be no mistake, the South China Sea and what
happens there is, thus, an important test of American
leadership and our ability to support our close allies in the
face of aggression that is outside of international norms.
So today we have two very highly distinguished former
officials, Admiral Blair and Dr. Campbell, to help us gauge the
latest developments in U.S. policy options following the
ruling.
With that, I would like to recognize the distinguished
ranking member for his comments, Senator Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Chairman Gardner. It is a
pleasure to work with you on this subcommittee. Your leadership
has been very much important for our national security and
raising the importance of the Asia-Pacific area to U.S.
interests. So I thank you. And, of course, the maritime
security issues are very much part of that.
I am going to abbreviate my statement and put it in for the
record.
But let me start by quoting from the Baltimore Sun
editorial this morning, because you raised a very good point,
and that is the ruling under the tribunal is not unexpected.
China's claims are hard to understand under the rule of law.
The United States, as you point out, takes no position in
regards to the legal claims, but we do take a strong position
against unilateral action and to use rule of law and diplomacy
to resolve these issues. And we will not only continue to
promote that policy, but we also have legal commitments with
other countries as they relate to those commitments, and we
also have our rights in regards to navigation on China seas.
So China has to make a decision. They have to make a
decision as to whether they are going to adhere to the rule of
law and be a world leader with great respect or whether they
are going to go their own course.
So the Baltimore Sun said this morning China's immediate
response was to double down on its stance, and officials have
been holding out the threat of military maneuvers for months.
In the long run, the country and the world would be better off
if China took this chance to show it can, indeed, be a good
global neighbor and leader.
And I could not agree more. Thirty years ago, we were
debating whether or not China would rise to be a major power.
Well, they are a major power. There is no question about that.
What kind of power are they going to be?
To me, this is their key test and key moment. Will China
help to support peace and stability in Asia? Will they seek to
overturn the order? Will China become a trade partner committed
to enforcing international law? Or will it see 19th century
behavior and the flouting of international norms? Will China
open up its conduct, allowing its people to express their
views? Or will they continue down a path of repression?
These are issues that I think are very much tied to how
they respond to the tribunal decision.
The last point I would make, Mr. Chairman, I was asked a
question this morning whether we are somewhat hypocritical in
criticizing China since we are not a member of the Law of the
Sea Treaty.
I think we should be a member of the Law of the Sea Treaty.
I think it would help the United States. We have had hearings
before this committee where it is lopsided with our generals
saying it is important to our national security. We have the
Arctic areas that are opening up more and more navigable
rights, and we are not at the table, the only Arctic country
not to be a party to the Law of the Sea. We disadvantage
American businesses who need the mineral rights on the seabeds.
We should be a member. But America stands for the rule of
law, and we will continue to stand up for the rule of law, and
we will continue to pursue our claims under the rule of law.
And we have an obligation to point out that China must adhere
to the rule of law, if it is going to have credibility
internationally on these issues.
[Senator Cardin's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today's timely hearing to
discuss US policy options in the South China Sea. And I thank our
witnesses, Dr. Campbell and Admiral Blair, for joining us today to
share their wisdom, insight and perspective. We could not ask for two
better witnesses to help us think through these issues, both the
immediate tactical questions and considerations and the broader
strategic landscape.
Yesterday, as you know the long-awaited ruling by the arbitral
tribunal in the case of The Republic of Philippines v. The People's
Republic of China was delivered. I believe that this ruling--and how
the regional and international community reacts--represents a watershed
moment for the region and the world, reinforcing efforts to build a
rules-based order and the sort of regional architecture that supports
stability and prosperity in the region and the world.
As I said yesterday, the ruling is binding on both parties
involved. And it is my hope that they will abide by the ruling. The
choices of the Philippines, China and other members of the regional
community with regards to the ruling will in large measure determine
whether or not the Asia-Pacific region is to be guided by international
law, institutions, and norms.
I believe the ruling is a good precedent for other South China Sea
claimants to seek resolution of maritime disputes through peaceful
means, whether through diplomatic processes among the parties or
through third-party mechanisms such as arbitration.
Although the United States is not a claimant in the South China Sea
and takes no position on competing maritime and territorial claims, we
do have a position on how the claims are adjudicated, and how questions
related to the different features--reefs, rocks, shoals and islands--
are classified under international law. We must continue to be clear
and consistent in our policy to oppose unilateral actions by any
claimant seeking to change the status quo through the use of coercion,
intimidation, or military force, engaging in land reclamation
activities on disputed features in the South China Sea, or the
militarization of any reclaimed features.
In keeping with the international law of the sea as reflected in
the Law of the Sea Convention, we expect that the United States
military will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international
law allows, both in the South China Sea and elsewhere around the world.
The ruling also underscores the need for the Senate to take action
to ratify the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. As we seek to work
with our partners in the region to construct a twenty-first century
architecture for the governance of Asia's maritime domains consistent
with international law, the United States cannot, and should not, risk
marginalization by remaining on the outside of this critically
important global agreement.
This is particularly important as we consider not just the
immediate issues surrounding the arbitral ruling, but also the broader
strategic issues at play with the ``rise of China.'' Thirty years ago
we were debating whether or not China would rise to be a major power.
That debate is now settled. But the question of what sort of power
China will be remains uncertain.
Will China help to support peace and stability in Asia? Or seek to
overturn the order? Will China become a trade partner committed to the
enforcement of international law? Or will we see 19th century
mercantilist behavior and the flouting of international norms? Will
China open space for its citizens to express their own views and ideas?
Or will it continue to brutally repress its own people?
We may not yet know all the answers to the question of what sort of
China is emerging as a major power on the international stage. But we
are starting to receive some answers to some of these questions--
including, now, how China will react to the tribunal ruling.
Despite its negative rhetoric rejecting the arbitral process over
the past several months, with a ruling now made, will China respect its
terms? Or will it ignore it, or worse, seek to undermine it, posing a
serious challenge to the idea of international law, norms, and
institutions in the Asia-Pacific? Will China seek to work with ASEAN on
maritime security issues and build regional architecture, or will it
seek to ``break'' ASEAN, and take-down the structures and institutions
that are vital to regional peace and stability.
Quite frankly, I am more than a little concerned by what we have
seen thus far. China has thus far stated, repeatedly and vociferously,
that it will disregard the tribunal ruling. And, in its regional
diplomacy, it has sought to bend and break the functioning of ASEAN.
In doing so it has elevated this case into a test for the regional
and international community: If the arbitral ruling is disregarded and
not upheld by China or the states of the region, if the Law of the Sea
is tossed onto the trash-heap, and if China breaks the functioning of
one of the world's most successful regional organizations--an
organization whose very existence correlates with the end of
interregional war in Southeast Asia--it will be a grave blow to the
international system and the regional order.
China's provocative actions in the South China Sea, in particular,
its aggressive island-building campaign and the tacit militarization of
these features threaten not just regional stability but also long-
standing U.S. interests in the free-flow of commerce, freedom of
navigation--and in the peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputes
consistent with international law.
More than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage and a
third of all global maritime traffic passes through these chokepoints.
The oil transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean
and through the South China Sea is triple the amount that passes
through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that transits the
Panama Canal.
Given our profound national security interests in the free flow of
commerce and freedom of navigation, we have a deep and abiding interest
in how claims are dealt with, and how international law applies to high
tide and low tide elevations and the territorial and economic claims
that flow from how these features are defined.
Earlier this year, Senator Gardner and I introduced the Asia-
Pacific Maritime Security Initiative Act of 2016, which builds on the
Administration's Maritime Security Initiative and provides the
Department of State and Defense with the strategic context and
resources they need to take clear and concrete measures to support a
rules-based order for the Asia-Pacific region.
So I look forward to today's testimony, and to having the
opportunity to discuss with our witnesses their views on China's
broader strategic orientation, as well as more specific and concrete
questions relating to US policy options as we think through the issues
at play with maritime security in the South China Sea.
Thank you.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Cardin. For the
information of the witnesses and the attendees here today,
there is a vote scheduled for 11 o'clock. We will continue the
hearing during the vote. We will just have people go back and
forth to the vote and take over the hearing.
I would kindly ask the witnesses to keep their remarks to 5
minutes. Your full statements will be entered into the record.
Our first witness is Admiral Dennis Blair, who currently
serves as chairman of the board and CEO of the Sasakawa Peace
Foundation USA. During his distinguished 34-year Navy career,
Admiral Blair served on guided missile destroyers in both the
Atlantic and Pacific fleets, and commanded the Kitty Hawk
battle group.
From 1999 to his retirement from the Navy in 2002, Admiral
Blair served as Commander in Chief to the U.S. Pacific Command,
the largest of the combatant commands. As Director of National
Intelligence from January 2009 to May 2010, Admiral Blair led
16 national intelligence agencies, managed a budget of $58
billion, and provided integrated intelligence support to the
President, Congress, and operations in the field.
Welcome, Admiral Blair. Thank you for your service to our
Nation, and we look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS C. BLAIR, CHAIRMAN AND CEO,
SASAKAWA PEACE FOUNDATION USA, FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC
COMMAND, WASHINGTON, DC.
Admiral Blair. Thank you very much. It is good to be here,
and it is good to turn on my talk button.
Let me use my short oral remarks to describe the
fundamental components of a successful American policy in the
South China Sea, one that combines our diplomacy, our military
activities, and our relations with the other countries in the
region.
What we see playing out now in East Asia is China's third
attempt to expand its eastern and its maritime border.
The first attempt, which has gone on for decades, has been
to add Taiwan to its territory. This attempt has included some
Chinese tactics that are now familiar to us: unyielding
rhetoric; cartography, Taiwan is always shown as part of China
on Chinese maps; international diplomatic competition. China
goes around to other countries in the world to try to sign them
up to recognize its claim and to reject Taiwan.
The second attempt was the Senkaku Islands. Again, China
used a variety of means to advance its claim and extend its
maritime border: the use of its fishing fleet and its coast
guard vessels, rather than its military and naval vessels; the
use of offshore drilling rigs in disputed waters; punitive
economic measures--cutting off the supply of rare earth metals
to Japan.
