[Senate Hearing 114-745]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-745
U.S. SANCTIONS POLICY IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
AND GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 8, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Todd Womack, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona, Chairman
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CHRISTOPHER A. CROSS, Delaware
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator From Arizona...................... 1
Markey, Hon. Edward J., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts.......... 2
Lyman, Hon. Princeton N., Senior Advisor to the President, United
States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC...................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Eckert, Hon. Sue E., Senior Fellow, Watson Institute
International and Public Affairs, Brown University, Providence,
Rhode Island................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Moss, Todd, Chief Operating Officer and Senior Fellow, Center for
Global Development, Washington, DC............................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Brooks-Rubin, Brad, Director of Policy, Enough Project,
Washington, DC................................................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 43
(iii)
U.S. SANCTIONS POLICY IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Africa
and Global Health Policy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Flake,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Flake [presiding], Markey, and Coons.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Flake. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health will come to order.
Today, the subcommittee will hear testimony regarding U.S.
sanctions policy in Africa. Sanctions can either lead to
successful outcomes or exacerbate the very issues they seek to
remedy and reflect poorly on those seeking to advance them. As
with most things, the devil is in the details.
In my experience, unilateral economic sanctions by
themselves rarely, if ever, achieve their intended goal. And I
have been long suspect of unilateral economic sanctions. I have
witnessed firsthand how nontargeted economic sanctions can
apply pressure to those who have no direct link to the levers
of power in a country. Now, looking beyond the issue of
multilateral versus unilateral economic sanctions, there are
other factors in play in determining whether or not targeted
individual sanctions on a country are warranted and are likely
to be an effective tool. But, right now, the United States has
targeted individual sanctions in place for nine sub-Saharan
countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan,
South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. I should say that these are targeted
individual sanctions on individuals in those countries. We also
have arms export restrictions in place against most of these
countries, and enforcement of both these and financial
sanctions can obviously be a challenge for these African
countries.
Today, we aim to step back and explore the effectiveness of
some of these efforts. We will examine the recent track record
of sanctions in Africa, when they have proven to be a useful
tool in achieving our policy objectives, and under what
circumstances they are falling flat or causing unintended
consequences. We will look at the relationship between
sanctions undertaken solely by the United States versus those
taken in concert with the international community. Finally, I
hope we will get a better understanding from today's discussion
of whether we are overusing or underusing sanctions, or the
threat of sanctions, in Africa.
We often hear elected officials advocate for the use of
sanctions as a foreign policy tool. I am rarely among those
pushing for sanctions. But, as those calls arise, we will all
benefit from hearing from our witnesses to hear what they have
to say about sanctions in Africa. This hearing is especially
timely, considering the calls for sanctions on the DRC that
have been forthcoming from Congress and elsewhere in previous
weeks.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses today. I have met
with a number of you already and look forward to hearing your
verbal testimony.
And, with that, I will turn it over to Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. And
thank you for having such an important hearing.
Last year, you and I and Senator Coons had the tremendous
pleasure of accompanying President Obama on his historic trip
to Kenya and Ethiopia. On that trip, we attended a large public
event at the African Union in Addis Ababa. Throughout the front
of that massive auditorium sat many of Africa's heads of state.
And the President delivered a speech about the responsibility
those leaders have to build and respect democracy in Africa. He
reinforced the message he had delivered on his first trip to
the continent as President, years earlier, that, and I quote,
``Africa does not need strong men, it needs strong
institutions.'' As the President spoke, he looked at those
leaders and told them that, as much as he would like to
continue in office as President of the United States, the
Constitution of the United States, like many constitutions in
Africa and around the world, limits him to two terms. He told
them that not even he, as President, is above the law. He
explained that even the President must respect the rules of the
game, because governance is fundamentally about trust, promises
made and promises kept between elected leaders and the people
who elected them. Changing or ignoring those rules risks
breaking that trust and sending a society towards turmoil and
instability.
Many of the leaders in the front rows sat stone-faced and
silent, not accustomed to such straight talk. If they had been
the only ones in the room, the silence would have been
stunning. But, they were not the only ones in the room. You,
Mr. Chairman, Senator Coons, and I, we saw that packed in all
the way to the ceiling were ordinary people from around the
African continent. After they heard President Obama's words,
they cheered so loudly that it shook the building. The people
of Africa are the heirs of hundreds of years of exploitation
and violence, first by colonial powers, and all too often by
their own leaders, since Africa was decolonized. They are
people who have been fighting hard against repression and
corruption, and are now working to build democracies throughout
the continent. They are counting the promises made about
freedom and prosperity.
Two weeks ago, I introduced a resolution calling for
targeted sanctions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where
President Joseph Kabila has been using every tactic at his
disposal to manipulate institutions, suppress political
opposition, and delay elections to try to remain in power
beyond the end of his mandate, a mandate set by DRC's people in
their own Constitution. For many months, President Obama,
Secretary Kerry, Assistant Secretary Thomas Greenfield, Special
Envoy Tom Perriello, and Ambassador James Swann have engaged in
a determined diplomatic effort to persuade President Kabila to
commit to stepping aside at the end of this term, as
specifically required in the Congo Constitution. But, now, with
just 5 months left until elections are supposed to happen, it
has become clear that our diplomats need additional tools to
communicate how seriously the United States views the actions
of President Kabila and his government, and to demonstrate our
commitment to the Congolese people.
Some may ask, Why is this important? Well, you only have to
look next door and to the wider region to see why it is so
important. Next door, in Burundi, President Nkurunziza's
unconstitutional election to a third term last year sparked
violence that has cost the lives of hundreds, displaced
thousands, and threatens to reignite ethnic tensions. And it
does not stop there. This weekend, I read a report about
Kenya's new mood, describing massive protests that have already
erupted in anticipation of elections there next year. Amid
concerns that President Kenyatta has manipulated the electoral
commission in his favor, Kenyan security forces have once again
cracked down on protesters and attempted to ban protests. And,
in direct violation of multiple court rulings and its country's
constitution, multiple protesters have already been killed,
stoking a very legitimate fear that 2017 could see a repeat of
the horrific violence surrounding the elections of 2007.
So, sanctions in DRC are not only about DRC. President
Kenyatta will be watching our approach to DRC to see just how
much he can get away with. For the sake of the people of
Burundi, DRC, Kenya, and others in the region, I think we have
to make absolutely clear that the United States stands with the
people and democracy, and will not tolerate leaders who use
force or manipulation to hold on to power or break their most
fundamental promises to their own people.
Those sanctions, I believe, should be targeted at those
officials in the Government of DRC who are responsible for
violence and human rights violations and undermining the
democratic processes or institutions. I believe such targeted
sanctions, sanctions specifically designed to avoid negatively
impacting ordinary Congolese, would make a significant impact
on Kabila's calculations, going forward, as he comes to realize
that his actions will have consequences.
Beyond influencing Kabila's decisions, though, sanctions
are about making a statement about America's commitment to the
Congolese people. Sanctions are about making clear to the
Congolese people that we will not help entrench strong men, but
will always lend a helping hand to people working to build
strong institutions and prosperous societies. Sanctions in
cases like these are an important way in which the U.S.
communicates to the people in the balcony--Congolese,
Burundians, Sudanese, Kenyans, and others--that promises made
must be kept, that we will not help strong men break promises
to their people.
I want to thank each and every one of our distinguished
guests for being here today. And I really want to thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for having this very important hearing.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Coons, do you have anything to say before we start?
Senator Coons. I will simply say my thanks to you and to
the ranking member.
As someone who also attended that same event, it was a
memorable event, and I very much look forward to hearing from
the members of the panel and to engaging in a debate. There is
relatively little time left for Congress to act in a way that
would send a clear and strong signal about our intentions and
our concerns about the DRC and future elections in other
countries. And it is my hope that, working together, we will
find a way, following this hearing, to do that in a concerted,
constructive way.
Thank you.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Senator Coons.
All of us could not be more pleased with the panel that we
have put together for today's hearing. We wanted to get a range
of opinion, and we certainly have that, and if you read through
the testimony and listen to what you will say, people will
realize what a breadth of experience we have here today.
We will try to keep it--we have votes coming up at some
point this afternoon. We have a nominations hearing right
following this, so we will have to keep pretty close on time,
so we will ask you to please limit your remarks to 5 minutes,
and then we will have plenty of time for questions. I will
introduce all four of you, here, and then quickly go.
Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Senior Advisor to the President
of the U.S. Institute for Peace. He has previously served in
numerous U.S.--or official U.S. capacities, including Special
Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and as Ambassador to Nigeria
and South Africa.
The Honorable Sue Eckert, Senior Fellow at Brown
University's Watson Center for International and Public
Affairs, where she directs the projects on targeted sanctions
and terrorist financing. She also previously served as
Assistant Secretary of Commerce of--for Export Administration.
Dr. Todd Moss is the Chief Operating Officer and Senior
Fellow at the Center for Global Development. He previously
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, in 2007 to 2008, and is an expert on U.S./Africa
relations, finance, and development policy.
Mr. Brad Brooks-Rubin is the Director of Policy at the
Enough Project. He was previously the Special Advisor for
Conflict Diamonds at the Department of State and Attorney
Advisor in the Treasury Department's Office of Chief Counsel,
Foreign Assets Control, where he advised on sanctions related
to Sudan, Liberia, DRC, and counterterrorism.
Thank you for being here. Look forward to the testimony.
Ambassador Lyman.
STATEMENT OF HON. PRINCETON N. LYMAN, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE
PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Senator Markey, Senator Coons. Thank you very
much for this opportunity.
And I will be expressing views of my own, not those,
necessarily, of the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Let me concentrate on three points relative to the issues
that you have raised.
First of all, sanctions are a tool, they are not a policy.
And they do not work very well if they are not part, not only
of a policy and policy objectives, but are for a broader
strategy to achieve them. We have cases where sanctions have
been very important--in Liberia, in Sierra Leone, in Cote
d'Ivoire--but we have to remember that that was associated or
complemented by the activities of peacekeepers, a broad
regional strategy, and other steps to bring about an end to the
situations on which those were targeted.
In the DRC, we have a very, very important situation, a
very delicate one, and a very dangerous one. And I think the
issue of extending terms is not a question of whether countries
are entitled to have more than one term, but, when terms are
extended in ways that are repressive and threaten the stability
and the peace of the country, they become an issue of peace and
security.
What I am afraid of, in the case of the DRC, is that we do
not have yet the unified international position to pressure and
get this objective achieved. We have agreement with the
European Union on the objective, but not necessarily the
strategy. And the African Union is, at best, divided on this
question. They stumbled over this same problem in Burundi, and
they have not come down strongly on the question of the
President Kabila stepping aside when his term is over in the
DRC. And that is unfortunate, because you need a combination of
pressures, but you need also the weight of African opinion, of
senior leaders, and of neighboring countries. And I think it is
important to put that strategy together and make it more
effective in the months ahead.
In the meanwhile, I would say that the threat of sanctions
is very important, but I am not sure--and I defer to people
following this more closely--that exercising them unilaterally
without agreement with our partners may not be the most
effective way to go forward.
The second point that I would make is--and Senator Flake
alluded to this--is that unilateral sanctions are less
effective if they are strictly unilateral. If you do not have
worldwide support or broad international support, it is very
easy to be--to evade them or to have other countries undercut
them. But, when you have worldwide support, when you have put
together a coalition around them, then not only do you have
more enforcement, but you can draw on the relative skills of
different entities.
We are very good at financial and economic sanctions. We
have a lot of talent and a lot of skill in those. The EU has a
lot of leverage with their very complex aid and trade
relationships with Africa, and they--and suspension of those
benefits is a very powerful instrument. The Africa Union brings
important political weight to bear. And, of course, they are
major participants in any peacekeeping operation. So, when you
have that kind of broad international structure around the use
of sanctions, they are far more effective.
The third point I would make--and it is perhaps the most
controversial--is that sanctions have to--sanctions are good if
they are aimed at achievable very specific objectives, but it
is harder to use sanctions to get real, deep political
transformation in countries and a change in the way countries
operate, because all rulers who are ruling autocratically see
that as political suicide, and they will resist the pressures,
they will go around the sanctions, they will let their
countries pay a tough price. Targeted sanctions, moreover, go
at individuals, they do not go at regimes, in general.
So, the question is, How do you deal with countries like
Sudan, like Zimbabwe and others, in which fundamental
transformation is necessary to get both a better--to end the
conflicts, but also to end the human rights violations? And I
think it has to be a combination of a long-term strategy of
engagement, perhaps sanctions layered, but linked to individual
steps, and building the strong democratic capacities within the
country. Because, without those, even a change in regime does
not necessarily produce the peace and democracy you want.
Let me just finish with an incident I experienced when I
was Ambassador to South Africa. Nelson Mandela was President.
And, at that time, Nigeria was ruled by Sani Abacha, a very
cruel and rapacious leader. So, a group of Nigerian activists
came to see Nelson Mandela, and they said, ``We need your help.
We want your support for international oil sanctions on
Nigeria. You know how sanctions helped you in South Africa, and
we need them now.'' And President Mandela's response caught him
off guard. He said, ``Yes, sanctions were helpful, but
sanctions are not enough if you do not have a strong indigenous
democratic movement in your country. Otherwise, you will not
get the outcome you want.'' I think that is an important lesson
for us as we look at how we get these longer-term changes that
we need in some of these countries.
Thank you. And I am happy to answer any questions
subsequently.
[Ambassador Lyman's prepared statement can be found in the
Additional Material Submitted for the Record section of this
transcript.]
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Ms. Eckert.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUE E. ECKERT, SENIOR FELLOW, WATSON
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BROWN
UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND
Ms. Eckert. Chairman Flake, Senator Markey, and Senator
Coons, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the effectiveness of targeted sanctions in
Africa.
Due to time constraints and the rich expertise of my fellow
witnesses, I am going to limit my remarks to focusing on U.N.
sanctions and the role U.N. sanctions play. This is largely
based on a new database, both a quantitative and qualitative
database, looking at the impact and effectiveness of U.N.
sanctions since they were first imposed in 1990.
Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council
imposes sanctions to maintain or restore international peace
and security. And, in general, there are six categories of
threats that they are most often used for. This is armed
conflict, in terms of--including support for peace negotiations
and peace enforcement, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
proliferation, unconstitutional changes of government,
governance of resources--natural resources--and protection of
civilians under R-to-P.
The purpose of these sanctions, contrary to popular
perception, is not just to coerce a change of behavior, but
also to constrain access to prescribed activities or finance,
and also to signal support for an international norm or
stigmatize the targets. These purposes are not mutually
exclusively, and most often are done simultaneously. All U.N.
sanctions entail stigmatizing in some manner.
You have already laid out the sanctions. There are
currently--U.N. sanctions--13, of which 8 are country-based
regimes in Africa. That is Somalia, Eritrea, the DRC, Sudan,
Libya, Guinea Bissau, Central African Republic, Yemen, and
South Sudan. While more than 60 percent of U.N. sanctions--8
out of 13--focus on armed conflict and peacebuilding, sanctions
focused on the threat of terrorism--for example, al Qaeda,
ISIL, the Taliban--and the threat of proliferation--North Korea
and, previously, Iran--receive a disproportionate share of the
Security Council's attention and resources.
Just to highlight some research points, U.N. sanctions are
the majority of the Africa sanctions, but most often,
particularly in the early days, they were imposed in a less-
than-coherent way, and sanctions, as the Ambassador said,
substituted for policy. The use of sanctions to demonstrate
resolve without integrating them into an overall strategy is
largely ineffective. And, for this reason, it is very important
that sanctions objectives be clearly articulated at the outset.
The second thing I would just like to say is that, from the
research, secondary sanctions, we found, have proven--and this
was in cases of Africa--the--against Liberia, in support for
the RUF, in Sierra Leone, and against Eritrea for its arms
exports to Somalia--have been highly effective, yet it is not
something that is very frequently discussed nor used.
Characteristics of effective sanctions, again, as the
Ambassador pointed out, relationship to other policy
instruments. Sanctions do not exist in isolation and are always
used with other instruments, most often diplomacy, at times
peacekeeping forces on the ground--62 percent of the cases.
Sanctions need, and must be part of, a broader coordinated
strategy.
With regard to objectives in types of sanctions, U.N.
targeted sanctions are effective more than 20 percent of the
time, and--but are nearly three times more effective in
constraining and coercing than--constraining--excuse me--or
signaling than they are in coercing. This is very important,
because it gets to the point of what the objective of the
sanctions are and having realistic expectations of these
measures to be able to be effective.
Arms embargoes are the most frequently imposed sanctions,
especially in African conflicts, in 89 percent of the episodes,
but are least effective when applied in isolation. Travel bans
are the next most utilized, 69 percent of cases. Asset freezes,
66. Travel bans combined, 73.
One interesting fact is, in 40 percent of the cases of
armed conflict, commodity sanctions--those are sanctions on
diamonds, such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and gold, at Cote
d'Ivoire, oil, charcoal in Somalia, or timber in Liberia--when
appropriately--have been highly effective for purposes of
constraint and signaling.
I am going to talk one moment just about the unintended
consequence of sanctions, because I think that this is
important. We found, in the data and the research that we have
done, that corruption, criminality, strengthening of
authoritative rule, and decline of legitimacy of the Security
Council have occurred. But, there are additional consequences,
which, until recently, have not been focused on, and this is as
a result of policies and sanctions intended to counter the
financing of terrorism and anti-money-laundering. And this is
the de-risking--the de-risking issue that some of you have
written to the executive branch about, the inability of
remitters or money service businesses and charities to access
financial services. And these problems have been particularly
acute in African countries, such as Somalia, Sudan, and Angola,
where humanitarian assistance is great--is in greatest need.