Chinese activities in recent years in the South China Sea
represent the third attempt of China to extend its maritime
borders, and they evolve a full array of past tactics, and it
adds some new ones: naval blockades of vessels of other
countries around disputed islands, land reclamation, the
installation of logistics facilities that are potential
military facilities.
So what is going on in the South China Sea today is not new
in concept for China or the region, but the geography, the
number, the military inferiority of other claimants, and
American history in the region make it all different and
require a tailored policy from the United States. We need to
fashion a response to Chinese aggression that supports our
basic interests and is tailored to the circumstances.
What has worked in the past to restrain Chinese aggression
on its maritime border has been patient diplomacy along with
the establishment of military deterrence.
The Taiwan Relations Act provided a good blueprint for
American actions on that first attempt by China to absorb
Taiwan. It called for a buildup of Taiwan's own defense
capability through assistance, American development of, and the
demonstration of the ability to support Taiwan if called on;
persistent diplomacy with China to emphasize other areas of
relations and to make them understand the high cost of
aggression in Taiwan.
For the Senkakus, the same pattern has proved successful:
cooperation with a strong ally, Japan; Japanese development of
its own military capabilities to defend its interests; American
declarations of support to Japan; persistent diplomacy by both
Japan and the United States to keep overall relations with
China as positive as possible, while emphasizing our interests.
The South China Sea has similarities to these two earlier
cases, but also important differences. The area is larger,
there are more conflicting claimants, and they are much weaker
than China. However, American policy should mix the same
ingredients of diplomatic patience, support for allies and
partners, and direct military protection of our own interests
that has contributed successfully to stabilizing the other two
regions.
Now, until about a year ago, our policy was wandering. We
chanted that we took no position on the territorial disputes
themselves. We made few military deployments to the region. And
we simply urged restraint on all parties. This feckless set of
policies did nothing but encourage China to try to expand its
influence.
But even without a clear U.S. policy, China's aggressive
moves were not very successful. Although China was expanding
the capability of the islands it occupied in the region, they
added very little to its military capability in the event of
serious conflict. They had the effect of stoking suspicion and
distrust of China, and sent these countries to the United
States, Japan, and other more powerful countries for support.
These countries offered the United States access to their bases
and ports. None of these countries made any territorial
concessions to China.
Within the past year or so, we are seeing the emergence of
a more robust American policy along the lines of what we have
seen work previously. We made it clear that there are vital
U.S. interests at stake, namely our ability to operate air and
naval forces freely in the region.
We have peacefully deployed significant military forces
there. We have started to provide support to other claimants in
the region, the Philippines and Vietnam.
The policy component that is lacking is the establishment
of our bottom line. That is, we have not made it clear where we
stand on any of the territorial claims of China and the other
parties. Until we do, it will be difficult to relate our
military deployments to our overall foreign policy and
diplomatic objectives.
I believe that the issue on which we can clearly draw a
bottom line would be at Scarborough Shoal, where we should make
it clear that the U.S. will support the Philippines to oppose
Chinese aggression, if necessary, by military force.
The decision yesterday of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration has provided a clear legal foundation for the
United States to take a position.
I would also add, echoing Senator Cardin, that the decision
makes it very clear that the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea is very much in the American interests, and I hope that
this committee can move it forward again.
Our objective is not to pick a fight with China, not to
contain it, but simply to set credible limits to Chinese
military coercion, to encourage it to pursue its objectives by
peaceful means. No matter what decisions are made, China will
remain powerful in the region.
Peace in East Asia has been a tremendous benefit both to
the United States and to countries there, including China, and
it will take smart and persistent American policies to maintain
it.
Thank you.
[Admiral Blair's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dennis C. Blair
Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
1. history of america's involvement in the region.
For much of its history, the U.S. armed forces have operated
actively and freely in the South China Sea, as well as other areas in
East Asia. Sometimes the actions have been independent and sometimes
with friends and allies. The United States deployed its naval power
into the South China Sea to defeat the Spanish fleet at Manila in 1898
and liberate the Philippines from Spain; later that year American
maritime forces captured Guam. During World War II, the United States
Navy operated throughout the Pacific Ocean, including the South China
Sea, to defeat Imperial Japan through a combination of economic warfare
against Japanese supplies and recapture of the territory that Japan had
occupied in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States Navy operated
throughout the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea and
the Sea of Japan during the 1950s Taiwan crises and the Korean War. In
the 1960s and 1970s American armed forces operated freely sometime in
conjunction with allies, throughout the South China Sea during the
Vietnam War. Since the end of that war in 1975, U.S. forces have
operated freely and routinely throughout the region in support of
treaty and partnership commitments and American interests, responding
to crises such as the end of the Marcos regime in the Philippines in
1986, in the Yellow Sea in 1994 and 2010, and around Taiwan in 1996.
There have been numerous U.S. and allied military and civil deployments
during this period in support of humanitarian objectives, from the
evacuation of South Vietnamese refugees in 1975 through the response to
the tsunami that devastated Aceh, Indonesia, in 2004, to the relief
operations in the Philippines for super-typhoon Haiyan in 2013.
2. traditional american interests and objectives.
For more than one hundred years, the basic historical American
objective in the Southeast Asia region has been to balance the
influence of destabilizing countries and ideologies so that states in
the region can develop independently and maintain good economic and
political relations with the United States. Thus, the United States
opposed attempts at regional aggression, both political and military,
by Germany (1898-1919), Japan (1941-45), the Soviet Union (1963-75)
and, more recently, China. Freedom of mobility and maneuver in oceans
and international airspace has always been a core interest of the
United States. The U.S. Congress authorized the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution in 1964 after U.S. warships were attacked on the high seas,
and President Ford ordered U.S. Marines to free U.S. mariners on board
SS Mayaguez in 1975, which was seized by Cambodia.
3. current american interests and objectives.
a. In addition to the traditional American policy of balancing the
influence of destabilizing countries and opposing attempts at regional
aggression, the United States maintains the following specific
interests in the South China Sea and in surrounding areas:
i. Defense treaty and legislative commitments with the
Philippines, Thailand, Australia, Republic of Korea, and Japan.
Legislation, the Taiwan Relations Act, mandates U.S. provision
of ``defense articles and services'' in response to aggression
against Taiwan.
ii. ``Strategic Partnership'' agreements with ASEAN,
Singapore, India, and Vietnam.
iii. A core interest in freedom of navigation and the
maintenance of naval mobility and maneuverability and access in
the all of the world's oceans, including the South China Sea.
Freedom of navigation is principally a naval and military
right, and includes innocent passage of warships in the
territorial sea, and the right of military aircraft and ships
to conduct archipelagic sea lanes passage through the
archipelagic states of Indonesia and the Philippines, transit
passage through straits used for international navigation, and
to exercise high seas freedoms and overflight throughout the
EEZ under article 58(2) and 87 of UNCLOS. Freedom of navigation
and naval and military access is the basis for American
continuous and transparent military exercises and other routine
activities in support of its own interests and its alliance and
partnership commitments, and for responses to crises in the
region that affect its interests. When American ships and
aircraft operate in the vicinity of those of other nations,
they observe, and expect others to observe, the Collision
Regulations and customary international law, which apply to
state vessels and civil shipping, and the Chicago Convention on
Civil Aviation and customary international law, which exempt
military aircraft from foreign jurisdiction and provide the
only mechanism for the lawful management of civil aircraft.
b. The United States supports all mechanisms for peaceful dispute
settlement in East Asia, including disputes involving the Korean
Peninsula, Taiwan, Japanese island and maritime claims and the South
China Sea. The United States welcomed the 2002 Declaration of Conduct
and the pledges that all ASEAN countries and China will negotiate all
disputes in good faith, and to refrain from actions that would make
negotiation more difficult. The United States favors all peaceful means
of dispute resolution, including bilateral and multilateral
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication (litigation). The
compulsory dispute resolution process in UNCLOS is an ideal mechanism
for resolving maritime disputes, especially after bilateral
negotiations have failed. The United States opposes military aggression
or coercion as a means to settle sovereignty or maritime disputes. When
disputes have involved allies (ROK, Japan), or former allies (Taiwan)
the U.S. has made military commitments to deter aggression. To this
point, the United States has not invoked its treaty or partnership
commitments to make military commitments in support of specific
territorial positions in the South China Sea.
4. america's vision for the south china sea.
a. The United States supports strong, free, sovereign, independent,
and prosperous states in the region of the South China Sea, free of
coercion from powerful states.
b. The United States supports the peaceful resolution of disputes
and insists that all states, large and small, comply with their
obligations under international law. Compliance with international law
is a foundation for the peaceful, stable, and prosperous international
system that benefits all states in Asia.
c. International law reflects universal values, and the same rule
of law applies to every country similarly situated. The ``rule of law''
means that law must be followed by the strong as well as the weak.
d. The United States supports settlement of territorial disputes
based upon adherence to the rule of law and application of accepted
principles of international law and based upon transparent, documented
and accepted historical facts. In areas with genuinely overlapping
claims of equal strength and validity, the United States encourages
joint development of resources, such as in the Vietnam-China zone in
the Gulf of Tonkin.
5. china's claims and activities in the south china sea
For the past twenty years, China has steadily built up its air and
maritime military forces in the vicinity of the South China Sea. It has
consolidated its civil maritime forces into the State Ocean
Administration, and has organized its fishing fleet in the South China
Sea to act as a ``maritime militia,'' an auxiliary of its government
maritime forces. It has claimed that virtually the entire South China
Sea belongs to China, although it has not specified exactly what that
claim entails. It has established an administrative governing body for
the entire South China sea, issuing regulations that China claims
governs the action of all states. China has sent an oil rig from a
state-owned oil company to drill in waters claimed by Vietnam, it has
virtually blockaded two islands claimed by the Philippines, and it has
attempted to enforce its own fishing regulations in the Natuna Sea,
well within Indonesia's EEZ. It has in the past several years
undertaken major improvements of seven islands it had previously
occupied, greatly enlarging them, and building runways, harbors and
logistic facilities.