With regard to challenges to effective sanctions, very
quickly, right now there is, you know, insufficient political
will within the Security Council, especially regarding China
and Russia.
Two, weak implementation and capacity. And this is the most
important issue, I would say, that we need to focus on.
And that is, countries lack basic legal authority and
executive bodies to translate U.N. sanctions into domestic law.
And, in very many cases, the failure to implement sanctions
boils down to a lack of capacity.
Ineffective and inadequate monitoring and enforcement,
mechanisms that we need to enhance in the context of the U.N.
And misperceptions and lack of understanding about what
sanctions are intended to do.
With regard to recommendations, very quickly. One is to
improve member states and regional capacity. This is using
those people on the ground--the AU, ECOWAS, SADC, et cetera--to
focus on sanctions. And this also gets to greater leadership
and focus for conflict-related sanctions vis-a-vis
nonproliferation and terrorism goals. It is just not there at
this point, both in terms of the U.S. Government and even
within the context of the U.N.
The second is to enhance sanctions monitoring and
enforcement. The--if there are violations, noncompliance, there
has to be some kind of response or else sanctions will lack
credibility.
The third is to strengthen cooperation with regional groups
and civil society.
The fourth is to develop better analysis and understanding
of sanctions and to focus on new tools, new ways that we can
exercise the tool to be more effective.
Finally, that U.N. sanctions have made an important
contribution to achieving U.S. policy objectives in Africa, but
to a limited degree and with some important unintended
consequences. It is a mixed record of effectiveness, but,
frankly, there are so few tools, between words and war, that
they will continue to be used. And we do have to be aware, I
think, as Secretary Lew has pointed out most recently, of the
tendency to use them automatically or without thought as part
of a broader strategy, which can lead to overuse.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
the effectiveness of African sanctions.
[Ms. Eckert's prepared statement can be found in the
Additional Material Submitted for the Record section of this
transcript.]
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Dr. Moss.
STATEMENT OF TODD MOSS, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER AND SENIOR
FELLOW, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Moss. Thank you, Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey.
I have three points today about the utility of targeted
bilateral U.S. sanctions, and I will conclude by highlighting
how each applies to the troubled case of Zimbabwe.
My first point is that U.S. bilateral sanctions are a
visible and potent signal from the world's most powerful
nation. If you steal elections, you do not get to send your
kids to school in Boston. If you rob public coffers, you do not
get to invest in California real estate. If you mistreat your
own people, you do not get to seek medical care in Houston
hospitals. Sanctions against the most oppressive, violent, and
kleptocratic regimes could even be used more frequently. For
example, I believe it is past time for the U.S. to take a hard
look at sanctions against political leaders in The Gambia.
Second point is that well-crafted and aggressively executed
targeted sanctions can have a significant impact on influencing
the decisions and policies of regimes and bad actors. Both
financial sanctions implemented by the Treasury Department and
travel sanctions imposed by the State Department can have
traceable effects when policymakers have very clear and
concrete objectives in mind, and especially when the
intelligence community is given the time and means to find
financial levers and vulnerabilities.
Third, regime change is the wrong metric for success. No
one claims, nor should anyone expect, that targeted bilateral
sanctions on their own will bring down a regime. Sanctions
complement, rather than replace, our other diplomatic,
economic, and military tools.
So, how do each of these points apply toward U.S. policy in
Zimbabwe? The current legislation, known as ZDERA, includes a
call for travel and economic sanctions against individuals,
specific individuals who are believed to be responsible for
violence and the breakdown of the rule of law in that country.
Point one. U.S. sanctions have been a very powerful and
visible bipartisan signal of U.S. policy of standing firm on
democracy. ZDERA was cosponsored by Senators from across the
political spectrum--Bill Frist, Jesse Helms, Russ Feingold, Joe
Biden, and Hillary Clinton. The executive branch sanctions
advocated by ZDERA were not directed at the country as a whole,
but aimed at specific individuals. Unfortunately, as of 2016,
none of the key ZDERA conditions have been met, either in
letter or in spirit. Those are restoring the rule of law,
holding free and fair elections, and depoliticizing the
security forces.
Point two. The lack of Zimbabwe's progress to date is not
an indicator that sanctions, per se, have failed. Zimbabwe's
decline continues primarily because of an entrenched highly
abusive regime combined with very unhelpful regional dynamics.
The European Union's weak and deeply misguided move last year
to lift most sanctions on Zimbabwe is not a path the United
States should follow.
Before we change course, we must ask whether the removal of
U.S. sanctions will advance U.S. policy goals or will the
removal play into the hands of the regime. In my view, lifting
sanctions at this time will merely strengthen Robert Mugabe and
the cabal around him by providing a major propaganda victory.
The regime will claim that it has vanquished its imperialist
oppressors and it now has formal American endorsement.
Point three. Sanctions against Zimbabwe would be much more
effective if they were embedded in a broader strategy that
included other tools of U.S. power and influence. The United
States has generally disengaged from Zimbabwe in recent years,
leaving our policy little more than sanctions plus humanitarian
assistance. Rather than throwing up our hands or acquiescing in
the face of difficulties, we must engage with allies to support
democratic forces in the country, rather than abandon them. The
sanctions list, itself, could be used more creatively to
encourage positive behavior and increase U.S. influence in a
post-Mugabe transition. In fact, the U.S. Government should be
preparing specific targets and options for further ratcheting
up pressure, which could be deployed, as necessary. This
absolutely must include the United States continuing to collect
information on certain politicians who, one day, should face
charges of embezzlement and war crimes.
Finally, one additional related point. Zimbabwe is today
taking steps to try to borrow again from the international
financial institutions. As the recent letter from Chairman
Corker to Treasury Secretary Lew makes clear, it is premature
for the United States to support any new lending to the
Government of Zimbabwe. Preconditions must include meaningful
reforms rather than simple technical targets.
Before asking for more funding from the international
community, Zimbabwe must also account for the billions of
dollars in missing diamond revenue. Most of all, the United
States should insist that Zimbabwe's government acknowledge and
take responsibility for gross human rights violations committed
by state agents, such as the Matabeleland massacres and, just
15 months ago, the abduction and probable murder of human
rights activist Itai Dzamara. Until the Government of Zimbabwe
has met the ZDERA conditions, it is not yet time for the U.S.
to abandon its targeted sanctions. More broadly across Africa,
sanctions will continue to be both a practical and symbolic
tool for U.S. policymakers, provided they are carefully
targeted, deployed among other policy tools, and not expected
to serve as a substitute for other actions.
Thank you.
[Mr. Moss's prepared statement can be found in the
Additional Material Submitted for the Record section of this
transcript.]
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin.
STATEMENT OF BRAD BROOKS-RUBIN, DIRECTOR OF POLICY, ENOUGH
PROJECT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin. Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey,
Senator Coons, I am grateful for the opportunity to testify on
this critical yet often misunderstood element of U.S. foreign
policy. And my statement, I think, will build on many of the
points my colleagues on the panel have made.
When once asked his opinion of Western civilization,
Mahatma Ghandi reportedly responded, ``I think it would be a
good idea.'' Men, women, and children across sub-Saharan Africa
pay a price every day for the unchecked violence and resource
theft committed by leaders who do not believe they will face
real consequences for their actions. Sanctions have become the
nonmilitary tool of choice of the U.S. Government to try to
deliver just those consequences across the globe. But, based on
my experience as a Treasury attorney advising the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, a State Department officer focused on
natural resources and conflict, a compliance advisor in the
private sector, and now at Enough, I see that sanctions in sub-
Saharan Africa have generally failed to achieve desired
impacts.
As of today, at least with respect to addressing conflicts
and violent kleptocracy across the continent, the problem with
sanctions and financial pressure is not that they are
ineffective, per se, but that they are not utilized as
effectively as possible in supporting U.S. efforts to promote
peace and human rights.
We are experiencing the cost of this in real time as our
influence wanes in countries like South Sudan and the DRC,
where conflicts now impact the region and the globe as a result
of migration, this despite spending billions of taxpayer
dollars in recent years to support humanitarian and
peacekeeping efforts. Our failure to use financial pressures
properly to develop meaningful leverage that imposes real costs
helps, in part, to explain this waning influence.
So, when asked my view of U.S. sanctions policy in sub-
Saharan Africa in 2016, I would respectfully invoke Gandhi and
say that it would be a good idea.
Sanctions can and do have beneficial impact when they are
carefully designed and strongly enforced. Treasury Secretary
Lew recently outlined the key elements of an effective modern
sanctions approach, including the need for clear policy goals,
investigators delivering financial intelligence analysis,
meaningful enforcement, and proactive sanctions relief. As
detailed in my testimony, however, almost none of these
elements is in place to support sub-Saharan African sanctions,
not because it is impossible, but because we do not devote the
necessary attention or resources, as we do not view these
countries through the serious economic lens they deserve.
At the Enough Project, we analyze five countries--Sudan,
South Sudan, the DRC, the Central African Republic, and
Somalia--each of which is subject to U.S. sanctions in some
form, through a lens of what we call ``violent kleptocracy,''
in which those in power and their networks of facilitators and
enablers hijack the state to engage in grand corruption and
foment violence. As the Panama Papers and the work of our
investigative initiative called the Sentry Show, these violent
kleptocracies depend on the international financial system,
particularly the U.S. dollar, as they engage in many of the
same types of transactions that narcotraffickers, terrorist
networks, WMD proliferators, and corrupt regimes in other parts
of the world use, and against which we have deployed the full
array of financial pressures. Because violent kleptocracies in
Africa all revolve around money, especially the dollar, we have
the power to disrupt them.
I set out in my testimony a six-part framework to ensure we
use sanctions effectively, which echo the sentiments of some of
my colleagues on the panel. That framework is: one, identify
clear policy goals; two, develop better financial intelligence;
three, employ modern sanctions tools beyond targeted listings;
four, build on the actions at key junctures; five, prioritize
enforcement; and six, keep sanctions temporary and mitigate
negative impacts.
In most cases, thorough analysis of African sanctions show
that they do not rate well against this framework. Yet. But, we
can take steps now to improve this and develop a more effective
and modernized approach. Some of the examples detailed in my
testimony include designation criteria designed to deliver
financial impact on high-level targets and enforcement actions
at key moments. In South Sudan, for example, two sanctioned
commanders have maintained U.S. dollar bank accounts in Kenya
and traveled openly in the region for months after they were
sanctioned. Other steps include enforcement action against this
in recent months could have been quite effective. Employ
sectoral and even secondary sanctions as needed when based on
clear intelligence to act on key economic vulnerability. Push
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN, to look
beyond drugs and terrorism when acting against money laundering
on the continent, something it has never done in sub-Saharan
Africa. Our research shows that both Congo and South Sudan
represent real opportunities for FinCEN to act against the
laundering of the proceeds of corruption and natural resource
trafficking. Issue strong messages against de-risking and
explain clearly how sanctions work and how they can evolve and
be nimble over time.
Finally, we believe Congress can play a strong role in
helping to move this effort forward by passing the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and by passing Senate
Resolution 479 introduced by Senators Markey, Durbin, and
Murphy, which call for targeted sanctions on President Kabila's
inner circle if the government does not organize free and fair
elections and adhere to its constitution. Appropriators should
allocate to Treasury and other agencies a greater share of
intelligence and investigative resources that can be dedicated
to sub-Saharan Africa, mirroring language released just today
in the House Financial Services and General Government Draft
Committee Report.
Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, we are fully aware
of the panoply of U.S. security concerns and interests, and we
are sanguine about where sub-Saharan Africa tends to rank, but
we are aware that sanctions represent a critical component in
our foreign policy toolbox, and believe they have not been used
to their full potential in sub-Saharan Africa. That approach
needs to change, and soon, if we are to use these tools most
effectively.
Thank you very much for the opportunity.
[Mr. Brooks-Rubin's prepared statement can be found in the
Additional Material Submitted for the Record section at the end
of this transcript.]
Senator Flake. Thank you all for your testimony.
I will start with 5 minutes of questioning--or 7 minutes--
and we will go from there.
Ambassador Lyman, you mentioned, when we met before, that--
and in your testimony--that sometimes the threat of sanctions
is more effective even than the sanctions, themselves. How is
that? Can you talk about that a minute?
Ambassador Lyman. For two reasons. Once you employ
sanctions, first of all, if they are targeted sanctions on
individuals, it is very hard to lift them anyway. If you are
targeting someone for their human rights violations, and then
the government does the right thing, are you really going to
lift the sanctions on that individual? So, how you link
targeted sanctions to political objectives is important to
think through.
Second, once you have put sanctions on, people start to
figure out how to evade them. And the longer they stay on, the
longer they do that. So, on the other hand, in looking at the
resolution that Senator Markey has introduced, if you are
saying that the U.S. is prepared look at sanctions across a
rather broad stream of people who are significant politically
as well as individually in their own actions, you are posing a
significant threat to the way that regime operates. But, if we
implement them without correlating support from the Africa
Union, from the Europeans, et cetera, they will not necessarily
have the same impact.
Right now, I think the threat is very important. When to
actually do that, seems to me, depends a lot on what other
pressures are coming to bear and how the regime is reacting.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Dr. Moss, with regard to Zimbabwe, what is the end game,
the sanctions that we have right now? What is the desired end
game and the likely end game?
Dr. Moss. Well, I think it still remains the conditions
contained in the ZDERA legislation, which is to get Zimbabwe
back on a democratic path and one of robust and equitable
economic growth and the rule of law. Now, those are pretty
broad goals. But, now, because our sanctions have been imposed,
that is part of the new political equilibrium. If we all of a
sudden say, ``Well, it has been 16 years, and Mugabe is still
in power, let us lift them,'' we are now actually injecting
that change into the political system there. That will be
interpreted as our--an abandonment of U.S. support for
democratic forces there. It will be abandoning some of our
leverage that we may have in a post-Mugabe transition, where we
can hold out the carrots of good actors. When a 92-year-old
leader is--has a fragile hold on power, he will start looking
for what actors like the United States are going to do when he
passes. And having the ability to use our sanctions to
encourage positive behavior in that period is something we
should not give up so quickly.
Senator Flake. Along those lines, how important is it that
the opposition and those likely to assume power after Robert
Mugabe leaves--how important is it that they see a consistent
application of sanctions or what might come on them if they do
not straighten up and fly right----
Dr. Moss. Yeah.
Senator Flake.--after they take control?
Dr. Moss. Well, I think we are at a moment where nobody
really knows what a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe will look like. There
are lots of possibilities there. Anyone who tells you they are
sure what it will look like, I think is--I would not give that
view too much credence.
But, the point is that we want to try to maximize our
leverage to try to encourage a positive outcome there. That
could mean offering carrots to members of the current regime
that want to have a better future. We have lifted sanctions
occasionally on actors that had them before, when they have
changed their behavior. And I think continuing to make those
signals out there are--is very important for the United States,
especially because there is such a high degree of uncertainty
of where the international community stands on Zimbabwe.
Senator Flake. Thanks.
Ms. Eckert, you mentioned regional organizations, the
importance there. Let us talk about the African Union for a
minute. Where--what examples do we have of effective sanctions
imposed by the African Union?
Ms. Eckert. Well, there are differences, in terms of
objectives. The objectives of the AU, SADC and ECOWAS are all
to restore democratically-elected governments. So, it is not
focused on human rights. This is according to the
constitutional basis of these organizations. But, they have
been important, because what they do is, they are focused on
the leaders, the individuals, so they actually apply the
sanctions and withhold them being able to attend regional
meetings, et cetera. So, it is different, in terms of how it is
applied, but we have a number of cases in which AU sanctions
preceded U.N. sanctions. So, the AU or ECOWAS was trying to
address the situation on the ground and went to the U.N. to
actually buttress the kind of message that was being sent and
the reason for those sanctions.
So, I think, in particular, the AU has taken a much greater
role in recent years of trying to reach out. Its Peace and
Security Committee. They have come to the Security Council on
occasion and asked for assistance in how you actually write
resolutions and how you implement and enforce, et cetera. And
there is not much there, frankly. And I think that this is a
tremendously lost opportunity, because we can work with those
countries, through the AU, to actually put in place more
effective means for implementing, not just AU sanctions, but
U.N. Security Council sanctions, above all. And the important
thing to remember, Why do we care about U.N. sanctions? It is
because, for most countries, it is the only legal basis for
those countries. It is a Chapter VII mandatory implementation,
so it is the only legal basis for so many countries to do
something on implementing these sanction measures, something
which is in our U.S. interest.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin, what do we need to be concerned about
with regard to implementation of sanctions against the DRC
right now? We have a situation--elections have been called for,
the Constitution requires them by the end of the year. In terms
of the timing of the threat of sanctions and then the actual
implementation, what concerns should we have, in terms of
lining up support from the international community, the EU, and
others? What should we be concerned about?
Mr. Brooks-Rubin. I think we should be concerned, first and
foremost, with delivering a clear message. The country of Congo
has never seen a peaceful transfer of power. And we are seeing
a move by the government to do everything in its power to avoid
holding that election. I think we know that President Kabila,
the enablers, the facilitators around him, have extremely deep
and vested interests. As Todd referenced, their children are
studying abroad, their networks are wide, and we need to
deliver a clear message now that that network can and will be
disrupted unless there is a clear move to a constitutional
transition of power. The longer it goes, and the less that the
regime feels like it will face real costs, the more likely we
are to see violence and repression begin. We need to move now
to make that message clear.
And certainly, with our--there are many differences within
the international community, but this is a moment for us to
lead and make clear what needs to be done and that our role in
this, because of the U.S. dollar and its role in the
international financial system, we have a strong impact to
make. And by leading and by demonstrating that this is what the
regime needs to do, we can bring other partners onboard. And if
we wait too long, things will descend very quickly.