6. china's diplomacy in the south china sea
a. As it steadily built up its power and capability in the South
China Sea, China's diplomatic approaches have alternated between
moderate and reasonable contentions--publicly it favors peaceful
negotiated solutions of differences with the other claimant states,
however then issues truculent threats that it will make no concessions
to the claims of others, and will use its power to enforce its claims.
Under President Xi, its diplomacy has been relatively harsh and
unyielding.
b. China's hard line and aggressive action have been completely
unsuccessful in gaining concessions from rival claimants in the South
China Sea. On the contrary, the other claimants have all reached out to
other countries for support, primarily to the United States. China has
paid a heavy price for its aggressive activities in the hostility of
the other claimant states and the strengthened American position in the
region for the relatively minor gains it has made in island enlargement
and naval coercion. Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia have all
welcomed American military exercises using their bases. They have also
strengthened their own military and maritime law enforcement
organizations, although none of them is a match for China's, and they
have been partially successful in forming a unified front against China
in ASEAN.
7. effectiveness of american activities and policies in the south china
sea.
a. The United States has taken advantage of China's heavy-handed
and aggressive actions in the South China Sea to strengthen its
bilateral relations, including its defense cooperation, with the other
claimant countries. It is cooperating closely with the Philippines in
maritime exercises, it has removed its prior prohibitions on the sales
of lethal military equipment to Vietnam, and it routinely deploys
surveillance aircraft to Malaysian bases. Both the United States and
Japan are pursuing assistance programs to the air and maritime forces
of the other claimant countries. China believes that the United States
is orchestrating a sophisticated South China Sea strategy using China's
rival claimants to constrain China's growing power in the region.
b. The United States has not prevented Chinese enlargement of seven
of the Spratly islands it occupies, and has not disrupted the Chinese
blockade of Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals. However, it has used
military deployments to violate Chinese territorial sea and EEZ claims,
and it has demonstrated decisively that it will not be deterred from
exercising full freedom of maneuver for its military forces under its
interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
8. potential improvements in american activities and policies.
a. The primary weakness in the American strategy in the South China
Sea is that it takes no position on the conflicting claims, while
urging restraint and negotiation on all parties. Its military maneuvers
in the region accomplish the purpose of maintaining the U.S. position
that it will operate its military forces throughout the South China
Sea. They provide no restraint on Chinese aggression against the claims
of other countries, even when the Chinese claims are extremely weak.
For the sake of time, I'll truncate my testimony and just read through
a list of Chinese claims that are inconsistent with UN articles and
UNCLOS; however I am happy to go into further detail about why these
claims are unlawful during questioning:
i. The unlawful invasion of the Paracel Islands in 1974,
which was a violation of the proscription against ``armed
attack'' against Vietnam, under article 2(4) of the Charter of
the United Nations.
ii. Straight baselines along the coast of mainland China and
in the Paracel Islands. The straight baselines along the
Chinese coast are unlawful because they do not connect a
coastline that is deeply indented and cut into or a fringe of
island, that follows the general direction of the coast. The
straight baseline system in the Paracel Islands is unlawful
because China is not an archipelagic state and may not use
straight baselines to connect mid-ocean island groups
(analogous to the United States using straight baselines around
its mid-Pacific territories and the Hawaiian Islands). These
claims violate the rules on straight baselines in UNCLOS
articles 7, 13, and 47.
iii. Claims to historic waters that do not comport with the
three-part test in international law as restated by the United
Nations in 1962: (1) exercise of authority over the waters; (2)
continuity of the exercise of authority; and (3) acquiescence
or acceptance by neighboring states. China's ``nine-dash line''
claim does not pass this three-part test. Sovereignty over land
features may be claimed under international law only in five
circumstances: (1) accretion, that is a build-up through
natural geologic processes, such as a volcanic eruption, (2)
cession, or voluntary transfer via treaty, (3) conquest, but
only before adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, (4) occupation
of terra nullius, that is not mere inchoate discovery, but
actual occupation, and (5) prescriptive exercise of authority
that is public, peaceful and extending over a long period of
time. The burden of proof is on the claimant state to present
facts and law in support of the claim.
iv. China's apparent claim of a territorial sea and other
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the vicinity of its newly
constructed artificial islands, in violation of article 60. All
maritime claims derive from land territory: ``the land
dominates the sea.'' In accordance with UNCLOS and customary
international law, coastal state sovereignty over oceans is
limited to a 12-mile territorial sea, typically measured from
normal baselines running along the low water mark of the coast
of a rock, island or mainland. The United States rejects
conditions on innocent passage in the territorial sea in
violation of articles 19 and 21 of UNCLOS.
v. Sovereignty claims within its EEZ. No state may claim
sovereignty over oceans or airspace beyond 12 miles of
territory. The coastal State enjoys certain specified, limited
and enumerated sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ
under Part V of UNCLOS, including exclusive rights to exploit
and develop natural resources, require consent for civilian
marine scientific research, and for offshore and seabed
installations related to those purposes. China illegally denies
high seas freedoms and other internationally lawful uses of the
sea associated with the operation of ships and aircraft in its
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in violation of articles 58(2)
and 87. Coastal States may not claim any right to regulate the
airspace above the EEZ, or the operation of warships, military
activities, or military aircraft in the EEZ. China has hampered
other states from enjoyment of the exclusive right and
jurisdiction in their own EEZs in violation of UNCLOS article
56.
vi. Chinese claims to the continental shelf of Japan in the
East China Sea and Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea
in violation of its duties under article 83. Overlapping EEZ
and continental shelf claims shall be resolved by beginning
from an equidistant line between the two states and then making
equitable adjustments based upon the length of contiguity of
the opposing coastlines.
vii. Chinese disruption of the laying of foreign submarine
cables and pipelines in its EEZ, in violation of articles 112
and 113 of UNCLOS and other legally binding instruments
relating to submarine cables on the continental shelf.
b. The United States needs to decide which claims in the South
China Sea it recognizes and which it does not, so that it can use its
superior military force to set limits on Chinese aggression, as it has
done in Taiwan, and in the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. It
would be ideal if there were a multilateral adjudication of the
conflicting claims in the South China Sea, since there are many
disputed claims beyond China's. Such a multilateral adjudication should
ideally be undertaken by the claimant countries themselves, with or
without China's participation. However, even without such a
comprehensive settlement, the United States should oppose some of
China's most extreme claims, if necessary, by the use of military
force. One of those extreme claims is Scarborough Shoal. China has no
claim to this feature except for its bogus Nine-Dash Line map; it is
much closer to the Philippines than to China; the United States used it
for a bombing range for many years, and even paid the Philippines for
its use. The United States should support Philippine opposition to
further Chinese aggression against Scarborough Shoal using military
force if necessary.
c. The objective of American military opposition to China's
aggressive actions in the South China Sea is not to contain China, but
to encourage China to settle its claims with its neighbors in an
equitable manner, rather than seeking always to expand its own local
power through its superior local military and law enforcement forces.
No matter which country owns which islands, China will be the greatest
local power in the region, and will be able to operate its military
forces freely throughout the region. However, it is in the American
interest for China to negotiate a peaceful settlement of its
conflicting claims with its neighbors and to observe that settlement.
9. effect of the 12 july decisions of the permanent court of
arbitration.
The decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on July 12 was a
significant defeat for China. The Court asserted its jurisdiction in
the matters it decided, reminded China that as a party to UNCLOS, it
was bound by the decision, and completely rejected the Nine-Dash line
as a basis for Chinese claims to any waters of the South China Sea.
While carefully avoiding opinions on sovereignty disputes about the
ownership of the features in the Spratly Islands, the Court made it
clear that the Philippines has jurisdiction over the marine and seabed
resources of most of the Spratly Islands. The decision declared illegal
China's actions to interfere with the fishing activities of the
Philippines and other countries, its failure to prevent harmful fishing
by its own fleet, its interference with Philippine exploration of
hydrocarbon deposits, and the environmental damage done by the dredging
around the islands it expanded.
Most important will be China's considered reaction to the decisions
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. As a party to UNCLOS, China has
no right to reject a ruling of the court. Should it do so, it will call
into question China's adherence to any of the international treaties it
has ratified. China will find it much more difficult to gain the trust
of both its neighbors and other more distant countries with which it
deals.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Admiral Blair.
Our second witness is the Honorable Kurt Campbell, who
currently serves as chairman of the board for the Center for a
New American Security. From 2009 to 2013, he served as the
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, where he played a key role in developing this
administration's pivot to Asia, or rebalance strategy.
Dr. Campbell also briefly served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific, and as director
on the National Security Council staff. In 2013, Secretary
Hillary Clinton awarded him the Secretary of State's
Distinguished Service Award, the Nation's highest diplomatic
honor.
Dr. Campbell also served as an officer in the U.S. Navy
Reserves, serving on surface ships, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Advisory Unit.
Welcome, Dr. Campbell, and thank you very much for being
here. We look forward to your testimony today.
STATEMENT OF HON. KURT M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN, CENTER FOR A NEW
AMERICAN SECURITY, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU
OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, DC.
Dr. Campbell. Thank you very much. I would ask that my full
testimony be submitted for the record, as you indicated.
Senator Gardner. Without objection.
Dr. Campbell. I also want to thank your excellent staff,
who I think provide an enormous service to you and the Nation.
I will say, just before we get started, if you will allow
me, Senator Gardner, I actually think the most important thing
in this hearing has already happened. And I just do not think
people realize how much we appreciate the graciousness and
respect with which you and Senator Cardin have interacted. It
sends an enormous message of good will that is appreciated in a
very divisive, difficult time.
So I want to personally thank you for how you have run the
committee. And I also want to thank you for coming out to
Shangri-La and making clear American strategic commitment in
the Asia-Pacific region.
I also want to thank Admiral Blair, if I can, for his
service and the opportunity to serve with him when he was
serving on Hawaii. He taught me something very important. Once
we were talking about something, and he turned to me and said,
Kurt, sometimes it is better to ask forgiveness than
permission. So it is something to keep in mind as we struggle
bureaucratically occasionally.
So, again, thank you very much for this opportunity. Very
quickly, I will just make a couple quick points, because I know
you are going to want to get to questions and answers.