Senator Flake. Right. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin, you referenced the resolution, which I
have introduced, calling for targeted sanctions on the DRC. And
that resolution calls for the sanctions to be done in
coordination with the African Union and with regional and
international partners, and with the United Nations,
specifically in the resolution. What impact do you think such
sanctions would have on President Kabila's decisionmaking? And
how do you think those types of sanctions would be received by
the people in Congo? Congo already has indigenous democratic
movements. So, it is not that we are trying to create those
institutions. They are already there. So, what do you think the
reaction would be?
Mr. Brooks-Rubin. Senator, I believe the reaction would
be--if they are implemented and enforced, and we can
demonstrate real meaning and real disruption of power, I think
the reaction on the ground would be tremendously positive. The
NGOs, the communities that we engage with as Enough, and that
our partners in other organizations engage with, demonstrate
that the Congolese people want a different path than what they
have experienced over the last more than 100 years.
In the opening remarks you gave referencing President
Obama's call on strong institutions, the Congolese people want
those strong institutions, they want to see a peaceful and
clear transition of power. They want to see that we can, and
the international community can, deliver that strong message.
We are already seeing arrests and detentions and violence
against protesters. And I think we have all seen, sadly, too
often what that results in. We need to be able to deliver that
message and to get to those movements that you reference now to
demonstrate that we can do something about this that has an
impact, that is more than just a message or more than is just
good intention. And I--by using some of the broader tools of
financial pressure and targeted sanctions at high-level
targets, we can do that.
Senator Markey. Mr. Moss, what do you think the reaction
would be in Congo if there were broad international sanctions
that were imposed upon the Congo government? How do you think
President Kabila's decisionmaking would be affected?
Dr. Moss. Yeah. So, I have no idea, in the case of the
Congo, what the effects of that would be. I find it plausible
that it would have the effects that Brad mentioned.
If I was a U.S. Senator trying to contemplate this, I would
want to know two things. One, what are the specific pressure
points that these sanctions are intended to hit? If there are
high-level targets, do we know where their accounts are? Do we
know where their businesses are? If the intelligence community
tells us that they are not going to be affected by targeted
sanctions, then we would not expect to see some of those
effects.
And second, I would want to see, from the administration,
how targeted sanctions fit within a broader strategy, and how
those pressure points are going to get us some of the steps
along the way of where U.S. policy is trying to go. The
sanctions are not embedded in a broader strategy and--that
seems credible--then we are doing something that just makes us
feel good, which can have important signaling effects and--but
are unlikely to really move the needle if we do not see those--
that context.
Senator Markey. Yeah.
Ms. Eckert, what do you think would happen if we, on an
international basis, imposed sanctions led by the United
States?
Ms. Eckert. I am not an Africa expert, so I will defer to
my colleagues on reading this, but I think that if the United
States was to take the leadership and continue to have the very
intensive discussions with the Europeans, getting them onboard,
I think that we have a very potent tool that we can use. I do
not know--I mean, given what we have seen in the past, in the
previous elections, in 2011, and the violence, I understand
well the State Department's concern about the unintended
consequence of these measures. And that is why I think, in
working on sanctions legislation, when I was here on the
House--on the Hill, on the House side, one of the most
effective things is not to mandate the sanctions, but to
underscore the importance and try to enhance the tool, and put
that in the hands of the policymakers.
I think that a concerted effort and leadership by the U.S.
and combined with the fact that we could actually get to some
of the assets, in particular, and the travel, I think would
send a very powerful message. I do not know exactly how Kabila
would respond. And I think that is the major fear of everyone
in the policy circles, is, we could be creating a worse
problem.
Senator Markey. Yeah. And again, my fear is not just how he
responds, but by every other nation subsequently as their
constitutions require them to leave. And so, we have to start
this someplace.
Ms. Eckert. That is right. And----
Senator Markey. We have to begin this effort. We just
cannot allow it to continue, domino after domino, to fall. Even
as these countries become more wealthy, they regress, in terms
of their democratic institutions. So, that wealth is something,
that influence which they have is something that we can target.
Mr. Lyman, you said it clearly has to be more than
bilateral, which I agree with you on. And I would love to get
your perspective on how to define the effectiveness of a
sanctions regime. Would you limit it to the ability to
influence a government or a group towards a specific result, or
is there also a value in communicating to a government or its
people that we, the United States, will not be seen as helping
a regime to violate the democratic or human rights of its
people or to break the peace of their society?
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you, Senator.
And this is my personal views. But, I think, first of all,
you have to ask, Why would President Kabila want to stay on? Is
it just for financial gain? Is it because he is worried about
retribution after he leaves? Is it something else? And if you
do not know that, you are not quite sure what kind of pressures
are going to be significant.
Second, we have a time factor here. His term is up in
December. It is not clear to me, given the complexity of the
DRC, that we could really impose and have far-reaching effect
on the government between now and December, by the time you
pass them, try to implement them, and the complexities of
commodity exchanges with neighboring countries, especially if
they are not cooperative.
So, the question is, What are we trying to do? And it seems
to me that the first thing we are trying to signal--we are
trying to signal, it seems to me, two things. One, continuation
in office is a destabilizing act and will lead to very
dangerous instability in the DRC. Second, we are signaling that
maintaining yourself in power by repressive techniques is
unacceptable. So, those are the two messages.
And then the question is, Can we rally enough support
around that, with the threat of sanctions or the readiness to
impose them, that the neighboring countries who would have to
participate in enforcing them and others will put that kind of
pressure and deal with whatever it is that is motivating
President Kabila to stay.
If this fails, if, come December, and he stays in power,
and things to start to get worse, then the objectives are a
little bit different. Then they become putting pressure on the
regime so that it cannot function very well, and then hopefully
it will step down.
So, I think we have to think about the timing, when those
things take effect, and how they will impact on the strategy
and politics of the neighboring countries in the Africa Union.
As I said earlier, I am troubled that the Africa Union is
not forceful and organized in this regard. There is another
point that Sue Eckert raised, which is very important if you
want to get to U.N. sanctions. The rule of thumb that we have
found is that, when the Africans are unified on wanting U.N.
sanctions, we can usually get them through. China and Russia
will not say no if the Africans say, ``This is what we want.''
But, when the Africans are divided, the Chinese and the
Russians say no. So, if you want to move this to U.N.
sanctions, for the reasons that Sue mentioned, then you have
really got to get the Africans united behind you.
Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Dr. Moss, let us talk for a minute about the relationship
between Congress and the administration, and where the impetus
for sanctions comes from. When I was in Zimbabwe a couple of
months ago, we met with the Foreign Minister, and he had the
letter in his hand that Chairman Corker had written with regard
to sanctions. He was obviously paying attention, as was the
government there, the letter saying, ``Do not, you know,
provide sanctions relief.'' What--is that the case across the
board? How many governments that we are talking about pay
attention to that? Where is it useful for Congress to be
pushing harder than the administration or give the
administration the flexibility to move? Can you talk about the
relationship a little between Congress and the administration?
Dr. Moss. Sure. I think it is very useful for Congress to
push the administration, which, maybe for other reasons, is
less motivated to take action. And that could be, you know--
there are lots of examples of that. However, I do think that
the ideal relationship is where Congress is giving a sense of
the legislature to the administration, giving them authorities
to take certain actions, but not overly prescribing them,
because it tends to be very blunt, it is hard to be creative
and selective, and it can actually wind up undermining U.S.
influence by constraining policymaker action.
Now, if you do not see policymakers being creative and
aggressive in pursuing what you see as U.S. interests, then you
might need to come over the top on that. I can understand that
frustration.
In the specific case that we are talking about in Zimbabwe,
the ZDERA legislation calls for the administration to consider
targeting top agitators for travel and financial sanctions. It
also--it is a separate piece that calls for--it is unrelated to
bilateral sanctions that it is calling for the U.S. to vote
against debt relief or new lending at the international
financial institutions. So, it is actually not the case--
although the Zimbabwean government does not quite understand
this--that they believe they cannot get loans from the World
Bank because of U.S. sanctions. That is not true. The reason
they cannot get loans from the World Bank is because they have
not been paying their World Bank loans, and they have
accumulated over a billion dollars in arrears, and the World
Bank will not lend to you if you owe back payments of--large
back payments.
So, the question now for the U.S. is, As Zimbabwe is trying
to figure out some accounting gimmicks to clear its arrears,
would we support new lending if they are able to clear that
hurdle? And that is why I believe Chairman Corker's letter was
very clear and very constructive.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Ambassador Lyman, kind of the same question. You have been
Ambassador to two very important African countries, you know,
with a history of sanctions. With regard to South Africa, the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Congress overrode a
presidential veto in that regard. Talk about the relationship
between Congress--can--I know that sometimes the State
Department will, obviously, want enabling or authorizing
legislation or simply ``cover'' so they can point to Congress
with these countries. When is that useful? How can Congress
play a constructive role and not undermine what the
administration would like to do, given what all of you have
talked about, about sanctions being used as a tool, as part of
a broader strategy?
Ambassador Lyman. First of all, let me draw on my
experience working on Sudan in--during the negotiations of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The tremendous value of both the
public's and the Congress's focus on this issue gave us much
more authority and leverage to play a role in those
negotiations than it would have been otherwise, because it was
clear that this was a U.S. high priority, and it was of concern
not just to someone in the administration or one element here,
but a broad concern of the United States.
What is troubling--and I have thought of this for a long
time--how little attention the United States, relatively, has
been given to the DRC, which--civil wars there have taken over
5 million deaths, and it is such an important country. So, the
fact that the Congress--you and Senator Markey and others--are
raising the importance of this and making it a priority for the
United States, I think is very helpful. And if I were in the
administration, I would think it is very helpful.
Now, I do think, as Todd spoke, you want to be encouraging
the administration, you want to--supporting what they are
trying to do, if they are trying to do this, and you want to
have a discussion with them as to how what you are doing here
can reinforce what they are doing there, and then see how the
two can reinforce each other. And I think, in those cases, it
is very important.
Clearly, the congressional enactment of sanctions on South
Africa came at a very critical time at the end of the Cold War,
when we were looking at South Africa much more in terms of the
anti-apartheid movement, and it sent a very strong signal and
was part of a larger process. Here, I think you are signaling
to the administration that Congress cares about this issue
that, as Senator Markey said, some of the actions going on
there are unacceptable. I think that bolsters the role of the
administration with its allies and in the field.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Ms. Eckert, do you have any thoughts on this?
Ms. Eckert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I confess to some tugging, because, having been on both
sides, but being both on the staff side----
Senator Flake. Right.
Ms. Eckert [continuing]. And working on sanctions
legislation on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and then
being in the position of implementing, in the Clinton
administration----
Senator Flake. That is why I am asking you. [Laughter.]
Ms. Eckert [continuing]. Where you stand depends on where
you sit----
Senator Flake. Right.
Ms. Eckert [continuing]. Or vice versa. But, I think that
what is most important is that for them not to be opposed. In
other words, to have outright opposition, to have the sanctions
with so little flexibility that the executive branch feels that
its hands are too bound, that it cannot conduct adequate
foreign policy, puts everyone in the bad position of sending a
mixed signal. And I think that is what we have seen in the
past, on a number of cases in which it just undermines the
sanctions. We send a mixed message. We are not effective at
achieving the goals. And, frankly, people have used that, in
terms of rally-round-the-flag effect, and it undermines the
credibility and effectiveness of the sanctions.
I think that the reinforcing nature can be quite important.
And I think, frankly, what you are doing here today--there are
so few hearings and so little focus on African sanctions and
how to make those more effective, so I think that this is a
tremendous way of trying to get the executive branch to focus,
to have a broader understanding in the public of why these are
important, and how and why they can be effective.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin, do you have any thoughts?
Mr. Brooks-Rubin. I do, thank you.
Yeah, having been in the executive branch, there is
something of a sort of natural reaction, but I am certainly
learning a lot from being on the other side. And I think there
are a few very key things that Congress can do.
As I mentioned, passing Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act is key. I mentioned, in my statement,
appropriations to Treasury and other agencies. A lot of what we
have talked about is developing the right intelligence and
having the right resources devoted to this. At the moment, they
are not, partially because the agencies now do not see that
it--they do not feel that kind of public and congressional
importance that Ambassador Lyman referenced. That needs to
come--we are certainly trying to do as much as we can, but
Congress can deliver an important message.
There are a lot of very good working-level staff who have a
lot of very good ideas about what can be done on these
programs. They need senior leadership to devote the resources
to them. And so, maybe that is--some additional appropriations.
But, then you can also hold them to account. When sanctions are
renewed and a part of the legislation that underlies sanctions
requires Treasury and other agencies to report to Congress on
how they are implementing and what they are doing, hold those
to account. There is often, you know, a sense that those--there
is a lot of very good information in there, and a lot of very
good material that Congress could use to really push Treasury.
We saw, in the Iran context, that a lot of the very
creative tools that are now in place and that really played a
role in moving that process forward came from Congress and
really pushed the administration to think more creatively. What
they have done in the Russia and Ukraine context, again, a lot
of very good ideas and being pressed to be creative and get out
of the rut. And I think the rut that we are in with respect to
sub-Saharan African sanctions can be moved--that needle can be
moved quite a bit by clear direction from Congress.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin, you suggest, in your testimony, that one
of the key shortcomings in our current approach to sanctions in
sub-Saharan Africa is the unwillingness to use them at critical
moments to build leverage. The elections in Congo are
approaching very rapidly. This is a key juncture in the whole
history of popular democracy in Africa. Congo is a big, big
country. It sends signals to an entire region. So, could you
give us your thoughts on the appropriate timing for sanctions
in DRC?
Mr. Brooks-Rubin. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, One of the contrasts between sanctions in sub-Saharan
Africa and sanctions in other contexts is often the willingness
to back off at key moments and sort of wait for the next
moment, the next process, which then, too often, does not come.
We saw this just unfold in South Sudan, where there were months
and months of delay of implementation of the peace agreement,
and more violence and more looting by corrupt officials, always
waiting.
Senator Markey. You are saying in sub-Saharan Africa, in
Sudan, we did not act at the appropriate time. When the crisis
was about to arrive, was building, we stood on the sidelines.
And that is a mistake. If you extrapolate that over now into
Congo with their elections on the way, knowing the
ramifications in Kenya and other countries, if an example is
set, which will be hard, then to say is something that the next
country should not do.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin. Yeah. Agreed. I think now is the time to
deliver that message. At--we cannot act soon enough. I helped
to coordinate the executive order on Congo sanctions in 2006,
and we did a lot of scurrying around for the right message
then, and the right things to do, and we waited. And then I was
at State in 2011, and again we waited, and we had kind of a
muddled response to that election. Here we are again.
It is time to act on this, because it is not just this
election. We have seen this movie before, sadly. And the time
is now to act.
And, you know, at every key moment in the Iran negotiation
process, we issued an enforcement or designation process to
deliver the message of accountability, ``In order for this
process to be serious, we are going to take a step and show you
that we will hold you to account if you do not move forward.''
And I think we need to do the same with Congo.
Senator Markey. Okay, thank you.
Back to you, Ambassador Lyman, if we could.
And we thank each of you for being here. You each have
distinguished careers. And I know Sue Eckert from the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, where she was an excellent,
excellent staffer.
The role of Congress, Mr. Lyman. The executive branch could
take action, if they wanted to, but what role do you think
Congress can play in helping to reinforce that point with any
country that we are trying to send a strong signal that the
United States wants a change in course of action?
Ambassador Lyman. Well, Senator, I would say, as I
indicated earlier, I think it signals that these are issues
that are of relevance to the American public, which you
represent. And therefore, it says something more than just the
administration. The administration obviously represents people.
But, it sends a very strong signal. I think it strengthens the
hand of American diplomacy. Yes, there are questions of, you
know, how much leeway you give and leverage you give each--you
know, the administration operating. But, I think the role of
Congress, as others here have said, in calling attention to the
issue, saying it is important to the Congress, ``The Congress
is prepared to consider some very tough legislation''--I think
this is very important.
I do think that we want to be--and I would hope Congress is
very clear on what it is that we are looking for here and what
it is that Congress wants to see. And--because one of the
problems of sanctions is, When do you lift them, and under what
circumstances do you lift them? It is often harder to lift them
than to put them on. So, the clearer it is as to what we are
aiming for and what any sanctions would be aimed at would be
very helpful.
But, on the whole, I think what you are doing is
strengthening not only public attention to this, but, in my
view, strengthening the hands--Tom Perriello and others in the
administration who, I think, are working along the same lines
for the same objectives.
Senator Markey. And I agree with you. And, you know, from
this committee's perspective, or back when I was in the House,
I was always a very strong supporter of sanctions on Iran, just
to send the signal that this was just not some diplomat coming
from the State Department, but the Congress itself was making
sure to emphasize their need to change their behavior. Many
administrations objected to passing those sanctions. We know,
ultimately, that is what led to the final agreement that
diplomats could reach.
So, could you each kind of try to deal with this question?
Because the resolution that I have introduced has no actual
specific prescription for what the sanctions regime should look
like. What, in your opinions, would be the best way to craft
sanctions, knowing that it should be international in nature?
What should it look like, in your opinions, if you want to
start signaling to the Congo Government as soon as possible
that we are serious?
Mr. Lyman? Or Ms. Eckert? Let us start with you, Ms.
Eckert.
Ms. Eckert. Thank you, Senator Markey.
There are things to go beyond legislation. And I think that
hearings are very important, and having the legislation out
there, and the threat of sanctions, is extremely important.
Some of the most uncomfortable positions I was in, in the
executive branch, was when I was called up for briefings that
were not public. And it got into very detailed, ``What are the
plans? How are we going to do this?'' And it was an engagement,
I think, that was constructive for the purpose of how we were
going to move forward. So, nonpublic oversight, I think, is
extremely important.