About the ruling itself, I think some elements of it were
expected. But to be honest, it is much more resounding. It is
much more decisive than I think any of us anticipated. Its
unanimous quality, its very clear statement, about how to think
about the South China Sea really invalidates virtually every
aspect of Chinese claims around the nine-dash or previously the
11-dash line.
So I think I agree very much with what has been said in
terms of this is an important statement of international law. I
would also underscore not only have there been good statements
from the United States, but many of our allies in other
countries have chimed in to support this effort. I would draw
your attention particularly to what the Australians have said
most recently, in addition to other countries in Northeast
Asia.
I think this sends a very clear signal of warning and care
to Chinese interlocutors as they contemplate next steps.
I also just want to say, a lot of people say, well, how can
you trace American strategic purpose in the world? Are there
any constants? I would simply say to you, if you look at the
issue of preservation of maritime commerce, freedom of the
seas, freedom of navigation, the first use of American power
abroad was in the Barbary pirates of the 17th century. You can
draw a line from there to here of essentially what is going on
in the South China Sea.
There are others that would suggest, and I think Admiral
Blair and you all, Senator Gardner and Senator Cardin, very
forcefully made clear that this is not some distant backwater.
This is a very important strategic waterway, in many respects
more important than the Gulf of Hormuz, because it involves not
only the transshipment of energy resources but also most of the
manufacturing goods that are moving across Asia more generally.
So in fact, no country has a greater interest in the peace
and stability of that arena than China, in addition to the
United States.
This ruling in many respects is about a fundamental
struggle that is ongoing in the Asia-Pacific region right now
in which we play a key part. What the United States and other
countries have done has created an operating system in Asia,
right? And that operating system is composed of many facets:
freedom of navigation, trade, peaceful resolution of disputes.
It has benefited all the countries in the region, and it
has led to the most dramatic period of economic growth in our
history. That is a 21st century system that we seek to adapt
and develop over time. It has been very good for every country,
including China.
Now what we have seen in China of late are some tendencies
to want to go back to really a 19th century spheres of
influence approach in which they demark arenas and areas as no-
go areas or belonging to them, as Admiral Blair has indicated.
That is profoundly not in our interests and, I believe,
fundamentally, are actually not in China's interests over the
long term because it will undermine the very system that has
led to enormous prosperity and peace.
So I just want to conclude by saying, when people ask,
well, show us evidence of success, I think what we are
experiencing, this multifaceted effort, which is bipartisan in
quality, Republicans and Democrats, the administration and
others, underscored at the Shangri-La Dialogue, have seen many
elements that are coming into play. First, very strong
statements of American purpose, that it is in the national
interest to sustain freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution
of disputes; making clear that these issues are raised and
discussed in an arena with allies and friends; making sure
allies speak out independently; also taking steps to build more
partnerships with countries in the region that are threatened
by these steps, what we are doing in Vietnam and the
Philippines is very important; and to make sure that our
attention does not wane.
We have difficulties here in the United States. I will tell
you, gentlemen, that the issue that worries Asians the most
right now is not what is going on in China but what is going on
in Washington. They are most concerned about the conduct of our
election and whether we are going to sustain our commitment to
our allies, our defense, and trade going forward. That is going
to be critical for us as we proceed into the 21st century.
Thank you very much. I will stop there, Senator.
[Dr. Campbell's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kurt M. Campbell,
Senator Gardner, Senator Cardin, it is an honor to testify today
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, East Asia
Subcommittee, on the recent developments in and future U.S. policy for
the South China Sea. I commend your leadership on U.S. national
security priorities in Asia and welcome the opportunity to discuss the
way forward. Yesterday was a historic day, with the Permanent Court of
Arbitration issuing an expansive and much-anticipated ruling in the
Philippines vs. China case. The long-awaited ruling is a triumph for
the rule of law as a tool of peaceful dispute management in this vital
waterway. But it also lays bare the need for the United States to
remain deeply engaged in the South China Sea, drawing upon all
instruments of national power if the South China Sea is to remain a
peaceful and prosperous part of the global commons. These disputes are
not simply sovereignty standoffs over uninhabited territories; they
raise fundamental questions about the nature of the rules-based
international order in Asia in the 21st century. The United States and
its partners must answer those questions with determination and clarity
if they seek to preserve that order and U.S. leadership in Asia in the
years and decades to come.
u.s. interests and china's strategy
The United States has several clear national interests in the South
China Sea. The first is commerce and freedom of the seas. Five trillion
dollars worth of trade passes through the South China Sea annually,
with a quarter of this bound for the United States. The same shipping
routes are also the economic lifelines for regional partners who are
dependent on the South China Sea for trade and energy. Inextricable
from this is the U.S. interest in freedom of the seas. In the early
days of the republic, the U.S. Navy was created to protect American
commercial interests abroad, and the principle of freedom of the seas
has been a closely held national interest ever since. Freedom of the
seas comprises all those freedoms that are guaranteed by international
law, including, but not limited to freedom of navigation and freedom of
overflight. American economic security depends on the ability of all
nations to use the global commons freely.
Second, the United States has an abiding national interest in the
security of its treaty allies. The Philippines, which sits on the front
lines of the South China Sea disputes and has longstanding claims there
is the most directly involved. But so too are the direct interests of
treaty allies, including Japan, Australia, and South Korea. As part of
the Pivot to Asia, the United States has also strengthened its ties
with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, all of which have abiding
interests in the South China Sea. And we remain committed to the
security of Taiwan, which is also a claimant. If the United States is
to assure its allies of its security guarantees, it must be deeply
engaged in the quickly evolving dynamics in the South China Sea.
Third, the United States has long maintained an interest in
preserving peace and stability in East Asia. This has been a guiding
principle of U.S. strategy for decades, as it is essential to securing
its other interests. China's recent maritime assertiveness is of
particular concern for this reason. Like many other South China Sea
claimants, Beijing's sovereignty claims are not new. But as a result of
its rapid rise, China has gained the ability to press those claims and
has been doing so in an aggressive manner. From its land reclamation
and installation of military facilities in the South China Sea, to its
pressure on Japan's administration of the Senkaku Islands in the East
China Sea, China appears to be quickly expanding its reach in the
waters close to its shores. Particularly worrisome is the fact that
China has attempted to impose so-called ``military alert zones,'' which
seek to hive off international waters and airspace around its
artificial islands, despite the fact that these territories are not so
entitled under international law. Many speculate that Beijing wants to
be able to maneuver unimpeded inside the First Island Chain and beyond,
and to limit the ability of others to do the same. If true, there is
little question that these objectives are dangerous and destabilizing
for the United States and all trading nations.
Now, the United States and China can and must cooperate in areas of
mutual interest, such as on climate change and the Iran nuclear deal,
but the developments of the last few years are concerning, and pose
challenges to the United States' longstanding regional priorities.
China's actions pose a unique challenge because the United States does
not have sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, yet has an abiding
interest in it remaining a peaceful part of the global commons.
Further, China's activities raise real questions about whether or not
Beijing intends to play by the rules of the global order--the very
order that has helped to facilitate its rise.
current lines of effort in the south china sea
U.S. policy in the South China Sea rightly recognizes that we must
work closely with regional partners if we are to succeed in our
objectives of preserving the rules-based order. As part of its Pivot or
Rebalance to Asia, the Obama Administration has pursued a whole-of-
government approach to the South China Sea. The administration has
transformed its partnerships, beginning with its relationship with
ASEAN, engaging more broadly and deeply with the organization than ever
before. Those efforts are bearing fruit: In their February joint
statement with President Obama at Sunnylands, ASEAN leaders expressed
their support for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and use of
international law to resolve disputes. They have also raised concerns
about challenges to freedom of navigation and overflight in the region.
These statements will not halt China's maritime assertiveness, but they
represent considerable progress for the consensus-based ASEAN, and
demonstrate that China is beginning to pay some regional reputational
costs for its actions. As the tribunal decision has approached,
however, China has sought to scuttle ASEAN consensus in support of the
ruling, which serves as a reminder that we must remain closely and
constantly engaged.
The United States has also invested in its bilateral relationships
with South China Sea states, forming new partnerships with Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Vietnam, and most recently announcing an end to the
Vietnam arms embargo. It has also overhauled its longstanding alliance
with the Philippines and is finally able to press ahead with the
implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which
will give the United States rotational base access to several military
sites that abut the South China Sea. The administration has encouraged
U.S. partners to build ties among themselves in hopes of realizing a
more networked regional security architecture. Japan is working more
closely with the Philippines and Vietnam; Vietnam and the Philippines
are forging ties among themselves; Australia and South Korea have both
been engaged in partner capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia.
This serves as a reminder that America's partnerships are among its
greatest assets, and that these relationships should continue to serve
as force multipliers in this critical waterway.
Recognizing the value of these partnerships, the Pentagon has begun
to implement the Maritime Security Initiative, with the important
support of this committee. This partner capacity building program seeks
to help states improve their maritime domain awareness capabilities so
that they can monitor their waters more effectively and share
information with other actors. This program is laudable because it not
only gives much-needed maritime aid, but because it encourages
recipients to network those capabilities. In so doing it seeks to
enable and empower regional partners to contribute to regional
stability.
As China has increased its island building activities, however, the
administration has also rightly recognized the role of the U.S.
military instrument in sending signals of deterrence and in upholding
international law. In October 2015 it resumed Freedom of Navigation
Operations in the South China Sea to contest China's spurious claims-as
well as those of other claimants. It has been conducting regular aerial
patrols, including from new locations in the Philippines. Importantly,
the Pentagon has also been conducting significant presence operations
in the South China Sea, including with the John C. Stennis carrier
strike group. These operations are all necessary and valuable as the
United States reinforces its interests and the global order in Asia,
and this whole-of-government approach will remain vital in the months
and years ahead.
the arbitration and beyond
Yesterday's arbitration decision represents an important step
forward in the United States' multifaceted approach to the South China
Sea. Despite the fact that it is no match for China's economic or
military might, the Philippines was able to obtain a resounding,
unanimous judgment under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that
should be viewed as legitimate by the region and the world. The
tribunal's decision has injected important clarity into the disputes
between the Philippines and China, substantially bounding their scope.