Another is the use of sanctions, in terms of resources. I
am very fond and supportive of my colleagues at the Treasury
Department, but the State Department has labored for years with
increasing sanctions and no additional resources. And they are
drowning. Because we have so many sanctions regimes, the
activity level has increased significantly--they do not have
the resources to do some of this. So, I think you send a strong
signal with regard to your seriousness of sanctions by
increasing staff, by increasing attention, even high-level
engagement. We have a sanctions coordinator at State, which is
relatively new in this administration, but it is focusing
almost exclusively on Russia or, you know, on Iran previously.
It is very difficult, because these sanctions get left behind.
All the African sanctions do not have a strong advocate. We do
not even have someone in the National Security Council whose
job is to deal with sanctions.
Senator Markey. There is no one on the National Security
Council whose job it is to deal with sanctions?
Ms. Eckert. Not specifically sanctions. They deal with it
through the bureaus, the regional bureaus. But, again, if you
had some higher-level focus, both within agencies and also
within the NSC mechanism, it brings a seriousness to better
coordination.
The final thing I would just say is that talking about
these issues and educating the American public, I think, is
incredibly important, because most do not understand how
important it is, what is happening there.
So, clarity of purpose, as the Ambassador said, and not
moving the goalposts. Be clear about what it is we are trying
to achieve. All of these things help.
As to timing, we have to get the AU and the countries and
the neighbors onboard. And I think that may take some time, but
that is critically important.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Ms. Eckert.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin. Thank you, Senator.
To be specific on what some of those sanctions measures
could be, again, I think we are talking about using whatever
financial intelligence we have to go at the high level, both
targets within the government and their enablers and their
facilitators. And, as I said, too often there is not that
intelligence inside the government. The research that we are
doing as Sentry and that other NGOs are doing, should be used
to get at those targets. And again, in the narcotics sanctions,
you rarely see a narcotics sanctions designation with one
entity. They designate a network. They find the key nodes of
networks. We need to take the same approach with respect to
Congo, identifying the key nodes and the networks that
President Kabila and those in his regime are using, that then
enable subsequent action.
I think the financial crimes enforcement network at FinCEN
is--it is high time that they were asked to take specific
action. It can start with a--they have a lot of authority to
request information that can prompt due diligence and
information-gathering that law enforcement can use. Let us ask
them to issue an advisory or a request--a private request to
other governments and financial institutions--they have access
to thousands of institutions--to get information on accounts
related to the regime that we can then act upon and demonstrate
that we can seize assets, freeze assets. That is what will send
a message locally. And I think there is----
Senator Markey. Okay. And I--I am going to run out of time
here.
Mr. Brooks-Rubin. Oh, sure.
Senator Markey. I would just apologize to you.
Mr. Moss, do you have a quick set of suggestions?
Dr. Moss. Yeah, I would just make the point that if
Congress is trying to send a signal to the Congolese and trying
to motivate the executive branch, the legislation should be as
broad and clear as possible. I think you only need to get into
specificity if that is necessary for policymakers, if they need
those tools to do what they are trying to do already. And that
is Ambassador Lyman's point--if it is not supportive of what
the administration is trying to do, that needs to get worked
out. You are not going to be able to over-legislate something
the State Department does not want to do.
Senator Markey. Although I would say that we did over-
legislate on sanctions on Iran. And ultimately, coordination
caught up. So, I would say that that was the sequence there.
But, I would hope, here, that it would all be done together, in
conjunction. And I think there is a common goal, here, to make
sure that Kabila and the Congo get that message.
And, Mr. Lyman, can I just ask you to quickly respond? The
Chairman has been very indulgent with me.
Ambassador Lyman. On this question, I do think that
sometimes it is a good-cop/bad-cop thing, like you mentioned on
the Iran thing, that works. But, here, if the administration is
really working toward the same objective and willing to put
pressure on, I think probably you want to work in close
support.
But, I think, again, the timing is important. We only have
a few months. So, the more coordinated effort that can be put
together in the next few months, it seems to me, is critical.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Senator Flake. Thank you, to all of you. This has been
incredibly informative.
This subject has been one that I have followed for a long
time, and had some experience with. I spent a year in Africa,
in Namibia, 1989-90. It was a time that--there was a transition
going on in South Africa. Sanctions were lifted, the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was being lifted in South
Africa. And, after Namibia's independence, those sanctions were
also--because of Namibia's governance by South Africa, Namibia
was included. But, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act did not
mention Namibia specifically by name, as well it should have
been. Several state and local governments around the country
actually mentioned Namibia by name. Those sanctions remained on
the books for years afterwards. And it became troublesome,
because sometimes lower-level bureaucrats in a city office or
state office, when it was the sale of some good from Namibia,
they might say, ``No, this contract cannot be had, because
sanctions are still applied.''
And so, these are important, and we have often used
sanctions in the past, particularly in Africa, with smaller
countries, like Namibia, kind of in a driveby fashion, and have
forgotten about them afterwards. Gratefully, not the Congress,
in that case.
But, this is very helpful as we move forward, particularly
given the timely nature of this discussion with regard to the
DRC. So, we appreciate the testimony you have given here today.
And you have----
Ms. Eckert. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to correct the
record, because I have just heard that, in fact, there may be a
person at the NSC who is very much a leader on sanctions, who
has come down from U.S./U.N. And if that is the case, I think
that that is very good news. But, before that point, there was
no one who was addressing sanctions specifically.
Senator Flake. Let the record note.
And thank you all.
The hearing record, for the benefit of members and staff,
will remain open til Friday. If the questions come to you, if
you could respond in a timely fashion, it would be appreciated.
And, with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Ambassador (RTD) Princeton N. Lyman
Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for holding this hearing. It is an honor to
appear before you today to present my views on U.S. sanctions policy in
Sub-Saharan Africa. The views I express today are my own and not those
of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP).
Africa has been far and away the target of more sanctions from the
UN, the European Union (EU), and the U.S. than any other continent.
Most of these sanctions and related restrictions are aimed at resolving
conflicts, and in recent years these have been overwhelmingly civil
wars. Only two sanctions regimes in Africa have been aimed at inter-
state war, between Ethiopia and Eritrea and between Eritrea and
Somalia. While aimed at threats to international peace and security,
sanctions have increasingly targeted individuals for gross human rights
violations and in a few cases for leading unconstitutional usurpations
of power, recognizing that these factors impinge directly on the
intensity and duration of conflicts. These targeted restrictions have
also largely replaced the use of broad based economic sanctions that
have had a negative impact on the populations of affected countries.
Both kinds of sanctions have nevertheless been used in Africa and are
worthy of evaluation as to their effectiveness.
I was asked to address four questions in my testimony.
Before doing so, let me state my general view of sanctions:
1. They are a tool, not a policy. Without a larger strategic framework
and set of supporting activities, they are not likely to
achieve their objectives.
2. Sanctions work best when they are supported by the international
community. Individual country sanctions, by the U.S. for
example, can be effective where the U.S. has particular
advantages, but by and large targeted regimes or individuals
will find ways around them if they are not more widely
enforced.
3. Sanctions have worked best when aimed at a specific outcome, such
as a peace agreement, or ending one country's support for war
in a neighboring country as with Rwanda's support for rebels in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). But sanctions,
especially by themselves, have least effect if the objective is
to pressure dictatorial regimes to give up power, or in their
eyes, to commit political suicide. Only in combination with
engagement, and organized and effective domestic democratic
pressure can sanctions help lead to transitions to democracy.
Let me now turn to the questions put to me for this hearing.
First, what is the recent track record of sanctions in Africa? Have
they proven a useful tool in achieving our policy objectives? Have they
had unintended consequences?
There has been a wide array of sanctions applied in Africa in
recent years, to include arms embargoes, targeted sanctions on
individuals, restricting trade of commodities that support combatants,
and travel restrictions. There are several instances where, together
with other steps and activities, these have been effective. In Angola,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire, restrictions on the trade in
diamonds and other commodities weakened rebel or anti-democratic
forces, and facilitated either their defeat or their agreement to
peace. But without supporting actions, sanctions alone would not have
been sufficient. In Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire,
international troops were necessary to finally defeat the targeted
elements. A similar combination of targeted sanctions and international
peacekeepers has reduced and contained the conflict in the Central
African Republic (CAR), but it is too soon to know if peace will be
secured there.
At the same time, sanctions have not produced the depth of
political transition needed in Sudan, nor the end of autocracy in
Zimbabwe. While most sanctions on Sudan are directed specifically to
the conflict in Darfur and more recently that in Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile, it is generally recognized that without a political
transformation in Sudan, these conflicts are unlikely to be resolved.
Yet sanctions, however they have impacted the economy and isolated the
regime, have not led the regime to undertake fundamental reform. Some,
like the organization ENOUGH, have proposed more sanctions, especially
better targeted and enforced financial sanctions to move the regime.
But there is little international support that would complement such
U.S. action. And U.S. sanctions alone will not convince a regime to
undertake what it still sees as losing power. A much more sophisticated
policy, that includes both the existing sanctions and the clear
prospect of how sanctions would be lifted, engagement with the regime
and opposition elements, and support for civil society, will be
necessary to affect such transformation.
Second, what is the relationship between international and U.S.
sanctions in Africa? Is one more effective than the other, or must they
be combined to achieve success?
As I indicated earlier, sanctions which have widespread
international support prevent targeted states or individuals from
evading sanctions or finding alternative sources of support to lessen
their effect. Politically, moreover, a multilateral regime ties any
individual sanctions to a broader strategy with valuable partners aimed
at addressing the conflict or other matter at which sanctions are
aimed. Finally, different states and institutions have particular
sources of leverage and influence that can be brought to bear on the
targets of the sanctions.
U.S. comparative advantage in applying sanctions derives from our
major role in banking and other financial institutions. Asset freezes,
sanctions against doing business with targeted individuals or
companies, and restricting investment in sanctioned regimes all are
instruments which the U.S. wields with particular effect. Moreover, the
U.S. has recently made more use of secondary sanctions, i.e.,
sanctioning or threatening to sanction institutions in other countries
for doing business with those the U.S. has sanctioned. The U.S. also
plays a major role in shaping UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. The
U.S. has held the ``pen" in such cases more than any other UNSC member.
It is significant, however, that most UN sanctions in Africa have
proceeded from recommendations, and prior action, by the African Union
(AU) or a sub-regional body like the Economic Community Of West African
States (ECOWAS). Of 43 African targeted sanctions packages, regional
African organizations are involved in 41, or 95 per cent. In the
initiation of UN Security Council sanctions packages, seven of the
first fourteen African were preceded by regional sanctions.
African engagement reduces the likelihood of the sanctions being
evaded by the targeted individuals. It also ties sanctions into other
efforts in the region to overcome the conflict. Moreover, when Russia
and China recently became more aggressive in opposing sanctions, a
unified African recommendation for them is virtually essential to
obtain UNSC approval. When African organizations or regional powers are
divided, as they are currently over South Sudan, it is not possible to
get Russian and Chinese support for sanctions.
The other side of this relationship is when sanctions lose their
appeal, especially when they go on for long periods of time without
effect or when African countries do not agree with the objective.
African countries are less likely to enforce the sanctions regime. We
see this in growing African unhappiness with the indictments of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and thus more African countries
willing to invite Sudan President Omar el Bashir to visit. Sudan's
foreign policy switch from close relations with Iran to providing
troops to help Saudi Arabia in Yemen has led to more Arab financial
support for Sudan despite heavy U.S. sanctions designed to inhibit such
financing. South Africa which has the most outside influence on the
situation in Zimbabwe, has never gone along with Western sanctions on
the country, which are focused on internal political practices and
human rights. South Africa is more concerned about the danger of
economic or political collapse in Zimbabwe, which would heavily impact
South Africa. More broadly, President Mugabe recently served as the
elected Chairman of the African Union. U.S. and EU sanctions are thus
of questionable effect.
EU sanctions are nevertheless quite significant in Africa overall.
While working hand in hand with the UN, but also often preceding UN
action, EU sanctions have been focused on promoting human rights and
support for democracy, whereas UN sanctions are directed to issues of
peace and security. By 2013, the EU had applied 22 sanctions regimes
against 19 African states, utilizing the Common Foreign and Security
Policy adopted in 1992, and more important in Africa, the benefits
under the Cotonou Agreement which governs trade and economic
assistance. EU sanctions often work in concert with African Union
sanctions in cases of unconstitutional seizures of power. The
suspension of EU aid has been particularly effective in this regard.
The EU has an advantage over the U.S. in the use of aid as a lever.
U.S. aid to Africa has become increasingly dominated by HIV/AIDS and
emergency humanitarian aid, neither of which lends itself to being cut
off for political or even security objectives.
Third, are certain types of sanctions (i.e., arms embargoes vs.
financial asset freezes) more effective than others in Africa? In what
political contexts are they most effective?
Sadly, arms embargoes do not have a good track record. The
literature suggests that without strong enforcement, especially by
neighboring countries and countries with active arms exporters, they
fail to reduce the level or intensity of conflict. And such enforcement
is rare. That is one reason the U.S. and others have been hesitant to
enact an arms embargo on South Sudan. Not only are the neighboring
countries in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),
which is also the institution directing the peace process in South
Sudan, divided over this issue, individuals in some of those countries
are actively involved in selling arms to one or the other of the
contending parties.
As Guy Lamb, author of an Institute for Security Studies paper on
enforcement of arms embargoes in Africa, pointed out some years ago:
In the majority of case studies . . . it was states bordering
countries targeted by the sanctions regimes, along with some
arms-producing states in Europe and Asia that were largely
responsible for embargo contraventions. In many of the cases,
when the panels of experts sought to investigate allegations of
arms embargo infringements, their efforts were frustrated by
the governments concerned. Numerous reports by panels of
experts bemoaned the lack of co-operation and even deliberate
obstruction to conceal information, by state authorities and
commercial enterprises that had been implicated in embargo-
busting activities.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Guy Lamb, ``Beyond `Shadow-Boxing' and `Lip Service,' '' 2007,
12,
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper135.pdf.
Moreover, some such embargoes are practically unenforceable. The
embargo on arms reaching rebel groups in Darfur, not an embargo on arms
entering Sudan, is one glaring example.
Since the mid-1990s, targeted economic sanctions have become the
preferred form of sanctions. That is because broad sanctions on a
country that affect imports of vital products, restrictions on
investment and trade, and other broad economic sanctions, have had a
disproportionate impact on the population, less on the regime or
rebels. Nevertheless, looking back on the sanctions placed on cocoa
exports from Cote d'Ivoire, diamond exports from Liberia and Sierra
Leone, and general economic sanctions on Sudan in the final stages of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, one can argue that they had
significant positive effect on the outcome in those cases. However,
their effectiveness wears off as regimes learn to accommodate to them,
evade them, or simply allow their people to suffer or migrate. Sudan is
a case in point. Zimbabwe is another.
Targeted sanctions, particularly financial ones and travel bans,
have become steadily more sophisticated and effective, especially when
enforced by the U.S. and its specialists in the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and other
parts of the U.S. government. They are aimed more at individuals than
regimes or countries at large. Thus their impact is often to isolate
individuals guilty of gross human rights violations, and in some cases
achieve accountability as with those individuals sent to the ICC from
the DRC. But because they are aimed at individuals, their effect on
regimes may be limited. It depends on the roles those individuals play
in their governments or organizations, the degree to which they are
easily replaceable, and the extent that they have either assets abroad
that are affected or any desire to travel. Beyond the specific
individuals targeted, such sanctions may also act as a warning to
others in the regime, especially top leaders who the international
community are hesitant to target lest it complicate the peace process,
but who still remain vulnerable. This is the aim in South Sudan.
The record of wider effects are nevertheless mixed. Reports from
the CAR suggest the threat of more targeted sanctions had some impact.
But in Sudan, indictment by the ICC of several top officials for their
part in the genocide in Darfur, have not prevented them from continuing
in government positions at senior levels. The same is true of some of
those targeted in South Sudan. While not a scientific conclusion, when
one looks at the thousands of names on various UN, U.S. and other
targeted sanctions lists, one can wonder if the overall impact on the
actions of regimes and armed institutions has been proportionally very
great.
That leads to the question of political contexts. Right now, the
U.S., and other countries and institutions are wrestling with whether
to impose additional targeted sanctions on individuals in the DRC. The
immediate justification is these individual's roles in human rights
violations. But the longer term aim is to pressure President Kabila to
abide by the constitutional limit on his presidency and to step down in
December of this year rather than thrust his country into what could be
widespread instability and chaos. Human rights violations are a
rightful cause in-and-of themselves, but the broader message of such
sanctions would be that the regime must stop using repression to
maintain the president in power.
But targeted sanctions will have little impact on the ultimate
objective without a broadly based, unified international diplomatic
effort to convince the regime to abide by the constitutional limit.
Such a concerted effort is not yet in place. The African Union has yet
to weigh in on this matter, divided over how to address concrete
instances of regime ``extensions." It stumbled over this issue in
Burundi. Countries surrounding the DRC also have competing interests in
the mineral rich country with its many ethnic rivalries and frequent
uprisings abetted from abroad. African countries fought on both sides
in the previous two ``African World Wars" in the DRC. Without consensus
within the African Union, it will be hard to exert the political
pressure that uniquely resides within Africa through its former
presidents and other political leaders to influence President Kabila to
change what appears to be his present course. Without such consensus,
other sanctions would not be enforceable.
The answer to the current crisis in the DRC is to raise it to a
high level of international concern and debate, within the African
Union and the UN. The threat to instability and renewed civil war
should be analyzed jointly by the UN, the AU, and the institutions of
neighboring countries. DRC officials should be held to account for how
they plan to address the crisis and demonstrate that they have a
realistic path to an election and stability. As consensus is developed
on both the threat and the means for engaging and pressuring the
regime, agreement can be reached on the role of sanctions as one tool
in that undertaking. Should the fragile peace process in South Sudan
fail, a similar process should be undertaken.