The world now has a stronger sense of what constitutes legal activities
and legal claims in the South China Sea, and this ruling may serve as
important precedent for other claimants. This decision is binding on
both parties, despite China's nonparticipation, and is now part of the
body of international law. But the tribunal's decision also leaves
important questions unresolved.
We welcome this decision despite the fact that China has given
notice that it will not comply with it. From its refusal to participate
in the case in 2013, to its recent efforts to marshal global opinion
against the judgment, to its reactions in the aftermath of the
judgment, China has put the world on notice that it will not embrace
this ruling. In all likelihood, it will not decamp from its artificial
islands or cease its efforts to claim zones around them. A critical
question for the United States and its partners, then, is how to
legitimize this ruling and ensure that it has some power, given China's
noncompliance? How do we help to ensure that after the Philippines has
spent three long years in court, might does not ultimately make right
in the South China Sea?
Analysts have long worried that China will use the decision as an
opportunity to declare an Air Defense Identification Zone in the South
China Sea, as it did in the East China Sea in 2013. And in the last
several months, there have been reports that China may intend to move
into Scarborough Shoal, conduct land reclamation, and install military
facilities at this location as it has on other land features. It could
also take more incremental steps in an effort to establish some
administrative authority in the Spratly Islands area, despite the
court's ruling. These could include the declaration of baselines around
the Spratly Islands, as it has announced in the Paracels, or some new
form of domestic law or regulation that it seeks to apply to the area
to try to justify some jurisdiction. If Beijing takes these actions,
they will be aimed at its domestic audience as well as an international
one, and will seek to send signals to China's people that it will not
relent on its sovereignty claims despite an adverse decision.
China may not embrace the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling,
but it is still subject to the court of international opinion and
sensitive to its judgments. This administration and the next will need
to take concrete steps to ensure that the decision has lasting power
and that South China Sea tensions do not escalate. These include the
following:
1. Conduct Robust Public Diplomacy in Support of the Decision.
U.S. officials have already begun to express their strong support
for this legal process, despite the fact that the United States is not
a claimant. Officials from the executive and legislative branches
should be conducting rigorous outreach to their counterparts in the
region, reinforcing the significance of this process and decision and
making plain what is at stake if it is not upheld. Washington should
also support Track 1.5 efforts so that think tank and university
scholars can amplify the official U.S. message in the region and
beyond.
2. Warn China Against Taking Destabilizing Actions.
U.S. policymakers at all levels must continue to impress upon
Chinese counterparts in public and in private that an ADIZ declaration
or land reclamation at new locations will be taken as dangerous and
destabilizing, and would require a serious U.S. response. U.S.
officials should also work with Chinese counterparts to discuss how
they can make the most out of the PCA's extremely expansive ruling.
3. Seek Greater Internationalization of the South China Sea Disputes.
This administration has made meaningful progress in engaging like-
minded, non- claimant countries on South China Sea issues. India is a
prime example. The more countries speak out against artificial island
building and militarization and in favor of freedom of navigation and
overflight in the global commons, the more China will pay reputational
costs for its noncompliance. Europe is mired in its own Brexit- induced
crisis, but represents a natural partner in legitimizing the rule of
law in the South China Sea. Indeed, in late May, France suggested that
the E.U. might conduct occasional patrols of its own in the South China
Sea. This should be welcomed and encouraged. In the coming months, the
United States must engage with European partners and encourage them to
play a constructive and vocal role in reinforcing the rules-based order
in the South China Sea.
4. Encourage Other Claimants to Seek Arbitration.
The PCA decision will have the farthest-reaching effects if it
serves as precedent for other South China Sea claimants. The United
States can help partners, including Vietnam and Malaysia, contemplate
the value of arbitration with respect to their own maritime claims. The
State Department should issue a paper that explores the potential
implications of the tribunal's landmark decision for other claimants as
part of its Limits in the Seas series. It should also engage closely
with regional counterparts in other claimant countries to build a
common understanding of how this decision may affect other claims.
5. Set Concrete Goals for the Maritime Security Initiative.
The Department of Defense and the U.S. Senate should both be
commended for their commitment to partner capacity building in the
Asia-Pacific region. If the program is to succeed in meaningfully
improving maritime domain awareness, it will need to set specific goals
and benchmarks. The Pentagon and Congress should work together to
determine what they hope to see from MSI five years from now, to
identify intermediate objectives, and the steps the United States and
its partners will need to take to achieve them. Additionally, the
United States will need to ensure that newer partners, like Vietnam and
Malaysia, as well as longstanding ones, like the Philippines, know how
to take advantage of this aid and can put it to good use. Just as
important, the United States will need to sustain a parallel diplomatic
initiative to ensure that recipients of MSI aid commit to building the
trust necessary amongst themselves to share the critical information
they obtain through MDA platforms. This effort is not just about
sharing technology, but building the political will to support it.
6. Issue an Interagency Report on the Rebalance and the South China
Sea.
Like the Rebalance itself, the United States approach to the South
China Sea employs multiple instruments of national power and is an
interagency effort. A new administration will be better able to explain
its progress to Congress, the American people, and to regional partners
if it issues an annual Rebalance report, detailing its progress and
laying out objectives for the following year. That report should
include a special section on the South China Sea and would improve
accountability and oversight for the many stakeholders in the next
administration's Asia policy.
7. Reinforce the Decision with Freedom of Navigation Operations--
Quietly.
The tribunal decision has provided some important clarity on the
status of land features in the South China Sea. Going forward, the
United States should reinforce the decision through its conduct of
FONOPS, making manifest that it does not recognize territorial seas or
airspace around those features that have been ruled to be low-tide
elevations. This is one of the clearest ways that we can communicate to
China that the rule of law will rule in the South China Sea, even if
China does not embrace the ruling. Washington need not publicize these
operations or conduct them with much fanfare, however, given the
expansiveness of yesterday's ruling and China's need to save some face
in its aftermath. The United States must nonetheless make good on its
pledge to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, and
to encourage partners to do the same.
8. Ratify UNCLOS.
This administration and many before it have recognized a clear U.S.
national interest in ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Our top military leaders, including those who are on the front lines of
Asia's maritime disputes, including Admirals Harry Harris and John
Richardson, have given this treaty their full-throated endorsement. We
are approaching a watershed moment and it is no longer enough to
profess our respect for UNCLOS as customary international law. If the
United States truly seeks to reinforce the existing rules-based order
in maritime Asia, it cannot remain outside of this critical part of the
global architecture. It must lead from within.
9. Stay the Course in Asia.
Amidst many competing claims for international attention and
concern over the underlying domestic consensus in the United States for
continuing robust engagement in Asia, it is of manifest importance that
the United States remain principally engaged in the region going
forward. Purposeful involvement from Japan to Korea, China to Southeast
Asia, Australia to India will send a reassuring message to a region in
doubt about the future. The lion's share of the history of the 21st
Century will be written in Asia, and the United States must contribute
responsibly and constructively to this developing narrative.
I harbor no illusions that meaningful progress on these disputes
will be easy, and I know my distinguished colleagues in this chamber
share this concern. But yesterday's decision is a reminder that there
are rules-based responses to these immense geopolitical challenges, and
the United States is far better positioned to confront them than it was
seven years ago. With a whole-of-government approach and alongside our
indispensable regional partners, we can safeguard U.S. interests in the
South China Sea and reinforce the international order in Asia.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Dr. Campbell.
I know we are approaching the time for the vote, so I will
keep my questions short so we can get to Senator Cardin and
other members who are attending today.
Obviously, there is a lot of discussion that we have to
have in light of the tribunal decision yesterday, this very
strong decision that goes to the very heart of a rules-based
system and a rules-based order of international law, and
nations that are obviously rising powers and a power in and of
themselves, whether they are going to be a part of that rules-
based system or flout those rules and continue to ignore the
very law that they agree to.
So I want to get into what you believe the next steps are
for China. But before I do that, I want to just ask this
question.
What consequence should be carried out right now for
China's activities? If you just have a ruling that is ignored,
it is only as good as the paper that they issued in the press
release yesterday. What consequence, what act of reparation,
should take place for violation of the sovereign rights?
Admiral Blair. I think some people do not understand the
price that China is already paying by the actions that it has
been taking. When it began these individual island reclamations
and drilling rig deployments and maritime militia deployments,
it expected the other countries of the region to roll over and
say, ``Oh, China, you are big. Here, go ahead and take this
island. We cede the sovereignty.''
Nothing of that sort happened. In fact, what has happened
is the countries of the region have begun to spend more on
their own defense. They have reached out to other countries
like the United States and Japan. And China is paying an
extremely heavy price militarily. These countries have opened
up access to their ports and airfields to the United States.
If you ask me, as the former Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Command, which would I rather have, five islands that
have airbases or access to seven airbases in the Philippines,
ports and airfields in Vietnam, as far as serious military
capability in the region, I would take the access that we have
gained from the other countries in rather China's relatively
vulnerable built-up islands every time.
So China has paid a high price. Now it is paying one more
price as the Permanent Court of Arbitration has discredited the
nine-dash line, which has basically been the basis of all
Chinese claims.
So the hill is getting steeper and steeper for China. And
my experience with the Chinese is they are practical people.
When it gets too steep, they will think of something else. I
think if you look at Chinese actions over the last 6 or 7
months, they, in fact, have been tapering off from the
aggressive activities of last year or 2.
So let's hope that in the rhetoric of the other countries,
the United States, the Philippines and Vietnam, we leave China
some room to back itself off the ledge in its own way, and
China realizes it is in its interests that there is another way
to support its interests rather than these blatant, naked
militarily based aggressive forces. If that happens, then we
have something to work with.
So I think we have to watch China's reaction. If not, then
we can take some stiffer actions ourselves.
Senator Gardner. Dr. Campbell?
Dr. Campbell. I really like Admiral Blair's answer. I would
stand behind him on that. I think that is good. It is prudent.
It is careful.
There are other costs as well, though, that are being paid.