Four, are we now over- or under-using sanctions in Africa?
It is easy to reach for the sanctions box when conflict erupts, or
terrible human rights violations occur. Sanctions make us feel we are
doing something. Sanctions, especially targeted financial and other
economic sanctions, allow concerned nations to withhold direct
participation in, and even indirect support to, what is happening. But
sanctions are a tool, they are not a policy. Without a policy, without
a strategy for dealing with what in most cases is a complex political
and social situation, they are of limited impact.
Sanctions, moreover, are most effective if aimed at a fairly
specific objective, i.e., a cease-fire, humanitarian access, or
participation in a peace process. The more sanctions are linked to
long-term processes of transformation, which could drag on for years,
they are less likely to have an effect and support for them will wane.
Further, the more sanctions aim at or demand processes that threaten
the political survival of those in power, the less they will be
effective. That may not be very satisfactory, but true nevertheless.
Rulers will resist the latter at almost any cost, including those to
their people. On the other hand, more specific demands such as cease-
fires or peace negotiations may serve the survival interest of the
regime. Sudan agreed to the allow South Sudan the right of self-
determination and ultimately independence, because it saw continuation
of the civil war depleting its resources, preventing it from coming out
of economic and political isolation, and even allowing for a stronger
internal base for the regime. As President Bashir commented after the
separation: without the troublesome south, Sudan could now be a unified
Islamic country. This proved not to be true, but he believed it at the
time.
Nevertheless, longer term political transformations are often the
desired outcome in many countries. Underlying problems of
marginalization, repression, and other grievances are very likely to
recur in violence after a piece-meal peace agreement. But for political
transformations to occur, a different strategy is needed than that
which ended the conflict. It may include sanctions, but carefully
layered ones that can be removed as steps toward transformation are
taken. A transformation strategy must also include engagement with
leaders, opposition figures, civil society, neighboring countries, and
regional experts. It should encourage the belief that transformation
need not be a zero sum game, as it has not been in many other
transforming countries such as South Korea, Indonesia, and Brazil.
Political transformation requires the development of truly democratic
political parties to govern in a transformed polity: democratic and
inclusive as Nelson Mandela demonstrated in South Africa. These are the
strategies necessary for countries like Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and
others where democratic transformation is essential, but a delicate
process.
Let me conclude with an emphasis on building indigenous democratic
political parties and institutions as an essential part of
transformation strategies. I remember in 1995 when a delegation of
Nigerian activists came to see Nelson Mandela, then president of South
Africa, to appeal for his support for international oil sanctions
against the regime of Sana Abacha. They pointed out that sanctions had
helped bring about the end of apartheid in South Africa. Mandela
replied, ``Yes, sanctions were helpful. But they would not have been
sufficient if there were not a strong indigenous democratic movement in
South Africa. Until you have that in Nigeria, sanctions will not
help.'' Fortunately, today there is a strong democratic movement in
Nigeria and a remarkable electoral process just took place. Let us hope
we find the right combination of instruments to help that process
emerge in other countries whose people yearn for it.
The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and
not the U.S. Institute of Peace.
__________
Prepared Statement of Sue E. Eckert
Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the effectiveness of targeted sanctions in Africa. I applaud
you for addressing this important instrument of U.S. and international
peace and security policy, one that does not often receive adequate
attention.
My comments today are based on my previous experience as Assistant
Secretary of Commerce responsible for regulating dual use goods and
technology, as well as more recent academic research and initiatives to
strengthen the instrument of UN sanctions. The Watson Institute for
International and Public Affairs at Brown University has been engaged
in research on UN targeted sanctions for more than 15 years,
collaborating with Member States and the Secretariat to make such
measures more effective. Along with colleagues at The Graduate
Institute in Geneva, we formed the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC),
an international group of scholars and practitioners conducting a
comprehensive and comparative analysis of the impacts and effectiveness
of UN sanctions, which resulted in publication of the book, Targeted
Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action this
April. In addition to developing new qualitative and quantitative
databases on the universe of UN sanctions (which also resulted in an
online tool, SanctionsApp), I also helped to organize with colleagues
at Compliance and Capacity Skills International, the High Level Review
of UN Sanctions which focused on strengthening implementation of UN
sanctions. In this capacity, I've had the opportunity to engage with
and international policymakers, national regulators, and civil society
involved in UN and U.S. sanctions. The views expressed today, however,
are my own, and are not necessarily endorsed by any entity or
colleagues with whom I am affiliated.
Due to time constraints and the wealth of experience of other
witnesses, my statement will focus on the effectiveness of UN sanctions
in addressing threats to international peace and security in Africa. I
am happy to provide any additional information, including greater
statistical analysis based upon our book and other initiatives
addressing aspects of U.S. sanctions.
Evolution of UN Sanctions \1\
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\1\ For more detailed discussion of the evolution of UN targeted
sanctions, see ``The Role of Sanctions'' in The UN Security Council in
the 21st Century.
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The past quarter century has witnessed a significant transformation
in the use of UN targeted sanctions. Instead of comprehensive economic
embargoes such as the one employed against Iraq in the early 1990s with
resulting injurious humanitarian consequences, the Security Council
deliberately shifted to ``targeted" or ``smart" sanctions as a means of
focusing measures on the decision-makers and their principal supporters
responsible for violations of international norms. All UN sanctions
since 1994 have been targeted in some manner.
As global threats have evolved, innovation in the design and
application of UN sanctions has ensued. From the original focus on
primarily cross-border attacks and civil wars in Africa, the rationale
for sanctions has expanded to encompass prevention of new forms of
human rights violations (such as sexual and gender-based violence and
recruitment of child soldiers), thwarting the development of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems, stemming terrorism,
countering the financing of conflict through exploitation of natural
resources or criminal activities, controlling natural resources to
prevent exploitation of mineral development, restoring democratically
elected governments, and countering violent extremism. At the same
time, UN sanctions are increasingly used along with other crisis
management tools--diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, referrals to
international judicial processes, as well as the imposition of
sanctions by entities other than the UN, including regional groups as
well as individual countries.
With UN sanctions targeting specific goods, services, individuals
and entities, new issues have arisen over time--the need to ensure that
UN sanctions are reconciled with the rule of law, particularly respect
for due process and human rights; the focus on nonstate actors; new
expert mechanisms to monitor implementation; and greater reliance on
the private sector to implement sanctions, requiring new partnerships
and strategies to ensure effectiveness. These institutional dynamics
reflect the need for the Security Council, the Secretariat and UN
agencies, Member States, and related international actors to adapt
continually to the intricacies of new threats to international peace
and security.
Objectives and Types of UN Sanctions in Africa \2\
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\2\ See also Appendices 2 and 3 for more detail on the primary
objectives of UN African sanctions and a chart on African states
subject to UN and African regional sanctions.
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Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security
Council imposes sanctions to maintain or restore international peace
and security. Sanctions have been used for a variety of purposes, and
have expanded over time as the Security Council has encountered a
broader array of threats to international peace and security. Sanctions
have been used to neutralize spoilers in conflict and peacekeeping
contexts, and the Council has signaled its intention to sanction
recruiters of child soldiers, suspected pirates, and groups using
natural resources, including wildlife products, to finance conflict.
Sanctions have also been focused on actors disrupting peace agreements
and peacekeeping missions, those involved in unconstitutional changes
of government (Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau). Today,
the UN utilizes sanctions to address six general categories of threats
to international peace and security: armed conflict (including support
for peace negotiations and peace enforcement often in African
countries), terrorism, WMD proliferation, unconstitutional changes of
government, governance of resources, and protection of civilians.\3\
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\3\ Principal objectives of sanctions referred to here reflect the
general categories adopted by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium to
differentiate the political objectives that UN sanctions seek to
achieve. Following are the categories and percentages of sanction
episodes determined by the TSC: armed conflict (cease hostilities,
negotiate or enforce peace agreement, support peacebuilding) 59
percent; counterterrorism 14 percent; nonproliferation 11 percent; and
support democracy (restoration of an elected government) 10 percent.
The remaining includes protection of civilians under the
Responsibility-to-Protect, support of judicial processes, and more
effective governance of natural resources. While respect and support
for human rights is a frequently cited rationale for UN sanctions,
human rights is rarely a primary objective of sanctions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address these challenges, the Security Council employs sanctions
for three strategic purposes: 1) to coerce targets into changing
policies or behavior (the most widely perceived goal of sanctions); 2)
to constrain targets in their ability to conduct proscribed activities;
and 3) to signal support for an international norm or stigmatize
targets. Such purposes are not mutually exclusive, and most sanctions
have multiple objectives.\4\ For example, nonproliferation sanctions
against Iran and North Korea attempted to change regimes' behavior and
to stigmatize their violations of nonproliferation norms, but primarily
focused on constraining access to goods, technology, and finance that
could assist WMD programs. All UN sanctions address threats to
international peace and security and involve signaling or stigmatizing
in some manner.
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\4\ Notwithstanding the multiple purposes of sanctions, popular
discourse remains fixated on the coercive aspect, often to the
exclusion of the other purposes. Public commentary usually focuses on
whether sanctions ``work'' in forcing a change of behavior, failing to
understand and appreciate the important constraining and signaling
functions of UN sanctions.
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Sanctions are targeted in variety of ways-against individuals,
corporate entities (e.g., firms, political parties, or other nonstate
actors such as UNITA, al-Qaeda, ISIL), sectors of an economy (e.g.,
aviation or arms, financial, or commodities such as oil, diamonds, or
timber); or specific regions of a country (as in Darfur in western
Sudan). Targeted sanctions attempt to deny targets the means to wage
conflict or otherwise threaten international peace and security, while
minimizing the impact on innocent civilians and the population as a
whole. Specifically, targeted measures include asset freezes, travel or
visa restrictions, aviation bans, arms embargoes, and restrictions on
commodities such as diamonds, timber, oil, charcoal, and luxury goods.
The most frequently utilized sanctions include arms embargoes, and
financial and travel measures.
Currently the UN maintains thirteen sanctions regimes, including
eight country-based regimes in Africa--Somalia/Eritrea, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African
Republic, Yemen, and South Sudan.\5\ The following table provides an
overview of sanctions imposed on African countries by the United
Nations.
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\5\ The remaining regimes include sanctions against al-Qaeda/ISIL
and globally affiliated terrorist groups, the Taliban, Iraq,
nonproliferation sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, and individuals suspected of involvement in the 2005 bombing in
Beirut that killed then-Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES
(1990-2016)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Targeted
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases Panel of
Arms Financial Travel Aviation Oil Diamonds Timber Other Experts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Somalia/Eritrea (1992-............. X X X -- -- -- -- X (i) X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Libya I (1992-2003)................ [X] [X] -- [X] -- -- -- [X] (ii) --
Libya II (2011-.................... X X X -- X -- -- -- X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Liberia] (1992-2016).............. [X] [X] [X] -- [X] [X] -- [X]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Angola (UNITA)] (1993-2002)....... [X] [X] [X] -- [X] [X] -- [X] (iii) [X]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Rwanda] (1994-2008)............... [X] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- [X] (iv)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Sudan I] (1996-2001).............. -- -- [X] [X] -- -- -- [X] (v)
Sudan II (2004-.................... X X X -- -- -- -- -- X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Sierra Leone] (1997-2010)......... [X] -- [X] -- [X] [X] -- -- [X]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Eritrea/Ethiopia] (2000-2001)..... [X] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES--continued
(1990-2016)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Targeted
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases Panel of
Arms Financial Travel Aviation Oil Diamonds Timber Other Experts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Democratic Republic of Congo (2003- X X X X -- -- -- -- X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Cote d'Ivoire] (2004-2016)........ [X] [X] [X] -- -- [X] -- -- [X]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guinea-Bissau (2012-............... -- -- X -- -- -- -- -- --
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Central African Republic (2013-.... X X X -- -- -- -- -- X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yemen (2014-....................... X X X -- -- -- -- -- X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Sudan (2015-................. -- X X -- -- -- -- -- X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brackets [ ] indicate UN sanctions terminated
(i) Charcoal exports and imports
(ii) Oil-related equipment
(iii) Sanctions against UNITA included diplomatic measures (closing of offices), a ban on the supply of aircraft, spare parts and servicing, prohibition
on equipment for mining/mining services, and a transportation ban on motorized vehicles, watercraft, and ground or water-borne services to areas in
Angola
(iv) Commission of Inquiry to collect information on the arms embargo (first expert-panel type mechanism)
(v) Diplomatic restrictions including reduction in the number and level of staff at Sudanese missions
While more than sixty percent (eight of thirteen) of current UN
regimes remain focused on armed conflict and peacebuilding objectives
in African countries, sanctions focused on the threat of terrorism (al-
Qaeda, ISIL, the Taliban) and the threat of nuclear proliferation
(North Korea) receive a disproportionate share of the Security
Council's attention and resources.\6\
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\6\ While most UN sanctions are aimed at ending conflict,
supporting peacebuilding, or restoring democratically elected
governments in Africa (68% of TSC episodes), there is an inverse
relationship between the number of sanctions regimes and the resources
put at their disposal. See appendices B and C in the chapter by Alix
Boucher and Caty Clement, ``Coordination of UN sanctions with other
actors and instruments," in Targeted Sanctions.
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Research Results
The Targeted Sanctions Consortium adopted two distinctive
conceptual innovations in assessing the impact and effectiveness of UN
sanctions: first, the unit of analysis is a case episode rather than a
country sanctions regime, some of which have been in existence for more
than twenty years. This allows for a more detailed assessment of
changes in types and purposes of targeted sanctions over time (as a
result, the TSC database includes 23 different country regimes broken
down into 63 case episodes for comparative analysis). Secondly,
sanctions are assessed according to three different (and frequently
simultaneous) purposes: to coerce a change in the target's behavior; to
constrain a target from engaging in proscribed activity (by denying
access to critical resources such as financing, technology, etc.); and
to signal and/or stigmatize a target or others about the violation of
an international norm.
Following are TSC findings relevant to African sanctions:
UN sanctions in Africa constitute the majority of all UN
sanctions--about 70% of the episodes. In the early days,
sanctions frequently were imposed in an ad hoc manner, without
a coherent coordinated strategy; rather than as part of a well-
designed comprehensive approach to address conflict, sanctions
were often the tool of first resort that substituted for
policy. While understandable that during times of crisis,
governments act quickly, the use of sanctions to demonstrate
resolve without integrating them into an overall strategy is
largely ineffective.
For this reason, it is important that the objectives of
sanctions are clearly articulated at the outset, for the
targets to understand precise actions that need to be taken for
sanctions to be lifted. Too often, vague criteria and moving
goalposts prolong sanctions unnecessarily. The Security Council
(and even Member States) has difficulty terminating sanctions
regimes once imposed (for example, in Liberia). Automatic
extension of sanctions regimes diffuses signals as to expected
actions, undermining their credibility.
Targeting (the list of specific individuals and entities subject to
sanctions) is important and should reflect the purposes of
sanctions. Too many, or more commonly in the case of African
sanctions, too few, or even wrong targets undermine credibility
of sanctions.
Different types of targeted sanctions differ in degree of
discrimination.\7\ With the exception of the 2011 sanctions on
Libya, most UN sanctions largely remain targeted in design. In
implementation of sanctions, however, Member States or private
sector actors concerned with the reputational risks if found to
be noncompliant, may interpret measures in an overly broad
manner, which expands the impact and unintended consequences of
sanctions.
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\7\ Degrees of Discrimination (or ``comprehensiveness'') of
different types of targeted sanctions include the most discriminating/
targeted individual sanctions (e.g. travel ban, assets freeze,
diplomatic restrictions (in which only one sector of government
directly affected), to arms embargoes (which are largely limited to
affecting fighting forces) and commodity sanctions (e.g. diamonds,
timber, charcoal which tend to affect some regions disproportionately),
to broad sectoral sanctions such as oil and financial (which affect an
entire population and therefore are the least discriminating of
targeted sanctions). Comprehensive sanctions are non-discriminating.
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Following are characteristics of effective UN sanctions:
Relationship to other policy instruments.
UN sanctions do not exist in isolation, and always include
the presence of other policy instrument seeking to achieve
related objectives. Diplomatic negotiations occurred more than
95% of the time, and peacekeeping forces are on the ground in
62% of episodes. Some aspects of force (i.e. limited strikes
and operations, robust military missions, no fly zone or naval
blockages) were used 52% of the time, and legal tribunals were
present in 46% of the cases. Sanctions need to be part of a
broader coordinated strategy. (Effective sanctions are
associated with multiple (at least 3) policy instruments).
Objectives and types of sanctions.
In terms of effectiveness, UN targeted sanctions are
effective more than 20% of the time and are nearly three times
more effective in constraining or signaling than coercing a
change in target behavior.
Arms embargos, the most frequently imposed sanction
especially in African conflicts (in 89% of episodes) are the
least effective especially when applied in isolation. Arms
embargoes are frequently the first type of sanction imposed.
Most targeted sanctions are employed in combination with
other sanctions measures. Travel bans are the next most
utilized measure (69% of cases), followed by asset freezes
(66%); travel bans are frequently employed in combination with
asset freezes (73% of cases).
Commodity sanctions are employed in 40% of cases, and always
in situations of armed conflict in Africa (77%). Sanctions on
diamonds (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Cote d'Ivoire), oil
(Libya, Angola, Sierra Leone), charcoal (Somalia), timber
(Liberia), when appropriate, appear highly effective,
especially for purposes of constraint (69%) and signaling
(76%).