So we often think about our own challenges and troubles here in
the United States. President Xi is trying to do a lot of things
right now in China. He has essentially dismantled collective
leadership in China. He makes all the decisions.
He is involved in a massive effort to try to retool the
Chinese economy, to move it more from just export-led, state-
driven growth to more consumer-led. It is a very hard
challenge. It is going to take years. It should be taking all
of his time, frankly. A lot of party issues he is trying to
work on.
And I think it is undeniable that he is trying to use
nationalism to kind of propel his efforts forward. I think this
is actually part of this effort.
One of the things that is striking, and I think those of
you who visited China know this, you can talk to people across-
the-board, hard-liners, democrats, others. There is pretty much
uniform view around these issues. They take the Chinese line on
the South China Sea.
So I think, in a way, Xi tried to use these to basically
assist in the nationalist drive in his own domestic efforts.
But now I think, in some respects, he has now faced with
international opposition from the tribunal, strong support from
others, and the kind of steps that Admiral Blair indicates. I
do not think it has gone in the direction that he had hoped.
Very few countries are better at changing approaches
carefully. They may not signal it in public. They may not say,
``Our bad. We are going to move away.'' But I think what
Admiral Blair indicates is the case here. I think, over time,
China will start to adjust its position because they will
realize that, right now, it is not in their best strategic
interests.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Admiral Blair, I understand what you said,
that China did not anticipate that the regional and
international resolve would be as strong as it has been in
reaction to their unilateral activities, but they are not
changing their actions. They are continuing to make their
assertions. They have certainly seen very direct military
actions in regard to the China seas, so I am not sure that the
international reaction has changed the calculation in China.
The second point is that now with the ruling from the
tribunal, I think we are playing on a different level now. We
have a ruling. It is going to be likely ignored at least in the
short term by China. And if their statements are accurate, they
will probably do something that will demonstrate their
sovereignty over this area by additional building or activities
or military actions.
So I am not sure they have paid a price for their
activities to date. And I can tell you that the countries of
the region, this is what they focus on. This is their issue,
maritime security. For the United States, obviously, it is a
critical point for many, many reasons.
Couple that with the fact that ASEAN, an organization that
was set up at the end of the interregional Southeast Asia
conflicts, is being pretty much discredited by China.
How should the United States and our alliance partners
respond to the next wave of activities that are likely to come
from China that disregard the ruling that we saw yesterday?
Admiral Blair. Senator, the ruling only took place
yesterday, so it is a little quick for China to react.
Senator Cardin. They knew it was coming yesterday. They
were prepared.
Admiral Blair. Well, clearly, what they were prepared for
was a much more favorable ruling than what they got. If you
look at their----
Senator Cardin. They should hire different lawyers if they
thought they were going to get different results.
Admiral Blair. Well, they are not the only country that has
wish-think as part of its policy sometimes.
But, no, the talking points that they are running on now
were written a week ago. They could have been written a month
ago. I think it is important to look at actions rather than the
immediate----
Senator Cardin. Well, we have had actions. We have military
airfields that have been built. We have rocks that have been
turned into military assets. We have----
Admiral Blair. Well, you need to be careful there, Senator,
because those facilities in the Spratlys, as opposed to the
Paracels, which are up north and much closer to China, are
currently potential military assets--10,000-foot runways, POL
storage, ports, logistics facilities.
But President Xi, when he was here last September, said he
has no intention of militarizing those potential assets in the
Spratlys. Militarization would involve the deployment of
uniformed forces and military equipment there. And so far,
China has been true to its word.
I saw a news report this morning that aircraft visited some
of those Spratly Islands, but they were civil aircraft. They
were not military aircraft. The one military aircraft that has
been there in the past 9 months was for a medevac to take an
injured----
Senator Cardin. They changed the landscape to have Chinese
presence on an area that is contested.
Admiral Blair. I do not want to be an apologist for China,
but those were features which China had already occupied. They
made them bigger.
Senator Cardin. But they changed them.
Admiral Blair. Yes, they made them bigger, and they put
potential military capability on them. But they have not
militarized them in the sense of putting antiaircraft batteries
and----
Senator Cardin. How long would that take to change?
Admiral Blair. Well, it has not happened yet, which is, I
think, significant.
Senator Cardin. But if you are a country in that region,
knowing what they have done there, as far as not only
jeopardizing your territorial claims, but also giving a
beachhead in the event they decide to be even more aggressive,
wouldn't you, if you were the military adviser to that country,
tell them that they are at higher risk today than they were
before?
Admiral Blair. I pretty much would do what the Philippines
and Vietnam have done, which is invite the United States to use
our bases that are on land and much more powerful and capable.
Senator Cardin. I do not mean to shortcut your answer. You
are saying there is nothing direct you would think that the
United States and our willing partners should be considering
other than what we have done in the past?
Admiral Blair. No, as I said in my statement, I think we
should be prepared to take military action on Scarborough Shoal
if China should undertake some of the same activities that it
has undertaken in Subi Reef and the others. We should draw the
line there.
I think we should be taking advantage of the ruling to
foster a multilateral solution of the settlement of the
contending claims with or without China, and then we should use
our military power to support that solution.
Right now, we do not have a specific position so that we
can use our military power to support our diplomacy. We just
conduct freedom of navigation exercises, which are fine,
military maneuvers. I think we need to draw some specific lines
and encourage China to compromise on some of its objectives, as
they have in other regions, as I said.
Dr. Campbell. Senator, could I just amplify on the things
to really be concerned by? I think Admiral Blair is giving you
a very good laydown.
The key here is some of the steps that China has taken are
on islands that they have held for decades, right? The question
really from here on out is, are they going to take steps on
islands that they have not had previous control or access to?
That is why there is so much focus on the Scarborough Shoal.
If I may, just something to think about, the real issues
that I think the United States has to be concerned by are
challenges to American or international overflight over this
area, or ships that their passage is contested. Those are the
areas where the United States has to be much firmer and much
clearer, and we need to get other partner countries to exercise
the rights of free passage and open access in a manner that
makes clear that this determination to try to turn the South
China Sea--it is not so much the island dots. It is the effort
to turn it into territorial waters that denies international
open access of the kind that we have underwritten for decades,
and it is the very base of international trade and commerce.
Senator Cardin. Just so I understand, the Obama
administration has been doing that.
Dr. Campbell. Yes.
Senator Cardin. Are you suggesting they need to do more?
Dr. Campbell. No, in fact--and thank you, Senator Cardin. I
think you missed a little bit when you were out.
I think I would suggest that this is a bipartisan success,
that what you see are multiple efforts led by the
administration, but supported elsewhere, that involve
diplomacy, that involve working with our allies, building up
partner capacity, taking a very strong position in
international organizations, supporting the rule of law, and
also articulating publicly what it is that we stand for.
Senator Cardin. I understand the verbiage. I am talking
about action. When you do flyovers, when you put our vessels in
the territorial waters themselves to challenge their free
navigation, that is action.
Dr. Campbell. Yes, very much. I think I would suggest, and
I would like to hear Admiral Blair on this, the real thing here
is to make this a normal element of our practice, that it is
not considered something that we do occasionally. It has to be
exercised regularly. It has to become a common feature of our
forward engagement and deployment.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. [Presiding] Senator Johnson?
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Campbell, as you talked about, further integration of
the world economy has been incredibly beneficial to China, as
it has been for Russia. My question is, based on that fact, why
does Russia engage in its aggression? Why is China engaged in
such provocative action?
I agree with you. This undermines their long-term
objectives of becoming more of a consumer society, becoming a
more healthy economy. You mentioned nationalism. I think, to a
certain extent, that drives Putin's calculations as well.
But again, why are they doing this when a cooperative
attitude within the South China Sea, from my standpoint, would
be, short-term and long-term, more beneficial to them? Can you
explain that to me?
Admiral Blair?
Admiral Blair. Well, I think, Senator, what they want is
both. They want to have their strong control of this area that
they call the first island chain, in which all military
activity is done with their permission. That would mean no
American reconnaissance flights. That would mean no American
survey flights. And they want to have a strong consumer economy
that other countries will have to deal with.
So not unlike other countries, they are looking for the
best of both worlds, as long as they can get it. Frankly, until
very recently, they have been able to get it.
Senator Johnson. So that would be my next question then.
Why do they think they can get away with what they are doing?
Admiral Blair. Because they have for several years in the
past. Look at----
Senator Johnson. So we have not shown the strength and
resolve mecessary to deter their actions?
Admiral Blair. Since we have not set any individual limits,
we have had a general policy of, ``We do not take a position,
but don't you do anything.'' They have operated below the level
of that warning in order to make gains.
I think that final thing is, I think the character of a
country's international policy bears a large resemblance to its
internal policy. Inside China, as you know, power is what
controls. Not laws, not precedents. If you have the power, then
you get the best of everything.
China applies the same approach to its relations with its
neighbors. And to the extent that it can be successful, it will
continue to do it.
Senator Johnson. I would like to have you answer, but I do
want to reserve time because I want to ask what position we
should take.
But, Mr. Campbell, if you would like to respond to my first
question?
Dr. Campbell. Just to answer a couple things, if I can,
Senator Johnson. It is a very important question.
The interesting thing is, when you sit down and actually
really discuss with China interlocutors about this, one of the
first issues that they will raise is the Monroe Doctrine. They
will say what about your role in your own hemisphere? Of
course, our answer is that was then, this is now, a very
different, a very different time. That is sometimes
unpersuasive to Chinese friends.
It is not uncommon that rising great powers, particularly
when they are authoritarian-led, seek these spheres of
influence. They believe that they are ultimately beneficial,
and they protect a ruling elite that is anxious about their
legitimacy. I just think that is not uncommon.
I do also want to say one of the things--what is very
different here than the Cold War is that every single one of
these countries, yes, they are working more and more with the
United States. We should be under no illusions. They all want a
better relationship with China because of dramatic commercial
interests and ties. I will say at the root of this, really, is
the United States has to do much more in the Asia-Pacific
region.