Also, secondary sanctions applied to neighboring states,
although applied infrequently (only two times or 6% of cases -
against Liberia in the case of its support for the RUF in
Sierra Leone, and against Eritrea over its arms exports to Al
Shabaab in Somalia), appear to be highly effective.
Importance of regional sanctions.
The past several decades have witnessed an increase in
sanctions applied by regional organizations. In 74% percent of
the episodes analyzed by the TSC, other regional sanctions of
the European Union, the African Union,\8\ or the Economic
Community of West African States preceded initial imposition of
UN sanctions. Often resulting from a request by a regional body
that has already imposed individual sanctions (travel ban or
assets freeze) on targets, UN sanctions often complement pre-
existing sanctions, and effectiveness appears enhanced by
regional measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The African Union is primarily concerned with non-
constitutional changes of government and routinely applies sanctions to
its own members. ECOWAS has sanctioned about half of its members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, targeted sanctions are more complicated to design
and implement than comprehensive economic measures; greater
technical expertise is required to administer asset freezes,
enforce travel sanctions, implement arms embargoes, and
calibrate sanctions. The 2011 sanctions on Libya, while
targeted on the financial and oil sectors, affected a
significant volume of assets (reportedly in excess of $160
billion) and posed significant complications for the sanctions
committee and national governments. Less targeted financial
measures against a central bank or economic sector such as
petroleum, affect a greater portion of the population as a
whole and can have the effect of making sanctions more
comprehensive.
I also want to call attention to the fact that even targeted
sanctions have unintended consequences. TSC research highlighted some
of these effects, including increases in corruption and criminality,
strengthening of authoritarian rule, and decline in legitimacy of
Security Council. Additional consequences of international policies/
sanctions related to countering the financing of terrorism/anti-money
laundering also include ``derisking'' or the inability of remitters or
money service businesses and charities to access financial services.
These problems have been particularly acute in African countries such
as Somalia, Sudan, and Angola where humanitarian assistance needs are
greatest. Access by nonprofit groups to banks and international funds
transfers necessary to get aid into regions of conflict is the subject
of new research funded by the Gates Foundation.
Security Council sanctions have played an important role in
numerous African countries, helping to end violence, promote peace
agreements and transition to post-conflict societies, gain governmental
control of natural resources, and support transitions to
democratically-elected governments. Appendix 1 provides examples of
effective African sanctions for the purposes of coercion, constraint,
and signaling. Institutional learning by the Security Council and
States over the past two decades implementing UN sanctions reflects
undeniable progress, but challenges persist that continue to hamper
more effective utilization of the sanctions instrument.
Challenges to Effective Sanctions
As the international community increasingly relies on United
Nations sanctions, problems regarding implementation have become more
pronounced. Weak implementation, inadequate monitoring and enforcement,
and misperceptions and a lack of understanding constitute the primary
obstacles to more effective UN sanctions.
Weak Implementation and Capacity.
Many countries lack basic legal authority and administrative
mechanisms to translate UN sanctions into domestic law and
regulations, fundamental to give full force to sanctions. The
ability to freeze assets without prior judicial action,
exercise appropriate border and visa controls, and enforce
restrictions on exports of arms and dual-use goods and
technology is often limited or nonexistent. In many cases,
failure to implement sanctions boils down to simple lack of
capacity at the domestic level. There are no systematic UN
attention, resources, and training to support national
sanctions capacity building.
Inadequate Monitoring and Enforcement.
Outside the work of panels of experts, there is little
tracking of sanctions implementation or other means to monitor
national compliance efforts. There is no enforcement mechanism
or body to address sanctions violations. When no consequences
result, targets come to regard the threat of coercion as empty,
further eroding the credibility of sanctions.
With P5 members' predominant focus on counterterrorism and
nonproliferation issues and disproportionate attention and
resources, sanctions dealing with armed conflict, especially in
Africa receive far fewer resources and attention,
notwithstanding the fact that they constitute the majority of
UN sanctions. Distinct challenges posed by African regimes-
including inconsistent cooperation with peacekeeping operations
and the failure to devote adequate attention to human rights,
conflict prevention, and peace enforcement sanctions, translate
into weaker enforcement than for counterterrorism and
nonproliferation sanctions.
Misperceptions and Lack of Understanding.
Notwithstanding the move to targeted measures and significant
procedural innovations, public perception remains largely
skeptical of sanctions. Many UN conflict resolution actors view
sanctions as politically toxic complications for their
mandates, and shy away from association, contributing to a lack
of coherence and effective implementation of UN peace and
security policies.
More broadly, public understanding of the purpose and effects
of sanctions is extremely limited. Fears of the consequences of
comprehensive economic sanctions persist, despite the fact that
the last time the Security Council imposed comprehensive
measures was in 1994. Policy debates remain fixated on whether
they ``work'' in forcing a change of behavior, failing to
recognize the important constraining and signaling functions of
UN sanctions. Perceptions that ``sanctions don't work,''
especially related to Africa, contribute to a profound cynicism
regarding the utility and efficacy of sanctions.
Recommendations to Strengthen UN Sanctions in Africa
P5 interests will continue to diverge, especially those related to
national economic interests which loom large in Africa. Nevertheless,
more can and should be done to prioritize and strengthen the
implementation of UN sanctions.\9\ Recommendations for UN sanctions to
be more effective instruments of international conflict resolution
include:
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\9\ The 2015 Compendium of the High Level of UN Sanctions contains
a detailed discussion of these issues annd related recommendations. See
http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/.
Improve Member States and Regional Capacities to Implement
Sanctions.
Notwithstanding practical limitations on the adoption of new
sanctions, as witnessed in the case of Syria, the Council and
Member States should vigorously implement and enforce all
existing UN sanctions, focusing especially on African sanctions
and not just those related to nonproliferation and
counterterrorism. Greater U.S. leadership and focus on
conflict-related sanctions is important for sustained
credibility of sanctions. The High Level Review of UN Sanctions
recommended that new measures and resources be undertaken for
sanctions assistance generally, including cooperation with
regional organization in strengthening and coordinating efforts
to implement asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargos. In
particular, the African Union has expressed interest in such
assistance previously and represents an ideal opportunity to
develop new approaches to capacity-building training and
services.
Enhance Sanctions Monitoring and Enforcement.
More vigorous monitoring and enforcement of UN sanctions, as
well as specific consequences for noncompliance, would
strengthen their credibility. When the Security Council
determines that a country is deliberately violating Council
sanctions, consequences should result, with the Council
developing a menu of secondary sanctions against UN members
found to violate sanctions. Member States should revive
enforcement assistance, particularly initiatives similar to the
sanctions assistance missions (SAMs) deployed in the early
1990s to monitor implementation of sanctions against the former
republic of Yugoslavia, expanding beyond border controls to
enforcement of travel bans, financial sanctions, and arms
embargoes.
Strengthen Cooperation with Regional Groups and Civil Society.
Coordination of regional measures with UN and national
sanctions should be strengthened, and civil society, including
both the private sector and NGOs, should become more involved
partners in implementing UN sanctions so as to promote enhanced
effectiveness.
Develop Better Analysis and Understanding of Sanctions.
Finally, the UN and Member States should promote better
understanding and analysis of conditions under which more
effectual sanctions are likely to result. Effective
implementation of sanctions is made more difficult by the lack
of accurate information and misunderstanding about the impacts
and effectiveness of targeted measures. Greater understanding
of the optimal conditions under which sanctions are most
effective, and appreciation that sanctions have multiple and
simultaneous purposes (coercion, constraint, and signaling),
will result in more realistic expectations of what sanctions
can reasonably be expected to achieve. Since UN targeted
sanctions are nearly three times more effective in constraining
and signaling targets than in coercing a change of behavior;
more resources should be invested in sanctions intended to
constrain/signal, given their relative effectiveness.
Conclusion
UN targeted sanctions have made important contributions in
achieving U.S. policy objectives, but to a limited degree and not
without important unintended consequences. Progress has been made in
recent years to enhance implementation, but more needs to be done for
sanctions to be used to full effect in advancing U.S. and international
security objectives in Africa.
Notwithstanding the mixed record of effectiveness of UN sanctions,
the fact remains that sanctions are one of the few tools of the
international community to promote international peace and security,
short of the use of force. Sanctions will continue as an essential
component of U.S. and the Security Council's response to international
threats.
Concerted attention, leadership, and action by like-minded states
to strengthen the implementation and enforcement of sanctions, as well
as enhancing the capacity of Member States to carry out their
obligations, are necessary to make sanctions an even more potent and
indispensable tool of collective security in Africa.
Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to discuss the
effectiveness of U.S. and international sanctions as policy tools in
Africa. I look forward to questions and being of assistance to the
subcommittee as you continue to address these critical foreign policy
challenges.
__________
APPENDIX 1: Examples of Effective African Sanctions \10\
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\10\ From Targeted Sanctions Consortium database at http://
graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/international-
governance/research-projects/UN--Targeted--Sanctions/targeted-
sanctions-consortium-da.html.
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Effective Coercion: Libya
libya--episode 3 (5 april 1999-12 september 2003)
Summary
Sanctions were suspended on 5 April 1999 once the two Lockerbie
suspects were handed over to the special Scottish Court in the
Netherlands (as specified in UNSCR 1192) and terminated on 12 September
2003 (UNSCR 1506) once compensation was provided and Libya renounced
terrorism.
Purposes
Coerce the Government of Libya to provide compensation and renounce
terrorism; and signal Libya and international community about norm
against state-sponsored terrorism.
Sanction type
All sanctions (aviation ban, arms imports embargo, diplomatic
sanctions, government asset freeze, and oil services equipment ban)
were suspended in April 1999 (seven months after the conditions for
suspension were set in UNSCR 1192) but not terminated until September
2003.
Effectiveness
Coercion (Effective)
Policy outcome: 4/5, Suspects were turned over, trials conducted,
compensation provided, and terrorism renounced, but not on the precise
terms of the original UNSCRs.
UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Suspension of sanctions was
significant to reinforce legal procedures underway in domestic and
international courts regarding compensation.
Constraint (N/A)
Policy outcome: N/A.
UN sanctions contribution: N/A.
Signaling
Policy outcome: 3/5, Norms against state-sponsored terrorism were
consistently articulated in relevant UNSCRs (1192 and 1506), but
Qadhafi was able to mobilize support from the AU. Arab League, Non-
Aligned Movement and Organization of the Islamic Conference to limit
the extent of his stigmatization.
UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Sanctions suspension created an
incentive to accept norms against state-sponsored terrorism in order
for Libya to be re-legitimized and reintegrated into the international
community.
Unintended consequences: Strengthening of authoritarian rule
__________
Effective Constraint: Liberia
liberia--episode 4 (22 december 2003-16 june 2006)
Summary
Following the departure of Charles Taylor and progress in the peace
process in Sierra Leone, a peace enforcement sanctions regime was
established in Liberia to ensure compliance with the comprehensive
peace agreement signed in Accra on 18 August 2003 and to support the
transitional government of national unity. The Liberian ceasefire was
maintained, DDR implemented, and elections were held during this
episode. UNSCR 1521 lifted the previous sanctions and immediately re-
imposed them in support of a new objective: peace enforcement. The
Council also articulated specific criteria for lifting.
UNSCR 1532 imposed financial sanctions on Charles Taylor, his
family, and other close associates for misappropriating Liberian funds
and property and using them to destabilize the transitional government
during the early phase of this episode. Taylor appeared before the
Sierra Leone Special Court in April 2006 and was extradited to the
Hague in June 2006. Elections were held in 2005 with Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf taking office January 2006.
Purpose
Constrain and signal parties that might threaten the comprehensive
peace agreement and the transitional government of national unity.
Sanction type
Ongoing arms imports embargo (now exempting internationally trained
armed forces and police), ban on exports of rough diamonds, travel ban
on individuals undermining peace and stability or supporting armed
rebel groups in Liberia and the subregion (including senior members of
former President Charles Taylor's Government, their spouses, and
members of Liberia's former armed forces retaining links to Charles
Taylor), and ban on export of timber (until certification schemes are
in place). Newly imposed asset freeze on Charles Taylor, his family
members, and close associates (from March 2004).
Effectiveness
Coercion (N/A)
Policy outcome: N/A.
UN sanctions contribution: N/A.
Constraint--(Effective)
Policy outcome: 4/5, Panel of Experts concludes that sanctions
helped to stabilize the situation in Liberia; elections were held, DDR
took place, though Taylor tried to destabilize the process at the
outset.
UN sanctions contribution: 3/5, Sanctions against the remnants of
Taylor's regime reinforced the peacebuilding efforts of the government
of Liberia, but international tribunals (the Sierra Leone Special Court
and ICC) played a major role in constraining Charles Taylor.
Signaling--(Effective)
Policy outcome: 5/5, Potential spoilers were deterred from
destabilizing the regime. UN sanctions contribution: 3/5, Sanctions
reinforced the peacebuilding efforts of the government of Liberia and
international tribunals played a major role in constraining the
remnants of Charles Taylor's regime.
Unintended consequences
Increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue
domains, humanitarian consequences, widespread harmful economic
consequences.
__________
Effective Signaling: Angola
angola--episode 4 (12 january 1999 9 december 2002)
Summary
The shooting down of the second of two UN aircraft over UNITA
controlled territory prompted strong reaction from UNSC (UNSCR 1221).
Given the return to full-scale war, UN peacekeepers were removed in
February 1999.
Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler assumed chair of Angola Sanctions
Committee in January, which sets up two expert panels in May (one on
financing of UNITA and another on arms, later merged). This results in
a major strengthening of the sanctions regime in terms of
implementation at the UN level. The PoE ``Fowler Report'' is released
and created a storm of protest by naming and shaming of African heads
of state for their role in undermining UN sanctions. UNSC sets up a
mechanism for monitoring sanctions violations (threat of secondary
sanctions) in April 2000, but no secondary measures imposed.
Sanctions were continued in December 2000, and there was evidence
that sanctions monitoring had disrupted UNITA's supply lines. A
December 2001 offensive against UNITA ended with Savimbi (and his Vice
President's) death in February 2002.
Phase out--A truce quickly followed in March, negotiations in
April, and UNITA dismantled its armed wing in August. UN lifted
sanctions in December 2002.
UNSCRs during the episode included UNSCR 1221 (January 1999) which
expressed outrage and specifically named Savimbi and UNSCR 1237 (May
1999), which created a panels of experts. In March 2000 the ``Fowler
Report" S/2000/203 was released. Following this, UNSCR 1295 (April
2000), established a monitoring mechanism and UNSCR 1448 (December
2002) terminated sanctions immediately before Angola joined the UNSC.
Purposes
Coerce UNITA to cease hostilities and implement the peace
agreement; constrain UNITA from being able to act autonomously;
stigmatize UNITA and its supporters in other African countries
(including heads of state).
Sanction type
Ongoing arms imports embargo, petroleum and petroleum products
imports ban, and aviation ban on UNITA (except through points of entry
named by the Government of Angola), asset freeze on UNITA, senior UNITA
officials, and their adult family members, diamond exports ban,
prohibition on supply of mining and ground or waterborne transportation
services and equipment into UNITA controlled areas. Travel ban on
senior UNITA officials and their adult family members and visa
cancelation measures were suspended in May 2002 and lifted later that
year, in November. Diplomatic sanctions on UNITA in the form of
limitations of diplomatic representation persisted until the end of the
sanctions regime.
Effectiveness
Coercion (Ineffective)
Policy outcome: 1/5, Sanctions contributed to shifting the balance
of forces, but Savimbi showed no sign of concessions before his death.
UN sanctions contribution: 2/5, Ultimately, the use of force was
decisive.
Constraint (Effective)
Policy outcome: 5/5, Diplomatic sanctions terminated much of
UNITA's official presence abroad; diamond sanctions weakened the
prospects of UNITA's raising of funds; squeezing the financial sources
led to no salt, no beer, and demoralization of Savimbi's forces.
UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Acknowledgment by the target of the
impact of sanctions.
Signaling (Effective)
Policy outcome: 5/5, Savimbi became the principal target and was
thoroughly isolated by UNSCR 1221.
UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Diplomatic pressure was also
significant.
Unintended consequences
Increase in corruption and criminality, strengthening of
authoritarian rule, decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN
Security Council, increase in international enforcement capacity in
different issue domains.
__________
APPENDIX 2
PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF UN AFRICAN SANCTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary Objectives TSC Episodes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Counterterrorism 5 Libya in the 1990s (1-3),
Sudan in the 1990s (1-2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good governance 1 Liberia (5)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Democracy support 3 Sierra Leone (1), Cote
d'Ivoire (4), Guinea-Bissau (1)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Armed conflict (cease hostilities, 32 Somalia (1-5), Liberia (1-5),
negotiation of settlement, peace Angola (1-4), Rwanda (1-2),
enforcement. support peacebuilding) Sierra Leone (2-5), Ethiopia-
Eritrea (1), DRC (1-4), Sudan
over Darfur (1-2), Cote d'Ivoire
(1,2,3,5), Libya in 2011 (3),
CAR (1)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protection of civilians under R2P 2 Libya in 2011 (1-2)
========================================================================
Total 43 UN African episodes out of a
total of 63 UN Episodes
(original TSC database)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table created by Andrea Charron and Clara Portela, ``The relationship
between UN and regional sanctions regimes,'' in Targeted Sanctions:
The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action, pg.104.
__________
APPENDIX 3
AFRICAN STATES SANCTIONED BETWEEN 1990 AND 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UN AU ECOWAS SADC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of African States 13 10 7 1
Sanctioned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Member States 193 (54 African) 54 15 15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of States Sanctioned 7 (24 if Africa 19 47 7
only)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Which States Angola, CAR, Cote CAR, Comoros, Cote Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar
d'Ivoire, DRC, d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-
Eritrea (twice), Guinea-Bissau, Bissau, Liberia,
Ethiopia, Guinea- Madagascar, Mali, Mali, Niger,
Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone
Libya (twice), Togo
Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Somalia,
Sudan (twice)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most Sanctioned States Sudan (twice), Libya Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau ..............