If you look back, the dominant issues of this period,
historically, will not be Iraq, will not be Afghanistan, will
not be all the blood and treasure that we have spent. It will
be the rise of Asia. We are not nearly focused on this enough.
And the lion share of the history of this century is going to
be written, in the 21st century, is our executive branch, our
Congress, our big institutions have not yet recognized, have
not yet really made the rebalance, or the pivot, a way of
American engagement in the world.
Senator Johnson. So what should our position be, and what
actions should we take?
Admiral Blair?
Admiral Blair. Senator, I would talk a little bit
differently about our maritime interests in the region. You
have heard several people at this hearing talk about the volume
of shipping that goes through there. China has no interest in
interfering with that shipping. Most of it goes to China
anyway.
Short of total war, no country has figured out yet how to
apply selective pressure to shipping lanes anyway. So it is
impractical.
What is really important is the American ability to
maneuver its military forces in that region of the world, which
we have done ever since 1898. It has basically been in support
of ensuring that a power hostile to the United States or
destabilizing to the region does not gain dominance, in a
sense. We have thrown our weight in, whether it was against
Japan when it militarily took the region, whether it was in
Vietnam. At least in the opening phases of the Vietnam War, we
thought North Vietnamese was an expansion of worldwide
communism.
So our overriding interest is to be able to use our
military forces to support our interests in that region. China
challenges that with a very expansive interpretation of what an
EEZ means. To China, having an EEZ means that you control the
military activities within it. They object violently to our
reconnaissance flights.
When I was Pacific Commander in Chief we had the EP3
incident when they actually ran into one of our aircraft, a
Chinese fighter did. Later, they cut cables of our survey
ships.
So I think what we have to do is have a steady, robust
American military exercise and operating presence in the South
China Sea to show that China will not be able to restrict us.
That is number one.
Senator Johnson. So our position should be to state our
interests clearly. This is what we are going to do, and then we
need to do it. And this would be a good time to start.
Admiral Blair. Let's do it. Yes, sir.
And I think that is more important than whether we run a
particular destroyer within 3 miles or 4 miles of a particular
rock. I think what is important is that the United States
freely operates its air, naval, and, if necessary, its ground
forces in that part of the world. And we do not need anybody's
permission to do it, and we have allies and friends we support
there. So that is kind of number one.
Senator Johnson. So state it clearly and operate regularly.
Admiral Blair. Yes.
Dr. Campbell. Senator, just to underscore, we are doing
that, and we should just continue it going forward.
I will also just say one of the big deterrents that we have
not discussed is that if there are tensions or conflicts in the
South China Sea, the first thing that will happen is insurance
premiums for shipping will go through the roof. That is very
bad for China and very bad for other shipping and receiving
nations. It is the last thing that they want to see.
So that, among everything else, really animates a lot of
actions.
Senator Gardner. [Presiding] Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. First of all, thank you both for being here.
This is actually a pretty big moment in international
relations, I think, for our country. I think you would both
agree with that. For people who are going to watch or are
thinking about this issue, the first thing, and I think you
both touched on this in your statements, is freedom of
navigation of the seas has been the linchpin of this economic
growth and prosperity that we have seen in the post-Second
World War era. That is particularly true of the Asia-Pacific
region. The South China Sea, in particular, I believe, the last
time I checked, is a place where a significant percentage of
global commerce is now transiting through.
So this matters in real-time to people in this country. I
guarantee you there are things in this room right now that came
to this country as they transited through the South China Sea,
and vice versa, for our exports. So this is incredibly
important.
What China is basically challenging is that world order.
What China is basically doing here is they are challenging the
idea that there is such a thing as freedom of navigation.
They have challenged this particular sea for a long time.
If you look at their passports, for a long, long time, that
nine-dash line was on there. They have claimed that they own
this, among other places, for a very long time. Now they are
beginning to act on it. So that is the first part.
Now, let me preface this by saying I have no quarrel with
the Chinese people, who I believe are great people who by and
large have the desire to move forward with prosperity and with
their lives, and we engage with them constantly. I have no
quarrel with China. I have a big quarrel with the Chinese
Communist Party, which I believe is more interested in the
future security of the Chinese Communist Party than they are of
the nation itself.
This is a country who views all their neighbors as
tributary states that need to be subservient to China. This is
a country that views the United States as a declining power.
They make the argument to the countries in the region that
America cannot be counted on to live up to its security
assurances. That is why this is such a critical moment.
By the way, this is also illustrative of another point, and
that is all these international things that China signs on to,
they are signatories to the Law of the Sea Treaty. They agreed
to this process by which they lost under and now they view as
illegitimate.
So how can we trust them on anything they sign when they
are willing to ignore it? This is a big, big problem.
And I think and I hope that the position of the
administration and the next administration will be that we will
never accept these arguments; that there will be no part of
these illegitimately claimed areas that we will not sail
through and challenge; that we will never accept it as a matter
of course, whether it is the air defense zone that they have
claimed or this illegitimate claim that they make now.
Mr. Campbell, you were one of the architects of the so-
called pivot to Asia, and you have written extensively about
this policy. So I would just ask you, and I think you have
touched on this already, but what is your assessment of the
success of this policy after 5 years after it was announced,
specifically? And what needs to be done next?
And on that point, I want to make one editorial comment, in
addition to the 2.5-minute editorial comment I just made, which
is this is why the defense sequester is so crazy. It is nuts,
because we need to be able to fund our ability to project power
in the region, because in the end, all the diplomatic rhetoric,
all the speeches from the Senate, are worthless if we do not
have the physical capability to deliver on our security
assurances that we have made to our allies in the region, in
South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and others.
But what is your assessment, Mr. Campbell, of the state of
affairs on the pivot to Asia? And what is the next iteration of
it moving forward as we go into a new administration and new
Congress?
Dr. Campbell. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate
the question, and thank you for your service.
I will say I do not mean any harm by this, but I will say
what I appreciated very much is how open your office was to us.
You asked us to come up to be briefed about Asia, asked very
good questions. You challenged us a lot, but you also were very
respectful.
I actually would say one of the most important things that
we are going to need to sustain to be effective in Asia is to
maintain a bipartisan commitment. That is incredibly difficult,
but I think you all, each in your own way, have laid out the
enormous American stakes on what is involved here and the need
to do more.
Look, I think the rebalance or pivot is proceeding in fits
and starts, to be honest. Part of that is that we have a lot of
domestic issues. It is impossible to leave the Middle East and
South Asia, given what is going on now. That is where the focus
really is.
So you have to find time in other parts of the schedule to
make sure that strategic focus comes from key Senators. Very
grateful for the team that came to Shangri-La. Very much
noticed by friends in the region as a whole.
I think the administration has done a pretty good job in
trying to make clear that this is where our future lies, but we
are going to have to do much more.
I agree with you about sequester. I would like to see much
more active diplomatic engagement, generally. Really, at the
base of much of this, I know we focus mostly on the military
dimension, but a lot of this is a diplomatic game. We have to
be very effective in terms of how we pursue our interests.
No American politician in the last 25 years has given a
speech in America about why Asia is important. We have not
tried to convince our American people about what we are about.
There have been hundreds and thousands of speeches about
Falluja and Iraq and Afghanistan, all important, but no one has
said, you know, this is why we engage, this is why we are out
there. We give those speeches in Asia. We do not do them at
home.
So I think we have our work cut out for us. And we had, at
the beginning of this administration, a little childish back
and forth, where some would say we are back in Asia and others
would say, no, we never left.
Senator Rubio, I would take a position that both are wrong.
For us to be back in Asia is going to take decades. It is going
to take multiple Presidents, deep, substantial engagement. And
for us to say we never left Asia, the price of admittance has
gone up dramatically. What used to pass for effective diplomacy
and military engagement, 15 or 20 years ago, will not get it
done, will not get it done today.
Now, as we speak, we have two aircraft carriers in the
Asia-Pacific region deployed. That should be a regular part of
our engagement, not something that happens occasionally.
So I commend you on the work that you have done to try to
undo the sequester. And I also want to see you continue your
role of really focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. I will do
everything I can to support that.
Thanks, Senator.
Admiral Blair. Senator Rubio, I listened carefully to what
you said. I think one thing you perhaps are missing about the
Chinese people is that they are, whether the Communist Party
whips them up or not, extremely nationalistic and feel that
China's destiny is much larger than what it currently is.
They believe that, for the last 150 years, they were
physically carved up by outside countries, notably Japan, but
also a large number of European countries and even the United
States.
Now they have become the second-largest economy in the
world. They have grown tremendously, and they feel their time
has come. And they feel their time has come in a pretty crude
way, which means that they should be the number one dog in
their part of the world and everybody else should adjust.
So I think this is deeper than just the Chinese Communist
Party, which is ruling them. And it is pretty understandable,
in terms of their history.
So I think what the United States does has to deal with
what I think are national feelings and desires by presenting
military situations in which the costs of aggression are too
high, channel that great Chinese energy which we have seen in
so many other countries, Chinese-American citizens here in the
United States, Taiwan, Singapore, other very vibrant Chinese
companies, into an area in which they can make tremendous
advances by their economic prowess, by their cultural
attainments.
But we have to set some military lines that say this far
and no further. Then I think we can move forward properly.
Senator Rubio. Admiral, I agree with you on their
nationalistic attitude and their view of history, the last
hundred years has been an aberration. I understand all of that,
and I do not disagree with your statement about that being a
powerful sentiment in China.
I would only add that I think the people in Korea and the
people in Japan have their own ambitions for the future, and
that is not to be a tributary state to China.
I would also add that I want China to be prosperous. I
would love to have them as a partner on all these major issues
we confront around the world. Imagine what a responsible
Chinese Government and the U.S. could do on the issues of
global jihadism and so forth.
I can tell you what is going to be a big problem, and that
is if that nationalism leads them to continue to steal secrets
from our companies and our military in order to cut corners, if
they aggressively act to take over international waters, and if
they do to other places what they have done to Hong Kong or
what they do now in the gross human rights violations.
If they treat their own people that way, just imagine what
they would do to other people, if they gained any sort of power
and control over them. And that cannot happen. That would be a
major, major problem.
Admiral Blair. I think we are in violent agreement there,
Senator.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Rubio. We are coming up
on the time we are going to have to adjourn. I just again want
to reiterate something that Senator Rubio mentioned, actually.
When he was talking about China being a participant in
UNCLOS and talking about how we cannot trust China in anything
they sign because of their defiance of the law that they agreed
to.
But I think, in many respects, we have a moment when the
United States is going to be asked that very question by our
allies. If China continues to violate the Philippines, this
ruling, and other claimants in the area, then the question our
allies in the region will once again pose to the United States
is how can we trust anything that you say when you are not
willing to come to our aid to back up what you have agreed to
do with us.
That is why it is so important that we continue to
reiterate and reinforce our expressions of mutual defense and
the mutual alliances that we have together, whether that is the
Philippines, whether that is Japan, Korea, Taiwan. It is very
important that we continue to show our allies that we are
committed to not just say that we will abide by them, but that
we will, indeed, act when called upon and as necessary and
needed.
One of the things I wanted to get into, though, is what is
next for the Philippines. The ruling comes down. The tribunal
comes down. What next? Where does President Duterte go? What
happens with the Philippines, now that they have this ruling?
Admiral Blair, Dr. Campbell, whoever prefers.
Admiral Blair. I think that an equitable solution of the
claims in the South China Sea is going to be a long and
difficult matter just because of the tangled nature of the
claims there.
If you look at the Spratlys color-coded to show which
country currently occupies which island, it looks like a bad
case of Technicolor measles. As you know, they are all
intertwined. The idea that you can say, well, you move off this
island, you move off that island, and let's draw some nice
lines is, I think, pretty impractical.
I think that it will take some imagination to come up with
a multilateral settlement of claims, which gives China a
recognition of some of its legitimate claims, which are
generally further north in the South China Sea, which divvies
up the Spratlys in an equitable format.
I think that there should be internationalization of some
islands, which can be used by all; I think there should be
joint development areas in which fishing activities are shared
and hydrocarbon development revenues are divided up among the
states; I think further work is needed on turning the
declaration of conduct back in 2002 into a code of conduct in
which there are peaceful expectations on all sides. I think
that is the work of years.
But I think underlying progress has to be what we have been
talking about here for the last hour, which is a recognition by
China that it cannot gain by military aggressive, coercive
means what it wishes. To do so will take a continuation of the
recent stiffening of American policy along with smart policies
by the other countries, and presenting that more united front
to China.
ASEAN's role has been mixed. Sometimes, they have not done
much. Other times, they have pulled themselves together and
made some unified statements, which I think are positive.
So it is that steady combination of military deterrence,
patient diplomacy, imaginative negotiations, which I think the
claimant states, starting with the Philippines, including
Vietnam, Malaysia, ought to pursue.
I very much feel, Chairman Gardner, this is a movie, not a
snapshot, and we have to do a lot of work to have the movie
have the right ending.
Senator Gardner. Dr. Campbell, I would just ask you to
follow up on that, but also perhaps to throw in a little bit of
what you have heard from the other claimants in the area, what
they might pursue now that this tribunal has ruled, if
anything.
Dr. Campbell. Thanks very much.
Senator Gardner, just in respect to the last question, I
will say, honestly, I think the ruling so exceeded what was
expected, I think if you read previous tribunal decisions,
sometimes it is hard to make out exactly what was decided.
There was a little bit of this, a little bit of that.
So in my view, I guess I agree with Admiral Blair on this
question of, ``Oh, they must have anticipated this.'' I do not
think anyone in the region anticipated it. This really was
clear as a bell, in terms of animating some very important
strategic purposes.
So I do not think anyone was thinking about, gee, what do
we do now in international law in advance of this ruling. So I
think there are going to be a lot of important conversations
that will take place in the coming months, and we should
encourage this.
Remember, this initial decision to go to The Hague was
encouraged by a number of countries, including the United
States.
I would say I like the idea of imaginative solutions. We do
have a few areas where countries have been able to share
resources. The agreement between Taiwan and Japan on fishing
was very important. There had been efforts to try to do this
with China in the past. Usually you get down the line and then
China says, well, of course, we will share some of these
resources, but this is, of course, our territory, which then is
a showstopper.
The idea is to be able to take advantage of resources in
circumstances where sovereignty and territoriality are not
resolved, are not clear.
I think the general point to recognize here is that, in
diplomacy, there are areas that cannot be immediately resolved,
and the best you can do is to have everyone, kind of cooler
heads prevail, and then export some of these problems into the
future where hopefully circumstances will be better.
China's practice under that rubric to basically salami
slice is really not in our best strategic interests. So we are
going to have to be watching very carefully as we go forward,
building capabilities.
I mean, one of the things I am most proud of and that has
really taken place is that there is a renaissance in the
relationship between the United States and the Philippines. The
Philippines are incredibly important in our own country.
But ever since we left the base, we had about 20 years of
very little strategic engagement. That has changed now. The
U.S. military is re-embracing their comrades.
Politically, the United States is less explosive in the
Philippines. I think there is a recognition across the
political spectrum that they want a better relationship with
us. We have a legal instrument in which American forces can now
deploy and act there, beyond the visiting forces agreement.
These are all important steps. But I think the general
recognition, Senator, is that we all look for immediate
responses. Asia is the long game. Asia is the long game.
So 2 years ago, when this legal process started, people
pooh-poohed it. It is not important. It is too slow. It will
not deliver the goods. Look at where we sit today--a
substantial development, which I think will animate the actions
of many countries around the region.
Despite this very assertive stance on the part of the
Chinese, I can tell you, behind the scenes, this has caused
real concern about the conduct of their own strategy, and there
will be those, carefully, that will be arguing for readjusting
going forward.
Senator Gardner. Actually, Senator Cardin is here. I have
been going along.
Do you have any additional questions for this panel?
Senator Cardin. I have a lot but go ahead.
Senator Gardner. The final question, should China proceed
to Scarborough Shoal, or perhaps a blockade of a Philippines
ship or action on the Second Thomas reef, what should the U.S.
reaction or response be?
Admiral Blair. If I can just make one preliminary point,
Senator Gardner, we, of course, have an obligation to allies
and partners, but allies and partners are perfectly ready to
fight to the last American. We need to make sure that we do not
want something more than they want it themselves, in terms of
their actions.
It is, I think, particularly important for you responsible
members of Congress to make sure that this is not the United
States doing things that allies should be, and friends and
partners should be working on themselves. It has to be worked
together, and we need to be aware of that.
On Scarborough Shoal, I think if China lands troops, or
brings in dredges to expand the reefs, we should remove them in
support of the Philippines, with military force, if necessary.
On Second Thomas Shoal, I think the situation is a little
bit less clear. I would rather speak in a classified session
about that one.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Dr. Campbell?
Dr. Campbell. I will just add to that.
Look, we have a strong security relationship with the
Philippines. The conduct of our private diplomacy has become
much more effective in the last couple of years, and I would
anticipate that we will make very clear that we will stand with
the Philippines.
I do want to say that the most important diplomacy about to
happen is the diplomacy between the Chinese and the
Philippines, right? So that in many respects is a positive
sign, the fact that the Chinese are reaching out. They want to
see what kind of relationship--we have had our own private
conversations with Duterte, the new President, and we will see
how this plays out over time.
But I think the Chinese have to understand that if they
take the steps that the Admiral indicates, it will have a
chilling effect across Asia and will undermine their interests
in a way that no other action that China has taken in the last
generation would.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. I just have one final question, if I might.
I do not want to get into a debate on the merits of the Law of
the Sea Treaty and the Senate's ratification. I have already
expressed myself. I am a strong supporter of it. I think the
United States hurt itself by not ratifying the treaty.
But I would like to just ask the narrow question as to the
impact of us not being a member of the Law of the Sea as it
relates to the repercussions of China not following the Law of
the Sea and the United States active engagement in this issue
as not being a member of the treaty.
Dr. Campbell. I can just maybe answer on that. I
appreciate, Senator Cardin, your leadership on efforts on the
Law of the Sea. The Law of the Sea efforts over almost 30 years
now, it is a little bit like Gallipoli, kind of run along the
beach with the machine-gunners there. We have gotten close a
couple times.
I will tell you an interesting thing, and I will not go
into names, but at the last go-round, the second to last, we
tried this a few years ago. I was asked to testify. Some
Senators asked questions about a ruling like the one we had
yesterday and what if it then impinged on American interests,
very much in the way of what has just taken place with China.
So the concern was that we would sign ourselves onto a
treaty where potentially an international group could rule on
something that would impinge on our own sovereignty, which is
what China has just experienced. I would say, personally, if we
want to focus on the Asia-Pacific going forward, we are going
to have to find a way to pass the Law of the Sea, because it
does hurt us.
And it is striking to us the Chinese have signed and they
are obligated, but do not want to do it. We have not signed,
but we want them to do it, right? So it is ironical to many in
the region.
What concerns us, though, is I am not sure what in the
world could get 67 votes in the Senate now, right? If we put in
something on motherhood, we would get maybe 62, 63, but there
would be those who would raise real questions.
Senator Cardin. We have gotten a lot of our bills passed by
67. Our committee has a good record going. I do not think we
would--we would see how we would do on that. It might be a
challenge.
Admiral Blair. I would add, Senator, that, to me, the
biggest advantage of us joining the Law of the Sea would be to
oppose the Chinese reinterpretation of what the rights of a
country with an EEZ are. China is methodically, over time,
attempting to give tremendous rights to EEZ countries to
restrict military activities in a way that would be completely
counter to U.S. interests.
Right now, we have to rely on our friends who have signed
the treaty, Japan, the United Kingdom, other strong maritime
nations, to carry our water for us inside that treaty instead
of providing the leadership we can.
So I think it is absolutely vital.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Menendez, I think is participating in the next
hearing as well, so that is the final, final question for you.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Thanks
to everyone for attending today's hearing.
For the information of members, the record will remain open
until the close of business Friday, including for members to
submit questions for the record.
Please respond as promptly as possible, and your responses
will be made a part of the record.
With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is now
adjourned, and we will proceed to the next hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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