(twice), Eritrea (twice), (twice)
(twice) Mauritania (twice)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: States sanctioned by three or more organizations are emboldened.
Table created by Andrea Charron and Clara Portela, as contained in ``The relationship between UN and regional
sanctions regimes,'' in Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action, pg. 106.
__________
Prepared Statement of Dr. Todd J. Moss
Thank you Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and other members
of the subcommittee. I appreciate being invited to testify again before
the subcommittee and the opportunity to highlight ways the United
States can more effectively pursue its objectives in Sub-Saharan
Africa, a region of growing economic and national security importance.
I proudly served in the State Department under Secretary Condoleezza
Rice and continue to work closely on U.S.-Africa policy as a researcher
at the Center for Global Development.
I have three points about the utility of U.S. sanctions, and one
clarification. I will conclude by highlighting each point using the
troubled case of Zimbabwe.
First, sanctions are a visible and potent political signal from the
world's most powerful nation. Financial and travel restrictions can be
a public declaration against tyranny and an affirmative statement of
American values. If you steal elections, you don't get to send your
children to school in Boston. If you rob public coffers, you don't get
to invest in California real estate. If you mistreat your own people,
you don't get to seek medical care in Houston hospitals. If anything,
this forceful statement that the United States will not turn a blind
eye to the most oppressive, violent, and kleptocratic regimes is not
used enough. For example, it is time for serious consideration of
adding sanctions to political leaders in the Gambia.
Second, well-crafted and aggressively executed targeted sanctions
can have a significant impact on influencing the decisions and policies
of regimes and bad actors. Both financial sanctions implemented by the
Treasury Department and travel sanctions imposed by the State
Department can have direct traceable effects when policymakers have
clear concrete objectives in mind and the intelligence community is
given the time and means to identify financial levers and
vulnerabilities. However, for such sanctions to be effective, they must
be imposed within a broader strategy that includes other levers of
power. Sanctions are one pressure point, but they must be accompanied
by unambiguous diplomatic messages and through alliances with other
powers that share our objectives. Congressional action can be
motivating, but overly-prescriptive legislation can be blunt and
static, which can undermine smart policy by reducing the scope for
future action.
Third, regime change is the wrong metric for success. Critics may
complain that sanctions do not work if a target regime survives. Yet no
one claims, nor should anyone expect, that sanctions on their own will
bring down a regime. Sanctions complement--rather than replace--other
diplomatic, economic, or military tools.
Finally, there is often confusion between targeted financial or
travel sanctions and the exclusion of rogue regimes from the
international financial system. Some governments, like Cuba, have
voluntarily opted out of the IMF, the World Bank, and other
international financial institutions. Others, like Somalia or Eritrea,
are unable to access finance from these organizations, not because of
specific U.S. sanctions, but because of their own record of nonpayment.
I'll conclude by outlining how these points matter for U.S policy
toward Zimbabwe.
The current legislation, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act of 2001 (ZDERA) states: ``It is the policy of the United
States to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect
peaceful, democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic
growth, and restore the rule of law.'' ZDERA includes a sense of
Congress that the President should implement travel and economic
sanctions against individuals responsible for violence and the
breakdown of the rule of law.
First, U.S. sanctions have been a powerful signal of U.S. policy in
support of democracy. When introduced, ZDERA attracted strong
bipartisan support in Congress. The bill was co-sponsored by senators
from across the political spectrum: Bill Frist, Jesse Helms, Russell
Feingold, Joseph Biden, and Hillary Clinton. The actual executive
branch sanctions advocated by ZDERA were not directed at the country as
a whole, but aimed at specific individuals, barring them from holding
assets in the United States, traveling here, and doing business with
U.S. entities. As of 2016, none of the key conditions contained in the
original ZDERA legislation--restoration of the rule of law, free and
fair elections, and depoliticization of the security forces--have been
met either in letter or in spirit. Thus, sanctions should remain in
place on Zimbabwe for the time being.
Second, U.S. policy objectives have not been achieved as the
country has yet to experience peaceful democratic change, broad-based
economic growth, or the restoration of the rule of law. But it is a
mistake to judge the lack of progress as a failure of sanctions per se.
Zimbabwe's morass continues primarily because of a highly entrenched
abusive regime that has shown little regard for the basic welfare of
its own citizens, combined with unhelpful regional dynamics.
While recognizing the lack of progress, before removing sanctions,
we must ask whether such a change will advance U.S. policy goals or
play into the hands of the regime. It is true that the ruling cabal
cynically blames sanctions rather than its own failures. But will
eliminating a false excuse lead to a better outcome? More specifically,
if sanctions are lifted, what happens next that helps the country on a
path towards democracy? Is it credible to argue that removing U.S.
sanctions at this time will change Zimbabwe's internal dynamics in a
way that bolsters the forces for democracy, much less force Robert
Mugabe to stand down? In my view, lifting U.S. sanctions at this time
will merely strengthen Robert Mugabe and the military circle around him
by providing a major propaganda victory. Mugabe will claim that the
regime has vanquished the country's imaginary imperialist oppressors
and has now received a formal American endorsement of his undemocratic
rule.
Third, sanctions could be much more effective in Zimbabwe if they
were embedded in a broader strategy that included other tools of U.S.
power. The United States has generally disengaged from Zimbabwe in
recent years, leaving our policy little more than sanctions plus
humanitarian assistance. A forward-leaning strategy could employ a
range of support for democratic forces, more aggressive diplomacy, and
utilize the sanctions list more creatively to selectively encourage
positive behavior and increase U.S. influence in a post-Mugabe
transition. This absolutely must include continuing to collect
information on those who one day should face charges of war crimes and/
or embezzlement.
Finally, the issue of targeted U.S. bilateral sanctions is separate
from arrears clearance and access to new lending at international
financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank. ZDERA calls for the
United States to exercise its shareholder vote against debt relief or
new loans to Zimbabwe until the stipulated conditions have been met. As
the recent letter from Chairman Corker to Treasury Secretary Lew makes
clear, it is premature for the United States to support any new lending
to the Government of Zimbabwe, absent clear and meaningful reforms.\1\
Preconditions should include ensuring basic political freedoms,
accountability for missing diamond revenues, and official
acknowledgement of gross human rights violations committed by state
agents, such as the Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s and, just
fifteen months ago, the abduction and probable murder of human rights
activist Itai Dzamara.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``No New Lending to Zimbabwe without Meaningful Reform,''
Letter from Senator Corker to Secretary Lew, January 29, 2016 http://
www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/corker-no-new-lending-to-
zimbabwe-without-meaningful-reform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Until the Government of Zimbabwe has met the ZDERA criteria and
shown unequivocally that it is on an irreversible path to true reform,
it is not yet time for the United States to abandon its targeted
sanctions. In fact, the U.S. government should be preparing specific
targets and options for further ratcheting up pressure, which could be
deployed on a timely basis as needed. More broadly across Africa,
sanctions will continue to be a practical and symbolic tool for U.S.
policymakers, provided they are carefully targeted, deployed among a
set of other policy tools, and not expected to serve as a substitute
for other actions.
__________
Prepared Statement of Brad Brooks-Rubin
Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, members of the subcommittee,
I am grateful for the opportunity to testify on this critical yet often
misunderstood element of U.S. foreign policy.
When once asked his opinion of Western civilization, Mahatma Gandhi
reportedly responded, ``I think it would be a good idea.''
Men, women, and children across sub-Saharan Africa pay a price
every day for the unchecked violence and resource theft committed by
leaders who do not believe they will face real consequences for their
actions. Sanctions have become the non-military tool of choice of the
U.S. government to try to deliver those types of consequences across
the globe, but sanctions in sub-Saharan Africa have thus far generally
failed to achieve the desired impact. This is in large part because we
repeatedly use the same types of tools. We do not target key decision
makers and their international facilitators. We rarely follow up or
enforce sanctions with further actions. We do not integrate sanctions
with other tools designed to promote improved governance. And we do not
sufficiently mitigate the negative consequences associated with
sanctions. Quite simply, we do not approach sanctions with respect to
sub-Saharan Africa the way we do other critical national security and
foreign policy crises.
So when asked my view of U.S. sanctions policy in sub-Saharan
Africa in 2016, I would invoke Gandhi and say that it would be a good
idea.
As of today, at least with respect to addressing conflicts and
violent kleptocracies across the continent, sanctions and financial
pressure are under-leveraged. But these tools could have tremendous
impact if they were used as they are in other contexts--and if
sanctions are integrated with pressure toward good governance. This
effort and the new ideas that can drive it need leadership and action
from both the Executive Branch and Congress.
It is not that we have neglected to use sanctions in sub-Saharan
Africa, of course. In my experience, as a former attorney at the U.S.
Treasury Department advising the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC), and as an officer in the Economic Bureau of the State
Department focused on natural resources and conflict, I have worked on
many such sanctions efforts related to the continent. I have seen, when
a crisis emerges, from Zimbabwe to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to South Sudan to Burundi, we almost immediately look in the sanctions
toolbox. But despite the existence of good examples and incredible
expertise within the interagency, we too often end up resigned to using
the same necessary but insufficient tools: limited numbers of asset
freezes, travel bans, and, on occasion, an arms embargo. These tools
tend to be long on message and short on financial impact. When these
sanctions measures are not flanked well by other efforts, they
frequently fail.
The understandable temptation, then, is to say that sanctions
related to these countries and contexts just do not work.
This is absolutely the wrong response. Sanctions can and do have
beneficial impact when they are carefully designed and strongly
enforced. The failure has not been with our choice to use sanctions.
The failure thus far, which can be readily addressed for the future, is
in the limited way in which we have viewed the problems and use
sanctions as a tool with sub-Saharan Africa. We have not yet approached
these countries with the serious economic lens they deserve, especially
before situations become crises. As a result, we have thus far deployed
only a limited selection of sanctions measures or approaches in sub-
Saharan Africa. We have not yet brought to sub-Saharan Africa the same
sense of urgency to counter threats related to terrorism or drug
trafficking. We have not yet brought to sub-Saharan Africa the same
seriousness of purpose to advance peace, democracy, and human rights
that we have brought to Iran, North Korea, and Burma.
Today I will draw on my experience, offer a constructive critique
of U.S. sanctions policy in the region, and present alternative
approaches that would make these sanctions efforts much more impactful.
We would want to do six critical things in order to deliver an
effective and modernized sanctions approach in sub-Saharan Africa:
1. Ensure that sanctions fit within a broader policy approach with
clear policy goals;
2. Develop better intelligence and expertise on a broader set of
potential targets that ensure the actions we take will fulfill
the policy goals we are seeking to achieve and disrupt the
financial flows involved;
3. Employ modern sanctions tools beyond targeted designations and
travel bans;
4. Build on the actions we take and have the courage to double down at
key junctures rather than easing pressure;
5. Prioritize civil and criminal enforcement actions under these
programs to prevent them from becoming empty gestures; and
6. Take better steps to keep sanctions temporary and mitigate negative
impacts.
To deploy this approach with the situations in South Sudan or the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, we would want take the
following types of steps:
Use the particular kinds of designation criteria that are designed
to deliver financial impact, such as for acts of public
corruption and looting of state assets, and go after much high-
level targets overall;
Keep the pressure on designated individuals and entities at key
junctures and enforce the sanctions we put forward;
Employ sectoral and even secondary sanctions as needed to act
specifically on key economic vulnerabilities and pressure banks
to take these crises seriously;
Push the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to look
beyond drugs and terrorism when acting against money laundering
on the continent, something it has never done;
Develop public reporting requirements for private-sector actors,
particularly investors, in target countries, as used
effectively in Burma;
Integrate sanctions more holistically with broader policy efforts
advancing good governance and responsible business; -Issue
strong messages against de-risking; and -Pass the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and allocate to the
Department of the Treasury and other U.S. government agencies a
greater share of intelligence and investigative resources that
can be dedicated to sub-Saharan Africa.
Actions like these would directly increase the impact of sanctions
in sub-Saharan Africa.
refocusing on the cost of violent kleptocracy
Over the past 16 years, I have worked on sanctions issues not only
at the Treasury and State departments, but also at a private law firm,
a private sector organization, and now for a human rights NGO and
investigative project. I have seen how sanctions can work and why they
fail or fall short of having the full desired impact. And I have heard
the full range of criticism and rationales concerning their use. But
for those of us who spend a lot of time examining the technical aspects
of how they work, we can too often forget why we are having the
discussion in the first place.
The human suffering caused by the violent conflicts and
kleptocratic behaviors of brutal regimes is immense. Millions of people
have been killed, injured, raped, or forced to flee their homes. Many
are displaced within the region and now many are on the move to Europe
and other areas. Instability reigns and violent extremism--with other
threats to security--have increased. Generous international donors,
including the U.S. government, with taxpayer money, send billions of
dollars in direct aid, or provide funds for peacekeeping operations and
development projects to support citizens in these countries and
mitigate the effects of these disasters.
Too often we underestimate or misunderstand the sources of
violence, thinking of them simply as brutal conflicts between rival
ethnic groups or strongmen seeking power. At the Enough Project, we
analyze five countries--Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic, and Somalia--through the
lens of what we call ``violent kleptocracy.'' We view these violent
kleptocracies as systems in which those in power and their networks of
facilitators and enablers engage in grand corruption and foment
violence. The state is completely hijacked to these purposes. And there
is little to no meaningful governance or public service provision to
benefit the people. Violence and mass corruption are not aberrations of
the system; they are the system itself. The particular structure,
actors, and specific means of implementing violent kleptocracy may
differ between countries, but they all feature these hallmarks, as do
many others on the continent.
The Enough Project is analyzing these systems as violent
kleptocracies and examining how these systems depend on the
international financial system, particularly the U.S. dollar. As the
Panama Papers' revelations and the work of our investigative initiative
The Sentry investigations show, the networks involved are using many of
the same types of transactions that narco-traffickers, terrorist
networks, and corrupt regimes in other parts of the world are using,
and against which we have deployed the full array of tools of financial
pressure. The violent kleptocracies in Africa all come back to money,
and as a result, we have the power to use sanctions and other tools to
disrupt them.
Despite the similarities with other national security concerns,
these regimes and their networks have hardly faced any costs or
pressure. For example, despite the constant discussion of corruption in
Africa through money laundering, our agency within Treasury dedicated
to fighting money laundering and which has an enormous suite of tools,
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), has only ever acted
against issues in sub-Saharan Africa that relate to drugs or terrorism.
It is time that we show that we are willing to address the suffering of
tens of millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa and the instability
and security threats that result, with the same resolve we use to
address other crises.
six questions to frame african sanctions actions
Considering the enormous human cost, increasing threats to national
security, and billions of aid dollars being spent, we need to approach
conflict and violent kleptocracy in sub-Saharan Africa with something
approaching the prioritization that we see for other crises. Contrary
to the assumption of some who view these as ``off the grid'' conflicts,
the violent kleptocratic systems that generate these conflicts depend
on the international financial architecture and the U.S. dollar to
thrive. We have failed thus far to use this important leverage to
advance peace and human rights the way we do in other situations.
Why? To start, we often fail to ask the basic questions that lead
to effective sanctions action.
1. What is the policy goal?
Sanctions actions are only effective if they are integrated as one
tool within a comprehensive foreign policy strategy. Sanctions are best
used as a means of financial pressure that is designed to work with
other measures to prompt a process that can be the catalyst to change
behavior. There must be a foreign policy process to pick up what the
sanctions begin and move it forward, rather than expect the sanctions
to do it all. Regardless of your particular view on the result of the
negotiation processes involved, this is what sanctions in Iran and to
some extent Burma were able to achieve. These steps have thus far been
too often lacking in sub-Saharan Africa.
As noted sanctions expert and researcher Gary Huffbauer has
explained, ``history has indeed shown that sanctions have limited
success when the goal is fundamental change in the core policy of an
autocratic regime.'' Huffbauer is correct that sanctions alone are not
a panacea. Sanctions cannot become a replacement for the comprehensive
policy strategies that are needed and that use leverage and
accountability along with other policies to promote good governance and
the protection of civil society and the media needed for peace.
Sanctions can be used strongly to prompt certain responses from a
regime or a target, but they should not be the automatic first choice
unless they are integrated with other measures.
2. What intelligence--and financial intelligence--do we have?
In a recent address on the key lessons in making sanctions more
effective, Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew noted, ``Powerful
sanctions require investigators and analysts to track how key actors
move and store their money and to build detailed cases drawing on
intelligence analysis.'' This assessment from Secretary Lew is borne
out by a recent study from the Center for New American Security,
showing that sanctions rarely deliver immediate economic losses but do
result in instability and elevated risk. That means that sanctions
often do not directly cause change; instead, they create the
opportunity for change if it is properly leveraged.
Simply stated, we have not yet devoted the investigative and
analytic resources to sub-Saharan African issues that Secretary Lew
himself says we need in order to make these efforts more effective.
Time and time again, I have seen this administration and the previous
one search for usable information too late and then be unable to
identify strategically how best to use it. Worse, the information
sought is not aimed at the financial side, targets with bank accounts,
assets, and networks, but too often rests on individuals where we have
nothing more to find or achieve than messaging opportunities. There are
simply an insufficient number of intelligence analysts in the Treasury
department or across the interagency to focus on Africa effectively at
the present time.
In the same speech, Secretary Lew said, ``We must guard against the
impulse to reach for sanctions too lightly or in situations where they
will have negligible impact.'' Without proper intelligence gathering to
identify targets we can impact and a comprehensive description of the
process we want to achieve, we will only equip ourselves with sanctions
that are able to have a negligible impact at best.
3. What tools do we use?
Once the administration does decide to deploy sanctions, too often
there are just three tools involved: targeted asset freezes, travel
bans, and in some cases, arms embargoes. These tools are all necessary,
but they are not sufficient.
Noted sanctions expert Gary Huffbauer's research has consistently
found that financial sanctions are more effective than trade sanctions,
and I would include arms embargoes in the latter category. But
financial sanctions must be broader than simply the designation of a
few individuals. Huffbauer noted in an essay back in 2000 that
``Targeted sanctions may satisfy the need . . . to `do something,' they
may slake humanitarian concerns, and they may serve to unify fraying
coalitions. But they are not a magic bullet for achieving foreign
policy goals.'' That assessment remains true in 2016.
Targeted sanctions remain essential, but we must be willing to use
financial pressures that go beyond a few designations of low-level
targets. In a recent report, Enough Project Founding Director John
Prendergast and I outlined several types of ``modernized'' measures
that could be used to make sanctions more effective in Sudan. These
measures include engagement with banks and possible secondary
sanctions, sectoral sanctions, anti-money laundering tools, and
sanctions measures more focused on corruption issues. Sadly we see
little to no willingness to consider these kinds of tools with Sudan,
or anywhere else in sub-Saharan Africa. There is too heavy a reliance
on a narrow set of targeted measures as the magic bullet Huffbauer
described. Again, FinCEN has never taken an action directed at sub-
Saharan Africa to target money laundering issues beyond connections to
global narcotics or terror networks.
4. When do we take follow-up steps?
When targeted financial sanctions and travel bans are deployed, we
often start with an initial approach and promise follow-up measures.
But the follow-up steps rarely come, and, at key moments when
additional leverage could play a key role, we instead ease pressure.
We can look to South Sudan as a perfect example. After 18 months of
brutal and horrific violence, the U.S. implemented in mid-2015 only the
targeted sanctions, focused on mid-level commanders that could get
through the veto threats of Russia, China, Angola, and others on the
U.N. Security Council. Follow-up was promised. Yet even after the delay
and one obstacle after another in implementing the peace agreement,
with further violence and destruction of the country, the
administration has found one reason after another not to act. Earlier
this year, Enough saw strong interest from the administration in acting
and was pleased to provide the results of investigations by The Sentry,
including information that identified specific targets for action.
Instead of acting to demonstrate the need for the parties to focus
seriously on implementing the peace agreement, the administration has
eased off, implying that any further pressure could cause further
destabilization. The same approach marked our response to the elections
in the Central African Republic, where pressure to ensure
accountability and good governance eased following the recent
elections.
Yet at key moments in other negotiations and processes, the U.S.
has been successful when it was willing to take a strong sanctions step
to show resolve and seriousness. Days before or after at least three
key junctures in the Iran nuclear negotiation process, including in
February 2014 when the first real talks began, the United States showed
its resolve by taking strong new sanctions actions. Press releases from
Treasury said clearly we believed that more accountability was
necessary to reach the desired negotiated end. That same resolve and
commitment to accountability is necessary in Africa as well.
5. How do we enforce?
Secretary Lew noted in his recent speech that powerful sanctions
also ``rely on enforcement officers to investigate violations and levy
penalties for significant wrongdoing.'' Indeed, in order to be
effective, sanctions cannot amount to empty rhetoric and messages. In
sub-Saharan Africa programs, unfortunately that has been the norm.
In the last five years, there have been few enforcement actions
taken by OFAC implementing programs related to sub-Saharan Africa, and
almost no enforcement actions taken by the U.N. Security Council or
U.N. member states. What we do see are enforcement actions focused
principally on other sanctions programs, particularly Iran, having an
impact in sub-Saharan Africa. Sudan, in particular, is now preoccupied
with the removal of sanctions because of the shock its banking sector
experienced as a result of the mega-settlement against BNP Paribas,
which included Sudan-related violations but, like other cases against
big banks, was principally focused on Iran. The U.S. Department of the
Treasury took an important step this past February, by acting against
Barclay's Bank for failing to take necessary due diligence when
implementing Zimbabwe sanctions. We need to ensure that all of the
sanctions programs are more consistently enforced.
Enforcement is necessary because, even if we are missing out on the
most important targets, violations occur. For example, two of the
sanctioned mid-level South Sudanese commanders maintained U.S. dollar-
denominated accounts at Kenya Commercial Bank and traveled openly to
major international hotels in the region for months after being
sanctioned, with little to no action taken.
Enforcing sanctions properly not only means ensuring that both U.S.
and foreign authorities are fulfilling their obligations. The State
Department and the Treasury Department often need to follow up with
outreach to foreign authorities and counterparts to support more
consistent enforcement. Our research indicates, for example, that the
Kenyan government does not appear to have taken the same public
measures to ensure implementation of U.N. sanctions on South Sudan by
its private sector as it has for other sanctions programs. Consistency
of capacity and political will is critical to proper enforcement.
6. How do we ensure that sanctions are treated as temporary measures,
and unintended consequences are mitigated?
Secretary Lew noted in his speech ``sanctions are not meant to dole
out punishment for past actions. They are forward-looking, intended to
keep illicit or dangerous conduct out of our system and create pressure
to change future behavior.'' Sanctions are meant to be temporary tools
that create a process to change behavior. In many cases, these measures
last for decades and become quasi-punitive measures. It can be nearly
impossible for targets to be removed from designations list, and clear
explanations of how they work and what their connection is to
underlying policy may be lacking. This provides sanctions targets with
less incentive to change than in a program where they can see a clear
improvement and tangible step if they take expected actions.
When sanctions are treated or viewed as replacements for punitive
criminal measures, it can undermine the message of sanctions and the
long-term beneficial impacts while allowing the targets of sanctions to
generate propaganda that benefits their image. Just weeks after
Barclay's Bank received the aforementioned penalty, the bank announced
it would close all of its African operations because the risk was too
great. To be sure, the most important factor Barclay's Bank cited for
this was the risky and corrupt business environment that exists in too
many countries on the continent. But the potential for ``over-
compliance'' approaches by businesses for which it is simply easier to
cut off whole countries or regions, rather than manage compliance with
sanctions against a few dozen individuals, is substantial.
My portfolio at Treasury included the Cote d'Ivoire sanctions, and
I once received a call from a compliance officer who proudly told me
that his company was no longer doing business in the country. At the
time, there were three people designated. In the entire country. When I
replied that the company's action may have been unnecessary and that
there were more people in Chicago on the sanctions list than in Cote
d'Ivoire, there was an uncomfortable silence.
When sanctions measures are expected from the outset to last for
many years and are not properly understood, they can feel like more
comprehensive types of measures. Regimes from Sudan to Zimbabwe have
blamed sanctions for all manner of economic problems, many of which
have nothing to do with sanctions at all but instead result from the
authoritarian leaders within these regimes and the catastrophic
economic decisions that they have made. But when we fail to explain how
the sanctions work and show that they can evolve and be nimble over
time, rather than become permanent forms of punishment, we give the
likes of Bashir and Mugabe easy wins.
answering these questions with a modernized sanctions approach
These six questions are relatively straightforward. We answer them
clearly and plainly in other contexts, but not in sub-Saharan Africa.
The simple fact is that we can do so much to modernize our sanctions
approach for greater impact. But we need to choose sanctions and other
financial pressures that will have the greatest economic impact on the
particular networks in the area we're targeting. We need to look beyond
the pressure measures to the broader foreign policy goals and
diplomatic engagement that promote good governance. And we must do more
to mitigate different types of unintended consequences.
First and foremost, we must focus on using the types of sanctions
and financial pressures that can make a direct economic impact on the
kleptocratic networks of perpetrators, enablers, and facilitators, when
we have the information needed. These include making sure we:
Use more effective targeted designation language and identify
higher-level targets that result in sanctions designations with
financial impact.
Consider the applicability of language used in the recent Libya
Executive Order--``actions that may lead to or result in the
misappropriation of state assets of Libya'' or ``threatening or
coercing Libyan state financial institutions or the Libyan
National Oil Company''--for countries like Congo and South
Sudan, where leaders and their networks routinely engage in
contract or procurement fraud and the outright theft of funds.
Our Sentry investigations in both of these countries show these
patterns and the types of activities and accounts involved, and
we intend to continue to provide this information to relevant
authorities. It is time for action to be taken that would
finally impose a cost on this behavior that have enabled
officials to divert billions of dollars across the region with
essentially no consequences. Even without language like that in
the Libya Executive Order, the United States must focus on
higher-level targets who have tangible financial assets and
decision-making authority. This should include the key leaders
in South Sudan and the elites surrounding Congolese President
Joseph Kabila. This is why we strongly support S. Res 479,
introduced by Senators Markey, Durbin, and Murphy, which calls
for targeted sanctions on President Kabila's inner circle in
concert with efforts to see elections held as constitutionally
mandated.
Empower Treasury and State officials to turn up the pressure on
banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions to
know their customers and stop turning a blind eye to doing
business with kleptocratic regimes on the continent.
Seriously consider the potential ways to apply secondary sanctions.
In the Iran context, the use of secondary sanctions, which in
essence allows enforcement of certain U.S. sanctions against
non-U.S. persons, proved quite impactful. Secretary Lew used
strong words of caution about future deployment of secondary
sanctions, but Treasury and State may be able to achieve the
same goals simply by raising these concerns with banks in
Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa. Identifying the problematic
transactions or accounts will likely be sufficient, but we need
to actually do it. For a country like Sudan, which has
developed a sophisticated banking network to counter long-term
U.S. sanctions, we believe limited use of secondary sanctions
would be appropriate.
Identify countries where the sectoral sanctions approach that was
developed for Russia/Ukraine and expanded for North Korea could
work. For example, as South Sudan turns to develop the mining
sector as a new source of revenue, sectoral measures could be
considered in the future if necessary to ensure that new
investments are free from corruption and licensing fraud. The
officials responsible for the development of this sector raise
concerns about the potential for misuse, based on information
in previous U.N., African Union, and other reports... Use of
sectoral sanctions could provide a powerful mechanism to ensure
that new investments are undertaken in a limited manner and
cannot be misused.
Push FinCEN to devote resources to evaluating how its authorities
could impact sub-Saharan Africa beyond drugs and terror. In
both South Sudan and Congo, there are strong opportunities for
FinCEN to use its power to issue advisories and conduct
investigations through Section 314 of the U.S.A. Patriot Act to
learn more and identify the key money laundering nodes. Once
identified, FinCEN should follow up and use Section 311, and
can look to one of the five special measures that provision
includes short of primary laundering concern designation. The
other four special measures would require greater due diligence
and information-sharing among financial institutions and law
enforcement. Greater information-sharing would enable FinCEN
and other financial intelligence units around the world to
develop more specific typologies and analyses that can better
target the way these officials launder the proceeds of
corruption, or use natural resource sectors such as gold and
oil to launder funds. These special measures may enable the
development of information critical to law enforcement for use
in overseas corruption investigations and prosecutions.
FinCEN's work over many years related to the way narco-
traffickers, oligarchs, and others who launder money through
real estate led to an important step last January through a
Geographic Targeting Order focused on properties purchased in
New York and Miami. This kind of investigation and analysis can
lead to similar strong steps related to money laundering out of
sub-Saharan Africa, particularly from South Sudan and Congo.
Promote financial and private sector transparency. The Burma
Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements have served as
one of the most innovative measures with sanctions in recent
years. In exchange for generally licensing new investment in
Burma, Treasury required those investing above certain levels
in Burma to report publicly on their activities, including
their steps to address human rights and environmental concerns,
as well as their engagement with potentially corrupt officials.
This type of reporting model has proved quite effective, with
both advocates and the private sector recognizing the benefit
of publicly available reporting on a government website as a
way of sharing experience and avoiding suspicion. The model
could be greatly expanded within the sub-Saharan context. These
measures could not only be implemented in conjunction with
general licensing that allows for new activity, but also be
adapted to serve as a replacement for potentially sensitive
sectoral sanctions. For example, this type of reporting
requirement could likely be used within existing sanctions
authorities on Congo, specifically in connection with new
investment in the natural resources sector, as a way of
ensuring that there are no concerns with illicit trade.
Swiftly pass the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
This legislation, which has bipartisan support in both the
House and the Senate will bolster the U.S. government's
infrastructure to take action against those who commit human
rights abuses or are complicit in acts corruption. There is no
reason that this bi-partisan and bi-cameral legislation cannot
pass Congress before the summer recess.
Allocate substantial new resources from Congress to the agencies
most responsible for investigating and enforcing U.S. sanctions
regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to advance these and
other tools, Treasury needs the new Congress to provide
financial allocations across the board, with clear restrictions
to ensure new full-time employees focus on sub-Saharan Africa.
Congress should use the appropriations process to ensure that
these offices have increased resources, and can use report
language to send a message to Treasury that this region of the
world is a critical part of its efforts. For OFAC, this would
include new resources for global targeting, enforcement,
licensing, and for personnel to develop stronger collaboration
with FinCEN and other elements of Treasury. FinCEN, too, should
receive new resources for its office of special measures, as
well as its global liaison and intelligence units. Finally,
additional staff focused on Africa should be added within the
coordinating Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes
to ensure sufficient senior level attention. Skeptics on the
use of sanctions in Africa point to the bandwidth problem,
which can and should be addressed with more resources.
Most observers, including Secretary Lew, have emphasized how much
more effective sanctions are when they are multilateral. This is
undoubtedly true in the end, but it rarely exists at the beginning. The
broad coalition the United States assembled over years of outreach and
pressure related to Iran proved essential to forcing Iran to the
negotiating table. But nothing like that coalition existed in the years
before. It took tremendous commitment and action from multiple
presidential administrations and congressional sessions to achieve this
outcome.
We are fully aware of the panoply of U.S. security concerns and
interests, and we are sanguine about where sub-Saharan Africa tends to
rank. The point, however, is that while our sanctions approach to the
region need not rise to the level of Iran in order to be effective, it
still needs to rise. So we must be determined and committed and, even
where it is difficult, we must deliver a strong message to our partners
and seek to build coalitions over the long-term through leadership.
Second, for these sanctions and financial pressures to be
successful, a range of steps can be taken to develop the broader set of
tools that complement them:
Build on the commitments made to the recent U.K. Anti-Corruption
Summit. Last month in London, a number of countries committed
to measures that would expand beneficial ownership due
diligence requirements, enhance public access to business
registries, and counter corruption. Enabling broader access to
information on companies can enhance intelligence-gathering for
the U.S. government and non-governmental watchdogs, as well as
enable banks to more publicly demonstrate the steps they are
taking to conduct due diligence. The United States should also
incorporate into diplomatic messaging the need for progress on
the commitments made by countries like Kenya and South Africa.
Enhance the responsible business agenda. The Obama administration's
National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct could mark
an important addition to the broader policy landscape. With a
National Action Plan that emphasizes the need for stronger
human rights due diligence by business, including banks,
through engagement and risk mitigation, the private sector may
be able to take steps that complement the goal of sanctions
well.
Focus on stronger implementation from the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative and other transparency, development,
and quasi-regulatory bodies. Transparency and accountability,
including through the Open Government Partnership, Open
Contracting Partnership, EITI, and even steps like Sustainable
Development Goal 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions)
can deliver important progress on good governance that
integrates well with the aims of effective sanctions.
Encourage civil society and media protection, including stronger
promotion of the World Bank's Global Partnership for Social
Accountability, which provides for capacity building for these
critical components of society working against grand
corruption.
Third and finally, the U.S. government must always look to guard
against unintended consequences. Sanctions measures can result in harm,
and we cannot entirely shy away from them. But the administration can
take at least the following measures:
Issue strong messages on de-risking. There have been no magic wands
to balance derisking with financial inclusion in any context in
which it has emerged; the issues are too complex and multi-
layered for easy approaches, as the Barclay's Bank example
demonstrated. One measure that can have a positive impact as a
first step is clear messaging on the focal areas of risk, and
where engagement would be encouraged. Too often, the U.S.
government simply fails to clearly and thoroughly explain what
the sanctions are, and are not, for fear of over-simplifying or
encouraging business it does not want to encourage. Where that
vacuum exists, propaganda from the targets will usually fill in
the gaps with misinformation.
Where this messaging is unsuccessful, Treasury should
investigate further the potential of ``non-enforcement''
approaches for banking services related to certain categories
of transactions, such as those for international and non-
governmental organizations. We should always remember, however,
that most of these countries remain very risky jurisdictions
for financial institutions, with limited reward in terms of
scale of the markets.
Even if all sanctions were removed on sub-Saharan Africa
overnight, this would still be the case, so until the market is
a safer and less corrupt place to do business, there is only so
much that the United States can, or arguably should, do.
Clarify sanctions targeting. One of the most difficult areas for
the private sector to manage is understanding the extent of a
target's network. Because the Treasury Department considers any
entity that is 50 percent owned or controlled by a sanctioned
entity to also be sanctioned, even if not specifically named as
such, compliance can be daunting if information provided is not
complete and updated. This challenge is particularly acute for
Sudan, where the comprehensive blocking of the government of
Sudan means any entity owned or controlled by the Omar al-
Bashir regime is considered sanctioned. Yet the last public
additions to the list happened more than nine years ago, with
only a few removals since that time. Clear information about
which parties are and are not subject to sanctions designations
can help mitigate many unintended and unnecessary consequences
for sanctions.
Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, members of the subcommittee,
sanctions are a critical component to our foreign policy toolbox in
many contexts, but thus far they have not been used to their full
potential with sub-Saharan Africa. They can play an even more critical
role in shaping the future of the U.S. response to violent
kleptocracies, conflicts, and other crises on the continent. But our
approach needs to change if we are to use these tools most effectively.